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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, 

 Plaintiff, 

UNPUBLISHED 

October 30, 2014 

v No. 316084 

Grand Traverse Circuit Court 

CHS-HAMILTON, INC. f/k/a HAMILTON 

FARM BUREAU COOPERATIVE, INC., 

LC No. 2011-028825-CZ 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

JOHN WILTZER and JOHN J. WILTZER, INC., 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and GLEICHER and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

RONAYNE KRAUSE, J. (dissenting) 

 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s award of 

sanctions because I believe this Court is required to defer to the trial court under the 

circumstances of this case. 

 I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts and applicable law. However, I disagree 

with the majority’s application of the standard of review and conclusion that the trial court erred 

in imposing sanctions. Our review is not de novo. Rather, where a party challenges some 

underlying fact supporting the trial court’s decision, then the appropriate standard of review is 

clear error, and the reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s view of the facts unless the 

reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the 

trial court. Herald Co Inc v Eastern Michigan Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 470-472; 719 

NW2d 19 (2006). Consequently, this Court will not reverse a trial court’s finding of frivolity 

merely because we would have arrived at a different conclusion, but rather only if we are certain 

that the trial court was wrong. I believe the majority erroneously fails to afford the trial court the 

deference which it is due. 

 Hamilton’s entire defense was, in effect, that the four corners of the written agreements 

imposed no duty to discharge the particular mortgage at issue, so therefore Hamilton had no such 
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duty. The trial court reasonably observed that Hamilton’s past dealings showed that Hamilton 

appeared not to regard the four corners of the written agreements as the entirety of its actual 

agreements, if indeed Hamilton regarded the written agreements as even relevant. The trial court 

further reasonably observed that national standards made Hamilton’s past dealings proper or 

even mandatory, in contrast to actions or inactions that would seem dictated by the written 

agreements. Consequently, the trial court issued sanctions upon finding that there was no 

reasonable basis to believe the facts asserted by Hamilton. 

 Again, this Court is obligated to defer to the trial court’s factual findings and may reverse 

only if definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake. The evidence in the 

record supports the trial court’s factual findings. The fact that Hamilton raised a superficially 

legally cognizable defense that might have been supportable is not a sufficient basis for 

overturning a trial court’s supported factual findings. We note that the trial court did not hold 

that Hamilton’s position lacked any support, but rather reasonable support. It appears to me that 

the majority disagrees with the trial court because it believes Hamilton’s defense has factual 

support. However, clear error may not be found merely because a reviewing court finds that an 

alternative outcome would have been permissible. See Hill v City of Warren, 276 Mich App 

299, 308-309; 740 NW2d 706 (2007). 

 Clearly, the trial court’s conclusion does not have no support in the record, and I am 

unpersuaded that Hamilton has carried its burden of showing that the deference this Court must 

afford trial courts should be overcome. I do not believe the record shows that the trial court 

clearly erred, therefore I would affirm. 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause