### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 3, 200 5 S es sio n
SHAVA LYNN KENDRI CK v . LARRY BERT KENDRI CK
Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Houston Coun ty No. 6-90 Leonard W. Mar tin, Jud ge

No. M2004- 00540-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jul y 8, 2005

This case involves a father’s e fforts to protect his children f rom their moth er ’s sexuallyabusive
re la tiv e s. Whe n th e mothe r f ile d f or div or c e in the Cha nc ery Co urt f or Ho us ton Cou nty , s he a lso filed a notice of intent to relocate with the childre n to the State of Ne w York to be cl o s er to her family , including a

stepfa t h er wh o h ad sexuallyabused a nd rape d her w hen she w as a c hild. Fol lo w in g a b e n c h tria l, th e tria l c o u r t d e c la r e d th e p ar ti e s d iv o r c e d , d e s ig n a te d th e mo th e r as the primary residential pa

rent, an d p er mitted the mother to move to the State of Ne w York w ith the parties’ children. The fathe r has appea led, arg uing first that the trial court’s custody and re location decisions have exposed the children to an unreasonable risk of sex ual abuse and second, that the trial court e rre d by

ref using to designate which of t he parties should be permitted to claim the c hildren as tax ex emptions. W e have determined that t h e t ri al court erre d by allowing the mother a nd the children to move to the State of New York without suff icient proof reg arding their safe ty . We have also conc luded that the court erre d by ref using to a ddress the pa

rties’ tax ex emption issues. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Vac ated

W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined.

Clifford K. McG own, J r., Waverly , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, L arry

Be rt Kendrick. Markley Runy on Gill, Erin, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Shava L

y nn Kendrick.
OP IN ION

I.

L arry Be rt Kendrick and Shava L y nn Kendrick m et whil e ser ving in the military and mar ried in 1997 in Montgomery

Count y , T ennesse e. The y had thre e childre n toge ther: Da niel, who was born on June 26, 1997, and twins Amanda and Adam, who were born on F ebrua ry 6, 2001. After
sever al y ear s o f marria g e, the pa rties experienc ed some marital discord stemming f rom Mr. Ke n d ri ck ’s l ac k

o f i n v o l v em en twi t h t h e c h i l d re n
. M r. Ke n d ri ck , wh o wa s t h en wo rk i n g as a l o n ghaul truck driver, wa s routinely away from home f

ive day s per we ek. His prolong ed abse nces require d Ms. Kendric k, who was disabled, to sta y at home to c are for the children. O n the day s when-2-

Mr. Kendrick was home , he ofte n ref used to help Ms. Kendric k with the children e ither bec ause he was too tired or

beca use be ha d other erra nds to run. He a lso declined to ca re f or the c hildren whe n Ms. Kendric k wanted to r un err an d s o r v i s i t with her friends. Acc ording ly , Ms. Kendric k was require d to hire a ba

by sitter, even w hen Mr. Ke ndrick wa s home.

On Fe bruary

25, 2003, Ms. Kendric k filed a c omplaint for divorce in the Chance ry Court for Houston County , citing inappropriate marital conduct and irre concilable differ ence s. She submitt ed a tempora ry pare nting plan de signating he rself as the primary residential pa rent. On Ma

rch 6, 2003, Mr . K e nd ri c k fil e d an a ns we r andc ou nte rc la im a sse rt ing that it wa s Ms . K e nd ri c k w ho wa s g uil ty of ina pp ro pr ia te mari ta l c on du c t. H e a lso su bmi tte d a te mpo ra ry pa re nti ng plan d e sig natin g Ms. Kendrick as the primary

residential pa

rent, e ven thoug h he had sta ted in hi s an s we r t h at he was
c apa ble of be ing the pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.
On Ap ri l 8, 20 03 , th e tr ia l c ou rt e sta bli sh e d a te mpo ra ry pa re nti ng pl an des ig natin g Ms. Kendrick the primary

residential pa

rent a nd allowing Mr. Kendrick liberal visitation. On April 9, 2003, Mr. Kendrick filed a motion to reduce his child support oblig ations on the basis that his job status chang ed. He had dec ided to stop doing “over -the-r oad trucking ” and to instea d drive a local route in orde r to have more fr ee time and a more normal schedule

. The trial court g rante d his moti on and re duced his c hild support from $400 to $300 per we ek. Both pa rties moved aw ay from Houston County afte r t hey separ ated. Mr. Kendrick moved to Colum bia, Tenne ssee, a nd Ms. Kendric k moved t o Clarksville, Tenne ssee. Howeve r, on May 28, 2003, Ms. Kendric k filed a motion seeking permission to relocate to either I llinois , New Y ork, or Missouri to be closer to her family . Mr. Kendrick opposed the motion to relocate. On June 19, 20 03 , th e tr ia l c ou rt

c on du c te d a

be nc h tr ia l re g ard ing a ll p e nd ing iss ue s. Du ri ng thi s h e ari ng , M s. Kendrick asserted that she de sired to be the c hildren’s primary residential parent and stated t hat she intended to m ove to the C anton, New York area

. She also testified that she would possibly be living with her mother and stepfathe r while she attempted to establish herself

. F or his pa rt , Mr. Ke nd ri c k a

rg ue d th a t he wa s mo re fi t to be the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. He a lso asserted that permitting Ms. Ke ndrick to move to the S t at e o f Ne w Yo rk to live with her mothe r w ou ld s ub

je c t th e c hil dr e n to the ri sk of se xua l a bu se be c a us e of

the ir pr ox imity

to M s. Kendrick’s stepfather, who ha d sexuallyabused and rape d Ms. Kendric k when she was a child. He also pointed out to the court that allowing Ms. Ke n d ri ck to move to Missouri to l ive nea r her bio log ic a l f

a the r w ou ld e nta il s imi lar risk be c a us e Ms. Ke nd ri c k’ s b iol og ic a l f a the r h a d a l so se xua lly mol e ste d h e r w he n s he wa s a c hil d. He a lso inf

orme d th e c ou rt

that Ms . K e nd ri c k w a s me nta lly unstable, that she wa s battling de pression, and that she had twice attempted to commit suicide.

Ms. Kendrick responded by assuring the trial court that she would protec t the children f rom her f ather and stepfather if she di d re l o ca t e, that she had no issues with depr ession, and that Mr. Kendrick himself battled depression and had urg ed her to commit sui cide. She a lso insis ted that the childre n w o u lde s s e n ti a ll y b e r a is e d b y

a n a n n y if M r
. K e n d r ic k

w e r e d e s ig n a te d a s th e p r ima ry residential pa

rent be cause of Mr. Ke ndrick’s w ork dema nds.-3-

Ruling fr om the bench at the close of the hea ring , the trial court declar ed the pa rties divorce d, design ated Ms. Ke ndrick a s the primary residential pa

rent, a nd allowed he r to reloc ate. Mr. Ke nd ri c k w a s g ive n th re e we e ks of vis itatio n p e r y e ar, in a dd iti on to any oth e r v isi ta tio n a g re e d to by the parties. The fina l decr ee, however , did not include a pare nting plan. Ms. Kendrick and the children pr omptly moved t o the S tate of New York and are curr ently residing in Canton, New Y ork
near the Canadia n border

. On August 26, 2003, Mr. Kendrick filed a motion for new tria l and to alter or amend the judgme nt. He stated that the l ack of a parenting plan was c ausing problems betwe en the pa rties, and specific ally

reque sted the court to addre ss which par ent would be a llowed to claim the childre n as exemptions for income tax purposes. He also st ated that he had proven at trial that he shoul d be the primary residential parent, e specia lly beca use Ms. Kendrick moved the c hildren to New York a fter the divorce hearing, g iving he r potentially abusive stepf

ather acc ess to them.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

c on du c te d a

he ari ng and de nie d th e mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l. T he c ou rt

a lso
re fu s ed t o desig nate whic h of the pa rties would be pe rmitted to claim the children on the ir tax returns. The court opined t hat t he fe dera l tax laws we re too “ complicated and convoluted” f or the court to ade quately

addre ss and told the parties that it was ba sically “betwe en y ou and the tax
se rv ic e , a nd y ou ha ve to abid e by the ir ru le s, un le ss y ’a ll a g re e on so me thi ng be tw e e n y ou that su its y ou be tte r. ” Th e c ou rt

the n o rd e re d th e pa

rt ie s to su bmit pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plans . Wh ile Ms. Kendrick complied with the orde r, Mr. Ke ndrick failed to submit a perma nent pare nting plan, a nd the tr ia l c ou rt

the re fo re bas ica ll y a do pte d M s. Ke nd ri c k’ s p e rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan w ith so me alterations.

II. D E S I GNAT I NG M S . K END R I C K A S THE P RI M ARY R ESI D ENTIAL P ARE NT AND P E RM I T T I NG H E R T O M OV E TO THE S TA TE O F N E W Y ORK The princ ipal issues on appea l relate to the trial court’ s ap p ro val of Ms. Ke ndrick’s perma nent pare nting plan de signating he r as the c hildren’s primary residential pa

rent a nd permitting her to move to the State of Ne w York. Mr . Kendrick states that the e vidence does not support the trial court’ s decisions and that t h e trial c ourt did not properly consider the fac tors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106( a) ( 2001) and Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404 (Supp. 2004). We have de termined that the re c or d d oe s no t pr ov ide a n a de qu a te ba sis fo r c on c lud ing that a llo wi ng the c hil dr e n to be in the ir mothe r’ s c us tod y

in N e w Y or

k is in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re sts

.

A.

C u s t o d y an d v i s i t at i o n ar ra n gem en t s ar e am o n g t h e mo s t i m p o rt an t d ec i s i o n s co n fr o n t i n g a trial court in a divor ce c ase. Steen v . Steen , 6 1 S. W.3 d 324 , 327 (T e nn . Ct. App . 2 00 1) . Co urts m us t strive to d e vis e c us tod y arr a ng e me nts that pro mot e the de ve lop me nt o f the c hil dr e n’ s r e la tio ns hip with both parents and inter fer e as lit tle as possible with post-divorce f amily decision-making

. Aaby v. Strange , 9 24 S.W. 2d62 3, 62 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) ; Taylor v. Taylor , 849 S.W .2d 319, 331-32 ( T enn. 1 9 9 3 )

. T h e n e e d s o f t h e c h i l d r e n ar e p ar a m o u n t , w h i l e t h e d e s i r e s o f t h e p ar e n t s ar e s e c o n d ar y. Le ntzv . Le ntz , 717 S

. W

. 2 d 876, 877 (Tenn. 1986) . Custodyshould never be used to punish orT en n
. Code An n
. § 36- 6- 101( a) ( 2) ( 2001) ve st s t h e cou r t s w i t h “ t h e wi des t di s cr et i on t o or der a c u s t ody 1

a rr a n g e m e n t t h a t i s in th e b e st inte re st o f t h e c h ild .”
-4- rew ard the pare nts, Turner v. Turner , 9 19 S .W. 2d34 0, 34 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp .1 99 5) ; Long v. Long , 48 8 S. W.2 d 729 , 733 (T e nn . Ct . A pp .1 97 2) , b ut r a the r s ho uldpr omo te the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re sts by placing them in a n environment that will best serve the ir phy sical and e motional needs. Luke v. Luke , 651 S.W .2d 219, 221 (Tenn. 1983)

. There are no hard a nd fast rule s for de termining which custody and visitation arra ng ement will best serve a

child’s nee ds. Taylor v. Taylor , 8 49 S.W. 2d a t 32 7; Dantzler v. Dantzler , 665 S.W. 2d38 5, 38 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp .1 98 3) . T he inq uir y is f a c tua ll y drive n a ndre qu ir e s th e c ou rt s to car efully weig h numerous conside rations. Nic ho ls v . Ni c ho ls , 792 S.W .2d 713, 716 (Tenn. 1990) ; Ro ge ro v . P itt , 75 9 S.W. 2d 10 9, 11 2 (T e nn .1 98 8)

