UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4950

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRODERICK F. JONES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:05-cr-00253-REP-1)

Submitted: May 29, 2014 Decided: June 20, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. 

Platt, Appellate Attorney, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. 

Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Christopher D. Jackson, 

Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Broderick F. Jones appeals the district court’s 

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 

eighteen months of imprisonment. He raises two issues on 

appeal: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by 

admitting hearsay statements without complying with Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1 and this court’s opinion in United States v. 

Doswell, 670 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 2012), and (2) whether 

sufficient evidence supports his violation. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

Jones argues that the district court erred by 

permitting hearsay evidence in the form of a video recording of 

the drug purchase at issue made by a confidential informant 

(“CI”), rather than presenting the testimony of the CI himself. 

A defendant at a revocation hearing has the right to confront 

and cross-examine adverse witnesses “unless the hearing officer 

specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation.”

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). The parameters 

of this right are established in Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C), which 

states that a defendant is entitled to “question any adverse 

witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice 

does not require the witness to appear.” Id.; see Doswell, 670 

F.3d at 530. The Doswell opinion requires that the district 

court “balance the releasee’s interest in confronting an adverse 
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witness against any proffered good cause for denying such 

confrontation.” 670 F.3d at 530. If the evidence is reliable 

and the Government’s explanation for not producing the witness 

is satisfactory, the hearsay evidence will likely be admissible

under Rule 32.1. Id. at 531. Applying these standards, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

allowing the video evidence without the live testimony of the 

CI, who was unavailable at trial.

Regarding the second issue, we review the district 

court’s revocation of supervised release for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th 

Cir. 1999). To revoke supervised release, a district court need 

only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a 

preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); 

see United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). 

This standard is met when a court “believe[s] that the existence 

of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United 

States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We review for clear error factual 

determinations underlying the conclusion that a violation 

occurred, United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th 

Cir. 2003), and credibility determinations made by the district 

court at revocation hearings are rarely reviewable on appeal. 

United States v. Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010).
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With these standards in mind, we have carefully 

reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not 

clearly err in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

Jones engaged in new criminal conduct, here assisting in the 

distribution of heroin to the CI as part of a drug conspiracy. 

The video recording of the heroin purchased supports the 

district court’s findings along with the testimony of two 

officers who witnessed the drug purchase. The court had ample 

reason to find that defense counsel’s explanation, that Jones 

could have been handing his coconspirator Thomas Henry something 

other than drugs or money, was not particularly persuasive. 

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of Jones’ 

supervised release. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately represented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED