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The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 07-2298

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Derrick Wayne Walker, *

*

Appellant. *

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Submitted: November 13, 2007

Filed: January 29, 2008

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Before RILEY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

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RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Derrick Wayne Walker (Walker) appeals the sentence imposed by the district

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 following the revocation of his supervised release. For the reasons stated

below, we affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

Neither party challenges the background facts leading to Walker’s revocation

of his supervised release. The only disputed issue is whether the district court is

authorized to impose an additional term of supervised release. Thus, we briefly state

the relevant facts.

In 1996, a jury convicted Walker of bank robbery (Count I) and use of a firearm

during a robbery (Count II), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 924(c),

respectively. As a result, Walker was sentenced to 105 months of imprisonment (45

months for Count I and 60 months for Count II) and three years of supervised release.

The presentence report (PSR) adopted by the district court classified the bank robbery

as a class C felony and the firearm violation as a class D felony.

After serving his sentence, Walker was released from prison in September 2003

and began to serve his term of supervised release. However, in December 2003,

Walker robbed a fast food restaurant. In state court, Walker pled guilty to robbery

charges and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment.

After his release from the Arkansas Department of Corrections, Walker was

transferred to the custody of the United States Marshals. In May 2007, following a

revocation hearing on his 1996 supervised release sentence, the district court found

Walker had violated the conditions of his supervised release and then sentenced

Walker to 24 months of imprisonment and 12 months of supervised release. Arguing

the district court is not authorized to sentence him to a post-revocation term of

additional supervised release, Walker appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the legality of Walker’s revocation sentence de novo, a matter that

turns on the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3583. See United States v. Palmer, 380 F.3d

395, 396 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations omitted). If a defendant violates the
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conditions of his supervised release, a district court, under § 3583, is permitted “to

impose both imprisonment and a new term of supervised release if the new term does

‘not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that

resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that

was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.’” Id. at 397 (citing 18 U.S.C. §

3583(h)) (emphasis in original). The district court “may require imprisonment for ‘all

or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that

resulted in such term of supervised release.’” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3))

(emphasis in original). Upon revocation, “[i]f a sentence is imposed ‘within the

bounds of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e),’ we will not disturb it absent an abuse of discretion.”

United States v. Holt, 130 F.App’x 837, 838-39 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States

v. Holmes, 283 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2002)).

Walker does not dispute his sentence of 24 months of imprisonment, but

contends the district court erred in imposing an additional 12-month term of

supervised release. We find the district court committed no error. Walker’s sentence

of 24 months of imprisonment plus a term of 12 months of supervised release does not

exceed the term of supervised release authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583. Walker’s

underlying offenses were class C and D felonies, and a term of supervised release of

up to three years is authorized by § 3583(b)(2). Therefore, when the district court

revoked Walker’s previous term of supervised release, the court did not abuse its

discretion by imposing a three year sentence composed of 24 months of imprisonment

and 12 months of supervised release.

Under § 3583, Walker may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a

further term of supervised release which, in the aggregate, do “not exceed the term of

supervised release authorized by the statute for the offense that resulted in the original

term of supervised release.” Palmer, 380 F.3d at 397. Walker’s revocation sentence

clearly does not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the

offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, that is, three years.
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At the revocation hearing, there was some confusion as to whether the district

court was considering Walker’s 1996 conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as a class

A felony rather than a class D felony as stated in the 1996 PSR. This confusion

prompted Walker to argue the district court previously adopted the PSR and did not

have jurisdiction to change the classification of the § 924(c) offense. We do not need

to address this argument because (1) the district court did not alter the classification

of the firearm felony for purposes of Walker’s revocation sentence; and (2) the district

court, under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), was empowered to impose a 12-month term of

supervised release in addition to a term of imprisonment regardless of the felony

classification. 

III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in sentencing Walker to 24 months of

imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release. Thus, we affirm

Walker’s sentence.

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