Affirmed; Opinion Filed June 18, 2015.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-14-00836-CR

No. 05-14-00837-CR

No. 05-14-00838-CR

MATTHEW LOUIS REESE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1400306-P, No. F13-60347-P, F13-00723-P

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Brown, and Justice Stoddart

Opinion by Justice Stoddart

This appeal involves three separate cases, each of which was resolved by a plea bargain. 

In cause number 05-14-00838-CR, Reese pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child 

with a deadly weapon; the trial court sentenced him to 55 years’ confinement. In cause number 

05-14-00837-CR, Reese pleaded guilty to sexual assault of a child; the trial court sentenced him 

to 20 years’ confinement. In cause number 05-14-00836-CR, Reese pleaded guilty to aggravated 

assault causing serious bodily injury; the trial court sentenced him to 20 years’ confinement. 

The trial court stacked the sentences, ordering the sentence in 05-14-00837-CR begin 

only when the judgment and sentence in 05-14-00838-CR ceased to operate, and the sentence in 

05-14-00836-CR begin when the judgment and sentence in 05-14-00837-CR ceased to operate. 
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The trial court also assessed fines in each cause number. In two issues, Reese argues the trial 

court erred by ordering the sentences in cause numbers 05-14-00836-CR and 05-14-00837-CR 

be served consecutively and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear all three cases and render 

judgment because the cases were not transferred to its docket. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

We begin by considering Reese’s arguments the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 

cases because they were not transferred to the trial court’s docket. The fact that the record does 

not contain a transfer order is an error of procedure and not jurisdiction. See, e.g., Goff v. State,

No. 05-13-00876-CR, 2014 WL 259668, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (citing Lemasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d); Bridwell v. State, No. 05–07–00258–CR, 2008 WL 467271,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 23, 2008, no pet.) (not designated for publication)). The absence 

of a transfer order in the record does not render the actions of the transferee court void. Id.

(citing Lemasurier, 91 S.W.3d at 899; Bridwell, 2008 WL 467271, at *2). Rather, it merely 

makes the transferee court’s action subject to a timely plea to the jurisdiction. Id. (citing

Lemasurier, 91 S.W.3d at 899). If a defendant fails to file a timely plea to the jurisdiction, he 

waives any right to complain that a transfer order does not appear in the record. Id. (citing Mills 

v. State, 742 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); Bridwell, 2008 WL 467271, at 

*2). 

Reese did not file a timely plea to the jurisdiction in any of the three cases and has 

waived his right to complain that the transfer order does not appear in the record. We overrule 

his issues arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear all three cases and render judgment 

because the cases were not transferred to its docket. 
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Reese also argues the trial court erred by ordering his sentences run cumulative to one 

another; he asserts the sentences should not be “stacked.” A trial court has discretion to impose 

concurrent or cumulative sentences, and “so long as the law authorizes the imposition of 

cumulative sentences, a trial judge has absolute discretion to stack sentences.” Ellington v. State,

No. 05-12-01625-CR, 2013 WL 6405486, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2013, pet. ref’d) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 764, 765 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d); Hurley v. State, 130 S.W.3d 501, 504 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes consecutive 

sentences where the law requires concurrent sentences. See Nicholas, 56 S.W.3d at 764.

Generally, sentences that arise out of the same criminal episode must be served 

concurrently. Bonilla v. State, 452 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing TEX. PENAL 

CODE §3.03(a)). However, penal code section 3.03(b)(2)(A) provides for an exception and 

permits the trial judge to cumulate sentences for child sexual abuse offenses: 

If the accused is found guilty of more than one offense arising out of the same 

criminal episode, the sentences may run concurrently or consecutively if each 

sentence is for a conviction of ... an offense ... under Section 33.021 or an offense 

under Section 21.02, 21.11, 22.011, 22.021, 25.02, or 43.25 committed against a 

victim younger than 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense 

regardless of whether the accused is convicted of violations of the same section 

more than once or is convicted of violations of more than one section[.]

TEX. PENAL CODE §3.03(b)(2)(A).

Reese was convicted of committing two offenses in violation of section 22.021 (cause 

numbers 05-14-00837-CR and 05-14-00838-CR). An offense under section 22.021 is included 

in section 3.03(b)(2)(A). TEX. PENAL CODE §3.03(b)(2)(A). Therefore, we conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Reese’s sentence in 05-14-00837-CR begin 

only when the judgment and sentence in 05-14-00838-CR ceased to operate.
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Reese’s third conviction is for violation of section 22.02 of the penal code (cause number 

05-14-00836-CR), which is not listed in section 3.03 as a sentence for which the trial court may 

order the sentences run consecutively. However, section 3.03 only applies to sentences for 

offenses arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single criminal action. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE §3.03(a). Reese argues his convictions in 05-14-00836-CR and 05-14-00837-

CR were prosecuted in a single criminal action. We disagree. The record shows the judgment in 

05-14-00837-CR was entered on June 18, 2014. However, the trial court did not conduct the 

plea proceedings in 05-14-00836-CR until the following day. Because the plea proceedings and 

assessments of punishment were conducted separately, we conclude the cases were not 

prosecuted in a single criminal action. See Robbins v. State, 914 S.W.2d 582, 583–84 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996). The trial court had discretion to stack the sentences. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. ART. 42.08. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/ Craig Stoddart/

CRAIG STODDART

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

140836F.U05
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

MATTHEW LOUIS REESE, Appellant

No. 05-14-00836-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1400306-P.

Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. Chief 

Justice Wright and Justice Brown 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 18th day of June, 2015.
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

MATTHEW LOUIS REESE, Appellant

No. 05-14-00837-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1460347-P.

Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. Chief 

Justice Wright and Justice Brown 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 18th day of June, 2015.

 
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

MATTHEW LOUIS REESE, Appellant

No. 05-14-00838-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-13-00723-P

Opinion delivered by Justice Stoddart. Chief 

Justice Wright and Justice Brown 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 18th day of June, 2015.