SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3218-17T2

ANITA WALSH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

PROSPECT EOGH, INC., d/b/a 

EAST ORANGE GENERAL 

HOSPITAL, and PROSPECT 

MEDICAL HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellants.

______________________________

Argued on October 31, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-7912-17.

Ivan R. Novich argued the cause for appellant

(Littler Mendelson, PC, attorneys; Ivan R. Novich, of 

counsel and on the brief; Lauren J. Marcus, on the 

briefs).

Arthur L. Raynes argued the cause for respondent 

(Wiley Malehorn Sirota & Raynes, attorneys; Arthur L. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 21, 2018
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Raynes, of counsel and on the brief; Courtney A. Reed 

Keren, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Anita Walsh sued her former employer, Prospect EOGH, Inc. 

d/b/a East Orange General Hospital and Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. 

(defendants) claiming she was wrongfully discharged under the New Jersey 

Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14. 

Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration 

agreement (Agreement) that plaintiff admits signing. Plaintiff claims that the 

Agreement was not explained to her, she does not recall signing it, and argues 

for the first time on appeal that it is not enforceable because defendants did not 

sign the document. Without allowing the requested oral argument, the motion

court issued an order denying defendants' motion, writing on it only: "Plaintiff

did not agree to give up right jury [sic] trial." We reverse and remand for 

reconsideration, with oral argument.

Plaintiff signed the Agreement on September 8, 2016, three days before 

she began work, in connection with her employment as Vice President of 

Operations. The Agreement is labeled "East Orange General Hospital Mutual 

Agreement to Arbitrate." Although there was a signature line for defendants,

they did not sign the Agreement. The Agreement states:
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To the fullest extent allowed by law, any controversy, 

claim or dispute between you and Prospect EOGH, Inc. 

dba East Orange General Hospital and/or any of its 

related entities, holding companies, parents, 

subsidiaries, divisions, officers, shareholders, 

directors, employees, agents, vendors, contractors, 

doctors, patients, insurers, predecessors, successors, 

and assigns (collectively, "the Company") relating to or 

arising out of your employment or the cessation of that 

employment will be submitted to final and binding 

arbitration.

The Agreement covers "all employment related claims including, but not limited 

to . . . violation of public policy, discrimination . . . or any other employmentrelated claim under any state or federal statutes or laws relating to an employee’s 

relationship with his/her employer . . . ." The Agreement also states, directly 

above the signature lines, in capital letters: "BY AGREEING TO THIS 

BINDING MUTUAL ARBITRATION PROVISION, BOTH YOU AND THE 

COMPANY GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY. BY SIGNING 

BELOW, I CONFIRM THAT I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE 

TO THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT." 

Defendants terminated plaintiff's employment on March 15, 2017, for 

reasons that she asserts in her November 2017 complaint were pretextual in 

nature. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated, contrary to CEPA, because 

she voiced her objections to the hospital's practices. 
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Defendants argue on appeal that their request for oral argument was 

denied improperly. They rely on Raspantini v. Arocho, 364 N.J. Super. 528, 

531 (App. Div. 2003) (stating that "because defendants' initial motion sought 

dispositive relief, plaintiffs' request for oral argument should have been granted 

as of right"). Defendants argue that although a trial court may deny a request 

for oral argument on a substantive motion, "the reason for the denial of the 

request, in that circumstance, should itself be set forth on the record," which the 

trial court did not do here. Id. at 531-32. We agree with defendants that oral 

argument, or the reason for not affording oral argument, must be provided by 

the court.

Defendants urge us not to remand the matter to the motion court because 

of the lack of oral argument, but rather to review the motion de novo. The 

reasons for the court's decision, however, are also lacking. The trial court must 

provide reasons with its decisions, either on the record or in writing. As we said 

more than twenty years ago,

Unfortunately, the judge made no findings of fact or 

legal conclusions as required by Rule 1:6-2(f). An 

articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution 

of a case. A trial judge has a duty to make findings of 

fact and conclusions of law "on every motion decided 

by written orders that are appealable as of right." R.

1:7-4. Failure to perform this duty "'constitutes a 

disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the 
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appellate court.'" Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-

70 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of 

Adjustment of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. 

Div. 1976)); see id. at 570 ("Naked conclusions do not 

satisfy the purpose of Rule 1:7-4.").

[Italiano v. Rudkin (Italiano), 294 N.J. Super. 502, 505

(App. Div. 1996).]

"Moreover, the appellate court ordinarily cannot perform its review 

function in the absence of findings." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 306 

(App. Div. 1997). Although we review the grant of a motion for summary 

judgment de novo, we cannot review the decision of the trial court on a blank 

slate. Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454 N.J. Super. 298, 301-02 (App. 

Div. 2018). The court wrote one sentence on the order, finding no evidence of 

a waiver of a jury trial, although such a waiver is set forth clearly in the 

Agreement. We are thus unclear as to whether the motion court reviewed the

proper material. Additionally, the court gave no reason for not allowing oral 

argument.

We reverse and remand to the court for oral argument and a reasoned 

decision. In the interest of completeness, the parties should be allowed to 

supplement their motion papers.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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