IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

LINDA BELL,

Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA,

Respondent,

MARICOPA COUNTY,

Respondent Employer,

PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT,

Respondent Carrier.

No. CV-14-0095-PR

Filed January 30, 2015

Appeal from the Industrial Commission of Arizona

The Honorable Margaret A. Fraser, Administrative Law Judge

No. 20100-690290

AWARD SET ASIDE

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

234 Ariz. 113, 317 P.3d 654 (App. 2014)

VACATED

COUNSEL:

Brian I. Clymer (argued), Brian Clymer Attorney at Law; Matt C. Fendon, 

Janell Youtsey, J. Victor Stoffa, Fendon Law Firm, Phoenix, for Linda Bell

Scott H. Houston (argued), Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, P.L.L.C., 

Phoenix, for Maricopa County and Pinnacle Risk Management

Toby Zimbalist, Phoenix, for Amicus Curiae Arizona Association of 

Lawyers for Injured Workers
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

2

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE BALES, and JUSTICES BERCH, BRUTINEL, and 

TIMMER joined.

VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, opinion of the Court:

¶1 As part of Arizona’s workers’ compensation statutes, A.R.S. 

§ 23-1062(B) directs when an injured employee becomes entitled to 

compensation for lost wages due to a work-related injury and how such 

compensation is payable thereafter. We hold that the waiting period for 

compensation set forth in § 23-1062(B) applies to claims for all types of 

disability, including both temporary partial disability (“TPD”) under A.R.S. 

§ 23-1044(A) and temporary total disability (“TTD”) under A.R.S. 

§ 23-1045(A). We further hold that § 23-1062(B) does not require proof of 

an initial period of TTD, but does require proof of seven consecutive days 

of some type of work-related disability before an injured employee becomes 

entitled to compensation for any type of disability, including TPD.

I.

¶2 Linda Bell was injured at her job at the Maricopa County

Public Defender’s Office in February 2010. She continued working after her 

injury, but missed work intermittently over the next seventeen months to 

attend medical appointments and receive treatment. Bell used sick leave 

and vacation time during that time to avoid loss of income. In July 2011, 

she underwent surgery for her injury and thereafter was off work for 

several months.

¶3 Bell requested a hearing before the Industrial Commission of 

Arizona (“ICA”) on whether she was entitled to TPD compensation to 

reimburse her for the sick leave and vacation time she had used during the 

seventeen months following her injury. The Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) denied Bell’s request for TPD compensation after an evidentiary 

hearing, finding that she “ha[d] not submitted any medical evidence that 

she [had been] taken off work during the time period for which temporary 

compensation benefits are requested.” Although Bell testified that the 

aggregate time she missed from work during the seventeen months 

amounted to more than seven days, the ALJ found that Bell “did not miss 

any period of time over one week,” and that her employer had 

accommodated all her medical restrictions. In addition, the ALJ concluded 

that § 23-1062(B) limits compensation to those employees who can 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

3

demonstrate that their “injury cause[d] total disability for more than seven 

days.” The ALJ summarily affirmed the decision upon review.

¶4 The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ’s award and decision 

upon review. Bell v. Indus. Comm’n, 234 Ariz. 113, 114 ¶ 1, 317 P.3d 654, 655 

(App. 2014). The court held that “the waiting period created by A.R.S. § 23-

1062(B) must be satisfied by temporary total disability rather than 

temporary partial disability,” and “by temporary total disability on 

consecutive working days.” Id. at 115–16 ¶¶ 12, 16, 317 P.3d at 656–57. 

Thus, the court upheld the ALJ’s findings that Bell was not entitled to TPD 

compensation because she failed to prove she had satisfied § 23-1062(B)’s 

waiting period. Id. at 117 ¶¶ 17, 19, 317 P.3d at 658.

¶5 We granted review because the legal issues presented are of 

statewide importance, potentially affecting other workers’ compensation 

claims. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the 

Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

II.

¶6 The issues presented are (1) whether the waiting period of 

§ 23-1062(B) precludes a claim for TPD compensation without prior total 

disability, and, if not, (2) whether consecutive days of lost time from work 

are required to prove entitlement to TPD compensation. We review de 

novo the meaning of § 23-1062(B) and its applicability to § 23-1044(A). See

In re Estate of Riley, 231 Ariz. 330, 332 ¶ 9, 295 P.3d 428, 430 (2013).

A.

1.

¶7 If a statute’s language is subject to only one reasonable 

meaning, we apply that meaning. J.D. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39, 40–41 ¶ 6, 335 

P.3d 1118, 1119–20 (2014). When the language can reasonably be read more 

than one way, however, we may consider the statute’s subject matter, 

legislative history, and purpose, as well as the effect of different 

interpretations, to derive its meaning. See Baker v. Univ. Physicians 

Healthcare, 231 Ariz. 379, 383 ¶ 8, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (2013). Moreover, when 

statutes such as §§ 23-1044 and -1062 “relate to the same subject . . . they 

should be construed together . . . as though they constituted one law” and 

interpretively reconciled “whenever possible, in such a way so as to give 

effect to all the statutes involved.” Pima County v. Maya Constr. Co., 158 

Ariz. 151, 155, 761 P.2d 1055, 1059 (1988). Because the text of §§ 23-1044 and 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

4

-1062 does not itself resolve the issues presented, we consider other factors 

to guide our analysis.

¶8 Section 23-1044(A), entitled “Compensation for partial 

disability; computation,” in pertinent part provides: “For temporary partial 

disability there shall be paid during the period thereof sixty-six and twothirds per cent of the difference between the wages earned before the injury 

and the wages which the injured person is able to earn thereafter.” Only 

§ 23-1044, and no other statute, “provides the method of determining the 

amount of compensation for partial disability.” Alsbrooks v. Indus. Comm’n, 

118 Ariz. 480, 481, 578 P.2d 159, 160 (1978); see A.R.S. tit. 23, ch. 6.

¶9 Section 23-1062(B), under the heading “commencement of 

compensation,” directs the commencement of payments to an injured 

employee:

The first installment of compensation is to be paid no later 

than the twenty-first day after written notification by the 

commission to the carrier of the filing of a claim except where 

the right to compensation is denied. Thereafter, 

compensation shall be paid at least once each two weeks 

during the period of temporary total disability and at least 

monthly thereafter. Compensation shall not be paid for the 

first seven days after the injury. If the incapacity extends 

beyond the period of seven days, compensation shall begin 

on the eighth day after the injury, but if the disability 

continues for one week beyond such seven days, 

compensation shall be computed from the date of the injury.

Section 23-1062(B) is the only provision in the workers’ compensation 

statutes that addresses timing of payments. See A.R.S. tit. 23, ch. 6. While 

it determines when compensation is payable, § 23-1044(A) determines the 

amount of compensation owed for periods of TPD.

¶10 “The word ‘disability,’ as used in our Compensation Act, does 

not mean disablement to perform the particular work [the employee] was 

doing at the time of [the] injury, but refers to injuries which result in 

impairment of earning power generally.” Savich v. Indus. Comm’n, 39 Ariz. 

266, 270, 5 P.2d 779, 780 (1931); see also Time, D.C. Freight Lines v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 148 Ariz. 117, 119, 713 P.2d 318, 320 (App. 1985) (“[T]he common 

denominator for disability compensation during each stage is the claimant’s 

reduced earning capacity and the fundamental point is that whether 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

5

temporary or permanent, the claimant is being compensated for a loss of 

earning capacity.”). “[W]hen [A.R.S. § 23-1044] says ‘disability,’ it means 

earning capacity disability even though the effect upon the work[er]’s 

earning capacity may be minimal,” Alsbrooks, 118 Ariz. at 484, 578 P.2d at

163, and likewise “[t]he terms ‘incapacity’ and ‘disability’ in A.R.S. § 23-

1062(B) refer to loss in earning capacity, as opposed to loss of actual 

earnings,” Tartaglia v. Indus. Comm’n, 177 Ariz. 199, 201, 866 P.2d 867, 869 

(1994). Thus, the compensation at issue in this case is for a claimed loss in 

earning capacity resulting from a work-related injury, as distinguished 

from “medical, surgical, and hospital benefits” to which an injured 

employee is generally entitled under § 23-1062(A).

2.

¶11 The parties conceded two significant points during oral 

argument in this Court. Bell conceded, as she did in the court of appeals, 

that the seven-day waiting period prescribed in § 23-1062(B)’s third 

sentence applies to claims for both TTD and TPD. See Bell, 234 Ariz. at 114–

15 ¶ 8, 317 P.3d at 655–56. And the employer and its insurance carrier 

conceded, contrary to the ALJ’s and the court of appeals’ conclusions, that 

§ 23-1062(B) does not require proof of an initial period of TTD before a 

claimant may recover compensation for TPD. We agree with those 

concessions because they comport with the statutes, legislative history, and 

case law.

¶12 On the first point, § 23-1062(B) broadly refers to 

“compensation,” “disability,” and “incapacity” without limiting those 

terms to any particular type of disability. See also A.R.S. § 23-901(5) 

(defining “Compensation,” without restriction or qualification, as “the 

compensation and benefits provided” for in the workers’ compensation 

statutes). Further, while Arizona’s workers’ compensation laws have 

always included a waiting-period requirement since being codified nearly 

ninety years ago, see Ariz. Rev. Code § 1441 (1928), our legislature, despite 

amending the relevant statute several times, has never limited the waiting 

period’s general language to incorporate the long-standing distinction 

between TPD and TTD, see id. § 1438(B)–(C) (providing benefits for both 

TPD and TTD). Thus, to hold that the waiting period does not apply 

equally to compensation claims for all types of disability, including TPD 

under § 23-1044(A), would require us to limit § 23-1062(B) in a way its

language has never expressed.
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

6

¶13 The directive in § 23-1044(A) that compensation for TPD 

“shall be paid during the period thereof” does not compel us to infer such 

a limitation. Because the purpose of § 23-1044(A) is to provide a method 

for determining how much TPD compensation is owed rather than when it 

is payable, we conclude that that statute’s isolated reference to “the period 

thereof” does not relate to the commencement of TPD compensation but 

instead to how compensation should be calculated throughout periods of 

TPD. See Alsbrooks, 118 Ariz. at 481, 578 P.2d at 160.

¶14 Conversely, interpreting § 23-1062(B)’s waiting period to 

apply to TPD compensation awardable under § 23-1044(A) is consistent 

with the latter’s mandate that TPD “shall be paid during the period 

thereof.” Applying § 23-1062(B) to § 23-1044(A) still enables a partially 

disabled employee to receive compensation during the entire period of 

TPD, including the initial waiting period, as long as the claimant meets the 

requirement in § 23-1062(B)’s fourth sentence that the “disability continues 

for one week beyond [the waiting period]” because then “compensation 

shall be computed from the date of the injury.” Section 23-1062(B)’s waiting 

period simply qualifies entitlement to TPD compensation under § 23-

1044(A) without foreclosing the availability of such compensation during 

the period thereof.

¶15 We therefore hold that § 23-1062(B)’s waiting period for 

compensation applies to an injured employee’s claim for any type of 

disability, including TPD under § 23-1044(A).

3.

¶16 On the related second point, § 23-1062(B), read as a whole, 

does not expressly condition an injured employee’s entitlement to TPD 

compensation on a showing of prior TTD. Contrary to the court of appeals’ 

observation that the statute’s meaning is plain, Bell, 234 Ariz. at 115 ¶ 10, 

317 P.3d at 656, subsection (B), and particularly its second sentence, may 

reasonably be interpreted more than one way.

¶17 The second sentence of § 23-1062(B) states that “compensation 

shall be paid at least once each two weeks during the period of temporary 

total disability and at least monthly thereafter.” Although that sentence 

specifically refers to TTD, and § 23-1062 nowhere expressly mentions TPD, 

the latter part of the sentence, “and at least monthly thereafter,” logically 

applies to types of disability other than TTD. We therefore disagree with 

the court of appeals’ conclusion that “[b]ecause the language imposing the 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

7

requisite waiting period follows closely after the reference to ‘temporary 

total disability,’ a plain and natural reading of this provision requires the 

waiting period to be satisfied by a work week of temporary total disability.” 

Id.

¶18 Legislative history supports our reasoning. As noted 

previously, the waiting period provision in § 23-1062(B)’s third sentence 

dates back to the 1920s. See 1925 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 83, § 73 (7th Reg. 

Sess.). Compare Ariz. Rev. Code § 1441 (1928) (original statutory waiting 

period), with A.R.S. § 23-1062(B). The legislature added the first and second

sentences to subsection (B) in 1968, not for the purpose of limiting § 23-1062 

to claims involving some period of TTD, but rather to “simplify the 

procedure and thereby shorten the period of time by which an injured 

claimant can claim and receive compensation for his injuries.” Hardware 

Mut. Cas. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 17 Ariz. App. 7, 10, 494 P.2d 1353, 1356

(1972).

¶19 Moreover, interpreting § 23-1062(B) to require that a period of 

TTD precede compensation for any type of disability fails to give effect to 

the mandatory language in § 23-1044(A), a related statute, that 

compensation for TPD “shall be paid during the period thereof.” Such an 

interpretation would also run afoul of the notion that “[w]orker’s 

compensation statutes are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate their 

remedial purpose.” Tartaglia, 177 Ariz. at 201, 866 P.2d at 869. Indeed, 

nothing in the text or history of the applicable statutes indicates that the 

legislature intended to condition TPD compensation on a preceding period 

of TTD, particularly when doing so might completely deprive an injured 

employee with only TPD of any compensation.

¶20 Our case law is also consistent with these conclusions. In 

Shaw v. Industrial Commission, we affirmed ICA awards spanning an initial 

period of TPD for approximately five months, followed by about four 

months of TTD, and ending with another period of TPD until the claimant’s 

condition became stationary. 109 Ariz. 401, 402, 510 P.2d 47, 48 (1973).

¶21 Likewise, in Roberson v. Industrial Commission, despite the lack 

of an initial period of TTD, we reasoned that if the injured employee had 

known that he had a loss in earning capacity from TPD after his injury but 

before being laid off shortly thereafter, then “a valid claim could have been 

made.” 98 Ariz. 336, 338, 404 P.2d 419, 421 (1965) (citing English v. Indus. 

Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 86, 90, 237 P.2d 815, 818 (1951) (“[T]he seven-day statute 

[§ 23-1062(B)] . . . should not be interpreted to deprive an employee of 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

8

compensation for injures when neither the injured employee, nor his 

employer . . . considers the accident as resulting in a compensable injury or 

to be so trivial as not to justify reporting to the commission.”)). We further 

reasoned that if the disability persisted for nearly three-and-a-half months 

after he was laid off, as the employee alleged it had, then he would be 

“entitled to receive compensation from the date of his injury until he returned 

to some regular work,” less the amount he was paid while assigned to postinjury trivial duties before the layoff. Id. at 338–39, 404 P.2d at 420–21 

(emphasis added).

¶22 Thus, we hold that any type of disability, including TPD 

under § 23-1044(A), may satisfy the waiting period without proof of prior 

TTD.

B.

¶23 Finally, we address what is required to satisfy the seven-day

waiting period prescribed by § 23-1062(B). Bell argues that the waitingperiod requirement may be met by aggregating nonconsecutive time of 

disability resulting from the same work-related injury. We disagree.

¶24 Our analysis of this issue turns on the third and fourth 

sentences of § 23-1062(B), which state:

Compensation shall not be paid for the first seven days after 

the injury. If the incapacity extends beyond the period of 

seven days, compensation shall begin on the eighth day after 

the injury, but if the disability continues for one week beyond 

such seven days, compensation shall be computed from the 

date of the injury.

Notably, this language does not include the words “consecutive,” 

“uninterrupted,” “immediately following,” or the like. Nor does it include 

words like “nonconsecutive,” “aggregate,” or “cumulative.”

¶25 Nevertheless, reading the two sentences together strongly 

suggests that the waiting period requires seven consecutive days of 

disability: “Compensation shall not be paid for the first seven days after the 

injury. If the incapacity extends beyond the period of seven days . . . .” A.R.S. 

§ 23-1062(B) (emphasis added). “The . . . ordinary meaning of the phrase 

‘seven days’ is ‘one week,’” Tartaglia, 177 Ariz. at 201, 866 P.2d at 869, and 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

9

a “week” is commonly understood to mean “any seven consecutive days,” 

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1337 (1983) (emphasis added).

¶26 In addition, the word “period” as used with reference to time

commonly means “a portion of time determined by some recurring 

phenomenon.” Id. at 875. Here, the “recurring phenomenon” that 

comprises “the period” is the existence of some type of disability for one

week—if the disability does not recur on seven consecutive days, it cannot 

constitute such a period. See County of Maricopa v. Indus. Comm’n, 145 Ariz. 

14, 19, 699 P.2d 389, 394 (App. 1985) (“[T]he terms ‘incapacity’ and 

‘disability’ [in § 23-1062(B)] both refer to loss of earning capacity.”); see also

Van Dresser v. Firlings, 24 N.E.2d 969, 970 (Mass. 1940) (“The word ‘period’ 

as applied to time carries with it the idea of the separation of a designated 

interval of time from the flow of time in general. The words ‘a period’ do 

not readily expand to include an irregular succession of times or periods of 

varying length, even though all are included within a calendar year.”).

¶27 Furthermore, § 23-1062(B)’s fourth sentence conditions 

retroactive compensation for the seven-day waiting period on the disability 

continuing “for one week beyond such seven days.” A.R.S. § 23-1062(B) 

(emphasis added). It would be incongruous to allow seven nonconsecutive 

days to satisfy the waiting period but then require seven consecutive days 

(“one week”) immediately thereafter. But cf. Tartaglia, 177 Ariz. at 201, 866 

P.2d at 869 (“The legislature may have used ‘one week’ [in § 23-1062(B)] 

simply because using ‘seven days’ twice in the same sentence might be 

confusingly redundant . . . .”).

¶28 We give the words in § 23-1062(B) their commonly 

understood meaning because it is neither plain nor clear that the legislature 

intended to give them a different meaning. See Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 

105 Ariz. 413, 421, 466 P.2d 18, 26 (1970); see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words and 

phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved use of 

the language.”). In this context, we accordingly construe the statute as

imposing a waiting period that requires seven consecutive days of some 

type of disability before an injured employee becomes entitled to 

compensation for any type of disability, including TPD under § 23-1044(A).

¶29 Our conclusion is consistent with County of Maricopa. The 

seven-day threshold was not at issue or addressed in that case, as the court 

of appeals here correctly observed. Bell, 234 Ariz. at 116 ¶ 15, 317 P.3d at 

657. Nonetheless, County of Maricopa is illustrative because the court there 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

10

affirmed an award granting benefits based on facts indicating that the 

claimant satisfied the waiting period.

¶30 The employee in County of Maricopa was injured on Friday, 

April 24; was absent from work on Monday, April 27; Tuesday, April 28; 

Wednesday, April 29; partially absent on Thursday, April 30; and then 

totally absent again on Friday, May 1 and Monday, May 4. County of 

Maricopa, 145 Ariz. at 17–18, 699 P.2d at 392–93. The employee thus satisfied 

the waiting period by establishing some degree of disability on at least 

seven days after his injury, beginning on Saturday, April 25, and lasting 

through Monday, May 4. The employee was awarded compensation for 

nonconsecutive time lost between May 8 and June 7 to attend medical 

appointments, id. at 18, 699 P.2d at 393, which is consistent with 

§ 23-1062(B)’s provision that “[i]f the incapacity extends beyond the period 

of seven days, compensation shall begin on the eighth day.” The employee 

was also awarded retroactive compensation for time lost during the waiting 

period, which is likewise consistent with § 23-1062(B) because his disability 

“continue[d] for one week beyond [the waiting period]” as implied by the 

fact that he had to continue seeking medical treatment until June 7 despite 

having returned to his regular employment duties. See id.

¶31 There are two significant caveats to the waiting-period 

requirement. First, “seven days” means seven consecutive calendar days, 

not working days, because “although an employee may be working only one 

or two days a week, his capacity to earn is reduced not only on work days, 

but also on each calendar day.” Tartaglia, 177 Ariz. at 201, 866 P.2d at 869; 

see also Shaw, 109 Ariz. at 402, 510 P.2d at 48 (rejecting argument that injured 

employee’s disability benefits should be limited to six months because she 

only worked six months per year, and holding that she “must be 

compensated for both temporary total disability and temporary partial 

disability for the length of time that such disabilities exist”). Although the 

court of appeals correctly acknowledged this point, Bell, 234 Ariz. at 115 n.2, 

317 P.3d at 656 n.2, the court incorrectly stated that “the § 23-1062(B) 

waiting period must be satisfied by temporary total disability on 

consecutive working days,” id. at 116 ¶ 16, 317 P.3d at 657 (emphasis added). 

To be clear, we hold that the waiting period requires seven consecutive 

calendar days, regardless of whether those calendar days were also 

working days.

¶32 Second, an injured employee’s entitlement to compensation 

depends on whether the injury resulted in a disability (that is, a loss in 

earning capacity), which does not necessarily require that the employee 
BELL V. ICA, ET AL.

Opinion of the Court

11

missed time from work, as the ALJ in this case apparently determined. See 

A.R.S. § 23-1044(A) (calculating TPD compensation by comparing “wages 

earned before the injury” with “wages which the injured person is able to 

earn thereafter”); County of Maricopa, 145 Ariz. at 19, 699 P.2d at 394 (“[A]n 

employee who receives the same or higher wages after an injury than he 

earned before the injury may nevertheless have suffered a loss of earning 

capacity.”). Because none of the ALJ’s findings reveal whether Bell could 

prove that her injury resulted in some type of disability, and if so, that the 

disability persisted for seven consecutive days, we set aside the award 

denying Bell TPD compensation. See Post v. Indus. Comm’n, 160 Ariz. 4, 7, 

770 P.2d 308, 311 (1989) (“To prevent appellate courts from having to 

assume a factfinder role, an [ALJ] must find on all the case’s material issues. 

Although lack of findings on a particular issue does not invalidate an award 

per se, we will vacate a judge’s award if we cannot determine the factual 

basis of his conclusion or whether it was legally sound.” (citations 

omitted)).

¶33 In sum, we hold that to receive compensation for any type of 

disability, the claimant must satisfy the waiting period prescribed in § 23-

1062(B), which requires proof of seven consecutive calendar days of some 

type of disability. Those days need not be work days, and the right to 

compensation does not hinge on time lost from work. We do not address 

whether the seven consecutive days must immediately follow the actual 

injury, or whether they may occur during any subsequent, post-injury 

timeframe.

III.

¶34 For the reasons stated above, we vacate the court of appeals’ 

opinion and set aside the ICA award. See Marriott Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 

147 Ariz. 116, 118, 708 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1985) (“Upon review, an appellate 

court may neither alter nor modify an [ICA] award but is limited either to 

affirm or set aside the award.”).