J-A07003-17

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

WILLIAM HENRY DEGOUNETTE,

Appellant No. 749 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of April 7, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0013436-2015

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2017

Appellant, William Henry Degounette, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on April 7, 2016 after the trial court convicted him of a 

misdemeanor of the third degree for violating 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5507, 

obstructing highways. As the Commonwealth concedes the insufficiency of 

the evidence introduced in support of Appellant’s conviction, we reverse the 

conviction and vacate the judgment of sentence.

On September 20, 2015, Appellant was charged with one count of 

defiant trespass1and one count of obstructing highways.2 The case 

proceeded to a bench trial at which the Commonwealth stipulated to the 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5507(a). 
J-A07003-17

- 2 -

affidavit of probable cause and the testimony elicited at the preliminary 

hearing which established as follows.

Sergeant Stephen Matakovich of the Pittsburgh Police Department was 

the only witness called by the Commonwealth. Sergeant Matakovich testified 

that, on September 20, 2015, he was working as a plain-clothes officer at 

Heinz Field for a Pittsburgh Steelers’ game. At approximately 11:00 a.m., 

Sergeant Matakovich received a report of a male on a bicycle stopping traffic 

on the Reedsdale Street exit off-ramp from the Parkway North in order to 

scalp tickets. When Sergeant Matakovich arrived on the scene, Appellant 

had left the exit ramp and was down the street away from the ramp. When 

questioned by Sergeant Matakovich, Appellant was verbally confrontational. 

Sergeant Matakovich advised Appellant at that time that he had been 

warned on numerous occasions in the past that he was not permitted on the 

Heinz Field property and that he was not permitted to stop traffic.3 

Appellant responded that he was still going to scalp tickets at which time he 

was arrested and charged with the aforementioned crimes.

The trial court found Appellant not guilty of defiant trespass but 

convicted him of a third degree misdemeanor for obstructing highways. The 

court proceeded to sentence Appellant to one year of probation. Appellant 

____________________________________________

3 Sergeant Matakovich testified that he personally warned Appellant about 

his repeated behavior on May 30, 2015, June 6, 2015, June 20, 2015, 

August 2, 2015, August 23, 2015, September 3, 2015, and September 5, 

2015. N.T., 10/27/15, at 4.
J-A07003-17

- 3 -

filed a timely post-sentence motion which was denied on April 25, 2016. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal raising one issue: Did the 

Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of 

obstructing highways? 4

A claim impugning the sufficiency of the evidence presents us with a 

question of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 

2000). Our standard of review is well-established:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the 

fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943–944 (Pa. Super. 2011), 

citing Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856–857 (Pa. Super. 2010).

____________________________________________

4 Appellant and the trial court complied with the requirements of Rule 1925 

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
J-A07003-17

- 4 -

The statute prohibiting the obstruction of a highway provides:

§ 5507. Obstructing highways and other public passages

(a) Obstructing.—A person, who, having no legal privilege to 

do so, intentionally or recklessly obstructs any highway, railroad 

track or public utility right-of-way, sidewalk, navigable waters, 

other public passage, whether alone or with others, commits a 

summary offense, or, in case he persists after warning by a law 

officer, a misdemeanor of the third degree....

(c) Definition.—As used in this section, the word “obstructs” 

means render impassable without unreasonable inconvenience 

or hazard.

18 Pa.C.S.A. §5507. In finding Appellant guilty of this offense, the trial 

court stated:

The evidence presented was clearly sufficient to support the 

conviction for [o]bstructing [h]ighways. [Appellant] had stopped 

traffic on a highway off-ramp with his bicycle while soliciting 

each vehicle to scalp tickets to that day[’]s Steeler[s’] game. 

The fact that [Appellant] was found on the sidewalk matters not; 

[h]is stopping of traffic on a public highway off-ramp was 

sufficient to establish the elements of the crime of [o]bstructing 

[h]ighways.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/16, at 3. Appellant argues that the record fails to 

establish that he obstructed the highway as there was no evidence that he 

rendered the Reedsdale Street ramp impassable without unreasonable 

inconvenience or hazard. As support, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. 

Battaglia, 725 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 1999) in which this Court determined 

that the evidence did not support a finding that the defendant, who had 

blown a “cloud” of leaves onto the street, violated Section 5507. 

Specifically, this Court concluded:
J-A07003-17

- 5 -

We cannot find proof appellant committed this offense. The only 

evidence offered was the abbreviated testimony of the officer, 

who saw automobiles travelling both ways “swerving 

dangerously” to avoid the leaves appellant and the other 

individual were blowing towards the street. This evidence, 

disputed by appellant, does not establish a violation of Section 

5507, which requires a finding appellant intentionally or 

recklessly rendered the roadway impassable. 

If cars swerved, there is no evidence they were forced to do so 

in order to pass. The record does not show how long the officer 

watched in order to see traffic in both directions swerve, nor is 

there testimony of the vantage point from which he estimated 

the danger. There is no testimony about the speed of the 

swerving cars, the nature of the roadway, or whether there were 

parked cars or pedestrians nearby. 

There is no evidence establishing the volume of leaves involved, 

except the testimony of appellant, who estimated there were 

about 30 to 40 gallons, enough to fill “a garbage bag”. If this 

made a cloud, it was a small cloud. While one need not compile 

a wall of leaves to violate the statute, the record here has no 

evidence of quantity sufficient to amount to an impassable 

obstruction. 

As a result, we are left with the officer's opinion the road was 

impassable without hazard, but without underlying facts 

sufficient to allow the finder of fact to reach the same 

conclusion, and appellant's conviction for obstructing highways 

cannot stand.

Id. at 194. As in Battaglia, Appellant argues, and the Commonwealth 

agrees, that the scant testimony offered by Sergeant Matakovich does not 

support the conclusion that Appellant rendered the Reedsdale Street 

off-ramp impassable without unreasonable inconvenience or hazard. 

Although, Sergeant Matakovich testified that he saw Appellant earlier in the 

day “up on the ramp”, N.T., 10/27/15, at 7, there was no testimony as to 

where Appellant stood at that time and whether he caused the ramp to be 
J-A07003-17

- 6 -

impassable. Moreover, the only testimony as to Appellant’s location when 

he was on the exit ramp was that, “[h]e was on the side of the road, and he 

was stopping the cars as they came down the ramp.” Id. at 6. As the 

Commonwealth concedes,

It is unclear how [A]ppellant actually rendered the roadway 

impassable, either recklessly or intentionally. Although it can be 

inferred that [A]ppellant was stationed on the ramp while trying 

to sell tickets, stopping traffic in the process and creating a 

situation where drivers would place themselves and/or others at 

risk by trying to navigate the ramp, the Commonwealth submits 

that this inference is questionable based upon the testimony of 

record.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. We agree. The evidentiary record in this case 

is woefully inadequate in establishing that Appellant caused the exit ramp to 

be impassable without unreasonable inconvenience or hazard.5 As such, 

the evidence was insufficient to find Appellant guilty of violating Section 

5507.6

____________________________________________

5

In Battaglia, there was some testimony that vehicles swerved 

“dangerously” in order to avoid the leaves that were blown onto the street. 

Yet, this Court found that testimony insufficient to convict under Section 

5507 since there was no evidence as to whether the road was impassable 

without hazard. Despite cars having to swerve in order to pass, we 

concluded the evidence was insufficient where there was no proof 

demonstrating the speed of the swerving cars, the nature of the roadway, or 

the location of parked cars or pedestrians. Battaglia, 725 A.2d at 194. 

Here, there is even less evidence. All that the record establishes is that 

Appellant “was on the side of the road, and he was stopping cars as they 

came down the ramp.” N.T., 10/27/15, at 6.

6 As we find that the evidence was insufficient to convict Appellant of 

obstructing the highway in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5507, we need not 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A07003-17

- 7 -

Conviction reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2017

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

determine whether the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty of a 

misdemeanor of the third degree as opposed to a summary offense.