* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

Summary Calendar

No. 01-31381

_______________________

THE LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL E. BECNEL, JR. ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

THE JOHN ARTHUR EAVES LAW FIRM ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Docket No. 01-CV-1944

_________________________________________________________________

October 11, 2002

Before JONES, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

This case comes to us on appeal from a dismissal for

lack of jurisdiction. Finding the appellants’ arguments without

merit, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
2

FACTS

In February 2001 the Law Offices of Daniel E. Becnel, Jr.

(“Becnel”) contracted with appellee John Arthur Eaves Law Firm

(“Eaves”) for the settlement of a number of Becnel’s clients’ cases

against American Home Products. There was a falling out and Becnel

filed a declaratory judgment action on June 26, 2001, seeking

dissolution of the referral agreement. This case was randomly

assigned to Chief Judge Berrigan. Shortly thereafter, Becnel filed

a motion to transfer the case to Judge Porteous’s court, before

whom the American Home Products cases were being tried. Becnel

claimed that the instant action was substantially the same and

closely related to those cases. Judge Porteous determined,

however, that the “two suits will not involve subject matter that

comprises all or a material part of the subject matter or operative

facts of the prior action” and transferred it back to Chief Judge

Berrigan on August 21, 2001. 

While the case was before Judge Porteous, Eaves filed a

motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction

(July 17, 2001), noting that one of the named defendants, Richard

M. Martin, Jr. (“Martin”), was a resident of Louisiana, whose

presence destroyed complete diversity. To this motion Becnel did

not respond. Instead, Becnel filed a motion seeking leave to amend

his original complaint to plead supplemental jurisdiction as an
3

alternative jurisdictional basis. Resolution of this motion was

referred to a magistrate judge.

The magistrate judge denied Becnel’s motion to amend on

November 9, 2001; Chief Judge Berrigan had conditionally dismissed

the complaint in October, subject expressly to the magistrate

judge’s decision on the motion to amend, a decision Becnel did not

challenge. The district court accordingly entered judgment

dismissing the case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the

district court’s judgment.

DISCUSSION

Because Becnel identified Martin as a defendant in the

original pleadings, no diversity jurisdiction existed, see

Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. 267, 3 Cranch (1806), as the district

court properly noted. Urging reversal, Becnel makes the following

two arguments before this court.

Becnel first argues that the district court erred in

finding Martin a necessary party to the case. Rule 19 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not mandate, Becnel argues,

the inclusion of Martin. Because joinder decisions are within the

trial court’s discretion, Fed.R.Civ.P. R. 19(a), and Becnel has

presented no compelling argument for Martin’s exclusion, this court

will not overturn Chief Judge Berrigan’s decision.

Becnel also argues that the magistrate judge abused her

discretion in declining to grant his motion to amend the complaint
4

to assert supplemental jurisdiction. Because Becnel did not assert

to the district court his objection to the magistrate judge’s

order, he has waived this point. It is incorrect to argue, as

Becnel does, that when the district court’s dismissal order was

made contingent on the magistrate judge’s ruling on the motion to

amend, the magistrate judge order then became “dispositive.” The

district court has no authority either to make a magistrate judge’s

order dispositive or to deprive Becnel of an opportunity to

challenge that order. Of course the district court undoubtedly had

no such intents or motive here. Becnel just goofed. We will not

review a magistrate judge order that has not been timely objected

to. Singletary v. BRX, Inc., 828 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 1987).

CONCLUSION

Federal procedural law grants much latitude to prospective plaintiffs. For better or worse, this court has taken notice

of the old saw, the plaintiff is master of his complaint. See,

e.g., Terrebonne Homecare, Inc. v. SMA Health Plan, Inc., 271 F.3d

186 (5th Cir. 2001). Having failed to manufacture federal

jurisdiction with his own devices, he has equally failed to

persuade us to do so for him.

Judgment AFFIRMED.