# Euroopa Liidu C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0898 |
| --- | --- |
| Euroopa Liidu
  Teataja | C 242 |
| | |
| Eestikeelne väljaanne | Teave ja teatised | 60. Aastakäik27. juuli 2017 |

ISSN 1977-0898

Euroopa Liidu

Teataja

C 242

Eestikeelne väljaanne

Teave ja teatised

60. Aastakäik27. juuli 2017

---

| Teatis nr | Sisukord | Lehekülg |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Teatised |
| | EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDE, ORGANITE JA ASUTUSTE TEATISED |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8500 – Central / SIGNA Prime / JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Otsus Veneto Banca S.p.A. kriisilahenduse tingimuste hindamise kohta | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Otsus Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. kriisilahenduse tingimuste hindamise kohta | 3 |

Teatis nr

Sisukord

Lehekülg

II   Teatised

EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDE, ORGANITE JA ASUTUSTE TEATISED

Euroopa Komisjon

2017/C 242/01

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8500 – Central / SIGNA Prime / JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Otsus Veneto Banca S.p.A. kriisilahenduse tingimuste hindamise kohta

2

2017/C 242/03

Otsus Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. kriisilahenduse tingimuste hindamise kohta

3

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| | IV   Teave |
| --- | --- |
| | TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Euro vahetuskurss | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Kokkuvõte Euroopa Komisjoni otsustest, millega lubatakse kasutamiseks turule lasta ja/või kasutada aineid, mis on loetletud Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 (mis käsitleb kemikaalide registreerimist, hindamist, autoriseerimist ja piiramist)(REACH) XIV lisas (avaldatud vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 artikli 64 lõikele 9)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE |
| | EFTA järelevalveamet |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 võimaliku riigiabi andmise kohta ettevõttele Landsvirkjun riiklike tagatistega tuletislepingute kaudu | 6 |

IV   Teave

TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT

Euroopa Komisjon

2017/C 242/04

Euro vahetuskurss

4

2017/C 242/05

Kokkuvõte Euroopa Komisjoni otsustest, millega lubatakse kasutamiseks turule lasta ja/või kasutada aineid, mis on loetletud Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 (mis käsitleb kemikaalide registreerimist, hindamist, autoriseerimist ja piiramist)(REACH) XIV lisas (avaldatud vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 artikli 64 lõikele 9)
   (
  1
  )

(avaldatud vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 artikli 64 lõikele 9)

1

5

EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE

EFTA järelevalveamet

2017/C 242/06

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 võimaliku riigiabi andmise kohta ettevõttele Landsvirkjun riiklike tagatistega tuletislepingute kaudu

6

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| | V   Teated |
| --- | --- |
| | HALDUSMENETLUSED |
| | Euroopa Personalivaliku Amet (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Teade avalike konkursside korraldamise kohta | 17 |
| | KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Eelteatis koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett) — Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Eelteatis koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8541 – Thermo FisHer Scientific – Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | MUUD AKTID |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Teadaanne — Avalik konsultatsioon — Jaapani geograafilised tähised | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Teade Alexanda Amon Koteyle, Elshafee El Sheikhile, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomole, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoevile, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvilile, OMAN ROCHMANile, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE’ile (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHABile, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleedile ja Jund Al Aqsale, kelle nimed on komisjoni rakendusmäärusega (EL) 2017/1390 lisatud nõukogu 27. mai 2002. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 (millega kehtestatakse teatavad eripiirangud organisatsioonidega ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida seotud teatavate isikute ja üksuste vastu) artiklites 2, 3 ja 7 osutatud loetellu | 22 |

V   Teated

HALDUSMENETLUSED

Euroopa Personalivaliku Amet (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Teade avalike konkursside korraldamise kohta

17

KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED

Euroopa Komisjon

2017/C 242/08

Eelteatis koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett) — Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Eelteatis koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8541 – Thermo FisHer Scientific – Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

MUUD AKTID

Euroopa Komisjon

2017/C 242/10

Teadaanne — Avalik konsultatsioon — Jaapani geograafilised tähised

20

2017/C 242/11

Teade Alexanda Amon Koteyle, Elshafee El Sheikhile, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomole, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoevile, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvilile, OMAN ROCHMANile, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE’ile (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHABile, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleedile ja Jund Al Aqsale, kelle nimed on komisjoni rakendusmäärusega (EL) 2017/1390 lisatud nõukogu 27. mai 2002. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 (millega kehtestatakse teatavad eripiirangud organisatsioonidega ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida seotud teatavate isikute ja üksuste vastu) artiklites 2, 3 ja 7 osutatud loetellu

22

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   EMPs kohaldatav tekst |

---

(1)   EMPs kohaldatav tekst

1

| ET | |
| --- | --- |

ET

---

II Teatised

EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDE, ORGANITE JA ASUTUSTE TEATISED

Euroopa Komisjon

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/1

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Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8500 – Central / SIGNA Prime / JVCo)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2017/C 242/01)

14. juulil 2017 otsustas komisjon loobuda vastuväidete esitamisest eespool nimetatud teatatud koondumise kohta ning kuulutada koondumine siseturuga kokkusobivaks. Otsuse aluseks on nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artikli 6 lõike 1 punkt b. Otsuse täielik tekst on kättesaadav ainult inglise keeles ning see avaldatakse pärast seda, kui sellest on kustutatud võimalikud ärisaladused. Otsus on kättesaadav:

| — | Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri ja kuupäeva järgi ning tegevusalade registri kaudu; |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri ja kuupäeva järgi ning tegevusalade registri kaudu;

| — | elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex’i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32017M8500 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex’i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32017M8500 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele.

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(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/2

---

Otsus Veneto Banca S.p.A. kriisilahenduse tingimuste hindamise kohta

(2017/C 242/02)

23. juunil 2017 otsustas ühtne kriisilahendusnõukogu mitte kohaldada kriisilahendust Veneto Banca S.p.A. suhtes. Otsus põhines järeldusel, et määruse (EL) nr 806/2014 (1) artikli 18 lõike 1 punktis c toodud tingimus ei olnud täidetud. Otsuse põhielemendid on järgmised:

| Otsuse vastuvõtmise kuupäev: | 23. juuni 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Otsuse nr: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Adressaat: | Banca d’Italia |
| Krediidiasutus: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Kapitaliinstrumentide allahindamise ja konverteerimise õiguse kohaldamine: | Ei |
| Kriisilahenduse meetmed | Ei |
| Fondi abi: | Ei |

Otsuse vastuvõtmise kuupäev:

23. juuni 2017

Otsuse nr:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Adressaat:

Banca d’Italia

Krediidiasutus:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Kapitaliinstrumentide allahindamise ja konverteerimise õiguse kohaldamine:

Ei

Kriisilahenduse meetmed

Ei

Fondi abi:

Ei

Lisateave otsuse kohta on ühtse kriisilahendusnõukogu ametlikul veebilehel https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

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(1)  ELT L 225, 30.7.2014, lk 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/3

---

Otsus Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. kriisilahenduse tingimuste hindamise kohta

(2017/C 242/03)

23. juunil 2017 otsustas ühtne kriisilahendusnõukogu mitte kohaldada kriisilahendust Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. suhtes. Otsus põhines järeldusel, et määruse (EL) nr 806/2014 (1) artikli 18 lõike 1 punktis c toodud tingimus ei ole täidetud. Otsuse põhielemendid on järgmised:

| Otsuse vastuvõtmise kuupäev: | 23. juuni 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Otsuse nr: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Adressaat: | Banca d’Italia |
| Krediidiasutus: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Kapitaliinstrumentide allahindamise ja konverteerimise õiguse kohaldamine: | Ei |
| Kriisilahenduse meetmed | Ei |
| Fondi abi: | Ei |

Otsuse vastuvõtmise kuupäev:

23. juuni 2017

Otsuse nr:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Adressaat:

Banca d’Italia

Krediidiasutus:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Kapitaliinstrumentide allahindamise ja konverteerimise õiguse kohaldamine:

Ei

Kriisilahenduse meetmed

Ei

Fondi abi:

Ei

Lisateave otsuse kohta on ühtse kriisilahendusnõukogu ametlikul veebilehel https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

---

(1)  ELT L 225, 30.7.2014, lk 1.

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IV Teave

TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT

Euroopa Komisjon

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/4

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Euro vahetuskurss (1)

26. juuli 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Valuuta | Kurss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | USA dollar | 1,1644 |
| JPY | Jaapani jeen | 130,26 |
| DKK | Taani kroon | 7,4368 |
| GBP | Inglise nael | 0,89275 |
| SEK | Rootsi kroon | 9,5705 |
| CHF | Šveitsi frank | 1,1152 |
| ISK | Islandi kroon | |
| NOK | Norra kroon | 9,2893 |
| BGN | Bulgaaria leev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tšehhi kroon | 26,047 |
| HUF | Ungari forint | 305,57 |
| PLN | Poola zlott | 4,2613 |
| RON | Rumeenia leu | 4,5632 |
| TRY | Türgi liir | 4,1406 |
| AUD | Austraalia dollar | 1,4717 |
| CAD | Kanada dollar | 1,4576 |
| HKD | Hongkongi dollar | 9,0959 |
| NZD | Uus-Meremaa dollar | 1,5678 |
| SGD | Singapuri dollar | 1,5850 |
| KRW | Korea vonn | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | Lõuna-Aafrika rand | 15,1998 |
| CNY | Hiina jüaan | 7,8646 |
| HRK | Horvaatia kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | Indoneesia ruupia | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | Malaisia ringit | 4,9889 |
| PHP | Filipiini peeso | 58,948 |
| RUB | Vene rubla | 69,7050 |
| THB | Tai baat | 38,996 |
| BRL | Brasiilia reaal | 3,6806 |
| MXN | Mehhiko peeso | 20,6644 |
| INR | India ruupia | 74,9375 |

Valuuta

Kurss

USD

USA dollar

1,1644

JPY

Jaapani jeen

130,26

DKK

Taani kroon

7,4368

GBP

Inglise nael

0,89275

SEK

Rootsi kroon

9,5705

CHF

Šveitsi frank

1,1152

ISK

Islandi kroon

NOK

Norra kroon

9,2893

BGN

Bulgaaria leev

1,9558

CZK

Tšehhi kroon

26,047

HUF

Ungari forint

305,57

PLN

Poola zlott

4,2613

RON

Rumeenia leu

4,5632

TRY

Türgi liir

4,1406

AUD

Austraalia dollar

1,4717

CAD

Kanada dollar

1,4576

HKD

Hongkongi dollar

9,0959

NZD

Uus-Meremaa dollar

1,5678

SGD

Singapuri dollar

1,5850

KRW

Korea vonn

1 303,91

ZAR

Lõuna-Aafrika rand

15,1998

CNY

Hiina jüaan

7,8646

HRK

Horvaatia kuna

7,4128

IDR

Indoneesia ruupia

15 507,48

MYR

Malaisia ringit

4,9889

PHP

Filipiini peeso

58,948

RUB

Vene rubla

69,7050

THB

Tai baat

38,996

BRL

Brasiilia reaal

3,6806

MXN

Mehhiko peeso

20,6644

INR

India ruupia

74,9375

---

(1)  Allikas: EKP avaldatud viitekurss.

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| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/5

---

Kokkuvõte Euroopa Komisjoni otsustest, millega lubatakse kasutamiseks turule lasta ja/või kasutada aineid, mis on loetletud Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 (mis käsitleb kemikaalide registreerimist, hindamist, autoriseerimist ja piiramist)(REACH) XIV lisas

(avaldatud vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006
   (1)
  artikli 64 lõikele 9)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2017/C 242/05)

Loa andmise otsused

| Otsuse viide (2) | Otsuse kuupäev | Aine nimetus | Loa omanik | Loa number | Lubatud kasutus | Läbivaatamis-perioodi lõppkuupäev | Otsuse põhjendused |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20. juuli 2017 | Bis(2-metoksüetüül)eeter,
  EÜ number 203–924-4,
  CASi number 111–96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Ireland | REACH/17/8/0 | Diglüümi kasutamine lahustina, et toota vaheainet, mis muundatakse ravimiseguks, mida kasutatakse ravimites hingamisteede haiguste raviks | 22. august 2024 | — | Määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 artikli 60 lõike 2 kohaselt on aine kasutamisest inimeste tervisele tulenevad riskid piisavalt ohjatud. |

Otsuse viide (2)

Otsuse kuupäev

Aine nimetus

Loa omanik

Loa number

Lubatud kasutus

Läbivaatamis-perioodi lõppkuupäev

Otsuse põhjendused

C(2017) 5025

20. juuli 2017

Bis(2-metoksüetüül)eeter,

EÜ number 203–924-4,

CASi number 111–96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Ireland

REACH/17/8/0

Diglüümi kasutamine lahustina, et toota vaheainet, mis muundatakse ravimiseguks, mida kasutatakse ravimites hingamisteede haiguste raviks

22. august 2024

—

Määruse (EÜ) nr 1907/2006 artikli 60 lõike 2 kohaselt on aine kasutamisest inimeste tervisele tulenevad riskid piisavalt ohjatud.

| — | Hetkel puuduvad sobivad alternatiivid ja nende otsimine toimub seitsmeaastase asendusprogrammi raames. |
| --- | --- |

—

Hetkel puuduvad sobivad alternatiivid ja nende otsimine toimub seitsmeaastase asendusprogrammi raames.

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(1)  ELT L 396, 30.12.2006, lk 1.

(2)  Otsus on kättesaadav Euroopa Komisjoni veebisaidil aadressil: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about_et.htm

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EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE

EFTA järelevalveamet

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/6

---

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 võimaliku riigiabi andmise kohta ettevõttele Landsvirkjun riiklike tagatistega tuletislepingute kaudu

(2017/C 242/06)

Vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 algatas EFTA järelevalveamet menetluse 3. mai 2017. aasta otsusega nr 085/17/COL, mis on esitatud käesolevale kokkuvõttele järgnevatel lehekülgedel autentses keeles. Islandi ametiasutustele on sellest teatamiseks saadetud otsuse koopia.

Käesoleva teatisega palub EFTA järelevalveamet EFTA riikidel, ELi liikmesriikidel ja huvitatud isikutel saata märkused kõnealuse meetme kohta ühe kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva teatise avaldamist järgmisel aadressil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

35, Rue Belliard

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Märkused edastatakse Islandi ametiasutustele. Märkused esitanud huvitatud isiku andmeid käsitletakse konfidentsiaalselt, kui ta esitab selle kohta kirjaliku taotluse, milles esitab nõude põhjendused.

Kokkuvõte

Menetlus

24. märtsi 2015. aasta e-kirjas palusid Islandi ametiasutused EFTA järelevalveametil selgitada, kas Landsvirkjuni tuletislepingutest tulenevad finantskohustused võivad olla tagatud Islandi olemasoleva riigigarantii kavaga. Kõnealused riiklikud tagatised olid EFTA järelevalveameti otsuse nr 159/13/COL teema (1).

Järelevalveamet sai taotluse alusel asjaomase meetme kohta teavet Islandi ametiasutustelt 11. veebruari 2016. aasta ja 22. märtsi 2016. aasta kirjaga. Lisaks arutati küsimust 31. mail 2016 Reykjavíkis toimunud Islandi ametiasutuste ja EFTA järelevalveameti vahelisel kohtumisel. Pärast kohtumist saatis EFTA järelevalveamet Islandi ametiasutustele kirja, milles esitas koosoleku protokolli ning palus täiendavaid selgitusi. Islandi ametiasutused vastasid EFTA järelevalveameti kirjale 31. oktoobri 2016. aasta e-kirjaga, milles esitasid täiendavaid dokumente.

Asjaolud

Landsvirkjun on riigi osalusega äriühing, mida käsitletakse seaduses nr 42/1983 (muudetud kujul) ja mis kuulub ühiselt riigikassa (99,9 %) ja Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %) omandisse. Viimane on piiratud vastutusega äriühing, mis kuulub täielikult riigikassale. Landsvirkjun on praegu suurim elektritootja Islandil, kellele kuulub üle 75 % kodumaisest elektrienergia tootmise turuosast, ja ta on üks Euroopa kümnest suurimast taastuvenergiat tootvast ettevõttest.

Valitsemissektori võla haldamise üksus („võlahaldamisüksus“) on üksus Islandi Keskpangas. Islandi Keskpank on sõltumatu avaõiguslik asutus, mis kuulub Islandi riigile.

Landsvirkjuni mõjutab nii valuutarisk kui ka võlaportfelli intressirisk. Landsvirkjun kasutab mitmesuguseid tuletislepinguid, et tururiski kontrollida ja hallata.

Vastavalt EFTA järelevalveametile praegu teada olevatele asjaoludele on võlahaldamisüksus andnud Landsvirkjuni teatavatele tuletislepingutele tagatisi vähemalt alates 2013. aastast. Otsus puudutab võlahaldamisüksuse tagatisi järgmistele tuletislepingutele: valuutavahetuslepingud, välisvaluutaoptsioonid ja intressimäära vahetuslepingud.

Riigigarantiidena antava riigiabi käsitlevate suuniste (edaspidi „garantiisuunised“) (2) punktis 3.2 on loetletud järgmised kumulatiivsed tingimused riigiabi elementide välistamiseks üksikgarantiis:

| a) | laenusaaja ei ole finantsraskustes, |
| --- | --- |

a)

laenusaaja ei ole finantsraskustes,

| b) | garantii ulatust on võimalik selle andmisel nõuetekohaselt mõõta, |
| --- | --- |

b)

garantii ulatust on võimalik selle andmisel nõuetekohaselt mõõta,

| c) | garantii ei kata rohkem kui 80 % tasumata laenust või muust rahalisest kohustusest ning |
| --- | --- |

c)

garantii ei kata rohkem kui 80 % tasumata laenust või muust rahalisest kohustusest ning

| d) | garantii eest on makstud turupõhist hinda. |
| --- | --- |

d)

garantii eest on makstud turupõhist hinda.

EFTA järelevalveamet on esialgu seisukohal, et võlahaldamisüksuse poolt Landsvirkjuni eespool nimetatud tuletistehingutele antud garantiid ei vasta tingimustele b, c ja d. Seega ei saa praeguses etapis garantiisuuniste punkti 3.2 alusel riigiabi elementide olemasolu välistada.

Esiteks ei ole Islandi ametiasutused seni suutnud selgitada, kas garantiid on seotud konkreetsete kohustustega, kui suur on tagatiste maksimumsumma ja kas tagatised on ajaliselt piiratud. Seetõttu on EFTA järelevalveamet praegu seisukohal, et garantiisuuniste punkti 3.2 tingimus b ei ole täidetud.

Teiseks tundub, et tagatised katavad kõiki finantskohustusi, mis Lansdsvirkjunil on seoses vastavate tuletislepingutega. Islandi ametiasutused ei ole senini esitanud mingit teavet, mis võimaldaks hinnata, kas tagatis on piiratud 80 % tasumata rahalistest kohustustest. Samuti puudub teave, mis võimaldaks kvantifitseerida Landsvirkjuni finantskohustusi, mis on seotud võlahaldamisüksuse poolt tagatud tuletislepingutega. Seetõttu on EFTA järelevalveamet praegu seisukohal, et garantiisuuniste punkti 3.2 tingimus c ei ole täidetud.

Kolmandaks, vastavalt garantiisuunistele tuleks riski võtmine hüvitada asjakohase garantiipreemiaga sõltuvalt garantiina või vastugarantiina antavast summast. Mis puudutab võlahaldamisüksuse tagatisi valuutavahetuslepingutele ja välisvaluutaoptsioonidele, siis näib, et Landsvirkjun ei maksa mingit garantiipreemiat. Mis puudutab intressimäära vahetuslepinguid, siis väidavad Islandi ametiasutused, et Landsvirkjun maksab asjakohast garantiipreemiat nende tuletislepingute netokohustuste põhjal, mis toovad Landsvirkjunile netokahjumit. EFTA järelevalveamet ei ole aga saanud piisavalt teavet metoodika kohta, mida kasutati preemiamäära määramisel, ning selle kohta, kas seda preemiamäära saab käsitada turuhinnana.

Hinnang

EFTA järelevalveamet on praegu seisukohal, et käesolevas otsuses käsitletud tagatised võivad kujutada endast eelist riigiabi eeskirjade tähenduses. Lisaks näib, et meede on oma olemuselt valikuline ning võib moonutada konkurentsi ja mõjutada EMP-sisest kaubandust. Seega ei saa järelevalveamet välistada, et kõnealune meede kujutab endast riigiabi EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses. Islandi ametiasutused ei ole seni esitanud ühtegi tõendit, mis võimaldaksid pidada võimalikku riigiabi kokkusobivaks EMP lepingu artikli 59 lõikega 2 või artikli 61 lõikega 3.

Järeldus

Võttes arvesse nimetatud asjaolusid, on järelevalveamet vastavalt EFTA riikide vahelise järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamist käsitleva lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 otsustanud algatada ametliku uurimismenetluse. Huvitatud isikuid kutsutakse üles esitama oma märkused ühe kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva teatise avaldamist Euroopa Liidu Teatajas.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
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(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
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(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
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(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
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(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
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—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
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(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
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(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  Järelevalveameti 24. aprilli 2013. aasta otsus nr 159/13/COL lõpetada menetlus, mis käsitleb piiramatu riigigarantii kaudu Landsvirkjunile ja Orkuveita Reykjavíkurile antud olemasolevat abi (ELT C 237, 15.8.2013, lk 3, ja EMP kaasanne nr 45, 15.8.2013, lk 28).

1

(2)  ELT L 105, 21.4.2011, lk 32, ja EMP kaasanne nr 23, 21.4.2011, lk 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Teated

HALDUSMENETLUSED

Euroopa Personalivaliku Amet (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/17

---

TEADE AVALIKE KONKURSSIDE KORRALDAMISE KOHTA

(2017/C 242/07)

Euroopa Personalivaliku Amet (EPSO) korraldab järgmised avalikud konkursid:

| | ADMINISTRAATORID ja ASSISTENDID HOONESEKTORIS |
| --- | --- |

ADMINISTRAATORID ja ASSISTENDID HOONESEKTORIS

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Ehitusjuhtimise insenerid (sealhulgas keskkonna- ja ehitustehnoloogiainsenerid) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Ehitusjuhtimise insenerid (sealhulgas keskkonna- ja ehitustehnoloogiainsenerid)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3): | 1. valdkond: Hoonete ehitamise koordinaatorid/tehnikud |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3):

1. valdkond: Hoonete ehitamise koordinaatorid/tehnikud

| | 2. valdkond: Hoonete ehitamise koordinaatorid/tehnikud kliimaseadmete ning elektromehaanika ja elektroonika alal |
| --- | --- |

2. valdkond: Hoonete ehitamise koordinaatorid/tehnikud kliimaseadmete ning elektromehaanika ja elektroonika alal

| | 3. valdkond: Tööohutuse/hoonete ohutuse assistendid |
| --- | --- |

3. valdkond: Tööohutuse/hoonete ohutuse assistendid

Konkursiteade avaldatakse
  Euroopa Liidu Teataja 27. juuli 2017. aasta väljaandes C 242 A 24 keeles.

Lisateave on esitatud EPSO veebisaidil: https://epso.europa.eu/

---

KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED

Euroopa Komisjon

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/18

---

Eelteatis koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett)

Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | 18. juulil 2017 sai Euroopa Komisjon nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artiklile 4 vastava teatise kavandatava koondumise kohta, mille raames ettevõtja Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment“, Luksemburg) omandab täieliku kontrolli ühinemismääruse artikli 3 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses ettevõtja Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett“, Ühendkuningriik) üle aktsiate või osade ostu teel. |
| --- | --- |

1.

18. juulil 2017 sai Euroopa Komisjon nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artiklile 4 vastava teatise kavandatava koondumise kohta, mille raames ettevõtja Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment“, Luksemburg) omandab täieliku kontrolli ühinemismääruse artikli 3 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses ettevõtja Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett“, Ühendkuningriik) üle aktsiate või osade ostu teel.

| 2. | Asjaomaste ettevõtjate majandustegevus hõlmab järgmist:
  —   Letterone Investment: rahvusvahelised investeeringud peamiselt telekommunikatsiooni- ja tehnoloogia-, tervishoiu- ja jaemüügisektoris.
  —   Holland & Barrett: tervise- ja heaolutoodete jaemüük, näiteks vitamiinide ja tervisetoitude müük ettevõtja kesklinnakaupluste võrgustiku ja e-kaupluse kaudu. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Asjaomaste ettevõtjate majandustegevus hõlmab järgmist:

—   Letterone Investment: rahvusvahelised investeeringud peamiselt telekommunikatsiooni- ja tehnoloogia-, tervishoiu- ja jaemüügisektoris.

—   Holland & Barrett: tervise- ja heaolutoodete jaemüük, näiteks vitamiinide ja tervisetoitude müük ettevõtja kesklinnakaupluste võrgustiku ja e-kaupluse kaudu.

| 3. | Komisjon leiab pärast teatise esialgset läbivaatamist, et tehing, millest teatatakse, võib kuuluda ühinemismääruse kohaldamisalasse, kuid lõplikku otsust selle kohta ei ole veel tehtud. Vastavalt komisjoni teatisele lihtsustatud korra kohta teatavate koondumiste menetlemiseks vastavalt nõukogu määrusele (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (2) tuleks märkida, et käesolevat juhtumit on võimalik käsitleda kõnealuses teatises sätestatud korra kohaselt. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Komisjon leiab pärast teatise esialgset läbivaatamist, et tehing, millest teatatakse, võib kuuluda ühinemismääruse kohaldamisalasse, kuid lõplikku otsust selle kohta ei ole veel tehtud. Vastavalt komisjoni teatisele lihtsustatud korra kohta teatavate koondumiste menetlemiseks vastavalt nõukogu määrusele (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (2) tuleks märkida, et käesolevat juhtumit on võimalik käsitleda kõnealuses teatises sätestatud korra kohaselt.

| 4. | Komisjon kutsub huvitatud kolmandaid isikuid esitama oma võimalikke märkusi kavandatava toimingu kohta.
  Komisjon peab märkused kätte saama kümne päeva jooksul pärast käesoleva dokumendi avaldamist. Märkusi võib saata komisjonile faksi (+32 22964301), elektronposti (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) või postiga järgmisel aadressil (lisada viitenumber M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett):





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisjon kutsub huvitatud kolmandaid isikuid esitama oma võimalikke märkusi kavandatava toimingu kohta.

Komisjon peab märkused kätte saama kümne päeva jooksul pärast käesoleva dokumendi avaldamist. Märkusi võib saata komisjonile faksi (+32 22964301), elektronposti (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) või postiga järgmisel aadressil (lisada viitenumber M.8582 – Letterone / Holland & Barrett):

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1 („ühinemismäärus“).

(2)  ELT C 366, 14.12.2013, lk 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/19

---

Eelteatis koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8541 – Thermo FisHer Scientific – Patheon)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | 19. juulil 2017 sai Euroopa Komisjon nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artiklile 4 vastava teatise kavandatava koondumise kohta, mille raames ettevõtja Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fisher“, Ameerika Ühendriigid) omandab kontrolli ühinemismääruse artikli 3 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses ettevõtja Patheon N.V. („Patheon“, Madalmaad) üle aktsiate või osade ostu teel. |
| --- | --- |

1.

19. juulil 2017 sai Euroopa Komisjon nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artiklile 4 vastava teatise kavandatava koondumise kohta, mille raames ettevõtja Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fisher“, Ameerika Ühendriigid) omandab kontrolli ühinemismääruse artikli 3 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses ettevõtja Patheon N.V. („Patheon“, Madalmaad) üle aktsiate või osade ostu teel.

| 2. | Asjaomaste ettevõtjate majandustegevus hõlmab järgmist:






  — | Thermo Fisher toodab ja tarnib laboriseadmeid, analüüsivahendeid, diagnostikatooteid ja nendega seotud tooteid ning osutab teenuseid. Üleilmselt tegutseva ettevõtja peakorter asub Ameerika Ühendriikides. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Asjaomaste ettevõtjate majandustegevus hõlmab järgmist:

—

Thermo Fisher toodab ja tarnib laboriseadmeid, analüüsivahendeid, diagnostikatooteid ja nendega seotud tooteid ning osutab teenuseid. Üleilmselt tegutseva ettevõtja peakorter asub Ameerika Ühendriikides.

| — | Patheon on allhankija ravimite toimeainete ja valmisravimite väljatöötamisel ja tootmisel. Üleilmselt tegutseva ettevõtja peakorter asub Madalmaades. |
| --- | --- |

—

Patheon on allhankija ravimite toimeainete ja valmisravimite väljatöötamisel ja tootmisel. Üleilmselt tegutseva ettevõtja peakorter asub Madalmaades.

| 3. | Komisjon leiab pärast teatise esialgset läbivaatamist, et tehing, millest teatatakse, võib kuuluda ühinemismääruse kohaldamisalasse, kuid lõplikku otsust selle kohta ei ole veel tehtud. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Komisjon leiab pärast teatise esialgset läbivaatamist, et tehing, millest teatatakse, võib kuuluda ühinemismääruse kohaldamisalasse, kuid lõplikku otsust selle kohta ei ole veel tehtud.

| 4. | Komisjon kutsub huvitatud kolmandaid isikuid esitama oma võimalikke märkusi kavandatava toimingu kohta.
  Komisjon peab märkused kätte saama kümne päeva jooksul pärast käesoleva dokumendi avaldamist. Märkusi võib saata komisjonile faksi (+32 22964301) või elektronposti (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) teel või postiga järgmisel aadressil (lisada viitenumber M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. – Patheon N.V.):





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisjon kutsub huvitatud kolmandaid isikuid esitama oma võimalikke märkusi kavandatava toimingu kohta.

Komisjon peab märkused kätte saama kümne päeva jooksul pärast käesoleva dokumendi avaldamist. Märkusi võib saata komisjonile faksi (+32 22964301) või elektronposti (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) teel või postiga järgmisel aadressil (lisada viitenumber M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. – Patheon N.V.):

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1 („ühinemismäärus“).

---

MUUD AKTID

Euroopa Komisjon

| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/20

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TEADAANNE — AVALIK KONSULTATSIOON

Jaapani geograafilised tähised

(2017/C 242/10)

Geograafilisi tähiseid käsitlevat peatükki sisaldava vabakaubanduslepingu (edaspidi „leping“) sõlmimiseks Jaapaniga peetavate läbirääkimiste raames on Jaapani ametiasutused lepingu kohase kaitse saamiseks esitanud geograafiliste tähiste lisatud loetelu. Euroopa Komisjon kaalub praegu, kas kõnealused geograafilised tähised peavad vastavalt tulevasele lepingule olema kaitstud geograafiliste tähistena intellektuaalomandi õiguste kaubandusaspektide lepingu (TRIPS-leping) artikli 22 lõike 1 tähenduses.

Komisjon kutsub liikmesriike ja kolmandaid riike või liikmesriikides või kolmandates riikides asuvaid või seal tegutsevaid füüsilisi ja juriidilisi isikuid, kellel on õigustatud huvi, esitama sellise kaitse suhtes nõuetekohaselt põhjendatud vastuväiteid.

Komisjon peab vastuväited kätte saama kahe kuu jooksul alates käesoleva teadaande avaldamise kuupäevast. Vastuväited tuleb saata järgmisel e-posti aadressil: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Läbi vaadatakse üksnes need vastuväited, mis saadakse eespool nimetatud tähtaja jooksul ning millest nähtub, et

| a) | asjaomase nimetuse kaitse oleks vastuolus taimesordi või loomatõu nimetusega ning võib seetõttu eksitada tarbijat toote tegeliku päritolu osas; |
| --- | --- |

a)

asjaomase nimetuse kaitse oleks vastuolus taimesordi või loomatõu nimetusega ning võib seetõttu eksitada tarbijat toote tegeliku päritolu osas;

| b) | kaitstav nimetus oleks täielikult või osaliselt homonüümne nimetusega, mis on liidus kaitstud Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 21. novembri 2012. aasta määrusega (EL) nr 1151/2012 (põllumajandustoodete ja toidu kvaliteedikavade kohta), (1) või nimetusega, mis sisaldub lepingutes, mille Euroopa Liit on sõlminud järgmiste riikidega:






  — | SADC majanduspartnerluslepingu riigid (Botswana, Lesotho, Mosambiik, Namiibia, Svaasimaa ja Lõuna-Aafrika Vabariik) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

kaitstav nimetus oleks täielikult või osaliselt homonüümne nimetusega, mis on liidus kaitstud Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 21. novembri 2012. aasta määrusega (EL) nr 1151/2012 (põllumajandustoodete ja toidu kvaliteedikavade kohta), (1) või nimetusega, mis sisaldub lepingutes, mille Euroopa Liit on sõlminud järgmiste riikidega:

—

SADC majanduspartnerluslepingu riigid (Botswana, Lesotho, Mosambiik, Namiibia, Svaasimaa ja Lõuna-Aafrika Vabariik) (2)

| — | Šveits (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

Šveits (3)

| — | Lõuna-Korea (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Lõuna-Korea (4)

| — | Kesk-Ameerika (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

Kesk-Ameerika (5)

| — | Colombia, Peruu ja Ecuador (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Colombia, Peruu ja Ecuador (6)

| — | Montenegro (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Montenegro (7)

| — | Bosnia ja Hertsegoviina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosnia ja Hertsegoviina (8)

| — | Serbia (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Serbia (9)

| — | Moldova (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldova (10)

| — | Ukraina (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukraina (11)

| — | Gruusia (12) |
| --- | --- |

—

Gruusia (12)

| c) | asjaomase nimetuse kaitse võiks kaubamärgi mainet ja tuntust ning kasutamise aega arvesse võttes eksitada tarbijat toote tegeliku olemuse osas; |
| --- | --- |

c)

asjaomase nimetuse kaitse võiks kaubamärgi mainet ja tuntust ning kasutamise aega arvesse võttes eksitada tarbijat toote tegeliku olemuse osas;

| d) | asjaomase nimetuse kaitse ohustaks täiesti või osaliselt identset nime või kaubamärki või tooteid, mida on õiguspäraselt turustatud vähemalt viis aastat enne käesoleva teatise avaldamist; |
| --- | --- |

d)

asjaomase nimetuse kaitse ohustaks täiesti või osaliselt identset nime või kaubamärki või tooteid, mida on õiguspäraselt turustatud vähemalt viis aastat enne käesoleva teatise avaldamist;

| e) | või kui vastuväidetes esitatakse üksikasju, millest võib järeldada, et nimetus, mille kaitset taotletakse, on üldnimetus. |
| --- | --- |

e)

või kui vastuväidetes esitatakse üksikasju, millest võib järeldada, et nimetus, mille kaitset taotletakse, on üldnimetus.

Eespool osutatud kriteeriume hinnatakse liidu territooriumist lähtuvalt; intellektuaalomandi õiguste korral hinnatakse neid vaid territooriumil või territooriumidel, kus nimetatud õigused on kaitstud. Kõnealuste nimetuste võimalik kaitse Euroopa Liidus sõltub läbirääkimiste edukast lõpetamisest ning seejärel vastuvõetavast õigusaktist.

Geograafiliste tähiste loetelu
   (13)

| Kaitstud nimetus Jaapanis | Transkriptsioon (ainult teavitamise eesmärgil) | Tootekategooria ja kirjeldus |
| --- | --- | --- |
| „

  “/„Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi“ | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Värske kala, koorikloomad, molluskid ja neist valmistatud tooted – karbid |
| „

  “/„Tsurajima Gobou“ | Tsurajima Gobou | Puuviljad, köögiviljad ja teraviljad töötlemata ja töödeldud kujul – takjas |
| „

  “ | Yamagata | Aluslepingu I lisas loetletud muud tooted (vürtsid jne) – muud kääritatud joogid – seishu (sake) |
| „

  “/„Maesawa Beef“ | Maesawa Gyu | Värske liha (ja rups) – veiseliha |
| „

  “/„Yonezawagyu“ | Yonezawa Gyu | Värske liha (ja rups) – veiseliha |
| „

  “/„Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi“ | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Värske liha (ja rups) – veiseliha |
| „

  “/„Nishio Matcha“ | Nishio no Matcha | Aluslepingu I lisas loetletud muud tooted (vürtsid jne) – roheline purutee |

Kaitstud nimetus Jaapanis

Transkriptsioon (ainult teavitamise eesmärgil)

Tootekategooria ja kirjeldus

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Värske kala, koorikloomad, molluskid ja neist valmistatud tooted – karbid

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

Puuviljad, köögiviljad ja teraviljad töötlemata ja töödeldud kujul – takjas

Image

Yamagata

Aluslepingu I lisas loetletud muud tooted (vürtsid jne) – muud kääritatud joogid – seishu (sake)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

Värske liha (ja rups) – veiseliha

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

Värske liha (ja rups) – veiseliha

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Värske liha (ja rups) – veiseliha

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Aluslepingu I lisas loetletud muud tooted (vürtsid jne) – roheline purutee

---

(1)  ELT L 343, 14.12.2012, lk 1.

(2)  Nõukogu 1. juuni 2016. aasta otsus (EL) 2016/1623 ühelt poolt Euroopa Liidu ja selle liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt SADC majanduspartnerluslepingu riikide vahelise majanduspartnerluslepingu Euroopa Liidu nimel allkirjastamise ja selle ajutise kohaldamise kohta (ELT L 250, 16.9.2016, lk 1).

(3)  Nõukogu ja komisjoni (teadus- ja tehnikakoostöö kokkuleppe osas) 4. aprilli 2002. aasta otsus 2002/309/EÜ, Euratom seitsme kokkuleppe sõlmimise kohta Šveitsi Konföderatsiooniga (EÜT L 114, 30.4.2002, lk 1) ning eriti Euroopa Ühenduse ja Šveitsi Konföderatsiooni vaheline põllumajandustoodetega kauplemise kokkulepe – 7. lisa.

(4)  Nõukogu 16. septembri 2010. aasta otsus 2011/265/EL ühelt poolt Euroopa Liidu ja selle liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt Korea Vabariigi vahelise vabakaubanduslepingu Euroopa Liidu nimel allkirjastamise ja selle ajutise kohaldamise kohta (ELT L 127, 14.5.2011, lk 1).

(5)  Leping, millega luuakse assotsiatsioon ühelt poolt Euroopa Liidu ja selle liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt Kesk-Ameerika riikide vahel (ELT L 346, 15.12.2012, lk 3).

(6)  Ühelt poolt Euroopa Liidu ja selle liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt Colombia ja Peruu vaheline kaubandusleping (ELT L 354, 21.12.2012, lk 3) ning ühelt poolt Euroopa Liidu ja selle liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt Colombia ja Peruu vahelisele kaubanduslepingule Ecuadori kõnealuse lepinguga ühinemise arvesse võtmiseks lisatud ühinemisprotokoll (ELT L 356, 24.12.2016, lk 3).

(7)  Nõukogu 15. oktoobri 2007. aasta otsus 2007/855/EÜ ühelt poolt Euroopa Ühenduse ja teiselt poolt Montenegro vahelise kaubandust ja kaubandusküsimusi käsitleva vahelepingu allkirjastamise ja sõlmimise kohta (ELT L 345, 28.12.2007, lk 1).

(8)  Nõukogu 16. juuni 2008. aasta otsus 2008/474/EÜ ühelt poolt Euroopa Ühenduse ning teiselt poolt Bosnia ja Hertsegoviina vahelise kaubandust ja kaubandusküsimusi käsitleva vahelepingu allakirjutamise ja sõlmimise kohta (ELT L 169, 30.6.2008, lk 10. Protokoll nr 6).

(9)  Nõukogu 29. aprilli 2008. aasta otsus 2010/36/EÜ ühelt poolt Euroopa Ühenduse ja teiselt poolt Serbia Vabariigi vahelise kaubandust ja kaubandusküsimusi käsitleva vahelepingu allkirjastamise ja sõlmimise kohta (ELT L 28, 30.1.2010, lk 1).

(10)  Nõukogu 3. detsembri 2012. aasta otsus 2013/7/EL Euroopa Liidu ja Moldova Vabariigi vahelise põllumajandustoodete ja toiduainete geograafiliste tähiste kaitset käsitleva lepingu sõlmimise kohta (ELT L 10, 15.1.2013, lk 1).

(11)  Assotsieerimisleping ühelt poolt Euroopa Liidu ja selle liikmesriikide ning teiselt poolt Ukraina vahel (ELT L 161, 29.5.2014).

(12)  Nõukogu 14. veebruari 2012. aasta otsus 2012/164/EL Euroopa Liidu ja Gruusia vahelise põllumajandustoodete ja toiduainete geograafiliste tähiste kaitset käsitleva lepingu sõlmimise kohta (ELT L 93, 30.3.2012, lk 1).

(13)  Käimasolevate läbirääkimiste raames Jaapani ametiasutuste esitatud nende tähiste loetelu, mis on registreeritud Jaapanis.

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| 27.7.2017 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 242/22

---

Teade Alexanda Amon Koteyle, Elshafee El Sheikhile, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomole, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoevile, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvilile, OMAN ROCHMANile, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE’ile (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHABile, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleedile ja Jund Al Aqsale, kelle nimed on komisjoni rakendusmäärusega (EL) 2017/1390 lisatud nõukogu 27. mai 2002. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 (millega kehtestatakse teatavad eripiirangud organisatsioonidega ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida seotud teatavate isikute ja üksuste vastu) artiklites 2, 3 ja 7 osutatud loetellu

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | Nõukogu otsuses (ÜVJP) 2016/1693 (1) on liitu kutsutud üles külmutama ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonide 1267 (1999) ja 1333 (2000) kohaselt koostatud loetelus (mida ajakohastab korrapäraselt ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsiooni 1267 (1999) alusel moodustatud ÜRO komitee) nimetatud organisatsioonide ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida liikmete ja teiste nendega seotud isikute, rühmituste, ettevõtjate ja üksuste rahalised vahendid ja majandusressursid.
  Nimetatud ÜRO komitee koostatud loetelus on järgmised isikud ja üksused:






  — | ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Nõukogu otsuses (ÜVJP) 2016/1693 (1) on liitu kutsutud üles külmutama ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsioonide 1267 (1999) ja 1333 (2000) kohaselt koostatud loetelus (mida ajakohastab korrapäraselt ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu resolutsiooni 1267 (1999) alusel moodustatud ÜRO komitee) nimetatud organisatsioonide ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida liikmete ja teiste nendega seotud isikute, rühmituste, ettevõtjate ja üksuste rahalised vahendid ja majandusressursid.

Nimetatud ÜRO komitee koostatud loetelus on järgmised isikud ja üksused:

—

ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida;

| — | ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaidaga seotud füüsilised ja juriidilised isikud, üksused, asutused ja rühmitused ning |
| --- | --- |

—

ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaidaga seotud füüsilised ja juriidilised isikud, üksused, asutused ja rühmitused ning

| — | nimetatud isikute, üksuste, asutuste ja rühmituste omandis või kontrolli all olevad või neid muul viisil toetavad juriidilised isikud, üksused ja asutused. |
| --- | --- |

—

nimetatud isikute, üksuste, asutuste ja rühmituste omandis või kontrolli all olevad või neid muul viisil toetavad juriidilised isikud, üksused ja asutused.

Teod ja tegevus, mis osutavad isiku, rühmituse, ettevõtja või üksuse seotusele ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaidaga, on järgmised:

| a) | osalemine ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida või nende mis tahes rühmituse, kõrvalrühmituse, nendest eraldunud või nendest tekkinud rühmituse tegude või tegevuse rahastamises, kavandamises, hõlbustamises, ettevalmistamises või elluviimises koos nendega, nende nime all, nende huvides või nende toetuseks; |
| --- | --- |

a)

osalemine ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida või nende mis tahes rühmituse, kõrvalrühmituse, nendest eraldunud või nendest tekkinud rühmituse tegude või tegevuse rahastamises, kavandamises, hõlbustamises, ettevalmistamises või elluviimises koos nendega, nende nime all, nende huvides või nende toetuseks;

| b) | relvade ja nendega seotud varustuse tarnimine, müümine või edastamine eespool nimetatuile; |
| --- | --- |

b)

relvade ja nendega seotud varustuse tarnimine, müümine või edastamine eespool nimetatuile;

| c) | liikmete värbamine eespool nimetatuile või |
| --- | --- |

c)

liikmete värbamine eespool nimetatuile või

| d) | muud neid toetavad teod või tegevus. |
| --- | --- |

d)

muud neid toetavad teod või tegevus.

| 2. | ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu komitee kiitis 20. juulil 2017 heaks Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikhi, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoevi, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMANi, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE’i (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHABi, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleedi ja Jund Al Aqsa kandmise ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida sanktsioonide komitee loetellu.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed ja Jund Al Aqsa võivad esitada ÜRO ombudsmanile igal ajal koos tõendusmaterjaliga taotluse eespool nimetatud ÜRO loetellu lisamise otsus läbi vaadata. Taotlus tuleks saata järgmisel aadressil:





  United Nations – Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Tel +1 212 9632671 |
| Faks +1 212 9631300/3778 |
| E-post: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu komitee kiitis 20. juulil 2017 heaks Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikhi, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoevi, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMANi, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE’i (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHABi, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleedi ja Jund Al Aqsa kandmise ISILi (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida sanktsioonide komitee loetellu.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed ja Jund Al Aqsa võivad esitada ÜRO ombudsmanile igal ajal koos tõendusmaterjaliga taotluse eespool nimetatud ÜRO loetellu lisamise otsus läbi vaadata. Taotlus tuleks saata järgmisel aadressil:

United Nations – Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel +1 212 9632671

Faks +1 212 9631300/3778

E-post: ombudsperson@un.org

Lisateavet saab veebisaidilt https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | Komisjon on vastavalt punktis 2 osutatud ÜRO otsusele vastu võtnud rakendusmääruse (EL) 2017/1390, (2) millega muudetakse nõukogu 27. mai 2002. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 (millega kehtestatakse teatavad eripiirangud organisatsioonidega ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida seotud teatavate isikute ja üksuste vastu) I lisa (3). Vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 artikli 7 lõike 1 punktile a ja artikli 7a lõikele 1 tehtavate muudatustega lisatakse määruse I lisas esitatud loetellu (edaspidi „I lisa“) Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed ja Jund Al Aqsa.
  I lisasse kantud isikute ja üksuste suhtes kohaldatakse järgmisi määruses (EÜ) nr 881/2002 sätestatud meetmeid:






  1) | kõigi asjaomastele isikutele ja üksustele kuuluvate või nende omandis või valduses olevate rahaliste vahendite ja majandusressursside külmutamine ning rahaliste vahendite ja majandusressursside otsese või kaudse nende käsutusse või nende toetuseks andmise keelamine (kõigile) (artiklid 2 ja 2a) ning |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Komisjon on vastavalt punktis 2 osutatud ÜRO otsusele vastu võtnud rakendusmääruse (EL) 2017/1390, (2) millega muudetakse nõukogu 27. mai 2002. aasta määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 (millega kehtestatakse teatavad eripiirangud organisatsioonidega ISIL (Daesh) ja Al-Qaida seotud teatavate isikute ja üksuste vastu) I lisa (3). Vastavalt määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 artikli 7 lõike 1 punktile a ja artikli 7a lõikele 1 tehtavate muudatustega lisatakse määruse I lisas esitatud loetellu (edaspidi „I lisa“) Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAAL, MIS ASUB ALBU KAMALIS SÜÜRIA ARAABIA VABARIIGIS), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed ja Jund Al Aqsa.

I lisasse kantud isikute ja üksuste suhtes kohaldatakse järgmisi määruses (EÜ) nr 881/2002 sätestatud meetmeid:

1)

kõigi asjaomastele isikutele ja üksustele kuuluvate või nende omandis või valduses olevate rahaliste vahendite ja majandusressursside külmutamine ning rahaliste vahendite ja majandusressursside otsese või kaudse nende käsutusse või nende toetuseks andmise keelamine (kõigile) (artiklid 2 ja 2a) ning

| 2) | kõigile asjaomastele isikutele ja üksustele sõjaliseks tegevuseks otsese või kaudse tehnilise konsultatsiooni, abi või väljaõppe andmise, müümise, tarnimise või edastamise keelamine (artikkel 3). |
| --- | --- |

2)

kõigile asjaomastele isikutele ja üksustele sõjaliseks tegevuseks otsese või kaudse tehnilise konsultatsiooni, abi või väljaõppe andmise, müümise, tarnimise või edastamise keelamine (artikkel 3).

| 4. | Määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 artiklis 7a on sätestatud läbivaatamismenetlus, mille kohaselt loetellu kantud isikud ja üksused võivad esitada loetellu kandmise põhjuste kohta märkuseid. Rakendusmäärusega (EL) 2017/1390 I lisasse lisatud isikud ja üksused võivad esitada komisjonile taotluse, et komisjon põhjendaks nende loetellu kandmist. Taotlus tuleks saata aadressil:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| „Restrictive measures“ |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 artiklis 7a on sätestatud läbivaatamismenetlus, mille kohaselt loetellu kantud isikud ja üksused võivad esitada loetellu kandmise põhjuste kohta märkuseid. Rakendusmäärusega (EL) 2017/1390 I lisasse lisatud isikud ja üksused võivad esitada komisjonile taotluse, et komisjon põhjendaks nende loetellu kandmist. Taotlus tuleks saata aadressil:

European Commission

„Restrictive measures“

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Lisaks juhitakse asjaomaste isikute ja üksuste tähelepanu võimalusele kaevata rakendusmäärus (EL) 2017/1390 Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 263 neljandas ja kuuendas lõigus sätestatud tingimustel edasi Euroopa Liidu Üldkohtusse. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Lisaks juhitakse asjaomaste isikute ja üksuste tähelepanu võimalusele kaevata rakendusmäärus (EL) 2017/1390 Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 263 neljandas ja kuuendas lõigus sätestatud tingimustel edasi Euroopa Liidu Üldkohtusse.

| 6. | Samuti juhitakse I lisasse kantud isikute ja üksuste tähelepanu võimalusele esitada määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 II lisas loetletud liikmesriikide pädevatele asutustele taotlus, et saada luba kasutada külmutatud vahendeid ja majandusressursse põhivajaduste rahuldamiseks või erimaksete tegemiseks kooskõlas kõnealuse määruse artikliga 2a. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Samuti juhitakse I lisasse kantud isikute ja üksuste tähelepanu võimalusele esitada määruse (EÜ) nr 881/2002 II lisas loetletud liikmesriikide pädevatele asutustele taotlus, et saada luba kasutada külmutatud vahendeid ja majandusressursse põhivajaduste rahuldamiseks või erimaksete tegemiseks kooskõlas kõnealuse määruse artikliga 2a.

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(1)  ELT L 255, 21.9.2016, lk 25.

(2)  ELT L 195, 27.7.2017, lk 11.

(3)  EÜT L 139, 29.5.2002, lk 9.

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