NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANK CUAUHTEMOC LUNA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-15028 

D.C. No. 

1:18-cv-00346-JMS-WRP 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

J. Michael Seabright, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 13, 2022**

San Francisco, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, BUMATAY, Circuit Judge, and BAKER,***

International Trade Judge.

Frank Cuauhtemoc Luna, pro se, appeals the district court’s order affirming 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of 

International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 18 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability 

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. 

This court reviews an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) “denial of social 

security benefits de novo and can reverse only if the ALJ’s findings are based on 

legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Attmore v. 

Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016). This standard is highly deferential. See 

Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & 

Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). An ALJ’s findings will be upheld 

“if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record,” Batson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004), and courts “will uphold 

the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation,” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 

1. Luna contends that the ALJ failed to consider all medical conditions listed 

in Luna’s initial application for social security benefits, especially when determining 

Luna’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). First, an ALJ is not required to discuss 

each and every piece of evidence in the record, particularly “evidence that is neither 
3 

significant nor probative.” See Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 

1012 (9th Cir. 2003). Luna’s argument principally fails because he does not 

demonstrate that any allegedly neglected impairments rendered him incapable of 

work under the Act, especially when considering that Luna maintained work for 

years while managing his impairments. The ALJ also reasonably focused on the 

conditions Luna identified at the February 5, 2018, hearing regarding his application 

for social security benefits as impediments to gainful employment, which Luna 

described as, “[m]ainly my back and my lack of concentration, being able to 

remember things or concentrate on simple instructions.” 

Second, the ALJ listed numerous conditions at step two when determining 

Luna’s severe and non-severe impairments and also discussed Luna’s alleged 

symptoms in detail throughout the disability determination. The ALJ’s own findings 

state that Luna suffered from other ailments that were not specifically listed. For 

example, although the ALJ never explicitly discussed “tendinopathy”—which refers 

to Luna’s shoulder issues—the ALJ discussed Luna’s shoulder issues at length. 

Similarly, the ALJ discussed Luna’s migraines, PTSD, and mental acuity more 

generally—conditions that might be traced back to Luna’s traumatic brain injury. 

And furthermore, Luna’s complaint that the ALJ did not explicitly refer to his 

traumatic brain injury misconstrues the ALJ’s discussion. The medical record 

demonstrates that Luna’s doctors speculated about the possibility that he had 
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sustained a traumatic brain injury at some point in his 25-year military career. But 

the ALJ was charged with determining Luna’s current impairments and limitations. 

Substantial evidence therefore supports the ALJ’s assessments of Luna’s RFC. See 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (providing that an ALJ’s 

RFC will be affirmed if it “applied the proper legal standard and . . . is supported by

substantial evidence”). 

2. Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s decision to discount Luna’s 

testimony regarding the severity of his impairments because Luna’s testimony was 

inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction with the medical record 

is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective testimony.”), and the 

nature of Luna’s treatment and improvement suggested that he had a greater capacity 

for some modicum of work. Indeed, “[i]mpairments that can be controlled 

effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining 

eligibility” for benefits. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 

(9th Cir. 2006); see also Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 (affirming the ALJ’s finding 

that effective conservative treatment such as physical therapy and use of a TENS 

unit were inconsistent with allegations of disabling pain). The ALJ also did not err 

in giving little weight to Luna’s wife’s function report for substantially the same 

reasons. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (noting that an ALJ may reject a lay 
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witness’s testimony for the same reasons he used for rejecting the claimant’s similar 

testimony).1

3. Luna also contends that the ALJ ignored the opinion of Luna’s treating 

physician, Colleen McManaman, D.O., and that the ALJ did not provide adequate 

reasons for discounting portions of the opinions of the two consultative examiners, 

Edward B. Christenson, M.D., and William J. Marks, Ph.D. Luna also criticizes the 

ALJ’s interpretation of his Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability ratings. 

The ALJ cited Dr. McManaman’s treatment notes numerous times in his 

decision. The ALJ “properly considered” Dr. McManaman’s notes and “listed 

specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record”—namely, 

that “[t]he record does not establish the medical signs, symptoms, laboratory 

findings or degrees of functional limitation required” —to determine that such 

information did not render Luna unable to work for purposes of receiving social 

security benefits. Earnshaw v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 357 F. App’x 36, 37 

(9th Cir. 2009). The ALJ specifically found “no evidence of gross anatomical 

deformity,” and also found that “[t]he severity of the claimant’s mental impairments, 

considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria” 

1 Because Luna does not substantiate his claim that the ALJ was biased against him, 

this allegation also fails. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999)) (stating that 

ALJs are presumed to be unbiased, and that presumption “can be rebutted by a 

showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification”).
6 

of the Act. 

The ALJ did not err in giving “partial weight” to consultative examiner Dr. 

Christenson’s emphasis of Luna’s “subjective complaints of lower extremity joint 

pains.” Indeed, earlier in the opinion, the ALJ explained that he only partially 

credited Luna’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms. In light of this 

finding, the ALJ gave only partial weight to Dr. Christenson’s assessment because 

the assessment relied heavily on Luna’s subjective reports and was contradicted by 

the record. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the 

ALJ did not err in rejecting the opinion of a consultative examiner because the 

examiner’s “opinion was contradicted by the opinions of other physicians” and the 

medical record); see also Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2014)

(quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041) (stating that an ALJ may reject even 

“a treating physician’s opinion [which is ordinarily entitled to greater deference than 

a consultative examiner’s opinion] if it is based to a large extent on a claimant’s selfreports that have been properly discounted as incredible”). 

Substantial evidence also supports the “limited weight” the ALJ assigned to 

consultative examiner Dr. Marks’s mental health consultative examination. The 

ALJ explained that Dr. Marks’s observations about possible problems with 

attendance and adaptability were contradicted by some of Dr. Marks’s own exam 

findings and were also inconsistent with the objective record. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d 
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at 1216 (inconsistency between doctor’s recorded observations and his opinion 

regarding claimant’s capacities); Ford, 950 F.3d at 1156 (inconsistency with record).

The ALJ properly gave “less weight” to the VA’s determination that Luna was 

100% disabled, assigning the highest ratings for sleep apnea at 50% disabled, flat 

feet at 50%, and PTSD at 30%, because the decision was “conclusory and [] not 

supported by the record.” See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(similarly giving less weight to the VA’s disability rating where the VA’s 

determinations were not supported by the claimant’s medical records). 

4. Finally, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council did not err in 

declining to overturn the ALJ’s findingsin light of Dr. McManaman’s May 15, 2018, 

letter disputing several aspects of the ALJ’s analysis. Dr. McManaman’s letter 

offered no new evidence that would justify remand and instead provided alternative 

interpretations of medical evidence the ALJ already considered. See Bostwick v. 

Berryhill, 677 F. App’x 344, 345–46 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the

treating physician’s letter did not “undermine the substantial evidence that

support[ed] the ALJ’s decision” because “the ALJ properly weighed the medical 

evidence before concluding that the claimant had the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work”). 

AFFIRMED.