In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-3930

LEE ANN SCHMIDT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 05 C 741—John C. Shabaz, Judge.

____________

ARGUED MAY 4, 2007—DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2007

____________

Before POSNER, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Lee Ann Schmidt appeals the

district court’s order upholding the denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income by the Social Security Administration.

Schmidt contends that the administrative law judge

(“ALJ”) erred by not giving controlling weight to her

treating physicians’ opinions, by finding that her testimony

lacked credibility, and by failing to take into account

additional limitations when questioning the vocational

expert. We affirm.
2 No. 06-3930

I.

Lee Ann Schmidt suffers from a series of health problems, beginning with a back injury that she sustained at

work in November 1996. She sought treatment from

T. Sunil Thomas, M.D., from January 1997 through March

1998. Dr. Thomas performed two surgeries on Schmidt’s

back, a left-side laminectomy and disketomy at L5-S1, and

an anterior disketomy and fusion at L5-S1.

In May 1998, Schmidt moved to Oklahoma and continued

her treatment with Jeffery Nees, M.D. On December 14,

1998, Dr. Nees stated that Schmidt had a normal gait, good

bilateral heel and toe walking, and she showed “no gross

deficits to my exam today.” He concluded that Schmidt

“ha[d] reached fairly maximum medical benefit,” and

released her from his care with the understanding that

she would undertake vocational rehabilitation. Approximately one month later, Dr. Nees stated that, in his opinion, Schmidt’s existing ailments resulted in a 45% permanent disability. He further opined that Schmidt could

return to limited employment on February 1, 1999, with the

restriction that she not lift more than fifteen pounds at a

time, avoid repetitive bending, stooping, or twisting, and

that she be allowed to change position freely.

Schmidt returned to Wisconsin and to Dr. Thomas for

evaluation and follow-up care. In November 1999, Dr.

Thomas completed a Wisconsin Department of Workforce

Development form indicating that Schmidt was able to

work part-time, with limitations. Approximately two

months later, Dr. Thomas opined that he agreed with Dr.

Nees’ assessment of Schmidt, including Dr. Nees’ conclusion that Schmidt had been capable of working half-days

(four hours per day) since February 1, 1999.
No. 06-3930 3

Two years later, in February 2002, Nathaniel S. Jalil,

M.D., an internist/nephrologist, evaluated Schmidt. Dr.

Jalil opined that Schmidt had “no significant past medical

history except for depression[,]” for which “she is on

Zoloft.” Schmidt reported to Dr. Jalil that she had a

“history of pain in both knee joints off and on for many

years.” She also stated that she had been working at a

new job that required her to stand continuously for four

hours, which caused her to experience pain in both of her

knee joints and her back. Dr. Jalil concluded that “[overall],

the patient is doing pretty good.” He prescribed an antiinflammatory for Schmidt’s sore knees, encouraged her to

continue walking, and referred her to Scott E. Cameron,

M.D., an orthopaedic surgeon. Dr. Cameron evaluated

Schmidt’s knees and diagnosed her with bilateral

hypermobile patellae with positive apprehension signs

bilaterally. He also noted that Schmidt had no effusion,

crepitance, tenderness, or arthritic changes, and her X-rays

were unremarkable. Finally, Dr. Cameron recommended

that Schmidt adjust her lifestyle to accommodate her knees.

In March 2002, Somsak Tanawattanacharoen, M.D.,

evaluated Schmidt for chronic low back pain. Schmidt told

Dr. Tanawattanacharoen that she was working part-time

with a work restriction due to her low back pain. In his

examination of Schmidt, Dr. Tanawattanacharoen found no

evidence of lumbar disc syndrome, no tenderness or

muscle spasms, normal bilateral straight-leg raising,

normal neurological functions, 5/5 muscle strength in the

lower extremities, no weakness of the big toe muscles, and

intact sensation along the lateral aspects of both feet. Dr.

Tanawattanacharoen then prescribed anti-inflammatory

medication and physical therapy. Later that month,

Schmidt failed to show up for her first physical therapy
4 No. 06-3930

1 In March 2002, Schmidt applied for disability insurance

benefits and supplemental security income, which triggered the

state agency’s review of her medical records.

session because she forgot about it, but she stated that

she would reschedule after she returned from a twoweek vacation if she was still having problems. Schmidt

never rescheduled.

