UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

KEITH LEONARD LAMEBULL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; 

DENVER SHERIFF HEALTH 

SERVICES; DENVER HEALTH; 

MICHAEL MARTINEZ; PETER CRUM; 

A. BRUEGGLER; SYNTHIA BEAN; 

PAULINE MCGANN; CARMEN 

KASSALTY; EMILY DRANGINIS; 

CAROL ROGERS, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 22-1009 

(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-02711-LTB-GPG) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 26, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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Keith Leonard Lamebull, proceeding pro se,1

 appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his amended complaint. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Lamebull asserts nine claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several 

individuals and entities for the conditions of his prior confinement at Denver County 

Jail.2

 Three claims are for deliberate indifference to his medical needs during pretrial 

detention, including one Defendant’s alleged failure to order him an MRI. Four 

claims concern allegedly improper medical fees that he was charged while detained. 

One claim concerns allegedly improper medical care that he received while the 

Denver Police Department conducted “a psy op known as Gang Stalking or 

Counterintelligence Stalking” against him. ROA at 66. And finally, one claim 

concerns the denial of his request for hearing aids. 

After screening his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(c), the magistrate judge recommended that it be dismissed as frivolous and 

as untimely under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Over Lamebull’s 

objections, the district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the amended 

complaint. Lamebull now appeals. 

1

 Because Lamebull is proceeding pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but 

we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 

2013). 

2

 Lamebull was confined at Denver County Jail but is now in the custody of 

the Colorado Department of Corrections.

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DISCUSSION 

I. Statute of Limitations 

The magistrate judge concluded, and the district court agreed, that Lamebull’s 

claims accrued no later than June 2019, when his pretrial detention ended. 

Consequently, Colorado’s two-year statute of limitations lapsed no later than June 

2021. Because Lamebull didn’t file his complaint until October 2021—roughly four 

months later—his complaint was deemed untimely. 

Lamebull argues that the district court erred in finding that his claims accrued 

no later than June 2019. He says that his claims didn’t accrue until April 29, 2021, 

when he received MRI results showing that he had a brain injury. Lamebull reasons 

that even if the court disagrees and finds that his complaint was filed a few months 

late, that delay shouldn’t be fatal given the challenges of preparing his complaint 

during COVID-19. 

We review de novo a dismissal of a complaint on statute-of-limitations 

grounds. See Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 785 F.3d 395, 413 (10th Cir. 2015) (“This 

court applies a de novo standard of review to questions involving the applicability of 

a statute of limitations.”).

 Although state law provides the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, 

federal law governs accrual. Chrisco v. Holubek, 711 F. App’x 885, 888 (10th Cir. 

2017). A § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of 

the injury which is the basis for the action.” Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1162 

(10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

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We agree with the district court that by June 2019—when he left Denver 

County Jail— Lamebull knew or had reason to know of the injuries that gave rise to 

his § 1983 claims. In almost every count, he alleges that he filed grievances over the 

same conduct underlying his present claims. See, e.g., ROA at 61 (alleging in Claim 

One that “I continued to suffer [health problems] and wrote numerous grievances on 

this issue between 02/27/17–05/27/18 and 04/07/19–05/09/19”); see also id. at 62 

(alleging in Claim Two that a Defendant’s “response to my grievance [regarding his 

medical issues] was not reasonable”); id. (alleging in Claim Three that “[o]n 

05/08/18 . . . I filed [a] grievance” regarding cerebral issues); id. at 64 (alleging in 

Claim Four that he filed two grievances in May 2017 and one in April 2019 for 

improper billing practices). Though Lamebull didn’t receive his MRI results until 

April 2021, “it is not necessary that a [plaintiff] know all of the evidence ultimately 

relied on for the cause of action to accrue.” Price, 420 F.3d at 1162 (citation 

omitted). 

For claims in which Lamebull doesn’t mention filing grievances, we can still 

see that Lamebull knew of the relevant facts more than two years before he filed his 

complaint. In Claim Six, for example, Lamebull complains that he was denied 

hearing aids on August 1, 2018, and thus had difficulty hearing when he was in court. 

On that day, then, Lamebull knew the facts that supported Claim Six. 

Nor has Lamebull convinced us that the limitations period should be tolled. 

Equitable tolling is appropriate when, due to extraordinary circumstances or a 

defendant’s wrongful conduct, the plaintiff couldn’t file his claims on time. Damian 

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v. Mountain Parks Elec., Inc., 310 P.3d 242, 245 (Colo. App. 2012).3

 When arguing 

that extraordinary circumstances exist, the plaintiff must also show that he diligently 

pursued his claims. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094, 1099 

(Colo. 1996) (en banc). Lamebull notes that in April 2020, he requested caselaw from 

his jail’s staff but was denied it due to COVID-related restrictions. While we are 

sympathetic to the challenges caused by COVID-19, we agree with the district court 

that this lone request does not warrant equitable tolling. 

In sum, we agree with the district court that Lamebull’s complaint was 

untimely. 

II. Frivolousness 

Lamebull argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claims without 

reviewing their merits and before ordering discovery. He says that discovery would 

have revealed the truth of the allegations in his amended complaint. 

We haven’t definitively announced whether the dismissal of a complaint under 

§ 1915A for frivolousness is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. Glaser v. 

City and Cnty. of Denver, 755 F. App’x 852, 853 n.2 (10th Cir. 2019). But we review 

de novo here because, even under this more generous standard, Lamebull’s appeal 

fails. 

3

 We cite Colorado law because “[s]tate law ordinarily governs the application 

of equitable tolling in a federal civil-rights action.” Harrison v. United States, 438 F. 

App’x 665, 668 (10th Cir. 2011). 

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“The clear import of the Prison Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”] . . . is to 

curtail meritless prisoner litigation.” See Green v. Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415, 418 

(10th Cir. 1996) (emphasis removed). Consistent with that goal, a district court must 

review a prisoner’s complaint “before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon 

as practicable after docketing.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If the court determines that the 

complaint is frivolous, it must dismiss that complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The 

court need not permit discovery before doing so. See Vincent v. Utah Plastic Surgery 

Soc’y, 621 F. App’x 546, 550 n.7 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a plaintiff “cannot 

file an inadequate complaint and then use the discovery process to develop a factual 

basis for [his] claims”). By arguing that the district court should not have dismissed 

his complaint until after discovery, Lamebull takes a position that’s contrary to one 

of the PLRA’s main goals: quickly filtering out meritless prisoner complaints. Green, 

90 F.3d at 418. His position is thus unpersuasive. 

And we agree with the district court that Lamebull’s complaint is frivolous 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis 

in either law or fact. Blakely v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 633 F.3d 944, 949-50 (10th Cir. 

2011). In a detailed and well-reasoned recommendation that the district court 

accepted, the magistrate judge explained why each of Lamebull’s claims against the 

various Defendants was frivolous. In his appeal brief, Lamebull doesn’t argue that 

the analysis was incorrect. 

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CONCLUSION 

The district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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