An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedur e .

NO. COA13-1359

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 July 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Mecklenburg County

Nos. 11 CRS 256463

12 CRS 12725

JAMES CECIL PEARCE

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 30 May 2013 by 

Judge Robert C. Ervin in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 June 2014.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General David W. Boone, for the State.

Don Willey for defendant-appellant.

BRYANT, Judge.

Where the State presents substantial independent evidence 

corroborating defendant’s confession, the State has met its 

burden under the corpus delicti rule.

The State’s evidence established that on 23 December 2011, 

officers of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department 
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responded to an incident at a house located at 1100 Pegram 

Street. Officer Michael White, the first officer on the scene,

observed defendant run from the back door of the house, fall 

down the back steps, pick himself up, and run off between 

neighboring houses. Inside the house, officers found a 9mm 

cartridge case on the floor. Believing a firearm had been 

discharged in the house, officers began searching the 

neighborhood for the weapon. Officers discovered a 9mm semiautomatic firearm in a trash can in front of a house 

approximately 25 to 50 feet behind the house from which 

defendant ran. Subsequent testing of the cartridge case found 

in the house determined that it was discharged from the firearm 

found in the trash can. 

Officers located defendant standing beside a house at 1104 

Pegram Street, immediately to the left of 1100 Pegram Street, 

and took him into custody. The officers placed defendant in the 

back seat of a patrol car, where he spoke with Officer White. 

While speaking with Officer White, defendant admitted that he 

got into an altercation with a man inside 1100 Pegram, 

brandished a firearm during the altercation, and discarded the 

firearm at a nearby house. In a subsequent interview, defendant 

again stated that during the altercation, he “pulled out the gun 
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and shot one time into the floor in the kitchen,” and that he 

“ran out the back door and ran straight to a trash can and put 

the gun inside because I didn’t want to have the gun while 

dealing with the police.” 

At the close of the State’s evidence, the trial court 

denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of 

a firearm by a felon. The jury convicted defendant on the 

charge of possession of a firearm by a felon, and defendant 

entered a guilty plea to attaining the status of an habitual 

felon. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 82 to 

111 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals. 

_____________________________

In his sole argument on appeal, defendant contends the 

trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of 

possession of a firearm by a felon. We disagree. 

“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to 

dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 

S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citation omitted). “Upon defendant’s 

motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether 

there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of 

the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, 

and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. 
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If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 

N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation and 

quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78—79, 265 

S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (citations omitted). “In making its 

determination, the trial court must consider all evidence 

admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most 

favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every 

reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its 

favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 

(1994) (citation omitted).

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a 

felon because the State presented insufficient evidence. 

Specifically, although defendant concedes the State introduced 

substantial evidence that he had a prior felony conviction, he 

argues the State’s evidence remained insufficient under the rule 

of corpus delicti to support sending this charge to the jury 

because his statements were the only evidence that showed he 

possessed a firearm.
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“To convict defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon 

the state must prove that (1) defendant was previously convicted 

of a felony and (2) subsequently possessed a firearm.” State v. 

Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347—48 (2012) (citing 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a) (20[13])). It is well established 

that “an extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is not 

sufficient to sustain a conviction of a crime.” State v. Cox, 

___ N.C. ___, ___, 749 S.E.2d 271, 275 (2013) (citation 

omitted). When the State relies upon a defendant’s 

extrajudicial confession, the corpus delicti rule requires “the 

State to present corroborative evidence, independent of the 

defendant’s confession, tending to show that (a) the injury or 

harm constituting the crime occurred [and] (b) this injury or 

harm was done in a criminal manner.” Id. at ___, 749 S.E.2d at 

275 (citations and quotation omitted). In applying this rule,

our Courts have held:

[I]t is fundamental that the corroborative 

evidence need not . . . in any manner tend 

to show that the defendant was the guilty 

party. Instead, the rule requires the State 

to present evidence tending to show that the 

crime in question occurred. The rule does 

not require the State to logically exclude 

every possibility that the defendant did not 

commit the crime.
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Id. at ___, 749 S.E.2d at 275 (citation and quotation omitted). 

The requirements of the rule may also be met “if the accused’s 

confession is supported by substantial independent evidence 

tending to establish its trustworthiness, including facts that 

tend to show the defendant had the opportunity to commit the 

crime.” State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 236, 337 S.E.2d 487, 495

(1985). “[T]here must be strong corroboration of essential

facts and circumstances embraced in the defendant’s confession. 

Corroboration of insignificant facts or those unrelated to the 

commission of the crime will not suffice.” Id.

Here, responding officers saw defendant flee from a house

and found a discharged 9mm cartridge case inside the house. 

Officers discovered a firearm in a trash can in front of a house 

that was approximately 25 to 50 feet from the house from which 

defendant fled. Forensic testing later determined that the 

cartridge case found in the house was ejected during the firing 

of the firearm found in the trash can. Officers apprehended 

defendant while he was standing beside the house next to that

from which he fled. This evidence strongly corroborates 

defendant’s statements that he fired a single shot from a 

firearm during an altercation inside the house at 1100 Pegram 

Street, ran with the firearm from the house, and discarded the 
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firearm in a nearby trash can so it would not be on his person 

when he interacted with the police.

As such, the State provided sufficient independent evidence 

to meet its burden under the corpus delicti rule. Defendant’s 

statements provided substantial evidence that he possessed a 

firearm, and defendant’s statements and undisputed evidence of 

his prior felony conviction in turn constituted sufficient 

evidence to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of 

possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, defendant’s 

argument is overruled.

No error.

Judges STROUD and HUNTER, Robert Jr., concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).