This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 32,496 4 SAMUEL MARTINEZ, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Jacqueline D. Flores, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellant 11 Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 Steven J. Forsberg, Assistant Public Defender 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellee 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VANZI, Judge. 182 {1} The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion 1 to suppress evidence. [RP 47-48] This Court’s first notice of proposed disposition 2 proposed to reverse the order on the basis th at there was sufficient probable cause for 3 the arrest. Defendant f iled a memorandum in opposition to the proposed disposition. 4 We are not persuaded by Defendant’s arguments and reverse the district court’s order. 5
{2} Defendant argues that the officer had no probable cause to arrest him because 6 the district court found that the stop sign violation was not indicative of impaired 7 driving, Defendant’s bad knees resulted inthe standard field sobriety tests (FSTs) 8 carrying very little weight, and Defendant subsequently co mpleted the alternate FSTs 9 successfully. [MIO 3] Defendant asserts that, even assuming the officer had probable 10 cause to arrest him at the end of the standardized FSTs, he chose to give Defendant 11 two alternative tests, and was not free to disregard the resu lts of the second test. [Id.] 12 Defendant relies on State v. Flores , 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 14, 122 N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 13 1038, and Bigford v. Taylor , 834 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1988), for the contention that 14 officers may not disregard a subsequent i nvestigation that le ssens probable cause. 15 [MIO 3, 5] Defendant essentially argues that his successf ul results on the alternative 16 tests dissipated any probable cause in itially found by the officer. [MIO 6] 17
{3} “An officer has probable cause to arre st when the facts and circumstances 18 within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant the officer to believe that an 19 offense has been or is being committed.” State v. Granillo-Macias , 2008-NMCA-021, 203 ¶ 9, 143 N.M. 455, 176 P.3d 1187. “Our probable cause inquiry is whether it was 1 objectively reasonable for the officer to belie ve that Defendant had been driving while 2 he was to the slightest degree impaired[.]” Id. “We judge reasonableness by an 3 objective standard, mindful that probable cau se requires more than a suspicion, but 4 less than a certainty.” State v. Sanchez , 2001-NMCA-109, ¶ 11, 131 N.M. 355, 36 5 P.3d 446 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 6
{4} In State v. Contreras , 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 5, 134 N.M. 503, 79 P.3d 1111, this 7 Court outlined the applicable law concerni ng a defendant’s rights when arrested for 8 driving under the influence: 9 A brief detention for investigatory purposes is a seizure entitled to 10 Fourth Amendment protections. The Fourth Amendment requires that all 11 seizures be reasonable. A poli ce officer may, in appropriate 12 circumstances approach a person for purposes of investigating possible 13 criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an 14 arrest. The officer, looking at the to tality of the circumstances, must be 15 able to form a reasonable suspicion that the individual in question is 16 engaged in or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Reasonable 17 suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the rational 18 inferences that may be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion is 19 dependent on both the content of information possessed by the police 20 and its degree of reliability. 21 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 22
{5} Defendant argues that, under Floresand Bigford , even if the officer had 23 probable cause to arrest after he failed th e standard FSTs, his successful performance 24 of the alternative FSTs, which the officer chose to administer because of Defendant’s 254 bad knees, dissipated any possible probable cause. [MIO 3, 8]. Bigford stands for the 1 proposition that the police may not disregar d facts tending to dissipate probable cause 2 to seize a truck susp ected of being stolen. 834 F.2d at 1218-219. Floresapplied a 3 similar principle in a case involving whether a further detention and search following 4 an investigatory stop exceeded the scope of what was permissible under principles of 5 reasonable suspicion. See Flores , 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 12. 6
{6} In light of the totality of the circumst ances approach inherent in our probable 7 cause analysis, we conclude that the distri ct court’s order granting the State’s motion 8 to suppress was legal error. See State v. Leyba , 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 159, 9 935 P.2d 1171 (stating that on appeal from a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 10 suppress, findings of fact are reviewed to determine if they are supported by 11 substantial evidence and legal conclusions are reviewed de novo). Even assuming 12 Defendant made a slow rolling stop, and di d not speed through the stop sign, the stop 13 for the traffic violation was valid. [MIO 1] The officer observed signs of intoxication 14 including bloodshot watery eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol. 15 Defendant admitted to drinking alcohol th at morning and performed poorly on the 16 standard walk and turn and one-leg-stand FSTs. [MIO 1-2] Under the totality of the 17 circumstances, all the evidence of impairment was not ne gated by Defendant’s 18 subsequent, better performance of the alternative alphabet and countdown FSTs. 195 {7} Lastly, Defendant attempts to disti nguish the cases cited in the memorandum 1 opinion. [MIO 6-7] We are not persuaded by Defendant’s comparison with specific 2 facts to other cases. “Each case stands on its own facts; there is no one set of 3 circumstances required for probable cause.” Sanchez , 2001-NMCA-109, ¶ 12. 4
{8} Therefore, we conclude that the officerhad probable cause to arrest Defendant. 5 See Leyba , 1997-NMCA-023, ¶ 8 (stating that on appeal from a trial court’s ruling on 6 a motion to suppress, findings of fact are re viewed to determine if they are supported 7 by substantial evidence and legal conclusi ons are reviewed de novo). Under the 8 circumstances of a vehicle speeding through a stop sign, we also conclude that there 9 were exigent circumstances to support the arrest. See City of Santa Fe v. Martinez , 10 2010-NMSC-033, ¶ 15, 148 N.M. 708, 242 P.3d 275 (noting inherent exigencies that 11 justify abolishing misdemeanor-arrest rule). 12
{9} For these reasons, and those stated in the first notice of proposed disposition, 13 we hold that the officer’s personal observations, along with Defendant’s admission 14 to drinking alcohol that morning, constitute d sufficient probable cause for the arrest. 15 We reverse the order suppressing the evid ence and remand to the district court. 16
{10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

__________________________________ 18 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 196 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 3

_________________________________ 4 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 5