United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1161 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

PATRIK IAN ARSENAULT, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE 

[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge] 

 

Before 

Lynch, Thompson, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

Jonathan G. Mermin and Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, 

LLP for appellant. 

Margaret D. McGaughey, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Appellate Chief, and Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States 

Attorney, on brief, for appellee. 

August 10, 2016 
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THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Patrik Ian 

Arsenault, a school aide for special-needs students, pled guilty 

to sexually exploiting three minors, as well as transporting, 

receiving, and possessing child pornography. In his appeal, 

Arsenault challenges the 780-month (or 65-year) sentence given to 

him as unreasonable. After careful consideration, we find 

Arsenault's arguments without merit and, accordingly, affirm the 

sentencing determination of the court below. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Investigation and Underlying Offense 

 In the summer of 2013, law enforcement agents began an 

investigation of Arsenault after confirming child pornography had 

been uploaded to an image-sharing website from his home.1 Federal 

agents then executed a search warrant at Arsenault's residence in 

Norridgewock, Maine where they sought computer related items in 

furtherance of the ongoing investigation. After the agents told 

Arsenault that he was not under arrest and not obligated to answer 

questions, he chose to talk anyway. Eventually, Arsenault made 

several rather damning admissions that he had been trading child 

pornography over the Internet for about a year, had sexually abused 

 1 As this sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea, "we glean 

the relevant facts from the change-of-plea colloquy, the 

unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report 

[("PSI")], and the record of the disposition hearing." United 

States v. Vargas, 560 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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two minors, had video recorded and photographed some of his 

encounters with the children, and had stored images and videos of 

his sexual acts with them on an external hard drive in his home. 

At the conclusion of the search, Arsenault was arrested and charged 

with gross sexual assault in state court and, the following day, 

was charged by way of complaint in federal district court. 

 A subsequent forensic review of Arsenault's hard drive 

revealed sexually explicit images of Arsenault with a third minor 

and also uncovered more than 7,500 images and more than 250 videos 

depicting prepubescent male children engaged in sexual acts with 

other children and/or adults. It was also learned that at least 

two of Arsenault's three victims were special-needs children under 

the age of twelve, whom Arsenault had been introduced to through 

his job as an aide for autistic children. On varying occasions, 

these two victims had been entrusted into Arsenault's overnight 

care, during which time he drugged and sexually abused them. 

Arsenault was eventually indicted for the sexual 

exploitation of the three minors, as well as the transportation, 

receipt, and possession of child pornography. On July 8, 2014, 

Arsenault pled guilty to all six counts of the indictment: the 

sexual exploitation of the three minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2251(a) and 2251(e) (Counts I-III); and the transportation, 

receipt, and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A) 
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(Counts IV-VI). Probation filed a presentence investigation 

report ("PSI") on August 26, 2014. Arsenault failed to file any 

written objections to that report. 

B. Sentencing Hearing 

 During his sentencing hearing, Arsenault again voiced no 

objections to the PSI, except for a request that the PSI clarify 

that the three minor victims were not actually his students. Nor 

did he raise any legal challenges to the recommended Sentencing 

Guidelines (the "Guidelines") enhancements. The judge proceeded 

with his sentencing task. After hearing from the families of the 

victims and noting that he had reviewed the PSI, victim-impact 

statements, and support letters submitted on Arsenault's behalf, 

the judge calculated the appropriate Guidelines range. Finding a 

total offense level -- after all enhancements had been tallied 

(more on these enhancements later) -- of 43 and a criminal history 

category of I, the judge found the applicable Guidelines range to 

be life imprisonment. 

 However, the life sentence recommended by the Guidelines 

was higher than the statutorily authorized maximum sentences. 

Under the relevant statutes, the maximum statutory sentence for 

Counts I-III was 30 years each, the maximum statutory sentence for 

Counts IV and V was 20 years each, and the maximum statutory 

sentence for Count VI was 10 years. The judge therefore found the 

applicable range to be the statutory maximum of 1,680 months, or 
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140 years. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.1 (U.S. 

Sentencing Comm'n 2015). After explaining his calculations, the 

judge again specifically asked Arsenault if he had any objections 

to these findings and calculations. Counsel for Arsenault 

responded that he had "no objection." 

Before imposing a sentence, the judge went on to discuss 

his sentencing rationale in detail. He explicitly stated that he 

had taken into consideration "each of the factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. Section 3553(a), including the obligation to impose a 

sentence that is sufficient, but no greater than necessary to 

achieve the purposes of the law" -- a concept known as the 

parsimony principle. The judge explained that while he had 

considered "each statutory factor," he had concentrated on the 

"history and characteristics of the defendant, the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, and the need to protect the public 

from future crimes of the defendant." After detailing his 

reasoning, the judge imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 780 

months, or 65 years. Arsenault timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

A review for the reasonableness of a sentence is 

bifurcated, requiring us to ensure that the sentence is both 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. See United States v. 

Mendez, 802 F.3d 93, 97 (1st Cir. 2015). We ordinarily review 

both procedural and substantive reasonableness under a deferential 
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abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Maisonet-Gonzalez, 

785 F.3d 757, 762 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Maisonet 

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 263 (2015). However, when assessing 

procedural reasonableness, this Court engages in a multifaceted 

abuse-of-discretion standard whereby "we afford de novo review to 

the sentencing court's interpretation and application of the 

sentencing guidelines, assay the court's factfinding for clear 

error, and evaluate its judgment calls for abuse of discretion." 

United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st. Cir. 2015). 

If a party fails to preserve claims of error in the court below, 

these standards of review may be altered. Id. In such instances, 

review is for plain error. Id. 

Arsenault appears to raise three arguments on appeal: 

(1) that the judge erred in applying numerous enhancements in his 

Guidelines calculation; (2) that the judge failed to adequately 

consider or explain how the 65-year sentence imposed did not 

violate the parsimony principle; and (3) that the 65-year sentence 

did in fact violate the parsimony principle. 

The first and second appear to be unpreserved, 

procedural reasonableness challenges. See United States v. 

Nelson, 793 F.3d 202, 205-06 (1st. Cir. 2015) (noting that 

procedural errors may include "failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range," "failing to adequately explain 

the chosen sentence," and "failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 3553(a) factors"); accord United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 

89 (1st Cir. 2009). Given Arsenault's failure to object, we review 

his procedural challenges for plain error.2 See Ruiz-Huertas, 792 

F.3d at 226. Under this stiff standard, Arsenault must establish 

"(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and 

which not only (3) affected [his] substantial rights, but also (4) 

seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings." Id. 

Arsenault's third challenge goes to the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence. See United States v. CarrascoDe-Jesus, 589 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing defendant's 

substantive reasonableness challenge for violation of the 

parsimony principle). As we have previously noted, the applicable 

standard of review for an unpreserved, substantive reasonableness 

challenge is "murky." United States v. Perez, No. 15-1234, 2016 

WL 1612854, at *4 (1st Cir. Apr. 22, 2016) (citing Ruiz-Huertas, 

792 F.3d at 228 (noting that it is unclear whether a substantive 

reasonableness claim must be preserved below to be afforded abuseof-discretion review versus a tougher plain error review)). Here, 

 2 The government argues that Arsenault may have waived any 

dispute regarding the Guidelines computations by repeatedly 

failing to object. See generally United States v. Sweeney, 606 F. 

App'x 588, 591 (1st Cir. 2015)(holding that "a waived issue 

ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal, whereas a forfeited 

issue may be reviewed for plain error"). But we assume favorably 

to Arsenault that he forfeited these claims and thus review for 

plain error. 
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however, it is not necessary to resolve this apparent incongruity. 

Arsenault's claim fails, even if we assume that the more favorable 

abuse-of-discretion standard applies to his substantive 

reasonableness claim. 

We begin our review with Arsenault's procedural 

challenges. 

A. Procedural Reasonableness 

 1. Guidelines Enhancements 

 Arsenault complains about the enhancements which upped 

his Guidelines range. Indeed, "failing to calculate (or improperly 

calculating) the Guidelines range" constitutes a procedural error. 

Nelson, 793 F.3d at 205. But Arsenault cannot demonstrate that an 

error occurred, let alone that the purported error was clear or 

obvious. 

