IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. and :

ESIS, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 486 C.D. 2017

: Submitted: October 20, 2017

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Lasky), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: February 22, 2018

Labor Ready Northeast, Inc., and ESIS, its workers’ compensation 

insurance carrier, (collectively, Employer) petition for review of an order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed a Workers’

Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) order granting Robert Lasky’s (Claimant) claim 

petition for total disability and specific loss benefits. On appeal here, Employer 

contends the WCJ erred or abused his discretion by capriciously disregarding 

competent medical evidence that Claimant’s condition, diagnosed as a hypoxia (lack 

of oxygen) induced involuntary movement disorder, was instead psychogenic 

(arising from mental or emotional stress, or psychological or psychiatric disorders)

in nature. Employer asserts the WCJ further erred by failing to admit into evidence 

an investigation report prepared by the Occupational Safety and Health 
2

Administration (OSHA); and, by failing to issue a reasoned decision as required by 

Section 422(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act1(Act). Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background

Claimant filed a claim petition alleging he sustained compensable 

injuries during the course of his employment with Employer following his exposure 

to toxic chemicals on April 20, 2013. Claimant sought partial disability benefits for 

the first two days following his exposure and then ongoing total disability benefits 

beginning April 22, 2013. Employer filed a timely answer denying Claimant’s 

material allegations. Before the WCJ, Claimant amended his petition to include a 

claim for specific loss of the left arm and facial disfigurement. In response, 

Employer amended its answer to include a denial of Claimant’s added allegations.

Initially, the WCJ noted Employer is a temporary employment agency 

that supplied Claimant’s services as a laborer to a company identified as 

“Insituform.” WCJ’s Op., 3/24/16, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 6. Claimant began 

working for Insituform in January 2013.

The WCJ summarized Claimant’s testimony as follows. On April 20, 

2013, Insituform directed Claimant to enter a cylindrical tube to install a “turn-rope.” 

F.F. No. 7a. Claimant explained that the turn-rope process required him to crawl 18 

feet into the tube, attach the turn-rope, crawl an additional 3 feet and again attach 

the turn-rope at the 21-foot mark. Id. Claimant described the tube as inflated by a 

fan to a diameter of approximately 37 inches. Id.

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §834.
3

When Claimant was inside the tube attaching the rope, the fan became 

disconnected or stopped working, and the tube collapsed. F.F. No. 7b. Claimant 

testified that once the tube collapsed, there was no longer any air in the tube, and he 

was breathing chemical fumes. Id. Claimant estimated he remained in the collapsed 

tube for up to two minutes without fresh air. Claimant believed he then lost 

consciousness. Id. Thereafter, Employer pulled Claimant from the tube using safety 

ropes attached to his ankles. Id. After Claimant regained consciousness, Employer’s 

line leader directed Claimant to fix his clothing and go to the breakroom for the rest 

of the day. Id. The incident occurred about one hour before the end of Claimant’s 

shift. Id.

Following the Saturday incident, Claimant attempted to submit an 

injury report to Insituform. F.F. No. 7c. However, Insituform directed Claimant to 

report the injury to Employer. Id. When Claimant contacted Employer, he was told 

to call back on Monday and speak to Mary, the office manager. Id. Claimant made 

multiple attempts to call Mary on Monday, but failed to reach her. Id.

On Monday afternoon, after receiving no response from Employer, 

Claimant sought emergency room treatment at Mercy Hospital in Scranton for 

symptoms of dizziness, nausea, headaches, shaking and slurred speech. F.F. No. 7d. 

Also, Claimant described a blackout lasting more than two hours Monday morning. 

Id. Claimant denied having any of these symptoms prior to the Saturday work 

incident. Id.
4

Thereafter, Claimant sought emergency room treatment at the 

Geisinger Community Medical Center, also in Scranton. F.F. No. 7e. There, 

Claimant treated with Dr. Iqbal Khan, a neurologist. Id. At Dr. Khan’s direction, 

Claimant also began treating with Dr. Michael Fox. Id. Eventually, Dr. Fox referred 

Claimant to Dr. Douglas Nathanson, also a neurologist. Id. At that time, Claimant 

stopped treating with Dr. Khan. Id.

Claimant further described ongoing symptoms, including an inability 

to breathe normally, tremors, cramps, involuntary movements of his head and 

mouth, facial twitching, loss of balance, nausea, headaches, vision problems, 

vomiting, and inability to control his left arm and hand. F.F. No. 7g.

On cross-examination, Claimant described his symptoms as 

“progressively worsening.” F.F. No. 7h. Claimant also specifically denied that 

Employer made available to him any air mask, independent breathing equipment, 

safety glasses, lights, or a secondary air source when he entered the tube on April 

20, 2013. Id. 

Claimant also submitted the deposition testimony of his treating 

physician, Dr. Lee T. Besen (Claimant’s Physician), who is board certified in family 

medicine and emergency medicine. F.F. No. 8. Claimant’s Physician has more than 

30 years of experience in treating patients with brain injuries from various causes, 

including, hypoxia, strokes and head trauma. Id. 
5

Claimant’s Physician first examined Claimant in late January 2014. F.F 

No. 8a. Claimant provided a history of the work incident. More specifically, 

Claimant stated he suffered exposure to chemical vapors while trapped inside a 

collapsed tube. Id. Claimant further indicated he lost consciousness for 

approximately one-and-a-half to two minutes. Id. Claimant’s Physician’s physical 

examination revealed Claimant suffered from involuntary movement of his facial 

muscles, snorting, drooling and contortions. Id. 

Claimant’s Physician described Claimant as having difficulty speaking. 

F.F. No. 8b. The doctor observed that Claimant had dysarthric speech and continual 

movement of his entire left side, face, trunk and arms, which is called “choreiformtype movement” of his entire left side. Id. The doctor further explained that 

Claimant suffered from an ataxic or unstable gait subject to involuntary and jerky 

movements and repeated falls. Id. Claimant’s symptoms remained consistent from 

the time of his initial disability examination continuing through Claimant’s 

Physician’s examinations. Id.

Claimant’s Physician also reviewed Claimant’s April 22, 2013 hospital

records, which included a chest X-ray and CAT scan following chemical inhalation, 

loss of consciousness and speech. F.F. No. 8c. Four days later, Claimant underwent 

additional emergency treatment for stuttering and imbalance, which developed after 

his chemical exposure in the tube. Id. Claimant’s Physician also reviewed medical 

records from Dr. Khan, the neurologist who provided Claimant with follow-up care 

after his emergency room visit. Id. Dr. Khan diagnosed Claimant’s condition as 

“sustained hypoxic ischemic and anoxic brain injury.” Id. Claimant’s Physician 
6

described Dr. Khan’s diagnosis as “consistent with his own diagnosis of Claimant’s 

condition.” Id.

Based upon his multiple examinations, and his review of Claimant’s 

history and medical records, Claimant’s Physician diagnosed Claimant as suffering 

from “hypoxia induced movement disorder; namely choreiform movement, which 

is involuntary about his mouth, upper and lower extremities on the left, on his nondominant side.” F.F. No. 8d. The doctor causally related Claimant’s condition to 

the April 20, 2013 work incident when the tube collapsed on Claimant. Id. 

Claimant’s Physician further testified that Claimant failed to show any improvement 

during his treatment. Id. Therefore, the doctor opined, as a result of a hypoxia 

induced movement disorder, Claimant remained unable to perform gainful 

employment. Claimant’s Physician further opined that as a result of the brain injury 

Claimant sustained on April 20, 2013, his left upper extremity is dysfunctional. Id. 

In opposition to Claimant’s claims, Employer submitted the deposition 

testimony of Kyle Rossetti (Coworker Rossetti), an Insituform employee who 

worked with Claimant on the third shift. F.F. No. 9. On April 20, 2013, Coworker 

Rossetti trained with Claimant and “Big Jim,” the line leader and another coworker, 

Anthony Aguilera. Id.

Coworker Rossetti testified that when going into the tube to perform 

the turn-rope procedure, an employee wears normal work clothes, which include 

safety glasses, long pants and safety shoes. Id. Rossetti further testified employees 

entering the tube wore leg shackles for emergency extraction. Id. He also described 
7

an air fan, which he described as an “industrial sized steel box fan,” which inflated 

the tube or “bag.” Id. 

Coworker Rossetti did not recall Claimant going into the tube without 

the safety equipment. Id. In addition, Rossetti did not recall anything unusual that 

happened while he worked with Claimant on April 19 and 20, 2013. Id. However, 

Rossetti admitted his uncertainty as to whether he actually worked the third shift

(10:00 P.M to 6:00 A.M.), or a double shift (10:00 P.M. to 2:00 P.M. the following 

day), or if he was on the first shift (6:00 A.M. to 2:00 P.M.) at the time of the 

incident. Id. Nonetheless, Rossetti testified being inside similar tubes and being 

able to breathe without an air hose. Id.

Employer also presented the testimony of Insituform’s Claim Manager, 

David Mark Jones (Claim Manager). F.F. No. 10. Claim Manager’s job duties 

include knowledge of everything that goes on in the plant, from financial budgeting 

to dealing with regulatory agencies such as OSHA. Id. Claim Manager recalled that 

Claimant began working at Insituform in January 2013 as a temporary employee 

provided by Employer. Claim Manager testified he would have been notified of 

Claimant being caught in a collapsed tube. F.F. No. 10b. However, nobody 

informed Claim Manager of such an event occurring on April 19, 2013. Id. 

Nonetheless, Claimant Manager admitted that an invoice from Employer indicated

that Claimant worked on April 20, 21 and 22, 2013. Id. 

Claim Manager acknowledged speaking with Claimant on April 22, 

2013. F.F. No. 10c. However, he denied that Claimant mentioned any work injury. 
8

Id. Claim Manager acknowledged that after talking to Claimant, he called Employer 

and terminated Claimant’s services. Id.

Claim Manager also acknowledged he called the local police to stop

Claimant from making threatening and harassing phone calls to Insituform. F.F. No. 

10d. However, Claim Manager denied contacting the police in retaliation for 

Claimant’s report of a work injury. Id. After that, Claimant stopped calling 

Insituform. Id. Thereafter, Insituform began receiving OSHA complaints. Id.

Employer submitted the deposition testimony of Dr. Richard Bennett 

(IME Physician), a physician board certified in neurology and electromyography. 

F.F. No. 11. IME Physician performed an independent medical evaluation of 

Claimant in November 2013. He took Claimant’s history. Id. Although Claimant 

indicated he suffered exposure to and inhalation of chemicals while inside a tube, he 

did not report a loss of consciousness. Id. In addition, the records the doctor

reviewed did not indicate Claimant suffered a loss of consciousness. Id.

IME Physician testified Claimant’s movement disorder did not fit any 

pattern. Id. Ultimately, IME Physician opined that the circumstances surrounding 

the work incident described by Claimant were not indicative of Claimant suffering 

a hypoxic brain injury. Id. Rather, IME Physician proffered, Claimant’s symptoms 

might be related to “hysterical paralysis.” Id. 

On cross-examination, IME Physician acknowledged that Claimant 

could not use his left hand or arm at the time of his examination. F.F. No. 12. The 
9

doctor also admitted that he was unaware of Claimant’s condition prior to the date

of his injury. Id. Nevertheless, IME Physician testified that Claimant could be 

malingering or have a serious psychological problem with an emotional component 

such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Id. 

Employer also submitted other items into evidence, including a DVD 

of the turn-rope process; a report of workers’ exposure to styrene during normal 

production activities; a temporary worker safety-training checklist signed by 

Claimant; a photo of safety equipment; and, a sample of the tubing material. F.F. 

Nos. 13-17.

In addition, Employer offered into evidence Claimant’s pay stubs and 

work record. F.F. No. 18. Claimant’s work record showed he worked at Insituform 

every day from April 3, 2013 through April 22, 2013. Id. In particular, Claimant 

worked eight hours each day from April 11, 2013 through April 22, 2013. Id.

Based on his observations of Claimant and his demeanor during the 

proceedings, the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony more credible and persuasive

than the deposition testimony of Coworker Rossetti regarding the work incident. 

F.F. No. 20. The WCJ recognized a discrepancy between Coworker Rossetti’s 

testimony (that the tube was not inflated during training) and Claimant’s credible 

testimony (that he was inside an inflated tube when it collapsed on him). Id. The 

WCJ also noted Coworker Rossetti’s admitted uncertainty as to how many shifts, or 

even what shift, he worked the day of the incident. Id. 
10

The WCJ found Claim Manager credible as to the proper method to 

perform the turn-rope process and the safety precautions that are in place. F.F. No. 

21. The WCJ also found credible Claim Manager’s testimony that he was unaware 

of any tubing collapse or injuries to Claimant on April 19, 2013. The WCJ noted 

this is not inconsistent with Claimant’s credible testimony that the tube collapse 

occurred on April 20, 2013. Id.

With regard to the medical evidence, the WCJ deemed the testimony 

and opinions of Claimant’s Physician credible and persuasive. F.F. No. 22. 

Therefore, he accepted them as fact. Id. Where Claimant’s Physician’s testimony 

and opinions conflicted with those of IME Physician, the WCJ accepted Claimant’s 

Physician’s testimony as more persuasive than that of IME Physician, who examined 

Claimant on only one occasion. Id.

As found by Claimant’s Physician, Claimant suffers from a hypoxia 

induced movement disorder affecting his face, mouth, and extremities on his left 

side causally related to the events of April 20, 2013 when the tube collapsed on 

Claimant. Id. The doctor further opined that Claimant’s condition left him unable 

to perform gainful employment and resulted in a dysfunctional left upper extremity. 

Id.

Consequently, based upon a review of the testimony and other 

evidence, the WCJ found Claimant sustained a compensable injury under the Act 

when a tube collapsed on him during the course of his employment with Insituform. 

F.F. No. 23. In support of this determination, the WCJ cited Claimant’s credible 
11

testimony that following the work incident, he began experiencing stuttering, 

imbalance, involuntary movements of his face, mouth, and left upper extremity. Id. 

Claimant did not have these symptoms prior to the work incident. Id.

In addition, the WCJ found that the medical experts agreed, and 

Claimant credibly testified, as to his inability to use his upper left extremity for all 

intents and purposes. F.F. No. 24. However, the WCJ did not find that Claimant 

suffered a serious, permanent, and unsightly disfigurement of the head, neck or face 

as a result of his work injury. Id. 

In accord with his findings, the WCJ determined that Claimant met the 

burden of proof in his claim petition for an injury described as a movement disorder 

affecting Claimant’s face, mouth and extremities on the left side. WCJ’s Op., 

Conclusion of Law (C.L.) No. 1. The injury left Claimant unable to perform gainful 

employment, resulting in temporary partial disability from April 20-22, 2013, and 

total disability beginning April 23, 2013 and continuing into the future. Id.

The WCJ also determined Claimant satisfied his burden of proof for a 

specific loss claim for the use of his upper left extremity. C.L. No. 2. To that end, 

the WCJ awarded Claimant 410 weeks of disability with a potential healing period 

of 20 weeks. Id.

On appeal, the Board affirmed. Employer petitions for review.2

 

2 Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported 

by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether constitutional rights 
12

II. Discussion

A. Capricious Disregard of Competent Evidence

1. Argument

Employer first contends the WCJ capriciously disregarded material 

evidence, which included an independent medical evaluation performed in April 

2014 by Dr. Paul M. Shipkin. Employer asserts Dr. Shipkin’s IME found that 

Claimant’s condition was psychogenic (arising from mental or emotional stress, or 

psychological or psychiatric disorders) in nature and that this opinion fully 

exculpated Employer.

Employer further argues the WCJ capriciously disregarded the medical 

report of Dr. Douglas C. Nathanson, which corroborated IME Physician’s opinion 

that Claimant’s condition was not work-related. Employer also asserts the WCJ 

improperly disregarded testimony that Claimant worked two days after the incident 

without any difficulties.

In addition, Employer asserts that Claimant’s Physician, in rendering 

his opinion, relied on information provided by Dr. Khan, a neurologist, who based 

his opinion on an inaccurate history provided by Claimant. Employer points out that 

Claimant’s Physician admitted on cross-examination that Claimant told Dr. Khan 

that he developed severe involuntary movements, dizziness and vomiting the day 

after the work incident. This account differs from the emergency room records, 

which do not indicate Claimant suffered from such symptoms or had any movement 

 

were violated. Phoenixville Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Shoap), 81 A.3d 830 (Pa. 

2013).
13

problem with his left arm at that time. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 220a-26a. 

Claimant’s Physician also admitted Dr. Khan relied on Claimant’s history and did 

not review the hospital records. Id. at 226a. To that end, Claimant’s Physician 

agreed that the history Dr. Khan relied upon was not accurate. Id. at 227a. 

Therefore, Employer argues Claimant’s Physician’s opinion relied upon 

incompetent medical evidence. 

2. Analysis

 The WCJ, as the ultimate fact-finder in workers’ compensation cases, 

has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight. A & J 

Builders, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Verdi), 78 A.3d 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2013). As such, the WCJ may accept or reject the testimony of a witness, including 

an expert witness, in whole or in part. Id.

Further, it is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support 

findings other than those made by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is whether there is 

evidence to support the findings actually made. Furnari v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Temple Inland), 90 A.3d 53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). We examine the record in its 

entirety to see if it contains evidence a reasonable person would find sufficient to 

support the WCJ’s findings. Id. If the record contains such evidence, the WCJ’s 

findings must be upheld. Id. In addition, we must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of all inferences 

reasonably deducible from the evidence. Id.
14

Moreover, a capricious disregard of the evidence occurs only when the 

WCJ deliberately or baselessly disregards apparently trustworthy evidence. 

Williams v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (USX Corp.-Fairless Works), 862 A.2d 

137 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Where there is substantial evidence to support a WCJ’s 

findings, and those findings support the WCJ’s legal conclusions, it should remain a 

rare instance in which an appellate court would disturb an adjudication based upon 

capricious disregard. Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002). Further, where the WCJ discusses the 

evidence in question, but rejects it as less credible or assigns it less evidentiary 

weight than other evidence, the WCJ’s determination does not constitute a capricious 

disregard of that evidence. Reed v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Allied Signal, 

Inc.), 114 A.3d 464 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).

a. Dr. Shipkin’s IME

Our review of the record indicates Dr. Shipkin’s IME report is attached 

to IME Physician’s deposition as Exhibit Bennet 7. See R.R. at 465a-74a. Dr. 

Shipkin examined Claimant on April 3, 2014, for a neurologic IME. Following his 

examination, Dr. Shipkin arrived at the following diagnosis (with emphasis added):

The working neurologic diagnosis is profound movement 

disorder ... beginning several days after 04/20/13 with 

negative MRI imaging early on (has not had a repeat 

study). The etiology for his clinical presentation is unclear

although nonphysiologic features (memory, coordination, 

gait, etc.) make a psychogenic etiology high on our 

differential diagnostic list of considerations with an occult 

organic pathological process to be ruled out (toxic 

encephalopathic injury, ischemic brain insult, etc).

If a psychogenic etiology is eventually determined to 

explain his clinical presentation this may be related to 
15

psychological trauma at the time of his 04/20/13 incident

causing a conversion reaction (unconscious, a form of 

post-traumatic stress disorder) or symptom magnification 

(conscious) for uncertain reasons.

[Claimant] does have a history of psychological issues 

dating back a number of years with an ex-girlfriend who 

lacerated his left arm with a knife as well as being a 

recovering alcoholic/substance abuser, etc.

At this point in time there seems to be a strong temporal 

association with his incident on 04/20/13. I would, 

however, reserve judgment at present pending a 

movement disorder expert opinion at a major university 

center.

[Claimant] does require psychiatric and neurologic care. 

More specifically, an opinion by a movement disorder 

expert at a major university center such as the University 

of Pennsylvania is strongly recommended where more 

sophisticated testing can be accomplished.

Based on his current status, he appears unable to maintain 

gainful employment and I would be happy to reassess this 

gentleman after the above noted evaluation.

R.R. at 473a.

Contrary to Employer’s contention, Dr. Shipkin’s IME does not 

exculpate Employer from liability. Rather, Dr. Shipkin stated the etiology or cause 

of Claimant’s condition was “unclear.” Id. (emphasis added). Although a 

psychogenic etiology was “high on the list,” Dr. Shipkin noted that a toxic 

encephalopathic injury or ischemic brain insult had not been ruled out. Id. In 

particular, Dr. Shipkin stated that if a psychogenic etiology is eventually determined

to explain his clinical presentation, Claimant’s condition may be related to 

psychological trauma at the time of the April 20, 2013 incident. Id.
16

Medical testimony will be found unequivocal and thus capable of 

supporting a finding if the medical expert, after providing a foundation, testifies that 

he believes a certain condition or fact exists. Campbell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette), 954 A.2d 726 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). However, medical 

testimony which is based on mere possibilities is equivocal and must be deemed 

incompetent. Id. As such, Dr. Shipkin’s statement that the cause of Claimant’s 

condition was unclear and that it may be related to psychological trauma must be 

considered equivocal as to causation. Id. 

In addition, Dr. Shipkin’s diagnosis is similar to that of IME Physician. 

Like Dr. Shipkin, IME Physician indicated that Claimant’s movement disorder could 

have an emotional component like PTSD not caused by an injury to the brain, spinal 

cord or nerves. See R.R. at 398a-99a. The WCJ rejected this testimony to the extent 

it conflicted with Claimant’s Physician’s opinions, which described Claimant’s 

condition as a hypoxia induced movement disorder causally related to the work 

incident. F.F. Nos. 8d, 22.

In sum, the WCJ accepted Claimant’s Physician’s opinion as more 

credible than Employer’s medical evidence asserting that Claimant’s movement 

disorder was psychogenic in nature. The WCJ, as fact-finder, is the sole arbiter of 

credibility in workers’ compensation cases. A & J Builders. As such, the WCJ did 

not err by failing to make explicit findings as to Dr. Shipkin’s similar report, which

was attached to IME Physician’s deposition. Moreover, as discussed above, Dr. 

Shipkin’s report failed to offer an unequivocal opinion that Claimant’s condition 
17

was psychogenic in nature and not work-related. As such, Dr. Shipkin’s opinion 

does not constitute competent evidence showing that Claimant suffered from a 

psychogenic condition. Campbell. 

b. Dr. Nathanson’s Report

Employer further contends the WCJ erred by failing to consider Dr. 

Nathanson’s report, attached to IME Physician’s deposition as Exhibit Bennett 5. 

See R.R. at 272a-86a. Employer asserts Dr. Nathanson, a neurologist, opined that 

Claimant’s movement disorder was not work related. We disagree. 

Claimant’s Physician was confronted with Dr. Nathanson’s report. Our 

review of that report, and of Claimant’s Physician’s testimony about it, fails to reveal 

a clear opinion by Dr. Nathanson as to causation. See R.R. at 195a-96a; 229a-32a.

Regardless, the WCJ accepted Claimant’s Physician’s opinion that 

Claimant suffered from a hypoxia induced movement disorder caused by the work 

incident as more credible than Employer’s contradictory medical evidence. F.F. No. 

22. As noted, this determination falls within the exclusive province of the WCJ. 

A&J Builders. Therefore, we reject Employer’s contention that the WCJ erred in 

failing to consider Dr. Nathanson’s report.

c. Dr. Khan’s Report

Employer also contends that the WCJ erred by failing to find Dr. 

Khan’s opinion incompetent because it was based on an inaccurate history provided 
18

by Claimant regarding the date he began experiencing involuntary movements and 

other symptoms. Again, we disagree.

Claimant’s Physician admitted on cross-examination that Claimant told 

Dr. Khan that he developed severe involuntary movements, dizziness and vomiting 

the day after the work incident. See R.R. at 220a-26a. Employer asserts this history 

differed from the emergency room records, which do not indicate that Claimant 

suffered from these symptoms or had any movement problem with his left arm 

immediately following the injury. Id. Claimant’s Physician also admitted Dr. Khan 

relied on Claimant’s history and did not review the hospital records. Id. at 226a.

Nevertheless, Claimant’s Physician never recanted his opinion, and he 

never indicated that he relied solely on Dr. Khan’s report in reaching his 

determination that Claimant’s condition is work-related. A medical expert’s opinion 

is not rendered incompetent unless it is based solely upon inaccurate or false 

information. Newcomer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ward Trucking Corp.), 

692 A.2d 1062 (Pa. 1997); Calex, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Vantaggi), 

968 A.2d 822 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). 

Whether or not Dr. Khan reviewed the hospital records, Claimant’s 

Physician reviewed the records, including the initial emergency room records. F.F. 

8c. Based on his review of Claimant’s history, medical records and his physical 

examinations, Claimant’s Physician opined Claimant suffered a hypoxia induced 

movement disorder causally related to the work incident. See R.R. at 197a-99a; F.F. 

No. 8d. Given these circumstances, any inaccuracies in Dr. Khan’s report do not 
19

render incompetent Claimant’s Physician’s opinions regarding Claimant’s work 

injury. Newcomer; Calex.

d. Employer’s witnesses; Claimant’s last days of work

Employer further contends the WCJ erred by incorrectly characterizing 

the testimony of its fact witnesses, Coworker Rossetti and Claim Manager, and by 

failing to consider wage records showing Claimant worked two days after the work

incident without any difficulties. 

To begin, we note that a WCJ need not address every detail of the 

evidence in rendering a decision. Amandeo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Conagra Foods), 37 A.3d 72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Here, the WCJ accepted 

Claimant’s testimony as more credible than that of Coworker Rossetti regarding the 

date of the injury and the fact that he was inside an inflated tube. F.F. No. 20. 

Claimant further testified he attempted to submit an injury report to Insituform the 

day of the incident, but the plant manager would not take a report and told him to 

contact Employer. F.F. No. 7c. This finding is supported by Claimant’s testimony. 

See R.R. at 38a-39a.

The WCJ also found that Claimant’s pay stubs and work history show 

that he worked full eight-hour days each day from April 11 through April 22, 2013. 

F.F. No. 18. To that end, the WCJ awarded Claimant partial benefits for April 20-

22, 2013, and total disability benefits beginning April 23, 2013. C.L. No. 2. In this 

way, the WCJ acknowledged that Insituform’s records show that Claimant worked 

two eight-hour days after the work incident.
20

Although the tube collapse occurred on April 20, and Claimant worked 

for two more days, Claimant’s Physician testified that symptoms causally related to 

a hypoxic event can be progressive with a delayed onset. See R.R. 207a-12a. The 

WCJ accepted Claimant’s Physician’s testimony and opinions as fact. F.F. No. 22. 

In short, Claimant’s Physician never recanted his opinion. Therefore, we reject 

Employer’s contention on this issue. Amandeo.

B. OSHA Report

1. Argument

Employer next contends the WCJ abused his discretion by not allowing 

Employer to introduce into evidence an OSHA report on air quality and by not 

allowing Employer additional time to present arguments regarding the admissibility 

of the OSHA report under the official records exception in 42 Pa. C.S. §§6103-04.

At a hearing before the WCJ in April 2015, Employer attempted to 

introduce into evidence an investigative report, prepared by an OSHA air quality 

hygienist, regarding the air quality in all areas of Insituform’s facility, including the 

tube. See R.R. at 119a. Claimant’s counsel objected on the basis that the report was 

hearsay. Id. at 120a. Following argument by counsel as to whether the report was 

admissible under the business records exception to hearsay, the WCJ sustained 

Claimant’s objection and did not allow the report into evidence. Id. at 122a.

Nonetheless, the WCJ afforded Employer an opportunity to depose an 

OSHA representative within 30 days of May 15, 2015. Id. at 148a-49a. Employer, 
21

however, failed to do so. On appeal here, Employer contends it attempted to 

subpoena the records, but received two letters from OSHA stating that OSHA 

investigators are prohibited from testifying in civil litigation without permission of 

the Deputy Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Labor. See Pet’r’s Br. at 41-42. 

Instead, OSHA advised Employer to request the OSHA investigative file through 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552. Employer, however, 

previously obtained the OSHA report from Claimant, who obtained it in a FOIA 

request.

2. Analysis

Admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the 

WCJ. Atkins v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stapley v. Germantown), 735 A.2d 

196 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs where the WCJ’s judgment 

is manifestly unreasonable, the law is misapplied or the record shows the WCJ’s 

action is the result of partiality, bias or ill-will. Allegis Grp. & Broadshire v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Coughenaur), 7 A.3d 325 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

Here, Employer’s Claim Manager attempted to introduce an OSHA 

investigative report which purportedly did not show any harmful chemical levels in 

the workplace or in the tube. R.R. at 119a-20a. Following the report, OSHA did 

not cite Employer for any violations. Id. at 122a.

Claimant objected to the report on hearsay grounds. Employer claimed 

the report was admissible as a business record. Id. at 120a. Claimant argued that 

Claim Manager had nothing to do with the OSHA investigative report other than 
22

receiving it. Id. Rather, Claimant argued OSHA conducted the investigation and 

prepared the report, which discussed “air quality on such and such date and such and 

such a tube ....” Id. at 121a. The WCJ sustained Claimant’s objection. Id. at 122a.

Subsection (b) of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act

provides (with emphasis added):

(b) General rule.—A record of an act, condition or event 

shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the 

custodian or other qualified witness testifies as to its 

identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made 

in the regular course of business at or near the time of the 

act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the 

tribunal, the sources of the information, method and time 

of preparation were such as to justify its admission.

 

42 Pa. C.S. §6108(b). Normally, whether a document should be admitted under the 

business records exception to the hearsay rule falls within the WCJ’s discretion. 

Virgo v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cty. of Lehigh Cedarbrook), 890 A.2d 13 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

Under this exception, it is not essential to produce either the person who 

made the entries or the custodian of the record at the time the entries were made. Id. 

It is also not essential that the witness qualifying the business record has personal 

knowledge of the facts reported in the business record. Id. Rather, as long as the 

authenticating witness can provide sufficient information regarding the preparation 

and maintenance of the records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness of the 

entity’s business records, such is sufficient to offset the hearsay character of the 

evidence. Id. However, if a record is in the nature of an expert opinion or diagnosis, 
23

the record’s conclusions or impressions are not admissible as a business record 

unless the person who rendered the opinion is available for cross-examination. Id. 

Claim Manager testified OSHA Representative Eileen Hoisen (OSHA 

Representative) performed the air quality check to determine whether there were any 

harmful chemical levels in the workplace. R.R. at 120a. Any conclusions or 

impressions as to the air quality by OSHA Representative, who was not available 

for cross-examination, would be inadmissible under 42 Pa. C.S. §6108(b). Virgo. 

Further, had Employer raised this issue before the WCJ, we believe the 

OSHA report also would have been inadmissible under the official records exception 

in 42 Pa. C.S. §§6103-04. See First Ward Republican Club of Phila. v. Pa. Liquor 

Control Bd., 11 A.3d 38 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (absent an authenticating witness who 

can provide sufficient information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the 

record, the record is inadmissible under the official records exception). Here, OSHA 

Representative, not Claim Manager, prepared the investigate report and conclusions. 

In any event, because OSHA Representative was not available for cross-examination

as to her findings and conclusions as to the quality of the air in the workplace, we 

see no error in the WCJ’s determination to not admit the OSHA report into evidence. 

Virgo.

C. Reasoned Decision

1. Argument

Employer further contends the WCJ failed to comply with the reasoned 

decision requirement in Section 422(a) of the Act. Employer asserts the WCJ’s 
24

decision was not reasoned because it is not based on the record as a whole. In 

particular, Employer again argues the WCJ failed to review exculpatory evidence 

including Dr. Shipkin’s IME report, medical records and reports from Dr. 

Nathanson, and hospital records which provided a contrary history to that provided 

by Claimant. Employer again asserts the WCJ failed to consider that Claimant 

worked two days after the incident. In short, Employer contends the WCJ’s failure 

to review this exculpatory evidence violated the reasoned decision requirement of 

the Act. 

2. Analysis

Section 422(a) requires the WCJ to issue a “reasoned decision 

containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a 

whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale for the decisions

....” 77 P.S. §834. A decision is “reasoned” if it allows for adequate appellate 

review. Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 828 A.2d 1043 

(Pa. 2003); Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 

191 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

 

Where medical experts testify by deposition, a WCJ’s resolution of 

conflicting evidence must be supported by more than a statement that one expert is 

deemed more credible than another. Dorsey. The WCJ must articulate an actual 

objective basis for the credibility determination for the decision to be “reasoned.” 

Daniels; Dorsey. As the Daniels Court explained:

[T]here are countless objective factors which may support 

the decision to accept certain evidence while ‘rejecting or 

discrediting competent [conflicting] evidence.’ For 
25

example, an expert witness’s opinion may be based upon 

erroneous factual assumptions ... or an expert may have 

had less interaction with the subject ... or the interaction 

was in a less timely fashion ... or the expert may betray a 

bias or interest in the matter. ... In addition, an expert 

witness may be unqualified or less qualified than the 

opposing party’s expert; or may be impeached with 

inconsistencies or contradictions in his or her testimony or 

reports; or may be impeached in some other convincing 

fashion.

Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).

Here, Employer’s reasoned decision argument essentially restates its

earlier argument that the WCJ improperly disregarded medical evidence 

corroborating IME Physician’s opinion. In our prior discussion rejecting these 

arguments, we recognized that the WCJ as fact-finder may accept or reject the 

testimony of any witness, including an expert witness, in whole or in part. A & J 

Builders. Also, it is irrelevant whether the record contains evidence to support 

findings other than those made by the WCJ; the critical inquiry is whether there is 

evidence to support the findings actually made. Furnari. Having determined the 

WCJ did not err by declining to more favorably weigh Employer’s medical evidence, 

we need not revisit these arguments under the guise of a reasoned decision challenge. 

Regardless, applying a standard reasoned decision analysis, we note the 

WCJ accepted Claimant’s Physician’s opinion as more credible than Employer’s 

contradictory medical evidence. F.F. No. 22. In particular, the WCJ noted that he 

found Claimant’s Physician’s testimony more persuasive than that of IME 

Physician, who examined Claimant on only one occasion for purposes of an IME. 

Id.
26

Further, the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony during the hearings

credible as to the fact he sustained a work injury as a result of being trapped in a tube 

collapse during the course of his employment located at Insituform. See F.F. Nos. 

20, 21, 23. To that end, the WCJ found Claimant’s testimony regarding the incident 

more credible than that of Coworker Rossetti or Claim Manager. F.F. Nos. 20, 21. 

In making these findings, the WCJ noted that he observed Claimant and viewed his

demeanor throughout the proceedings. F.F. No. 20.

Based on our review of the WCJ’s decision and the record, we conclude

that the WCJ’s findings and credibility determinations are supported by substantial 

evidence and satisfy the reasoned decision requirement in Section 422(a) of the Act. 

Daniels; Dorsey.

For the above reasons, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the 

WCJ’s decision granting Claimant’s claims against Employer for total disability and 

specific loss benefits for the work injuries he sustained as a result of being trapped 

in a tube collapse during the course of his assigned employment at Insituform. 

Therefore, we affirm the Board’s order.

 

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Labor Ready Northeast, Inc. and :

ESIS, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 486 C.D. 2017

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Lasky), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of February, 2018, for the reasons stated in 

the foregoing opinion, the order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board is 

AFFIRMED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge