Bond Stree t markets under the names “ Bond Stree t,” “Stebco,” “Te ch-Rite by Bond 1 Street,” a nd “Tra vel Rite by

Bond Stree t.” Public Admin. R. Doc. No. 1.

Slip Op. 07 - 153 

## UNI TED STATES COU

RT OF INTERNATIO

NAL TRADE

: BO ND STREET, L TD, : : Plaintiff, : :

v. : B e fo re : M USG RA VE , Senior Jud ge : Court No. 07-00226 UN I TE D ST AT ES, : : De fe nd ant. : : OP IN ION [Dism issing for

lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to ref iling.] Dec ided: October 25, 2007 Fi tc h, Kin g a nd

Caf fe ntz is ( J am es Ca ffe ntz is ), for

the plaintiff. Peter D. Ke isler , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Gen e ra l; JeanneE. Davidson , Direc tor, Patricia M. McCarthy , Assistant Director , Commercial L itigation Branc h, Civil Division, U.S. Depa rtment of J ustice ( Stephen C. Tosini ), fo r t he de fe nd ant. Cro we ll &Mo rin g LLP

( Ma tth e w P. J

aff e ) for proposed de fenda

nt-intervenor s Gleason I ndustrial Products, I nc., and Pre cision Products, I nc.

Pla int if f B on d Stre e t L td. (“ B on d Stre e t” ), an im po rt e r o f b us ine ss a

nd tr a ve l pr od

uc ts, 1 ini tiate d th is a c tio n u

nd e r 1 9 U .S. C. § 15 16 a

(2 000) to c on te st a

fi na l de te rm inatio n b y

the U. S. Depa rtment of Commerce , I nternational Trade Administration, that Bond Street’ s “Stebco slide-f latCourt No. 07-00226 Pag e 2

car ts” are wi t h i n t he scope of the a ntidumping duty

order on Hand Tr

ucks fr om the People’s Re pu bli c of Chi na . Pl. ’s June 27 , 2 00 7 Summo ns ; see Hand Trucks and Certain Parts T hereof from thePe op le ’s Re

pu bli c of Chin a: Sc op e Ru lin g on Ste bc o Por tab le Sli de -F lat Car t , I nv. A-570-891 (M ay 30 , 2 00 7) P ub . A dmi n. R. D oc . N o. 12 (“ Sc op e De te rm inatio n” ). F or the re a so ns se t f

or th below, the c ourt conc ludes that this action is prematu re , an d wi l l dismiss the matter f or lac k of jurisdiction. Backg ro und Bond Stree t commence d this action by filing a summons with the Court on J une 27, 2007. On J uly 30, 2007 (33 day s later) , Bond Stree t submit ted its complaint to t h e C ourt, which wa s attache d to a “Consent Motion for Ex tension of Time,” whe rein B ond Street soug ht leave f rom the Court to file its complaint out-of-time. Pl.’s Consent Mot. for Ext ension of Time. In an orde r date d Aug ust 1, 2007, the Court gr anted B ond Street’s motion and order ed the Clerk of the Court to acc ept for f iling B ond Street’s untimely complaint. See Bond Street, L td., v. United States , Court No. 07- 226 (CI T Aug . 1, 2007) (or der g ranting Plaintiff’s motion to fil e its complaint out-of-time). On Aug ust 8, 2007, the defe ndant filed a motion to di smiss t he cur rent a ction on the g round that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the claim. The defenda nt asser ts that under Ge or

ge tow n Steel Corp. v. United States , 801 F .2 d 130 8 (F e d. Cir . 198 6) , the tim e lim its sp e c if ie d b y 19 U. S.C. § 1516a(a )(2) (A) a

re jurisdictional a

nd the plaintiff’s f

ailure to file its complaint within 30 day s of fi lin g the su mmo ns pr e c lud e s th e Court fr om a c qu ir ingjur isd ic tio n o ve r the ma tte r. De f. ’s Mo t. t o Dismiss at 2-3.Court No. 07-00226 Pag e 3

I n response to the motion to dismiss , the plaintiff asse rts, int e r a lia , that the C ourt is indeed wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n o ve r t he ma tte r; ho we ve r, the pla int if f c on te nd s th a t th e Cou

rt lac ks su

bje c tm a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n n o t b e c a u s e t h e c o mp l a i n t w a s u n t i me l y filed , b ut b e c a

us e the e nti re a c tio n is pr e ma tur e . Pl.’s Reply to D ef.’ s Mot. to Dismiss at 1-3. Plaintiff c ontends that bec ause Commerc e transmitted its decision to Bond Street via f acsimile, and never sent a copy throug h the mail, the 30- day judicial-appe al per iod set forth i n 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a) (2)( A)(ii) ne ver c ommenced to r un. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a )(2) (A)( ii) (2000) ( providing that an intere sted party may commence an ac tion in this C ourt by

filing a summons “within t h i rt y day s after

. . . the date of

mailing of

a deter mination”). The pla intiff asser ts that the Court should therefor e deny the def endant’ s motion to dismi ss and ins tead dism iss the action as premature. Pl.’s Reply to Def.’ s Mot. to Dism iss at 2-3. The de fenda

nt does not contest the fa ct that Commerce did not mail the decis i o n. Rather, the def endant as s er ts that, even if it wer e dete rmined that Commerce ’s transmittal of the de cision via fa csimile instead of mailing was e rror , such error would be harmless. Reply in Support of Def.’ s Mot. to Dismi ss at 3. Discussion I t is well established that this Cour t lacks jurisdiction wher e the c omplaint in an action br ou g ht u nd e r 1 9 U .S. C. § 15 16 a (a )( 2) (A ) i s f ile d mo re tha

n 30 day s af

te r the fi lin g of

the su mmo ns . See G eorgetown Steel , 8 01 F.2 d 1 30 8; Pistachio Group of Ass’n of Food Indus., Inc. v . United Sta te s, 11 CI T 537, 667 F.Supp. 886 (1987) (dismis sing action wher e plaintiffs filed a complaint 32 day s after the filing of the sum mons). Be cause “sec tion 1516a(a) (2)( A) spec ifies the ter ms and conditions upon w hich the United States has waive d its sovereig n immunit y in consenting to be suedCourt No. 07-00226 Pag e 4

in the Court of I nternational T rade , those limit ations must be strictly observe d and ar e not subject to impli ed exceptions.” Ge or ge tow n S te e l, 8 0 1 F. 2 d

at 1 3 1 2 (c i t i n g Lehman v. Nakshian, 45 3 U .S. 156, 161 (1981))

. Howeve r, it appea

rs that the C ourt has never addressed the question of whe ther Commerc e’s failure to mail a scope de termination to the plaintiff would rende r premature an ac tion challeng ing that deter mination. Hence , the issue that must be resolv ed i s n o t simply whether the Court has jurisdiction over the mer its of the case , but w hether this a ction should be dismiss ed as untimely filed

or dis mis se d a s pr e ma tur e . I f un tim e ly fi le d, the c a se mus t be dis mis se d a nd that is the e nd

of it; if pr e mat ure, th e Court

mus t di smi ss t

he c a se wi tho ut p re

jud ic e to r e fi lin g a ft e r C omm e rc e ma ils a copy of the Scope Deter

mination to the plaintiff. For the re asons set for th below, the cour

t finds that the su mm o n s w a s f

il e d p r e matu

r e ly , an d w il l d is mi s s th e c a s e f o r la c k o f ju

r is d ic ti o n without p re j u d i ce t o re fi l i n g. Wher e i t i s es t ab l i shed that the a g ency failed to mail a de cision or mailed it to the wrong

a d dre s s , co u rt s h av e u n i fo rm l y h el d t h at t h e j u ri s d i ct i o n al t i m e p er i o d d o es n o tco m m en ce . In Knickerboc ker Liquors Corp. v. United States , 432 F.Supp. 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1977), the U.S. Court of Cla ims he ld: The 180-da

y limit ation period be g ins to run no t from the date a protest is denied, but fr om t he date the no tic e of

de nia l is mailed

to the plaint i ff. Thus, until the ind e pe nd e nt, tho ug h r e la te d, ob lig a tio n to ma il the no tic e of de nia l is c omp lie d w ith by c us tom s, the c or

re sp on din g ob lig a tio n im po se d o n th e pl ain tif

f b y 28 U. S.C. [§] 2631(a) (1), to file a

summons withi n 180 day s therea fter doe s not attach.Court No. 07-00226 Pag e 5

Knickerboc ke r, 43 2 F . Su pp . at 13 49 (e mph a sis in origin a l) (h old ingfu rt he r t hat w he n Cu sto ms

ma ile d it s n oti c e of

de nia l to Pla int if

f t wo y e ars a ft e r t

he de c isi on

wa s r e nd e re d, Pla int if

f’ s summo ns , which wa s filed 6 day s after the date of

that mailing, wa s timely). Unfortunately , few“date of mailing ” ca ses addr ess whethe r the ac tua l re c e ipt of a de cision

cure s a def

ect in mailing or whe ther a n action commenc ed prior to t h e d at e o f mailing must be dis mis se d as prem atu re. H owe ver, sev eral case s i nt erpr eti ng si mi lar st atu to ry revi e w p e ri od s a dd

re ss these que stions, and those case s inform our dec ision in t his matter. I n W estern Union T

elegraph Co. v. F.C.C , 773 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the U.S. Court of Appea l s for the D istrict of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit”) w as fa ced w ith a question simil ar to that prese nted her e. In that case , a plainti ff had filed a petition for re view under 28 U.S.C. § 2344, which pr ov ide d th a t a

pe tit ion fo r j ud ic ia l r e vie w o f a

n ag e nc y or de r mus t be f

ile d “ wi thi n 6 0 d ay s a ft e r i ts entry .” 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1982). “ Entry ” w as s t at u t orily define d as occ urringon the date of publi c a ti o nin

th e F e d e r a l R e g is te r . H e n c e , a lt h o u g h th e o r d e r

w a s r e le a s e d

to th e p u

b li c on Ma r c h 8 , 1 9 8 5 , it

w a s n o t “ e n te r e d ” u n ti l M ar c h 2 1 , 1 9 8 5 , w h e nit w a s p u b li s h e d in th e F e d e r al Reg ister. The D .C. Circuit held that t h e p etition for re view, which ha d been f iled on Marc h 15, 1985, was pre mature and dismiss ed the action for lac k of jurisdiction. W estern Union , 773 F.2d at 381. The plaintiff in W estern Union ha d a

rgue d th a t “ it w a s not r e qu ir e d to wa it unti l

c omm e nc e me nt o f t

he pr e sc ri be d p e ri od

to s e e k r e vie w, be c a

us e the or de r w a s e ff

e c tiv e imm e diate lyCourt No. 07-00226 Pag e 6

upon its release to the public on Marc h 8 and was there fore ripe for revie w on that date.” Id . at 377. Howeve r, the Court explained: I t is no t a prin c ipl e of law that all ag e nc y a c tio n must be re vie wa ble a s so on

a s it is ef fe ct i v e and ripe–or indee d that all ag ency action nee d be re viewable at all. Her e the g overningstatutes provide that re view is unava ilab le until the date the Commi ssion gives public noti ce , whether or not the orde r bec omes eff ective a nd otherwise r ipe bef

ore the n; and we have neither been r efe rre d to nor ca n conce ive of any constitutional obstacle to that dispositi on in the circ umstances of this case. 77 3 F .2 d at 37 7 ( c it ati ons o mit te d) . T he Court fu rt he r o bs e rv e d th a t th e langua g e of the statut e requiringthat a petition for r evie w b e fi l ed “within 60 day s after its entry ,” esse ntially

cre ated a “window” for f

iling rather than a

“dea dline” for

filing, a nd noted that the C ourt could find no rele vant ca se whe re a

court interpr eted “ functionally identical statutory t i m e requirements for the filing of revie w petitions as establishing only a ter mination date, and not a c ommenceme nt date, for judicial jurisdiction.” Id . at 377-78 (c iting, inter ali a , British Steel v. United States , 6 CI T 200, 573 F.Supp. 1145 (1983))

. I nd e e d, thi s Co ur

t ha s in te rp re te d the statut or y tim e lim its e sta

bli sh e d f or jud ic ia l r e vie w i n a similar fa shion. I n British St eel , a p l ai n t i ff fi l edan ac t i o ni nt h i s C o u r t c h al l en gi n g a counter vailing duty

deter mination prior to the publication in the Fe d er al R eg ister of the counter vailing duty

order . The Court found that the action was prematurely filed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that “unde r [19 U.S.C

. § 1 516a(a )(2) (A)( 1983)] a final af firmative deter mination by

the I TA or I TC may not be reviewe d until afte r t he publi cation of an order based upon the deter

mination.” British St eel , 6 CI T at 204, 573 F .Supp. at 1149 (emphasis in orig inal). I n T yler v . Donovan , 3 CI T 6 2 , 5 3 5 F

. Su p p . 6 9 1 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , th e Co u rt a d dr essed the commencing of a judicial-re view period in a circ umstance w here the plaintiff had a ctual notice ofCourt No. 07-00226 Pag e 7

the ag ency

decision by

other mea

ns. I n Tyler , a plainti ff soug ht reviewof a de cision of the Secr etar y

o f La b o r d i s m i s s i n g h i s a

p p l i c a t i o nf

o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o nf

o r w o r k e r a d j u s t m e n ta s s i s t an c e . In dis mis sin g the a

pp lic a tio n, the Se c re tary

of L a bo r s e nt t he pla int if

f a le tte r n otify in g him that hi s

c la im h a d b e e n d e nie d a

nd that he ha d 60 day s to app e a l the de c isi on to thi s Cour t. Th e pla int if

f d id so, but filed the summons and complaint 82 day s after the letter w as mailed. Th e Court fo un d that the pla int if

f’ s summo ns and

c omp la int

we re no t un tim e ly

fi le d b e c a us e “the Sec reta

ry of L abor f

ailed to comply

with the applicable statute and re g ulations for the

commence ment of the statutory six ty -day period,” which re quired publication of the dec ision in t he Fe dera l Reg ister. Tyler , 3 CI T at 62, 535 F. Supp. at 693. As to the pl aintiff’s actual knowledg e of the dec ision, the Court found that the letter re ceive d by the plaintiff ser

ved only as “the Secre tary of L abor’ s informal method of infor ming plaintiff of

his final deter

mination . . .[ t] he letter d o es not

serve as the notice require d by the statute and implementing regulations.” Tyler , 3 CI T at 66, 535 F.Supp. at 694. Although the action bef

ore the court d o es n ot involve a publication re quirement, sec tion 1516a(a )(2) (A)( ii), much like the statutes discussed above, clea rly indicates a speci fi c t rig g ering

e ve nt t o c omm e nc e the 30 -d ay pe ri od fo r se e kin g jud ic ia l re vie w. I ns te a d o f d a te of pu bli c a tio n in the Fe dera l Reg ister, the statute spec ifies that a pa rty may seek judici al revie w of a scope de te rm inatio n “ [w]ithin

thi rt y da y s a ft e r t he date of

ma ili ngof a de te rm inatio n. ” 19 U. S.C. § 1516a(a )(2) (A)( ii). I t is undisput ed that the Scope Deter mination was never mailed to Bond Stree t. Furthe r, the defe ndant has not provided, a nd the cour

t is unable to find, support for the notion that the mailingCourt No. 07-00226 Pag e 8

and fax ing of

paper s can r easona

bly be see n as equiva lent, either at the administrative or judicial level. See Group Italglass U.S.A., Inc ., v. United States , 17 CI T 1205, 1210, 839 F. Supp. 868, 872 (1 99 3) (o bs e rv in g t hat “ [d]e sp ite wi de sp re a d a nd inc re a sin g us e of

te le ph on ic fa c sim ile communications technolog y in industry , courts have either shunned the filing or service of pape rs by fax or have r estricted the use of f ax to s ituations where the parties c o n s en t o r t o o t her limited sp e c if ie d c ir c ums tanc e s. ” ); RFR Industries, Inc . v. Century Steps, I nc . 477 F.3d 1348, 1351 - 1352 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 7) (h old ingthat ans we r w a s n ot p ro pe rl y se rv e d o n th e op po sin g pa rt y via fax be c a us e the op po sin g pa

rt y ha d n e ve r c on se nte d to se rv ic e of pro c e ss v ia fax (a pp lyinglaw o f t

he F if th Circuit)). Moreove r, the c ourt ca

nnot a g ree with the defe ndant’s contention that Commerce’ s failure t o m ai l the dec ision was “a me re pr ocedur al er ror f or which B ond Street must demonstrate a ctual ‘s ub sta nti a l pr e jud ic e ’ b e fo re ob ta ini ngany be ne fi t.” Re ply

in S up po rt

of De f. ’s Mo t. t o D ism iss

a t 3. No ne of

the c a se s c ite d b y

the de fe nd ant s up po rt

the no ti on th at a harm le ss e rr or ana ly sis is appropr iate within the contex t of deter mining the jurisdiction of the Court. B eca use a judicia l review period is “jurisdictional in nature and may not b e enlarg ed or a ltered by the cour ts,” Natural Re so ur c es D e

fe ns e Cou nc il v . N. R. C. , 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. C ir. 1981), the que stion of prejudicial

err or simply does not apply

. Acc ording ly , the court will deny the defendant’s moti on to dismi ss, and dismiss the ac tion without prejudice to ref iling. Also befor e the court is a motion to intervene as a matter of rig ht on beh al f o f G l eason I nd us tr ia l Pr od

uc ts, I nc , ( “ Gl e a so n” ) a nd Pr e c isi on

Pr od uc ts, I nc . ( “ Pr e c isi on ” ) ( c oll e c tiv e ly “propose d defe ndant-interve nors”) . Aug ust, 30, 2007 Mot. of Applicant Def .-Interve nors Glea sonCourt No. 07-00226 Pag e 9

I ndustrial Products, I nc., and Pre cision Products, I nc., to I nt er v en e as of Right. B eca use of the “funda mental principle that intervention cannot cure a jurisdictional de fec t in the o ri gi n al suit,” dismiss al of the motion to intervene is require d as we ll. Nucor Corp. v. United States , Slip Op. 07- 144 at 15 (Sept. 26; 2007) ( c iti ng Un ite d Sta te s e xre l. T e x . P or tla nd

Ce me nt C

o. v . M c Cor d , 233 U. S

. 157, 163-64 (1914) and Sim m o n s v . I

n te r s ta teCo m m e r c e Co m m 'n , 716 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.1983)).

Conclu sion The c ourt will dismi ss without pre judice to r efiling the curr ent action as prematurely filed. Th e de fe nd ant’ s mot ion to dis mis s, and the pr op os e d in te rv e no rs ’ m oti on to i nte rv e ne a s o f r ig ht w ill be dis mis se d a s mo ot.

/s/ R. Kenton Musgra ve R. KENTON MUSGRAVE, SENI OR J UDGE Dated: Oc tober 25, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w York

## UNI

TED STATES COU

RT OF INTERNATIO

NAL TRADE

: BO ND STREET, L TD, : : Plaintiff, : :

v. : B e fo re : M USG RA VE , Senior Jud ge : Court No. 07-00226 UN I TE D ST AT ES, : : De fe nd ant. : :

JUDG MENT This action havingbeen submitted for decision, and the Court, af t er due deliber ation and c on sid e ratio n o f a ll p a

pe rs and pr oc e e din g s, havin g ren dere d a de c isi on he re in; no w, the re fo re in confor mity with said decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDG ED AND DECREED that this action, be, and he reby is, dismi ssed as pre mature w ithout prejudice; it is further OR DE RE D tha

t th e de fe nd ant’ s A ugus t 8, 20 07 mot ion to d ism iss , b e ingre nd e re d mo ot, be, and he reby

is, dismi ssed; it is further OR DE RE D that proposed de fenda nt-i n t er v en o rs Au gu s t3 0 , 2 0 0 7 m o t i o nt o i n t er v en e, being rende red moot, be, a

nd here by is, dismi ssed.

/s/ R. K enton Musgr ave

R. KENTON MUSGRAVE, SENI OR J UDGE Dated: Oc tober 25, 2007 New Y ork, Ne w York