[Cite as BSI Sec. Servs. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2011-Ohio-4866.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

BSI SECURITY SERVICES : 

: Appellate Case No. 24050 

Plaintiff-Appellant : 

: Trial Court Case No. 09-CV-4228 

v. : 

: 

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF : (Civil Appeal from 

PUBLIC SAFETY : (Common Pleas Court) 

: 

Defendant-Appellee : 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 23rd day of September, 2011. 

. . . . . . . . . 

LAWRENCE J. WHITE, Atty. Reg. #0062363, 2533 Far Hills Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45419 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 

MICHAEL DeWINE, Atty. Reg. #0009181, by CHERYL R. HAWKINSON, Atty. Reg. 

#0055429, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, 30 East Broad Street, 26th Floor, Columbus, 

Ohio 43215 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

 . . . . . . . . . 

CANNON, J., sitting by assignment. 

{¶ 1} This administrative appeal is submitted to this court on the record and the 

briefs of the parties. Appellant, BSI Security Services, appeals the judgment entered by the 
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Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss 

filed by appellee, Ohio Department of Public Safety. 

{¶ 2} BSI is a security firm. Appellee is charged with regulating security firms such 

as BSI. On January 2, 2009, appellee sent a notice of intent to revoke or suspend license or to 

impose a civil penalty to BSI, via registered mail. However, this notice was returned as 

undelivered due to an incorrect address. On February 6, 2009, appellee sent a second notice 

of intent to revoke or suspend license to BSI. The record does not indicate where this second 

notice was sent. In addition, the record does not contain a certified mail receipt of the service 

card. However, the record contains admissions from BSI that it actually received the 

February 2009 notice. The notices alleged that BSI employees were not properly registered. 

{¶ 3} BSI did not request an administrative hearing within 30 days of receiving the 

notice of intent to revoke license. Appellee issued an adjudication order finding BSI in 

violation of R.C. 4749.06 and companion sections of the Ohio Administrative Code. 

Appellee revoked BSI’s license. As an alternative to losing its license, the adjudication order 

provided BSI the option to pay a civil penalty of $35,200. BSI appealed the adjudication 

order, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 119, to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. 

{¶ 4} Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that BSI had not 

exhausted its administrative remedies. The basis of appellee’s motion was that BSI did not 

request a hearing within 30 days of receiving the February 2009 notice of intent to revoke or 

suspend license. BSI filed a response in opposition to appellee’s motion to dismiss. 

Therein, BSI acknowledged that appellee sent the notices of intent to revoke or suspend 

license. BSI asserted that its counsel had contacted appellee in an attempt to obtain the 
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names of the employees at issue, but appellee had not provided that information. Since the 

names had not been provided, BSI concluded that “no additional meeting or hearings were 

necessary.” 

{¶ 5} The trial court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss, finding that BSI had failed 

to exhaust its administrative remedies. 

{¶ 6} BSI has timely appealed the trial court’s judgment entry to this court and raises 

the following assignment of error: 

{¶ 7} “The common pleas court abused its discretion by finding that BSI failed to 

exhaust its administrative remedies and failed to perfect its appeal as required by ORC 119.12 

when there is no evidence in the record that BSI was ever even served with the notice of intent 

to revoke license in the first place to initiate [its] administrative remedies by timely filing a 

notice request for hearing. Mere assertion without any evidence should not be enough to 

satisfy summary judgment [sic].” 

{¶ 8} At the appellate level, we note there is a highly-deferential standard of review 

in an R.C. 119 appeal regarding factual determinations. See Royer v. Ohio Real Estate 

Comm. (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 265, 268. (Citations omitted.) However, we review issues 

of law under a de novo standard of review. Sohi v. Ohio St. Dental Bd. (1998), 130 Ohio 

App.3d 414, 421. 

{¶ 9} There are two primary issues for this appeal: (1) the adequacy of the notices 

sent to BSI and (2) the sufficiency of the record submitted to the trial court by appellee. 

{¶ 10} BSI argues that R.C. 119.07 requires notices regarding the suspension of an 

administrative license to be sent via registered mail. “[T]he failure of an agency to provide 
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notice in the manner specified in R.C. 119.07 invalidates any subsequent order issued by the 

agency.” Chirila v. Ohio State Chiropractic Bd. (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 589, 594. 

{¶ 11} “The doctrine of exhaustion requires a person to exhaust administrative 

remedies before seeking redress from the judicial system.” Jain v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 

Franklin App. 09AP-1180, 2010-Ohio-2855, at ¶10, citing Basic Distrib. Corp. v. Ohio Dept. 

of Taxation, 94 Ohio St.3d 287, 290, 2002-Ohio-794, citing Noernberg v. Brook Park (1980), 

63 Ohio St.2d 26. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to 

permit administrative agencies the opportunity to exercise their expertise in resolving the 

matter prior to a party seeking involvement from the courts. Jain v. Ohio State Med. Bd., at 

¶10. (Citations omitted.) “Allowing a claimant to raise an issue for the first time in an 

appeal to the court of common pleas would frustrate the statutory system for having issues 

raised and decided through the administrative process.” Id. (Citations omitted.) 

{¶ 12} In this matter, BSI has waived the issue of whether the notice sent by appellee 

was proper, since BSI did not exhaust its administrative remedies by raising this issue at the 

administrative level. 

{¶ 13} Further, a party generally waives the right to appeal an issue that could have 

been, but was not, raised in earlier proceedings. Jain v. Ohio State Med. Bd., at ¶10, citing 

MacConnell v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Franklin App. No. 04AP-433, 2005-Ohio-1960, at 

¶21. See, also, Staschak v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, Franklin App. No. 03AP-799, 

2004-Ohio-4650, at ¶33-35; Grill v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., Medina App. No. 

03CA0029-M, 2003-Ohio-5780, at ¶19. Any procedural errors in the administrative review 

process should be argued and disposed of during the initial appeal, and may not be raised for 
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the first time on appeal from the trial court ruling. BSI did not raise the issue of improper 

service, in any manner, at the trial court level. Obviously, since it did not raise it below, the 

trial court was not given an opportunity to address any issues regarding service of the notice. 

Thus, BSI has waived this issue on appeal. 

{¶ 14} Moreover, in addition to being waived, BSI’s argument fails on its merits as 

the record demonstrates that BSI received the notice of intent to revoke or suspend its license. 

 In BSI’s notice of appeal to the trial court, its counsel, David Stenson, asserted the following: 

“[p]rior to the adjudication order the undersigned counsel spoke with [appellee] in February of 

2009 based on a notice of intent to revoke or suspend BSI license.” Also, in its response to 

appellee’s motion to dismiss, BSI asserted: 

{¶ 15} “Appellee did in fact send Appellant two notices of intent to revoke or suspend 

Appellant’s license consistent with R.C. Chapter 119, on January 2, 2009, and February 6, 

2009. Appellant never requested a hearing on either occasion, however according to previous 

counsel of Appellant, two call[s] were made to Appellee in February and March 2009, prior to 

the Adjudication Order of Appellee. Said Counsel spoke to Appellee and requested the 

information on three employees. The names of the employee[s] were never given to said 

counsel.” 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, at the trial court level, BSI specifically acknowledged receiving 

the notice of intent to revoke or suspend license. Also, it conceded that it did not request a 

hearing, which appears to have been a strategic decision. BSI concluded that “no additional 

meeting or hearings were necessary” since appellee had not provided the requested names of 

the employees. BSI’s counsel determined that a hearing would have been “totally useless.” 
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These assertions contradict BSI’s current position, that it “could not have requested an 

administrative hearing within 30 days” due to a lack of notice. The record refutes BSI’s 

argument that it did not receive the notice of intent to suspend or revoke its license. 

{¶ 17} BSI also asserts that an agency is required to file a complete record with the 

trial court in an R.C. 119.12 appeal. See Royer v. Ohio Real Estate Comm., 131 Ohio App.3d 

at 268. It argues that the record was not complete because it did not contain the certified mail 

receipt card. However, even though a complete record is required, “unintentional omissions 

may be excused.” Id. at 269. In Royer, the Third Appellate District reversed because there 

was no evidence in the record that Royer received proper notice. Id. at 270. However, in 

this matter, the record contains specific admissions from BSI that the notices were sent. 

Finally, we note that BSI did not raise the issue of an incomplete record at the trial court level. 

 See McGee v. Ohio State Bd. of Psychology (1993), 82 Ohio App.3d 301, 305. For this 

additional reason, its argument is unpersuasive. 

{¶ 18} BSI’s assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶ 19} The judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J., and FROELICH, J., concur. 

(Hon. Timothy P. Cannon, Eleventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the 

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.) 

Copies mailed to: 

Lawrence J. White 

Michael DeWine 

Cheryl R. Hawkinson 

Hon. Timothy N. O’Connell 
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