FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D21-1435

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ERIC DEMOND PARRISH,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Thomas V. Dannheisser, Judge.

September 28, 2022

WINOKUR, J.

Eric Demond Parrish appeals his sentence, raising two issues. 

As to the issue regarding his eligibility for sentence review, we 

affirm. As to the issue of the court’s refusal to impose a departure 

sentence, we dismiss under the authority of Wilson v. State, 306 

So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), rev. granted, No. SC20-1870, 2021 

WL 1157838 (Fla. Mar. 26, 2021).

I

The State charged Parrish with three counts: sexual battery 

with force on his fifty-three-year-old foster mother; battery on his 

foster mother; and false imprisonment of his foster mother. 
2

Parrish was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses. A jury 

found Parrish guilty on all counts.

At sentencing, Parrish presented evidence to support a 

downward departure sentence on the ground that he requires 

specialized treatment for a disorder. See § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla.

Stat.1 The State opposed a departure sentence, noting Parrish’s 

extensive criminal history, the escalating nature of his criminal 

conduct, and his high risk of reoffending. 

Before pronouncing sentence, the trial court asked the parties 

whether Parrish’s sentence should be subject to judicial review 

after twenty years, pursuant to section 921.1402(2)(d), Florida 

Statutes. Parrish’s counsel indicated that she did not think his 

offense qualified for a sentence review. The court then imposed

sentence. The court rejected Parrish’s request for a downward 

departure, noting that regardless of whether Parrish qualified for 

a departure, this was not a case where such departure would be 

appropriate. The court sentenced him to thirty years in prison on 

the sexual battery count, five years concurrent on the false 

imprisonment count, and time served on the battery count. The 

court did not mention whether or when Parrish would be entitled 

to a sentence review, nor did it indicate anything about a sentence 

review in the written sentence.

Following appeal, Parrish filed a motion to correct sentencing 

error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). 

Parrish argued in his motion that because he was under eighteen 

years old when he committed sexual battery, because sexual 

battery is a life felony, and because he was sentenced to more than 

twenty years imprisonment, that he is eligible for judicial review 

after twenty years under section 921.1402(2)(d). The trial court did 

not issue an order on this motion within sixty days, so it is deemed 

denied. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2)(B).

1 Parrish also argued that he should be sentenced as a 

youthful offender, but the State correctly responded that Parrish 

was not eligible for a youthful offender sentence because he was 

convicted of a life felony. See § 958.04(1)(c), Fla. Stat.
3

II

Regarding the motion to correct sentencing error, it appears 

to us that Parrish does meet the requirements of section 

921.1402(2)(d), which entitles him to a review of his sentence after 

twenty years. However, we see no requirement that the court, 

when sentencing an offender, is required to pronounce the 

offender’s entitlement to a sentence review pursuant to section 

921.1402(2)(d). Nor is the sentencing court required to indicate 

these facts on the sentencing order.2,3

Rather, section 921.1402(3) places the requirement to notify 

Parrish of his eligibility for a sentence review on the Department 

of Corrections: “The Department of Corrections shall notify a 

juvenile offender of his or her eligibility to request a sentence 

review hearing 18 months before the juvenile offender is entitled 

to a sentence review hearing under this section.” And section 

921.1402(4) places the burden of seeking judicial review on the 

offender once notified: “A juvenile offender seeking sentence 

review pursuant to subsection (2) must submit an application to 

the court of original jurisdiction requesting that a sentence review 

hearing be held.” The sentencing court’s responsibility, on the 

other hand, is set forth in section 921.1402(6) and is triggered upon 

receiving an application for judicial review: “Upon receiving an 

2 This would not be the case for an offender convicted of 

murder, under section 782.04, Florida Statutes, committed before 

the age of eighteen. For such offenders, the court is required to 

make written findings indicating whether the offender actually 

killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. This finding 

determines the length of time before the offender is eligible for a 

sentence review. See §§ 775.082(1)(b)3., (3)(a)5.c., (3)(b)2.c.; 

921.1402(2)(a)–(c), Fla. Stat. No such finding is required for 

offenders convicted of any crime other than murder. See

§§ 775.082(3)(c), 921.1402(2)(d), Fla. Stat.; see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.781(c)(1).

3 We reject the State’s argument that Parrish “waived” or 

“invited” any error regarding this issue by his failure to assert that 

he was entitled to a sentence review at the sentencing hearing.
4

application from an eligible juvenile offender, the court of original 

sentencing jurisdiction shall hold a sentence review hearing to 

determine whether the juvenile offender’s sentence should be 

modified.”

Because the trial court had no affirmative duty under section 

921.1402 to notify Parrish at sentencing of his eligibility for 

judicial review, Parrish has not established a sentencing error that 

the court was required to correct.

III

Regarding Parrish’s claim that the court erred in refusing to 

impose a departure sentence, this Court has held that it lacks 

authority to review a sentencing court’s decision not to grant a 

departure sentence. See Wilson, 306 So. 3d at 1273. Accordingly, 

we dismiss this portion of Parrish’s appeal.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.

LONG, J., concurs; BILBREY, J., concurs with opinion.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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BILBREY, J., concurring.

I concur in the majority decision. I agree that Appellant is 

entitled to a sentence review after twenty years. See §§ 

775.082(3)(c), 921.1402(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2019). However, since he 

was convicted of an offense other than murder or felony murder 

under section 782.04, Florida Statutes, there is no statutory 

requirement for written findings on his eligibility for a sentence 
5

review. Compare § 775.082(1)(b)3., (3)(a)5.c., (3)(b)2.c. with § 

775.082(3)(c).*

Nonetheless, for juvenile offenders eligible for a sentence 

review of sentences for nonhomicide offenses, I urge circuit judges 

to pronounce eligibility at sentencing and include such eligibility 

in the commitment documents provided to the Department of 

Corrections. The Department must notify juvenile offenders of 

their eligibility for a sentence review eighteen months before 

entitlement. § 921.1402(3), Fla. Stat. But given that the eligibility 

for a sentence review for nonhomicide juvenile offenders is to occur 

after they serve twenty years, it seems the Department is more 

likely to overlook its obligation if it is not in writing. 

Additionally, juvenile offenders may be more likely to 

undertake rehabilitation, express remorse, and complete 

education and training programs while in prison if they know of 

the possibility of a reduced sentence in the future. See § 

921.1402(6)(a), (6)(e), (6)(g) (listing certain factors to be considered 

during a sentence review hearing). While knowing that they have 

the prospect of a reduced sentence at the start of their 

* Since Appellant faced the prospect of a life sentence, rule 

3.781, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, generally applied to 

him. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.781(a). But the rule did not require 

written findings of sentence review eligibility for Appellant. The 

second sentence of rule 3.781(c)(1) states, “The court shall make 

written findings as to whether the juvenile offender is eligible for 

a sentence review hearing under sections 921.1402(2)(a), 2(b), or

2(c), Florida Statutes, based on whether the defendant killed, 

attempted to kill, or intended to kill the victim.” Those three 

subsections of section 921.1402 cross reference subsections of 

section 775.082 which concern only juvenile offenders who commit 

murder or felony murder of varying degrees. Section 

921.1402(2)(d), not mentioned in the rule, cross references section 

782.082(3)(c) which applies to a juvenile offender like Appellant 

who commits a nonhomicide life felony or first degree felony 

punishable by life. Section 782.082(3)(c) does not require written 

findings. 
6

incarceration benefits the juvenile offenders, it also benefits the 

Department if the knowledge results in better-behaved prisoners. 

See A. Mitchell Polinsky, DETERRENCE AND THE OPTIMALITY OF 

REWARDING PRISONERS FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR, 44 Int’l Rev. of Law 

and Econ. 1 (2015). Ultimately, it is the citizens of Florida who 

benefit if a juvenile offender is rehabilitated and becomes a 

productive member of society. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. 

(stating that rehabilitation is “a desired goal of the criminal justice 

system”). A circuit judge pronouncing eligibility for sentence 

review for juvenile offenders increases the prospect of this 

occurring. 

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin F. Karpf, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.