*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 98-60080

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

BERNARD SANGS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 2:97-CR-96-4-S-B

November 11, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury convicted Bernard Sangs of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to

distribute cocaine base. The district court sentenced Sangs to life imprisonment. Sangs timely

filed this appeal, in which he argues that (1) the district court erroneously admitted evidence and

(2) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Neither of Sang’s contentions has

merit. We affirm.

We review the district court’s determination regarding the admissibility of evidence for an
 

2 United States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 835 (5th Cir. 1991).

 

3 United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990).

 

4 See id.

 

5

Id.

 

6 Lokey, 945 F.2d at 834. See also United States v. Nichols, 750 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th

Cir. 1985). In Nichols, we held that evidence is intrinsic if it documents the “establishment of the

conspiracy, identity of the participants, and execution of the scheme[.]” Id.

 

7 Trial Transcript at 191-192.

 

8

Id. at 191.

2

abuse of discretion.2 Sangs argues that the district court erred by admitting into evidence Western

Union records which reflected money transfers from Sangs and others in the Clarksdale,

Mississippi area to recipients in California. The transfers occurred over six months before the

mailings which resulted in the indictment. The admissibility of such “similar acts” or “other acts”

depends on whether the evidence is “intrinsic” or “extrinsic” evidence.3 Intrinsic evidence is

admissible, while the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is governed by Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).4

“Other act” evidence is “intrinsic” when (1) both it and the evidence of the crime charged are

“inextricably intertwined” or (2) both acts are part of a “single criminal episode” or (3) the other

acts were “necessary preliminaries” to the crime charged.5 Evidence is intrinsic to a conspiracy if

it is “relevant to establish how the conspiracy came about, how it was structured, and how each

appellant became a member.”6 In the instant case, the district court determined that the evidence

was admissible to “establish that a conspiracy existed and how it was structured in this instance,

how it operated, between the Marks/Clarksdale, Mississippi area and the Los Angeles, California

area.”7 The court also noted that it would instruct the jury about the relevant period and the fact

that Sangs must be found to be a member of the conspiracy during that period.8 While the

connection between the money transfers and the conspiracy in this case was not immediate, the

transfers did demonstrate the execution of a scheme whereby Sangs and his Mississippi co-
 

9 Because the evidence ofthe money transfers wasintrinsic, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) is not

implicated. See United States v. Torres, 685 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1982). We therefore need not

consider Sangs’ argument that that the transfers were inadmissible extrinsic evidence.

 

10 United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1997).

 

11 United States v. Singer, 970 F.2d 1414, 1419 (5th Cir. 1992).

 

12 United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1405 (5th Cir. 1991).

3

conspirators would deliver money to the unidentified California conspirators in exchange for

illegal contraband. Thus, it cannot be said that the district court abused its discretion by admitting

the evidence as intrinsic.9

We review Sangs’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to see whether the

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government with all reasonable

inferences and credibility choices made in support of the conviction, allows a rational fact finder

to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.10 Sangs contends that the

Government’s case was based solely upon the testimony of one witness, Antonio Johnson. “The

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or co-conspirator will support a conviction, provided

that [the] testimony is not incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face.”11 “[T]estimony

generally should not be declared incredible as a matter of law unless it asserts facts that the

witness physically could not have observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws

of nature.”12 Johnson’s testimony does not fit within this category. In addition, contrary to

Sangs’s assertion otherwise, Johnson’s testimony was not uncorroborated. The Government

introduced tape recordings of telephone and body-wire conversations between Sangs and

Johnson. It also introduced post office receipts corresponding to the various deliveries testified to

by Johnson. Sangs’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction is

therefore without merit.

AFFIRMED.