J-S43033-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD DANDAR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 130 WDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-20-MD-0000180-2016

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2018

Appellant Ronald Dandar appeals pro se from the order dismissing as 

untimely his two motions for an extension of time to file a serial Post 

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition from his 1977 conviction for two counts 

of receiving stolen property. Appellant claims that he is entitled to relief from 

an illegal sentence. Because there is no appealable order, we quash.

By way of background, we note that in CR-349-1976 and CR-394-1976, 

Appellant has made numerous filings requesting relief from his 1977 sentence 

of 1 1⁄2 to 5 years’ imprisonment for theft by deception. This Court, on 

December 1, 2017, affirmed the denial of Appellant’s most recent attempt at 

PCRA relief. See Commonwealth v. Dandar, 544 WDA 2017, 2017 WL 

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1 41 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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5983864 (Pa. Super. filed December 1, 2017) (unpublished mem.). In that 

case, we set forth the procedural history of this case as follows:

On November 11, 1976, [Appellant] was convicted by a jury of 

two counts of theft by deception and sentenced on January 18, 

1977, to two concurrent one and one-half to five years terms of 

imprisonment. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Dandar, 408 A.2d 534 (Pa. Super. 

1979) (unpublished memorandum). [Appellant] was unsuccessful 

in his first attempt to obtain collateral relief from the judgment of 

sentence under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), the 

predecessor to the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Dandar, 454 

A.2d 641 (Pa. Super. 1983). In 1997, this Court affirmed the 

denial of his pro se PCRA petition, finding Dandar “was sentenced 

to two concurrent one and one-half (11⁄2) to five (5) year 

sentences in 1978, and he is no longer serving a sentence of 

imprisonment, probation or parole for the theft charges relating 

to the instant petition.” Commonwealth v. Dandar, 704 A.2d 

1115 (Pa. Super. October 29, 1997) (unpublished memorandum, 

at 2).

Id. at *1. We reiterated that because Appellant was no longer serving a 

sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the theft charges, Appellant 

was not eligible for relief. Id.

While his appeal was pending with this Court, Appellant filed two 

motions seeking extensions of time in which to file PCRA petitions from his 

1977 conviction. Those motions were docketed in MD-180-2016. The PCRA 

court denied both motions on December 15, 2017, stating that it had no 

jurisdiction to extend the time for Appellant to file a PCRA petition.

Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the December 15, 

2017 order on the basis that the PCRA court denied him PCRA relief. However, 

in its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explicitly stated that the December 15, 
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2017 order “did not, as stated in the Notice of Appeal, dismiss [Appellant’s] 

PCRA petition.” Trial Ct. Op., 2/2/18, at n.1.

Initially, we must address whether this appeal is properly before us. We 

may raise issues concerning our jurisdiction sua sponte. Commonwealth v. 

Baio, 898 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

In general, appeals are properly taken from final orders. Pa.R.A.P. 

341(b); Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 64 A.3d 602, 608 (Pa. 2013). “An 

order granting, denying, dismissing, or otherwise finally disposing of a petition 

for post-conviction collateral relief shall constitute a final order for purposes 

of appeal.” See Pa.R.Crim.P. 910.

Here, the PCRA court’s December 15, 2017 order denied Appellant’s 

motions for an extension of time to file a PCRA petition. As noted by the PCRA 

court, the order did not dispose of a PCRA petition. Accordingly, we conclude 

that the PCRA court’s order is not a final order and does not fit within any 

exception permitting an appeal from an interlocutory or collateral order. See

Pa.R.A.P. 311, 313, 341. Therefore, the order is not appealable, and we must 

quash this appeal.2 

Appeal quashed.

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2

In any event, we agree with the PCRA court that there was no basis to extend 

the time to file a PCRA petition in the instant matter, as Appellant is no longer 

serving a sentence associated with this case, and is therefore ineligible for 

PCRA relief. See Trial Ct. Mem. and Order, 12/15/17, at 1; see also 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/24/2018