Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 21, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00416-CR

CLAIR A. WOLF, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 248th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1354683

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A jury convicted Clair A. Wolf of solicitation of capital murder1and 

assessed his punishment at life confinement and a $10,000 fine. Appellant 

challenges his conviction on grounds that the trial court erred by (1) admitting into 

evidence the opinion testimony of Emily Travathan at the guilt-innocence phase of 

trial; and (2) sustaining the State’s objections during appellant’s cross-examination 

 

1

See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.03(a), d(1) (Vernon 2011) (criminal solicitation); Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2014) (capital murder).
2

of Nancy Ijames at the punishment phase of trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This criminal prosecution arises from a longstanding family feud among 

siblings over their mother’s estate. Appellant is the brother of Vennie Wolf and 

Elizabeth Wolf. Vennie and Elizabeth Wolf were appointed co-executors of their 

mother’s estate after their mother died in June 2007. Appellant did not qualify as 

an executor and was not appointed.

Vennie Wolf testified that appellant frustrated his sisters’ attempts to settle 

the estate as the siblings fought multiple legal battles during three years of bitter 

litigation. They conducted four failed mediations but reached a settlement at a 

fifth mediation held on June 14, 2010. Appellant agreed to relinquish his claim to

the estate in exchange for cash and three pieces of real property. The feud

nevertheless continued after settlement; the cash never was distributed to appellant 

because he did not fulfill his settlement obligations. 

Appellant dated Emily Travathan from 2006 to 2008. She testified that 

appellant told her on two or three occasions that the happiest day of his life would 

be the day his sisters died. Travathan testified over appellant’s objection that she 

believed appellant was angry enough to hurt his sisters.

Appellant was jailed in March 2012 on unrelated charges; at that time, he 

met William Maceachran and they became friends. According to Maceachran, 

appellant was angry at his sisters and told Maceachran that he wanted his sisters 

killed. From late March 2012 until mid-April 2012, Maceachran and appellant

discussed the murders of Vennie Wolf, her husband Brock Moore, and Elizabeth 

Wolf. Appellant and Maceachran agreed that appellant would give Maceachran a 

place where he and his daughter could live rent free for life if Maceachran 
3

committed the murders for appellant.

Maceachran testified that he contacted the Harris County District Attorney’s 

office regarding appellant’s solicitation of murder. With Maceachran’s help, the 

District Attorney’s office recorded a conversation between appellant and 

Maceachran in jail. The State played the recorded conversation at trial. In the 

recording, appellant states that the “walls got ears.” He nevertheless answers 

Maceachran’s questions regarding his motives for killing his sisters and the murder 

plan. Maceachran asks, “[I]f you kill ‘em what’s the point?” Appellant answers, 

“The point is, I get the estate back.” Maceachran states, “Ok, I got to thinking 

about what you were saying, about uh, making this look like a bad dope deal, on 

uh, Brock and his old lady. Do you think that’s the best way? I mean, which —

what do you think?” Appellant answers, “Anyway that looks like it’s not 

conspicuous. You follow me?”

The jury convicted appellant of solicitation of capital murder following the 

guilt-innocence phase of trial. At the trial’s punishment phase, the jury heard 

testimony from which the State attempted to link appellant to a prior murder

attempt on Vennie Wolf’s life. Vennie Wolf testified that she received a package 

at her home on June 18, 2010, four days after appellant relinquished his claim to 

his mother’s estate. She testified that the package exploded when she opened it, 

causing her permanent disfigurement and loss of the use of two fingers. Vennie 

Wolf also testified that appellant was convicted of cruelty to animals in 2007.

Another of appellant’s former girlfriends, Nancy Ijames, testified that she 

began dating appellant in 2006. She stated that appellant left a cardboard box in 

the closet of her home. Ijames’s neighbor, Lee Musclewhite, testified that he 

removed the cardboard box from Ijames’s home. He feared that the box contained 

a bomb and contacted law enforcement.
4

Bomb technician David Bock, who is employed by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”), testified that he investigated the bomb that

injured Vennie Wolf. Bock testified that he responded to Musclewhite’s call 

regarding the cardboard box. He stated that the cardboard box contained a live 

bomb, which he disabled. Bock stated that he compared the remnants of the bomb 

that injured Vennie Wolf with the bomb that he removed from the cardboard box. 

He explained that the bombs shared many design characteristics, which suggested 

that the same individual built both bombs.

ATF technician Amy Michaude also testified. She stated that she compared 

trace evidence from the remnants of the bomb that injured Vennie Wolf with trace 

evidence from the bomb that Bock removed from the cardboard box. She stated 

that trace evidence from the two bombs matched.

ATF firearm and tool mark examiner Ron Nichols testified that he also

examined the remnants of the bomb that injured Vennie Wolf and the bomb that 

Bock removed from the cardboard box. Nichols stated that he believed the same 

tools were used to make each bomb.

Appellant called one witness at the punishment phase of trial. His witness, 

Nettie Wilson, testified that she lived with appellant from 2000 until 2010. Wilson 

stated that appellant did not keep gunpowder at their home and he never told her he 

was going to kill his sisters. On cross-examination, Wilson testified that she and 

appellant committed fraud on the federal government by cashing appellant’s 

unemployment checks while he was in jail.

The jury assessed appellant’s punishment at life confinement and a $10,000 

fine. This punishment is at the upper end of the range of available punishments 

that appellant could have received. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon 

2011) (an individual adjudged guilty of a first-degree felony shall be punished by 
5

imprisonment for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than five 

years, and may be punished by a fine not to exceed $10,000).

ANALYSIS

Appellant contends in two issues that the trial court erred by (1) allowing 

Travathan to give improper opinion testimony regarding his guilt at the guiltinnocence phase of trial; and (2) limiting cross-examination of Ijames at the 

punishment phase of trial. We consider the issues in turn.

I. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Admitting Travathan’s Testimony

Appellant contends that the trial court erred by permitting Travathan to 

opine in front of the jury that appellant was angry enough to hurt his sisters. He 

argues that Travathan’s testimony was an improper opinion of appellant’s guilt. 

The State argues that Travathan’s testimony was admissible under Texas Rule of 

Evidence 701.

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse 

of discretion; we will not reverse the decision if it is within the zone of reasonable 

disagreement. See Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

Additionally, we disregard a trial court’s non-constitutional error in admitting or 

excluding evidence unless the error affects an appellant’s substantial rights. See 

Tex. R. Evid. 103; Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 218-

19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “Substantial rights are affected when the error has a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[S]ubstantial 

rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence if the appellate 

court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did 

not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 
6

356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Texas Rule of Evidence 701 permits a lay witness to offer opinion testimony 

if the opinion is (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) 

helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of 

a fact issue in the case. See Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 134 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004). If a witness’s lack of personal knowledge yields testimony that

amounts to “choosing up sides” or an opinion of guilt or innocence, the opinion 

should be excluded. See Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997); see also DeLeon v. State, 322 S.W.3d 375, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (“No witness is competent to voice an opinion as to guilt or 

innocence.”). However, if the opinion is otherwise admissible, the testimony is not 

objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 

fact. Tex. R. Evid. 704; see Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d at 134.

An opinion satisfies Rule 701’s personal knowledge requirement “if it is an 

interpretation of the witness’s objective perception of events (i.e. his own senses or 

experience).” Fairow, 943 S.W.2d at 899. A witness’s testimony can include 

opinions, beliefs, or inferences as long as they are drawn from the witness’s own 

experiences or observations. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002). Therefore, once the witness establishes personal knowledge of the 

facts underlying his or her opinion, the witness has satisfied Rule 701’s personal 

knowledge requirement. Fairow, 943 S.W.2d at 899.

Travathan testified that she dated appellant from 2006 to 2008. She stated

that appellant always talked about his mother’s estate, and that she had 

conversations with appellant about his sisters and the estate. She testified that 

appellant repeatedly told her the happiest day of his life would be the day his 

sisters died. Travathan stated that appellant became increasingly bitter and 
7

obsessed with his mother’s estate as time passed. The State asked Travathan, 

“After hearing him and listening to him, did you think that he was mad enough” to 

hurt his sisters. Travathan answered, “Yes, sir.”

We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in allowing 

Travathan to testify regarding her opinion that appellant was mad enough to hurt 

his sisters. Travathan’s testimony established her personal knowledge of facts

from which she could conclude that appellant harbored significant anger towards 

his sisters. The trial court could have found Travathan’s opinion rationally based 

on her personal observations of appellant’s actions and statements; therefore, it 

acted within its discretion by admitting this testimony. See Tex. R. Evid. 701;

Fairow, 943 S.W.2d at 899 (“[O]nce the proponent of the opinion establishes 

personal knowledge of the facts underlying the opinion, he has satisfied the 

perception requirement of Rule 701. This is so even if the opinion concerns 

culpable mental state.”); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997) (lay witness’s testimony that she “believed that [the accused] possibly 

killed” the victim was not an impermissible opinion of guilt because the witness 

elaborated on observations she made the night preceding the murder, culminating 

in her never seeing the victim alive again). We overrule appellant’s first issue.

II. The Trial Court’s Restriction of Appellant’s Cross-examination of 

Ijames Did Not Affect Appellant’s Substantial Rights

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s 

objections during his cross-examination of Ijames at the punishment phase of trial. 

Appellant argues that he was denied the opportunity to establish Ijames’s bias in 

violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Texas Rule of Evidence 613(b). The State argues that the trial 

court exercised appropriate discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination.
8

A. Preservation

As an initial matter, we determine that appellant did not preserve a 

Confrontation Clause complaint for appeal. Therefore, we consider only 

appellant’s non-constitutional argument under Rule 613(b).

To preserve error in the exclusion of evidence, the proponent must object, 

obtain a ruling from the trial court (or object to the trial court’s refusal to rule), and 

make an offer of proof. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), (2); Reyna v. State, 168 

S.W.3d 173, 176-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 33.2. 

The proponent also must state the grounds for the desired ruling “with sufficient 

specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.” Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a)(1)(A); Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 177 (“The party complaining on appeal . . . 

must, at the earliest opportunity, have done everything necessary to bring to the 

judge’s attention the evidence rule or statute in question and its precise and proper 

application to the evidence in question.”) (quoting Martinez v. State, 91 S.W.3d 

331, 335-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). When a single objection encompasses 

complaints under both the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 

the objection preserves error only on non-constitutional evidentiary grounds. See

Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 (Confrontation Clause error not preserved where 

counsel argued at trial only that excluded evidence on a witness’s credibility was 

not hearsay); Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(Confrontation Clause error not preserved where counsel objected to testimony at 

trial only on hearsay grounds).

The following exchange occurred during appellant’s cross-examination of 

Ijames:

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: [W]asn’t there one time when you, I 

guess, got in a dispute with Mr. Wolf and tried to run him and a friend 
9

over in your car?

THE STATE: Object to this now.

IJAMES: Now, wait a minute. I don’t remember.

THE COURT: One moment until I make a ruling. That’s sustained.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: May we approach, your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

(At the bench)

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: To show bias — also able to show bias.

THE COURT: It will be sustained.

As the exchange shows, appellant did not articulate a constitutional argument to 

preserve a Confrontation Clause complaint. Appellant contended generally that his 

argument went to “bias.” His argument could have referred either to the Texas 

Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause. See Reyna, 168 S.W.3d at 179 

(argument for proffering evidence attacking “credibility” could have referred either 

to the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Confrontation Clause). Because appellant’s 

argument implicated both the Texas Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation

Clause, the argument was insufficient to preserve a Confrontation Clause 

complaint. See id. at 179.

Appellant’s argument preserved a contention that the excluded evidence 

should have been admitted under the Texas Rules of Evidence. See id.; Paredes, 

129 S.W.3d 530, 535. We review a trial court’s non-constitutional evidentiary 

rulings for abuse of discretion, and disregard those errors not affecting an

appellant’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. Evid. 103; Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b);

Tillman, 354 S.W.3d at 435; Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218-19.
10

B. Admissibility

Texas Rule of Evidence 613(b) addresses how a witness may be examined 

concerning bias or interest and when extrinsic evidence of that bias or interest may 

be admitted. See Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). 

The rule presumes that a defendant has the right to impeach a State’s witness. See 

id. Under Texas law, “[a] witness may be asked any question, the answer to which 

may have a tendency to affect his credibility.” Koehler v. State, 679 S.W.2d 6, 10 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (emphasis in the original). “The possible animus, motive, 

or ill will of a prosecution witness who testifies against the defendant is never a 

collateral or irrelevant inquiry, and the defendant is entitled, subject to reasonable 

restrictions, to show any relevant fact that might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, 

motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness testifying against him.” 

Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 42-43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

At the punishment phase of trial, the State encouraged the jury to consider 

appellant’s prior bad act of injuring Vennie Wolf with a bomb. Appellant was 

never charged in connection with the bombing; therefore, the State had the burden 

of proving that appellant committed the bombing beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2014).

The State presented a number of witnesses in an effort to prove that 

appellant committed the bombing. Ijames testified that appellant left a cardboard 

box in her closet. She testified that she asked her neighbor, Musclewhite, to 

remove the box. Musclewhite testified that he removed the box and called law 

enforcement. ATF agent Bock testified that he responded to Musclewhite’s call, 

removed the box from Musclewhite’s possession, and uncovered a bomb within 

the box. Bock, Michaude, and Nichols testified that the remnants of the bomb that 

injured Vennie Wolf and the bomb Bock uncovered in the box shared many 
11

characteristics.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in limiting his crossexamination questioning of Ijames. Appellant asked Ijames, “[W]asn’t there one 

time when you, I guess got in a dispute with Mr. Wolf and you tried to run him and 

a friend over in your car?” The State objected, but before the court ruled, Ijames 

answered, “Now, wait a minute. I don’t remember.” The trial court sustained the 

objection. Appellant made a bill of exception, in which the following exchange 

occurred:

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Ms. Ijames, was there an occasion 

where you tried to run over Mr. Wolf and a friend of his in your car?

IJAMES: If I did, I don’t remember it.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. You don’t remember having an 

accident with him or whatever? You don’t remember running into his 

car with — when y’all were having an argument?

IJAMES: Honest to God, I don’t remember it.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. That’s all we have.

Appellant argues that he should have been allowed to examine Ijames regarding 

this incident to show her bias against him. Appellant asserts that the trial court’s 

error was significant because Ijames’s testimony connected appellant to the bomb 

found within the cardboard box; in turn, the bomb in the box connected appellant 

to the bomb that injured Vennie Wolf.

The State contends that the trial court acted within its discretion in 

sustaining the State’s objection. It argues that appellant never proved a nexus or 

logical connection to any potential motive for Ijames to testify against him because 

appellant never proved that Ijames tried to run over appellant in her car.

The parties’ arguments highlight the balance between appropriate, 
12

exploratory cross-examination and inappropriate, harassing cross-examination. 

Cross-examination is by nature exploratory. Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 497 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Nevertheless, the examining party must show that the 

testimony is relevant. Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). The party does this by “demonstrating that a nexus, or logical connection, 

exists between the witness’s testimony and the witness’s potential motive to testify 

in favor of the other party.” Id.

Appellant asked Ijames a question regarding this incident; the State objected 

without stating its grounds; and the trial court sustained the objection without 

stating its reasons. Appellant indicated a desire to explore an incident, which may 

be relevant to bias and which the State never suggested was speculative. See 

Holmes v. State, 323 S.W.3d 163, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[W]here the 

defendant, in cross-examining a State’s witness, desires to elicit subject matters 

that tend to impeach the witness’s character for truthfulness — for example, to 

show malice, ill-feeling, ill-will, bias, prejudice, or animus on the part of the 

witness toward the defendant — in order to preserve the issue for appellate review, 

he is not required to show that his cross-examination would have affirmatively 

established the facts sought, but merely that he desired to examine the witness with 

regard to those specific subject matters that tend to impeach the witness during his 

cross-examination.”).

 Ijames twice stated that she did not remember that the event occurred, and, 

thereafter, appellant did not introduce any extrinsic evidence suggesting that the 

event occurred. This record provides reason to question whether appellant could 

have produced any evidence that the event occurred, and whether he was pursuing 

a speculative and harassing inquiry. If appellant was pursuing a purely speculative 

and harassing inquiry, then the trial court properly exercised discretion in 
13

sustaining the State’s objection to appellant’s cross-examination question. See 

Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498 (“[A] trial judge may limit cross-examination when a 

subject is exhausted, or when the cross-examination is designed to annoy, harass, 

or humiliate, or when the cross-examination might endanger the personal safety of 

the witness.”).

In any event, we determine that any asserted error did not affect appellant’s 

substantial rights. We assess whether an evidentiary error affected a defendant’s 

substantial rights at the punishment phase by asking whether the defendant 

received a longer sentence as a result of the error. See Davis v. State, 315 S.W.3d 

908, 918-19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) rev’d on other grounds, 349 

S.W.3d 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Ivey v. State, 250 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2007), aff’d, 277 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). We consider 

everything in the record, including other evidence admitted in the case, the nature 

of the evidence supporting the jury’s determination, the character of the alleged 

error, and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the 

case. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We also may 

consider the State’s and appellant’s theories for assessing punishment. Id.

We conclude that the trial court’s alleged error in sustaining an objection to 

cross-examination of Ijames did not affect appellant’s substantial rights because 

the alleged error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect; therefore, it

did not result in appellant receiving a longer sentence. See id.; Davis, 315 S.W.3d 

at 918-19.

The State argued at closing that the jury should consider evidence adduced 

at the guilt-innocence phase of trial and assess a heavy punishment based on that 

evidence. See Rayme v. State, 178 S.W.3d 21, 27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2005, pet. ref’d) (“It is clear that in assessing punishment the jury may consider all 
14

of the evidence adduced at trial on guilt or innocence.”) (citing Duffy v. State, 567 

S.W.2d 197, 208) (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). The evidence adduced at the guiltinnocence phase of trial included testimony that appellant wished his sisters dead; 

it also included the recording between Maceachran and appellant, in which the two 

confirm their murder plan. The task of setting a punishment within the statutory 

range is a “normative” judgment. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2006). The sentencer’s discretion is “essentially unfettered.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). The full punishment allowed by law already 

was in play on the basis of extensive evidence adduced at the guilt-innocence 

phase of the trial. See id. This circumstance cuts against a contention that 

additional cross-examination to elicit bias as to Ijames would have affected the 

jury, and consequently, appellant’s punishment. See Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 

at 323; Montilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355.

Musclewhite testified that he removed a box from the closet of appellant’s 

girlfriend, and Bock testified that he received the box from Musclewhite and found

a bomb within the box. Bock, Michaude, and Nichols examined the bomb. 

Ijames’s animus, if shown, would not have suggested that the bomb was found 

anywhere other than Ijames’s closet. Appellant did not contest Ijames’s testimony 

that he had a relationship with Ijames. We determine that Ijames’s animus, if 

proved, would not have provided much, if any, additional evidence for the jury to 

infer that Ijames lied about appellant leaving the box in her closet. cf. Linney v. 

State, 401 S.W.3d 764, 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013) pet. ref’d)

(constitutional error in limiting cross-examination was harmless where the 

proposed line of questioning would not have suggested that a sexual assault victim 

inflicted self-harm for any other reason than in response to the sexual assault). 

Therefore, even if the jury relied on Ijames’s testimony to connect appellant to the 
15

bombing, and if it considered the bombing in assessing punishment, we have fair 

assurance that they would have done the same regardless of whether Ijames held 

animus towards appellant. See Montilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355.

After examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the trial 

court’s decision to limit Ijames’s cross-examination did not influence the jury or 

had but a slight effect on its assessment of punishment. See id. Therefore, we hold 

that the trial court’s decision, if error, did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Montilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. Accordingly, we 

overrule appellant’s issue.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

/s/ William J. Boyce

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Donovan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).