[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10420

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DOUGLAS LINDSEY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF THE FLORIDA 

DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00465-RH-MAF

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10420

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Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Douglas Lindsey appeals from the district court's Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissal of his suit, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

against Richard Sweringen, in his official capacity as Commissioner 

of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Mr. Lindsey argues that, based on an Oklahoma state court order finding that he 

was no longer required to register as a sex offender in that state,

Florida’s sex offender registration regime, Fla. Stat. § 943.0435, is 

unconstitutional as applied to him under the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause. Mr. Lindsey also challenges a district court order setting 

aside an entry of default against the FDLE. After review, we affirm. 

I

Mr. Lindsey was convicted in Oklahoma in 1999 of multiple 

counts of statutory rape, sodomy, and lewd molestation, based on 

several sexual encounters with a 15-year-old girl. Due to his convictions, Mr. Lindsey was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to the Oklahoma Sex Offender Registration Act (“OSORA”). 

Based on an individualized risk assessment, he was found to be a 

level three sex offender, meaning he posed a serious danger to the 

community, and in accordance with that designation was required 

to register as a sex offender for life, pursuant to 57 Okla. Stat.

§§ 582.5(C), 583(C), (D). 

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A

In June of 2009, Mr. Lindsey filed a motion for review of his 

lifetime risk assessment determination. In September of 2009, an 

Oklahoma district court issued an order (the “Oklahoma order”)

finding that Mr. Lindsey was a level one sex offender. Pursuant to 

its authority under § 583(E), it determined that, based on his new 

designation and the absence of any legal trouble for a period of 10

years, he was no longer required to register as a sex offender under 

the OSORA. Soon thereafter he was removed from the Oklahoma 

Sex Offender Registry. 

In 2011, Mr. Lindsey moved to Martin County, Florida. He 

did not register as a sex offender. In November of 2017, the FDLE, 

which maintains the Florida Sexual Offender and Predator System 

(the “Florida Registry”), informed him that he was required to register as a sex offender, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 943.0435. Mr. Lindsey complied. 

In June of 2019, Mr. Lindsey formally requested that the 

FDLE remove him from the Florida Registry based on the Oklahoma order. The FDLE denied his request, stating that, because 

he was “released from the sanction imposed for [his] qualifying sex 

crime after October 1, 1997, [he] ha[d] a requirement to register in 

Florida as a sexual offender.” 

In August of 2020, Mr. Lindsey moved back to Oklahoma. 

Florida law no longer requires him to update his registration 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10420

information, but his prior Florida registration remains publicly 

available, including on the internet. 

B

As a general matter, for persons with out-of-state convictions like Mr. Lindsey, residency in Florida triggers the registration 

requirement. See § 943.0435(1). Mr. Lindsey, specifically, was required to register because his offenses of conviction, the sanctions 

from which he was released after October 1, 1997, were similar to 

certain enumerated offenses under Florida law. See

§ 943.0435(1)(h)1.a. The registration requirement lasts for the duration of the offender’s life absent a full pardon or post-conviction 

relief setting aside the conviction(s). See § 943.0435(11). Certain 

sex offenders may petition for removal of the registration requirement after 25 years, but not those convicted of offenses such as sexual battery and lewd or lascivious offenses, or similar offenses of 

another jurisdiction. See § 943.0435(11)(a). The Florida Sex Offender Act does not provide a mechanism for removal from the 

Florida Registry upon domiciling outside the state. 

Mr. Lindsey filed his § 1983 complaint in August of 2021, 

seeking a declaration that the FDLE has violated and continues to 

violate his constitutional rights and a permanent injunction prohibiting the FDLE from continuing to enforce Florida’s sex offender 

registration requirements against him. As relevant to this appeal, 

the complaint alleges that § 943.0435 is unconstitutional as applied 

to him, in violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, based on 

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the FDLE’s failure to “fully recognize” the effect of the Oklahoma 

order.1 

Mr. Lindsey effectuated service of process on the FDLE on 

September 3, 2021. The FDLE failed to timely file an answer or 

responsive pleading and Mr. Lindsey moved for entry of default, 

which the Clerk of Court entered on September 27, 2021. On September 29, 2021, he moved for default judgment. Several days 

later, on October 1, 2021, the FDLE moved to set aside the entry 

of default, explaining that its failure to timely respond was not willful but was “due to a perfect storm of [three] attorneys testing positive for COVID-19, two attorney positions being vacant, one attorney on [family and medical leave] and one attorney on military 

leave[, out of a total of 15 attorneys employed by the FDLE’s Office 

of General Counsel,] during the time that the Complaint was to be 

processed.” One of the attorneys who contracted COVID-19 also 

was responsible for coordinating civil litigation against the FDLE 

and communicating with the Office of the Attorney General to authorize representation. The FDLE further argued that it acted 

promptly to correct the default and that Mr. Lindsey would not be 

prejudiced. The district court granted the motion and directed the 

1 Mr. Lindsey also brought equal protection and right to travel claims under 

the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not challenge the disposition of those 

claims on appeal. As such, they are abandoned. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). See also Doe v. Moore, 410 

F.3d 1337, 1346-49 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the denial of equal protection 

and right to travel challenges to Florida’s Sex Offender Act). 

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Clerk to set aside the default, crediting the FDLE’s arguments and 

the “strong policy of determining cases on their merits.” 

The FDLE later filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 

which the district court granted. This timely appeal followed.

II

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th 

Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state 

a facially plausible claim, that is, a claim supported by “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires states to recognize 

and give effect to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1; V.L. v. E.L., 577 

U.S. 404, 407 (2016). The purpose of the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause

was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral 

parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy 

upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, 

irrespective of the state of its origin.

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Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) 

(citation omitted). Regarding judgments, “the full faith and credit 

obligation is exacting.” Id. at 233. 

With respect to statutes, or “public Acts,” the Full Faith and 

Credit Clause “does not require a State to substitute for its own 

statute . . . the statute of another State reflecting a conflicting and 

opposed policy,” so long as the state has “not adopt[ed] any policy 

of hostility to the public Acts of that other State.” Franchise Tax 

Bd. Of Cal. v. Hyatt, 578 U.S. 171, 176 (2016) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 

408, 412-14 (1955) (holding that Arkansas courts need not apply a 

time limitation contained in Missouri’s, but not Arkansas’, workmen’s compensation law); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611-12 

(1951) (finding a policy of hostility where the forum state, Wisconsin, excluded from its courts actions arising under Illinois law while 

permitting the adjudication of similar Wisconsin claims). 

According to Mr. Lindsey, the Oklahoma order is a final 

judgment entitled to “exacting” full faith and credit in Florida. Like 

the district court, we disagree. Mr. Lindsey’s 1999 Oklahoma convictions remain in place and their validity is not in question. This 

is not a case, therefore, where the underlying convictions have 

been set aside. The Oklahoma order, based solely on Oklahoma 

law—that is, the authority granted to the Oklahoma district court 

under 57 Okla. Stat. § 583(E)—does not purport to bind any other 

jurisdiction. Nor does Oklahoma, as a general matter, have extraterritorial jurisdiction to exercise police power in Florida. See, e.g., 

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Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827-28 (1975) (noting that a 

state’s police power does not extend beyond its borders). 

By demanding that Florida give full faith and credit to the 

Oklahoma order, Mr. Lindsey really is asking for full faith and 

credit to the provision of Oklahoma’s sex offender law that effectuated the Oklahoma order. As such, the question before us is 

whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Florida to abide 

by a discretionary sex offender registration removal procedure provided for under Oklahoma law, but not Florida law. The answer is 

no.

The provision of the OSORA at issue, § 583(E), permits level 

one sex offenders, regardless of the offense of conviction, to petition for discretionary removal of the sex offender designation after 

10 years of no arrests for any felony or misdemeanor while registered at any level, thereby “allowing the person to no longer be 

subject to the registration requirements of the [OSORA].” See 57 

Okla. Stat. § 583(E). See also § 583(C), (D). As noted, the Oklahoma court found that Mr. Lindsey was both a level one sex offender and eligible for removal of the sex offender designation.

By its plain language, § 583(E) does not affect the registration requirements of any other state. The Florida Sex Offender Act, 

on the other hand, does not rely on classification levels, and instead 

conditions the removal of sex offender registration requirements 

primarily on the offense of conviction. See Fla. Stat. § 934.0435(1). 

Persons convicted of certain enumerated sex offenses are subject 

to the sex offender designation for life and may not petition to

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22-10420 Opinion of the Court 9

remove the designation. See § 943.0435(11)(a)1-2. The Oklahoma 

and Florida regimes are therefore in conflict, as Mr. Lindsey’s case 

demonstrates, because a person absolved of registration in Oklahoma may nevertheless still be subject to indefinite registration in 

Florida based on the offense of conviction. 

The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not direct us to resolve this conflict in Mr. Lindsey’s favor. In fact, it prescribes the 

opposite, as the Clause does not require Florida to substitute the 

OSORA for the Florida Sex Offender Act. See Hyatt, 578 U.S. at 

176. Florida has a legitimate interest in prescribing the manner in 

which it protects the health and welfare of its citizens from persons 

convicted of sex offenses. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003) 

(recognizing state’s sex offender registry as a valid exercise of its 

power to protect the health and safety of its citizens); United States 

v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (“There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.”). 

Florida need not dispense with its preferred method of doing so 

because another jurisdiction has less restrictive requirements on 

sex offender registration. As the district court essentially recognized, even if Oklahoma did not have any registration requirements for offenders like Mr. Lindsey, that legislative choice would 

not prevent Florida from enacting a sex offender registration 

scheme.

III

A district court may set aside an entry of default “for good 

cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). We review for abuse of discretion 

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the district court’s determination to set aside the Clerk’s entry of 

default. See In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 

(11th Cir. 2003). 

In evaluating good cause, courts may consider a variety of 

factors, such as whether (1) the default was contumacious or willful; (2) setting it aside would prejudice the adversary; (3) the defaulting party presents a meritorious defense; (4) the default implicated the public interest; and (5) the defaulting party acted 

promptly to correct the default. See Compania Interamericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 

948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996). A party willfully defaults by displaying 

either an intentional or reckless disregard for the judicial proceedings. See id. at 951-52 (finding willful default where a litigant was 

given “ample opportunity to comply with court orders but fail[ed]

to effect any compliance,” as the court had exhibited “considerable 

patience” in granting the party several extensions). 

Mr. Lindsey argues that the district court erred in setting 

aside the default judgment against the FDLE by failing to give due 

consideration to his argument that the FDLE could not establish 

“good cause” sufficient to set aside the default based on its lack of 

internal procedural safeguards in handling cases. For this proposition, he cites to Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), and 

Funchess v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 683, 694 (11th Cir. 1985). Mr. 

Lindsey’s reliance on those decisions is misplaced. 

Both decisions involve claims concerning criminal sentences. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356-57; Funchess, 772 F.2d at 693-94. 

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The Supreme Court’s decision in Rita concerned 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(c), which explicitly requires the sentencing court, “at the 

time of sentencing,” to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” See 551 U.S. at 356. No such 

statutory mandate exists for courts ruling on defaults. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. As for Funchess, that decision cuts against

Mr. Lindsey because it recognizes the assumption that “all courts 

base rulings upon a review of the entire record.” See 772 F.2d at 

693-94 (stating that the “fact that the sentencing order does not refer to the specific types of non-statutory ‘mitigating’ evidence petitioner introduced indicates only the trial court’s finding [that] the 

evidence was not mitigating, not that such evidence was not considered”) (citation omitted). As such, Mr. Lindsey cannot show 

that the district court erred in its implicit rejection of his good cause 

argument. See, e.g., Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1303 (11th 

Cir. 1999) (court’s findings that were inconsistent with plaintiffs’ 

argument were an “implicit rejection” of that argument). 

Mr. Lindsey’s underlying “good cause” argument also fails 

on the merits. First, the conduct did not appear to willful, as the 

FDLE filed the motion to set aside the default soon after the entry 

of default. There also was no evidence that the FDLE had “continuously mishandled” the matter, see Robinson v. United States, 734 

F.2d 735, 739 (11th Cir. 1984), or had failed to respond despite prior 

accommodations from the court, see Compania Dominicana, 88 

F.3d at 952. Further, given the FDLE’s prompt response to the 

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entry of default, Mr. Lindsey did not suffer prejudice, as the timeline of the matter proceeded effectively as if there had been no delay.2

IV

The district court’s orders are affirmed.

AFFIRMED. 

2 Nor can it be said, as Mr. Lindsey argues, that adequate procedural safeguards would have ensured a timely response from the FDLE. See Heaton v. 

Bonacker & Leigh, 173 F.R.D. 533, 536 (M.D. Ala. 1997). This was not a cascade of individual errors resulting in an “internal communications breakdown,” id., but rather, an unfortunate consequence of a series of untimely absences. 

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