alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Filed 8/12/15 Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

GREAT OAKS WATER COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

SANTA CLARA VALLEY WATER 

DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

 H035885

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. CV053142)

Plaintiff Great Oaks Water Company (Great Oaks) brought this appeal from the 

trial court’s denial of its request for attorney fees in an action where it secured a judgment 

against defendant Santa Clara Valley Water District (District ) based upon the latter’s 

allegedly unlawful fixing of a groundwater extraction charge, and allegedly improper 

application of the proceeds of the charge. Great Oaks contends that it should have been 

awarded its fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which authorizes 

such an award “to a successful party . . . in any action which has resulted in the 

enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,” provided certain 

conditions are satisfied. Great Oaks contends that the trial court erred by concluding that 

the conditions were not satisfied.

This appeal, however, is a companion to the appeal in Great Oaks Water Company 

v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, No. H035260, in which the District has challenged 
2

the judgment underlying the application for fees at issue here. By separate opinion in that 

matter this court has now reversed the underlying judgment in its entirety. It follows that 

Great Oaks is no longer “a successful party” for purposes of the statute it relies on here, 

and that its claims of error in this matter are therefore moot. 

The order denying the application for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1021.5 is affirmed.
3

______________________________________

RUSHING, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

 

____________________________________

PREMO, J.

____________________________________

ELIA, J.

Great Oaks Water Company v. Santa Clara Valley Water District

H035885
##### 



CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 May 1,
2006
    
    /s/ Robert J. DellingerRobert J. Dellinger
Executive Vice President andChief Financial Officer
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED OC TOBER 23, 2015

NO. 03

- 13

- 00494

- CR

Eugene Kelly Wolfenberger, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTIC E ROSE, JUSTICES GOO DWIN AND BOURLAND

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE BOURLAND

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having rev iewed

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error in the

trial court’s judgment of conviction . Therefore, the Court affirms the trial court’s judgment of

conviction

. Because appellant is indigent and unable t o pay costs, no adjudicati on of costs

is made.
Exhibit 21.1
 Subsidiaries ofAmerican Medical Systems Holdings, Inc.
    
    Jurisdiction of IncorporationAmerican Medical Systems, Inc.
    
    DelawareAmerican Medical Systems Australia Pty. Ltd.
    
    AustraliaAmerican Medical Systems Benelux B.V.B.A.
    
    BelgiumAmerican Medical Systems Canada Inc.
    
    CanadaAmerican Medical Systems France S.A.S.
    
    FranceAmerican Medical Systems Deutschland GmbH
    
    GermanyAmerican Medical Systems Iberica S.L.
    
    SpainAmerican Medical Systems UK Limited
    
    United KingdomAMS Research Corporation
    
    DelawareAMS Sales Corporation
    
    DelawareAmerican Medical Systems Europe B.V.
    
    The NetherlandsThermatrx, Inc.
    
    DelawareAMS  American Medical Systems do Brasil Produtos Urológicos e Ginecológicos Ltda.
    BrazilInfluence Medical Technologies, Ltd.
    
    IsraelOvion Inc.
    
    DelawareInnovaQuartz Incorporated
    
    ArizonaLaserscope
    
    CaliforniaLaserscope International, Inc.
    
    DelawareSolarant Medical, Inc.
    
    DelawareAmerican Medical Systems Luxembourg S.à.r.l.
    
    LuxembourgCytrix Israel Ltd.
    
    Israel
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

June 1, 2016

a0525 

# Order

Clerk June 1, 2016

152121

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 152121

COA: 320870

Saginaw CC: 13

- 038720

- FC

LEON HENRY HATHAWAY, III,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 25, 2015

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.3 05(H)(1), in

lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in part the judgment of the Court of

Appeals, and we REMAND this case to the Saginaw Circuit Court to determine whether

the court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the sentenc e

procedure described in People v Lockridge , 498 Mich 358 (2015). On remand, the trial

court shall follow the procedure described in Part VI of our opinion. If the trial court

determines that it would have imposed the same sentence absent the unconstitut ional

constraint on its discretion, it may reaffirm the original sentence. If, however, the trial

court determines that it would not have imposed the same sentence absent the

unconstitutional constraint on its discretion, it shall resentence the defendant

. In all other

respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining

questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

We do not retain jurisdiction.
2124.

#### WATSON *v.*THE STATE.

There can be no larceny where the property alleged to have been stolen was taken with the consent of the owner or of his authorized agent.

*802Accusation of larceny from house, from city court of Blakely— Judge Jordan. August 27, 1909.

Submitted October 6, —

Decided October 13, 1909.

*O. D. Bussell, G. B. Oliver,*for plaintiff in error.

*Walter Parle, solicitor,*contra.

Hill, C. J.

Watson was convicted of the offense of larceny from the house, and his motion for new trial, based on the general grounds alone, was overruled. We think the conviction was unauthorized by the evidence. The testimony of the State, in brief, shows that the defendant took two bottles of coca-cola from the storehouse of the prosecutor. The clerk of the prosecutor testified, that on the evening of the alleged larceny, the defendant came into the store and asked him to leave the coca-cola out of the ice-box when he locked up at night, so he could get it after church, as he had done before without complaint. He complied with the 'request, and the clerk so informed the prosecutor. After services at the church the clerk went to the store with the defendant, and the defendant went in for the coca-cola. The witness further stated that the defendant had gone in the store before and gotten cold drinks, and paid the prosecutor subsequently, and that the prosecutor made no complaint. The defendant in his statement admitted getting the coca-cola, stating that he intended paying for it as he had done before, with the prosecutor’s consent. From the evidence for the State it must be apparent that there was no intent to commit larceny, and that the trespass, which is an essential element of the offense, was lacking. *Williams*v. *State, 55 Ga.*391, 395. There can be no larceny where the owner or his authorized agent consents to the taking.

*Judgment reversed.*
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

      Solely for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, the
undersigned Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of LaCrosse
Footwear Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify, based on my knowledge, that the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended April 1, 2006
(the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.

Date: May 15, 2006

/s/ David P. Carlson
----------------------------------------
David P. Carlson
Exhibit 10.29

[PRINCETON REVIEW LETTERHEAD]

August 8, 2007

Stephen Melvin

40 Woodland Dr

Rye Brook, NY 10573

Dear Stephen:

This letter
confirms our agreement regarding the completion of your tenure as Chief Financial Officer of The Princeton Review. Under this agreement, you commit to remaining with The Princeton Review until no later than December 31, 2007, during which time
you will take all necessary actions to facilitate the Q3 close and a smooth transition to your successor. Once these obligations are met, you may at your own discretion choose to leave The Princeton Review; you will be paid your full salary through
your final day of employment with the company.

In return for your staying and meeting the above-mentioned commitments, you will receive six months of
severance pay rather than the three months severance pay called for in your contract; severance will commence on the first business day following your final day of employment at The Princeton Review. In addition, The Princeton Review will reimburse
for COBRA through the six-month severance period. Finally, The Princeton Review will extend a complimentary course for your son (who is currently a junior in high school) throughout his tenor as a high school student.

Please acknowledge your acceptance of this offer by returning a signed copy of this letter to Human Resources.

Sincerely,

/s/ Michael Perik



Michael Perik

CEO, The Princeton Review



|                   |  |               
|------------------ |  | --------------
|/s/ Stephen Melvin |  | August 8, 2007
|Stephen Melvin     |  | Date
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTIONS 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Supreme Holdings, Inc., on Form 10-qsb for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Thomas John Cloud, Jr., Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sections 906 of the Sabanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)

The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in the report fairly presents, in al material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Supreme Holdings, Inc.



By/s/ Thomas John Cloud, Jr.

Thomas John Cloud, Jr.

President and CEO

May 30, 2003





CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTIONS 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Supreme Holdings, Inc., on Form 10-qsb for the period ending Septembe30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Robert Joseph Wilson, Chief Financial Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sections 906 of the Sabanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(3)

The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange act of 1934; and

(4)

The information contained in the report fairly presents, in al material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

Supreme Holdings, Inc.



By/s/ Robert Joseph Wilson

Robert Joseph Wilson

Secretary/Treasurer and CFO

May 30, 2003
1.
    
    I have reviewed the annual report on Form 20-F, as amended by this Amendment No. 1 on Form
20F/A, of Maxcom Telecomunicaciones, S.A.B. de C.V.;
 2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;
 3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly represent in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
 4.
    
    The companys other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company and have:
     5.
    
    The companys other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the
audit committee of the companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
    SIGNATURE:
    
    /s/ Eduardo Vázquez

TITLE: Chief Executive Officer
Joey ATWATER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D18-1247

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

November 16, 2018 Rehearing Denied January 29, 2019

Joey Atwater, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

B.L. Thomas, C.J., and Wetherell and Winsor, JJ., concur.
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Science Snippet        June 6, 2016        EarthView–Rain-Swollen Brazos River Floods Suburban Houston
# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas May 24, 2021 No. 04-21-00202-CR Darrel Keith PEAVY , Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 187th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR11517 Honorable Stephanie R. Boyd, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, Darrel Peavy pled nolo contendere to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to six years of imprisonment in accordance with the terms of his plea-bargain agreement. The trial court’s certification of defendant’s right to appeal states that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2(a)(2). After Peavy filed a notice of appeal, the trial court clerk sent copies of the certification and notice of appeal to this court. See id. 25.2(e). The clerk’s record, which includes the trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification, has been filed. See id. 25.2(d). “In a plea bargain case . . . a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal; or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” Id. 25.2(a)(2). The clerk’s record, which contains a written plea bargain, establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by Peavy. See id. The clerk’s record does not include a written motion filed and ruled upon before trial; nor does it indicate that the trial court gave its permission to appeal. See id. Thus, the trial court’s certification appears to accurately reflect that this is a plea-bargain case and that Peavy does not have a right to appeal. We must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” Id. 25.2(d). This appeal will be dismissed pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) unless an amended trial court certification showing that Peavy has the right to appeal is made part of the appellate record by June 23, 2021

. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 25.2(d), 37.1; Daniels v. State , 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, order).We ORDER all appellate deadlines be suspended until further order of the court.

_________________________________ Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 24th day of May, 2021.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
# Exhibit 32.1

Section 1350 Certification of Chief Executive Officer

---

# CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADDED BY
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of First Federal Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, James J. Stebor, President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
added by 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) |  | The Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) |  | To my knowledge, the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.
|--- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| |                                                      |  |  |                       | 
| | ---------------------------------------------------- |  |  | --------------------- | 
| |                                                      |  |  | /s/   James J. Stebor | 
| |                                                     
| | James J. SteborPresident and Chief Executive Officer | 

May 17, 2004

---
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of SINO ASSURANCE, INC.,  (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009 (the "Report"), I, Guokang Tu, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  1) The Report fully complies with the requirement of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Company's financial position and results of operations.      By: /s/ Guokang Tu, CEO and Chairman  Date:November 13,, 2009
EXHIBIT 10.17


 


ANDREW CORPORATION


EXECUTIVE SEVERANCE BENEFIT PLAN AGREEMENT


 


THIS AGREEMENT, made this 5th day of July, 2004, by and between Andrew
Corporation (the “Company”) and Mickey Miller (the “Executive”),


 


WITNESSETH:


 


WHEREAS, the Company maintains the Andrew Corporation Executive
Severance Benefit Plan, as amended and restated effective May 14, 2004 (the
“Plan”); and


 


WHEREAS, the Executive has been designated as an eligible participant
in the Plan;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, the Executive and Company hereby agree as follows:


 


1.                                       Plan
Benefits.  The Executive has been
designated as a TIER II Participant in the Plan and shall be eligible solely
for the benefits set forth therein applicable to TIER II Participants.  The receipt of such benefits shall be subject
to all of the terms and conditions set forth in the Plan, including, but not
limited to, terms related to the amount, time and form of benefits.  By execution of this Agreement, the
Executive agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Plan, as amended and
restated effective May 14, 2004, and as may be subsequently amended.


 


2.                                       Arbitration.  The Executive acknowledges that
Section 7.2 of the Plan contains an arbitration provision, and by
execution of this Agreement agrees to be bound by the terms of such arbitration
provision.


 


3.                                       Plan
Not Contract of Employment.  The
Plan does not constitute a contract of employment and nothing in the Plan shall
be construed to give the Executive the right to be retained by the Company or
to any benefits not specifically provided by the Plan.


 


4.                                       Plan
Supercedes Prior Change in Control Severance Agreements.  The Executive acknowledges and agrees that
the benefits and terms set forth in the May 14, 2004 restatement of the Plan,
as applicable to the Participant based on the Tier designated in paragraph 1
above, are a replacement for and in lieu of any benefits to which the Executive
may have been entitled under the Plan prior to its restatement or under any
other agreement with the Company relating to Change in Control severance
benefits.  The Executive further
acknowledges such benefits and terms may be subsequently amended pursuant to
Section 7.1 of the Plan.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Agreement to be
executed as of the date first above written.


 


	
  EXECUTIVE

  	
  ANDREW CORPORATION

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  /s/ Mickey Miller

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Ralph E. Faison

  	
   

  
	
  , individually

  	
   

  	
  By: Ralph E. Faison

  
	
   

  	
  Its: President & Chief Executive Officer