COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Annunziata 

STEVEN CHAMBERS, S/K/A 

 STEVEN LAMONT CHAMBERS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1103-94-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 OCTOBER 17, 1995 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY 

William L. Wellons, Judge 

 (James E. Ghee, on brief), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; 

John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee 

submitting on brief. 

 Steven Chambers appeals from a conviction for distribution 

of cocaine. He contends that the trial judge erred in admitting 

into evidence a laboratory certificate of analysis and an array 

of photographs. We affirm the conviction. 

 The evidence at trial proved that Larry Wilson was acting as 

a police informant when he asked Brian Edmonds where he could buy 

cocaine. Edmonds led Wilson to a trailer park, went alone to a 

trailer, and accompanied a man to Wilson's automobile. The man, 

an individual unknown to Wilson, entered Wilson's automobile and 

directed Wilson to turn on the interior light. As Edmonds waited 

outside the automobile, the man negotiated a price for cocaine 

and sold Wilson a "rock" in a clear plastic bag. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 Three days after the sale, a police officer showed Wilson an 

array of eleven photographs in an album. Wilson identified from 

those eleven photographs a photograph of the man who sold him the 

substance. The police officer told him the person he identified 

was Steven Chambers. 

 Wilson testified that he made another drug purchase from 

Chambers several days after identifying the photograph. During 

his testimony in court, Wilson identified Chambers as the person 

who negotiated the price for cocaine and sold the "rock" to him. 

The Certificate of Analysis

 The evidence at trial proved that when the officer received 

the substance from Wilson, neither the officer nor Wilson knew 

the name of the man who sold the substance to Wilson. The 

officer placed the substance in an evidence package and enclosed 

a request for analysis in the package indicating the name Brian 

Edmonds and an unknown person. The officer sealed the package 

and later mailed it to the laboratory. The evidence seal and the 

mailing certificate contain the same two case numbers. The 

officer wrote Edmonds' name on his offense report beside one of 

the two numbers on the evidence seal. After Wilson identified 

Chambers from the photograph, the officer wrote Chambers' name on 

his offense report opposite the other number. 

 The certificate of analysis was sent from the laboratory and 

put in the Chambers file by the clerk of the court. The 

certificate stated that the solid substance was cocaine, 
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contained the offense number listed on the officer's mailing 

receipt, and contained the following identification: 

 Suspect(s): 

 EDMONDS, Brian 

 UNIDENTIFIED 

 Chambers contends that the trial judge erred in admitting 

the certificate of analysis of the substance because the 

certificate did not contain his name. We disagree. 

 By statute, the certificate is admissible "provided (i) the 

certificate of analysis is filed with the clerk of the court 

hearing the case at least seven days prior to the hearing or 

trial and (ii) a copy of such certificate is mailed or delivered 

by the clerk or attorney for the Commonwealth to counsel of 

record for the accused at least seven days prior to the hearing 

or trial upon request of such counsel." Code § 19.2-187. 

Although this statute requires strict compliance by the 

Commonwealth, Gray v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 943, 945, 265 S.E.2d 

705, 706 (1980), Chambers does not contend that the letter of the 

law was not observed. He argues that implicit in the statute is 

a requirement that his name appear on the face of the 

certificate. 

 The purpose of Code § 19.2-187 is to "ensure that the 

certificate to be used in evidence is lodged timely in a secure 

and appropriate place, accessible to the accused, and available 

to him upon request." Stokes v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 550, 

552, 399 S.E.2d 453, 454 (1991). The statutory filing 
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requirements were fulfilled and the purpose was served. Although 

Chambers' name was not on the certificate, the certificate did 

contain the designations "Unidentified" and "Brian Edmonds." 

Chambers was not prevented from making an inquiry when he saw the 

certificate in the file. 

 Implicit in Chambers' objection to the admissibility of the 

certificate is the assertion that the proper foundation for the 

admissibility of the certificate was not laid because his name 

was not on the certificate. The record proved, however, that the 

substance sent to the laboratory was identified by a case number 

that corresponded to a case number assigned to the incident 

involving Chambers and Edmonds. Because the evidence linked the 

substance to Chambers through a chain of possession, see Rogers 

v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 531, 90 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1955), and 

the evidence proved the relevance of the substance, the trial 

judge did not err in admitting the certificate of analysis. See

Harshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 69, 427 S.E.2d 733 (1993). 

 Evidence is admissible if it tends to prove a matter that is 

properly at issue in the case and if its probative value 

outweighs any prejudicial effect. Evans-Smith v. Commonwealth, 5 

Va. App. 180, 196, 361 S.E.2d 436, 441 (1987). The 

Commonwealth's evidence proved that the certificate reported the 

analysis of the cocaine purchased from Chambers. Furthermore, 

Chambers has shown no prejudice that outweighs the probative 

value of the evidence. 
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The Photographic Identification

 Wilson identified Chambers from a group of eleven 

photographs three days following the cocaine purchase. After 

this identification, Wilson purchased cocaine from Chambers a 

second time. Wilson then identified Chambers in court as the 

individual who had twice sold him cocaine. Chambers argues the 

trial judge erred in allowing evidence of the basis for 

identification because the procedure was unduly suggestive. The 

admissibility of the photographs themselves is not at issue 

because the Commonwealth never introduced them. The defense 

introduced the photographs. However, the Commonwealth's evidence 

established that Wilson initially identified Chambers through the 

photographs. Thus, Chambers argues that evidence of the 

photographic identification, not the pictures themselves, should 

be suppressed. 

 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 

impermissibly suggestive photographic displays may be suppressed 

and may also require suppression of eyewitness identifications at 

trial. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). 

Convictions based on photographic displays and later 

identifications in court will only be set aside if the 

"photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification." Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384. A 

court must balance the suggestiveness of the photo display and 
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reliability to determine if the identification is admissible. 

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). If an eyewitness 

had the opportunity to carefully observe the defendant, then 

suggestiveness may be overcome. Id.

 In the present case, Chambers' claim of suggestiveness 

relies on the presence of a baseball hat in Chambers' photograph. 

 After Wilson purchased cocaine from Chambers, Wilson described 

Chambers to the officer. He testified that Chambers wore a 

baseball cap at that time. When the officer showed the eleven 

photographs to Wilson, only Chambers' photograph depicted him 

wearing a baseball hat. Chambers alleges the presence of the 

baseball hat made the identification "all but inevitable." We 

disagree. 

 The record is unclear whether Wilson's oral description of 

Chambers to the officer included a baseball hat. Furthermore, 

Wilson purchased the cocaine while sitting close to Chambers in 

the front seat of an automobile. Wilson had the opportunity to 

look directly at Chambers. Wilson also had other dealings with 

Chambers after the initial sale. Considering the totality of the 

circumstances, as required by Brathwaite, we conclude the 

evidence proved that Wilson had the opportunity to make an 

accurate identification during the initial drug sale. 432 U.S. 

at 113. Thus, Chambers has not proven that there was a 

"substantial likelihood of misidentification." Neil v. Biggers, 

409 U.S. 188, 201 (1972). 
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 For these reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.