No. 82-110 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TIIE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

DEBRA JO HARDY, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

LaBELLEIS DISTRIEUTING CO., STEVEN 

E. NEWSOM, Loss Prevention Manager; 

DAVID KOTKE, Showroom Manager, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable 

Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Joseph P. Hennessey, Billings, Montana 

For Respondents: 

James L. Jones, Billings, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: January 27, 1953 

Decided: March 31, 1983 

8 

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Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Plaintiff , Debra Jo Hardy brought this action against defendants for false imprisonment. The District Court of the 

Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, issued judgment 

aEter a jury verdict in favor of defendants and plaintiff 

appeals. 

Defendant, LaBelle Is Distributing Company ( LaBelle Is) , hired 

Hardy as a temporary employee on December 1, 1978. She was 

assigned duty as a sales clerk in the jewelry department. 

On December 9, 1978, another employee for LaBelle Is, Jackie 

Renner, thought she saw Hardy steal one of the watches that 

JAaBellels had in stock. Jackie Renner reported her belief to 

LaBelle s showroom manager that evening. 

On the morning of December 10, Hardy was approached by the 

assistant manager of LaBellels jewelry department and told that 

all new employees were given a tour of the store. He showed her 

into the showroom manager's office and then left, closing the 

door behind him. 

There is conflicting testimony concerning who was present in 

the showroom manager Is off ice when Hardy arrived. Hardy 

tes ti£ ied that David Kotke , the showroom manager, Steve Newsom, 

the store's loss prevention manager, and a uniformed policeman 

were present. Newsom and one of the policemen in the room 

testified that another policeman, instead of Kotke , was present. 

Hardy was told that she had been accused of stealing a watch. 

Hardy denied taking the watch and agreed to take a lie detector 

test. According to conflicting testimony, the meeting lasted 

approximately from twenty to forty-five minutes. 

Hardy took the lie detector test which supported her statement that she had not taken the watch. The showroom manager apologized to Hardy the next morning and told her that she was still 

welcome to work at LaBellels. The employee who reported seeing 

Hardy take the watch also apologized. The two employees then 

argued briefly, and Hardy left the store. 
Hardy brought this action claiming that defendants had wrongfully detained her against her will when she was questioned about 

the watch. 

On appeal Hardy raises basically two issues 

1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict 

and judgment; and 

2. Whether the District Court erred in the issuance of its 

instructions. 

The two key elements of false imprisonment are the restraint 

of an individual against his will and the unlawfulness of such 

restraint. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, False Imprisonment, §5. The individual 

may be restrained by acts or merely by words which he fears to 

disregard. Panisko v. Dreibelbis (1942), 113 Elont. 310, 124 

P.2d 997; Kroeger v. Passmore (1908), 36 Mont. 504, 93 P. 805. 

Here,. there is ample evidence to support the jury's finding 

that Hardy was not unlawfully restrained against her will. While 

Hardy stated that she felt compelled to remain in the showroom 

manager's off ice, she also admitted that she wanted to stay and 

clarify the situation. She did not ask to leave. She was not 

told she could not leave. No threat of force or otherwise was 

made to compel her to stay. Although she followed the assistant 

manager into the off ice under pretense of a tour, she testified 

at trial that she would have followed him voluntarily if she had 

known the true purpose of the meeting and that two policemen were 

in the room. Under these circumstances, the jury could easily 

find that Hardy was not detained against her will. See also, 

Meinecke v. Skaggs (1949), 123 Mont. 308, 213 P.2d 237, and 

Roberts v. Coleman (1961), 228 Or. 286, 365 P.2d 79. 

Hardy also claims the District Court erred by issuing 

court's instructions 10, 12, 13, and 14, and by refusing her proposed instructions 7, 11, 17, 19, and 30. Hardy argues that the 

court's instructions failed to comply with the facts and law, 

which were more accurately represented in her proposed instruct ions . 
Where jury instructions, taken as a whole, state the law 

applicable to the case, a party cannot claim reversible error as 

to the giving of certain instructions. Goodnough v. State 

(1982) , Mont . , 647 P.2d 364, 39 St.Rep. 1170. 

Here, the court's instructions adequately stated the law on 

false imprisonment. Appellant's proposed instructions 7, 11, 17, 

19, and 30 either reiterated the court's instructions or were 

inappropriate , and theref ore were properly ref used by the 

District Court. 

Instruction 10 given by the District Court provided that 

there was no false imprisonment if the plaintiff voluntarily 

complied with the request to remain in the showroom manager's 

office. This is one of the key elements of false imprisonment 

and was properly given. 32 Arn.Jur.2df False Imprisonment, 

§lo; Griffin v. Clark (1935), 55 Idaho 364, 42 P.2d 297. 

Court's instruction 12 provided that an employer upon reasonable cause may request a police investigation. Instruction 13 

provided that a store employee may temporarily detain another 

person to investigate a theft only upon probable cause. These 

instructions paraphrase the standard rule requiring probable 

cause before a person may be detained. Duran v. Buttrey Food, 

Inc. (1980), Mont . , 616 P.2d 327, 38 St.Rep. 1545. 

Appellant failed to object to instruction 14, and finding no 

plain error, we need not review the instruction. State Highway 

Commission v. Beldon (1975), 166 Mont. 246, 531 P.2d 1324. 

Finding substantial evidence to support the judgment and no 

error in the issuance of the instructions, the District Court's 

judgment is a£ f irmed . 
We Concur: 

%ce_ &@&, Chief Justice