UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROSA BACCUS; MYRA BACCUS, a/k/a Myra Hawthorne, individually and as Mother and next friend of K.B. and K.B., minor children; LASHAUNNA BACCUS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and TALISHA WINSTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, and MARIANNE BACCUS; KORDEL BACCUS, Plaintiffs,

v. CLARENCE BACCUS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 13-7053 (D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00389-JHP) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the de termination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 29, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - Before BRISCOE , Chief Judge, PORFILIO and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
The parties in this appeal, all proceedi ng pro se, are relatives of Kevin Baccus. After Kevin was murdered by an unknown assailant, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), the issuer of Kevi n’s group life insurance policy, filed an interpleader action in district court naming all of Kevin’s known relatives as defendants. At the time of his death, Kevin’s brother, Clar ence Baccus, was the named beneficiary in the po licy. Just a short time before Kevin was murdered, however, he had changed his policy to subs titute Clarence for his wife, Myra Baccus, and had eliminated his mother , Rosa Baccus, as a continge nt beneficiary. Because Clarence was identified as a possible su spect in Kevin’s mu rder, MetLife was concerned about the possibility of competi ng claims for the insu rance proceeds. Consistent with the interpleader pr ocess, MetLife deposited the group life benefits, plus interest, into the court’s registry and sought to be discharged from the case. The district court granted the motion for discha rge and entered judgment in favor of MetLife pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 1 None of the parties filed an appeal from the district c ourt’s Rule 54(b) judgment.

1 Rule 54(b) permits a district court to enter final judgment “as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” after determining “that there is no just reason for delay.”- 3 - With MetLife terminated fro m the case, the district c ourt realigned the parties, naming Clarence as the defendant and all of the other family memb ers as plaintiffs. This realignment was based on the court’ s determination that Oklahoma’s slayer statute might apply to bar Clarence from receiving the insura nce proceeds and the remaining family members had claims as contingent beneficiaries. The district court subsequently decide d to appoint counsel for Kevin’s minor children, and for Talisha Winston, one of Kevin’s adult daughters. Ms. Winston and her attorney, and the attorn ey for the minor children a ppeared at the scheduled settlement conference, but no other parties appeared. The magistrate judge then recommended that an order enter setting a hearing for Clarence to personally appear and show cause why judgment should not be entered against him. Clarence filed an objection to the recommendation, but the di strict court adopted it and scheduled a show cause hearing, with a pr etrial conference to follow that hearing. Clarence did not appear at the show cause hearing or pretrial conference; Ms. Winston was the only party to appear. The court determined that judgment should be entere d against Clarence for his failure to appear at the se ttlement conference, the s how cause hearing, and the pretrial conference and shou ld be entered in favor of Ms. Winston and the minor children. The court directed that the insurance proceeds be paid to the Estate of Kevin Baccus and be held in the court coffe rs until state probate proceedings were initiated. Clarence, Myra, and Rosa then filed a join t notice of appeal from the- 4 - district court’s order. 2 Those parties subsequently f iled an amended notice of appeal indicating that they were also appeali ng from the district court’s December 2011 judgment in favor of MetLife. 3 On appeal, appellants argue the merits of the underlying action, insisting that there are no family members adverse to Clarence, he shoul d receive the life insurance proceeds as the named beneficiary, and MetL ife failed to deposit sufficient interest with the insurance pro ceeds. But their opening brief fail s to meaningfully address the district court’s rationale for its decision— that judgment against Clarence was appropriate as a sanction for failing to s how up for scheduled court conferences and hearings. In their thirty-pag e brief, there is only one sent ence that appears relevant to the district court’s rationale . That sentence states: Did the District Court[’s] failure to force the other Appellants and Appellee to comply with [the sche duling order], and its subsequent failure to issue sanctions or orde rs to comply, create a bias and predisposition so heavily weighted against the Appellant Beneficiary that it denied his due process right s, and negated the necessity of the pre-trial conference.

2 LaShaunna Baccus did not join in th e notice of appeal, but prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period to file an appeal, she did join with the other appellants in filing a motion for stay pending appeal. We construe the motion for stay as the functional equivale nt of her notice of appeal. See Smith v. Barry , 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992) (“If a documen t filed within the time specified by Rule 4 gives the notice required by Rule 3, it is effective as a notice of appeal.”)
3 None of the appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the December 2011 judgment in favor of MetLife; therefore, it may not be reviewed in this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (notice of a ppeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from).- 5 - Aplt. Br. at 6. But this issue was not developed any further in the brief. Appellants bear the burden of demonstr ating error in the district court’s decision. See Hernandez v. Starbuck , 69 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 1995). While we liberally construe the fi lings of pro se appellants, see Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,
Kan ., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003), we are “not required to manufacture an appellant’s argument on appeal when [he] has failed in [his] burden to draw our attention to the error below.” Hernandez , 69 F.3d at 1093 (int ernal quotation marks omitted). Given the lack of any meani ngful argument responsive to the court’s rationale for its decision, appellants have waived any challenge to that decision. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived.”). Because appellants fail to identify any e rror in the district court’s rationale for its decision, this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we di smiss the appeal. We also deny appellants’ motions to proceed wit hout prepayment of costs and fees. See DeBardeleben v. Quinlan , 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10t h Cir. 1991) (concluding “a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the la w and facts in suppo rt of the issues raised on appeal” is a prerequisite for leav e to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and fees). We remind appellants of their obligation to pay the filing and- 6 - docket fees in full. See Kinnell v. Graves , 265 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001). All other pending motions are denied as moot.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge