IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-60473

Summary Calendar

MISSISSIPPI RISING COALITION; RONALD VINCENT; LEA CAMPBELL; 

PAMELA BLACKWELL, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CITY OF OCEAN SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s order dismissing their claims under 

the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The district court ruled

that plaintiffs lack both Article III and statutory standing. We AFFIRM.

Plaintiffs are a non-profit organization, Mississippi Rising Coalition, and 

various residents of Ocean Springs, Mississippi. Plaintiffs allege that

defendant, the City of Ocean Springs (“the City”), violated the FHA when the 

City’s Board of Aldermen passed a resolution requiring the Mississippi state

flag to be flown over city hall and other municipal buildings. Specifically,

plaintiffs claim that flying the state flag, which includes the Confederate battle 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 3, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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flag in its canton, amounts to “racial steering” under the FHA because it deters

African-Americans from living in or moving to Ocean Springs. See Gladstone 

Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979) (defining “racial 

steering” as “directing prospective home buyers interested in equivalent 

properties to different areas according to their race”).

The FHA states that “[a]n aggrieved person may commence a civil action 

in an appropriate United States district court or state court . . . to obtain 

appropriate relief with respect to [a] discriminatory housing practice or 

breach.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). An “aggrieved person” means a person who

“(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) 

believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice 

that is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i). Under the FHA, then, one must 

allege the existence of a “discriminatory housing practice” as a threshold 

requirement to be considered an “aggrieved person” with standing to sue.

We agree with the district court that plaintiffs lack both Article III and 

statutory standing to bring their FHA claims.

First, plaintiffs have not alleged a sufficient “injury in fact” to confer 

Article III standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992). We recently held that exposure to the Mississippi state flag did not 

constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing for an equal protection claim. 

See Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 250-53 (5th Cir. 2017) (“That Plaintiff 

alleges that he personally and deeply feels the impact of Mississippi’s state 

flag, however sincere those allegations are, is irrelevant to . . . standing 

analysis unless Plaintiff alleges discriminatory treatment.”), cert. denied, 138 

S. Ct. 468 (2017). If exposure to a flag does not injure a plaintiff for equal 

protection purposes, exposure to the same flag does not injure a plaintiff for

FHA purposes either. Plaintiffs’ allegations therefore fail to establish Article 

III standing, as the district correctly held.

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Second, plaintiffs’ allegations also fail to establish statutory standing 

under the FHA. The only act they allege is the City’s resolution requiring the 

Mississippi state flag to be flown over public buildings. That is not a 

“discriminatory housing practice” as required by the FHA, and plaintiffs are 

therefore not “aggrieved persons” under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i).

Plaintiffs do not allege that the City is refusing to sell or rent homes to AfricanAmericans, or to any other racial group. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Nor do they 

allege that the City has made housing “unavailable” or “den[ied]” it to anyone. 

Id. Plaintiffs may believe that flying the flag in question makes living in the 

City less desirable, but the complained-of action does not plausibly equate to 

making housing unavailable under the statute. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157-58 n.13 (3rd Cir. 2002) (“[N]o 

court has stretched the ‘make unavailable or deny’ language of § 3604(a) to 

encompass actions that both (1) do not actually make it more difficult (as 

opposed to less desirable) to obtain housing and (2) do not directly regulate or 

zone housing or activities within the home.”).

Plaintiffs also invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3604(c), but it does not help their case. 

That subsection makes it unlawful “[t]o make, print, or publish . . . any notice, 

statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 

indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race . . . or an 

intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3604(c) (emphasis added.) Even assuming arguendo that displaying a 

state flag could be considered “making” or “publishing” a “notice, statement, or 

advertisement,” that alone does not plausibly suggest that the City has done 

anything “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling.” Such a capacious 

reading of “with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling” would risk 

converting any decision by a municipal body into to a potential FHA claim, 

regardless of its connection to the sale or rental of housing. We decline to read 

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the FHA so broadly. We therefore agree with the district court that plaintiffs

cannot be considered “aggrieved persons” capable of suing under the FHA. 42 

U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).

Finally, the City has moved for sanctions and costs against plaintiffs and

their counsel. While we disagree with plaintiffs’ arguments, sanctions are 

appropriate only for frivolous appeals—meaning that “the result [of the appeal] 

is obvious or the arguments of error are wholly without merit and the appeal 

is taken in the face of clear, unambiguous, dispositive holdings of this and other 

appellate courts.” Streamline Prod. Sys., Inc. v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., 851 F.3d 

440, 463 n.12 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

Although we believe the answer to the question is straightforward, we are 

aware of no precedent from our court or the Supreme Court concerning 

whether a resolution requiring flying a state flag on public buildings can give 

rise to an FHA violation. We therefore decline the City’s sanction request.

AFFIRMED. Motion for sanctions DENIED.

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