* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-10881

Summary Calendar

 

WILLIAM JACK TONEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DOUG SHOPMEYER; FAITH JOHNSON; SCOTT HAID;

COUNTY OF DALLAS; PITTMAN, Doctor; BOWERS,

Doctor; JIM BOWLES, Sheriff of Dallas County;

MURRAY, Officer; CITY OF IRVING,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:96-CV-2058-P

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May 25, 1998

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

William Jack Toney, Texas prisoner # 728919, proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis (IFP), appeals the district court’s

dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), of his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint against court-appointed attorney Doug Shopmeyer;

State Court Judge Faith Johnson; Dallas County; Doctors Pittman

and Bowers; Sheriff John Bowles; police officers Mitchell,
No. 97-10881

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Murray, and John Doe; the State of Texas; and the City of Irving,

Texas. Toney alleges that the district court applied the

standard for convicted prisoners, rather than that for pretrial

detainees, in evaluating his claims of inadequate medical care

and improper conditions of confinement. The district court

properly evaluated Toney’s allegations of improper treatment as a

pretrial detainee. Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 639,

643 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).

Toney alleges that the district court erred in dismissing

his claims that the defendants (1) denied him adequate medical

treatment and subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of

confinement; (2) subjected him to false arrest, illegal search

and seizure, self-incrimination, malicious prosecution, an

illegal sentence, denial of due process, and improper probation

revocation; (3) subjected him to involuntary servitude;

(4) denied him access to the courts; (5) subjected him to

excessive force; (6) retaliated against him for exercising his

constitutional rights; (7) conspired to, and retaliated against

him, without affording him due process by transferring him to the

psychiatric unit; and (8) subjected him to mental injury. Toney

also alleged that the district court erred in determining that

Judge Johnson was entitled to judicial immunity against Toney’s

claims. We have reviewed the record and Toney’s brief and affirm

the district court’s decision for essentially the reasons adopted

by the district court. See Toney v. Shopmeyer, No. 3-96-CV-2058-
No. 97-10881

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P (N.D. Tex. July 28, 1997). Although he was afforded ample

opportunity to state his claim for violation of his

constitutional rights with respect to his arrest on marijuana

charges, Toney has made only conclusional allegations, which are

insufficient to state a constitutional violation. Jacquez v.

Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1986)(pro se plaintiff

must plead specific facts). 

By failing to address sufficiently the district court’s

reasons for dismissing his complaint against the State of Texas,

Toney has abandoned any challenge to that dismissal. See 

Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744,

748 (5th Cir. 1987)(when appellant fails to identify error in the

district court's analysis, it is as if the appellant had not

appealed that judgment). Toney abandoned his claims against

Defendant Scott Haid in the district court, and he has not

asserted them in this court. See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346

(5th Cir. 1994)(amended complaint supersedes original complaint);

see Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748 (issues not asserted on appeal are

abandoned). 

Toney contends that the district court erred by failing to

consider his state law claims. A district court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if the

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “District courts enjoy

wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental
No. 97-10881

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** Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).

jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal claims are

dismissed.” Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Toney contends that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his motion for an injunction. Toney has not made the

required showing of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success

on the merits. The district court did not err in denying the

motion. See Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir.

1991).

Toney provides no support for his contentions that the

district court did not construe his complaint liberally, that the

district court should have ordered service on the defendants,

that his case should not have been directed to the magistrate

judge, and that the magistrate judge should have recused himself. 

See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993)(pro se

briefs are afforded a liberal construction but arguments must be

briefed in order to be considered). Finally, Toney contends that

the district court should have conducted a Spears** hearing prior

to dismissing his complaint. Toney was given an opportunity to

plead his best case. See Jacquez, 801 F.2d at 793. He has not

shown that a hearing was required.

The district court did not err in dismissing Toney’s civil

rights complaint. The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.
No. 97-10881

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