Filed 11/13/14 D.T. v. Super. Ct. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

D.T.,
Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest. B257555
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK94347)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for ex traordinary writ. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Teresa T. Sullivan , Judge. Petition granted and remanded. Law Offices of Alex Iglesias, Steven Shenfeld and Tawni Lara for Petitioner. No appearance by Respondent. Richard D. Weiss, County Counsel, Dawy n Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Co unsel, for Real Party in Interest. Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles (CLC2), Charles Aghoian and Debra
Bernard for minor child V.T.2 Petitioner D.T. (mother) is the mother of V.T., a one-year-old dependent of the juvenile court. After V.T. was declared a dependent, and after mother learned the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Fa mily Services (Department) intended to
detain V.T. and her older half siblings who were also dependen ts of the court, mother left
her home with the children and could not be located for several months. While mother and the children were absent, the Departme nt filed a supplementa l dependency petition
on behalf of all children. After mother and the children were located, the juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition. At the urging of counsel for the children—but against the Department’s recommendation— the court denied mother reunification services with respect to V.T. under the bypa ss provision in Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(15) (hereafter subdivision (b)(15)), wh ich applies in cases of parent abduction an d similar situations. 1 The court scheduled a hearing for the selection and implementation of a perm anent plan for V.T. (§ 366.26.) Mother has filed a writ petition challengi ng the juvenile court’s decision with respect to V.T. (Cal. Rules of Court, ru le 8.452.) She claims the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion in denying her requ est to continue the disposition hearing for a contest, and (2) erred in de nying reunification services under the bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15). We conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the disposition hearing for a contest and we remand so the court ma y conduct such a hearing. In light of our conclusion, we need not, and do not, express an opinion as to whether subdivision (b)(15) would permit the court to deny reunificati on services in this case.
That is a matter to be decided by the juvenile court based on the record presented at the contested hearing.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In September 2012, a little over one year before V.T. was born, the Department filed a dependency petiti on on behalf of mother’s three children, ages five, seven and nine. (These three children will sometimes be referred to collectively as the older children or as V.T.’s half siblings.) The petition was filed after mo ther drove with the
children to a McDonald’s restau rant while intoxicated, dropped them off at the play area, proceeded through the “drive thru” and drove into a wall in the drive-thru. A passerby tried to take mother’s keys an d mother allegedly punched the person in the face. Mother
was arrested and found to have a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.20. Three hours after her arrest, law enforcem ent received a call about mother’s three children, whom she had left in the play area. Mother stated she did not tell law
enforcement about the children because she di d not want them detained. Mother was
convicted of misdemeanor DUI pursuant to a plea agreement, which included dismissal
of an additional DUI count and counts of ba ttery and willful crue lty to a child. In
connection with her criminal sentence, mother was ordered to complete an alcohol and drug education counseling program, and a Mo thers Against Drunk Dr iving victim impact program, among other things. In October 2012, the juvenile court su stained a dependency petition based on the allegations described above. The juvenile c ourt released the three children to mother and ordered the Department to provide family pr eservation services. Mother was ordered to submit to random drug and alcohol testing, complete a parenting program, enroll in individual counseling, and comply with a ll criminal court orders, including attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).
V.T. was born in mother’s home in late October 2013. Two days after her birth, mother brought V.T. to the hosp ital. Initially, mother denied to hospital staff that she had any involvement with the Department, but sh e later provided the name of a Department social worker. Hospital staff contacted the Department. After a team decision meeting (TDM), the Department decided to file a dependency petitio n on V.T.’s behalf, but not to detain her. In late November 2013, the4 Department filed such a petition, alleging V.T. was at risk because of (1) mother’s failure to adequately address chronic and unresolve d head lice issues affecting V.T.’s half siblings, and (2) mother’s unresolved alcohol abuse issues and her failure to regularly participate in random drug testi ng and alcohol abuse programming. At a hearing in late November 2013, the juvenile court ordered that V.T. remain
released to mother and that the Department provide moth er with family maintenance
services and make unannounced home visits. The court also directed that a nurse go to mother’s home to assist mother regarding the lice issues and it scheduled a progress hearing for December 2013 to addre ss the status of the lice problem. 2 A public health nurse and a Department social worker visited mother a few days
before the December 2013 hearing. The public health nurse did not observe any lice in
the children’s hair. At the December 2013 hearing, the juve nile court set a February 2014 date for adjudication of the petition filed on behalf of V.T., and it directed the Department to file a report addressing the continuing examination of the children to en sure they remained
lice-free. In late January 2014, the Department submitted a combined jurisdiction and disposition report. According to that report, an individual (apparently from a hospital or clinic) contacted the Department earlier th at month to express concerns about V.T. because recent chest x-rays we re abnormal and mother had repeatedly failed to contact the clinic for follow-up. V.T. was finally se en later that month and was diagnosed with dyspnea (shortness of breath) and respiratory ab normality. She was prescribed albuterol and a nebulizer. At around this time, a public health nurse again examined the children’s
hair and found no lice. The Department’s report also advised th at mother had missed at least 10 of 24 drug tests during the previous year, including two of the three tests that were scheduled

2 At the hearing, the court found “Raul Do e” to be V.T.’s alleged father. His whereabouts have never been determined and he is not involved in this writ proceeding.5 on dates after the filing of th e dependency petition on V.T.’s behalf. The report noted
that mother had failed to enro ll in counseling, was no longer participating in AA, and had only minimally participated in the programs ordered by the criminal court. The Department recommended that the court declar e V.T. a dependent child and offer mother family maintenance services. In early February 2014, mother pled no contest and the court sustained the allegation that V.T. was at risk because of mo ther’s unresolved alco hol issues and failure to regularly participate in random drug tes ting and in an alcohol program. The court dismissed the allegation regarding the h ead lice problems without prejudice. As for disposition, the juvenile court orde red V.T. placed with mother and directed the Department to provide family maintenanc e services. The court ordered mother to (1) submit to random or on-demand drug testi ng every other week, and to complete a full drug rehabilitation program if she tested positive or missed a test, (2) complete individual counseling to address personal re sponsibility and child safety issues, and (3) comply with all criminal court programs, including attending AA. In February and March 2014, mother misse d all three of the drug tests to which she was required to submit. In mid-March 2014, a Department so cial worker attempted to make an unannounced visit to mother’s home. A youn g man drove up and claimed mother and the
children were at the store. The social worker left a card and asked the man to have
mother contact her. Six days later, the social worker attemp ted another unannounced visit. She was met by another young man who walked up wi th a pit bull and said mother and the
children were at the store. The social worker wa lked up to the door and saw a young man inside, lying on the couch. It was the same man who had greeted the social worker when she attempted to visit six days earlier. Th e social worker gave that person another
business card and told him to advise mother that an emergency TDM would be held at the Department’s local office.6 Two days later, the social worker visite d the elementary school of V.T.’s half siblings. A receptionist advised that the ch ildren were now attending a different school.
The social worker visited that school and was able to meet privately with each of the three children. Two of them reported that mother and all children had moved in with a cousin. One reported that their maternal grandmother had “put them out” because she was upset mother would go out at night and leave the children unatte nded. At least two of the children were unkempt a nd were wearing what appeared to be dirty clothing. The
social worker observed no marks or bruises on the children. Four days later, a TDM took place in which mother, two social workers and various relatives participated. At the mee ting, mother claimed she had moved, but she refused to provide her new address. A decision was made to request a “warrant
consultation” for the ch ildren’s detention. A little over a week later, in early April 20 14, the juvenile court issued a removal order authorizing the Department to detain all four children. Over the next 10 days, the Department and law enforcement made four a ttempts to execute the removal order at two
different addresses—twice at mother’s last known address (the maternal grandmother’s home) and twice at an address provided by the two fathers of V.T.’s half siblings.
Mother and children were not located. On the last occasi on, the maternal grandmother told the Department social worker and tw o accompanying law enforcement officers that
she had not seen mother or the childre n for some time and did not know their
whereabouts. Five days later, in mid-April 2014, the Department filed a supplemental dependency petitio n (§ 387) on behalf of all four children. The supplemental petition contained a single count alleging the children we re at risk because mother had (1) failed to participate in court-ordere d random drug tes ting and a drug reha bilitation program, and (2) failed to make the children available fo r Department visits. Accompanying reports
reflected that mother and the children were sti ll at large. A day be fore the filing of the supplemental petition, a Department social worker left a voicemail message for mother, providing her with the date and ti me for the detention hearing.7 Mother and the children did not appear at the detention hearing. The juvenile court issued a protective custody warrant for all four children and an arrest warrant for mother. The court also found a prima facie case for detaining the children. The court directed that the Department detain the child ren when located and it gave the Department discretion to place V.T.’s half siblings with their respective father s. The court also ordered that, once the children were detained, mother was to have only monitored visits
with them. In late April 2014, the Department file d a report detailing recent efforts to locate
mother and children. The De partment learned that the children—who had previously
been enrolled in the Palmdale School Dist rict—had not attended school since the beginning of the month. They were not enro lled in any schools in the Palmdale School District or in four nearby school districts. According to personne l with the Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Serv ices, mother had been using her electronic benefits transfer (EBT) card at various loca tions in California, though she appeared to always return to Hemet. A Department soci al worker recalled that mother had relatives
in Hemet. In early June 2014, the Department submitted a combined jurisdiction and disposition report with respect to the supplemental petition. The whereabouts of mother and children were still unknown, even though the Department had contacted various law enforcement and child welfare ag encies, as well as numerous sch ool districts in an effort
to locate them. Mother’s fa mily had refused to provide information about mother’s whereabouts. According to the report, the fathers of V.T.’s half siblings were extremely frightened for their children and the Depart ment was concerned that mother was not addressing V.T.’s respiratory health issues. The Department concluded its report with a
recommendation that the court sustain th e supplemental petition and order family
reunification services. On June 6 or 7, 2014, a Los Angeles County Sher iff’s Department deputy contacted the Department to report that mo ther and the children were found at the maternal grandmother’s home in Palmdale. The sheriff’s department located the family8 after receiving information from the father of one of V.T.’s half si blings, who had been actively searching for his daughter. Mother wa s arrested and the children were taken into protective custody. A Department social worker responded to the home in Pa lmdale. When the children were being transported to the sheriff’s station, two of the older children told the social worker that, a few months earlier, a so cial worker called moth er and told her the children were going to be deta ined. Mother then told the children they were leaving and they went to a relative’s home in Hemet, wh ere they stayed with mother’s cousin. The children were disheveled, but appeared healthy, except for V.T. She had a severe diaper rash. She was taken to a hosp ital and diagnosed with a yeast infection.
The older children were rel eased to their respective fath ers, while V.T. was placed
in a foster home. On June 9, 2014, a short hearing took place in the juvenile court. 3 Mother, who was still in custody and had apparently not received notice of the hearing, was not present. Her appointed counsel was pres ent. The court recalled its warrants and approved the current placemen ts of the children, including that of V.T. in foster care. It ordered that mother have only monitored visits with the children at a Department office. In addition, and at the request of counsel fo r the children who believe d maternal relatives had acted “in concert [with mother] with hidi ng the children,” the court ordered that the
maternal relatives have no co ntact with the children.
The court trailed the matter to the next day for arraignment a nd a progress hearing, and it scheduled a jurisdiction hearing for July 1. The court also directed the Department

3 On the day of the hearing, the Departme nt filed two “Last Minute Information For The Court” forms, reporting about the events leading up to, and in cluding, the detention of the children. In both fo rms, the social worker checke d the box “Information only” and left blank the box for “Change in Recomme ndation.” Thus, the Department was not changing its recommendation fro m the combined jurisdiction and disposition report that mother should receive re unification services.9 to submit a report discussing whether it would be appropriate to terminate jurisdiction over V.T.’s older half siblings with a family law order.
The court convened for another short hearing the following day. Mother was present. She entered a general denial and submitted to detention of the children. The court found a prima facie case for the deten tion and confirmed its placement orders from the previous day. At the Department’s reque st, the court confirmed that mother was still subject to the previously ordere d drug-testing requirement. The Department submitted an addendum report on th e morning of the July 1 jurisdiction hearing. According to the report, V.T.’s half siblings told a Department social worker that they had been living with a cousin in Hemet. The Department also reported regarding moth er’s visits with the children. In midJune, V.T. had a monitored visit with mother. V.T.’s caregiver later contacted the social worker and was very upset beca use mother had yelled at her in the reception area and had accused her of causing a small sc ratch on V.T.’s ear. Mother spent most of the visit complaining about V.T.’s care. After a seco nd visit with V.T. and one of the older children, mother spoke to a social worker and accused the Department and the social worker of being responsible for her dependen cy case remaining open . According to the report, mother took no respons ibility for her own actions. In this addendum report, the Departme nt stated that it was recommending that jurisdiction over V.T.’s half siblings be termin ated with family law orders providing that the children’s respective fathers be granted sole physical and joint legal custody. Significantly to this proceeding, the report made no new reco mmendation regarding V.T

. The parties appeared for the adjudication on July 1. Mother was present. The court admitted the various reports discussed above, including, over the objection of mother’s counsel, the addendum report filed th at very same day. Counsel objected on the grounds that it contained a change in recomm endation concerning V.T.’s half siblings and was untimely. No w itnesses testified. Before hearing arguments from counsel, mother’s counsel stated that she was asking for a contested dispositi on “based on the last-minute change in recommendation.”10 Counsel added that if the court was not inclin ed to grant a contested hearing, she would
like to call the children to testify but the children were not present. The court did not respond to this request, stating that it wish ed to proceed with the adjudication. Counsel for the parties offered their argum ents. Counsel for the Department asked the court to sustain the supplemental petition because (1) mother had not drug-tested as required, (2) mother had not made progress in the court-ordered programs, and (3) it “appear[ed] that the mother had been absconding with the children, had abducted them
and moved them to Hemet.” Co unsel for the children offered similar arguments in asking the court to sustain the supplemental petition.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to di smiss the supplemental petition. Counsel
claimed mother had been co mplying with the drug-testi ng requirement until the court issued the protective custody warrants. She also claimed mother had been attending AA consistently and she presented a sign-up sheet in an effort to support that contention, but
the court found that the document lacked credibility. Counsel c onceded mother had failed to make the children available for Depa rtment visits after the court issued the protective custody warrants. After hearing from counsel, the court sustained the supplemental petition. The court immediately turned to the disp osition, noting that mo ther’s counsel had
asked to have the matter set for a contest an d asking counsel for the parties to state their positions regarding the request. Counsel for the Department objected to a continuance. She noted that the matter was “originally set for June 9, 2014.” C ounsel for the Department did not address the fact that the Department had changed its recommendation regarding the older children just that morning with no advance notice to mothe r. Counsel for one of the older children joined in the Depart ment’s argument, claiming the continuance request was just a delaying tactic and asserting that her client “has his rights.”
Mother’s counsel asserted she was seeki ng a contest and might want to call all the children to testify. She noted that, until that morning, the Department had consistently
recommended that mother receive reunifications services for all four children. Counsel11 stated she needed more time to prepare for the disposition because of the change in
recommendation. She also not ed that the Department had not interviewed mother, despite mother’s counsel’s requests at the last two hearings (on June 9 and 10). Counsel for the children “strongly objec t[ed]” to continuing the matter for a contest. She argued that further delay would be detrimental to the children, noting they were doing well in their current placements. The court asked counsel for the children to state her position regarding the fact that the Department’s recommendation as noticed for that day was to offer mother reunificati on services. Counsel avoided the question, turning instead to the merits of the disposition by arguing th at mother should be denied reunification services under the bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15). 4 This was the first time any one had invoked the bypass provision in subdivision ( b )( 15 ) and suggested it could be used to deny mother reunification services . Children’s counsel then argued that th e court should terminate juri sdiction over the older children and issue family law orders. Couns el made no reference to V.T. Mother’s counsel repeated she had received “zero notice.” She cited the Department’s last minute ch ange in recommendation. Counsel for the Department noted that at the June 9 h earing, the court had asked the Department to submit a supplemental repo rt addressing the possibility of terminating jurisdiction over the older child ren with a family law order which, in counsel’s view, provided mother with notice. The juvenile court agreed with counsel for the Department
that this directive constituted notice. Th e court summed up: “I’ve heard your argument and I’ve made my ruling that notice was provid ed to the moth er June 9th when the Court did order the Department to address termin ation of jurisdiction on this case.”

4 Subdivision (b)(15) provides that a court ma y deny reunification services if it finds that “the parent or guardian has on one or more occasions w illfully abducted the child or child’s sibling or half sibling from his or he r placement and refused to disclose the child’s or child’s sibling’s or half sibling’s whereabout s, refused to return physical custody of the child or child’s sibling or half sibling to his or her placement, or refused to return physical custody of the child or child’s sib ling or half sibling to the social worker.”12 Following that ruling, mother’s counsel asked to be heard regarding the disposition. The court asked mother’s c ounsel to address the bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15). The court noted it had evidence of “mother’s willful abduction of
the children.” Counsel for mo ther noted that even if th e court were to find that subdivision (b)(15) is applic able, it should award mother reunification services because doing so would be in the best interests of the children.
Counsel for the children reiterated that she was asking that mother be denied services under subdivision (b)(15). Counsel for the Department asked the cour t to terminate jurisdiction over the older children with family law orde rs. Counsel for the Departme nt stated she was “submitting” with respect to subdivision (b )(15), stating she had not “had the opportunity to consult with the Department in regards to that.” She noted that her “initial understanding” was that there was no basis to deny family reuni fication services to mother and stated she could “consult with the Department to see whet her or not they would agree” that mother
should be denied services under subdivision (b)(15).
Counsel for the fathers of the older children asked the court to terminate jurisdiction over them and issue family law orders. The court then proceeded to issue its dis position orders. With respect to the three older children, the court denied reunifica tion services under s ubdivision (b)(15) and terminated jurisdiction w ith family law orders as requested . As for V.T., the court denied
mother reunifications services under subdiv ision (b)(15) and it scheduled a hearing for the selection and implementation of a perm anent plan for V.T. (§ 366.26.) Mother filed a writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s order setting the section 366.26 hearing for V.T. She claims th e juvenile court (1) abused its discretion in denying her request to contin ue the disposition hearing for a contest, and (2) erred in denying reunification services under the bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15). Counsel for V.T. opposes the granting of relief, maintaining that both of mother’s contentions lack merit. The Department ma intains the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying a contin uance. However, the Depart ment takes no position with13 respect to mother’s contention she may no t be denied reunification services under subdivision (b)(15).

DISCUSSION

The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mother’s Request to Continue the Disposition for a Contested Hearing We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a continuance request for an abuse of discretion. ( In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481.) However, as our Supreme Court stated—albeit in a different c ontext—“the trial court’s discretion is not
unlimited and must be ‘ “exercised in confor mity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or def eat the ends of substantial justice.” ’ ” ( Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233, quoting Martin v. Cook (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 799, 807, superseded by statut e on another point as explained in Tackett v. City of Huntington Beach (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 60, 64-65.) In claiming she was entitled to a continua nce, mother cites a statutory provision and a Rule of Court. The statutory provis ion is section 358, su bdivision (a)(3), which provides: “If the social worker is alleging that subdivision (b) of Section 361.5 is applicable, the court shall continue the proceedings for a period not to exceed 30 days. The social worker shall notify each parent of the content of subdivision (b) of Section 361.5 and shall inform each pa rent that if the court do es not order reunification a permanency planning hearing w ill be held, and that his or her parental rights may be
terminated within the tim eframes specified by law.” (Italics added.)
The rule mother cites is substan tially similar. It provides: “If petitioner [the Department] alleges that section 3 61.5(b) is applicable, the court must continue the proceedings not more than 30 calendar days. The court must order the petitioner to notify each parent or guardian of the contents of section 361.5(b) and must inform each parent
that if reunification is not ordered at the disposition hearing, a section 366.26 implementation hearing will be he ld and parental rights may be terminated.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.686(b), italics added.)14 As counsel for V.T. points out , and as mother readily admits , these provisions
refer to a situation in which the Department claims one of the bypass provisions in section 361, subdivision (b), applies. In this case, the Depart ment did not invoke subdivision (b)(15). Co unsel for the children invoked the provision. Therefore, when read literally, section 358, subdivision (a )(3), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.686(b), do not apply. However, these provisions are rooted in notions of fundamental fairness and due process. They are based on the recognition that a parent, facing the prospect of being denied the opportunity to reuni fy with a child and having parental rights terminated, is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to presen t argument. “[P]arenting is a fundamental right the impairment of which requires strict adherence to procedural due process.” ( In re Crystal J . (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 412.) In ju venile dependency proceedings, as in other proceedings that would deprive an indi vidual of important rights, due process takes the form of the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. (See In re Matthew P. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 841, 851.) Moreover, “ ‘the right to notice a nd an opportunity to be heard “must be granted at a meaningf ul time and in a meaningful manner.” [Citation.]’ ” ( In re Crystal J

. , supra , 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 412, quoting Fuentes v.
Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80, original brackets.) There is absolutely no reason why a parent should be gi ven a meaningful opportunity to defend against the Depart ment’s recommendation that reunification services should be denied pursuant to one of the bypass provisions in section 361.5, subdivision (b), but should not be given an oppo rtunity to do so when blindsided by such a recommendation coming out of left field from counsel for the children. If anything, the parent in the latter scenario is entitled to mo re, not less protection. The Department is vested with extensive authority to recommend a parent be denied reunification services in appropriate circumstances. In such case, however, the parent is entitled to notice and an opportunity to prepar e to contest the recommendation. While other parties may offer their opinions to the court, nothing in th e dependency scheme suggests the important notice requirements can be bypassed when they do.15 In this case, mother’s counsel was essentially am bushed by the children’s counsel’s invocation of subdivision (b)(15), when none of the children was present in court to consult with counsel. The bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15) is rarely invoked and has been the subject of almost no published case law. (See A.A. v. Superior
Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 237, 243 [“Neither party has been able to find any case law regarding section 361.5, subdivision (b)(15) and our independent research has not revealed any”].) 5 Indeed, even counsel for the De partment did not feel comfortable addressing the propriety of applying subdivis ion (b)(15), noting that she would need to consult with the Department rega rding its potential applicability. Under these circumstances, it is disconcer ting that the Department asserts mother forfeited the right to challenge the juvenile court’s decision to deny her continuance request because she supposedly sought a con tinuance only with respect to the older children. The Department’s forfeiture theo ry is that mother’s counsel sought the continuance only because of the Department’s change in recommendation, which change concerned only the older children. We find no basis for this argument because, at the time mother’s counsel requested the continua nce, she did not refer to a change in recommendation concerning V.T. because the Department never changed its
recommendation that mother receive reun ification services with respect to V.T. Moreover, when the argument concerning the continuance request took place, there was
no reason for mother not to focus on the Department’s change in recommendation because the juvenile court ha d provided no indication it would consider applying the bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15). In a ny event, nothing in th e record supports the argument that mother’s counsel sought a continuance of the disposition hearing only as to

5 It appears that since A.A. v. Superior Court, supra , 209 Cal.App.4th 237, subdivision (b)(15) has been cited—but not analyzed—in only two published decisions. ( In re S.E. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 610, 613; In re L.J. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1131.)16 V.T.’s siblings; the only fair reading of the record is that counsel sought a continuance to contest disposition as to all her children. In sum, we find counsel for the children inexplicably invited the juvenile court’s error in denying the continuance request an d summarily denying mother reunification services with respect to V.T. We find the court abused its discretion in refusing to continue the disposition hearing for a contes t and we remand for the juvenile court to conduct such a hearing. In light of our conclusion, the question whether the juvenile court erred in applying the bypass provision in subdivision (b)(15) is moot and we do not
consider it.
DISPOSITION The writ petition is granted. The juvenile court is directed to (1) vacate that portion of its July 1, 2014 di sposition order denying reunification services to mother and setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selec tion and implementation of a permanent plan for V.T., and (2) schedule a new date for a contes ted disposition hearing concerning V.T. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

BIGELOW, P. J.

FLIER, J.