IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2017-CP-00799-COA CHARLES DYE A/K/A CHARLES EDWARD DYE APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JON MARK W EATHERS COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHARLES DYE (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA MCCLINTON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/17/2018 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, JJ. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A Forrest County grand jury indicted Charles D y e f or sexual battery under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2006). The indictm ent alleged that in Forrest County , between on or about May 1, 2013, and August 11, 2013, [ Dy e] did w i l l f

ully , purposely , u nlawf

ully , and f

eloniously com m it S exual Battery u pon [ H.B.], a c hild who was a t t he tim e in question under the age of 14 y ears, and [ Dy e ] was a t the tim e 24 m onths older than [ H.B.], by engaging in the act of sexual penetration, to wit vaginal sexual intercourse . . . . Dy e later p led guilty , and the circuit court accepted his plea and s e ntenced him to serve thirty
y ears in the custody of t he Departm ent of Corrections, with f if teen y e ars suspended, f

if teen
y ears to serve, and f

i ve y ears of

post-release supervision.¶2. Four m onths af ter he pled guilty , Dy e f

iled a m otion f

or post-conviction relief

(PCR). His m o tion asserted one claim : that his indictm ent was “f atally def ective f or f ailing to charge and contain all the essential elem ents of sexual battery p ursuant to [ section] 9 7-3-95(1)(d).” Specif ically , Dy e claim e d t h a t t h e indictm e nt was def ective because it did not allege the victim ’s specif

ic age or birth date or Dy e’s specif i c a g e o r b irth date. The circuit court

sum m arily

dism issed Dy e ’s m otion as without m erit. Dy e then appealed. ¶3. “The rule in this state is that an indictm ent which states the stat u t o r y l a n g u a ge is generally suf

f icient to i nf

orm the a ccused of the charge against h im .” State v. Hawkins , 145
So. 3d 636, 639-40 (¶8) (Miss. 2014) (quoting King v. State , 5 80 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Miss. 1991)). “The [ S uprem e] Court has held repeatedly that, so l ong as a f air reading of th e indictm ent, t aken as a whole, clearly d escribes the n ature and cause of the charge against the accused, the indictm ent i s legally suf f icient.” Id. at 640 (¶9) (quotation ma r k s , a l t erations

om itted). Here, Dy e’s indictm ent specif ically cited t he statute under w h ich he was indicted, Mississippi C o d e A n n otated § 97-3-95(1)(d), and t racked the language of the statute. Consistent with the statute, the indictm ent all e g e d that the victim was under the age of
f ourteen a n d t h a t D y e was at least twenty

- f our m onths older t han her a t the tim e of the of f ense. 1 There is no requirem ent that an indictm ent p rovi d e the victim ’s or def endant’s

exact a ge or birth date. Dy e’s indictm ent suf f i c i e n t l y i nf

orm e d h im of the nature of the charge, and the circuit court correctly dism i ssed his PCR m otion as without m erit.

1 Dy e was twenty -f

ive y ears old at the tim e of the of f ense. 2¶4. AFFIRMED.

LEE, C .J., IRVING A ND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, CARL TON, FAIR, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR.

3