alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-06-00065-CV

STANLEY GRAFF, Appellant

V.

VERNON BERRY, ET AL., Appellee

On Appeal from the 6th District Court

Red River County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV01133

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
2

O RDER

As part of the appellate record in this matter, original exhibits were transferred to this 

Court for our use when this appeal was before us. Specifically, original documents marked 

“Defendant’s Exhibit 1” and “Defendant’s Exhibit 2” were transferred to this Court. It appears 

to this Court that the proper repository for these exhibits should be the District Clerk’s Office of 

Red River County, Texas. Accordingly, we order the clerk of this Court to transfer the original 

exhibits filed in this appeal into the keeping of the District Clerk of Red River County by mailing 

the exhibits to the district clerk via certified mail, return receipt requested.

We further order the Red River County District Clerk, Janice Gentry, on receipt of said 

exhibits, to sign and return to this Court the enclosed receipt for said exhibits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

Date: August 29, 2013
3

RECEIPT FOR ORIGINAL EXHIBITS

I, Janice Gentry, District Clerk of Red River County, hereby acknowledge receipt of the 

following original exhibits from the Court of Appeals, Sixth Judicial District, Texarkana, Texas, 

in the case of Stanley Graff v. Vernon Berry, et al., appellate cause number 06-06-00065-CV; 

trial court cause number CV01133: original documents marked “Defendant’s Exhibit 1” and 

“Defendant’s Exhibit 2.”

___________________________________

Janice Gentry

Red River County District Clerk

Date: __________________
W.A., Father of M.A., a Minor Child, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.

No. 1D18-3670

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

December 7, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 32.2

    Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350

I, Michael Manahan, Chief Financial Officer of PracticeXpert, Inc. (the
"Corporation"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, to my knowledge that:

1. the  Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB of the  Corporation  for the  quarterly
period  ended  September  30,  2005  (the  "Report")  fully  complies  with  the
requirements  of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act of 1934;
and

2. the  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.

Date:  November 25, 2005

By:  /s/ Michael Manahan
      Michael Manahan, Chief Financial Officer
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 

# Explore Search: Floods

Filters

              - science_science(8)
              - (-)products_data(1)
              - products_publications(33)
              - products_web_tools(2)
              - multimedia_image(2)
              - multimedia_image-141771(1)
              - multimedia_image-141776(1)
              - multimedia_video(16)
              - multimedia_video-149195(1)
              - multimedia_video-149197(15)
              - news_news-149245(2)
              - news_news-149248(2)
              - news_news-149250(1)

## By Location

              - alaska(2)
              - american samoa(1)
              - california(7)
              - colorado(11)
              - commonwealth of the northern mariana islands(1)
              - connecticut(6)
              - district of columbia(1)
              - florida(5)
              - georgia(1)
              - guam(1)
              - hawaii(2)
              - kansas(3)
              - maine(3)
              - massachusetts(4)
              - montana(3)
              - (-)nevada(1)
              - new hampshire(2)
              - new jersey(8)
              - new mexico(2)
              - new york(12)
              - north carolina(1)
              - oklahoma(3)
              - oregon(1)
              - pennsylvania(4)
              - puerto rico(4)
              - rhode island(6)
              - south carolina(1)
              - u.s. virgin islands(2)
              - vermont(3)
              - virginia(5)
              - washington(2)

## By Year

Data Release        May 23, 2023        Geospatial data, flood-frequency analysis, and surface-water model archive for flood-inundation maps of the Muddy River, near Moapa, Nevada
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 

# Explore Search: Feature Stories

Filters

              - multimedia_video(2)
              - multimedia_video-149194(1)
              - multimedia_video-149195(1)

## By Location

              - alaska(7)
              - arizona(4)
              - california(38)
              - colorado(1)
              - delaware(1)
              - (-)district of columbia(2)
              - florida(1)
              - georgia(2)
              - hawaii(15)
              - idaho(4)
              - maryland(2)
              - massachusetts(2)
              - michigan(1)
              - minnesota(3)
              - montana(3)
              - north carolina(2)
              - oklahoma(1)
              - oregon(3)
              - puerto rico(2)
              - south dakota(7)
              - u.s. virgin islands(2)
              - utah(1)
              - virginia(2)
              - washington(16)
              - wisconsin(1)
              - wyoming(15)

## By Year

Featured Films and Shorts        January 7, 2022        USGS Capabilities: Geomorphology

Presentations and Events        April 5, 2019        National Liaison Committee Meeting for the NWQP — Part 1
Exhibit
13.2




Certification
of the Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


As
Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of
2002




In
connection with the annual report of Companhia de Bebidas das Américas – AmBev
(the Company) on Form 20–F for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”),
I, Nelson José Jamel, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.




Date:
April 20, 2010





/s/ Nelson José
  JamelName:
                Nelson
      José JamelTitle:
                Chief
      Financial Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.


151
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTON A. EWING,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

K2 PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

DBA Conserva Solar, a California Limited Liability Company; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 18

- 56487

D.C. No. 3:16

- cv

- 00678

- LAB

- AGS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 15, 2019 **

Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges

.

Anton A. Ewing appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment enforcing

the terms of a settlement agreement in his action all eging federal and state law

claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

JUL 24 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 56487

discretion the district court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement, Doi v.

Halekulani Corp. , 276 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002), and for clear error the

district court’s findings of fact

, Ahern v. Cent. Pac. Freight Lines , 846 F.2d 47, 48

(9th Cir. 1988). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing the parties’

settlement agreement because the district court’s findings that Ewing agreed to the

terms, and that defendants substantially complied with those terms , were not

clearly erroneous. S

ee Doi , 276 F.3d at 1137

- 40 (district court did not abuse its

discretion in enforcing settlement agreement where material terms of agreement

were read into the record and parties agreed to them); Jeff D. v. Andrus , 899 F.2d

753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The c onstruction and enforcement of settlement

agreements are governed by principles of local law which apply to interpretation of

contracts generally.”); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1550 ( setting forth essential

elements to the existence o f a contract under Cali fornia law); id. § 1567 (consent

not free when obtained through duress, fraud, undue influence, or mistake).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Appellee Klein’s request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 , set forth in3 18

- 56487

his answering brief, is denied.

AFFIRMED.
Patrick Dantre FLUKER v. STATE of Mississippi

2017-CT-00734-COA

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Filed: October 16, 2018 Closed: January 10, 2019

Certiorari - Denied
Marco PACE, etc., Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D18-0824

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed November 14, 2018

Daniel C. Minkes, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and SALTER and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
A.P., Sr., Father of A.P., Jr. and A.F.-P., Minor Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.

No. 1D18-2937

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

December 18, 2018

Susan Barber, Assistant Regional Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, and Crystal M. Frusciante, Sunrise, for Appellant.

Ward L. Metzger of Department of Children and Families, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, A.P., Sr., appeals an order terminating his parental rights pursuant to sections 39.806(1)(c) and (1)(f), Florida Statutes (2017). Appellant argues that the trial court erred in basing the termination in part upon section 39.806(1)(c),1 that section 39.806(1)(f)2 is unconstitutional because the Legislature eliminated the proof-of-nexus requirement in a 2014 amendment, and that termination was not in the children's manifest best interests. We find no merit in Appellant's challenge to the trial court's application of section 39.806(1)(c) in terminating his rights or in his best interests argument. Given such, we decline to address Appellant's constitutional challenge to section 39.806(1)(f). *See**In re Holder* , 945 So.2d 1130, 1133 (Fla. 2006) (explaining that courts are to avoid considering a constitutional question when the case can be decided on non-constitutional grounds); *Overstreet v. Overstreet* , 244 So.3d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("The law requires us to refrain from reaching constitutional questions if we can resolve the case on other grounds."); *J.F. v. Dep't of Children & Families* , 198 So.3d 706, 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("As a result of our conclusion as to this ground [ section 39.806(1)(c) ], we do not need to determine whether termination was authorized under section 39.806(1)(f).").

Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Appellant's parental rights.

AFFIRMED.

Wolf, Lewis, and Wetherell, JJ., concur.

1

Section 39.806(1)(c) provides a ground for termination when a parent "engaged in conduct toward the child or toward other children that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent or parents in the parent-child relationship threatens the life, safety, well-being, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child irrespective of the provision of services." § 39.806(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017).

2

Section 39.806(1)(f) provides a ground for termination when a parent "engaged in egregious conduct or had the opportunity and capability to prevent and knowingly failed to prevent egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health of the child or the child's sibling." § 39.806(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2017). In 2014, the Legislature amended the statute to include the language "[p]roof of a nexus between egregious conduct to a child and the potential harm to the child's sibling is not required." Ch. 14-224, § 19, Laws of Fla. (2014).
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 

# Explore Search: Earthquakes

link

link

### Latest Earthquakes

### Latest Earthquakes

View the latest earthquake events and information from the past 24 hours, 7 days, or 1 month.

Earthquake Hazards Program

Search the Earthquake Catalog

Earthquake data and products

Earthquake science

Earthquake FAQs

Filters

              - science_science(4)
              - products_data(1)
              - products_maps(2)
              - products_publications(47)
              - multimedia_video(2)
              - multimedia_video-149195(1)
              - (-)multimedia_video-149198(1)
              - news_news-149248(1)
              - news_news-149250(2)

## By Location

              - alaska(1)
              - california(3)
              - hawaii(13)
              - oregon(2)
              - (-)utah(1)
              - washington(1)
              - wyoming(2)

## By Year

link

link

### Latest Earthquakes

### Latest Earthquakes

View the latest earthquake events and information from the past 24 hours, 7 days, or 1 month.

Earthquake Hazards Program

Search the Earthquake Catalog

Earthquake data and products

Earthquake science

Earthquake FAQs

B-roll        December 31, 2015        Flat Canyon Trench Excavation, Wasatch Fault Zone, Utah
---

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of AlphaRx, Inc. on
Form 10-Q for the period ending December 31, 2010 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, Michael Lee, as chief executive
officer and chief financial officer of AlphaRx, Inc., hereby certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:

|1. | This 10-Q report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      of the Exchange Act; and                                                                 
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   |                                                                                                                                                                       
|2. | The information contained in this 10-Q report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
      AlphaRx, Inc.

Dated February 14, 2011

/s/ Michael Lee Michael Lee Chief Executive Officer
Interim Chief Financial Officer and Director (Principal Executive and
Financial Officer)

21

---
Srinath SUBRAMANIAN, Appellant, v. Veena SUBRAMANIAN, Appellee.

Nos. 4D17-3400 4D17-3603 4D18-268

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[December 5, 2018]

Lori D. Shelby of the Law Office of Lori D. Shelby, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Terrence P. O'Connor of Morgan, Carratt & O'Connor, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Warner, J.

Appellant, former husband, challenges the trial court's final judgment awarding attorney's fees to the former wife and guardian ad litem, which award was based upon the appellant's vexatious litigation. The trial court determined the entitlement to fees in the final judgment of dissolution of marriage after a contentious ten-day trial where appellant represented himself. It awarded fees against the appellant, relying *1076on *Mettler v. Mettler* , 569 So.2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) and *Rosen v. Rosen* , 696 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1997). We affirm.

Appellant contends that his due process rights were violated because he was not given notice that the court would determine entitlement to attorney's fees during the trial on the dissolution. We disagree that he was denied due process. First, the order setting the case for trial identified attorney's fees as an issue at trial. Second, even if the order was not specific to the continued trial date, both in opening and closing argument, the former wife requested fees based upon vexatious litigation. Furthermore, both parties addressed entitlement to fees in closing argument. In addition, during his case, the husband called his former attorney to address the scope of litigation, thus addressing the issue of vexatious litigation. Third, although he points to the court's statement that it would deal with the multiple motions for attorney's fees at the end, it appears to us that these comments were directed to whether the attorneys should testify in the dissolution trial as to the services rendered for the *amount* of fees, not entitlement. Thus, at the very least, the issue of entitlement was tried by implied consent. *See**D.J. v. Dep't of Children and Families* , 9 So.3d 750, 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (finding because parties argued the contested issue during closing arguments and the opposing party did not object to evidence on the issue, the issue was tried by implied consent, and the party's due process rights were not violated). No fundamental due process error occurred.

We affirm as to the remaining issues. With respect to the final calculation of attorney's fees and costs in the order granting fees to the former wife, there was a scrivener's error in the column assessing fees to the appellant. While the court ordered that the appellant pay sixty percent of the wife's fees and costs, the figure in the husband's column for the wife's trial attorney represents the entire fee. However, the ultimate amount that the husband was ordered to pay-$347,216.25-is sixty percent of all fees, including the appellate fees due to the wife's attorney. Thus, on remand the court should correct the clerical error in the judgment.

*Affirmed and remanded for correction of judgment.*

Damoorgian and Kuntz, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 99.2
  
  
  rd
 Re:
    
    Superior Wholesale Inventory Financing Trust XII (Issuer)
Annual Statement as to Compliance
        a.
    
    A review of the activities of the Servicer during the period of June 23, 2005 through
December 31, 2005, and of its performance under the Indenture, the Trust Sale and Servicing
Agreement, and the Pooling and Servicing Agreement has been made under his supervision, and
 b.
    
    To his knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations
under the Indenture, the Trust Sale and Servicing Agreement, and the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement throughout such period.
   /s/ J.B. Van Orman, Jr.
DEMS PARTNERSHIP v. RAM AUTOMOTIVE, INC. and Richard A. Friedrichs

NO. 2018-CA-0774

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

OCTOBER 31, 2018

Kelly L. Staples, Michael L. DeShazo, Taylor M. Burnham, KINNEY, ELLINGHAUSEN, RICHARD & DeSHAZO, 1250 Poydras Street, Suite 2450, New Orleans, LA 70113, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

Michael A. Britt, 4640 Rye Street, Suite 200, Metairie, LA 70006, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

(Court composed of Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano )

Judge Daniel L. Dysart *845Ram Automotive, Inc., and Richard A. Friedrichs, appeal a summary judgment granted in favor of DEMS Partnership, dismissing appellants' reconventional demand, with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.

**BACKGROUND:**

DEMS Partnership ("DEMS") filed suit against Ram Automotive, Inc., and Richard A. Friedrichs (collectively "Ram") for unpaid rent and *ad valorem* taxes due pursuant to a lease agreement. Ram filed exceptions and a Petition in Reconvention against DEMS. DEMS answered the Petition in Reconvention, and subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to have the Petition in Reconvention dismissed.

After a hearing on April 20, 2018, the trial court rendered judgment, which states in pertinent part:

> **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED** that DEMS's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that all claims by Ram Automotive, Inc., and Richard Friedrich's contained in the Reconventional Demand against DEMS Partnership are dismissed with prejudice.

Ram thereafter filed a Petition for Appeal that was signed by the trial court on September 15, 2018. DEMS filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the grant of a partial summary judgment without the trial court's express certification that the partial summary judgment is final, and that there is no just reason for delay, is not a final, appealable judgment. We agree.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 1915B provides:

> (1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against a party, whether in an original demand, reconventional demand, cross-claim, third-party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the trial court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

> (2) In the absence of such a determination and designation, any such order or decision shall not constitute a final judgment for the purpose of an immediate appeal and may be revised at any time prior to rendition of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

The judgment rendered by the trial court does not adjudicate all the claims between the parties, and does not dismiss Ram from the suit. Further, it is not certified as final, with an express determination that there is no just reason for delay.

Accordingly, the judgment from which Ram appeals is not final and appealable, and we therefore dismiss the appeal.

**APPEAL DISMISSED**