UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 17-1191 (TJK)

MARY TYES-WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Mary Tyes-Williams, an African-American woman, has worked in various chaplaincy 

positions for the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) since 2004. She describes the first decade of 

her career as a steady climb marked by superior performance reviews and robust skills 

development. After 11 years with BOP, however, she ran into trouble with two coworkers who 

at various times held supervisory positions over her and received promotions that Tyes-Williams 

sought for herself. From Tyes-Williams’s perspective, these coworkers unlawfully discriminated 

against her by treating her condescendingly, interfering with her career advancement, and 

depriving her of advantages routinely offered to white, male employees. Tyes-Williams sought 

support from an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) counselor and later filed an EEO 

complaint, but she claims her coworkers’ bad behavior did not abate. After BOP took no action 

on her formal EEO complaint, Tyes-Williams filed this lawsuit.

Tyes-Williams brings four claims, alleging discrimination, retaliation, a hostile work 

environment, and a retaliatory hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 

Defendant has moved to dismiss the latter three, arguing that Tyes-Williams failed to 

administratively exhaust some of her claims and that, in any case, none of them allege 

misconduct serious enough to state a discrimination claim. For the reasons explained below, the 
2

Court will grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss Tyes-Williams’s claims of retaliation, hostile 

work environment, and retaliatory hostile work environment.

Factual and Procedural Background

Tyes-Williams has worked for the BOP since December 2004. ECF No. 1, Complaint

(“Compl.”), ¶¶ 1, 6, 7. In June 2014, she was promoted to a GS-13 position as a Chaplaincy

Services Coordinator with BOP’s Central Office Reentry Division. Id. ¶ 9. Although this 

position was based in Washington, D.C., Tyes-Williams worked remotely, first from the 

Southeast Regional Office in Atlanta, Georgia, and most recently from the Federal Correctional 

Complex in Yazoo City, Mississippi. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. 

According to Tyes-Williams, in her new position she was subjected to a pattern of 

discrimination and retaliation on the basis of her race and gender beginning in “approximately 

November 2015.” Id. ¶ 14. She identifies two allegedly discriminating officials: Heidi Kugler 

and Kevin Kelley. Id. In August 2015, Tyes-Williams reported directly to Kugler, a white 

female. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. Tyes-Williams and Kelley, a white male, held positions of the same 

grade, GS-13. Id. ¶ 15. In November 2015, the BOP advertised an opening for a GS-15 

position. Id. ¶ 19. Although Tyes-Williams alleges that she was well-qualified and 

recommended for the position, she did not receive an interview. Id. ¶ 20. Instead, Kugler was 

selected for the position. Id.

Tyes-Williams alleges that Kugler and Kelley proceeded to treat her in a cold, 

unpleasant, and hostile manner. See id. ¶¶ 17–18, 21, 38, 40–41. She contacted an EEO 

counselor about filing an EEO complaint of discrimination on November 16, 2015. Id. ¶ 22. 

Thereafter, she alleges, Kugler circumscribed her responsibilities—although not those of any

white employees—and limited her advancement potential. Id. ¶¶ 23–26. Further, Kugler limited 

Tyes-Williams’s access to training opportunities. Id. ¶¶ 27–31.
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In February 2016, Kelley was promoted to Kugler’s old position, although Tyes-Williams

alleges that she had applied and was qualified for it. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. This made Kelley TyesWilliams’s supervisor. Id. ¶ 33. In March 2016, Tyes-Williams requested to be transferred to 

Yazoo City, Mississippi. Id. ¶ 42. Her request was not approved for more than three months. 

Id. ¶ 43. In response to this alleged “ongoing discriminat[ion],” Tyes-Williams followed up on 

her original EEO contact by filing an informal complaint on March 18, 2016. Id. ¶ 44. 

Thereafter, Tyes-Williams experienced trouble with her assigned performance standards

and the performance ratings she received. Among other things, she received a less-than-perfect 

“Excellent” rating—her first such rating in eight years—and was frustrated by the vagueness of 

the standards she was expected to meet. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51, 54–55. Eventually, however, the rating 

that Tyes-Williams received in April 2017 was adjusted upward. Id. ¶¶ 58–60. Finally, in April 

2017, Tyes-Williams requested two days per week of telework and was granted only one, despite 

some white employees being allowed two. Id. ¶¶ 60–62.

On June 16, 2017, Tyes-Williams filed the instant action. Her complaint includes four 

counts: discrimination (Count I), hostile work environment (Count II), retaliation (Count III), 

and retaliatory hostile work environment (Count IV). See Compl. ¶¶ 64–89. Defendant has 

moved to dismiss Counts II and IV for failure to allege misconduct that rises to the level of a

hostile work environment claim. ECF No. 6-1, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV, at 7. As to Count III, 

Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that Tyes-Williams (1) has not exhausted “most 

subparts” of her claim, (2) has failed to allege a materially adverse action, and (3) has failed to 

allege a causal connection between her protected activity and some of the alleged retaliation. See 

id. at 15–23. 
4

Legal Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint; it does not 

require a court to ‘assess the truth of what is asserted or determine whether a plaintiff has any 

evidence to back up what is in the complaint.’” Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017) (quoting Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). The Court 

construes all factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012). When defendants allege that 

plaintiffs have failed to administratively exhaust their Title VII claims, courts typically resolve 

the exhaustion question in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Augustus v. Locke, 699 F. 

Supp. 2d 65, 69 n.3 (D.D.C. 2010).

Analysis

A. Hostile Work Environment and Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment

Claims (Counts II and IV)

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, federal employers may not discriminate “based 

on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). “[A] plaintiff may 

establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination . . . has created a hostile or 

abusive work environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). To 

state a hostile work environment claim, an employee must allege misconduct so serious that it 

has changed “a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment within the meaning of Title VII.” 

Id. at 67. In determining whether a work environment is hostile, courts consider “the frequency 

of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or 
5

a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The Supreme Court has held 

that “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, 

gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing” are not sufficiently serious to create a hostile work 

environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (quoting B. Lindemann 

& D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 175 (1992)). Nor are “offhand comments

[or] isolated incidents (unless extremely serious).” Id.

Here, many of the slights Tyes-Williams experienced are of a kind that courts in this 

district have expressly held are, on their own, insufficient to form a hostile work environment 

claim. About half of the affronts Tyes-Williams identifies are interactions with Kugler or Kelley 

that she found offensive or inappropriate. For example, she alleges that Kugler was “cold” to her 

and was “unfairly critical” of her work. Compl. ¶ 16. Kugler also referred to herself as TyesWilliams’s “boss,” but referred to subordinate white employees as “co-worker[s]” or 

“teammate[s].” Id. ¶ 17. After Kugler was promoted over Tyes-Williams, she said she would 

“support” Tyes-Williams transferring to another department. Id. ¶ 21. And Kugler asked TyesWilliams how her husband would feel about her traveling or changing duty stations, which TyesWilliams found inappropriate. Id. ¶ 18. As for Kelley, Tyes-Williams alleges that he yelled at 

her in front of her colleagues on two occasions. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. But “disparaging remarks, 

criticisms of [the plaintiff’s] work, and other negative comments” do not make a hostile work 

environment. Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F. Supp. 2d 64, 94 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Stewart v. 

Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1134–35 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

1

 Similarly, neither do these allegations.

 1 Tyes-Williams attempts to distinguish Nurriddin from her own case, asserting that the 

plaintiff’s hostile work environment claims “were dismissed in large part because, as the 
6

Tyes-Williams makes other allegations regarding her assignments and performance 

evaluations, but these allegations are also insufficient to state a hostile work environment claim. 

Tyes-Williams alleges that when Kugler became her supervisor, she instructed Tyes-Williams to 

stop performing work for the South Central and Southeast Regional branches despite consistent

positive feedback from those branches on her performance. Compl. ¶¶ 23–24. Tyes-Williams 

characterizes this work as “front-facing” and providing a “terrific opportunity for advancement.” 

Id. ¶ 25. Tyes-Williams also alleges that Kugler required her—and no other employee—to 

obtain explicit permission before working on any new tasks, even if they fell within her existing 

job responsibilities. Id. ¶ 26. When Kugler issued performance ratings, Tyes-Williams received 

“Excellent” rather than “Outstanding” for the first time in eight years. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. When 

Kelley became Tyes-Williams’s supervisor, she alleges, he imposed vague performance 

standards that he refused to clarify to her. Id. ¶¶ 54, 55. And again, Tyes-Williams received a 

rating of “Excellent” rather than “Outstanding,” which a grievance committee later corrected to 

“Outstanding.” Id. ¶¶ 57–59. However, allegations of “the removal of important assignments, 

lowered performance evaluations, and close scrutiny of assignments by management” are also 

not enough to state a hostile work environment claim. Nurriddin, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 94 (citing 

Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 92 (D.D.C. 2005)).

 

employees admitted in their own pleadings, they had significant positive experiences with their 

supervisors that undercut their claims that they were subjected to a hostile work environment.” 

ECF No. 7, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s 

Partial Motion to Dismiss (“Pl. Opp.”) at 22. While the court in Nurriddin did note that the 

employee’s promotion, performance award, and coveted detail assignment “substantially 

undermine[d]” the hostile work environment claim, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 94, that comprised a 

single sentence rather than a “large part” of the opinion. These considerations were plainly 

subordinate to the court’s thorough analysis of whether the complained-of actions could meet the 

standard for a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 94–95.
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Tyes-Williams’s additional allegations also fail to plead a hostile work environment. She 

alleges that at one point, Kugler forbade her—and no other employee—from attending trainings 

at the BOP’s training center unless she was presenting the training. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 30–31. 

Although Kugler said this decision was made for budgetary reasons, Tyes-Williams alleges that 

the branch’s budget had recently increased by $30,000. Id. ¶ 32. When Tyes-Williams 

requested to change her duty station to Yazoo City, Mississippi, she alleges that the BOP did not 

approve her request for more than three months. Id. ¶¶ 42–43. And finally, when Tyes-Williams 

submitted a request to Kelley to telework two days of the week, he authorized only one day, even 

though a number of other employees in the office were permitted two days. Id. ¶¶ 60–62. But in 

Beckwith v. Ware, 174 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2014), the court found that a plaintiff’s being 

denied an award, the opportunity to telecommute, certain training, and a transfer came “nowhere 

near satisfying the . . . standard” for a hostile work environment.2

 Such is the case here.

In short, Tyes-Williams alleges numerous workplace slights that closely match claims 

that courts in this district have held are insufficient. Of course, it is possible that a plaintiff could 

state a hostile work environment claim by pleading some combination of actions that courts have 

previously found insufficient if, in total, those actions rose to the requisite level of hostility. But 

that is not the case here. Tyes-Williams alleges criticism, condescension, poor management, and 

one instance of unwanted physical contact,3 but considered collectively, she does not allege a 

 2 Tyes-Williams attempts to distinguish Beckwith on the grounds that “there was no indication

that the events [comprising the hostile work environment claim] were career-destroying or 

career-altering.” Pl. Opp. at 24. The Court notes that the same could be said of Tyes-Williams’s 

allegations. In fact, the factual similarities between Beckwith and Tyes-Williams’s case are 

instructive, as both concern the denial of training opportunities, denial of some opportunity to 

telework, and the handling of a plaintiff’s request to transfer to a different location.

3 In September 2015, Tyes-Williams alleges, after Kelley yelled at her in front of their 

colleagues, he “pushed a door directly into the back of [her] foot and leg.” Compl. ¶ 40.
8

pattern of behavior that altered the “terms, conditions or privileges of [her] employment.” 

Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1135.

Tyes-Williams points to numerous decisions in this district that, she claims, show that her 

allegations have met the standard to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. Pl. Opp. at 17–19. These 

include Sims v. District of Columbia, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12–14 (D.D.C. 2014), where the court 

found a genuine issue of material fact as to a hostile work environment where the plaintiff was 

singled out for night shifts, denied overtime opportunities, and given a manifestly unwarranted 

performance improvement plan; Teliska v. Napolitano, 826 F. Supp. 2d 94, 99–100 (D.D.C. 

2011), where the court held the plaintiff had stated a hostile work environment claim where she 

alleged removal from an assignment due to false accusations of misconduct, a disfavored 

geographic placement, and denial of overtime opportunities; and Winston v. Clough, 712 F. 

Supp. 2d 1, 12–13 (D.D.C. 2010), where the court held that the plaintiff had stated a hostile work 

environment claim where he alleged “facing unsubstantiated allegations that he threatened 

violence against a co-worker, . . . being evicted from his workspace and barred from meetings, 

. . . being stripped of supervisory duties and banished to cramped work space, [and] facing a 

proposed suspension that was later overruled.” These cases are easily distinguishable, however, 

because in each one, the plaintiffs’ allegations concerned his or her pay, location, position, or 

disciplinary record. Such allegations, unlike Tyes-Williams’s, go to the very terms, conditions,

and privileges of employment.

Tyes-Williams makes a similar argument about Pegues v. Mineta, 2006 WL 2434936, 

No. 04-2165 (GK), at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2006), where the court held that the plaintiff had

stated a hostile work environment claim where he alleged “‘countless’ instances of abuse” and 

“many instances of offensive and inappropriate conduct.” There, however, the plaintiff alleged 
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verbal abuse that was considerably more pervasive than the handful of verbal unpleasantries 

Tyes-Williams has identified here.

As part of her hostile work environment claim, Tyes-Williams also alleges that she was 

denied two promotions in favor of Kelley and Kugler, who were less qualified. Compl. ¶¶ 71(c), 

71(g). She includes her denial of a promotion in favor of Kelley in her retaliatory hostile work 

environment claim as well. Id. ¶ 84(c). The Circuit has held that a plaintiff is free to attempt to 

plead such “discrete act[s]” as part of a hostile work environment claim. Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 

F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But to offer any support to that claim, those discrete acts must 

be “adequately connected,” id., and must contribute to a coherent and severe or pervasive pattern 

of “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; Baird, 662 F.3d at 1252. And 

because such discrete acts tend to be “different in kind” from this type of misconduct, Walden v. 

Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Inst., 177 F. Supp. 3d 336, 345 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting 

Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33 (D.D.C. 2003)), courts in this district are generally 

skeptical of plaintiffs “bootstrap[ping] their alleged discrete acts of retaliation into a broader 

hostile work environment claim.” Id. at 344 (quoting Dudley v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 

Auth., 924 F. Supp. 2d 141, 164 (D.D.C. 2013)).

In light of these principles, Tyes-Williams’s allegations that she was denied these 

promotions do not save her otherwise inadequately pleaded hostile work environment claims. 

Tyes-Williams has not pleaded any factual connection between them and the various other 

actions she attributes to Kugler and Kelley. She does not, for example, allege in her complaint 

that they were responsible for selecting those who were promoted or otherwise hired into the 

positions she sought. Moreover, viewing the allegations in the complaint as a whole, TyesWilliams’s denial of these two promotions was hardly part of a coherent and severe or pervasive 
10

pattern of “intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that states a hostile work environment claim. 

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.

Because Tyes-Williams has failed to allege misconduct that meets the legal threshold for 

a hostile work environment claim or a retaliatory hostile work environment claim, the Court will 

dismiss Counts II and IV.

B. Retaliation Claim (Count III)

Federal employers may not retaliate against an employee who “has opposed any practice 

made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). “In order 

to prevail upon a claim of unlawful retaliation, an employee must show ‘she engaged in 

protected activity, as a consequence of which her employer took a materially adverse action 

against her.’” Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Weber v. Battista, 

494 F.3d 179, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). But to bring any Title VII claim in federal court, an 

employee must first have exhausted her administrative remedies. Bowden v. United States, 106 

F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Defendant does not contest that Tyes-Williams engaged in protected activity. At issue 

here are whether Tyes-Williams exhausted her administrative remedies, whether she has alleged 

a materially adverse action, and whether she has adequately pleaded that an adverse action was 

taken against her because of her protected activity. 

Tyes-Williams alleges five adverse actions in Count III of her complaint. Compl. ¶ 79. 

In her words, these adverse actions were:

a. Forcing [her] to cease performing important, front-facing high-profile duties 

and responsibilities while Caucasian males continued to be allowed to perform 

similar functions;

b. Denying [her] the opportunity to attend important training sessions at the 

request of Mr. Kelley, while Caucasian males continued to have the 

opportunity to attend the training;

c. Delaying [her] request to change duty locations for no valid reason; and
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d. Falsely deflating [her] performance evaluation, delaying the issuance of [her 

Performance Work Plan], and judging [her] by artificially inflated and 

purposefully vague, ambiguous, and subjective standards; and

e. Denying [her] telework request for two days per week while approving two or 

three days for non-African-American employees.

Id. Although Tyes-Williams alleges in conclusory fashion that these retaliatory actions caused

“past and future loss of income and benefits of employment [and] lost career and business 

opportunities and advancement,” id. ¶ 80, the Court notes that her complaint does not identify 

any particular loss that she sustained, nor any concrete harm at all. 

1. Exhaustion

Title VII and EEO regulations impose numerous deadlines on employees seeking redress 

for discrimination, retaliation, or a hostile work environment. Bowden, 106 F.3d at 437. “Yet if 

an employee fails to meet any of those statutory or regulatory deadlines, the employee’s federal 

court action may be dismissed for failure to administratively exhaust the claim.” Niskey v. Kelly, 

859 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Hernandez v. Pritzker, 741 F.3d 129, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2013), 

cert. denied sub nom. Niskey v. Duke, 138 S. Ct. 427 (2017). Title VII’s exhaustion 

requirements are not jurisdictional. Artis v. Bernanke, 630 F.3d 1031, 1034 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 

Two requirements for federal employees are relevant here: (1) that “[a]n aggrieved person must 

initiate contact with [an EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be 

discriminatory,” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1); and (2) that an employee must give an agency 180 

days to take action on her EEO complaint before filing suit over the alleged discrimination in 

federal court, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c). 

a. The 45-Day Requirement

Courts in this district do not apply the 45-day requirement to “discrete acts of retaliation 

that occurred after the filing of [an] EEO charge” in a uniform way. Redding v. Mattis, 327 F. 

Supp. 3d 136, 139–40 (D.D.C. 2018). Some impose the requirement on each discrete act of 
12

retaliation that forms the basis of a plaintiff’s claim in federal court “regardless of any 

relationship that exists between those discrete claims and any others”; others decline to apply the 

requirement to discrete acts of retaliation when they are related to discrimination claims that 

were in fact presented to an EEO officer. Hicklin v. McDonald, 110 F. Supp. 3d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 

2015) (quoting Rashad v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 945 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165–66 

(D.D.C. 2013)); Mount v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 74, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2014). The former is the 

majority view. Redding, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 140. The Circuit has repeatedly declined to opine on 

which approach is correct. See, e.g., Mount v. Johnson, 664 F. App’x 11, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(unpublished); Payne v. Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Weber, 494 F.3d at 184.

Here, Tyes-Williams urges the Court to adopt the minority view and to hold that she has 

exhausted all of her retaliation claim because the acts of retaliation underlying it are “like or 

related to” those she brought to the EEO counselor. Pl. Opp. at 26–29. But imposing the 45-day 

requirement on each purported retaliatory act filed after an EEO charge has greater support in 

this district, it is most consonant with the Supreme Court’s overall approach to exhausting such 

claims as set forth in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), and it 

upholds “the purpose of the exhaustion doctrine, namely, ‘to give the agency notice of a claim 

and the opportunity to handle it internally so that only claims plaintiff has diligently pursued will 

survive.’” Hicklin, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (quoting Romero–Ostolaza v. Ridge, 370 F. Supp. 2d 

139, 149 (D.D.C. 2005)). Accordingly, the Court holds that to the extent that Tyes-Williams’s 

retaliation claim is based on acts that she failed to report to the EEO counselor within 45 days of 

their occurrence, it is time-barred by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).

Applying the requirement here, Tyes-Williams may not base her retaliation claim on 

either of the first two allegedly retaliatory actions she identifies in her complaint, nor on part of 
13

the fourth, because she did not report them to the EEO office within 45 days. The timeline of 

events reflected in the complaint makes this clear. As for the first such action, Kugler allegedly 

told Tyes-Williams not to work with the South Central and Southeast Regional branches on 

November 18, 2015; she then told Tyes-Williams to get explicit permission for performing any 

new tasks on November 30, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 26, 79(a). As for the second, Kugler allegedly

forbade Tyes-Williams from attending BOP training in-person in December 2015. Id. ¶¶ 27, 30, 

79(b). Neither of these actions could have been administratively exhausted, because TyesWilliams did not make her first contact with an EEO counselor until March 18, 2016, well 

beyond the 45-day mark.

4

 Id. ¶ 78. And as for the fourth action, Tyes-Williams contests the 

“Excellent” performance rating she received on April 15, 2016. Id. ¶ 48. This action similarly 

could not have been administratively exhausted, because Tyes-Williams did not make 

subsequent contact with the EEO counselor until more than 45 days later, on June 22, 2016. Id. 

¶ 78.

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Tyes-Williams’s retaliation claim for failure to exhaust 

her administrative remedies to the extent it is based on Kugler limiting her responsibilities in 

November 2015, barring her from attending in-person training in December 2015, or giving her 

an “Excellent” performance rating in April 2016.

5

 Compl. ¶¶ 79(a), 79(b).

 4 Tyes-Williams argues that the BOP has waived the defense of timeliness by investigating these 

claims. Pl. Opp. at 26. But because BOP did not take final action on Tyes-Williams’s claims, it 

cannot have waived the defense of timeliness. Waiver occurs when an agency not only accepts 

and investigates an untimely claim, but also “decide[s] it on the merits—all without mentioning 

timeliness.” Nurriddin, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 86 (quoting Bowden, 106 F.3d at 438).

5 Tyes-Williams also argues that her initial EEO contact, on November 16, 2015, sufficed to 

exhaust her retaliation claim. Pl. Opp. at 26. But as the first protected activity in which she 

engaged, this EEO contact cannot have both caused the subsequent retaliation against her and 

exhausted her retaliation claims.
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b. The 180-day Requirement

The 180-day requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c) applies straightforwardly 

to any allegations concerning discrete acts of retaliation: plaintiffs cannot file claims in federal 

court about any such acts that happened within the previous 180 days, because allowing such 

claims “contravene[s] EEOC’s investigative duty and undermine[s] Congress’s policy of 

encouraging informal resolution ‘up to the 180th day.’” Murthy v. Vilsack, 609 F.3d 460, 465 

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Martini v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1346–47 (D.C. Cir. 

1999)).

Those portions of Tyes-Williams’s retaliation claim based on her performance evaluation

in April 2017 and her desire for telework—part of the fourth, and the fifth, allegedly retaliatory 

actions she identified—are barred by this requirement. Again, the timeline of events makes this 

evident. Kelley gave Tyes-Williams an “Excellent” performance rating on April 7, 2017. 

Compl. ¶¶ 57, 79(d). And on April 18, 2017, Tyes-Williams requested that she be permitted to 

telework two days per week, but Kelley subsequently authorized only one day per week. Id.

¶¶ 60–61, 79(e). Tyes-Williams filed this lawsuit on June 16, 2017, well before 180 days had 

elapsed from either of these alleged acts of retaliation. Accordingly, the Court must dismiss her 

retaliation claim to the extent that it relies on them for failure to exhaust.

Thus, the only remaining portions of her retaliation claim that Tyes-Williams could have 

exhausted are based on the delay in approving her transfer request, which she made in March 

2016, Compl. ¶¶ 42–43, 79(c), and on the remainder of her performance-evaluation claim, which 

arose out of a conversation in June 2016, id. ¶¶ 55, 79(d). In other words, those are the only acts 

of retaliation she alleges that could have fallen both (1) within 45 days before her EEO contacts

on March 18, 2016, and June 22, 2016, and (2) more than 180 days before she filed this lawsuit. 

The Court assumes for purposes of this analysis that she has exhausted those aspects of her
15

retaliation claim and will proceed to analyze the sufficiency of these two acts as potential bases 

for that claim.

2. Materially Adverse Action

An employee fails to state a retaliation claim if she has not alleged a materially adverse 

action, which is one that “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination,’” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)), and that 

“affect[ed] the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment 

opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm,” Holcomb 

v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Neither of Tyes-Williams’s remaining alleged acts of retaliation are materially adverse to 

her. As for the performance-evaluation claim, Tyes-Williams had a phone call with Kelley on 

June 1, 2016, where she raised concerns about her 2016 performance standards being 

unworkably vague, and he dismissed her concerns. Compl. ¶ 55. Performance evaluations can 

qualify as materially adverse actions only when they concretely affect the employee’s “position, 

grade level, salary, or promotion opportunities,” Taylor, 571 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Baloch v. 

Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), or “when attached to financial harms,” 

Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199. Here, even if the standards by which Kelley evaluated her in 2016 

were vague, Tyes-Williams does not identify any way in which they affected her status or her 

compensation. Thus, they cannot qualify as materially adverse actions.

As for the delay of her transfer, on March 1, 2016, Tyes-Williams requested to be 

transferred to Yazoo City, Mississippi; Kugler told her on March 14, 2016, that the request had 

not yet been approved; and “more than three months” later, the request was ultimately approved. 

Compl. ¶¶ 42–43. But delays in personnel actions—similar to the effect of performance 
16

evaluations—are materially adverse only when they result in independent, tangible effects such 

as “endangering compensatory or advancement potential.” Zelaya v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 733 F. 

Supp. 2d 121, 131 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Diggs v. Potter, 700 F. Supp. 2d 20, 44 (D.D.C. 

2010). Tyes-Williams does not plead any plausible way in which the three-month delay in 

approving the transfer she requested affected her compensation or career trajectory. Her 

conclusory allegation that it resulted in “past and future loss of income and benefits of 

employment [and] lost career and business opportunities and advancements” is not grounded in 

any of the events that she describes in her complaint. See Compl. ¶ 80. Thus, the three-month 

delay cannot qualify as a materially adverse action either.

Finally, Tyes-Williams argues that the Court may not consider these allegedly adverse 

actions individually—that in evaluating her retaliation claim, it must consider whether all the 

actions taken together, including those that she has not exhausted, would dissuade an employee 

from engaging in protected activity. Pl. Opp. at 30. As an initial matter, it is a small minority of 

courts in this district that have held that a retaliation claim requires the collective consideration 

of allegedly adverse actions. E.g., Payne v. Salazar, 899 F. Supp. 2d 42, 56 (D.D.C. 2012); Test 

v. Holder, 614 F. Supp. 2d 73, 84 (D.D.C. 2009); Nurriddin, 674 F. Supp. 2d at 91. More 

common is the approach of deciding whether to consider retaliatory acts collectively “on a caseby-case basis.” Baloch v. Norton, 517 F. Supp. 2d 345, 363 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Wanamaker v. 

Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 464 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also Walden v. Patient-Centered 

Outcomes Research Inst., 304 F. Supp. 3d 123, 134 (D.D.C. 2018); Lurensky v. Wellinghoff, 167 

F. Supp. 3d 1, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2016); Taylor v. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d 124, 148–49 (D.D.C. 

2012). And here, where the plaintiff has not pleaded any facts indicating a cumulative effect of

the adverse actions greater than the sum of their individual effects, the Court declines to do so, 
17

especially regarding those claims she has failed to exhaust.

6

 See Taylor, 892 F. Supp. at 148. 

The Court notes that this approach to evaluating whether a retaliation claim has met the pleading 

standard is consistent with the Supreme Court’s characterization of such claims in Morgan. In 

that case, Court observed that while hostile work environment claims are based on the 

cumulative effect of many individual actions, retaliation claims are “discrete acts” that must be 

separately exhausted. 536 U.S. at 114.

Because all of the acts that Tyes-Williams identifies as retaliatory are either unexhausted 

or are not materially adverse to her, the Court will dismiss Count III in its entirety. And because

the Court dispenses with Count III on these grounds, it need not address Defendant’s additional 

argument that Plaintiff has failed to allege a causal connection between her protected activity and 

at least some of Defendant’s alleged retaliatory acts.

Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(ECF No. 6) is GRANTED. Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) are 

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly

TIMOTHY J. KELLY

United States District Judge

Date: January 15, 2019

 6 Even if the Court were to collectively consider the two claims Tyes-Williams has in fact

exhausted, its conclusion that her complaint fails to allege a materially adverse retaliatory action 

would be unaffected.