In July 2002, Schmidt called Dr. Jalil’s office to request

medication to alleviate her back pain, and Dr. Jalil prescribed Ultracet. Later that month, Dr. Jalil reevaluated

Schmidt, who was requesting a doctor’s note stating that

she needed to live on a first-floor apartment in addition to

pain medication samples. Dr. Jalil noted that Schmidt

complained that she still was experiencing back pain that

radiated down her legs stemming from her back surgery,

and that she was taking medication that he prescribed to

her to alleviate her pain. Other than her back pain, Dr. Jalil

opined that Schmidt was “doing very good.” Following

his examination, he provided Schmidt with the note that

she requested and some medication samples.

In July 2002 and January 2003, two physicians working

on behalf of a state agency reviewed Schmidt’s medical

records.1

 They concluded that Schmidt could perform

work consistent with medium exertion. The state physicians noted, however, that Schmidt had postural limitations on some activities, such as stooping, kneeling,

crouching, and crawling.

In February 2003, Schmidt returned to Dr. Jalil complaining about a recent flare-up of her back and joint pain. Dr.

Jalil referred Schmidt to a rheumatologist, Marlon J.

Navarro, M.D. When Dr. Navarro examined Schmidt a
No. 06-3930 5

few days later, she complained of constant dull back pain,

constant numbness and tingling in her left leg, increased

stiffness in her lower back, intermittent ankle, wrist,

hand, and hip pain, hypermobile patellae, and swollen

knee and ankle joints. She also told Dr. Navarro that she

was performing all of her activities of daily living, but

she was no longer employed, and she was applying for

Social Security disability. Dr. Navarro opined that Schmidt

had a normal neurological examination with intact sensation and systematic normal deep tendon reflexes in both

her upper and lower extremities. While Schmidt stated

that it was too painful for her to flex her lumbar spine,

Dr. Navaro found that her right and left rotation and

flexion were normal. He further opined that Schmidt’s

sacroiliac maneuvers were negative, she had no spinal

tenderness, and her total body examination did not reveal

any swelling, restricted motion, tenderness, or instability.

Ultimately, Dr. Navarro diagnosed Schmidt as suffering

from joint and back pain, and, with the exception of her

knee condition, Schmidt’s pain likely was the result of

early degenerative joint disease. He then recommended

that Schmidt use different pain medications and referred

her to a pain clinic for her joint pain.

Approximately one week later, Schmidt had another

follow-up appointment with Dr. Jalil. Dr. Jalil noted that

Schmidt complained of back pain and pain radiating

into her lower extremities, especially on the left side.

Schmidt further complained of difficulty bending over,

sitting up from a supine position, and prolonged standing.

When Dr. Jalil examined Schmidt, he found no focal

neurological deficits and normal superficial and deep

tendon reflexes, but her gait was slightly unstable, her leg

raising was positive on the left, she had some spinal
6 No. 06-3930

tenderness, and she had a slight sensory deficit over her

big and second toes. Dr. Jalil reassured Schmidt that the

pain in her back was due to osteoarthritis and her previous

back surgeries, and noted that Schmidt had a generally

benign physical examination. He noted that “[a]t this

stage, not much can be done for her back pain[,]” and

he did not recommend any treatment beyond Schmidt’s

previously prescribed medications.

The next month, April 2003, Schmidt returned to Dr. Jalil

complaining of numbness in her left leg. When Dr. Jalil

examined Schmidt, he again did not detect any additional

physical problems. He then referred Schmidt to a neurologist, Sarat Ahluwalia, M.D. Two weeks later, Dr. Ahluwalia

examined Schmidt. Schmidt complained of chronic back

and leg pain and new symptoms of right leg pain with

radiation. Following her examination, Dr. Ahluwalia

concluded that Schmidt was in no apparent distress and

had only mild neck tenderness. Schmidt’s motor examination showed normal strength in both of her upper extremities, but her lower extremity examination revealed

mild muscle weakness, some decreased sensation, and

brisk reflexes on her left side. Dr. Ahluwalia diagnosed

Schmidt as suffering from low back pain with some

radicular features and recommended that she undergo

another magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scan of her

spine. Schmidt’s MRI of her lumbar spine showed satisfactory post-operative changes, no defined recurrent or

residual disc protrusion or bulging, and only mild facet

degenerative changes and a possible cyst. The MRI of

Schmidt’s cervical spine showed a small broad-based

right disc protrusion with very mild stenosis. Dr.

Ahluwalia prescribed physical therapy, a Transcutaneous

Electrical Nerve Stimulation (“TENS”) unit, and medication.
No. 06-3930 7

In June 2003, Schmidt had an electromyograph (“EMG”)

and nerve conduction studies of her left leg, which showed

normal results with no evidence of radiculopathy or

neuropathy. That same month, Schmidt returned to Dr.

Ahluwalia for a follow-up examination. She reported that

her symptoms were unchanged. When Dr. Ahluwalia

examined Schmidt, she noted that Schmidt had normal

motor examination with full strength in all muscle groups,

with the exception of mild weakness in her left toe. She

also reviewed Schmidt’s diagnostic tests. Dr. Ahluwalia

concluded that Schmidt’s back and neck pain were

myofascial, so she recommended additional testing and

an MRI scan of Schmidt’s brain. She further recommended

that Schmidt continue taking her medication and undergoing physical therapy.

The next week, Schmidt saw Dr. Jalil for a follow-up

examination. Schmidt again complained of numbness and

tingling in her upper and lower extremities, as well as neck

pain. Following his examination, Dr. Jalil noted that he

“did not find anything significant.” He slightly adjusted Schmidt’s pain medication and scheduled her for

a follow-up visit in three months.

Contrary to Dr. Ahluwalia’s treatment plan, Schmidt

began skipping her physical therapy sessions. While

Schmidt attended two sessions in April 2003, she missed

her appointment on May 1, 2003. In notes dated July 23,

2003, Schmidt’s physical therapist stated that it was

unknown whether Schmidt met the goals of the treatment,

and if Schmidt continued to miss her appointments

without notification, then she “will be considered discharged from treatment.” Schmidt never returned to

physical therapy.
8 No. 06-3930

In October 2003, Schmidt returned to Dr. Jalil for a

follow-up examination. Schmidt complained of numerous

maladies, including short-term memory loss, numbness

and tingling in her lower extremities, dizziness, and a dry

cough. Following his examination, Dr. Jalil noted that

Schmidt had a normal ear examination, except for a little

fluid behind the right ear, an enlarged and swollen lymph

node on the right side of her neck, and bilateral rhonchi

and wheezing. He diagnosed Schmidt as suffering from

dizziness and vertigo, otitis media, and bronchitis, as

well as being a “chronic smoker.” Dr. Jalil adjusted

Schmidt’s medications and recommended that she abandon her smoking habit. He also ordered chest X-rays and

laboratory studies, all of which returned normal results.

Two months later, in December 2003, Schmidt returned

to Dr. Jalil and asked him to sign a “Functional Capacity

Questionnaire” prepared by her attorney. On that questionnaire, Dr. Jalil noted that Schmidt suffered from arthritis

of the lumbar spine, status post-fusion, arthritis of the

cervical sine, and depression. He further stated that he

prescribed for Schmidt both pain medication and medication for her depression. Dr. Jalil also checked “yes” to

indicate that Schmidt had “chronic and disabling pain”;

that her emotional condition contributed to her pain; and

that she could not be expected to concentrate and pay

attention to details after performing sedentary work for

even a few hours. He further opined that Schmidt could

perform only very low-stress jobs with the limitation that

she be able to sit or stand at her option, and that she

was incapable of even sedentary work on a sustained

basis. Finally, Dr. Jalil opined that Schmidt either

would have to leave work early or miss work more than

four times per month.
No. 06-3930 9

2 Like the state physicians’ review of Schmidt’s medical records,

this review was triggered by Schmidt’s March 2002 application

for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income.

In addition to her medical treatment for her physical

ailments, Schmidt also sought treatment for her mental

impairments from Marcus P. Desmonde, Psy.D/L.P.,

beginning in July 2002. Schmidt complained of depression

related to her physical problems and stated that she had

been taking Zoloft. Following his examination, Dr.

Desmonde noted that Schmidt’s concentration was above

average, and that she was outgoing, friendly, cooperative,

spontaneous, and uninhibited. Schmidt told Dr. Desmonde

that she did not have any thought disorders, suicidal or

homicidal ideation, or symptoms of anxiety or panic. She

also stated that the symptoms of her depression were “well

regulated on her Zoloft.” Dr. Desmonde diagnosed

Schmidt as suffering from an adjustment disorder with

depressed mode and assessed her Global Assessment of

Functioning (“GAF”) in the prior six months between fiftyfive and sixty, which indicated mild to moderate symptoms. He opined that Schmidt appeared capable of understanding simple to moderately complex instructions, as

well as interacting appropriately with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public. Dr. Desmonde did note,

however, that Schmidt “may have difficulty tolerating

the stress and pressure of full time, competitive employment at this time.”

In July 2002 and January 2003, two psychologists working on behalf of a state agency reviewed Schmidt’s medical

records.2

 They concluded that Schmidt did not have any

significant work-related limitations caused by a mental

impairment.
10 No. 06-3930

In January 2003, Schmidt began individual therapy

with a social worker, Mary T. Sirek, MSW. After missing

her first appointment, Schmidt met with Sirek, and her

chief complaints were pain and sadness. Schmidt endorsed

all of the symptoms of a major depressive disorder and

reported a previous suicide attempt that did not require

hospitalization. She also reported suffering from panic

attacks, but stated that taking Zoloft “helped significantly.”

Sirek diagnosed Schmidt as suffering from a major depressive disorder, single episode, and panic disorder with

agoraphobia in remission. She also assessed Schmidt a

current GAF score of fifty-five, which indicated a moderate impairment. Sirek recommended that Schmidt attend

bi-weekly therapy sessions.

Schmidt returned two weeks later, and Sirek described

her as “very positive” and stated that she “looks very

good today.” Sirek also noted that noted that Schmidt “did

not complain of her pain,” nor did she “seem to be in as

much pain as she has been in the past.” Schmidt then

missed several therapy sessions and was not seen again

for more than two months. When Schmidt returned to

therapy in April 2003, Schmidt told Sirek that “for the most

part . . . things have been going quite well,” with the

exception of feeling increased pain in her back, hips, and

knee. Schmidt then missed another series of therapy

sessions. On June 13, 2003, Sirek noted that Schmidt “was

a no show four times and seen only three times,” and

“[s]he never responded to my letters regarding her no

shows.” Sirek concluded that Schmidt’s “appointments

were so scattered she never really invested in her goals.”

She then discharged Schmidt from her care, citing “patient

withdraw.”

In October 2003, at the request of the state agency, Dr.

Desmonde re-evaluated Schmidt. Dr. Desmonde reviewed
No. 06-3930 11

his notes from his prior examinations of Schmidt, as well

as Sirek’s notes. He found no evidence of a personality

disorder. Ultimately, Dr. Desmonde concluded that his

current assessment was consistent with his July 2002

evaluation, namely that Schmidt suffered from an adjustment disorder with depressed mood with mild to moderate

symptoms. He reiterated that she appeared “capable of

understanding simple to complex instructions and carrying out tasks with reasonable persistence and pace for 2

to 3 hours. She interacts appropriately with co-workers,

supervisors and has little contact with the general public

in her current bookkeeping job.” Finally, he opined that

Schmidt “currently tolerates the stress and pressure of

part time employment, but may have difficulty tolerating the stress and pressure of full time, competitive

employment.”

In March 2002, during the time that she was being treated

for the physical and mental conditions discussed above,

Schmidt applied for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)

and supplemental security income (“SSI”), alleging a

disability onset date of January 24, 2002. Specifically,

Schmidt’s applications stated that her ability to work is

limited because of her “[l]ower back fusion, with nerve

damage. Both knees dislocate very easy.” The Social

Security Administration (“Agency”) denied Schmidt’s

applications at the initial stage and on reconsideration.

Schmidt then requested a hearing on her claim before

an ALJ.

During the hearing before the ALJ, Schmidt was represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf. In

addition to testifying about her back and knee pain,

Schmidt testified that she could no longer perform her

former, part-time job as a bookkeeper in a typical office
12 No. 06-3930

setting because she needed to get up and move around, she

could not sit for long periods of time, and she made errors

due to her pain. She also testified that she was able to

drive, perform household chores, cook, wash dishes, and

launder her clothes. Schmidt stated, however, that she had

difficulty with grocery shopping and had problems using

stairs. Finally, Schmidt testified that she was taking both

pain and anti-inflammatory medicine, in addition to overthe-counter Tylenol.

A vocational expert also testified during Schmidt’s

hearing before the ALJ. The ALJ asked the vocational

expert a hypothetical question regarding an individual of

Schmidt’s age, education, and previous work experience

who had similar impairments, including back and leg pain,

pain and numbness in her hand and arm, knee pain,

bilateral hyper-mobile knees, and who suffers from

depression and adjustment disorder with depressed mood.

Additionally, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to

assume that the hypothetical individual was able to

perform light work with a sit/stand option and no more

than occasional bending, twisting, stooping, kneeling,

crawling, and climbing. Finally, the ALJ told the vocational

expert to accommodate the need for reduced stress by

considering work that would not involve high production

goals or more than simple to moderately complex instructions. The vocational expert responded that such an

individual could not perform Schmidt’s past relevant work,

but could perform various other jobs with light duty

limitations, such as cashier (6,000 jobs in Wisconsin) or

assembly-type manufacturing (7,000 jobs in Wisconsin).

The vocational expert further testified that if the hypothetical individual was limited to sedentary work, the individ-
No. 06-3930 13

3 The ALJ asked the vocational expert if it was correct that there

were 5,000 additional cashier jobs available with a sedentary

restriction versus a light-duty restriction, and the vocational

expert testified that the numbers were correct.

ual could perform both cashier (11,000)3 and assembly-type

manufacturing (6,000) jobs. The vocational expert also

stated that his testimony would not change if the hypothetical individual was limited to unskilled work and

was precluded from power gripping. Noting that the

vocational expert’s testimony was based on the hypothetical individual working eight-hour days, five days per

week, Schmidt’s attorney asked if those same jobs

would be available if the hypothetical individual was

restricted to working no more than half-days or four

hours at a time. The vocational expert responded that all

of the jobs he previously identified would be eliminated.

The ALJ denied Schmidt’s applications for DIB and SSI

benefits, holding that Schmidt failed to carry her burden of

proving that she was disabled within the meaning of the

Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Specifically,

the ALJ concluded that Schmidt failed to show that she

suffered from a medically determinable physical or mental

impairment expected to last at least twelve months or

result in death and that rendered her unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

(2)(A). The ALJ reasoned that Drs. Jalil’s and Desmonde’s

conclusions regarding Schmidt’s work restrictions should

not be given controlling or substantial weight based on

the totality of the medical evidence. The ALJ also concluded that “the objective findings do not support the

level of chronic pain asserted by the claimant.” Finally,

the ALJ relied heavily on the vocational expert’s testimony
14 No. 06-3930

to conclude that the Commissioner had demonstrated

that Schmidt could perform numerous jobs despite her

limitations. The ALJ thus denied Schmidt’s applications

at step five of the five-step sequential analysis. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(iv); see also Young v. Barnhart,

362 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2004) (“If the claimant makes

it past step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

to demonstrate that the claimant can successfully perform

a significant number of jobs that exist in the national

economy.”).

Schmidt appealed to the Appeals Council, which denied

her request for review. The Appeals Council’s denial of

review made the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the

Commissioner subject to judicial review. Schmidt then

filed suit in the district court, which affirmed the ALJ’s

decision and subsequently denied her motion to alter or

amend its judgment. Schmidt now appeals to this court.

II.

Where, as here, the Appeals Council has declined to

review the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s decision constitutes

the final decision of the Commissioner. Haynes v. Barnhart,

416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, like the district

court, we review the ALJ’s decision. White v. Sullivan, 965

F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1992). When assessing the ALJ’s

decision, we review the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo.

Haynes, 416 F.3d at 626. We deferentially review the ALJ’s

factual determinations, Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171,

1176 (7th Cir. 2001), and we will affirm the ALJ’s decision

if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record,

Boiles v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005); see also

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
No. 06-3930 15

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668

(7th Cir. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence must be more than a scintilla but may be less

than a preponderance.” Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841

(7th Cir. 2007). “When reviewing for substantial evidence,

we do not displace the ALJ’s judgment by reconsidering

facts or evidence or making credibility determinations.” Id.

(citing Jens v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 2003)). “In

other words, so long as, in light of all the evidence, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the

claimant] is disabled, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision

denying benefits.” Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir.

1996).

On appeal, Schmidt first argues that the ALJ should have

given controlling weight to the opinions of Drs. Jalil and

Desmonde and that the ALJ failed to explain adequately

his refusal to credit their assessments. Normally, “[a]

treating physician’s opinion regarding the nature and

severity of a medical condition is entitled to controlling

weight if supported by the medical findings and consistent

with substantial evidence in the record.” Skarbek v.

Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d)(2)). “However, ‘while the treating physician’s

opinion is important, it is not the final word on a claimant’s

disability.’ ” Books, 91 F.3d at 979 (quoting Reynolds v.

Bowen, 844 F.2d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 1988)). As we previously

have noted, “ ‘[t]he patient’s regular physician may want

to do a favor for a friend and client, and so the treating

physician may too quickly find disability.’ ” Id. (quoting

Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1985)). See also

Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 2006)

(discussing the treating physician rule and stating that
16 No. 06-3930

while a treating physician has the advantage over other

physicians whose reports might figure in a disability case

because the treating physician has spent more time with

the claimant, “the fact that the claimant is the treating

physician’s patient also detracts from the weight of that

physician’s testimony, since, as is well known, many

physicians (including those most likely to attract patients

who are thinking of seeking disability benefits) will often

bend over backwards to assist a patient in obtaining

benefits,” and therefore “the weight properly to be given to

testimony or other evidence of a treating physician depends on circumstances” (internal citations omitted)). An

ALJ thus may discount a treating physician’s medical

opinion if it the opinion “is inconsistent with the opinion of

a consulting physician or when the treating physician’s

opinion is internally inconsistent, as long as he minimally

articulates his reasons for crediting or rejecting evidence

of disability.” Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 503 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In this case, the ALJ provided an adequate explanation of

his decision not to give controlling weight to Dr. Jalil’s and

Dr. Desmonde’s opinions. Regarding Dr. Jalil’s December

2003 statement that Schmidt was incapable of performing

even sedentary work, the ALJ found that diagnosis was

not supported by the medical evidence in the record. For

example, Dr. Jalil’s February 2003 treatment notes indicate

that Schmidt’s physical examination was benign, and his

June 2003 treatment notes indicate that he did not find

anything significant despite Schmidt’s complaints regarding numbness and tingling in her extremities. Further,

despite Schmidt’s complaints about pain, Dr. Jalil remarked on multiple occasions that her condition was

“pretty good” and “very good.” We agree with the ALJ that
No. 06-3930 17

these statements and others in Dr. Jalil’s treatment notes

are inconsistent with Dr. Jalil’s December 2003 conclusion

that Schmidt could not perform sedentary work. Further,

as the ALJ notes, Schmidt has failed to establish that

she suffers from her claimed level of chronic pain because her medical records indicate that she was able to

keep her pain in check using various medicines, and that

she did not follow through with her physical therapy or

pursue pain management. Finally, the “Functional Capacity Questionnaire” on which Dr. Jalil stated that Schmidt

could not perform sedentary work is suspect because

Schmidt’s attorney apparently drafted it and it did not

include any new medical evidence or any other basis to

justify these more extreme limitations. See, e.g., Dixon, 270

F.3d at 1177 (finding that the ALJ properly discounted

the opinion of treating physician who opined that his

patient was disabled merely “by writing ‘yes’ next to a

question that [the patient’s] attorney had pre-typed [but]

did not elaborate on the basis of this opinion”).

The evidence in Schmidt’s medical records leads us to the

same conclusion regarding Dr. Desmonde’s statement that

Schmidt “may have difficulty” tolerating the stress and

pressure of performing full-time work based on her mental

condition. The ALJ declined to give that statement controlling weight because it appeared to be out of sync

with both Dr. Desmonde’s other observations in his

treatment records, as well as those of Schmidt’s therapist,

Sirek. Dr. Desmonde evaluated Schmidt on two occasions,

and concluded that she was capable of doing daily activities, that she was outgoing, friendly, and cooperative, as

well as free from hallucinations, delusions, obsessive

thoughts, paranoid, suicidal or homicidal ideation, or

symptoms of anxiety or panic. He also noted that Schmidt
18 No. 06-3930

had intact memory and above-average concentration, her

judgment and insight were not impaired, and she demonstrated no evidence of a personality disorder. Dr.

Desmonde consistently diagnosed Schmidt’s functioning range as mild to moderate, and remarked that the

symptoms of Schmidt’s depression were “well regulated

on her Zoloft.” Additionally, before Schmidt voluntarily

withdrew from therapy, Sirek observed in January 2003

that Schmidt was “very positive” and that she “looks very

good today,” and in April 2003 Schmidt told her that “for

the most part . . . things have been going quite well.”