 Here is what the sentencing judge did. First, he 

appropriately set the applicable base offense levels. Counts IIII were each subject to a base offense level of 32. See USSG 

§ 2G2.1(a). Counts IV-VI together were subject to a group base 

offense level of 22. See id. at § 2G2.2(a)(2). The judge then 

applied various enhancements based on different aspects of each 

offense.3 This resulted in an adjusted offense level of 50 for 

 3 Pursuant to several subsections of USSG §§ 2G2.1(b) and 

3A1.1(b)(1), enhancements were applied to Counts I-II because the 

offenses involved: (1) the commission of a sexual act by force or 

other means upon (2) vulnerable, (3) minors under twelve, (4) who 
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Counts I and II, an adjusted offense level of 40 for Count III, 

and an adjusted offense level of 45 for grouped Counts IV through 

VI. Next, the judge calculated the combined offense level, which 

resulted in a total combined offense level of 55. 

 The total combined offense level was properly calculated 

by taking the highest adjusted offense level (50), adding 3 levels 

pursuant to USSG § 3D1.4 for the combined offenses, adding 5 levels 

pursuant to USSG § 4B1.5(b)(1) because Arsenault committed a sex 

crime and was not a career offender, and subtracting 3 levels for 

acceptance of responsibility. This total combined offense level 

was ultimately reduced to 43 pursuant to USSG ch.5, pt. A, cmt. 

n.2 ("An offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an 

offense level of 43"). 

 With a total combined offense level of 43 and a criminal 

history category of I, Arsenault faced a recommended Guidelines 

range of life imprisonment. As mentioned before, because the life 

 

were under Arsenault's care, and (5) the distribution of (6) 

material that portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct. Pursuant 

to several subsections of USSG § 2G2.1 enhancements were also 

applied to Count III because the offense involved: (1) a minor 

under twelve, (2) who was under Arsenault's care, and (3) the 

distribution of child pornography. Pursuant to several 

subsections of USSG § 2G2.2, enhancements were applied to Counts 

IV-VI because the offenses involved: (1) minors under twelve, (2) 

a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation 

of minors, (3) the distribution for receipt of something of value 

for (4) material that portrayed sadistic or masochistic conduct, 

(5) through the use of a computer, and (6) over 600 images of child 

pornography. 
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sentence was higher than the statutorily authorized maximum 

sentence for each offense, the final applicable range was 1,680 

months, or 140 years, pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1. The judge 

ultimately sentenced Arsenault to a below-Guidelines sentence of 

780 months, or 65 years. 

 On appeal, Arsenault takes issue with a couple of aspects 

of the judge's calculations. However, none of his arguments carry 

the day. 

 First, Arsenault specifically challenges the following 

enhancements: (1) the two-level enhancement because the victims 

were in his custody, care or supervisory control (Counts I-III); 

(2) the two-level enhancement for committing a sex act by use of 

either force, threats or drugs, an intoxicant, or other similar 

substance without the persons' knowledge (Counts I and II);4 (3) 

the two-level enhancement for distribution of pornography (Counts 

 4 Arsenault briefly argues that this two-level enhancement 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2241 was improperly based on his use of 

force in the commission of the offenses and should be rejected as 

"duplicative or redundant." The PSI recommended a two-level 

enhancement for the use of either force or threats pursuant to § 

2241(a) or by some other means (such as drugs or an intoxicant) 

pursuant to § 2241(b) in the commission of a sexual act. 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2241(a) and (b). It is unclear which of the two subsections 

was ultimately relied upon by the judge. However, Arsenault's 

argument fails because if the two-level enhancement was based on 

his use of force pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), Arsenault's 

duplicative arguments fail for the reasons discussed below 

regarding double counting. And if the two-level enhancement was 

based on his use of drugs to render his victims unconscious, there 

is no dispute that he in fact drugged his victims. See id. at § 

2241(b). 
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I-III); (4) the two-level enhancement for use of a computer (Counts 

IV-VI); and (5) the five-level enhancement for 600 or more images 

(Counts IV-VI). 

 Arsenault does not argue that the sentencing judge 

failed to recognize the advisory nature of the Guidelines or his 

broad discretion to impose a non-Guidelines sentence. See 

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that 

sentencing judges can vary from Guidelines ranges based on policy 

considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines). 

Rather, Arsenault contends that these enhancements simply do not 

"make sense" or they punish him for "inherent" and "standard" 

features of child pornography, which, he suggests, are already 

factored into the base offense level. Generously construed, his 

arguments boil down to an assertion that the child pornography 

Guidelines are just bad policy and, as such, the sentencing judge 

erred in applying them when calculating his sentencing range. We 

disagree. As we have explained, a sentencing judge is free to 

agree with the Guidelines, even if a defendant finds them to be 

bad policy. Stone, 575 F.3d at 93 (noting that "part of the 

sentencing court's broad discretion must be the discretion to 

conclude that guidelines are convincing for various reasons, 

including that they reflect popular will.").

 Further, it is clear from the record that the sentencing 

judge simply declined to accept Arsenault's argument that he should 
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diverge from the Guidelines recommendation because of the 

harshness stemming from the enhancements. Although the result is 

severe, we have typically upheld enhancements that capture 

independent aspects of wrongfulness of an offense even when they 

result in a high Guidelines range. See id. at 96. Thus, the mere 

fact that these enhancements either resulted in a high Guidelines 

range or involved features common to child pornography does not 

result in a procedural error. Clearly Arsenault comes up short of 

showing plain error here. 

 With regard to his second complaint, Arsenault 

challenges application of the following enhancements: (1) the 

four-level enhancement for sadistic or masochistic conduct (Counts 

I-II); (2) the five and three-level enhancements applied in 

calculating his combined offense level; and (3) the two-level 

enhancement because Arsenault knew or should have known that the 

victims were vulnerable (Counts I-II). Arsenault argues that these 

enhancements are "duplicative" (in other words, they result in 

double counting). 

We have held that where "neither an explicit prohibition 

against double counting nor a compelling basis for implying such 

a prohibition exists, clearly indicated adjustments for 

seriousness of the offense and for offender conduct can both be 

imposed, notwithstanding that the adjustments derive in some 

measure from a common nucleus of operative facts." United States 
- 13 - 

v. Reyes-Rivera, 812 F.3d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United 

States v. McCarty, 475 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2007)). As for the 

contested enhancements, we are doubtful that they constitute 

double counting at all. But even if we assume that they do, 

Arsenault's claims still fail. Here, commentary to the 

enhancements for sadistic or masochistic conduct and for the 

calculation of the combined offense level (USSG §§ 2G2.1, 2G2.2, 

3D1.4, and 4B1.5) do not provide a double-counting prohibition. 

And while USSG § 3A1.1 n.2 does prohibit application of the 

vulnerability enhancement "if the factor that makes the person a 

vulnerable victim [i.e., young age] is incorporated in the offense 

guideline," an exception exists to this partial bar where "the 

victim was unusually vulnerable for reasons unrelated to age." 

Given the special-needs status of two of Arsenault's victims, the 

application of the vulnerability enhancement here is permissible. 

On these points, Arsenault proffers no pertinent case law in 

support of his contrary position, and gives us no compelling basis 

for interference with the Guidelines directives. Once again he 

has not met his burden under the plain error standard. 

2. Sentencing Explanation 

Arsenault complains that the judge failed to adequately 

explain why a 65-year sentence, imposed on a defendant who is now 

in his twenties, does not violate the parsimony principle when 

considered with other § 3553(a) factors, such as deterrence and 
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public safety. Arsenault insists that the judge should have 

spelled out why a "shorter-but-still-draconian sentence of (say) 

30 or 40 years," in which he would be well into his 50s or 60s at 

release, would not be greater than necessary to achieve the 

legitimate goals of sentencing. Arsenault points us to a Seventh 

Circuit case, United States v. Presley, 790 F.3d 699, 702 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (Posner, J.), which discusses at length the "downside 

of long sentences" and the problems of elderly prisoner 

populations. In Presley, the court, sua sponte, questioned the 

appropriateness of lengthy sentences which fail to adequately 

factor in "the traditional triad of sentencing considerations: 

incapacitation, which prevents the defendant from committing 

crimes (at least crimes against persons other than prison personnel 

and other prisoners) until he is released, general deterrence (the 

effect of the sentence in deterring other persons from committing 

crimes), and specific deterrence (its effect in deterring the 

defendant from committing crimes after he's released)." Id. at 

703. In sentencing matters it urged district judges to consider 

the predicted age of a defendant upon release noting "the 

phenomenon of aging out of risky occupations" including risky 

criminal behavior. Id. at 702. 

