Affirmed in Part and Dismissed in Part and Opinion filed November 4, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00078-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF CECELIA MARGARET GIBBONS, DECEASED

On Appeal from Probate Court Number 1

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 401,492

OPINION

This appeal arises from a core probate matter involving a contest as to which 

of three wills executed by the testatrix should be admitted to probate. The attorney 

who drafted the first two wills in dispute filed an application to probate the second 

will and later amended that application to seek probate of the first will. The 

testatrix’s husband filed an application to probate the third will, and also sought 

declaratory relief. Two beneficiaries under the first two wills in dispute, as well as 
the attorney who drafted the first two wills, opposed admission of the third will to 

probate. After a jury trial, the trial court admitted the third will to probate, granted 

the testatrix’s husband letters testamentary, and signed a final order granting 

declaratory relief requested by the testatrix’s husband and awarding attorney’s fees 

to the testatrix’s husband under the Declaratory Judgments Act. Before signing the 

final order, the trial court signed two orders finding counsel for the parties 

contesting the third will to be in contempt of court for disobeying a prior court 

order. On appeal, the three parties who contested the admission of the third will to 

probate assert various challenges to the trial court’s contempt orders and its final 

order. We dismiss the appeal to the extent the appellants attempt to challenge the 

contempt orders, and, except to this extent, we affirm the trial court’s final order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Dr. Cecelia Gibbons (hereinafter “Cecelia”),1 was diagnosed with brain 

cancer.

2

 On the day of her diagnosis, May 13, 2010, Cecelia contacted her friend, 

appellant Christine S. Willie (hereinafter “Christine”),

3 an estate planning attorney, 

and talked to her about estate planning. Christine prepared a will, and the next day 

Cecelia executed it (hereinafter the “May Will”). Six days later, Cecelia had 

surgery to remove a brain tumor. 

Two weeks later, on June 3, 2010, Cecelia executed another will that had 

1 In this opinion, we refer to Dr. Cecelia Gibbons by her first name because other people 

involved in this case have the same last name.

2 The facts recited in the first three paragraphs of this section are based on trial evidence and 

have not been challenged in this appeal. 

3 In this opinion, we refer to Christine Willie by her first name because her husband Joseph 

Willie, II is also involved in this case.

2

 
been prepared by Christine (hereinafter the “June Will”). Shortly thereafter, 

Christine sent Cecelia an email explaining the gifts under the June Will and the 

beneficiary designations on Cecelia’s life-insurance policies. This email showed 

that Christine had been designated as one of the beneficiaries under two lifeinsurance policies. Christine’s husband, appellee John Richard Shanks, testified 

that Cecelia was shocked and surprised to see that Christine was a beneficiary 

under these two life-insurance policies.

Cecelia and Shanks went to Christine’s office on June 21, 2010, to pick up 

Cecelia’s file. Christine testified that she did not see Cecelia again after that day. 

Within a few days, Cecelia met with attorney Carbett J. Duhon, III. Two months 

later, on August 26, 2010, Cecelia executed a third will that had been prepared by 

Duhon (hereinafter the “August Will”). 

Cecelia passed away on December 9, 2010. Within the week, Christine filed 

an application to probate the June Will, in which Cecelia named Christine as the 

independent executrix of her estate. Two weeks later, Shanks filed an application 

in the same case to probate the August Will, in which Cecelia named Shanks as the 

independent executor of her estate. Six months later, Christine amended her 

application so that she sought to probate the May Will rather than the June Will. 

Christine alleged that Cecelia lacked testamentary capacity after May 20, 2010, 

and therefore lacked testamentary capacity when she executed the June Will and 

the August Will. 

Shanks timely amended his application adding a number of new parties on 

whom citation would be served but from whom Shanks did not seek any 

affirmative relief. Among these parties was (1) appellant Raven A. Pitre, Cecelia’s 

daughter, (2) appellant Gwen Stribling Henderson, a beneficiary under the May 

3
Will and the June Will but not under the August Will, (3) appellee Glenn Gibbons, 

Cecelia’s brother, and (4) appellee Annabella Gibbons, Cecelia’s mother. Glenn 

filed an answer and appeared in the case individiually and as attorney-in-fact for 

Cecelia’s mother Annabella. Shanks asked that the trial court admit the August 

Will to probate, grant him letters testamentary, and appoint him independent 

executor of Cecelia’s estate. Shanks also sought declaratory relief under the Texas 

Declaratory Judgments Act and sought recovery of reasonable and necessary 

attorney’s fees under that statute. Pitre and Henderson each filed oppositions to 

the probate of the August Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue 

influence by Shanks. 

The case proceeded to trial. During trial, Henderson, Pitre, and Christine 

nonsuited “their entire cause of action against all other [a]pplicants.” The trial 

court granted Shanks a directed verdict as to the validity of the August Will and on 

the issue of Cecelia’s capacity to execute the August Will. In answering the 

questions submitted in the jury charge, the jury found that Christine and Pitre did 

not have probable cause to contest the August Will. The jury also found the 

amount of a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Shanks’s attorneys. 

The trial court signed an order admitting the August Will to probate, denying 

probate as to the May Will and the June Will, and granting letters testamentary to 

Shanks as independent executor upon taking of the required oath. The trial court 

signed a final order in which it granted declaratory relief requested by Shanks. The 

trial court declared that, under the no-contest clause of the August Will and in light 

of the jury’s findings that Christine and Pitre did not have probable cause to 

contest the August Will, the bequests to Christine and Pitre in the August Will 

were revoked and would pass as if the Christine and Pitre had predeceased Cecelia. 

4
The trial court also made declarations relating to the beneficiary designations under 

two of Cecelia’s life-insurance policies. The trial court ordered Christine and Pitre 

to pay Shanks his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses under 

Section 37.009 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

Before signing the final order, the trial court signed two separate orders in 

which the court granted a motion for contempt filed by Shanks and found that 

attorney Joseph Willie, II (hereinafter “Joseph”), attorney for Henderson, Pitre, and 

Christine, was in contempt of court for disobeying a prior court order.

II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

On appeal, Henderson, Pitre, and Christine (hereinafter collectively the 

“Contestants”) present seven issues challenging the trial court’s final order and two 

issues challenging the trial court’s two contempt orders.

4

 We address the seven 

issues challenging the final order and the arguments under them seriatim. We then 

address the challenges to the contempt orders.

A. Did the trial court have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant declaratory 

relief regarding the life-insurance policies?

Under their first issue the Contestants assert that the trial court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief regarding the life-insurance policies 

because there was no live controversy regarding who was entitled to the lifeinsurance proceeds. The Supreme Court of Texas has held that a request for 

declaratory judgment is moot if the claim presents no live controversy. See Tex. 

4 Christine, Pitre, and Henderson filed suit against Shanks and Duhon in an ancillary matter 

under a separate cause number asserting tort claims. An appeal from the trial court’s judgment 

in that cause number is the subject of an appeal in this court in Cause number 14-12-01026-CV. 

5

 
A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Yarbrough, 347 S.W.3d 289, 290 (Tex. 2011). A 

declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists that will 

be resolved by the declaration sought. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 

465, 467 (Tex. 1995). For a justiciable controversy to exist, there must be a real 

and substantial controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and 

not merely a theoretical dispute. See id.

In the final order, the trial court declared that (1) at all times up to and 

including August 26, 2010, Cecelia possessed the requisite capacity to change or 

update her beneficiary designations on two of her life-insurance policies; (2) 

Shanks did not unduly influence Cecelia to change or update the beneficiary 

designations on these policies; (3) Christine is not a beneficiary under either of 

these two policies; and (4) before her death, Cecelia validly changed the 

beneficiary designations on these life-insurance policies to name her estate as the 

sole beneficiary under these policies. 

