Filed 9/24/20 Marriage of J.K. & M.H. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re the Marriage of J.K. and M.H.

J.K.,

Respondent,

v.

M.H.,

Appellant,

SAN DIEGO COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,

Respondent.

 D075901

 (Super. Ct. No. DN175191)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Pennie K. McLaughlin, Commissioner. Affirmed.

M.H., in pro. per., for Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent J.K.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney 

General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys 
2

General, for Respondent San Diego County Department of Child Support 

Services.

M.H. (Father) appeals an order determining child support arrears and 

setting an escalating monthly arrears payment schedule. He challenges both 

the order itself and numerous aspects of the six-year litigation preceding it. 

Many of Father’s challenges are not cognizable in this appeal because the 

alleged errors occurred long ago. As to the challenges that are properly 

before us, we conclude Father has failed to show any prejudicial error and 

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother were married, had one son, and divorced. Their 

2007 judgment of divorce, entered in Michigan, directed Father to pay 

Mother child support “as previously ordered” for three years, at which time 

the amount would be reviewed. Five years later, a Michigan court granted 

Mother’s motion to change her residence to Oceanside, California. Mother

relocated to Oceanside, and Father moved to California as well. 

Mother registered the Michigan divorce judgment with the trial court 

and requested changes to visitation and child support. In a supporting 

declaration, Mother alleged that the existing Michigan visitation order 

allowed their son to spend his summer vacation with Father. She argued 

that Father’s move to California was a significant change in circumstances 

requiring review of the visitation order. As to child support, Mother wrote, “I 

am requesting that the Court order guideline child support.” The existing 

Michigan child support order was for $361 monthly. Mother also requested 

an order directing Father to make payments on a student loan, reimburse her 

for their son’s medical expenses, and to allow their son to continue therapy 

with a different therapist. 
3

In an interim order, the court ordered child support of $572 monthly 

and retained jurisdiction “over all outstanding issues.” It found the financial 

documentation submitted by Father to be “unhelpful” and ordered Father to 

file a proper income and expense declaration within 30 days. It also ordered 

the parties to meet and confer regarding a therapist. 

After further hearings, the court appointed an expert to examine 

Father’s business income. It continued to reserve jurisdiction over all 

remaining issues. Four months later, it ordered Father to provide the expert 

with his banking records by a date certain. The special master later died, 

which appeared to cause further delays. 

Eighteen months after Mother’s request to modify the Michigan 

judgment, the court made findings regarding Father’s monthly income and 

custody timeshare for various periods. It directed Mother’s attorney to 

calculate guideline child support based on the court’s findings for those 

periods using “DissoMaster.”1

Another year later, the court used those figures to determine Father’s 

child support arrears. It directed Father to make a monthly arrears payment 

of $200, until modified by further court order. It appears that Father had 

requested a reduction of his regular monthly child support payments. 

Because the court was concerned about the accuracy of Father’s current 

financial documents, the court did not make any further child support orders. 

Instead, it ordered Father to participate in a vocational evaluation. The 

court’s order included the standard notation, “All orders not in conflict with 

the foregoing shall remain in full force and effect.” Father did not participate 

1 “DissoMaster is a computer software program widely used by courts to 

set child support and temporary spousal support.” (Namikas v. Miller (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1574, 1578, fn. 4.)
4

in the vocational evaluation, so the court ordered his request to modify child 

support off-calendar. It again included the standard notation regarding prior 

orders. 

The court made a further order calculating arrears and, later, ordered 

Father to make monthly arrears payments of $500. It ordered Father to file 

an updated income and expense declaration. In its final order, it stated, “The 

Court confirmed child support is as previously ordered.”2

In October 2017, Father applied ex parte to obtain an order “to release 

the funds frozen in my wife’s checking account and our son’s savings 

account.” The court denied the ex parte application. It wrote, “[Father] is 

told that [the Department of Child Support Services] has jurisdiction 

[regarding] this issue.” (See Fam. Code, § 4251.)

The next year, Father sought an order resetting his previous request to 

reduce child support or, in the alternative, an order terminating child support 

altogether. He argued he had been ill-served by his prior counsel and no 

child support should be required of parents who provide “the basic necessities 

of life” to their children. Mother opposed the motion and contended that 

Father “still refuses to provide accurate income information for the Court to 

meaningfully decide any request for modification of child support.” She again 

requested that he complete a vocational evaluation. Mother also requested 

that the court confirm its existing orders regarding child support and arrears

payments. In a declaration, Mother stated “[t]he last and still current child 

support order was in the amount of $547” monthly. 

2 Father appealed the final arrears order, and this court affirmed the 

order in an unpublished opinion. (In re Marriage of J.K. and M.H. (Dec. 8, 

2017, D072075).) Our unpublished opinion provides additional details 

regarding these proceedings.
5

At the next hearing, the parties discussed the court’s previous orders 

regarding child support. The court initially expressed its understanding that 

the current order for child support was $572 monthly, but with Mother’s 

agreement it determined the figure was in fact $547 monthly because it was 

the last value calculated by the court in determining arrears. The court 

rejected Father’s claim that he should not pay any child support. Father

asked the commissioner presiding in court to recuse herself. The court 

refused. After a recess, the parties agreed to a new, nonguideline child 

support payment of $400 monthly going forward. The court ordered arrears 

payments of $200 monthly as well. The court confirmed that Father’s driver 

license and real estate license had been released from suspension, subject to 

review at future hearings. 

Two months later, Mother requested a revised payment plan on 

arrears. She calculated that it would take 11 years to repay the arrears in 

full at the current monthly payment of $200. The court ordered the County of 

San Diego Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) to conduct an audit 

of past obligations and payments to settle the question of Father’s 

outstanding arrears. It rejected Father’s contention that the $400 stipulated 

child support payment should be retroactive to 2015. 

Before the next hearing, Father filed a declaration contending that the 

court’s child support orders, especially its imposition of interest on any 

arrears, violated the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA; 

Fam. Code, § 5700.101 et seq.) because Mother’s initial request for 

registration of the Michigan judgment did not specify any grounds to modify 

the Michigan child support order. Father reiterated his request that the 

commissioner presiding in court recuse herself. He argued that two-thirds of 

California’s funding for commissioner salaries came from the federal
6

government based on the state’s child support orders. He claimed the 

commissioner was financially interested in the matter based on this funding 

scheme. Father also raised various allegations against his prior counsel. 

At the hearing, the court confirmed the parties had received DCSS’s 

audit. The parties again reviewed the history of the court’s child support 

orders. Father argued that the court’s first, interim child support order did 

not modify the Michigan judgment, but the court did not agree. On the audit, 

Father requested an additional payment credit of $42. Mother did not object, 

so it was included in the accounting. The court determined that Father owed 

approximately $22,000 in arrears and $7,500 in interest. Father objected to 

the imposition of interest, but the court explained that the California child 

support order accrued interest, regardless of Michigan law. Mother raised 

the issue of a “more reasonable” payment plan on arrears. After discussion, 

the court ordered escalating monthly arrears payments from $200 to $250 to 

$400. Father appeals. 

DISCUSSION

I

Standards of Appellate Briefing and Review

Father represents himself in this appeal, as he did during most of the 

challenged portions of the trial court proceedings. “Under the law, a party 

may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is 

to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater 

consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] 

Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct 

rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) 

These rules include general prohibitions on raising arguments for the first 

time on appeal (In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 
7

201, 212) or in a reply brief (In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 

206 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477-1478 (Khera & Sameer)). We will not consider 

arguments that run afoul of these rules, including numerous new arguments

in Father’s reply brief.

Substantively, the appealed order is presumed correct, and any error 

must be affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 

557, 564.) “ ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an 

ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Ibid.) “To 

demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis 

supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that 

support the claim of error. [Citations.] When a point is asserted without 

argument and authority for the proposition, ‘it is deemed to be without 

foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court.’ ” (In re S.C.

(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 (S.C.).) “Mere suggestions of error without 

supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do 

not properly present grounds for appellate review. The court is not required 

to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error. 

The point is treated as waived and we pass it without further consideration.” 

(Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals 

Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) “ ‘We are not bound to develop 

appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal 

argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as 

waived.’ ” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 

939, 956.)
8

II

Augmentation and Judicial Notice

Father has filed three unopposed motions to augment the record. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155.) We previously granted the first motion, 

filed October 15, 2019. We now grant the second and third motions, filed 

April 30, 2020, and June 2, 2020. The documents attached to the motions to 

augment are deemed part of the record on appeal.

Father has also filed four motions for judicial notice, covering 

numerous documents. (Evid. Code, § 459.) Several requests cover documents 

filed in the trial court. We treat these requests as motions to augment the 

record and grant them. The documents identified by Father as 

Attachments A, B, N, O, and R are deemed part of the record on appeal. 

(Father’s request for judicial notice of a reporter’s transcript is denied 

because it is already part of the record, as augmented.) 

Several other requests cover the California Constitution and various 

California statutes. Though a formal request is unnecessary, we grant these 

requests. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).) We likewise grant Father’s requests 

for judicial notice of his Exhibit 28, Canons 2 and 3 of the California Code of 

Judicial Ethics (id., § 451, subd. (c)), and his Attachments AA and EE, Ethics 

Opinion Nos. 59 and 76 published by the California Judges Association (see 

Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Evid. Code (2020 ed.) foll. § 450 

[courts may consult “discussions by learned writers” in formulating rules of 

law].) For the same reason, we grant judicial notice of his Attachments W 

and X, the text of the 1996 and 2008 versions of the UIFSA and related 

commentary. We also grant Father’s requests for judicial notice of the 

existence and content of various official explanatory materials and statistics 

regarding California’s child support program and the federal role in funding 
9

it, identified as Attachments P, Q, V, Y, and Z, though we do not take judicial 

notice of their truth. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c); People v. Castillo (2010) 

49 Cal.4th 145, 157; Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

1057, 1063-1064 (Mangini).)

Father’s requests for judicial notice of various federal court orders and 

appellate briefs are denied because they are irrelevant to any disputed issues 

properly before us. (Mangini, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) His requests for 

judicial notice of letters and emails from the DCSS and the Internal Revenue 

Service are likewise denied. Even assuming they are official acts of the state 

and federal executive branches (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c)), we can take 

judicial notice only of their existence and content, not the truth of any 

matters stated therein. Because these documents are relevant (if at all) only 

for their truth, judicial notice is inappropriate. (See Lockley v. Law Office of 

Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) We 

deny judicial notice of Father’s real estate license record and a DCSS child 

support guideline calculation for the same reasons. (Ibid.)

Father also requests judicial notice of his own correspondence with 

DCSS, and correspondence between Father and his attorneys. We deny those 

requests because Father has not shown that these documents are the proper 

subjects of judicial notice. (See Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical 

Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 154.) We deny judicial notice 

of the child support guideline calculations created by Father for the same 

reason. (See ibid.)

III

Judicial Bias

Father contends the commissioner presiding in court erred by declining 

to recuse herself for bias. He claims that two-thirds of California’s funding 
10

for child support commissioners ultimately comes from the federal 

government, based on California’s child support orders. He argues the court 

had a financial interest in ordering substantial child support based on this 

funding scheme. Even accepting Father’s characterization of these federal 

funds, we conclude Father has not shown the court had a financial interest in 

the proceedings that would require it to recuse itself.

Father relies primarily on Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510 (Tumey). 

In Tumey, the U.S. Supreme Court considered an Ohio statute that 

empowered a village mayor to try defendants accused of violating Ohio’s 

alcohol prohibition laws. (Id. at p. 514.) As compensation, a mayor was 

allowed to retain any legal fees paid. (Id. at p. 520.) “But no fees or costs in 

such cases are paid him except by the defendant if convicted. There is, 

therefore, no way by which the Mayor may be paid for his service as judge, if 

he does not convict those who are brought before him . . . .” (Ibid.) 

The Supreme Court held that the prospect of such fees resulted in an 

unfair proceeding that violated a defendant’s constitutional right to due 

process. “[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a 

defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or 

property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, 

substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his 

case.” (Tumey, supra, 273 U.S. at p. 523.) “We cannot regard the prospect of 

receipt or loss of [the mayor’s] emolument in each case as a minute, remote, 

trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not [fair] to each defendant,

brought before the Mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his 

guilt or innocence, that the prospect of such a loss by the Mayor should weigh 

against his acquittal.” (Id. at p. 532.) Moreover, any fines imposed were 

received in part by the village and used to pay officials to enforce the 
11

prohibition laws. (Id. at pp. 517, 520.) This funding scheme provided 

additional incentive to a mayor to convict: “The mayor is the chief executive 

of the village. He supervises all the other executive officers. . . . With his 

interest, as mayor, in the financial condition of the village, and his 

responsibility therefor, might not a defendant with reason say that he feared 

he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence from one who would have so 

strong a motive to help his village by conviction and a heavy fine?” (Id. at 

p. 533.)

Our Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Haas v. County of 

San Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, which considered a due process 

challenge to the financial interest of temporary administrative hearing 

officers. The County of San Bernardino adopted a practice of selecting 

hearing officers “on an ad hoc basis and paying them according to the 

duration or amount of work performed.” (Id. at p. 1020.) The Supreme Court 

agreed with the plaintiff that this practice gave hearing officers “an 

impermissible financial interest in the outcome of the cases they are 

appointed to decide, because the officers’ prospects for obtaining future ad hoc 

appointments depend solely on the county’s goodwill and because the county, 

in making such appointments, may prefer those officers whose past decisions 

have favored the county.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

Father has not shown the court commissioner here has a similar direct, 

personal, substantial financial interest in ordering child support. Court 

commissioners are appointed by each superior court and receive no other 

compensation other than as a court commissioner. (Fam. Code, §§ 4251, 

subd. (b), 4252, subd. (a).) Father has not shown that a court commissioner’s 

compensation or her continued employment depends on the child support 

ordered. The general relationship between child support and federal funding
12

is too indirect and remote to constitute a financial interest in any specific 

case or outcome. (See Lolley v. Campbell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 367, 379 [holding 

that the prospect of attorney fees if a state hearing officer ruled against 

defendant, and was successful on appeal to the superior court, was not a 

substantial financial interest]; Silva v. County of Los Angeles (C.D.Cal. 2002) 

215 F.Supp.2d 1079, 1087 [holding that county-provided judicial benefits 

were not a substantial financial interest requiring disqualification of superior 

court judges in matters involving the county]; see also Marshall v. 

Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 250 [describing potential financial interest 

as “exceptionally remote” where the government official would not profit 

economically].) Father’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.

IV

Child Support Arrears

Father challenges the court’s determination of child support arrears on 

several grounds. We address each in turn.

First, Father contends the court should have used the amount awarded 

in the Michigan child support order ($361 monthly) as the applicable child 

support figure in calculating arrears from the date of the registration of the 

Michigan judgment in California through the date he and Mother agreed to 

set child support at $400 per month (or, alternatively, it should have used 

$400 monthly for the whole period). The basis for Father’s contention is the 

court’s alleged error under the UIFSA by modifying the Michigan judgment 

in the absence of a statement of grounds for modification in Mother’s request 

for modification. Under the UIFSA, if a party registering an out-of-state 

child support order requests modification of that order, the modification 

request “must specify the grounds for modification.” (Fam. Code, § 5700.609.) 

We conclude any error in the court’s initial child support order is 
13

unreviewable in this appeal. The initial child support order was an 

appealable order. (In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 

906.) The time to appeal the order expired long ago. (See Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.104(a).) We therefore lack appellate jurisdiction to review it. 

(See Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins.

Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56 (Van Beurden); see also In re Marriage 

of Spector (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 201, 208.)3

Relatedly, Father argues the initial California child support order was 

invalid because it did not specifically state it was modifying the Michigan 

judgment. Even setting aside the question of reviewability, Father’s 

argument fails because there is no requirement for such a statement under 

the UIFSA. (See Fam. Code, § 5700.613.) Father relies on authorities

interpreting UIFSA’s predecessor. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gerkin (2008) 

161 Cal.App.4th 604, 612.) These authorities no longer apply. He also relies 

on the official comments to the UIFSA, which state that it would be “good 

practice” for the new court to explicitly state it is assuming responsibility for 

the child support order. These are comments on Family Code 

section 5700.611, rather than section 5700.613. The latter statute is 

applicable here because the parties all resided in California at the time of the 

3 In his opening brief, Father appeared to contend that this error left the 

trial court without jurisdiction to order child support. In his reply brief, 

however, Father disclaims any such jurisdictional argument. He maintains 

the court simply erred under the UIFSA. While we need not consider the 

issue in light of this disclaimer, the trial court clearly had jurisdiction 

because it is undisputed that Father, Mother, and their son all resided in 

California. (See Fam. Code, § 5700.613, subd. (a).) 
14

order. And, in any event, the comment’s suggestion regarding “good practice” 

does not mean that its omission is an error requiring reversal.4

Second, Father argues that the court lacked statutory authority to 

order child support because he has joint custody of his son and therefore 

cannot be a “noncustodial” parent. We addressed and rejected that argument 

in our prior opinion. Our conclusion is now law of the case; we will not 

reconsider it here. (See City of Santa Paula v. Narula (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 

485, 491-492.)

Third, Father argues that California’s child support statutes, or the 

order at issue here, are unconstitutional on various grounds. None of 

Father’s arguments has merit. He claims the statutes are unconstitutionally 

vague (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373-1374), but he does 

not analyze the statutes themselves. His claim relies on the trial court’s 

alleged uncertainty regarding the amount of past support orders. Any such 

uncertainty does not show the statutes themselves are unconstitutionally 

vague. Father also claims the child support order violates his substantive 

due process right to be free from government interference in the care, 

custody, and control of his son. He has not shown how a monetary payment 

to his former wife, for support of their son, infringes on the established 

parameters of that right. (See Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 66.) 

Father’s focus on his rights ignores the fact that joint custody is necessarily a 

shared endeavor, both financially and otherwise. (See generally Fam. Code, 

4 To the extent Father argues the court erred by not applying the $400 

child support agreement retroactively, he has not provided any basis for 

finding error, especially in light of (1) our prior opinion affirming an earlier 

arrears order incorporating higher amounts and (2) the parties’ agreement on 

the record that the $400 obligation was forward-looking. His claim that 

“there were no other child support orders made” before the $400 agreement 

ignores the court’s initial, interim order. 
15

§ 4053.) The state has an interest in ensuring that children are protected

and supported, especially where (as here) the parents did not agree on the 

amount of support. (See Tolces v. Trask (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 285, 291.) We 

disagree that the state’s role only arises where one or both parents rely on 

public assistance. Father claims the child support orders violate the equal 

protection rights of divorced parents when compared with married parents. 

But the state has a rational basis for distinguishing between divorced and 

married parents in imposing child support obligations, because the 

relationship between the parents in both situations is substantially different. 

Father has not shown that divorced parents are a suspect class requiring any 

judicial scrutiny beyond that standard. (See Lyng v. Castillo (1986) 477 U.S. 

635, 638-639.) Father’s reliance on authorities considering equitable 

abatement of child support obligations incurred while a noncustodial parent 

provides custody is unavailing. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wilson (2016) 

4 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1016 [discussing the “Jackson rule” of equitable 

abatement].) Joint custodial support obligations in California already 

account for a child’s time in the physical custody of the parent incurring such 

obligations. (See Fam. Code, § 4055, subd. (b)(1)(D).) Father has not shown 

any constitutional violation.5

V

Arrears Payments

Father contends the trial court erred by ordering an escalating arrears 

payment schedule. He claims he did not have prior notice that the court 

would increase his arrears payments and the order violated his right to 

5 In his reply brief, for the first time, Father challenges the imposition of 

interest on his unpaid California arrears. We do not consider arguments 

made for the first time on reply. (Khera & Sameer, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1477-1478.)
16

procedural due process. DCSS argues that Father forfeited this claim of error 

by failing to object in the trial court. (See Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co. v. 

Tower Industries, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1881, 1888.) Even setting aside 

forfeiture, Father’s contention fails on its merits.

“It is a fundamental concept of due process that a judgment against a 

defendant cannot be entered unless he was given proper notice and an 

opportunity to defend.” (In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 

1166; see In re Marriage of O’Connell (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 565, 574.) Here, 

contrary to Father’s claim, Mother provided notice that she would seek to 

increase Father’s arrears payments. In a declaration, Mother calculated 

Father’s child support arrears and the length of time it would take for

repayment on the existing schedule. In conclusion, she wrote, “I am therefore 

requesting an increase in the monthly amount paid towards arrears to 

facilitate a more expedited repayment of the arrears.” Moreover, as DCSS 

notes, the court had the power to impose conditions, such as increased 

payments, in granting Father’s request that his real estate license be 

released from suspension. (See Fam. Code, § 17520, subd. (k)(4)(C).) 

VI

Miscellaneous Issues

Father claims the court erred by denying his ex parte application to 

rescind DCSS’s levy on his family’s bank account. We have no jurisdiction to 

consider this order because Father did not identify this order in his notice of 

appeal (see Dakota Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 

504 (Dakota Payphone)) and, even if he had, his notice of appeal would be 

untimely as to this order (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104; Van Beurden,

supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56). In any event, we note, contrary to Father’s claim, 

that “[a] court order authorizing such a levy is not required. The levy is 
17

founded on an existing support order, overdue support, and the existence of 

an order by operation of law requiring payment of support arrears.” (In re 

Marriage of LaMoure (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 807, 819.) 

Father makes various claims of incompetence and malfeasance against 

his former attorneys. Any claims Father may want to assert against his 

former attorneys are not at issue in this appeal, which concerns his child 

support obligations and arrears. To the extent his claims touch on the order 

under review in this appeal, he has not provided any factual or legal basis for 

reversing the order based on any attorney incompetence or malfeasance. (See 

S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408; see also In re Marriage of Rosevear 

(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 686-687.)

Father argues various other aspects of the underlying proceedings were 

erroneous or unfair, including an order regarding therapy for his son and 

another order regarding visitation. To the extent we can discern Father’s 

contentions, we have no appellate jurisdiction to review these orders, which 

occurred several years ago. (See Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56; 

Dakota Payphone, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 504.)
18

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.