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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47868

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AMERY HOPE GARRITSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: December 9, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Amery Hope Garritson appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While being questioned by an officer in a casino lobby about drug paraphernalia found 

inside, Garritson’s father passed what appeared to be his phone, some cash, and another 

unidentified object to Garritson. The officer responded by telling Garritson’s father not to “hand 

anything off” without asking and denying him permission to give his car keys to Garritson. A 

second officer then approached Garritson and requested her identification. Garritson refused the 

request and exited the lobby. After Garritson refused further requests for identification, the second 
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officer told casino security personnel that Garritson was being “kicked out” of the casino and 

reentered the lobby. When Garritson followed, the second officer commanded her to leave the 

lobby. Garritson disregarded the officer’s command. Garritson’s father then slid his keys to 

Garritson, and she disregarded the second officer’s command to drop the keys. The second officer 

then informed Garritson she was being detained and placed her in handcuffs. Ultimately, officers 

arrested Garritson for resisting or obstructing officers. A subsequent search of Garritson’s purse 

yielded methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

The State charged Garritson with resisting or obstructing officers, trafficking 

methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Garritson moved to suppress, among 

other things, the evidence found in her purse as the fruit of an unlawful seizure.1 As relevant to 

this appeal, the district court concluded that officers conducted a lawful inventory search of 

Garritson’s purse after arresting her and, therefore, denied her motion to suppress. Pursuant to a 

plea agreement, Garritson conditionally pled guilty to an amended charge of possession of 

methamphetamine (I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1)), retaining her right to appeal the denial of her motion to 

suppress. In exchange for Garritson’s guilty plea, the State dismissed the other charges. Garritson 

appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion 

to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

 

1 Garritson also argued that, even if her arrest was lawful, the subsequent search of her purse 

was not and that officers questioned her and elicited statements from her after she invoked her 

right to remain silent. Garritson does not pursue these arguments on appeal. 
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III.

ANALYSIS

Garritson argues that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress, asserting 

that the search of her purse was not a lawful inventory search because officers arrested her without 

probable cause. The State responds that the district court correctly determined that officers had 

probable cause to arrest Garritson for resisting or obstructing after she refused officers’ commands 

to leave the casino lobby and relinquish her father’s keys. We hold that the district court correctly 

concluded that Garritson was lawfully arrested; therefore, Garritson has failed to show error in the 

denial of her motion to suppress. 

A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special 

and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 

443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999). 

Inventory searches following a lawful arrest are one such well-established exception to the warrant 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); State v. 

Slaybaugh, 108 Idaho 551, 554, 700 P.2d 954, 957 (Ct. App. 1985). A peace officer may make a 

warrantless arrest when a person has committed a public offense in the officer’s presence. I.C. 

§ 19-603(1). Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary 

care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is 

guilty. State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). In analyzing whether 

probable cause existed, this Court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the 

moment of the seizure warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken 

was appropriate. Id.; State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974). The 

application of probable cause to arrest must allow room for some mistakes by the arresting officer; 

however, the mistakes must be those of a reasonable person, acting on facts leading sensibly to 

their conclusion of probability. Julian, 129 Idaho at 137, 922 P.2d at 1063. The facts making up 

a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint. Id. at 136-37, 922 P.2d 

at 1062-63. In considering whether there was probable cause, the expertise and the experience of 

the officer must be taken into account. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 323, 824 P.2d 894, 898 

(Ct. App. 1991).
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The district court concluded that the officers had probable cause to arrest Garritson for 

resisting and obstructing in violation of I.C. § 18-705. Idaho Code Section 18-705 prohibits 

willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing any public officer in the discharge, or attempt to 

discharge, any duty of his office. During the hearing on Garritson’s motion to suppress, the State 

argued that Garritson violated I.C. § 18-705 by refusing to comply with the officers’ commands to 

leave the casino lobby and relinquish her father’s keys. In denying Garritson’s motion to suppress, 

the district court found that, despite overhearing an officer deny Garritson’s father permission to 

give his keys to her, Garritson “nonetheless picked up the keys and refused to relinquish them” 

when ordered to do so. The district court reasoned that Garritson’s refusal to abide the officer’s 

prior order “clearly hindered” the investigation of Garritson’s father by “distracting the officers’

attention” and increasing tensions “in a moment already fraught with stress and pressure.” 

Garritson does not dispute that public officers ordered her to relinquish her father’s keys or that 

she was aware of the officers’ official status. Rather, Garritson asserts that the district court erred 

by concluding that her refusal to relinquish the keys gave rise to probable cause for resisting or 

obstruction because the State failed to show that the officer’s order for Garritson to drop her 

father’s keys was “given within the scope of the officers’ lawful duties.” We disagree. 

Within the context of I.C. § 18-705, this Court has interpreted the word “duty” as 

encompassing only the lawful and authorized acts of a public officer. State v. Wilkerson, 114 

Idaho 174, 180, 755 P.2d 471, 477 (Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 115 Idaho 357, 358, 766 P.2d 1238, 

1239 (1988) (affirming without opinion). Thus, I.C. § 18-705 does not criminalize peaceful 

resistance to or obstruction of an officer’s unlawful acts. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 817, 203 

P.3d 1203, 1216 (2009). Accordingly, the issue is whether officers could lawfully order Garritson 

to relinquish her father’s keys. We conclude that they could.

Officers may briefly detain a person based upon specific articulable facts which justify 

suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. See

State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). An investigatory

detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 

stop. State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926, 931 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Gutierrez, 137 

Idaho 647, 651, 51 P.3d 461, 465 (Ct. App. 2002). Where a person is detained, the scope of the 

detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Roe, 140 Idaho at 181, 90 P.3d 
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at 931. By seizing a person, an officer also incidentally seizes those effects the person has in his 

or her possession. Such incidental seizure of a person’s effects does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment if the person’s seizure is justified. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 715 

(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Obviously, an officer cannot seize a person without also seizing 

the personal effects that the individual has in his [or her] possession at the time.”). Once an officer 

initiates a valid investigative detention, the officer is entitled to “maintain the status quo 

momentarily” during the detention. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). Accordingly, 

officers conducting a lawful investigatory detention, which encompasses the incidental detention 

of effects in the detainee’s possession, are performing a duty of their office under I.C. § 18-705. 

Garritson does not argue that officers did not or could not conduct a lawful investigative 

detention of her father for possession of drug paraphernalia. Rather, according to Garritson, even 

if her father lacked a “constitutional or statutory right to distribute any of the property in his 

possession,” the State failed to show how her father’s “act of kicking the keys” to her “necessarily 

means that [her] act of picking up the keys and refusing to immediately drop them obstructed the 

officers’ investigation into [her father]’s suspected possession of drug paraphernalia.” This 

argument is unpersuasive. As previously stated, officers may seize a detainee’s personal effects 

incidental to the seizure of the detainee and maintain “the status quo” during the seizure. See 

Place, 462 U.S. at 715-16 (Brennan, J., concurring); Adams, 407 U.S. at 146. Thus, personal 

effects seized incidental to a lawful investigative detention are entitled to no more freedom from 

seizure than the detainee. By taking possession of the keys, Garritson, who the district court found 

had not been arrested or detained, created a possibility that the keys might leave the casino lobby. 

The officer’s order for Garritson to relinquish the keys would eliminate this possibility, and her 

failure to comply distracted officers and impeded their investigation of Garritson’s father. 

In sum, Garritson altered the status quo of the investigation of her father by taking 

possession of his keys and then, by refusing a command to relinquish the keys, interfered with the 

officers’ attempts to restore and maintain the status quo. Thus, Garritson has not shown that the 

district court erred by concluding that her conduct provided the officers probable cause to arrest 

her for resisting and obstructing. Accordingly, Garritson has not shown error in the denial of her 

motion to suppress. Because we affirm the district court’s decision on this basis, it is unnecessary 
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to consider the State’s arguments that Garritson’s refusal follow officers’ commands to leave the 

casino lobby also provided probable cause to arrest her for resisting or obstructing officers. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Garritson has failed to show error in the district court’s conclusion that officers had 

probable cause to arrest Garritson for refusing their command to relinquish her father’s keys. 

Consequently, Garritson has failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress. 

Accordingly, Garritson’s judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine is affirmed. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.