17-1702-cr
United States v. Diallo

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32 .1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRON IC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York on the
25 th day of May, two thousand eighteen.

Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges

.

_____________________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee

,

v. 17-1702-cr

MAMADOU HABIB DIALLO,

Defendant-Appellant

.

_____________________________________________________
Appearing for Appellant: John S. Wallenstein, Garden City, N.Y.

Appearing for Appellee: Matthew Laroche, A ssistant United States Attorney (Daniel B. Tehrani, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief ), for Geoffrey S. Berman, United Stat es Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, N.Y.

Appeal from the United States Di strict Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J. ).2 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED

.

Mamadou Diallo appeals from the May 16, 2017 final judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pauley, J .) convicting him of one count of conspiracy to export and transport stolen motor vehicles in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and sentencing him principally to 24 months’ imprisonment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, a nd specification of issues for review.

On appeal, Diallo argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is longer than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. “We re view a sentence for procedural
and substantive reasonableness under a defe rential abuse-of-dis cretion standard.” United States v. Thavaraja , 740 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). Substantive
reasonableness “focuses on a distri ct court’s explanation of its se ntence in light of the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Gonzalez , 529 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2008). We will vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness only if it “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Watkins , 667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

Diallo argues that the district court faile d to adequately consid er his troubled childhood, his remorse, and the consequences of removal, pa rticularly since Diallo was granted asylum in the United States based on his political persecuti on in Nigeria. We disa gree. The record makes
clear that the district court di d consider those facts but found th em outweighed by the fact that Diallo engaged in a serious crime over the cour se of at least a year . The district court acknowledged that Diallo’s sentence was likely to result in his removal but noted “that is something that [Diallo] should have been we ll aware of throughout hi s tenure in the United States.” App’x at 216-17. There is no error.

We have considered the remainder of Dia llo’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the di strict court hereby is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk