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1

Filed 6/29/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MARK ESSICK,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

A162887

(Sonoma County Super. Ct.

No. SCV-267581)

Following the submission to the County of Sonoma (the County) of a 

harassment complaint against Mark Essick, the elected sheriff of the County, 

an independent investigator, Ms. Amy Oppenheimer, conducted an inquiry 

and prepared a written report. A local newspaper requested that the County 

release the complaint, the report, and various related documents (collectively, 

the Oppenheimer Report) pursuant to the California Public Records Act 

(CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.). Sheriff Essick objected to the County’s 

release of the Oppenheimer Report. In this “reverse” CPRA action, the trial 

court denied his request for a preliminary injunction barring the 

Oppenheimer Report’s release.

Sheriff Essick appeals, contending the trial court erred because (1) the 

Oppenheimer Report should be classified as confidential under an exemption 

to the CPRA (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k)), either as a “peace officer[]” 

“personnel record[]” (Pen. Code, §§ 832.7, subd. (a), 832.8, subd. (a)) or 

because it constitutes a “report[] or findings” relating to a complaint by a 
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2

member of the public against a peace officer (Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, subd. (b), 

832.7, subd. (a)); and (2) the County should be estopped to release the 

Oppenheimer Report because it promised him that, in conducting its 

investigation, it would abide by Government Code section 3300 et seq. (the 

Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act) (POBRA), and it 

therefore should be bound to keep the results of the investigation 

confidential.1 We disagree on both points and will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND2

In August 2020, while a large and complex set of wildfires swept 

through portions of Sonoma County in close proximity to many homes, Sheriff 

Essick met with the County Board of Supervisors, fire officials, and members 

of the public in a streamed town hall meeting. During the meeting, Sheriff 

Essick provided updates on an evacuation strategy and fielded questions 

from the public. When asked a question concerning whether evacuated 

residents might be permitted to reenter mandatory evacuation zones to feed 

pets and animals left behind, Sheriff Essick refused to grant such permission, 

citing safety concerns.

Following the meeting, Sheriff Essick exchanged text messages with 

Lynda Hopkins, an elected member of the Sonoma County Board of 

Supervisors. Supervisor Hopkins started the exchange, asserting her belief 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXX Sheriff Essick 

1 See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

2 We have concurrently filed public (redacted) and sealed (unredacted) 

versions of this opinion. We hereby order the unredacted version sealed until 

30 days from the date this opinion is filed. Both the redacted and unredacted 

versions shall be provided to the parties. Omissions in the public (redacted) 

version are shown by greyed out portions of the language in the opinion.
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3

replied XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

He also left a text telling Supervisor Hopkins XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXX

In a later phone conversation between Supervisor Hopkins and Sheriff 

Essick, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX According to Supervisor Hopkins XX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XX X Sheriff Essick’s recollection of the conversation differed. In his version 

of what happened, Supervisor Hopkins XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX Sheriff Essick claims XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXX He denies XXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXX

Immediately after the phone call, Supervisor Hopkins lodged a 

complaint against Sheriff Essick with the Sonoma County Administrator, 

Sheryl Bratton, alleging XXXXXXXX.

3

 Ms. Bratton forwarded the complaint 

3 Under section 2-8 of the Sonoma County Code, the duties of the 

County Administrator are described as follows: “Supervise, direct and 

coordinate the administration of all county offices, departments and 
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4

to the County Human Resources Director, Christina Cramer, who conducted 

an intake interview of Supervisor Hopkins. In September 2020, County 

Administrator Bratton, County Human Resources Director Cramer, County 

Counsel Robert Pittman, and Susan Gorin, the chair of the Sonoma County 

Board of Supervisors, jointly retained the Law Offices of Amy Oppenheimer, 

a private law firm, to conduct an impartial investigation of XXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX After collecting and analyzing the facts, 

Ms. Oppenheimer found XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX that XXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX But the findings also concluded that 

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

On December 16, 2020, the Board of Supervisors, in a letter over Chair 

Gorin’s signature, gave Sheriff Essick “Formal Notice of Outcome of 

Investigation,” which stated XXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXX 4 More specifically, the letter XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX The letter stated XXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

institutions, and the official conduct of all county officers . . . as to all matters 

over which the board of supervisors has responsibility and control.”

4 We grant Sheriff Essick’s unopposed request that we take judicial 

notice of the County’s “Formal Notice of Outcome of Investigation,” which 

was not included in the trial court record. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.) 

We assume without deciding that the records of county entities fall within 

the purview of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c).
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Before the Board of Supervisors sent its XXXXXXXXXX to Sheriff 

Essick, the Press Democrat, a local newspaper, submitted a request under 

the CPRA seeking disclosure of the final investigative report. The day the 

Board sent its XXXXXXXXXX County Counsel Pittman informed Sheriff 

Essick the Board had received the Press Democrat’s CPRA request and 

intended to release the documents we refer to here as the Oppenheimer 

Report (i.e., the original complaint, the formal notice containing the outcome

of the investigation, the confidential executive summary of investigative 

report, and a redacted copy of the confidential investigative report authored 

by Ms. Oppenheimer). Diane Aqui, Sheriff Essick’s counsel, responded to 

Mr. Pittman asserting the requested documents are personnel records and 

investigative reports of a peace officer that are protected from disclosure 

under Penal Code section 832.7. Mr. Pittman wrote back, expressing his 

disagreement with Ms. Aqui’s interpretation of the Penal Code and informing 

her the Board intended to release the records to the Press Democrat on 

December 24, 2020.

On December 21, 2020, Sheriff Essick filed a complaint for declaratory 

and injunctive relief against the County of Sonoma requesting the trial court 

bar the release of the Oppenheimer Report to the Press Democrat. In the 

complaint, Sheriff Essick requested a temporary restraining order and a 

preliminary injunction to keep the Oppenheimer Report closed to the public 

for the duration of the trial proceedings. The trial court issued the requested 

temporary restraining order and set a hearing for March 2021. But on 

May 19, 2021, the trial court entered a minute order denying the preliminary 

injunction, ruling there was no evidence to show the investigative records 

should be classified as “personnel records” (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a)) that 
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are protected from public release. The court entered a written order on 

June 7, 2021, denying the preliminary injunction.

Sheriff Essick appealed. We granted a temporary stay of the trial 

court’s order on June 24, 2021, prohibiting the County from releasing the 

Oppenheimer Report until further notice. On July 30, 2021, we granted 

Sheriff Essick’s petition for a writ of supersedeas, ruling that, pending the 

resolution of this appeal, the County may not release the subject records until 

further notice. The parties subsequently filed their briefs on the merits of 

this appeal.5

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Landscape

Enacted in 1968 and modeled on the federal Freedom of Information 

Act (5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.), the CPRA “grants public access to public records 

5 After the parties filed their briefs on the merits of the appeal, the 

County filed a motion to strike, asking this court to either (a) strike certain 

portions of Sheriff Essick’s reply brief that allegedly contain improper new 

arguments, (b) disregard the challenged portions of the reply brief, or 

(c) accept a surreply brief responding to the allegedly improper arguments. 

Sheriff Essick filed an opposition to the motion to strike. Sheriff Essick also 

filed a motion for leave to file a “sur surreply brief” in the event this court 

accepts the County’s surreply.

As to the County’s motion to strike, we will not address point by point 

the parties’ detailed contentions in their motion papers as to whether 

particular arguments made in Sheriff Essick’s reply brief are improper. 

Suffice it to say that, in addressing the merits of this appeal, we have 

considered only those arguments in Sheriff Essick’s reply brief that we view 

as proper rebuttal (and to the extent we may have considered any arguments 

the County believes to be improper, the County has suffered no prejudice, as 

we are ruling in its favor on the merits of the appeal). We deny the 

remaining relief requested by the County in its motion—we will not strike 

portions of Sheriff Essick’s reply brief, and we will not accept the County’s 

proposed surreply. Finally, we deny as moot Sheriff Essick’s motion for leave 

to file a “sur surreply” that responds to the proposed surreply.
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held by state and local agencies. [Citation.] . . . ‘[It] was enacted for the 

purpose of increasing freedom of information by giving members of the public 

access to records in the possession of state and local agencies. [Citation.] 

Such “access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business,”

the Legislature declared, “is a fundamental and necessary right of every 

person in this state.” ’ [Citation.]” (Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 

44 Cal.App.5th 897, 913 (Becerra).)

Consistent with its basic design favoring disclosure, the CPRA broadly 

defines “ ‘[p]ublic records’ ” as including “any writing containing information 

relating to the conduct of the public’s business prepared, owned, used, or 

retained by any state or local agency . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e).) 

This expansive framing of the statutory right of access—a right that is 

ultimately rooted in our state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, 

subd. (b)(2))—is fundamental to our approach to construing the statutory 

scheme as a whole. (Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 913 [“CPRA must 

be ‘broadly construed’ because its statutory scheme ‘furthers the people’s 

right of access’ ”].) To be sure, “the [A]ct does not confer an absolute right of 

access.” (Ibid.) In passing the CPRA, the Legislature declared it was 

“ ‘mindful of the right of individuals to privacy.’ ” (Becerra, at p. 913, quoting 

Gov. Code, § 6250.)

The CPRA balances the dual concerns for privacy and disclosure by 

providing for various exemptions that permit public agencies to refuse 

disclosure of certain public records. (Gov. Code, §§ 6254–6255.) “In 2004, 

California’s voters passed an initiative measure that added to the state 

Constitution a provision directing the courts to broadly construe statutes that 

grant public access to government information and to narrowly construe 

statutes that limit such access. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2).)” (Long
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Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach (2014) 59 Cal.4th 59, 68

(City of Long Beach).) Applying these constitutionally grounded principles of 

construction in a case involving a peace officer’s personnel file, our Supreme 

Court held in 2014 that article I, section 3, subdivision (b)(2) of the California 

Constitution “does not affect the construction of any statute ‘to the extent . . .

it protects [the] right to privacy, including any statutory procedures 

governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official 

performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer.’ (Cal. Const., 

art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(3).)” (City of Long Beach, supra, at p. 68.) But the 

balance struck by the Legislature still favors disclosure in cases involving 

peace officer records and all other kinds of records. That is because the party 

opposing disclosure under any CPRA exemption always bears the burden of 

proving the exemption applies (City of Long Beach, at p. 70; County of Los

Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63–64), which means 

that, on the facts, doubtful cases must always be resolved in favor of 

disclosure.

Among the exemptions recognized within the CPRA scheme is the 

umbrella protection of Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k). That 

provision protects “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or 

prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, 

provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” (Gov. Code, § 6254, 

subd. (k).) Succinctly put, Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k) 

“ ‘incorporates other [disclosure] prohibitions established by law.’ ” (Copley 

Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1283 (Copley Press), 

quoting CBS, Inc. v. Block (1986) 42 Cal.3d 646, 656; City of Long Beach, 

supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 67.) Thus, to mark out the precise reach of 

exemptions available under Government Code section 6254, subdivision (k), 
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we must look beyond the CPRA itself, to privileges and confidentiality 

protections defined elsewhere in the law.

Here, Sheriff Essick relies primarily on sections 832.7 and 832.8 of the 

Penal Code. These two provisions are found within the statutory scheme 

known as the Pitchess statutes. (Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7, 832.8.) Read 

together, Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 protect as “confidential” the 

“personnel records of peace officers” and “information obtained from these 

records.” (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a).) “Personnel records” means anything 

in a file maintained under the officer’s name “by his or her employing agency” 

(Pen. Code, § 832.8, subd. (a)) that relates to a variety of subjects in which an 

officer may have a privacy interest, including, as pertinent here, the officer’s 

“advancement, appraisal, or discipline” (id., subd. (a)(4)) or “[c]omplaints, or 

investigations of complaints” concerning the performance of his or her duty

(id., subd. (a)(5); see City of Long Beach, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 68). Though 

it is not his principal focus, Sheriff Essick relies as well on Penal Code section 

832.5, which—by cross-reference (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a))—extends 

overlapping confidentiality protection to records relating to investigations of 

certain citizen complaints against peace officers “in the possession of the 

[officer’s employing] department or agency.” (Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd. (b); 

see id., subd. (a)(1).)6

6 Following the enactment of certain amendments in 2019, the Pitchess 

statutes “deem[] as nonconfidential—and subject to public inspection 

pursuant to the CPRA—all records maintained by a state agency relating to 

reports, investigations, or findings from incidents involving an officer’s 

discharge of a weapon; an officer’s use of deadly force or force resulting in 

great bodily injury; and incidents involving a sustained finding of a sexual 

assault or dishonesty by an officer. ([Pen. Code,] § 832.7[, subd. ](b)(1)

(A)–(C).)” (Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 918.) As a broad descriptor 

for complaints that are not subject to disclosure under Penal Code 
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B. The County of Sonoma Is Not Sheriff Essick’s 

“Employing Agency”

According to Sheriff Essick, “The ultimate question in this appeal is 

whether the records sought to be disclosed are ‘personnel records’ within the 

meaning of Penal Code § 832.8.” In a closely related line of argument, Sheriff 

Essick contends that even if the records at issue here are not “ ‘personnel 

records’ ” as defined by Penal Code section 832.8, they are confidential files 

relating to the investigation of a “complaint[] by [a] member[] of the public” 

against a peace officer under Penal Code section 832.5. Both strands of the 

argument fail for the same reason: To support the “ ‘personnel records’ ” 

version of the argument under Penal Code section 832.8 and the citizen 

complaint version of the argument under Penal Code section 832.5, Sheriff 

Essick must demonstrate that the County is his employer. We conclude he 

has not met that burden.

That the County has chosen to pay its elected officials is immaterial to 

its relationship to Sheriff Essick. (Sonoma County Code, § 21-5 [“The 

unclassified service shall consist of: [¶] (a) All officers elected by the people”]; 

see generally Sonoma County Code, ch. 21 [“unclassified service” includes 

those over whom Civil Service Commission lacks authority].) The county 

sheriff is a public official elected by Sonoma County voters, and as such, is 

ultimately responsible to them—not to the Board of Supervisors or anyone 

section 832.7, subdivision (b)(1)(A)–(C), Sheriff Essick uses the term “nonserious” complaints. We agree that Supervisor Hopkins’s complaint and the 

finding relating to it were not per se disclosable under Penal Code section 

832.7, subdivision (b)(1)(A)–(C), but to the extent that, implicitly, Sheriff 

Essick suggests her complaint was “non-serious”—in a colloquial sense, since 

that phrase appears nowhere in the statute—we do not endorse the language 

he uses to describe the operation of the 2019 amendments to the Pitchess

statutes.
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else in county government. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b) [requiring 

elected sheriff].)7 Not only does the Board of Supervisors lack power to hire 

the county sheriff, it lacks power to fire the person in that office as well. The 

Board of Supervisors, acting on behalf of the County, has no power to appoint 

or terminate the sheriff. (Gov. Code, § 24205 [requiring elected sheriff even 

in charter counties].)

Nor does the Board of Supervisors have disciplinary power over the 

county sheriff. In commissioning the Oppenheimer Report, the Board of 

Supervisors was fulfilling its “statutory duty to supervise the conduct of all 

county officers.” (Dibb v. County of San Diego (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1200, 1210, 

citing Gov. Code, § 25303 [creating that duty].) Contrary to Sheriff Essick’s 

argument, Government Code section 25303 does not create an employeremployee relationship between the Board of Supervisors and the county 

sheriff. Rather, a county board has “oversight responsibility” as to an elected 

sheriff but lacks power to direct how he or she performs official duties. (Dibb, 

supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1209–1210; cf. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.

Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 350 [in applying the 

multiple criteria that determine the existence of an employment relationship 

for purposes of worker’s compensation, “ ‘[t]he principal test of an 

employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered 

has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result 

desired . . . .’ ”].)

The Board of Supervisors did, to be sure, issue XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXX but not every statement of XXXXXXXX is a “written 

7 It matters not that the County Administrator and County Counsel 

Pittman were also involved in the retention of Ms. Oppenheimer to carry out 

the investigation; in doing so, they were acting as adjuncts to the Board of 

Supervisors.
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reprimand” constituting “punitive action” within the meaning of POBRA. 

The Board of Supervisors’ XXXXXXXXXX could only be a “reprimand” if the 

Board of Supervisors were Sheriff Essick’s employer. “Reprimands” must

have employer-driven consequences—affecting promotion, advancement, or 

pay, and potentially leading to discharge. Written reprimands of peace 

officers are “punitive actions” only because they “ ‘may lead to the adverse

consequences . . . at some future time’ ” by the department issuing the 

reprimand. (Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 317 

[italics added by Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2001) 

89 Cal.App.4th 985, 996]; see Gordon v. Horsley (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 336, 

348 [written reprimand “punitive action” because it would “almost certainly 

have an impact on his future opportunities for advancement in the sheriff’s 

department”]; Caloca v. County of San Diego (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1209, 

1222 [citizens review board’s non-disciplinary finding of misconduct “punitive 

action” because it would “be considered in future personnel decisions affecting 

[the] deputies and may lead to punitive action”]; Hopson v. City of Los 

Angeles (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 347, 353 [police commission’s report was 

“punitive action” because of “its potential impact on the [officers’] career 

opportunities”].) Sheriff Essick faces no such consequences here.8

We are not persuaded that the Oppenheimer Report is “discipline” from 

which the Sheriff might appeal. The Oppenheimer Report has no 

consequence for Sheriff Essick’s duties, tenure, compensation, or benefits. If 

criticism of the conduct of elected officials were “discipline” subject to a full 

8 Sheriff Essick cites Sparks v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 

173 Cal.App.4th 794, but that case does not hold that an elected sheriff is an 

employee of the Board of Supervisors within the meaning of the Pitchess 

statutes. Cases are not precedent for propositions they do not consider. 

(McDowell & Craig v. City of Santa Fe Springs (1960) 54 Cal.2d 33, 38.)
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array of due process rights for determining truth and accuracy, our 

democracy would function rather differently than it does. Any statements 

from members of the Board of Supervisors approving or disapproving Sheriff 

Essick’s conduct, individually or collectively, are expressions of the 

Supervisors’ own free speech rights and do not amount to discipline. 

(Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) 391 U.S. 563, 574 [“statements by 

public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First 

Amendment protection”].) The truth and accuracy of such statements must 

be open to testing in the public square. Indeed, the fact we are dealing with 

what may fairly be characterized as political speech among elected officials 

toward one another underscores the importance of reading the CPRA in favor 

of disclosure.

Ignoring the overarching governance and free speech aspects of the 

situation here, Sheriff Essick urges us to treat him as a subordinate of the 

Supervisors, subject to their charge. He insists the County must be his 

“employer,” otherwise the investigation here would have been merely an idle 

act. But he overlooks something basic about a system of divided government 

in which there are checks and balances. One of those cross-checks, at county 

level, is the oversight authority of the Board of Supervisors over other county 

officers. (Gov. Code, § 25303.) A central role of the Board of Supervisors, like 

any other legislative body, is to investigate the conduct of executive officials 

and thereby shine a light on matters that the voters of the County may wish 

to know. Here, the voters of the County have ultimate authority over the 

county sheriff, and they are entitled to be informed as to that person’s

strengths, as well as weaknesses, successes and failures—including the 

person’s ability to model traits of civility and respect for others that may be 

expected in an official who should embody those values for the public.
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C. By Commissioning the Preparation of the Oppenheimer Report, 

the County of Sonoma Did Not Take on the Role of Sheriff 

Essick’s “Employer”

Changing gears, Sheriff Essick asserts that, under Copley Press v. 

Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1272, it is irrelevant whether the Board of 

Supervisors is the sheriff’s employing agency in the normal course, because, 

on the facts presented here, “Sonoma County functioned as [Sheriff] Essick’s 

employing agency by initiating the complaint intake, deciding to investigate, 

determining the process of investigation, making a final determination, 

issuing discipline, and maintaining the records” relating to the complaint. 

Thus, Sheriff Essick argues, by investigating actions carried out by him in his 

capacity as a “peace officer,” the Board of Supervisors effectively took on the 

role of Sheriff Essick’s employer. We cannot agree.

Because the Oppenheimer Report was the product of an independent 

outside inquiry, the holding in Copley Press does not apply. In that case, San 

Diego’s Civil Service Commission performed statutorily mandated functions 

as to internal peace officer discipline the county sheriff’s department would 

otherwise have handled. (Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1292.) There 

was no dispute that the records there were produced in what was tantamount 

to an internal personnel discipline process. Our Supreme Court found that 

shifting this internal affairs function to an outside agency did not strip the 

records at issue there of the protection they would have had if generated 

internally. (Id. at p. 1294.) Here, by contrast, the Sonoma County Board of 

Supervisors was performing an independent investigative inquiry. 

Legislative oversight is something vastly different than the routine discipline 

of a rank-and-file peace officer and cannot be compared to outsourcing a 

routine internal discipline function.
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15

The more analogous precedent is Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. 

Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268. In that case, the City of 

Pasadena retained an independent consultant to review its police 

department’s policies following a fatal shooting of an unarmed teenager. (Id.

at p. 274.) The Los Angeles Times and others sought disclosure of the 

resulting report under the CPRA. (Pasadena Police Officers Assn., at p. 274.) 

The trial court denied a preliminary injunction in the ensuing “reverse” 

CPRA case, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Pasadena Police Officers 

Assn., at pp. 274–275.) The court reasoned that the report did not reflect the 

advancement, appraisal or discipline of the officers involved in the shooting, 

and it refused to interpret the Pitchess statutes so broadly as to “ ‘sweep 

virtually all law enforcement records into the protected category of “personnel 

records.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 288.) So, too, here, Sheriff Essick’s argument, taken to 

its logical conclusion, would allow the Pitchess statutes to be used as a veil to 

conceal all records held by any agency or department of the County 

concerning acts done in his official capacity if anything in those records is 

critical of him or could in some way place him in an unflattering light. We 

reject the argument. The Pitchess statutes, properly read, provide no shield 

against embarrassment to an elected official who also happens to be a peace 

officer.

D. Sheriff Essick’s Estoppel Claims Do Not Make the Records 

Confidential

As a backup line of argument, Sheriff Essick contends that the

Oppenheimer Report is confidential because the County of Sonoma promised

him its investigation would comply with POBRA. According to Sheriff

Essick, the County of Sonoma’s agreement to conduct the investigation under

POBRA created an enforceable legal promise that the records would be
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16

confidential and he would have the right to a de novo administrative appeal,

“whether he was entitled to them or not.” We are not persuaded.

Because nothing in the POBRA statutory scheme explicitly grants or

mentions confidentiality from CPRA requests, there was no

misrepresentation or concealment of any material facts here. By voluntarily

granting Sheriff Essick POBRA protections, Sonoma County was offering to

go beyond what it was bound to do to ensure the investigation was

procedurally fair. That gave Sheriff Essick, for example, a right to have

counsel present during his interview and to have the interview conducted

under certain neutral conditions, but it did not create any right of

confidentiality. Sheriff Essick emphasizes that he was promised a right of

de novo administrative appeal, along with the other procedural protections

provided by POBRA; presumably, as we understand the argument, that

means he had a right to have the initial report and findings held in

confidence until he exhausted his administrative appellate rights. But since

POBRA is silent on confidentiality, any claimed expectation of a right to

appeal was independent of that issue. If the investigative report and findings

were to be treated as confidential, the only arguable legal source for that

protection came from outside of POBRA—specifically Penal Code sections

832.5, 832.7 and 832.8 of the Pitchess statutes, which, understandably,

supply the primary basis for the argument Sheriff Essick advances in this

appeal. Our conclusion that those statutes provide no confidentiality

protection eliminates any possible legal foundation for his estoppel argument

as well.

In the end, therefore, we reject Sheriff Essick’s POBRA-based estoppel

argument for the same reasons we reject his primary line of argument. 

Absent any confidentiality protection provided by the Pitchess statutes, there
REDACTED

17

is no substance to his estoppel claim. If Sheriff Essick believed Sonoma

County’s commitment to abide by POBRA procedures meant that any report

produced at the conclusion of the investigation would be “absolutely”

confidential, his claimed expectation of secrecy amounts to nothing more than

a misunderstanding of the law. He could not possibly have relied justifiably

on the County guaranteeing him a right to confidentiality that POBRA does

not provide. And he cannot now bootstrap his way to confidentiality by

invoking POBRA indirectly, via an estoppel argument that cannot be

supported by proof of misrepresentation, concealment or reasonable reliance.

III. DISPOSITION 

The order of the trial court denying Sheriff Essick’s request for a 

preliminary injunction is affirmed. This court’s July 30, 2021 order 

prohibiting the County from releasing the records that are the subject of this 

appeal shall expire 30 days from the date this opinion is filed. The

unredacted version of this opinion shall likewise remain sealed for 30 days

from the filing of this opinion. Once that period expires, the unredacted 

version of this opinion shall become public and the County may release the 

records, unless the California Supreme Court orders otherwise. Costs shall 

be awarded to the respondents.

STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

POLLAK, P. J.

DESAUTELS, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
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Essick v. County of Sonoma – A162887

Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of Sonoma

Trial Judge: Hon. Jennifer V. Dollard

Counsel: Smith Dollar, Diane Aqui; Law Offices of Joseph G. Baxter and 

Joseph G. Baxter, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Colantuono, Highsmith & Whatley, Michael G. Colantuono, 

Matthew C. Slentz, and Abigail A. Mendez, for Defendants 

and Respondents.