UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4113

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RANDALL K. TAYLOR,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg. Robert C. Chambers, 

Chief District Judge. (6:12-cr-00135-1)

Submitted: July 2, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, 

Appellate Counsel, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth 

Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Randall Keith Taylor pled guilty, without a written 

plea agreement, to failure to register as a sex offender, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). The district court 

sentenced Taylor to eighteen months’ imprisonment and fifteen 

years’ supervised release. On appeal, Taylor argues that his 

fifteen-year term of supervised release is procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court failed to make an 

individualized assessment and that his fifteen-year term of 

supervised release is substantively unreasonable because it is 

greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing. 

We affirm. 

A “term of supervised release . . . [is] part of the 

original sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913 

(4th Cir. 1998), “and is reviewed for reasonableness.” United 

States v. Preston, 706 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013); see Gall 

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007) (stating that 

appellate review of sentence is for abuse of discretion). We 

review for “significant procedural error[s],” including “failing 

to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2006)] factors[] . . . 

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51. To avoid procedural error, “the district court 

must make an individualized assessment,” wherein it applies the 

relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific facts of the 
3

defendant’s case. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Taylor argues that the district court’s reasons for 

imposing the fifteen-year term of supervised release were not 

individualized and could have been stated for any defendant 

being sentenced to a term of supervised release. We disagree. 

In fashioning the sentence, the district court considered 

Taylor’s criminal history, stating that the fifteen-year term of 

supervised release would “help make sure the defendant, who has 

a significant criminal history, does not violate the law in some 

other fashion.” (J.A. 85).* Further, the district court 

considered the need to deter Taylor from repeating his offense, 

noting that the fifteen-year term of supervised release would 

“assist the Government to prosecute Mr. Taylor should he in the 

future fail again to register as he’s required.” (J.A. 85). We 

conclude that the district court demonstrated that it conducted 

an individualized assessment and that Taylor’s sentence is

procedurally reasonable. 

Taylor also argues that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a 

sentence for abuse of discretion, “examin[ing] the totality of 

the circumstances.” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 

 * “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.
4

212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). Assuming, without deciding, that the 

supervised release term is not entitled to a presumption of 

reasonableness on appeal, see United States v. Goodwin, ___ F.3d 

___, ___, 2013 WL 1891302 at *5-*9 (7th Cir. May 8, 2013) (No. 

12-2921), we conclude that the supervised release term is

nevertheless substantively reasonable. The district court was 

statutorily authorized to impose Taylor’s fifteen-year term of 

supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing 

range of five years to life of supervised release for violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 2250). Moreover, the district court adequately 

considered the § 3553(a) factors applicable to the imposition of 

supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2006). We find 

Taylor’s argument that his fifteen-year term of supervised 

release does not reflect his history and characteristics or the 

nature and circumstances of the instant offense unpersuasive. 

The district court referenced Taylor’s “significant criminal 

history” when explaining the fifteen-year term of supervised 

release (J.A. 85) and expressed concern that Taylor registered 

for years in Ohio and understood his obligation, but when he 

moved to West Virginia, Taylor “decided just not to comply.” 

(J.A. 75). Further, the district court found that Taylor’s 

sentence “reflects the nature and circumstance of the offense, 

[and] the history and characteristics of [Taylor].” (J.A. 89). 

Although Taylor argues that the district court should have 
5

considered that his offense was not as serious as other sex 

offenses, the district court was not permitted to consider the 

seriousness of Taylor’s offense when determining the term of 

supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). Accordingly, we 

conclude that that Taylor’s term of supervised release is 

substantively reasonable. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED