STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
 

L.S., 

Respondent Below, Petitioner FILED 

November 22, 2017 

vs) No. 17-0069 (Randolph County 16-DV-235) EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA O.F.,
 

Petitioner Below, Respondent
 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Petitioner L.S., by counsel Phillip S. Isner and David C. Fuellhart III, appeals the Circuit 

Court of Randolph County’s December 21, 2016, order denying his appeal of a domestic 

violence protective order.1 The guardian ad litem, Heather M. Weese, filed a response on behalf 

of respondent O.F. in support of the circuit court’s order. On appeal, petitioner contends that the 

circuit court erred in denying his appeal of the family court order granting a domestic violence 

protective order because the family court denied him procedural due process. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these 

reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

On November 28, 2016, the magistrate court entered an emergency domestic violence 

protective order (“DVPO”) against petitioner and for respondent’s protection.2 On December 5, 

2016, the family court held a hearing and entered a DVPO against petitioner. Petitioner appealed 

the family court’s order to the circuit court. At the December 12, 2016, hearing on this appeal, 

petitioner testified that he disputes any allegations of abuse or harassment, but that he was unable 

to dispute those allegations before the family court. Petitioner testified that he received notice of 

the hearing date and time before the family court, but due to his mistaken belief as to the time of 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W.Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W.Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W.Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 

W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2

The appendix record submitted for this Court’s review contains primarily procedural 

information and little factual information. Accordingly, the facts underlying the grant of the 

DVPO are unavailable. 

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the hearing, he did not appear on time and the hearing had concluded by the time he appeared. 

Finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate error in the family court’s ruling, the circuit court 

denied petitioner’s appeal on December 21, 2016. It is from this order that petitioner appeals. 

We apply the following standard of review: 

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit 

court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of review. We review the final 

order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we 

review the circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous 

standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review. 

Syl. Pt. 2, Walker v. W.Va. Ethics Comm’n, 201 W.Va. 108, 429 S.E.2d 167 (1997). 

On appeal, petitioner argues that he was denied procedural due process as a result of the 

family court’s failure to “conduct a new hearing wherein the [p]etitioner could be present.” 

Petitioner contends that holding the hearing in his absence denied him a meaningful opportunity 

to be heard. Petitioner’s argument, however, ignores the fact that he was served with notice of 

his hearing and had the opportunity to be heard on the date and time provided in the notice. “The 

fundamental requirement of procedural due process in a civil proceeding is ‘the opportunity to be 

heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” In re J.S., 233 W.Va. 394, 402, 758 

S.E.2d 747, 755 (2014) (citation omitted). Due to his own mistake concerning the time of the 

hearing, petitioner arrived after the hearing had already concluded. Petitioner cites no law in 

support of his argument that the family court should have attempted to contact him or wait for 

him to arrive. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s decision denying petitioner’s 

appeal of the DVPO. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s December 21, 2016, order 

denying petitioner’s appeal of the domestic violence protective order. 

Affirmed. 

ISSUED: November 22, 2017 

CONCURRED IN BY: 

Chief Justice Allen H. Loughry II 

Justice Robin Jean Davis 

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Menis E. Ketchum 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker 

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