[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10004

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEREMIE SAINTVIL, 

a.k.a. Jeremie Stvil, 

a.k.a. Jeremie Saint Vil, 

a.k.a. Jeremi Stvil, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00013-AW-GRJ-1

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jeremie Saintvil appeals his conviction and sentence for four 

fraud-related crimes.1

 In short, Saintvil orchestrated an extensive 

scheme to obtain Paycheck Protection Program2 (“PPP”) loans for 

illegitimate businesses that he created with information he stole 

from elderly persons. On appeal, Saintvil contends that (1) the 

district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the 

indictment for duplicity and failing to strike surplusage from the 

1 A jury found Saintvil guilty of each count with which he was charged: (1) 

aiding and abetting bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, (2) 

submitting a false statement to a federally insured institution, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1014, (3) aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1028A(a)(1), and (4) making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

1001(a).

2 In March 2020, “as a result of the coronavirus pandemic,” Congress passed 

the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act which 

authorized the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to administer funds 

under the PPP to help businesses retain employees and pay other qualified 

expenses. The CARES Act also included a “special allocation . . . of funds 

committed directly [to] the [Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) 

program] to respond to the COVID pandemic.” The EIDL program provides 

assistance to businesses affected by certain disasters—in this case, the 

coronavirus pandemic.

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indictment, (2) venue was improper, and (3) his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

From February 2018 through June 2020, Saintvil 

“fraudulently obtained and possessed” the personal identifying 

information of several elderly individualsin assisted or senior living 

facilities. Alongside other fraudulent activities (i.e., opening lines 

of credit, obtaining physical checks and debit cards, and 

transferring funds), Saintvil used the stolen identities to create

fictitious businesses and apply for nine PPP loans. Seven of the 

nine applications were approved, and funding was distributed. In 

similar fashion, Saintvil also fraudulently applied for, and received,

an EIDL loan. One way or another, the distributed proceeds—

which totaled more than $1,000,000—ended up in Saintvil’s 

control.

In its indictment against Saintvil, the grand jury detailed 

Saintvil’s entire scheme as perpetrated against various banks and 

financial institutions, but in Count One3 it only charged a single 

execution of bank fraud as against Florida Credit Union (“FCU”).

4

 

3 We focus on Count One for two reasons. First, Saintvil’s duplicity and 

surplusage arguments are targeted at Count One. Second, the remaining 

three counts reallege and incorporate by reference the factual allegations laid 

out in Count One.

4 The indictment started by detailing Saintvil’s larger fraudulent scheme:

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Specifically, the indictment focused on Saintvil’s use of a certain 

individual’s identity (referred to as R.J.H.) to create the fictitious 

business HEJ Holding, Inc. (“HEJ Holding”) and to apply to FCU 

for a PPP loan. Accordingly, our recitation of the factual 

background will focus primarily on facts pertinent to this 

fraudulent instance.5

B. The Charge 

Between on or about February 1, 2018, and on or about June 

30, 2020, in the Northern District of Florida and elsewhere, the 

defendant, . . . did knowingly and willfully execute and 

attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud a federally 

insured financial institution, that is, FCU, [and 12 other 

institutions], and to obtain moneys owned by and under the 

custody and control of FCU, [and 12 other institutions] by 

means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, 

representations, and promises.

The indictment then narrowed in on the fraud related to FCU in outlining the 

“execution” of Saintvil’s fraud.

D. Execution of the Scheme 

Between on or about May 4, 2020, and on or about May 21, 

2020, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute 

this fraudulent scheme, the defendant . . . did knowingly and 

willfully submit false and fraudulent representations to FCU in 

an SBA PPP loan application, and in supporting loan 

documents and emails.

5 Saintvil’s use of R.J.H.’s identity to create HEJ Holding and apply for a loan 

with FCU is part of a pattern. The rest of Saintvil’s scheme was perpetrated 

in the same way; he just changed the identities and financial institutions that 

he used.

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In May 2020, FCU—a federally insured credit union 

headquartered in Gainesville, Florida—received an email 

purportedly from R.J.H. who claimed to be the owner of HEJ 

Holding.6 The email contained numerous attachments in support 

of HEJ Holding’s request for a PPP loan for $159,202.30.

7

 The 

attachments included a PPP Borrower Application Form, two 

federal tax documents for HEJ Holding, a copy of R.J.H.’s Florida 

Driver’s License, and a document showing the average monthly 

6 The email was sent to Jane Harris, a FCU employee, from a Gmail address 

that included R.J.H.’s name. The email read: 

Good afternoon Jane, I’m a proud Veteran and owner of HEJ 

Holding Inc. I have heard nothing but amazing reviews from 

members of [FCU] about your handling of the SBA [PPP].

Unlike major banking institutions that has [sic] caused 

tremendous hardship with ineffective processes, we’re in 

desperate need for personalize [sic] banking attention that can 

ensure funding as quickly as possible. 

The pandemic has crippled my business and continue [sic] to 

wreck incalculable havoc to me personally, my team and their 

families. I beg of you to please help me with the prompt 

submittal of my SBA PPP application. I’ve included all 

necessary documents to ensure expeditious processing. 

Thank you very much for all of your help Jane and I look 

forward to hearing from you promptly. 

Sincerely, 

[R.J.H.]

7 According to the application, HEJ Holding had 17 employees and average 

monthly payroll expenses of $63,680.92.

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payroll for HEJ Holding. FCU did not immediately issue any 

funding because it believed the application was fraudulent.

R.J.H. and FCU continued to communicate about the loan 

application. In a series of emails over the next two-and-a-half 

weeks, FCU was “able to capture the IP address from where the 

email originated” which was later determined to be registered to 

Saintvil’s mother and the physical address where the IP was 

registered, in Delray Beach, Florida, was owned by Saintvil. And, 

“[i]n one of the email exchanges between [R.J.H.] and FCU, a 

completed PPP loan application was electronically signed.”

FCU, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(“FBI”) by this time, called R.J.H. to request his physical presence 

in order to complete the loan application process. The FCU 

employee who conducted the call testified that the male voice on 

the other end of the line started the call by attempting to sound like 

an older man but his voice “changed to frustration” as the call 

progressed. The following morning, R.J.H. emailed FCU stating,

“we have officially concluded it is not in the best interest of our 

team’s safety to have someone or myself drive from South Florida 

to Gainesville to open an account in this day age [sic].” 

Further investigation revealed that (1) R.J.H.’s address was 

changed from a senior living facility to the address for HEJ Holding 

in January 2020, (2) R.J.H. was alive and residing in a “memory 

center, or assisted living facility, in Central Florida,” (3) when 

contacted by the FBI, R.J.H.’s daughter stated that R.J.H. never 

owned a business, never operated HEJ Holding, and did not 

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control the email address or phone number associated with the 

PPP loan, (4) HEJ Holding was not a registered business with the 

Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and the 

State did not have any record of 2019 corporate income tax returns 

for HEJ Holding, and (5) the service used to generate the payroll 

document, Paychex Flex, advised that they could “find no record 

of [HEJ Holding or R.J.H.].” In light of these findings, in June 2020, 

the FBI obtained and executed a search warrant for the Delray 

Beach residence (tied to the IP address from which the email 

application was submitted).

Saintvil was at the residence when the search warrant was 

executed. The FBI uncovered extensive evidence of Saintvil’s 

fraudulent scheme, including the following evidence8 specific to 

the R.J.H./HEJ Holding fraud: “[C]redit cards, banking check 

books, and other identification documents for [Saintvil], and 

others, including a . . . debit card in the name of R.J.H.”; and a

computer on which agents were able to locate “emails pertaining 

to [HEJ Holding’s] SBA PPP loan application, including the same 

attachments that were submitted to FCU in support of the loan.”

B. Procedural History 

In March 2021, a grand jury indicted Saintvil with bank 

fraud, submission of a false statement to a federally insured 

8 Significant evidence of Saintvil’s other fraudulent PPP applications was 

uncovered—including numerous debit cards and check books in the names of 

other individuals as well as a copy of one identity-theft victim’s driver’s license 

on a photocopier.

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institution (specifically, FCU), aggravated identify theft, and 

making a false statement to the government (specifically, the SBA). 

Based on the indictment, Saintvil filed a Motion to Dismiss or 

Strike Surplusage. He argued first that the district court “should 

dismiss Count One . . . because it is duplicitous,” in that it 

“improperly alleg[ed] two separate offenses in the same count.” In

other words, Saintvil argued that Count One was duplicitous 

because the bank fraud statute has two subsections,

9 each 

constituting separate offenses, so that he was improperly charged 

with two crimes in a single count of the indictment. Alternatively, 

Saintvil moved the court to “strike as surplusage from Count One 

the allegations regarding the twelve financial institutions [other 

than FCU] . . . and eight businesses [other than HEJ Holding] 

. . . because [their inclusion was] not only irrelevant to the offenses 

charged but also prejudicial to [Saintvil] and inflammatory.”

9 The bank fraud statute provides: 

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a 

scheme or artifice—

(1) to defraud a financial institution; or

(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, 

securities, or other property owned by, or under the 

custody or control of, a financial institution, by means 

of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 

promises;

shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not 

more than 30 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1344.

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The district court denied Saintvil’s motion. As to Saintvil’s 

duplicity argument, the district court determined that the bank 

fraud statute’s two subsections provided “alternative ways in 

which the statute may be violated,” rather than separate offenses. 

As such, the district court found that Count One was not 

duplicitous. And, as to Saintvil’s surplusage argument, the district 

court concluded that Saintvil had not met the “exacting standard” 

for showing surplusage because he had not shown that the 

information at issue was immaterial, inflammatory, or prejudicial.

After an eight-day jury trial in which Saintvil proceeded pro 

se, the jury found Saintvil guilty of all four counts. After the verdict 

but before sentencing, Saintvil filed a motion arguing that venue 

was improper as to each count because his actions took place in the 

Southern, rather than Northern, District of Florida. At sentencing, 

the district court denied Saintvil’s motion, because “at trial there 

was proof to support the venue that was presented,” i.e., the 

Northern District of Florida, and Saintvil’s motion was further 

“untimely”10 and “unfounded.”

10 On this point, the district court questioned Saintvil as to why he had not 

waived his motion by failing to raise it pretrial. Saintvil responded that he 

“was not exposed to the government presentation at trial” so there was “no 

record as to whether they were going to provide evidence to prove [venue].” 

The district court found that venue was proper, but later clarified its statement 

on the untimeliness of Saintvil’s motion:

I want to correct a misstatement I made earlier when I was 

reviewing your venue motion. I asked if it was waived by not 

raising it pretrial. Of course, you could raise – to the extent 

you could waive it as an evidentiary matter, that time has 

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In total, the district court sentenced Saintvil to 204 months’ 

imprisonment.

11 The district court recognized that this sentence 

was “above the guidelines,” but concluded that it was necessary 

because Saintvil’s case was “out of the heartland of normal fraud 

cases.” Specifically, the district court concluded that an aboveguideline sentence was proper because “the conduct was 

egregious,” in that “[t]he overall fraud” and “amount of loss” were

extreme, the “breadth of fraud was extraordinary,” Saintvil

targeted many people “who were among the most vulnerable 

people there are,” and Saintvil took advantage of the PPP program 

that was intended to move money “quickly to the people who 

need[ed] it.” The district court also considered Saintvil’s abilities

and education, criminal history, motive, and refusal to accept 

responsibility, which when considered alongside the need to 

protect the public from Saintvil, counseled in favor of a stronger 

sentence. In sum, the district court concluded that “all of the 

circumstances of the offense” showed that “a guideline sentence 

would [not] be sufficient to reflect the seriousness of the offense.”

Saintvil timely appealed.

passed, too. There are different kinds of venue objections. At 

any rate, I have denied that motion already.

11The district court sentenced Saintvil to two concurrent terms of 180 months’ 

imprisonment as to Counts 1 and 2, as well as a term of 24 months’ 

imprisonment as to Count 3 to run consecutively with Counts 1 and 2. 

Additionally, the district court imposed a term of 60 months’ imprisonment as 

to Count 4 to run concurrently with Counts 1 and 2.

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II. Discussion

Saintvil puts forth three arguments on appeal. First, he 

argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 

the indictment as duplicitous and failing to strike surplusage from 

the indictment. Second, he argues that venue was improper. 

Third, he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

We address each argument in turn, ultimately affirming Saintvil’s 

conviction and sentence.

A. Duplicity and Surplusage 

Saintvil’s first set of arguments concern the district court’s 

denial of his motion to dismiss. We start with his argument that 

Count One of his indictment improperly charged him with two 

separate crimes and then consider his argument that the indictment 

contained unlawful surplusage. 

1. Duplicity 

We review alleged deficiencies in an indictment de novo. See 

United States v. Pacchioli, 718 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013).

“A count is duplicitous if it charges two or more separate 

and distinct offenses.”12 United States v. Deason, 965 F.3d 1252, 1267 

(11th Cir. 2020). Put differently, each count of an indictment may 

12 “[D]uplicitous count[s] pose three dangers: (1) A jury may convict a 

defendant without unanimously agreeing on the same offense; (2) A defendant 

may be prejudiced in a subsequent double jeopardy defense; and (3) A court 

may have difficulty determining the admissibility of evidence.” United States 

v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 977 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).

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only charge a single offense. But “where a statute defines two or 

more ways in which an offense may be committed, all may be 

alleged in the conjunctive in one count.” United States v. Felts, 579 

F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see also United 

States v. Burton, 871 F.2d 1566, 1573 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Where a 

penal statute, . . . prescribes several alternative ways in which the 

statute may be violated and each is subject to the same 

punishment . . . the indictment may charge any or all of the acts 

conjunctively, in a single count[.]”); id. at 1574 (“An indictment is 

not duplicitous if, in one count, it charges a defendant with 

violating the statute in both ways.” (footnote omitted)). 

“Bank fraud is established under two alternative methods.” 

United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). First, 

to prove bank fraud under § 1344(1), “the government must 

establish that the defendant (1) intentionally participated in a 

scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property; and 

(2) that the victim of the scheme or artifice was an insured financial 

institution.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, to prove bank fraud 

under § 1344(2), the government must establish “(1) that a scheme 

existed in order to obtain money, funds, or credit in the custody of 

the federally insured institution; (2) that the defendant participated 

in the scheme by means of false pretenses, representations or 

promises, which were material; and (3) that the defendant acted 

knowingly.” Id. (quotation omitted). Finally, we have held that 

“[a] conviction can be sustained under either section [of the bank 

fraud statute] when the indictment . . . charge[s] both clauses.” Id.

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Saintvil relies upon the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351 (2014), which he argues held

that the bank fraud statute’s subsections establish different 

offenses. Saintvil, however, misstates the law. In Loughrin, the 

Supreme Court held that § 1344(1), unlike § 1344(2), requires a 

showing of “intent to defraud a bank.” Id. at 359–62. That is, the 

two subsections of the bank fraud statute have different elements. 

It does not follow, however, that the two subsections therefore 

define different offenses altogether. Rather, just as the district 

court reasoned, and as we have held, see Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303, 

subsections (1) and (2) of the bank fraud statute are merely two 

ways to prove the same offense—bank fraud. Loughrin hurts, 

rather than helps, Saintvil’s case.

Without Loughrin, Saintvil’s position has no support. 

Indeed, his argument collapses in light of our holdings that the 

bank fraud statute provides alternative ways to prove the same 

offense and that the two subsections can be charged together in 

one count. See Dennis, 237 F.3d at 1303; Felts, 579 F.3d at 1344; 

Burton, 871 F.2d at 1573.

We agree with the district court that Count One was not 

duplicitous.13

2. Surplusage

13 We need not reach Saintvil’s argument that the jury instructions did not 

properly account for the duplicity because we conclude that Count One was 

not duplicitous.

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We review the district court’s refusal to strike alleged 

surplusage for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Awan, 966 

F.2d 1415, 1426 (11th Cir. 1992).

“A motion to strike surplusage from an indictment should 

not be granted unless it is clear that the allegations are not relevant 

to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). We have recognized that this threshold is a “most 

exacting standard.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“For an indictment to be valid, it must contain the elements 

of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprise the 

defendant of what he must be prepared to meet.” United States v. 

Bobo, 344 F.3d 1076, 1083 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted and 

alterations adopted). Specifically for bank fraud, “[t]he allegation 

of a scheme is an essential element[.]” United States v. Adkinson, 135 

F.3d 1363, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1344). In other 

words, an indictment that includes bank fraud as a charge should 

“set forth the manner and means by which the scheme and artifice 

to defraud operated.” Bobo, 344 F.3d at 1084.

Saintvil argues that the indictment included “surplusage” 

because there was extraneous information in Count One (i.e., 

references to financial institutions other than FCU and fraudulent 

businesses other than HEJ Holding) that referenced parts of his 

scheme that were not directly charged in Count One. This

argument is a non-starter. Because an allegation of bank fraud 

requires the government to prove the existence of a scheme, and 

the scheme-related evidence is exactly the information that Saintvil 

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argues is surplusage, he cannot prove that this information is not 

“relevant to the charge.” Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426; see also Bobo, 344 

F.3d at 1083–84. While the included information is extensive, the 

scheme was extravagant and multi-faceted which necessitated the 

inclusion of additional information in the indictment beyond his 

actions vis-à-vis FCU and HEJ Holding. Because the additional 

information was relevant and required in order to charge Saintvil 

properly,

14 Saintvil fails to meet the “exacting standard” for a 

motion to strike surplusage. See Awan, 966 F.2d at 1426. The 

district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

strike certain information from Saintvil’s indictment.

B. Venue 

“We review de novo a determination that the government 

established venue by a preponderance of the evidence.” United 

States v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022). We view 

venue-related evidence “in the light most favorable to the 

government and make all reasonable inferences and credibility 

determinations in favor of the verdict the jury returned.” Id.

“Like most rights, a defendant’s venue right is not absolute, 

and it will be deemed waived unless asserted prior to trial.” United 

States v. White, 590 F.3d 1210, 1213 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United 

14 Because Saintvil clearly fails to meet one of three mandatory conditions for 

a motion to strike surplusage, we need not reach his arguments as to the other 

two conditions (that the allegations are inflammatory and prejudicial). We do 

note, however, that his arguments as to the latter two elements also lack 

persuasive force.

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States v. DiJames, 731 F.2d 758, 761 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that 

“the right to be tried in the state and district where the crime was 

alleged to have been committed may be waived voluntarily by the 

defendant”). If, however, a defendant “has no notice of a defect of 

venue until the [g]overnment rests its case,” the outer limit for 

raising a venue objection is extended so that it “is timely if made at 

the close of the evidence.” United States v. Daniels, 5 F.3d 495, 496 

(11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1152 

(11th Cir. 2002) (holding that a challenge to venue failed because 

“appellant did not present his venue objection until the prosecution 

had rested its case”). 

“In many (and perhaps most) cases in which the defendant 

fails to object to a defect in venue, the defendant’s silence may be 

taken to imply a waiver of the venue right.” White, 590 F.3d at 1214

(alterations adopted and quotations omitted). We will not find 

waiver, however, when “there is evidence which suggests that the 

defendant has not waived his venue right.” Id. In White, for 

example, we held that a defendant waived his venue right through 

silence when he “did not object before or during trial” and instead 

“waited until after he was convicted to complain [about venue].” 

Id.

Here, Saintvil did not challenge venue before or at trial, but 

rather waited a week prior to sentencing to file a motion 

challenging venue. As such, he has waived his venue right. See id. 

Indeed, Saintvil was put on notice as to a potential venue challenge 

because the evidence adduced at trial revealed that his actions (i.e., 

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submitting the fraudulent documents and otherwise carrying out 

his scheme) occurred in the Southern District of Florida rather 

than the Northern District of Florida. Therefore, at the latest, 

Saintvil should have challenged venue during trial. See Daniels, 5 

F.3d at 496; Roberts, 308 F.3d at 1151–52.

C. Substantive Reasonableness 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a 

deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A district court abuses its considerable 

discretion and imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only 

when it ‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that 

were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an 

improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of 

judgment in considering the proper factors.’” United States v. 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United 

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)). “The 

party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that the 

sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) 

factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” 

Id.

Under § 3553(a), a sentencing court must impose a sentence

that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to 

provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate 

deterrence, and to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In addition, the sentencing court 

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences 

available, the guideline sentencing range, and the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (3)–(4), (6).

The district court may impose an upward variance based on 

the § 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 

637–38 (11th Cir. 2013), but sentences outside the guideline range 

require sufficiently compelling justifications, Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 

For example, the district court may impose an upward variance if 

it concludes that the guideline range insufficiently accounted for 

the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 

F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). The district court may likewise 

vary upward based on factors already accounted for in calculating 

the guideline range. See United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619–

20 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court’s failure to discuss mitigating 

evidence does not indicate that it ignored or failed to consider this 

evidence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). 

Despite Saintvil’s contention otherwise, his sentence is 

substantively reasonable. First, the district court quite clearly 

“consider[ed] the extent of the deviation and ensure[d] that the 

justification [for the deviation was] sufficiently compelling.” Gall, 

552 U.S. at 50. The district court canvassed the applicable 

considerations on the record, including: the breadth of the fraud, 

the duration of the fraudulent scheme, the large number of victims, 

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the vulnerability of those victims, the high loss amount, the 

circumstances of the offense (i.e., Saintvil taking advantage of 

emergency PPP funds), his history of fraudulent behavior, the need 

for deterrence, the need to protect the public from his actions, and 

his refusal to accept responsibility for his crimes. Each of these 

considerations was explained to Saintvil during sentencing. Id. 

(“After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the district court] 

must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for 

meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair 

sentencing.”). Second, these same considerations support the 

district court’s sentencing determination and cut against Saintvil’s 

unfounded argument that he is less culpable than other defendants 

(that he identifies in case law) who received upward variances. 

Third, the district court’s extensive explanation shows that it 

adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that an 

above-guideline sentence was necessary. See Osorio-Moreno, 814 

F.3d at 1288. To the extent that the district court did not recite 

each individual factor, that is not required anyway. Amedeo, 487 

F.3d at 832. Fourth, and finally, Saintvil argues that the district 

court erred in sentencing because “every single one of the grounds 

used by the district court” to support the upward variance was 

“accounted for in the sentencing guidelines.” This argument has 

no support under our law. See Johnson, 803 F.3d at 620 (“[The 

appellant] contends that all relevant factors for the district court to 

consider in imposing a sentence already were incorporated into the 

calculation of his advisory guidelines range, such that no fact or 

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10004

circumstance warranted a variance. This argument is 

meritless . . . .” (quotation omitted)).

Simply put, Saintvil has not carried his burden of 

demonstrating that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256.

AFFIRMED.

USCA11 Case: 22-10004 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 20 of 20