Docket No. 91072–Agenda 25–November 2001.

SHIRLEY ROBIDOUX, Indiv. and as Ex’r of the Estate of

Harvey Robidoux, Deceased, Appellee, v. URETZ J. OLIPHANT,

								M.D., et al. (Uretz J. Oliphant, M.D., et al., Appellants).

Opinion filed June 20, 2002.

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

	This appeal stems from the death of Harvey Robidoux, who

was injured in a motorcycle accident on July 15, 1995, and was

subsequently taken to the Carle Foundation Hospital (the Hospital)

in Urbana. While there, he was treated by, inter alia, defendant Uretz J. Oliphant, M.D., an employee of defendant Carle Clinic

Association (the Clinic). Harvey Robidoux died at the Hospital the

same day. In June 1997, plaintiff Shirley Robidoux, Harvey’s

widow, sued Oliphant and the Clinic, along with several others

who are not parties to this appeal, in the circuit court of

Champaign County. In 1999, following defendants’ motions for

summary judgment, plaintiff filed a response to which she attached

the affidavit of David Richards, M.D., plaintiff’s expert witness. On

October 4, 1999, Oliphant filed a supplemental reply to plaintiff’s

response and a motion to strike Richards’ affidavit. The next day,

October 5, the trial court granted Oliphant’s motion to strike, as

well as his “unrefuted” motion for summary judgment. The trial

court subsequently granted the Clinic’s motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed. No.

4–00–0105 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We

allowed defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court.

BACKGROUND

	The following facts are taken from the pleadings and other

materials of record, including Richards’ affidavit and Oliphant’s

deposition. On July 15, 1995, plaintiff’s decedent, Harvey

Robidoux (decedent), was injured in a motorcycle accident and

was taken to the Hospital. He arrived at the emergency room

shortly after 12 p.m. Oliphant, the head of the Hospital’s trauma division, was not in the emergency room when decedent arrived,

and took no part in his initial care and treatment. At 12:32 p.m., it

was ordered that decedent undergo a computed tomography (CT)

scan. During this scan, decedent went into cardiac arrest. Oliphant,

who arrived at the emergency room about this time, ordered the

CT scan halted, and decedent was taken to the operating room.

	Oliphant, who is a board-certified general surgeon, began

operating on decedent at about 1:15 p.m. He testified in his

deposition that he found a large, ruptured hematoma, or blood clot,

extending from decedent’s pelvis upward and spreading over half

his abdomen. Oliphant determined that decedent’s iliac vein1 was completely severed, and he believed that all of decedent’s iliac

vessels on one side were torn. Decedent died a short time later.

According to Oliphant, the cause of death was intra-abdominal

bleeding from the severed or injured iliac vessels.

	In his deposition, Oliphant was asked if alternative measures,

including starting surgery earlier, might have saved decedent’s life.

Oliphant answered that because of the severity of decedent’s

injuries, he did not believe it would have made any difference.

Oliphant also stated that his treatment of decedent on July 15,

1995, was within the appropriate standard of care.

	In counts I through III of her fourth amended complaint,

plaintiff alleged that Oliphant was negligent in failing timely to (1)

institute appropriate fluid resuscitation therapy, (2) diagnose

internal bleeding, (3) treat internal bleeding, and (4) diagnose an

unstable pelvic fracture. In counts X through XII plaintiff sought

to hold the Clinic, Oliphant’s employer, vicariously liable for

Oliphant’s actions.

	Oliphant and the Clinic filed motions for summary judgment.

In Oliphant’s motion, to which he attached excerpts from his

deposition, Oliphant asserted that he was not involved in the initial

treatment of decedent and there was no negligence in his

subsequent treatment of decedent. Plaintiff’s response was filed

seven days after the initial deadline set by the trial court, but within

an extended deadline that was set by the court sua sponte.2 Plaintiff asserted in her response that there were genuine issues of material

fact as to whether Oliphant acted within the standard of care.

Attached to plaintiff’s response was Dr. Richards’ signed affidavit,

which stated in full:

			“The undersigned, being first duly sworn under oath,

deposes and states as follows:

			1. I am a physician licensed to practice medicine in the

State of Ohio and a board certified general surgeon;

			2. I have been treating trauma patients with injuries

similar to those of Harvey Robidoux and have practiced in

the same area of health care medicine that is at issue in this

case in excess of six years;

			3. I have reviewed the records of Ford-Baier Ambulance

Service and Carle Foundation Hospital, as well as various

depositions, including the deposition of Urtez [sic] J. Oliphant, M.D.;

			4. That in my opinion, based upon a reasonable degree

of medical certainty, the care and treatment provided by

Dr. Oliphant to Harvey Robidoux at Carle Foundation

Hospital on July 15, 1995, fell below the standard of care.

In my opinion, Dr. Oliphant failed to recognize in a timely

fashion that the patient had a[n] unstable pelvic fracture

that was the most probable source of the bleeding, failed

to take appropriate measures to provide adequate fluid

resuscitation therapy and failed to take appropriate measures to immobilize and repair the damages [sic] blood vessels;

			5. In my opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of

medical certainty, had the patient received appropriate

fluid resuscitation in a timely manner, and appropriate

treatment to immobilize and repair the damage to blood

vessels in the pelvic region, it is more probably true than

not that the patient would have survived.

			6. This affidavit is based on my education, training and

experience, as well as my review of the various materials

referenced herein and that, if sworn as a witness, I can and

will testify competently to the facts and opinions stated

herein, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.”

	Oliphant filed a supplemental reply to plaintiff’s response and

a motion to strike Richards’ affidavit. In his motion, Oliphant

alleged that Richards’ affidavit was improper and in violation of

Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). Oliphant asserted

that the affidavit was undated and unverified, and therefore did not

contravene Oliphant’s summary judgment motion, which was

supported by his sworn deposition testimony. According to

Oliphant, there was no indication in Richards’ affidavit “of

verification or swearing under oath by any proper official or notary

public.” Oliphant added that Richards’ affidavit consisted of “vague

conclusions” and contained no admissible facts, and thus did not

comply with Supreme Court Rule 191, which requires that such

affidavits set forth with particularity “the facts” upon which the

affiant relied. 145 Ill. 2d R. 191. In addition, Oliphant pointed to

a Rule 191 requirement that sworn or certified copies of all papers

upon which the affiant relies must be attached to the affidavit. No

such papers were attached to Richards’ affidavit.

	The trial court granted Oliphant’s motion to strike, explaining

that Richards’ affidavit “is not verified and does not comport with

the requisites of Supreme Court Rule 191.” The court then granted

Oliphant’s motion for summary judgment, which the court held

“stands unrefuted in effect.” Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider,

to which she attached Richards’ supplemental affidavit. Oliphant

filed a response to plaintiff’s motion to reconsider and a motion to

strike Richards’ supplemental affidavit.

	Because the original judge who granted Oliphant’s motion for

summary judgment had since retired, a different judge presided

over a joint hearing on plaintiff’s motion to reconsider, Oliphant’s

motion to strike Richards’ supplemental affidavit, and the Clinic’s

motion for summary judgment. Despite finding that Richards’

supplemental affidavit was “adequate to create a genuine issue of

material fact,” the trial court nevertheless granted Oliphant’s

motion to strike, “not because [the affidavit] is defective under

Rule 191, but because it is not timely.” The court therefore denied

plaintiff’s motion to reconsider and held that the summary

judgment in favor of Oliphant remained “in full force and effect.”

The court also granted the Clinic’s motion for summary judgment.

Finally, the court found, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a)

(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) that, as to all of these rulings, there was no

just reason to delay enforcement or appeal.

	Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed and

remanded. No. 4–00–0105 (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). The appellate court first held that the striking of

an affidavit for noncompliance with Rule 191 should be reviewed de novo and not under the “abuse of discretion” standard. The court then found that, while Richards’ original affidavit might have

violated Rule 191 in a technical sense, it was nevertheless

substantively in compliance and should not have been stricken. This

affidavit, the appellate court further held, presented a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Oliphant’s treatment of decedent fell

below the standard of care. Accordingly, the appellate court

determined that the trial court improperly granted summary

judgment in favor of Oliphant and the Clinic. We allowed

defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

	The question before us is one of statutory construction. We

are asked to determine the precise scope of the requirements set forth in Rule 191(a). It is well settled that the construction of our

rules is comparable to this court’s construction of statutes. The

committee comments to Supreme Court Rule 2 state that “the

same principles that govern the construction of statutes are

applicable to the rules.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 2, Committee Comments; cf. Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995) (supreme court rules are neither aspirational nor are they suggestions; “[t]hey have the

force of law, and the presumption must be that they will be obeyed

and enforced as written”). As is the case with statutes, our primary

task in construing a rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intent

of its drafters. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395, 404-05 (1998). “The most reliable indicator of intent is the language used,

which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d at 405. The construction of a statute is a question of law

and is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000). We therefore review the interpretation of Rule 191(a) de novo.

 	Rule 191(a) states in pertinent part:

		“Affidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for

summary judgment under section 2--–1005 of the Code of

Civil Procedure *** shall be made on the personal

knowledge of the affiants; shall set forth with particularity

the facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense

is based; shall have attached thereto sworn or certified

copies of all papers upon which the affiant relies; shall not

consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence;

and shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a

witness, can testify competently thereto.” 145 Ill. 2d R.

191(a).

	Plaintiff directs our attention to this court’s decision in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), and argues that, in light of this decision, the requirements of Rule 191(a) cannot be given literal

effect. 	We disagree.

	In Wilson, this court adopted Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to an expert’s testimony at

trial. Rule 703 states in pertinent part:

			“The facts or data in the particular case upon which an

expert bases an opinion or inference may be those

perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the

hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in

the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon

the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be

admitted.” Fed. R. Evid. 703.

The court in Wilson noted that, in a trial context, “[b]oth Federal and State courts have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow

opinions based on facts not in evidence.” Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 193.  	Rule 705 states:

			“The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference

and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the

underlying facts or data, unless the court requires

otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to

disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-

examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 705.

	In accordance with Rule 705, we held in Wilson that, at trial, “an expert may give an opinion without disclosing the facts

underlying that opinion.” Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194. “Under Rule 705 the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-

examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.”

Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194. We explained in Wilson that our “following of Federal Rules 703 and 705 comports with the

modern trend liberalizing certain trial procedures.” Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 195. Thus, under Wilson, an expert testifying at trial may offer an opinion based on facts not in evidence, and the expert is

not required on direct examination to disclose the facts underlying

the expert’s opinion.

	Plaintiff at bar argues in essence that there is an inconsistency

between Wilson and the plain language of Rule 191(a). As noted, under Wilson, an expert’s opinions may be offered at trial in the form of conclusions. However, under the plain language of Rule 191(a), an expert’s affidavit in support of or in opposition to a

motion for summary judgment must consist not of conclusions but

of facts admissible in evidence, and it must set forth these facts

with particularity. Plaintiff thus appears to contend that we should

construe Rule 191(a) not according to its plain language, but rather

in conformity with the more relaxed standard established in Wilson.

	The difficulty with plaintiff’s contention is that Wilson deals with an expert’s testimony at trial, while Rule 191(a) deals with affidavits in support of or in opposition to motions for summary judgment. As was explained by our appellate court in Kosten v. St. Anne’s Hospital, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (1985), these two procedural settings are very different. In Kosten, the plaintiff raised the same argument as does plaintiff at bar, contending that, in light

of this court’s decision in Wilson, her expert’s affidavit “need not state any facts but may set forth only conclusions.” Kosten, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1080. In rejecting this argument, our appellate court

explained:

			“Wilson has no relevance to summary judgment procedure. An affidavit utilized in summary judgment

procedure is totally different from testimony at trial. The

affidavit cannot be cross-examined as can a witness at

trial.

			Supreme Court Rule 191 is specific in mandating that

affidavits cannot consist of conclusions but must set forth

facts admitted in evidence. [Citation.] Wilson did not overrule or modify Rule 191.” Kosten, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 1080.

Accord Landeros v. Equity Property & Development, 321 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63 (2001); Woolums v. Huss, 323 Ill. App. 3d 628, 636 (2001); Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1993).3

	We agree with the reasoning of the court in Kosten. Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735

ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 1998); Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 517-18 (1993). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine if one

exists. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d at 517. Although a plaintiff is not required to prove his case at the summary judgment stage, in order

to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party

must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle the party to

a judgment. Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 172 Ill. 2d 243, 256 (1996). An affidavit submitted in the summary judgment context serves as a substitute

for testimony at trial. Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 587 (1971). Therefore, it is necessary that there be strict compliance with Rule 191(a) “to

insure that trial judges are presented with valid evidentiary facts

upon which to base a decision.” Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 851 (1987).

	Further support for the position taken by the court in Kosten can be found in the federal court of appeals decision in Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1993), which addressed an issue similar to the Rule 191-Wilson question. In Hayes, the court considered the interplay between Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (one of the rules adopted in Wilson) and Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e), a

subsection of the federal rule governing motions for summary

judgment in federal court, is similar to our Rule 191(a). Rule 56(e)

states in pertinent part:

			“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on

personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that

the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated

therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts

thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto

or served therewith.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

	The plaintiffs in Hayes raised essentially the same argument as did the plaintiff in Kosten and plaintiff in the case at bar, i.e., that under Federal Rule of Evidence 705, the conclusory assertions

made in their experts’ affidavits were sufficient to withstand a

motion for summary judgment. The court in Hayes disagreed, and affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment. According

to the Hayes court, such affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must meet the standards of Rule

56(e), which “requires that the nonmoving party ‘set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Hayes, 8 F.3d at 92, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The court added that the

plaintiffs’ reliance upon Rule 705 was “largely inapposite” because

that rule “was designed to apply in the context of a trial, where

cross-examination provides an opportunity to probe the expert’s

underlying facts and data and to test the conclusions reached by the

expert.” Hayes, 8 F.3d at 92.

	The court in Hayes further stated:

			“The evidentiary rules regarding expert testimony at trial

were ‘not intended *** to make summary judgment

impossible whenever a party has produced an expert to

support its position.’ [Citation.] We are not willing to

allow the reliance on a bare ultimate expert conclusion to

become a free pass to trial every time that a conflict of fact

is based on expert testimony. As with all other evidence

submitted on a motion for summary judgment, expert

affidavits must be reviewed in light of [Rule] 56.” Hayes, 8 F.3d at 92.

See also Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“To hold that Rule 703 prevents a court from

granting summary judgment against a party who relies solely on an

expert’s opinion that has no more basis *** than *** theoretical

speculations would seriously undermine the policies of Rule 56.

We are unwilling to impose the fruitless expenses of litigation that

would result from such a limitation on the power of a court to

grant summary judgment”); Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) (concluding that Rules 703 and 705

“do not alter the requirement of [Rule] 56(e) that an affidavit must

set forth specific facts in order to have any probative value”).

	In light of these authorities, we conclude that Rule 191(a)

should be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning

of its language. Its requirements should be adhered to as written.

See Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995). If we were to lessen these requirements and interpret Rule 191(a) in conformity

with the more relaxed standard established in Wilson, we would be making “summary judgment impossible whenever a party has produced an expert to support its position.” Merit Motors, 569 F.2d at 673. We decline to construe Rule 191(a) in this manner. 

	Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff points to the special

concurrence in Woolums v. Huss, 323 Ill. App. 3d 628 (2001), which asserts an essential equivalence between expert opinion

testimony at trial and an expert’s affidavit in a summary judgment

context. The special concurrence argues that, given this court’s

decision in Wilson, “the admission of an expert opinion under Rule 191 at the summary judgment stage requires a greater showing of

foundation than is required for admission of the same expert

opinion at trial.” Woolums, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 642 (Steigmann, P.J., specially concurring). According to the special concurrence,

this is an inconsistency for which there is no sound basis.

	We find this argument unconvincing. As noted, Federal Rules

703 and 705 were designed to apply to an expert’s testimony at trial. Rule 191, on the other hand, was drafted to apply to pre-trial proceedings, including summary judgment. For purposes of our

analysis, there is no equivalence between these two procedural

contexts. Accordingly, there is no inconsistency in having one

standard for admission of an expert’s testimony at trial and a

different, more stringent standard for admission of an expert’s

affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment. As noted, such an affidavit serves as “a substitute for

testimony taken in open court.” Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580, 587 (1971). Given that cross-examination is unavailable as a means to test an affidavit,

it is not surprising that the standard for admission of an affidavit in

a summary judgment context would be higher than for the

admission of an expert’s opinion at trial. Cf. Solon v. Godbole, 163 Ill. App. 3d 845, 851 (1987) (“strict compliance with Supreme

Court Rule 191(a) is necessary to insure that trial judges are

presented with valid evidentiary facts upon which to base a

decision”).

	For the reasons set forth above we conclude that Wilson is inapplicable to a summary judgment situation. Therefore, an

expert’s affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion for

summary judgment must adhere to the requirements set forth in the

plain language of Rule 191(a).

	Plaintiff next argues that even if Wilson does not apply, and Rule 191(a) therefore is construed according to its plain meaning,

the rule’s provision requiring that supporting documents be

attached to the affidavit need not be strictly followed. According

to plaintiff, the failure to attach such papers to the affidavit is

merely a technical violation of the rule, and should be disregarded

if the affiant is competent to testify at trial. We disagree.

	We have already held that Rule 191(a)’s requirements are to

be construed according to the plain language of the rule. Here, the

plain language clearly requires that such papers be attached to the

affidavit. Moreover, Ssupreme cCourt rules, like statutes, should be

construed as a whole, with individual provisions interpreted in light

of other relevant provisions. See Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). The Rule 191(a) provisions barring conclusionary assertions and requiring an

affidavit to state facts with “particularity” would have little

meaning were we to construe the attached-papers provision as

merely a technical requirement that could be disregarded so long

as the affiant were competent to testify at trial.

	In support of her position, plaintiff relies upon Beals v. Huffman, 146 Ill. App. 3d 30 (1986), which held that the failure to attach to an affidavit the papers on which an affiant relies is a

technical violation of Rule 191(a). According to the court in Beals, such technical interpretations are not favored, and technical

insufficiencies such as the failure to attach documents should be

disregarded if it appears that the affiant would be a competent

witness at trial. Beals, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 39. For the reasons set forth above, we decline to construe the attached-papers provision

in this manner. As we stated in Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 210 (1995), the rules of this court  are neither are aspirational nor are

they mere suggestions.; “T[t]hey have the force of law, and the

presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as

written.”

	Plaintiff next urges that an affidavit need not be notarized in

order to comply with the requirements of Rule 191(a). We agree. 

	We note initially that there is no express requirement in Rule

191(a) that an affidavit be notarized. As was noted in Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1993), “Supreme Court Rule 191 does not expressly require that affidavits include evidence of the

administration of an oath to the affiant.” What is required is that

the “affidavit must be signed by the deponent or his name must

appear therein as the person who took the oath.” Northrop, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 7.

	The signed affidavit at issue in Northrop recited that the affiant, “ `  ‘after being duly sworn upon [his] oath[,] depose[s] and

state[s] as follows.'’ ” Northrop, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 7. The court in Northrop held that this affidavit was “minimally sufficient, as the deponent’s name appears as one having taken an oath.” Northrop, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 7. In the instant case, Richards’ affidavit, which

was also signed, presents a similar recitation, stating that “[t]he

undersigned, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and states

as follows.” The appellate court below relied upon Northrop in concluding that Richards’ affidavit did not violate Rule 191(a),

even though the affidavit lacked notarization. We agree with this

interpretation of the rule.

	Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendants argue that in order

to comply with Rule 191(a), an affidavit must appear to have been

sworn to before an officer of the court. In support, defendants

point to decisions by our appellate court in People v. Smith, 22 Ill. App. 3d 377 (1974), and Hough v. Weber, 202 Ill. App. 3d 674 (1990). Defendants’ reliance upon these decisions is misplaced.

	Smith contains an assertion that an affidavit must appear to have been sworn to before an officer. The court in Hough cites to Smith in making essentially the same assertion. However, neither of these decisions involves Rule 191(a), which by its terms applies

to “[a]ffidavits in support of and in opposition to a motion for

summary judgment under section 2--–1005 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, affidavits submitted in connection with a motion for

involuntary dismissal under section 2--–619 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, and affidavits submitted in connection with a special

appearance to contest jurisdiction over the person, as provided by section 2--–301(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure.”4 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a).

	In Smith, the “affidavit” in question stated, allegedly falsely, that the person named in an accompanying ballot application was

“physically incapable of being present at the polls on election day.”

Smith, 22 Ill. App. 3d at 378. This affidavit was the centerpiece of an indictment charging the defendants, including the physician who

signed the affidavit, with conspiracy to commit perjury. The

affidavit did not fall within the scope of Rule 191(a). It was not

filed in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion,

nor was it submitted in connection with a special appearance to

contest jurisdiction over the person, or in connection with a section

2--–619 motion to dismiss. The same is true of Hough, which dealt with a dispute between a widow and her husband’s adult children

over the disinterment of the husband’s remains. The widow sued

to prevent the disinterment, and the trial court issued a preliminary

injunction in her favor. The defendants subsequently filed a motion

for rehearing and a motion to preserve the evidence, both of which

were denied. The affidavit in question was submitted in support of

the motion to preserve evidence. As was the case in Smith, this affidavit was not within the scope of Rule 191(a). These decisions provide no support for defendants’ argument that Rule 191(a)

requires an affidavit to be notarized. 	

	Defendants also attempt to distinguish Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1993), where, as noted, an affidavit was found

to be “minimally sufficient” under Rule 191 even though the

affidavit was not notarized. Defendants note that the affiant in

Northrop, unlike Richards in the instant case, “had already given sworn deposition testimony, but had thereafter filed a defective

affidavit.” The appellate court below rejected this same argument,

correctly concluding that “[t]he fact that Richards had not yet been

deposed is irrelevant.” As the appellate court noted, “[t]he court

[in Northrop] actually found the affidavit sufficient because the affiant had taken an oath, not because he had been deposed.” This

conclusion by the appellate court below is supported by the language used by the court in Northrop, which stated: “We nevertheless conclude that the affidavit here was minimally

sufficient, as the deponent’s name appears as one having taken an

oath.” Northrop, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 7.

	We now apply our construction of Rule 191(a) to Richards’

original affidavit, which, as previously indicated, was stricken by

the trial court. We note initially that, contrary to the trial court’s

assertion that the affidavit was “not verified,” we find that it

showed sufficient signs of verification to meet the requirements of

Rule 191(a). As discussed previously, an affidavit need not be

notarized in order to comply with Rule 191(a). Instead, it must be

signed by the affiant, or “his name must appear therein as the

person who took the oath.” Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7 (1993). Here, Richards’ affidavit was signed, and his name

appeared as one having taken an oath. Lack of notarization did not

render this affidavit insufficient.

	As to the requirement that facts be set forth with particularity

and that the affidavit consist not of conclusions but of facts

admissible in evidence, Richards’ initial affidavit does appear to be

somewhat conclusionary. However, we are not convinced that the

affidavit is as devoid of factual support as defendants maintain. In

his affidavit Richards mentions, for example, decedent’s “unstable

pelvic fracture,” which, according to Richards, Oliphant failed to

recognize in a timely fashion as the most probable source of bleeding. Richards also points to “damage to blood vessels in the

pelvic region,” opining that there should have been “appropriate

treatment to immobilize and repair” such damage.

	Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the affidavit did not have

attached “sworn or certified copies of all papers upon which the

affiant relie[d].” 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a). As noted, this requirement

is inextricably linked to the provisions requiring specific factual

support in the affidavit itself. It is not a mere technical requirement.

Were we to relax this attached-papers requirement and construe it

in conformity with the more lenient standard established in Wilson, we would be lowering the bar and allowing the avoidance of

summary judgment whenever a party is able to produce an expert

to support its position. See Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977). We are unwilling to allow the

simple production of an expert’s conclusion “to become a free pass

to trial” in such a context. Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 1993).

	Notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff asserts that the trial

court’s decisions to strike Richards’’ initial affidavit and grant the

motion for summary judgment were taken without a hearing.

Plaintiff therefore argues that she “was deprived of any opportunity

to correct deficiencies in the original affidavit before it was stricken

or, most importantly, to submit a supplemental affidavit prior to the

trial court[‘''’ s] ruling on the motion for summary judgment.”

	Plaintiff did not raise this issue in her motion to reconsider, nor

was it raised during the hearing on this motion. “Questions not

raised in the trial court cannot be argued for the first time on

appeal.” Ragan v. Columbia Mutual Insurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 355 (1998). Plaintiff therefore has waived this issue. In

addition, under the local circuit court rules, “[t]he allowance of

oral arguments upon motions [is] discretionary with the court,”

which may “decide a motion without hearing oral arguments.” Sixth 6th

Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 2.1(c) (eff. February 6, 1997). According to

these rules, it was within the court’s discretion to grant the motion

to strike the affidavit and the motion for summary judgment

without conducting a hearing.

	For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that, under any

standard of review, Richards’ initial affidavit clearly did not meet the plain-language requirements of Rule 191(a). It was therefore

not error for the trial court to strike this affidavit and grant

summary judgment in favor of defendants.

	Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in striking

Richards’ supplemental affidavit and denying plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration. We disagree.

	We note initially that while the supplemental affidavit states

that “copies of the records and depositions that [Richards]

reviewed and relied upon in support of [his] opinions are attached

hereto as Group Exhibit B,” we could find no such Group Exhibit

B attached to the supplemental affidavit in the record. This exhibit

is referred to during the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to reconsider,

but its absence from the record on appeal leaves us to speculate as

to whether the appropriate documents were attached to the

affidavit, as required by Rule 191(a).

	Plaintiff correctly notes that the judge at the hearing on the

motion to reconsider held that the supplemental affidavit was

adequate under Rule 191(a). The judge stated that “this time in the

supplemental affidavit Dr. Richards incorporates *** certain

specific facts upon which he’s relying in arriving at his opinion,”

and the judge concluded that this affidavit “would be adequate to

create a genuine issue of material fact.” However, the judge struck

the affidavit “not because it is defective under Rule 191, but

because it is not timely.” The judge stated that “[t]here is simply no

explanation, much less a good one tendered, as to why the

supplemental affidavit *** was not submitted” prior to the trial

court’s decision on the motion for summary judgment.

	In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge cited Gardner v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242 (1991), where the court stated:

			“Trial courts should not permit litigants to stand mute,

lose a motion, and then frantically gather evidentiary

material to show that the court erred in its ruling. Civil

proceedings already suffer from far too many delays, and

the interests of finality and efficiency require that the trial courts not consider such late-tendered evidentiary

material, no matter what the contents thereof may be.” (Emphasis in original.) Gardner, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 248- 49.

	The judge also noted that “there has been a chronic pattern [of

tardiness] throughout this case which has truly infected these

proceedings.” He then provided a chronology of plaintiff’s

tardinesses in the case:

			“Two Motions for Judgment were filed by the defense

because the Plaintiff had not filed amended pleadings in

compliance with the time frames set by [the trial court].

The first Motion for Judgment was filed March 22nd,

1999, and [the trial court] granted the Plaintiff an

extension of time to respond and granted that extension

*** to April 13th of 1999. Again, the Plaintiff did not file

in a timely fashion, so a second Motion for Judgment was

filed April the 15th of 1999. Notwithstanding that, [the

trial court] granted leave to file a Third Amended

Complaint on May the 11th of 1999. On June 17th of

1999 another Motion for Extension of Time was allowed

the Plaintiff [by the trial court], this time to respond to a

Motion to Strike and Dismiss. Notwithstanding the

extension of time, the response for the Motion to Strike

and Dismiss was filed eight days late. On July 21st of

1999, nevertheless[,] the Plaintiff was given leave to

amend the complaint again.. ***. On September 13th of

1999 the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Fourth

Amended Complaint, quote ‘belatedly,’ closed quotes,

was granted by [the trial court] over the objection of the

Defendant, and the Plaintiff was given to September 22nd

of 1999 to file a response to the Motions for Summary

Judgment that I am being asked to reconsider today. On

[September] 27th of 1999, [the trial court], again,

apparently ex parte, afforded the Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to September the 29th of 1999, and it was not

until October 5th of 1999 that Summary Judgment was

granted.”

The judge concluded that “the sound exercise of the Court’s

discretion dictates granting the Motion to Strike the Supplemental

Affidavit simply on the basis of timeliness or lack thereof.”

	A ruling on a motion to reconsider is within the sound

discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an

abuse of that discretion. Williams v. Covenant Medical Center, 316 Ill. App. 3d 682, 693 (2000); Higgens v. House, 288 Ill. App. 3d 543, 546 (1997). Given the circumstances in this case, and

given the sound policy reasons invoked by the trial judge, we

cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the judge to strike the supplemental affidavit. The trial court therefore did not err in

striking the supplemental affidavit and in denying the motion for

reconsideration.

	CONCLUSION

	For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Supreme

Court Rule 191(a) should be construed according to the plain and

ordinary meaning of its language. Its provisions should be adhered

to as written. In addition, an affidavit need not be notarized to

comply with Rule 191(a), so long as it is either signed by the affiant

or his name appears as one having taken an oath. We conclude

further that it was not error for the trial court to strike Richards’

original affidavit and grant the motions for summary judgment, nor

was it error for the trial court to strike Richards’ supplemental

affidavit and deny plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. We

therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court below, which

reversed the judgment of the circuit court., and affirm the judgment

of the circuit court.

	Reversed.Appellate court judgment reversed;

	circuit couert judgment affirmed. affirm

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:

	I respectfully dissent from the majority’s sanctioning of

summary judgment in this case when the trial court failed to

comply with the mandates of section 2–1005 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–1005 (West 2000)).

Specifically, the trial court granted summary judgment in this case

without the benefit of “the hearing” specifically contemplated by

the Code. See 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2000).

	Before setting out my opposition to the fundamental,

procedural flaw in this case, I note my disagreement with the

majority’s interpretation of Rule 191’s attachment requirement as

it relates to the rule’s particularity requirement. The linchpin of the

majority’s ultimate conclusion is that plaintiff’s original affidavit

failed because the plaintiff did not attach documents in support of

the affidavit. If all other matters were equal, the majority’s

conclusion on that point would be correct. I contend, however,

that all else was not equal and that the plaintiff was not afforded a

level playing field.

	The attachment issue was first raised by the defendants after

plaintiff filed the original affidavit in opposition to the summary

judgment motion. The defendants’ supplemental replies and

motions to strike alleged that the plaintiff’s affidavit was improper

and in violation of Supreme Court Rule 191. The supplemental

pleadings in reply were filed the day before the trial judge granted

summary judgment. Without affording the plaintiff any opportunity

to respond to the new objections, the next day the trial court struck

plaintiff’s affidavit. After striking plaintiff’s affidavit, the trial court

then reasoned that summary judgment for defendant was

inescapable because plaintiff had, in effect, presented no opposition

to the summary judgment motion. In short, the trial court permitted

the defendants to blind-side the plaintiff by ignoring the summary

judgment hearing requirement and depriving the plaintiff of the

right to file a counteraffidavit or otherwise respond to the

defendants’ supplemental filings.

	Section 2–1005 unequivocally contemplates a hearing on

summary judgment motions. Section 2–1005 provides that the

“opposite party may prior to or at the time of the hearing on the motion file counteraffidavits.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS

5/2–1005(c) (West 2000). If there is no hearing, how can the

deadline for filing counteraffidavits be established? Section 2–1005

plainly grants the opposing party the right to present

counteraffidavits at the time of the summary judgment hearing.

Here, the opposing party (plaintiff) did not receive the benefit of a

hearing where he might have cured any defects in the original

response and affidavit.

	The majority explains that the lack of a hearing in this case is

of no moment because the local circuit court rules permit oral

hearings on a discretionary basis and plaintiff waived the issue. I

disagree with both of these reasons. First, it is inexplicable how the

majority can countenance the usurpation of a statutory requirement

by a local circuit court rule. The procedural requirements of section

2–1005 are plain and simple, legal requirements, binding upon all

Illinois trial courts.

	Second, on the issue of waiver, we may consider issues not

properly preserved by the parties in order to ensure a just result.

Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 514 (1994). Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and

the court has a duty to construe the record strictly against the

movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1993). Moreover, summary judgment should be entered only when the

right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d at 518.

	In this case, waiver should not have been relied upon by the

majority because of the procedural irregularities that occurred

below. The trial court should have allowed plaintiff the opportunity

to respond to defendants’ supplemental objections, filed the day

before it awarded summary judgment to defendant. The trial court

procedure used here is tantamount to blindfolding the opponent

and then asking the opponent to shoot at a moving target. In

addition, while plaintiff’s arguments concerning the lack of a

hearing on the summary judgment motion were not raised in a

written motion, those arguments were raised before the trial court

by plaintiff during oral argument on the motion to reconsider.

Because plaintiff afforded the trial court the opportunity to correct

its own error, the rationale behind the waiver rule is not present.

See People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 253 (2000) (Rathje, J., specially concurring); In re Marriage of Houghton, 301 Ill. App. 3d 775, 780 (1998); see also People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 85 (1996) (application of the waiver rule is less rigid where the basis

for the objection is the trial court’s conduct).

	Furthermore, I also disagree with the majority’s decision

regarding Rule 191 because of the practical implications of the majority’s interpretation of the attachment requirement. Although

I agree with the majority that the attachment requirement is more

than a mere technicality, I do not believe that we should blindly

demand strict compliance. Rather, the attachment of documents

should be enforced with an eye towards the practicalities of

managing a court file. For instance, at oral argument, plaintiff’s

counsel clarified that the same documents relied upon by the

plaintiff’s doctor were already filed of record. Why then should we

require duplicative filings of the same documents relied upon by

multiple parties in support of or in opposition to a summary

judgment motion? A party should be permitted to comply with the

attachment provision by incorporating by reference the

identification of the pertinent papers.

	Finally, on a minor point of reference by the majority, I also

respectfully object to the notion that a litigant’s right to trial could

be equated with a “ ‘free pass to trial’ ” (Sslip op. at 16, quoting

Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir. 1993)). If anything, the “free pass” in this case is the unwarranted grant of

summary judgment and the defendants’ pass from trial. Every

litigant is entitled to a trial and that right may only be denied by

summary judgment when the right of the moving party is clear and

free from doubt. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d at 518.

	Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this separate opinion,

I respectfully dissent.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.