1 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont 

_________________ 

NO. 09-17-00177-CR 

NO. 09-17-00178-CR 

NO. 09-17-00179-CR 

NO. 09-17-00180-CR 

NO. 09-17-00181-CR 

_________________ 

HERMAN EDWARD HOFFMAN, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

________________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 

Montgomery County, Texas 

Trial Cause Nos. 15-307438, 15-307425, 15-307422, 15-307041, 15-307040 

________________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

The State charged Herman Edward Hoffman (Herman) in five separate causes 

of cruelty to livestock animals, alleging he failed to provide necessary food, water, 
2 

or care arising out of his treatment of over two hundred horses.

1, 2 See Tex. Penal 

Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2) (West 2016). A jury convicted Herman in all five causes. 

See id. The trial judge assessed punishment of one year in the Montgomery County 

Jail for each case, to be served concurrently, and a $4,000 fine in each case. Herman 

appeals his convictions. 

In four issues, Herman argues: (1) the judgments should be reversed for a new 

trial with separate trial counsel because appellants’ trial counsel was ineffective; (2) 

the judgments should be reversed based on Brady and Michael Morton Act 

violations; (3) the judgments should be reversed and an acquittal entered because the 

evidence is factually insufficient in each case; and (4) the judgments should be 

reversed and dismissed with prejudice because appellants were prosecuted twice for 

the same offenses violating the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and 

Texas Constitutions. We overrule all issues and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 1

 His wife, Kathleen Hoffman, was also charged and convicted for cruelty to 

livestock animals arising out of the same instances. They were tried together and 

filed a joint brief raising identical issues on appeal. We address Kathleen Hoffman’s 

appeal in a separate opinion. 

2

 Mr. Hoffman and his wife were initially charged with twenty separate counts 

of cruelty to livestock animals by failing to provide necessary food, water, or care; 

however, the State proceeded with five counts for purposes of expediency. 
3 

I. Factual Background 

The State seized 207 horses from Kathleen and Herman Hoffman. Before the 

criminal prosecution, the Hoffmans were subject to civil forfeiture proceedings in 

Justice Court, which judgment was appealed to the County Court at Law for a trial 

de novo pursuant to Texas Health and Safety Code section 821.025. See Tex. Health 

& Safety Code Ann. §§ 821.023, 821.025 (West Supp. 2018).3

 The Justice Court 

determined they treated all seized animals cruelly, ordered the animals surrendered, 

and ordered the Hoffmans to pay $150,000.00 for costs associated with the care of 

the animals. The County Court at Law issued almost identical findings but ordered 

the Hoffmans to pay $485,331.68 in costs incurred by the SPCA for housing and 

caring for the animals. The Hoffmans were subsequently prosecuted together and 

convicted in five causes each of the criminal offense of cruelty to livestock animals 

under Texas Penal Code section 42.09(a)(2). See Tex. Penal Code § 42.09(a)(2). The 

criminal convictions are the basis of these appeals. 

The Hoffmans resided at property on League Line Road in Montgomery 

County, Texas. Herman and his wife owned around fifteen acres and leased an 

additional twenty-five acres adjacent to their property, or around forty acres 

 3

 We cite the current version of the statute as it does not affect the outcome of 

these appeals. 
4 

altogether. In addition to 207 horses,4

 the Hoffmans kept dairy cows and goats on 

the forty acres.5

 

Herman had extensive experience raising and breeding horses.6

 Herman 

graduated from Purdue University in 1975, majoring in farm and business 

management, with a minor in economics and a minor in animal science. Herman 

indicated he and his wife’s quarter horse business began in 1984 and 1985. Herman 

testified he purchased animals from across the country and put a “foundation herd” 

together of the closest blood to famous horses. 

A deputy constable from the livestock division, Gordon Welch, indicated his 

department began receiving complaints about the body weight and living conditions 

of the Hoffmans’ horses in 2014.7

 Between 2014 and June 2015, the deputy 

constables received and responded to many complaints regarding the Hoffmans’ 

horses. Welch testified they gave the Hoffmans recommendations for improving the 

 4

 State’s Exhibit 233 was a video played for the jury in which Herman 

Hoffman estimated they had 190 horses on the property, fifty cows, and twenty 

goats. 

5

 None of the Hoffmans’ other animals were seized. 

6

 Kathleen also had extensive experience with horses, which we address in a 

separate opinion. 

7

 Deputy Welch testified he met the Hoffmans approximately five years prior 

to trial when one of their bulls escaped. At the time, the Hoffmans gave Deputy 

Welch a tour of their property where Welch observed eighty to one hundred horses 

in good health. 
5 

horses’ condition by “stepping up” the feeding program and ensuring they wormed 

the horses. The deputy suggested Herman and Kathleen were both in control of the 

horses, and the recommendations were directed to them both. The deputy constables 

assigned to the livestock division worked with the Hoffmans for several months 

before issuing a warning on October 10, 2014. Deputy Welch circled the definition 

of cruelty indicating “fails unreasonably to provide necessary food, water, or care 

for a livestock animal in the person’s custody” on the written warning and directed 

the Hoffmans to seek medical assistance for the horses from a licensed veterinarian. 

Welch wanted a vet to examine the animals and make recommendations because he 

felt the Hoffmans’ feeding program was inadequate due to the large number of 

horses in the pens, and the weaker horses were not able to get adequate feed. 

According to Welch, veterinarian Dr. David Husfeld visited the Hoffmans’ 

property and evaluated the horses. Dr. Husfeld opined in a letter dated October 27, 

2014, the “condition of this group of horses ranges from [] good to very bad.” Dr. 

Husfeld suggested the remedy was “more and better feeding” along with a “good 

parasite control program[.]” Dr. Husfeld also suggested “the thinner animals ideally 

need to be separated to [feed.]” 

The deputy constables received more complaints about the horses’ condition 

and made additional visits to the Hoffmans’ property where they observed a further 
6 

decline of the animals. On June 23, 2015, Deputy Welch, his partner, and an 

investigator with the District Attorney’s office went to the Hoffmans’ property. 

Based on their visual observations, they obtained a search warrant for the property 

on June 24, 2015. As a result of those findings, they also secured and executed a 

seizure warrant. 

At trial, several witnesses who participated in the seizure described the 

deplorable conditions. The participating Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 

Animals (SPCA) barn supervisor testified her first impression of the property was it 

appeared to be a “kill pen.” She also observed many skinny, distressed horses. The 

SPCA barn supervisor also testified there was no grass for the horses and no place 

for them to graze. 

Because of the large number of animals and the logistics of dealing with a 

seizure of that magnitude, Montgomery County required help from the SPCA. 

Deputy Welch and other State witnesses suggested the Hoffmans’ horses were 

unaccustomed to handling, so it took around two weeks to round them up, give them 

medical treatment, worm them, and transport them to another location. The SPCA 

barn supervisor assisting with the seizure described horses with rain rot8

, bones 

showing, and overgrown hooves. 

 8

 “Rain rot” is an infection of the skin. 
7 

Dr. Amy Crum, an SPCA veterinarian, went to the Hoffman property to assess 

the overall situation and triage horses in need of emergency veterinary care. Dr. 

Crum testified her initial impression of the herd was they were in very poor condition 

with nutritional and hoof care problems, respiratory disease, infected wounds, and 

many other issues. Dr. Crum testified she was concerned some animals’ deaths were 

imminent, so they removed eighteen of those horses to the Houston SPCA for 

immediate care. According to Dr. Crum, the horses lacked basic veterinary care and 

husbandry, nutrition, and foot care—things horse owners should provide. Of the 

horses requiring emergency veterinary care, several were emaciated and in danger 

of not being able to support their own weight, while others had debilitating wounds. 

Dr. Crum explained how they tracked and cared for the seized horses by assigning 

them a unique six number identification and connected the records by using that 

number. 

State witnesses, including Dr. Crum, discussed how they used the Henneke 

Body Conditioning Score (BCS) for horses. That scale provides a score ranging from 

1 to 9 for evaluating a horse’s body condition. A score of 1 means a horse is 

extremely emaciated, and a score of 9 suggests an obese horse. Dr. Crum and the 

SPCA barn supervisor testified an ideal BCS is 5. 
8 

Several State witnesses discussed appropriate horse care and husbandry 

standards at trial. These witnesses testified horses required regular hoof care by a 

farrier, including trimming, and neglecting a horse’s hooves could result in laminitis 

and other permanent lameness. Dr. Crum testified this was particularly important for 

confined horses that had no opportunity to run or naturally wear down their hooves. 

Dr. Crum also testified that horses required regular dental care. Failure to 

periodically “float” or file down a horse’s teeth, results in the teeth growing to sharp 

points and impeding the animal’s ability to eat. 

Witnesses testified about the need for a proper parasite control program, and 

evidence revealed a veterinarian made that recommendation to the Hoffmans before 

the seizure of the animals. Witnesses also discussed the need to seek prompt 

veterinary attention for horses with wounds or for animals that collapsed. Evidence 

established when there is no grass readily available for horses, an owner should 

regularly feed hay and grain to provide adequate nutrition. Finally, to ensure weaker, 

thinner animals had an opportunity to feed adequately, evidence showed they should 

be separated from the rest of the herd. 

Montgomery County seized 207 horses. Dr. Crum testified that around 

twenty-five percent of the Hoffmans’ horses were of an adequate weight. The SPCA 

barn supervisor testified thirty seized horses could not be saved and were euthanized, 
9 

and three horses died unassisted. Some horses had been adopted, and about eight 

were available for adoption. Other horses were not ready to be adopted, and the 

SPCA continued to work with those. 

 Before trial, the State revealed it was going forward with the criminal 

prosecutions against the Hoffmans for five of the horses and elected to consolidate 

the trials of Herman and Kathleen. The criminal trial began on May 15, 2017, and 

the jury convicted the Hoffmans on all counts on May 18, 2017. 

II. Analysis 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Asserted as Herman’s third issue, we address his sufficiency complaint first. 

Herman argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support his convictions for 

cruelty to livestock animals.9 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2). When an 

appellant raises a claim of insufficiency, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks 

 9

 Although Herman complains of factual insufficiency, for years, Texas has 

recognized the legal sufficiency standard as outlined in Jackson v. Virginia as the 

only standard reviewing courts should employ in determining whether the evidence 

is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 

893, 895, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
10 

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307 (1979)) (concluding the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a 

reviewing court should apply” when examining the sufficiency of the evidence); 

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We look to “all of the 

evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or 

inadmissible.” Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) 

(citations omitted). The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and weight 

to be given to their testimony. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2016). Juries may draw multiple reasonable inferences from facts so long as each 

inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. Accordingly, we must 

defer to the jury’s determinations of weight and credibility of the witnesses. See 

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. In conducting a sufficiency 

review, an appellate court considers “‘events occurring before, during[,] and after 

the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant [that] show 

an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.’” Hooper, 214 

S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1985)). 

 The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Herman 

intentionally or knowingly failed to provide necessary food, water, or care for each 
11 

of the livestock animals in his custody listed in the complaints for a jury to find him 

guilty in all causes. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2). “Necessary food, water, 

or care” is defined by the statute to mean “food, water, or care provided to the extent 

required to maintain the livestock animal in a state of good health.” Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 42.09(b)(6) (West 2016). 

 The evidence here was overwhelming that Herman and his wife both failed to 

provide necessary food or care as needed to maintain each of the five horses in good 

health. See id. The Hoffmans focus solely on the evidence of the horses’ 

malnourishment as being insufficient. They argue that without certain blood tests the 

State cannot establish the animals were malnourished. While we disagree with 

Herman’s argument the evidence was insufficient to find the horses were 

malnourished, there was sufficient evidence about the lack of care for each one of 

these animals. Veterinary records revealed and testimony at trial supported each of 

the animals’ hooves had been neglected, and they all suffered from parasites. 

Moreover, four of the animals suffered from significant untreated health problems 

and wounds. 

1. Evidence Regarding Horse 287593 

Horse 287593 was an older palomino mare. Evidence revealed she was 

extremely emaciated and had significant dental problems. The State admitted 
12 

photographs depicting a horse with protruding hip bones, shoulder bones, a sunken 

face, and vertebrae showing. Evidence revealed the horse had a BCS of 1, indicative 

of extreme emaciation. 

Testimony from the SPCA barn supervisor suggested a horse would not be in 

poor body condition solely because of its age, and if an older horse was provided 

with proper nutrition, it should not look skinny. Dr. Crum testified the horse was 

severely emaciated, suffered from muscle wasting, and completely lacked muscle 

due to starvation. Dr. Crum testified the horse’s dental problems rendered her unable 

to chew food, and the horse lacked dental care for an extended period. Kathleen and 

Herman testified the horse had been kicked in the jaw, resulting in broken mandibles 

years before, and a veterinarian told them to “leave it alone.” 

Dr. Crum stated the horse was not in good health when seized, did not have 

adequate food, and had been suffering for months. Testimony and veterinary records 

revealed the mare had gastrointestinal parasites, particularly strongyle ova, which 

Dr. Crum testified were easily treatable with over-the-counter medications and a 

basic part of horse care. Dr. Crum described attempts to provide the mare soft food 

in the form of mash and intravenous fluids, but even after supporting her with a sling, 

they could not keep her standing, so she was humanely euthanized. 
13 

2. Evidence Regarding Horse 287598 

 The evidence for horse 287598 revealed he had a BCS of 4 and extremely 

overgrown hooves. Dr. Crum and the SPCA barn supervisor testified the horse’s 

hooves had not been trimmed in a very long time, and the left front hoof was 

extended into an “elf shoe” shape. Photographs admitted by the State depict the hoof 

Dr. Crum described. Dr. Crum conveyed this was very abnormal, the hoof was 

egregiously overgrown, and it took months for the horse’s hoof to become so 

overgrown. Dr. Crum estimated it had been months to years since the horse received 

farrier care. Dr. Crum also testified an animal kept in a stall requires more hoof care 

because they do not wear their hooves down naturally. Dr. Crum described the 

importance of hoof care and if neglected, how a horse’s hooves could lead to other 

serious health problems, including laminitis. The State’s evidence and testimony 

revealed the horse suffered from laminitis. The SPCA barn supervisor testified 

laminitis stems from a separation of the hoof wall from the coffin bone, which is 

incredibly painful for the animal. Dr. Crum testified the horse was in pain, as well.

In addition to severe hoof problems and lameness, Dr. Crum revealed this horse had 

parasites, pointy teeth that had not been floated in months, and he had not been fed 

adequate food. Dr. Crum suggested they euthanized him because of his poor longterm prognosis. 
14 

 At trial, Herman attributed the horse’s overgrown hooves to bad genes and 

asserted because the horse was lame, he was more comfortable with a long hoof than 

a short hoof. 

3. Evidence Regarding Horse 287609 

 Trial testimony and evidence revealed horse 287609 suffered from a 

significant wound to a distal limb containing granulation tissue and pus, and the 

horse had difficulty bearing weight on that limb.10 Dr. Crum testified the horse 

suffered from the wound for at least several weeks, and a veterinarian should be 

involved in the care of a wound that severe. Dr. Crum also testified she would 

recommend surgical debridement, cleaning, and bandaging before closing the 

wound. An x-ray of the horse’s leg was admitted as State’s Exhibit 147. Dr. Crum 

said the x-ray revealed infection had spread to the bone. This condition limited 

treatment options going forward, and due to the animal’s prolonged suffering, they 

decided to humanely euthanize it. In addition to the leg wound, the horse had 

parasites, cracked hooves, and bad teeth. Dr. Crum estimated it had been without 

proper dental care for months. 

 10 Evidence suggested the wound was consistent with wire being wrapped 

around the leg. 
15 

4. Evidence Regarding Horse 287610 

 Evidence and testimony revealed horse 287610 had a BCS of 2. State’s 

Exhibits 152 through 156 reveal this animal was extremely emaciated. Dr. Crum 

testified the horse had gastrointestinal parasites, had not been getting proper food, 

and was very weak because he was so emaciated. Dr. Crum suggested horse 287610 

was about 400 pounds underweight, and it would take many months for him to 

become that emaciated. Veterinary records admitted at trial are in accord with this 

testimony. Dr. Crum stated the horse did not have healthy hooves and was without 

proper farrier care for at least several months. Dr. Crum testified she did not expect 

horse 287610 to survive when she first saw him, but they administered intravenous 

fluids to the horse for several days, and thereafter, he only required basic care and 

needed to eat. 

Testimony revealed this horse collapsed during the seizure after running for 

twenty or thirty minutes while they sought to load him and was unable to stand until 

they administered intravenous fluids. Dr. Crum suggested it is an emergency 

situation when a horse cannot stand. 

At trial, Herman contradicted this testimony and claimed people ran the horse 

for two-and-a-half hours during the seizure. Herman testified the horse had fought, 
16 

played, and ran with the rest of the herd earlier in the day. Herman also suggested 

the horse was the dominant male and was always thin. 

5. Evidence Regarding Horse 287611 

The State admitted photographs of horse 287611, a sorrel mare, as Exhibits 

166 through 185. The images depict a sorrel mare significantly underweight with 

“rain rot.” The photographs also reveal several deep wounds and rotting flesh over 

the horse’s left hip. Veterinary records and Dr. Crum’s testimony revealed the mare 

had a BCS of 2 and was severely emaciated. The horse had bad hooves and parasites. 

Dr. Crum testified the horse had large and chronic lacerations over both her hips 

draining pus, suggesting they had been there for at least several weeks; the skin was 

also dying from prolonged infection. Dr. Crum testified a prudent owner should have 

called a veterinarian to clean appropriately and debride the wound, provide 

antibiotics and pain management. Dr. Crum conveyed the injuries were painful, and 

the horse was lame in the rear limbs. Dr. Crum testified the horse was not 

accustomed to human interaction, would not tolerate restraint, and oral sedatives had 

little effect. Dr. Crum revealed the horse was euthanized because it was determined 

to be a danger. 

Herman testified horse 287611 was wounded when she became wedged 

between two trees. Herman contradicted the testimony of Dr. Crum and stated it was 
17 

protocol to leave the wound like that, and it would have healed in six months. 

Herman testified there was nothing at all inherently dangerous about the wound. 

6. Other Evidence 

The Hoffmans testified severe weather in the spring of 2015 precluded 

deliveries of hay and feed to their property. Herman testified horses “take care of 

themselves[,]” and he did everything he could for the health and welfare of the horses 

given the circumstances. Kathleen testified she did the same and described the 

lengths she went to caring for the animals, despite her having serious heart problems. 

The Hoffmans both testified they divided the ownership of the animals, where 

Herman had the horses, and Kathleen owned the cattle. Kathleen testified Herman 

was the actual owner of the horses in June 2015. Testimony revealed this was done 

as part of a business arrangement. Ownership is not an element of the offense, 

however. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(2). Rather, the critical inquiry is 

whether the animal was in the person’s custody. See id. “Custody” is defined by the 

statute as including the “responsibility for the health, safety, and welfare of a 

livestock animal subject to the person’s care and control, regardless of ownership of 

the livestock animal.” Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(b)(3) (West 2016) (emphasis 

added). Testimony from employees revealed Herman and Kathleen both had control 

of the horses. Vicki Henley testified she observed Kathleen heavily involved in the 
18 

care of the horses and directing employees on how to care for them. Deputy Welch 

also testified he understood both defendants were in control of the horses. 

Of the five horses included in the complaints, only Horse 287610 survived. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude 

the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

every element to support the jury’s verdict finding Herman Hoffman guilty of cruelty 

to livestock animals for each of the State’s complaints. Thus, we overrule his third 

issue. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Brady/Michael Morton Act Violations 

We will address Herman’s first and second issues together, as they were both 

raised in his motion for new trial. 

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of 

discretion standard. See Webb v. State, 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); 

Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Lewis v. State, 911 

S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Likewise, we review a trial court’s denial of a 

motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See Webb, 232 S.W.3d at 112; Archie 

v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We cannot substitute our 

judgment for the trial court’s; rather, we determine whether the trial court was 

arbitrary or unreasonable in its decision. See Holden, 201 S.W.3d at 763. We must 
19 

uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. 

See Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 699 (citing Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2004)). Mistrial is an extraordinary remedy and only appropriate for 

highly prejudicial and incurable errors. Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 648 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2000). 

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

 In his first issue, Herman argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

His complaints against trial counsel fall into two main categories: (1) failure to 

obtain additional discovery; and (2) a conflict between Herman and his wife 

rendered the attorney representing them both ineffective. 

First, he asserts trial counsel failed to “effectively obtain discovery from the 

State and its agents[.]” Herman points to trial counsel’s inability to obtain blood test 

results, complete records of the seizing agency, the Hoffmans’ seized medical and 

feeding records, and photos taken by witnesses, which would have been favorable 

evidence for his defense. Herman contends that counsel failed to properly enforce 

court orders to produce documents and he failed to subpoena documents needed for 

expert analysis or otherwise retain a defense expert. However, our review of the 

record shows that the discovery requests and subpoenas of which they complain 
20 

were apparently issued improperly and were subsequently quashed while Herman 

and Kathleen were defending themselves pro se. 

 The Hoffmans argue Kathleen was more egregiously affected by the 

ineffective assistance of counsel because of a conflict of interest.11 Particularly, they 

assert on appeal her best defense, considering her debilitating medical condition, 

would have been to blame Herman for neglecting the horses, but trial counsel failed 

to assert such a defense. Nonetheless, Herman has failed to advance a logical 

argument on appeal that he was harmed in any way by counsel’s failure to adopt a 

trial strategy to blame him for neglecting the horses. The Hoffmans moved for a new 

trial. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. While trial counsel testified 

at the hearing, no testimony was elicited from him regarding his trial strategy. At the 

hearing, the Hoffmans did not subpoena any of the witnesses identified as favorable 

defense witnesses or provide affidavits to show what each witness would have 

testified to or introduce records they alleged contained exculpatory evidence. 

 “An appellate court looks to the totality of the representation and the particular 

circumstances of each case in evaluating the effectiveness of counsel.” Thompson v. 

State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Ex Parte Felton, 815 

 11 We note, however, Kathleen and Herman filed a joint brief in this appeal. 
21 

S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). To establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel, an appellant must meet a two-pronged test: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that 

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant 

by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing 

that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 

53, 55–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). “Unless [an] appellant can prove both prongs, an 

appellate court must not find counsel’s representation to be ineffective.” Lopez v. 

State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Allegations of ineffectiveness must be shown in 

the record, and the record must affirmatively establish the alleged ineffectiveness. 

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct “[fell] 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Jackson v. State, 877 

S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see 

also Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 

As for a defendant being prejudiced by a trial attorney’s deficient 

performance, courts have explained “[t]o show prejudice, ‘[t]he defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
22 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” 

Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

a) Discovery 

Assuming without deciding that Herman met his burden under the first prong 

and shown that trial counsel’s representation was deficient, Herman has failed to 

meet the requisite second prong. Herman focuses on trial counsel’s “failure to 

obtain” certain discovery, including but not limited to records, necropsy reports, 

witness interviews, blood test results, and other documents. Beyond asserting the 

foregoing information was necessary to his defense, Herman made no showing that 

trial counsel’s failure to obtain the evidence would have changed the outcome at trial 

or that it prejudiced him in any way. The Hoffmans complain that the State failed to 

produce blood test results of each of the five horses which they assert are necessary 

to accurately assess a BCS score for each horse. The evidence, though, would only 

go to the weight of the evidence offered by the State’s expert witnesses and not to 

the admissibility of their opinions. The record shows that requested records were 

produced electronically by the State. The trial court held any information unrelated 

to the five specific horses at issue was irrelevant. While the SPCA and the State 

produced requested documentation in their possession or subject to their control, 
23 

some documentation the Hoffmans requested was shown not to exist. Thus, Herman 

failed to show a different outcome would have resulted. Moreover, although Herman 

claims he was unable to interview certain witnesses, he failed to call any of these 

witnesses to testify at the hearing on the motion for new trial. So, there was no 

indication of what they would have testified to at trial, much less whether it would 

have been favorable to Herman. The Hoffmans made no showing that but for 

counsel’s deficient representation, there would have been another outcome at trial. 

See id. The record reveals the Hoffmans conducted much of the discovery pro se, 

and even after the trial court warned them on October 26, 2016, of its intent to set 

the matter preferentially, they delayed in retaining trial counsel until sometime after 

January 24, 2017, for a trial that began on May 15, 2017, which would have 

significantly impacted any attorney’s ability to retain experts or pursue additional 

discovery. 

b) Dual Representation and Conflict 

Herman and Kathleen were tried jointly and represented by the same retained 

counsel.12 In some situations, the same attorney’s representation of multiple 

 12 It has not been lost on this Court that Herman and Kathleen are represented 

by shared retained appellate counsel. Prior to filing a brief, they moved to 

consolidate their appeals and subsequently filed a joint brief, which may be viewed 

as an attempt to invite error by advancing a claim of conflict of interest. Because we 

find their claim of a conflict of interest to be wholly without merit, the Court opted 
24 

defendants in the same trial may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Pina v. 

State, 127 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing 

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1978); James v. State, 763 S.W.2d 

776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). “However, multiple representation is not per se 

violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” James, 763 

S.W.2d at 778. A defendant who does not object at trial to multiple representation 

must show actual and not merely speculative conflict of interest before an appellate 

court will reverse. Id. at 778–79; see also Routier v. State, 112 S.W.3d 554, 581–82 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance based on a 

conflict of interest, Herman must show (1) his counsel was burdened by an actual 

conflict of interest, and (2) the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of 

counsel’s performance. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–50 (1980); 

Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). “[A]n actual conflict 

of interest exists when ‘one defendant stands to gain significantly by counsel 

adducing probative evidence or advancing plausible arguments that are damaging to 

 

not to strike the brief for violating Texas Rules of Professional Conduct 1.06, 

necessitating briefs from new and separate counsel on appeal. See Tex. Disciplinary 

Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 1.06, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G., 

app. A (West 2013). 
25 

the cause of a co-defendant[.]’” Routier, 112 S.W.3d at 584 (quoting James, 763 

S.W.2d at 779). 

Although the Hoffmans argue in their brief Kathleen’s best defense would 

have been to blame Herman for neglect of the horses, the existence of a better 

defense for one party does not rise to the level of an actual conflict. Herman and his 

wife employed the joint trial strategy that elements beyond their control prevented 

them from getting food to the animals. Herman testified there were semi-loads of 

hay and grain coming in twice a week. They argued torrential rains blocked eighteen 

wheelers from delivering hay and feed to the livestock. They also sought to argue 

there was nothing wrong with their animals, blaming overgrown hooves on bad 

genetics, rationalizing that emaciated horses had always been that way, and 

testifying emaciated horses had been fed adequately. Like the facts in James, the 

Hoffmans’ strategy at trial was that neither was culpable. See 763 S.W.2d at 780. 

Moreover, neither Herman nor Kathleen tried to incriminate the other in any way at 

trial, consistent with their joint defense. See id. Kathleen testified at trial they both 

did the best they could. Herman likewise testified he did everything he could for the 

health and welfare of the horses given the circumstances. At trial, Herman confirmed 

he felt that the general population’s expectation for the condition of these horses was 

unreasonable. The acknowledgment of a hypothetically superior trial strategy on 
26 

appeal and speculative conflicts does not retroactively create an actual conflict at 

trial. Id.

Additionally, although trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for 

new trial, no testimony was elicited from him to develop the record to support 

Herman’s claim of conflict of interest or otherwise explain counsel’s strategy at trial. 

Separate counsel for each co-defendant might well have proven much more 

damaging than the strategy in effect adopted by trial counsel. Any attempt to 

impeach the other or place blame on the other spouse would have likely elicited 

specific, damaging, and prejudicial facts. We hold that this record fails to reflect any 

conflict of interest on the part of retained counsel. 

2. Brady/Michael Morton Act Violations 

 In his second issue, Herman complains the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for mistrial and motion for new trial based on Brady and Michael Morton 

Act violations. 

In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held a defendant’s 

due process rights are violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable 

to an accused where the evidence is material, regardless of the prosecution’s good 

faith or bad faith. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Before an appellate court can find 

reversible error for a Brady violation, the defendant must show: (1) the State failed 
27 

to disclose evidence, regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith; (2) the 

evidence withheld is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence is material, i.e., 

there is a reasonable probability had the evidence been disclosed, it would have 

changed the outcome of the trial. Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002). “‘The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might 

have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not 

establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976)); see also Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 812 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Moreover, the Brady rule does not apply when the 

defendant was already aware of the information. Hayes v. State, 85 S.W.3d 809, 815 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Havard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195, 204 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1989)). 

The Michael Morton Act is codified in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

Article 39.14. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14 (West 2017). It requires

the State, upon request, to disclose certain items to a defendant. See id. art. 39.14(a); 

Glover v. State, 496 S.W.3d 812, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. 

ref’d). If the State has not received a request, it only has an affirmative duty to 

disclose exculpatory information. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(h); Glover, 

496 S.W.3d at 815. 
28 

Here, much of the evidence the Hoffmans complained of was found by the 

trial court to be irrelevant or not in existence. The trial court explained 

documentation and records for animals seized that were not the subject of the 

criminal trial were not relevant. The Hoffmans contended those records would have 

shown the large remainder of the herd was healthy. But such records were not shown 

to have any bearing on the condition of the five horses in the criminal complaints. 

This is particularly true given the fact law enforcement officials and a veterinarian 

of the Hoffmans’ choice instructed the Hoffmans to separate the weaker and thinner 

horses from the herd to ensure they had adequate access to feed. Further, with respect 

to evidence of the five specific horses at issue, the State explained in pretrial hearings 

necropsies were not performed on all the animals and therefore, the documents being 

requested did not exist. 

Dr. Crum testified at trial that the interpretation of the blood tests was included 

in the veterinary records, but the full blood work was stored in a database. The 

medical records summarizing the blood tests revealed the animals were 

malnourished, which certainly could not be considered exculpatory. The State 

maintained they provided the veterinary records on the five horses at issue, and at 

trial, Dr. Crum acknowledged some of the records contained mistakes. When 

defense counsel moved to strike all the veterinary records because they were 
29 

“inherently unreliable on critical issues[,]” the trial court overruled the objection and 

noted it went to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence. While the 

Hoffmans complained about the missing blood test results, the discovery they 

propounded did not specifically request those results. The State’s duty to provide 

information under the Michael Morton Act is only triggered upon a timely request. 

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 39.14(a). Under Brady and the Michael Morton 

Act, the State has only an affirmative duty to produce exculpatory information. See 

id. art. 39.14(h); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Hoffmans’ suspicions the State had not 

produced evidence does not establish its materiality. See Hampton, 86 S.W.3d at 

612. For these reasons, we conclude the Hoffmans have not met their burden of 

establishing the materiality of the evidence, that it was exculpatory, or that such 

evidence existed. 

The Hoffmans also complain of records seized from their home pursuant to a 

warrant, specifically veterinary records and feeding records. They argue these 

records are exculpatory and would prove they provided proper care and food to the 

horses. At trial, Herman testified a vet recommended they not perform surgery on 

Horse 287593’s broken jaw. Herman also testified two different veterinarians 

examined the leg of Horse 287609 on three or four occasions and advised the 

Hoffmans to spray it with a water hose, allowing it to heal from the inside out. 
30 

According to Herman, the vet told them there was not “a thing you can do about it.” 

The Hoffmans did not call the veterinarians that allegedly gave this advice to testify 

at trial nor did they subpoena records to support these claims. If the records Herman 

described existed, the Hoffmans knew about them. Brady applies when there is 

information the prosecution is aware of, but a defendant is not. Hayes, 85 S.W.3d at 

815. Thus, Brady would not apply to these records. 

 The Hoffmans repeatedly argue the State “singled out” five horses in bad 

shape, and since the animals were in a herd, they should be able to show the 

condition of the other horses in the herd as proof they were not guilty of cruelty. At 

multiple pretrial hearings, the trial court ruled evidence about the condition of the 

other seized animals was not relevant. This included medical records, blood tests, 

and necropsy reports. The trial court instructed the Hoffmans that they could 

subpoena any necropsy reports the Hoffmans maintained were missing or that the 

State did not have in its possession, directly from the SPCA, which they failed to do. 

 From the record before us, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Herman’s motion for mistrial or motion for new trial. We 

overrule Herman’s first and second issues. 
31 

C. Double Jeopardy 

 Herman argues in his fourth issue he was prosecuted twice for the same 

offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Texas 

Constitutions. The United States Constitution provides, “No person shall . . . be 

subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S. 

CONST. amend. V. The Texas Constitution provides, “No person, for the same 

offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty; nor shall a person be again 

put upon trial for the same offense after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent 

jurisdiction.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 14. 

 Initially, we must determine whether jeopardy previously attached at the 

justice court hearing before determining whether Herman’s subsequent prosecution 

for animal cruelty was barred by double jeopardy. See State v. Almendarez, 301 

S.W.3d 886, 890 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.) (examining prosecution 

for cruelty to livestock animals pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 42.09 

following a civil seizure trial under Chapter 821 of the Health and Safety Code); see 

also State v. Moreno, 294 S.W.3d 594, 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explaining 

“jeopardy must have attached initially” before double jeopardy protections apply). 

 Courts have previously examined the statutory scheme involving forfeiture of 

animals through civil proceedings and subsequent criminal prosecutions or vice 
32 

versa. See Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 890. The statutory scheme under Chapter 821 

of the Health and Safety Code is civil in nature. See id. at 891; Chambers v. State, 

261 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting the State filed 

“animal cruelty case pursuant to [C]hapter 821 of the [H]ealth and [S]afety [C]ode 

dealing with the health and safety of animals, not as a crime” under Texas Penal 

Code section 42.09); Granger v. Folk, 931 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 

1996, orig. proceeding) (recognizing, although not in a Double Jeopardy case, that 

this Court noted “two avenues exist for the State in protecting animals from cruel 

treatment, i.e., criminal prosecution under ... the [Texas] Penal Code and the civil 

remedy provided under [s]ection 821.023 of the [Texas] Health and Safety Code”); 

see also Bradley v. State, No. 01-08-00332-CR, 2009 WL 1688200, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). “[E]ven in those cases where the legislature has indicated an intention 

to establish a civil penalty, a court must inquire further whether the statutory scheme 

is so punitive in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil 

remedy into a criminal penalty.” Capps v. State, 265 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 

99 (1997)); see also Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at *3. The factors courts must look 

to in making this determination are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative 
33 

disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; 

(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation 

will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) 

whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative 

purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether 

it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Hudson, 522 U.S. 

at 99–100 (citations omitted). 

Texas courts have examined animal cruelty statutes applying the Hudson

factors. See Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 892–95; Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at 

**3–4. Those courts have concluded the intent of provisions 821.022–.023 of the 

Health and Safety Code are civil in nature. See Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 895; 

Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at *3. Moreover, those courts analyzed sanctions 

similar to the ones the Hoffmans faced here in light of the Hudson factors and 

concluded the sanctions were not “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 

transform the civil action and remedies imposed into a criminal punishment” and 

therefore, subsequent criminal prosecution for cruelty to animals did not violate the 

double jeopardy prohibitions of the United States and Texas Constitutions. See 

Almendarez, 301 S.W.3d at 895–96; Bradley, 2009 WL 1688200, at *4. 
34 

 In Almendarez, the defendant moved to quash an indictment for cruelty to 

animals on the basis it violated double jeopardy since he had already been subject to 

proceedings in justice court where two of his horses were seized, and he had to pay 

restitution to cover the costs. 301 S.W.3d at 888. The court there noted “proceedings 

brought under Subchapter B of Chapter 821 and the remedies authorized therein are 

designed to protect animals from cruel treatment, and neither divesting a party from 

the ownership of cruelly treated animals nor requiring the payment of money for 

their care are excessive to this alternative purpose.” Id. at 895. Like our sister court 

in Almendarez, we determine that although larger in scale, the civil seizure of the 

Hoffmans’ horses and fine imposed for their care was not excessive. 

We conclude jeopardy did not attach to the civil proceedings, and therefore, 

the criminal prosecution of Herman did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of 

the United States or Texas Constitutions. 

 Issue four is overruled. 

IV. Conclusion 

We conclude the evidence was legally sufficient to support Herman’s 

convictions of cruelty for each of the five horses at issue. Even if we assume 

Herman’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient, Herman failed to establish he 

was prejudiced by any such deficiency and therefore, did not meet both prongs 
35 

required to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, Herman failed to 

establish violations of the Brady or the Michael Morton Act. Finally, the civil seizure 

and forfeiture proceedings for cruelty to livestock animals and the criminal 

prosecution for cruelty to livestock animals is not violative of the Double Jeopardy 

Clause of the United States or Texas Constitutions. The judgments of the trial court 

are affirmed. 

AFFIRMED. 

 

 

 ________________________________ 

 CHARLES KREGER 

 Justice 

 

Submitted on September 4, 2018 

Opinion Delivered November 14, 2018 

Do Not Publish 

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.