34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(2). Appellant's petition was procedurally 

barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See 

NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the 

State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the 

rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2). 

First, appellant claimed that he had good cause because he 

had unexhausted claims. Exhaustion of claims in order to seek federal 

court review does not demonstrate good cause. See Colley v. State, 105 

Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 

529 U.S. 446, 452-53 (2000). To the extent that appellant argued he had 

good cause because he was not given an evidentiary hearing on all of the 

claims raised in the first petition, the underlying claim, that the district 

court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing on all of his claims, 

was considered and rejected by this court on appeal from the denial of his 

first petition. The determination that the district court did not err in 

denying some of his claims without an evidentiary hearing is the law of 

the case, and the doctrine of the law of the case prevents further litigation 

of this issue. See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 535 P.2d 797 (1975). To the 

extent that appellant claimed that he had good cause because the district 

court's order had been drafted by the State, this claim did not provide good 

cause as he could have litigated this issue in the appeal from the denial of 

his first petition. Likewise, appellant's claim that the district court judge 

was biased in the first post-conviction proceedings falls short of 

demonstrating good cause as it too could have been raised in the appeal 

from the denial of his first petition. 

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Next, appellant appeared to claim that he had good cause 

because he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. 

These claims were reasonably available to be raised in a timely petition 

and ineffective assistance-of-counsel claims that are themselves 

procedurally barred cannot establish good cause. 3 Hathaway v. State, 119 

Nev. 248, 252-53, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 

529 U.S. 446, 453 (2000). 

Next, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. , 132 S. 

Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant argued that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel excused his procedural defects. Ineffective assistance of 

post-conviction counsel would not be good cause in the instant case 

because the appointment of counsel in the prior post-conviction 

proceedings was not statutorily or constitutionally required. Crump v. 

Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303, 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague v. Warden, 

112 •Nev. 159, 164, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996). Further, this court has 

recently held that Martinez does not apply to Nevada's statutory postconviction procedures, see Brown v. McDaniel, Nev. , P.3 d 

(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014), and thus, Martinez does not provide 

good cause for this late and successive petition. 

3We note that appellant was informed of the limited right to appeal 

in the guilty plea agreement. See Davis v. State, 115 Nev. 17, 974 P.2d 

658 (1999). 

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Next, appellant argued that his petition was not delayed 

because he had continuously litigated the validity of his conviction. 

Continuous litigation is not good cause for a late and successive petition. 

Finally, appellant claimed that laches should not bar his 

petition because the State was not prejudiced by the thirteen-year delay. 

Because the State pleaded laches pursuant to NRS 34.800(2), the State 

was not required to demonstrate prejudice; rather, a rebuttable 

presumption exists that there is prejudice to the State in either 

responding to the petition or in conducting a retrial. Rebutting the 

presumption of prejudice requires appellant to demonstrate that the 

"petition is based upon grounds of which the petitioner could not have had 

knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances 

prejudicial to the State occurred," MRS 34.800(1)(a), and show a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice has occurred in the proceedings 

resulting in the judgment of conviction or sentence, MRS 34.800(1)(b). 

Appellant's bald assertion that there was no prejudice or that any 

prejudice was the fault of the State falls far short of rebutting the 

presumption of prejudice. And to the extent that appellant claimed that 

he demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he was 

actually innocent, appellant did not demonstrate actual innocence because 

he failed to show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him in light of . . . new evidence." Calderon v. 

Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 

327 (1995)); see also Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 

537 (2001); Mazzan v. Warden, 112 Nev. 838, 842, 921 P.2d 920, 922 

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Douglas 

(1996). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying 

appellant's petition as procedurally barred and barred by ladies. 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 4 

/ PetAin J. 

Hardesty 

CHERRY, J., concurring: 

Although I would extend the equitable rule recognized in 

Martinez to this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is 

facing a severe sentence, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d 

(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting), I concur in 

the judgment on appeal in this case because the State pleaded laches 

4We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted in 

proper person to the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude 

that no relief based upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent 

that appellant has attempted to present claims or facts in those 

submissions which were not previously presented in the proceedings 

below, we have declined to consider them in the first instance. 

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J. 

under NRS 34.800(2) and appellant failed to rebut the presumption of 

prejudice to the State. 

cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge 

Ronald Lawrence Mortensen 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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