[Cite as State v. Efford, 2023-Ohio-3360.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

Nos. 112077 and 112078

v. :

DEAMAUTE EFFORD, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 21, 2023

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case Nos. CR-19-645865-A and CR-20-653320-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Jeffrey S. Schnatter, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Flowers & Grube, Louis E. Grube, and Melissa A. Ghrist, 

for appellant. 

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Defendant-appellant Deamaute Efford (“Efford”) appeals his 

sentence after guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and other charges. For the 
reasons that follow we affirm in part and remand in part for the trial court to correct 

its sentencing entry.

Factual and Procedural History

On November 18, 2019, Efford was indicted in Cuyahoga County C.P.

No. CR 19-645865-A (“Case No. 19-645865”) on one count of domestic violence a 

felony of the fifth degree. The indictment alleged: furthermore, Efford knew that 

the victim, Z.R. was pregnant. The indictment also included a pregnant-victim 

specification.

On September 24, 2020, Efford, along with two codefendants,

Jahmontay Harder (“Harder”) and Teighlor Johnson (“Johnson”), was indicted in 

Cuyahoga County C.P. No. CR 20-653320-A (“Case No. 20-653320”), a nine-count

indictment involving the murder of Tavon Powell (“Powell”). Efford was charged 

with aggravated murder, an unclassified felony (Count 1); aggravated robbery, a 

felony of the first degree (Count 2); aggravated burglary, a felony of the first degree 

(Count 3); murder, an unclassified felony (Count 4); murder, an unclassified felony 

(Count 5); felonious assault, a felony of the second degree (Count 6); and felonious 

assault, a felony of the second degree (Count 7). The remaining two counts only 

pertained to Harder. Each count held an associated one-year and three-year firearm 

specification.

On August 23, 2021, Efford entered into a negotiated plea agreement. 

Efford pleaded guilty as charged in Case No. 19-645865. In Case No. 20-653320, 

Efford pleaded guilty to Count 1, as amended, to involuntary manslaughter, a felony 
of the first degree and to the two associated firearm specifications. Efford also 

pleaded guilty to Count 2, aggravated robbery. The state moved to dismiss the 

associated firearm specifications and the remaining charges against Efford in the 

indictment.

As part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the two charges 

in Case No.20-653320 would not merge for sentencing. Additionally, Efford agreed 

to cooperate in the prosecution of his two co-defendants. In return, the state would 

recommend a sentence with a “floor” of 10 to 15 years. During the plea colloquy, the 

trial court ensured that Efford understood that the court was not bound by the 

sentencing recommendation.

Efford was sentenced on September 30, 2022. By that time, both he 

and Johnson had testified at Harder’s trial. The state represented that Efford had 

fulfilled the obligations under his plea agreement and asked the court to impose the 

recommended sentence. The state also noted that the case would not have 

progressed if Efford’s mother had not gone to the police and arranged for police to 

locate and interview Efford. Several members of Efford’s family were present and 

gave statements to the court. Efford’s attorney then spoke and noted that Efford did 

not have a juvenile record, and had only received a citation for disorderly conduct

prior to the domestic violence indictment. 

Before issuing its sentence, the trial court asked Efford if he was 

wearing a GPS monitor when he participated in the aggravated robbery. Efford 

admitted that he was wearing the GPS monitor assigned from the domestic violence 
case. The trial court then noted that it had heard Efford testify at Harder’s trial. The 

trial court found that Efford was the ringleader, not Harder. It was Efford who 

kicked in Powell’s door in order to effectuate the robbery. The court noted that 

Efford wanted to back out of the plea deal at the beginning of trial, although he did 

testify. Additionally, the trial court found that Efford’s testimony was “significantly 

inconsistent” with Johnson’s testimony and the known facts of the case.

The trial court sentenced Efford to 12 months on the domestic

violence charge with credit for time served. On the involuntary manslaughter charge

(Count 1), the trial court imposed a sentence of three years on the firearm 

specification consecutive to 11 to 16 and one-half years on the involuntary 

manslaughter charge. On the aggravated robbery charge, the trial court imposed a 

sentence of six years to run consecutive to Count 1. The aggregate term was 20 years 

to 25 and one-half years.

In support of consecutive sentences, the trial court found that Efford 

committed the 2020 case while awaiting trial on the 2019 case. The trial court found 

that a single term did not adequately reflect Efford’s conduct and the sentence was 

necessary to punish the offender and protect the public and was not 

disproportionate in a murder case.

The trial court’s subsequent journal entry of the conviction found that 

Efford pleaded guilty to notice-of-prior-conviction and repeat-violent-offender

(“RVO”) specifications. Efford was neither charged with nor did he plead guilty to 

any such specifications.
Efford appeals and assigns the following errors for our review.

Assignment of Error No. 1

The trial court committed plain error by imposing consecutive 

sentences based upon factual findings that the record clearly and 

convincingly does not support.

Assignment of Error No. 2

The trial court committed plain error by convicting Efford on 

specifications for which he was not charged and did not enter a guilty 

plea.

Assignment of Error No. 3

The trial court committed plain error by sentencing Efford pursuant to 

the unconstitutional Reagan Tokes law.

For ease of analysis, we will address Efford’s assignments of error out 

of order.

Convictions for RVO and Prior Conviction Specifications

In the second assignment of error, Efford argues that the trial court

erred when it included in its journal entry that Efford had pleaded and been found 

guilty of RVO specifications and prior-conviction specifications. The state concedes 

that this was an error. The record reflects that Efford’s codefendant Harder was the 

only defendant indicted for RVO specifications and prior-conviction specifications. 

Accordingly, Efford’s second assignment of error is sustained. The case is remanded 

for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc journal entry correcting this error.
Reagan Tokes Sentence

In his third assignment of error, Efford argues that the trial court

committed plain error by sentencing him under the Reagan Tokes Law, S.B. 201. 

Efford alleges that the law violates the constitutional rights to a jury trial and

procedural due process; and violates the separation-of-powers-doctrine.

The Ohio Supreme Court has recently addressed all of these issues

and found they lack merit. See State v. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535.

Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.

Imposition of Consecutive Sentences

Finally, in the first assignment of error, Efford argues that it was plain 

error for the trial court to impose consecutive sentences as the record did not clearly 

and convincingly support consecutive sentence findings. Specifically, Efford alleges 

that the record did not support the findings that consecutive sentences were 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and 

the danger he poses to the public.

The review of felony sentences is governed by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). 

State v. Watkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110355, 2022-Ohio-1231, ¶ 21, citing State 

v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 16. Pursuant to 

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), a reviewing court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and 

remand a felony sentence if this court clearly and convincingly finds either that the 

record does not support the sentencing court’s findings as prescribed under specific 
statutes or the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Artis, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 111298, 2022-Ohio-3819 ¶ 11. It is well settled that a sentence that is 

contrary to law is plain error and an appellate court may review it for plain error. 

State v. Dowdell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111026, 2022-Ohio-2956, ¶ 9 citing State 

v. Whittenburg, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109700, 2022-Ohio-803, ¶ 6.

Generally, there is a presumption for concurrent sentences when a 

person is convicted of multiple offenses, R.C. 2929.41(A). The law allows a court to 

impose consecutive sentences only when certain conditions are met. Those 

conditions are met when the trial court finds that “consecutive service is necessary 

to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public.” R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). In 

addition to these findings, the court must also find any one of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while 

the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction 

imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the 

Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one 

or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the 

courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s 

conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future 

crime by the offender.
In making this determination, the trial court “must consider the 

number of sentences it will impose consecutively along with the defendant’s 

aggregate sentence that will result.” State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio4607, ¶ 12. A reviewing court conducts a de novo review of the imposition of 

consecutive sentences and may reverse or modify the sentence, including the 

number of consecutive sentences, if the court “clearly and convincingly finds that 

the record does not support the trial court’s findings.” Id.

When reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must first 

determine whether the trial court made the required findings under 

R.C. 2929.14(C). If the court failed to make the required findings, then the appellate 

court must find the order of consecutive sentences was contrary to law and either 

modify or vacate the sentence and remand. Id. at ¶ 25. If the court did make the 

required findings, the appellate court must determine whether the record clearly 

and convincingly supports those findings. Id.

In the instant case, the trial court made all the requisite findings, 

finding that consecutive sentencing was necessary to punish the offender and 

protect the public. The trial court also found that consecutive sentences were not 

disproportionate “in a murder case.” Finally, the court noted that Efford committed

the offenses in Case No. 20-655320 while awaiting trial on Case No. 19-645865. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a). Therefore, we look to determine whether the findings are 

clearly and convincingly supported by the record.

Clear and convincing proof is defined as
[t]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind * * * a 

firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. 

It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to 

the extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as 

in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal. In re Estate 

of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-104, 25 Ohio B. 150, 495 N.E.2d 23 

(1986).

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98934, 2013-Ohio-2201, ¶ 5.

During the hearing, the trial court discussed the conduct underlying 

the offense. Specifically, the court noted that the evidence suggested that Efford was 

the primary instigator of the offense, not Harder. The evidence supported, and 

Efford admitted, that he was the one who kicked down Powell’s door. The trial court 

also noted that Efford was wearing a court-ordered GPS ankle monitor at the time 

of the offense. Not only was Efford unconcerned that he had a pending case in court,

but he was unconcerned that the trial court and or law enforcement could track his 

location and connect him to the crime. Efford made the choice to conduct further 

crimes under these circumstances. The court’s finding that a consecutive sentence 

was necessary to prevent future crime and punish the offender is supported by the

record. 

In his brief, Efford focuses significant attention on the trial court’s use 

of the word murder in concluding that the sentence was not disproportionate to his 

conduct. Efford argues that his plea to involuntary manslaughter removes the issue 

of murder, and that there is no evidence that Efford committed murder because all 

murder-related charges were dismissed. The trial court, however, does not solely 
look at the convicted charge but at the conduct of the defendant. See R.C. 2929.11 

and 2929.12. The record reflects that Johnson told Harder and Efford that the 

victim had a large sum of money in his apartment. According to the victim’s

girlfriend, the victim brought the money home the same night he was killed. The 

three then proceeded to the victim’s apartment to rob, and ultimately kill him. 

Harder was found guilty of all counts including aggravated murder. A trial court 

may consider “the entirety of a defendant’s actions in a particular case.” State v. 

Diaz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102582, 2015-Ohio-4382, ¶ 9. Given the foregoing, 

the nature of the plea agreement does not mitigate Efford’s proven conduct. The 

trial court’s findings were supported by the record.

Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed and case remanded to correct the sentencing 

entry.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., CONCUR;

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURRING:

I fully concur with the majority opinion on the second and third 

assignments of error. On the first assignment of error, under which Efford 

challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences, I agree with the 

majority that the trial court did not err in the imposition of consecutive sentences 

and write to further address the issues raised.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court initially explained why it was 

not imposing the recommended sentence, which recommended the trial court “set 

the floor at between ten and fifteen years.” The parties’ plea agreement required in 

part that Efford cooperate in the state’s prosecution of his codefendants and testify 

truthfully. Efford did provide testimony at the trial of a codefendant, with whom he 

had a close relation, despite having concerns about potential consequences. The 

state, having obtained a conviction against that codefendant, acknowledged that 

there were some inconsistencies with Efford’s testimony, but believed Efford 

fulfilled his obligation under the plea agreement. Understandably, the state does 

not wish to deter similar plea agreements. 

This case reveals the inherent problem of non-enforceable plea 

agreements. There are often inconsistent results produced with such agreements 

between different judges. A defendant like Efford makes a deal in an attempt to 

minimize his exposure, while the state offers that deal to strengthen its case against 

the codefendant. Such agreements are often reached with the consent of the victim 

or the victim’s family. The prosecutor uses this leverage in an attempt to resolve 
cases and reach some form of justice. The fate of the agreement, however, rests in 

the balance of the particular judge handling the case. Different judges see such 

agreements, and the weight given to testimony offered to secure the agreement, 

differently. 

Yet, none of this matters because the trial judge, in what amounts to 

having the ultimate say, is not bound by any of the terms of the plea agreement. Had 

Efford drawn a different judge on his arraignment day, his agreement may well have 

been honored and his exposure shortened. This raises the question of whether such 

nonbinding “agreements” should even be offered or considered. Yet, that is a 

question for another day. 

As it stands, the trial judge was not bound by the recommended 

sentence, could consider whether the plea agreement was satisfied, and explained 

why the court did not believe Efford had been forthcoming with testifying truthfully 

and honestly. The trial court indicated that Efford was still better off having testified 

under the plea agreement, as he otherwise would have been looking at a possible 

sentence of life without parole.1 The trial court imposed an aggregate term of 20 to 

25 and one-half years for the involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery 

convictions.

2

1 In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-20-653320-A, Efford was charged under seven counts 

in the indictment, which included a charge of aggravated murder, but he pled guilty to 

two amended charges of involuntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery, which the 

parties agreed would not be merged, pursuant to the plea agreement.

2The trial court also sentenced Efford in the domestic-violence case, Cuyahoga 

C.P. No. CR-19-645865-A, to 12 months with credit for time served.
The record further reflects that in imposing consecutive sentences, 

the trial court made the requisite findings, which are discussed in the majority 

opinion. Because Efford did not object to the imposition of consecutive sentences 

at the sentencing hearing, he forfeited this issue, absent plain error. See State v. 

Whitaker, 169 Ohio St.3d 647, 2022-Ohio-2840, 207 N.E.3d 677, ¶ 166, citing State 

v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 152.

In reviewing a consecutive-sentence challenge, the appellate court 

applies R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)’s clear-and-convincing standard. It is important to 

reiterate that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is written in the negative and requires the court of 

appeals to clearly and convincingly find that “the record does not support the 

sentencing court’s findings” under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Support for the findings may 

appear anywhere in the record. State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d 453, 

¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Pursuant to Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607, upon a de 

novo review and without any deference to the trial court’s consecutive sentencefindings, we must have “a firm conviction or belief, after reviewing the entire record, 

that the evidence does not support the specific findings made by the trial court to 

impose consecutive sentences, which includes the number of consecutive terms and 

the aggregate sentence that results.” Gwynne at ¶ 29.

The majority opinion reviews evidence in the record that shows 

Efford was told the victim had a large sum of money in his apartment, Efford kicked 

in the door of the victim’s apartment, a shooting occurred, and Efford was wearing 

a GPS ankle monitor at the time and had a pending domestic-violence case. 
Although Efford takes issue with the trial court’s reference to murder when he pled 

guilty to involuntary manslaughter, I agree with the majority that the trial court 

properly considered the “conduct” involved and the entirety of Efford’s actions in 

this case.

Upon reviewing the record, I do not have the firm conviction or belief 

that the record does not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not commit error, let alone plain error, and the first 

assignment of error should be overruled.