### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs D ec em be r 8, 200 4
IN R E: W. B. IV Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Williamson County No. 41460 Al Nations, Judge

No. M2004- 00999-COA-R 3-P T - F iled April 29, 2005



### IN R E: D . D . , M . H. , W. B. IV Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Williamson County No. 27880 Al Nations, Judge

No. M2004- 01572-COA-R 3-P T - F iled April 29, 2005

I n a s i n gl e p roceeding , the juvenile court terminated the pa renta l rig hts of a mother to he r three children and the par ental rig hts of the fathe r of one of those children, ruling that they had abandoned th e c h il d r e n
. T h e mo th e r a n d th e f a th e r f il e d s e p ar a te ap p e a ls , w h ic h w e h a v e c o n s o li dated f or de c isi on . We re ve rs e be c aus e thepr oo f at tria l di d n ot rise t o th e lev el r e qu ir e d to e sta bli sh abandonme nt as define d by applicable statutes. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Reve rsed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J r, J.., j oined.
J udy A. Oxford, Fr anklin, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, V.H.
S h ar o n E

. G u f

f e e , F r a n k l i n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t , W

. B

. III

. C. Di ane C ros ier , Fran kl in , T enn ess ee, f or t he ap pel lee s, L . B. a nd K. B.M o t h e r a l s o h a d a n o l d e r b o y , w h o w a s i n t h e c u s t o d y o f h i s f a t h e r
. F a t h e r , W

. B. I I I , w a s n ot t h e f at h er of 1 ei t her of t he t wo other c hi l d ren who a re t he subject of t he p et i t i o n herei n, D

. D

. and M

. H

. , and t hey each had dif ferent f at h er s
. T h i s a ppea l i n v ol v es on l y M ot h er a n d t h e f at h er of t h e y ou n g es t c h i l d.

T he t rans cri p t of M s. M ust i n’ s t est i m o ny i d ent i f i es t hi s p ers o n a s B o b b i e So ngwo rt h. H o wever, a do cum ent 2 i nt rod uced i nt o evi d ence show s her l ast nam e as G o ngwer. -2- OP IN ION
I.
V

. H

. ( “ M o th e r ” ) w a s t h e m o t h e r o f t w o yo u n g c h i l d r e n , a g i r l , D

. D

. , ( b o r n 8 /4 / 9 5 ) a n d a b o y, M.H. (born 10/24/97). On J une 20, 2000, she g ave birth to another boy . The c hild was named a fter 1 his f ather

. I n this opinion we will r efe r to the child as W.B. IV and to his fathe r, W.B. I I I , as F ather

. Mother had a

long- term addiction to cra ck cocaine and fe are d that her c hildren would be taken aw ay from her . As a re sult, she was unwilling to turn to the De partment of Children’ s Services f or assistance

. Dr. Susan Campbell, a doctor at the medical c enter wher e W.B. IV was born, was sy mpathetic to Mother’ s conce rns and introdu ce d h er to Dia nn Mustin, a founder and member of Kade sh Ba

rnea Ministries, I ncorpor ated. M s. Mustin described the or g anization as “people who we rewanti ng to ke e p fa mil ie s tog e the r an d he lp y ou ng mothe rs so the y wo uld n’ t g e t c aug ht u p in the sy stem.”
Prior to and for some time after the birth of W.B. IV, Mother an d h er children lived in an apartment in Hermitag e with Father. He had a job and furnished the apa rtment and other

support for all of Mother’s children. After they g ot involved, Ms. Mustin and her friends in the org anization had fre quent contac t w ith Mother and attempted to a ssist her

. They would sometimes bring the childre n to their homes to g ive Mother a brea k. During the group’s early involvement with Mother and he r family , one of Ms. Mustin’s frie nds, Bobbie G ong wer , took “primary responsibility ” for

them. 2
Mo the r kne w that in or de r to ke e p he r c hil dr e n a nd take c are of the m, sh e ne e de d to g o in to a drug reha

bili t at ion prog ram. Ms. Mustin, Ms. Gongw er, and their friends ag ree d to help her. Mother enr olled in a prog ram, but appa re ntly did not complete it. After thr ee months in the reha bilitation program, Mother lost her apa rtment. Ms. Mustin an d her f riends then a

rrang ed for Mother and he r

c h il d r e n to s tay

a t a h o u s e inF r a n k li n o w n e d b y K a d e s h B ar n e a
. T h e c h il d r en fr eq u ently

stay ed with Ms. Gong wer on the wee kends. Sometime in 2001, Mother dec ided she wanted to try

to make it on her ow n and moved to an a partment in Na shville.
Whether it was the f

irst place she moved or not, which is not clear in the re cord, Mother g ot an apa rtment, probably

in the summer of 2001, at the J .C. Napier H omes, a public housing projec t in Nashville. Father testified that he provided furniture for that apartment, since Mother ha d none, a ndpr ov ide d oth e r s up po rt fo r the famil y . A lth ou g h th e e vid e nc e is n ot e nti re ly c le ar o n th is p oin t, a c c or din g to M oth e r’ s si ste r, F a the r l ive d w ithMo the r a nd the c hil dr e n a t N apie r H ome s f or so meSo m et i m es hi s b rother wo ul d t ake t he i t em s t o M o t her; som et i m es t he b rother wo ul d t ake M o t her s ho p p i ng. 3 -3- part of this time, continuing to provide support. He subsequently moved to his mother’s house, but continued to see Mother and the children r eg ularly

. I n September of 2001, Ms. Gong wer moved t o California. By J anuary and Februa ry of 2002, Ms. Go ng we r w a s r e pe a te dly a sking Ms. Mu sti n to loc a te a ndc he c k o n th e c hil dr e n. At fi rs t, M s. Mustin was reluctant to do so, but, in April of 2002, she found Mother and the childre n at the Na pier Homes apa

rtment. Be cause of the c ondition of and environment in the apartment, Ms. Mustin took the three children to he r home, without objection fr om Mother.
At Ms. Gong wer ’s request, the three children w ere sent to California to stay with her in May of 20 02 . M oth e r g a ve writt e n p e rm iss ion , b y a do c ume nt dated May 24 , 2 00 2, fo r M s. Mu sti n to transport the c hildren to California, and for Ms. Gong we r t o car e for the childre n and to see k temporary

custody “until I can c are for my children in a drug fre e envir onment and my self be dr ug fr e e .” Th e do c ume nt s tate d th a t F a the r w a s in ja il a t that tim e
. F a the r a lso te sti fi e d that hewa s in ja il f or thr e e mon ths in Ma y thr ou g h July of 20 02 . H e didno t ob

je c t to his so n g oin g to C a lif ornia t e m p o r ar i l y.
Du ri ng thec hil dr e n’ s visi t to Ca lif ornia , it wa s inte nd e d that Moth e r w ou ld a g a in atte mpt to deal with her

drug addiction. Ag ain, Ms. Mustin and her friends tried to help Mother. The children wer e sent ba ck fr om California i n J uly of 2002. Ms . Gong wer had only enoug h money

to fly them to I ndiana. Ms. Mustin located Mother , and they drove tog ether

to I ndiana to pick up the c hildren. Ms. Mustin asked Father for financ ial help in retr i ev ing the children, but F ather stated he ha d no mon e y sin c e he ha d o nly

re c e ntl y g ott e n o ut o f j a il.
After the childre n returne d from California , they ag ain l ived wit h Mother in Fr anklin in the house furnished by the org anization. During this ti me, Mother would f reque ntly take the c hildren a way fo r the we e ke ndor

a fe w d a y s at a

tim e . Alth ou g h Ms. Mus tin wa s in fre qu e nt c on ta c t w ith Mother, she did not alway s know wher e Mother and the children wer e during these a bsence s. Father testified that Mother and the childre n would visit him (he wa s living with his mother at his mother’s house) a lmost every

other we ekend, an d t h is testimonywas c orrobor ated by Mother’s sister. Be cause M s
. M u s ti n d idn o t w a n t h im ar o u n d , F a th e r ’ s b r o th e r

o r M o th e r ’ s s is te r

w o u ldp ic k

up Mother and the children. Although Ms. Mustin doubted the fr equenc y of visits testified to byFather, sh e a c kn ow led ged th ere we retim e s sh e kn e w the c hil dr e n w e rewi th F a the r, tim e s Mo the r w ou ld cal l fr o m Father’s house , times that she knew F ather ’s brother had picke d up Mother and the children, and other times she just did not know where Mother wa s with the children. F ather testified that he provide d food, clothes, and other items for a ll the children whe n they visited and that whene ver Mother

called him and said W.B. I V nee ded something , he would make sure the c hild got it. He did not pay

cash support to Mother beca use the w as af

raid she w ould spend the money on 3 dr ug s.M s. M u stin te stif ie d th a t sh e h a d fo u rte e n c h ild re n liv ing in h e r h o m e . S h e a n d he r h u sb a n d w e re the p a re n ts 4 of fou r of t h e m.
M s
. M us t i n s t at ed t hat M ot her ha d com pl et ed an d/ or fai l ed t o com pl et e pr ogr ams of s hor t er dur at i on, but t hat 5
no ne ha d wo rke d fo r he r o n a l o ng t erm b asis.

