COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

PHILLIP T. LARGEN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2856-96-3 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 27, 1997 

COLLEEN H. LARGEN (HARTIS) 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

Richard C. Pattisall, Judge 

 (Arthur E. Smith, on brief), for appellant. 

 (John J. Robertson; Legal Aid Society of the 

New River Valley, Inc., on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Phillip T. Largen (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court classifying a Honda automobile as marital property. 

 Husband raises four arguments on appeal. He contends that the 

trial court erred by (1) making an equitable distribution award 

to Colleen H. Largen (Hartis) (wife) when she did not seek 

equitable distribution of marital property or allege the 

existence of an oral agreement; (2) finding that the parties 

entered into an enforceable oral premarital contract; (3) finding 

that husband's separately titled automobile was transmuted into 

marital property by oral agreement and other factors; and (4) 

determining the value of the car in the absence of any evidence. 

 Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 "In reviewing an equitable distribution award, we rely 

heavily on the trial judge's discretion in weighing the 

particular circumstances of each case." Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. 

App. 1, 8, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1988). "Fashioning an equitable 

distribution award lies within the sound discretion of the trial 

judge and that award will not be set aside unless it is plainly 

wrong or without evidence to support it." Srinivasan v. 

Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). 

 The sole issue concerns the 1991 Honda automobile titled in 

husband's name at the time of the marriage. The evidence 

established that husband purchased the car in 1991 but that wife 

paid the entire debt of $13,111.52 two weeks prior to the 

marriage and gave the title to husband. The court found that the 

parties agreed to pay off the car so that they could obtain 

financing on a new home. The court also found that husband 

agreed to title the car in both names, but failed to do so. Wife 

also paid off husband's separate debts of $6,000 and paid all 

maintenance and insurance on the car. Husband was unemployed for 

one year during the two-year marriage. 

Pleadings

 The trial court had equitable distribution jurisdiction 

pursuant to husband's prayer in his cross-bill for the court to 

determine the parties' property rights. See Lowe v. Lowe, 233 

Va. 431, 433, 357 S.E.2d 31, 32 (1987). After finding it clearly 
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necessary to do so, the court bifurcated this matter, entered the 

decree of divorce, and retained jurisdiction to resolve the 

parties' equitable distribution. See Code § 20-107.3(A). 

Oral Agreement

 The trial court found that the parties agreed to retitle 

husband's automobile in both parties' names. Husband contends 

wife failed to prove the existence of any agreement and that it 

would be unenforceable because it was not in writing. See Code 

§ 20-148. 

 The agreement does not fail because it was not in writing. 

"To be valid and enforceable, the terms of an oral agreement must 

be reasonably certain, definite, and complete to enable the 

parties and the courts to give the agreement exact meaning." 

Richardson v. Richardson, 10 Va. App. 391, 395, 392 S.E.2d 688, 

690 (1990). In the absence of any understanding that the oral 

agreement will be reduced to writing, the agreement is not 

unenforceable, but "the proponent of the oral contract has the 

burden of proving all elements of a valid enforceable contract." 

Id. at 396, 392 S.E.2d 690. The trial court found the terms of 

the oral agreement sufficiently definite, as do we. Wife paid 

over ninety percent of the purchase price of the automobile in 

furtherance of the parties' goal to purchase a home together. 

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that 

the parties agreed to jointly title the car but that husband 

failed to follow through with his obligation under the agreement. 
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 Transmutation

 Husband contends that the trial court erred in finding that 

the car was transmuted into marital property, as the car was 

titled in his name only and wife's payments prior to the marriage 

did not constitute personal efforts under Code § 20-107.3(A)(3). 

 Husband does not challenge the court's findings that wife paid 

$13,111 of the total purchase price of $14,500 and paid all 

maintenance and insurance costs. 

 As noted above, the court found that husband failed to 

retitle the car in both parties' names. But for husband's 

violation of the parties' agreement, any discussion of the 

classification of the car as marital property would be mere 

cavil. Title alone does not sway the decision, for "whether the 

property is separate or marital is determined by the statutory 

definition and is not determined by legal title." Garland v. 

Garland, 12 Va. App. 192, 195, 403 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1991). 

 [T]o disregard the parties' contributions to 

the acquisition and maintenance of the 

property and how and when they acquired 

rights and equities in the property--whether 

pre- or post-marital--is to disregard the 

mandate of the statute. Nothing in Code 

§ 20-107.3 limits consideration of the 

various subsection (E) factors to the time 

frame of the marriage. 

Floyd v. Floyd, 17 Va. App. 222, 227, 436 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1993). 

 "Property which is initially separate may become marital 

property either by express agreement, or by the manner in which 

it is maintained." McDavid v. McDavid, 19 Va. App. 406, 410-11, 
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451 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1994). See Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. 

App. 446, 454, 364 S.E.2d 523, 528 (1988). In this case, there 

was both an express, but unfulfilled, agreement and wife's 

greater contributions and maintenance. We cannot say that the 

trial court was plainly wrong in ruling that the automobile 

purchased by husband prior to the marriage, but ninety percent 

paid for and maintained by wife, was transmuted into marital 

property. 

Valuation

 The evidence established that the car was purchased for 

$14,500 in 1991 and maintained throughout the marriage. Neither 

party presented evidence of the car's current value. The court 

ruled that 

 from the evidence of the purchase price of 

the vehicle, the loan payoff balance, the 

plaintiff's efforts directed to the care, 

maintenance and condition of the vehicle, her 

use of the vehicle, pertinent periods of 

timespan, depreciation and other factors 

considered and within the knowledge of the 

Court, that the value of the marital property 

in question is $12,000, although the Court 

acknowledges that neither party offered 

evidence of the value of the Honda on 

September 22, 1995, the date of the 

evidentiary hearing. 

The court's decision was not based on judicial notice of facts 

not in evidence, even though the only precise value amount given 

by the parties was the purchase price in 1991. Cf. Darnell v. 

Barker, 179 Va. 86, 93, 18 S.E.2d 271, 275 (1942). We cannot say 

on appeal that the court's finding that the car was worth $12,000 
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was unsupported by the evidence. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.