SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3745-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RONRAY L. HARRIS,

a/k/a RON RAY, RONALD 

HARRIS, RONRAY HARRIS,

RONALD R. HARRIS, RON 

MARROW, RON R. HARRIS, 

RONRAY L. HARRIS, and

RON HARRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Argued September 15, 2021 - Decided October 14, 2022

Before Judges Accurso and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment No. 

17-05-0307.

Nakea J. Barksdale, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. 

Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Nakea J. 

Barksdale, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Gretchen A. Pickering, Senior Assistant Prosecutor,

argued the cause for respondent (Jeffrey H. 

Sutherland, Cape May County Prosecutor, attorney; 

Gretchen A. Pickering, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ACCURSO, J.A.D.

Defendant Ronray L. Harris was charged in a five-count indictment with 

first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree aggravated 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree possession of a weapon for an 

unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a 

weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and fourth-degree certain persons not to have 

weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a).1 The jury acquitted him of the weapons 

charges, and the judge thereafter dismissed the certain persons offense. 

Defendant was convicted of third-degree theft from the person, N.J.S.A. 

2C:20-2(b)(2)(d), and second-degree aggravated assault. The judge sentenced 

defendant to a discretionary extended prison term of sixteen years on the 

aggravated assault, subject to the periods of parole ineligibility and 

1

 A subsequent indictment charged defendant with third-degree bail jumping, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-7. Defendant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 

three years in State prison concurrent to the sentence imposed in this matter. 
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supervision required by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

7.2, and to a concurrent five-year term on the theft.

At trial, the State established that shortly after 3:30 a.m. on February 23, 

2017, Wildwood Police received a 911 call from Gerald Saunders claiming 

he'd just been stabbed at the bus station and needed an ambulance. The twominute call was played for the jury. Saunders identified defendant as his 

assailant, and claimed defendant stabbed him just after Saunders got off the 

bus. Saunders also told the dispatcher defendant ran off with Saunders' work 

coat.

When police arrived, they found Saunders bleeding from a gash on his 

arm and a puncture wound in his back. The bus driver testified that although 

she didn't know his name, Saunders was a regular on her bus, which he took to 

work. The driver testified that after Saunders got off the bus that morning and 

was retrieving his bike from inside a cargo hold near the door, she heard a man 

approach him. The two walked toward the doors of the bus terminal and began 

to fight. Then Saunders ran back to the bus, told the driver he'd been stabbed 

and asked her to call the police. The jury viewed a New Jersey Transit video 

of the altercation outside the bus. 
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The video showed a man in a black jacket and hooded sweatshirt

approach Saunders as he was removing his bike from the cargo hold. The two 

appear to exchange words and, after the man appears to lunge at Saunders, one 

or two blows. As the man drags Saunders' bike away from the bus, Saunders 

follows, taking off a bright blue jacket and laying it across a trash receptacle as 

he does so. When Saunders catches up to the man and attempts to yank his 

bike back from him, the two square up. A quick exchange of blows follows, 

and then Saunders backs quickly away from the man and turns to run toward 

the bus as the man follows. Saunders enters the bus briefly and the man walks 

out of the terminal, picking up Saunders' jacket, which he carries off with him. 

Saunders starts to follow the man to the exit and then pulls out a cell phone. 

The entire altercation occurs in less than two minutes. 

The responding officer told the jury Saunders was bleeding from his arm 

and back, and the wounds looked as though he'd been stabbed. In an audio 

recording from the officer's body camera played for the jury, Saunders told the 

officers what happened. He claimed he and defendant had previously had an 

argument over defendant trying to take a puppy without paying for it. And 

that morning as he was getting his bike out of the bus, defendant came up 

behind him and said, "See, I could've had you" and dragged his bike off. 
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Saunders followed him, taking off his coat and trying to get his bike back, 

telling defendant "Yo, I gotta go to work." Saunders claimed that after he took 

off his coat, defendant "just started juggin." Saunders told the officer he didn't 

see a knife and didn't realize he'd been cut until he went to throw a punch and 

saw his arm was bleeding. He again identified defendant as the man who'd 

stabbed him and provided a description for the officers. The officer testified 

no knife or other weapon was ever recovered. 

The EMT who tended to Saunders agreed with the officer the wounds 

appeared to be stab wounds. He testified the technicians could not get the 

bleeding from the puncture wound in Saunders' back under control and feared 

there had been damage to an artery or internal organ. The technicians 

requested the assistance of an advanced life support unit, and after 

rendezvousing with that unit, asked for a medevac helicopter. That request 

was declined due to weather conditions, and Saunders was taken by ambulance 

to the hospital. 

Saunders also testified. He initially denied he'd made the 911 call. 

After being shown the transcript of the call, Saunders admitted he'd placed it. 

He explained he'd identified defendant as the man who attacked him, "[c]ause I 

thought it was him," but denied he'd been stabbed that night, testifying he was 
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"cut." He explained he and defendant had previously had "a little argument, 

confrontation" after defendant attempted to take a puppy Saunders had without 

paying full price, "[s]o the night I got stabbed I thought it was him." Saunders

denied speaking to an officer at the bus terminal. He also claimed he could not 

remember what he'd said in the statement he'd made to the detective at the 

hospital. He could not remember telling the responding officers it was 

defendant who'd stabbed him or identifying defendant in a photo in the 

hospital. He did, at the prosecutor's request, show his scars to the jury.

Following a Gross2 hearing, defendant's statement to the detective, in 

which he identified defendant's photo and confirmed he was the man who 

stabbed him, was played for the jury. The detective testified Saunders told 

him defendant had dated Saunders' girlfriend's daughter, and that he'd known 

him since he was twelve years old. Defendant did not testify. 

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

POINT I

THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 

INSTRUCT THE JURY ON MUTUAL COMBAT AS 

A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONSTITUTED A 

VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO DUE 

PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL. U.S. 

2 State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1 (1990).
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CONST. AMENDS. VI AND XIV; N.J. CONST. 

ART. I, PARS. 9 AND 10. 

POINT II

DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF 16 YEARS WITH 

AN 85% PAROLE DISQUALIFIER FOR THEFT, 

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND BAIL JUMPING 

IS EXCESSIVE, UNDULY PUNITIVE, AND MUST 

BE REDUCED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN ITS FINDING AND WEIGHING OF 

AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS. 

U.S. CONST. AMENDS. VI AND XIV; N.J. CONST. 

ART. I, PARS. 9 AND 10.

After having reviewed the record, we reject both arguments.

There is no question but that "[a]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury 

are essential for a fair trial." State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117, 122 (1982).

"[E]rroneous instructions on material issues are presumed to be reversible 

error, excusable only if they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 

Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 273 (1986). "The test of whether an error is 

harmless," however, "depends upon some degree of possibility that it led to an 

unjust verdict." State v. Burton, 309 N.J. Super. 280, 289 (App. Div. 1998). 

"The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to 

whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." 

Ibid.
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The judge charged the jury at defendant's request with all lesser included 

offenses of robbery and aggravated assault, including third-degree theft from a 

person, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(d); third-degree aggravated assault, bodily 

injury purposely or knowingly with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2);

third-degree aggravated assault, significant bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(b)(7); fourth-degree aggravated assault, bodily injury recklessly with a 

deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(3); as well as the disorderly persons 

offenses of simple assault, bodily injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1); and simple assault, negligent bodily injury with a 

deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(2). Defendant also asked for a petty 

disorderly persons offense charge under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a) for simple assault 

"committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent," based on 

Saunders having taken off his jacket and putting "his hands up to engage in a 

fight." The State objected, arguing Saunders only did so after defendant had 

forcibly taken Saunders' bike and dragged it away. The prosecutor argued a 

victim who engages with a thief to regain possession of his property has not 

mutually consented to a fight. 

Defense counsel countered that the man in the video who scuffled with 

Saunders, who counsel claimed was not defendant, obviously never had any 
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intent to steal Saunders' bike, which the man left on the platform. Counsel 

contended the man only pulled the bike away to get Saunders away from the 

bus, because his purpose "was to fight and Mr. Saunders agreed to that fight by 

taking off his coat and putting up his hands." 

The prosecutor argued that even allowing defendant's purpose was a 

fight and not a theft, Saunders was stabbed, and there could be no mutual 

consent to being lured into a fist fight with someone armed with a concealed 

deadly weapon. The judge denied the charge, finding the evidence did not 

support it, and that including it along with the simple assault, bodily injury and 

simple assault, deadly weapon charges would unnecessarily complicate the 

charge and confuse the jury. 

The law is clear that in order "[t]o give full force to the reasonable doubt 

standard," as well as to preserve a defendant's right "to have the jury consider 

all defenses supported by the evidence, . . . a defendant is entitled to a charge 

on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence," State v. Short, 131 

N.J. 47, 53 (1993), regardless of whether the included defense is indictable, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(d). When a defendant requests a lesser included offense 

charge, the trial judge must thoroughly examine the record to determine 

whether there is a rational basis in the evidence for finding the defendant was 
10 A-3745-18

not guilty of the greater offense but was guilty of the lesser included one. 

State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293, 299 (1988). The Court in Sloane likened a 

defendant's entitlement to a lesser offense charge to the right to have the jury 

instructed on any available defense supported by the evidence. Id. at 303.

Although defendant is correct that there was some evidence in the record 

regarding Saunders' willingness to engage in fisticuffs with defendant, we 

cannot find the evidence supported the defense of mutual combat. " It is a 

well-settled principle of law that an aggressor will not be allowed, under the 

law, to mitigate his crime on the theory of mutual combat when it appears that 

his victim had no desire to fight, and intended to fight only to the extent that a 

defense of his person against an unprovoked assault was necessary." State v. 

Pasterick, 285 N.J. Super. 607, 617 (App. Div. 1995) (quoting Langford v. 

State, 93 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1956)). "[M]utual combat requires a mutual intent to 

fight, as distinguished from an encounter where one is attacking and the other 

is merely defending himself." Ibid. (quoting 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's 

Criminal Law § 161 at 361 (15th ed. 1994)).

The evidence was unequivocal that defendant was the aggressor in the 

encounter captured on video, lunging at Saunders and forcibly taking the bike 

he needed to get to work. The video also makes plain Saunders only took off 
11 A-3745-18

and laid aside his work coat as he followed defendant dragging the bike, just 

before attempting to unsuccessfully yank it back from him. Although 

Saunders directed a couple of punches at defendant, he did so only after he 

was attacked by defendant. 

In addition, there was nothing suggesting defendant suffered any injury, 

whereas Saunders clearly suffered seriously bleeding wounds to his arm and 

back. In the context of discussing whether mutual combat can give rise to a 

passion/provocation defense in a murder prosecution, the Court in Crisantos 

noted the common law qualifier that "the contest must have been waged on 

equal terms and no unfair advantage taken of the deceased." 102 N.J. at 274

(quoting 1 O. Warren & B. Bilas, Warren on Homicide § 110 at 525-26 

(1938)). "[I]f a person, under color of fighting on equal terms, kills the other 

with a deadly weapon which he used from the beginning or concealed on his 

person from the beginning, the homicide constitutes murder." Id. at 275 

(quoting Torcia, § 110 at 254). Although defense counsel argued in closing 

that Saunders' wounds could have been caused by the quick scuffle next to the 

open cargo door on the bus, the video establishes Saunders had already closed 

the door before any scuffle began. 
12 A-3745-18

Viewing all these facts in a light most favorable to defendant, we are 

satisfied the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on mutual 

combat as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. There is no view of 

the evidence that would provide a jury a rational basis to acquit defendant of 

second-degree aggravated assault and convict him of petty disorderly person 

simple assault based on mutual combat. See State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 

398 (2002).

We also reject defendant's claim his sentence is excessive. Defendant 

concedes he was extended-term eligible as a persistent offender. N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-3(a). He contends the trial court failed to consider the age of his prior 

convictions and that none involved violent offenses in determining an 

extended term was necessary. And although he presented several mitigating 

factors, the court rejected all of them. On appeal, he contends both mitigating 

factor one, that defendant's conduct did not cause serious harm, N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(b)(1), and eleven, that the imprisonment of the defendant would entail 

excessive hardship to his family, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11), should have been 

found. He contends the undue weight the trial court accorded the aggravating 

factors it found and its failure to find mitigating factors one and eleven 
13 A-3745-18

resulted in his manifestly excessive sixteen-year NERA term, which should be 

vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. 

After reviewing defendant's extensive criminal history, consisting of 

eight prior indictable convictions, including assault and resisting arrest in 

1996, third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous 

substance in 1998, third-degree hindering his own prosecution and a fourthdegree certain persons offense in 2002, third-degree possession of CDS, 

fourth-degree hindering prosecution, a fourth-degree certain persons offense in 

2008, and third-degree possession of CDS in 2012, as well as four disorderly 

persons offenses, three municipal ordinance violations, a pending bail jumping 

charge, and four juvenile adjudications, the judge found aggravating factors 

three, risk of recidivism, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six, the extent of the 

defendant's prior record and the seriousness of the crimes of which he has been 

convicted, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine, the need to deter, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(9), and no mitigating factors. 

As to the mitigating factors defendant presses on appeal, the judge 

rejected mitigating factor one because the jury convicted defendant of 

purposefully or knowingly causing Saunders serious bodily injury and 

mitigating factor eleven because, although defendant had at that time seven 
14 A-3745-18

children between the ages of eleven months and twenty-five years, the 

hardship facing his family, whom the pre-sentence report reflected lived in 

another state at an unknown address, was not different from others in the same 

circumstances. 

The judge agreed defendant satisfied the statutory prerequisites for 

sentencing as a persistent offender and based on her assessment of the 

aggravating and mitigating factors, rejected the State's request for an aggregate 

eighteen-year NERA term for aggravated assault, and instead determined to 

sentence defendant to sixteen years in State prison, subject to NERA, and a 

concurrent five-year term on the theft conviction. His subsequent three-year 

sentence for bail jumping was also run concurrently.

Having considered defendant's arguments, we find no basis to reverse his 

sentence. Defendant's sixteen-year extended-term sentence is concededly 

within the range of the five-year minimum of the ordinary-term range for a 

second-degree offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2), and the twenty-year maximum 

of the extended-term range, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(3). The aggravating factors 

the court found have ample support in the record and there was no error in the 

court relying on defendant's extensive criminal record in support of both the 

aggravating factors as well as its extended term sentence. See State v. Tillery, 
15 A-3745-18

238 N.J. 293, 327-28 (2019). The court did not err in rejecting mitigating 

factors one and eleven as they lacked support in the record. Accordingly, 

because the trial court's findings and balancing of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors are supported by adequate evidence in the record, and the 

sentence imposed is neither inconsistent with the sentencing provisions of the 

Code of Criminal Justice nor shocking to the judicial conscience, we affirm. 

See State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70-71 (2014).

Affirmed.