1 

13‐3368

Jeffrey Navin v. HSBC Bank USA

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.  CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER

JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER

THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).    A PARTY CITING A

SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley

Square, in the City of New York, on the 21st day of October, two thousand

fourteen.

      

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE,

    CHESTER J. STRAUB,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

     Circuit Judges.

____________________________________________

JEFFREY NAVIN,  

     Plaintiff‐Appellant,

     ‐v.‐            No. 13‐3368

HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE

HOLDERS OF DEUTSCHE ALT‐A

SECURITIES INC., MORTGAGE LOAN

TRUST SERIES 2005‐6 C/O AMERICAS

SERVICING COMPANY FOR NORWEST
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HOME IMPROVEMENT, WELLS FARGO,

WELLS FARGO BANK,

     Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________________________________  

For Appellant:     KENNETH R. DAVIS, Stamford, CT.

For Appellees:     MARC S. EDRICH (Joseph H. Carlisle, on the brief),

Litchfield Cavo LLP, Simsbury, CT.

   

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

(Stefan R. Underhill, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Jeffrey Navin (“Navin”) appeals from a decision of the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissing his complaint for failure

to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as well as an

order denying Navin’s motion for reconsideration.1  We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

 

1 The standards of review are not in dispute.  We review de novo a district court’s grant

of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true

and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.  See Krys v. Pigott, 749 F.3d

117, 128 (2d Cir. 2014).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We

review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  See Analytical

Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012).
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The majority of Navin’s claims are barred by the Rooker‐Feldman doctrine

because they were already litigated and decided by Connecticut state courts.  

McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).  To the extent that Navin

raises claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”),

CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42‐110a et seq., that are not barred by Rooker‐Feldman, those

claims are time‐barred as not having occurred within the three‐year statute of

limitations.  We have considered all of Navin’s remaining arguments and find

them to be without merit, and we affirm the dismissal of Navin’s complaint for

substantially the reasons stated in Judge Underhill’s well‐reasoned decision.2

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

     

       FOR THE COURT:

       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

              

 

2 Defendants‐Appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal for Navin’s failure to file a

principal brief that complies with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) and/or

Local Rule 28.1 is DENIED as moot.