# Europos Sąjungos C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0960 |
| --- | --- |
| Europos Sąjungos
  oficialusis leidinys | C 242 |
| | |
| Leidimas lietuvių kalba | Informacija ir pranešimai | 60 metai2017m. liepos 27d. |

ISSN 1977-0960

Europos Sąjungos

oficialusis leidinys

C 242

Leidimas lietuvių kalba

Informacija ir pranešimai

60 metai2017m. liepos 27d.

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| Pranešimo Nr. | Turinys | Puslapis |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikatai |
| | EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS INSTITUCIJŲ, ĮSTAIGŲ IR ORGANŲ PRIIMTI KOMUNIKATAI |
| | Europos Komisija |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Neprieštaravimas koncentracijai, apie kurią pranešta (Byla M.8500 – Central / SIGNA Prime / JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Sprendimas atlikus Veneto Banca S.p.A. pertvarkymo sąlygų įvertinimą | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Sprendimas atlikus Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. pertvarkymo sąlygų įvertinimą | 3 |

Pranešimo Nr.

Turinys

Puslapis

II   Komunikatai

EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS INSTITUCIJŲ, ĮSTAIGŲ IR ORGANŲ PRIIMTI KOMUNIKATAI

Europos Komisija

2017/C 242/01

Neprieštaravimas koncentracijai, apie kurią pranešta (Byla M.8500 – Central / SIGNA Prime / JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Sprendimas atlikus Veneto Banca S.p.A. pertvarkymo sąlygų įvertinimą

2

2017/C 242/03

Sprendimas atlikus Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. pertvarkymo sąlygų įvertinimą

3

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| | IV   Pranešimai |
| --- | --- |
| | EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS INSTITUCIJŲ, ĮSTAIGŲ IR ORGANŲ PRANEŠIMAI |
| | Europos Komisija |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Euro kursas | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Europos Komisijos sprendimų dėl leidimų pateikti rinkai naudoti skirtas chemines medžiagas, išvardytas Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 dėl cheminių medžiagų registracijos, įvertinimo, autorizacijos ir apribojimų (REACH) XIV priede, ir (arba) sprendimų dėl tų medžiagų naudojimo santrauka (skelbiama pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 64 straipsnio 9 dalį)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | PRANEŠIMAI, SUSIJĘ SU EUROPOS EKONOMINE ERDVE |
| | ELPA Priežiūros tarnyba |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Kvietimas pateikti pastabas pagal ELPA valstybių susitarimo dėl Priežiūros institucijos ir Teisingumo Teismo įsteigimo 3 protokolo I dalies 1 straipsnio 2 dalį dėl galimos valstybės pagalbos, suteiktos įmonei Landsvirkjun, teikiant valstybės garantijas dėl išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorių | 6 |

IV   Pranešimai

EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS INSTITUCIJŲ, ĮSTAIGŲ IR ORGANŲ PRANEŠIMAI

Europos Komisija

2017/C 242/04

Euro kursas

4

2017/C 242/05

Europos Komisijos sprendimų dėl leidimų pateikti rinkai naudoti skirtas chemines medžiagas, išvardytas Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 dėl cheminių medžiagų registracijos, įvertinimo, autorizacijos ir apribojimų (REACH) XIV priede, ir (arba) sprendimų dėl tų medžiagų naudojimo santrauka (skelbiama pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 64 straipsnio 9 dalį)
   (
  1
  )

(skelbiama pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 64 straipsnio 9 dalį)

1

5

PRANEŠIMAI, SUSIJĘ SU EUROPOS EKONOMINE ERDVE

ELPA Priežiūros tarnyba

2017/C 242/06

Kvietimas pateikti pastabas pagal ELPA valstybių susitarimo dėl Priežiūros institucijos ir Teisingumo Teismo įsteigimo 3 protokolo I dalies 1 straipsnio 2 dalį dėl galimos valstybės pagalbos, suteiktos įmonei Landsvirkjun, teikiant valstybės garantijas dėl išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorių

6

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| | V   Nuomonės |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRACINĖS PROCEDŪROS |
| | Europos personalo atrankos tarnyba (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Pranešimas apie viešuosius konkursus | 17 |
| | PROCEDŪROS, SUSIJUSIOS SU KONKURENCIJOS POLITIKOS ĮGYVENDINIMU |
| | Europos Komisija |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Išankstinis pranešimas apie koncentraciją (Byla M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett) – Bylą numatoma nagrinėti supaprastinta tvarka (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Išankstinis pranešimas apie koncentraciją (Byla M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific – Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | KITI AKTAI |
| | Europos Komisija |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Informacinis pranešimas. Viešos konsultacijos. Japonijos geografinės nuorodos | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Pranešimas, skirtas Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, kurių vardai ir pavardės (pavadinimai) įtraukti į sąrašą, nurodytą 2002 m. gegužės 27 d. Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002, kuriuo nustatomos tam tikros specialios ribojamosios priemonės, taikomos tam tikriems asmenims ir subjektams, susijusiems su ISIL (Da'esh) ir Al-Qaida organizacijomis, 2, 3 ir 7 straipsniuose, remiantis Komisijos įgyvendinimo reglamentu (ES) 2017/1390 | 22 |

V   Nuomonės

ADMINISTRACINĖS PROCEDŪROS

Europos personalo atrankos tarnyba (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Pranešimas apie viešuosius konkursus

17

PROCEDŪROS, SUSIJUSIOS SU KONKURENCIJOS POLITIKOS ĮGYVENDINIMU

Europos Komisija

2017/C 242/08

Išankstinis pranešimas apie koncentraciją (Byla M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett) – Bylą numatoma nagrinėti supaprastinta tvarka (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Išankstinis pranešimas apie koncentraciją (Byla M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific – Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

KITI AKTAI

Europos Komisija

2017/C 242/10

Informacinis pranešimas. Viešos konsultacijos. Japonijos geografinės nuorodos

20

2017/C 242/11

Pranešimas, skirtas Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, kurių vardai ir pavardės (pavadinimai) įtraukti į sąrašą, nurodytą 2002 m. gegužės 27 d. Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002, kuriuo nustatomos tam tikros specialios ribojamosios priemonės, taikomos tam tikriems asmenims ir subjektams, susijusiems su ISIL (Da'esh) ir Al-Qaida organizacijomis, 2, 3 ir 7 straipsniuose, remiantis Komisijos įgyvendinimo reglamentu (ES) 2017/1390

Al-Qaida

22

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Tekstas svarbus EEE. |

---

(1)   Tekstas svarbus EEE.

