Filed 11/14/14 In re L.N. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re L.N. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B254138

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LISA H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. CK31209)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Rudolph 

Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.

Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel,

and Melinda A. Green, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *
2

Mother Lisa H. appeals from the orders issued at the permanency planning 

hearing, held January 24, 2014, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 

366.26.1 Mother did not object below, and does not argue here, that the juvenile court 

erred in ordering guardianship as the permanent plan, with maternal great-aunt as the 

legal guardian of her two minor daughters, nor does she challenge the juvenile court’s 

termination of dependency jurisdiction. Mother only argues the court erred in refusing to 

award her transportation assistance to effectuate that portion of the court’s order that 

maintained her right to visitation. We find no merit in mother’s contention and therefore 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Because mother has not raised a substantial evidence question for review, we 

briefly summarize only those facts and procedural issues material to our discussion, as 

well as some additional facts for context.

In December 2011, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family 

Services filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) regarding mother’s two 

minor daughters. The girls were detained and placed in foster care. Mother had a 

lengthy history with the Department and previously failed to reunify with three of her 

other children. In early 2012, both girls were placed with maternal great-aunt, and 

thereafter were regularly reported by the social worker to be doing extremely well in their 

placement. 

Mother was granted monitored visitation, with the Department given discretion to 

liberalize. Mother did not comply with her case plan. Mother was generally consistent in 

visiting, but the visits did not always go well. Reunification services were terminated on

March 6, 2013. 

The section 366.26 hearing was originally scheduled for July 3, 2013. Maternal 

great-aunt was willing to become a permanent legal guardian, but told the Department 

 

1 All further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
3

she thought it would be better for mother if she did not adopt the girls. If granted a legal 

guardianship, maternal great-aunt expressed her willingness to allow mother to continue 

to visit. The section 366.26 hearing was continued to allow for consideration of the 

guardianship option and for preparation of the necessary paperwork. 

On August 28, 2013, the court ordered legal guardianship as the permanent plan. 

The court ordered the Department to report on the possible closing of the dependency 

case with a Kin-GAP2legal guardianship. 

On January 24, 2014, at the continued section 366.26 hearing, the court appointed 

maternal great-aunt as the legal guardian of both girls pursuant to a Kin-GAP legal 

guardianship. Letters of guardianship were signed and filed. The court ordered that 

mother was allowed visitation as “previously ordered.” 

During the hearing, counsel for mother asked the court to order the Department to

provide transportation funds to mother so that she could visit. The court denied the 

request, stating it intended to terminate jurisdiction and could not issue an order that 

could not be enforced. The court terminated dependency jurisdiction. 

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Preliminarily, we address the question of our jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 

Mother timely appealed from the order issued at the continued section 366.26 hearing

held on January 24, 2014. There is no question a direct appeal lies from such an order. 

(§ 395; see also In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 531-532.) However, in briefing before 

this court, mother states she is not challenging the court’s order appointing maternal 

great-aunt as legal guardian of the girls, nor the order terminating jurisdiction. Mother is 

solely contesting the juvenile court’s denial of her request for transportation funds to visit 

 

2 Kinship Guardianship Assistance Payment Program (Kin-GAP) (§ 11360). See 

also section 366.21, subdivision (j) (“If, at any hearing held pursuant to Section 366.26, a 

guardianship is established for the minor with an approved relative caregiver, and 

juvenile court dependency is subsequently dismissed, the minor shall be eligible for aid 

under the Kin-GAP Program”). 
4

the girls. Mother simply asserted, without authority, that the issue is appealable pursuant 

to section 395. The Department did not address the question of appealability at all. 

While appellate jurisdiction to consider this issue is by no means clear, we have

found no authority that makes it clear we lack jurisdiction to consider this narrowly 

drawn appeal. We therefore will exercise our discretion to construe the notice of appeal 

broadly and address the merits of mother’s appeal. (See generally In re Madison W. 

(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1451 [construing parent’s notice of appeal from order 

terminating parental rights liberally to encompass order denying parent’s section 388 

petition where such denial occurred within the 60 days prior to filing of the notice of 

appeal].) 

Mother contends that notwithstanding the termination of dependency jurisdiction, 

the court still maintained jurisdiction of the girls as wards of the guardianship pursuant to 

section 366.3. That is true. However, mother then argues, without citation to authority, 

that the court’s jurisdiction over the guardianship necessarily gives it the authority to 

order the Department to provide transportation funds to mother. We are not persuaded by 

mother’s unsupported leap in logic.

Where, as here, the minor children are placed with a relative guardian, the juvenile 

court “shall” terminate dependency jurisdiction, unless the guardian objects or 

exceptional circumstances are present (neither occurred here). (§ 366.3.) The juvenile 

court then “retains jurisdiction over the child as a ward of the court . . . but it no longer

holds ongoing review hearings.” (In re Kenneth S., Jr. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1353, 

1358, italics added; see also § 366.4.) 

Under the retained jurisdiction related to the guardianship, “any motions relating 

to that guardianship may properly be filed in the juvenile court.” (In re D.R. (2007) 155 

Cal.App.4th 480, 486-487; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(c) [“A petition to 

terminate a guardianship established by the juvenile court, to appoint a successor 

guardian, or to modify or supplement orders concerning the guardianship must be filed in 

juvenile court.”]; cf. In re Twighla T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 [affirming juvenile 

court’s order terminating dependency jurisdiction because record showed guardian 
5

exhibited cooperative attitude toward visitation by parent and if problems developed, 

parent had access to juvenile court based on its retained jurisdiction over guardianship].)

In enacting legislation establishing Kin-GAP legal guardianships, the Legislature 

sought to “enhance family preservation and stability” and to save money by reducing 

“continued governmental intervention” by the courts and social service agencies. 

(§ 11361.) In light of these salient goals, mother provides no persuasive argument for the 

court’s authority to order the Department, after termination of dependency jurisdiction 

and the court’s regular supervision, to provide transportation funds to mother. The time 

period for mother to seek reunification services, including transportation assistance, has 

long since terminated.3

Mother has failed to cite any authority or argument supporting the juvenile court’s 

jurisdiction to order transportation funds to mother following the court’s termination of 

dependency jurisdiction and institution of a legal guardianship in a Kin-GAP proceeding 

over both minor girls as the permanent plan. Mother has failed to affirmatively show any 

error.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders of January 24, 2014, are affirmed.

GRIMES, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, Acting P. J.

FLIER, J. 

 

3 The court’s authority under section 366.3 to order services to the legal guardian, 

under certain limited circumstances, is not applicable here. (See, e.g., In re Z.C. (2009) 

178 Cal.App.4th 1271.)