If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 14, 2019

v No. 344399

Wayne Circuit Court

JAY ANTOINE COOPER, LC No. 17-008195-01-FH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and MARKEY and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The prosecution appeals as of right an order dismissing charges against defendant for 

violation of defendant’s speedy trial rights. We reverse and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

I. BASIC FACTS

This case arises from a death caused when defendant’s motor vehicle allegedly crashed

into three parked cars on October 12, 2003. Lakisha Coleman (“Lakisha”) received a call that 

her brother, Jonathan Coleman (“Jonathan”) was in an accident. Lakisha arrived at the scene of 

the accident and saw that Jonathan and defendant were in defendant’s vehicle. Defendant was in 

the driver’s seat of the vehicle, and Jonathan was in the passenger’s seat. Jonathan was 

unresponsive and the fire department removed Jonathan from the vehicle using the jaws of life. 

An autopsy later concluded that the car accident caused Jonathan’s death. 

On August 29, 2006, a magistrate judge signed a felony warrant and complaint, charging 

defendant with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing death, MCL 257.625(4)(a),

and manslaughter with a motor vehicle, MCL 750.321. However, though the events giving rise 

to the charges occurred in 2003 and the arrest warrant was issued in 2006, defendant was not 

arrested until July 2017. He was living in Virginia at the time. 
-2-

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of his constitutional right to a 

speedy trial.1 Applying the speedy trial factors articulated in Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514; 92 S

Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), the trial court determined that the 14 year delay between the 

offense and the arrest, including the 11 year delay between the issuance of a warrant and the 

arrest, created a presumption of prejudice. The trial court found that the prosecution did not state 

a reason for the delay, and that defendant had asserted his right to a speedy trial from the 

beginning of the case. The trial court also acknowledged defendant’s arguments relating to 

prejudice arising from the delay that: (a) the vehicles were not available for inspection, (b) the 

physical evidence at the scene of the accident was no longer available, (c) defendant’s medical 

records were destroyed, and (d) defendant could not cross-examine the people who drew and 

analyzed his blood at the hospital. The trial court concluded that defendant’s right to a speedy 

trial was violated and dismissed the charges against defendant. 

II. ANALYSIS

The prosecution argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the delay period 

for defendant’s speedy trial claim started either at the date of the offense or the date of the 

issuance of the complaint and warrant. We agree. 

“The determination whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial is a mixed question of 

fact and law.” People v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 664; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). “The 

factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while the constitutional issue is a question of law 

subject to review de novo.” Id. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling regarding a motion to 

dismiss for an abuse of discretion. People v Campbell, 289 Mich App 533, 535; 798 NW2d 514 

(2010). “A trial court may be said to have abused its discretion only when its decision falls 

outside the range of the principled outcomes.” People v Nicholson, 297 Mich App 191, 196; 822 

NW2d 284 (2012). 

A defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan 

Constitutions, as well as by statute and court rule. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; 

MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A). “In determining whether a defendant has been denied the right to a 

speedy trial, we balance the following four factors: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for 

delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.” People v 

Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261-262; 716 NW2d 208 (2006), citing Barker. 

In the trial court, the prosecutor twice conceded that the first of the four Barker factors –

the length of the delay between the crime and defendant’s actual arrest – created a presumption 

of prejudice. “When the delay is less than 18 months, the defendant must prove that he or she 

suffered prejudice.” People v Rivera, 301 Mich App 188, 193; 835 NW2d 464 (2013). 

However, prejudice is presumed after a delay of 18 months or more, which shifts the burden to 

the prosecution to rebut the presumption. Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665. Specifically, in the 

prosecution’s response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, the prosecution stated: “The People 

 1 Defendant specifically abandoned his claim that the pre-arrest delay violated his due process 

rights.
-3-

concede the length of time exceeds the 18 month period of time in which the burden shifts to the 

People to explain.” Additionally, at the initial hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, the 

following exchange occurred: 

The Court: I don’t think I have enough facts at this point to find that the—

certainly there has been a delay. I think the first element is satisfied. 

Mr. Beadle: I think I conceded that in the brief, did I not? I think I did. 

The Court: I’m pretty sure you did. 

While conceding that factor one weighed in defendant’s favor, the prosecution focused on the 

other three remaining factors and argued that defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated.

The prosecution now takes the opposite position on appeal. It focuses exclusively on the 

first Barker factor and argues that the trial court erred when it determined that the delay period 

commenced either on the date of the offense or the date of the issuance of the felony complaint 

and warrant. We recognize the prosecution’s inconsistent position but conclude that the 

inconsistency is not an impediment here, where the issue is one of law. “A ‘stipulation’ . . . is an 

agreement, admission or concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties or their 

attorneys, respecting some matter incident thereto. Its purpose is generally stated to be the 

avoidance of delay, trouble, and expense.” Staff v Johnson, 242 Mich App 521, 535; 619 NW2d 

57 (2000) (citations omitted). “Stipulations of fact are binding, but stipulations of law are not 

binding.” Id. Although the prosecution twice stipulated that the length of the delay exceeded 18 

months, the prosecution’s concessions were premised on a misapprehension of the correct legal 

standard to determine when the delay period commences for a speedy trial violation. 

Turning to the merits of the prosecutor’s appeal, the trial court cited both the 14 year 

period between the offense and defendant’s arrest, and the 11 year period between the issuance 

of the warrant and defendant’s arrest when it calculated the length of the delay. The prosecution 

argues that the trial court used the wrong date in determining when the delay period for a speedy 

trial violation commenced. We agree. 

We find defendant’s reliance upon Doggett v United States, 505 US 647; 112 S Ct 2686; 

120 L Ed 2d 520 (1992), misplaced. In Doggett, our United States Supreme Court determined 

that a delay of 81⁄2 years between the defendant’s indictment and his arrest violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at 648. Although the Supreme Court determined that the 

delay between the defendant’s indictment and arrest violated his right to a speedy trial, the 

Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that “the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy 

trial has no application beyond the confines of a formal criminal prosecution. Once triggered by 

arrest, indictment, or other official accusation, however, the speedy trial enquiry must weigh the 

effect of delay on the accused's defense just as it has to weigh any other form of prejudice 

that Barker recognized.” Id. at 655. 

Our Michigan Supreme Court has also confirmed that “[t]he time for judging whether the 

right to a speedy trial has been violated runs from the date of the defendant’s arrest.” Williams, 

475 Mich at 261, citing United States v Marion, 404 US 307, 312; 92 S Ct 455; 30 L Ed 2d 468 

(1971). In fact, “[a] formal charge against, or restraint of, the accused is necessary to call the 
-4-

right to speedy trial into play.” People v Rosengren, 159 Mich App 492, 506 n 16; 407 NW2d 

391 (1987) citing Marion. In Michigan, a criminal prosecution is initiated with the filing of an 

information or by grand jury indictment. In this case, the prosecution issued a complaint and a 

warrant, which do not trigger a criminal prosecution. Instead, the criminal prosecution for 

speedy trial purposes was triggered when defendant was arrested. 

Defendant was arrested in July 2017. The trial court dismissed the charges on June 1, 

2018. Therefore, the length of the delay was approximately 11 months. See Rivera, 301 Mich 

App at 194 (calculating the length of the delay as the time between arrest and dismissal of the 

charges). The trial court erred when it shifted the burden to the prosecution to rebut the 

presumption of prejudice because the length of the delay was less than 18 months. Waclawski, 

286 Mich App at 665. As such, the trial court erred when it used an incorrect date for calculating

the length of the delay, and again erred when it improperly shifted the burden to the prosecution 

to rebut the presumption of prejudice, because the delay was for less than 18 months. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ James Robert Redford 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly