alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit
31.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14 OR 15D-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE


ACT
OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





I, Heung
Hung Lee, certify that:





1. I have
reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Creative Vistas,
Inc.;





2. based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period covered by this report;





3. based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this report;





4. the
registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing
and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:





a)
designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under one supervisor, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;





b)
evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and





c)
disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal
quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and





5. the
registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):





a) all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and





b) any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.





Dated:
May 17, 2010





/s/ Heung Hung LeeHeung
      Hung LeeChief
      Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant Below, Appellant,

v. PROVIDENCE SERVICE CORPORATION, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. § § § No. 345, 2019 § § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § C.A. No. N18C-06-114 § § § § § § Submitted: August 8, 2019 Decided: August 20, 2019

Before VAUGHN , SEITZ , and TRAYNOR , Justices.

ORDER Upon consideration of the notice of interlocutory appeal, the supplemental notice of appeal, and the documents attach ed hereto, it appears to the Court that: (1) The defendant below-appellant, I llinois Union Insurance Company (“Chubb”), has petitioned this Court under Supreme Court Rule 42 to accept an interlocutory appeal from a Superior Cour t opinion, dated July 9, 2019, granting the motion for partial summary judgment file d by the plaintiff below-appellee, Providence Service Corporation, and denying the cross-motion for summaryjudgment filed by Chubb. 1 The Superior Court held th at the professional incidents

in two different lawsuits were not related for purposes of the Prior Acts or Prior

Notice Exclusion in the excess insu rance policy issued by Chubb. (2) On July 19, 2019, Chubb filed an a pplication for certification of an interlocutory appeal. Chubb argued that the Superior Court’s decision determined a substantial issue of material importance, there were conflicting trial court decisions on the question of law resolved in the d ecision, and review of the decision might terminate the litigation and would serve the interests of justice. Providence opposed the application. (3) On August 7, 2019, the Superior Court denied the application. Applying the Rule 42 criteria, the Supe rior Court concluded that the opinion determined a substantial issue, but that there were not conflicting trial court

decisions and that review would not subs tantially reduce further litigation or serve the interests of justice. (4) We agree that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case. Applications for interlocutory review ar e addressed to the sound discretion of the

Court. 2 In the exercise of its discretion, this Court has concluded that the application for interlocutory review does not meet th e strict standards for certification under

1 Providence Serv. Corp. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co. , 2019 WL 3854261 (Del. July 9, 2019). 2 Supr. Ct. R. 42(d)(v).Supreme Court Rule 42(b). The case is not exceptional, 3 and the potential benefits of interlocutory review do not outweigh the inefficiency, disruption, and probable costs caused by an interlocutory appeal. 4 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is REFUSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Justice

3 Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(ii). 4 Supr. Ct. R. 42(b)(iii).
SYNERGY RENTS, LLC, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. Paul BASILE, Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D18-0556

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

JUNE 01, 2018

ORDERED that the stipulation of dismissal is recognized by the Court, and this appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida is hereby dismissed. This cause is removed from the oral argument calendar of Monday, June 4, 2018.

SUAREZ, LAGOA and LOGUE, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 10.2

                     AMENDMENT TO EXECUTIVE SEVERANCE POLICY

                              NEW SEVERANCE POLICY
                 IN CHANGE OF CONTROL AND CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
                  (EACH AS DEFINED IN 2003 OMNIBUS EQUITY PLAN)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                               SEVERANCE*
                             --------------
<S>                          <C>
Executive Chairman; CEO      **Per contract
COO                            30 months
Executive Vice President       24 months
</TABLE>

*Severance calculated on the basis of annual salary and target bonus

**As per contracts.

                              NEW SEVERANCE POLICY
                FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS EXCEPT "FOR CAUSE",
                  CHANGE OF CONTROL AND CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                           MAXIMUM SEVERANCE*    MINIMUM SEVERANCE*
                           ------------------    ------------------
<S>                        <C>                   <C>
Executive Chairman; CEO     **Per contract        **Per contract
COO                           24 months             12 months
Executive Vice President      21 months              9 months
</TABLE>

*Severance calculated on the basis of annual salary and target bonus

**As per contracts.
EXHIBIT 32


     CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In connection with the Annual Report of Nelnet Education Loan Funding,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
we certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     1.   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.



Date:  March 31, 2005                 By:     /s/ Terry J. Heimes
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Name:  Terry J. Heimes
                                      Title: President
                                             (Principal Executive Officer)


                                      By:     /s/ James D. Kruger
                                      ------------------------------------------
                                      Name:  James D. Kruger
                                      Title: Secretary and Treasurer
                                             (Principal Financial and Accounting
                                             Officer)
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         December 17, 2024.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sean Robinson, 202-268-8405.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on November 29, 2024, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail & USPS Ground Advantage® Contract 489 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2025-540, K2025-538.                

Sean Robinson,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2024-29724 Filed 12-16-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
IN RE: Kirby Dale KELLY

NO. 2018-B-2113

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

January 14, 2019

ORDER

Considering the Petition for Interim Suspension for Threat of Harm filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,

IT IS ORDERED that respondent, Kirby Dale Kelly, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22479, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law on an interim basis pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 19.2, pending further orders of this court. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 26(E), this order is effective immediately.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel may seek the appointment of a trustee(s) to protect *1208the interests of respondent's clients pursuant to the provisions of Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 27, if appropriate.
Order filed November 13, 2014

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 14

- 00741

- CV

____________ CHRISTOPHER SPATES A ND PRODIGY SERVICES , Appellant s
V.

ENI US OPERATING COM PANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2012

- 35849



### O R D E R

This is an appeal from a judgment signed July 28, 2014 . The notice of appeal was due August 27, 2014

. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. Appellant, however, filed his notice of appeal on September 11, 2014 , a date within 15 days of the due date for the notice of appeal. A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when the perfecting instrument is filed within fifteen days of its d ue date. Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Appellant did not file a motion toextend time to file the notice of appeal in this court

. 1 While an extension may be

implied, appellant is still obligated to come forward with a reasonable expl anation to support the late filing. See Miller v. Greenpark Surgery Center Assocs., Ltd.
, 974 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). Accordingly, we ORDER appellant to file a proper motion to extend time to file the notice of app eal on or before 10 days after the date of this order. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3;10.5(b). If appellant does not comply with this order, we will dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3.

PER CURIAM

1 There is a motion contained in the clerk’s record.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, James R Morris, certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of GlobalSCAPE, Inc.; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessaryto make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder my supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared; 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the registrant’s most recent fiscal year that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: March 29, 2011
1424.

#### Southern Railway Company *v.*Freeman.

*Hill, C. J.*

*1. Under the law*of *this*State, *an*employee *of a*railroad company can not recover damages for personal injuries against the company when his own negligence, however slight, contributes in an appreciable degree to the cause of his injury. Therefore, in a suit for such a purpose, no presumption against the company arises until the employee shows affirmatively that he was himself without fault; and it is error to give in charge to the jury section 2321 of the Civil Code, in such a manner as to make it appear applicable irrespective of this limitation. *Georgia Railroad Co.*v. *Hicks,*95 *Ga.*301 (22 S. E. 613).

2. Whether the commission of acts other than those which the law makes, negligence per se constitutes negligence is a question of fact, to be determined by the jury, and not by the judge. Therefore, in this case it was error to charge as follows: “If you find that the engine ran back' and bumped the ear in which he was working, or at which he was working, and caused this plank to fall out, and this was the reason he was. *56injured, I say tlie plaintiff would be entitled to recover.” Hopkins’ Law of Personal Injuries, §§25, 2G, and many decisions of the Supreme Court there collated. * *Judgment reversed.*

Action for damages, from city court of Baxley — Levi O’Steen, judge pro hac vice. September 22, 1908.

Submitted December 9, 1908. —

Decided April 15, 1909

*John F. DeLacy,*for plaintiff in error.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-7400

MICHAEL LEWIS MOORE, a/k/a Michael L. Moore, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

 v. 

DIRECTOR JON OZMINT, South Carolina Department of 

Corrections; MCKITHER BODISON, Warden Lieber Correctional 

Institution, 

 Respondents - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (8:08-cv-02036-GRA) 

Submitted: November 17, 2009 Decided: November 24, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Michael Lewis Moore, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Melody Jane Brown, Assistant 

Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

Michael Lewis Moore seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) 

petition. The district court referred this case to a magistrate 

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2006). The 

magistrate judge recommended that relief be denied and advised 

Moore that failure to file timely objections to this 

recommendation could waive appellate review of a district court 

order based upon the recommendation. Despite this warning and a 

thirty-day extension of time in which to file objections, Moore 

failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. 

The timely filing of specific objections to a 

magistrate judge’s recommendation is necessary to preserve 

appellate review of the substance of that recommendation when 

the parties have been warned of the consequences of 

noncompliance. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-46 (4th 

Cir. 1985); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). Moore 

has waived appellate review by failing to file objections after 

receiving proper notice. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of 

appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

2 
3 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 10.94**

 

**Terms of Transition Services Arrangements with Michael J. Donahue**

 

It may be beneficial for you to serve as a consultant to BearingPoint, Inc. for the thirty(30) days immediately following the effective date of your employment termination, in order to assist management in the orderly transition of your duties, and the resolution of certain outstanding matters. In exchange for your reasonablecooperation and assistance during this fixed thirty (30) day term, BearingPoint shall continue to make your email “Outlook” account available and active, and you may retain possession of your BearingPoint laptop computer andaccessories during this transition period. In exchange for your reasonable cooperation and assistance during this fixed thirty (30) day term, BearingPoint shall also pay you a fee, equivalent to one (1) month compensation at your currentmonthly base salary. In the event that you choose not to do so, or you cease to provide reasonable assistance, in BearingPoint’s sole discretion, at any time during this thirty day term, BearingPoint shall be responsible to pay you only throughthe date of your last contribution, if any on a pro-rated basis. At the conclusion of the transition period, you agree to immediately return the BearingPoint laptop computer and accessories. At such time your BearingPoint “Outlook” accountwill also terminate.
Preston PAMPHILE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D18-3281

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

December 31, 2018

Preston Pamphile, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Samuel B. Steinberg and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

This timely sworn petition seeks belated appeal of a September 18, 2017, order declaring Petitioner competent to proceed *nunc pro tunc* to the time of trial. We dismiss the petition because of a jurisdictional issue.

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty and judgments and sentences were rendered on December 2, 2014, in Leon County Circuit Court case number 2014-CF-1428. In 2016, Petitioner filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel raising four grounds. The petition was granted in part, the judgments and sentences were reversed, and the cause was remanded for further proceedings on the question of establishing Petitioner's competency at the time of trial. *See**Pamphile v. State* , 216 So.3d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). On remand, the circuit court issued a *nunc pro tunc* order on the competency issue, but did not re-enter the judgments and sentences. An order on competency is not independently reviewable *1186under rule 9.140(b), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Because no appealable order has been rendered by the circuit court, the petition for belated appeal is dismissed.

Lewis, Winokur, and Jay, JJ., concur.
Troy I. THOMAS, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D18-4096

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

November 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.