RENDERED: MARCH 5, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0327-MR

NICHOLAS CHARLES BREINER APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CI-90068 

JON LEDFORD APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, MAZE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Nicholas Charles Breiner (“Breiner”), a former middle 

school employee, filed suit against Jon Ledford (“Ledford”), a Court Designated 

Worker (“CDW”), and the Board of Education of Montgomery County for 

discrimination in violation of KRS1 344.040 and defamation. The Montgomery 

 

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, and Breiner appealed. After careful review 

of the record and applicable law, finding no error, we affirm. 

On April 10, 2018, Breiner filed a complaint in the Montgomery 

Circuit Court raising issues of violation of KRS 344.040 and defamation against 

Ledford in both his official and individual capacities and the Board of Education of 

Montgomery County. Prior to the events that transpired, Breiner was employed as 

the Director of Vocal Music and Director of the Theater Department at McNabb 

Middle School in Montgomery County. On April 7, 2017, Breiner disclosed his 

sexual orientation as a bisexual male on social media. A few days later, Deputy 

Superintendent Rick Culross called a meeting to question Breiner about his sexual 

orientation. 

On April 11, 2017, Ledford attended a confidential meeting regarding 

a student at the middle school as part of his statutory duties as a CDW. Breiner

alleged, before or during the meeting, Ledford made several comments about 

Breiner’s interactions with students related to his sexual orientation. Specifically, 

Breiner alleged Ledford accused him of improperly “openly pushing the ‘gay’ 

agenda on students and trying to turn them ‘gay.’” Record at 3. Breiner contends 

Ledford’s alleged statements were defamatory. 

Breiner alleged, after the meeting Ledford attended, he suffered 

disparate treatment from the administration of McNabb Middle School. On May 8, 
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2018, the Board of Education terminated Breiner. The principal informed Breiner 

he was terminated due to budget restraints, his performance, and protocol. Breiner 

discovered his position was filled by a heterosexual female two months later. 

Breiner contended his treatment and termination amount to discrimination due to 

his sexual orientation. 

Before the Board of Education responded to the complaint, the circuit 

court entered an agreed order dismissing Breiner’s claims against the Board of 

Education. 

In response to Breiner’s complaint, Ledford moved to dismiss 

Breiner’s claims against him in both his official and individual capacities. Ledford 

argued he was immune from suit under the doctrines of qualified official immunity 

and quasi-judicial immunity and argued Breiner’s complaint was deficient. 

Breiner responded to the motion, conceding Ledford was entitled to immunity in 

his official capacity and opposing the motion as to Ledford’s individual capacity. 

On July 16, 2019, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the 

complaint. Breiner filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate on July 24, 2019, 

arguing the circuit court failed to make findings that Ledford was acting in his 

capacity as a CDW when he made the alleged statements under Yanero v. Davis, 

65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001). Ledford opposed the motion, arguing the circuit court 
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was not required to issue findings of fact in ruling on the motion to dismiss under 

CR2 12.02(f). 

On November 5, 2019, the circuit court vacated its order dismissing 

Breiner’s complaint and ordered an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Yanero. 

Ledford responded to the circuit court’s order with a motion for reconsideration 

and reinstatement of the order dismissing the complaint. Ledford argued the 

parties fully briefed Yanero when arguing the motion to dismiss, and Breiner did 

not request an evidentiary hearing in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate. On 

February 17, 2020, the circuit court entered an order reinstating the July 16, 2019 

order dismissing the complaint. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Breiner argues the circuit court erred in dismissing his 

complaint because: (1) Ledford was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; (2) 

Ledford was not entitled to qualified official immunity; and his complaint was 

sufficient.

Our standard of review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is as 

follows:

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted admits as true the material 

facts of the complaint. So a court should not grant such a 

motion unless it appears the pleading party would not be 

entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be 

proved. . . . Accordingly, the pleadings should be 

 

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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liberally construed in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, all allegations being taken as true. This 

exacting standard of review eliminates any need by the 

trial court to make findings of fact; rather, the question is 

purely a matter of law. Stated another way, the court 

must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be 

proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief? Since a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a 

reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s 

determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the 

issue de novo. 

Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Likewise, “[t]he question of immunity is a matter of law which 

this Court reviews de novo.” Sangster v. Kentucky Bd. of Medical Licensure, 454 

S.W.3d 854, 856 (Ky. App. 2014) (citations omitted). 

Based on our review of the record and applicable case law, Ledford 

was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, so we need only address Breiner’s first 

argument. Breiner argues Ledford was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity

because his alleged defamatory statements about Breiner were not within the scope 

of his employment as a CDW. In response, Ledford argues he was entitled to 

quasi-judicial immunity because he acted in his official capacity when making the 

alleged statements. 

“Absolute immunity against suits for money damages is ‘well 

established’ for judges, and such immunity has also been extended to non-judicial 

officers performing ‘quasi-judicial’ duties.” Sangster, 454 S.W.3d at 858
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(citations omitted). Kentucky extends quasi-judicial immunity “to those persons 

performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these 

persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id. In 

determining whether quasi-judicial immunity applies, we apply a “functional 

approach” in which we “‘look[] to’ the nature of the function performed, not the 

identity of the actor who performed it. The party claiming absolute immunity

bears the burden of establishing a justification for that immunity.” Id. at 858-59

(citation omitted). This doctrine “applies to officials other than judges” when the 

official performs “a function requir[ing] exercise of discretionary judgment.” Id. at 

859. 

The Supreme Court of Kentucky extended the doctrine of quasijudicial immunity to CDWs in Horn by Horn v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 173

(Ky. 1995). There, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held the CDW acted within the 

scope of her employment and was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity based on the 

following reasoning:

[W]e hold that the acts of the CDW were protected by 

quasi-judicial immunity as Haynes was acting within the 

scope of her employment and under the direction of a 

judge of the court. Here, we agree with the Court of 

Appeals when it stated: “In this instance the court 

designated worker was that officer who carried into 

effect what was required to be done by the court. We can 

think of no better example of where absolute immunity 

attaches. . . .” The Appellant would have us believe that 

the CDW was acting outside the scope of employment 
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when she accompanied the juvenile to the detention 

center because Haynes testified that her purpose in 

making the trip was to get a glimpse of this new facility. 

Notwithstanding the CDW’s motives, however, the fact 

remains that Haynes would not have been allowed access 

to the detention center were she not employed as a court 

designated worker. It would be splitting hairs indeed to 

divvy up the CDW’s actions into categories of within and 

without scope of employment based upon some 

subjective rationale utilized by the CDW in assessing her 

daily routine moment by moment. Rather, we believe the 

better route flows from Appellee’s argument that the 

totality of Haynes’ function as a court designated worker 

should govern rather than the happenstance of her being 

in the car with Appellant. We agree with the opinion by 

the Court of Appeals in Dugger v. Off 2nd, Inc., Ky.App., 

612 S.W.2d 756 (1980), which, while involving quasijudicial immunity for a prosecutor, applies equally with 

regard to the duties of the CDW in the case at bar, in that 

quasi-judicial immunity attaches to the CDW when 

working within her capacity as a court designated 

worker.

Id. at 176. 

Here, although the facts differ, the analysis is the same. There is no 

question Ledford attended the confidential meeting to perform his statutory duties 

as a CDW. As in Horn, despite Ledford’s motives in making the alleged 

statements about Breiner, Ledford would not have been permitted to attend the 

confidential and statutorily required meeting were he not employed as a court 

designated worker. See id. Breiner requests we examine Ledford’s alleged 

defamatory statements in a vacuum, arguing the statements themselves were not 

made within the scope of his employment. We refuse to engage in “hair splitting” 
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in determining whether a party is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as Horn

requires this Court to consider “the totality of [the CDW’s] function as a court 

designated worker . . . rather than the happenstance” of Ledford making an alleged 

defamatory statement during his appearance as a CDW. Id. Ledford acted as a 

factfinder for the court in attending the meeting, which is a discretionary act. 

Although we do not condone the content of Ledford’s alleged statements, Ledford 

was working in his capacity as a CDW when he allegedly made a defamatory 

statement against Breiner, so Ledford is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Montgomery 

Circuit Court dismissing the complaint. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Edward E. Dove

Lexington, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

S. Chad Meredith

Solicitor General of Kentucky

Matthew F. Kuhn

Deputy Solicitor General

Frankfort, Kentucky

Brett R. Nolan

Special Litigation Counsel

Frankfort, Kentucky

Heather L. Becker 

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky