J-A26007-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CHRISTOPHER J. PARKER, JR. AND ALI 

J. PARKER,

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellees

v.

ANTHONY E. SURMAN, D/B/A A.J. 

SURMAN CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

Appellant No. 307 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 1, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): AR-17-000826

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2019

Appellant, Anthony E. Surman, d/b/a A.J. Surman Construction, Inc., 

appeals from the judgment of $2,970.00 entered against him.1 We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the factual background and procedural 

history of this case as follows:

[Appellees] Christopher Parker and Ali Parker purchased a home 

in Mt. Lebanon in July of 2016. Mr. and Mrs. Parker decided to 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant appealed from the order denying his post-trial motion on January 

29, 2018. An order denying post-trial motions is interlocutory and generally 

not appealable. See Levitt v. Patrick, 976 A.2d 581, 584 n.2 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (stating that appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from 

order denying post-trial motions). However, since judgment was entered on 

March 1, 2018, we consider the appeal as taken from the entry of judgment. 

See Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514-

15 (Pa. Super. 1995) (stating that appellate courts may “regard as done that 

which ought to have been done”) (citations omitted). We have amended the 

caption accordingly. 
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have the only full bathroom in the home remodeled, and on 

October 4, 2016[,] Mr. Parker signed a two[-]page proposal from 

A[.]J[.] Surman Construction “together with” American Patriot 

Construction, Inc.[,] to do the work for $7,456. However, the 

proposal Mr. Parker signed is not valid because it lacks a 

contractor registration number and multiple other features 

specified by Pennsylvania’s Home Improvement Consumer 

Protection Act[,]1 ... 73 P.S. §[] 517.1 et seq. (“HICPA” hereafter).

1 73 P.S. § 517.6, entitled “Proof of registration,” states that 

“A contractor shall include its registration number ... on all 

contracts, estimates and proposals with owners in this 

Commonwealth.” 73 P.S. § 517.7(a)(1), entitled “Home 

improvement contracts,” states that “No home 

improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against 

an owner unless it: ... contains the home improvement 

contractor registration number of the performing 

contractor.” Other features for a valid contract under 73 

P.S. [§] 517.7 that were missing from the proposal Mr. 

Parker signed include the signature of the contractor or a 

sales person, an address that is not a post office box 

number[,] and approximate start and completion dates.

[Appellant], who prepared the proposal, accepted a $1,860 check 

from the Parkers after Mr. Parker signed the proposal and 

[Appellant] also accepted their $3,728 check when he began the 

work on Tuesday, October 11, 2016. The scope of work described 

in the proposal called for removal and replacement of the wall tile, 

floor tile, toilet, tub, towel bar, sink, faucets and vanity cabinet as 

well as two coats of paint. After only the first day of work on the 

bathroom, Mr. and Mrs. Parker arrived home from their jobs to 

find holes had been made in the wall of the hallway outside the 

bathroom. Mr. and Mrs. Parker next encountered a problem with 

the work not being completed within the three days promised by 

[Appellant]. Each day, from October 13 until October 22, 

[Appellant] would say that he just needed another hour or two to 

finish. Since the Parkers were not able to use the primary 

bathroom in their home, this was a major inconvenience.

On Saturday, October 22, after [Appellant] and a helper finished 

working, Mrs. Parker went in the bathroom to investigate it for 

herself. She noticed something seriously wrong with the tile floor 

because it cracked when she walked on it and it clearly was not 

level. The Parkers were losing their patience. However, on 

October 24, [Appellant] refused to do more work unless the 
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Parkers paid him additional money. [Appellant] also asserted that 

the price total had increased by $389. With the proposal showing 

no additional money due until completion, Mr. and Mrs. Parker at 

first refused to pay any more money. But they could find no other 

contractor that could come quickly, hence on October 27[,] they 

paid an additional $1,126.50 for [Appellant] to come back and 

finish.2

2 All three checks from the Parkers were payable to “A[.]J[.]

Surman Construction.”

[Appellant] promised, both verbally and by electronic mail, that 

all of the bathroom work would be finished no later than Saturday, 

October 29. However, after finishing work on Saturday, October 

29, once again, [Appellant] said an hour or two more would be 

needed to finish. At this point, the Parkers asked [Appellant] to 

return the key to their home and told him he was not permitted 

to do any more work in their home. The holes in the wall of the 

hallway had not been repaired, a marble windowsill in the 

bathroom that [Appellant] broke had not been replaced, there 

were large holes in the bathroom wall from his unsuccessful effort 

to replace the towel bar, the top of the toilet tank was broken, the 

toilet was leaking, the tub was unstable, grout was missing from 

the floor tile[,] and the previously functional light switch was no 

longer operable. 

On October 31, 2016[,] [Appellant] sent the Parkers an invoice 

with another additional charge of $2,484. The Parkers paid 

nothing additional and filed a civil lawsuit for money damages 

against [Appellant] Anthony E. Surman d/b/a AS Surman 

Construction with their local magisterial district judge. [Appellant] 

did not appear for the hearing with the magisterial judge, but 

timely appealed the decision to the compulsory arbitration section 

of this court. On March 2, 2017[,] the Parkers filed their complaint 

in this court against [Appellant] Anthony E. Surman d/b/a A.J. 

Surman Construction, Inc[.]3 ... The one hundred forty-eight 

paragraph detailed complaint includes counts alleging [Appellant] 

violated [the] HICPA and Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices 

and Consumer Protection Law (see 73 P.S. §[] 201-1 et seq., 

“UTPCPL” hereafter). After the arbitration panel awarded money 

damages to the Parkers, [Appellant] appealed to obtain a new 

non-jury trial, and [this court] conducted the trial on January 12, 

2018. [The court’s] verdict was in favor of the Parkers and against 

[Appellant] in the amount of $2,970.
J-A26007-18

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3 The Parkers did not sue the corporate entity, “A.J. Surman 

Construction, Inc[.]” because it is a Virginia [c]orporation 

that was terminated by the [Commonwealth] of Virginia on 

August 31, 2016. The Parkers did not sue “American Patriot 

Construction, Inc.” because they never dealt with anyone 

affiliated with that entity and it did not have a contractor 

registration number required by [the] HICPA.

[Appellant] then filed a post-trial motion, which [the court]

denied. [Appellant] then appealed to the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania and filed a concise statement of matters complained 

of on appeal.[2] 

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 5/1/2018, at 1-4. 

Presently, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:

Does the [c]omplaint and the trial record provide a factual basis 

for the trial court’s finding that [Appellant] was guilty of 

misrepresentation and deceptive conduct sufficient to impose 

liability against [Appellant], a non-party to a home improvement 

contract?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.3 

We apply the following standard of review:

Our scope of review of a verdict entered in a nonjury case is 

limited to determining whether its factual findings are supported 

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant timely filed both his notice of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

3 We observe that Appellant’s brief does not comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as 

there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in 

distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated 

therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent.”); Donaldson v. Davidson Bros., Inc., 144 A.3d 93, 99 n.9 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (determining that the appellant failed to comply with Rule 

2119(a) where the appellant’s brief did not “present and develop eight 

arguments in support of the eight questions raised”). Although Appellant only 

advances one question in his statement of the questions involved, he divides 

his argument section into nine sections. We admonish Appellant for his lack 

of compliance with Rule 2119(a). 
J-A26007-18

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by the evidence and whether the court made a legal error. The 

prevailing party is entitled to have all its evidence believed and is 

entitled to be given all reasonable inferences from that evidence. 

When the trial court sits as fact finder, the weight to be assigned 

the testimony of the witnesses is within its exclusive province as 

are credibility determinations. Further, the court is free to choose 

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. 

Stokes v. Gary Barbera Enterprises, Inc., 783 A.2d 296, 297 (Pa. Super. 

2001) (internal citations omitted). 

The trial court found Appellant liable on three separate grounds: 

participation theory, violations of the UTPCPL, and violations of the HICPA. In 

his brief, Appellant contests all three grounds. However, in the interest of 

judicial economy, we focus our review on the trial court’s finding Appellant 

liable under the HICPA.4

The trial court determined that Appellant was liable under the HICPA, 

explaining:

Any HICPA violation is deemed a violation of the UTPCPL. See 73 

P.S. § 517.10.[5] [Appellant], as an individual, is a “contractor” 

under the HICPA because he was undertaking a home 

improvement project. See 73 P.S. § 517.2. Hence, he violated 

the HICPA by not including a registration number on the proposal 

____________________________________________

4 We note that Appellant does not argue that the amount of the judgment 

would change depending on which of the above-stated grounds form the basis 

for his liability. In other words, regardless of the ground relied upon, Appellant 

would remain liable for the same amount of money — $2,970.00. 

5 “A violation of any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed a violation 

of the act of December 17, 1968 (P.L. 1224, No. 387), known as the Unfair 

Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Nothing in this act shall 

preclude an owner from exercising any right provided under the Unfair Trade 

Practices and Consumer Protection Law.” 73 P.S. § 517.10 (footnote omitted). 
J-A26007-18

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(see 73 P.S. [§] 517.6[6]), subjecting him to the private action for 

damages under the UTPCPL brought by Mr. and Mrs. Parker. See 

73 P.S. § 201-9.2.

TCO at 4-5. 

In response, with respect to his liability under the HICPA, Appellant only 

argues that:

The trial court also found [Appellant] liable pursuant to [the 

HICPA] and [the UTPCPL].... 

Underlying the trial court[’s] determination that [Appellant] is 

liable under [the] HICPA and the UTPCPL is its conclusion that 

[Appellant] is a ‘Contractor’ as that term is defined under [the] 

HICPA.... A contractor under the HICPA is defined as follows:

“Contractor.” Any person who owns and operates a home 

improvement business or who undertakes, offers to 

undertake or agrees to perform any home improvement. 

The term includes a subcontractor or independent 

contractor who has contracted with a home improvement 

retailer, regardless of the retailer’s net worth, to provide 

home improvement services to retailer’s customers. The 

term does not include any of the following:

(1) A person for whom the total cash value of all of 

that person’s home improvements is less than $5,000 

during the previous taxable year.

(2) A home improvement retailer having a net worth 

of more than $50,000,000 or an employee of that 

retailer that does not perform home improvements.

75[]P.S. [§] 517.2. 

The trial court held that, “[Appellant], as an individual, is a 

‘contractor’ under HICPA because he was undertaking a home 

____________________________________________

6 “A contractor shall include its registration number in all advertisements 

distributed within this Commonwealth and on all contracts, estimates and 

proposals with owners in this Commonwealth. This section shall apply to all 

advertisements, contracts, estimates and proposals created by a contractor 

after the effective date of this act.” 73 P.S. § 517.6. 
J-A26007-18

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improvement project.” The facts do not support the trial court’s 

finding.

[The Parkers] entered into a contract with A[.]J[.] Surman 

Construction together with American Patriot Construction, Inc. 

[Appellant] did not sign the contract. In the contract, 

[Appellant’s] title is listed as “Business Development and 

Estimating.” [The Parkers] payed for work performed by checks 

payable to A[.]J[.] Surman Construction. The totality of this 

evidence supports the conclusion that the contractor in this case 

was A[.]J[.] Surman Construction together with American Patriot 

Construction, Inc. The evidence does not support the trial court’s 

conclusion that ... [Appellant] individually was undertaking the 

home improvement contract. Therefore, the judgment against 

[Appellant] should be reversed.

Appellant’s Brief at 22-24 (internal citations omitted). 

We disagree with Appellant that the totality of the evidence 

demonstrates that the contractor in this case was not him but, instead, A.J.

Surman Construction together with American Patriot Construction, Inc. We 

reiterate that the trial court found that A.J. Surman Construction, Inc. “is a 

Virginia Corporation that was terminated by the [Commonwealth] of Virginia 

on August 31, 2016[,]” which was five weeks before Appellant met with the 

Parkers, signed the proposal, and began work. See TCO at 3 n.3; Parkers’ 

Brief at 17 (citation omitted). Thus, A.J. Surman Construction, Inc., is a 

nonexistent entity. Furthermore, the trial court observed that “[t]he Parkers 

did not sue ‘American Patriot Construction, Inc.’ because they never dealt with 

anyone affiliated with that entity and it did not have a contractor registration 

number required by [the] HICPA.” TCO at 3 n.3. Moreover, the Parkers 

persuasively assert that “[a]t no point in the proceedings ... did [Appellant] 

introduce any evidence showing a relationship, let alone a legally enforceable 
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one, that existed between [Appellant] and American Patriot.” Parkers’ Brief 

at 13.7 They also cite a plethora of evidence supporting that they “never dealt 

with anyone on behalf of American Patriot and only with [Appellant] as [A.J.] 

Surman Construction....” Id. at 18; see also id. at 18-21 (explaining, inter 

alia, that the original solicitation through Angie’s List provided that the 

contracting company was A.J. Surman Construction and no reference was 

made to American Patriot, they wrote checks to A.J. Surman Construction, 

and Appellant personally signed the proposal with the title of ‘Business 

Development & Estimating’ of A.J. Surman Construction).8 Thus, we reject 

____________________________________________

7 We further note that, in Appellant’s earlier motion for summary judgment, 

he never mentioned American Patriot. Instead, he argued that “any claim 

that [the Parkers] have based upon the quality of the workmanship for the 

bathroom remodel job should be taken up with A.J. Surman Construction, 

Inc.” Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 12/5/2017, at 2. Appellant 

also reiterated the same argument in his pretrial statement. See Appellant’s 

Pretrial Statement, 12/11/2017, at 1 (“[The Parkers] entered into a contract 

with A.J. Surman Construction, Inc.[,] for a bathroom remodeling job at their 

home.... A.J. Surman Construction, Inc. is a Virginia Corporation and any 

claim that [the Parkers] have based upon the quality of workmanship for the 

bathroom remodel job should be taken up with A.J. Surman Construction, 

Inc.”). 

8 We also observe that Appellant did not maintain a contractor’s license. See 

Parkers’ Brief at 30-31 (citing N.T. Trial, 1/12/2018, at 94). Yet, the trial 

court found that Appellant “individually did the work[,]” and held himself out 

as an experienced contractor. See TCO at 4; see also N.T. Trial at 17 (Mrs. 

Parker: “So the whole time that this project was ongoing, it was only 

[Appellant] that we were dealing with. He brought a worker with him that 

was identified as Larry ... in his discovery responses but he said he didn’t know 

his last name or if he was a contractor in his discovery. We were dealing with 

[Appellant], over and over again. He was the one who wrote the contract. He 

was the one telling us about the progress every day. We would physically see 
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Appellant’s argument that the contractor was A.J. Surman Construction, Inc.,

together with American Patriot Construction, Inc., in light of the evidence 

adduced at trial and the arguments advanced by the parties. Accordingly, 

Appellant has not convinced us that the trial court erred in finding him 

individually liable under the HICPA, and therefore we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.9

Judgment affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/5/2019

____________________________________________

him working in the house whenever we were home. He was the one to 

purportedly get the materials....”). The Parkers also assert that Appellant 

“failed to produce at trial or otherwise any employment agreement, W-2, 

paystub or any other document evidencing his purported employment with 

[A.J.] Surman Construction together with American Patriot.” Parkers’ Brief at 

22. 

9

It is unclear whether Appellant argues that the “gist of the action” doctrine 

bars the Parkers from recovering under the HICPA. To the extent he does 

make this argument, we deem it waived. Appellant does not show where he 

raised this issue before the trial court, nor does our review of the record 

indicate that he did. See Pa.R.A.P. 302 (“Issues not raised in the lower court 

are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Similarly, to 

the extent Appellant argues that he does not qualify as a contractor under the 

HICPA, this argument is waived because he did not advance it before the trial 

court. See id.