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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 246 (Monday, December 23, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 104530-104531]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-30610]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision for DOE/EIS-0082-S-SA-01 Supplement Analysis 
for Defense Waste Processing Facility Failed Melter Aboveground Storage

AGENCY: Office of Environmental Management, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision (ROD).

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announces its decision to 
construct an interim aboveground storage facility for storage of two 
Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) failed melters (Melter Nos. 1 
and 2) in lieu of underground storage units. Moving Melter Nos. 1 and 2 
from the Failed Equipment Storage Vaults (FESVs) to aboveground storage 
will allow space for storage of two melters

[[Page 104531]]

with a higher radiological nature to be stored in the FESVs. The 
potential environmental impacts of this decision were analyzed in DOE/
EIS-0082-S-SA-01, ``Supplement Analysis for Defense Waste Processing 
Facility Failed Melter Aboveground Storage'' (the SA). The SA found 
that the proposed change and information discussed in this SA are not 
significant and therefore do not require a supplement to the Final 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final SEIS) Defense Waste 
Processing Facility (DOE/EIS-0082-S).

ADDRESSES: This ROD and related information are available at the 
University of South Carolina--Aiken, Public Reading Room. The documents 
are posted on the DOE NEPA website at www.energy.gov/nepa.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tracy Williams, NEPA Document Manager/
NEPA Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River 
Operations Office, ATTN: Tracy Williams, P.O. Box A, Building 730-B, 
Aiken, SC 29802-0151, [email protected], (803) 952-8278.
    For general information on the DOE Office of Environmental 
Management NEPA process, contact: Bill Ostrum, EM NEPA Compliance 
Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 
Washington, DC 20585; or email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On June 1, 1982, DOE decided that failed equipment that could not 
be repaired was to be decontaminated, packaged, and transferred to the 
SRS burial facilities. However, DOE was concerned that melters, and 
possibly other equipment, potentially could not be decontaminated to 
levels that would allow them to be handled or even repaired without 
resulting in unacceptable radiation doses to workers. Therefore, DOE 
constructed two underground vaults in S-Area near the DWPF to provide 
safe interim storage of this equipment until a permanent disposal 
facility can be identified. Failed equipment is first placed into 
containers (e.g., Melter Storage Box) before being put into interim 
storage facilities.
    Currently, two DWPF failed melters (Melter Nos. 1 and 2) are stored 
underground in two operational FESVs. For analysis, DOE assumed that a 
total of approximately 14 vaults would be required for underground 
storage of failed melters and other large equipment due to their highly 
radiological nature. The life expectancy of the DWPF melters has been 
extended based on current performance. The current ``Liquid Waste 
System Plan'', SRMC-LWP-2023-0001, Revision 23-P, March 2023 assumes 
one melter changeout, which would be Melter No. 3 replaced by Melter 
No. 4. As such, storage for up to four melters is projected to be 
required for the life of DWPF, not fourteen. Storage for fourteen 
melters is no longer required. Construction of the aboveground storage 
facility should provide the required additional failed melter storage 
space for the life expectancy of DWPF. Actual radiation dose 
calculations for Melter Nos. 1 and 2 have been determined to be far 
lower than what was analyzed in the Final SEIS. Consequently, the low 
radiological nature of Melter Nos. 1 and 2 allow for properly 
constructed aboveground storage. Moving Melter Nos. 1 and 2 from the 
FESVs to aboveground storage will allow space for storage of two 
melters with a higher radiological nature to be stored in the FESVs.
    The same design criteria outlined in the existing analysis has been 
applied to the design of the aboveground storage facility, and the size 
of the aboveground facilities will be like that of the underground 
facilities.
    In accordance with DOE's NEPA implementing regulations, and 
consistent with the NEPA Recommendations for the Supplement Analysis 
Process, 2nd Edition, DOE prepared the DOE/EIS-0082-S-SA-01, 
``Supplement Analysis for Defense Waste Processing Facility Failed 
Melter Aboveground Storage'', July 2024, to evaluate whether the 
aboveground storage of failed melters require supplementing the 
existing EIS or preparing a new EIS.
    In the SA, DOE evaluated the impacts of this proposed change and 
new information since publication of the Final SEIS. This included 
potential change to impacts to geologic resources, groundwater, surface 
water, air resources, cultural resources, aesthetics and scenic 
resources, traffic and transportation, radiological health effects from 
normal operations, nonradiological health effects from normal 
operations, worker radiological and nonradiological health, accidents, 
chemical hazards, waste generation, decontamination and 
decommissioning, unavoidable adverse impacts, DWPF Organic Waste 
Treatment options, greenhouse gasses, noise, land use, biological 
resources, floodplains and wetlands, socioeconomic resources and 
existing facilities, and cumulative impacts. In all cases, DOE 
identified no or negligible differences in potential impacts. DOE 
concluded that the proposed change and information discussed in the SA 
are not significant and therefore do not require a supplement to Final 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Defense Waste Processing 
Facility (DOE/EIS-0082-S). No further NEPA documentation is required.

Decision

    The DOE announces its decision to construct an interim aboveground 
storage facility for storage of two DWPF failed melters (Melter Nos. 1 
and 2) in lieu of underground storage units, as described in the SA. In 
the SA, DOE concluded that the proposed change and information 
discussed in the SA are not significant and therefore do not require a 
supplement to Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement Defense 
Waste Processing Facility (DOE/EIS-0082-S). No further NEPA 
documentation is required.

Mitigation

    Because the proposed activity circumstances are similar in nature 
to the existing potential impacts based on this analysis, DOE 
determined, consistent with the FEIS, that no additional mitigation 
measures are anticipated.

Signing Authority

    This document of the Department of Energy was signed on December 2, 
2024, by Candice Trummell, Senior Advisor for Environmental Management, 
pursuant to delegated authority from the Secretary of Energy. That 
document with the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For 
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of 
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE Federal 
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the 
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document 
of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way 
alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the 
Federal Register.

    Signed in Washington, DC, on December 18, 2024.
Jennifer Hartzell,
Alternate Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.
[FR Doc. 2024-30610 Filed 12-20-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
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