Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1702-CR-265 | October 30, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James J. Leffler, II,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

84A01-1702-CR-265

Appeal from the Vigo Superior 

Court

The Honorable David R. Bolk, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

84D03-1511-F3-2713

Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue

[1] James Leffler II pleaded guilty to dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 

felony, and the trial court sentenced him to nine years executed in the Indiana 

Department of Correction. On appeal, Leffler raises two issues for our review. 

The State cross-appeals arguing Leffler waived his right to appeal his sentence. 

Concluding Leffler waived his right to appeal his sentence, we dismiss his 

appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In late 2015, Leffler was arrested and charged with dealing in 

methamphetamine, a Level 3 felony; dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 4 

felony; possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; and two counts of 

maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony. The State also alleged 

Leffler was an habitual offender.

[3] On July 15, 2016, Leffler and the State entered into a written plea agreement 

pursuant to which Leffler agreed to plead guilty to dealing in 

methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the 

remaining charges. Additionally, the plea agreement provided, 

The parties have no agreement regarding sentencing except that 

such sentence shall not exceed nine (9) years. The parties shall 

argue sentencing before the Court. The defendant shall waive the 

right to have any aggravating circumstances to be found beyond 

a reasonable doubt by a jury and said aggravating circumstances 
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would be determined by the Judge. . . . The defendant waives 

the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this matter.

Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 56. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial 

court advised Leffler of the various rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, 

including his right to appeal his sentence. The relevant colloquy went as 

follows:

[Trial Court]: You’re waiving your right to appeal the 

sentence imposed in this matter.

* * *

[Trial Court]: If the case went to trial and you were 

convicted, you’d have a right to appeal your 

conviction and any sentence imposed by this 

Court to a higher court; understand you have 

this appeal right?

[Leffler]: Yes sir.

[Trial Court]: Understand that by entering into this plea 

agreement, you’re giving up your appeal right 

with both respect to the finding of guilt and 

any sentence imposed by this Court?

[Leffler]: Yes.

Transcript, Volume VI at 5-9. The trial court accepted Leffler’s plea and 

entered judgment of conviction. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court 

sentenced Leffler to nine years in the Department of Correction. The trial court 

also advised Leffler that “[y]ou have a right to appeal the sentence imposed in 
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this case Mr. Leffler[,]” and appointed a public defender to represent him. Tr., 

Vol. VII at 89. 

[4] Leffler now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We first address the State’s cross-appeal. The State argues Leffler cannot 

challenge his sentence because he waived his right to do so pursuant to the 

terms of the plea agreement. Leffler counters that the plea agreement is 

ambiguous and notes the trial court advised Leffler of his right to appeal. We 

agree with the State.

[6] Leffler first argues the plea agreement is ambiguous and unenforceable. The 

validity and interpretation of a plea agreement is a question of law. We 

evaluate questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to 

the trial court's determinations. McCown v. State, 890 N.E.2d 752, 756 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008). 

[7] As noted above, the plea agreement provides, 

The parties have no agreement regarding sentencing except that 

such sentence shall not exceed nine (9) years. The parties shall 

argue sentencing before the Court. The defendant shall waive the 

right to have any aggravating circumstances to be found beyond 

a reasonable doubt by a jury and said aggravating circumstances 

would be determined by the Judge. . . . The defendant waives 

the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this matter.
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Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 56. Leffler alleges the first sentence, which states 

the parties “have no agreement regarding sentencing[,]” conflicts with the 

remaining provisions of the paragraph stating Leffler waives certain rights. 

Contrary to Leffler’s argument, the first sentence of the paragraph only refers to 

the parties’ agreement that the trial court will determine the sentence imposed, 

and that the trial court’s sentence may not exceed nine years. The agreement 

unambiguously waives Leffler’s right to appeal. 

[8] Leffler also asserts the trial court advised him he may appeal his sentence. In 

Creech v. State, the defendant executed a plea agreement in which sentencing 

was left to the discretion of the trial judge, subject to a cap of six years executed. 

887 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ind. 2008). The agreement further provided, “I hereby 

waive my right to appeal my sentence so long as the Judge sentences me within 

the terms of my plea agreement.” Id. The court imposed a six-year sentence. 

On appeal, the defendant sought to challenge the appropriateness of his 

sentence. Our supreme court concluded the “express language” of the plea 

agreement established a valid waiver of the defendant’s right to appeal his

sentence. Id. at 76. Further, although the trial judge erroneously advised the 

defendant at the end of the sentencing hearing that he had a right to appeal, our 

supreme court concluded the advisement had no effect on his plea because “[the 
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defendant] had already pled guilty and received the benefit of his bargain.” Id.

at 77.1

[9] Here, Leffler executed a valid waiver of his right to appeal his sentence and the 

trial court advised him that he was waiving this right at the guilty plea hearing. 

Leffler answered in the affirmative that he understood he was forfeiting his right 

to appeal his sentence. Further, as in Creech, the trial court’s mistaken 

advisement that Leffler had the right to an appeal occurred after Leffler had 

pleaded guilty and had received the benefit of his bargain. We conclude Leffler

has waived his right to appeal his sentence and grant the State’s cross-appeal for 

dismissal of the appeal. See Starcher v. State, 66 N.E.3d 621, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016) (enforcing written waiver of right to appeal sentence despite trial court’s 

erroneous advisement at sentencing that defendant had a right to appeal), trans. 

denied.

Conclusion

[10] For the reasons stated above, we dismiss Leffler’s appeal.

[11] Appeal dismissed.

Riley, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

 

1 As our supreme court stated in Creech, “we take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of avoiding 

confusing remarks in a plea colloquy.” 887 N.E.2d at 76.