NO. 4-00-0797

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

RONALD L. MOHR,					)	Appeal from

		Plaintiff-Appellee,			)	Circuit Court of

		v.						)	Sangamon County

JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State,		)	No. 99MR456

		Defendant-Appellant.		)

								)	Honorable

								)	Thomas R. Appleton,

								)	Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:

		Secretary of State, Jesse White (Secretary), appeals a

circuit court order requiring him to reinstate Ronald Mohr's

driving privileges.  We affirm the circuit court.

		In September 1982, Mohr was arrested for driving under

the influence of alcohol (DUI) and pleaded guilty to that charge. 

His license was revoked, and the trial court sentenced him to 100

days in jail.  In March 1987, Mohr was arrested for driving on a

revoked license (DWR).  He was convicted and the date that he was

eligible to reapply for his license was extended to ___.

		In April 1989, Mohr consumed a case of beer, i.e., 24 beers, crashed his truck, and sustained serious injuries.  He was

convicted of DUI and sentenced to 11 months in the county jail. 

In November 1993, Mohr was again arrested for DWR.  He was

convicted, and his license revocation was extended to ___.

		In 1994, Mohr was evaluated for alcohol abuse by Michelle Titran, a licensed evaluator.  The evaluation revealed

that, prior to his accident in 1989, Mohr typically consumed between one and two six-packs of beer twice a week, occasionally

drinking a third six-pack on Saturdays or days when he was not

required to report to work.  Mohr was classified as a Level II--

significant-risk alcohol abuser, and Titran recommended that he

complete at least 10 hours of alcohol and drug remedial education

and a minimum of 20 hours of outpatient treatment, followed by an

aftercare plan.  Mohr attended the required alcohol-risk educa

tion classes. 

		Mohr again attended alcohol counseling in 1999, as a

prerequisite to his petition to regain his driver's license.  92

Ill. Adm. Code §1001.440(a)(6) (West CD-ROM March 1999) (alcohol

evaluation must be current, i.e., completed within six months of the hearing).  Kathleen Cullop, a treatment counselor, also

diagnosed Mohr as a Level II--significant-risk abuser and indi

cated in her report that Mohr had been "presented with the tools

to maintain a non[]problematic pattern of alcohol use through

abstinence and/or controlled use."  Cullop also indicated that

Mohr had abstained from alcohol since his accident in 1989.  Due

to Mohr's long period of sobriety, Cullop concluded that no

further recommendations beyond seeking community and family

support were necessary.  She believed Mohr's prognosis was good.

		In April 1999, Mohr petitioned the Secretary for

reinstatement of driving privileges.  At the hearing on Mohr's

petition, he submitted the 1994 and 1999 evaluations.  He also

testified that he had resolved to stop drinking immediately after

the 1989 accident, and he has not had alcohol since that time.  Mohr admitted that he quit drinking because once he starts he

cannot stop.  Although Mohr has never been diagnosed as an

alcoholic and does not attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, he

believes that he is an alcoholic.

		In presenting his case to the hearing officer, Mohr

apologized for his past behavior and submitted letters from

friends, family, coworkers, and a minister regarding his ongoing

sobriety and his need for a driver's license.  Mohr testified

that he is employed by a company based in Minnesota and that his

job requires him to travel throughout the United States.  Due to

a recent change in company policy, all employees are now required

to have a valid driver's license.

		After hearing all of the evidence, the hearing officer

questioned Mohr's Level II--significant-risk classification and

recommended that Mohr's petition be denied.  The hearing officer

concluded that the facts supported a Level III--high-risk classi

fication, stating:

			"The [p]etitioner's admission of alcoholism, 

		his loss of control over his drinking in the 

		past, along with his belief that he could 

		not return to controlled drinking in the future 

		is inconsistent with his Level II classifica-

		tion, and more consistent with a Level III[--] 

		[d]ependent classification.

	* * *

			Given the [p]etitioner's Level II classi-

		fication is being called into question ***, 

		it becomes unclear if the 20 hours of treat-

		ment completed by [p]etitioner is sufficient 

		to meet his needs."

		The classification "level" assigned to a petitioner 

affects the administrative requirements needed to obtain rein

statement of driving privileges.  Christiansen v. Edgar, 209 Ill. App. 3d 36, 45, 567 N.E.2d 696, 702 (1991).  The least serious of

the three levels is designated "Level I" and the most serious

"Level III."  92 Ill. Adm. Code §1001.410 (West CD-ROM March

1999).  Those drivers placed in Level III--high-risk (dependent) category must not only complete 12 consecutive months of absti

nence from alcohol, but also show implementation of an "ongoing

support/recovery program."  92 Ill. Adm. Code §1001.440(b)(3)

(West CD-ROM March 1999).

		Based upon the perceived inconsistencies in the evi

dence presented at the hearing, the hearing officer directed Mohr

to return to his alcohol evaluator and treatment provider to

resolve the discrepancies between the evaluations and Mohr's

testimony.  The hearing officer found Mohr had failed to carry

his burden to prove that he would be a safe and responsible

driver and would not endanger the public safety and welfare.  The

Secretary adopted the hearing officer's findings and denied

Mohr's petition in November 1999.

		Mohr filed a complaint for administrative review in the

circuit court in December 1999.  The circuit court reversed the Secretary, finding that Mohr established he would be a safe and

responsible driver.  The court noted that all the evidence showed

Mohr had abstained from alcohol use for a substantial period of

years and that he had completed his required remedial education. 

		As we have previously noted, findings and conclusions

of an administrative agency on questions of fact are prima facie true and correct.  Grams v. Ryan, 263 Ill. App. 3d 390, 396, 635 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (1994).  The circuit court may not overturn the

decision of an administrative body unless the authority of the

administrative body was exercised in an arbitrary and capricious

manner or the decision was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.  Grams, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 635 N.E.2d at 1380.  If anything in the record fairly supports the agency's decision,

the decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence

and must be sustained on review.  Grams, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 635 N.E.2d at 1380.  Thus, for the circuit court to find the

Secretary's findings were against the manifest weight of the

evidence, it must have determined no rational trier of fact could

have reached the same conclusions.  Grams, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 396-97, 635 N.E.2d at 1381.  Applying this standard, we conclude

that the circuit court's reversal of the Secretary was appropri

ate.

		Driving a motor vehicle on public roads is a privilege

and not a right.  Once driving privileges are revoked, their

restoration is not automatic.  Grams, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 635 N.E.2d at 1380.  The Secretary will not reinstate driving privileges until satisfied that granting of the privilege will

not endanger public safety.  The petitioner bears the burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is entitled to

be granted driving privileges.  Grams, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 635 N.E.2d at 1380.  

		In determining whether the petitioner has met this

burden, the hearing officer may consider various factors, includ

ing (1) frequency, type, and severity of traffic violations; (2)

efforts at rehabilitation or reform of past driving practices;

(3) demeanor of the petitioner at the hearing; (4) credibility of

petitioner at the hearing; (5) credibility and weight of peti

tioner's documentary evidence; and (6) the petitioner's total

driving record.  92 Ill. Adm. Code §§1001.420(d), 1001.430(c)

(West CD-ROM March 1999).  These factors are not exhaustive and

each petitioner's case is unique, requiring that all of the

evidence be considered.  92 Ill. Adm. Code §1001.400 (West CD-ROM

1999).

		The hearing officer's decision to recommend denying

driving privileges was based on the officer's determination that

petitioner was a Level III--clinically dependent classification

instead of a Level II.  That determination was based on what the

hearing officer found to be the petitioner's admission of

alcoholism and , his loss of control over his drinking in the past,

along with his belief that he could not return to controlled

drinking in the future. 

		Petitioner used to drink too much.  After an accident that nearly cost him his life, petitioner chose to stop drinking

and never drink again.  Since then petitioner has not had a

single drink in over 10 years.  Petitioner has never been classi

fied as an alcoholic.  Petitioner has never attended Alcoholics

Anonymous because he has no trouble abstaining and does not even

consider drinking.  Two professional evaluators found him to be a

Level II classification and not a Level III.  Petitioner has not

even considered returning to controlled drinking because he does

not want to drink anymore.

		A review of the hearing officer's findings and recom

mendations finds that the petitioner has done everything that he

was required to do for alcohol evaluation and fully complied with

the Secretary of State's rules.

			"The hearing officer finds that the 

		petitioner has completed all recommendations 

		for treatment.  The [p]etitioner completed 20 

		hours of treatment at Creative Consultations 

		on April 22, 1999.  A treatment verification 

		with attached treatment plan, discharge sum-

		mary, and aftercare plan was introduced ***.  

		The information contained in the summary does 

		satisfy the Secretary of State [r]ules."

		The petitioner submitted letters from some seven

different individuals, all attesting to his abstinence and all

attesting to his good work habits.  These letters were not copy-

cat letters but were sincere and certainly gave every indication that this petitioner, as found by the hearing officer, was

sincere.  As indicated by the letter of recommendation of pastor

John Cross, "I have occasion to see Ron two or three times each

week and I've never seen him consume anything with alcohol.  I

truly believe he is alcohol free and not a risk for driving under

the influence if he was to regain his driving privileges."  

		In light of all the evidence, petitioner's perhaps

overly critical self-analysis of his own drinking, which he has

not done for 10 years and says he will never do again, does not

make petitioner a Level III risk as the hearing officer found. 

Petitioner met his burden of proving by clear and convincing

evidence that he would be a safe and responsible driver and would

not endanger the public safety and welfare.  

		We affirm the trial court's judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

	  	Affirmed.

		McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.