PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. SEVGI Q. MUHAMMAD, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-5040

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORT HERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. No. 4:12-CR-00162-GKF-1)

Fred Randolph Lynn, Tulsa, Okla homa, for Defendant – Appellant. Leena Alam, Assistant United States Attorn ey, (Danny C. Williams, Sr., United States Attorney, and Dennis A. Fries, Assistant United States Atto rney, on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff – Appellee.

Before HARTZ , O’BRIEN , and HOLMES , Circuit Judges.

HARTZ , Circuit Judge.

Defendant Sevgi Muhammad was indicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on 24 co unts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 9, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 two counts of making a false statement unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2 ), and one count of stealing public money under 18 U.S.C. § 641. All the char ges arose out of Defendant’s obtaining housing assistance th rough the Housing Choice V oucher Program of the United States Department of Housin g and Urban Development (HUD ). She pleaded no contest to one count of making a false statement. At the outset of her sentencing hearing, however, she moved to withdraw her plea. Th e district court later held an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion, and sentenced Defendant to se rve three years of probation and pay $1,698 in restitution. On appeal Defendant argues that her plea was not knowing and voluntary and that the district court erred when it denied her mo tion to withdraw the pl ea. She argues that her plea was not valid because she did not know (1) that a no-contest plea would have the same “attendant consequen ces” as a finding of guilt, Aplt. Br. at 9; (2) that the plea would result in a felony conviction and a find ing of guilt; (3) that the conviction would make it difficult to obtain credit, employment, federal financial aid, and Section 8 housing; and (4) that the conviction woul d preclude her from firearm ownership and render her testimony in court suspect. But the law does not require a defendant to be informed of the collateral cons equences of a plea, and the district court properly found that she knew that her plea would lead to a finding of guilt of the offense charged. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND A. Indictment3 Defendant came to the Unite d States from Turkey, and has a son who was born here. According to the indictment, from May 2004 to August 2009 Defendant received HUD rent subsidies based on her false statements in a written application and recertification forms that sh e was not receiving any inco me from any source. The indictment stated that she improperl y received $8,351 in subsidies. B. Plea Bargain As trial was set to begin on Nove mber 19, 2012, Defendant’s attorney informed the district court that she “[ was] indicating that she [did] not wish to go to trial and wishe[d] to accept the government’s offer.” R., Vol. 2 at 11. After giving counsel time to prepare, the court conducted the plea proc eeding, complying fully with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of ma king a false statement. The plea petition was on a printed form for plea s of guilty. In handwriting, “guilty” was crossed out in several places and replaced by “no contest,” and the form’s blank lines were filled in with the descri ption of the plea agreement. Id. , Vol. 1 at 55

‒ 59. Among the handwritten portions was the statement that “upon acceptance of plea & finding of guilt,” the government would “not object to a probated sentence” an d would “dismiss all other counts.” Id. at 56. During the plea colloquy Defendant responded that she could read, write, and understand English “[a] little,” id. , Vol. 2 at 20, and two Turkish interpreters were present. She said that it had been her inte nt to go to trial, but that morning she had decided to enter a plea to one count. She fu rther said that she un derstood the rights she4 was waiving, including that “if [she] decided not to take the witness stand, no inference of guilt could be drawn from [her] decision,” and that if she chose to have a jury trial she “could not be convicted unless all 12 members of the jury agreed th at [her] guilt of the essential elements of the crime had been proven by beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 22–23. Also during the plea colloquy, the district co urt verified that Defendant was familiar with the indictment and her plea petition: The Court: Have you received a copy of the indictme nt pending against you? The Defendant: Yes. The Court: Have you read it or had it read to you in Turkish? The Defendant: Yes. The Court: Do you understand the natu re of the charge to which you are pleading no contest? The Defendant: Yes. The Court: And it is a rather long indictment. Have you had it read to you in its entirety? The Defendant: Yes.

. . . . The Court: Mr. Widell [defense couns el], given the expedited nature here of the plea, have we had time to have the entire petition read to [Defendant]? [Defense Counsel]: We have, Your Honor. The Court: Very well. [Defendant], has the petition been read to you in Turkish? The Defendant: Yes. The Court: Are all of the statements contained in that petition true, correct and complete? The Defendant: Yes.
Id. at 24, 30–31. Defendant expressed her unde rstanding that she could be sentenced to serve up to five years in prison and pay a fine of up to $250,000. And she stated that she5 was not relying on any promise besides th e government’s promise not to oppose probation and to dismiss the other charges. Further, she responded a ffirmatively that she “had enough time to fully conf er” with her counsel, that sh e had “fully conferred with him about any defenses and any informa tion available to” her, and that she was completely satisfied with his services. Id. at 21. The district court accepted the plea and concluded, “Based upon [Defendant’s] plea of no contest, this court finds her guilty as charged . . . .” Id. at 33. It set sentencing for March 5. On that date defense counse l orally moved to withdraw her plea on the ground “that it wasn’t knowingly made,” id. at 38, because she did not understand that upon entering a no-contest plea she would be found guilty. The court allowed defense counsel to withdraw from the case and said that a hearing would be scheduled later. C. Evidentiary Hearing Defendant, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw her plea on March 22, 2013. The evidentiary hearing was held on April 2. At the hearing Defendant testified that when she pleaded no contest she did not know th at the plea would result in a felony conviction. She asserted that her attorney did not explai n her punishment and simply said, “Just say ‘no contest’ and trust me.” Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks omitted). But she was unwilling to assert unde r oath that the plea petition had not been read to her in full. When first questione d about the matter on cr oss-examination by the prosecutor, she responded as follows: Q: Did your interpreters go ov er the plea petition with you?6 A: They read me part of it. Q: You had told the court that you had gone over the entire plea petition, that you had read it, a nd understood the entire petition. Now— A: That’s right. Q: Now you’re telling us that you only went over part of it? A: I would— THE INTERPRETE R: I’m sorry? A: Whatever I understood, I’d like to talk about it now. Q: You had the opportunity to ta lk about it then, did you not? A: No. Everyone was rushing that day.

. . . . Q: At the time you told the court that you had read the entire plea petition and you understood it? A: Whatever I understood, I said yes to it. Q: Did you tell the court at the change-of-plea hearing that you had gone over the entire plea petiti on and that you understood it? A: Whatever my interpre ters told me I said yes. Just my interpreters told me whatever my a ttorney told them. Ask my interpreter to find out what she told me. Q: Ma’am, my question to yo u is—has nothing to do with the no contest right now, it has to do with the plea petition. A: I don’t speak English that well; somebody has to guide me.
Id. at 66–67. Later the matter arose again: Q: You told the court that you had gone over the petition with your attorney, the entire petition. Do you remember doing that? A: I didn’t read anything. I just understood whatever the interpreters have told me. Q: You told the court that you did go over everything, that you had read and understood everything. A: Whatever that was that they told me, I listened to it. If they didn’t read me everything, they didn’t read it to me. You can ask my interpreter. Q: So now you’re saying your interpre ters failed to read you everything even though they took an oath that they would?7 A: I don’t believe that they were wrong—wrongdoing of anything. They just followed my attorney. Whatever my attorney told them they told me.
Id. at 75–76. The testimony of Defendant’s original attorney, William Widell, did not help her. He said the following: On the day of trial he first wanted to see whether the district court would grant a motion in lim ine to exclude evidence of Defendant’s previous foreign conviction. If the motion was granted, he was prepared to go to trial; but if it was denied, he had advised Defendant to enter a conditional plea, allowing her to appeal the ruling. On the morning set for trial, however, she told him that she did not want a trial and did not want to wait until a ruling on the motion in limine. The in terpreters were present for this conversation between counsel and client. Defendant was origina lly going to enter a guilty plea, but Mr. Widell thought she was “unlikely to admit that she had done something wrong,” so he suggested that she enter a no-contest plea instead. Id. at 117. He explained to her that “[a] no contest plea is the same thin g as a guilty plea, except you don’t have to say that yo u did anything wrong.” Id. at 120. He told her there would be a finding of guilt, but he was not sure if he explained in any other way that a no-contest plea and a guilty plea would have the same c onsequences. See id. at 120–21. He and Defendant “sat down with the interpreters a nd we went through [the plea petition] line by line.” Id. at 125. When they went over the secti on that referenced a finding of guilt, he told her that the court would find her guilty.8 One of the interpreters at the plea hearing also testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw Defendant’s plea. He r testimony on direct examinati on by defense counsel supported Defendant’s position. She said: [Interpreter]: Me and the other interp reter were left alone with the defendant and we were told to read the plea petition to her, and it was a few pages, I can’t remember how many pages, and we didn’t understand some parts of it. I definitely didn’t understand what ‘no cont est’ was. And we had to mark the questions and ask them when he came back in the courtroom or came back near us. But at no point she was not told that this would be fo und guilty. She wa s just told that she would not have to st and before the judge and admit to guilt.

. . . . [Defense Counsel]: To be clear, are you saying that Mr. Widell did not read and explain the pl ea petition to [Defendant]? [Interpreter]: That’s right. R., Vol. 2 at 162–63. On cross examination, however, the interpre ter clarified that the only shortcoming in translating the entire petition to which she coul d attest was that the interpreters did not understand some of the language: [Prosecutor]: You had indicated that you were left alone, you and the other interpreter, to interpret the plea petition for the defendant; is that correct? [Interpreter]: Yes, sir. [Prosecutor]: Did you do that? [Interpreter]: We tried our best.

. . . .9 [Prosecutor]: When you say you tried your best, what do you mean by that? [Interpreter]: The legal wo rding can be very confusing for everyone and there were many sentences we didn’t understand, but her main question was would she be deported, would she lose her son, would she go to pris on, and how much she would have to pay, so her main ques tions were those. She kept repeating them. And every time Mr. Widell was, you know, within reach, we asked him.
Id. at 164. The prosecutor further elicited that the witness was an e xperienced interpreter, having worked in state and federal courts, and th at she never indicated to the district court that she did not understand the meaning of a term in the petition or used during the plea colloquy. The witness then said that she did not “remember one way or the other” whether defense counsel went over the handwritten portions of the petition with Defendant and could not “doubt or not doubt ” whether Mr. Widell was correct when he said that he had. Id. at 169. The cross-examination concluded with her testimony that she had “interpreted correctly to the court wh en [Defendant] told the court that she had gone over the entire plea petition,” id. at 171, and that the other interpreter “may well have gone over” with Defendant the portions of the petition that the witness had not gone

over, id. at 172. On redirect, defense counsel e licited that the witness did not understand that the “no-contest plea would result in a finding of guilt to a felony.” Id. at 173. But there was no evidence that any ot her specific language had been difficult to translate. At the hearing the government also pres ented evidence that Defendant understood English better than she had indicated. Her 2003 asylum petition stated that she was fluent in English, although she test ified that she had just copied from a document filled out for10 her by her attorney and that she did not know what the word “fluent” meant. Also, an application for food stamps indicated she spoke English, but Defendant claimed that form had been filled out by a friend. Finally , the probation officer who worked with Defendant to prepare her presentence report te stified that he spoke to her entirely in English, that she seemed to understand what he was saying, and that she “follow[ed] the directions and answer[ed] hi s questions appropriately.” Id. at 88. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw her plea, stating: The primary issue here is whether th e plea was knowing and voluntary, and the contention made by the defendant he re is that she did not know that by entering a plea of no contest that sh e would be found guilty. That is contrary to the statement containe d on page 2 of the written petition wherein the petition states that the gove rnment will dismiss all other counts upon acceptance of plea and finding of guilt. There is no contention here that the plea petition was not read to th e defendant by the interpreters. It does not appear, if the recollection of [the interpreter] is correct, that any questions were put to Mr. Widell about a finding of guilt, but it’s clear that the petition itself states that upon her plea of no contest, and the court’s acceptance of that plea, that ther e will be a finding of guilt.
Id. at 185. The court also found persuasi ve that Defendant clearly understood the potential sentence she could receive under the plea, which implied that she understood that there would be a finding of guilt. See id. at 185–87. II. DISCUSSION A. Whether Defendant’s Plea Was Knowing and Voluntary “To be valid, a guilty plea must repres ent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” United States v. Dunbar , 71811 F.3d 1268, 1279 (10th Cir. 2013 ) (brackets and internal quot ation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has declared: A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences , including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfille d or unfulfillable promises ), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes.). Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (emp hasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). “By using the word ‘direct,’ the Court excluded collateral consequences.” United States v. Krejcarek , 453 F.3d 1290, 1297 (10th Cir. 2006). “[T]here is no requirement that a defend ant be advised of all potential collateral consequences of a guilty plea in order for th at plea to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Id. at 1296. “Consequences of a guilty plea unrelated to the length and nature of the federal sentence ar e not direct consequences.” United States v. Hurlich , 293 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). The validity of the plea “is ge nerally a question of law subj ect to de novo review.” United States v. Vidal , 561 F.3d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 2009). But resolution of the legal issue may depend on fact finding. And we review the district court’s findings of historical fact for clear error. See United States v. Soto , 660 F.3d 1264, 1268 (10th Cir. 2011) (contention that plea was invalid was based on assertion that district court found to be untrue). Accordingly, we review the factual reco rd in the light most favorable to the12 district court’s ruling. See United States v. Cruz , 58 F.3d 550, 553 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1995). Turning to Defendant’s challenge to he r plea, we first address her undisputed claim that she was not informed that as a result of her plea, she would have a felony conviction, she would have di fficulty in obtaining credit, securing employment, obtaining Section 8 housing and federal financial aid, and that her conviction would preclude her from owning a firearm and woul d subject her future testimony to impeachment. In our view, these consequences of her plea are collat eral consequences that she need not know to enter a valid plea. Defendant cites no case where a court found that knowledge of any of these consequences was necessary for a pl ea to be knowing. And courts have ruled that defendants do not need to be aware of collateral conseque nces similar or identical to several of those she names. See United States v. Nicholson , 676 F.3d 376, 382 (4th Cir. 2012) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey , 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (revocation of pilot’s license); United States v. Campusano , 947 F.2d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 1991) (use in ev idence in federal trial of defendant’s guilty plea in state prosecution); United States v. Crowley , 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3rd Cir. 1976) (defendant would lose civil-service job and conv iction was for a felony); see also United States v. Youngs , 687 F.3d 56, 61(2nd Cir. 2012) (possibility of civil commitment after serving criminal sentence is collate ral consequence); Steele v. Murphy , 365 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2004) (possible life commitment as a sexually dang erous person is collateral consequence).13 Defendant next argues that her plea wa s not knowing and voluntary because she did not understand that it would result in a finding of guilt and because she did not understand the difference betwee n a plea of no contest and a plea of guilty. But her attorney testified that he told her that “a no-contest plea is the same thing as a guilty plea, except you don’t have to say that you did anyt hing wrong.” R., Vol. 2 at 120. And the plea petition itself states that if she pleads no contest, “the Court may impose the same punishment as if I had pleaded ‘NOT GUILT Y,’ stood trial, and been convicted by a jury,” and that the government would di smiss the other charges against her “upon acceptance of plea & finding of guilt.” R., Vol. 1 at 56. 1 Morever, upon accepting her plea, the district court announced, “Based up on [Defendant’s] plea of no contest, this

1 The district court may have overstated the point by saying that there was “no contention here that the plea petition was not read to the defendant by the interpreters,” R., Vol. 2 at 185, because defense counse l did contend that not all of the petition was read to Defendant. But there was no evidence (not even Defendant’s own testimony) to support that contention, and the only issue raised by Defendant regarding the accuracy of the translation was the interpreter’s assertion that she did not know the meaning of “no contest.” Of course, it would be a gross derelic tion of duty for an interpreter not to insist on clarification of the meaning of a term that was to be translated. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts , Standards for Performa nce and Professional Re sponsibility for Contract Court Interpreters in the Federal Courts, Federal Court Interpreters on U.S. Courts, ¶¶ 1 (“Accuracy and Completeness”), 8 (“Asse ssing and Reporting Impediments to Performance”), http://www.usc ourts.gov/ uscourts/FederalCourts/Interpreter/ Standards_for_Performance.pdf (l ast visited Mar. 25, 2014); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court Interpreter Orie ntation Manual and Glossary , Federal Court Interpreters on U.S. Courts, Ch. 3 § IV (“Accuracy of Performance”), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts /FederalCourts/Interpreter/federal-court-interpreterorientation-manual.pdf (last revised Jan. 14, 2014).14 court finds her guilty as charged . . . ,” id. , Vol. 2 at 33, yet there was no objection to this finding of guilt. Construing the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the decision below, we conclude that Defendant’s plea of no contest was knowing and voluntary. B. Refusal to Allow Withdrawal of Plea Defendant also challenges the district cour t’s denial of her motion to withdraw her plea. A defendant is allowed to withdraw he r plea before sentencing if she “‘can show a fair and just reason for re questing the withdrawal.’” United States v. Garcia , 577 F.3d 1271, 1273 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). To determine whether there is a fair and just reason, the court examines seve n factors: “(1) whether the defendant has asserted [her] innocence, (2) prejudice to the government, (3) delay in filing defendant’s motion, (4) inconvenience to the court, (5) defendant’s assistance of counsel, (6) whether the plea is knowing a nd voluntary, and (7) waste of judicial
resources.” Id. at 1273–74 (internal quotation marks omitted). We review for abuse of discretion, and “[a]lthough a motion to withdr aw a plea prior to sentencing should be freely allowed, we will not reverse a distri ct court’s decision unless the defendant can show that the court acted unjustly or unfairly.” Id. at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court considered the seven re levant factors and ruled that (1) all but the first weighed against Defendant and (2) the favorable weight of the first—assertion of innocence—was attenuated because her prior no-contest plea itself essentially claimed15 innocence. Defendant’s brief on appeal argues that all the factors weighed in her favor. But her district-court brief, al though citing the seven factors, discussed only whether her plea was knowing and voluntary. By not raising arguments on the other factors in district court, Defendant waived them and we need not consider them further. See United States v. Moland , 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1993) (“ We will not consider issues which are raised for the first time on appeal unless a party demonstrates an impediment which prevented raising the argument below. ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. There was no “fair and just reason” for permitting withdrawal . Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see Garcia , 577 F.3d at 1274–75. III. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM Defendant’s conviction and sentence.