In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1992 

DEMETRIUS ROSS, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v.

GREG GOSSETT, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 15-cv-309-SMY-MAB — Staci M. Yandle, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 1, 2021 — DECIDED MAY 5, 2022 

____________________ 

Before MANION, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs in this case are all inmates who were housed by the Illinois Department of Corrections (the “IDOC”) at the Illinois River, Big Muddy River, or 

Menard correctional centers during the period from April 

2014 through July 2014. They alleged that the prison-wide 

shakedowns conducted by the defendants violated their constitutional and statutory rights. Their second amended complaint, which is the operative one here, was brought under 
2 No. 20-1992 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of the plaintiffs and all other similarly situated inmates in those three correctional centers during that time who were subjected to the shakedowns of their 

prison cells by the tactical teams. Relevant to this appeal, they 

allege that the planning and execution of the shakedowns violated the Eighth Amendment because it was designed to inflict pain and humiliation, as well as alleging conspiracy and 

failure-to-intervene claims under the Eighth Amendment. 

The plaintiffs allege that tactical team leaders of the IDOC 

conducted institution-wide shakedowns of inmates’ cells at 

those correctional centers pursuant to a common policy or 

practice implemented, overseen, and encouraged by Department supervisors.

The district court consolidated a number of cases into this 

case, and the plaintiffs sought class certification, seeking to 

certify a class of inmates incarcerated in 2014 at: Menard from 

April 4-16, Illinois River from April 21-29, Big Muddy from 

May 12-19, and Lawrence from July 7-11. They sought certification only for claims against a discrete subset of the hundreds of defendants in this case, encompassing only the 22 

defendants who were involved in supervisory roles for the 

shakedowns. The district court granted the proposed class 

certification, and the appellants now challenge that decision 

on appeal.

We review a district court’s class certification determination only for abuse of discretion. Gorss Motels, Inc. v. Brigadoon 

Fitness, Inc., 29 F.4th 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2022); Bell v. PNC Bank, 

Nat’l Ass’n, 800 F.3d 360, 373 (7th Cir. 2015). In determining 

whether the court abused its discretion, we consider whether 

the court misunderstood the applicable law or made clear errors of fact. Id. 
No. 20-1992 3

I.

We begin, then, with the facts as set forth by the district 

court in its determination. See Dist. Ct. Order at 1–4. In 2014, 

the IDOC’s Chief of Operations, Joseph Yurkovich, and Deputy Chief of Operations, Michael Atchison, decided to execute 

prison-wide shakedowns for purposes of sanitation and to 

discover and remove contraband. Toward that end, they 

formed tactical teams supervised by senior IDOC officials, including head administrators from each of the prisons. They 

discussed the plan with the Statewide Tactical Commander, 

David White, and the Southern Regional Commander, Timothy McAllister, who created operations orders outlining the 

shakedown schedule and staffing needs.

Prior to the shakedown at each prison, White and/or 

McAllister discussed the actual operation of the shakedown 

with the prison warden and tactical commanders, and conducted three separate briefings. First, they would discuss the 

plan with tactical team commanders, wardens, and assistant 

wardens, including specific details as to how duties would be 

performed, what inmates would wear, and how inmates

would be handcuffed, as well as discussing how tactical team 

members would conduct themselves and handle inmates. 

Next, the tactical team commanders and the assistant commanders discussed the shakedown plan with the members of 

the tactical team. Finally, the entire group would come together and discuss the plan, including the wardens, and 

McAllister or White. 

That coordinated execution extended to the uniforms for 

the tactical team, and the sequence of events for the shakedown. Tactical team officers wore uniforms which contained 

no identifying insignia or name badges, thus making 
4 No. 20-1992 

identification of individual team members difficult, and 

which consisted of an orange jumpsuit, vest, gloves and helmet with face shield. Based on that distinctive uniform, the 

tactical teams were colloquially referred to as “Orange 

Crush” by inmates. 

The shakedown itself proceeded in a deliberate, preordained manner, from the entry of the officers into the cell 

units all the way to the return of the inmates to their cells. The 

plaintiffs and defendants both agree that the shakedowns occurred and were executed according to a uniform plan under 

their supervision. They diverge, however, in the description 

of that plan. 

As the court recognized, the plaintiffs describe the following sequence of events in the shakedowns. First, tactical team 

officers would enter the living units in a cacophonous manner, yelling loudly and banging their batons on the bars and 

railings of the unit. The tactical officers would then instruct 

inmates to strip and remove their clothing, and would order 

a “reverse” strip search, in which inmates would be required 

to manipulate their genitals and buttocks and then to put their 

hands into their mouths—a strip search sequence which the 

plaintiffs describe as demeaning and unsanitary.

Inmates were then commanded to put on a shirt, pants, 

and shoes, but were not allowed to don underwear. They 

were handcuffed in a position that is particularly painful and 

uncomfortable, in which their hands were behind their backs 

with their thumbs up and palms facing out. They were then 

marched to a holding area in a “nuts to butts” fashion, in 

which the genitals of inmates would come into contact with 

the backside of the inmate in front of them. They maintain 

that the tactical team members routinely pushed and shoved 
No. 20-1992 5

inmates to ensure that such physical contact occurred. The 

holding areas included dining halls, gyms and chapels, and 

they were forced to remain in that holding area, handcuffed, 

either seated with their heads down or standing facing a wall, 

for 1 to 4 hours while the cells were searched. They were then 

returned to their cells in the same physically intrusive manner. 

II. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), “[o]ne 

or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Moreover, as relevant here, the plaintiffs 

also sought to demonstrate that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The appellants do not take issue with the district court’s recitation of the 

facts, but argue that the district court erred in determining 

that the requirements of commonality, typicality, and predominance, were met.

A.

As both the district court and the appellants recognize, in 

order to satisfy commonality, the plaintiffs’ claim must “depend on a common contention” and “[t]hat common 
6 No. 20-1992 

contention ... must be of such a nature that it is capable of 

classwide resolution—which means that determination of its 

truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The district court held 

that the plaintiffs satisfied that requirement because they alleged that the defendants acted pursuant to a common policy 

and implemented the same or similar procedures at each of 

the four institutions, and that the challenge was to the constitutionality of that common plan as enacted. Accordingly, the 

court held that the claims arise under the same constitutional 

requirements and require resolution of key common factual 

and legal questions, specifically: “whether Defendants developed and carried out a uniform policy and practice that had 

the effect of depriving the putative class members of their 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment; whether the shakedowns were executed in the 

manner Defendants contend or as Plaintiffs claim; whether 

Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the putative 

class members of their constitutional rights through the 

shakedowns; and whether the Defendants knew of, approved, facilitated and/or turned a blind eye to the alleged 

unconstitutional shakedowns.” Dist. Ct. Order at 7. The court 

held that those questions would generate common answers, 

and that, “[i]n particular, the answer to whether Defendants 

developed and carried out a uniform policy and practice that 

had the effect of depriving the putative class members of their 

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment does not require individualized consideration 
No. 20-1992 7

and will resolve the liability aspect of this litigation and for 

each of the class claims.” Id. 

The appellants argue that Wal-Mart requires a different result. They contend that the plaintiffs may be able to establish 

commonality by showing the existence of an unconstitutional 

policy, but that under the reasoning in Wal-Mart the plaintiffs

need to present “significant proof” of that policy, including 

its unconstitutional aspects, at the class certification stage. 

They assert that the plaintiffs failed to present significant 

proof that “the policy existed as plaintiffs claimed it did.” The 

proof required by the appellants was not that a common policy and plan existed—they concede it did—but that the policy 

which existed was the one alleged by the plaintiffs with its 

unconstitutional provisions rather than the one alleged by 

them. The district court properly rejected that argument, recognizing that the analysis sought by the appellants is appropriate in an examination of the merits, but is not the proper 

focus in a class certification determination.

Wal-Mart itself is instructive as to that distinction. In that 

case, the plaintiffs, current and former female employees of 

Wal-Mart, alleged that the discretion exercised by their local 

supervisors over pay and promotion matters violated Title 

VII by discriminating against women. Id. at 342. In contrast to 

the present case, in Wal-Mart it was uncontested that there 

was no written or explicit corporate policy against the advancement of women. In fact, the existence of any uniform 

policy was itself contested. The Court described the basic theory of the plaintiffs’ case as “that a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias against women to infect, perhaps 

subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one 

of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby making 
8 No. 20-1992 

every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.” Id. at 345. Accordingly, the Court held 

that proof of commonality necessarily overlapped with the 

merits as to the contention that Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern 

or practice of discrimination, in that the answer to the crucial 

question as to why each class member was disfavored was incapable of a common answer absent “some glue holding all 

the alleged reasons for all those decisions together.” Id. at 352. 

(emphasis in original). That glue, the Court held, could be 

provided by “significant proof” that Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination. Id. at 353. Plaintiffs’ evidence, however, demonstrated only a corporate policy of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters. Id. at 355. The Court recognized that “[o]n its face, of 

course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment 

practice that would provide the commonality needed for a 

class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment 

practices.” Id. Therefore, the evidence by the plaintiffs was insufficient to demonstrate commonality. 

In contrast, the evidence that was lacking in Wal-Mart—

that the alleged discriminatory actions were undertaken pursuant to a uniform policy—is not only present in this case, it 

is undisputed. The appellants concede that the shakedowns 

were conducted according to a uniform plan created and implemented by the appellants, and that the plan was executed 

in a uniform manner under their supervision. There is no 

need for the plaintiffs to provide “significant proof” of the existence of a uniform policy precisely because its existence is 

conceded. The only dispute is the content of that uniform policy—specifically, whether that uniform policy reflected the 

version alleged by the plaintiffs or the one alleged by the defendants. That is a merits question, however. Either way, the 
No. 20-1992 9

issue as to the constitutionality of the policy is capable of a 

common answer applicable to all of the defendants. If the policy is as the defendants allege and those provisions are constitutional, then the defendants will be entitled to a judgment 

in their favor. If the policy is as the plaintiffs allege and they 

can demonstrate that those uniform provisions are unconstitutional, then the plaintiffs will succeed. Either way, resolution of the question will provide a common answer as to the 

claims of the putative class that the shakedown policy created 

and implemented by the supervisors violated their constitutional rights. The district court therefore properly concluded 

that the appellants’ arguments as to the content of the uniform 

policy were not relevant to the class certification context, but 

rather would be appropriate in a motion for summary judgment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding 

that the commonality requirement was met on these facts. 

And because the appellants’ typicality argument here mirrored the arguments as to commonality, there is no abuse of 

discretion as to that holding either. 

B.

That leaves the remaining challenge by the appellants, 

which is to the district court’s determination that the predominance factor was met. One of the provisions of Rule 23(b) 

must be satisfied in order to maintain a class action, and the 

district court held that Rule 23(b)(3) had been met. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23. That provision requires the court to find that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 

over any questions affecting only individual members, and 

that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
10 No. 20-1992 

fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Id. at 

23(b)(3).

The Rule 23(b)(3) standard “requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” 

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 

459 (2013); see also Gorss Motels, 29 F.4th at 845 (“it is the 

method of determining the answer and not the answer itself 

that drives the predominance consideration”). As the district 

court recognized, the predominance requirement is met 

“when common questions represent a significant aspect of a

case and can be resolved for all members of a class in a single 

adjudication.” Dist. Ct. Order at 10; Gorss Motels, 29 F.4th at 

844. “An individual question is one where members of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from 

member to member; a common question is one where the 

same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima

facie showing or the issue is susceptible to generalized, classwide proof.” Gorss Motels, 29 F.4th at 843–44; Tyson Foods, Inc. 

v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016). 

Citing numerous cases, the district court recognized that 

courts routinely have found that common questions predominate where the case claims the existence of a widespread or 

uniform practice. Dist. Ct. Order at 11. The court held that the

issues as to liability are common and predominate in this case, 

and that any variation in the particular experiences of class 

members would primarily impact the type and amount of recoverable damages, and would not defeat predominance. Id. 

at 11–12, citing Tyson Foods, 577 U.S. at 453 (“[w]hen one or 

more of the central issues in the action are common to the 

class and can be said to predominate, the action may be 
No. 20-1992 11

considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual 

class members”)(internal quotation marks omitted). The court 

also held that a class action was superior to other available 

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, under Rule 23(b)(3). Because of the number of putative 

class members and the common questions of law and fact that 

predominate as to those defendants, the court held that a class 

action would serve the economies of time, effort and expense 

and prevent inconsistent results. Id. at 12. 

The appellants argue that the predominance requirement 

is not met because individual issues would dominate and 

would require thousands of mini-trials in order to determine 

which component of the policy each inmate was subjected to. 

They further assert that supervisor liability cannot be found 

unless the supervisor, with knowledge of the subordinate’s 

conduct, approves the conduct, and therefore that supervisor 

liability claims are less appropriate for class-wide resolution. 

Both of these arguments, however, stem from the same misunderstanding of the issues presented in the claims of the putative class against these 22 defendants. The plaintiffs did not 

seek class status as to each and every defendant involved in 

the shakedown. The proposed class in this case relates only to 

the claims against the 22 supervisors responsible for the creation and implementation of the uniform shakedown plan, and 

the allegations are that the plan itself utilized measures designed to inflict pain or humiliation with no penological purpose, and therefore that the defendants violated the Eighth 

Amendment in their actions in imposing those conditions on 

the inmates. The defendants have maintained throughout this 

action that the shakedown plan was imposed in the same 
12 No. 20-1992 

manner at each institution, that safeguards were in place to 

ensure that everyone was aware of the plan, and that supervisors were present to ensure uniform execution of it. And the 

plaintiffs point to the consistent survey responses from 300 

tact team members stating that they saw no member of the 

tact team deviate from the common plan that had been communicated to them. There is no dispute at this point in the litigation, then, that the shakedowns were conducted pursuant 

to a uniform plan.

In its memorandum in opposition to the motion for class 

certification in the district court, the appellants set forth the 

three constitutional claims common to each putative class 

member alleged by the plaintiffs as follows: “(1) Defendants 

designed and implemented procedures to be followed during 

all four shakedowns that were abusive and humiliating, rather than in furtherance of any proper penological purpose, 

in violation of the Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights, 

(2) Defendants reached an agreement to deprive the class of 

their constitutional rights and to protect one another from liability for that deprivation, and (3) Defendants knew that the 

class’s Eighth Amendment rights were about to be violated 

and failed to intervene to prevent the constitutional violation. 

Doc. 491 at 14. Nothing in those allegations requires mini-trials, let alone thousands of them. 

The focus of each claim is on the requirements of the uniform plan that was used in the shakedowns, and the dispute 

at trial is between the two parties’ different versions of the 

shakedown plan. We recognized in Gorss that similar claims 

of uniform behavior, such as those involving a uniform form 

or standardized agreement, are the type of claims that are 

amenable to class-wide proof and therefore capable of 
No. 20-1992 13

satisfying the predominance inquiry. 29 F.4th at 844. Here, the 

mini-trials envisioned by the appellants relate to the conduct 

of individual officers with respect to individual inmates, but 

class status was not sought as to those defendants. The class 

action relates only to the supervisors, and the claims relate 

only to their actions with respect to the design and implementation of the allegedly-unconstitutional policy. 

For that reason, the appellants’ argument that supervisory 

liability cases are poorly suited to classwide resolution is similarly flawed. The appellants argue that supervisor liability is 

especially inappropriate where the evidence shows at worst 

that non-supervisory defendants departed from the policy set 

by the supervisors, because of the need for individualized evidence of the supervisor’s knowledge and approval of the 

non-supervisor’s actions. But that is the opposite of the allegations here. The class action against the supervisors here is 

decidedly not based on aberrant actions by rogue non-supervisors. It is premised entirely on the constitutionality of the 

procedures that were part of the plan designed and implemented by the supervisors, which allegedly were planned to 

cause pain or humiliation with no penological justification. 

Therefore, the argument as to the need for individual evidence for supervisor liability is inconsistent with the claims 

asserted here (and in any case was not itself raised in the district court.) The type of failure-to-intervene claims that would 

render supervisor liability dependent on individual facts are 

not present here, and the mere possibility of other legal theories or individual cases is insufficient to defeat predominance. 

Even as to damages, the issue would be which of the unconstitutional actions the inmate experienced, but given the 

agreement that the shakedowns were carried out pursuant to 
14 No. 20-1992 

the same procedures, that issue is as likely to be resolved by a 

determination of the uniform practice at the particular facility 

that day, rather than one reliant on testimony from an individual. Individual testimony would be necessary only as to 

claims that individuals acted in a manner inconsistent with 

the uniform policy and in an unconstitutional manner, but 

those claims are not asserted as to these defendants and this 

putative class. Even assuming a damages assessment would 

require individual evidence, however, the court did not abuse 

its discretion in determining that the common issues as to liability establish predominance. See Tyson Foods, 577 U.S. at

453–54 (“[w]hen one or more of the central issues in the action 

are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the 

action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even 

though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar 

to some individual class members”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(holding that the need for individual damages determination 

did not require denial of the motion for class certification).

Finally, with respect to predominance, the appellants argue that the district court failed to engage in the proper inquiry in that the court did not discuss the elements of the 

claims and apply the inquiry to those elements. See Santiago 

v. City of Chicago, 19 F.4th 1010 (7th Cir. 2021). But the district 

court in fact addressed the only arguments they made in the 

district court as to the elements of the claims. In the district 

court, they argued that predominance requires an examination of the substantive elements of the claims, and that the differing testimony of the putative class members and the plaintiffs dissolved their claim as to the substance of the uniform 

practice. They then argued that without that uniform practice 
No. 20-1992 15

as alleged by the plaintiffs, the class members would have to 

prove individualized facts to demonstrate the elements of liability. They have repeated that argument to this court, and 

expanded it with examples, such as arguing that individual 

evidence would be required as to whether handcuffs were too 

tight for each individual inmate. That argument again assumes that the claims are based on the actions of individual 

officers; they are not. For instance, as to the handcuffing, the 

claim is that the plan unconstitutionally mandated the use of 

a particularly painful handcuff position that had no corresponding penological benefit. The evidence as to that claim 

would relate to what handcuffing method was mandated, 

and what the reasons were for its use. It is a common question 

not an individualized one. The appellants’ argument once 

again is based on the notion that the plaintiffs had failed to 

establish that the uniform practice was as they alleged, and 

that any unconstitutionality would stem from actions of individuals. 

As we have repeatedly emphasized, however, the class 

certification analysis is not an examination of the merits:

“’a court weighing class certification must walk 

a balance between evaluating evidence to determine whether a common question exists and

predominates, without weighing that evidence to 

determine whether the plaintiff class will ultimately prevail on the merits.’ Bell v. PNC Bank, 

N.A., 800 F.3d 360, 377 (7th Cir. 2015) (emphases 

added). We recognize the contradiction built 

into the standard. The judge must examine the 

evidence for its cohesiveness while studiously 

ignoring its bearing on merits questions[.]” 
16 No. 20-1992 

Gorss, 29 F.4th at 845, quoting In re Allstate Corp. Sec. Litig., 966 

F.3d 595, 603 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, the court drew the proper 

line. It addressed the challenge to the elements of the claims 

raised by the defendants, and recognized that all of the claims 

asserted in this case were claims based upon the responsibility of these defendants for the implementation of a uniform 

plan. The claims depend upon the ability of the plaintiffs to 

establish that the shakedowns were conducted pursuant to 

the uniform plan as they describe it and that those plans were 

themselves unconstitutional. The argument by the defendant 

that the plaintiffs cannot prove that the plan was as they alleged addresses their ability to succeed on the merits, not the 

propriety of class certification. The court properly limited the 

inquiry here to whether a common question exists and predominates, not whether the plaintiffs would prevail as to that 

common question. The court did not abuse its discretion in 

holding that the requirements of Rule 23 were met as to the 

class claims limited to this particular group of defendants.

Accordingly, the decision of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.