Finally, the ALJ noted that two state agency psychologists

reviewed Schmidt’s medical records in July 2002 and

January 2003, and concluded that Schmidt did not have

any significant work-related limitations cause by a

mental impairment. We thus find that the ALJ’s decision

not to accord controlling weight to Dr. Jalil’s and Dr.

Desmonde’s opinions was reasonable and that the ALJ

sufficiently articulated the reasons for his decision.

Schmidt next argues the ALJ failed to provide specific

reasons for his finding that Schmidt’s allegations regarding

her limitations were not fully credible and that the ALJ

failed to follow Social Security Ruling 96-7p, which governs the assessment of an applicant’s credibility. “Because

the ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses, we

will not disturb [his] credibility determinations as long as

they find some support in the record.” Dixon, 270 F.3d at

1178-79. Accordingly, “ ‘[w]e will reverse an ALJ’s credibility determination only if the claimant can show it was

patently wrong.’ ” Jens, 347 F.3d at 213 (quoting Powers v.

Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations

and citations omitted)).

Here, contrary to Schmidt’s assertions, the ALJ specifically stated in his opinion that he considered Schmidt’s
No. 06-3930 19

testimony and the entire records under Social Security

Ruling 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The ALJ then

summarized Schmidt’s testimony, in particular her assertions of pain and the limitations she claimed as a result of

her impairments. After discussing Schmidt’s testimony and

the medical evidence in the record, the ALJ stated that

Schmidt’s “allegations of disabling pain and incapacitating limitations [were] not consistent with or supported by

the objective medical record of treating and examining

physicians,” in addition to reiterating that “the objective

findings do not support the level of chronic pain asserted

by [Schmidt].” These conclusions were supported by

evidence in the medical record indicating that Schmidt

regularly exhibited normal neurological findings,

strength, reflexes, and sensation. In short, the diagnostic

evidence in Schmidt’s medical records conflicts with

testimony and claims of disabling pain. Further,

Schmidt’s medical history indicates that she voluntarily

discontinued physical therapy and declined to pursue

pain management, both of which cast doubt on the

severity of Schmidt’s pain and her need to alleviate it. The

ALJ also noted that while Schmidt claimed in her brief that

her daily activities were “minimal,” the record indicated

that she engaged in significant daily activities, including

working part-time as a bookkeeper, attending college

classes, spending time with her granddaughter,

babysitting, performing household chores, preparing

meals, taking vacations, socializing with family and

friends, driving, and reading. Finally, the ALJ did not

totally discount Schmidt’s testimony regarding how her

pain affected her ability to perform certain activities, as

evinced by the ALJ’s decision to limit Schmidt’s range of

work to sedentary when assessing her residual functional

capacity. Accordingly, we find that the ALJ provided
20 No. 06-3930

4 The “special technique” assists an adjudicator in evaluating

the severity of a claimant’s mental impairments. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520a. The adjudicator evaluates the level of severity of a

claimant’s mental impairment at steps two and three of the

sequential evaluation by rating the claimant’s limitations and

restrictions in four areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social

functioning; (3) concentration, persistence or pace; and (4)

episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). These

four functional areas correspond to the requirements of

“paragraph B” of the Agency’s mental impairment listings. 20

C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, § 12.00 et seq.

sufficient reasons for his finding that Schmidt’s allegations regarding her limitations were not fully credible,

and we will not disturb those findings.

Schmidt further argues that the ALJ erred in assessing

her physical and mental impairments in calculating her

residual functional capacity, and thus the ALJ’s questions

to the vocational expert based on those determinations, as

well and the vocational expert’s responses, were flawed.

Schmidt first argues that the ALJ inadequately determined

her mental impairments because he skipped from the

“special technique” used to rate the degree of limitation

caused by her mental impairments, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520a,4

 to a mental residual functional capacity

without any explanation of how he reached his conclusions. Contrary to Schmidt’s assertions, the ALJ did

evaluate Schmidt’s mental limitations under the “paragraph B” criteria in his opinion, and he incorporated those

assessments into his determination of Schmidt’s mental

residual functional capacity. Finding that Schmidt had

only mild limitations in daily activities and social functioning, and no episodes of decompensation, the ALJ

concluded that Schmidt did not have any further work-
No. 06-3930 21

related limitations due to her mental impairments. With

the exception of the above discussed statement by Dr.

Desmonde that Schmidt “may have difficulty tolerating

the stress and pressure of full time, competitive employment” based on her mental condition, the ALJ’s mental

findings nearly mirror Dr. Desmonde’s findings in his

treatment notes. The ALJ also limited Schmidt’s work to

jobs not involving high production goals, thus giving

some credibility to Schmidt’s stress claims. We therefore

find substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination of Schmidt’s mental residual functional capacity.

Schmidt next attacks the ALJ’s assessment of her physical

impairments and subsequent determination of her physical

residual functional capacity. First, Schmidt argues that

the ALJ’s analysis was deficient because he did not

specify the frequency with which she would need to

alternate between sitting and standing. We find Schmidt’s

contention unavailing, however, because the ALJ did

restrict Schmidt to work that allowed her an opportunity

to sit or stand at her “own option.” Further, the limitation that the ALJ imposed was consistent with Schmidt’s

testimony that she could not sit or stand for long periods,

and Dr. Jalil’s opinion that Schmidt needed to change

positions at her “own option.” Second, Schmidt contends

that she suffered from greater manipulative limitations

than those that the ALJ imposed. We also find this argument unpersuasive because there was no basis in Schmidt’s

medical records, including those of Dr. Jalil and the state

agency reviewers, indicating that she needed greater

manipulative restrictions. The ALJ also sufficiently attempted to accommodate Schmidt’s complaints of numbness and pain in her upper extremities by including a

limitation of no power gripping. Third, Schmidt asserts
22 No. 06-3930

that the ALJ failed to credit Dr. Nees’ and Dr. Thomas’

statements that she should be limited to part-time work.

Unfortunately for Schmidt, she had already proffered

Dr. Nees’ and Dr. Thomas’ opinions to support an earlier

disability claim, and the ALJ in that case explicitly rejected

them to the extent that they indicated that Schmidt was

capable of performing only part-time work after February

1, 1999. Schmidt elected not to appeal that decision, thus

that opinion stands as the final decision on her disability

through the date of the decision, May 8, 2000. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.988. Earlier evidence, such as previous physicians’

opinions, can be considered relevant when adjudicating

subsequent applications for benefits, see Groves v. Apfel, 148

F.3d 809, 810-11 (7th Cir. 1998), and the ALJ acknowledged

as much when he mentioned his consideration of Dr. Nees’

opinion. However, as he did with Dr. Jalil’s opinion, the

ALJ found that Dr. Nees’ opinion and Dr. Thomas’ opinion

did not deserve controlling weight, and the record as a

whole did not support a finding that Schmidt was limited

to part-time work. Likewise, based on our review of the

record, we find the ALJ’s determination supported by

substantial evidence. Fourth, Schmidt argues that the ALJ

erred by failing to adopt her residual functional capacity

as determined by any of her physicians. As we have

stated previously, an ALJ must consider the entire record,

but the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular

physician’s opinion or choose between the opinions any

of the claimant’s physicians. See Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d

300, 306 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, that is exactly what the

ALJ did in weighing all of Schmidt’s physicians’ opinions

along with her testimony and the other record evidence. In

sum, we find that the ALJ’s determination of Schmidt’s

physical limitations and conclusion that she was capable
No. 06-3930 23

of full-time, sedentary work was supported by substantial evidence.

Finally, having determined that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s determination of Schmidt’s mental and

physical limitations and resulting residual functional

capacity, we examine the ALJ’s conclusion that Schmidt

was not disabled because she could perform a significant

number of jobs. We reject Schmidt’s contention that the

ALJ should have included additional mental and physical

limitations in his questioning of the vocational expert,

because the ALJ is required only to incorporate into his

hypotheticals those impairments and limitations that he

accepts as credible. See Ehrhart v. Sec’y Health & Human

Servs., 969 F.2d 534, 540 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, the ALJ posed

appropriate hypothetical questions to the vocational

expert based on his determination of Schmidt’s residual

functional capacity, and the vocational expert testified that

Schmidt could perform a significant number of jobs.

Accordingly, we find that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s conclusion that Schmidt’s applications failed

at step five of the five-step sequential analysis.

III.

We find that the ALJ’s denial of Schmidt’s applications

for DIB and SSI benefits is supported by substantial

evidence, and therefore we AFFIRM the Commissioner’s

decision.
24 No. 06-3930

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—8-8-07