Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Xiao Ling Peng v. Nardi, 2017 IL App (1st) 170155

Appellate Court 

Caption

XIAO LING PENG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK NARDI, 

MOHAMMED KOUK, and LEI GUAN, Defendants (Lei Guan, 

Defendant-Appellee).

District & No. First District, Fourth Division 

No. 1-17-0155

Filed December 14, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-L-11447; the 

Hon. John P. Callahan, Jr., Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Jonathan Lustig, of Chicago, for appellant.

Terrence F. Guolee and Daniel T. Rupkey, of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., 

of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Justices Gordon and Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Xiao Ling Peng, a restaurant worker, filed a negligence suit against her coworker, Lei 

Guan, and two other drivers, seeking damages for injuries she sustained in a three-car collision 

that occurred while Guan was driving restaurant employees to work in a van their employer 

provided for their commute. The trial court initially denied Guan’s motion to dismiss, but later 

granted his motion to reconsider and then dismissed Peng’s action as to Guan with prejudice 

and authorized her to take an interlocutory appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). 

Peng’s allegations against the other two drivers are pending in the trial court. Peng contends 

the court erred in finding that a civil suit against her tortious coworker is barred by the 

exclusivity provision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/5(a) 

(West 2014)) because the commute was not part of her employment and she did not 

affirmatively elect the de minimis reimbursement for some medical expenses that her employer 

voluntarily paid directly to one of her medical care providers. Guan responds that Peng 

misapprehends authority, indicating that her injury is work-related and exclusively 

compensable under the Act because the employer controlled Peng’s transportation. He also 

contends that Peng is estopped from contradicting her workers’ compensation claim. Peng 

replies that she filed for workers’ compensation recently, in 2016, just before the statute of 

limitations ran, solely to protect her rights, but that her intention is to be compensated through 

the litigation she initiated in 2014, as evidenced by this appeal. 

¶ 2 In 2014, Peng and Guan were co-employees of a Chinese and Japanese buffet restaurant 

owned and operated by Royal Illinois, LLC (Royal Illinois). Peng worked in the “back of the 

house,” preparing food for the dim sum station and keeping the station tidy. Guan was a waiter. 

The restaurant was located in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, which is a community northwest of 

Chicago, and Peng, Guan, and a number of other Royal Illinois employees resided on the south 

side of Chicago, in the Bridgeview and Chinatown neighborhoods. The employer gave Guan 

the keys to a 15-seat 2010 Ford E350 passenger van to transport him and other employees to 

and from the restaurant, paid him $600 a month for his driving duties, and covered the cost of 

fuel. The employer prohibited Guan from allowing anyone else to drive the van. The employer 

also prohibited Guan from making personal use of the vehicle and instructed him to leave the 

van parked when he was not transporting restaurant employees. The vehicle would be filled to 

capacity on weekends, but less full during the week. The employer would initially tell Guan 

where to pick up new employees because he would not recognize them, but after that, Guan 

chose the pick-up and drop-off points. He typically made three stops in Bridgeview and 

Chinatown. Guan also chose the specific route to take to and from work, based on prevailing 

traffic conditions. 

¶ 3 The accident that caused injury to Peng occurred on Friday, June 20, 2014, at 10:20 a.m. 

when Guan was driving in Chicago on northbound I-90, in the far left lane, at or near its 

intersection with Harlem Avenue. (Three different accident dates appear in the record on 

appeal, and we have used the date written on the Illinois Traffic Crash Report.) Peng was asleep 

while seated in the third row of the van’s four rows of seats. Despite “urgently braking,” Guan 

struck the back of a 2008 Acura K1 being driven by Mohammed A. Kouk, who in turn struck 

the back of a Nissan van being driven by Mark A. Nardi. Guan’s passengers suffered mostly 

minor injuries, with the worst appearing to be a deep facial cut. At the emergency room, Peng 

was diagnosed with “a muscle and tendon” injury in her left hip and discharged with a walker 
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and painkillers. When the hip pain continued to be unbearable more than a month later, Peng 

went to the hospital and was diagnosed with a pelvic fracture. When she was deposed in August 

2015, Peng said the medical treatment she received had only partially alleviated the pain. 

¶ 4 An employee injured on the job normally cannot sue her Illinois employer or co-employee, 

provided the employee is entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits from the employer 

or its insurer. Ramsey v. Morrison, 175 Ill. 2d 218, 224, 676 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (1997); Illinois 

Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Virginia Surety Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 113758, ¶ 16, 979 N.E.2d 

503; see 820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2014). The Act is a comprehensive statute that compels 

an employer to pay for job-related injuries without being able to resort to the various defenses 

it could plead in a tort suit. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 2012 IL App (1st) 113758, ¶ 16. 

However, in return for disbursing prompt and no-fault compensation, the maximum amount 

the employer must pay is capped. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 2012 IL App (1st) 

113758, ¶ 16. Thus, when an accident occurs, an employee is financially protected and the 

employer avoids the prospect of litigation and a potentially larger judgment in a common law 

action. Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455, 462, 564 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (1990);

Fregeau v. Gillespie, 96 Ill. 2d 479, 486, 451 N.E.2d 870, 873 (1983) (indicating the workers’ 

compensation system “was designed to provide speedy recovery without proof of fault for 

accidental injuries”); 820 ILCS 305/11 (West 2014) (workers’ compensation “shall be the 

measure of the responsibility of any employer”). 

¶ 5 A co-employee acting in the course of his employment who accidentally injures an 

employee is immune from a common law negligence action in furtherance of the Act’s

underlying policy that the costs of industrial accidents be placed on the industry. Ramsey, 175 

Ill. 2d at 227 (citing Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry. Co., 17 Ill. 2d 618, 628, 161 N.E.2d 

812, 818 (1959)). The purpose of the Act would be blunted if the costs of job-related injuries 

were shifted from one employee to another employee. Rylander, 17 Ill. 2d at 628. The Illinois 

Supreme Court reasoned: 

“ ‘[If coemployee immunity were not recognized] an employee who has inadvertently 

injured a fellow worker would be forced to bear the sole cost of defending and 

satisfying the common-law action without any part of the cost being passed on to the 

industry, since the common employer’s liability is expressly limited to the 

compensation award. [Citation.] In view of the fact that a considerable portion of 

industrial injuries can be traced to the negligence of a coworker, such litigation could 

reach staggering proportions, and would not only tend to encourage corrupt and 

fraudulent practices but would also disrupt the harmonious relations which exist 

between coworkers. The avoidance of such results is most certainly beneficial to the 

employee.’ [Citation.]” Ramsey, 175 Ill. 2d at 227-28. 

¶ 6 Also:

“ ‘The principle behind this legislation was that the business enterprise or industry 

should directly bear the costs of injury to its employees in the same manner as the 

enterprise has always borne the costs of maintaining and repairing its plant, machinery 

and equipment.

* * *

If [the Act] were construed to withhold immunity to a coemployee from a 

negligence action, the cost of injury to an employee of the business would be shifted 

from the employer, where the Act places it, to a fellow employee, where the Act does 
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not place it. *** We cannot believe the legislature intended to permit the ultimate costs 

of employee injury to be borne by fellow employees, whether negligent or not.’ ” 

Ramsey, 175 Ill. 2d at 228-29 (quoting Madison v. Pierce, 478 P.2d 860, 863-64 (Mont. 

1970)).

¶ 7 “So far as persons within the industry are concerned, the *** Act eliminated fault as a basis 

of liability.” Rylander, 17 Ill. 2d at 628.

¶ 8 Section 5(a) of the Act, which is known as the exclusivity provision, expressly bars 

common law actions for injuries that come within the scope of the Act by stating “No common 

law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer *** or the agents or employees of 

*** [the employer] for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of 

his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any 

employee who is covered by the provisions of this Act ***.” (Emphases added.) 820 ILCS 

305/5(a) (West 2014). An employee can escape the exclusivity provision and proceed with 

civil litigation against an employer and/or co-employee only if the employee can allege and 

prove the injury (1) did not arise from his or her employment, (2) was not received during the 

course of employment, (3) was not accidental, such as an intentionally inflicted injury, or 

(4) was not compensable under the Act, such as being discharged in retaliation for filing a 

claim for workers’ compensation. Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 463; Fredericks v. Liberty Mutual 

Insurance Co., 255 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1031 (1994) (the broad immunity granted by the 

exclusive remedy section of the workers’ compensation statute may be overcome in actions 

involving intentional torts by the employer or claims for retaliatory discharge for filing a 

compensation claim). 

¶ 9 As a general rule, an accident occurring while an employee is traveling to or from work is 

not considered to have arisen out of or occurred in the course of employment for purposes of 

the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. Hall v. DeFalco, 178 Ill. App. 3d 408, 413, 533 

N.E.2d 448, 452 (1988) (citing Hindle v. Dillbeck, 68 Ill. 2d 309, 318, 370 N.E.2d 165, 169 

(1977), Stevenson Old Sales & Service v. Industrial Comm’n, 140 Ill. App. 3d 703, 705, 489 

N.E.2d 328, 330 (1986), Sloma v. Pfluger, 125 Ill. App. 2d 347, 356, 261 N.E.2d 323, 327 

(1970), and Sjostrom v. Sproule, 49 Ill. App. 2d 451, 460, 200 N.E.2d 19, 24 (1964), aff’d 33 

Ill. 2d 40, 210 N.E.2d 209 (1965)). 

¶ 10 An exception to this rule exists, however, when the employer provides a means of 

transportation to or from work or affirmatively supplies an employee with something in 

connection with going to or coming from work. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 413 (citing Hindle, 

68 Ill. 2d at 320, and Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 460-61). Employers are sometimes motivated 

to provide transportation for employees to and from the workplace, i.e., vanpools, in order to 

recruit and retain employees or when parking space at the job site is limited. Thayer v. State, 

653 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Iowa 2002). Larson’s treatise indicates that the basis for imposing 

liability on the employer through the workers’ compensation system is that the employer has 

controlled the conditions of transportation. 2 Lex K. Larson and Thomas A. Robinson, 

Workers’ Compensation Law § 15.01, at 15-2 (2017) (“If the trip to and from work is made in 

a truck, bus, car, or other vehicle under the control of the employer, an injury during that trip 

is incurred in the course of employment.”) When the employer takes control of an employee’s 

transportation, the employer “has extended the risks of employment and therefore has extended 

the course of employment.” Torres v. Industrial Comm’n, 670 P.2d 423, 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 

1983), Smithey v. Hansberger, 938 P.2d 498, 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (nuclear power plant 
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employee was acting within scope of his employment while driving an employer-provided 

vanpool and involved in a rollover accident, so only remedy available to his injured coworkers 

was workers’ compensation). “By providing a vehicle for traveling to and from work, the 

employer “ ‘has, in a sense, sent the employee home on a small ambulatory portion of the 

premises.’ ” J.D. Dutton, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 584 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) 

(quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 17.10, at 4-129 (1978)); 

Johnson v. Farmer, 537 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Iowa 1995) (“when an injury occurs while a worker 

is being transported to an intended place of employment in a vehicle owned by the employer, 

the latter’s control over that situation makes the vehicle an extension of the work place” (citing 

1 Arthur Larson, Larson’s Workmens’ Compensation Law § 17.00, at 4-209 (1995))). 

¶ 11 Illinois law provides numerous examples of this scenario, a few of which are helpful here. 

In Hall, an accident occurred after an employee finished his shift at a McDonald’s restaurant 

in Winnetka, Illinois, and the restaurant manager was driving him to the local CTA train 

station. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 410. As the truck approached the CTA stop, it veered off the 

road and crashed into a building, causing them injuries. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 409. Although 

the manager was not driving a company vehicle, and the employee perceived the ride as a 

personal courtesy rather than a job perk, one of the manager’s daily work duties was to 

transport employees, and he did so in furtherance of McDonald’s interests. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 

3d at 410. Thus, when the worker attempted to sue, the courts determined the employee’s injury 

arose out of or in the scope of employment and was compensable under the Act, rather than 

through tort litigation against the manager. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 414. 

¶ 12 Section 5(a) of the Act also barred negligence actions in Hindle regarding the death of one 

crew member and serious injuries to another that occurred when their crew leader was using 

her father’s pick-up truck as part of her regular duties to supervise and transport her teenaged 

crew to and from the northern Illinois corn fields where they detasseled corn. Hindle, 68 Ill. 

2d at 312. When the crew leader applied the truck’s brakes on a gravel road, the vehicle 

swerved, skidded, left the road, and struck a utility pole. Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d at 312. The 

passengers were in the back of the pickup, which had been outfitted for them with two lawn 

chairs and an old truck seat. Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d at 312. The crew leader was required to provide 

her crew’s transportation and received additional pay for the transportation duties. Hindle, 68 

Ill. 2d at 314. The court indicated it was irrelevant whether the crew members were paid for 

their time while being transported to or from the corn fields (Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d at 320), making 

this case similar to Hall, in which the McDonald’s employee had clocked out before departing 

for the train station (Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 410). The employer controlled the conveyance 

and had expanded the risks of employment. Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d at 320. Common law negligence 

actions against the employer, the crew leader, and the truck owner were all barred by section 

5(a). 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2014); Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d at 313. 

¶ 13 Another illustration of the employer-conveyance or employer-control principle is found in 

Sjostrom, in which a civil engineer and a mechanical engineer employed in the Stockyards 

neighborhood of Chicago were temporarily assigned to supervise construction of a new plant 

that was south, near Kankakee, Illinois, and were reimbursed for travel expenses. Sjostrom, 49 

Ill. App. 2d at 453. Their employer instructed them to commute together in either a company 

car or personal car in order to avoid reimbursing a duplicate travel expense. Sjostrom, 49 Ill. 

App. 2d at 455. During one such joint commute, using the mechanical engineer’s car, their 

vehicle collided with another, and they were both seriously injured. Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d 
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at 457. The passenger sued his coworker; however, the court found the passenger’s injuries 

arose out of and in the course of his employment and that his common law action was barred 

by the Act. Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 460. The passenger would not have been exposed to 

the “hazards of the road” but for his employment and his employer’s provision for 

transportation to the job site. Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 460. The court noted that employerprovided conveyance is a “well recognized exception to the rule that travel to and from work 

is ordinarily not within the [Act].” Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 460. “ ‘This [well recognized] 

exception to the general rule has been held to be as well established as the rule itself, and to be 

supported by overwhelming authority ***.’ ” Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 460 (quoting 99 

C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 235, at 837). On further appeal, the supreme court affirmed 

and emphasized the distinction between employee trips that are based on personal decisions 

(not compensable through workers’ compensation) and travel in which the employer has 

controlled the method of travel (exclusively compensable through workers’ compensation). 

Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1965). 

¶ 14 With these concepts in mind, we consider the allegations that were made in this case and 

the rulings which led to this appeal. 

¶ 15 Peng initially sued only the two other drivers in 2014, but filed amended pleadings to 

include her employer and coworker. In her second amended complaint, Peng alleged that Guan 

was operating the van within the scope of his employment and that this rendered their 

employer, Royal Illinois, vicariously liable for Guan’s negligent driving. According to the 

authority we discussed above, if Guan was acting within the scope of his employment when 

his negligence injured Peng, she would have no remedy against him other than workers’

compensation benefits. Royal Illinois and Guan sought dismissal on grounds that the workers’ 

compensation system was the exclusive source of an employee’s relief against an employer 

and co-employee for a work-related injury. The dismissal motion was supported by an affidavit 

from the assistant manager of Royal Illinois, Linda Chen, who swore that Guan was driving 

the van for a work-related purpose and acting within the scope of his employment when the 

accident occurred. Chen also swore that the company had workers’ compensation insurance 

coverage in effect from Travelers Insurance. The trial court dismissed the second amended 

complaint without prejudice and granted Peng leave to amend.

¶ 16 In her third amended complaint, which is the version at issue on appeal, Peng omitted any 

mention of Royal Illinois, sued the three drivers, and alleged only that she was a passenger in 

a van that Guan was driving when he negligently caused the multi-vehicle accident with Nardi 

and Kouk. Guan repeated his earlier arguments for dismissal. Peng countered, however, that 

the third amended complaint should survive because she and Guan worked together in the 

restaurant, but he had a separate job as a van driver, and Peng’s commute with Guan was not 

required by her employer, was not compensated time, and was not work-related. The trial court 

apparently found this argument persuasive. We cannot summarize the court’s reasoning 

because there is no transcript of the hearing and the written order denying Guan’s motion to 

dismiss contains no findings or basis for the denial. According to Peng, the trial court 

concluded that she was not in the course of her employment at the time of the accident. The 

court scheduled discovery and other deadlines in preparation for trial. 

¶ 17 Less than a month later, Guan filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to 

dismiss, again arguing that the workers’ compensation system was the exclusive source of an 

employee’s relief against her coworker for a work-related injury. Guan argued that it was 
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indisputable that Peng was an employee acting within the scope of her employment, and he 

relied in part on “newly discovered” evidence that Peng had filed a workers’ compensation 

claim which had been accepted by Royal Illinois and its insurer, Travelers Insurance. Guan 

tendered correspondence from Travelers Insurance, confirming that Peng filed a workers’

compensation claim and that the insurer opened a claim file, determined Peng’s injuries were 

compensable, and paid some of her medical bills. Guan said it appeared Peng’s workers’

compensation claim had been closed only because she failed to submit her additional medical 

bills, but that her lack of diligence in complying with a requirement under the Act did not 

entitle her to maintain a tort claim against her employer or co-employee. One of Guan’s other 

new exhibits was a screenshot from a webpage maintained by the Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Commission, which indicated that Ming Cheng, whose name appeared on the 

Illinois accident report as one of Guan’s passengers, had also filed a workers’ compensation 

claim and that Travelers Insurance had settled the claim, thus conceding that Guan’s accident 

was work-related. Guan also attached previous exhibits (not “newly discovered”), including 

Peng’s interrogatory answer acknowledging she “filed a [worker’s compensation] claim for 

and/or receive[d] *** worker’s compensation benefits,” the accident report bearing Cheng’s 

name, and the Chen affidavit indicating Guan and Peng were coworkers and that Travelers 

Insurance was the employer’s workers’ compensation carrier.

¶ 18 The trial court did not immediately rule on the motion for reconsideration and instead 

entered and continued it for approximately three weeks “for Plaintiff to show work comp case 

dismissed.” According to Peng, this abbreviated statement indicates that the trial court took 

the unusual step of ordering Peng to dismiss her workers’ compensation action so as to proceed 

only on her civil complaint. As discussed below, the record is ambiguous, at best, as to Peng’s 

contention. The record shows that, a few weeks later, the trial court was informed that Peng 

had not dismissed her workers compensation claim and the parties presented arguments on the 

motion to reconsider. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted Guan’s motions 

to reconsider and dismiss.

¶ 19 On appeal, Peng first addresses the trial court’s decision to grant Guan’s motion for 

reconsideration, then responds to the trial court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, and then 

concludes her appellate brief by arguing that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 

order her to dismiss her compensation claim before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. 

Rather than jumping back and forth through the proceedings as Peng has done, in the interests 

of clarity and efficiency, we will address the three rulings in their chronological order. 

¶ 20 We start with Peng’s contention that the judge declined to stay the civil suit pending the 

outcome of Peng’s workers’ compensation action and instead committed reversible error and 

exceeded the scope of his authority by ordering her to dismiss her compensation claim. 

¶ 21 We find that Peng’s argument lacks support in the record, as there is no indication she 

requested or was denied a stay of the proceeding, and the record is ambiguous as to whether 

the judge ordered Peng to dismiss her compensation claim. Unless Peng asked the trial court 

to enter a stay and gave the trial court legal grounds for doing so, there is no basis for us to 

conclude that the judge erred in rejecting her argument. Furthermore, the order of December 

16, 2016, indicates that the judge entered and continued hearing on Guan’s motion to 

reconsider to January 9, 2017, “for [Peng] to show work comp case dismissed,” which is 

neither a clear statement of what occurred in December nor an explanation of why Peng would 

be returning in January “to show work comp case dismissed.” If the judge required Peng to 
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dismiss her compensation claim, we would expect the judge to definitively state that 

requirement, rather than jotting an abbreviated note at the bottom of a “CASE 

MANAGEMENT” form, which is used to enter deadlines for discovery efforts and to note the 

purpose of upcoming case management conferences. The transcript of the January hearing 

contains no mention of a stay and is ambiguous as to whether the trial court mandated that 

Peng withdraw her claim before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. Furthermore, Peng 

did not follow the purported order and did not dismiss her compensation claim. 

¶ 22 Guan’s appellate attorneys, who are new to the case and did not represent Guan in the trial 

court, point out the uncertainty in the record and contend that Peng waived her appellate 

argument by failing to first present it in the trial court either by written motion or at least during 

the hearing on Guan’s motion to reconsider. 

¶ 23 Any doubts that arise from an incomplete record are resolved against the appellant—the 

party who bears the burden of tendering a sufficient record to support his or her arguments. 

Wing v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 9, 70 N.E.3d 244. Moreover, 

our adversarial system does not allow Peng to introduce new arguments in a court of review. 

Pajic v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 394 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1051, 917 N.E.2d 564, 574 (2009) 

(arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived). We will not presume that the judge 

erroneously denied a stay or exceeded the scope of the circuit court’s jurisdiction by ordering 

Peng to take certain steps in the workers’ compensation forum. Without an adequate record 

preserving the claimed error, we decline to presume that the error occurred. We presume that 

the trial judge knew and followed the law, unless the record affirmatively indicates otherwise, 

and we presume that the judge’s orders have a sufficient factual basis. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 

153517, ¶ 9. 

¶ 24 Peng’s contentions about the motion to dismiss are the heart of this appeal. The standard 

of review for rulings on motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure is de novo. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014); Foster v. Johnson, 378 Ill. App. 3d 197, 

200, 882 N.E.2d 108, 110 (2007). Section 2-619 authorizes a defendant to raise certain defects 

and defenses that negate a plaintiff’s cause of action. Foster, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 200. A section 

2-619 motion provides a means of disposing not only of issues of law but also of easily proven

issues of fact. Barber-Colman Co. v. A&K Midwest Insulation Co., 236 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 

1072, 603 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (1992). A section 2-619 motion may be supported by affidavits; 

the products of discovery, such as interrogatory answers; documentary evidence not 

incorporated into the pleadings as exhibits; testimonial evidence; or other evidentiary 

materials. Barber-Colman, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1068. Guan contended that Peng was seeking 

relief in the wrong forum. Peng argues the dismissal of her civil action was an error because 

she has a right to sue a co-employee for an injury that occurred outside the course of her 

employment. Peng contends that she was commuting to work and that she was not at her 

employer’s premises, not at her job site, not performing any duty within the scope her 

employment as a restaurant worker, and not being compensated for her travel time. She also 

points out that her employer did not require her to live in any specific area or use any specific 

means of transportation to and from work and that she made those choices. Peng contends she 

is analogous to the United Airlines flight attendant who injured her knee while she was a 

passenger, not on duty, flying on a leisure travel pass from Denver to New York City, the day 

before she was to work on a flight departing New York. United Airlines, Inc. v. Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL App (1st) 151693WC, 50 N.E.3d 661. In those 
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circumstances, the flight attendant’s knee injury did not arise out of or in the course of her 

employment and was not compensable through the workers’ compensation system. United 

Airlines, 2015 IL App (1st) 151693WC. Peng also contends that she filed a compensation claim 

only after she filed this civil suit and did so out of caution and on the eve of the statute of 

limitations because there was uncertainty as to the proper venue for her recovery, as authorized 

by Rhodes and Wren, and that her decision to preserve her right to workers’ compensation 

benefits did not negate her election of this civil suit. Rhodes v. Industrial Comm’n, 92 Ill. 2d 

467, 442 N.E.2d 509 (1982); Wren v. Reddick Community Fire Protection District., 337 Ill. 

App. 3d 262, 785 N.E.2d 1052 (2002). She contends that her employer’s unsolicited direct 

payment of some of her initial medical expenses was not due to her affirmative election of 

workers’ compensation benefits and that the employer’s fractional contribution toward the 

medical care and pay that she is owed by the employer is insufficient to affect her legal rights. 

She contends Copass authorizes her to receive workers’ compensation benefits yet also pursue 

a civil negligence action. Copass v. Illinois Power Co., 211 Ill. App. 3d 205, 211, 569 N.E.2d 

1211, 1215 (1991) (survivor’s acceptance of uninitiated payments was insufficient to constitute 

an election of statutory benefits, so as to bar a wrongful death suit alleging spouse was killed 

by the intentionally tortious actions of employer and co-employee). 

¶ 25 We find that the facts and relevant law indicate that, regardless of Peng’s preference for 

civil litigation against her allegedly negligent coworker, the workers’ compensation system is 

the exclusive source of compensation from her employer and co-employee for an injury that 

occurred during the course of her employment. Peng was traveling in an employer-controlled 

passenger van when the van struck another vehicle on the interstate and was thus injured in a 

work-related accident (Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 413; Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d at 313; Sjostrom, 49 Ill. 

App. 2d at 460), in what can be thought of as an extension of her work site or “a small 

ambulatory portion of the [employer’s] premises.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.D. 

Dutton, 584 P.2d at 1192. Peng was not compensated for her commute time or required to use 

the restaurant vanpool to get to and from the restaurant, and thus was not “on the job” in the 

traditional sense of that phrase, but she relinquished control over the conditions of 

transportation when she climbed into a vehicle owned by her employer and driven by her coemployee under the employer’s direction. Johnson, 537 N.W.2d at 772. Peng’s employer 

controlled the conditions and risks of transportation and thus exposed itself to liability for its 

employees’ injuries during their commute. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 413; 2 A. Larson, Workers’ 

Compensation Law § 15.01 (2014).

¶ 26 Peng is like the suburban McDonald’s shift worker in Hall, the corn detasselers in Hindle, 

and the civil engineer in Sjostrom. See Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d 408; Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d 309; 

Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d 451. In each of these examples, accidents occurred in an employercontrolled vehicle, either before the employee arrived at or left the job site for the day. The 

McDonald’s employee in Hall finished his shift before he accepted a ride to the local train 

station, the corn detasselers in Hindle were never paid for their time returning to town in the 

back of a pick-up truck, and the Chicago-based engineer in Sjostrom was en route from home 

to work in another town where he would be supervising the construction of a new plant. Hall, 

178 Ill. App. 3d 408; Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d 309; Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 453. In Hall, the 

McDonald’s restaurant manager was performing one of his job duties when he transported 

restaurant employees to the local train station; in Hindle, the crew leader was required by the 

employer to supervise and transport her team members from the cornfields to town; and in 
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Sjostrom, a mechanical engineer and civil engineer were instructed to commute together so the 

employer could avoid duplicate travel expenses. Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d 408; Hindle, 68 Ill. 2d 

309; Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 454. Peng is no different from these employees whose sole 

source of compensation from their employer and co-employee was through the workers’ 

compensation system, rather than tort litigation. See Hall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 414; Hindle, 68 

Ill. 2d at 313; Sjostrom, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 464; see also Ramsey, 175 Ill. 2d at 224 (where it 

was undisputed that coworkers were acting within the scope of their employment when the 

vehicle one of them was driving collided with another vehicle, but the question was whether 

the other driver/third party could recover contribution from a driver who was immunized by 

the Act’s exclusivity provision). Furthermore, Peng’s situation is not analogous to the United 

Airlines flight attendant whose employer was in the transportation business and whose 

commute on the day she was injured was independent of her employment relationship with the 

airline. See United Airlines, 2015 IL App (1st) 151693WC. Royal Illinois was in the restaurant 

business, and its vanpool was for its employees to get to and from work and was not open to 

the general public.

¶ 27 Peng focuses on irrelevant facts when she points out that her employer did not require her 

to live in the Chinatown or Bridgeview neighborhoods and that she could choose any means 

she wanted to commute to work from Chicago to Hoffman Estates. It makes no difference that 

Peng was not at her job site, not performing any restaurant tasks, and not being compensated 

for her time when she was being chauffeured to the restaurant by her co-employee in an 

employer-controlled van. The authority discussed above indicates that none of these details 

affects Peng’s right to compensation through the workers’ compensation system. The case law 

and treatise indicate the dispositive facts for purposes of compensation are that the vehicle was 

an employer-controlled conveyance for employee travel. It is undisputed that Royal Illinois 

provided the van and driver and thus had control over the conditions of Peng’s commute. 

Therefore, Royal Illinois is liable for Peng’s job-related injury through the workers’ 

compensation system, and a civil suit is not the correct action. It follows that Guan is also 

immune from Peng’s common law negligence claim because he was acting within the scope 

of his employment when his alleged negligence caused the collision which injured Peng. 

Ramsey, 175 Ill. 2d at 227. 

¶ 28 We also reject the suggestion that Peng is free to choose between the workers’ 

compensation system and the courts. The Act provides that when an employee’s injury is 

compensable through the Act, no common law or statutory right to compensation is available. 

820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2014). The injury need only be compensable, and there is no statutory 

language indicating the employee must actually claim, elect, or receive workers’ compensation 

in order to trigger the exclusivity provision. Even if Peng never filed a compensation claim, 

according to the plain language of the Act, the Act applies to her injury, and section 5(a) 

precludes the current civil action. Regardless of whether Peng first filed her lawsuit against 

Guan or her workers’ compensation claim against Royal Illinois, and regardless of whether she 

has accepted any amount of benefits from Royal Illinois’s insurer Travelers Insurance, Peng’s 

only source of compensation from any of them for her injuries sustained in the vanpool 

accident is through a workers’ compensation claim. 

¶ 29 We also reject Peng’s suggestion that she may maintain a civil suit because there is some 

uncertainty as to the proper venue for her recovery. Rhodes and Wren indicate that nothing 

prevents a cautious employee from filing both a workers’ compensation claim and a civil tort 
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suit to toll the statute of limitations where grounds for recovery are uncertain. Rhodes, 92 Ill. 

2d at 470; Wren, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 266. Nevertheless, an injured employee cannot recover 

from the employer on both claims, and once the employee has collected compensation on the 

basis that his injuries are compensable under the Act, the employee is estopped from recovering 

damages on the basis that his injuries are not compensable under the Act. Rhodes, 92 Ill. 2d at 

470; Wren, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 266. The record indicates that there is no uncertainty about 

Peng’s right to compensation through the Act, and therefore, she may no longer maintain a 

duplicative civil action seeking damages from her co-employee for the same injuries. More 

specifically, assistant manager Chen’s affidavit attached to Guan’s motion to dismiss Peng’s 

second amended complaint (which he also tendered in opposition to Peng’s third amended 

complaint) indicated Guan was driving the van within the scope of employment and that Royal 

Illinois had workers’ compensation coverage in effect through Travelers Insurance. Peng did 

not refute the Chen affidavit with any contrary averment. The undisputed facts were sufficient 

to establish that Peng’s exclusive form of compensation was through the Act and that her civil 

claim against Guan was not sustainable and should have been dismissed with prejudice. 

Furthermore, there is no uncertainty about the law. The employer-conveyance principle is a 

sound, well-established one in Illinois and other jurisdictions. Additional cases holding that an 

injury arose out of and within the course of employment, where an employee was injured in an 

accident while commuting in an employer-provided conveyance, include Smithey, 938 P.2d 

498; Daniels v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 633 S.W.2d 396 (Ark. 1982); Securex, Inc. 

v. Couto, 627 So. 2d 595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Adams v. United States Fidelity & 

Guaranty Co., 186 S.E.2d 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 806 P.2d 426 

(Idaho 1991); Thayer, 653 N.W.2d at 600 (the zone of protection provided by workers’ 

compensation “may extend to include injuries occurring even beyond the physical parameters 

of the employer’s premises”); Kindel v. Ferco Rental, Inc., 899 P.2d 1058 (Kan. 1995); 

Receveur Construction Co./Realm, Inc. v. Rogers, 958 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1997); McBride v. R.F. 

Kazimour Transportation, Inc., 583 So. 2d 1146 (La. Ct. App. 1991); Watson v. Grimm, 90 

A.2d 180 (Md. 1952); Lassabe v. Simmons Drilling, Inc., 743 P.2d 568 (Mont. 1987); Schauder 

v. Pfeifer, 570 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 1991); William F. Rittner Co. v. Workmen’s 

Compensation Appeal Board, 464 A.2d 675 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983); Medlin v. Upstate Plaster 

Service, 495 S.E.2d 447 (S.C. 1998); Pickrel v. Martin Beach, Inc., 124 N.W.2d 182 (S.D. 

1963); Vaughan’s Landscaping & Maintenance v. Dodson, 546 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 2001); 

Doering v. Wisconsin Labor & Industrial Review Comm’n, 523 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. Ct. App. 

1994). In short, Peng does not need to maintain her civil action as a backstop to her 

compensation claim. 

¶ 30 Peng devotes a considerable portion of her appellate brief to argument that the court abused 

its discretion by granting Guan’s motion to reconsider his motion attacking Peng’s third 

amended complaint. The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring the court’s attention to 

(1) error in the court’s previous application of the law, (2) changes in the law, or (3) newly 

discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the first hearing. Kaiser v. MEPC 

American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 987, 518 N.E.2d 424, 429-30 (1987); Gardner 

v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248, 571 N.E.2d 1107, 

1111 (1991). A motion for reconsideration is directed at the trial court’s sound discretion, and 

the court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Robidoux 

v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 347, 775 N.E.2d 987, 1000 (2002).
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¶ 31 For instance, Peng argues that the reconsideration motion was based on so-called “newly 

discovered” evidence, when the material was actually available to Guan when he prepared his 

motion to dismiss, and thus Guan unfairly used the reconsideration process to compensate for 

his inadequate preparation on the motion to dismiss. Peng argues that there was no change in 

the law or error in the court’s earlier ruling and that when a motion for reconsideration relies 

only on newly discovered evidence, unless there is a reasonable explanation indicating 

evidence was not available at the time of the original hearing, the trial court is under no 

obligation to consider it. Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 987 (trial court which had denied fee 

request that was not supported by adequate records was not required to reconsider on basis of 

reconstructed time records); Gardner, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 248 (trial court could properly 

disregard new affidavit where plaintiff did not give reasonable explanation as to why affidavit 

was not submitted prior to hearing). Peng contends Guan offered no explanation for his failure

to timely present the Travelers Insurance letter and the screenshot and was unfairly given a 

“second bite at the apple.” Peng contends that it was a further abuse of discretion to grant 

reconsideration and dismissal on the basis of a new legal theory, the election of remedies 

doctrine, instead of the course of employment doctrine that was the basis for Guan’s motion to 

dismiss. Peng further contends that she “has essentially been required to hit a moving target” 

in this litigation and was substantially prejudiced by the court’s arbitrary and unreasonable 

combination of two distinct legal theories. Peng’s third contention regarding the motion for 

reconsideration is that a statement during the hearing reveals that the court treated one of 

Guan’s statements as a judicial admission on Peng’s behalf, which defies the definition of the 

term admission, and that Peng made no such admission.

¶ 32 We disagree with Peng’s premise that the court’s ruling was unfair and prejudicial to her 

case. We find that the initial denial of Guan’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint 

was an erroneous application of the law and that the court corrected its error by granting Guan’s 

motions for reconsideration and dismissal. The previous denial was error because, as discussed 

above, the workers’ compensation system has always been Peng’s exclusive remedy for her 

injuries regardless of whether she affirmatively pursued this civil suit against her coworker 

instead of her workers’ compensation claim. Where an injury was to an employee and arose 

out of and in the course of employment, the workers’ compensation system provides the 

employee’s exclusive remedy. The fact that Peng was injured in an employer-controlled 

conveyance, not the fact that she received benefits, was conclusive of her rights. Assistant 

manager Chen’s affidavit, which Guan tendered in opposition to an earlier version of Peng’s 

complaint, was unopposed by Peng and showed that she was injured in an employer-controlled 

conveyance and that the dismissal was warranted. If there was any remaining doubt about Peng 

and Guan’s respective rights, it was addressed by the “newly discovered” material, which 

showed that Peng and another van passenger had applied for and received compensation under 

the Act. However, this “new” evidence was not dispositive. The existing record established 

that Peng was injured during the course of employment, and therefore, the motions to dismiss 

and reconsider should have been granted. Peng was not treated unfairly when the trial court 

corrected its error.

¶ 33 We also point out that the election of remedies theory was introduced into the proceedings 

by Peng, not Guan, when Peng brought in Rhodes and Wren for the proposition that she was 

entitled to file both a civil action and compensation claim while she was uncertain and 

“cautious” about the proper forum. Thus, when the court made statements such as, “We’re not 
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going to litigate in two forums,” the court was responding to Peng’s arguments, rather than 

unfairly granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of new theory which caught Peng by 

surprise. 

¶ 34 Furthermore, we reject the premise of Peng’s argument about the court’s statement, 

“There’s a pending workers’ compensation matter which they’ve admitted in the course of.” 

The hearing was primarily about whether there was any question that Peng’s injury occurred 

during the course of her employment. Peng argues that Guan is the “they” who made the 

“admission” and that the court improperly attributed the admission to Peng, who has never 

conceded that her injury was work-related. The transcript discloses, however, that “they” was 

a reference to the employer and its workers’ compensation insurer, not Guan, and that their 

admission was that Peng was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The parties’ 

arguments and exhibits, such as assistant manager Chen’s affidavit and the other 

documentation indicating passenger Cheng’s injuries were treated as “in the course of” 

employment, assured the court that the employer and its insurer were not disputing that Peng 

was injured during the course of her employment and would be compensated through the 

workers’ compensation system rather than a civil suit. 

¶ 35 We come to the conclusion that none of Peng’s arguments about the reconsideration ruling 

is well-grounded or persuasive, and we affirm the granting of reconsideration.

¶ 36 Having considered and rejected Peng’s arguments, we affirm the granting of 

reconsideration and the dismissal of Peng’s action as a matter of law.

¶ 37 Affirmed.