RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0620-ME

AMANDA HAVILL APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

FAMILY DIVISION THREE (3)

HONORABLE LORI N. GOODWIN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 11-D-502715-006

JEFFERSON NEAL APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: EASTON, JONES, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Appellant, Amanda Havill (“Amanda”) appeals from the 

Jefferson Family Court’s denial of her request to extend a Domestic Violence 

Order (“DVO”) against the Appellee, Jefferson Neal (“Jeff”). Amanda argues the 

family court abused its discretion by declining to extend the DVO and that it erred 

when it failed to make sufficient findings of fact. We conclude the family court 
-2-

did not abuse its discretion in these circumstances and that it belatedly made the 

requisite findings of fact to support its decision. Therefore, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Amanda has a long history of petitions against Jeff about domestic 

violence. Amanda and Jeff were never married but cohabitated for a while. They 

have one daughter (“Child”), now aged 12. This appeal concerns the sixth “trailer”

or subfile, one for each petition filed by Amanda. While we were not provided the 

entire record, we do have relevant information about the previous filings. 

Amanda filed the first petition for an Emergency Protective Order 

(“EPO”) on October 9, 2011, when the Child was one year of age. The court 

granted the EPO the same day. This case was dismissed eight days later by 

agreement. Amanda filed the second petition a year later, on October 19, 2012, 

and a second EPO was granted. This petition was also dismissed by agreement one 

week later, on October 26, 2012.

 Amanda filed a third petition on October 6, 2014. In this case, a 

Domestic Violence Order was entered on October 20, 2014, and remained in effect 

until April 11, 2016. Amanda filed petition number four on November 26, 2016. 

This case was dismissed on January 9, 2017, by agreement. The fifth petition was 

filed on August 26, 2020. The hearing for a DVO was continued multiple times, 
-3-

and the EPO expired per the statutory timeframe. KRS1 403.740(6). The latest

petition was filed by Amanda on October 12, 2021. It is the result of this sixth 

petition which is before this Court. 

The facts alleged in the petition for trailers number five and six are 

identical. Amanda alleges that Jeff has perpetuated a repeated pattern of abuse 

upon her for over ten years. She alleges she has suffered black eyes, a broken 

nose, has been spit on, and has been verbally and mentally abused in the presence

of the Child. She alleges Jeff has threatened to kill her on multiple occasions. She 

writes in the petition she possesses a recorded statement of Jeff stating he wishes 

someone would kill her. She claims he owns multiple firearms and uses loaded 

guns as intimidation.

In the sixth petition, Amanda adds that an EPO was granted in August 

2020. She further alleges Jeff’s counsel purposefully delayed the hearing so that 

the EPO expired without her knowledge. She claims nothing has changed since 

that time and she is still afraid of him. Another EPO was granted in Amanda’s 

favor on October 12, 2021, based on the repeated allegations in petition six. 

Several continuances occurred for various reasons, and the hearing for 

determination of a DVO was held on February 14, 2022.

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-4-

 While much of the parties’ testimony was conflicting, the parties 

agreed that the primary allegation in the fifth and sixth petitions involve a 

telephone conversation that occurred on August 24, 2020. During this 

conversation, the parties argued about their Child’s school uniforms. Amanda 

recorded this phone conversation without Jeff’s knowledge or consent. At some 

point during the call, Jeff made statements to the effect of wishing someone would 

kill Amanda.

 Jeff claims these statements were made to a third party who was 

present with him at his residence. Jeff believed the phone conversation with 

Amanda was concluded at the time he made this statement, and he thought he had 

ended the call. Amanda argues that Jeff made these statements during their 

conversation and that he intended for her to hear him. 

Jeff tells a different story, which offers a reason for the sixth petition 

other than any actual fear Amanda may have of him. Jeff claims that in June 2021, 

he filed a motion to modify his parenting schedule in the circuit court custody

action. A hearing date was scheduled for December 2021. Amanda’s deposition 

was scheduled for mid-October 2021. Amanda’s new counsel (who had recently

been substituted for her previous counsel) emailed Jeff’s counsel to advise that Jeff 

could not be present during Amanda’s deposition because of an EPO.
-5-

 On October 12, 2021, Jeff’s counsel responded and informed 

Amanda’s counsel that the EPO had expired, and he indicated Jeff would be 

present at Amanda’s deposition. It was on this date Amanda filed her sixth 

petition, and another EPO was granted. Due to the EPO, neither Amanda’s 

deposition nor the December hearing date took place. Jeff alleges Amanda filed 

the EPO as a stall tactic to continue to keep Jeff away from the Child. 

During the hearing on the latest petition, Amanda testified to the 

allegations in her petition. She spoke about having black eyes and having her teeth 

cracked by being punched in the mouth by Jeff. She claims their Child was always 

present during these incidents. Amanda alleges she’s witnessed Jeff do cocaine 

and drink excessively.

 Amanda admits she agreed to convert three of her prior EPO’s into No 

Unlawful Contact Orders; however, she claimed they were not effective. Amanda 

also admitted she contacted Jeff during a period when the prior DVO was in effect

because she was afraid to leave their Child alone with him, as the Child was not 

covered by the prior DVO. Amanda testified that, eventually, Jeff’s parenting time 

with the Child was required to be supervised in the separate custody action.

Amanda then testified about the phone call of August 24, 2020. She 

claims she called Jeff to discuss the Child’s school uniforms. Their delivery was 

delayed, so she indicated to Jeff that she had purchased substitute uniforms the 
-6-

Child could wear to school for the first day. Amanda testified Jeff became very 

angry and began yelling at her. He called her names and made a statement that he 

wished someone would kill her.

 She recorded the phone call, and Amanda’s counsel asked to play it 

for the court. Jeff’s counsel objected to the recording. He claims he had not been 

provided it and had never heard it. At this point, the family court recessed for Jeff 

and his counsel to listen to the recording. 

When the parties returned, they informed the court they had reached 

an agreement for yet another No Unlawful Contact Order. Before the terms of the 

proposed order could be put fully on the record, Amanda changed her mind and 

claimed she didn’t understand the agreement. She stated she did not want to

dismiss the EPO petition in exchange for a No Unlawful Contact Order. The court 

then set another date to conclude the hearing.

On April 11, 2022, the family court heard a motion from Amanda to 

extend the EPO, as it otherwise would expire that day. The family court stated it 

did not have the authority to extend the EPO because of the six-month limitation, 

but it agreed to grant Amanda a very short-term and limited DVO. The DVO 

would only restrain Jeff from having contact with Amanda, not the child, and it 

was only to last until the next hearing date. The family court stated the following 

hearing then would be a hearing to extend the DVO.
-7-

On May 2, 2022, the family court concluded the hearing. Over Jeff’s 

objection, Amanda was allowed to play the recording of the phone call. The 

family court stated the recording was very difficult to understand, and we agree. It 

was impossible to understand the majority of what Jeff said during the recorded 

phone call. 

Jeff pointed out the relevant statement in the phone call was 

part of a conversation between Jeff and a third party, not between Jeff and 

Amanda. He argued it was a violation of Kentucky’s eavesdropping statute2to 

record that portion of the conversation. He argued the family court should not 

consider any part of the conversation that occurred after Jeff and Amanda both 

believed their conversation to be concluded. Jeff testified he had in Bluetooth 

headphones during the phone conversation, and he thought he had pushed the 

button to end the phone call with Amanda prior to making the statement to a third 

person about wishing someone would kill her. 

Jeff argued Amanda knew their conversation was concluded when the 

statement was made. He entered a record of text messages between Jeff and 

Amanda that were exchanged immediately after the phone conversation. Jeff 

specifically references a text Amanda sent to Jeff on August 24, 2020, at 9:22 p.m., 

2 KRS 526.020.
-8-

which read “Wow/ I heard your conversation with JD-Are you too intoxicated to

hang up your phone when our conversation was over??”3

The family court declined to grant the extension of the DVO. The 

family court judge stated that but for Amanda having recorded a conversation with 

a third party without Jeff’s knowledge, she would have no personal knowledge of 

his statements. The family court found that Amanda’s text messages to Jeff 

acknowledged their conversation was concluded. The family court stated that 

while it does not dispute domestic violence has occurred in the past, Amanda’s 

petition references no recent allegations of abuse, only this statement directed to a 

third party. While the family court ruled orally from the bench, it did not issue any 

written order until February 14, 2023, after orders from this Court to do so. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A review of a trial court’s decision regarding an entry of an order of 

protection is limited to “whether the findings of the trial judge were clearly 

erroneous or that he abused his discretion.” Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112, 

115 (Ky. App. 2010). “Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s decision is 

unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.” Dunn v. Thacker, 546 S.W.3d 576, 

578 (Ky. App. 2018). A trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if 

3 Respondent’s Exhibit 1, Page 26.
-9-

supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 

2003). 

ANALYSIS

Amanda argues the family court committed two errors. First, she 

argues the family court abused its discretion in declining to extend the DVO. 

Second, she claims the family court erred when it failed to make sufficient written 

findings of fact. 

Domestic violence orders are governed by KRS Chapter 403. To

enter a domestic violence order, a trial court is required to find by a preponderance 

of the evidence that domestic violence has occurred and is likely to occur again. 

KRS 403.740. “The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied when 

sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have 

been a victim of domestic violence.” Dunn v. Thacker, 546 S.W.3d at 580. “The 

definition of domestic violence and abuse, found in KRS 403.720(1), includes 

‘physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of 

fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault 

between family members.’” Abdul-Rahman v. Peterson, 338 S.W.3d 823, 825 

(Ky. App. 2011).

Amanda first argues the family court abused its discretion because it 

based its ruling on the finding that had Amanda not recorded a conversation to 
-10-

which she was not a party, she would not have any personal knowledge of Jeff’s 

threat. As it turns out, the propriety of Amanda’s recording of the conversation is 

not decisive in our review. Amanda testified as to Jeff’s statements, and Jeff did 

not deny making those statements. The family court allowed the recording to be 

played, although as previously stated, most of Jeff’s side of the conversation was

so muffled it was incoherent. Even if Amanda had not recorded the conversation, 

she still heard Jeff’s statement, which she perceived as a threat. 

We must apply the wording of the statute which speaks in terms of 

“infliction of fear of imminent physical injury.” The family court could have 

found Jeff’s statement, considering the history of these parties, equated to a threat 

adequate to make a finding of domestic violence, but the family court was not 

required to do so in these circumstances. By contrast, in Williford v. Williford, 583 

S.W.3d 424 (Ky. App. 2019), the petitioner overheard several threats with an 

actual plan to kill the petitioner: “I’m going to go in there and get him in an 

argument and blow his head off[.]” Id. at 426. 

With that being said, the family court acted within its discretion to 

deny the extension with a finding that Jeff had not inflicted fear of injury on 

Amanda since Jeff did not direct the statement to Amanda, and the statement did 

not express any plan beyond a thoughtless and flippant general death wish, which 

is too often stated when formerly intimate persons break up. While Amanda 
-11-

testified that Jeff made additional statements to her during their telephone 

conversation that were threatening in nature, Jeff testified his only statement in that 

manner was to the third party with him in the room. The family court’s 

determination of which party’s testimony to believe was not an abuse of discretion. 

“The family court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses 

and weigh the evidence presented.” Id. at 429. 

“A court may enter a DVO ‘if it finds from a preponderance of the 

evidence that an act or acts of domestic violence and abuse have occurred and may 

again occur . . . .’” Bissell v. Baumbardner, 236 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Ky. App. 2007) 

(citing KRS 403.740(1)). The family court did not find that an act of domestic 

violence had occurred in this instance. While the family court acknowledged that 

acts of violence occurred in the past, it did not find the allegations in the petition 

met the evidentiary standard.

A family court is not required to disregard the history of the case or of 

the parties. See Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385, 388 (Ky. App. 2007). As 

previously discussed, this is the sixth domestic violence petition filed in this action, 

filed over a span of ten years. The parties also have a corresponding custody 

action regarding their minor child. The family court reviewed the multiple prior 

agreements to convert EPOs into No Unlawful Contact Orders, the agreements to 

continue, and the agreements to dismiss previous EPOs. The family court in this 
-12-

instance looked at the totality of the circumstances to make its finding that an act 

of domestic violence had not occurred. The denial of the extension of the DVO 

was not an abuse of discretion.

Amanda further argues the family court failed to make sufficient 

written findings of fact. “A family court is obligated to make written findings of 

fact showing the rationale for its actions taken under KRS Chapter 403, including 

DVO cases, even if the rationale may be gleaned from the record.” Thurman v. 

Thurman, 560 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Ky. App. 2018). This includes cases where a 

family court denies the petition for a DVO. Hall v. Smith, 599 S.W.3d 451, 455 

(Ky. App. 2020). However, “it would seem unduly burdensome and unnecessary 

for a court to make findings of fact that establish a non-finding of necessary facts.” 

Id. This Court in Hall determined that checking a particular box on AOC form 

275.3 in a DVO case where the trial court declined to issue a DVO would meet the 

requirement of written factual findings. Id. 

If checking the box on the standardized form is adequate fact-finding 

to affirm the denial of the issuance of a domestic violence order, the order issued 

by the family court in this instance is clearly sufficient. While the family court’s 

order was delayed, it did include written findings that it did not find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that an act of domestic violence had occurred. 

When reviewing an order regarding the issuance of an order of 
-13-

protection, “the test is not whether we would have decided it differently, but 

whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion.” 

Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008). We give great deference 

to the trial courts as the finders of fact. “It has long been held that the trier of fact 

has the right to believe the evidence presented by one litigant in preference to 

another.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). “The 

trier of fact may take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including 

the credibility of the witness.” Id. 

CONCLUSION

The Jefferson Family Court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

evidence and are not clearly erroneous. The Jefferson Family Court acted within 

its discretion. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the Jefferson 

Family Court. 

LAMBERT, JUDGE, CONCURS.

JONES, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE 

OPINION.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Allison S. Russell

Shanna R. Ballinger

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

B. Mark Mulloy

Louisville, Kentucky