1 Filed 9/26/13 In re T.M. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Yolo)

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In re T.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
T.M., Defendant and Appellant. C071746 (Super. Ct. No. JD-12-94)

Appellant T.M., a minor, pleaded no co ntest to committing a misdemeanor curfew violation and violating park curfew, an infr action. The juvenile court adjudged him a ward of the court and placed him on proba tion with various terms and conditions. On appeal, the minor challenges the im position of certain gang-related conditions of probation, and contends the court erred in imposing a res titution fine in excess of the $100 statutory maximum (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6, subd. (b)(2)). We reduce the restitution fine to $100, add to the gang-relate d conditions a reference to the definition of2 criminal street gang contained in Pena l Code section 186. 22, subdivision (f) and
otherwise affirm the order of the juvenile court.
BACKGROUND Officers investigating the report of a gang fight in Woodland saw the minor standing on the street corner. An officer spoke with the minor a nd asked (among others) whether he had any weapons. The minor respon ded that he had a taser. In his pockets, officers found the taser, a cigar, and a lighter. A petition was filed in case JD-12-94, alle ging that the minor is a person within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 beca use he possessed a stun gun (a misdemeanor), violated city curfew (a misdemeanor), violated park curfew (an infraction), and possessed tobacc o products (an infraction). While that petition was pending, a sec ond petition was filed in case JD-12-160, alleging that the minor committe d second degree burglary and r eceived stolen property. The minor pleaded no contest to viol ating city curfew (a misdemeanor), and violating park curfew (an infrac tion), in exchange for dismissal of the other allegations in case JD-12-94, and all allegations of JD-12-1 60. He was remanded to the custody of his father and placed on probation. Among the conditions of probation, the court directed the minor to “[s]tay away from anyone you know or Probation tells [you] is a gang member. Do not possess or have under yo ur control any gang colors or gang paraphernalia. Do not use gang signs.” The court also imposed a re stitution fine of $130, of which $110 goes to the “state restitution fund” and $20 represents a “collection fee.”
DISCUSSION
I
The Probation Conditions are Neith er Invalid nor Unconstitutional Over the minor’s objections, the trial c ourt imposed the gang-related conditions of probation quoted above. On appeal, the mi nor contends these conditions (1) are invalid because they are not justified by the circumstances of his crimes or his social history, and3 (2) are unconstitutionally vague b ecause they do not define th e term “gang” and do not contain a knowledge requirement. The minor is trifling with the court on bot h assertions. Why? Because the court directed the minor to “[s]tay away from anyo ne you know or Probation tells [you] is a gang member. Do not possess or have unde r your control any gang colors or gang paraphernalia. Do not use gang signs.” What does all that mean? First, the court means for the minor to stay away from the bad people as advise d by his probation officer or those with whom he was associating (1) when he was arrested in this case for being out after midnight, armed with a weapon, and wher e a gang fight had been reported, (2) when he was earlier arrested for participating in criminal street gang-re lated activity, and (3) when he was earlier doing things that led to juvenile court findings and to the imposition of gang conditions of probation in two different cases. Seco nd, the court prohibitions not to possess or control gang colors or gang paraphernalia or to use gang signs are
unmistakable. In any event, the Legislature has given trial courts broad discretion to devise appropriate conditions of probation, so lo ng as they are intend ed to promote the “reformation and rehabilitation” of the proba tioner. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j); In re
Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1 76, 188.) Welfare and Ins titutions Code section 730, subdivision (b) provides that when a minor is adjudged a ward of the court and “is placed under the supervision of the probation officer . . . , the court may make any and all
reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward . . . . The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” This section grants courts broad di scretion in establishing conditi ons of probation in juvenile cases, even broader than that of a criminal court, because “juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervis ion than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.” (See In re Antonio R . (2000) 784 Cal.App.4th 937, 941; In re Christopher M . (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692, disapproved on another matter in People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.App. 4th 353, 375, fn. 6.) Generally, we review the court’s impositi on of a probation cond ition for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121; accord, In re Christopher M., supra , 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 69 2.) However, we review constitutional challenges to a probation condition de novo. ( In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.Ap p.4th 174, 183.) A condition of probation is not invalid un less it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relate s to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. All three factors must be present to invalidate a condition of probation. ( In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246.) Applying th ese criteria, we disagree with the minor that the gang-related conditions were inva lid and therefore improperly imposed. The minor violated a city curfew ordinance a nd park curfew because he was out after midnight, and at the scene when officers res ponded to reports of a gang fight. Not only was he present where a gang fight had been re ported, but the minor also had a weapon in his pocket. Although he denied to the proba tion officer associating with gang members, he had been arrested in 2008 for participati ng in criminal street gang-related activity, and in two previous cases the juve nile court had ordered gang co nditions of probation. Under such circumstances, the court does not need additional evidence the minor is yet a gang member in order to impose conditions of prob ation requiring a minor to steer clear of gang associations and paraphernalia. “Where a court entertains genuine concerns that the minor is in danger of falling under the influe nce of a street gang, an order directing a minor to refrain from gang association is a reasonable preventive measure in avoiding future criminality and setting the mi nor on a productive course.” ( In re Laylah K . (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1502.) Here, in view of the minor’s present and past situation, the juvenile acted within its discretion in or dering the gang conditions as a reasonable preventative measure to help the mi nor avoid future criminality.5 We disagree that the gang conditi ons of the minor’s probation are unconstitutionally vague. A rest riction is unconstitutionally va gue if it is not sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and for the court to
determine whether the conditi on has been violated. (See In re E.O . (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) The underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of “fair warning” and the “rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enfo rcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are ‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions.’ ” ( In re Sheena K . (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) A restriction failing this test does no t give adequate notice—i.e., “fair warning”— of the conduct proscribed. ( Ibid .) Noting that other cases have held the wo rd “ ‘gang’ ” to have both “ ‘sinister’ ” and “ ‘considerable benign connotations,’ ” the minor contends a gang-related condition of probation must include a definition of th e word “gang” to ove rcome a constitutional challenge. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939) 306 U.S. 451, 453-455 [83 L.Ed. 888, 890-891] long ago invalidated a New Jersey anti-gang statute in part because the wo rd “gang” had various definiti ons in dictionaries and in historical and sociological writings, but no de finition in statutory or case law, and other
courts have continued to fo llow this analysis. (E.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 631 [no ting that dictionary definition of “gang” includes a “ ‘group of persons working under the same directi on or at the same task’ ”]; see also People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 948- 950 [modifying order proscrip tion on associating with ‘ “gang members’ ” to “ ‘member[s] of a crim inal street gang’ ”].) In our view, it is instead “obvious that the juvenile court in tended only to ban [t he minor] from places involving activity by ‘siniste r’ gangs” and he “need not wo rry about attending a Rotary Club meeting or an Eagle Scou t campout,” and, accordingly, we “need not tarry over this argument.” (Cf. In re Victor L . (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 914.) In short, it is not6 ambiguous: the word “gang” in the conditions of probation means “criminal street gang” and the conditions using the word “gang” bo th give the minor sufficient notice of the precluded activities and are sufficiently precis e for the court to de termine whether the
condition has been violated. We nonethele ss add to the conditions a reference to the
definition of “criminal street gang” contained in Penal C ode section 186.22, subdivision (f). We also reject the minor’s claim that the gang-related probation conditions are unconstitutionally vague becau se they lack a knowledg e requirement. The minor concedes that just two years ago in People v. Patel (2011) 196 Cal.App. 4th 956, 960, this
court announced “our intent to henceforth no longer entertai n this issue on appeal.” We held that, hereafter we would “constru e every probation condition proscribing a probationer’s presence, possession , association, or similar action to require the action be undertaken knowingly. It [is] no longer . . . necessary to seek a modification of a probation order that fails to expressly in clude such a scienter requirement.” ( Id . at pp. 960-961, fn. omitted.) Because the minor indicates he rais es this issue on appeal only to preserve the issue for future federal review, we do not consider th is issue further. The probation conditions at issue here fall s quarely within the “presence, possession, association, or similar action” described by the court in Patel whereby the court construes the “probation condition . . . to require th e action be undertaken knowingly.” ( People v. Patel, supra , 196 Cal.App.4th at pp. 960-961.)
II The Faulty Restitution Fine The minor contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in imposing a $130
restitution fine under Welfare a nd Institutions Code section 730 .6. The People agree, and ask that we reduce the fine to the statutory maximum. We agree the court abused its discretion a nd the restitution fine must be reduced to $100. (See People v. McGhee (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 710, 716.) Welfare and7 Institutions Code, secti on 730.6, subdivision (b )(2) provides that a restitution fine of no more than $100 may be imposed on a minor found to have comm itted one or more misdemeanor offenses. Subdivision (q) of that section allows the county to impose an
additional fee for the collection of the res titution fine, not to exceed 10 percent of the
fine.
DISPOSITION Paragraph 12 of the court’s fi ndings and orders, is modified to require the minor to pay a restitution fine in the amount of $100, plus a $10 collection f ee. Paragraph 39 is modified to read “Stay aw ay from anyone you know or Probation tells you is a gang member [meaning ‘criminal street gang’ as de fined in Penal Code section 186.22, subd. (f)]. Do not possess or have under your cont rol any gang colors or gang paraphernalia. Do not use gang signs.” In all other respects, the order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

NICHOLSON , J.

We concur:

RAYE , P. J.

ROBIE , J.