### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00418- CR

Jul ise s He r nande z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 403RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 90440 48, H ONO RAB LE BRENDA KENNEDY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A j ur y fo un d a pp e lla nt Jul ise s H e rn and e z g uil ty of ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t, and the c ourt sentenc ed him to fifteen y ear s’ imprisonment. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 21.11( a)( 1) (West 2003). Appellant contends the evidenc e is f actua lly insufficient to sustain the g uilty verdic t and that his trial counse l was ineff ective. We disag ree with both contentions and aff irm the conviction. I nM ar c h 2 0 0 3 , th e f o u r - y e ar - o ld c o mp la in an t to ld h e r mo th e r , E li za

b e th M arti n e z, that she did not want appe llant “to g ive her love any more.” Appellant, who wa s seventee n, worke d wi th M art ine z’s hu sb and
. He wa s livin g in the fa mil y ’s sp are be dr oo m and he lpi ngwi th t

he re nt. Martinez said she ini tially thought that the c omplainant meant that appe llant had kissed her on the chee k. But when she questioned the complainant further , the complainant told her that appellant ha d come into her

room, taken he r fr om the bed, pulled down he r under pants, and put his penis “insideThe indictment also included c ounts ac cu s i n g ap p el l ant of a g g ravated sexual assault and 1 indece ncy with a child by

exposure. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 21. 1 1 (a) (2) ( West 2003), § 2 2. 02 1( a )( 1) (B ) ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 5) . T he jur

y wa s una ble to r e a c h a

ve rd ic t on

the se c ounts
. 2 her.” The c omplainant pointed to her va g ina when she said this. Martinez reported w hat she had been told to the police.

The phy sician who c onducted the se x ual assault examin at i on testified that the complainant tol d him about three e pisodes of sexual assault during the two wee ks prior to the examination. He said that the complainant’ s hy men was a

bsent, which wa s consistent with but not proof of penetr ation by

a penis or f

inge r. L eonor Castillo, an employ ee of the district attorney ’s offic e, ser ved as tra nslator during meeting s betwee n the complainant, he r par ents, and th e assi stant district attorney assig ned to the case
. Castillo testified that the complainant said a ppellant squee zed her bre asts, touched he r mouth with “his w ee n i e, ” and touched her vag ina with his finge r. The c omplainant also said that appellant plac ed his mouth on her vag ina.

The c omplainant, a ner

vous and re luctant witness, testified that appellant touche d her br e a sts wi th h is h and s.

Count two of the indictment contained thre e p ara g raphs a lleg ing that appellant
e ng a g e d i ns e xu a l c o n t a c tw i t h t h e c o mp l a i n an tb y t o u c h i n g h e r

g e n i t a l s , b y

t o u c h i n g h e r

b r e a sts , an d b y c a u s in g h e r to to u c h h is g e n it als. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 21.11( a)( 1), (c ). The tr ial court’s char g e authorized a finding of g uilt based on any or all of these theories, a

nd the jury

returne d
a g e ne ra l ve rd ic t of

g uil t. 13 I n a fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w, the qu e sti on is wh e the r, vie wi nga ll the e vid e nc e in
a neutra l lig ht, the jury

was rationally

justified in finding guilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. Zuniga

v . S tat e , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The evidence may be fa ctually

insufficient beca use: (1) the evidenc e of guilt, considere d alone, is too weak to support a finding of g uilt bey ond
a re asonable doubt, or (2) the contra ry evidenc e is so strong as to prec lude a finding of g uilt bey ond a reasonable doubt. Id
. a t 48 4- 85
. I n the ins tant c a se , th e de fe ns e c a lle d n o w itn e sse s a nd the re is
no e vid e nc e c on tr ary

to t he fi nd ingof

g uil t. T he te sti mony

pr e vio us ly su mm ari zed

is p la inl y sufficie nt to support a verdi ct o f gu i l t bey ond a re asonable doubt on all three pa rag raphs of

count two. Point of error one is overrule d.

I n his other point of err or, appe llant con t en d s t h at hi s trial counsel did not provide eff ective assistance. To preva il on this claim, appellant must show that counsel made suc h serious
err ors th a t h e w a s n o t f u n c ti o n in g e f

f e c ti v e ly a s c o u n s e l a

n d th a t t h e s e e r r o r s p r e ju d ic e d the appellant’ s defe nse to such a de g ree that he wa s deprive d of a f air trial. Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U. S
. 668, 687 (1984); He rn an de z v . S tat e , 988 S.W .2d 770, 771-72 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999); He rn an de z v . S tat e , 726 S.W .2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. A p p . 1 9 8 6 ). W e must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fe ll within the wide rang e of re asonable profe ssional assistance. J ac k so n v . S tat e , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). To overc ome this presumption, any
a lle g a tio n o f i ne ff

e c tiv e ne ss m

us t be fi rm ly

fo un de d in

the re c or d, and the re c or d mu st a ff ir ma tiv e ly demonstrate the alleg ed inef fec tiveness. Ma lle tt v . S

tat e , 65 S.W .3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Appellant asse rts th a

t h is a tt o rney should have objec ted to the State ca lling two outcr y witnesses: Elizabeth Martinez and L eonor Castillo. See T ex . Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ar t. 38.0724

(West 2005). Multiple outcry witnesses m ay testify about s epar ate inst ance s of abuse if eac h was the first per so n t o wh o m t h e child relay ed information about separate incidents or ty pes of a buse. He rn an de z v . S tat e , 973 S.W .2d 787, 789 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1998, pet. ref ’d). On t h e present
rec ord, t he testi mony of t he two outcry witnesses does not appe ar to have bee n objectionable unde r article 38.072. Appellant also a rg ues that counse l should have objec ted to the outcry testimony

as violating his Six th A mendment confr ontation r ights u n der Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004), de cided one month before his trial. Whi le such a n objection cou l d h av e been made, appellant make s no eff

ort to de monstrate that it would have been meritorious. We also note that the g uilty verdic t is sust ainable on the complainant’s testimony alone. Appe llant further

complains that his attorney did not object to the prosecutor t elling the jury that she was an outcry witness. We find no such statement by

the prosec utor in the rec ord. L eonor Castil lo did testify that the prosec utor was prese nt when the c omplainant made outcry statements, but appellant r efe rs us to no authority holding that this testim ony

was objec tionable. Appellant conte nds that his tria l attorney should ha ve objected to the State calling the complainant to testify

three differ ent times an d t o t h e u se of c losed-cir cuit television for he r testimony . The c omplainant, who was f ive at the time of trial, was twice called by the State to testify in o pe n c ourt . I t a

pp e ars fr om t

he reco rd that sh e wa s n e rv ou s and un c omf or ta ble on the wi tne ss stand, and she did not testify to a ny inculpatory fac ts. The complainant was c alled a third time a nd allowed to testi fy by way of closed-circ uit television. I t was during this testimony that she desc ribed
a pp e lla nt’ s im pr op e r t ou c hin g . App e lla nt c ite s n o autho ri ty ho ldi ng that it wa s impr op e r t o r e c a ll the complainant a s a witness. He appea rs to conce de that the use of closed- circ uit telev ision was5

proper under pr evailing authority , but he sug g ests that the holding in Cra wfo rd c a lls thi s a

uth or ity into question. Se e Ma ry lan d v . Craig , 497 U. S. 836 , 8 55 (1 99 0) ; Ma rx v . S tat e , 953 S.W .2d 321, 3 2 8 ( T e x. A p p . —

A u s ti n1 9 9 7 ), aff’d , 987 S.W .2d 577, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Appellant of fe rs no argume nt i n s up po rt of thi s su g g e sti on . F ina lly , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t hi s atto rn e y sh ou ld have ob je c te d to the State ’s us e of le a din g qu e sti on s d

ur ingthe c omp la ina

nt’ s te sti mony . T he us e of le a din g qu e sti on s w a s w ith in t he tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n, and c ouns e l c ou ld h a ve re a so na bly believed that the leadingwas not objec tionable under the circ umstances. See Tex. R. Evid. 611(c)
. Appellant also c omplains that his attorney should have objec ted to the trial cour t deter mining the c omplainant’s compete ncy to t es t i fy

in the jury ’s pre sence . See Tex. R. Evi d. 104(c) , 601(a) (2). He states that the cour t’s conduct impl i ed that the judg e endor sed the complainant’s testimony . The re cord r efle cts that the cour t br iefly questioned the complainant about her unde rstanding of the diff ere nce betwee n telling the truth and telling a lie. We find no basis for concludingthat the intere sts of justice require d thi s ex am i n at ion to be done outside the jury ’s prese nce. Id
. ru le 10 4( c ). Ap pe lla nt ur g e s that c ouns e l sh ou ld h a ve re qu e ste d a “ ta int he ari ng ” to deter mine whether

the complainant’ s testimony had bee n tai n t ed during the cour se of pr evious interviews. He points to no evidence that such a taint mig ht have e x isted.

Appellant ar g ues that his trial counsel should have reque sted t h e ap p ointment of
me dic a l or

ps y c ho log ic a l ex pert s to ass ist the de fe ns e . Wh ile su c h a re qu e st w a s n ot m a de , it is possible that counsel consider ed and r ejec ted such a reque st a s unnece ssary . Appellant also c ites no evidenc e that such e x pertise would have bee n benef icial to the def

ense.6 Finally , appellant c ontends that his tr ial counsel was ineffe ctive beca use he did not
e le c t to g o to the jur

y fo r pun ish me nt, wh ic h in tur n de pr ive d ap pe lla

nt of any c ha nc e fo r c omm

un ity supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 42.12, § 3g (a) (1)( C) (West Supp. 2005). Appellant re fer s us to a st atement by counsel indi catingthat he believe d that appellant’ s status as an
un do c ume nte d a l i e n

d i s q u a l if ie d h im f or pr ob a tio n. Whil e c ouns e l mi g ht h a ve be e n mi sta ke n in thi s,
we c annot deter

mine from the trial rec ord that this was the only rea son he chose to go to the c ourt fo r p un ish me nt. Couns e l ma y have be lie ve d, ba se d o n h is e xpe ri e nc e , th a t a jury wa s unli ke ly

to
re c omm e nd

pr ob a tio n a

nd wo uld a sse ss a ha rs he r p un ish me nt t

ha n th e c ourt
. Ap pe lla nt’ s c omp la int s r e g ard ingthe pe rf or manc e of his tr ia l c ou

ns e l are no t f

ir mly
ro ote d in the re c or d. He ha s no t ov e rc ome the pr e su mpt ion that c ouns e l ex erci sed reas on a ble profe ssional judgment dur ing the course of appe llant’s trial. Point of error two is overrule d. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: De cembe r 15, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh