# Úradný vestník C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-1037 |
| --- | --- |
| Úradný vestník
  Európskej únie | C 242 |
| | |
| Slovenské vydanie | Informácie a oznámenia | Ročník 6027. júla 2017 |

ISSN 1977-1037

Úradný vestník

Európskej únie

C 242

Slovenské vydanie

Informácie a oznámenia

Ročník 6027. júla 2017

---

| Číslo oznamu | Obsah | Strana |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Oznámenia |
| | OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii (Vec M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Rozhodnutie týkajúce sa posúdenia podmienok na riešenie krízovej situácie úverovej inštitúcie Veneto Banca S.p.A. | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Rozhodnutie týkajúce sa posúdenia podmienok na riešenie krízovej situácie úverovej inštitúcie Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. | 3 |

Číslo oznamu

Obsah

Strana

II   Oznámenia

OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Európska komisia

2017/C 242/01

Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii (Vec M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Rozhodnutie týkajúce sa posúdenia podmienok na riešenie krízovej situácie úverovej inštitúcie Veneto Banca S.p.A.

2

2017/C 242/03

Rozhodnutie týkajúce sa posúdenia podmienok na riešenie krízovej situácie úverovej inštitúcie Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

3

---

| | IV   Informácie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Výmenný kurz eura | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Zhrnutie rozhodnutí Európskej komisie o autorizáciách pre uvedenie na trh na účely použitia a/alebo pre používanie látok uvedených v prílohe XIV k nariadeniu Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1907/2006 o registrácii, hodnotení, autorizácii a obmedzovaní chemikálií (REACH) [uverejnené podľa článku 64 ods. 9 nariadenia (ES) č. 1907/2006]
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | INFORMÁCIE TÝKAJÚCE SA EURÓPSKEHO HOSPODÁRSKEHO PRIESTORU |
| | Dozorný úrad EZVO |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 1 ods. 2 časti I protokolu 3 k Dohode medzi štátmi EZVO o zriadení dozorného úradu a súdu k možnej štátnej pomoci poskytnutej spoločnosti Landsvirkjun vo forme štátnych záruk na zmluvy o derivátoch | 6 |

IV   Informácie

INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Európska komisia

2017/C 242/04

Výmenný kurz eura

4

2017/C 242/05

Zhrnutie rozhodnutí Európskej komisie o autorizáciách pre uvedenie na trh na účely použitia a/alebo pre používanie látok uvedených v prílohe XIV k nariadeniu Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1907/2006 o registrácii, hodnotení, autorizácii a obmedzovaní chemikálií (REACH) [uverejnené podľa článku 64 ods. 9 nariadenia (ES) č. 1907/2006]
   (
  1
  )

[uverejnené podľa článku 64 ods. 9 nariadenia (ES) č. 1907/2006]

1

5

INFORMÁCIE TÝKAJÚCE SA EURÓPSKEHO HOSPODÁRSKEHO PRIESTORU

Dozorný úrad EZVO

2017/C 242/06

Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 1 ods. 2 časti I protokolu 3 k Dohode medzi štátmi EZVO o zriadení dozorného úradu a súdu k možnej štátnej pomoci poskytnutej spoločnosti Landsvirkjun vo forme štátnych záruk na zmluvy o derivátoch

6

---

| | V   Oznamy |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY |
| | Európsky úrad pre výber pracovníkov (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Oznámenie o verejných výberových konaniach | 17 |
| | KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Predbežné oznámenie o koncentrácii (Vec M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett) – Vec, ktorá môže byť posúdená v rámci zjednodušeného postupu (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Predbežné oznámenie o koncentrácii (Vec M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific – Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | INÉ AKTY |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Oznámenie – verejná konzultácia – Zemepisné označenia z Japonska | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Oznámenie určené osobám menom Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a subjektom s názvom OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, ktoré boli vykonávacím nariadením Komisie (EÚ) 2017/1390 pridané do zoznamu podľa článkov 2, 3 a 7 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 881/2002 z 27. mája 2002, ktoré ukladá niektoré špecifické obmedzujúce opatrenia namierené proti niektorým osobám a subjektom spojeným s organizáciami ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káida | 22 |

V   Oznamy

ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY

Európsky úrad pre výber pracovníkov (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Oznámenie o verejných výberových konaniach

17

KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE

Európska komisia

2017/C 242/08

Predbežné oznámenie o koncentrácii (Vec M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett) – Vec, ktorá môže byť posúdená v rámci zjednodušeného postupu (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Predbežné oznámenie o koncentrácii (Vec M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific – Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

INÉ AKTY

Európska komisia

2017/C 242/10

Oznámenie – verejná konzultácia – Zemepisné označenia z Japonska

20

2017/C 242/11

Oznámenie určené osobám menom Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a subjektom s názvom OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, ktoré boli vykonávacím nariadením Komisie (EÚ) 2017/1390 pridané do zoznamu podľa článkov 2, 3 a 7 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 881/2002 z 27. mája 2002, ktoré ukladá niektoré špecifické obmedzujúce opatrenia namierené proti niektorým osobám a subjektom spojeným s organizáciami ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káida

22

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text s významom pre EHP |

---

(1)   Text s významom pre EHP

1

| SK | |
| --- | --- |

SK

---

II Oznámenia

OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Európska komisia

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/1

---

Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii

(Vec M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(Text s významom pre EHP)

(2017/C 242/01)

Dňa 14. júla 2017 sa Komisia rozhodla nevzniesť námietku voči uvedenej oznámenej koncentrácii a vyhlásiť ju za zlučiteľnú s vnútorným trhom. Toto rozhodnutie je založené na článku 6 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (1). Úplné znenie rozhodnutia je dostupné iba v anglickom jazyku a bude zverejnené po odstránení akýchkoľvek obchodných tajomstiev. Bude dostupné:

| — | v časti webovej stránky Komisie o hospodárskej súťaži venovanej fúziám (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Táto webová stránka poskytuje rôzne možnosti na vyhľadávanie individuálnych rozhodnutí o fúziách podľa názvu spoločnosti, čísla prípadu, dátumu a sektorových indexov, |
| --- | --- |

—

v časti webovej stránky Komisie o hospodárskej súťaži venovanej fúziám (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Táto webová stránka poskytuje rôzne možnosti na vyhľadávanie individuálnych rozhodnutí o fúziách podľa názvu spoločnosti, čísla prípadu, dátumu a sektorových indexov,

| — | v elektronickej podobe na webovej stránke EUR-Lexu (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=sk) pod číslom dokumentu 32017M8500. EUR-Lex predstavuje online prístup k európskemu právu. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronickej podobe na webovej stránke EUR-Lexu (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=sk) pod číslom dokumentu 32017M8500. EUR-Lex predstavuje online prístup k európskemu právu.

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 24, 29.1.2004, s. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/2

---

Rozhodnutie týkajúce sa posúdenia podmienok na riešenie krízovej situácie úverovej inštitúcie Veneto Banca S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/02)

Jednotná rada pre riešenie krízových situácií 23. júna 2017 rozhodla, že nezačne riešiť krízovú situáciu úverovej inštitúcie Veneto Banca S.p.A. Toto rozhodnutie vychádzalo zo záveru, že podmienka stanovená v článku 18 ods. 1 písm. c) nariadenia (EÚ) č. 806/2014 (1) nie je splnená. Hlavné prvky rozhodnutia sú tieto:

| Dátum prijatia rozhodnutia: | 23. jún 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Číslo rozhodnutia: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Adresát: | Banca d’Italia |
| Úverová inštitúcia: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Uplatnenie právomoci odpísať a konvertovať kapitálové nástroje: | Nie |
| Opatrenie na riešenie krízovej situácie: | Nie |
| Pomoc z fondu: | Nie |

Dátum prijatia rozhodnutia:

23. jún 2017

Číslo rozhodnutia:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Adresát:

Banca d’Italia

Úverová inštitúcia:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Uplatnenie právomoci odpísať a konvertovať kapitálové nástroje:

Nie

Opatrenie na riešenie krízovej situácie:

Nie

Pomoc z fondu:

Nie

Ďalšie informácie o tomto rozhodnutí sa nachádzajú na oficiálnom webovom sídle SRB na adrese: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 225, 30.7.2014, s. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/3

---

Rozhodnutie týkajúce sa posúdenia podmienok na riešenie krízovej situácie úverovej inštitúcie Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/03)

Jednotná rada pre riešenie krízových situácií 23. júna 2017 rozhodla, že nezačne riešiť krízovú situáciu úverovej inštitúcie Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.. Toto rozhodnutie vychádzalo zo záveru, že podmienka stanovená v článku 18 ods. 1 písm. c) nariadenia (EÚ) č. 806/2014 (1) nie je splnená. Hlavné prvky rozhodnutia sú tieto:

| Dátum prijatia rozhodnutia: | 23. jún 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Číslo rozhodnutia: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Adresát: | Banca d’Italia |
| Úverová inštitúcia: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Uplatnenie právomoci odpísať a konvertovať kapitálové nástroje: | Nie |
| Opatrenie na riešenie krízovej situácie: | Nie |
| Pomoc z fondu: | Nie |

Dátum prijatia rozhodnutia:

23. jún 2017

Číslo rozhodnutia:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Adresát:

Banca d’Italia

Úverová inštitúcia:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Uplatnenie právomoci odpísať a konvertovať kapitálové nástroje:

Nie

Opatrenie na riešenie krízovej situácie:

Nie

Pomoc z fondu:

Nie

Ďalšie informácie o tomto rozhodnutí sa nachádzajú na oficiálnom webovom sídle SRB na adrese: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 225, 30.7.2014, s. 1.

---

IV Informácie

INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Európska komisia

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/4

---

Výmenný kurz eura (1)

26. júla 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Mena | Výmenný kurz |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Americký dolár | 1,1644 |
| JPY | Japonský jen | 130,26 |
| DKK | Dánska koruna | 7,4368 |
| GBP | Britská libra | 0,89275 |
| SEK | Švédska koruna | 9,5705 |
| CHF | Švajčiarsky frank | 1,1152 |
| ISK | Islandská koruna | |
| NOK | Nórska koruna | 9,2893 |
| BGN | Bulharský lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Česká koruna | 26,047 |
| HUF | Maďarský forint | 305,57 |
| PLN | Poľský zlotý | 4,2613 |
| RON | Rumunský lei | 4,5632 |
| TRY | Turecká líra | 4,1406 |
| AUD | Austrálsky dolár | 1,4717 |
| CAD | Kanadský dolár | 1,4576 |
| HKD | Hongkongský dolár | 9,0959 |
| NZD | Novozélandský dolár | 1,5678 |
| SGD | Singapurský dolár | 1,5850 |
| KRW | Juhokórejský won | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | Juhoafrický rand | 15,1998 |
| CNY | Čínsky juan | 7,8646 |
| HRK | Chorvátska kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | Indonézska rupia | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | Malajzijský ringgit | 4,9889 |
| PHP | Filipínske peso | 58,948 |
| RUB | Ruský rubeľ | 69,7050 |
| THB | Thajský baht | 38,996 |
| BRL | Brazílsky real | 3,6806 |
| MXN | Mexické peso | 20,6644 |
| INR | Indická rupia | 74,9375 |

Mena

Výmenný kurz

USD

Americký dolár

1,1644

JPY

Japonský jen

130,26

DKK

Dánska koruna

7,4368

GBP

Britská libra

0,89275

SEK

Švédska koruna

9,5705

CHF

Švajčiarsky frank

1,1152

ISK

Islandská koruna

NOK

Nórska koruna

9,2893

BGN

Bulharský lev

1,9558

CZK

Česká koruna

26,047

HUF

Maďarský forint

305,57

PLN

Poľský zlotý

4,2613

RON

Rumunský lei

4,5632

TRY

Turecká líra

4,1406

AUD

Austrálsky dolár

1,4717

CAD

Kanadský dolár

1,4576

HKD

Hongkongský dolár

9,0959

NZD

Novozélandský dolár

1,5678

SGD

Singapurský dolár

1,5850

KRW

Juhokórejský won

1 303,91

ZAR

Juhoafrický rand

15,1998

CNY

Čínsky juan

7,8646

HRK

Chorvátska kuna

7,4128

IDR

Indonézska rupia

15 507,48

MYR

Malajzijský ringgit

4,9889

PHP

Filipínske peso

58,948

RUB

Ruský rubeľ

69,7050

THB

Thajský baht

38,996

BRL

Brazílsky real

3,6806

MXN

Mexické peso

20,6644

INR

Indická rupia

74,9375

---

(1)  Zdroj: referenčný výmenný kurz publikovaný ECB.

---

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/5

---

Zhrnutie rozhodnutí Európskej komisie o autorizáciách pre uvedenie na trh na účely použitia a/alebo pre používanie látok uvedených v prílohe XIV k nariadeniu Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1907/2006 o registrácii, hodnotení, autorizácii a obmedzovaní chemikálií (REACH)

[uverejnené podľa článku 64 ods. 9 nariadenia (ES) č. 1907/2006
   (1)
  ]

(Text s významom pre EHP)

(2017/C 242/05)

Rozhodnutia o udelení autorizácie

| Odkaz na rozhodnutie (2) | Dátum rozhodnutia | Názov látky | Držiteľ autorizácie | Číslo autorizácie | Autorizované použitie | Dátum uplynutia lehoty na preskúmanie | Odôvodnenia rozhodnutia |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20. júla 2017 | Bis(2-metoxyetyl)éter,
  č. ES 203-924-4,
  č. CAS 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Írsko | REACH/17/8/0 | Použitie diglymu ako rozpúšťadla v procese výroby medziproduktu na ďalšiu konverziu na farmaceutickú zlúčeninu, ktorá sa používa v liekoch na liečbu ochorení dýchacieho ústrojenstva. | 22. augusta 2024 | — | V súlade s článkom 60 ods. 2 nariadenia (ES) č. 1907/2006 riziká pre ľudské zdravie vyplývajúce z používania látky sú primerane kontrolované. |

Odkaz na rozhodnutie (2)

Dátum rozhodnutia

Názov látky

Držiteľ autorizácie

Číslo autorizácie

Autorizované použitie

Dátum uplynutia lehoty na preskúmanie

Odôvodnenia rozhodnutia

C(2017) 5025

20. júla 2017

Bis(2-metoxyetyl)éter,

č. ES 203-924-4,

č. CAS 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Írsko

REACH/17/8/0

Použitie diglymu ako rozpúšťadla v procese výroby medziproduktu na ďalšiu konverziu na farmaceutickú zlúčeninu, ktorá sa používa v liekoch na liečbu ochorení dýchacieho ústrojenstva.

22. augusta 2024

—

V súlade s článkom 60 ods. 2 nariadenia (ES) č. 1907/2006 riziká pre ľudské zdravie vyplývajúce z používania látky sú primerane kontrolované.

| — | V súčasnosti neexistujú žiadne alternatívy a ich hľadanie prebieha v rámci 7-ročného programu hľadania náhrady. |
| --- | --- |

—

V súčasnosti neexistujú žiadne alternatívy a ich hľadanie prebieha v rámci 7-ročného programu hľadania náhrady.

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 396, 30.12.2006, s. 1.

(2)  Rozhodnutie je k dispozícii na webovom sídle Európskej komisie: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about/index_sk.htm.

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INFORMÁCIE TÝKAJÚCE SA EURÓPSKEHO HOSPODÁRSKEHO PRIESTORU

Dozorný úrad EZVO

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/6

---

Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 1 ods. 2 časti I protokolu 3 k Dohode medzi štátmi EZVO o zriadení dozorného úradu a súdu k možnej štátnej pomoci poskytnutej spoločnosti Landsvirkjun vo forme štátnych záruk na zmluvy o derivátoch

(2017/C 242/06)

Rozhodnutím č. 085/17/COL z 3. mája 2017, ktoré je uvedené v autentickom jazyku za týmto zhrnutím, Dozorný úrad EZVO začal konanie podľa článku 1 ods. 2 časti I protokolu 3 k Dohode medzi štátmi EZVO o zriadení dozorného úradu a súdu. Islandské orgány boli informované prostredníctvom kópie tohto rozhodnutia.

Dozorný úrad EZVO týmto žiada štáty EZVO, členské štáty EÚ a zainteresované strany, aby predložili svoje pripomienky k predmetnému opatreniu v lehote jedného mesiaca odo dňa uverejnenia tohto oznámenia na adresu:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

35, Rue Belliard

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Tieto pripomienky sa oznámia islandským orgánom. Zainteresované strany, ktoré predložia pripomienky, môžu písomne s uvedením dôvodov požiadať o dôverné zaobchádzanie s údajmi o ich totožnosti.

Zhrnutie

Postup

E-mailom z 24. marca 2015 islandské orgány požiadali dozorný úrad o objasnenie, či je možné podľa platného islandského systému štátnych záruk poskytnúť záruku na finančné záväzky spoločnosti Landsvirkjun vyplývajúce zo zmlúv o derivátoch. Tento systém bol predmetom rozhodnutia dozorného úradu č. 159/13/COL (1).

Dozorný úrad si k príslušných opatreniam vyžiadal informácie od islandských orgánov. Tie mu boli poskytnuté v listoch z 11. februára 2016 a 22. marca 2016. O tejto otázke sa navyše diskutovalo na rokovaní medzi islandskými orgánmi a dozorným úradom v Reykjavíku 31. mája 2016. Po rokovaní poslal dozorný úrad islandským orgánom list, v ktorom zaznamenáva obsah rokovania a žiada o ďalšie vysvetlenia. E-mailom z 31. októbra 2016 islandské orgány odpovedali na list dozorného úradu a predložili niektoré doplňujúce dokumenty.

Skutočnosti

Landsvirkjun je spoločnosť verejného partnerstva, na ktorú sa vzťahuje zákon č. 42/1983 o spoločnosti Landsvirkjun, v znení zmien. Spoločnosť Landsvirkjun spoločne vlastnia štátna pokladnica (99,9 %) a spoločnosť Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). Eignarhlutir ehf. je spoločnosť s ručením obmedzeným v plnom vlastníctve štátnej pokladnice. Spoločnosť Landsvirkjun je v súčasnosti najväčším výrobcom elektrickej energie na Islande s trhovým podielom 75 % domácej výroby elektrickej energie a jednou z desiatich najväčších spoločností vyrábajúcich energiu z obnoviteľných zdrojov v Európe.

Správa štátneho dlhu (GDM) je útvar v rámci Centrálnej banky Islandu. Centrálna banka Islandu je nezávislá verejná inštitúcia vo vlastníctve islandského štátu.

Spoločnosť Landsvirkjun je vystavená riziku transakcií v cudzej mene, ako aj riziku úrokovej sadzby na svoje dlhové portfólio. Spoločnosť Landsvirkjun využíva na kontrolu a riadenie svojho trhového rizika všetky formy zmlúv o derivátoch.

Podľa toho, ako v súčasnosti dozorný úrad posudzuje skutočnosť, správa štátneho dlhu poskytovala spoločnosti Landsvirkjun záruky na určité zmluvy o derivátoch prinajmenšom od roku 2013. Rozhodnutie sa týka záruk správy štátneho dlhu na tieto zmluvy o derivátoch: devízové swapy, devízové opcie a úrokové swapy.

Podľa bodu 3.2 usmernení o štátnej pomoci týkajúcich sa štátnych záruk (ďalej len „usmernenia o zárukách“) (2) postačuje splnenie týchto súhrnných podmienok na vylúčenie prvkov štátnej pomoci v jednotlivých zárukách:

| a) | dlžník nemá finančné ťažkosti; |
| --- | --- |

a)

dlžník nemá finančné ťažkosti;

| b) | rozsah záruky je možné správne stanoviť, keď sa poskytuje; |
| --- | --- |

b)

rozsah záruky je možné správne stanoviť, keď sa poskytuje;

| c) | záruka nekryje viac ako 80 % nesplatenej pôžičky alebo iného finančného záväzku; |
| --- | --- |

c)

záruka nekryje viac ako 80 % nesplatenej pôžičky alebo iného finančného záväzku;

| d) | za záruku sa platí trhovo orientovaná cena. |
| --- | --- |

d)

za záruku sa platí trhovo orientovaná cena.

Dozorný úrad predbežne zastáva názor, že záruky poskytnuté správou štátneho dlhu spoločnosti Landsvirkjun na uvedené transakcie s derivátmi nespĺňajú podmienky b), c) a d). Podobne v tejto fáze prítomnosť prvkov štátnej pomoci nemožno vylúčiť na základe bodu 3.2 usmernení o zárukách.

Po prvé, islandské orgány doposiaľ neboli schopné vysvetliť, či sú záruky spojené s konkrétnymi povinnosťami, aká je maximálna výška záruk a či sú záruky časovo obmedzené. Dozorný úrad preto v súčasnosti zastáva názor, že podmienka b) bodu 3.2 usmernení o zárukách nie je splnená.

Po druhé, záruky zrejme pokrývajú všetky finančné záväzky, ktoré spoločnosti Landsvirkjun vyplývajú z príslušných zmlúv o derivátoch. Islandské orgány doposiaľ neposkytli nijaké informácie, ktoré by umožnili posúdiť, či je záruka obmedzená na 80 % nesplatených finančných záväzkov. Neexistujú ani informácie, ktoré by umožnili kvantifikovať finančné záväzky spoločnosti Landsvirkjun vyplývajúce zo zmlúv o derivátoch, na ktoré poskytla záruky správa štátneho dlhu. Dozorný úrad preto v súčasnosti zastáva názor, že podmienka c) bodu 3.2 usmernení o zárukách nie je splnená.

Po tretie, podľa usmernení o zárukách by riziko malo byť spravidla odmenené primeraným poplatkom za sumu, na ktorú sa poskytuje záruka alebo protizáruka. Pokiaľ ide o záruky správy štátneho dlhu na devízové swapy a devízové opcie, spoločnosť Landsvirkjun zrejme neplatí nijaký poplatok. Pokiaľ ide o záruky správy štátneho dlhu na úrokové swapy, islandské orgány tvrdia, že spoločnosť Landsvirkjun platí primeraný poplatok za záruku na čisté záväzky vyplývajúce zo zmlúv o derivátoch, ktorý znamená čistú stratu pre spoločnosť Landsvirkjun. Dozorný úrad však nedostal postačujúce informácie o metodike, aká bola použitá na stanovenie úrovne poplatku, a teda či možno túto úroveň poplatku považovať za trhovú cenu.

Posúdenie

Dozorný úrad v súčasnosti zastáva názor, že záruky, ktorých sa toto rozhodnutie týka, môžu predstavovať výhodu v zmysle pravidiel týkajúcich sa štátnej pomoci. Okrem toho sa zdá, že opatrenie je svojou povahou selektívne a mohlo by narušiť hospodársku súťaž a ovplyvniť obchod v rámci EHP. Dozorný úrad preto nemôže vylúčiť možnosť, že opatrenie predstavuje štátnu pomoc v zmysle článku 61 ods. 1 Dohody o EHP. Islandské orgány neposkytli v tejto fáze nijaké argumenty o tom, že potenciálnu štátnu pomoc je možné považovať za zlučiteľnú s fungovaním Dohody o EHP na základe jej článku 59 ods. 2 alebo článku 61 ods. 3.

Záver

Vzhľadom na uvedené skutočnosti sa dozorný úrad rozhodol začať formálne vyšetrovacie konanie v súlade s článkom 1 ods. 2 časti I protokolu 3 k Dohode medzi štátmi EZVO o zriadení dozorného úradu a súdu. Zainteresované strany sa vyzývajú, aby predložili svoje pripomienky v lehote jedného mesiaca odo dňa uverejnenia tohto oznámenia v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  Rozhodnutie dozorného úradu č. 159/13/COL z 24. apríla 2013 uzavrieť konanie o existujúcej pomoci poskytnutej spoločnostiam Landsvirkjun a Orkuveita Reykjavíkur vo forme neobmedzených štátnych záruk (Ú. v. EÚ C 237, 15.8.2013, s. 3 a dodatok EHP č. 45, 15.8.2013, s. 28).

1

(2)  Ú. v. EÚ L 105, 21.4.2011, s. 32 a dodatok EHP č. 23, 21.4.2011, s. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Oznamy

ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY

Európsky úrad pre výber pracovníkov (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/17

---

OZNÁMENIE O VEREJNÝCH VÝBEROVÝCH KONANIACH

(2017/C 242/07)

Európsky úrad pre výber pracovníkov (EPSO) organizuje tieto verejné výberové konania:

| | ADMINISTRÁTORI A ASISTENTI V SEKTORE BUDOV |
| --- | --- |

ADMINISTRÁTORI A ASISTENTI V SEKTORE BUDOV

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Inžinieri správy budov (vrátane environmentálnych inžinierov a inžinierov pre technické, technologické a energetické vybavenie stavieb) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Inžinieri správy budov (vrátane environmentálnych inžinierov a inžinierov pre technické, technologické a energetické vybavenie stavieb)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3) | Profil 1: Koordinátori/technici v oblasti výstavby budov |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3)

Profil 1: Koordinátori/technici v oblasti výstavby budov

| | Profil 2: Koordinátori/technici v oblasti klimatizácie, elektromechaniky a elektrotechniky budov |
| --- | --- |

Profil 2: Koordinátori/technici v oblasti klimatizácie, elektromechaniky a elektrotechniky budov

| | Profil 3: Asistenti v oblasti bezpečnosti pri práci/bezpečnosti budov |
| --- | --- |

Profil 3: Asistenti v oblasti bezpečnosti pri práci/bezpečnosti budov

Oznámenie o výberových konaniach je uverejnené v 24 jazykoch v
  Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie v sérii C 242 A z 27. júla 2017.

Ďalšie informácie sú k dispozícii na webovom sídle úradu EPSO: https://epso.europa.eu/.

---

KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE

Európska komisia

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/18

---

Predbežné oznámenie o koncentrácii

(Vec M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Vec, ktorá môže byť posúdená v rámci zjednodušeného postupu

(Text s významom pre EHP)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | Komisii bolo 18. júla 2017 podľa článku 4 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (1) doručené oznámenie o zamýšľanej koncentrácii, ktorou podnik Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment“, Luxembursko) získava v zmysle článku 3 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia o fúziách kontrolu nad celým podnikom Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett“, Spojené kráľovstvo) prostredníctvom kúpy akcií. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisii bolo 18. júla 2017 podľa článku 4 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (1) doručené oznámenie o zamýšľanej koncentrácii, ktorou podnik Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment“, Luxembursko) získava v zmysle článku 3 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia o fúziách kontrolu nad celým podnikom Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett“, Spojené kráľovstvo) prostredníctvom kúpy akcií.

| 2. | Predmet činnosti dotknutých podnikov:
  —   Letterone Investment: medzinárodná investičná spoločnosť, ktorá investuje v oblasti telekomunikácií a technológií, zdravotníctva a maloobchodu,
  —   Holland & Barrett: maloobchodný predaj produktov v oblasti zdravia a výživových doplnkov, napríklad vitamínových doplnkov a zdravých potravín prostredníctvom vlastnej siete obchodov a online obchodov. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Predmet činnosti dotknutých podnikov:

—   Letterone Investment: medzinárodná investičná spoločnosť, ktorá investuje v oblasti telekomunikácií a technológií, zdravotníctva a maloobchodu,

—   Holland & Barrett: maloobchodný predaj produktov v oblasti zdravia a výživových doplnkov, napríklad vitamínových doplnkov a zdravých potravín prostredníctvom vlastnej siete obchodov a online obchodov.

| 3. | Na základe predbežného posúdenia a bez toho, aby bolo dotknuté konečné rozhodnutie v tejto veci, sa Komisia domnieva, že oznámená transakcia by mohla patriť do rozsahu pôsobnosti nariadenia o fúziách. V súlade s oznámením Komisie o zjednodušenom postupe pri riešení niektorých koncentrácií podľa nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (2) je potrebné uviesť, že túto vec je možné posudzovať v súlade s postupom stanoveným v oznámení. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Na základe predbežného posúdenia a bez toho, aby bolo dotknuté konečné rozhodnutie v tejto veci, sa Komisia domnieva, že oznámená transakcia by mohla patriť do rozsahu pôsobnosti nariadenia o fúziách. V súlade s oznámením Komisie o zjednodušenom postupe pri riešení niektorých koncentrácií podľa nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (2) je potrebné uviesť, že túto vec je možné posudzovať v súlade s postupom stanoveným v oznámení.

| 4. | Komisia vyzýva zainteresované tretie strany, aby jej predložili prípadné pripomienky k zamýšľanej koncentrácii.
  Pripomienky musia byť Komisii doručené najneskôr do 10 dní od dátumu uverejnenia tohto oznámenia. Pripomienky je možné zaslať faxom (+32 22964301), e-mailom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu alebo poštou s uvedením referenčného čísla M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett na túto adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisia vyzýva zainteresované tretie strany, aby jej predložili prípadné pripomienky k zamýšľanej koncentrácii.

Pripomienky musia byť Komisii doručené najneskôr do 10 dní od dátumu uverejnenia tohto oznámenia. Pripomienky je možné zaslať faxom (+32 22964301), e-mailom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu alebo poštou s uvedením referenčného čísla M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett na túto adresu:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 24, 29.1.2004, s. 1 („nariadenie o fúziách“).

(2)  Ú. v. EÚ C 366, 14.12.2013, s. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/19

---

Predbežné oznámenie o koncentrácii

(Vec M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific – Patheon)

(Text s významom pre EHP)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | Komisii bolo 19. júla 2017 podľa článku 4 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (1) doručené oznámenie o zamýšľanej koncentrácii, ktorou podnik Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fisher“, USA) získava v zmysle článku 3 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia o fúziách kontrolu nad podnikom Patheon N.V. („Patheon“, Holandsko) prostredníctvom kúpy akcií. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisii bolo 19. júla 2017 podľa článku 4 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004 (1) doručené oznámenie o zamýšľanej koncentrácii, ktorou podnik Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fisher“, USA) získava v zmysle článku 3 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia o fúziách kontrolu nad podnikom Patheon N.V. („Patheon“, Holandsko) prostredníctvom kúpy akcií.

| 2. | Predmet činnosti dotknutých podnikov:






  — | Thermo Fisher je výrobca a dodávateľ laboratórneho zariadenia, analytických a diagnostických nástrojov a súvisiacich výrobkov a služieb. Má sídlo v USA a pôsobí na medzinárodnej úrovni, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Predmet činnosti dotknutých podnikov:

—

Thermo Fisher je výrobca a dodávateľ laboratórneho zariadenia, analytických a diagnostických nástrojov a súvisiacich výrobkov a služieb. Má sídlo v USA a pôsobí na medzinárodnej úrovni,

| — | Patheon je zmluvná vývojová a výrobná organizácia, ktorá ponúka svoje služby v oblasti účinných farmaceutických látok a hotových liekov. Má sídlo v Holandsku a pôsobí na medzinárodnej úrovni. |
| --- | --- |

—

Patheon je zmluvná vývojová a výrobná organizácia, ktorá ponúka svoje služby v oblasti účinných farmaceutických látok a hotových liekov. Má sídlo v Holandsku a pôsobí na medzinárodnej úrovni.

| 3. | Na základe predbežného posúdenia a bez toho, aby bolo dotknuté konečné rozhodnutie v tejto veci, sa Komisia domnieva, že oznámená transakcia by mohla patriť do rozsahu pôsobnosti nariadenia o fúziách. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Na základe predbežného posúdenia a bez toho, aby bolo dotknuté konečné rozhodnutie v tejto veci, sa Komisia domnieva, že oznámená transakcia by mohla patriť do rozsahu pôsobnosti nariadenia o fúziách.

| 4. | Komisia vyzýva zainteresované tretie strany, aby jej predložili prípadné pripomienky k zamýšľanej koncentrácii.
  Pripomienky musia byť Komisii doručené najneskôr do 10 dní od dátumu uverejnenia tohto oznámenia. Pripomienky je možné zaslať faxom (+32 22964301), e-mailom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu alebo poštou s uvedením referenčného čísla M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. – Patheon N.V. na túto adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisia vyzýva zainteresované tretie strany, aby jej predložili prípadné pripomienky k zamýšľanej koncentrácii.

Pripomienky musia byť Komisii doručené najneskôr do 10 dní od dátumu uverejnenia tohto oznámenia. Pripomienky je možné zaslať faxom (+32 22964301), e-mailom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu alebo poštou s uvedením referenčného čísla M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. – Patheon N.V. na túto adresu:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 24, 29.1.2004, s. 1 („nariadenie o fúziách“).

---

INÉ AKTY

Európska komisia

| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/20

---

OZNÁMENIE – VEREJNÁ KONZULTÁCIA

Zemepisné označenia z Japonska

(2017/C 242/10)

V rámci prebiehajúcich rokovaní s Japonskom o dohode o voľnom obchode (ďalej len „dohoda“) vrátane kapitoly o zemepisných označeniach japonské orgány predložili zoznam zemepisných označení, ktorý je pripojený k tomuto dokumentu, s cieľom zabezpečiť ich ochranu na základe dohody. Európska komisia v súčasnosti posudzuje, či tieto zemepisné označenia budú podľa budúcej dohody chránené ako zemepisné označenia v zmysle článku 22 ods. 1 Dohody o obchodných aspektoch práv duševného vlastníctva.

Komisia vyzýva všetky členské štáty alebo tretie krajiny, resp. fyzické alebo právnické osoby s legitímnym záujmom, ktoré majú bydlisko alebo sídlo v niektorom členskom štáte alebo tretej krajine, na predloženie námietok voči takejto ochrane v podobe náležite odôvodneného vyhlásenia.

Vznesené námietky sa musia Komisii doručiť do dvoch mesiacov po uverejnení tohto oznámenia. Vznesené námietky by sa mali zaslať na túto e-mailovú adresu: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu.

Vznesené námietky sa preskúmajú, len ak budú doručené v uvedenej lehote a ak z nich vyplynie, že ochrana navrhovaného názvu by mala tieto dôsledky:

| a) | názov by bol v rozpore s názvom odrody rastlín alebo živočíšneho plemena, čo by spotrebiteľa mohlo uviesť do omylu, pokiaľ ide o skutočný pôvod výrobku; |
| --- | --- |

a)

názov by bol v rozpore s názvom odrody rastlín alebo živočíšneho plemena, čo by spotrebiteľa mohlo uviesť do omylu, pokiaľ ide o skutočný pôvod výrobku;

| b) | názov by bol čiastočným alebo úplným homonymom názvu, ktorý je už v Únii chránený podľa nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1151/2012 z 21. novembra 2012 o systémoch kvality pre poľnohospodárske výrobky a potraviny (1), alebo sa nachádza v dohodách, ktoré Únia uzatvorila s týmito krajinami:






  — | štáty SADC-DHP (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambik, Namíbia, Svazijsko a Južná Afrika) (2), |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

názov by bol čiastočným alebo úplným homonymom názvu, ktorý je už v Únii chránený podľa nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 1151/2012 z 21. novembra 2012 o systémoch kvality pre poľnohospodárske výrobky a potraviny (1), alebo sa nachádza v dohodách, ktoré Únia uzatvorila s týmito krajinami:

—

štáty SADC-DHP (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambik, Namíbia, Svazijsko a Južná Afrika) (2),

| — | Švajčiarsko (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

Švajčiarsko (3),

| — | Kórea (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

Kórea (4),

| — | Stredná Amerika (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

Stredná Amerika (5),

| — | Kolumbia, Peru a Ekvádor (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

Kolumbia, Peru a Ekvádor (6),

| — | Čierna Hora (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

Čierna Hora (7),

| — | Bosna a Hercegovina (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosna a Hercegovina (8),

| — | Srbsko (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

Srbsko (9),

| — | Moldavsko (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldavsko (10),

| — | Ukrajina (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukrajina (11),

| — | Gruzínsko (12), |
| --- | --- |

—

Gruzínsko (12),

| c) | ochrana názvu by vzhľadom na povesť ochrannej známky, jej všeobecnú známosť a obdobie jej používania mohla uviesť spotrebiteľa do omylu, pokiaľ ide o skutočnú totožnosť výrobku; |
| --- | --- |

c)

ochrana názvu by vzhľadom na povesť ochrannej známky, jej všeobecnú známosť a obdobie jej používania mohla uviesť spotrebiteľa do omylu, pokiaľ ide o skutočnú totožnosť výrobku;

| d) | ochrana názvu by ohrozila existenciu úplne alebo čiastočne totožného názvu, resp. úplne alebo čiastočne totožnej ochrannej známky alebo existenciu výrobkov, ktoré sú ku dňu zverejnenia tohto oznámenia legálne na trhu minimálne päť rokov; |
| --- | --- |

d)

ochrana názvu by ohrozila existenciu úplne alebo čiastočne totožného názvu, resp. úplne alebo čiastočne totožnej ochrannej známky alebo existenciu výrobkov, ktoré sú ku dňu zverejnenia tohto oznámenia legálne na trhu minimálne päť rokov;

| e) | alebo ak námietky obsahujú informácie, na základe ktorých možno vyvodiť záver, že názov, ktorého ochrana sa posudzuje, je všeobecným názvom. |
| --- | --- |

e)

alebo ak námietky obsahujú informácie, na základe ktorých možno vyvodiť záver, že názov, ktorého ochrana sa posudzuje, je všeobecným názvom.

Uvedené kritériá sa posúdia vo vzťahu k územiu Únie, ktoré v prípade práv duševného vlastníctva znamená výlučne územie alebo územia, kde sa uvedené práva ochraňujú. Prípadná ochrana týchto názvov v Európskej únii je podmienená úspešným ukončením týchto rokovaní a následným prijatím právneho aktu.

Zoznam zemepisných označení
   (13)

| Chránený názov v Japonsku | Transkripcia (len na informačné účely) | Kategória a opis výrobku |
| --- | --- | --- |
| „

  “/„Džusankosan Jamato Šidžimi“ | Džusankosan Jamato Šidžimi | Čerstvé ryby, kôrovce, mäkkýše a výrobky z nich – schránkovce |
| „

  “/„Curadžima Gobou“ | Curadžima Gobou | Ovocie, zelenina a obilniny v pôvodnom stave alebo spracované – lopúch |
| „

  “ | Jamagata | Iné výrobky prílohy I k zmluve (koreniny atď.) – ostatné kvasené nápoje – sejšu (saké) |
| „

  “/„hovädzie mäso Maesawa“ | Maesawa Gjú | Čerstvé mäso (a droby) – hovädzie |
| „

  “/„Jonezawagjú“ | Jonezawa Gjú | Čerstvé mäso (a droby) – hovädzie |
| „

  “/„Tokusan Macusaka Uši“ | Tokusan Macusaka Uši | Čerstvé mäso (a droby) – hovädzie |
| „

  “/„Nišio Mača“ | Nišio no Mača | Iné výrobky prílohy I k zmluve (koreniny atď.) – zelený čaj v prášku |

Chránený názov v Japonsku

Transkripcia (len na informačné účely)

Kategória a opis výrobku

Image

Džusankosan Jamato Šidžimi

Čerstvé ryby, kôrovce, mäkkýše a výrobky z nich – schránkovce

Image

Curadžima Gobou

Ovocie, zelenina a obilniny v pôvodnom stave alebo spracované – lopúch

Image

Jamagata

Iné výrobky prílohy I k zmluve (koreniny atď.) – ostatné kvasené nápoje – sejšu (saké)

Image

Maesawa Gjú

Čerstvé mäso (a droby) – hovädzie

Image

Jonezawa Gjú

Čerstvé mäso (a droby) – hovädzie

Image

Tokusan Macusaka Uši

Čerstvé mäso (a droby) – hovädzie

Image

Nišio no Mača

Iné výrobky prílohy I k zmluve (koreniny atď.) – zelený čaj v prášku

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 343, 14.12.2012, s. 1.

(2)  Rozhodnutie Rady (EÚ) 2016/1623 z 1. júna 2016 o podpise a predbežnom vykonávaní Dohody o hospodárskom partnerstve medzi Európskou úniou a jej členskými štátmi na jednej strane a štátmi SADC-DHP na strane druhej v mene Európskej únie (Ú. v. EÚ L 250, 16.9.2016, s. 1).

(3)  Rozhodnutie Rady a Komisie 2002/309/ES, Euratom, o dohode o vedeckej a technologickej spolupráci zo 4. apríla 2002 o uzavretí siedmich dohôd so Švajčiarskou konfederáciou (Ú. v. ES L 114, 30.4.2002, s. 1), a najmä dohoda medzi Európskym spoločenstvom a Švajčiarskou konfederáciou o obchode s poľnohospodárskymi výrobkami – príloha 7.

(4)  Rozhodnutie Rady 2011/265/EÚ zo 16. septembra 2010 o podpísaní v mene Európskej únie a o predbežnom vykonávaní Dohody o voľnom obchode medzi Európskou úniou a jej členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Kórejskou republikou na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 127, 14.5.2011, s. 1).

(5)  Dohoda, ktorou sa zakladá pridruženie medzi Európskou úniou a jej členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Strednou Amerikou na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 346, 15.12.2012, s. 3).

(6)  Dohoda o obchode medzi Európskou úniou a jej členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Kolumbiou a Peru na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 354, 21.12.2012, s. 3) a Protokol o pristúpení k Dohode o obchode medzi Európskou úniou a jej členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Kolumbiou a Peru na strane druhej na účely zohľadnenia pristúpenia Ekvádoru (Ú. v. EÚ L 356, 24.12.2016, s. 3).

(7)  Rozhodnutie Rady 2007/855/ES z 15. októbra 2007 o podpísaní a uzavretí Dočasnej dohody o obchode a obchodných záležitostiach medzi Európskym spoločenstvom na jednej strane a Čiernohorskou republikou na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 345, 28.12.2007, s. 1).

(8)  Rozhodnutie Rady 2008/474/ES zo 16. júna 2008 o podpísaní a uzavretí Dočasnej dohody o obchode a obchodných záležitostiach medzi Európskym spoločenstvom na jednej strane a Bosnou a Hercegovinou na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 169, 30.6.2008, s. 10, protokol 6).

(9)  Rozhodnutie Rady 2010/36/ES z 29. apríla 2008 o podpise a uzavretí Dočasnej dohody o obchode a obchodných záležitostiach medzi Európskym spoločenstvom na jednej strane a Srbskou republikou na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 28, 30.1.2010, s. 1).

(10)  Rozhodnutie Rady 2013/7/EÚ z 3. decembra 2012 o uzavretí Dohody medzi Európskou úniou a Moldavskou republikou o ochrane zemepisných označení poľnohospodárskych výrobkov a potravín (Ú. v. EÚ L 10, 15.1.2013, s. 1).

(11)  Dohoda o pridružení medzi Európskou úniou a jej členskými štátmi na jednej strane a Ukrajinou na strane druhej (Ú. v. EÚ L 161, 29.5.2014).

(12)  Rozhodnutie Rady 2012/164/EÚ zo 14. februára 2012 o uzavretí Dohody medzi Európskou úniou a Gruzínskom o ochrane zemepisných označení poľnohospodárskych výrobkov a potravín (Ú. v. EÚ L 93, 30.3.2012, s. 1).

(13)  Zoznam poskytli japonské orgány v rámci prebiehajúcich rokovaní; názvy sú zapísané v príslušnom registri Japonska.

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| 27.7.2017 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 242/22 |
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27.7.2017

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 242/22

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Oznámenie určené osobám menom Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a subjektom s názvom OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, ktoré boli vykonávacím nariadením Komisie (EÚ) 2017/1390 pridané do zoznamu podľa článkov 2, 3 a 7 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 881/2002 z 27. mája 2002, ktoré ukladá niektoré špecifické obmedzujúce opatrenia namierené proti niektorým osobám a subjektom spojeným s organizáciami ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káida

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | V rozhodnutí Rady (SZBP) 2016/1693 (1) sa Únia vyzýva, aby zmrazila finančné prostriedky a hospodárske zdroje členov organizácií ISIL (Dá’iš) a al-Káida a ďalších s nimi spojených jednotlivcov, skupín, podnikov a subjektov uvedených v zozname vyhotovenom podľa rezolúcií BR OSN č. 1267 (1999) a č. 1333 (2000), ktorý má pravidelne aktualizovať výbor OSN zriadený podľa rezolúcie BR OSN č. 1267 (1999).
  Zoznam vyhotovený týmto výborom OSN zahŕňa:






  — | ISIL (Dá’iš) a al-Káidu, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

V rozhodnutí Rady (SZBP) 2016/1693 (1) sa Únia vyzýva, aby zmrazila finančné prostriedky a hospodárske zdroje členov organizácií ISIL (Dá’iš) a al-Káida a ďalších s nimi spojených jednotlivcov, skupín, podnikov a subjektov uvedených v zozname vyhotovenom podľa rezolúcií BR OSN č. 1267 (1999) a č. 1333 (2000), ktorý má pravidelne aktualizovať výbor OSN zriadený podľa rezolúcie BR OSN č. 1267 (1999).

Zoznam vyhotovený týmto výborom OSN zahŕňa:

—

ISIL (Dá’iš) a al-Káidu,

| — | fyzické alebo právnické osoby, subjekty, orgány a skupiny spojené s ISIL (Dá’išom) a al-Káidou, ako aj |
| --- | --- |

—

fyzické alebo právnické osoby, subjekty, orgány a skupiny spojené s ISIL (Dá’išom) a al-Káidou, ako aj

| — | právnické osoby, subjekty a orgány, ktoré sú vlastnené alebo kontrolované uvedenými osobami, subjektmi, orgánmi a skupinami alebo ktoré uvedené osoby, subjekty, orgány a skupiny podporujú. |
| --- | --- |

—

právnické osoby, subjekty a orgány, ktoré sú vlastnené alebo kontrolované uvedenými osobami, subjektmi, orgánmi a skupinami alebo ktoré uvedené osoby, subjekty, orgány a skupiny podporujú.

Činy alebo aktivity, ktoré naznačujú, že osoba, skupina, podnik alebo subjekt sú „spojené“ s ISIL (Dá’išom) a al-Káidou, zahŕňajú:

| a) | účasť na financovaní, plánovaní, napomáhaní, príprave alebo páchaní činov alebo aktivít ISIL (Dá’išu) a al-Káidy alebo ktorejkoľvek jej bunky, pobočky, frakčnej alebo odvodenej skupiny, alebo vykonávanie uvedeného v spojení s nimi, pod ich menom, v ich mene alebo na ich podporu; |
| --- | --- |

a)

účasť na financovaní, plánovaní, napomáhaní, príprave alebo páchaní činov alebo aktivít ISIL (Dá’išu) a al-Káidy alebo ktorejkoľvek jej bunky, pobočky, frakčnej alebo odvodenej skupiny, alebo vykonávanie uvedeného v spojení s nimi, pod ich menom, v ich mene alebo na ich podporu;

| b) | dodávanie, predaj alebo prevoz zbraní a súvisiaceho materiálu ktorejkoľvek z nich; |
| --- | --- |

b)

dodávanie, predaj alebo prevoz zbraní a súvisiaceho materiálu ktorejkoľvek z nich;

| c) | nábor osôb pre ktorúkoľvek z nich alebo |
| --- | --- |

c)

nábor osôb pre ktorúkoľvek z nich alebo

| d) | inú podporu činov alebo aktivít ktorejkoľvek z nich. |
| --- | --- |

d)

inú podporu činov alebo aktivít ktorejkoľvek z nich.

| 2. | Výbor Bezpečnostnej rady OSN 20. júla 2017 schválil pridanie záznamov osobám menom Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a subjektom s názvom OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa do zoznamu sankčného výboru pre ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káidu.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa môžu ombudsmanovi OSN kedykoľvek predložiť spolu s podpornou dokumentáciou žiadosť o prehodnotenie rozhodnutia zaradiť ich do uvedeného zoznamu OSN. Takúto žiadosť je potrebné zaslať na adresu:





  United Nations – Office of Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Tel. +1 212 963 2671 |
| Fax +1 212 963 1300/3778 |
| E-mail: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

Výbor Bezpečnostnej rady OSN 20. júla 2017 schválil pridanie záznamov osobám menom Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a subjektom s názvom OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa do zoznamu sankčného výboru pre ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káidu.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa môžu ombudsmanovi OSN kedykoľvek predložiť spolu s podpornou dokumentáciou žiadosť o prehodnotenie rozhodnutia zaradiť ich do uvedeného zoznamu OSN. Takúto žiadosť je potrebné zaslať na adresu:

United Nations – Office of Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel. +1 212 963 2671

Fax +1 212 963 1300/3778

E-mail: ombudsperson@un.org

Viac informácii možno nájsť na webovej stránke: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | V nadväznosti na rozhodnutie OSN uvedené v bode 2 prijala Komisia vykonávacie nariadenie (EÚ) 2017/1390 (2), ktorým sa mení príloha I k nariadeniu Rady (ES) č. 881/2002 z 27. mája 2002, ktoré ukladá niektoré špecifické obmedzujúce opatrenia namierené proti niektorým osobám a subjektom spojeným s organizáciami ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káida (3). Týmito zmenami podľa článku 7 ods. 1 písm. a) a článku 7a ods. 1 nariadenia (ES) č. 881/2002 sa do zoznamu v prílohe I k tomuto nariadeniu (ďalej len „príloha I“) pridávajú mená Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a názvy OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa.
  Podľa nariadenia (ES) č. 881/2002 sa na osoby a subjekty zaradené do prílohy I vzťahujú tieto opatrenia:






  (1) | zmrazenie všetkých finančných prostriedkov a hospodárskych zdrojov, ktoré im patria alebo sa nachádzajú v ich vlastníctve alebo držbe, ako aj zákaz (pre všetkých) sprístupniť im alebo v ich prospech, priamo alebo nepriamo, akékoľvek finančné prostriedky a hospodárske zdroje (článok 2 a článok 2a), ako aj |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

V nadväznosti na rozhodnutie OSN uvedené v bode 2 prijala Komisia vykonávacie nariadenie (EÚ) 2017/1390 (2), ktorým sa mení príloha I k nariadeniu Rady (ES) č. 881/2002 z 27. mája 2002, ktoré ukladá niektoré špecifické obmedzujúce opatrenia namierené proti niektorým osobám a subjektom spojeným s organizáciami ISIL (Dá'iš) a al-Káida (3). Týmito zmenami podľa článku 7 ods. 1 písm. a) a článku 7a ods. 1 nariadenia (ES) č. 881/2002 sa do zoznamu v prílohe I k tomuto nariadeniu (ďalej len „príloha I“) pridávajú mená Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili a názvy OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POBOČKA NACHÁDZAJÚCA SA V ALBU KAMAL, SÝRSKA ARABSKÁ REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa.

Podľa nariadenia (ES) č. 881/2002 sa na osoby a subjekty zaradené do prílohy I vzťahujú tieto opatrenia:

(1)

zmrazenie všetkých finančných prostriedkov a hospodárskych zdrojov, ktoré im patria alebo sa nachádzajú v ich vlastníctve alebo držbe, ako aj zákaz (pre všetkých) sprístupniť im alebo v ich prospech, priamo alebo nepriamo, akékoľvek finančné prostriedky a hospodárske zdroje (článok 2 a článok 2a), ako aj

| (2) | zákaz priamo alebo nepriamo im poskytovať, predávať, dodávať alebo pre nich vykonávať technické poradenstvo, pomoc alebo odbornú prípravu súvisiace s vojenskými činnosťami (článok 3). |
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(2)

zákaz priamo alebo nepriamo im poskytovať, predávať, dodávať alebo pre nich vykonávať technické poradenstvo, pomoc alebo odbornú prípravu súvisiace s vojenskými činnosťami (článok 3).

| 4. | V článku 7a nariadenia (ES) č. 881/2002 sa stanovuje postup preskúmania, v rámci ktorého osoba, subjekt, orgán alebo skupina uvedené v zozname predložia pripomienky k dôvodom zaradenia do zoznamu. Osoby a subjekty, ktoré boli vykonávacím nariadením (EÚ) 2017/1390 pridané do prílohy I, môžu Komisiu požiadať o uvedenie dôvodov ich zaradenia do zoznamu. Takúto žiadosť je potrebné zaslať na túto adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| „Restrictive measures“ |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/ Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

V článku 7a nariadenia (ES) č. 881/2002 sa stanovuje postup preskúmania, v rámci ktorého osoba, subjekt, orgán alebo skupina uvedené v zozname predložia pripomienky k dôvodom zaradenia do zoznamu. Osoby a subjekty, ktoré boli vykonávacím nariadením (EÚ) 2017/1390 pridané do prílohy I, môžu Komisiu požiadať o uvedenie dôvodov ich zaradenia do zoznamu. Takúto žiadosť je potrebné zaslať na túto adresu:

European Commission

„Restrictive measures“

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/ Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Do pozornosti dotknutých osôb a subjektov sa takisto dáva skutočnosť, že v súlade s podmienkami stanovenými vo štvrtom a v šiestom odseku článku 263 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie môžu vykonávacie nariadenie (EÚ) 2017/1390 napadnúť na Všeobecnom súde Európskej únie. |
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5.

Do pozornosti dotknutých osôb a subjektov sa takisto dáva skutočnosť, že v súlade s podmienkami stanovenými vo štvrtom a v šiestom odseku článku 263 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie môžu vykonávacie nariadenie (EÚ) 2017/1390 napadnúť na Všeobecnom súde Európskej únie.

| 6. | Pre poriadok sa do pozornosti osôb a subjektov zaradených do prílohy I dáva skutočnosť, že môžu predložiť príslušným orgánom daného členského štátu či štátov, ktoré sú uvedené v prílohe II k nariadeniu (ES) č. 881/2002, žiadosť o povolenie použiť zmrazené finančné prostriedky a hospodárske zdroje na pokrytie základných potrieb alebo na osobitné platby podľa článku 2a uvedeného nariadenia. |
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6.

Pre poriadok sa do pozornosti osôb a subjektov zaradených do prílohy I dáva skutočnosť, že môžu predložiť príslušným orgánom daného členského štátu či štátov, ktoré sú uvedené v prílohe II k nariadeniu (ES) č. 881/2002, žiadosť o povolenie použiť zmrazené finančné prostriedky a hospodárske zdroje na pokrytie základných potrieb alebo na osobitné platby podľa článku 2a uvedeného nariadenia.

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(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 255, 21.9.2016, s. 25.

(2)  Ú. v. EÚ L 195, 27.7.2017, s. 11.

(3)  Ú. v. ES L 139, 29.5.2002, s. 9.

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