[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-13761

Non-Argument Calendar

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FRED LEE BRYANT, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

WARDEN, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, 

Respondents-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-00363-TFM-N

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13761

Before JORDAN, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Fred Lee Bryant, a counseled Alabama state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas

corpus petition. We granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on 

the following issue:

Whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 

960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992), by failing to address Bryant’s claim that the trial court erred by requiring two 

witnesses, who previously had told the trial court 

they intended to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege, to invoke the privilege in the jury’s presence.

After review,1 we vacate and remand.

This Court has expressed “deep concern over the piecemeal 

litigation of federal habeas petitions” and instructed district courts 

to resolve all claimsfor relief in habeas corpus petitions. See Clisby, 

960 F.2d at 935-36. Under Clisby, we will vacate the district court’s 

judgment without prejudice and remand the case for further consideration of any unresolved claims when a district court fails to 

address all the claims in a § 2254 petition. Id. at 938. In making 

claims under a § 2254 petition, the petitioner “must present a claim 

1 We review de novo the legal question of whether the district court violated 

the rule in Clisby by failing to address a claim. Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 

1295, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2013).

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21-13761 Opinion of the Court 3

in clear and simple language such that the district court may not 

misunderstand it.” Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th 

Cir. 2013). No Clisby error occurs when the habeas petitioner fails 

to clearly present the claim to the district court. Barritt v. Sec’y, 

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 1246, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2020). In 

Dupree, we found the district court violated Clisby by failing to 

address a claim in 2 sentences in the middle of a 15-page supporting 

memorandum of law attached to the pro se § 2254 petition, which 

was entitled to liberal construction. Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299-1300. 

In contrast, we found in Barritt that a passing reference to coercion 

in an ineffective-assistance claim was not sufficient to state an independent coercion claim for Clisby purposes, considering the petitioner never alleged a freestanding coercion claim in state court or 

district court. Barritt, 968 F.3d at 1251-52. We noted though “the 

district court addressed each of Barritt’s claims that were actually 

presented[,] there [was] no indication that it was aware of a coercion claim or chose to ignore it.” Id. at 1252. 

The district court violated Clisby by failing to address Bryant’s claim that the trial court erred in requiring the witnesses to 

invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury. Clisby, 

960 F.2d at 938. There is language in Bryant’s filings raising a claim 

of trial-court error. In his original and amended § 2254 petitions, 

Bryant made a two-sentence reference to trial court error for allowing the witnesses to invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of 

the jury in violation of Alabama law. Bryant also asserted in his 

jurisdiction statement that his trial counsel, the state, and the trial 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13761

court “appeared to be unaware of the long standing Alabama law 

that ‘It is improper for the prosecution to call as a witness one it 

knows will certainly invoke the privilege against testifying as a witness, with the sole purpose of having the jury observe that invocation.’” This was enough for the State to read Bryant’s petition as 

raising a separate claim of trial court error and respond to that argument, and for the magistrate judge to address how many claims 

he had raised, which was in contrast to Barritt where “there [was]

no indication that [the district court] was aware of a coercion claim 

or chose to ignore it,” 968 F.3d at 1252. Bryant’s statements in his 

jurisdictional section and the body of his argument, along with the 

State’s response to the issue were more than the 2 sentences in the 

middle of a 15-page pro se supporting memorandum of law this 

Court concluded in Dupree were sufficient to raise a claim. See 

Dupree, 715 F.3d at 1299-1300. Although Bryant is counseled and 

is not entitled to liberal construction of his arguments, Bryant’s 

statements were enough to alert the district court of the issue in 

clear and simple language such that the district court may not misunderstand it. See id. at 1299.

We vacate the district court’s decision without prejudice and 

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. By 

remanding, we offer no opinion on whether there is a federal constitutional claim or whether the underlying claim has merit. See 

id. 

VACATED and REMANDED.

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