19-852 

United States v. Knowles 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE 

EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 21st day of February, two thousand twenty. 

PRESENT: 

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee,

 v. No. 19-852 

DONALD KNOWLES, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________________

FOR APPELLEE: ANDREY SPEKTOR (Jo Ann M. Navickas, 

Margaret E. Gandy, on the brief) Assistant 

United States Attorneys, Of Counsel, for

Richard P. Donoghue, United States 

Attorney for the Eastern District of New 

York, Brooklyn, NY. 
 

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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JOSEPH GENTILE, Frankie & Gentile, P.C., 

Mineola, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District 

of New York (Kuntz, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on April 2, 2019, is 

AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Donald Knowles appeals from a judgment entered by the 

District Court after he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to one count of unlawful 

possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2). The 

District Court sentenced Knowles primarily to 60 months’ imprisonment. Knowles timely 

appealed, raising challenges to his sentence. 

Knowles accepts that application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines resulted in a 

sentencing range of from 57 to 71 months based on a Total Offense Level of 21 and 

Criminal History Category of IV. He challenges, however, the District Court’s refusal to 

make two discretionary downward departures. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, to which we refer only as 

necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 

Unlike many sentencing challenges, “a refusal to downwardly depart is generally not 

appealable.” United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Rather, courts of appeals typically have no jurisdiction to entertain such 

claims. Only in certain circumstances may such a refusal be subject to appeal: “Claims that 

the district court erred in refusing to depart are not cognizable on appeal in the absence of 

substantial indication that the district judge believed she lacked authority to depart or an 

indication that a violation of the law occurred.” United States v. Jackson, 658 F.3d 145, 153-54 

(2d Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Scott, 387 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a 

district court’s sentencing decision is appealable for procedural error “where the defendant 

shows that a violation of law occurred, that the Guidelines were misapplied, or that the 
 

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refusal to depart was based on the sentencing court’s mistaken conclusion that it lacked the 

authority to depart” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our practice is to presume that the 

district court understood its authority unless the record contains evidence suggesting the 

contrary: “In the absence of clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge 

misapprehended the scope of his departure authority, we presume that a sentence judge 

understood the scope of his authority.” United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 

2006) (internal quotations marks omitted). 

Knowles argues first that the District Court erred in declining to depart downwardly 

under the authority of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 based on evidence that Knowles suffers from pain 

arising from a jaw injury and related surgery in 2013, pain that additional surgery in 2018 was 

not able to eliminate fully. Section 5H1.4 provides that “[a]n extraordinary physical 

impairment may be a reason to depart downward. . . .” The District Court’s sentencing 

memorandum reflects beyond doubt, however, that it understood the relevant facts and 

determined that they did not warrant a downward departure. We perceive no risk that the 

District Court misunderstood its authority here. We are therefore not free to review its 

decision not to depart downwardly from the Guidelines range. 

Knowles next contends that the District Court erred in declining to depart 

downwardly under the authority of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). Section 4A1.3(b)(1) provides 

that, “[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category 

substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the 

likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be 

warranted.” Knowles contends that a Criminal History Category of IV overstates the 

seriousness of his criminal record. The District Court analyzed this argument, too, in its 

sentencing memorandum and declined to depart. Knowles points to no evidence that the 

District Court misperceived its authority under section 4A1.3(b)(1) either. See United States v. 

Desena, 260 F.3d 150, 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a district court’s denial of motion to 

downwardly depart under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 is not appealable where there was “no indication 

that [the district court] mistakenly believed [that it] lacked the authority to depart as a matter 

of law”). Therefore this decision, too, is not subject to our review. 
 

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* * * 

We have considered all of Knowles’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit. The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court