Because the district judge did not specifically address 

the concerns raised by the Presley court, Arsenault argues that 

the judge failed to consider all the relevant § 3553(a) factors 
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thereby committing procedural error. While we certainly agree 

that it would have been appropriate for the district judge -- had 

he chosen to do so -- to have been mindful of the Seventh Circuit's 

admonition that elderly prisoner issues "should be part of the 

knowledge base that judges, lawyers, and probation officers 

consult in deciding on the length of sentences to recommend or 

impose," id., we cannot conclude that the judge here plainly erred 

by not expressly considering these concerns. 

What Arsenault's argument actually amounts to is 

faulting the judge for "not assign[ing] the weight to certain 

factors that [he] thought appropriate" and not taking into account 

specific considerations -- such as the elderly-prisoner problem 

-- which he finds relevant. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 227. 

Nevertheless, as we have said before, a judge has no obligation to 

assign weight to certain factors or considerations as a defendant 

deems necessary. See United States v. Rossignol, 780 F.3d 475, 

479 (1st Cir. 2015) ("That the [appellant] would prefer an 

alternative weighing of the circumstances does not undermine the 

district court's sentencing decision."); see also United States v. 

Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that 

the district judge's silence about a sentencing angle advocated by 

a party did not undercut the sentencing decision where the record 

"evinc[ed] a sufficient weighing of the section 3553(a) factors"). 
- 16 - 

Nor can we conclude, as Arsenault urges, that the 

district judge plainly erred in not giving voice to his distinct 

concerns. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires a sentencing judge to state 

in open court the reasons for his imposition of a particular 

sentence. However, as we have repeatedly held, although a district 

judge has a duty to adequately explain his choice of a particular 

sentence, "[he] has no corollary duty to explain why [he] eschewed 

other suggested sentences." Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 228 (quoting 

United States v. Vega–Salgado, 769 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2014)). 

Moreover, the judge is not required to explain his 

consideration of § 3553(a) factors in some sort of "rote 

incantation," and "where, [as here], the district judge explicitly 

states that [he] has considered the section 3553(a) factors, such 

a statement is entitled to some weight." Id. at 226-27. 

The record makes clear that the district judge explained 

his sentencing rationale in detail, explicitly noting his 

mindfulness of § 3553(a) considerations. Specifically, the judge 

focused on Arsenault's personal history and characteristics, the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, and the need to protect 

the public from future crimes by Arsenault. 

With regard to Arsenault's personal history, the judge 

considered Arsenault's upbringing; the fact that he was sexually 

abused as a child; his extensive substance abuse history; and his 

education and work experiences, noting that Arsenault had a "long 
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history of working with children" since he was 15. The judge 

further emphasized that despite knowing his compulsion and sexual 

attraction to young boys, Arsenault chose to work in a profession 

that would put him in regular one-on-one contact with such 

children. 

With regard to the nature of the offense, the district 

judge discussed the seriousness of the offense and the need to 

provide just punishment, and pointed out a series of aggravating 

factors including the exceptional vulnerability of the direct 

victims, the effects on the parents as a second class of victim, 

and society as a whole as a third class of victim. The judge 

remarked that over the course of his last 11 years on the bench, 

Arsenault's case "may well be the worst [child pornography case he 

had] ever seen." The judge discussed the inculpating evidence 

found on Arsenault's hard drive including videos showing Arsenault 

having sex with two unresponsive, special-needs boys who had been 

entrusted to him for overnight care. The judge highlighted that 

Arsenault "selected out and chose these especially vulnerable boys 

as his victims"; that two of his victims were autistic; and that 

one victim was nonverbal, "which effectively meant he couldn't 

complain effectively" concerning the abuse inflicted upon him. 

The judge also underscored that not only did Arsenault drug, 

assault, and film his abuse of the children, he went on to trade 
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the content he produced over the Internet, via a forum where the 

material can never be erased and cannot be undone. 

The judge took into consideration the egregious and 

callous tone with which Arsenault described his actions. For 

example, the judge focused on Arsenault's own, cold descriptions 

of his abuse in which he described how "one of the victims, he 

seems to get uncomfortable. He started to squirm, and he started 

requesting all done." Despite the child's requests, Arsenault 

continued to callously describe how he would "have to give [his 

victims] their sleep medications earlier" and how it was "all [he 

could] think about." To make matters worse, Arsenault invited a 

trading partner via email to come abuse the children together with 

him stating "ha, ha, ha, well I tried a few different positions, 

although it would have been better if [the child] was more sedated" 

and "you really should come and join us next time." 

With regard to public protection, the judge noted that 

Arsenault's actions "erode[d] the confidence that we [as a society] 

have in each other" and that Arsenault's actions bred a lack of 

public trust concerning well-meaning male teachers entrusted to 

care for children. The court noted that "when someone like 

[Arsenault] . . . cloak[s] himself in [the] great profession of [a 

teacher or aide] and then abuses the trust that comes with the 

profession, it casts an awful and unfair pall on the entire 

profession, particularly the men." The judge thus found that it 
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was necessary for Arsenault to "be placed away from contact with 

young boys for a long, long time so [he would] do no more harm." 

This thorough and detailed explanation was more than 

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 3553(c). The bottom 

line is that Arsenault has failed to demonstrate that the judge 

committed an error -- let alone a clear or obvious error that 

affected his substantial rights and seriously impaired the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 

Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 226. And having found no procedural 

defect amounting to plain error, we now review Arsenault's 

substantive reasonableness challenge.5 

B. Substantive Reasonableness 

 To the extent Arsenault argues that his sentence is 

ultimately greater than necessary and therefore substantively 

unreasonable because of the elderly-prisoner problem, this 

argument mirrors his arguments already discussed above that his 

 5 Arsenault also appears to accuse the judge of not taking 

into account § 3553(a)(6), which requires judges to "consider 

. . . the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 

similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Arsenault suggests 

that his sentence should be lessened because it is longer than 

those of defendant priests sentenced in unrelated sexual abuse 

cases. His argument fails because he proffers no evidence that 

the priests cited were in fact identically situated to him. See 

United States v. Wallace, 573 F.3d 82, 97 (1st Cir. 2009) (18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) raises concerns only "if two identically 

situated defendants received different sentences from the same 

judge."). 
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sentence violated the parsimony principle because the sentencing 

judge did not take into account the effects of his old age upon 

release in his consideration of deterrence, recidivism, and public 

safety factors. These corresponding substantive reasonableness 

arguments are equally unavailing. 

 A sentence is substantively sound and "will survive a 

challenge to its substantive reasonableness as long as it rests on 

a 'plausible sentencing rationale' and reflects a 'defensible 

result.'" Perez, 2016 WL 1612854, at *4 (citing United States v. 

Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008)). Additionally, "reversals 

in substantive reasonableness challenges are particularly unlikely 

when . . . the sentence imposed fits within the compass of a 

properly calculated [Guidelines sentencing range]." United States 

v. Hernández-Maldonado, 793 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 522, 193 L. Ed. 2d 411 (2015) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d at 228-29). "When the 

challenged sentence falls within the recommended Guidelines range, 

the [appellant] must 'adduce fairly powerful mitigating reasons 

and persuade us that the district judge was unreasonable in 

balancing pros and cons.'" United States v. Batchu, 724 F.3d 1, 

14 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Madera–Ortiz, 637 F.3d 

26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011)). 

Here, Arsenault appears to argue that because of the 

procedural errors alleged above, the judge ultimately sentenced 
- 21 - 

him to an unduly harsh sentence that is substantively unreasonable. 

However, Arsenault fails to adduce any mitigating reasons powerful 

enough to persuade us that the judge was unreasonable in his 

judgment call. As discussed above, the judge explicitly stated 

that he considered his "obligation to impose a sentence that is 

sufficient, but no greater than necessary to achieve the purposes 

of the law" and thoroughly explained his plausible and defensible 

judgment call. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

sentencing judge's determination. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Arsenault's 780-

month sentence.