SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

333 

CA 12-01631 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

RICHARD WESTGATE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID S. BRODERICK, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF THOMAS D. HOGAN, III, KAREN HOGAN, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, 

ET AL., DEFENDANT. 

 

VIOLA, CUMMINGS & LINDSAY, LLP, NIAGARA FALLS (MICHAEL J. SKONEY OF

COUNSEL), FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT. 

COHEN & LOMBARDO, P.C., BUFFALO (JONATHAN D. COX OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Niagara County

(Richard C. Kloch, Sr., A.J.), entered February 14, 2012. The order,

among other things, denied plaintiff’s cross motion for partial

summary judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by denying those parts of the motion

of defendants David S. Broderick, as administrator of the estate of

Thomas D. Hogan, III, and Karen Hogan for summary judgment dismissing

the Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) causes of action and reinstating

the amended complaint to that extent and by granting that part of

plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability

with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action against

defendant David S. Broderick, as administrator of the estate of Thomas

D. Hogan, III, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this Labor Law and common-law

negligence action seeking damages for injuries that he sustained when

a ladder jack scaffold collapsed from under him while constructing a

house for Thomas D. Hogan, III (decedent) and defendant Karen Hogan in

2007. We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court erred in granting

those parts of the motion of defendants David S. Broderick, as

administrator of the estate of Thomas D. Hogan, III, and Karen Hogan

(defendants) for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240 (1)

and 241 (6) causes of action based on the homeowner exemption. We

therefore modify the order accordingly. An “owner” for purposes of

the homeowner exemption pursuant to those sections of the Labor Law

“has been held to encompass a person who has an interest in the

property” where a qualifying injury occurs and is not limited to the
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CA 12-01631 

titleholder (Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566; see e.g. Kane v

Coundorous, 293 AD2d 309, 311; Reisch v Amadori Constr. Co., 273 AD2d

855, 856). Here, defendants failed to establish as a matter of law

that decedent and Karen Hogan had the requisite interest in the

property (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557,

562). Defendants presented no evidence of a property interest with

respect to decedent, and their submissions with respect to Karen

Hogan’s alleged property interest raised an issue of fact with respect

to her interest in the property. “In order to transfer an ownership

interest in real property, there must be a deed, or other ‘conveyance

in writing’ . . . Although it is not necessary that such conveyance be

recorded . . . , it is a well-established rule that delivery of the

deed with intent to transfer title is required” (Goodell v Rosetti, 52

AD3d 911, 913). Defendants attempted to establish Karen Hogan’s

ownership through her deposition testimony regarding a purported

unrecorded deed claimed to be executed by Jean Hogan prior to her

death in 2000 conveying the property to Karen. That alleged deed was

not produced, although Karen described its size and asserted that a

certain attorney never recorded the deed. Defendants further

submitted a deed from the estate of Jean Hogan conveying the property

to Karen in 2008. However, we conclude that Karen’s deposition

testimony combined with the later deed was insufficient to establish

that Karen was an owner at the time of plaintiff’s injury (cf. Saline

v Saline, 94 AD3d 1080, 1082; Whalen v Harvey, 235 AD2d 792, 793, lv

denied 89 NY2d 816). Indeed, by presenting evidence of both deeds,

defendants by their own submissions raised an issue of fact whether

Jean Hogan transferred her property interest to Karen prior to her

death in 2000 or whether the property was conveyed by Jean’s executrix

in 2008, after the date on which plaintiff was injured (see generally

Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562). However, we note that, even in the event

that Karen ultimately establishes her ownership in the property such

that she is entitled to the benefit of the homeowner exemption, the

benefit of that ownership would not inure to decedent or his estate

based on their relationship as husband and wife (see Fisher v Coghlan,

8 AD3d 974, 975, lv dismissed 3 NY3d 702).

We further conclude that the court erred in denying that part of

plaintiff’s cross motion for partial summary judgment on liability

with respect to decedent. We therefore further modify the order

accordingly. Plaintiff’s fall was within the class of those protected

by Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y.

City, 1 NY3d 280, 289 n 8), and the record establishes that decedent

was a contractor within the meaning of the statute because he “ ‘had

the power to enforce safety standards and choose responsible

subcontractors’ ” (Mulcaire v Buffalo Structural Steel Constr. Corp.,

45 AD3d 1426, 1428). Furthermore, a person’s “right to exercise

control over the work denotes [the person’s] status as a contractor,

regardless of whether [he or she] actually exercised that right”

(Milanese v Kellerman, 41 AD3d 1058, 1061), and here defendants’

attorney essentially conceded that decedent had that right. The court

properly denied that part of plaintiff’s cross motion with respect to

Karen, however, because plaintiff failed to establish as a matter of

law that she had the requisite control and, in any event, as noted

there is an issue of fact whether she is entitled to the benefit of 
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CA 12-01631 

the homeowner exemption.

Entered: June 7, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court