Filed 8/6/24 P. v. Khamo CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHASSAQ GEORGE KHAMO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D082469

 (Super. Ct. No. SCE413435)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Herbert J. Exarhos, Judge. Affirmed.

Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, 

A. Natasha Cortina and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
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A jury found Chassaq George Khamo guilty of assault (Pen. Code,1

§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(b)(2)(A)).

Khamo contends on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred because it

failed to instruct the jury that the victim, H.T., was testifying under a grant 

of immunity. We disagree and therefore affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

One evening in 2022, H.T. sat in his truck and shot pellets at pigeons 

perched on an electrical wire. Khamo, who had been feeding the pigeons for 

years, approached H.T.’s truck with another man, S.M., to confront H.T.

Using a bicycle chain with a lock on it, Khamo broke the truck’s passenger 

window while S.M. smashed the driver’s side window. H.T. got out of his

truck holding a club or stick and the three men brawled. During the fight, 

H.T. suffered a concussion and a broken leg. 

The People charged both Khamo and S.M. with assault (§ 245, subd. 

(a)(4)), misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(b)(2)(A)), and other charges 

that were later dismissed. The prosecution filed a request for an order 

compelling privileged testimony from H.T. pursuant to section 1324, which in 

relevant part, prohibits the People from using the compelled testimony 

against the witness in a subsequent criminal case unless the prosecution is 

based on “perjury, false swearing or contempt” in connection with the order. 

(§ 1324.) After discussing the request with the parties at a pre-trial hearing, 

the court granted the prosecution’s request and ordered that H.T. testify

under the immunity conditions described in section 1324.

H.T. testified about the incident at trial, and he was cross-examined by 

Khamo’s attorney. At no point during H.T.’s testimony did anyone mention 

or introduce evidence of his section 1324 immunity. 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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When the parties discussed proposed jury instructions with the court, 

the court stated that it would modify CALCRIM No. 226 on the credibility of 

witnesses to exclude certain bracketed portions of the instruction. Although 

the proposed instruction included some bracketed language beyond the 

default text, the instruction did not include the following bracketed factor 

among the list of factors for the jury to consider when evaluating credibility:

“Was the witness promised immunity or leniency in exchange for his or her 

testimony?” (See CALCRIM No. 226.) Neither party objected to the 

instruction as modified, nor did they object when the court gave the

instruction to the jury.2 The jury found Khamo guilty of the assault and 

misdemeanor vandalism. 

DISCUSSION

Khamo contends on appeal that the court erred by failing to instruct 

the jury that H.T. testified under a grant of immunity. Specifically, Khamo 

argues that the court had a sua sponte duty to revise CALCRIM No. 226 to 

include the bracketed language instructing the jury that among the factors it 

could consider was whether a witness was promised immunity or leniency in 

exchange for his testimony. (See CALCRIM No. 226.) We disagree.

In criminal cases, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the 

jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the 

2 As given to the jury, CALCRIM No. 226 stated in relevant part: “You 

alone must judge the credibility or believability of the witnesses. In deciding 

whether testimony is true and accurate, use your common sense and 

experience. You must judge the testimony of each witness by the same 

standards, setting aside any bias or prejudice you may have. You may 

believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony. Consider the testimony 

of each witness and decide how much of it you believe. [¶] In evaluating a 

witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to 

prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of that testimony.” The instruction 

then listed various factors the jury “may consider” in evaluating credibility.
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evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v. 

Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73.) However, “[a] trial court has no sua sponte 

duty to revise or improve upon an accurate statement of law without a 

request from counsel [citation], and failure to request clarification of an 

otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of 

appeal.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 638 (Lee); People v. Welch

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [where “the court gives an instruction correct in 

law, but the party complains that it is too general, lacks clarity, or is 

incomplete, he must request the additional or qualifying instruction in order 

to have the error reviewed.”] [Cleaned up.].) “We determine whether a jury 

instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo 

standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) 

We ask whether the instructions as a whole fully and fairly set forth the 

applicable law and assume that jurors are capable of understanding and 

correlating all jury instructions given. (Ibid.) 

Khamo does not contend the court’s instruction on witness credibility

misstated the law. He argues, rather, that the court should have added 

H.T.’s immunity from prosecution to the instruction’s list of factors for 

evaluating credibility. But Khamo forfeited his claim of error because if he 

“believed the instruction . . . required elaboration or clarification, he was 

obliged to request such elaboration or clarification in the trial court.” (Lee, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 638.) When the court discussed the instruction with

the parties, neither party objected. At no point did Khamo’s attorney request 

that the court add the factor regarding immunity to the instruction, even 

though counsel had the opportunity to do so. Contrary to what Khamo 

argues, the court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on H.T.’s 

immunity. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 508; People v. 
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Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 867, fn. 20 [“Defendant points to no authority 

requiring the court to instruct the jury that immunized-witness testimony is 

to be viewed with distrust. We have held that the court has no such duty to 

instruct sua sponte.”].)

Moreover, even if Khamo’s attorney had proposed the additional 

language, there was no evidence of H.T.’s immunity admitted at trial. The 

Judicial Council’s Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 226 state that courts should 

give instructions on bracketed factors “that are relevant based on the 

evidence.” (Italics added; see Evid. Code, § 780, subds. (e), (i), & (k); People v. 

Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239 [“trial court must instruct on the general 

principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence”].) Neither 

party questioned H.T. about the immunity order, even though Khamo’s 

attorney could have on cross-examination. If she had, Khamo would have 

had a basis for requesting that the court include the bracketed language in 

CALCRIM No. 226 regarding immunity. But without any evidence that H.T. 

was testifying under a grant of immunity, the trial court would have had no 

obligation to do so even upon request. (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 

1, 30 [trial court “may properly refuse an instruction offered by the 

defendant . . . if it is not supported by substantial evidence”].)

For these reasons, we conclude that the court did not err in instructing 

the jury on witness credibility without including language about immunity.
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.