W e d o no t co m m en t o n the e nfo rce ab i l i t y of such a d o cu m en t i n these o r o t he r circu m st an ce s. 6

Fat her was i nca r cer at ed at t hi s t i me. 7

M s. M ust i n tes t i f

i ed she d el i vered M o t her’ s m ai l to her at t he t i m e, t hat t he m ai l i ncl ud ed chi l d s up p o rt checks 8 fo r D

. D

. , and t hat M o t her bail ed hers el f out o f jai l , presum ab l y wi t h t hat m o ney. M o t her’ s whereab o ut s af t er t hat were n o t m a d e c le a r fro m a n y tes tim o n y. -4- Ms. Mustin t estified that during thi s time Mother also would sometimes lea ve the c hildren with her for

day s at a time, without informing any body as to her de stination or plans. After one of Mother’s absenc es with the children, around January of 2003, Ms. Mustin rece ived a phone call fr om a man who w as unknown to her

. He told her that he was in a hotel room with the t hree children and that he had no f

ood for them or any way to take ca re of them. Mother had le ft three day s earlier, and the man had no ide a whe re she was or how to rea ch her . Ms. Mustin went to the hotel and broug ht the childre n back to he r own home. She and her husband took car e of the children. 4
Ms. Mu sti n w a s c on c e rn e d a bo ut h e r a

bil ity to g e t me dic a l c arefor thec hil dr e n inthi s inf orma l arr a ng e me nt. Whe n s he loc a te d M oth e r, sh e pr e se nte d h e r w itha do c ume nt d e sig ne d to g ive M s
. Mustin and her husband le g al custody of the thre e childre n while Mother e ntere d a drug reha bilitation program of betwe en six months and one and one -half y ear s in leng th. The doc ument 5 inc lud e d th e fo llo wi ng c on dit ion : “ [u]po n v e ri fi e d s ucc e ssf ul c omp le tio n o f the pr og ram in fu ll acc ordanc e with the prog ram re quirements an d af ter de monstrating that I

am able to maintain a healthy drug -fr ee, sta

ble fa milyenvironment for at least 6 months, the Mustins wil l return c ustody of my c hil dr e n to me .” Mo the r sig ne d the do c ume nt on Janu ary 10 , 20 03

. Ap pa re ntl y , Mo the r d id 6 not complete the r ehabilitation prog ram nor did she return to Franklin. It is not clear whe re Mother was living , althoug h Ms. Mustin s till had sporadic conta ct with her. Some time later, Mother “ borrowe d” W illiam Mustin’s car without permission. W hen she did not return it afte r four

day s, the Mustins swore out a wa rrant ag ainst Mother, who a s a re sult was then incar cer ated in the Williamson C ounty J ail. By that time, Ms. Musti n rea liz ed that she nee ded the assistan ce o f t h e courts. On May 1, 2003, she filed a

depende ncy

and neg lect petition in the J uvenile Court of Willi amson County , which wa s hear d the same day
. Mother wa s broug ht from 7 the jail to attend the hea

ring on the petition. The Juvenile Court Refer ee a ppointed a Gua

rdian a d Litem, found that the childre n wer e dependent and neg lected, and pl ace d them in the t empora ry leg al and phy sical custody

of Ms. Mustin. 8
Mr. and Mrs. B g ot to know the children throug h a vac ation bibl e s ch o o l the childre n a tte nd e d inthesu mme r o f 2 00 3. Th e y be c a me int e re ste d inthec hil dr e n a ndwante d to he lp M s. Mu sti n w iththe m. A ft e r a ssu ri ng he rs e lf of the B s’ c ha ra c te r, Ms. Mu sti n a g re e d to le t th e m vi sitT hi s i ncarcerat i o n was f o r vi o l at i o n o f p rob at i o n. Fat her adm i t t ed on cro ss
- exam i nat i o n t o num erous run- i ns 9
w ith the law a n d s e v e ra l m isd e m e a n o r a n d felo n y c o n v ic tio n s. H e is a r e c o v e rin g a d d ic t wh o a lso so ld d ru g s in th e p a st. H e testi f i ed t ha t as o f

t he d ate o f

t rial , he ha d b ee n c l ea n for 1 4 m o nths.

M rs . B te stif

ie d tha t sh e ra n into o n e o f M o the r’s fam ily m e m b e rs w h ile sh e ha d D .D . i n to w a n d ga v e him 10 h er h ome ph on e n u mber , “ an d s ai d t h at w e wou l d be w i l l i n g t o w or k w i t h t h em, i f t h ey wou l d l i k e t o c al l a n d c h ec k on her

. ” M r s
. B di d not r ememb er wh en t hi s i nci dent occu r r ed. Fat her t es t i f i ed t hat a c ous i n w ho wor ks at t he B s ’ ch ur ch cal l ed Fat her ’ s mo t her an d t ol d her t hat t he B s had had her gr ands on, W

. B

. I V , bapt i zed, and t hat was how h e l ear ned
o f his so n ’s w h e re a b o u ts. -5- thec hil dr e n at he r h ome . T he y vis ite d s e ve ra l ti me s a

we e k, a ndthe n h a d th e c hil dr e n v isi t th e m in their own home. TheBs ha d three children of their own.
On J uly 28, 2003, the B s filed a pe tition for custody of t he three children of Mot her. A mong oth e r thi ng s, the pe tit ion state d that the y “ wi sh to ad op t the min or c hil dr e n an d pla n to pr oc e e d w ith le g a l pr oc e e din g s nec e ssa ry to ac c omp lis h this a do pti on .” Th e y ha d th e a g re e me nt o f M s. Mu sti n and Ka desh B arne a. The Juvenile Court Refere e hea rd t he P etition for Cust ody on the s ame day it was filed. The re fe re e no te d th e failu reof Mo the r t o ta

ke re sp on sib ili ty

fo r the c hil dr e n, a ndthea g re e me nt o f M s. Mu sti n to thepr op os e d c ha ng e of c us tod y . T he re fe re e rec omm e nd e d th a t c us tod y be a wa rd e d to theB s, a ndthere c omm e nd a tio n w a s c on fi rm e d a s th e de cree of th e c ou rt on Au g us t 7. Th e reis nothing in the r ecor d to show that either Mother or F ather rec eived written notice that the petition f o r c h a n g e o f c u s to d y h a d b e e n f il e d o r th a t th e p e ti ti o n h a d b e e n g r a n te d

. T h e y a lso r ece ived no oth e r ty pe of

no tic e prior

to the pr oc e e din g . F a the r w a s inpriso n at th e tim e , a ndhe ro uti ne ly 9 telephoned Ms. M u s ti n to c h e c k o n a n d ta lk to W. B

. I I I

. M s
. M u s ti n d id n o t in f o r m h im o f the petition to chang e custody or the proc eeding s thereon.
Th e c hil dr e n w e nt t o li ve wi th the B s a nd sta rt e d the sc ho ol y e ar. Ev e n af te r thi s c ha ng e , M s. Mustin did not tell Mo ther or F ather that the childre n wer e now in the c ustody of someone e lse. During this ti me period Ms. Musti n told Fatherwhen he called that she could not put W.B. I V on the phone be cause “y ou just mi ssed him.” Mother and Father at some point learne d that the childre n wer e no long er w ith Ms. Must in. Ms. M ustin testified that after a period with no contact fr om Mother, Mother c alled and “ somehow she [Mot her] found out that they wer e living w ith somebody else.” Whether in this or a subsequent call, Mother became ang ry and cur sed Ms. Mustin. S he made more tele phone c al l s , and Ms. Mustin felt hara ssed and stopped taking phonecalls fr om Mother. That wa s the turning point in Ms. Mustin’s relationship with Mother. She testified that she did not tell Mother wher e the c hildren we re be cause she wa nted to spare the Bs f rom hara ssment. Mrs. B testified that she had asked Ms. Mustin not to give out the inf ormation that the B s had custody of the c hil dr e n o r any

c on ta c t in fo rm a tio n a

bo ut the m.
Mo the r andF a the r f

ou ndou t, a

pp are ntl y thr o u g hf am i l y m e m b e r s, tha t th e c hil dr e n w e rewi th the B s. Mr. and Mrs. B did not meet or have any contac t with Father

until af t er h e go t o u t of 10 prison. After

Father wa s rele ased on October 23, 2003, and lea rned how to rea ch W.B. IV, he c alledO n O ct ob er 29, 200 3, t he B s f i l ed a pet i t i on for r es t r ai ni ng order ag ai ns t Fat her , al l egi ng t hat he “ has 11 thr e a te n e d to p h ysic a lly ta k e c u sto d y o f [W .B . IV ]. T h e p e tit io n e rs fea r th a t he w ill d o so , a n d a b sc o n d w ith the c h ild
an d/ or c h i l dr en
. ” Fa t h er den i ed mak i n g an y s u ch t h r ea t s
. Fol l owi n g a h ea r i n g be for e t h e Ju v en i l e Ref er ee , t h e pet i t i on fo r r est rai ni ng ord er was d i smi ss ed by agreeme nt wi t h a warni ng.

C A SA vol un t eer H ar r y B oy co t es t i f i ed t hat he had vi s i t ed Fat her ’ s hom e i n Februa r y 200 4 and found i t cl ean 12 and ad eq uat e and t hat M o t her app eared t o be s t ayi ng ther e wi t h F at her. H e al so vi si t ed the B s, and s t at ed t hat he t ho ught (c o n tinu e d ...) -6- the B s, wanting to see his child. That c all became contentious. He had also c alled Ms. Mustin, and that conver sation led the Bs to se ek a restraining order ag ainst him. The pe tition was resolved by 11 ag ree ment.
On Novem b er 3 , 2 0 0 3 , the B s filed three petitions in t he Juvenile Court to t erminate the pare ntal rig hts of Mother and the fathe rs of e ach of the three children. Thepetitions onlycited a single g round for

termination: “. . . bec ause [responde nts have] abandone d the child as de fined by Te nn e sse e statut ory a nd c a se la w in that a pe ri od of a t le a st fo ur (4 ) mon th s h as i mm edi ate ly prec eded the filing of

this P eti t i o n during which the [Respondents have] willfully failed to pay support for the c hild or maintain reg ular c ontact with the child.”
Af te r the re str a ini ng or de r p e tit ionwa s d ism iss e d, F a the r w a s a llo we d tw o s up e rv ise d v isi ts with his son at t he Bs’ church. He also dropped of f Christmas prese nts for all threechildren at the Bs’ home. I n J anuary , Father’s mother became seriously ill, and he was unable to visit his son for a while. Hecalled the Bs and asked that W.B. I I I be broug ht to vi s i t h i s gra n d mother, and the y declined. H e later

asked that the child attend his g randmother ’s fune ral, a nd ag ain they declined.
I n J anuary

of 2004, both Mother a nd Father filed petitions to set visitation, s ince visitation had not been addre ssed in the custody order s. After a hea ring on J anuar

y 26, 2004, those petitions wer e continued and set to be hear d with the petition f or termination of pare ntal rig hts. N either F ather nor Mother w as allowe d any visitation during this time. On Marc h 2, 2004, Father filed a petition forcus to dyof h is so n. He s tat ed t hat he had been in carcera ted du ri ng th e hear in g that led to th e Bs obtaining c ustody

and that he had not been give n any notice of the proceeding

. He f urther c laimed to have a meaning ful relationship with W.B. I V and insisted that he has “ maintained continual c are , su pe rv isi on a ndsu pp ort of themin or

c hil d s inc e his bi rth andun til a pe ri odof

inc arc e ratio n in Fe bruary 2003 and ending October 23, 2003.”
II. T HE T E RM I NAT I ON H E ARI NG
Th e he ari ng on theB s’ pe tit ionfo r t e rm inat io n w a s c on du c te d o n M arc h 3 , 2 00 4. B oth Mother and F ather

wer e pre sent and repr esente d by counsel. A G uardia n ad Litem repre sented the interests of the c hildren.
Of the nine witnesses who took the stand, Diann Mustin testi fied at the g reatest leng th. Other testify ing w itnesses wer e Mrs. B , Mr. B , a C ASA volunteer, a child and f amily thera pist who had 12(

. . . con t i n u ed) 12 t hey were “a wond erf

ul f am i l y ” and t hat t he chi l d ren app eared t o be wel l

- cared fo r. -7- counsele d one of the children, a nurse who w as a f

riend of Mothe r, the y oung er sist er of Mother, and responde nt W.B. I I I , Father. Mother herse lf did not take the stand.
Di a nn Mu sti n to ld o f l on g tim e e ff orts b y he rs e lf a nd he r frie nd s to hel p M oth e r o ve rc ome her drug addiction. Despite those eff orts, and despite Mother’s sever al attempts at r eh ab i l i tation throug h various prog rams, Mother ha d been una ble to stay

off dr ug s. Ms. Musti n an d her f riends too k th e ste ps that th e y

fe lt w e rene c e ssa

ry to p ro te c t th e c hil dr e n f

ro m th e ir pa re nts

. Ms. Mu sti n’ s te sti mon y

re g ard ing Mo the r’ s h ist ory of dr ug us e a ndfaile d atte mpt s to overc ome it was es sentially uncontra dicted by

other witnesse s. Howeve r, Ms. Smit h-Ke aton testified in Mother’s be half. The witness, an LPN working with Meharry Medica l Col l ege, me t Mother three y ear s earlier when Mother was in a drug treatment prog ram for preg nant women. The y ha d r e maine d f

ri e nd s. Ms. Smith- Ke a tona tte mpt e d to pr ov ide su pp ort fo r Mo the r i n d e a lin g wi th her drug addiction. She testified that Mother ha d rec ently completed a

28-day inpatient treatment prog ram at Meharry

and had sinc e taken steps toward improving her life so that she could re g ain her children. F or example, M o t h er had g otten a job. Howe ver, Ms. Smith-Keaton a lso testified that Mother had c hosen not to participate in the prog ram’s a fter c are component. It wa s t h e witness’s belief that psy cholog ical proble ms underly ing dr ug use and a ddiction must be addre s s ed for a succe ssful rec overy , and she note d that no one had a ddresse d these ne eds for Mother in the past.
Mo the r’ s y ou ng e r s ist e r es se nti a lly c or ro bo rate d F a the r’ s in vo lve me nt w ithW.B .IV p ri or to his incarc eration, including the f reque nt weeke nd visits t o Father’s mother ’s house a nd the providing of support during those visits and otherwise providing items for the c hild.
The e vidence also showed that F ather had in the past used and sold ill eg al drugs. Howe ver, he had be en cle an for over a y ear
. When F ather took the stand, he testified that during the time that Mother was living in Fr anklin, he would often have he r and the children c ome to his house for the wee kend, as se t out earlier . Father testified that he had a g ood relationship wit h his son and exercised visitation as often a s he could. He claimed, howe ver, that Ms. Musti n and the Bs we re beg rudg ing an d s everely

limit ed his opportunities for visitation. He admitted that he did not pay support for his child, but claimed that he furnishe d the nee ds of Mother and all the childre n when the y vis ite d w ithhim . H e a lso state d th a t heno w h a d a re g ula r job a t his br oth e r’ s c le a nin g bu sin e ss and the he lived in and at lea st partly owned the house that had belong ed to his late mother.
Ms. Mustin and the Bs testified that they had re servations about letting F ather have visitation wi th h is s on . T he y

didno t be lie ve that it

wo uldbe in the be st i nte re st o f any of thec hil dr e n to vis it him. Ms. Mustin s tated that she did not see k to cut Father off from his child. Howe ver, she testified that Father had admitted to her on at l east one occa sion in the past that he wa s unable to take car e of thec hil d, a nd that “ I did ha ve a pr ob le m w ithhim

se e ing [F a the r] b e c aus e I

kn e w i t w a s h op e le ss. It w a s a hu rt fu l th ing to m e be c aus e I kn e w that th a t’ s all i t w a s, ” me a nin g that it wa s o nly a vis it.T he pet i t i oner s ar gu ed t hat t he R ul es of Juv eni l e P r ocedur e and r el eva nt s t at ut es r equi r ed t hat al l post

- t r i al 13
mo t i ons i n J uv eni l e Co ur t be broug ht by pet i t i on r at her t han by mo t i on, and t hat t he cour t coul d n ot t her efore cons i der t he m o t i o ns to a l t er o r am en d

. T he y co nten d ed t ha t as a result , t he resp o nd en t s’ no t i ce s o f ap p ea l we re u nti m ely b ec au se f i l ed m o re t han t hi rt y da y s af t er t he t erm i nat i o n o rder. T he t ri al co urt hel d t hat t he m o t i o ns t o l l ed t he t i m e fo r t he f i l i ng o f t h e no tice o f ap p e a l, b u t d e n ie d the m o tio n s. -8- At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court announced its dec ision from the benc h. The court de clar ed that the pe titioners had prove n by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that M other ha d abandone d her c hildren and a lso stated that i t found on i ts own motion t hat the conditions of de pe nd e nc y

a ndne g le c t w hic h le d to there mov a l of thec hil dr e n f ro m th e ir mothe r’ s h omesti ll persisted and would preve nt the ir safe return to Mothe r. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3) (A). Th e c ou rt a lso fo un d th a t it

wa s inthebe st i nte re st o f a ll the c hil dr e n th a t th e mothe r’ s p are nta l rig hts be terminated.
Th e c ou rt re c ognizedthat te rm inatin g F a the r’ s p are ntal rig hts pr e se nte d a mor e dif fi c ult situation, because it was not clea r that he willfully failed to visit his child. The court held, howeve r, that th e g ro un d o f a

ba nd on me nt h a d be e n pro ve n be c aus e F a the r ha d will fu lly faile d to supp ort hi s so n d u r i n g t h e f

o u r m o n t h s p r i o r t o t h e f

i l i n g o f t h e p e t i t i o n
. T h e c o u rt d e t e r m i n e d t h a t i t w a s in W.B . IV’ s b e st i nte re st that F a the r’ s rig hts be te rm in ate d be c aus e of thec hil d’ s b on d w ithhis sib lin g s. The trial c ourt memorialized its de cision in two separ ate or ders, both filed on A pril 19, 2004, one terminating the pa

renta l rig hts of Mother, the other terminating the rig hts of Father. Mother and Father both filed motions to alter or amend. After a hearing on J une 3, 2004, the tria l court denie d both motions

. The pa

rties then filed se parate notices of a ppeal, whic h this court has consolidated 13 for pur poses of de cision.

III . S T ANDARD S F OR T ER M INA TIO N O F P A R ENTA L R I GH TS A par ent has a

fundame ntal rig ht to the car e, custody and contr ol of his or her

child. Stanley
v . I lli no is , 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. C t. 1208, 1212-13 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. Mc Cloud , 921 S.W. 2d17 0, 17 4- 75 (T e nn . 1 99 6) ; I n R e A do p t i o n o f a F e m a l e Chil d , 8 9 6 S

. W .2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995) ; Nale v. Robe rtson , 871 S.W .2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1994). This rig ht is a fundamenta l bu t no t a bs olu te ri g ht, a nd the state ma y int e rf e re wi th p are nta l rig hts if the reis a c omp e lli ng state interest. Santosky v . Kramer , 4 55 U. S. 74 5, 74 7, 10 2 S. Ct . 1 38 8, 13 91 (1 98 2) ; Nash-Putnam , 921 S.W .2d at 174-75. Terminating pare ntal rig h ts has the leg al ef fec t of reduc ing the pare nt to the role of a complete strang er, and of

se ve ri ng fo re ve r a ll l e g a l rig hts a ndob lig a tio ns of thepa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n o f the c hil d ag ainst whom the order of termination is enter ed and of the c hild who is the subject of the petiti on to that pare nt or g uardia n. The pa rent or g uardia n shall have no f urther ri g ht t o n oti c e of

pr oc e e din g s f

or the a do pti on of that c hil d b y oth e r p e rs on s a ndsh a ll-9-

have no right to objec t to the child’s adoption or t here afte r t o have any relationship, leg al or other wise, with the child. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113( l )(1)

. The United States Supreme Court ha s rec og nized the u n i q ue nature of proc eeding s to terminate par ental rig hts, stating that “[f]ew conse quence s of judicial action are so g rave as the sever ance of natural family ties.” M. L. B. v. S. L. J. , 51 9 U.S. 10 2, 11 9, 11 7 S. Ct. 555, 565 (1996), qu o t i n g Santosky, 455 U.S. at 787, 102 S. Ct . at 1412 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting)

. As a

re su lt, “ [t]he int e re st o f p are nts in the ir rela tio ns hip wi th the ir c hil dr e n is sufficie ntly

fundame ntal to come within the finite cla ss of liberty interests p ro t ec t ed bythe Fourteenth Amendme nt.” Id. , (q u o t i n g Santosky , 4 55 U. S., a t 77 4, 10 2 S. Ct. at 14 05 (R e hn qu ist , J ., dissenting) ). Our leg islature has ide ntified those situations in which the state’s interest in the welfa re of a child justifies interfer ence with a pare nt’s constitutional rig hts by setting f orth g rounds on which termination proce eding s can be broug ht. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g ). The s t at utes on te rm inatio n o f p are nta l rig hts pr ovid e the o nly auth ority fo r a c ou rt to t e rm inate a

pa re nt’ s rig hts

. Os bo rn v . M

ar r , 1 27 S.W. 3d73 7, 73 9 (T e nn . 200 4)

. Th us , pare nta l rig hts ma y be te rm inate d o nly wh e rea statut orily

de fi ne d g ro un d e xists . T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 1) ; J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S

. W

. 3 d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002) ; In re M .W .A. , 9 8 0 S. W. 2 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 2 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 8 )

. To support the t ermination of pa renta l rig hts, onlyone g round nee d be prove d, so long a s it is proved by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. In the Matter of D.L.B. , 1 1 8 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 0 , 3 6 7 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 3 )

. In addition, it mus t be shown that termination of pa renta l rig hts is in t he b estinterest of the child. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 2) ; In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

. On e of thesa fe g ua

rd s r e qu ir e d b y thefu nd a me nta l natur e of a pa re nt’ s c on sti tut ion a l rig hts is that c ourts must a

pply a highe r standard of proof whe n adjudicating termination ca ses. Santosky , 45 5 U. S. at 76 9, 10 2 S. Ct. a t 14 03 ; In re M .W .A. , 980 S.W .2d at 622. To justify the termination of pa re nta l ri g hts , bo th theg ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n a ndthefa c t th a t te rm ina tio n is in the be st i nte re st of the c hild mustbe esta blished by

clea r an d co n v i n cing evidenc e. Te nn. Code. Ann. § 36 -1 -1 13 (c )( 1) ; In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d at 546. “This heightene d standard . . . serve s to prevent the unwar rante d termination or interf ere nce with the biologica l pa rents’ rig hts to their c hildren.” In re M.W .A. , 980 S.W .2d at 622.
I n order to be clea r and c onvincing , evidenc e must eliminate any serious or substantial doubt about the cor

rec tness of the c onclusions to be draw n from the e vidence

. In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d a t 54 6; Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W. 2d89 6, 90 1 n .3 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . Su c h e vid e nc e sh ou ld produce in the fac t-finder ’s mind a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the alleg ations sought to be established. In re A.D .A. , 84 S.W. 3d59 2, 59 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) ; I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I n contra st to the preponder anceof the e vidence standard, c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e sh ou ld d e mons tr ate th a t th e truthof thefa c ts a sse rt e d is “ hig hly probable ” as oppose d to merely “more probable ” than not. I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W. 3da t 47 4; see als o Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger , 56 S.W .3d 527, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).-10-

Thus, it was the burde n of the pa rties see king to terminate Mother’ s and F ather ’s par ental rig hts, herein the Bs, to pr esent “evide nce in w hich there is no serious or substantial doubt about the c or re c tne ss o f the c on c lus ion s d ra wn by the e vid e nc e ” that g ro un ds e xist a nd that te rm inatio n w ou ld serve the best intere sts of the children. In re Vale ntine , 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d at5 4 6 (q u o t i n g Ho dg e s v . S .C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W .2d at 901 n.3.)
Du e to the g ra ve c on se qu e nc e s th a t a c c omp a ny su c h d e c isi on s, c ou rt s mu st a pp ly individualiz ed dec ision-making to a termination dec ision. In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999). Due proce ss require s the application of stringe n t standards to insure pr otection of the fu nd a me nta l rig hts a t st ake . B e c aus e of thec on sti tut ion a l impli c a tio ns , g ra vity of c on se qu e nc e s, hig he r s ta nd ardof pr oo f, a nd re qu ir e d ind ivi du a lize d de c isi on makin g , ou r l e g isl a tur e ha s e xplic itl y required that courts making te rmination of par ental rig hts decisions “ente r an or der w hich makes specific finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(k)

. I n this court’s review, we must determine de novo whether the B s proved their case by clea r and convinc ing e vidence

. In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d at 546. First, we must review e ach of the trial c ou rt ’s sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo , with a pre sumption of corre ctness unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise, in a ccor dance with T enn. R. A pp. P. 13( d). Then, we mus t d et er m i ne whether the fa cts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by the pre ponderance of

the e vid e nc e , c le arl y

a ndc on vin c ing ly

e sta bli sh thee le me nts ne c e ssa ry to t e rm inate pa

re nta l rig hts

. Jones , 9 2 S. W.3 d at 83 8; In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d at 548-49.
IV. A B ANDON M E NT
Ab a nd on me nt, a s d e fi ne d by statut e , is one of the g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l rig hts

. Tenn. Code Ann.§ 36- 1-113(g ). The de finitions of abandonme nt a re found in T enn. Code Ann. § 3 6 -1 -1 0 2 (1 )( A) , an d t h e o n es t h atar e r el ev an th er ei n i n cl u d e t h e w i l l fu l fa i l u re t o v i s i t(o r e n gage in more than token visitation) or willful failure to support th e par ent' s minor child (or make rea sonable pay ments toward the support of the child) f or a pe riod of four

consec utive months. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)( A)(i) and (iv).
Th e s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o v i s i t o r t o s u p p o rt m u s t b e w i l l f u l is constitutionallymandated, and inten t i s a nec essary element of

abandonme nt. In re Swanson , 2 S.W. 3d a t 18 8. Th us , if

thefailu reto s up po rt

or vis it c a nn ot b e pr ov e d to be int e nti on a l or wi llf ul, then abandonment has not bee n shown . In the Matter of D.L.B. , 11 8 S. W.3 d at 36 7 ( “ pa re nta l rig hts may be terminated only

if . . . the failure to make r easona ble payments was willful”).
The c oncept of

willfulness or intent is often the determining fac tor in whether the exist ence of that g round has be en shown by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. See, e .g., In re J .J.C., D.M.C., and S.J.B. , 148 S.W .3d 919, 927 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p
. 2 0 0 4 ) (holding that DCS did notshow by clea r and convincing evidenc e that the fat her’ s failure to support was willful since the pe rmane ncy plans would have le d him to b el i ev e t h at s upport payments wererequire d only if a c ourt order ed such pay me nts a nd the fathe r v isi te d th e c hil dr e n a ndpr ov ide d g if ts f or the m) ; In re L.J.C., A.L.C., and-11-

J .R .C. , 124 S.W .3d 609, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003 ) (hol ding that the rec ord did not provide cle ar and convinc ing e vidence that an indig ent mother intende d, rathe r than wa s simplyun ab l e, to pay c hil d s up po rt ); In re A.D .A. , 84 S.W. 3d59 2, 59 8 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) (h old ing that th e pr oo f d id n o t s h o w t h at t he mother’ s failure to visitwas intentional rather than the result of a number of circ umstances including DCS’s placeme nt of the child in another county ). The que stion of intent or willfulness is fact spe ci fic a nd depends on the totalityof circ umstances

. F a ilu reto p ro vid e su pp ort is wi llf ul i f the pa

re nt i s a wa

reof his or he r d uty to su pp ort, i s c apa

bleof pay ing su pp ort, m ake s n ot atte mpt to p ro vid e su pp ort, andha s n o ju sti fi able excuse. In re J

.J.C., D.M.C., and S.J.B. , 1 4 8 S

. W

. 3 d at9 2 6 , q u o t i n g In re Ad op tio n o f M uir , No. M2002-02963-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 22794524, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (no Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed). Willful conduct is intentional or voluntary ; often, intent must be inferr ed fr om circumstantial evide nce. Id. Willf uln e ss i s a

qu e sti on of fa c t that th e tria l c ou rt is i n the best position to make. In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .32d at 367.
V. G R O U N D S A S T O F A THER
As to Father, the pe tition fil ed by the B s alleg ed that he ha d abandone d his child, W .B. IV, in that for a pe riod of four months im mediately

prec eding t h e fi l i ng of the pe tition, Father ha d wi l l fu l l y fa i l ed t o p ay s u p p o rt fo r th e ch i l d o r m ai n t ai n re gu l arco n t ac twi t h t h e c h i l d

. T h i s l an gu age trac ks one of the definitions of aba ndonment
, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (A)( i). I n the orde r terminating Father’s pa

renta l rig hts, the trial co u rt found by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that Father ha d abandone d his child in that for a pe riod of at least four months prior to the filing of the petition to terminate he willfully failed to pay support for the minor child. Whil e both the B s and the trial court relied upon the de finition of abandonment that is found in subsection (i) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) , that relianc e was misplaced beca use another

subsection applies to F ather

. Un de r the app lic ablede fi nit ion , a ba nd on me nt m e a ns : A par ent or g uardia n is incarc erated at the time of the instit ution o f an ac t i o n or proce eding to declar e a c hild to be an abandone d child, or the par ent or g uardia n has been incar cer ated during all or part of the four (4) months immediately prec eding the instit ution of such ac tion or proce eding , and either has will fully failed to visit

or has will ful ly fai le d to su

pp or t or ha s wi llf

ull y fai le d to ma k e re as on ab le pa y me nts tow ar

d the su pp or t of th e c hild for four (4) consec utive months imme diately prec eding such parent's or guardi an's i ncarce ra t i on , o r the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n h a s e ng a g e d in conduct prior to inc arc eration whic h exhibi ts a wanton disreg ard for the welf are of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (A)( iv) (empha sis ad d ed ). This definition rec og nizes that an inc arc e rate d p are nt h a s li mit e d o pp ortu ni ti es to vis it o r t o e arnmon e y wi th w hic h to pay

su pp ort, making it difficult to show that such failure s werewillful

. S e e I n r e A do p ti o n o f Cope land , 43 S.W .3d 483, 488-489 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000).T he y ba se thi s argu m en t o n the a sserti o n that Fa t he r ne ve r d i rec t l y pa i d ch i l d sup p o rt t o M o t he r o r t o M s. 14 M usti n. O f

co urse , suc h a f ail ure d o es no t i n and o f i t self estab l i sh a w i l l f

ul fail ure t o m ak e re aso na b l e sup p o rt p aym en t s.
In li sting it s re a so n s fo r d e te rm inin g tha t t e rm ina tio n o f F a the r’s p a re n ta l righ ts w a s in t h e c h ild ’s b e st inte re st, 15 t he cour t al s o f ound t hat f at her was at t emp t i ng t o m ake a c han ge i n h i s ci r cums t anc es , was at t emp t i ng t o l i ve a h eal t hi er l i fest y l e and ab st ai n f

rom drugs, and had at t em p t ed t o vi si t

. W i t h regard t o t he b est i nt erest f act o r at T enn. C o d e A nn. § 36

- 1

- 1 1 3 (i )( 9 ), t he co urt fo und , by cl ear and co nvi nci ng evi d ence, t hat Father h ad wi l l f ul l y f ai l ed t o pa y s up p o rt c o n siste n t with the c h ild su p p o rt g u id e line s, b u t it is no t cle a r w h a t p e rio d o f t im e this sta te m e n t re fer s to . A d d iti o n a lly, such fai l ure i s no t a grou n d fo r te rm ina tion, and , as t he d i scus si o n of wi l l f ul ness m akes cl ear, do es not est ab l i sh t he g ro u n d o f willf

u l fa ilure to p ro v id e re a so n a b le su p p o rt.
A ltho u g h in In r e Val ent i ne , 79 S. W

. 3d at 54 6, a t er mi nat i on of par ent al r i gh t s ca s e, t he Supre me C our t s t at ed 16 tha t wh e n the trial c o u rt h a s n o t m a d e a s p e c ifi c fin d ing o f fa c t o n a p a rtic u la r m a tter , a p p e llate c o u rts re v ie w th e fac ts i n t he r ecor d under a de novo st and ard, t he C o urt l at er mad e cl ear i n In re D .L .B

. t hat , at l eas t wi t h r ega r d t o t he f act ual q u e stio n o f willf

u lne ss, the trial c o u rt is in the b e st p o sitio n to m a k e su c h fi n d ing s a n d , w h e re su c h fi n d ing s a re a b se n t, t h e ca s e s h ou l d be r ema n ded. I n a n um b er o f c ases , t h e Cour t of

Appea l s h as r el i ed on In re D .L .B

. as wel l as T enn. C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (k ), to va c a te a n d re m a n d fo r th e re q u ire d fi n d ing s. See , e . g. , In r e J

. W. P. , 154 S. W

. 3d 586, 591 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 20 0 4 ) ( vacati ng t erm i nat i o n ord er on ground s fo und by court be cause of l ack o f f i nd i ngs o f

f act and
rem and i ng fo r prep arat i o n of f i nd i ngs and co ncl usi o ns)

. -12- I n th e c a s e b e f

o r e u s , F a th e r w a s in c ar c e r a te d b e tw e e n F e b ru ar y o f 2 0 0 3 a n d October 23, 2003. The termination petition was filed only eleve n d ay s af

t er Fathe r wa s relea sed fr om prison. Thus, the def

inition found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (iv) wa s the applica ble one. The rele vant period of time for the de termination of whether F ather abandone d his son was the four months prior to Febr

uary 2003. I n r e C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d at 474 (holding that beca use t he mother was incar cer ated for a portion of the four months immediately prec eding the filing of the pe tition, subsection (A) (iv), which ha d been a lleg ed along with (A)( i), g overne d). The pe tition allege d a g round that could not be applied to F ather

. It is clea r from the wor ding of the order that the t rial court terminated Fathe r’s parental rights on a g round that wa s simplynot appli cable, as a matter of law . Consequently , we must reve rse the trial court’s te rmination of Father’s pa

renta l rig hts based on failure to support in the four months i m m ed i at elyprec eding the filing of the petition.
Th e B s a rg ue the y a lso pro ve d a

wi llf ul f a ilu reto s up po rt

fo r the re le va nt f

ou r- mon th pe ri od

. B e c aus e thetria l c ou rt us e d th e g ro un d ba se d on thewr on g fo ur mon th p e ri od , p re su ma

bly 14 beca use that wa s the alleg ation in the petition, the court made no finding s of fac t as to whethe r Father willfully failed to pr ovide re asonable support during the four months immediately prec eding his incarc eration. Th at omission would require us to remand for f indings on that issue if that 15 g round we re a lleg ed in the petition. In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d at 367 (re manding for f indings a s 16 to“ a ll o the r g rou nd s for ter min a tio n o f p are nta l rig hts a sse rt e d inthe

. . . p e tit ion ” ); In re J .J.C., D.M.C., and S.J.B. , 148 S.W .3d at 928 (re manding for f indings a s to alternative g rou nd for termination alleg ed in the petition).
Howeve r we have revie wed the petition and find no alleg ation of a g round base d on willful failu reto s up po rt du ri ng the fo ur mon ths pr e c e din g F a the r’ s in c arc e ratio n. Th e pe tit ionsp e c if ic a llyEve n t h ou g h t h er e wa s s ome t es t i mon y a bou t t h e deg r ee of Fa t h er ’ s s u ppor t du r i n g t h e ch i l d’ s l i fe, w e ca n n ot 17
con cl u de on t h e bas i s of t h i s r ec or d t h at t h er e wa s a n i mpl i ed con s en t t o t r y t h e g r ou n d s et ou t i n T en n
. Code An n
. § 36- 1 -1 0 2 (1 )( A )( iv.)

. See T en n
. R. Ci v P. 15. 02

T he co urt al so fo und by cl ear a nd c o nvi nci ng e vi d ence t hat M o t her had neglect ed t he chi l d ren “ t o t he p o i nt 18 t hat s uch negl ect i s shocking” fo r at l east fo ur mo nt hs p ri o r t o t he f i l i ng of t he p et i t i o n. -13- alleg es only

one ground: abandonment by willful failure to support or vi sit for the four month period immediately

prec eding the filing of the pe t i t i o n
. T his pleading limit ed the r uling to that g round beca use t o find otherwise would place the parent at a disadvantag e in prepa ring a def ense. See I

n re M.J .B. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 651 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) ( holding that be ca u s e o f t h e fundamental nature of par ental rig hts, courts must take a ve ry strict view of pr ocedur al omissions t hat could put a par ent at a disa dvantag e in pre paring for tria l). 17
The B s also arg ue that they proved that prior to his incarce ration F ather eng ag ed in conduc t that exhibi ted a wanton disreg ard f or t he we lfareof his child, ref erring to the la st part of Te nn. Code An n. § 3 6- 1- 10 2( 1) (A )( iv)

. Ho we ve r, the y didno t c omee ve n c los e to a lle g ing thi s g ro un d inthe ir petition, and Father c ould not be considere d to have be en on notice that he wo u l d have to de fend ag ainst this charg e. The trial court did not make any finding s on this allegation and was not aske d to because it was not an issue r aised in the plea dings or at trial.
The orde r terminating Father’s pa renta l rig hts is reverse d.
VI . G ROUND S AS T O M OTH ER
He re in, thetria l c ou rt fo un d that Mo the r h a d a ba nd on e d h e r c hil dr e n b y wi llf ull y faili ng to support them or maintain contac t w ith them in the f our months prec eding the filing of the pe tition. 18 The e vidence is clear

that Mother’s attention to the needs of her children was sporadic at best and that she did not visit wit h them or off er the m any

support betwee n J u l y 3 , 2 0 0 3 and Nove mber 3, 2003, the date on w hich the B s filed their termination petition.
The evide n c e f

r o m w h ic h w il lf

u ln e s s o r in te n t c a n b e in f

e rr e d , h o w e v e r , is le s s c le ar. Custodyof the c hildren wa s chang ed to the Bs on J uly 28. Thus, for over three of the re levant four months, the children we re no long er w it h M s
. M u stin. Ms. Mus tin did not t ell Mother about the c ha ng e in c us tod y
. Af

te r Mo the r fo un d ou t a nd be c a me ho sti le to M s. Mu sti n ina te le ph on e c a ll, Ms. Mu sti n to ok

no mor e c a lls fr om h e r. At theB s’ re qu e st, Ms. Mu sti n d id n ot r e ve a l th e ide nti ty of thec hil dr e n’ s c us tod ians
. The e vidence is not clear w hen Mother le arne d the childre n wer e with the B s. Father c alled them on behalf

of hi mself and Mother

sometime after

he wa s relea sed fr om prison. Mrs. B testified Mother did not make c ontact with them until around Thanksg iving, a fter the petition was filed.
It is d i fficult to under stand how Mother c ould have visited the c hildren while she w as unawa re of their wher eabouts. Of course , she could have ta ken steps throug h the courts to find theA t s om e poi nt pri or t o t he f i l i ng of t he pet i t i on, M s
. M us t i n drove M r s
. B t o t he N api er H om es ar ea. T hey 19
s aw M ot h er on a s t r ee t c or n er t h er e wi t h a g r ou p of pe opl e. M s
. M u s t i n t es t i f i ed M ot h er w as ma k i n g s u g g es t i v e body
m o vem ent s. N ei t her wom an ap p roac hed M o t her or at t em p t ed t o t al k t o her.

A l t ho ugh M s. M ust i n did no t s t at e t hat Jul y 28 was t he exact d at e gi ven, t hat i s t he i m p l i cat i o n. I t was t he 20 hea r i ng on t hat dat e t hat res ul t ed i n t he ch ang e of cu s t od y t o t he B s
. T he B s make much of M ot her ’ s f ai l ur e t o app ear

(c o n tinu e d ...) -14- children and establish visitation. S he did file a petition for visitation in J anuary of 2004, but it was no t he ardun til thehe ari ng on thepe tit ionto t e rm inate pa re nta l rig hts . T he B s d id n ot thin k it wo uld be g o o d f o r th e c h il d r e n to s e e th e ir mo th e r s in c e h e r p r io r c o n d u c t o f le a v in g th e m c au s e d them a n x i e t y. Thereis lit tle evidenc e of Mother ’s situation before Father wa s relea sed. At the time of the 19 hearing and for some time befor e, she lived w ith him at his house. She had e ntere d and complete d a drug treatment prog ram shortly befor e the he aring , outside the rele vant four month period.
Wit h reg ard to support, the evidenc e of Mother’s ability to pay support is sketchy . Therewas testimonyshe re g ularly

rec eived c hild support for D.D. from D.D.’s fathe r and did not send any of that money

to Ms. Mustin or t he Bs during the re levant four month period. Ther e is no evidenc e that Mo the r h a d a ny

oth e r s ou rc e of

inc omedu ri ng that ti me
. F urthe r, theB s’ a tto rn e y state d th e B s d id not reque st and would not have a cce pted an ysupport; Ms. Musti n never asked Mother

to provide su pp ort. When the Depa

rtment of Children’s Service s or other child-plac ing ag ency obtains custody of c h i l d re n re m o ved fr om the pare nts’ home, it is required to notify the par ents of the statutory definitions of aba ndonment and the criteria and proce dures for termination of par ental rig hts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403( a)( 2)(A)

. I n such situations, a court cannot terminate a par ent’s rig hts on the g round of a

bandonment unless such notice , including the conseque nce o f ab andonment, has been g iven by the ag ency

petitioning for

termination or the co u rt itself. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 2- 40 3( a )( 2) (B ). I n the c a se be fo reus , n e ith e r D CS no r ano the r a g e nc y wa s in vo lve d, so thestatut e does not apply

. Nonethele ss, Mothe r’s knowledg e of a duty or expectation that she pr ovide support and visit is a fac tor in det er m i n ing w illfulness. W e find nothing in the rec ord to indicate she was e ve r t oldsh e wa s e xpe c te d to pr ov idesu pp ort or fa c e te rm inatio n o f h e r p are nta l rig hts

. Mother appe are d at the hea ring on May

1, 2003, on Ms. Mustin’s petiti on for c ustody , having been br o u g h t f

r o m jail th a t d a y
. T h e r e s u lt w a s a n a g r e e me n t b y M o th e r th a t th e c h il d ren w ere d e p e n d e n ta n d n e g l e c t e d a n d a n a g r e e m e n tt h a tM s
. M u s t i n s h o u l d b e g i v e n t e m p o r ar y c u s t o d y. Mother also a g ree d to attend and suc cessfu l ly complete a

long- term, inpatient drug and alc ohol tr e a tme nt p ro g ram. M s. Mu sti n te sti fi e d th a t lo ng te rm me a nt an ex ten ded pr og ram of tw e lveto twenty -four

months. The temporary arr ang ement was to rema in in effe ct until chang ed by further ag ree ment, and the f

inal hearing on the petition was stay ed “upon [Mother] complying w ith the order s of this court.” Ms. Mustin testified that at the May 1 hearing Mothe r was informed that the next court date wa s in July

. As of the Julyhearing on the Bs’ petition for custody , Ms. Mustin had 20(

. . . con t i n u ed) 20 at t h at h ea r i n g , bu t t h e r ec or d does not s h ow t h at M ot h er w as e v er s er v ed wi t h or n ot i f i ed of t h e pet i t i on t o g i v e cu s t ody t o t he B s.
T he o rder st at ed t he chi l d ren were fo und t o b e d ep end ent and negl ect ed d ue t o ab and o nm ent b y t hei r mo t her,

21 “d u e to the C o u rt’s a ssu m p tio n o f [M o the r ’s ] c o n tinu e d d ru g us e , an d d u e to [M o the r’s] failur e to c o m p ly with this Cour t ’ s pr i or O r der i n t h i s ma t t er
. ” T h e ev i den t i ar y ba s i s for t h es e f i n di n g s doe s n ot a ppea r i n t h i s r ec or d.

T he requir em ent t hat s he ent er and co m p l et e a l o ng t erm i np at i ent t reat m ent p rogram wo ul d seem t o present 22 d iff ic u lti e s w ith re g u la r v isitatio n o r su p p o rt. -15- not hear d fr o m M other since the May 1 hearing. T he next tim e Mother c ontacted her wa s after Mother found out the c hildren we re living elsewhe re. The B s filed their pe tition for c ustody J uly 28, 2003, and in it asked that proce ss issue and that Mo the r b e se rv e d and be re qu ir e d to a ns we r. Th e pe tit ioninc lud e d a no tic e , h ow e ve r, that a he ari ng wa s to be he ld o n July 28 a t 9: 00 a .m. , th e sa meday it w a s f ile d. A h e ari ng wa s in de e d h e ld that day , w ith ou t Mo the r o r F a the r, a nda n o rd e r w a s e nte re d A ug us t 7 a wa rd ing c us tod y to theB s. 21 Nothing in the r ecor d indicates Mother was informed by

any one that her

failure t o v i sit or su pp ort th e c hil dr e n f

or fo ur c on se c uti ve mon ths c ou ld r e su lt i n te rm inatio n o f h e r p are nta l rig hts

. 22 Although a par ent has a

continuing r esponsibilityto support his or her c hildren. In re L.J .C. 124 S.W .3d 609, 621 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), a termination of par ental rig hts based on abandonment for f ailure to support must include a determination that the failure wa s willful. I n other c ases, DCS’s lack of clarity in notify ing pare nts of the e lements and c onsequenc es of a bandonment has be en found to detra ct from proof of willfulness. See, e .g. , In re J .J.C., D.M.C., and S.J.B , 148 S.W .3d at 927; Sta te v . D e ma rr , No

. M 2 0 0 2 -0 2 6 0 3 -C OA -R 3 -J V, 2 0 0 3 W L 2 1 9 4 6 7 2 6 , at * 1 3 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Au g. 13, 2003).
We find that the evidenc e did not rise to the leve l of cle ar an d co n v incing that Mother willfullyfailed to support or v i s i t h er children during the four months immediately prec eding the filing of the petition.
I n addition to abandonment , t h e trial c ourt, on its own motion, found “by clea r and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that c on dit ion s le a din g to thec hil dr e n’ s r e mov a l f ro m [Mo the r] f

or ne g le c t st ill persist and ther efor e pre vent a sa fe r eturn to t he home of [ Mother] for the c hildren ...” Thecourt’s order echoe s the statutory

lang uag e desc ribing an additional g round upon which a terminat i o n of pare ntal rig hts can be based, c ommonlycalled pe rsistence of conditi ons. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 113(g )(3) (A).
The B s’ petition alleg ed abandonment as its onlyg round as to Mother; it made no me ntion of per sistence of conditions or fac ts r elevant to that g round. On a ppeal, Mother

arg ues that it was a violation of her

due proc ess rig hts to base the termination of her pare ntal rig hts on a g round thatT he bri ef s t at es t hat m i nim um r equi r ement s of due pr oces s wer e pr ovi ded M ot her becau s e s he was gi ven 23
wr i t t en not i ce of t he cl ai ms and t he evi dence aga i ns t her i n t he pet i t i on, gi ven t he op po r t un i t y t o be hea r d, was af forded t ri al ri ght s, had a neut ral judge, and was gi ven an o rder reci t i ng t he f act s rel i ed on b y t he co urt

. I t i s o n t he b asi s o f t he
ass ert i o n t hat M o t her was gi ven wri t t en no t i ce o f t he cl ai m s and evi d ence agains t he r t hat we i nt erpret t he B s’ po si t i o n, sin c e the o n ly gr o u n d a lleg e d w a s a b a n d o n m e n t i n the fo u r m o n ths p re c e d ing the fi ling o f t h e p e tit io n . C o n se q u e n tly,
a ltho u g h the B s’ state m e n t t h a t, “T h e T ria l C o u rt’s e la b o ra tio n o n the fac ts o f t h e c a se d o e s n o t ne g a te it s h o ld ing c le a rly b a se d up o n the p ro o f p re se n te d ” c o u ld b e re a d a n o the r w a y, w e inte rp re t i t, a n d the re st o f the a rg u m e n t, to e sse n tially
s t at e t hat ev en i f

t he cour t was i n er r or i n re l y i ng o n a groun d not al l ege d i n t he pet i t i on, s uch er r or w as ha r ml es s i n v i ew of t he f i ndi ng bas ed on t he al l ege d gr ound. A dd i t i onal l y , t he B s do not ar gu e t her e wa s cl ear an d convi nci ng ev i dence t o s u ppor t t h e per s i s t en ce of c on di t i on s g r ou n d.

