The slip opinion is the first version of an opinion released by the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court.

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- 112 NMRA, authenticated and formally published. The slip opinion may contain deviations from the formal authenticated opinion.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
Opinion Number: 2

F iling Date: June 2, 2022 3

NO. S

- 1

- SC

- 38977 4
STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel., 5 HON. NANCY J. FRANCHINI, 6 HON. ROBERT DAVID PEDERSON, 7 HON. BRYAN BIEDSCHEID, 8 HON. RICHARD JACQUEZ, 9 As New Mexico State District Court Judges 10 And Citizens of New Mexico, 11 THE DISTRICT METROPOLITAN COURT 12 JUDGES ’ ASSOCIATION, INC., 13 HON. LINDA ROGERS, 14 HON. ROSEMARY COSGROVE

- AGUILAR, 15 As Metropolitan Court Judges and 16 Citizens of the State of New Mexico, 17
Petitioners, 18

v. 19
MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER, 20 Secretary of State for the 21 State of New Mexico, 22
Respondent. 23

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING 24
The Vargas Law Firm, LLC 25 Ray M. Vargas, II 26 Albuquerque, NM 27for Petitioners 1
Office of the Secretary of S t ate 2 Dylan Kenneth Lange, General Counsel 3 Santa Fe, NM 4 for Respondent 5

I nAccord , P.C. 6 Daniel A. I vey

- Soto 7 Albuquerque, NM 8
for Amicus Curiae 9OPINION 1

BO H NHOFF , Judge

. 2

{1} In this case , we address the constitutionality of legislation that staggers 3
retention elections for New Mexico district and metropolitan court judges. In 4

November 2020, New Mexico voters approved an amendment to Article XX, 5
Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution that authorized the Legislature to enact 6 legislation “to

. . . stagger the election of officers for a particular state, county or 7
district office througho ut the state.” N.M. Const. art. XX, § 3(C). In early 2021, the 8
Legislature passed and the Governor approved Senate Bill 266, which amended 9
NMSA 1978, Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 (2021) , to provide for staggered retention 10

elections of district court and metrop olitan court judges, respectively. S.B. 266, 55 th 11
Leg., 1 st Sess. (N.M. 2021) , 12
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/21%20Regular/final/SB0266.pdf

. Petitioners, sitting 13

district and metropolitan court judges and their association, brought this mandamus 14
proceeding to challenge the constitutionality of this legislation. Petitioners contend 15

that Article VI , Section 33 of the New Mexico Constitution mandate s that retention 16
elections of all district and metropolitan court judges must be held at the same time, 17

and as th e more specific provision , it control s over Article XX, Section 3. Following 18
oral argument on December 2, 2021, we denied the petition, concluding that 192

amended Article XX, Section 3 authorized the Legislature to stagger the retention 1
election cycles for di strict and metropolitan court judges. We issue this opinion to 2
explain our reasoning. 3

I. JURISDICTION 4

{2} This Court has original jurisdiction to hear petitions for writs of mandamus. 5
N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3. Mandamus is a proper remedy to test the constitutionality 6
of a statute when the petitioner has no “ plain, speedy, [ or ] adequate remedy at law. ” 7

Bartlett v. Cameron , 2014

- NMSC

- 002, ¶ 8, 316 P.3d 889 (internal quotation marks 8
and citation omitted) ; State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick , 1974

- NMSC

- 059, ¶ 6, 86 9
N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975. Mandamus may be used in appropriate circumstances to 10

“ prohibit unconstitutional official action. ” State ex rel. Sugg v. Toulouse Oliver , 11

2020

- NMSC

- 002, ¶ 7, 456 P.3d 1065 (internal quotation marks and citation 12
omitted). Petitioners ground ed their request for mandamus relief on the fact that, 13
based on the current language of Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6, Respondent would take 14
action in the near future to place district and metropolitan cou rt judges on the 2022 15
general election ballot, action which otherwise would be unauthorized. Respondent 16
does not contest jurisdiction. We agree that our jurisdiction was properly invoked to 17
address the constitutionality of Respondent’s contemplated action. 183

II. BACKGROUND 1

{3} Prior to 1988, “our Constitution required partisan election of the entire 2
judiciary, with the governor filling judicial vacancies by appointment.” State ex rel. 3
Richardson v. Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating Comm’n , 2007

- NMSC

- 023, ¶ 16, 141 4

N.M. 657 , 160 P.3d 566 (citations omitted) ; accord State ex rel. King v. Raphaelson , 5

2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 6, 356 P.3d 1096. At that time, Article XX, Section 4 of the 6

New Mexico Constitution provided that, following the governor’s appointment of a 7
district judge to fi ll a vacancy, “such appointee shall hold such office until the next 8
general election. His successor shall be chosen at such election and shall hold his 9

office until the expiration of the original term .” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. 10
Swope v. Mechem , 1954

- NMSC

- 011, ¶ 22, 58 N.M. 1, 265 P.2d 336, construed this 11
provision to reflect an intent that the terms of all district judges would be uniform. 12
That is, the terms of all district judges throughout the State would end at the same 13
time every six years, reg ardless of when or whether the seat became vacant or newly 14
occupied, and consequently all district judges would be subject to re

- election at the 15

same time: 16
[The last sentence of Article XX, Section 4] applies to all vacancies 17 following an incumbent; assu ming the death of an incumbent in the 18 office of

. . . district judge, there can be no doubt that the appointee or 19 his successor elected at the general election following his appointment 20 serves only until the termination date of the term of the original 21 inc umbent. 224 This means that, under all equations of vacancy in these offices, 1

. . . the terms of district judges

. . . will begin and end at the same time. 2
Swope , 1954

- NMSC

- 011, ¶¶ 21

- 22. 3

{4} New Mexico’s system for selecting its judges underwent major revision in 4
1988. In that year, 5

the Constitution was amended to institute a merit selection system, in 6 which the governor now fills judicial vacancies by appointment from a 7 list of applicants who are evaluated on a variety of merit

- based factors 8 and recommended by a judicial nominating commission. N.M. Const. 9 art. VI, §§ 35

- 37. The appointed judge is then subject to one partisan 10 election in the next general election, after which he or she is subject to 11 nonpartisan retention election, requiring a fifty

- seven percent 12 supermajority to be retained in office. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 33. 13
Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating Comm’n , 2007

- NMSC

- 023, ¶ 16 (footnote omitted). 14

{5} Article VI, Section 35, which addresses the appointment and initial election 15
of appellate judges, provides that “ [a] ny person appointed [as a Supreme Court 16
justice or Court of Appeals judge] shall serve until the next general election. That 17
person’s successor shall be chosen at such election and shall hold the office until the 18
expiration of the original term.” We hav e held that pursuant to Article VI, Section 19

36 , which states that “[e] ach and every provision of Section 35 of Article [VI] of this 20
constitution shall apply to the district judges nominating committee , ” the foregoing 21
language in Article VI, Section 35 is a pplicable to district court judges. Raphaelson , 22

2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . We now 235

similarly conclude that pursuant to Article VI, Section 37 , which provides that 1
“[e] ach and every provision of Section 35 of Article [VI] of this constitution shall 2
apply to the metropolitan court judicial nominating committee, ” that language in 3
Article VI, Section 35 also is applicabl e to metropolitan court judges. 4

{6} In Raphaelson , this Court addressed whether, under the 1988 amendments to 5
Article VI of our Constitution, a district court judge elected in a partisan election is 6
subject to retention in the sixth 1 year of his or her predecessor judge’s term or in the 7
sixth year following the partisan election in which he or she was first el ected. 8
Raphaelson , 2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 1. The Court observed that in Swope , 1954

- NMSC

9
11, ¶ 22, it had concluded that under Article XX, Section 4, “the terms for all district 10
court judges were designed to be on the same schedule, beginning and ending at the 11
same time every six years regardless of when or whether the seat became vacant or 12
newly occup ied.” Raphaelson , 2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 23. The Court noted that “[t]he 13
language of former Article XX, Section 4 is substantially similar to the language of 14
current Article VI, Section 35. ” Id. ¶ 25. The Court then reasoned that Article VI, 15

Section s 33, 35 , and 36 should be given the same construction as Article XX, Section 16

4: 17

1 Article VI, S ubs ection s 33(C) and (D) prescribe six

- and four

- year terms for district court judges and metropolitan court judges, respectively.6 The Swope opinion encapsulates the common understanding and 1 interpretation of terms of office for district judges, not only at the time, 2 but up to the successful amendment of the Constitu tion in 1988. In light 3 of this Court’s clear holding in Swope , the framers of the 1988 4 amendments had a choice. They could have altered the definition of a 5 term of office

. . . . But they did not do so. Far from a change in 6 direction, the 1988 amendments e nshrine the same understanding and 7 interpretation as Swope

. 8
Raphaelson , 2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 27 ; see also id. ¶ 31 . The Court also reiterated the 9
public purpose, previously noted in Swope , 1954

- NMSC

- 011, ¶ 22, served by this 10
approach to judicial elections: “ I t fosters consistency and uniformity thereby 11
avoiding confusion in the electorate. Both judges and the people who will sit in 12
judgment of their performance know exactly when that opportunity arises

— and 13
when to focus on that performance

— every six years acros s the state.” Raphaelson , 14

2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 30. 15

{7} By 2019, however, the wisdom of continued adherence to a policy of a 16
uniform date for the retention election of all district and metropolitan judges was 17
being questioned. The impetus for revisiting the issue w as the increase in the number 18
of district judges in some judicial districts as well as the number of metropolitan 19
judges in Bernalillo County, the State’s only metropolitan court, and the impact that 20
those numbers had on election ballots. In 2014, for exam ple, the Bernalillo County 21
general election ballot included twenty district judges and twelve metropolitan 22
judges who were subject to retention election. N.M. Sec’y of State
, Canvass of 237

Results of General Election Held on November 4, 2014

– State of New Mexico

. 2 In 1
2018, the County’s general election ballot included eighteen metropolitan court 2
judges who were subject to retention election, and in 2020 the ballot included 3

seventeen district court judges who were subject to retention election

. N.M. Sec’y 4

of State , Canvass of Results of General Election Held on November 6, 2018

– State 5
of New Mexico ; 3 N.M. Sec’y of State
, Canvass of Results of General Election Held 6
on November 3, 2020

– State of New Mexico

. 4 In theory, in 2026, twenty

- seven 7
district court j udges and nineteen metropolitan court judges could be on the County’s 8
general election ballot. This development, which would contribute to lengthier 9
ballots printed with smaller fonts, generated concern among legislators and election 10

administrators

. See, e .g. , Verified Response of the Secretary of State filed herein at 11

2 (“[V]oting is very different today than it was in 1954. Now ballot crowding, voter 12
fatigue, and high costs of elections are the major concerns of every election 13

2 A vailable at https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting

- and

- elections/election

results/past

- election

- results

- 2014/ (last visited April 22 , 2022) ( follow the “ 2014 Statewide General Election Results Statewide Summary ” hyperlink )

. 3 A vailable at https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting

- and

- elections/election

results/past

- election

- results

- 2018/ (last visited April 22 , 2022) ( follow the “ 2018 General El ection Results Statewide Summary ” hyperlink )

. 4 A vailable at https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting

- and

- elections/election

results/election

- results

- 2020/ (last visited April 22 , 2022) ( follow the “ 2020 General Election Candidate Summary Results Report ” hyperlin k )

.8

administrator

. . . . ”); Bri ef of Amicus Curiae Legislative Sponsors at 29

- 30, State 1

ex rel. Sommer v. Oliver , S

- 1

- SC

- 37785 (N.M. July 18, 2019) (discussing prospect 2
that absent staggered retention elections for district and metropolitan court judges, 3

the addition of forty

- six retention questions to the Bernalillo County general election 4
ballot every twelve years could “ have the potential to overwhelm voters”)

. 5

{8} The Legislature attempted to address these concerns in 2019 when it passed 6
and the Governor approved House Bill 407, w hich included the Nonpartisan Judicial 7
Retention Act, codified at NMSA 1978, §§ 1

- 26

- 1 to

- 6 (2019, amended 2021)

. H.B. 8
407, 54 th Leg., 1 st Sess. (N.M. 2019), 9
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19%20Regular/final/HB0407.pdf

. That Act generally 10
provided for sta ggered retention elections of Supreme C ourt justices and Court of 11
Appeals , district court , and metropolitan court judges. In particular, Section 1

- 26

- 12
5(B) (2019) provided: 13
Terms of office for positions on the district court in each judicial 14 district sha ll be staggered, as follows: 15
(1) the term of office for division 1 and for every third 16 division number thereafter shall expire in 2020 and every six years 17 thereafter; 18
(2) the term of office for division 2 and for every third 19 division number thereafter shall expire in 2022 and every six years 20 thereafter; and 219 (3) the term of office for division 3 and for every third 1 division number thereafter shall expire in 2024 and every six years 2 thereafter. 3
In similar manner, Section 1

- 26

- 6(B) (2019) provided for staggering the expiration 4
of the terms of office of metropolitan court judges in 2022 and 2024 and every four 5
years thereafter

. 6

{9} Soon thereafter, certain district and metropolitan court judges brought a 7
mandamus action challenging the constitutionality of S ections 1

- 2 6

- 5 and

- 6 (2019) 8
as impermissibly extending their terms of office. See Verified Petition for Writ of 9

Mandamus , State ex rel. Sommer v. Oliver , S

- 1

- SC

- 37785 (N.M. July 2 , 2019 ). In 10
Sugg , 2020

- NMSC

- 002, ¶¶ 1, 13, we agreed with the petitioning judges and found 11

that the statutes were unconstitutional. 5 However, in that case the constitutional 12
infirmity at issue was not grounded in the conflict between the mandate of uniform 13
judicial elections found in Article VI, Section s 33 and 35, and the legis lation’s 14
provision for staggering those elections , see id. ¶ 11, and we therefore had no 15

occasion to revisit Swope or Raphaelson . Rather, “the narrow but important 16
question” that we addressed was the Legislature’s authority to alter terms of office 17

5 In Sugg , 2020

- NMSC

- 002, we also addressed and upheld related petitions challenging, on the same grounds, the constitutionality of other provisions of House Bill 407 that provided for staggered elections of county commissioners, other county of ficers, and district attorneys by altering the terms of those offices

.10

and thu s election cycles that are established by the Constitution: “whether the 1
challenged provisions of HB 407, in delaying [the p]etitioners’ election cycles and 2
extending

— either expressly or

. . . by necessary implication

— their term limits, 3
exceeded the Legisl ature’s authority.” Sugg , 2020

- NMSC

- 002, ¶ 11. Following 4
extensive discussion of case law from other jurisdictions, see id. ¶¶ 13

- 22, we 5
concluded that, whether characterized as extending terms or deferring elections, 6

Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 (2019) were u nconstitutional: 7
As to the petitioning judges

. . . , the Legislature’s attempts to modify 8 their election cycles contravened clear and unambiguous constitutional 9 mandates. Specifically, in requiring district and metropolitan court 10 judges to face retention or rejection at general elections every sixth and 11 fo urth year, respectively, the framers of our Constitution evinced a clear 12 intent to establish outer time limits by which retention elections for 13 these classes of judges must be held. 14
Sugg , 2020

- NMSC

- 002, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We 15
nevertheless suggested the Legislature could resolve the problem by proposing a 16
constitutional amendment that would authorize the invalidated legislation: 17
“Assuming, as appears to be the case, that the Legislature wishes to pursue the 18

election

- related policy goals sought to be effectuated through the portions of HB 407 19
that we strike down today, it is its prerogative to propose, and the voters [’] to adopt, 20

a constitutional amendment to that end.” Id. ¶ 23. 2111

{10} The Court’s invitation was accepted. In its 2020 session, the Legislature 1
adopted House Joint Resolution 8, which proposed to amend Article XX , Section 3 2
of the Constitution by, among other changes, adding the following la nguage as part 3

of Subsection C : 4
The term of a state, county or district officer may be adjusted by law to 5 align or stagger the election of officers for a particular state, county or 6 district office throughout the state. Any such adjustment shall require a 7 legislative finding that the a djustment is to provide for consistency in 8 the timing of elections for that office or to balance the number of of fices 9 appearing on the ballot. 10
H.J.R. 8, 54 th Leg., 2 nd Sess. (N.M. 2020), 11
https://nmlegis.gov/Sessions/20%20Regular/final/HJR08.pdf

. Thereafte r, at the 12
November general election, the voters adopted this amending language by a margin 13
of 503,308 in favor to 277,744 against. Canvass of Returns of General Election Held 14
on November 3, 2020

– State of New Mexico , supra

. 15

{11} Finally, in 2021, the Legislatu re passed and the Governor approved Senate 16
Bill 266, which amended Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 (2019)

. S.B. 266. The legislation 17

re

- adopted nearly verbatim the language of Sections 1

- 26

- 5(B) and

- 6(B) , 6 quoted 18

6 The only differences between the 2019 and 2021 versions of these two sections are that the years of the expiring terms were updated in the 2021 amendment.12

above. Section II, paragraph 9, supra

. The legislation also included, as a temporary 1
provision that was not codified, the following legislative finding: 2
Pursuant to Article 20, Section 3 of the constitution of New 3 Mexico, the legislature finds that the judicial term adjustments provided 4 for di strict court judges in Section 1 of this 2021 act and for 5 metropolitan court judges in Section 2 of this 2021 act are needed to: 6

A. balance the number of judicial positions appearing on the 7 ballot in any one election cycle; 8

B. enable more effective evaluat ion of judges by the judicial 9 performance evaluation commission; and 10

C. create greater continuity of judges at the trial court level 11 by not having all judges up for judicial retenti on in the same election 12 cycle. 13

S.B. 2 66, § 3. 14

III. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMEN T 15

{12} Petiti oners’ argument is straightforward. Article VI, Section 33 of the New 16

Mexico Constitution, as construed by Raphaelson , 2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 28, 17
specifically requires that retention elections of all district judges statewide occur at 18
the same time. Article XX, Section 3, as amended in 2020, generally authorizes the 19
Legislature to stagger the dates of elections of district officers. If district and 20
metropolitan court judges are “district officers” within the meaning of Article XX, 21
Section 3, then the two provisio ns are in conflict. Citing the principle of 22
constitutional construction that, where two constitutional provision s are in 2313

irreconcilable conflict, the general provision must yield to the specific provision, 1
Petitioners assert that Article VI, Section 33 mus t control district and metropolitan 2
court judge retention elections, and as a result Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 are 3

unconstitutional. 4

IV. PRINCIPLES FOR RESOL VING CONFLICT S BETWEEN 5 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVI SIONS 6

{13} The primary goal of our interpretation of the Constitutio n is to identify and 7
give effect to the intent of its framers and the electorate. State v. Ameer , 2018

- 8

NMSC

- 030, ¶ 9, 458 P.3d 390; see also Greene v. Esquibel , 1954

- NMSC

- 039, ¶ 29, 9
58 N.M. 429, 272 P.2d 330 (“[T]he polestar in the construction of Constitu tion s is 10
the intention of the makers and adopters.”). In Asplund v. Alarid , this Court noted 11
the challenge in discerning intent when constitutional provisions are in conflict: 12
Acts passed which conflict with the Constitution are invalid. But the 13 Constituti on itself may be amended in the manner provided by it; and 14 when an amendment has been duly made, it becomes as much a part of 15 the Constitution as any other part thereof. It can hardly be asserted that 16 one part of the Constitution is unconstitutional, becau se it is not in 17 perfect accord with another part of the same instrument. 18

1923

- NMSC

- 079, ¶ 11, 29 N.M. 129, 219 P. 786 (internal quotation marks and 19
citation omitted) . Prior decisions of this Court have articulated several principles to 20

address this situati on and construe constitutional provisions which are claimed to be 21

in conflict. 2214

{14} First, if possible we will construe constitutional provisions in a harmonious 1
manner that will avoid any conflict. Hem v. Toyota Motor Corp. , 2015

- NMSC

- 024, 2
¶ 23, 353 P.3d 1219 ; accord State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Advisory 3

Comm ., 2017

- NMSC

- 025, ¶ 19, 401 P.3d 734. 4

{15} Second, where a constitutional amendment conflicts with a pre

- existing 5
provision of the Constitution , and one provision “ is not readily identifiable as t he 6 more specific of the two” provisions , the later provision governs “ ‘ as the latest 7
expression of the sovereign will of the people, and as an implied modification pro 8
tanto of the original provision.’” City of Albuquerque v. N.M. State Corp. Comm’n , 9

1979

- NMSC

- 095, ¶ 6, 93 N.M. 719, 605 P.2d 227 (quoting Asplund , 1923

- NMSC

10
079, ¶ 11); see also Denish v. Johnson , 1996

- NMSC

- 005, ¶ 29, 121 N.M. 280, 910 11
P.2d 914 (same). 12

{16} Third, and as a qualification to the second principle of recency, if one 13
provision is ident ifiable as the more specific of the two, “ ‘ the specific section 14
governs over the general regardless of priority of enactment .’” Denish , 1996

- 15

NMSC

- 005, ¶ 29 (emphasis added) (quoting N.M. State Corp. Comm’n , 1979

- 16

NMSC

- 095, ¶ 5). The rationale for the genera l/specific rule is that the enacting body 17
“is presumed not to have intended a conflict between two [provisions] and because 18
[its] attention is more particularly directed to the relevant subject matter in 1915

deliberating upon the special law.” State v. Santill anes , 2001

- NMSC

- 018, ¶ 7, 130 1
N.M. 464, 27 P.3d 456 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

. 7 2

{17} In New Mexico, the general/specific rule of constitutional construction can be 3
traced to statutory construction principles. See N.M. State Corp. Comm’n , 1979

- 4

NMSC

- 095, ¶5 (citing State v. Blevins , 1936

- NMSC

- 052, ¶ 7, 40 N.M. 367, 60 P.2d 5

208 ; Saiz v. City of Albuquerque , 1971

- NMCA

- 101, ¶ 9, 82 N.M. 746 , 487 P.2d 174 , 6
overruled on other grounds by Galvan v. City of Albuquerque , 1975

- NMSC

- 005 , ¶ 7
14, 87 N.M. 235, 531 P.2d 1208 ; Santa Fe Downs, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue , 1973

- 8

NMCA

- 064, ¶ 11, 85 N.M. 115, 509 P.2d 882 ) ; s ee also Fifth Jud. Dist. Nominating 9

Comm’n , 2007

- NMSC

- 023, ¶ 17 (“ [R]ules of statutory construction

. . . apply 10
equally to constitutional construction

. ”); Postal Fin. Co. v. Sisneros , 1973

- NMSC

11
029, ¶ 8, 84 N.M. 724, 507 P.2d 785 (“The usual principles governing the 12
construction of statutes also apply to the interpretation of constitutions.”). 13

7 While three decisions of this Court have articulated the rule that the specific constitutional provision prevails over the general one, in none of these cases has the rule actually been applied. In New Mexico State Corp. Commission , neither of the two prov isions in question could be characterized as more specific than the other, and the conflict was re s olved instead on the basis of the principle of recency. 1979

- NMSC

- 095, ¶ 6. In Denish , the two provisions at issue were not irreconcilable and could be const rued in a harmonious manner. 1996

- NMSC

- 005, ¶¶ 30

- 33 . And in League of Women Voters , the two conflicting provisions again were resolved on the basis of the principle of recency. 2017

- NMSC

- 025, ¶ 23.16

{18} T he general/spe cific rule is subject to an exception: “[T]o the extent of any 1

necessary repugnancy between them, the special statute, or the one dealing with the 2
common subject matter in a minute way, will prevail over the general statute, unless 3
it appears that the legi slature intended to make the general act controlling .” Blevins , 4

1936

- NMSC

- 052, ¶ 7 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 5

omitted ); see also Santillanes , 2001

- NMSC

- 018, ¶ 7 (“[I]f two statutes dealing with 6
the same subject conflict, [ then ] the more specific statute will prevail over the more 7
general statute absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary .” 8
(emphasis added) ). More generally, w e have noted that 9
the general/specific statute rule should not be applied in a rigid, 10 mechanistic fashion

. . . . [T]he general/specific statute rule is merely a 11 tool of statutory interpretation and is not an end to itself. The 12 general/specific statute rule should not be applied in a manner that 13 ignores

. . . the overall goal of statutory construction to ascertain and 14 give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 15

I d

. ¶ 17 (internal quotation marks and citation s omitted)

. 16

{19} The same considerations that underlie adoption of the clear intent exception 17
to the genera l/specific rule of statutory construction counsel its adoption in the 18

context of constitutional construction. See Block v. Vigil

- Giron , 2004

- NMSC

- 003, ¶ 19
4, 135 N.M. 24, 84 P.3d 72 (“ [O] ur pri mary goal is to give effect to the intent of the 20
Legislature whic h proposed [the constitutional provision] and the voters of New 21
Mexico who approved it.”). If evidence indicates that the purpose of a later

- adopted 2217

constitutional provision, whether general or specific, was to accomplish an implicit 1
repeal of an earlier p rovision, we will give effect to the later

- adopted provision. Cf. 2

Galvan , 1975

- NMSC

- 005, ¶ 11 ( noting that “ repeals by implication, ” while not 3
favored, “will be declared where the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear 4
and explicit in its wor ds as to show it was intended to cover the whole subject, and 5
therefore to displace the prior statute” (internal quotation marks and citation 6
omitted) )

. 7

V. THE 2020 AMENDMENT T O ARTICLE XX, SECTIO N 3 8 IMPLICITLY REPEALED ARTICLE VI, SECTION 33 ’S 9 REQUIREMENT TH AT ALL DISTRICT AND METROPOLITAN 10 COURT JUDGES STAND F OR RETENTION ELECTIO N AT THE 11 SAME TIME 12

{20} How do these principles inform our analysis of the constitutionality of 13

Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6? Initially, we consider whether “district officer,” as used in 14

Articl e XX, Section 3(C), encompasses district and metropolitan court judges. 15
Judges hold public offices and thus are public officers as opposed to employees. See 16
N.M. Const. art. VI, § 19 (barring Supreme Court justices and Court of Appeals, 17

district , and metro politan court judges from holding any office other than a judicial 18
office); Perea v. Bd. of Torrance Cnty. Comm’rs , 1967

- NMSC

- 056, ¶ 8, 77 N.M. 19
543, 425 P.2d 308 ( outlining the characteristics of a public officer and stating that 20
judge s are public and judicial officers ); see generally 63C Am. Jur. 2d Public 2118

Officers and Employees §§ 9, 19 ( 20 18 ) (stating that judges are public and judicial 1
officers). In New Mexico, district court judges hold office within specific judicial 2

districts , N.M. Const. art. VI, § 12. Similarly, metropolitan court judges hold their 3
offices within a “metropolitan court district.” N.M. Const. art. VI, § 38; NMSA 4
1978, § 34

- 8A

- 1 (2010) . “ It is presumed that words appearing in a constitution have 5
been used according to their plain , natural, and usual signification and import.” 6

Clark v. Mitchell , 2016

- NMSC

- 005, ¶ 12 , 363 P.3d 1213 (internal quotation marks 7
and citation omitted). We conclude that district court judges and metropolitan court 8
judges are district officers within the mea ning of Article XX, Section 3. As a result, 9
Article VI, Section s 33 , 35, 36, and 37, and Article XX, Section 3 irreconcilably 10

conflict and cannot be harmonized : Article XX, Section 3 authorizes staggering of 11
terms contrary to this Court’s interpretation of Article VI, Section s 33 , 35, 36, and 12

37 as requiring all district and metropolitan court judges to stand for retention at the 13

same time. See Raphaelson, 2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ ¶ 28 , 31 ; Swope , 1954

- NMSC

- 011, 14
¶ 22

. Because Article VI, Section 33 focuses solely on judicial retention elections, it 15
is the more specific of the two provisions , and t herefore in the absence of clear intent 16
to the contrary its provisions would control. 17

{21} T he succession of legislative and judicial developments during the re cent past 18

as described above is evidence of an intent that the 2020 amendment to Article XX, 1919

Section 3 controls over the requirement in Article VI, Section s 33 , 35. 36, and 37 , 1
as interpreted by this Court, that all district and metropolitan court judges m ust stand 2

for retention election at the same time

. 3
In the interpretation of a statute, changes made by the act in the previous 4 state of the law may be given consideration. Indeed, one of the 5 recognized rules of construction of statutes is to look to the st ate of the 6 law when the statute was enacted in order to see for what it was intended 7 as a substitute. 8
Bettini v. City of Las Cruces , 1971

- NMSC

- 054, ¶ 12 , 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967 9
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted ) ; s ee , e.g. , Clark , 2016

- NMSC

- 005, ¶ 10
16 (relying on “ the history and context of Article VI, Section 33 ” of the New Mexico 11
Constitution to conclude that it did not reflect “any intent by the framers to prohibit 12

nonretained judges from applying for and being appointed to judicial vacancies”); 13
Vigil

- Giron , 2004

- NMSC

- 003, ¶ 10 (“Finally, any uncertainty as to the legislative 14
intent behind the constitutional provision is removed by the implementing 15
legislation, enacted

. . . im mediately following the adoption of the constitutional 16
provision.”). See generally Raphaelson , 2015

- NMSC

- 028, ¶ 22 (“The historical 17
purposes of the constitutional provision are instructive in determining the obvious 18
spirit

. . . utilized in [its drafting]. ” (alterations in original) (internal quotation ma rks 19
and citation omitted)). 2020

{22} In particular, statutory changes

— and thus, pursuant to the foregoing 1
authority, a constitutional amendment

— may be interpreted in light of court 2
decisions that prompted the amendm ent. See, e.g. , Trujillo v. Trujillo , 1986

- NMCA

3
052, ¶ 21, 104 N.M. 379, 721 P.2d 1310 (“The statute [narrowing the scope of 4
tavernkeeper liability regarding alcohol sales to potentially intoxicated person s ] was 5
an obvious response to Lopez [ v. Maez , 1982

- NMSC

- 103, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 6

1269 ],

. . . [and w]e would contravene legislative intent were we to interpret the 7
statute as broadening the scope of tavernkeeper’s liability.”)
, implicitly overruled on 8
other grounds as recognized in Mendoza v. Tamaya Ente rs., Inc. , 2010

- NMCA

- 074 , 9
¶ 20, 148 N.M. 534 , 238 P.3d 903 ; Feminist Women’s Healt h Ctr. v. Codispoti , 821 10
P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (construing statute regarding insurance 11
proceeds exemptions in light of court decisions that preceded its amendment); cf. 12

Brown v. Shell Oil Co. , 339 N.W.2d 709, 711 (Mich. App. 1983) (“Amendi ng 13
legislation should be liberally construed so as to correct defects in predecessor 14
statutes.”). 15

{23} In 2019, the Legislature enacted Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 (2019) as part of an 16

attempt to address concerns about “ballot integrity” and “voter fatigue” by 17

stagger ing the terms of district and metropolitan court judges along with other 18

officials. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Legislative Sponsors at 29

- 30, State ex rel. 1921

Sommer v. Oliver , S

- 1

- SC

- 37785 (N.M. July 18, 2019). In 2020, in Sugg , 2020

- 1

NMSC

- 002, ¶ 23, we invalidated the 2019 legislation for lack of constitutional 2
authorization, but invited the Legislature to propose and submit to the voters an 3

amendment to the Constitution that would authorize such staggered elections . The 4
following year, the Legislatur e passed House Joint Resolution 8 , and the voters 5
subsequently approved the amendment to Article XX, Section 3. In 2021, the 6 Legislature with the Governor’s approval amended Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 (2019) to 7
reinstate the provisions for staggered election s of district and metropolitan court 8
judges. Granted, the Legislature could have made its intent unmistakable by 9
expressly stating in the amendatory language of Article XX, Section 3 that it applied 10
to district and metropolitan court judges. This sequence of events nevertheless 11
reflects with sufficient and reasonable clarity that the 2020 amendment to Article 12
XX, Section 3 was intended to implicitly repeal the requirement in Article VI, 13

Section s 3 3 , 35, 36, and 37, that all district and metropolitan court judges stand for 14

retention at the same time. We therefore hold that Article XX, Section 3 authorize s 15
the Legislature to stagger the retention terms of district and metropolitan court 16
judges and there is no other constitutional bar to such staggering

. 1722

VI. CONC LUSION 1

{24} Article XX, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution, as amended by the 2
voters in 2020, authorized the Legislature to amend Sections 1

- 26

- 5 and

- 6 (2019) 3
to stagger retention elections for district and metropolitan court judges. Accordingly, 4
the pet ition for writ of mandamus is denied. 5

{25} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF , Judge 8 Retired, sitting by designation 9

WE CONCUR: 10

11 MICHAEL E. VIGIL , Justice 12

13 BRIANA H. ZAMORA , Justice 14

15 J. MILES HANISEE , Chief Judge 16 Sitting by designation 17

18 RICHARD C. BOSSON , Justice , 19 Retired, s itting by d esignation 20