2018 IL App (1st) 170874 & 171011

Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 

Opinion filed June 27, 2018 

Third Division

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

FRANK J. SCARPELLI, JR., and MARGARET )

SCARPELLI, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

__________________________________________) 

ANNE-MARIE POINCELET, in Her Individual ) 

Capacity, as Beneficiary of the Pamela J. Poincelet ) 

Trust No. 1 and the Pamela J. Poincelet Irrevocable ) 

Trust No. 1, and as Trustee of the Pamela J. ) 

Poincelet Trust No. 1 and the Pamela J. Poincelet ) 

IrrevocableTrust No. 1, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) 

 ) 

FRANK J. SCARPELLI, JR., in His Individual ) 

Capacity and as Former Trustee of the Pamela J. ) 

Poincelet Trust No. 1 and the Pamela J. Poincelet ) 

Irrevocable Trust No. 1, and MARGARET O. ) 

SCARPELLI, in Her Individual Capacity, ) 

 ) 

Defendants. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of Cook County. 

Nos. 2016 L 8816 & 2015 CH 15087 

(cons.) 

The Honorable 

Celia G. Gamrath, 

Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

2 

JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion. 

Justices Howse and Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Following the filing of individual and amended complaints by plaintiffs-appellants Frank 

J. Scarpelli Jr. and Margaret Scarpelli (plaintiffs or as named), defendant-appellee 

McDermott Will & Emery LLP (McDermott) filed a motion to dismiss them both pursuant to 

section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016)). The 

trial court granted defendant’s motion with prejudice, based on the attorney litigation 

privilege. Plaintiffs appeal, contending that the trial court should not have applied the 

attorney litigation privilege to this cause as it does not cover prelitigation conduct, does not 

apply to the type of conduct they allege occurred, and leaves them with no recourse.1 They 

ask that we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of their claims with prejudice and for other 

relief this court deems fair and just. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This cause involves multiple underlying cases principally involving Frank, his wife 

Margaret, Anne-Marie Poincelet, and McDermott, Anne-Marie’s attorney. However, the 

focus of the instant appeal revolves around intrusion upon seclusion claims brought 

separately by Frank and Margaret against McDermott and consolidated by our court. AnneMarie is not a party to this appeal.

 1

For the record, Frank and Margaret, each represented by different counsel, filed separate opening 

briefs on appeal. These briefs, however, are essentially the same, almost word-for-word in fact, and assert 

the same facts and issues for our review. Additionally, we note that Margaret filed a reply brief in 

response to defendant’s appellee brief. Frank moved our court to join in Margaret’s reply brief, and we 

granted his motion. 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

3 

¶ 4 Frank and Anne-Marie are cousins. Their extended family developed several businesses, 

including many property companies and apartment complexes, with their principal place of 

business in Carpentersville, Illinois (Kane County). Frank worked for these family 

businesses. In 1994, Frank began helping Anne-Marie’s mother, his aunt Pamela Poincelet, 

with the management of her personal properties and financial affairs. Eventually, Pamela 

formed two trusts. She named Frank as trustee of both of them, and she named Anne-Marie 

as her beneficiary. In subsequent years, Pamela named Frank as her agent and gave him 

power of attorney over her health care as well as her property. Pamela died in 2011, leaving 

Anne-Marie as her heir. Frank became the executor of Pamela’s estate and, after her death, 

continued to act as trustee of her two trusts. 

¶ 5 In early 2015, Anne-Marie confronted Frank and Margaret about missing funds in 

Pamela’s accounts and trusts. Anne-Marie believed Frank and Margaret had misappropriated 

millions of dollars from them and used the proceeds for their personal benefit. The day after 

this confrontation, Frank was terminated from his employment at the family businesses. The 

locks in the offices were changed and Frank was not permitted to enter his office or the 

businesses’ premises, where he kept various documents regarding Margaret and their 

personal affairs. Anne-Marie hired McDermott to represent her in investigating and 

potentially pursuing litigation concerning Frank and Margaret’s alleged misappropriation.

Frank hired attorney James Tunick to represent him.2

¶ 6 In March 2015, McDermott contacted Tunick to set up a meeting between Frank, 

Margaret, and Anne-Marie to discuss the missing money and attempt to settle the matter. A 

meeting was arranged for March 19, 2015, at McDermott’s office. On that day, Frank and 

 2

There is no indication in the record that Margaret, at this point, hired any attorney to 

represent her regarding Anne-Marie’s misappropriation allegations.
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

4 

Margaret, along with Tunick, arrived at McDermott’s building. According to Frank and 

Margaret’s complaints, they were met by a man and escorted to a small room, where they 

met another man who was introduced to them as an “ex-FBI agent.” While in this room with 

the door closed, the “ex-FBI agent” frisked Frank by patting him down and, with Margaret’s 

permission, searched her purse. The men then escorted Frank, Margaret, and Tunick into a 

large conference room, where several McDermott attorneys were waiting for them. On the 

conference room table were stacks of documents, including drafts of deeds with legal 

descriptions of every property and home Frank and Margaret owned, trust papers, letters of 

direction, and assignments listing Frank and Margaret’s banking institutions and bank 

account numbers. 

¶ 7 During the meeting, Frank and Margaret were presented with a document drafted by 

McDermott, titled “Tolling & Asset Management Agreement” (Asset Agreement). This

document stated that Frank and Margaret had the benefit of counsel of their choice and had 

been offered the opportunity to review the agreement with him, that Anne-Marie had certain 

potential legal claims against them for diversion or dilution of funds, that Frank and Margaret 

met with forensic accountants and admitted wrongdoing, and that the parties were exploring 

the possibility of settling these potential claims following a full accounting. The Asset 

Agreement prescribed that Frank and Margaret agreed not to “distribute, expend, or transfer 

any real or personal property” until all such claims were resolved to Anne-Marie’s 

satisfaction. To effectuate this, the Asset Agreement provided that Frank and Margaret would 

put many of their assets, cash, and real property into two trusts: the Frank Scarpelli 2015 

Special Trust, with Frank and Tunick as cotrustees, and the Margaret Scarpelli 2015 Special 

Trust, with Margaret and Tunick as cotrustees. It further provided that Anne-Marie would 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

5 

exercise certain supervisory controls over these trusts, including the power to veto any sale, 

exchange, or distribution of any trust asset; the power to appoint trustees; and the power to 

remove trustees without cause at any time. Finally, the Asset Agreement stated that Frank 

and Margaret agreed to pay all of Anne-Marie’s costs in the matter, including attorney fees, 

investigative fees, and forensic accountant fees. Frank and Margaret were also given a copy 

of a document, titled “Verified Complaint,” and told that someone from McDermott was 

waiting at the courthouse with instructions to file it if they did not immediately sign the 

documents in the conference room. With Tunick present, both Frank and Margaret signed all 

the documents presented to them that day, including the Asset Agreement. 

¶ 8 Several months later, in October 2015, Anne-Marie, individually and as beneficiary and 

trustee of Pamela’s trusts, filed a cause of action in the circuit court of Cook County against 

Frank and Margaret for breach of the Asset Agreement and for theft. McDermott represented 

Anne-Marie in the cause. 

¶ 9 In response, in November 2015, Margaret filed a separate cause of action in the circuit 

court of Kane County against Anne-Marie and McDermott. In December 2015, Frank did the 

same, filing a substantially similar (but separate) cause of action in that same court against 

Anne-Marie and McDermott. Count I of their complaints was asserted against Anne-Marie 

only and sought declaratory judgment that the documents from the March 19 meeting were 

invalid and unenforceable because Frank and Margaret signed them under duress. Count II of 

their complaints, directed at both Anne-Marie and McDermott, alleged conversion/trespass to 

chattels and claimed that Anne-Marie “and/or someone acting on her behalf” obtained their 

“private and/or confidential information” and that McDermott maintained possession and 

exercised unauthorized control over it. And, count III of their complaints, also directed 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

6 

against both Anne-Marie and McDermott, alleged intrusion upon seclusion and claimed that 

Anne-Marie and McDermott intentionally intruded upon their private affairs and 

misappropriated this information to compel them to sign the March 19 documents. 

¶ 10 Anne-Marie and McDermott moved the circuit court of Kane County to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ causes of action or to transfer them to Cook County, where Anne-Marie’s claim 

against plaintiffs was pending. In response, Margaret voluntarily agreed to transfer count I 

(declaratory judgment as against Anne-Marie only) of her complaint to the circuit court of 

Cook County, and voluntarily dismissed count II (conversion/trespass as against Anne-Marie 

and McDermott) of her complaint with prejudice, leaving, as to McDermott, only Count III 

(intrusion upon seclusion) in Kane County. Eventually, the circuit court of Kane County 

transferred both plaintiffs’ causes in their entirety to Cook County, where they were 

consolidated with Anne-Marie’s initial cause. 

¶ 11 McDermott moved to dismiss both Frank’s and Margaret’s count III of intrusion upon 

seclusion as against it.3

 Following argument—which centered extensively around the case of 

O’Callaghan v. Satherlie, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, and the attorney litigation privilege—

the trial court granted McDermott’s motion, with prejudice. The trial court found several 

points of O’Callaghan critical to the instant cause, including its interpretation that the 

attorney litigation privilege is “absolute,” irrespective of motive, and that “no liability will 

attach even at the expense of an uncompensated harm” to a plaintiff. The trial court further 

 3

There was much motion practice in this cause, as plaintiffs continued throughout 

litigation to file individually, rather than join their cases. For example, the operative 

complaints involved herein were Margaret’s second amended complaint (which saw her 

dismiss count II against McDermott but retain count III against it) and Frank’s third amended 

complaint (which retained both counts II and III against McDermott). As issues are not raised 

on appeal in this respect, we have simplified this to merely provide a background context for 

the procedural posture of this cause. 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

7 

declared that O’Callaghan “makes it clear” that both attorney conduct and communications 

are covered, so long as they “relate to proposed or pending litigation” and are “in furtherance 

of representation.” Then, in applying O’Callaghan to the instant cause, the trial court 

declared that, from the pleadings, it was “clear that any conduct or actions that the law firm 

of McDermott took was in furtherance of representation of Anne-Marie Poincelet and it was 

in connection with proposed or imminently pending litigation,” with any doubts as to this 

finding “to be resolved in favor of finding that the privilege applies.” Accordingly, the trial 

court dismissed plaintiffs’ counts against McDermott for intrusion upon seclusion pursuant to 

the “absolute attorney litigation privilege.”4

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing their intrusion upon 

seclusion claims as against McDermott.5 Essentially, plaintiffs claim that the trial court 

misinterpreted and misapplied the attorney litigation privilege by concluding that it covers 

prelitigation conduct in general, by finding that it applied to the type of conduct alleged in 

this cause specifically, and by upholding its determination even though plaintiffs are left with 

 4

Again, we simplify the motion practice in this cause, as no issues are raised concerning 

it. The trial court’s order, upon the parties’ agreement, declared (and clarified) that plaintiffs’ 

counts against McDermott were dismissed with prejudice “in their entirety.” Following this 

decision, Margaret went on to file a third amended complaint as against Anne-Marie only for 

declaratory judgment and intrusion upon seclusion (her original counts I and III). Likewise, 

Frank filed a fourth amended complaint, officially dismissing his original count II of 

conversion against McDermott, but retaining counts against Anne-Marie. Plaintiffs’ litigation 

as against Anne-Marie and Anne-Marie’s litigation against plaintiffs are not part of the 

instant appeal.

5

With plaintiffs having voluntarily dismissed their claims for conversion/trespass to 

chattels as against McDermott, and with all their remaining counts now directed against 

Anne-Marie only, plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claims as against McDermott are, 

pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the only ones we are called to review on appeal at this 

time. 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

8 

no recourse. Based upon our review of the record, as well as the law regarding the attorney 

litigation privilege and, particularly, O’Callaghan, we disagree.

¶ 14 We note for the record that the parties agree as to the applicable standard of review.

Briefly, the trial court’s dismissal was premised on McDermott’s section 2-615 motion. Such 

motions attack the legal sufficiency of the complaint by alleging defects on its face, and upon 

their grant, we are to examine the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pled facts. See In re Estate of Powell, 2014 IL 115997, 

¶ 12; Bunting v. Progressive Corp., 348 Ill. App. 3d 575, 580 (2004). However, if these are 

not sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, then dismissal of 

the cause is appropriate. Powell, 2014 IL 115997, ¶ 12 (“a court cannot accept as true mere 

conclusions unsupported by specific facts” and dismissal is proper where no set of facts, as 

apparent from the pleadings, can be proven that would entitle the plaintiff to recover). Our 

review follows a de novo standard. Powell, 2014 IL 115997, ¶ 12 (appeal from dismissals 

pursuant to section 2-615 are reviewed de novo). Additionally, we are also to use de novo 

review when examining whether the attorney litigation privilege applies in a cause. Popp v. 

O’Neil, 313 Ill. App. 3d 638, 642 (2000) (this is a question of law). 

¶ 15 We find that the trial court properly dismissed Frank’s and Margaret’s intrusion upon 

seclusion claims pursuant to McDermott’s section 2-615 motion. 

¶ 16 Undeniably, the instant cause centers on the attorney litigation privilege, its applicability 

to the facts herein, and O’Callaghan. To begin, and short of presenting a dissertation on its 

historical development, it suffices here to say that the attorney litigation privilege is well 

established, and very much alive, in our law. It derives from section 586 of the Restatement 

(Second) of Torts, which states: 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

9 

 “An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter 

concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, 

or in the institution of, or during the course and as part of, a judicial proceeding in 

which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.” 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977). 

¶ 17 There are many legal principles at play here. At its foundation, the privilege is meant to 

provide attorneys with “the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. App. 3d 686, 701-02 

(2000). It is also intended to further attorneys’ need to fully and fearlessly communicate with 

their clients (Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642-43), as well as to promote the free flow of truthful 

information to courts (Edelman, Combs & Latturner v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 

3d 156, 165-66 (2003)). Ultimately, our courts have consistently made clear that “[a]n 

attorney must be at liberty to candidly and zealously represent his client in communications 

to potential opposing parties in litigation or other proceedings without the specter of civil 

liability for his statements clouding his efforts.” Atkinson v. Affronti, 369 Ill. App. 3d 828, 

833 (2006). 

¶ 18 Operationally, the litigation privilege affords an attorney complete immunity with respect 

to the communications he makes. Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642 (it affords complete 

immunity); accord Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 832 (it is an absolute privilege). This is true 

regardless of the attorney’s motives in making that communication and irrespective of the 

attorney’s knowledge of the falsity of it or the unreasonableness of his conduct. See Popp, 

313 Ill. App. 3d at 642; accord Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 834; see also Johnson v. Johnson 

& Bell, Ltd., 2014 IL App (1st) 122677, ¶ 15. The privilege applies to communications made 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

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before and during litigation (see Edelman, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 165), as well as after litigation 

(see Stein v. Krislov, 2013 IL App (1st) 113806, ¶ 34). And, liability will not attach even at 

the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff. Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 833. 

¶ 19 The only requirement for the application of the attorney litigation privilege is that the 

communication must pertain to proposed or pending litigation. See Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d 

at 832, 834, and Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642 (both citing Golden v. Mullen, 295 Ill. App. 3d 

865, 870 (1997)). This is known as the “pertinency requirement.” However, our courts have 

made clear that this requirement is not strictly applied. Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 834; 

accord Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642; see also Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 870. In fact, the 

privilege will nonetheless protect an attorney even when the communication is not confined 

to specific issues related to the litigation. Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 834; accord Popp, 313 

Ill. App. 3d at 642. As long as it relates to the litigation and is in furtherance of 

representation, the privilege applies. Kurczaba, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 706. Ultimately, should 

any doubt arise as to whether the pertinency requirement is met, it must be resolved in favor 

of a finding of pertinency. Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 832 (citing Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d 

at 870); accord Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642 (citing Skopp v. First Federal Savings, 189 Ill. 

App. 3d 440, 448 (1989)). 

¶ 20 Through the years, as our jurisprudence has developed and as the methods of legal 

representation have modernized, the attorney litigation privilege has also progressed. In other 

words, although the privilege began as merely protection for an attorney from defamation 

claims by his client regarding communications pursuant to the Restatement (Second), it has 

been extended widely to other arenas and situations, including who receives the 

communication and when it is made. For example (and this is by no means meant to be a 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

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complete anthology), it has been extended to out-of-court communications between opposing 

counsel, out-of-court communications between attorney and client related to pending 

litigation, out-of-court communications between attorneys representing different parties 

suing the same entities, statements made during quasi-judicial proceedings, communications 

necessarily preliminary to a quasi-judicial proceeding, out-of-court communications between 

an attorney and opposing parties in demand letters prior to litigation, and out-of-court 

communications between an attorney and a prospective client. Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 

832 (and cases cited therein); Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 643-44. Moreover, it has been 

extended to apply not simply when a defamation cause is brought against the attorney, but 

beyond to many types of causes of action where it could apply under the circumstances and 

in order to further the privilege’s purpose. See Thompson v. Frank, 313 Ill. App. 3d 661, 662 

(2000), and Johnson, 2014 IL App (1st) 122677, ¶ 17 (for example, allegations of intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, 

and invasion of privacy). 

¶ 21 This brings us to O’Callaghan. Decided recently, and by this very division of our court, 

O’Callaghan provided a comprehensive overview of the attorney litigation privilege, clearly 

reaffirmed its foundational and operational points, found it applicable to the circumstances 

presented, and extended its absolute protection in several ways. Although its facts are 

different, we find O’Callaghan to be directly on point to the instant cause and instructive 

with respect to the privilege’s widespread boundaries. 

¶ 22 In O’Callaghan, the owners of a condominium unit sued the attorney and firm 

representing the association for intentional infliction of emotional distress and strict liability 

for ultrahazardous activity. In an underlying complaint (which was eventually dismissed), 
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12 

they alleged that the association failed to properly remedy a ceiling leak, causing toxic black 

mold to infiltrate their unit. In their separate action against the association’s attorney and 

firm, the owners alleged that these defendants had, in the underlying action, failed to disclose 

an expert’s recommendations for remediating the mold, contrived a defense even though they 

knew there could be no meritorious defense, concealed information, prolonged litigation in 

several ways, refused to negotiate terms for inspection, and did not participate in settlement 

or mediation in good faith. They also alleged that the attorney and firm ordered reports to be 

falsely amended, directed inspectors to perform actions to spread the mold, and hired 

unlicensed roofing consultants to make inadequate repairs. Just as in the instant cause, the 

attorney and firm filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss the owners’ complaint, asserting the 

litigation privilege. And, just as in the instant cause, the trial court granted their motion. 

¶ 23 On appeal, we affirmed, finding that the attorney litigation privilege absolutely protected 

the attorney and firm from any liability to the owners, thereby barring the owners’ claims and 

meriting dismissal under section 2-615. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 33 (upon 

application of privilege, owners had no way to amend their complaint to survive dismissal).

After first reviewing the historical and foundational points of the privilege, as well as its 

public policy and basic tenets, we reaffirmed several points. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 

142152, ¶¶ 24-25. For example, we reiterated that an attorney’s motives are irrelevant and 

that no liability will attach even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff.

O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 25. We also reaffirmed the pertinency 

requirement as the privilege’s only linchpin, declaring that while communications must relate 

to proposed or pending litigation, this rule is not strictly applied and any doubt is resolved in 

favor of pertinency. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 25. 
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13 

¶ 24 With this basis, we next turned to several principles that, with the passage of time, we 

believed required clarification and expansion. We began by taking on the Restatement’s 

(Second) specific—and, in retrospect, limiting—references to defamation and 

communications. Historically, the privilege had been applied to attorneys’ communications 

and within the framework of defamation lawsuits brought against them because of these 

communications. Like the Atkinson and Popp courts before us, we recognized that as our 

legal world had progressed, so had the attorney litigation privilege—to different situations, 

different people, and different causes of action. 

¶ 25 Therefore, we first reiterated the timeframe the privilege covers; we reacknowledged that 

it applies to communications made before, during and after litigation. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 142152, ¶ 26. Next, we noted that other jurisdictions had already extended the 

privilege to claims other than defamation brought against attorneys. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 142152, ¶ 26. This only made sense, as the privilege “would be meaningless if a 

party could merely recast its cause of action to avoid the privilege’s effect.” O’Callaghan, 

2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 26. And significantly, in direct contradiction to the owners’ 

suggestion, we further found that the privilege extended beyond communications to include 

conduct performed within the practice of law, since attorneys typically do things—actions—

in addition to communications in order to secure justice for their clients. See O’Callaghan, 

2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 27. Accordingly, we not only extended the context of the 

applicable cause of action in which to apply the privilege, but we also extended what is 

covered. See O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 27 (because supreme court never 

adopted restatement in its entirety, appellate court could apply privilege outside context of 

only defamation as contained in restatement if Illinois policy would be furthered in doing so; 
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and, “[l]imiting the privilege to communications, as opposed to conduct, would undermine 

the policies behind the privilege” since there is “ ‘no mechanistic formula to define what is 

and what is not the practice of law’ ” (quoting Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of 

Chicago, 2012 IL 112040, ¶ 15)).

¶ 26 In applying all this to the facts of O’Callaghan, we found that the attorney and firm were 

absolutely protected pursuant to the litigation privilege from the allegations in the owners’ 

complaint. This was because all of the allegations—from the alleged improper 

communications (lying to the Association, ordering workers to remove mold-containing 

barriers and demanding that experts alter their opinions) to the alleged improper conduct 

(discovery violations, failing to disclose evidence, concealing evidence, contriving a badfaith defense, and failing to properly participate in settlement and mediation)—clearly 

pertained to the role of the attorney and firm as attorneys in the underlying action and were 

done in furtherance of representing their client. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, 

¶ 29. In other words, all the alleged improper communications and conduct revolved around 

the subject of the litigation. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 29. This directly 

rebutted any suggestion that the attorney and firm were not acting in furtherance of 

representing their client, which essentially saw them trying to mitigate their client’s damages, 

regardless of their diligence or whether their acts were entirely proper. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 142152, ¶ 31. Accordingly, we held that the trial court properly dismissed the 

owners’ complaint as the absolute attorney litigation privilege barred their claims.

O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 33. 

¶ 27 We find no reason to depart from O’Callaghan’s reasoning and, instead, find that it 

directly applies to the instant cause and renders the same result. McDermott was defending 
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15 

its client, Anne-Marie, against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs now contend that McDermott made the 

following improper communications and engaged in the following improper conduct: that 

McDermott (“and/or” Anne-Marie or “their agents”) intruded upon their affairs by opening, 

reviewing, and/or maintaining possession and/or control over their personal mail, bank 

account information, emails, and medical records; hired investigators and forensic 

accountants to investigate their financial information; and used all this information to compel 

them to sign the March 19 documents. However, keeping in mind all the principles regarding 

the privilege we have discussed, we find that the privilege bars all of these claims. The 

alleged improprieties clearly pertained to the role of McDermott as the attorney in the 

litigation Anne-Marie was determining whether to pursue when she discovered millions of 

dollars missing from the two trusts her deceased mother had set up for her as the 

beneficiary—trusts managed directly by Frank, Margaret’s husband, as sole trustee.

McDermott’s conduct of obtaining plaintiffs’ information (which, by the way, plaintiffs have 

yet to note how it was even done, let alone whether it was somehow inappropriate, 

considering Frank kept this information in his desk drawer at work) was entirely done in 

furtherance of representing Anne-Marie. Indeed, McDermott called the March 19 meeting 

between Anne-Marie and plaintiffs, presented Anne-Marie’s allegations, showed the 

evidence, and sought to settle the matter—furthering Anne-Marie’s interest in limiting 

litigation and its associated costs, which would presumably be considerable here as we are 

dealing with the misappropriation of, again, millions of dollars. Pursuant to the privilege, it

does not matter what the motives were behind McDermott’s conduct or the unreasonableness 

of its actions in calling and conducting the meeting. And, Anne-Marie’s underlying 

proceeding against plaintiffs in the circuit court of Cook County, wherein she was 
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16 

represented by McDermott, rebuts any suggestion that McDermott was not acting in 

furtherance of her interest, regardless of whether its acts were entirely proper. To the 

contrary, the absolute attorney litigation privilege bars plaintiffs’ claims here warranting, as 

the trial court properly found, the dismissal of their complaint. 

¶ 28 Having so concluded, there is little to address with respect to plaintiffs’ arguments on 

appeal. As we noted, plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s dismissal of their complaints for 

intrusion upon seclusion against McDermott must be reversed because the court 

misinterpreted and misapplied the attorney litigation privilege in three ways: by concluding 

that it covers prelitigation conduct in general, by finding that it applied to McDermott’s 

conduct specifically, and by upholding its determination even though they are left with no 

recourse. However, in light of our thorough analysis, it quickly becomes evident that none of 

these holds any merit.

¶ 29 With respect to plaintiffs’ assertion regarding prelitigation conduct, we note that it 

attempts to target two concepts. First, plaintiffs argue that the privilege does not cover 

anything that occurs in the prelitigation context. They claim that none of the conduct at issue 

in O’Callaghan took place prior to a lawsuit being filed, while all of McDermott’s alleged 

conduct took place prior to a lawsuit being filed and, thus, the privilege cannot apply.

Plaintiffs cite the 10 months between the time Frank was locked out of his office at the 

family business and Anne-Marie’s filing of her lawsuit, during which time the March 19 

meeting took place. This argument clearly fails, and the citation to dates and length of time 

between Anne-Marie’s discovery of misappropriate and the filing of her lawsuit is a red

herring. Even assuming that all the conduct at issue in O’Callaghan took place after litigation 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

17 

had begun,6 this does not mean that the attorney litigation privilege does not apply. We have 

already noted that the facts of O’Callaghan are somewhat different than those of the instant 

cause. But, we have also already stated that this does not change the privilege’s applicability.

The point is, regardless of the facts presented therein, O’Callaghan clearly and specifically 

reaffirmed that the litigation privilege “applies to communications made before, during

[citation], and after litigation [citation].” O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 26. 

Were this not enough, both Popp and Atkinson specifically stand for the very proposition that 

prelitigation communication is wholly covered by this privilege. Popp applied it between an 

attorney and a potential client during preliminary legal consultations—even though the 

attorney never represented the potential client and no litigation on the potential client’s 

behalf ever took place. Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 643 (“[e]ven during an initial consultation, 

the attorney must be able to openly and honestly discuss the potential client’s situation in 

order to determine the desirability of initiating legal proceedings”). And, Atkinson reaffirmed 

that the privilege has solidly been extended to what may occur before any possible litigation 

is undertaken, if ever. Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 832 (i.e., the privilege applies to 

communications in demand letters between attorneys and opposing parties prior to litigation).

Again, the only requirement is that the statements are pertinent to a possible future legal 

proceeding. Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 643. We have already shown that this requirement has 

been met in the instant cause. 

 6

We say “assuming” because, although the majority of the allegations in O’Callaghan

clearly took place after litigation commenced (i.e., discovery violations, failing to disclose 

evidence, concealing evidence, contriving a bad-faith defense, etc.), it is not entirely clear 

that some of them may have indeed occurred prior to litigation (i.e., ordering workers to 

remove barriers, lying to the association, insufficiently remediating the mold). 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

18 

¶ 30 The second portion of plaintiffs’ assertion is that the privilege cannot apply here because 

it covers only communications and not conduct. They state that none of the cases discussing 

the applicability of the privilege in a prelitigation context support the conclusion that an 

attorney’s conduct is also covered. This is inherently incorrect. Yes, the restatement refers to 

communications as being covered under the privilege. But, we have already discussed at 

length the evolution of the privilege, apart and beyond the Restatement (Second), to cover 

conduct as well. We made this abundantly clear in O’Callaghan where we reasoned that, 

“[b]ecause conduct may be performed in the practice of law, counsel may engage in conduct 

to secure justice for their clients,” and, accordingly, “[l]imiting the privilege to 

communications, as opposed to conduct, would undermine the policies behind the privilege.” 

O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 27. We further noted therein that, were there to be 

any worries, the pertinency requirement would still apply, just as it does with 

communications, to prevent attorneys from shielding unrelated misconduct from liability.

O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 27. Again, were this not enough, there is further 

legal support for the coverage of conduct apart from, and beyond, O’Callaghan. In the only 

cases since that one that have returned to address the litigation privilege, both reaffirmed that 

the privilege immunizes “statements and conduct” (Doe v. Williams McCarthy, LLP, 2017 IL 

App (2d) 160860, ¶ 19), and that it applies to actions taken by an attorney in connection with 

potential litigation just as it does to communications (Gorman-Dahm v. BMO Harris Bank, 

N.A., 2018 IL App (2d) 170082, ¶¶ 29, 35). 

¶ 31 We further find no merit in plaintiffs’ next assertion—namely, that the litigation privilege 

does not cover McDermott’s specific conduct in this cause. Plaintiffs claim that, unlike in 

O’Callaghan, neither of them ever gave anyone permission to give McDermott the 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

19 

information, and McDermott did not obtain it through the ordinary practice of law; therefore, 

the conduct was outside the scope of the privilege. However, not only do plaintiffs fail to cite 

any case law for such an assertion, but O’Callaghan and the cases upon which it is based 

make clear that this is unimportant in any regard. Again, an attorney’s motives are irrelevant 

with respect to the applicability of the privilege, as is the reasonableness or unreasonableness 

of his conduct. See O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶¶ 25, 30 (“motives and 

diligence before taking the challenged actions are irrelevant for purposes of the litigation 

privilege”) (citing Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642, and Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 834); see 

also Johnson, 2014 IL App (1st) 122667, ¶ 15. McDermott’s purpose in presenting the 

information to plaintiffs was to assist Anne-Marie in bringing the matter of the 

misappropriation of her mother’s trusts, controlled exclusively by Frank, to some sort of 

settlement in an effort to avoid litigation. McDermott conveyed this to attorney Tunick 

(representing Frank), Tunick reconveyed this to Frank and Margaret, and plaintiffs chose to 

attend that meeting and sign the March 19 documents. This all clearly pertained to proposed 

or potential litigation Anne-Marie was considering to undertake in relation to her missing 

money, which is the main, and only, benchmark for the application of the privilege. See 

Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 832, 834, and Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 642 (both citing Golden, 

295 Ill. App. 3d at 870). And, were this even a question, we would resolve any doubt in favor 

of a finding that the pertinency requirement was met. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 

142152, ¶ 25. 

¶ 32 Finally, there likewise is no support for plaintiffs’ assertion that the litigation privilege 

should not apply because it leaves them with no recourse. Plaintiffs claim that there is no 

underlying proceeding, akin to the mold case in O’Callaghan, in which they could seek 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

20 

recourse against McDermott, and because McDermott’s conduct occurred outside the scope 

of any judicial proceeding, they have no way to seek redress for their injuries. However, we 

fail to see how such an assertion can stand. Significantly, O’Callaghan and its predecessors 

all make clear that the privilege applies even at the expense of uncompensated harm to a 

plaintiff. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 25; accord Atkinson, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 

833 (citing Golden, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 870, Weber v. Cueto, 290 Ill. App. 3d 936, 942 

(1991), and Libco Corp. v. Adams, 100 Ill. App. 3d 314, 317 (1981)). Additionally, 

O’Callaghan noted that there can be no civil cause of action for misconduct that occurred in 

prior litigation and, in rejecting the same recourse argument made by plaintiffs here, pointed 

out that parties should attempt to redress their injuries from such misconduct in judicial 

proceedings in the same litigation. O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶¶ 28, 31 

(“otherwise, litigation would never end”).7 The trial court in the instant cause noted the same 

principle, similarly rejecting any concern that neither plaintiff would have recourse if the 

privilege were applied. Because McDermott’s conduct directly related to proposed litigation 

and was in furtherance of the representation of its client, the privilege applied absolutely, 

regardless of this concern. At the same time, we note here that McDermott is still 

representing Anne-Marie in the underlying litigation against plaintiffs, a case that was 

consolidated with the instant ones, and plaintiffs have both specifically retained their 

intrusion upon seclusion claims against Anne-Marie, counts which are still alive in the circuit 

court of Cook County. Presumably, it is there where plaintiffs should assert, or should have 

asserted (by this time), any claim for redress for their injuries related to their intrusion upon 

 7

Significantly, Popp applied the privilege even though the attorney there was never 

involved in any litigation, where there most certainly was no “underlying” litigation. See 

Popp, 313 Ill. App. 3d 638. 
Nos. 1-17-0874 & 1-17-1011 (cons.) 

21 

seclusion claims. As in O’Callaghan, the method plaintiffs have pursued here is 

inappropriate. 

¶ 33 In sum, the attorney litigation privilege applies in the instant cause and absolutely bars 

plaintiffs’ claims for intrusion upon seclusion against McDermott. Accordingly, the trial 

court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint as against McDermott pursuant to section 2-

615 of the Code based on that privilege.8

¶ 34 CONCLUSION

¶ 35 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 36 Affirmed. 

 8

Having so found, we need not address any of the alternative grounds for dismissal 

proposed by McDermott, which include plaintiffs’ failure to sufficiently plead a valid 

intrusion upon seclusion claim, their failure to allege any of its required elements, and 

forfeiture.