In G on z al es v. D epart m ent of Ch i l dre n’s Ser vi ces , 13 6 S.W

. 3 d 61 3 , 61 7 (T enn. 20 0 4 ), our Sup rem e C o urt 24 hel d t hat t he ques t i on of i nt er ven t i on i n a t er mi nat i on of pare nt al r i gh t s cas e hea r d i n j uv eni l e c our t s houl d be ana l y zed und er R ul e 2 4 o f t he T enness ee R ul es of C i vi l P roce d ure bec ause t ho se r ul es app l y i n chancery and ci rcui t co urt s and t ho se court s have co ncurrent juri sdi ct i o n wi t h juveni l e co urt s t o hear t erm i nat i o n of p arent al ri ght s cases, be cause t he R ules o f Ju ve nil e P ro ce d ure d o no t ad d ress int erv en t i o n, and b ec au se the a p p l i ca t i o n o f the ru l e w o uld no t co m p ro m i se t h e ef f i ca cy of j u v en i l e pr oce edi n g s
. W e t h i n k a s i mi l ar a n al y s i s w ou l d r es u l t i n t h e a ppl i ca t i on of T en n
. R

. C i v
. P

. 15 t o t er mi n at i on pr oce edi n g s i n j u v en i l e cou r t s
. T h e Rul es of J u v en i l e Proced ure d o no t d i r ec t l y a ddr es s t h e i s s u e of
am end m ent of p l ead i ngs t o co nfo rm to th e evi d ence o r express or i m p l i ed co nsent t o t ry i ss ues not s et out i n t he p le a d ing s. R u le 3 9 o f t h o se ru le s, go v e rn ing ter m ina tio n o f p a re n ta l r igh ts c a se s, ho w e v e r, sta te s tha t t h e c o u rt sh a ll
co nd uct a heari ng “ t o d et erm i ne t he i ss ues r ai sed b y t he p et i t i o n and by any answer( s) f i l ed

. ” T enn. R

. Juv. P

. 39 (f )( 1 ). T hi s r ul e does not conf l i ct wi t h t he procedur e a ut hor i zed by T enn
. R. Ci v. P

. 15

. 02 , wh i ch s houl d be s t r i ct l y cons t r ued in a p ro c e e d ing to d e p riv e a p a re n t o f his o r h e r c o n stitutio n a lly- p ro te c te d rig h ts. -16- was not raised in any

of the plea dings. TheBs do not ar g ue that the c ourt’s termination of Mother ’s pare ntal rig hts on the persistenc e of conditions g round was appropriate. I nstead, they assert that the trial court ba sed its decision on the g round allege d in the petition, i.e ., abandonme nt, and on the evidenc e pre sented. 23
We a g r e e w i t h M o t h e r ’ s ar g u m e n ta n dt h e B s ’ d e c i s i o n n o tt o c o n t e s tt h a tar g u m e n t. Gene rally , a court may

only try issues that have be en raised in the pleading s. A major purpose of pleading s is “to give notice of the issues to be tried so that the opposing party can adequately prepa re for tria l.” Ke is li n g v . Ke is li ng , 9 2 S

. W

. 3 d 374, 377 (Tenn. 2002) . Proper notice is considere d a fundame ntal component of due proce ss. Mu lla ne v . Ce ntr al H an ov e r B an k

& Tru st Co. , 3 39 U. S. 30 6, 31 4, 70 S.Ct . 6 52 , 6 57 (1 95 0) ; State v. Pe arson, 85 8 S.W. 2d 87 9, 88 4 (T e nn
. 19 93 ). Whil e it is true th a t p arti e s may

try a n is s u e n o t r a is e d inth e p le a d in g s b y e xp r e s s o r

imp li e d c o n s ent, see Te nn . R. Civ . P. 15 .0 2, we c a nn ot c on c lud e that th e pa rt ie s trie d a

tot a lly se pa rate g ro un d inthi s 24
ca s e. T h er e i s n o thing in the r ecor d to indicate that the pa rties had any

rea son to believe that the court wa s considering another g round.
Be cause the private interest at stake in this case is fundame ntal, i.e ., the permanent seve ring o f a l l p ar e n t

- c h i l d t i e s ; b e c au s e t h e r i s k o f a n e rr o n e o u s d e p r i v a t i o n o f t h o s e r i g h t s i s c r e a t e d b y a su a s po nte ruling on a g round not alleg ed is g reat; and bec ause the g overnme nt has no compelling interest in such a proce dure, due proce ss compels reversa l of t he trial court’s holding that Mother’s pare ntal rig hts could be termination on the ba sis of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3 )( A). See Keisling , 92 S.W .3d at 378-80. Mother was at a distinct disadvantag e in pr eparing to de fend on a g ro un d th a t w a s n ot alle g e d, a ndthec ou rt s a rere qu ir e d to vie w d ue pro cess re qu ir e me nts stric tly-17-

in cases i n v o l v i n g the termination of pa renta l rig hts. See I

n re M.J .B. , 140 S.W .3d at 651. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s holding on the g round of pe rsistence of conditions.
IV. C ONCL US I ON
Much of the testimony at trial and much of the trial court’s ruling had to do wi t h the children ’ s b e s t i n te

r ests, i.e. , the sec ond prong of the two-pa rt requir ement for

termination of par ental rig hts. I t would be i mproper for us to determine w hether there was c lear

and convinc ing e vidence that such intere sts lay

in termination of Mother’ s and F ather ’s par ental rig h t s beca use of our c o n c l u s i o n s t h a tn o g r o u n d f o r t e r m i n a t i o n w a s s h o w n b y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a n d s t a t u t o r i l ymandated sta ndard. In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d at 368 (“ Be cause g rounds for terminating the par ental ri ghts of [th e fathe r] h a ve no t be e n e sta bli sh e d, wedo no t r e a c h th e be st i nte re st o f the c hil d a na ly sis .” ); In re J

.W .P. , 154 S.W .3d at 593 (holding that it would be pre mature to a ddress the issue of best intere sts under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( b) abse nt the establish m en t of g rounds under subsection (a ) of that statute)

. Courts are not authorized to terminate a pare nt’s rig hts onlybeca use the c hildren would be better of f with such termination. Theremust first be a showing that a par ent has in esse nce f orfe ited his or her rights throug h conduct the le g islature has de termined c onstitut es suffic ient dang er of harm to the child to be made a

g round for

termination. “The fede ral a nd stat e co n s tituti ons require the opportunity for an individualiz ed determination that a pare nt is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her

child befor e the f

undamental right to the c are and custody of the c hild can be ta ken away .” In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d at 188. Thus, despite the g ood intentions of the Bs to provide a stable and nurturing environment for these c hildren by

adopting them, our dec ision cannot be ba sed on the be nefits to the childre n from such an outc ome without proof of g rounds. W e mus t also base our decision solely

on the g rounds actua lly plead and the proof pr esente d at trial and pr operly admitted into evidence

. Howeve r, our r ever sal of the termination order doe s not affe ct the orde r curre n t l y in place g iving the Bs c ustody

of the c hildren. In re Vale ntine , 79 S.W .3d at 550. Questions re g arding future custody or visitation arrang ements re main within the purview of the juvenile court. Id

. The orde r of the trial court t er minating Mother ’s par ental rig hts is reverse d. The orde r te rm inatin g F a the r’ s p are nta l rig hts is al so re ve rs e d. Th e c os ts on a pp e a l areta xedto the app e lle e s.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE