[Cite as State v. Bright, 2016-Ohio-6973.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 14 MA 0058 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ) 

) 

VS. ) OPINION 

) 

TIANT BRIGHT ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of 

Common Pleas of Mahoning County, 

Ohio 

Case No. 12 CR 1292 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Paul J. Gains 

Mahoning County Prosecutor 

Atty. Ralph M. Rivera 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Timothy J. Cunning 

Scullin & Cunning, LLC 

940 Windham Court, Suite 4 

Boardman, Ohio 44512 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

Dated: September 22, 2016
[Cite as State v. Bright, 2016-Ohio-6973.]

WAITE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Tiant Bright (“Bright”) appeals his conviction on felonious 

assault with an accompanying firearm specification and improperly discharging a 

firearm at or into a habitation with two accompanying firearm specifications in the 

Mahoning County Common Pleas Court. Bright raises two assignments of error, 

asserting the trial court erred in failing to sever Bright’s trial from that of his codefendant and by denying Bright’s request for a continuance. Based on the 

foregoing, both of Bright’s assignments of error are without merit and the judgment of 

the trial court should be affirmed. 

Factual History 

{¶2} In early December of 2012, Summer Romeo (“Romeo”) contacted 

Jesse Grate (“Grate”) about performing repairs on her SUV. Grate arranged for his 

cousin to do the repairs at Grate’s home where Grate resided with his fiancée and 

their three children. On December 5, 2012 Romeo called Grate and complained that 

the SUV still was not working properly. Grate had her bring the vehicle back to his 

house so he could look at it himself. After a while, Romeo left with the SUV, only to 

call Grate later that day to inform him that the SUV was still not getting heat and that 

the oil dip stick was broken. She continued to call and text Grate throughout the day. 

Later that afternoon Romeo met Grate at his house, accompanied by her friend, 

Damari Rodriguez. Grate testified that it was a “friendly conversation” but that 

Romeo wanted her SUV repaired. Grate added antifreeze to the SUV and Romeo 

eventually left, apparently satisfied, shortly after 5:05 p.m. 
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{¶3} Around 7:00 p.m., Romeo and Rodriguez, now accompanied by 

Appellant Tiant Bright (“Bright”) and Eric Velasquez, confronted Grate at his house 

about the repairs. Bright demanded that Grate give them $40 for the broken dipstick, 

but Grate said he would purchase a new part himself, as it did not cost $40. Grate, 

Romeo and Bright began to argue about the situation. Grate testified that Bright 

started threatening him and his family. (Trial Tr., pp. 231-232.) Grate’s fiancée, 

Penny Yates, approached and also entered into the conflict. She testified that Bright 

stated, “I will be back.” (Trial Tr., p. 432.) Grate testified that they got back into the 

SUV and Bright told Romeo to take him to “Laclede [so he could] go get [his] gun.” 

(Trial Tr., p. 232.) 

{¶4} Shortly before 8:00 p.m., Romeo’s SUV pulled up in front of Grate’s 

house. This incident has been referred to as “Incident One” throughout the 

proceedings. (Two additional interactions occurred that same evening and have 

been referred to as “Incident Two” and “Incident Three” for clarification purposes). 

Grate testified that Romeo was driving and Bright was sitting behind her. At some 

point, Bright stuck his hand, holding what appeared to be a handgun, outside of the 

vehicle and shot off several rounds “kind of towards the house but mostly like at the 

air.” (Trial Tr., pp. 232-233.) Grate was standing on his front porch with Yates and 

three other individuals. Grate called 911 at 7:48 p.m. The police arrived and spoke 

to Grate, who gave a police report including a description of the vehicle. Grate and 

Yates both testified that Romeo and Bright continued driving up and down the street 

in front of the house, now followed by a second vehicle, a large pickup truck. (Trial 
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Tr., p. 235.) Romeo continued sending threatening texts after the first incident. 

Grate testified he decided that Yates and the children should leave the house for the 

rest of the evening. (Trial Tr., p. 234.) 

{¶5} Around 8:30 p.m., both vehicles pulled up in front of Grate’s home, 

although Grate was now at his neighbor’s house only a few houses away. (Trial Tr., 

p. 236.) Grate heard gunshots which he believed came from the truck as it was 

stopped in front of his house. (Trial Tr., p. 316.) Grate then testified that he, his 

cousin and a few others hunkered down in his house with the lights out and blankets 

and garbage bags covering the windows to avoid detection by Romeo and Bright in 

the event the hostilities continued. (Trial Tr., pp. 237-238.) Shortly thereafter, 

Grate’s friend informed him that individuals were approaching the house through the 

backyard. Grate noticed an individual wearing a hoodie similar to the one he had 

seen Bright wearing earlier that evening. (Trial Tr., pp. 239-240.) Grate called 911 

and was still on this call when the house was hit by several gunshots. (Trial Tr., pp. 

241-242.) After the gunshots died down, Grate testified he went out on the front 

porch and saw Romeo’s SUV drive down the street, make a U-turn and head back up 

the street. (Trial. Tr., p. 242.) 

{¶6} Police arrived shortly thereafter to investigate the scene and interview 

any witnesses. Having a full description of Romeo’s SUV, the police later stopped 

Romeo driving the vehicle at approximately 11:00 p.m. Romeo, the only person 

inside, was detained and the vehicle was towed. 
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{¶7} Bright was indicted by the Grand Jury on January 3, 2013 on two 

counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.011(A)(2) with an accompanying 

firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A); one count of improperly 

discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1); with 

two accompanying firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A) and R.C. 

2941.146(A). 

{¶8} A joint jury trial with co-defendant Romeo commenced March 3, 2014. 

Bright was ultimately convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2902.11(A)(2), 

a felony of the second degree, with an accompanying firearm specification in violation 

of R.C. 2941.145(A); and improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation in 

violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1), a felony of the second degree, with two 

accompanying firearm specifications, in violation of R.C. 2941.145(A) and R.C. 

2941.146(A). 

{¶9} On May 14, 2014, the trial court sentenced Bright to six (6) years of 

incarceration for felonious assault; three (3) years for the accompanying R.C. 

2941.145(A) firearm specification; six (6) years for improperly discharging a firearm at 

or into a habitation; three (3) years for the R.C. 2941.145(A) accompanying firearm 

specification; and five (5) years for the R.C. 2941.146(A) accompanying firearm 

specification. The convictions for felonious assault and improperly discharging a 

firearm at or into a habitation were to run concurrently, but consecutively by law to 

the firearm specifications, for a stated prison term of seventeen (17) years. 

{¶10} Bright filed this timely appeal, raising two assignments of error: 
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FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The Trial Court Erred by Refusing to Sever the Co-Defendants. 

{¶11} In his first assignment of error, Bright contends the trial court erred 

when it failed to sever his trial from that of his co-defendant, Summer Romeo. He 

asserts that comments made by Romeo prior to commencement of the trial contained 

exculpatory evidence, and Bright was prevented from calling Romeo as a witness in 

his case due to her status as a co-defendant. 

Joinder of defendants and the avoidance of multiple trials is favored in 

the law for many reasons. Joinder conserves judicial and prosecutorial 

time, lessens the not inconsiderable expenses of multiple trials, 

diminishes inconvenience to witnesses, and minimizes the possibility of 

incongruous results in successive trials before different juries. 

State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 223, 225, 400 N.E.2d 401 (1980). 

{¶12} Pursuant to Crim.R. 14, if it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by 

joinder of a co-defendant, the trial court may grant a motion for severance. However, 

the burden is on the defendant to prove that the joinder is prejudicial. State v. Kozic, 

7th Dist. No. 11 MA 160, 2014-Ohio-3788, ¶ 69. “The test is ‘whether a joint trial is 

so manifestly prejudicial that the trial judge is required to exercise his or her 

discretion in only one way – by severing the trial. * * * A defendant must show clear, 

manifest and undue prejudice and violation of a substantive right resulting from 

failure to sever.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 89, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), 

citing United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 998 (9th Cir.1989). 
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[J]oinder of defendants is proper so long as all defendants participated 

in the same series of transactions leading to the charges even though 

not all defendants participated in every act. * * * Not all defendants 

need be charged in each count * * * nor would differing levels of 

culpability among defendants necessarily justify severance. 

State v. Bundy, 7th Dist. No. 02 CA 211, 2005-Ohio-3310, ¶ 53, quoting Schiebel at 

88-89. 

{¶13} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion for 

severance for abuse of discretion. State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 

293 (1990). Abuse of discretion is more than an error or judgment but, rather, implies 

that the court’s determination was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State 

v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 

{¶14} In the instant matter, Bright was indicted along with his co-defendant, 

Romeo, on January 3, 2013. Bright contends that Romeo’s statements made in open 

court prior to the commencement of trial are tantamount to exculpatory evidence and 

required that the trials be severed. Appellant cites to a discussion in which the trial 

court engaged with Bright and Romeo who were each present with separate counsel. 

This discussion was held outside of the jury’s presence. It regarded some 

preliminary matters. The record reveals the following colloquy occurred: 

[COUNSEL FOR ROMEO]: One moment, Your Honor. Your Honor, 

may -- after discussions with my client I believe she would wish to 
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address the Court. I believe she would like to terminate my services as 

of this morning, Your Honor. 

THE COURT: Miss Romeo, is that a correct statement by [your 

counsel]? 

DEFENDANT ROMEO: I would like to hire an attorney and pay an 

attorney because I’m not going -- this is all wrong. 

THE COURT: What is it that you believe [your counsel] has done or not 

done that would interfere in any way with your ability to proceed today 

with him at [sic] as your attorney? 

DEFENDANT ROMEO: Because they’ve got the wrong man, and I 

don’t want to go to prison for something I didn’t do. 

THE COURT: Miss Romeo, do you understand that [your counsel] has 

in no way represented to this Court or to anyone else that you’ve done 

anything whatsoever wrong nor has he suggested to this Court or 

anyone else on the record in this court that you should be found guilty 

of anything or plead to anything? He has been appointed to represent 

you and he continues to represent you on the basis of maintaining your 

innocence in connection with the charges that are before the Court at 

the present time? 
-8-

DEFENDANT ROMEO: I understand that but they’re trying to offer my 

co-defendant to plead to the firearm. He was never even in the picture. 

The man that actually supposed to be here isn’t even here. The man 

that they never charged is the man that did this. 

(Trial Tr., pp. 20-21.) 

{¶15} A short time later, counsel for Bright requested the matter be severed: 

[COUNSEL FOR BRIGHT]: Yes, Your Honor. In light of the 

statements that the co-defendant, Summer Romeo, made, the defense 

for Mr. Bright asks that this matter be severed in light of the contentions 

made by the co-defendant, not that they’re on the record. There has to 

be some way in which counsel for Mr. Bright can attempt to bring Miss 

Romeo before the Court as a witness, and clearly that can’t happen 

with her being a co-defendant. So at this time I’m asking for a 

continuance and an opportunity and a separate trial for Mr. Bright so 

that, based on the allegations and contentions and acknowledgments, 

that Miss Romeo made on that record that -- 

THE COURT: Which are not under oath and do not have any formal 

standing with respect to any action of the Court other than as part of the 

Court’s effort to satisfy himself that, in fact, Miss Romeo understands 

what she’s doing at this point. 

(Trial Tr., pp. 27-28.) 
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{¶16} It appears that Romeo’s comments, when examined in their entirety 

and within context, are not exculpatory in nature. Bright’s contentions to the contrary 

are speculative at best. The comments amounted to an assertion of Romeo’s own 

innocence during the court’s colloquy regarding any potential plea agreement, rather 

than as actual evidence about the extent of Bright’s involvement. In fact, she 

appears to complain about the plea deal offered to Bright, who would undoubtedly be 

called upon to testify against her at trial should he accept. As the trial court also 

noted, her comments were not sworn testimony, but were arguments to the court 

during a plea colloquy. Taken together, her comments do not rise to the level of 

exculpatory evidence for Bright, as he urges. 

{¶17} The admissibility of Romeo’s statements is also questionable. The 

statements were made prior to trial as part of a colloquy with the judge during plea 

discussions. Evid.R. 410(A)(5) precludes such statements from being admissible: 

“any statement made in the course of plea discussions in which counsel for the 

prosecuting authority or for the defendant was a participant and that do not result in a 

plea of guilty or that result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.” Evid.R. 410(A)(5). 

Neither Romeo nor Bright entered into plea agreements. As such, the statements 

arguably lack admissibility, as they were made in the context of plea discussions 

which did not ultimately result in a guilty plea. 

{¶18} Bright bears the burden of “affirmatively showing that his rights were 

prejudiced” and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever the trials. 

State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 421 N.E.2d 1288 (1981), syllabus. Although 
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Bright contends that severance was necessary so that his right to call Romeo as a 

witness could be protected, his argument is highly speculative. Assuming the trial 

court did sever, Romeo would not be required to testify if called and could, and 

arguably would, assert her right against self-incrimination in this matter. Romeo’s 

status as a participant in this crime does not change. Fifth Amendment rights against 

self-incrimination apply to all witnesses in criminal and civil proceedings. Lefkowitz v. 

Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 76, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). As such, Bright has 

not affirmatively demonstrated a “clear, manifest and undue prejudice and violation of 

a substantive right” resulting from the trial court’s failure to sever the trials in the 

instant matter. Schiebel, at 89, citing United States v. Castro, supra, at 998. 

{¶19} Without a showing of clear and manifest prejudice, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it denied Bright’s request to sever his trial from that of 

Romeo. Bright’s first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

The Trial Court Erred by Refusing to Grant a Continuance. 

{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Bright contends the trial court erred 

in refusing to grant him a continuance. “The grant or denial of a continuance is a 

matter that is entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v. 

Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), syllabus. An appellate court will 

not reverse a denial of a continuance absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 67. An 

abuse of discretion “implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 

unconscionable.” State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 444 (1980). 
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{¶21} An appellate court’s review of a denial of a motion for a continuance 

requires the application of a balancing test where we must weigh the trial court’s 

interest in controlling its docket and the public’s interest in the prompt, efficient 

dispatch of justice versus any prejudice to the moving party. Unger at 67; see, also 

Fiocca v. Fiocca, 10th Dist. No. 04AP-962, 2005-Ohio-2199, at ¶ 6; Seget v. Seget, 

8th Dist. No. 83905, 2004-Ohio-6209, at ¶ 10. 

{¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court in Unger, supra, articulated factors that a trial 

court should consider when determining whether to grant a motion for continuance: 

[T]he length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have 

been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, 

opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for 

legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; 

whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances which gives 

rise to the request for continuance; and other relevant factors, 

depending on the unique facts of each case. 

Id. at 67-68. 

{¶23} Bright again relies on his belief that Romeo’s pre-trial statements rise to 

the level of exculpatory evidence. Bright’s request for continuance relied entirely on 

Romeo’s comments that “[b]ecause they’ve got the wrong man, and I don’t want to 

go to prison for something I didn’t do” and “[h]e was never even in the picture. The 

man that actually supposed to be here isn’t even here. The man that they never 

charged is the man that did this.” Both statements, viewed in a vacuum, arguably 
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might appear to be helpful to Bright’s defense. (Trial Tr., pp. 20-21.) However, the 

trial court was not operating in a vacuum: it was conducting a colloquy with a 

defendant attempting to assert her own innocence in the midst of a discussion 

regarding a potential plea agreement. Bright argues that Romeo’s non-testimonial 

statements indicate that she had more information to provide regarding Bright’s role 

in the crime. As a co-defendant, it is highly likely Romeo had more information as to 

what transpired that evening. There is no surprise to the participants in that regard. 

While Bright acknowledges that Romeo had made no prior statements that might be 

exculpatory, he ignores all of the direct eyewitness testimony in this case inculpating 

him, including testimony by Grate placing him in the car the night of the incident and 

with the gun. Bright’s assertions regarding Romeo’s statements are speculative at 

best, and usefulness by Bright, in light of all other evidence, does not rise to the level 

of prejudice warranting a continuance when balanced against the other interests. 

Romeo’s comments did not constitute new evidence which would require the court to 

grant a continuance in order to allow Bright’s counsel to investigate further. 

Moreover, the non-testimonial statements themselves appear inadmissible under the 

evidence rules, as they were made within the context of plea negotiations, and could 

not have been presented to the jury by a court reporter or sheriff deputy as Bright 

contends. Moreover, Romeo’s statements that she and her co-defendant are 

innocent are, in themselves, not exculpatory. Accordingly, given the particular 

circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
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Bright’s motion for a continuance. Bright’s second assignment of error is without 

merit and is overruled. 

{¶24} Consequently, based on the foregoing, Appellant’s two assignments of 

error lack merit and are overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Donofrio, P.J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs.