United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10401

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Jimmie Lee Walton, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:22-CR-273-1 

______________________________

Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A jury found Jimmie Lee Walton guilty of bank robbery, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court sentenced him to 84 months of 

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On appeal, he presents 

three arguments: (1) the magistrate judge erred when she granted his 

appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw due to a conflict of interest; (2) the 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 9, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-10401 Document: 00517027032 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/09/2024
No. 23-10401

2

district court erred when it gave an Allen charge instead of declaring a mistrial 

after the jury indicated that it was deadlocked; and (3) the district court erred 

when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because the evidence was legally 

insufficient to support his conviction. 

Regarding Walton’s first claim, the record reflects that Walton failed 

to appeal the magistrate judge’s order granting appointed counsel’s motion 

to withdraw to the district court. His failure to appeal the magistrate judge’s 

ruling is fatal to his claim because it deprives this court of jurisdiction. See 

United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 59(a). Because this court lacks jurisdiction to review the 

magistrate judge’s order, the appeal is DISMISSED IN PART. 

As for Walton’s claim that the district court erred in its use of an Allen 

charge, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. AndaverdeTinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 2013). The term “Allen charge,” which is 

derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), generally refers to 

“‘supplemental instructions urging a jury to forego their differences and 

come to a unanimous decision.’” United States v. Eghobor, 812 F.3d 352, 357 

n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bottom, 638 F.2d 781, 786 n.4 

(5th Cir. 1981)). “[T]he relevant inquiry on appeal is whether: (1) any 

semantic deviation from approved Allen-charge language was so prejudicial 

that it requires reversal and (2) the circumstances surrounding the use of the 

charge were coercive.” Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 515. 

In evaluating an Allen charge’s coercive effect, this court considers the 

totality of the circumstances. Id. at 517. “Factors that weigh against finding 

coercion include where: (1) the time lapse between the charge and the jury’s 

decision was not unduly short; (2) the charge was not given prematurely; and 

(3) the jurors were not required to deliberate for an unreasonable length of 

Case: 23-10401 Document: 00517027032 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/09/2024
No. 23-10401

3

time before the charge was given.” Eghobor, 812 F.3d at 359 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, the record reflects that any deviation was not so prejudicial to 

require reversal. Furthermore, the one-hour difference between the charge 

being given and the jury reaching its verdict was not unduly short, see United 

States v. Clayton, 172 F.3d 347, 351–52 (5th Cir. 1999), the charge was not 

prematurely given as the jury deliberated for approximately six hours, see 

Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 517–18, and the jurors were not required to 

deliberate for an unreasonable length of time before the charge was given, see 

Eghobor, 812 F.3d at 359. Given the totality of the circumstances, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion. See Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 517. 

Lastly, we review Walton’s insufficiency of the evidence argument de 

novo, although granting “substantial deference to the jury verdict.” United 

States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). Under this rubric, “[i]t is not necessary that the 

evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly 

inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v. 

Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 506 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Instead, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable 

to the verdict, accepting all credibility choices and reasonable inferences 

made by the jury” which support the verdict, United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 

140, 147 (5th Cir. 2000), this court will affirm if “a reasonable trier of fact 

could conclude . . . the elements of the offense were established beyond a 

reasonable doubt,” Suarez, 879 F.3d at 630 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

At Walton’s trial, the Government presented (1) testimonial evidence 

from the robbed bank teller and her coworker, (2) testimonial evidence from 

a Dallas Police Department detective, and (3) surveillance footage from the 

Case: 23-10401 Document: 00517027032 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/09/2024
No. 23-10401

4

bank and surrounding businesses. Given the “substantial deference” 

afforded to the jury’s verdict, the evidence presented at trial supports the 

conclusion that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the elements of the 

offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Bowen, 818 F.3d 179, 186 (5th 

Cir. 2016). Thus, this argument does not merit reversal. 

Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART and 

DISMISSED IN PART. 

Case: 23-10401 Document: 00517027032 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/09/2024