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Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

BILL K. WILSON, SUPERINTENDANT, INDIANA 

STATE PRISON v. JOSEPH E. CORCORAN 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–91. Decided November 8, 2010 

PER CURIAM. 

Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to

state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal 

law. Because the Court of Appeals granted the writ to

respondent without finding such a violation, we vacate its

judgment and remand. 

* * * 

In 1997, respondent Joseph Corcoran shot and killed 

four men, including his brother and his sister’s fiance. An 

Indiana jury found him guilty of four counts of murder,

found the statutory aggravating circumstance of multiple

murders, and unanimously recommended capital punishment. The trial judge agreed and sentenced respondent to 

death. 

But on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana vacated

the sentence out of concern that the trial judge might have 

violated Indiana law by relying partly on nonstatutory 

aggravating factors when imposing the death penalty. 

Corcoran v. State, 739 N. E. 2d 649, 657–658 (2000). 

When addressing respondent at sentencing, the trial court

had remarked: 

“‘[T]he knowing and intentional murders of four innocent people is an extremely heinous and aggravated 

crime. . . . I don’t think in the history of this county 

we’ve had a mass murderer such as yourself. It 

makes you, Mr. Corcoran, a very dangerous, evil mass

murderer. And I am convinced in my heart of hearts, 
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. . . if given the opportunity, you will murder again.’” 

Id., at 657 (quoting transcript). 

According to the Indiana Supreme Court, the trial judge’s 

reference to the innocence of respondent’s victims, the 

heinousness of his offense, and his future dangerousness 

was not necessarily improper; it is permissible to provide 

“an appropriate context for consideration of the alleged 

aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). But because the trial court 

might have meant that it weighed these factors as aggravating circumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court remanded for resentencing. See ibid. 

On remand, the trial court issued a revised sentencing

order. It wrote: 

“‘The trial Court, in balancing the proved aggravators

and mitigators, emphasizes to the Supreme Court 

that it only relied upon those proven statutory aggravators. The trial Court’s remarks at the sentencing 

hearing, and the language in the original sentencing 

order explain why such high weight was given to the 

statutory aggravator of multiple murder, and further

support the trial Court’s personal conclusion that the

sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender 

and these crimes.’” Corcoran v. State, 774 N. E. 2d 

495, 498 (Ind. 2002) (quoting order). 

On appeal, over respondent’s objection, the Supreme Court 

accepted this explanation and affirmed the sentence. Id., 

at 498–499, 502. It explained that it was “now satisfied 

that the trial court has relied on only aggravators listed in

Indiana Code §35–50–2–9(b). . . . There is no lack of clarity in [the trial court’s] statement and no plausible reason

to believe it untrue.” Id., at 499. 

Respondent later applied to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana for a writ of 

habeas corpus. His habeas petition asserted a number of 
Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 3 

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grounds for relief, including a renewed claim that, notwithstanding its assurances to the contrary, the trial court

improperly relied on nonstatutory aggravating factors

when it resentenced him. Respondent also asserted that

this reliance violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Record, Doc. 13, p. 11. In its response to the petition, the State specifically disputed that contention. Id., 

Doc. 33, p. 16 (“[Respondent] fails to establish any constitutional deficiency in [the] Indiana Supreme Court’s review of the trial court’s treatment of Corcoran’s sentence 

on remand, let alone does it show that the state supreme 

court’s judgment is in any way inconsistent with applicable United States Supreme Court precedent”).

The District Court, however, had no need to resolve this 

dispute because it granted habeas relief on a wholly different ground: that an offer by the prosecutor to take the 

death penalty off the table in exchange for a waiver of a 

jury trial had violated the Sixth Amendment. Corcoran v. 

Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 725–726 (2007). It did not 

address the sentencing challenge because that was “rendered moot” by the grant of habeas relief. Id., at 734. 

The State appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed 

the District Court’s Sixth Amendment ruling. Corcoran v. 

Buss, 551 F. 3d 703, 712, 714 (2008). Then, evidently 

overlooking respondent’s remaining sentencing claims, the 

Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the District Court 

“with instructions to deny the writ.” Id., at 714. To correct this oversight, we granted certiorari and vacated the 

Seventh Circuit’s judgment. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558 

U. S. 1 (2009) (per curiam). We explained that the Court 

of Appeals “should have permitted the District Court to 

consider Corcoran’s unresolved challenges to his death 

sentence on remand, or should have itself explained why 

such consideration was unnecessary.” Id., at ___ (slip op., 

at 2). 
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On remand—and without any opportunity for briefing 

by the parties—the Court of Appeals changed course and 

granted habeas relief. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F. 3d 

547, 555 (2010). After determining that respondent’s

sentencing challenge had been waived by his failure to 

include it in his original cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit 

concluded that the claim satisfied plain-error review. Id., 

at 551. The panel explained that, “unlike the Indiana 

Supreme Court,” it was unsatisfied with the trial court’s

representation that it relied only on aggravating factors

authorized by Indiana law. Ibid. Because the trial court’s 

revised sentencing order said that it used the nonstatutory

factors of heinousness, victims’ innocence, and future 

dangerousness to determine the weight given to the aggravator of multiple murders, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Indiana Supreme Court had made an 

“‘unreasonable determination of the facts’” when it accepted the trial court’s representation that it did not rely 

on those factors as aggravating circumstances. Ibid. 

(quoting 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2)). The panel therefore

required the Indiana trial court to reconsider its sentencing determination in order to “prevent non-compliance 

with Indiana law.” 593 F. 3d, at 552–553. 

But it is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral 

attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to

a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(a). And we have repeatedly held that “‘federal habeas corpus relief does not

lie for errors of state law.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 

62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780 

(1990)). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court 

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.” 502 U. S., at 67–68. But here, the panel’s 
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opinion contained no hint that it thought the violation of 

Indiana law it had unearthed also entailed the infringement of any federal right. Not only did the court frame

respondent’s claim as whether “the Indiana trial court 

considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances . . . in

contravention of state law,” 593 F. 3d, at 551 (emphasis 

added), it also explicitly acknowledged that “[n]othing in

[its] opinion prevents Indiana from adopting a rule permitting the use of non-statutory aggravators in the death 

sentence selection process. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 

862, 878 (1983) (permitting their use under federal law),” 

id., at 551–552 (citations omitted).

Nor did it suffice for the Court of Appeals to find an 

unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U. S. C. 

§2254(d)(2). That provision allows habeas petitioners to 

avoid the bar to habeas relief imposed with respect to

federal claims adjudicated on the merits in state court by

showing that the state court’s decision was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” It does 

not repeal the command of §2254(a) that habeas relief may 

be afforded to a state prisoner “only on the ground” that 

his custody violates federal law. 

In response to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the State

filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The 

State’s petition argued that the Seventh Circuit had erred 

by granting relief in the absence of a federal violation. It 

also contended, on the authority of our opinion in Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U. S. 78 (1983) (per curiam), that the 

Court of Appeals erred by second-guessing the Indiana

Supreme Court’s factual determination that its own trial

court complied with Indiana law. 

The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing, but amended its 

opinion to include this language: 

“This [remand for resentencing] will cure the state

trial court’s ‘unreasonable determination of the facts.’ 
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28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) [sic]. (It will also prevent noncompliance with Indiana law. [Corcoran] contended

that, under the circumstances of this case, noncompliance with state law also violates the federal Constitution and thus warrants him relief under 28 U. S. C. 

§2254(d)(2). [The State] has not advanced any contrary argument based on Wainwright v. Goode, 464 

U. S. 78 (1983), or any similar decision.)” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 144a–145a. 

The amendment did not cure the defect. It is not 

enough to note that a habeas petitioner asserts the existence of a constitutional violation; unless the federal court 

agrees with that assertion, it may not grant relief. The 

Seventh Circuit’s opinion reflects no such agreement, nor

does it even articulate what federal right was allegedly 

infringed. In fact, as to one possible federal claim, the

court maintains that it would not violate federal law for 

Indiana to adopt a rule authorizing what the trial court 

did. 593 F. 3d, at 551–552. 

In lieu of finding or even describing a constitutional 

error, the amended opinion says only that the State had 

not “advanced any contrary argument based on Wainwright v. Goode . . . or any similar decision.” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 145a. It is not clear what this language was 

meant to convey. It cannot have meant that the State 

forfeited the position that respondent’s allegations do not

state a constitutional violation, since (as we observed) the

State explicitly disputed that point before the District

Court—the last forum in which the subject had been 

raised, leading the Court of Appeals to conclude that 

respondent had waived the claim entirely. 593 F. 3d, at 

551. And there is no suggestion that the State has ever 

conceded the existence of a federal right to be sentenced in

accordance with Indiana law. Under those circumstances, 

it was improper for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ 
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without first concluding that a violation of federal law had 

been established. 

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. We express no view about the merits of the 

habeas petition. 

It is so ordered.