J-S67035-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDREW JOSHUA BAUMGARDNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1222 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000378-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 24, 2019

Appellant Andrew Joshua Baumgardner appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County on March 

13, 2019, after he was convicted of Forgery and related offenses following a 

non-jury trial. We affirm. 

The trial court detailed the relevant procedural history and provided a 

thorough summary of the testimony herein as follows: 

After a trial without jury, this court convicted [Appellant] of: 

Count 1 - Forgery (F3)2; Count 2 - Conspiracy to Commit Forgery 

(F3)3; Count 3 - Access Device Fraud (F3)4 ; Count 4 - Conspiracy 

to Commit Access Device Fraud (F3)5 ; Count 5 - Conspiracy to 

Commit Identity Theft (F2)6; Count 6 – Receiving Stolen Property 

(M1)7; Count 7 - Forgery (F3)8; and Count 8 - Identity Theft (F2).9

See Verdict, January 22, 2019. This court scheduled sentencing, 

directed the preparation and submission of a presentence report 

(PSI), and granted counsel leave to file sentencing memoranda 

prior to sentencing. See Order, January 22, 2019.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Sentencing occurred on March 13, 2019. After consideration

of the PSI, the parties’ memoranda, the oral arguments and 

statements of the parties, and the evidence at trial, this court 

imposed the following10 sentences:

Count 8 - Identity Theft 30 - 120 months SCI

Count 5 - Conspiracy- Identity Theft 30 - 120 months SCI

Count 7 - Forgery 16 - 32 months SCI

Count 1 - Forgery 16 - 32 months SCI

Count 3 - Access Device Fraud 18 - 60 months SCI

The aggregate sentence11 was not less than 110 months to not 

more than 364 months in the state correctional institute.

On March 22, 2019, [Appellant] filed a timely Post Sentence

Motion. Therein, he raised the following claims: 1) insufficient 

evidence to support convictions for two forgeries; 2) the 

sentences were excessive; 3) evidence presented "was insufficient 

to support the verdicts"; and 4) the verdicts were against the 

weight of the evidence. See Post Sentence Motion, ¶¶ 4 - 8. The 

court directed a response from the Commonwealth, the 

preparation of transcripts from trial and sentencing, and granted 

the parties leave to file briefs on the issues. See Order, March 25, 

2019.

The Commonwealth filed its Answer on April 3, 2019. The

Transcript of Proceedings of Sentencing Hearing (Tr.Sentencing),

March 13, 2019, was filed on April 10, 2019. [Appellant] filed his 

Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Post Sentence

Motion on April 22, 2019. The Transcript of Proceedings of 

TrialWithout- Jury (Tr.) was filed April 23, 2019. The 

Commonwealth did not file a brief.

On June 10, 2019, this court issued an Order denying 

[Appellant’s] Post Sentence Motion. [Appellant] filed the instant 

timely appeal on July 5, 2019. See Notice of Appeal, July 5, 2019. 

This court directed [Appellant] to file a concise statement of 

matters complained of on appeal. See Order, July 8, 2019. The 

[Appellant] timely complied on July 29, 2019.

***

The Commonwealth first presented the testimony of Joshua

Fries. Tr., p. 6. Mr. Fries is the store manager for Rutter's here in 

the Borough of Chambersburg, Franklin County. Tr., p. 7. Mr. Fries 

is also the custodian of the records for the Rutter's store in

question. Tr., p. 7.

Mr. Fries testified that, according to the records12 of 

Rutter's, a purchase was made on December 8, 2017, in the 

amount of $166.72; the items purchased included “a bacon-
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wrapped cheese dog, a large mozzarella stick and two cartons of 

Newport l00s.” Tr., p. 9. The purchase was made using a Visa 

credit card with the last four numbers “6559.” Id; see also 

Commonwealth's Exhibit 4. Mr. Fries also confirmed that he had

turned over store surveillance recordings at the request of the 

police during the subsequent investigation of this credit card 

transaction. Id.

Christie Edwards testified next for the Commonwealth. Tr., 

p. 11. She is one of the owners of Abe’s Towing and a custodian 

of its records. Tr., pp. 11 - 12. Ms. Edwards testified that on 

December 8, 2017, Abe's Towing towed a vehicle to their shop 

from the Red Carpet Inn. Tr., p. 13. Abe's Towing replaced a tire 

on the vehicle at a cost of $172.18. Tr., p. 13; see also 

Commonwealth's Exhibit 2a.

Ms. Edwards testified that the bill was paid by credit card 

that was provided to them by phone. Tr., p. 14; see also

Commonwealth's Exhibit 2b. The credit card used was a Visa with

the last four digits 6559. See Commonwealth's Exhibit 2B. The

signature of the person who signed the receipt is illegible. Tr., p.

15; see also Commonwealth's Exhibit 2b.

The Commonwealth next called Randy Plotner to testify. Tr, 

p. 17. Mr. Plotner is the store manager for the Turkey Hill store in

Waynesboro, Franklin County. Tr., p. 18. He is also the custodian 

of that store's business records. Tr., p. 18. Mr. Plotner testified 

that, according to the Turkey Hill records, a purchase of gasoline 

was made on November 27, 2017,13 in the amount of $28.50; the 

purchase was by a Visa credit card with the last four numbers 

6559, in the name of Shirley A. Zeigler. Tr., p. 20; see also 

Commonwealth's Exhibit 3a.

Mr. Plotner also testified that a purchase of gasoline was 

made at the Turkey Hill store on December 1, 2017,14 in the 

amount of $34.55. Tr., pp. 24-25. This purchase was by Visa 

credit card with the last four numbers 6559, in the name of 

Shirley Zeigler. Tr., p. 21; see also Commonwealth's Exhibits 3b. 

Mr. Plotner turned over store surveillance video/ pictures to the 

police in furtherance of the subsequent investigation. Tr., p. 21;. 

see also Commonwealth's Exhibits 6a & 6b.

Shirley Zeigler next testified for the Commonwealth. Tr., p. 

27. She testified that [Appellant] rented an apartment from her. 

Id. At the time of her testimony, Ms. Zeigler was 81 years of age.15

Id.

Ms. Zeigler rented an upstairs apartment to [Appellant] in

2017. Tr., pp. 27-28. Ms. Zeigler lived in the downstairs 

apartment. Tr., p. 28. She never gave [Appellant] or Caitlin 
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Griffith, the co-defendant, permission to use her credit card. Tr.,

pp. 28 - 29. She did not make any of the purchases previously 

testified to by the other witnesses. Tr., p. 29. She also did not 

generally lock her apartment door, which was accessible to 

[Appellant] and the co-defendant by a shared entry way. Tr., p. 

30.

Corporal Shawn Adolini of the Waynesboro Police 

Department also testified. Tr., p. 31. On December 22, 2017, he 

executed a search warrant on [Appellant’s] apartment. Tr., p. 32. 

The police were searching for documents related to Ms. Zeigler, 

as a result of the investigation leading to the instant charges. Tr., 

p. 32.

Upon searching [Appellant’s] apartment, police recovered:

1) trash bags with mail addressed to Ms. Zeigler16; 2) a book of

unused checks for Ms. Zeigler's checking account17; 3) several 

checks belonging to Ms. Zeigler, written to various payees, 

including the co-defendant, Ms. Griffith18; 4) and numerous credit 

cards, membership cards, canceled driver's license, checks, etc., 

in the name of Ms. Zeigler.19 Tr., pp. 34-41. All these items were 

located within the apartment shared by [Appellant] and the 

codefendant, Ms. Griffith. Tr., p. 37.

The co-defendant, Caitlin Griffith, testified next for the

Commonwealth. Tr., p. 41. [Appellant] is the father of her child. 

Tr., p. 42. She testified that she was charged with offenses related 

to the charges against [Appellant]; she agreed to cooperate with 

the Commonwealth in exchange for an agreed upon disposition of 

the charges against her. Tr., pp. 42 - 44.

Ms. Griffith confirmed that she and [Appellant] were residing 

together in late 2017 in the upper floor apartment of Ms. Zeigler's 

home. Tr., p. 44. Around that time, Ms. Griffith observed that 

[Appellant] was in possession of Ms. Zeigler's wallet and 

checkbook. Tr., p. 45. She testified that they “went down into [Ms.

Zeigler's] apartment and talked to her and then he had [the wallet

and checkbook].” Tr., p. 45.

Although Ms. Griffith could not recall exactly what items 

[Appellant] stole from Ms. Zeigler, she did recall that they began

“using the stuff.” Tr., p. 45. Together, they purchased gas from 

the Turkey Hill store on November 27, 2017; she acknowledge[d] 

that she did not have Ms. Zeigler's permission to use the credit 

card and [Appellant] also knew he was not authorized. Tr., pp. 45 

-46.

She confirmed they used the card again to purchase gas at

Turkey Hill on December 1, 201 7, that they both intended to use 

it, and they had a plan to use it. Tr., p. 46. In addition to the gas
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purchases, Ms. Griffith testified that she, with [Appellant’s] 

knowledge, booked a hotel room at the Red Carpet Inn using Ms.

Zeigler's credit card. Tr., pp. 46 - 47; see also Commonwealth's

Exhibits 5a & 5b.

In regards to the car repairs at Abe's Towing, Ms. Griffith

testified that it was her vehicle that was repaired. Tr., p. 50. 

However, [Appellant] signed the credit card receipt. Tr., p. 51. 

She confirmed that the surveillance photos displayed her and 

[Appellant] at the Turkey Hill store; however, she could not

remember going to the Rutter's store. Tr., pp. 51 - 52. Even 

though she could not remember going to the Rutter's store, Ms. 

Griffith testified that both she and [Appellant] smoked Newport 

cigarettes. Tr., p. 52. Finally, Ms. Griffith reviewed the photos 

taken during the execution of the search warrant; she confirmed 

that the items depicted in Ms. Zeigler's name were stolen by 

[Appellant]. Tr., p. 60.

The final witness20 of the trial was Officer Kelly Rogers from

the Waynesboro Police Department. Tr., p. 64. Officer Rogers 

detailed his investigation of Ms. Zeigler's initial complaint and 

gathering of certain pieces of evidence. Tr., pp. 64 - 71. Of note, 

Officer Rogers testified to the contents of an intercepted phone 

call between [Appellant] and his mother; this call occurred after 

[Appellant] had been arrested for these offenses. p. 70. 

Specifically, [Appellant] asked his mother to hide money and bank 

cards of the victim so Cpl. Adolini would not find them. Tr., p. 70.

____

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(2)

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 (18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(2))

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(ii)

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 (18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(1)(ii)

6 18 Pa.C.S. § 903 (18 Pa.C.S. § 4120(a))

7 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a)

8 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(2)

9 18 Pa.C.S. § 4120(a)

10 Listed in order to be served; all sentences were imposed 

consecutively.

11 The Commonwealth conceded Count 2 - Conspiracy - Forgery 

and Count 4 - Conspiracy - Access Device Fraud merged with 

Count 5 - Conspiracy - Identity Theft, and that Count 6 - Receiving 

Stolen Property merged with Count 3 - Access Device Fraud. See 

Commonwealth's Sentencing Memorandum, filed February 14, 

2019, p. 2. Therefore, no sentences were imposed on those 

counts.

12 See Commonwealth's Exhibit 4.
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13 Mr. Plotner explained that although the purchase actually

occurred on November 27, 2017, the record is considered part of 

the November 26, 2017, business day. Tr., p.20.

14 November 30, 2017, business day.

15Trial occurred on January 22, 2019; therefore, at the time 

[Appellant] committed these crimes (2017), Ms. Zeigler was over 

the age of 60.

16 Commonwealth's Exhibits 1a & 1 b.

17 Commonwealth's Exhibit 1c

18 Commonwealth's Exhibit 1d.

19 Commonwealth's Exhibits 1e - 1n.

20 [Appellant] did not call any witnesses. Tr., pp. 61 - 64.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/20/19, at 1-3; 5-12. 

Appellant filed this timely appeal, and both the trial court and Appellant 

have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.1In his 

appellate brief, Appellant presents the following Statement of Questions 

Involved: 

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 110 to 364 months, 

which is double the recommended sentence, not 

commensurate with the offenses, and did not take all 

sentencing factors into account?

a. Whether the only apparent reason for the excessive 

sentences was that the Appellant chose a TWOJ,[2]rather 

than accept a plea offer. 

2. Whether there is any evidence to support a guilty verdict on 

the second forgery count.

Brief for Appellant at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

____________________________________________

1 On October 7, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a Briefing Letter with this Court 

wherein it indicated no appellate brief would be forthcoming. 

2 Appellant is referring to a trial without a jury. 
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Appellant’s first claim raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of one’s sentence do 

not entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 

A.2d 162, 170 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 

910, 912 (Pa.Super. 2000)). Thus, before we may address the merits of such 

a challenge, we first must consider:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903;

(2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in 

a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

[720];

(3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); 

and

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 

2006)).

Appellant has complied with the first three requirements; therefore, we 

proceed to determine whether he has raised a substantial question. 

Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question 

about the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

* * *

We have found that a substantial question exists when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing 

judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the 

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.

We cannot look beyond the statement of questions 

presented and the prefatory [Rule] 2119(f) statement to 

determine whether a substantial question exists....
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When we examine an appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement to 

determine whether a substantial question exists, our inquiry must 

focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast to 

the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to 

decide the appeal on the merits....A Rule 2119(f) statement is 

inadequate when it contains incantations of statutory provisions 

and pronouncements of conclusions of law.

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 467–68 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(citations, footnote and other punctuation omitted).

Herein, instead of presenting a colorable argument in his Rule 2119(f) 

Statement that the trial court’s actions were either inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms which 

underlie the sentencing process in support of a substantial question, Appellant

sets forth a catchall recitation of numerous undeveloped claims and conclusory 

pronouncements like those which were disapproved in Radecki. For example,

Appellant states the aggregate sentence he received was approximately 

double that which was proposed by the presentence investigation and that 

four of the five remaining effective sentences were to run consecutively. Brief 

for Appellant at 11. He also generally posits that the trial court’s sentence did 

not take into account each sentencing factor and consider his rehabilitative 

needs. Id. at 11-12. Finally, Appellant baldly claims his sentence “is contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process and, 

therefore, appellate review of the sentence is justified.” Id. at 12. 

It is well-settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of 

sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 
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(Pa.Super. 2006). In addition, we consistently have recognized that bald 

excessiveness claims premised on the imposition of consecutive sentences do 

not raise a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. 

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc) (stating, “[a] court's 

exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or consecutively 

does not ordinarily raise a substantial question[ ]”), appeal denied, 126 A.3d 

1282 (Pa. 2015) see also Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598, 604 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (explaining defendant did not raise a substantial question

by merely asserting sentence was excessive when he failed to reference any 

section of Sentencing Code potentially violated by the sentence), appeal 

denied, 881 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2005).

In light of the foregoing, we conclude Appellant has failed to raise a 

substantial question; however, even if we were to determine that Appellant's 

discretionary aspects of sentencing challenge raised a substantial question, 

we still would find that he is not entitled to relief. 

Appellant faults the trial court for sentencing him to a sentence which is 

almost double that which had been proposed by the presentence investigation. 

It is axiomatic that the trial court remains the final arbiter of the sentence 

imposed and, therefore, was not bound by the proposed term. As this Court 

has stated: 

Pennsylvania has a system of indeterminate sentencing, which 

implicitly adopts the philosophy of individualized sentencing. The 

trial judge is given broad discretion within this system to 

determine the proper sentence to impose. We have emphasized 
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that a trial court must not delegate its sentencing decision to any 

person or group. Instead, sentencing must result both from a 

consideration [by the trial judge] of the nature and circumstances 

of the crime as well as the character of the defendant.

***

[I]n the past this Court has emphasized that there is no reason 

for a probation office to make a sentencing recommendation. 

However, the fact that this Court does not look with favor upon 

the probation office recommending sentences does not mean that 

they are prohibited from doing so. Our central concern is to insure 

that the trial judge remains the final arbiter of the sentence 

imposed; the trial judge must not relinquish this responsibility to 

any other person or group.

Commonwealth v. Moore, 583 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa.Super. 1990) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Although Pennsylvania's sentencing system is individualized, the 

sentencing court is not required to impose the minimum possible confinement. 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d at 171. Indeed, an appellant is not

entitled to a “volume discount” when he or she is sentenced for multiple 

convictions. Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1050 (Pa.Super. 

2011). 

Moreover, where, as here, the sentencing court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report, we properly may assume the court was aware 

of the defendant's character and weighed it along with mitigating statutory 

factors. See Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 8 A.3d 912, 919 (Pa.Super. 

2010). Nevertheless, the trial court specifically stated that it had reviewed 

the PSI Investigative Report, along with the parties’ presentencing 
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memoranda, before fashioning its sentence. N.T. Sentencing, 3/13/19, at 2. 

In addition, the trial court also recited the applicable sentencing guidelines 

relative to each offense. Id. at 7-8. The court went on to inform Appellant 

that it had “considered the substance of [his] prior criminal history” which 

began in 2005 and proceeded to recount the same for him. Id. at 8-11. 

Appellant’s claims to the contrary, the trial court did consider the 

protection of the public, the gravity of his offenses and his rehabilitative needs

prior to imposing his sentence. The court heard counsel’s argument that 

Appellant needed drug and alcohol treatment. The court went on to express 

it found “it somewhat difficult to believe that through all [Appellant’s] time in 

the judicial system, over the last—well, now going on 14 years, [he] had not 

once been afforded drug and alcohol treatment,” and stressed it was 

Appellant’s obligation to seek the help he claimed he needed for his addictions. 

Id. at 9-10. The court also stressed that Appellant had “spent the better part 

of the last 14 years victimizing this community in one manner or another. 

Sometimes it involved victimizing individuals. For example the thefts and the 

simple assault. Sometimes it involved the community at large.” Id. at 10-

11. 

Under our standard of review, an abuse of discretion may not be found

unless the trial court's decision is “clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. 

Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). “The rationale behind 

such broad discretion and the concomitantly deferential standard of appellate 
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review is that the sentencing court is in the best position to determine the 

proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the 

individual circumstances before it.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Under our deferential standard of review, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's sentence, and we decline to disturb it. Appellant’s 

first claim merits no relief.

Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

guilty verdict on the “second forgery count.” In reviewing a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we employ a well-settled standard of review: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt 

may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 

be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). 
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In his Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, Appellant 

stated: 

The only evidence of a Forgery committed by [Appellant] was a 

credit card charge slip from Abe’s for towing and repairs to Ms. 

Griffith’s car, purportedly signed by [Appellant[] Ms. Griffith 

testified that she, not [Appellant], made the motel reservation 

online and paid online. She also signed the registration sheet. 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 7/29/19, at 2. 

In the scant argument portion of his appellate brief devoted to this 

claim, Appellant enumerates the specific elements of the crime of Forgery.3 

In the four sentences that follow, Appellant cites to no caselaw to support his 

claim or otherwise acknowledges the emphasized portion of the crime of 

Forgery, see footnote 3, as a basis of guilt. 

____________________________________________

3 As Appellant indicated, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101(a) defines Forgery as follows: 

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent 

to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is 

facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, 

the actor:

(1) alters any writing of another without his authority;

(2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or 

transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another 

who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a time 

or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the 

case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; 

or

(3) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a 

manner specified in paragraphs (1) or (2) of this subsection.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101(a)(2) (emphasis added).
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 Following our review of the record and considering the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we find the 

evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant acted with the knowledge that he was 

facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by his co-defendant for the benefit of 

both with regard to the Red Carpet Inn reservation. Contrary to Appellant’s 

assertion that Ms. Griffith acted alone when making the room reservation, Ms. 

Griffith testified that she and Appellant booked the same through Expedia, and 

Appellant knew they were using Ms. Zeigler’s card to pay for the room. N.T. 

Trial, 1/22/19, at 46-47, 49. Significantly, Appellant stayed with Ms. Griffith 

at the Red Carpet Inn. Id. at 49. Thus, although Ms. Griffith signed the 

receipt authorizing Ms. Zeigler’s credit card to be charged, her actions and 

those of Appellant were in accordance with a shared knowledge of a criminal

plan to forge Ms. Zeigler’s name to pay for a room at the Red Carpet Inn room

in which they both stayed. Such evidence sufficiently establishes Appellant 

was well-aware that he and Ms. Griffith were facilitating a fraud upon Ms. 

Zeigler. As a result, this claim lacks merit. 

Judgment of Sentence Affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/24/2019