1

| LT | |
| --- | --- |

LT

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II Komunikatai

EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS INSTITUCIJŲ, ĮSTAIGŲ IR ORGANŲ PRIIMTI KOMUNIKATAI

Europos Komisija

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/1

---

Neprieštaravimas koncentracijai, apie kurią pranešta

(Byla M.8500 – Central / SIGNA Prime / JVCo)

(Tekstas svarbus EEE)

(2017/C 242/01)

2017 m. liepos 14 d. Komisija nusprendė neprieštarauti pirmiau nurodytai koncentracijai, apie kurią pranešta, ir pripažinti ją suderinama su vidaus rinka. Šis sprendimas priimtas remiantis Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 6 straipsnio 1 dalies b punktu. Visas sprendimo tekstas pateikiamas tik anglų kalba ir bus viešai paskelbtas iš jo pašalinus visą konfidencialią su verslu susijusią informaciją. Sprendimo tekstą bus galima rasti:

| — | Komisijos konkurencijos svetainės susijungimų skiltyje (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Šioje svetainėje konkrečius sprendimus dėl susijungimo galima rasti įvairiais būdais, pavyzdžiui, pagal įmonės pavadinimą, bylos numerį, sprendimo priėmimo datą ir sektorių, |
| --- | --- |

—

Komisijos konkurencijos svetainės susijungimų skiltyje (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Šioje svetainėje konkrečius sprendimus dėl susijungimo galima rasti įvairiais būdais, pavyzdžiui, pagal įmonės pavadinimą, bylos numerį, sprendimo priėmimo datą ir sektorių,

| — | elektroniniu formatu EUR-Lex svetainėje (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=lt). Dokumento Nr. 32017M8500. EUR-Lex svetainėje galima rasti įvairių Bendrijos teisės aktų. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektroniniu formatu EUR-Lex svetainėje (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=lt). Dokumento Nr. 32017M8500. EUR-Lex svetainėje galima rasti įvairių Bendrijos teisės aktų.

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(1)  OL L 24, 2004 1 29, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/2

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Sprendimas atlikus „Veneto Banca S.p.A.“ pertvarkymo sąlygų įvertinimą

(2017/C 242/02)

2017 m. birželio 23 d. Bendra pertvarkymo valdyba nusprendė nepradėti „Veneto Banca S.p.A.“ pertvarkymo. Šis sprendimas priimtas remiantis išvada, kad Reglamento (ES) Nr. 806/2014 (1) 18 straipsnio 1 dalies c punkto sąlyga neįvykdyta. Pagrindiniai šio sprendimo elementai yra šie:

| Sprendimo priėmimo data | 2017 m. birželio 23 d. |
| --- | --- |
| Sprendimo Nr. | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Adresatas | Banca d’Italia |
| Įstaiga | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Skolos nurašymo priemonių taikymas ir kapitalo priemonių pajėgumo perskaičiavimas | Nėra |
| Pertvarkymo veiksmas | Nėra |
| Fondų parama | Nėra |

Sprendimo priėmimo data

2017 m. birželio 23 d.

Sprendimo Nr.

SRB/EES/2017/11

Adresatas

Banca d’Italia

Įstaiga

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Skolos nurašymo priemonių taikymas ir kapitalo priemonių pajėgumo perskaičiavimas

Nėra

Pertvarkymo veiksmas

Nėra

Fondų parama

Nėra

Daugiau informacijos apie šį sprendimą pateikta oficialioje BPV interneto svetainėje https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  OL L 225, 2014 7 30, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/3

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Sprendimas atlikus „Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.“ pertvarkymo sąlygų įvertinimą

(2017/C 242/03)

2017 m. birželio 23 d. Bendra pertvarkymo valdyba nusprendė nepradėti „Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.“ pertvarkymo. Šis sprendimas priimtas remiantis išvada, kad Reglamento (ES) Nr. 806/2014 (1) 18 straipsnio 1 dalies c punkto sąlyga neįvykdyta. Pagrindiniai šio sprendimo elementai yra šie:

| Sprendimo priėmimo data | 2017 m. birželio 23 d. |
| --- | --- |
| Sprendimo Nr. | SRB/OP/2017/12 |
| Adresatas | Banca d’Italia |
| Įstaiga | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Skolos nurašymo priemonių taikymas ir kapitalo priemonių pajėgumo perskaičiavimas | Nėra |
| Pertvarkymo veiksmas | Nėra |
| Fondų parama | Nėra |

Sprendimo priėmimo data

2017 m. birželio 23 d.

Sprendimo Nr.

SRB/OP/2017/12

Adresatas

Banca d’Italia

Įstaiga

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Skolos nurašymo priemonių taikymas ir kapitalo priemonių pajėgumo perskaičiavimas

Nėra

Pertvarkymo veiksmas

Nėra

Fondų parama

Nėra

Daugiau informacijos apie šį sprendimą pateikta oficialioje BPV interneto svetainėje https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  OL L 225, 2014 7 30, p. 1.

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IV Pranešimai

EUROPOS SĄJUNGOS INSTITUCIJŲ, ĮSTAIGŲ IR ORGANŲ PRANEŠIMAI

Europos Komisija

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/4

---

Euro kursas (1)

2017 m. liepos 26 d.

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Valiuta | Valiutos kursas |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | JAV doleris | 1,1644 |
| JPY | Japonijos jena | 130,26 |
| DKK | Danijos krona | 7,4368 |
| GBP | Svaras sterlingas | 0,89275 |
| SEK | Švedijos krona | 9,5705 |
| CHF | Šveicarijos frankas | 1,1152 |
| ISK | Islandijos krona | |
| NOK | Norvegijos krona | 9,2893 |
| BGN | Bulgarijos levas | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Čekijos krona | 26,047 |
| HUF | Vengrijos forintas | 305,57 |
| PLN | Lenkijos zlotas | 4,2613 |
| RON | Rumunijos lėja | 4,5632 |
| TRY | Turkijos lira | 4,1406 |
| AUD | Australijos doleris | 1,4717 |
| CAD | Kanados doleris | 1,4576 |
| HKD | Honkongo doleris | 9,0959 |
| NZD | Naujosios Zelandijos doleris | 1,5678 |
| SGD | Singapūro doleris | 1,5850 |
| KRW | Pietų Korėjos vonas | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | Pietų Afrikos randas | 15,1998 |
| CNY | Kinijos ženminbi juanis | 7,8646 |
| HRK | Kroatijos kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | Indonezijos rupija | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | Malaizijos ringitas | 4,9889 |
| PHP | Filipinų pesas | 58,948 |
| RUB | Rusijos rublis | 69,7050 |
| THB | Tailando batas | 38,996 |
| BRL | Brazilijos realas | 3,6806 |
| MXN | Meksikos pesas | 20,6644 |
| INR | Indijos rupija | 74,9375 |

Valiuta

Valiutos kursas

USD

JAV doleris

1,1644

JPY

Japonijos jena

130,26

DKK

Danijos krona

7,4368

GBP

Svaras sterlingas

0,89275

SEK

Švedijos krona

9,5705

CHF

Šveicarijos frankas

1,1152

ISK

Islandijos krona

NOK

Norvegijos krona

9,2893

BGN

Bulgarijos levas

1,9558

CZK

Čekijos krona

26,047

HUF

Vengrijos forintas

305,57

PLN

Lenkijos zlotas

4,2613

RON

Rumunijos lėja

4,5632

TRY

Turkijos lira

4,1406

AUD

Australijos doleris

1,4717

CAD

Kanados doleris

1,4576

HKD

Honkongo doleris

9,0959

NZD

Naujosios Zelandijos doleris

1,5678

SGD

Singapūro doleris

1,5850

KRW

Pietų Korėjos vonas

1 303,91

ZAR

Pietų Afrikos randas

15,1998

CNY

Kinijos ženminbi juanis

7,8646

HRK

Kroatijos kuna

7,4128

IDR

Indonezijos rupija

15 507,48

MYR

Malaizijos ringitas

4,9889

PHP

Filipinų pesas

58,948

RUB

Rusijos rublis

69,7050

THB

Tailando batas

38,996

BRL

Brazilijos realas

3,6806

MXN

Meksikos pesas

20,6644

INR

Indijos rupija

74,9375

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(1)  Šaltinis: valiutų perskaičiavimo kursai paskelbti ECB.

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| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/5

---

Europos Komisijos sprendimų dėl leidimų pateikti rinkai naudoti skirtas chemines medžiagas, išvardytas Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 dėl cheminių medžiagų registracijos, įvertinimo, autorizacijos ir apribojimų (REACH) XIV priede, ir (arba) sprendimų dėl tų medžiagų naudojimo santrauka

(skelbiama pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 64 straipsnio 9 dalį
   (1)
  )

(Tekstas svarbus EEE)

(2017/C 242/05)

Sprendimai, kuriais suteikiamas leidimas

| Nuoroda į sprendimą (2) | Sprendimo data | Cheminės medžiagos pavadinimas | Leidimo turėtojas | Leidimo numeris | Autorizuotas naudojimas | Peržiūros laikotarpio pabaigos data | Sprendimo priežastys |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 2017 m. liepos 20 d. | Bis(2-metoksietil)eteris
  EB Nr. 203–924–4,
  CAS Nr. 111–96–6 | „Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited“, Ringaskiddy, Korko grafystė, Airija | REACH/17/8/0 | Diglimo kaip tirpiklio naudojimas gaminant tarpinį junginį, kuris toliau konvertuojamas į vaistinį preparatą, naudojamą kvėpavimo takų ligoms gydyti skirtų vaistų sudėtyje | 2024 m. rugpjūčio 22 d. | — | Pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 60 straipsnio 2 dalį dėl cheminės medžiagos naudojimo kylanti rizika žmonių sveikatai yra tinkamai kontroliuojama. |

Nuoroda į sprendimą (2)

Sprendimo data

Cheminės medžiagos pavadinimas

Leidimo turėtojas

Leidimo numeris

Autorizuotas naudojimas

Peržiūros laikotarpio pabaigos data

Sprendimo priežastys

C(2017) 5025

2017 m. liepos 20 d.

Bis(2-metoksietil)eteris

EB Nr. 203–924–4,

CAS Nr. 111–96–6

„Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited“, Ringaskiddy, Korko grafystė, Airija

REACH/17/8/0

Diglimo kaip tirpiklio naudojimas gaminant tarpinį junginį, kuris toliau konvertuojamas į vaistinį preparatą, naudojamą kvėpavimo takų ligoms gydyti skirtų vaistų sudėtyje

2024 m. rugpjūčio 22 d.

—

Pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 1907/2006 60 straipsnio 2 dalį dėl cheminės medžiagos naudojimo kylanti rizika žmonių sveikatai yra tinkamai kontroliuojama.

| — | Šiuo metu nėra tinkamų pakaitalų, tačiau jų paieška vykdoma pagal septynerių metų pakaitinę programą. |
| --- | --- |

—

Šiuo metu nėra tinkamų pakaitalų, tačiau jų paieška vykdoma pagal septynerių metų pakaitinę programą.

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(1)  OL L 396, 2006 12 30, p. 1.

(2)  Sprendimas skelbiamas Europos Komisijos interneto svetainėje adresu http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about_lt.

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PRANEŠIMAI, SUSIJĘ SU EUROPOS EKONOMINE ERDVE

ELPA Priežiūros tarnyba

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/6

---

Kvietimas pateikti pastabas pagal ELPA valstybių susitarimo dėl Priežiūros institucijos ir Teisingumo Teismo įsteigimo 3 protokolo I dalies 1 straipsnio 2 dalį dėl galimos valstybės pagalbos, suteiktos įmonei „Landsvirkjun“, teikiant valstybės garantijas dėl išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorių

(2017/C 242/06)

2017 m. gegužės 3 d. Sprendimu Nr. 085/17/COL, pateiktu originalo kalba po šios santraukos, ELPA priežiūros institucija pradėjo procedūrą pagal ELPA valstybių susitarimo dėl Priežiūros institucijos ir Teisingumo Teismo įsteigimo 3 protokolo I dalies 1 straipsnio 2 dalį. Islandijos valdžios institucijoms perduota šio sprendimo kopija.

ELPA priežiūros institucija šiuo pranešimu ragina ELPA valstybes, ES valstybes nares ir suinteresuotąsias šalis pateikti pastabas dėl minėtos priemonės per vieną mėnesį nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo adresu:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

35, Rue Belliard

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Šios pastabos bus perduotos Islandijos valdžios institucijoms. Pastabas teikiančiai suinteresuotajai šaliai pateikus pagrįstą raštišką prašymą, jos tapatybė gali būti neatskleidžiama.

Santrauka

Procedūra

2015 m. kovo 24 d. e. laiške Islandijos valdžios institucijos paprašė paaiškinti, ar įmonės „Landsvirkjun“ finansiniai įsipareigojimai pagal išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorius galėtų būti užtikrinami pagal dabartinę Islandijos valstybės garantijų sistemą. Ta sistema buvo Institucijos sprendimo Nr. 159/13/COL (1) objektas.

Pateikusi prašymus, Institucija iš Islandijos valdžios institucijų 2016 m. vasario 11 d. ir 2016 m. kovo 22 d. gavo raštus su informacija apie susijusią priemonę. Be to, šis klausimas aptartas per 2016 m. gegužės 31 d. Islandijos valdžios institucijų ir Institucijos posėdį Reikjavike. Po posėdžio Institucija išsiuntė Islandijos valdžios institucijoms raštą, kuriame pateiktas posėdžio protokolas ir prašoma papildomų paaiškinimų. 2016 m. spalio 31 d. e. laišku Islandijos valdžios institucijos atsakė į Institucijos raštą ir pateikė kelis papildomus dokumentus.

Faktai

„Landsvirkjun“ yra viešojo sektoriaus partnerystės įmonė, kurios veikla reglamentuojama Įstatymu Nr. 42/1983 dėl įmonės „Landsvirkjun“ (su pakeitimais). Įmonę „Landsvirkjun“ bendrai valdo valstybės iždas (99,9 %) ir įmonė „Eignarhlutir ehf.“ (0,1 %). Pastaroji įmonė yra ribotos atsakomybės bendrovė, visiškai priklausanti valstybės iždui. Įmonė „Landsvirkjun“ šiuo metu yra didžiausia elektros energijos gamintoja Islandijoje, jai priklauso daugiau kaip 75 % vidaus elektros energijos gamybos rinkos dalies, be to, ji yra viena iš dešimties didžiausių atsinaujinančiosios energijos įmonių Europoje.

Valstybės skolų valdymo skyrius yra vienas iš Islandijos centrinio banko skyrių. Islandijos centrinis bankas yra nepriklausoma viešoji institucija, kurią valdo Islandijos valstybė.

Įmonei „Landsvirkjun“ kyla užsienio valiutos keitimo rizika, taip pat palūkanų normos rizika jos skolos portfeliui. Įmonė „Landsvirkjun“ naudoja įvairių formų išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorius rinkos rizikai kontroliuoti ir valdyti.

Remiantis dabartiniais Institucijos turimais faktais, Valstybės skolų valdymo skyrius bent jau nuo 2013 m. įmonei „Landsvirkjun“ teikė garantijas dėl tam tikrų išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorių. Sprendimas susijęs su Valstybės skolų valdymo skyriaus garantijomis dėl šių išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorių: užsienio valiutų apsikeitimo sandorių, užsienio valiutų pasirinkimo sandorių ir palūkanų normų apsikeitimo sandorių.

Pagal valstybės pagalbos gairių dėl valstybės garantijų (toliau – Garantijų gairės) (2) 3.2 punktą individuali valstybės garantija nelaikoma valstybės pagalba, jeigu atitinka visas toliau nurodytas sąlygas:

| a) | paskolos gavėjas neturi finansinių sunkumų; |
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a)

paskolos gavėjas neturi finansinių sunkumų;

| b) | suteikiant garantiją, galima tinkamai įvertinti jos dydį; |
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b)

suteikiant garantiją, galima tinkamai įvertinti jos dydį;

| c) | garantija užtikrinama ne daugiau kaip 80 % negrąžintos paskolos arba kito finansinio įsipareigojimo; ir |
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c)

garantija užtikrinama ne daugiau kaip 80 % negrąžintos paskolos arba kito finansinio įsipareigojimo; ir

| d) | už garantiją sumokama rinkos sąlygas atitinkanti kaina. |
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d)

už garantiją sumokama rinkos sąlygas atitinkanti kaina.

Institucija laikosi preliminarios nuomonės, kad Valstybės skolų valdymo skyriaus įmonei „Landsvirkjun“ suteiktos garantijos dėl pirmiau minėtų išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorių neatitinka b, c ir d sąlygų. Todėl šiame etape šie elementai negali būti nelaikomi valstybės pagalba pagal Garantijų gairių 3.2 punktą.

Pirma, Islandijos valdžios institucijos iki šiol negalėjo paaiškinti, ar garantijos susijusios su konkrečiais įsipareigojimais, kokia yra didžiausia garantijų suma ir ar garantijoms taikomi laiko apribojimai. Todėl šiuo metu Institucija laikosi nuomonės, kad nesilaikoma Garantijų gairių 3.2 punkto b sąlygos.

Antra, panašu, kad garantijos apima visus finansinius įsipareigojimus, kuriuos įmonė „Lansdsvirkjun“ prisiėmė pagal atitinkamus išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorius. Islandijos valdžios institucijos dar nepateikė jokios informacijos, pagal kurią būtų galima įvertinti, ar garantija apribota iki 80 % neapmokėtų finansinių įsipareigojimų. Be to, nėra informacijos, pagal kurią būtų galima nustatyti, kiek finansinių įsipareigojimų pagal išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorius, kuriuos užtikrina Valstybės skolų valdymo skyrius, turi įmonė „Landsvirkjun“. Todėl šiuo metu Institucija laikosi nuomonės, kad nesilaikoma Garantijų gairių 3.2 punkto c sąlygos.

Trečia, pagal Garantijų gaires už prisiimamą riziką turėtų būti atlyginama nustatant tam tikrą priemoką garantija užtikrintai arba netiesiogiai garantija užtikrintai sumai. Kalbant apie Valstybės skolų valdymo skyriaus garantijas dėl užsienio valiutų apsikeitimo sandorių ir užsienio valiutų pasirinkimo sandorių, panašu, kad įmonė „Landsvirkjun“ nemoka jokios priemokos. Kalbant apie Valstybės skolų valdymo skyriaus garantijas dėl palūkanų normų apsikeitimo sandorių, Islandijos valdžios institucijos tvirtina, kad įmonė „Landsvirkjun“ moka tinkamas garantijos priemokas už grynuosius įsipareigojimus pagal išvestinių finansinių priemonių sandorius, iš kurių matyti įmonės „Landsvirkjun“ bendrieji nuostoliai. Tačiau Institucija negavo pakankamai informacijos apie tai, kokia metodika taikyta priemokos lygiui nustatyti ir atitinkamai, ar šis priemokos lygis gali būti laikomas rinkos kaina.

Vertinimas

Šiuo metu Institucija laikosi nuomonės, kad šiame sprendime aptariamomis garantijomis gali būti suteiktas pranašumas, kaip nurodyta valstybės pagalbos taisyklėse. Be to, atrodo, kad priemonė yra atrankinio pobūdžio ir gali iškraipyti konkurenciją bei pakenkti EEE vidaus prekybai. Todėl Institucija negali atmesti galimybės, kad nagrinėjama priemonė yra valstybės pagalba pagal EEE susitarimo 61 straipsnio 1 dalį. Islandijos valdžios institucijos šiame etape nepateikė jokių argumentų, kuriais būtų įrodyta, kad nagrinėjama potenciali valstybės pagalba gali būti suderinama su EEE susitarimo 59 straipsnio 2 dalimi arba 61 straipsnio 3 dalimi.

Išvada

Atsižvelgdama į tai, kas išdėstyta pirmiau, Institucija nusprendė pradėti oficialią tyrimo procedūrą pagal ELPA valstybių susitarimo dėl Priežiūros institucijos ir Teisingumo Teismo įsteigimo 3 protokolo I dalies 1 straipsnio 2 dalį. Suinteresuotųjų šalių prašoma pateikti savo pastabas per mėnesį nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo Europos Sąjungos oficialiajame leidinyje.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  2013 m. balandžio 24 d. Institucijos sprendimas Nr. 159/13/COL baigti esamos pagalbos, suteiktos įmonėms „Landsvirkjun“ ir „Orkuveita Reykjavíkur“ teikiant neribotas valstybės garantijas, bylą (OL C 237, 2013 8 15, p. 3, ir EEE priedas Nr. 45, 2013 8 15, p. 28).

1

(2)  OL L 105, 2011 4 21, p. 32, ir EEE priedas Nr. 23, 2011 4 21, p. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Nuomonės

ADMINISTRACINĖS PROCEDŪROS

Europos personalo atrankos tarnyba (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/17

---

PRANEŠIMAS APIE VIEŠUOSIUS KONKURSUS

(2017/C 242/07)

Europos personalo atrankos tarnyba (EPSO) rengia šiuos viešuosius konkursus:

| | PASTATŲ SEKTORIAUS ADMINISTRATORIAI IR ASISTENTAI |
| --- | --- |

PASTATŲ SEKTORIAUS ADMINISTRATORIAI IR ASISTENTAI

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Už pastatų valdymą atsakingi inžinieriai (įskaitant už aplinką ir paslaugas atsakingus inžinierius) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Už pastatų valdymą atsakingi inžinieriai (įskaitant už aplinką ir paslaugas atsakingus inžinierius)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3) | 1 specializacija. Pastatų statybos koordinatoriai / technikai |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3)

1 specializacija. Pastatų statybos koordinatoriai / technikai

| | 2 specializacija. Pastatų oro kondicionavimo ir elektromechanikos bei elektros inžinerijos koordinatoriai / technikai |
| --- | --- |

2 specializacija. Pastatų oro kondicionavimo ir elektromechanikos bei elektros inžinerijos koordinatoriai / technikai

| | 3 specializacija. Už darbuotojų saugą / pastatų saugą atsakingi asistentai |
| --- | --- |

3 specializacija. Už darbuotojų saugą / pastatų saugą atsakingi asistentai

Pranešimas apie konkursą 24 kalbomis skelbiamas 2017 m. liepos 27 d. Europos Sąjungos oficialiajame leidinyje C 242 A.

Daugiau informacijos pateikiama EPSO svetainėje https://epso.europa.eu/.

---

PROCEDŪROS, SUSIJUSIOS SU KONKURENCIJOS POLITIKOS ĮGYVENDINIMU

Europos Komisija

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/18

---

Išankstinis pranešimas apie koncentraciją

(Byla M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett)

Bylą numatoma nagrinėti supaprastinta tvarka

(Tekstas svarbus EEE)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | 2017 m. liepos 18 d. pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4 straipsnį Europos Komisija gavo pranešimą apie siūlomą koncentraciją: įmonė „Letterone Investment Holdings S.A.“ (toliau – „Letterone Investment“, Liuksemburgas) pirkdama akcijas įgyja, kaip apibrėžta Susijungimų reglamento 3 straipsnio 1 dalies b punkte, visos įmonės „Holland & Barrett International Limited“ (toliau – „Holland & Barrett“, Jungtinė Karalystė) kontrolę. |
| --- | --- |

1.

2017 m. liepos 18 d. pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4 straipsnį Europos Komisija gavo pranešimą apie siūlomą koncentraciją: įmonė „Letterone Investment Holdings S.A.“ (toliau – „Letterone Investment“, Liuksemburgas) pirkdama akcijas įgyja, kaip apibrėžta Susijungimų reglamento 3 straipsnio 1 dalies b punkte, visos įmonės „Holland & Barrett International Limited“ (toliau – „Holland & Barrett“, Jungtinė Karalystė) kontrolę.

| 2. | Įmonių verslo veikla:
  —   „Letterone Investment“: tarptautinių investicijų įmonė, daugiausiai investuojanti telekomunikacijų ir technologijų, sveikatos priežiūros ir mažmeninės prekybos sektoriuose,
  —   „Holland & Barrett“: sveikatos ir gerovės produktų, tokių kaip, pavyzdžiui, vitaminų papildai ir sveikatai naudingi maisto produktai, mažmeninė prekyba parduotuvių tinkle ir internetu. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Įmonių verslo veikla:

—   „Letterone Investment“: tarptautinių investicijų įmonė, daugiausiai investuojanti telekomunikacijų ir technologijų, sveikatos priežiūros ir mažmeninės prekybos sektoriuose,

—   „Holland & Barrett“: sveikatos ir gerovės produktų, tokių kaip, pavyzdžiui, vitaminų papildai ir sveikatai naudingi maisto produktai, mažmeninė prekyba parduotuvių tinkle ir internetu.

| 3. | Preliminariai išnagrinėjusi pranešimą Komisija mano, kad sandoriui, apie kurį pranešta, galėtų būti taikomas Susijungimų reglamentas. Komisijai paliekama teisė dėl šio klausimo priimti galutinį sprendimą. Pagal Komisijos pranešimą dėl supaprastintos tam tikrų koncentracijų nagrinėjimo pagal Tarybos reglamentą (EB) Nr. 139/2004 procedūros (2) reikėtų pažymėti, kad šią bylą numatoma nagrinėti pranešime nurodyta tvarka. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Preliminariai išnagrinėjusi pranešimą Komisija mano, kad sandoriui, apie kurį pranešta, galėtų būti taikomas Susijungimų reglamentas. Komisijai paliekama teisė dėl šio klausimo priimti galutinį sprendimą. Pagal Komisijos pranešimą dėl supaprastintos tam tikrų koncentracijų nagrinėjimo pagal Tarybos reglamentą (EB) Nr. 139/2004 procedūros (2) reikėtų pažymėti, kad šią bylą numatoma nagrinėti pranešime nurodyta tvarka.

| 4. | Komisija kviečia suinteresuotas trečiąsias šalis teikti pastabas dėl pasiūlyto veiksmo.
  Pastabos Komisijai turi būti pateiktos ne vėliau kaip per 10 dienų nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo. Pastabas galima siųsti faksu (+32 22964301), el. paštu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu arba paštu su nuoroda „M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett“ adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija kviečia suinteresuotas trečiąsias šalis teikti pastabas dėl pasiūlyto veiksmo.

Pastabos Komisijai turi būti pateiktos ne vėliau kaip per 10 dienų nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo. Pastabas galima siųsti faksu (+32 22964301), el. paštu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu arba paštu su nuoroda „M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett“ adresu:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OL L 24, 2004 1 29, p. 1 (Susijungimų reglamentas).

(2)  OL C 366, 2013 12 14, p. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/19

---

Išankstinis pranešimas apie koncentraciją

(Byla M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific – Patheon)

(Tekstas svarbus EEE)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | 2017 m. liepos 19 d. pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4 straipsnį Europos Komisija gavo pranešimą apie siūlomą koncentraciją: įmonė „Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.“ (toliau – „Thermo Fisher“, JAV) pirkdama akcijas įgyja, kaip apibrėžta Susijungimų reglamento 3 straipsnio 1 dalies b punkte, įmonės „Patheon N.V.“ (toliau – „Patheon“, Nyderlandai) kontrolę. |
| --- | --- |

1.

2017 m. liepos 19 d. pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 139/2004 (1) 4 straipsnį Europos Komisija gavo pranešimą apie siūlomą koncentraciją: įmonė „Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.“ (toliau – „Thermo Fisher“, JAV) pirkdama akcijas įgyja, kaip apibrėžta Susijungimų reglamento 3 straipsnio 1 dalies b punkte, įmonės „Patheon N.V.“ (toliau – „Patheon“, Nyderlandai) kontrolę.

| 2. | Įmonių verslo veikla:






  — | „Thermo Fisher“ yra laboratorijų įrangos, analizės prietaisų, diagnostikos ir susijusių produktų gamintoja ir tiekėja, taip pat teikia susijusias paslaugas. Įmonės centrinė būstinė yra JAV, o veiklą ji vykdo tarptautiniu mastu, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Įmonių verslo veikla:

—

„Thermo Fisher“ yra laboratorijų įrangos, analizės prietaisų, diagnostikos ir susijusių produktų gamintoja ir tiekėja, taip pat teikia susijusias paslaugas. Įmonės centrinė būstinė yra JAV, o veiklą ji vykdo tarptautiniu mastu,

| — | „Patheon“ yra užsakomųjų kūrimo ir gaminimo paslaugų įmonė, tiekianti vaistų veikliąsias medžiagas ir gatavus vaistus. Įmonės centrinė būstinė yra Nyderlanduose, o veiklą ji vykdo tarptautiniu mastu. |
| --- | --- |

—

„Patheon“ yra užsakomųjų kūrimo ir gaminimo paslaugų įmonė, tiekianti vaistų veikliąsias medžiagas ir gatavus vaistus. Įmonės centrinė būstinė yra Nyderlanduose, o veiklą ji vykdo tarptautiniu mastu.

| 3. | Preliminariai išnagrinėjusi pranešimą Komisija mano, kad sandoriui, apie kurį pranešta, galėtų būti taikomas Susijungimų reglamentas. Komisijai paliekama teisė dėl šio klausimo priimti galutinį sprendimą. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Preliminariai išnagrinėjusi pranešimą Komisija mano, kad sandoriui, apie kurį pranešta, galėtų būti taikomas Susijungimų reglamentas. Komisijai paliekama teisė dėl šio klausimo priimti galutinį sprendimą.

| 4. | Komisija kviečia suinteresuotas trečiąsias šalis teikti pastabas dėl pasiūlyto veiksmo.
  Pastabos Komisijai turi būti pateiktos ne vėliau kaip per 10 dienų nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo. Pastabas galima siųsti faksu (+32 22964301), el. paštu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu arba paštu su nuoroda „M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. – Patheon N.V.“ adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija kviečia suinteresuotas trečiąsias šalis teikti pastabas dėl pasiūlyto veiksmo.

Pastabos Komisijai turi būti pateiktos ne vėliau kaip per 10 dienų nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo. Pastabas galima siųsti faksu (+32 22964301), el. paštu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu arba paštu su nuoroda „M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. – Patheon N.V.“ adresu:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OL L 24, 2004 1 29, p. 1 (Susijungimų reglamentas).

---

KITI AKTAI

Europos Komisija

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/20

---

INFORMACINIS PRANEŠIMAS. VIEŠOS KONSULTACIJOS

Japonijos geografinės nuorodos

(2017/C 242/10)

Vykstant deryboms su Japonija dėl laisvosios prekybos susitarimo (toliau – Susitarimas), įskaitant skyrių dėl geografinių nuorodų, Japonijos valdžios institucijos pateikė toliau pridėtą geografinių nuorodų, kurios turėtų būti saugomos pagal susitarimą, sąrašą. Europos Komisija šiuo metu svarsto, ar šios geografinės nuorodos turi būti saugomos pagal būsimą Susitarimą kaip Sutarties dėl intelektinės nuosavybės teisių aspektų, susijusių su prekyba, 22 straipsnio 1 dalyje apibrėžtos geografinės nuorodos.

Komisija ragina visas valstybes nares ar trečiąsias šalis, visus fizinius ar juridinius asmenis, turinčius teisėtų interesų ir gyvenančius arba įsisteigusius kurioje nors valstybėje narėje arba trečiojoje šalyje, pareikšti galimus prieštaravimus dėl tokios apsaugos pateikiant tinkamai pagrįstą pareiškimą.

Prieštaravimo pareiškimai Komisijai turi būti pateikti per du mėnesius nuo šio pranešimo paskelbimo. Prieštaravimo pareiškimai turėtų būti siunčiami e. pašto adresu AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Prieštaravimo pareiškimai bus nagrinėjami tik tuo atveju, jeigu bus gauti per pirmiau nurodytą laikotarpį ir jeigu juose bus įrodyta, kad siūlomas saugoti pavadinimas:

| a) | prieštarautų augalo veislės ar gyvūno veislės pavadinimui ir todėl vartotojams galėtų kilti abejonių dėl tikrosios produkto kilmės; |
| --- | --- |

a)

prieštarautų augalo veislės ar gyvūno veislės pavadinimui ir todėl vartotojams galėtų kilti abejonių dėl tikrosios produkto kilmės;

| b) | būtų visiškai arba iš dalies homonimiškas Sąjungoje pagal 2012 m. lapkričio 21 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentą (ES) Nr. 1151/2012 dėl žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų kokybės sistemų (1) jau saugomam pavadinimui arba būtų įrašytas susitarimuose, kuriuos Sąjunga sudarė su šiomis šalimis:






  — | PAVB EPS valstybėmis (Botsvana, Lesotu, Mozambiku, Namibija, Svazilandu ir Pietų Afrika) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

būtų visiškai arba iš dalies homonimiškas Sąjungoje pagal 2012 m. lapkričio 21 d. Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentą (ES) Nr. 1151/2012 dėl žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų kokybės sistemų (1) jau saugomam pavadinimui arba būtų įrašytas susitarimuose, kuriuos Sąjunga sudarė su šiomis šalimis:

—

PAVB EPS valstybėmis (Botsvana, Lesotu, Mozambiku, Namibija, Svazilandu ir Pietų Afrika) (2)

| — | Šveicarija (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

Šveicarija (3)

| — | Korėja (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Korėja (4)

| — | Centrinės Amerikos valstybėmis (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

Centrinės Amerikos valstybėmis (5)

| — | Kolumbija, Peru ir Ekvadoru (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Kolumbija, Peru ir Ekvadoru (6)

| — | Juodkalnija (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Juodkalnija (7)

| — | Bosnija ir Hercegovina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosnija ir Hercegovina (8)

| — | Serbija (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Serbija (9)

| — | Moldova (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldova (10)

| — | Ukraina (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukraina (11)

| — | Gruzija (12) |
| --- | --- |

—

Gruzija (12)

| c) | atsižvelgiant į gerą prekės ženklo vardą, žinomumą ir laikotarpį, kurį jis yra naudojamas, galėtų vartotojus suklaidinti dėl tikrosios produkto tapatybės; |
| --- | --- |

c)

atsižvelgiant į gerą prekės ženklo vardą, žinomumą ir laikotarpį, kurį jis yra naudojamas, galėtų vartotojus suklaidinti dėl tikrosios produkto tapatybės;

| d) | pakenktų visiškai ar iš dalies tapačiam pavadinimui ar prekės ženklui arba produktams, kurie iki šio pranešimo paskelbimo dienos teisėtai tiekiami rinkai ne trumpiau kaip penkerius metus; |
| --- | --- |

d)

pakenktų visiškai ar iš dalies tapačiam pavadinimui ar prekės ženklui arba produktams, kurie iki šio pranešimo paskelbimo dienos teisėtai tiekiami rinkai ne trumpiau kaip penkerius metus;

| e) | arba jei prieštaravimo pareiškimuose būtų pateikta išsamios informacijos, kuria remiantis būtų galima daryti išvadą, kad pavadinimas, kurį siekiama apsaugoti, yra bendrinis. |
| --- | --- |

e)

arba jei prieštaravimo pareiškimuose būtų pateikta išsamios informacijos, kuria remiantis būtų galima daryti išvadą, kad pavadinimas, kurį siekiama apsaugoti, yra bendrinis.

Pirmiau nurodyti kriterijai vertinami Sąjungos teritorijos atžvilgiu. Intelektinės nuosavybės teisių atveju tai yra tik ta teritorija ar teritorijos, kuriose saugomos minėtos teisės. Kad šie pavadinimai galėtų būti saugomi Europos Sąjungoje, būtina sėkmingai baigti derybas ir priimti atitinkamą teisės aktą.

Geografinių nuorodų sąrašas
   (13)

| Saugomas pavadinimas japonų kalba | Transkripcija (tik informacijos tikslais) | Produkto kategorija ir aprašymas |
| --- | --- | --- |
| „

  “/„Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi“ | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Šviežios žuvys, moliuskai bei vėžiagyviai ir jų produktai. Jūriniai bestuburiai |
| „

  “/„Tsurajima Gobou“ | Tsurajima Gobou | Vaisiai, daržovės ir grūdai, švieži arba perdirbti. Varnalėšos |
| „

  “ | Yamagata | Kiti Sutarties I priede išvardyti produktai (prieskoniai ir kt.). Kiti fermentuoti gėrimai. Seishu (sakė) |
| „

  “/„Maesawa Beef“ | Maesawa Gyu | Šviežia mėsa (ir subproduktai). Jautiena |
| „

  “/„Yonezawagyu“ | Yonezawa Gyu | Šviežia mėsa (ir subproduktai). Jautiena |
| „

  “/„Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi“ | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Šviežia mėsa (ir subproduktai). Jautiena |
| „

  “/„Nishio Matcha“ | Nishio no Matcha | Kiti Sutarties I priede išvardyti produktai (prieskoniai ir kt.) – Žaliosios arbatos milteliai |

Saugomas pavadinimas japonų kalba

Transkripcija (tik informacijos tikslais)

Produkto kategorija ir aprašymas

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Šviežios žuvys, moliuskai bei vėžiagyviai ir jų produktai. Jūriniai bestuburiai

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

Vaisiai, daržovės ir grūdai, švieži arba perdirbti. Varnalėšos

Image

Yamagata

Kiti Sutarties I priede išvardyti produktai (prieskoniai ir kt.). Kiti fermentuoti gėrimai. Seishu (sakė)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

Šviežia mėsa (ir subproduktai). Jautiena

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

Šviežia mėsa (ir subproduktai). Jautiena

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Šviežia mėsa (ir subproduktai). Jautiena

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Kiti Sutarties I priede išvardyti produktai (prieskoniai ir kt.) – Žaliosios arbatos milteliai

---

(1)  OL L 343, 2012 12 14, p. 1.

(2)  2016 m. birželio 1 d. Tarybos sprendimas (ES) 2016/1623 dėl Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir PAVB EPS valstybių ekonominės partnerystės susitarimo pasirašymo Europos Sąjungos vardu ir laikino taikymo (OL L 250, 2016 9 16, p. 1).

(3)  2002 m. balandžio 4 d. Tarybos ir Komisijos sprendimas 2002/309/EB, Euratomas dėl bendradarbiavimo mokslo ir technologijų srityje susitarimo, dėl septynių susitarimų sudarymo su Šveicarijos Konfederacija (OL L 114, 2002 4 30, p. 1), ypač Europos bendrijos ir Šveicarijos Konfederacijos susitarimas dėl prekybos žemės ūkio produktais (7 priedas).

(4)  2010 m. rugsėjo 16 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2011/265/ES dėl Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir Korėjos Respublikos laisvosios prekybos susitarimo pasirašymo Europos Sąjungos vardu ir laikino taikymo (OL L 127, 2011 5 14, p. 1).

(5)  Susitarimas, kuriuo steigiama Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir Centrinės Amerikos asociacija (OL L 346, 2012 12 15, p. 3).

(6)  Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir Kolumbijos bei Peru prekybos susitarimas (OL L 354, 2012 12 21, p. 3) ir Prisijungimo protokolas prie Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir Kolumbijos bei Peru prekybos susitarimo, kuriuo atsižvelgiama į Ekvadoro prisijungimą (OL L 356, 2016 12 24, p. 3).

(7)  2007 m. spalio 15 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2007/855/EB dėl Europos bendrijos ir Juodkalnijos Respublikos laikinojo susitarimo dėl prekybos ir su prekyba susijusių klausimų pasirašymo ir sudarymo (OL L 345, 2007 12 28, p. 1).

(8)  2008 m. birželio 16 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2008/474/EB dėl Europos bendrijos bei Bosnijos ir Hercegovinos laikinojo susitarimo dėl prekybos ir su prekyba susijusių klausimų pasirašymo ir sudarymo (OL L 169, 2008 6 30, p. 10, 6 protokolas).

(9)  2008 m. balandžio 29 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2010/36/EB dėl Europos bendrijos ir Serbijos Respublikos laikinojo susitarimo dėl prekybos ir su prekyba susijusių klausimų pasirašymo ir sudarymo (OL L 28, 2010 1 30, p. 1).

(10)  2012 m. gruodžio 3 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2013/7/ES dėl Europos Sąjungos ir Moldovos Respublikos susitarimo dėl žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų geografinių nuorodų apsaugos sudarymo (OL L 10, 2013 1 15, p. 1).

(11)  Europos Sąjungos bei jos valstybių narių ir Ukrainos asociacijos susitarimas (OL L 161, 2014 5 29).

(12)  2012 m. vasario 14 d. Tarybos sprendimas 2012/164/ES dėl Europos Sąjungos ir Gruzijos susitarimo dėl žemės ūkio ir maisto produktų geografinių nuorodų apsaugos sudarymo (OL L 93, 2012 3 30, p. 1).

(13)  Japonijoje registruotų geografinių nuorodų sąrašas, kurį vykstant deryboms pateikė Japonijos valdžios institucijos.

---

| 27.7.2017 | LT | Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

LT

Europos Sąjungos oficialusis leidinys

C 242/22

---

Pranešimas, skirtas Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, kurių vardai ir pavardės (pavadinimai) įtraukti į sąrašą, nurodytą 2002 m. gegužės 27 d. Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002, kuriuo nustatomos tam tikros specialios ribojamosios priemonės, taikomos tam tikriems asmenims ir subjektams, susijusiems su ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida organizacijomis, 2, 3 ir 7 straipsniuose, remiantis Komisijos įgyvendinimo reglamentu (ES) 2017/1390

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | Tarybos sprendimu (BUSP) 2016/1693 (1) Sąjunga raginama įšaldyti organizacijų ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida narių ir su jais susijusių kitų asmenų, grupių, susivienijimų ir subjektų, nurodytų pagal JT ST rezoliucijas 1267 (1999) ir 1333 (2000) parengtame sąraše, kurį turi reguliariai atnaujinti pagal JT ST rezoliuciją 1267 (1999) įsteigtas JT komitetas, lėšas ir ekonominius išteklius.
  Į šį JT komiteto parengtą sąrašą įtraukti:






  — | organizacijos ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Tarybos sprendimu (BUSP) 2016/1693 (1) Sąjunga raginama įšaldyti organizacijų ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida narių ir su jais susijusių kitų asmenų, grupių, susivienijimų ir subjektų, nurodytų pagal JT ST rezoliucijas 1267 (1999) ir 1333 (2000) parengtame sąraše, kurį turi reguliariai atnaujinti pagal JT ST rezoliuciją 1267 (1999) įsteigtas JT komitetas, lėšas ir ekonominius išteklius.

Į šį JT komiteto parengtą sąrašą įtraukti:

—

organizacijos ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida;

| — | su organizacijomis ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida susiję fiziniai ar juridiniai asmenys, subjektai, organizacijos ir grupės ir |
| --- | --- |

—

su organizacijomis ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida susiję fiziniai ar juridiniai asmenys, subjektai, organizacijos ir grupės ir

| — | juridiniai asmenys, subjektai ir organizacijos, nuosavybės teise priklausantys bet kuriam iš išvardytų asmenų, subjektų, organizacijų ir grupių, jų kontroliuojami arba kitaip juos remiantys. |
| --- | --- |

—

juridiniai asmenys, subjektai ir organizacijos, nuosavybės teise priklausantys bet kuriam iš išvardytų asmenų, subjektų, organizacijų ir grupių, jų kontroliuojami arba kitaip juos remiantys.

Į veiksmų arba veiklos, liudijančios, kad asmuo, grupė, susivienijimas arba subjektas yra „susiję su“ organizacijomis ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida, sąvoką įtraukta:

| a) | dalyvavimas finansuojant, planuojant, lengvinant, rengiant arba kurstant veiksmus arba veiklą, vykdomus ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida arba bet kurio jų padalinio, filialo, nuo jų atskilusios grupės arba iš jų kilusios organizacijos, kartu su jais, jų naudai arba juos remiant; |
| --- | --- |

a)

dalyvavimas finansuojant, planuojant, lengvinant, rengiant arba kurstant veiksmus arba veiklą, vykdomus ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida arba bet kurio jų padalinio, filialo, nuo jų atskilusios grupės arba iš jų kilusios organizacijos, kartu su jais, jų naudai arba juos remiant;

| b) | ginklų ir susijusių medžiagų tiekimas, pardavimas arba perdavimas bet kuriam iš jų; |
| --- | --- |

b)

ginklų ir susijusių medžiagų tiekimas, pardavimas arba perdavimas bet kuriam iš jų;

| c) | žmonių verbavimas bet kuriam iš jų arba |
| --- | --- |

c)

žmonių verbavimas bet kuriam iš jų arba

| d) | kitokie bet kurio iš jų rėmimo veiksmai arba veikla. |
| --- | --- |

d)

kitokie bet kurio iš jų rėmimo veiksmai arba veikla.

| 2. | 2017 m. liepos 20 d. JT Saugumo Tarybos komitetas patvirtino, kad Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa įrašai būtų įtraukti į Sankcijų komiteto sąrašą, skirtą ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa gali bet kuriuo metu JT ombudsmenui pateikti prašymą kartu su visais patvirtinamaisiais dokumentais, kad sprendimas dėl jų įtraukimo į minėtą JT sąrašą būtų persvarstytas. Toks prašymas turėtų būti siunčiamas šiuo adresu:





  United Nations - Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Tel. +1 212 963 2671 |
| Faksas +1 212 963 1300/3778 |
| E. paštas ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

2017 m. liepos 20 d. JT Saugumo Tarybos komitetas patvirtino, kad Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa įrašai būtų įtraukti į Sankcijų komiteto sąrašą, skirtą ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa gali bet kuriuo metu JT ombudsmenui pateikti prašymą kartu su visais patvirtinamaisiais dokumentais, kad sprendimas dėl jų įtraukimo į minėtą JT sąrašą būtų persvarstytas. Toks prašymas turėtų būti siunčiamas šiuo adresu:

United Nations - Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel. +1 212 963 2671

Faksas +1 212 963 1300/3778

E. paštas ombudsperson@un.org

Daugiau informacijos https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | Pagal 2 dalyje nurodytą JT sprendimą Komisija priėmė Įgyvendinimo reglamentą (ES) 2017/1390 (2), kuriuo iš dalies keičiamas 2002 m. gegužės 27 d. Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002, kuriuo nustatomos tam tikros specialios ribojamosios priemonės, taikomo tam tikriems asmenims ir subjektams, susijusiems su ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida organizacijomis, I priedas (3). Pakeitimu, padarytu pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002 7 straipsnio 1 dalies a punktą ir 7a straipsnio 1 dalį, Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa vardai ir pavardės (pavadinimai) įtraukiami į to reglamento I priedo sąrašą (toliau – I priedas).
  Į I priedą įtrauktiems asmenims ir subjektams taikomos šios Reglamente (EB) Nr. 881/2002 nustatytos priemonės:






  1) | visų atitinkamiems asmenims ir subjektams priklausančių, jų valdomų arba laikomų lėšų ir ekonominių išteklių įšaldymas, draudimas (visiems) tiesiogiai arba netiesiogiai teikti atitinkamiems asmenims ir subjektams arba jų naudai lėšų ir ekonominių išteklių (2 ir 2a straipsniai) ir |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Pagal 2 dalyje nurodytą JT sprendimą Komisija priėmė Įgyvendinimo reglamentą (ES) 2017/1390 (2), kuriuo iš dalies keičiamas 2002 m. gegužės 27 d. Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002, kuriuo nustatomos tam tikros specialios ribojamosios priemonės, taikomo tam tikriems asmenims ir subjektams, susijusiems su ISIL („Da'esh“) ir Al-Qaida organizacijomis, I priedas (3). Pakeitimu, padarytu pagal Reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002 7 straipsnio 1 dalies a punktą ir 7a straipsnio 1 dalį, Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa vardai ir pavardės (pavadinimai) įtraukiami į to reglamento I priedo sąrašą (toliau – I priedas).

Į I priedą įtrauktiems asmenims ir subjektams taikomos šios Reglamente (EB) Nr. 881/2002 nustatytos priemonės:

1)

visų atitinkamiems asmenims ir subjektams priklausančių, jų valdomų arba laikomų lėšų ir ekonominių išteklių įšaldymas, draudimas (visiems) tiesiogiai arba netiesiogiai teikti atitinkamiems asmenims ir subjektams arba jų naudai lėšų ir ekonominių išteklių (2 ir 2a straipsniai) ir

| 2) | draudimas tiesiogiai ar netiesiogiai duoti, parduoti, teikti ar perduoti su karine veikla susijusius techninius patarimus, pagalbą ar mokymą bet kuriam iš atitinkamų asmenų ir subjektų (3 straipsnis). |
| --- | --- |

2)

draudimas tiesiogiai ar netiesiogiai duoti, parduoti, teikti ar perduoti su karine veikla susijusius techninius patarimus, pagalbą ar mokymą bet kuriam iš atitinkamų asmenų ir subjektų (3 straipsnis).

| 4. | Reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002 7a straipsnyje nustatytas peržiūros procesas, pagal kurį į sąrašą įtraukti asmenys teikia pastabas dėl jų įtraukimo į sąrašą pagrįstumo. Asmenys ir subjektai, Įgyvendinimo reglamentu (ES) 2017/1390 įtraukti į I priedą, gali teikti Komisijai prašymą pagrįsti jų įtraukimą į sąrašą. Toks prašymas turėtų būti siunčiamas šiuo adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| “Restrictive measures” |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/ Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002 7a straipsnyje nustatytas peržiūros procesas, pagal kurį į sąrašą įtraukti asmenys teikia pastabas dėl jų įtraukimo į sąrašą pagrįstumo. Asmenys ir subjektai, Įgyvendinimo reglamentu (ES) 2017/1390 įtraukti į I priedą, gali teikti Komisijai prašymą pagrįsti jų įtraukimą į sąrašą. Toks prašymas turėtų būti siunčiamas šiuo adresu:

European Commission

“Restrictive measures”

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/ Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Atitinkamų asmenų ir subjektų dėmesys taip pat atkreipiamas į tai, kad jie turi galimybę užginčyti Įgyvendinimo reglamentą (ES) 2017/1390 Europos Sąjungos Bendrajame Teisme Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 263 straipsnio ketvirtoje ir šeštoje pastraipose nustatytomis sąlygomis. |
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5.

Atitinkamų asmenų ir subjektų dėmesys taip pat atkreipiamas į tai, kad jie turi galimybę užginčyti Įgyvendinimo reglamentą (ES) 2017/1390 Europos Sąjungos Bendrajame Teisme Sutarties dėl Europos Sąjungos veikimo 263 straipsnio ketvirtoje ir šeštoje pastraipose nustatytomis sąlygomis.

| 6. | Siekiant tvarkos į I priedą įtrauktų asmenų ir subjektų dėmesys atkreipiamas į tai, kad jie turi galimybę pateikti prašymą atitinkamos (-ų) valstybės (-ių) narės (-ių) kompetentingoms institucijoms, išvardytoms Reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002 II priede, siekdami gauti leidimą naudotis įšaldytomis lėšomis ir ekonominiais ištekliais būtiniausiems poreikiams patenkinti arba konkretiems mokėjimams atlikti, kaip nustatyta to reglamento 2a straipsnyje. |
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6.

Siekiant tvarkos į I priedą įtrauktų asmenų ir subjektų dėmesys atkreipiamas į tai, kad jie turi galimybę pateikti prašymą atitinkamos (-ų) valstybės (-ių) narės (-ių) kompetentingoms institucijoms, išvardytoms Reglamento (EB) Nr. 881/2002 II priede, siekdami gauti leidimą naudotis įšaldytomis lėšomis ir ekonominiais ištekliais būtiniausiems poreikiams patenkinti arba konkretiems mokėjimams atlikti, kaip nustatyta to reglamento 2a straipsnyje.

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(1)  OL L 255, 2016 9 21, p. 25.

(2)  OL L 195, 2017 7 27, p. 11.

(3)  OL L 139, 2002 5 29, p. 9.

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