The evidence at trial showed that on January 17, 2011, Joseph sent a letter to 

the insurer on one of Cecelia’s life-insurance policies stating that he had been 

retained by Christine. Joseph also notified the insurer that Christine was 

challenging the validity of any beneficiary changes purportedly made after June 

15, 2010, to Cecelia’s life insurance policy with that insurer on the basis that 

Cecelia lacked the capacity to contract and that she was subject to duress, coercion, 

and undue influence. The evidence at trial also showed that, on the same day, 

Christine filed a claim on this life-insurance policy. 

Christine later testified at her deposition and at trial that she was no longer 

pursuing any claim to any proceeds under Cecelia’s life-insurance policies. Even 

though Christine stopped pursuing any such claim, she sent a letter to one of the 

6
insurers challenging the validity of the beneficiary changes that Cecelia made after 

June 15, 2010, and asserting that Cecelia lacked the capacity to contract and she 

was subject to duress, coercion, and undue influence. Counsel for Shanks stated 

during a bench conference that he tried to obtain a stipulation from Christine that 

the beneficiary changes that Cecelia made to her life-insurance policies were valid, 

but that Christine would not enter into this stipulation. According to counsel for 

Shanks, he could not “get a straight answer” in this regard from Joseph, who said 

that Christine is no longer seeking to obtain insurance benefits but there was no 

agreement as to whether Cecelia had capacity to make the beneficiary changes.

The Contestants assert that there are no live pleadings by Christine regarding 

her entitlement to any insurance proceeds. But, the Contestants’ nonsuit of any 

claims asserted by them does not prejudice Shanks’s right to pursue his pending 

claims for declaratory relief. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162 (stating that “[a]ny dismissal 

pursuant to this rule shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on 

a pending claim for affirmative relief”); City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368, 

375 (Tex. 2011). The Contestants claim that Shanks judicially admitted that 

Christine was not pursuing any insurance proceeds and had relinquished any 

claims to such proceeds. Presuming for the sake of argument that Shanks made 

these admissions, Christine’s failure to pursue recovery of any of the life-insurance 

proceeds does not necessarily mean that there was no live controversy regarding 

the trial court’s declarations regarding the changes made by Cecelia to her lifeinsurance beneficiary designations. The trial court did not declare that Christine 

was not pursuing life-insurance proceeds or that she was not entitled to recover 

these proceeds. Though the trial court declared that Christine is not a beneficiary 

under either of the two life-insurance policies in question, the focus of these 

7
declarations was on the validity of the Cecelia’s changes to the beneficiary 

designations to these policies. The record reflects that Christine would not 

stipulate that she was not contesting the validity of these changes. Christine 

previously had challenged the validity of these changes in a letter to one of the 

insurers, and there was no evidence that Christine had notified this insurer that she 

now agreed that these changes were valid. 

As to the declaratory relief the trial court granted regarding the lifeinsurance policies, we conclude that Shanks’s claims presented justiciable 

controversies and that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to grant this 

relief. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467–69; Rodarte v. Investeco 

Group, L.L.C., 299 S.W.3d 400, 408–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, 

no pet.); WesternGeco, L.L.C. v. Input/Output, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 776, 781–82 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

B. Did the testatrix’s husband seek declaratory relief regarding the will’s 

no-contest clause solely for the purpose of obtaining attorney’s fees?

Under their first issue, the Contestants also assert that Shanks’s claims 

seeking declaratory relief regarding the August Will’s no-contest clause were 

duplicative of the issues involved in a proceeding to adjudicate applications to 

probate two different wills, and were brought solely for the purpose of obtaining 

attorney’s fees. Prior to the nonsuit during trial, Christine had a pending 

application for probate of either the June Will or the May Will and for issuance to 

Christine of letters testamentary. Shanks applied for probate of the August Will,

issuance to Shanks of letters testamentary, payment of his necessary expenses and 

disbursements, and declaratory relief regarding the life-insurance policies. 

Shanks’s claims seeking declaratory relief regarding the August Will’s no-contest 

8
clause did not duplicate other claims already pending before the trial court and did 

not duplicate the issues involved in a proceeding to adjudicate applications to 

probate two different wills. These declaratory-judgment claims were properly 

asserted under the Declaratory Judgments Act.5 See Badouh v. Hale, 22 S.W.3d 

392, 394, 397 (Tex. 2000) (adjudicating declaratory-judgment claim as to whether 

will beneficiary violated will’s no-contest provision). Shanks sought and obtained 

declaratory relief regarding the August Will’s no-contest clause. The record 

supports the trial court’s implied determination that Shanks did not bring these 

declaratory-judgment claims solely for the purpose of obtaining attorney’s fees. 

See Funes v. Villatoro, 352 S.W.3d 200, 215–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2011, pet. denied).

Having considered and rejected all of the Contestants’ arguments under their 

first issue, we overrule that issue.

C. Did the trial court err in submitting the issue of bad faith to the jury?

Under their second issue, the Contestants refer to their nonsuit of their 

5 The Contestants also state in passing that these claims were improper as a matter of law. To the 

extent the Contestants assert that granting such relief is not proper under the Declaratory 

Judgments Act, the plain meaning of this statute refutes this assertion. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & 

Rem. Code Ann. § 37.004(a) (West 2014) (stating that “[a] person interested under a . . . will . . . 

may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument . . . 

and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder”); id. § 37.005 (West 

2014) (stating that “[a] person interested as or through an executor or administrator, including an 

independent executor or administrator . . . may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in 

respect to the trust or estate: (1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next 

of kin, or others . . . (3) to determine any question arising in the administration of the trust or 

estate, including questions of construction of wills and other writings”).

9

 
claims during trial, and they note that this nonsuit rendered the merits of their 

claims moot. The Contestants then assert that because they had no claims for 

affirmative relief on file after their nonsuit, the issue of their bad faith should not 

have been submitted to the jury. We presume, without deciding, that the 

Contestants preserved error on this argument in the trial court and sufficiently 

briefed it on appeal. 

As stated above, the Contestants’ nonsuit of any claims asserted by them 

does not prejudice Shanks’s right to pursue his pending claims for declaratory 

relief. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162; Albert, 354 S.W.3d at 375. These claims included 

Shanks’s declaratory-judgment claims regarding the August Will’s no-contest 

clause. Under former Probate Code section 64, applicable to this clause, the nocontest provision in the August Will is unenforceable against a will beneficiary 

contesting the August Will, such as Christine or Pitre, if the beneficiary had 

probable cause to contest the will and if the beneficiary brought and maintained the 

will contest in good faith. See Act of May 25, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 414, §1, 

2009 Tex. Gen. Stat. 995, 995–96 (stating that “[a] provision in a will that would 

cause a forfeiture of a devise or void a devise or provision in favor of a person for 

bringing any court action, including contesting a will, is unenforceable if: (1) 

probable cause exists for bringing the action; and (2) the action was brought and 

maintained in good faith”) (formerly codified at former Probate Code section 64), 

repealed effective January 1, 2014 by Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 

680, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 1512, 1512–1732. The trial evidence raised genuine 

fact issues regarding these matters, and the trial court did not err in submitting 

these issues to the jury. In any event, it should be noted that the jury found that 

Christine and Pitre did not have probable cause to contest the August Will, and the 

10
jury followed the trial court’s instruction not to answer the good-faith question if 

the jury answered the probable-cause question in this manner. Thus, the jury made 

no finding regarding good faith or bad faith, so any error in submitting the issue of 

bad faith to the jury would be harmless.6

Having considered and rejected all of the Contestants’ arguments under their 

second issue, we overrule that issue.7

D. Did the trial court reversibly err in allowing the testatrix’s brother to 

amend his answer and to answer as attorney-in-fact for the testatrix’s

mother less than seven days before trial?

In their third issue, the Contestants assert that the trial court reversibly erred

in allowing an amendment of pleadings less than seven days before trial. In 

September 2011, Glenn Gibbons, Cecilia’s brother filed an original answer in 

which he asserted a general denial and did not assert any claims for affirmative 

relief. In September 2012, less than seven days before trial and without seeking 

6 The trial court incorporated the jury’s verdict by reference into its Final Order; nonetheless, in 

two of its declarations, the trial court stated that the jury determined that Christine and Pitre 

acted in bad faith and without probable cause in contesting the August Will. These declarations 

are inaccurate to the extent the court states that the jury found that either Christine or Pitre acted 

in bad faith. Nonetheless, the Contestants have not assigned error as to this inaccuracy on 

appeal, and under former Probate Code section 64, no finding regarding good faith or bad faith 

was necessary in light of the jury’s finding regarding probable cause. See Act of May 25, 2009, 

2009 Tex. Gen. Stat. at 995–96.

7 In the second issue itself, the Contestants state that there was no evidence to support a bad-faith 

finding by the jury. But, the Contestants have not provided any argument, analysis, or citations 

to the record or legal authority in support of this assertion. Even construing the Contestants’ brief 

liberally, we cannot conclude that they have adequately briefed any argument in support of this 

assertion. See San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Therefore, we find briefing waiver. See id. In any event, the jury 

made no finding regarding bad faith or good faith.

11

 
leave of court, Glenn filed an “Amended Answer and Entry of Appearances”

(hereinafter the “Amended Answer”). In this filing, Glenn individually, and, as 

attorney-in-fact for his mother, Annabella Gibbons, asserted a general denial, 

entered “their appearances in this cause for all purposes,” and noted that they had 

joined in and adopted Shanks’s expert designations and responses to requests for 

disclosure. Though Glenn did not plead any claims for affirmative relief, he did 

request in his prayer that the court award him, individually, and, as attorney-in-fact 

for his mother, Annabella Gibbons, all actual damages to which he may be entitled 

as well as reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and costs for all work to be 

done in the trial court. 

The Contestants objected to the Amended Answer on the grounds that Glenn 

filed it less than seven days before trial without leave of court and that this 

amended answer operated as a surprise to the Contestants. The Contestants moved 

to strike the pleading. We presume for the purposes of our analysis that the trial 

court overruled these objections and denied the motion to strike and that the 

Contestants preserved error in the trial court regarding these complaints. In its 

final order, the trial court did not grant any affirmative relief to Glenn, either 

individually or as attorney-in-fact for Annabella. In the final order, the trial court 

stated that the order fully and finally disposed of all claims and all parties with 

respect to the phase of the proceedings relating to the will contest and Shanks’s 

declaratory-judgment claims and that the order was appealable. The trial court also 

stated that the court did not intend to adjudicate Glenn’s anticipated application for 

attorney’s fees and expenses and that the court retained jurisdiction over the 

continued administration of Cecelia’s estate, which would include any such 

application and which was a separate and independent phase of the probate 

12
proceedings.

We presume, without deciding, that the trial court erred in overruling the 

Contestants’ objections to the Amended Answer and in denying their motion to 

strike this pleading. After reviewing the record, we conclude that, even under this 

presumption, this error did not probably cause the rendition of an improper 

judgment and did not probably prevent the Contestants from properly presenting 

the case to this court. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); Greenstein, Logan & Co. v.

Burgess Marketing, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1987, writ

denied). Thus, no harm resulted from any such error. Accordingly, we overrule 

the Contestants’ third issue.

E. Did the trial court err in denying a motion for new trial based on the 

trial court’s alleged error in admitting evidence at trial?

In their fourth issue, the Contestants assert that the trial court erred in 

denying the written motion for mistrial that they filed more than three weeks after 

the trial had ended. In this motion, the Contestants argue that the trial court erred 

in admitting into evidence at trial over their objection a Judgment of Fully 

Probated Suspension rendered in a disciplinary action against Joseph, the 

Contestants’ counsel, who also testified as a witness at trial (“Disciplinary 

Judgment”).

8

 In this judgment, the trial court found that Joseph had committed 

professional misconduct by neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him by two 

clients, and the trial court ordered that Joseph be actively suspended from the 

practice of law for six months, probated over one year.

8 Shanks filed a motion to disqualify Joseph from representing the Contestants, but the record 

reflects that the trial court denied the motion. See Tex. R. Prof. Cond. 3.08.

13

 
The Contestants argued that this erroneous admission of evidence was not 

harmless and caused the rendition of an improper jury verdict. This court must 

give effect to the substance, rather than the form or title, of the Contestants’ 

motion. See State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980). We 

conclude that the substance of the Contestants’ motion is a motion for new trial 

based upon the trial court’s allegedly erroneous admission into evidence of the 

Disciplinary Judgment.9 

While on the witness stand at trial, Joseph was asked whether his law license 

had ever been suspended, and without objection, he answered, “I have a current 

appeal going right now. I don’t have a final judgment.” He then testified regarding 

the subject matter of the disciplinary action in which the Disciplinary Judgment 

was rendered. Joseph also testified without objection that he had “won” all of the 

complaints filed against him by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline. Joseph 

then agreed that he had not “won” all of them because one of these matters was on 

appeal. Joseph testified without objection that the Disciplinary Judgment stated 

that the court found that the appropriate sanction was six months’ active 

suspension to be probated over one year. Joseph testified that the sentence had not 

been imposed or acted upon. When Shanks offered the Disciplinary Judgment into 

evidence, Joseph objected that the judgment was still on appeal and therefore not 

final and operative and that the judgment was irrelevant. The trial court overruled 

Joseph’s objections and admitted the exhibit into evidence, with “the 

understanding of Mr. Willie’s explanation, that he has appealed that decision and 

9 If the substance of the motion were a motion for mistrial, it would have been untimely, and the 

trial court would not have erred in denying it. See Brazos River Auth. v. Berry, 457 S.W.2d 79, 

80–81 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.); State v. Berry, 385 S.W.2d 711, 714 

(Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 

14

 
that he is not currently under the dictates of what that Court ruled until such time 

as the appeal is carried forward and made final.” 

We presume, without deciding, that the trial court erred in admitting the 

Disciplinary Judgment into evidence. After reviewing the record, we conclude 

that, even under this presumption, any such error did not probably cause the 

rendition of an improper judgment and did not probably prevent the Contestants

from properly presenting their case to this court. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a);

Wilson v. John Frantz Co., 723 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, no harm resulted from any such error, and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Contestants’ motion for new trial 

regarding this alleged error. Accordingly, we overrule the Contestants’ fourth 

issue.

F. Did the judge appointed to hear the motion to recuse the presiding 

judge of the trial court not allow the movant to present certain evidence 

at the hearing on their motion?

In their fifth issue, the Contestants assert that Judge Olen Underwood, who 

was appointed to hear Christine’s motion to recuse the presiding judge of the trial 

court, did not allow excerpts from a reporter’s record and deposition excerpts to be 

admitted into evidence at the hearing on the motion to recuse. 

The reporter’s record from the hearing on Christine’s motion to recuse 

reflects that, after Joseph made his opening statement, Judge Underwood obtained 

Joseph’s agreement that his opening statement told the court what the evidence 

would show and demonstrated the evidence that Joseph would put before the court. 

Judge Underwood then stated that, even if he accepted as true all of the evidence 

that Joseph described in his opening statement, that evidence would not provide 

15
any basis for granting Christine’s motion to recuse. Judge Underwood announced 

at the end of the hearing that the motion to recuse was denied. At no time during 

the hearing did Christine attempt to offer evidence, ask for permission to offer 

evidence, or object to the trial court’s alleged refusal to receive evidence. We 

conclude that, during the recusal hearing, no complaint was made about any 

alleged failure by Judge Underwood to allow excerpts from a reporter’s record and 

deposition excerpts to be admitted into evidence, and thus error was not preserved 

as to the fifth issue.

10 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Neely v. Comm’n for Lawyer 

Discipline, 302 S.W.3d 331, 350 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. 

denied). Accordingly, we overrule the fifth issue.

G. Did the trial court reversibly err when it realigned the parties?

In their seventh issue, the Contestants assert that the trial court erred when it 

realigned the parties and ruled that Shanks should appear as the plaintiff in the trial 

of the case, with the right to open and close argument. Shanks filed a “Motion to 

Align the Parties for Trial,” seeking to appear at trial as plaintiff with the right to 

open and close. Christine opposed his motion and moved the trial court to order 

that she appear at trial as plaintiff, with the right to open and close. The trial court 

granted Shanks’s motion and impliedly denied Christine’s motion.

10 The Contestants also state in a conclusory manner that Judge Underwood erred in denying the 

motion to recuse and that there was no written order denying this motion. But, the Contestants 

have not provided any argument, analysis, or citations to the record or legal authority in support 

of either of these assertions. Even construing the Contestants’ brief liberally, we cannot conclude 

that they have adequately briefed any argument in support of these assertions. See San Saba 

Energy, L.P., 171 S.W.3d at 337. Therefore, we find briefing waiver. See id. 

16

 
We presume, without deciding, that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 

266, Christine should have been considered the “plaintiff,” that the burden of proof 

for the whole case did not rest on Shanks, and that the trial court abused its 

discretion by realigning the parties and ruling that Shanks should appear as the 

plaintiff in the trial of the case, with the right to open and close argument. See Tex. 

R. Civ. P. 266; Seigler v. Seigler, 391 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Tex. 1965). After 

reviewing the record, we conclude that, even under this presumption, any such

error did not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment and did not 

probably prevent the Contestants from properly presenting the case to this court. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); Seigler, 391 S.W.2d at 404; Reynolds v. Park, 485 

S.W.2d 807, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, no harm 

resulted from any such error. Accordingly, we overrule the Contestants’ seventh 

issue.

H. Did the trial court reversibly err by failing to appoint an attorney-adlitem for the testatrix’s mother?

In their eighth issue, the Contestants assert that the trial court reversibly 

erred by failing to appoint an attorney-ad-litem for Annabella, Cecelia’s mother. In 

September 2012, Glenn filed the Amended Answer, in which he, individually, and, 

as attorney-in-fact for Annabella, asserted a general denial, entered appearances, 

and noted that they had joined in and adopted Shanks’s expert designations and 

responses to requests for disclosure. Though Glenn did not plead any claims for 

affirmative relief, he did request in his prayer that the court award him, 

individually, and, as attorney-in-fact for his mother, Annabella Gibbons, all actual 

damages to which he may be entitled as well as reasonable and necessary 

attorney’s fees and costs for all work to be done in the trial court. The Contestants 

asserted that there was a conflict of interests between attorney-in-fact Glenn and 

17
Annabella, his principal, and that the trial court should appoint an attorney-adlitem to protect Annabella’s interests. 

We presume for the purposes of our analysis that the Contestants preserved 

error in the trial court as to their eighth issue. In its final order, the trial court did 

not grant any affirmative relief to Glenn, either individually or as attorney-in-fact 

for Annabella. In the final order, the court stated that the order fully and finally 

disposed of all claims and all parties with respect to the phase of the proceedings 

relating to the will contest and Shanks’s declaratory-judgment claims and that the 

order was appealable. The trial court also stated that the court did not intend to 

adjudicate Glenn’s anticipated application for attorney’s fees and expenses and that 

the court retained jurisdiction over the continued administration of Cecelia’s estate, 

which would include any such application and which was a separate and 

independent phase of the probate proceedings. We presume, without deciding, that 

the trial court erred by failing to appoint an attorney-ad-litem for Annabella. After 

reviewing the record, we conclude that, even under this presumption, this error did 

not probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment and did not probably 

prevent the Contestants from properly presenting the case to this court. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 44.1(a); Greenstein, Logan & Co., 744 S.W.2d at 184. Thus, no harm 

resulted from any such error. Accordingly, we overrule the Contestants’ eighth

issue.

I. Does this court have appellate jurisdiction over the trial court’s two 

contempt orders?

In their sixth and ninth issues, the Contestants challenge two contempt 

orders in which the trial court granted a motion for contempt filed by Shanks, 

finding that Joseph was in contempt of court for disobeying a prior court order. 

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The Contestants have not cited any cases holding that a court of appeals has 

appellate jurisdiction to review a contempt order. One might think that 

interlocutory contempt orders in a case would be merged into the final judgment 

and be reviewable on appeal from that final judgment. See Webb v. Jorns, 488 

S.W.2d 407, 408–09 (Tex. 1972). That is not the case, however, because the 

Supreme Court of Texas has held that, to the extent that a trial court uses its 

contempt power, appellate courts lack appellate jurisdiction to review the trial 

court’s action, though they may review the action in an original proceeding. See 

Rosser v. Squier, 902 S.W.2d 962, 962 (Tex. 1995); Ex parte Williams, 690 

S.W.2d 243, 243, n.1 (Tex. 1985); Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 

1967); Deramus v. Thornton, 333 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1960). Under this rule, 

we have no appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court’s two contempt orders, 

even on appeal from the trial court’s final order. See Rosser, 902 S.W.2d at 962; 

Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d at 243, n.1; Gedney v. Gedney, No. 09-10-00521-

CV, 2012 WL 1448336, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 26, 2012, no pet.) 

(mem. op.); Hooper v. Hooper, No. 14-09-01024-CV, 2011 WL 334198, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Metzger v. 

Bradt, 892 S.W.2d 20, 54–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). 

Some jurists have criticized this rule. See Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 66 

n.7 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., dissenting, joined by Enoch, J.) (stating that “[t]he rule 

that no appeal will lie from a judgment of contempt is dubious at best, but firmly 

entrenched and seldom challenged”). Nonetheless, we are bound to apply it under 

the doctrine of stare decisis. See Rosser, 902 S.W.2d at 962; Ex parte Williams, 

690 S.W.2d at 243, n.1; Gedney, 2012 WL 1448336, at *1; Hooper, 2011 WL 

334198, at *1. Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction over the Contestants’ 

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sixth and ninth issues, and we dismiss this appeal to the extent that the Contestants 

attempt to appeal from the two contempt orders. 

III. CONCLUSION

Shanks’s claims for declaratory relief regarding the life-insurance policies

presented justiciable controversies, and the trial court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction to grant relief on these claims. The record supports the trial court’s 

implied determination that Shanks did not bring these declaratory-judgment claims 

solely for the purpose of obtaining attorney’s fees. The trial court did not err in 

submitting to the jury the question regarding the good faith of Christine and Pitre. 

In any event, the jury did not answer this question, and any error in submitting the 

issue of bad faith to the jury would be harmless. Presuming the existence of error 

as to the Contestants’ third, seventh, and eighth issues, the errors would be 

harmless. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Contestants’ 

motion for new trial regarding the admission of an exhibit into evidence. Error 

was not preserved in the trial court as to the fifth issue. And, this court lacks 

appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the sixth and ninth issues.

This appeal is dismissed to the extent that the Contestants attempt to 

challenge the two contempt orders. Except to this extent, we affirm the trial 

court’s Final Order.

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Wise.

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