F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v.

G E N A R O A C E V E D O

- D E L A C R U Z , Defendant-Appellant. No. 15-10418

D.C. No. 4:14-cr-01196-RM-EJ M-1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Rosemary Marquez , District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted October 21, 2016 San F rancisco, California

F iled J a nuary 5, 2017

B efore: Carlos T. B ea and Sandra S. I k u ta, Circuit J udg e s, and J ane A. Restani, J u dg e

. *

Opinion by J udg e I k

uta

* T h e H o no r a b l e J an e A

. Restan i, Ju d g e f o r th e U.S. C o u rt of In tern atio n al T rad e, sittin g b y d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 2

SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

Affirming a sentence, the panel held that a violation of a protective order involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence in violation of California Penal Code § 273.6(d) is a categ orical cri m e o f violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

COUNSEL

Henry J acobs (arg

u ed), L aw Offices of Henry J acobs PL L C, Tucson, Ariz o na, for Defendant-Appellant.

L auren L aB uff (arg

ued), A ssistant United States Attorney ; Robert L

. Miskell, Appellate Chief; J ohn S. L eonardo, United States Attorney ; United States Attorney ’s Office, Tucs o n, Ariz ona; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 3

OP INION

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e:

T h i s appeal raises the question whether a violation o f a protective order involving an act of violence or credible threat of violence in violation of section 273.6(d) of the California Penal Code is a categ orical crime of violence for purposes o f § 2L 1

. 2 (b)(1)(A)(ii) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Sentencing Guidelines”). 1 W e review d e novo the district c o urt’s determination that Genaro Acevedo-De L a Cruz ’s prior conviction constitutes a crime o f violence, United States v

. Mendoza-Padilla
, 8 3 3 F .3d 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.

I

W e first set forth the leg al framewor k a p p l i cable to this appeal. The f

ederal Sentencing G uideli n es impose a base offense level of 8 for defendants convicted o f u n l a w f ul reentry i n violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(a). I f the d efendant had a p rior felony conviction for “a crime of violence,” the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of Acevedo-De L a Cruz ’s sentencing provided for a

1 A l l citatio n s to th e Un i ted States Sen ten cin g Gu i d elin es are to th e 2 0 1 4 m an u al, w

h ic h ap p lied at th e tim e o f A cev ed o- De L a C ru z’ s

sen ten cin g

. S e e J

o h n so n v. Go mez , 92 F.3 d 9 64
, 9 6 8 (9 th Cir. 1 9 9 6 ). A m en d m en ts to th e Sen ten cin g Gu id elin es e f f ectiv e N o v em

b er 1
, 2 0 1 6
, e l im in ated t

h e relev an t lan g u ag e in U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1 .2 (b )(1 )(A )(ii). U

. S

. Sen ten cin g Gu id elin es Man u al ap p

. C, am en d

. 8 0 2
, at 1 4 7– 4 9 ( U .S. Sen ten cin g Co m

m ’ n 2 0 1 6).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 4

16-level sentence enhancement. Id. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). 2 A “crime of violence” is defined to include any “offense under federal
, s t a t e, or local law that has as an e lement the u se, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical force ag ainst the person of another.” Id . § 2L 1.2, cmt. n.1(B )(iii). 3 “Phy sical force” f or purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines means “force capable of causing phy sical p ain or inju r y to another

2 U.S.S.G. § 2 L 1.2
, “ Un law f u lly En terin g o r Rem ain in g in th e Un ited States” p ro v id ed , in p ertin en t p art:

(a) B ase Of

f en se L ev el: 8

(b ) Sp ecif

ic Of f en se Ch aracteristic

(1 ) A p ply th e Greatest:

I f t h e d ef en d an t p rev io u sly w as d ep o rted
, o r u n law f u lly rem ain ed in th e Un ited States, af

t er—
(A ) a c o n vi ctio n f

o r a f elo n y th at is

. . . (ii) a crim e o f

v io len ce

. . . in crease b y 1 6 lev els i f th e co n v ictio n receiv es

c r i m i n al h isto ry p o in ts u n d er Ch ap ter Fo u r o r b y 1 2 l ev e l s if th e co n v ictio n

d o es n o t receiv e crim in al h isto ry

p o in ts.

3 A p plicatio n

No te 1 (B )(iii) to § 2 L 1 .2 p ro v id ed :

“ Crim e o f v io len ce” m ean s an y o f th e f

o llo w in g

o f f en ses u n d er f

ed eral, state, o r lo cal law : m u rd er,

m an s lau g h ter, k id n ap p i n g , ag g rav ated assau l t, f orcib le

sex o f f en ses (in clu d in g w

h ere co n sen t to th e co n d u ct is

n o t g iv en o r is n o t leg ally v alid
, su ch as w h ere co n sen t to th e co n d u ct is in v o lu n tary , in co m p eten t, o r co erced ),
statu to ry rap e, sex u al ab u se o f a m i n o r, ro b b ery , arso n , ex to rtio n , ex t o rt i o n ate ex ten sio n o f cred it, b u rg lary of

a d w ellin g , o r an y o th er o f f en s e u n d er f

ed eral, state, or lo cal law th at h as as an elem en t t h e u se, attem

p ted u se,

o r th reaten ed u se o f p h y sical f o rce ag ain st th e p erso n of

an o t h er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 5

person.” United S

tates v. Flores-Cordero
, 723 F .3d 1085, 1087 (9th Ci r

. 2013) (quoting Johnson v. U nited States
, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). To determine whethe r a prior conviction qualifies a s a crime of violence, we use the categ orical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States
, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). W e first identify the elements of the
statute of conviction, and then compare those e lements to the
g eneric federal definition of a crime of violence to determine whether the statute of conviction criminaliz es more conduct than the g e neric federal crim e

. Almanza-Arenas v

. Lynch
, 815 F .3d 469, 475 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). I f the statute o f conviction criminaliz es the same (or less) conduct as d oes the
g eneric federal crime, then the sentence enhancement applies to every conviction under the statute of conviction. 4 Id

.

W h en interpreting a state statute o f conviction, we look to the state’s rules of statutory const r uction. Id. “Under California law, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the leg islature.” I d

. (quoting Lieberman v. Hawkins (

In re Lieberman)
, 2 45 F .3d 1090, 1092 ( 9 t h C ir. 2001)). To ascertain the intent of the leg islature, we look first to the plain lang uag e of the statute. Id. “W e g ive the lang uag e its usua l a n d ordinary meaning
, and ‘[ i] f ther e i s no ambig uity
, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said.’” People v

. Gutierrez
, 58 Cal. 4th 1 354, 1369 ( 2 0 1 4 ) (alterations in orig inal) (quoting M

ays v. City of Los An g e l e s , 4 3 Cal. 4th 313, 321

4 If th e statu te o f co n v i c t i o n crim in alizes m o re co n d u ct th an th e g en eric f ed eral crim e, w e co n sid er w h eth er th e statu te is div isib l e; if i t is d iv isib le, th en w e ap p ly th e m o d if ied categ o rical ap p ro ach

. Desca mp s v. Un ited S ta tes , 1 3 3 S. Ct. 2 2 7 6
, 2 28 4 ( 2 01 3 ). Here, w e d o n o t n eed to ap p ly th e m o d if

ied categ o rical ap p ro ach b ecau se w e co n clu de th at a

co n v ictio n u n d er sectio n 2 7 3 .6 (d ) o f th e Calif o r n ia Pen al Co d e is categ o rically

a crim e o f

v io len ce.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 6

(2008)). “W h en attempting to ascerta in the ordinary
, usual meaning of a word, courts approp ri a tely refer to the dictionary definition of that word.” W asatch Prop. Mgmt. v

. Degrate , 35 Cal. 4th 1111, 1121–22 (2005).

The conclusion that a state statute crimina liz es more conduct than is included in the g eneric federal definition of a crime of violence “requires more than the application o f leg al imag inati on to a state statute’s lang uag e.” Gonzales v

. Duenas-Alvar ez , 549 U .S. 183, 193 (2007). Rather, “[ i] t requires a realistic probability
, not a theoretical possibility
, that the State would a p p l y i ts statute to conduct that f alls outside the g eneric definition of a crime.” Id. To show that realistic probability
, the defendant “must at least point to his

own case or other cas e s i n w h ich the state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nong eneric) manner for which he arg u es.” Id.

The state statute of conviction at issu e here is section 273.6(d) o f the California Penal Code, w h i c h criminaliz es a violation of a p rotective o rder “involvi n g a n act o f violence

or ‘a credible threat’ o f violence.” 5 “ A c r e d ible threat” o f violence is defined as “a t hreat made with the intent and the

5 Cal. P en al Co d e § 2 7 3.6 (d ) p ro v id es:

A s u b seq u en t co n v ictio n f

o r [an “ in ten tio n al an d k n o w i n g v io lat i o n ” o f certain p ro tectiv e o rd ers d esc r i b ed in sectio n 2 7 3 .6 (a)], o ccu rrin g w ith in sev en y ears o f a p r io r co n v ictio n f o r a v io latio n o f an o rd er d escrib ed i n s u

bd iv isio n (a) an d in v o lv in g an act of

v io len ce o r “ a cred ib l e th reat” of v i o len ce, as d ef in ed in

su bd iv isio n (c) o f Sectio n 1 3 9
, is p u n ish ab l e b y im p riso n m en t in a co u n ty j ail n o t to ex ceed o n e y ear, or p u rsu an t to su

bd iv isio n (h ) o f Sectio n 1 1 7 0

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 7

apparent ability to carry o ut the threat so as to c ause the targ et of the threat to reasonably f ear for his or her saf

et y or the safety of his or her immediate family .” Cal. P e n a l C o d e § 139(c).

I I

W e now turn to the facts of this case. On April 23, 2015, Acevedo-De L a Cruz p leaded gu i l ty to one count of illeg al reentry following deportation in violation of 8 U .S.C. § 1326(a). At sentencing
, t h e d i s trict court considered the effect of Acevedo-De L a Cruz ’s p r e vious felony conviction under section 273.6(d) of the Ca l i f ornia Penal Code for a violation of a protective order involving an act of violence o r

a credi b l e t h r eat of v iolence. The district court concluded that this prior conviction was a categ orical crime o f violence warranting a 16-level sentence en h ancement under § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) o f t h e S e n t e n c i n g Guidelines. According ly
, the d istrict c o urt sentenced Acevedo-De L a Cruz to 46 months imprisonment.

I I I

On a ppeal, Acevedo-De L a Cruz claims t h at his conviction under section 2 73.6(d) of the Cal ifornia Penal Code is not a categ or i c a l crime of violence for purposes o f § 2L 1 .2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Sentencing Guidelines

. He

reasons that one element of section 273.6(d) refers only to “a credible threat of violence” while § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) refers
to a threat of “phy sical force,” and a rg ues that “violence” criminaliz es more conduct than “phy sical force.” I n making this arg umen t , Acevedo-De L a Cruz relies on the third definition o f “violence” in the Merri a m -W ebster Online Dictionary
, which defines “violence” as including “vehementU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 8

f e e ling or ex pression: fervor.” I n lig ht o f this definition, he contends, section 273.6(d) could criminaliz e a credible threat of violence without the threatened use of phy sical force.

No California c o urt has y e t construed the word “violence” for purposes of section 273.6(d), so we beg in with t he plain
tex t of the statute

. A lmanza-Arenas
, 815 F .3d at 475. The primary definition of “violence” in the dictionary requires phy sical force. B lack’s L aw Dictionary defines “violence” a s “[ t] he use of physical force
, [ u s u a l l y ] accompanied b y fury
, vehemence, o r outrag e ; [ especially ] physical forc e u n lawfully

ex e rc i s ed w ith the intent to harm.” Black’s Law Dictionary ( 1 0th ed. 2014) ( emphasis added). The Ox f ord Eng lish Dictionary s imilarly defines “ violence” as “[ t] h e deliberate

ex e r cis e o f p hysical force a g ainst a person, property , etc.; physically violent behaviour or treatment;” and “the unlawful

ex e r cis e o f p hysical force
, intimidation by the ex hibition o f such force.” Oxford English D ictionary (3d ed

. 2 014) (emphasis added).

W h en interpreting other state statutes, C a l ifornia courts have adopted this common underst a n d i n g of the word “violence” in concluding that force can occur without violence, b u t violence cannot occur without force. See P eople v. B abich
, 14 Cal. App. 4th 801, 807 & n.2 (1993) (holding tha t “ violence” under the California false imprisonment statute means “ the ex ercise of phy sical force used t o r e s train over and above the force reasonably
necessary to e f

f e ct such restraint,” and noting that such a conclusion is “consistent wi th applicable dictionary definitions, whic h sug g est v iolence always includes force
, but force may or may not include violence” (emphasis ad d ed));

see also People v. Ne wman , 238 Cal. App. 4th 103, 108 (2015); People v. Dominguez
, 180 Cal. A pp. 4th 1351, 1357U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 9

(2010). W e see no basis for departing fr o m t h i s c ommons e n s e interpretation of “violence” for purposes of secti o n 273.6(d). S

ee W a s a tch Prop. Mgmt.
, 35 Cal. 4th at 1122 (“The court w ill apply common sense to the lang uag e at hand and interpr e t t h e statute to make it workable a nd reasonable.”). The usua l a n d ordinary definition o f “violence” includes phy sical force. See G utierrez
, 58 Cal. 4th at 1369.

W h ile Acevedo-De L a Cruz correctly notes that diction a ries have provided other definitions o f “violence,” including the ex pression o f vehement feeling s, h e f ails to point us to any “c a s es i n which the state courts in fact did apply [ section 273.6(d)] in the special (nong eneric) mann e r for which he arg u es.” D uenas-Alvarez
, 549 U.S. at 1 93. Nor has he otherwise demonstrated t h at there is “ a realistic probability
, n ot a theoretical possibility ” that California would deem the term “ violence” to include r hetorical vehemence, w ithout more, for purposes of a violation o f section 273.6(d). Id. Therefore, Acevedo-De L a Cruz ’s contention that the California leg islature intended “violence” under section 273.6(d) to mean the ex pres s ion of vehement feeling without p hy sical fo r c e relies o n “leg a l imag ination.” Id. We conclude that “a cr ed i b le threat of violence” under section 273.6(d) does not criminaliz e more conduct than the threatened u s e of phy sical f orce for purposes o f § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

W e therefore hold that a conviction under section 273.6(d) o f the California Penal Code is a categ oric al c ri m e of violence for purposes of § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii ) o f theU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. A C E V E D O -D E L A C R U Z 10

Sentencing G uideline s

. The district court did not err in adding a 16-level enhancement to Acevedo-De L a Cruz ’s
sentence. 6

AF F IRMED.

6 A cev ed o

- De L a Cru z’ s Octo b er 2 7 , 2 0 1 6 , m o tio n is g ran ted

.