UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL P. NELDER,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

KELLY WORLEY,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 15-4048

(D. Utah)

(D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00245-DB)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

 

Plaintiff Michael P. Nelder is an inmate at Central Utah Correctional Facility 

(CUCF). Proceeding pro se, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States 

District Court for the District of Utah, asserting Eighth Amendment and due-process 

claims arising from his designation by defendant Kelly Worley, a sergeant at CUCF, as a 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See 

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under 

the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited 

for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 16, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

2 

suspected Juggalo gang member. He appeals the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment to Worley.1

 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

Worley interviewed Nelder to determine whether he had gang relationships. 

Although Nelder maintains that he told Worley he was not a Juggalo, but was friends 

with Juggalos, Worley categorized Nelder as a suspected Juggalo for his prison records. 

As a result, he was transferred to a segregated housing unit with other suspected and 

known Juggalos. Other than designating Nelder a suspected Juggalo, Worley had no role 

in determining his security classification or housing assignment. According to Nelder, 

within two months of his being moved to segregation, a Juggalo gang member assaulted 

him because he was not a Juggalo. Nelder did not report this assault to officials because 

he feared retaliation by the Juggalos. 

On appeal Nelder argues that his suspected-Juggalo classification amounted to 

“guilt by association” and violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due-process 

rights. He stresses that his due-process claim “isn’t about housing, it’s about being 

wrongfully classified as a Juggalo.” Aplt. Br. at 4. He also argues that his placement in 

segregation was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 

 

1

 Nelder’s brief also names Steve Turley and A.C. Bigelow as appellees. They were both 

named as defendants in Nelder’s original complaint; but they were omitted from his 

amended complaint. “[I]t is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily 

supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.” Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp., 

929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nelder 

therefore has no pending claim against Turley and Bigelow, and he has no right to relief 

against them on appeal. 
3 

3 

because Worley should have known that he would be subject to assault by Juggalo gang 

members if placed in segregation. 

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the 

same standards that the district court should have applied.” Schanzenbach v. Town of 

Opal, 706 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations marks omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and record show there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 

Merrifeld v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 2011). 

We affirm the rejection of Nelder’s due-process claim. The Due Process Clause 

protects against the denial of “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 

But Nelder complains only about his classification as a gang member, not his housing. 

And being labeled does not, in itself, deny a person either liberty or property. See Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708‒709 (1976) (defamation by the government, alone, does not 

deprive one of a protected liberty interest). 

We also affirm the denial of Nelder’s Eighth Amendment claim. “[P]rison 

officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks 

omitted). But “[b]ecause only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates 

the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must act with deliberate indifference to inmate 

health or safety to violate the inmate’s constitutional rights.” Castillo v. Day, 790 F.3d 

1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Deliberate indifference 
4 

4 

has both an objective and a subjective component.” Id. To prevail on the objective 

component, the prisoner must show that the harm he suffered “was sufficiently serious.” 

Id. “To prevail on the subjective component, the prisoner must show that the defendant 

knew the prisoner faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk.” Id. at 1021 

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Nelder’s claim fails on the subjective 

prong. “[A] prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Verdecia v. Adams, 327 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). But there is no evidence in the record that Worley had knowledge of an 

actual threat to Nelder’s safety. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and GRANT Nelder’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

 Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge