# Diario Oficial C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0928 |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 242 |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 60.° año27 de julio de 2017 |

ISSN 1977-0928

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 242

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

60.° año27 de julio de 2017

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| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicaciones |
| | COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2017/C 242/01 | No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Decisión relativa a la evaluación de las condiciones para la resolución en relación con Veneto Banca S.p.A. | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Decisión relativa a la evaluación de las condiciones para la resolución en relación con Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. | 3 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

II   Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2017/C 242/01

No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Decisión relativa a la evaluación de las condiciones para la resolución en relación con Veneto Banca S.p.A.

2

2017/C 242/03

Decisión relativa a la evaluación de las condiciones para la resolución en relación con Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

3

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| | IV   Información |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Tipo de cambio del euro | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Resumen de las Decisiones de la Comisión Europea sobre las autorizaciones de comercialización para uso o las autorizaciones de uso de las sustancias incluidas en el anexo XIV del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo relativo al registro, la evaluación, la autorización y la restricción de las sustancias y preparados químicos (REACH) [publicado de conformidad con el artículo 64, apartado 9, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006]
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | INFORMACIÓN RELATIVA AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO |
| | Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia, en lo referente a posibles ayudas estatales concedidas a Landsvirkjun a través de garantías del Estado sobre contratos de derivados | 6 |

IV   Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

2017/C 242/04

Tipo de cambio del euro

4

2017/C 242/05

Resumen de las Decisiones de la Comisión Europea sobre las autorizaciones de comercialización para uso o las autorizaciones de uso de las sustancias incluidas en el anexo XIV del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo relativo al registro, la evaluación, la autorización y la restricción de las sustancias y preparados químicos (REACH) [publicado de conformidad con el artículo 64, apartado 9, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006]
   (
  1
  )

o

[publicado de conformidad con el artículo 64, apartado 9, del Reglamento (CE) n.o

1

5

INFORMACIÓN RELATIVA AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

2017/C 242/06

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia, en lo referente a posibles ayudas estatales concedidas a Landsvirkjun a través de garantías del Estado sobre contratos de derivados

6

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| | V   Anuncios |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Convocatoria de concursos-oposición generales | 17 |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | OTROS ACTOS |
| | Comisión Europea |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Comunicación — Consulta pública — Indicaciones geográficas de Japón | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Anuncio a la atención de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa, a quienes se ha añadido a la lista mencionada en los artículos 2, 3 y 7 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 del Consejo, de 27 de mayo de 2002, por el que se imponen determinadas medidas restrictivas específicas dirigidas contra determinadas personas y entidades asociadas con las organizaciones EIIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida, en virtud del Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 de la Comisión | 22 |

V   Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Convocatoria de concursos-oposición generales

17

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

2017/C 242/08

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración (Asunto M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

OTROS ACTOS

Comisión Europea

2017/C 242/10

Comunicación — Consulta pública — Indicaciones geográficas de Japón

20

2017/C 242/11

Anuncio a la atención de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa, a quienes se ha añadido a la lista mencionada en los artículos 2, 3 y 7 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 del Consejo, de 27 de mayo de 2002, por el que se imponen determinadas medidas restrictivas específicas dirigidas contra determinadas personas y entidades asociadas con las organizaciones EIIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida, en virtud del Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 de la Comisión

o

22

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| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE. |

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(1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE.

1

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

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II Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/1

---

No oposición a una concentración notificada

(Asunto M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2017/C 242/01)

El 14 de julio de 2017, la Comisión decidió no oponerse a la concentración notificada que se cita en el encabezamiento y declararla compatible con el mercado interior. Esta decisión se basa en el artículo 6, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (1). El texto íntegro de la decisión solo está disponible en inglés y se hará público una vez que se elimine cualquier secreto comercial que pueda contener. Estará disponible:

| — | en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad, |
| --- | --- |

—

en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad,

| — | en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=es) con el número de documento 32017M8500. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho de la Unión en línea. |
| --- | --- |

—

en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=es) con el número de documento 32017M8500. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho de la Unión en línea.

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(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/2

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Decisión relativa a la evaluación de las condiciones para la resolución en relación con Veneto Banca S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/02)

El 23 de junio de 2017, la Junta Única de Resolución decidió no someter a Veneto Banca S.p.A. a un procedimiento de resolución. Esta decisión se basó en la conclusión de que no se cumplía la condición recogida en el artículo 18, apartado 1, letra c), del Reglamento (UE) n.o 806/2014 (1). Los elementos principales de esta decisión son los siguientes:

| Fecha de adopción de la decisión: | 23 de junio de 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Decisión n.o: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Destinatario: | Banca d’Italia |
| Entidad: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Aplicación de las competencias de amortización y conversión de los instrumentos de capital: | No |
| Medida de resolución: | No |
| Ayuda del Fondo: | No |

Fecha de adopción de la decisión:

23 de junio de 2017

Decisión n.o:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Destinatario:

Banca d’Italia

Entidad:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Aplicación de las competencias de amortización y conversión de los instrumentos de capital:

No

Medida de resolución:

No

Ayuda del Fondo:

No

Para ampliar información sobre la presente Decisión consulte el sitio web oficial de la JUR: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  DO L 225 de 30.7.2014, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/3

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Decisión relativa a la evaluación de las condiciones para la resolución en relación con Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/03)

El 23 de junio de 2017, la Junta Única de Resolución decidió no someter a Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. a un procedimiento de resolución. Esta decisión se basó en la conclusión de que no se cumplía la condición recogida en el artículo 18, apartado 1, letra c), del Reglamento (UE) n.o 806/2014 (1). Los elementos principales de esta decisión son los siguientes:

| Fecha de adopción de la decisión: | 23 de junio de 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Decisión n.o: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Destinatario: | Banca d’Italia |
| Entidad: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Aplicación de las competencias de amortización y conversión de los instrumentos de capital: | No |
| Medida de resolución: | No |
| Ayuda del Fondo: | No |

Fecha de adopción de la decisión:

23 de junio de 2017

Decisión n.o:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Destinatario:

Banca d’Italia

Entidad:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Aplicación de las competencias de amortización y conversión de los instrumentos de capital:

No

Medida de resolución:

No

Ayuda del Fondo:

No

Para ampliar información sobre la presente Decisión consulte el sitio web oficial de la JUR: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

---

(1)  DO L 225 de 30.7.2014, p. 1.

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IV Información

INFORMACIÓN PROCEDENTE DE LAS INSTITUCIONES, ÓRGANOS Y ORGANISMOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión Europea

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/4

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Tipo de cambio del euro (1)

26 de julio de 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Tipo de cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar estadounidense | 1,1644 |
| JPY | yen japonés | 130,26 |
| DKK | corona danesa | 7,4368 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,89275 |
| SEK | corona sueca | 9,5705 |
| CHF | franco suizo | 1,1152 |
| ISK | corona islandesa | |
| NOK | corona noruega | 9,2893 |
| BGN | leva búlgara | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corona checa | 26,047 |
| HUF | forinto húngaro | 305,57 |
| PLN | esloti polaco | 4,2613 |
| RON | leu rumano | 4,5632 |
| TRY | lira turca | 4,1406 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,4717 |
| CAD | dólar canadiense | 1,4576 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 9,0959 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandés | 1,5678 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapur | 1,5850 |
| KRW | won de Corea del Sur | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricano | 15,1998 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi | 7,8646 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,4128 |
| IDR | rupia indonesia | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | ringit malayo | 4,9889 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 58,948 |
| RUB | rublo ruso | 69,7050 |
| THB | bat tailandés | 38,996 |
| BRL | real brasileño | 3,6806 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 20,6644 |
| INR | rupia india | 74,9375 |

Moneda

Tipo de cambio

USD

dólar estadounidense

1,1644

JPY

yen japonés

130,26

DKK

corona danesa

7,4368

GBP

libra esterlina

0,89275

SEK

corona sueca

9,5705

CHF

franco suizo

1,1152

ISK

corona islandesa

NOK

corona noruega

9,2893

BGN

leva búlgara

1,9558

CZK

corona checa

26,047

HUF

forinto húngaro

305,57

PLN

esloti polaco

4,2613

RON

leu rumano

4,5632

TRY

lira turca

4,1406

AUD

dólar australiano

1,4717

CAD

dólar canadiense

1,4576

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

9,0959

NZD

dólar neozelandés

1,5678

SGD

dólar de Singapur

1,5850

KRW

won de Corea del Sur

1 303,91

ZAR

rand sudafricano

15,1998

CNY

yuan renminbi

7,8646

HRK

kuna croata

7,4128

IDR

rupia indonesia

15 507,48

MYR

ringit malayo

4,9889

PHP

peso filipino

58,948

RUB

rublo ruso

69,7050

THB

bat tailandés

38,996

BRL

real brasileño

3,6806

MXN

peso mexicano

20,6644

INR

rupia india

74,9375

---

(1)  Fuente: tipo de cambio de referencia publicado por el Banco Central Europeo.

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| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/5

---

Resumen de las Decisiones de la Comisión Europea sobre las autorizaciones de comercialización para uso o las autorizaciones de uso de las sustancias incluidas en el anexo XIV del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo relativo al registro, la evaluación, la autorización y la restricción de las sustancias y preparados químicos (REACH)

[publicado de conformidad con el artículo 64, apartado 9, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006
   (1)
  ]

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2017/C 242/05)

Decisiones por las que se concede una autorización

| Referencia de la Decisión (2) | Fecha de la Decisión | Nombre de la sustancia | Titular de la autorización | Número de autorización | Uso autorizado | Fecha de expiración del período de revisión | Motivos de la Decisión |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20 de julio de 2017 | Bis(2-metoxietil) éter
  N.o CE: 203-924-4
  N.o CAS: 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Irlanda | REACH/17/8/0 | Uso de diglima como disolvente en el proceso de fabricación de una sustancia intermedia para la ulterior transformación en un compuesto farmacéutico utilizado en medicamentos para el tratamiento de enfermedades respiratorias | 22 de agosto de 2024 | — | De conformidad con el artículo 60, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006, los riesgos para la salud humana derivados del uso de la sustancia están adecuadamente controlados. |

Referencia de la Decisión (2)

Fecha de la Decisión

Nombre de la sustancia

Titular de la autorización

Número de autorización

Uso autorizado

Fecha de expiración del período de revisión

Motivos de la Decisión

C(2017) 5025

20 de julio de 2017

Bis(2-metoxietil) éter

N.o CE: 203-924-4

N.o CAS: 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Irlanda

REACH/17/8/0

Uso de diglima como disolvente en el proceso de fabricación de una sustancia intermedia para la ulterior transformación en un compuesto farmacéutico utilizado en medicamentos para el tratamiento de enfermedades respiratorias

22 de agosto de 2024

—

De conformidad con el artículo 60, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 1907/2006, los riesgos para la salud humana derivados del uso de la sustancia están adecuadamente controlados.

| — | No existen actualmente alternativas adecuadas; se están buscando alternativas mediante un programa de sustitución de 7 años. |
| --- | --- |

—

No existen actualmente alternativas adecuadas; se están buscando alternativas mediante un programa de sustitución de 7 años.

---

(1)  DO L 396 de 30.12.2006, p. 1.

(2)  La Decisión está disponible en el sitio web de la Comisión Europea: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about_es

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INFORMACIÓN RELATIVA AL ESPACIO ECONÓMICO EUROPEO

Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/6

---

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC sobre el establecimiento de un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia, en lo referente a posibles ayudas estatales concedidas a Landsvirkjun a través de garantías del Estado sobre contratos de derivados

(2017/C 242/06)

Mediante la Decisión n.o 085/17/COL, de 3 de mayo de 2017, reproducida en la versión lingüística auténtica en las páginas siguientes al presente resumen, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC inició el procedimiento establecido en el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la parte I del Protocolo 3 del acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia. Se ha informado al Gobierno islandés mediante una copia de la Decisión.

Mediante el presente anuncio, el Órgano de Vigilancia de la AELC invita a los Estados de la AELC, a los Estados miembros de la UE y a los terceros interesados a que presenten sus observaciones sobre dicha medida en el plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de publicación de la presente comunicación, remitiéndolas a:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| 35, rue Belliard/Belliardstraat |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

35, rue Belliard/Belliardstraat

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Los comentarios se comunicarán a las autoridades islandesas. Se podrá ocultar la identidad de las partes interesadas que presenten comentarios, previa solicitud por escrito aduciendo las razones para ello.

Resumen

Procedimiento

En un correo electrónico con fecha de 24 de marzo de 2015, las autoridades islandesas solicitaron al Órgano que aclarase si las obligaciones financieras de Landsvirkjun en relación con los contratos de derivados podrían quedar garantizadas con arreglo al régimen actual de garantías estatales de Islandia. Dicho régimen fue objeto de la Decisión n.o 159/13/COL del Órgano de Vigilancia (1).

Tras las oportunas solicitudes, el Órgano de Vigilancia recibió información de las autoridades islandesas sobre la medida en cuestión mediante cartas con fecha de 11 de febrero de 2016 y 22 de marzo de 2016. Por otra parte, esta cuestión se debatió durante una reunión en Reikiavik el 31 de mayo de 2016 entre las autoridades islandesas y el Órgano de Vigilancia. Tras la reunión, el Órgano de Vigilancia remitió una carta a las autoridades islandesas en la que reproducía el contenido de la reunión y solicitaba aclaraciones adicionales. Las autoridades islandesas respondieron a dicha carta mediante un correo electrónico con fecha del 31 de octubre de 2016 y presentaron algunos documentos adicionales.

Hechos

Landsvirkjun es una sociedad pública regulada por la Ley n.o 42/1983 sobre Landsvirkjun, con sus correspondientes enmiendas, y es propiedad del Tesoro Público (99,9 %) y de Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). Esta última es una sociedad de responsabilidad limitada propiedad al cien por cien del Tesoro Público. Landsvirkjun es actualmente el mayor productor de electricidad de Islandia y posee una cuota de más del 75 % de la generación de electricidad del país, además de ser uno de los diez principales productores de energías renovables de Europa.

La Gestión de la Deuda del Gobierno (GDM, por sus siglas en inglés) es una unidad que forma parte del Banco Central de Islandia. El Banco Central de Islandia es una entidad pública independiente que es propiedad del Estado islandés.

Landsvirkjun está expuesta al riesgo del cambio de divisas así como al riesgo de los tipos de interés en su cartera de deuda. Landsvirkjun utiliza diferentes formas de contratos de derivados para controlar y gestionar sus riesgos de mercado.

De acuerdo con la interpretación actual de los hechos por parte del Órgano de Vigilancia, la GDM ha ofrecido garantías a Landsvirkjun sobre determinados contratos de derivados, al menos desde 2013. La decisión se refiere a las garantías de la GDM respecto a los siguientes contratos de derivados: permutas financieras de divisas, opciones sobre divisas y permutas financieras de tipos de interés.

Con arreglo al punto 3.2 de las directrices sobre ayudas estatales sobre las garantías estatales («Directrices sobre garantías») (2), el cumplimiento de las siguientes condiciones acumulativas es suficiente para descartar la presencia de elementos de ayudas estatales en una garantía individual:

| a) | el prestatario no se encuentra en una situación financiera difícil; |
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a)

el prestatario no se encuentra en una situación financiera difícil;

| b) | el alcance de la garantía puede evaluarse adecuadamente en el momento de su concesión; |
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b)

el alcance de la garantía puede evaluarse adecuadamente en el momento de su concesión;

| c) | la garantía no cubre más del 80 % del préstamo u otra obligación financiera pendiente, y |
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c)

la garantía no cubre más del 80 % del préstamo u otra obligación financiera pendiente, y

| d) | se paga por la garantía un precio acorde con el mercado. |
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d)

se paga por la garantía un precio acorde con el mercado.

De manera preliminar, el Órgano de Vigilancia considera que las garantías concedidas por la GDM a Landsvirkjun para las transacciones de derivados anteriormente enunciadas no cumplen las condiciones previstas en las letras b), c) y d). En consecuencia, no puede descartarse en esta fase la presencia de elementos de ayuda estatal con arreglo al apartado 3.2 de las Directrices sobre garantías.

En primer lugar, hasta el momento las autoridades islandesas no han explicado si las garantías están vinculadas a obligaciones específicas, cuál es el importe máximo de las garantías o si estas se asocian a algún tipo de limitación temporal. Por lo tanto, el Órgano opina por el momento que no se cumple la condición de la letra b) del apartado 3.2 de las Directrices sobre garantías.

En segundo lugar, las garantías parecen cubrir todas las obligaciones financieras de Landsvirkjun en virtud de los respectivos contratos de derivados. Hasta el momento, las autoridades islandesas no han proporcionado ninguna información que permita evaluar si la garantía se limita al 80 % de las obligaciones financieras pendientes. Asimismo, no existe ninguna información que permita cuantificar las obligaciones financieras de Landsvirkjun en el marco de los contratos de derivados que estén garantizados por la GDM. Por lo tanto, el Órgano opina por el momento que no se cumple el requisito establecido en la letra c) del apartado 3.2 de la Directrices sobre garantías.

En tercer lugar, con arreglo a las Directrices sobre garantías, la asunción del riesgo normalmente debe compensarse con una prima adecuada sobre el importe garantizado o contragarantizado. En cuanto a las garantías de la GDM respecto a las permutas financieras y opciones de cambios de divisas, parece que Landsvirkjun no paga ningún tipo de prima. Por lo que respecta a las garantías de la GDM respecto a las permutas de tipos de interés, las autoridades islandesas alegan que Landsvirkjun paga una prima de garantía adecuada sobre pasivos netos de contratos de derivados que ponen de manifiesto una pérdida neta de Landsvirkjun. Sin embargo, el Órgano de Vigilancia no ha recibido información suficiente sobre la metodología empleada para determinar el nivel de la prima y si, en consecuencia, dicho nivel de la prima puede considerarse acorde con el precio de mercado.

Evaluación

Actualmente, el Órgano de Vigilancia considera que las garantías que se abordan en la presente Decisión pueden constituir una ventaja de acuerdo con las normas sobre ayudas estatales. Además, la medida parece ser de naturaleza selectiva y susceptible de falsear la competencia y de afectar al comercio en el seno del EEE. Por consiguiente, el Órgano de Vigilancia no puede excluir que la medida constituya una ayuda estatal en el sentido del artículo 61, apartado 1, del Acuerdo del EEE. Hasta el momento, las autoridades islandesas no han proporcionado ninguna prueba de que la potencial ayuda estatal evaluada pueda considerarse compatible en virtud del artículo 59, apartado 2, o del artículo 61, apartado 3, del Acuerdo del EEE.

Conclusión

A la vista de las consideraciones anteriores, el Órgano de Vigilancia ha decidido incoar el procedimiento de investigación formal, de acuerdo con lo establecido en el artículo 1, apartado 2, de la Parte I del Protocolo 3 del Acuerdo entre los Estados de la AELC por el que se instituyen un Órgano de Vigilancia y un Tribunal de Justicia. Se invita a las partes interesadas a que presenten sus observaciones en el plazo de un mes a partir de la publicación de la presente Decisión en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
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(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
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(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
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(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
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(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
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(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
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(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
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(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  La Decisión n.o 159/13/COL del Órgano de Vigilancia, de 24 de abril de 2013, de cerrar el caso relativo a la ayuda existente concedida a Landsvirkjun y Orkuveita Reykjavíkur a través de garantías estatales ilimitadas (DO C 237 de 15.8.2013, p. 3 y Suplemento n.o 45 del EEE, de 15.8.2013, p. 28).

1

o

o

(2)  DO L 105 de 21.4.2011, p. 32, y Suplemento del EEE n.o 23 de 21.4.2011, p. 1.

2

o

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/17

---

CONVOCATORIA DE CONCURSOS-OPOSICIÓN GENERALES

(2017/C 242/07)

La Oficina Europea de Selección de Personal (EPSO) convoca los concursos-oposición generales siguientes:

| | ADMINISTRADORES Y ASISTENTES EN EL SECTOR INMOBILIARIO |
| --- | --- |

ADMINISTRADORES Y ASISTENTES EN EL SECTOR INMOBILIARIO

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Ingenieros en gestión de edificios (incluidos ingenieros medioambientales y de servicios) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Ingenieros en gestión de edificios (incluidos ingenieros medioambientales y de servicios)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3): | Perfil 1: Coordinadores/técnicos en construcción de edificios |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3):

Perfil 1: Coordinadores/técnicos en construcción de edificios

| | Perfil 2: Coordinadores/técnicos de edificios en aire acondicionado e ingeniería electromecánica y eléctrica |
| --- | --- |

Perfil 2: Coordinadores/técnicos de edificios en aire acondicionado e ingeniería electromecánica y eléctrica

| | Perfil 3: Asistentes en seguridad en el trabajo/seguridad de los edificios |
| --- | --- |

Perfil 3: Asistentes en seguridad en el trabajo/seguridad de los edificios

La convocatoria de concursos-oposición se publicará en 24 lenguas en el
  Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea C 242 A de 27 de julio de 2017.

Más información en el sitio web de la EPSO: https://epso.europa.eu/

---

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión Europea

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/18

---

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración

(Asunto M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Asunto que podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | El 18 de julio de 2017, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual la empresa Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. («Letterone Investment», Luxemburgo) adquiere el control, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento de concentraciones, de la totalidad de la empresa Holland & Barrett International Limited («Holland & Barrett», Reino Unido) mediante adquisición de acciones. |
| --- | --- |

1.

El 18 de julio de 2017, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual la empresa Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. («Letterone Investment», Luxemburgo) adquiere el control, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento de concentraciones, de la totalidad de la empresa Holland & Barrett International Limited («Holland & Barrett», Reino Unido) mediante adquisición de acciones.

| 2. | Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:
  —   Letterone Investment: inversión internacional enfocada en las inversiones en los sectores de las telecomunicaciones y la tecnología, la asistencia sanitaria y el comercio minorista.
  —   Holland & Barrett: comercio minorista de productos sanitarios y orientados al bienestar, como por ejemplo suplementos vitamínicos y alimentos sanos, tanto a través de su red de tiendas céntricas como en línea. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:

—   Letterone Investment: inversión internacional enfocada en las inversiones en los sectores de las telecomunicaciones y la tecnología, la asistencia sanitaria y el comercio minorista.

—   Holland & Barrett: comercio minorista de productos sanitarios y orientados al bienestar, como por ejemplo suplementos vitamínicos y alimentos sanos, tanto a través de su red de tiendas céntricas como en línea.

| 3. | Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. Con arreglo a la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. Con arreglo a la Comunicación de la Comisión sobre el procedimiento simplificado para tramitar determinadas concentraciones en virtud del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (2), este asunto podría ser tramitado conforme al procedimiento simplificado establecido en dicha Comunicación.

| 4. | La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.
  Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del número de referencia M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett, a la siguiente dirección:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.

Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación del número de referencia M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett, a la siguiente dirección:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («Reglamento de concentraciones»).

(2)  DO C 366 de 14.12.2013, p. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/19

---

Notificación previa de una operación de concentración

(Asunto M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | El 19 de julio de 2017, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual la empresa Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. («Thermo Fischer», Estados Unidos) adquiere el control, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento de concentraciones, de la empresa Patheon N.V. («Patheon», Países Bajos) mediante la adquisición de acciones. |
| --- | --- |

1.

El 19 de julio de 2017, la Comisión recibió la notificación, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 del Consejo (1), de un proyecto de concentración por el cual la empresa Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. («Thermo Fischer», Estados Unidos) adquiere el control, a tenor de lo dispuesto en el artículo 3, apartado 1, letra b), del Reglamento de concentraciones, de la empresa Patheon N.V. («Patheon», Países Bajos) mediante la adquisición de acciones.

| 2. | Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:
  —   Thermo Fisher: fabricante y suministrador de equipos de laboratorio, instrumentos de análisis, diagnósticos y productos y servicios conexos. Tiene su sede en Estados Unidos y opera a nivel internacional.
  —   Patheon: empresa de desarrollo de contratos y fabricación que ofrece principios activos y servicios en el sector de los medicamentos acabados. Tiene su sede en los Países Bajos y opera a nivel internacional. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Las actividades comerciales de las empresas en cuestión son las siguientes:

—   Thermo Fisher: fabricante y suministrador de equipos de laboratorio, instrumentos de análisis, diagnósticos y productos y servicios conexos. Tiene su sede en Estados Unidos y opera a nivel internacional.

—   Patheon: empresa de desarrollo de contratos y fabricación que ofrece principios activos y servicios en el sector de los medicamentos acabados. Tiene su sede en los Países Bajos y opera a nivel internacional.

| 3. | Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Tras un examen preliminar, la Comisión considera que la operación notificada podría entrar en el ámbito de aplicación del Reglamento de concentraciones. No obstante, se reserva su decisión definitiva al respecto.

| 4. | La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.
  Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación de la referencia M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V., a la siguiente dirección:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| Dirección General de Competencia |
| Registro de Concentraciones |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

La Comisión invita a los interesados a que le presenten sus posibles observaciones sobre el proyecto de concentración.

Las observaciones deberán obrar en poder de la Comisión en un plazo máximo de diez días a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación. Podrán enviarse por fax (+32 22964301), por correo electrónico a COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o por correo, con indicación de la referencia M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V., a la siguiente dirección:

Comisión Europea

Dirección General de Competencia

Registro de Concentraciones

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  DO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («Reglamento de concentraciones»).

---

OTROS ACTOS

Comisión Europea

| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/20

---

COMUNICACIÓN — CONSULTA PÚBLICA

Indicaciones geográficas de Japón

(2017/C 242/10)

En las negociaciones en curso con Japón para un acuerdo de libre comercio (en lo sucesivo, «Acuerdo»), que incluye un capítulo sobre las indicaciones geográficas, las autoridades japonesas han presentado, para su protección en virtud del acuerdo, la lista adjunta de indicaciones geográficas. La Comisión Europea está examinando actualmente si, en el marco del futuro acuerdo, procede conceder protección a dichas indicaciones en calidad de indicaciones geográficas a tenor del artículo 22, apartado 1, del Acuerdo sobre los Aspectos de los Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual relacionados con el Comercio.

La Comisión invita a cualquier Estado miembro o tercer país o a cualquier persona física o jurídica que ostente un interés legítimo y esté establecida o resida en un Estado miembro o un tercer país a oponerse a la protección propuesta presentando una declaración debidamente motivada.

Las declaraciones de oposición deben llegar a la Comisión en un plazo de dos meses a partir de la presente comunicación. Deberán enviarse a la siguiente dirección de correo electrónico: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Únicamente se examinarán las declaraciones de oposición que se reciban dentro del plazo fijado y que indiquen que la protección de la denominación propuesta:

| a) | entra en conflicto con el nombre de una variedad vegetal o de una raza animal y, por ese motivo, puede inducir a error al consumidor sobre el verdadero origen del producto; |
| --- | --- |

a)

entra en conflicto con el nombre de una variedad vegetal o de una raza animal y, por ese motivo, puede inducir a error al consumidor sobre el verdadero origen del producto;

| b) | es homónima o parcialmente homónima de una denominación ya protegida en la Unión en virtud del Reglamento (UE) n.o 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de noviembre de 2012, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios (1), o está contenida en los acuerdos que la Unión ha celebrado con los países siguientes:






  — | Estados del AAE de la SADC (Botsuana, Lesoto, Mozambique, Namibia, Suazilandia y Sudáfrica) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

es homónima o parcialmente homónima de una denominación ya protegida en la Unión en virtud del Reglamento (UE) n.o 1151/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 21 de noviembre de 2012, sobre los regímenes de calidad de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios (1), o está contenida en los acuerdos que la Unión ha celebrado con los países siguientes:

—

Estados del AAE de la SADC (Botsuana, Lesoto, Mozambique, Namibia, Suazilandia y Sudáfrica) (2)

| — | Suiza (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

Suiza (3)

| — | Corea (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Corea (4)

| — | Centroamérica (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

Centroamérica (5)

| — | Colombia, Perú y Ecuador (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Colombia, Perú y Ecuador (6)

| — | Montenegro (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Montenegro (7)

| — | Bosnia y Herzegovina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosnia y Herzegovina (8)

| — | Serbia (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Serbia (9)

| — | Moldavia (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldavia (10)

| — | Ucrania (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ucrania (11)

| — | Georgia (12); |
| --- | --- |

—

Georgia (12);

| c) | habida cuenta de la reputación de una marca comercial, su notoriedad y el tiempo que lleva usándose, podría inducir a error al consumidor sobre la verdadera identidad del producto; |
| --- | --- |

c)

habida cuenta de la reputación de una marca comercial, su notoriedad y el tiempo que lleva usándose, podría inducir a error al consumidor sobre la verdadera identidad del producto;

| d) | pone en peligro la existencia de una denominación total o parcialmente homónima o de una marca registrada o la existencia de productos que se hayan comercializado legalmente al menos durante los cinco años anteriores a la fecha de publicación de la presente comunicación; |
| --- | --- |

d)

pone en peligro la existencia de una denominación total o parcialmente homónima o de una marca registrada o la existencia de productos que se hayan comercializado legalmente al menos durante los cinco años anteriores a la fecha de publicación de la presente comunicación;

| e) | o si las declaraciones aportan información que permita concluir que el nombre que se proyecta proteger tiene carácter genérico. |
| --- | --- |

e)

o si las declaraciones aportan información que permita concluir que el nombre que se proyecta proteger tiene carácter genérico.

Los criterios arriba señalados se evaluarán en relación con el territorio de la Unión, que, en el caso de los derechos de propiedad intelectual, se refiere únicamente al territorio o territorios en los que están protegidos dichos derechos. La posible protección de esas denominaciones en la Unión Europea estará supeditada a la conclusión satisfactoria de las negociaciones y del acto jurídico subsiguiente.

Lista de indicaciones geográficas
   (13)

| Denominación protegida en Japón | Transcripción (solo a efectos informativos) | Categoría de producto y descripción |
| --- | --- | --- |
| «

  »/«Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi» | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Pescado, crustáceos y moluscos frescos y productos derivados-Marisco |
| «

  »/«Tsurajima Gobou» | Tsurajima Gobou | Frutas, hortalizas y cereales frescos o transformados — Bardana |
| «

  » | Yamagata | Otros productos del anexo I del Tratado (especias, etc.)-Otras bebidas fermentadas — Seishu (sake) |
| «

  »/«Maesawa Beef» | Maesawa Gyu | Carne fresca (y despojos) — Vacuno |
| «

  »/«Yonezawagyu» | Yonezawa Gyu | Carne fresca (y despojos) — Vacuno |
| «

  »/«Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi» | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Carne fresca (y despojos) — Vacuno |
| «

  »/«Nishio Matcha» | Nishio no Matcha | Otros productos del anexo I del Tratado (especias, etc.) — Té verde en polvo |

Denominación protegida en Japón

Transcripción (solo a efectos informativos)

Categoría de producto y descripción

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Pescado, crustáceos y moluscos frescos y productos derivados-Marisco

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

Frutas, hortalizas y cereales frescos o transformados — Bardana

Image

Yamagata

Otros productos del anexo I del Tratado (especias, etc.)-Otras bebidas fermentadas — Seishu (sake)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

Carne fresca (y despojos) — Vacuno

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

Carne fresca (y despojos) — Vacuno

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Carne fresca (y despojos) — Vacuno

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Otros productos del anexo I del Tratado (especias, etc.) — Té verde en polvo

---

(1)  DO L 343 de 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Decisión (UE) 2016/1623 del Consejo, de 1 de junio de 2016, relativa a la firma, en nombre de la Unión Europea, y a la aplicación provisional del Acuerdo de Asociación Económica (AAE) entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y los Estados del AAE de la Comunidad para el Desarrollo del África Meridional (SADC), por otra (DO L 250 de 16.9.2016, p. 1).

(3)  Decisión 2002/309/CE, Euratom del Consejo y de la Comisión respecto al Acuerdo de cooperación científica y tecnológica, de 4 de abril de 2002, sobre la celebración de siete Acuerdos con la Confederación Suiza (DO L 114 de 30.4.2002, p. 1), y en particular el Acuerdo entre la Comunidad Europea y la Confederación Suiza sobre el comercio de productos agrícolas — Anexo 7.

(4)  Decisión 2011/265/UE del Consejo, de 16 de septiembre de 2010, relativa a la firma, en nombre de la Unión Europea, y a la aplicación provisional del Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y la República de Corea, por otra (DO L 127 de 14.5.2011, p. 1).

(5)  Acuerdo por el que se establece una Asociación entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros, por un lado, y Centroamérica, por otro (DO L 346 de 15.12.2012, p. 3).

(6)  Acuerdo comercial entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y Colombia y el Perú, por otra (DO L 354 de 21.12.2012, p. 3), y Protocolo de adhesión del acuerdo comercial entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y Colombia y el Perú, por otra, para tener en cuenta la adhesión de Ecuador (DO L 356 de 24.12.2016, p. 3).

(7)  Decisión 2007/855/CE del Consejo, de 15 de octubre de 2007, relativa a la firma y celebración del Acuerdo interino sobre comercio y asuntos comerciales entre la Comunidad Europea, por una parte, y la República de Montenegro, por otra (DO L 345 de 28.12.2007, p. 1).

(8)  Decisión 2008/474/CE del Consejo, de 16 de junio de 2008, relativa a la firma y a la celebración del Acuerdo interino sobre comercio y asuntos comerciales entre la Comunidad Europea, por una parte, y Bosnia y Herzegovina, por otra (DO L 169 de 30.6.2008, p. 10 — Protocolo n.o 6).

(9)  Decisión 2010/36/CE del Consejo, de 29 de abril de 2008, relativa a la firma y celebración del Acuerdo interino sobre comercio y asuntos comerciales entre la Comunidad Europea, por una parte, y la República de Serbia, por otra (DO L 28 de 30.1.2010, p. 1).

(10)  Decisión 2013/7/UE del Consejo, de 3 de diciembre de 2012, relativa a la firma y celebración del Acuerdo entre la Unión Europea y la República de Moldavia sobre la protección de las indicaciones geográficas de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios (DO L 10 de 15.1.2013, p. 1).

(11)  Acuerdo de Asociación entre la Unión Europea y sus Estados miembros, por una parte, y Ucrania, por otra (DO L 161 de 29.5.2014).

(12)  Decisión 2012/164/UE del Consejo, de 14 de febrero de 2012, relativa a la celebración del Acuerdo entre la Unión Europea y Georgia sobre la protección de las indicaciones geográficas de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios (DO L 93 de 30.3.2012, p. 1).

(13)  Lista facilitada por las autoridades japonesas en el marco de las negociaciones en curso, registrada en Japón.

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| 27.7.2017 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 242/22

---

Anuncio a la atención de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa, a quienes se ha añadido a la lista mencionada en los artículos 2, 3 y 7 del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 del Consejo, de 27 de mayo de 2002, por el que se imponen determinadas medidas restrictivas específicas dirigidas contra determinadas personas y entidades asociadas con las organizaciones EIIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida, en virtud del Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 de la Comisión

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | La Decisión (PESC) 2016/1693 del Consejo (1) insta a la Unión a congelar los fondos y recursos económicos de los miembros de EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida así como a otras personas, grupos, empresas y entidades asociados con ellas, como se contempla en la lista establecida con arreglo a las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas 1267(1999) y 1333(2000), lista que actualizará periódicamente el Comité de las Naciones Unidas establecido en virtud de la RCSNU 1267(1999).
  En la lista establecida por dicho Comité de las Naciones Unidas figuran:






  — | EEIL (Daesh) y Al Qaida; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

La Decisión (PESC) 2016/1693 del Consejo (1) insta a la Unión a congelar los fondos y recursos económicos de los miembros de EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida así como a otras personas, grupos, empresas y entidades asociados con ellas, como se contempla en la lista establecida con arreglo a las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas 1267(1999) y 1333(2000), lista que actualizará periódicamente el Comité de las Naciones Unidas establecido en virtud de la RCSNU 1267(1999).

En la lista establecida por dicho Comité de las Naciones Unidas figuran:

—

EEIL (Daesh) y Al Qaida;

| — | personas físicas o jurídicas, entidades, organismos y grupos asociados con EEIL (Daesh) y Al Qaida, y |
| --- | --- |

—

personas físicas o jurídicas, entidades, organismos y grupos asociados con EEIL (Daesh) y Al Qaida, y

| — | personas jurídicas, entidades y organismos propiedad de cualquiera de dichas personas, entidades, organismos o grupos asociados, controlados por ellos o que les apoyen de cualquier otra forma. |
| --- | --- |

—

personas jurídicas, entidades y organismos propiedad de cualquiera de dichas personas, entidades, organismos o grupos asociados, controlados por ellos o que les apoyen de cualquier otra forma.

Los actos o actividades que indican que una persona física, un grupo, una empresa o una entidad está «asociado con» EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida son:

| a) | la participación en la financiación, planificación, facilitación, preparación o comisión de actos o actividades por parte de EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida, o de cualquier célula, entidad afiliada o grupo escindido o derivado de ellos, o en coordinación con los mismos, así como en su nombre, representación o apoyo; |
| --- | --- |

a)

la participación en la financiación, planificación, facilitación, preparación o comisión de actos o actividades por parte de EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida, o de cualquier célula, entidad afiliada o grupo escindido o derivado de ellos, o en coordinación con los mismos, así como en su nombre, representación o apoyo;

| b) | el suministro, la venta o la transferencia de armas y material conexo a cualquiera de ellos; |
| --- | --- |

b)

el suministro, la venta o la transferencia de armas y material conexo a cualquiera de ellos;

| c) | el reclutamiento para cualquiera de ellos, o |
| --- | --- |

c)

el reclutamiento para cualquiera de ellos, o

| d) | cualquier otro apoyo de sus actos o actividades. |
| --- | --- |

d)

cualquier otro apoyo de sus actos o actividades.

| 2. | El Comité del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas aprobó el 20 de julio de 2017 incluir las entradas de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa en la lista del Comité de sanciones contra EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa podrán presentar en todo momento al Ombudsman de las Naciones Unidas una solicitud de reconsideración de la decisión de incluirlos en la citada lista de las Naciones Unidas, acompañando su solicitud de toda documentación justificativa. Dicha solicitud deberá enviarse a la dirección siguiente:





  Naciones Unidas - Oficina del Ombudsman |
| --- | --- |
| Oficina TB-08041D |
| Nueva York, NY 10017 |
| ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA |
| Tel: +1 212 963 2671 |
| Fax: +1 212 963 1300/3778 |
| Correo electrónico: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

El Comité del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas aprobó el 20 de julio de 2017 incluir las entradas de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa en la lista del Comité de sanciones contra EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa podrán presentar en todo momento al Ombudsman de las Naciones Unidas una solicitud de reconsideración de la decisión de incluirlos en la citada lista de las Naciones Unidas, acompañando su solicitud de toda documentación justificativa. Dicha solicitud deberá enviarse a la dirección siguiente:

Naciones Unidas - Oficina del Ombudsman

Oficina TB-08041D

Nueva York, NY 10017

ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA

Tel: +1 212 963 2671

Fax: +1 212 963 1300/3778

Correo electrónico: ombudsperson@un.org

Puede obtenerse más información en https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/es/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | Con arreglo a la decisión de las Naciones Unidas citada en el apartado 2, la Comisión ha adoptado el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 (2), por el que se modifica el anexo I del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 del Consejo, de 27 de mayo de 2002, por el que se imponen determinadas medidas restrictivas específicas dirigidas contra determinadas personas y entidades asociadas con EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida (3). La modificación, efectuada de conformidad con el artículo 7, apartado 1, letra a), y el artículo 7 bis, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002, incluye los nombres de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa en la lista del anexo I de este Reglamento («Anexo I»).
  Las personas físicas y entidades incluidas en el anexo I están sujetas a las medidas del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 que figuran a continuación:






  1) | inmovilización de todos los fondos y recursos económicos cuya propiedad, posesión o tenencia ostenten las personas físicas y entidades concernidas, así como prohibición de que nadie ponga fondos y recursos económicos a su disposición ya sea directa o indirectamente, y de que los utilice en su beneficio, (artículos 2 y 2 bis), y |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Con arreglo a la decisión de las Naciones Unidas citada en el apartado 2, la Comisión ha adoptado el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 (2), por el que se modifica el anexo I del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 del Consejo, de 27 de mayo de 2002, por el que se imponen determinadas medidas restrictivas específicas dirigidas contra determinadas personas y entidades asociadas con EEIL (Daesh) y Al-Qaida (3). La modificación, efectuada de conformidad con el artículo 7, apartado 1, letra a), y el artículo 7 bis, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002, incluye los nombres de Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (SUCURSAL DE ALBU KAMAL, REPÚBLICA ÁRABE SIRIA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed y Jund Al Aqsa en la lista del anexo I de este Reglamento («Anexo I»).

Las personas físicas y entidades incluidas en el anexo I están sujetas a las medidas del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 que figuran a continuación:

1)

inmovilización de todos los fondos y recursos económicos cuya propiedad, posesión o tenencia ostenten las personas físicas y entidades concernidas, así como prohibición de que nadie ponga fondos y recursos económicos a su disposición ya sea directa o indirectamente, y de que los utilice en su beneficio, (artículos 2 y 2 bis), y

| 2) | prohibición de la concesión, venta, suministro o transferencia, directa o indirectamente, de asesoramiento técnico, ayuda o formación relacionados con actividades militares a cualquier persona física y entidad de que se trate (artículo 3). |
| --- | --- |

2)

prohibición de la concesión, venta, suministro o transferencia, directa o indirectamente, de asesoramiento técnico, ayuda o formación relacionados con actividades militares a cualquier persona física y entidad de que se trate (artículo 3).

| 4. | El artículo 7 bis del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 establece la posibilidad de efectuar una revisión cuando las personas incluidas en la lista presenten alegaciones sobre las razones de su inclusión en la misma. Las personas físicas y entidades añadidas al anexo I por el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 podrán presentar a la Comisión una solicitud relativa a las razones de su inclusión en la lista. La solicitud deberá remitirse a:





  Comisión Europea |
| --- | --- |
| «Medidas restrictivas» |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

El artículo 7 bis del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 establece la posibilidad de efectuar una revisión cuando las personas incluidas en la lista presenten alegaciones sobre las razones de su inclusión en la misma. Las personas físicas y entidades añadidas al anexo I por el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 podrán presentar a la Comisión una solicitud relativa a las razones de su inclusión en la lista. La solicitud deberá remitirse a:

Comisión Europea

«Medidas restrictivas»

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Se recuerda igualmente a las personas y entidades concernidas que tienen la posibilidad de impugnar el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 ante el Tribunal General de la Unión Europea con arreglo a las condiciones establecidas en el artículo 263, párrafos cuarto y sexto, del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Se recuerda igualmente a las personas y entidades concernidas que tienen la posibilidad de impugnar el Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) 2017/1390 ante el Tribunal General de la Unión Europea con arreglo a las condiciones establecidas en el artículo 263, párrafos cuarto y sexto, del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea.

| 6. | A efectos de una buena administración, se recuerda a las personas y entidades incluidas en la lista del anexo I que tienen la posibilidad de solicitar a las autoridades competentes del Estado o Estados miembros correspondientes que figuran en el anexo II del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 la autorización de utilizar fondos o recursos económicos bloqueados para sufragar gastos básicos o pagos específicos con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 2 bis del citado Reglamento. |
| --- | --- |

6.

A efectos de una buena administración, se recuerda a las personas y entidades incluidas en la lista del anexo I que tienen la posibilidad de solicitar a las autoridades competentes del Estado o Estados miembros correspondientes que figuran en el anexo II del Reglamento (CE) n.o 881/2002 la autorización de utilizar fondos o recursos económicos bloqueados para sufragar gastos básicos o pagos específicos con arreglo a lo dispuesto en el artículo 2 bis del citado Reglamento.

---

(1)  DO L 255 de 21.9.2016, p. 25.

(2)  DO L 195 de 27.7.2017, p. 11.

(3)  DO L 139 de 29.5.2002, p. 9.

---