. Th e Te nn e sse e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y a ndthe c ou rt s have ide ntified the fa ctors that trial c ourts should consider. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106( a) ( 2001); Bah v. Bah , 668 S.W .2d 663, 666 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983). Courts customarily

devise initial custody

an d visitation arrang ements by eng ag ing in a
c omp arativ e fitn ess a na ly sis that r e qu ir e s th e m to de te rm ine wh ic h o f t he a va ila ble c us tod ia ns is compar atively

more fit than the othe r. In re Parsons , 914 S.W .2d 889, 893 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995); Bah v. Bah , 6 68 S.W. 2da t 66 6. Th is “ c omp arativ e fi tne ss” a na ly sis do e s n ot m e a su re the pa re nts ag ainst the standard o f perfec tion because the courts are pr ag matic enoug h to understand that perf ection in marriag e and pa renting is as evane scent a s it is i n life’s other pursuits. Ea rls v . E

ar ls , 42 S.W. 3d 87 7, 88 5 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); Rice v . Rice , 9 83 S.W. 2d68 0, 68 2- 83 (T e nn . Ct

. App.1998). Rather , the ana ly sis requires the courts to determine which o f t h e p are nts, in li g ht of their pre sent circ umstances, is compa ratively more fit to assume and discha rg e the r esponsibiliti es of be ing a c us tod ia l pa

re nt.
Cus tod y a ndvis itatio n d e c isi on s o ft e n h ing e on su bt le fa c tor s, inc lud ing the pa re nts ’ demea nor and c redibility

during the divorce proce eding s themselves. Adelsperge r v. Ade lsperger , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App.1997). A ccor dingly , appellate courts ar e re luctant to secondg ue s s a t r i a l c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n s
. T r i a l c o u r t s m u s tb e ab l e t o e xe r c i s e b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n i n the se matters, but they

still must base their de cisions on the proof a nd upon the appr opriate a pplication 1 of the re levant princ iples of law. D v. K , 917 S.W .2d 682, 685 (Tenn. Ct. App.1995). T hus, we revie w these de cisions de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial court’s finding s of fa ct are corr ect unless the e vidence p re p o n derates otherwise

. Nic ho ls v . Ni c ho ls , 792 S.W .2d at 716; Doles v. D oles , 848 S.W .2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

Tria l c ou rt s nec e ssa

ri ly ha ve br oa d disc re tio n to fa sh ion c us tod y a ndvis itatio n a

rr a ng e me nts that best suit the unique circ umstances of eac h case

. Parker v . Parker , 986 S.W .2d 557, 563 (Tenn. 19 99 ); Suttles v. Suttles , 7 48 S.W. 2d42 7, 42 9 ( Te nn . 1 98 8) ; Helson v. Cyrus , 989 S.W .2d 704, 707 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). It is not our r ole to “ tweak [t hese decisions] .

. . in the hopes of a chieving
a more rea sonable result than the trial c ourt.” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001)

. A trial court’s decision reg arding custody or visitation should be set aside only when it “f

alls outside the spec trum of ruling s that might reasonably result from an application of t he correc t leg al standar ds to the evidenc e found in the r ecor d.” Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d at 88.C h ild re n thr ive in sta b le e n v iro n m e n ts. Aaby v

. St r ange , 9 2 4 S .W .2 d a t 6 2 7 ; Gor s k i v
. Ra gai ns , N o. 2 01A01- 9710- G S- 00597, 1999 W L 511451, at * 4- 5 (T en n
. C t

. A pp. Ju l y 21, 1999) ( N o T en n
. R

. App. P. 11 a ppl i ca t i on fil e d ); N A T I O N A L I NT E R DI S C I P L I NA R Y C OL L OQU I UM ON C HI L D C US T ODY , L E G A L A ND M E N T A L H E A L T H P ERSPE CTI VES ON C HI L D C US T ODY L AW : A D E SK BOO K F OR J U D GES § 5 :1 , at 5 1 (1 9 9 8 ).

-5- B.
Ms. Kendric k has admit ted t hat her stepfathe r sex ually abused and rape d her f or seve ral y ear s during her c hildhood. Yet, she dec ided that she a nd the parties’ childre n wo uld move in with her mothe r a ndste pf

a the r w hil e sh e wa s g e tti ng he rs elf e sta bli sh e d. Othe r tha n v a g ue pr omi se s to protec t the children f

rom her ste pfathe r, Ms

. Kendrick provided no concr ete information about the steps she would take to preve nt her stepfather from abusing them. W hen making both custody and reloc ation decisions, the courts must con s i d er , among other fa ctors, the c hara cter and beha vior of other pe rsons residing in or fre quenting the par ent’s home a n d t h ese persons’ intera ction with the child. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 6-106(a )(9) , -108(c )(11) , -404(b) (13). Many red fl ag s should have bee n raised by Ms. Kendric k’s sug g estion that she move the children to e ither Missouri to be nea rer to her biolog ical father or to Ne w York to be near er to he r mother and a

busive stepfa ther. Additional alarms should have bee n sounded whe n Ms. Kendric k stated that she mig ht actually live with her mother a nd stepfathe r in New York. This admission
a lon e sh ou ld h a ve pr e ve nte d th e tr ia l c ou rt fr om a llo wi ng Ms. Ke ndri c k to re loc a te wi tho ut f ir st determining whe ther the reloc ation was in the children’ s best interests. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6- 10 8( d) (3 ), -1 08 (e ). Th e tr ia l c ou rt , h ow e ve r, appe are d to pa y lit tle he e d to the fa c t th a t Ms

. Kendrick’s biolog ical father and her stepfather are pedophiles. The court should never have a llowed Ms. Kendric k to relocate to New Y ork without conducting a best intere sts analy sis and requiring her to submit specific plans reg arding how she planne d to protect he r childre n from sexual abuse.

De vis ing a pe rm a ne nt pa

re nti ng arr a ng e me nt in thi s c a se is f urthe r c omp lic a te d in tw o w a y s. First, the children have been living in the State of Ne w York since 2003. Second, the r ecor d contains no evidenc e re g ard i n g t h e extent to which Ms. Kendric k’s stepfather ha s had ac cess to the thre e children. B efor e any

court uproots these children, it must first be absolutely clea r that such a move i s n e c e s s ar y. 2

F or the se re a so ns , w e re ma ndthi s c a se fo r a he a ri ng re g ard ing the status of the c hil dr e n, the ir interac tion with Ms. K endric k’s stepfathe r, and the way s in w hich Ms. K endric k is pr o t ec t i n g t he children’ s health and sa fety . To aid the trial court in this i nquiry , Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-215(a )(3) (2001) authorizes Tennessee ’s courts to request anothe r state to conduc t a custody evaluation and to have the r esults of the eva luation forwa rded to the c o u rt

. T h us, in addition to t he evide nce submitt ed by

the parties themselves, the trial c ourt may further inform i ts decision reg arding the p ar t i e s ’ c h i l d r e n u s i n g t h e e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d b y N e w Y o rk ’ s c h i l d p r o t e c t i v e s e r v i c e s a g e n c y.
I f s uf fi c ie nt p ro of

is p re se nte d th a t Ms . K e nd ri c k is un able to e ns ur e he r c hil dr e n’ s sa fe ty in their cur rent e nvironment, the trial court sha ll take all nece ssary steps to remove the children f rom that e nv ir on me nt, wh ic h may inc lud e de sig natin g Mr

. Ke nd ri c k a s the prima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt i f appropriate. F urther, if

it is found that the children a re in da ng er, the court shall order Ms. Kendrick-6-

to a pp e ar b e fo re it w ith the thr e e c hil dr e n a s we ll a s iss ue “ a ny or de rs ne c e ssa

ry to e ns ur e the sa fe ty of the c hild[ ren] . . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 225(a) , (c)

. C.

Ms. K endric k arg ues that Mr. Kendrick waived any rig ht to challen ge h er perma nent pare nting plan be cause he fa iled to submit a permanent parenting plan of his own. Whi le we a g ree that parties must follow trial court orders, w e dec line to find that Mr. Kendrick’s fa i l u re t o file a pare nting plan of

his own signa ls his acquiesce nce in Ms. Ke ndrick’s pa renting plan. The undisputed evidenc e reg arding the history of abusive conduct on the part of M s
. Ke n d ri ck’s stepfathe r and biolog ical fathe r should ha ve been suf ficient to prompt the trial c ourt to stay its hand until additional eviden ce re gar ding the steps that would be take n to protect the c hildren had be en prese nted. There fore , we conclude that the court e rre d by adopting Ms. Kendric k’s par enting plan and desig nating her a s the primary residential pare nt w ithout re quiring her to de monstrate that her move to New Y ork had not a nd would not expos e the pa rties’ c hildren to a risk of se x ual abuse

. III
. T HE D E P E NDE NCY E XE M P T I ON
Mr. Kendrick also ar g ues that the tr i al co u rt er red by ref using to de signate which of the pa rt ie s w ou ld be a llo we d to c la im the c hil dr e n a s e xemp tio ns fo r ta x p ur po se s. He state s th a t th is ref usal is causing unnece ssary confusion betwe en the pa rties. M s
. Ke n d ri ck arg ues that the trial court prope rly

ref used to addre ss the parties’ tax issue beca use Mr. Kendrick r aised this issue for the first time during the hearing on the motion for a ne w trial. She also ar g ues that it is within t he trial
c ou rt ’s dis c re tio n to de c ide wh e the r t o a llo c a te a de pe nd e ncy ex emp tion. We d isa g re e wi th M s. Ke nd ri c k’ s a

rg ume nts

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1)( E)(xii) requires tria l courts to consider the tax conseque nces to e ach pa

rty when f ashioning child support pay ments. As we rece ntly stated, “[t] he
c ou rt s sh ou ld c on sid e r the ta x co ns e qu e nc e s o f the ir c hil d s up po rt

or de rs . T he ir

de cis ions w ith
re g ard to the a llo c a tio n o f e xemp tio ns fo r m ino r c hil dr e n a re dis c re tio na

ry a ndsh ou ld r e st o n f

a c ts of the pa rticular c ase.” Ba ra ba s v . R og e rs , 868 S.W .2d 283, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App.1993) ( citations omi tte d) ; see Enge l v. Y

oung , No. M 2001-00734-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 1129451, at *6-7 (T enn. Ct

. A p p
. M ar c h 1 4 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( N o T e n n
. R. A p p
. P. 1 1 ap p li c a ti o n f il e d ) ( c le ar ly s e tt in g f

orth the standards to use w hen dete rmining w hich party shall be allocated a de pendenc y exemption). The duty of a trial court to make these considerations is clea r from the s tatute and need not be ra ised by

the parties to take ef

fec t. There fore , t he tax ex emption issue was not waive d by Mr. Kendrick when it wa s raised for t he first time during the m otion for new t rial hearing . The trial c ourt e rr e d b y ref us ing to a dd re ss the ta x exempti on qu e sti on . O n r e ma nd , th e c ou rt is d ir e c te d to de te rm ine wh ic h o f the tw o p art ie s w ill be pe rm itt e d to c la im the c hil dr e n a s e xemp tio ns fo r i nc ome tax purposes.-7- IV.

We vacate the judg ment and the pe rmane nt pa renting plan desig nating Ms. Kendric k as the p r im ar y r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t a n d r e ma n d th e c a s e f o r a ti me ly h e ar in g c o n s is te n t w ith th is o p in io n
. We tax t he costs of this appe al in equal pr oportions to L arry Be rt Kendrick and his surety and to Shava L y nn Kendrick for w hich execution, if nec essary , may issue.

______________________________ WI LL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.