UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVID MATTHEW HALLMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, 

District Judge. (1:12-cr-00010-CCE-1)

Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: December 13, 2013

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

David Matthew Hallman pled guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to four counts of using a minor child to 

engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of creating 

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) 

(2012). Although Hallman’s Guidelines range resulted in a life 

sentence, this was limited by the applicable thirty-year 

statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). The district court 

thus imposed four consecutive thirty-year sentences, resulting 

in an aggregate term of 1440 months’ imprisonment. See U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.2(d) (2011). 

On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there 

are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal, but asking us to review 

Hallman’s convictions and the reasonableness of the sentence. 

Although advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental 

brief, Hallman has not done so. The Government has declined to 

file a response brief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Because Hallman did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 

517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard, 

Hallman must establish that an error occurred, that this error 

was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. United 
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States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009). Our 

review of the record establishes that the district court fully 

complied with the mandates of Rule 11, ensuring that Hallman’s 

plea was knowing and voluntary, and supported by an independent 

basis in fact. We therefore affirm Hallman’s convictions.

We review Hallman’s sentence for reasonableness, 

applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). This review requires 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. We first assess 

whether the district court properly calculated the advisory 

Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the 

parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id.

at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th 

Cir. 2010). 

If there is no procedural error, we review the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the 

totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing 

court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it 

chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United 

States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). 

If the sentence is within the defendant’s properly calculated 

Guidelines range, we apply a presumption of substantive 
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reasonableness. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 168-69

(4th Cir. 2010); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 

(2007) (permitting appellate presumption of reasonableness for 

within-Guidelines sentence).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 

that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively 

reasonable. We discern no error in the district court’s 

computation of Hallman’s Guidelines range, the opportunities it 

provided Hallman and his counsel to speak in mitigation, or its 

explanation of the sentence imposed by reference to the relevant 

§ 3553(a) factors. In addition to noting its overall 

consideration of the relevant sentencing factors, the district 

court opined that the aggregate 1440-month sentence was 

appropriate given the seriousness of Hallman’s offense conduct, 

which included recording the repeated rapes and sexual abuse he 

and his co-defendant inflicted on multiple minor children, and 

the need to impose a just punishment that would protect the 

public from any such future criminal conduct by Hallman. 

Finally, we have found no basis in the record to overcome the 

presumption of reasonableness accorded the within-Guidelines 

sentence the district court imposed. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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This court requires that counsel inform Hallman, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Hallman requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Hallman. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED