In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: April 5, 2021

S21A0191. MORRIS v. THE STATE.

S21A0192. MORRIS v. THE STATE.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

In 2009, a jury found Mims Michael Morris, Sr. (“Mims”), Mims 

Michael Morris, Jr. (“Michael”), and Roy Bradshaw (“Roy”) guilty of 

malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and robbery in 

the fatal beating of Earl Gill.1 In Case No. S21A0191, Mims appeals, 

 1 The attack occurred on March 15, 2008. A Putnam County grand jury 

returned a joint indictment against Mims, Michael, Roy, and Teresa Bradshaw 

for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault

(Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), kidnapping with bodily injury (Count 

4), and robbery (Count 5). Following a joint trial of Mims, Michael, and Roy

that ended on October 2, 2009, a jury found all three defendants guilty on all 

counts, except Count 4, which was withdrawn by the State at the close of its 

case-in-chief. The trial court sentenced Mims and Michael to life in prison for 

Count 1, 20 years in prison for Count 3, and 20 years in prison for Count 5, 

with Counts 3 and 5 to run consecutively to the life sentence; Count 2 was 

vacated by operation of law. Mims and Michael filed timely motions for new 

trial. Mims amended his motion on January 7, 2020; Michael amended his 

motion on May 27, 2014, and June 5, 2020. The trial court conducted hearings

on the motions on June 12, 2020, and entered an order on Mims’s motion on 

July 13, 2020 and on Michael’s motion on August 3, 2020. In the orders, the 

trial court determined that Count 3 merged with Count 1 as to both Mims and 
2

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

convictions. In Case No. S21A0192, Michael appeals, also 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and contending that the 

trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury not to 

consider Roy’s statement against him and that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel.2 For the reasons explained below, 

we affirm in both cases.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the 

record shows the following. Josh Morris (“Josh”) testified as follows. 

On March 15, 2008, Josh and his brother, Michael, were staying at 

an EconoLodge in Milledgeville, where they had traveled to do 

landscaping work with Mims (their father) and Roy. At the time, 

Mims was staying with Roy and his wife, Teresa Bradshaw 

(“Teresa”), at the Bradshaws’ camp house at the lake. That 

 

Michael, corrected the sentences to so reflect, and otherwise denied the 

motions. Mims and Michael filed timely notices of appeal. The cases were 

docketed in this Court to the term beginning in December 2020, consolidated,

and submitted for decision on the briefs. 

2 We have already affirmed Roy’s convictions. See Bradshaw v. State, 300 

Ga. 1 (792 SE2d 672) (2016).
3

afternoon, Michael and Josh met Gill, who lived and worked at the 

EconoLodge. The three of them discussed sharing some marijuana, 

and Michael gave Gill money to purchase some. About 20 minutes

after Gill left to get the marijuana, he returned on foot to Josh’s room 

at the EconoLodge; Josh, Josh’s wife, Michael, Michael’s girlfriend, 

Mims, Roy, Teresa, and Gill’s friend and co-worker, Chris Vukovich,

were all in the room. Gill did not have any marijuana or Michael’s

money, and he told his new friends, “I’ve been got,” meaning that he 

had been scammed. Gill said that he would go to his sister’s house 

to get money to pay them back. Roy told Gill to “get in the van,” and 

Michael said, “I’m going to ride with y’all” and got into the van. Gill 

left the EconoLodge in the Bradshaws’ van with Roy, Teresa, Mims, 

and Michael. Later that evening, Roy called Josh and told Josh to 

“meet him at the store.” Josh drove with his wife to the store, 

Michael got into his truck, and they followed Teresa, Roy, and Mims 

in the Bradshaws’ van to their camp house at the lake. 

The chief deputy sheriff, who interviewed Josh after Josh was 

taken into custody, testified that Josh told him that Josh heard 
4

Mims tell Gill “get in the car or I’ll kill you.” At trial, however, Josh 

denied hearing Mims tell Gill to get in the van or threatening to kill 

him.

Michael Robins, a friend of Gill’s, testified as follows. He 

encountered Gill at the EconoLodge that day. Gill, who was with two 

“young dudes” whom Robins did not know, asked if Robins could get 

them some marijuana. Robins said that he could, intending to con 

them, and the two young strangers gave him $25, Gill gave him $10, 

and Gill and the other two men chipped in a few dollars for gas. Gill 

rode with Robins and two of Robins’s friends to a nearby WalMart,

supposedly so that Robins could meet someone who would supply 

the marijuana. Robins went into WalMart alone, Robins’s friends 

ordered Gill out of the car, and they left Gill at the WalMart.

Teresa was the only witness to testify at trial regarding what 

transpired after she, Roy, Mims, Michael, and Gill left the 

EconoLodge in the van.3 She testified as follows. Teresa drove, Roy 

 3 Teresa pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter prior to the trial and 

was sentenced to 15 years with 6 to serve in prison on the condition that she 

testify.
5

sat in the front passenger seat, Gill and Mims sat in the middle 

passenger seats, and Michael sat on the bench seat in the back. Gill 

directed them to an apartment to try to find Robins, but Robins was 

not there. As they continued driving around, Roy got out of his seat 

in the front, confronted Gill about the missing money, and hit Gill. 

Then Gill directed Teresa to Possum Point Drive, the street where 

his sister lived. Gill was unable to find his sister’s house, however, 

and Michael stood up and his “fists went to flying.” Michael hit Gill 

“and kept hitting him and kept hitting him and kept hitting him.”

While this was happening, Teresa heard Mims say that Michael was 

hitting Gill so hard that his feet were coming off the floor. Mims said 

that Michael hit Gill about 15 times, so fast that he could not see the 

blows and he could feel the wind coming off Michael’s fist. Then 

Teresa heard one of the men say that they should throw Gill out of 

the van. Roy had Teresa pull to the side of the road. Roy opened the 

door and told the other men to get out. Either Mims or Michael, or 

both, dragged Gill from the vehicle by his feet as he grabbed the back 

of Teresa’s seat and begged them to stop.
6

Teresa testified further as follows. When Mims and Michael 

had Gill on the ground, they started kicking him. Teresa yelled that 

she was leaving, and Mims and Michael got back into the van. 

Michael was holding Gill’s sneakers, and Roy told Teresa to drive 

away. In the rear-view mirror, Teresa saw Gill get up and walk down 

the road as she drove away. Mims said that he had been kicking Gill, 

Gill grabbed his foot, and Mims fell, got back up, and kicked Gill 

even harder. Michael commented that Gill might have $25 of his but 

he had something of Gill’s – the shoes. Michael tried on the shoes, 

and they did not fit, so he gave them to Mims, who was wearing 

“dark beige Hush Puppy-type shoes” at the time. Teresa stopped to 

buy gas, and Mims and Michael went into the store to buy 

refreshments. Either Roy or Mims called Josh and told Josh to meet 

them at the store. After Josh and his wife arrived at the store, they 

all went to the Bradshaws’ lake house for the night.

Joanne Jenkins and Roger Kent, who lived on Possum Point 

Drive, testified that Gill knocked on their door that night and 

identified himself as “Earl.” His head was bloody, and he seemed 
7

disoriented. He asked to be taken to the hospital and told the couple

“two men beat me up and threw me out.” Kent took Gill to the 

hospital; hospital personnel alerted law enforcement of the apparent 

crime.

After arresting Roy, Mims, and Michael four days after the 

attack, an investigator took photos of Mims’s and Roy’s hands 

because they appeared swollen, although Michael’s did not. The 

Putnam County sheriff testified that, after being arrested, Roy 

admitted that he “popped the man upside the head in the truck” and 

hit Gill “probably about three times.” Roy also told the sheriff, 

“Yeah, I swung on this guy a couple of times, but I didn’t do nothing 

like that right there. Because, like I said, I didn’t have any money 

involved in this.” Although Roy admitted that he hit Gill in the van, 

Roy claimed that his participation in the attack “didn’t happen out 

of the truck” and that his “feet never hit the ground” when Teresa 

stopped the van. 

The Bradshaws’ niece, Brittany Bradshaw, testified that, in 

the days after the attack, she had conversations with Teresa, Roy, 
8

and Mims about what happened when they went to Milledgeville. 

Brittany testified: “The first thing that [Teresa] had ever said to me 

was that she didn’t realize how good her husband could fight until 

she seen him fighting with this other guy.” Teresa told Brittany that 

they had given a man money to buy marijuana, the money was taken 

from him, and they left in the van so the man could get the money 

back. Teresa told Brittany that the man could not get the money and

that, while Teresa was driving the van, Roy started “beating [the 

man’s] head up against the van and stomping him in the head.” 

Teresa also told Brittany that either Roy or Mims had taken the 

man’s shoes off, “put them on their feet and stomped his head with 

them.” Roy told Brittany that they had jumped on the man, beaten 

him, and thrown him out of the van. Mims told Brittany that “they 

had beat the hell out of someone.” 

Amy Warnock, who considered Teresa her best friend, testified 

that Teresa told her about the assault on Gill for which Teresa had 

pleaded guilty. Warnock testified:

[Teresa] told me that she knew her husband could fight, 
9

but she didn’t know how well until that weekend. And she 

said that they went to Milledgeville and they had given a 

man – no name, just a man – $25 to get them marijuana. 

The man came back with no money and no marijuana. 

[The man] and Roy Lee Bradshaw got in [an] argument 

and began to fight . . . until there was blood in the van 

everywhere. . . . And they dropped [the man] off.

Gill’s blood was found in multiple places inside the Bradshaws’ 

van, along with a bloody baseball bat. Investigators obtained a

recording from the security system at the gas station where Teresa 

stopped after the attack. The security video was played at trial. The 

security video depicted Mims wearing bright white sneakers when 

he went into the store to buy beer. Gill’s friend Vukovich testified 

that Gill had bleached and washed his sneakers that morning and 

that they were “snow white.” In the security video, Michael can be 

seen looking down at the back of both of his own fists, removing a 

drink from the cooler and rubbing it against the knuckles of his right 

hand, looking again at the back of his right hand, and then shaking 

his hand as if in pain. In the security video, as Michael waits to pay 

for his drink, Teresa is seen opening the door and is heard telling 

Michael that they needed to leave.
10

Gill died ten days after the attack from multiple, blunt-force 

injuries of the head, which included surface bruising and 

lacerations, facial bone fractures, a large subdural hemorrhage, and 

catastrophic swelling of the brain. He also had a broken rib, which 

the medical examiner testified would not have been fatal.

Case No. S21A0191

1. Mims contends that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to warrant his convictions for malice murder and 

robbery.4 We disagree.

(a) As to his murder conviction, Mims argues that the evidence 

established that either Michael or Roy or both caused Gill’s fatal 

head injuries and that there was no evidence that he aided or 

encouraged them in beating Gill. And, Mims argues, even if there

was evidence that he kicked Gill, there was no evidence that the 

 4 In another enumerated error, Mims also contends that the trial court 

erred by failing to merge the aggravated assault conviction into the malice 

murder conviction, but the sentencing error was corrected in the order denying 

his motion for new trial. Accordingly, this claim of error is moot. See Williams 

v. State, 305 Ga. 776, 784 (4) (827 SE2d 849) (2019).
11

kicking was a cause of Gill’s death.

Mims, Michael, and Roy were jointly charged, “acting together 

and as parties to the crime,” in beating Gill to death. See OCGA §

16-2-20 (b) (A person is a party to a crime if that person “[d]irectly 

commits the crime; . . . [i]ntentionally aids or abets in the 

commission of the crime; or . . . [i]ntentionally advises, encourages, 

hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the crime.”). Properly 

viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, see Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) 

(1979), the evidence showed that, after learning about Michael’s lost 

or stolen money, Mims demanded that Gill get into the van; he 

verbally encouraged the attack on Gill in the van; and he kicked Gill

while Gill lay on the ground. In the days before Mims and the others 

were arrested, Mims acknowledged his involvement in the brutal 

attack to the Bradshaws’ niece. And when Mims was arrested a few 

days after the attack on Gill, Mims’s hands appeared swollen. The 

evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Mims was a party to Gill’s murder, and a 
12

conviction for murder was therefore authorized. See id.

(b) As to his robbery conviction, Mims argues that there was no 

evidence that he took Gill’s shoes from Gill’s person by use of force, 

as alleged in the indictment. Rather, he argues, Teresa’s testimony 

shows that Michael took the shoes from Gill: Michael had the shoes 

when he and Mims got back into the van; Michael tried the shoes on 

first; and then Michael gave them to Mims. Mims argues that the 

gas station security video could not support a finding that the white 

shoes Mims was wearing were Gill’s shoes, which were never 

recovered. 

But Mims, Michael, and Roy were charged jointly with robbery, 

“acting together and as parties to the crime,” by stealing Gill’s shoes. 

The evidence shows that, before the attack, Gill was wearing his 

bright white sneakers and that, after the attack, he was shoeless 

when he made his way to a house to ask for help. Before being 

arrested, Teresa told her niece that either Roy or Mims had taken 

Gill’s shoes off, put the shoes on, and stomped Gill’s head with them. 

And at trial, Teresa testified that, after the attack, Michael gave 
13

Gill’s shoes to Mims, who was depicted wearing white sneakers in 

the security video, rather than the dark beige Hush Puppy-type 

shoes he had been wearing earlier. Irrespective of which person took 

Gill’s shoes from his feet, the evidence was sufficient for a rational 

jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mims was a party to the 

taking of Gill’s shoes by force. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B).

Case No. S21A0192

2. Michael contends that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to support his convictions because the only evidence that 

he was more than merely present for the charged crimes was 

accomplice testimony that was not corroborated by independent 

evidence, as required by former OCGA § 24-4-8.5 Specifically, he

argues that Teresa was an accomplice and that the only evidence 

that he participated in the attack on Gill was introduced through 

her trial testimony and her prior statements that she saw Michael 

 5 Under former OCGA § 24-4-8, which applied to the trial of the case in 

2009, “[in] felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony 

of a single witness is not sufficient [to establish a fact]. Nevertheless, 

corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony 

of a second witness[.]”
14

hit Gill and saw Michael return to the van with Gill’s shoes after the 

beating. Michael also argues that Teresa’s testimony that she heard 

Mims make statements about Michael hitting Gill could not 

corroborate her testimony, because Mims’s statements only came 

into evidence through Teresa herself and are not independent of her 

testimony as an accomplice. 

Corroborating evidence that satisfies the requirements of 

former OCGA § 24-4-8

may be circumstantial, it may be slight, and it need not of 

itself be sufficient to warrant a conviction of the crime 

charged. It must, however, be independent of the 

accomplice testimony and must directly connect the 

defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he 

is guilty. Slight evidence from an extraneous source 

identifying the accused as a participant in the criminal act 

is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a 

verdict.

Styles v. State, 309 Ga. 463, 466-467 (1) (847 SE2d 325) (2020) 

(citation and punctuation omitted) (applying former OCGA § 24-4-

8). Teresa’s testimony and statements about Michael’s involvement 

in the attack were corroborated, including by the testimony and 

pretrial statement of his brother, Josh, that Michael was angry at 
15

the loss of his money and, after Mims told Gill “get in the car or I’ll 

kill you,” Michael opted to join in the excursion in the van to go to 

Gill’s sister’s house to get money from her. Teresa’s statement was 

also corroborated by the security video showing Mims, Michael, and 

Teresa together, minutes after the beating, with Mims wearing 

bright white shoes like Gill had been wearing that day and Michael 

looking at his knuckles and shaking his right hand. This 

circumstantial evidence might not be sufficient on its own to 

authorize a conviction for murder and robbery, but it provided the 

corroboration of Teresa’s testimony necessary for the jury to find 

Michael guilty of those offenses. See Styles, 309 Ga. at 467 (1); 

Taylor v. State, 297 Ga. 132, 135 (772 SE2d 630) (2015) (applying 

former OCGA § 24-4-8). The record also shows that the evidence was 

sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Michael guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to the crimes for which he was 

convicted. See Jackson, 443 U. S. at 319 (III) (B).

3. Michael contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to the admission of Roy’s custodial 
16

statement. The statement at issue was introduced through the 

sheriff, who testified that Roy admitted that he “popped [Gill] upside 

the head,” hit him “probably about three times,” and “swung on 

[him] a couple of times,” but claimed, “I didn’t do nothing like that 

right there. Because, like I said, I didn’t have any money involved in 

this.”6 Although, as summarized by the sheriff, Roy did not refer to 

Michael, Michael argues that, taken in context, Roy’s statement 

obviously leads to the inference that Michael participated in the 

attack. That context includes the evidence presented at trial that 

Michael was the person who gave Gill the money that he lost and 

that Michael was particularly interested in recouping his loss. 

Because Roy’s statement implicated Michael, he argues, 

introduction of the statement at trial violated his right to confront 

witnesses under the Sixth Amendment of the United States 

 6 During the hearing on Roy’s motion to exclude his custodial statement 

the sheriff explained that Roy’s reference to something “like that right there” 

was to a photograph of Gill after the attack that the sheriff showed to Roy 

during the interview. The trial court denied Roy’s motion to exclude the 

statement. The State opted to question the sheriff about the limited portions 

of the statement set out above, however, and not to play the recording of the 

interrogation for the jury, so the reference to something “like that right there” 

was not explained to the jury.
17

Constitution and Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (88 SCt 

1620, 20 LE2d 476) (1968), and failure to object on that ground was 

deficient performance by trial counsel. Michael contends that he was 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object because, without Roy’s 

statement, the jury would have found that Teresa’s testimony about 

Michael’s participation was not corroborated.

To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

Michael “must prove both that his lawyer’s performance was 

professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result.” 

Styles, 309 Ga. at 471 (5) (citation and punctuation omitted). See 

also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 

LE2d 674) (1984).

A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the 

witnesses against him is violated under Bruton

when co-defendants are tried jointly and the testimonial 

statement of a co-defendant who does not testify at trial 

is used to implicate another co-defendant in the crime. 

However, Bruton excludes only the statement of a nontestifying co-defendant that standing alone directly 

inculpates the defendant. Bruton is not violated if a codefendant’s statement does not incriminate the defendant 
18

on its face and only becomes incriminating when linked 

with other evidence introduced at trial. 

Pender v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (a) (Case No. S20A1505, decided 

Mar. 15, 2021) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Ardis v. 

State, 290 Ga. 58, 60 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 526) (2011).

As Michael’s argument reveals, Roy’s statement only 

incriminates Michael when combined with other evidence presented 

at trial from which the jury could conclude that Michael participated 

in beating Gill and taking his shoes. Consequently, admitting Roy’s

statement did not violate Michael’s right to confront witnesses 

under the Sixth Amendment and Bruton. See Taylor v. State, 304 

Ga. 41, 45-46 (2) (816 SE2d 17) (2018); McLean v. State, 291 Ga. 873, 

876 (3) (738 SE2d 267) (2012). Any objection therefore would have 

been futile, and “[t]he failure to make a meritless motion or objection 

does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” White v. State, 307 Ga. 882, 889 (3) (c) (838 SE2d 828)

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

4. Michael contends that, even if Roy’s custodial statement did 
19

not expressly implicate him, he was entitled under the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution to have the jury instructed that it could consider Roy’s

statement only against Roy. Without such a limiting instruction, 

Michael argues, the jury may have believed, wrongfully, that it could 

consider Roy’s statement as corroboration of Teresa’s testimony 

about Michael’s participation. As with his related claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, Michael contends that he was prejudiced 

because, if the jury had been instructed to consider Roy’s statement 

only against Roy, the jury would have found that Teresa’s testimony 

about Michael’s participation was not corroborated. Consequently, 

Michael contends, the trial court committed plain error by not 

instructing the jury sua sponte that it could not consider Roy’s

statement as evidence of Michael’s guilt.

To establish plain error, the appellant

must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived, 

the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable 

dispute, the error must have affected his substantial 

rights, and the error must have seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
20

proceedings. To show that his substantial rights were 

affected, [the appellant] must make an affirmative 

showing that the error probably did affect the outcome 

below. If [the appellant] fails to meet any one of the 

elements of the plain error test, his claim fails.

Armstrong v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (4) (852 SE2d 824) (2020) (citations 

and punctuation omitted). Assuming without deciding that it was an 

obvious error not to instruct the jury to limit its use of Roy’s 

statement to the case against Roy,7 we conclude that Michael fails 

to show that the error probably affected the outcome below.

Although Roy’s statement conveyed that he did not inflict Gill’s more 

 7 See Colton v. State, 292 Ga. 509, 511 (2) (739 SE2d 380) (2013) (“[A] codefendant’s statement meets the Confrontation Clause’s standard for 

admissibility when it does not refer to the existence of the defendant and is 

accompanied by instructions limiting its use to the case against the confessing 

co-defendant.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Richardson v. 

Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211 (II) (107 SCt 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987) (“[T]he 

Confrontation Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying 

codefendant’s confession with a proper limiting instruction when . . . the 

confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant’s name, but any 

reference to his or her existence.” (footnote omitted)); Suggested Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 1.31.93 (B) (4th ed., 2007, updated 

January 2020) (“Any out-of-court statement made by one of the defendants on 

trial in this case after the alleged criminal act has ended may be considered 

only against the person who made the statement and only if you find that such 

statement was freely and voluntarily made. If you find that an out-of-court 

statement was made to the police freely and voluntarily by a defendant on trial 

in this case, then you are to consider the statement only as against the 

particular defendant who made it.”).
21

severe injuries, Roy did not directly identify Michael as a participant 

in the attack, and there was other substantial evidence that 

corroborated Teresa’s testimony about Michael’s participation, as 

discussed above in Division 2. See White v. State, 270 Ga. 804, 810 

(4) (b) (514 SE2d 14) (1999). Because Michael failed to show that the 

trial court’s instructional error, if any, probably affected the outcome 

of the trial, his plain error argument fails.

5. Michael contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to object to prior consistent statements used to 

bolster the State’s key witness. Specifically, Michael argues that 

Teresa’s testimony that she saw Michael hit Gill and that she heard 

Mims make statements about Michael’s involvement in the attack 

were repeated multiple times through the sheriff and a detective, 

who testified that Teresa said the same in her custodial statements.8

 8 On direct examination, the sheriff testified that Teresa told him that 

Michael “was back there [in the van] beating [Gill’s] tail” and that “Mims 

bragged on his son about his son’s skill beating the man” and about “the 

prowess of his son’s fighting.” On cross-examination by Roy’s attorney, the 

sheriff testified that Teresa stated that Michael “was back there hitting on Mr. 

Gill.” On direct examination, the detective testified that Teresa “mentioned 
22

The court instructed the jury to consider prior consistent statements 

as substantive evidence. Michael argues that, even if Teresa’s prior 

statements were introduced to show that, in her trial testimony, she 

was trying to minimize Roy’s involvement, the statements relating 

to Michael would not be admissible to rebut a claim of fabrication or 

motive relating to Roy. And, Michael argues, even if the defendants 

attacked Teresa’s credibility generally, impeachment does not open 

the door for bolstering the witness’s credibility with prior consistent 

statements.

At the hearing on Michael’s motion for a new trial, his trial 

counsel was not asked, and did not volunteer, his rationale in not

objecting to testimony about Teresa’s prior consistent statements. 

Even assuming that Teresa’s prior consistent statements were 

objectionable under then-prevailing law,9 without trial counsel’s 

 

that Mims, Sr. was bragging about his son hitting [Gill] inside of the van, that 

he could feel the breeze off of his son’s fists as he came around to strike Mr. 

Gill.”

9 At the time of Michael’s trial in 2009, Georgia case law established that 

a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as substantive evidence at 

trial but 
23

testimony or some other evidence explaining the basis for his 

decisions, Michael cannot overcome the presumption that those 

decisions were strategic. See Hill v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (10) (850 

SE2d 110) (2020). Teresa’s pretrial custodial statements, like her 

trial testimony, tended to minimize the role of her husband Roy and 

to focus blame on Michael and Mims for the fatal injuries inflicted 

on Gill. But those custodial statements, like Teresa’s trial testimony,

contrasted with her pretrial confidences to her niece and best friend

when Teresa spoke about being surprised by Roy’s prowess as a 

fighter and did not mention Michael throwing even a single punch.

In light of this contrast, opting not to object to testimony about 

Teresa’s custodial statements was within the realm of objectively 

reasonable trial strategy, as the trial court found. See Gardner v. 

 

only where (1) the veracity of a witness’s trial testimony has been 

placed in issue at trial; (2) the witness is present at trial; and (3) 

the witness is available for cross-examination. A witness’s veracity 

is placed in issue so as to permit the introduction of a prior 

consistent statement only if affirmative charges of recent 

fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised 

during cross-examination.

Broner v. State, 284 Ga. 402, 403 (2) (667 SE2d 613) (2008) (citation and 

punctuation omitted).
24

State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (852 SE2d 574) (2020) (“[D]ecisions regarding 

trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for an ineffectiveness 

claim only if they were so patently unreasonable that no competent 

attorney would have followed such a course.” (citation and 

punctuation omitted)). Consequently, Michael’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel fails. See Davis v. State, 306 Ga. 140, 148 (3) 

(g) (829 SE2d 321) (2019).

Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.