# Uradni list C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-1045 |
| --- | --- |
| Uradni list
  Evropske unije | C 242 |
| | |
| Slovenska izdaja | Informacije in objave | Letnik 6027. julij 2017 |

ISSN 1977-1045

Uradni list

Evropske unije

C 242

Slovenska izdaja

Informacije in objave

Letnik 6027. julij 2017

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| Obvestilo št. | Vsebina | Stran |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Sporočila |
| | SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Odločitev o oceni pogojev za reševanje banke Veneto Banca S.p.A. | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Odločitev o oceni pogojev za reševanje banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. | 3 |

Obvestilo št.

Vsebina

Stran

II   Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2017/C 242/01

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Odločitev o oceni pogojev za reševanje banke Veneto Banca S.p.A.

2

2017/C 242/03

Odločitev o oceni pogojev za reševanje banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

3

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| | IV   Informacije |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Menjalni tečaji eura | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Povzetek sklepov Evropske komisije o avtorizacijah za dajanje v promet in uporabo in/ali za uporabo snovi iz Priloge XIV k Uredbi (ES) št. 1907/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o registraciji, evalvaciji, avtorizaciji in omejevanju kemikalij (REACH) (objavljeno v skladu s členom 64(9) Uredbe (ES) št. 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | INFORMACIJE V ZVEZI Z EVROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM |
| | Nadzorni organ Efte |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o morebitni državni pomoči, dodeljeni družbi Landsvirkjun prek državnih poroštev za pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča | 6 |

IV   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2017/C 242/04

Menjalni tečaji eura

4

2017/C 242/05

Povzetek sklepov Evropske komisije o avtorizacijah za dajanje v promet in uporabo in/ali za uporabo snovi iz Priloge XIV k Uredbi (ES) št. 1907/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o registraciji, evalvaciji, avtorizaciji in omejevanju kemikalij (REACH) (objavljeno v skladu s členom 64(9) Uredbe (ES) št. 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  )

(objavljeno v skladu s členom 64(9) Uredbe (ES) št. 1907/2006)

1

5

INFORMACIJE V ZVEZI Z EVROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM

Nadzorni organ Efte

2017/C 242/06

Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o morebitni državni pomoči, dodeljeni družbi Landsvirkjun prek državnih poroštev za pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča

6

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| | V   Objave |
| --- | --- |
| | UPRAVNI POSTOPKI |
| | Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Razpis javnih natečajev | 17 |
| | POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Zadeva M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett) – Zadeva, primerna za obravnavo po poenostavljenem postopku (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Zadeva M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | DRUGI AKTI |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Informativno obvestilo – Javno posvetovanje – Geografske označbe Japonske | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Obvestilo za Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa, ki so dodani na seznam iz členov 2, 3 in 7 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 881/2002 z dne 27. maja 2002 o posebnih omejevalnih ukrepih za nekatere osebe in subjekte, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, na podlagi Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) 2017/1390 | 22 |

V   Objave

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Razpis javnih natečajev

17

POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

2017/C 242/08

Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Zadeva M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett) – Zadeva, primerna za obravnavo po poenostavljenem postopku (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije (Zadeva M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

DRUGI AKTI

Evropska komisija

2017/C 242/10

Informativno obvestilo – Javno posvetovanje – Geografske označbe Japonske

20

2017/C 242/11

Obvestilo za Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa, ki so dodani na seznam iz členov 2, 3 in 7 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 881/2002 z dne 27. maja 2002 o posebnih omejevalnih ukrepih za nekatere osebe in subjekte, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, na podlagi Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) 2017/1390

22

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| | (1)   Besedilo velja za EGP. |

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(1)   Besedilo velja za EGP.

1

| SL | |
| --- | --- |

SL

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II Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/1

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Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

(2017/C 242/01)

Komisija se je 14. julija 2017 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo z notranjim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1). Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v angleščini in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=sl) pod dokumentarno številko 32017M8500. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=sl) pod dokumentarno številko 32017M8500. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

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(1)  UL L 24, 29.1.2004, str. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/2 |
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27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/2

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Odločitev o oceni pogojev za reševanje banke Veneto Banca S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/02)

Dne 23. junija 2017 je Enotni odbor za reševanje odločil, da banke Veneto Banca S.p.A. ne bo uvrstil v postopek reševanja. Ta odločitev je temeljila na ugotovitvi, da pogoj iz člena 18(1)(c) Uredbe (EU) št. 806/2014 (1) ni bil izpolnjen. Glavni elementi te odločitve so:

| Datum sprejetja odločitve: | 23. junij 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Odločitev št.: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Naslovnik: | Banca d’Italia |
| Institucija: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Uporaba pooblastil za odpis in konverzijo kapitalskih instrumentov: | Ne |
| Ukrep za reševanje: | Ne |
| Pomoč iz sklada: | Ne |

Datum sprejetja odločitve:

23. junij 2017

Odločitev št.:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Naslovnik:

Banca d’Italia

Institucija:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Uporaba pooblastil za odpis in konverzijo kapitalskih instrumentov:

Ne

Ukrep za reševanje:

Ne

Pomoč iz sklada:

Ne

Več informacij o tem sklepu je na voljo na uradnem spletišču Enotnega odbora za reševanje: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  UL L 225, 30.7.2014, str. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/3 |
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27.7.2017

SL

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C 242/3

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Odločitev o oceni pogojev za reševanje banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/03)

Dne 23. junija 2017 je Enotni odbor za reševanje odločil, da banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. ne bo uvrstil v postopek reševanja. Ta odločitev je temeljila na ugotovitvi, da pogoj iz člena 18(1)(c) Uredbe (EU) št. 806/2014 (1) ni bil izpolnjen. Glavni elementi te odločitve so:

| Datum sprejetja sklepa: | 23. junij 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Odločitev št.: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Naslovnik: | Banca d’Italia |
| Institucija: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Uporaba pooblastil za odpis in konverzijo kapitalskih instrumentov: | Ne |
| Ukrep za reševanje: | Ne |
| Pomoč iz sklada: | Ne |

Datum sprejetja sklepa:

23. junij 2017

Odločitev št.:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Naslovnik:

Banca d’Italia

Institucija:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Uporaba pooblastil za odpis in konverzijo kapitalskih instrumentov:

Ne

Ukrep za reševanje:

Ne

Pomoč iz sklada:

Ne

Več informacij o tem sklepu je na voljo na uradnem spletišču Enotnega odbora za reševanje: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  UL L 225, 30.7.2014, str. 1.

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IV Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/4 |
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27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/4

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Menjalni tečaji eura (1)

26. julija 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Menjalni tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ameriški dolar | 1,1644 |
| JPY | japonski jen | 130,26 |
| DKK | danska krona | 7,4368 |
| GBP | funt šterling | 0,89275 |
| SEK | švedska krona | 9,5705 |
| CHF | švicarski frank | 1,1152 |
| ISK | islandska krona | |
| NOK | norveška krona | 9,2893 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka krona | 26,047 |
| HUF | madžarski forint | 305,57 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 4,2613 |
| RON | romunski leu | 4,5632 |
| TRY | turška lira | 4,1406 |
| AUD | avstralski dolar | 1,4717 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,4576 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 9,0959 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,5678 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,5850 |
| KRW | južnokorejski won | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | južnoafriški rand | 15,1998 |
| CNY | kitajski juan | 7,8646 |
| HRK | hrvaška kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,9889 |
| PHP | filipinski peso | 58,948 |
| RUB | ruski rubelj | 69,7050 |
| THB | tajski bat | 38,996 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 3,6806 |
| MXN | mehiški peso | 20,6644 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 74,9375 |

Valuta

Menjalni tečaj

USD

ameriški dolar

1,1644

JPY

japonski jen

130,26

DKK

danska krona

7,4368

GBP

funt šterling

0,89275

SEK

švedska krona

9,5705

CHF

švicarski frank

1,1152

ISK

islandska krona

NOK

norveška krona

9,2893

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

češka krona

26,047

HUF

madžarski forint

305,57

PLN

poljski zlot

4,2613

RON

romunski leu

4,5632

TRY

turška lira

4,1406

AUD

avstralski dolar

1,4717

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,4576

HKD

hongkonški dolar

9,0959

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,5678

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,5850

KRW

južnokorejski won

1 303,91

ZAR

južnoafriški rand

15,1998

CNY

kitajski juan

7,8646

HRK

hrvaška kuna

7,4128

IDR

indonezijska rupija

15 507,48

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,9889

PHP

filipinski peso

58,948

RUB

ruski rubelj

69,7050

THB

tajski bat

38,996

BRL

brazilski real

3,6806

MXN

mehiški peso

20,6644

INR

indijska rupija

74,9375

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(1)  Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

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| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/5 |
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27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/5

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Povzetek sklepov Evropske komisije o avtorizacijah za dajanje v promet in uporabo in/ali za uporabo snovi iz Priloge XIV k Uredbi (ES) št. 1907/2006 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta o registraciji, evalvaciji, avtorizaciji in omejevanju kemikalij (REACH)

(objavljeno v skladu s členom 64(9) Uredbe (ES) št. 1907/2006
   (1)
  )

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

(2017/C 242/05)

Sklepi o dodelitvi avtorizacije

| Sklic na sklep (2) | Datum sprejetja sklepa | Ime snovi | Imetnik avtorizacije | Številka avtorizacije | Dovoljena uporaba | Potek roka za preverjanje | Razlogi za sklep |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20. julij 2017 | bis(2-metoksietil) eter
  št. ES 203-924-4
  št. CAS 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, Cork, Irska | REACH/17/8/0 | Uporaba diglima kot topila v postopku proizvodnje intermediata za nadaljnjo pretvorbo v farmacevtsko spojino, ki se uporablja v proizvodih za zdravljenje bolezni dihal. | 22. avgust 2024 | — | V skladu s členom 60(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1907/2006 so tveganja za zdravje ljudi, ki izhajajo iz uporabe snovi, ustrezno nadzorovana. |

Sklic na sklep (2)

Datum sprejetja sklepa

Ime snovi

Imetnik avtorizacije

Številka avtorizacije

Dovoljena uporaba

Potek roka za preverjanje

Razlogi za sklep

C(2017) 5025

20. julij 2017

bis(2-metoksietil) eter

št. ES 203-924-4

št. CAS 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, Cork, Irska

REACH/17/8/0

Uporaba diglima kot topila v postopku proizvodnje intermediata za nadaljnjo pretvorbo v farmacevtsko spojino, ki se uporablja v proizvodih za zdravljenje bolezni dihal.

22. avgust 2024

—

V skladu s členom 60(2) Uredbe (ES) št. 1907/2006 so tveganja za zdravje ljudi, ki izhajajo iz uporabe snovi, ustrezno nadzorovana.

| — | Trenutno ni na voljo ustreznih alternativ, njihovo iskanje pa poteka v okviru sedemletnega programa za nadomestitev. |
| --- | --- |

—

Trenutno ni na voljo ustreznih alternativ, njihovo iskanje pa poteka v okviru sedemletnega programa za nadomestitev.

---

(1)  UL L 396, 30.12.2006, str. 1.

(2)  Sklep je dostopen na spletišču Evropske komisije na naslovu http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about/index_sl.htm.

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INFORMACIJE V ZVEZI Z EVROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM

Nadzorni organ Efte

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/6 |
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27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/6

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Poziv k predložitvi pripomb o morebitni državni pomoči, dodeljeni družbi Landsvirkjun prek državnih poroštev za pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča

(2017/C 242/06)

Z Odločbo št. 085/17/COL z dne 3. maja 2017 v verodostojnem jeziku na straneh, ki sledijo temu povzetku, je Nadzorni organ Efte začel postopek v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča. Islandski organi so bili o tem obveščeni z izvodom odločbe.

Nadzorni organ Efte s tem obvestilom poziva države Efte, države članice EU in zainteresirane strani, naj pošljejo svoje pripombe o zadevnem ukrepu v enem mesecu od objave tega poziva na naslednji naslov:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

35, Rue Belliard

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Pripombe bodo poslane islandskim organom. Zainteresirana stran, ki predloži pripombe, lahko pisno zaprosi za zaupno obravnavo svoje identitete in navede razloge za to.

Povzetek

Postopek

V elektronskem sporočilu z dne 24. marca 2015 so islandski organi zaprosili Nadzorni organ, da pojasni, ali se za finančne obveznosti družbe Landsvirkjun, ki izhajajo iz pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, lahko jamči z obstoječo državno poroštveno shemo Islandije. Ta shema je bila predmet odločbe Nadzornega organa št. 159/13/COL (1).

Islandski organi so na zahtevo Nadzornega organa v dopisih z dne 11. februarja 2016 in 22. marca 2016 poslali informacije v zvezi z zadevnim ukrepom. Poleg tega se je o tem vprašanju razpravljalo na sestanku islandskih organov z Nadzornim organom 31. maja 2016 v Reykjaviku. Po sestanku je Nadzorni organ islandskim organom poslal dopis, ki je vseboval zapisnik sestanka, in zahteval dodatna pojasnila. Z elektronskim sporočilom z dne 31. oktobra 2016 so islandski organi odgovorili na dopis Nadzornega organa in predložili nekatere dodatne dokumente.

Dejstva

Družba Landsvirkjun je javno partnerstvo, ki ga ureja Zakon št. 42/1983 o Landsvirkjunu, kakor je bil spremenjen, Landsvirkjun je v skupni lasti državne zakladnice (99,9 %) in družbe Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). Eignarhlutir ehf. je družba z omejeno odgovornostjo, ki je v stoodstotni lasti državne zakladnice. Družba Landsvirkjun je trenutno največji proizvajalec električne energije v Islandiji, ki ima več kot 75-odstotni tržni delež v domači proizvodnji električne energije, in je ena od desetih največjih družb za proizvodnjo obnovljive energije v Evropi.

Mehanizem za upravljanje javnega dolga je enota centralne banke Islandije. Centralna banka Islandije je neodvisna javna institucija v lasti države Islandije.

Družba Landsvirkjun je izpostavljena valutnemu tveganju ter obrestnemu tveganju v okviru svojega dolžniškega portfelja. Družba Landsvirkjun uporablja različne oblike pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih za nadzor in obvladovanje tržnega tveganja.

Nadzorni organ je na podlagi trenutno razpoložljivih dejstev ugotovil, da je mehanizem za upravljanje javnega dolga družbi Landsvirkjun zagotavljal poroštva za nekatere pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih vsaj od leta 2013. Odločba zadeva poroštva mehanizma za upravljanje javnega dolga za naslednje pogodbe o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih: valutne zamenjave, valutne opcije in zamenjave obrestnih mer.

V skladu s točko 3.2 smernic o državni pomoči glede državnih poroštev („smernice o poroštvih“) (2) izpolnjevanje naslednjih kumulativnih pogojev izključuje obstoj elementov državne pomoči v zvezi s posameznim poroštvom:

| (a) | posojilojemalec ni v finančnih težavah; |
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(a)

posojilojemalec ni v finančnih težavah;

| (b) | obseg poroštva je mogoče pravilno določiti ob njegovi dodelitvi; |
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(b)

obseg poroštva je mogoče pravilno določiti ob njegovi dodelitvi;

| (c) | poroštvo ne zajema več kot 80 % neodplačanega posojila ali druge finančne obveznosti ter |
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(c)

poroštvo ne zajema več kot 80 % neodplačanega posojila ali druge finančne obveznosti ter

| (d) | za poroštvo se plača tržno oblikovana cena. |
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(d)

za poroštvo se plača tržno oblikovana cena.

Predhodno stališče Nadzornega organa je, da poroštva, ki jih je mehanizem za upravljanje javnega dolga dodelil družbi Landsvirkjun za zgoraj navedene transakcije v zvezi z izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti, ne izpolnjujejo pogojev iz točk (b), (c) in (d). Zato v tej fazi obstoj elementov državne pomoči na podlagi točke 3.2 smernic o poroštvih ne more biti izključen.

Prvič, islandski organi doslej niso uspeli pojasniti, ali so poroštva povezana s specifičnimi obveznostmi, koliko znaša najvišji znesek poroštva in ali so poroštva časovno omejena. Zato je trenutno stališče Nadzornega organa, da pogoj (b) točke 3.2 smernic o poroštvih ni izpolnjen.

Drugič, zdi se, da poroštva zajemajo vse finančne obveznosti, ki jih ima družba Landsvirkjun v okviru zadevnih pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih. Islandski organi doslej niso predložili nobenih informacij, na podlagi katerih bi se lahko ocenilo, ali je poroštvo omejeno na 80 % neodplačanih finančnih obveznosti. Poleg tega ni na voljo nobenih informacij, na podlagi katerih bi se lahko količinsko opredelile finančne obveznosti družbe Landsvirkjun v okviru pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, za katere je poroštva dodelil mehanizem za upravljanje javnega dolga. Zato je trenutno stališče Nadzornega organa, da pogoj (c) točke 3.2 smernic o poroštvih ni izpolnjen.

Tretjič, v skladu s smernicami o poroštvih bi se moral prevzem tveganja navadno poplačati z ustrezno premijo na znesek poroštva ali znesek, zavarovan s poroštvom. Glede poroštev mehanizma za upravljanje javnega dolga za valutne zamenjave in valutne opcije se zdi, da družba Landsvirkjun premije sploh ni plačala. Glede poroštev mehanizma za upravljanje javnega dolga za zamenjave obrestnih mer islandski organi trdijo, da družba Landsvirkjun plačuje ustrezne poroštvene premije za neto obveznosti iz pogodb o izvedenih finančnih instrumentih, ki kažejo neto izgubo družbe Landsvirkjun. Vendar Nadzorni organ ni prejel zadostnih informacij o metodologiji, ki je bila uporabljena za določitev ravni premije, in posledično o tem, ali se lahko šteje, da za premijo velja tržna cena.

Ocena

Trenutno stališče Nadzornega organa je, da poroštva, ki se obravnavajo v tej odločbi, lahko pomenijo prednost v smislu pravil o državni pomoči. Poleg tega se zdi ukrep selektiven ter bi lahko izkrivljal konkurenco in vplival na trgovino znotraj EGP. Zato Nadzorni organ ne more izključiti možnosti, da ukrep pomeni državno pomoč v smislu člena 61(1) Sporazuma EGP. Vendar pa islandski organi v tej fazi še niso predložili utemeljitev, ki bi dokazovale, da bi bilo morebitno državno pomoč mogoče šteti za združljivo na podlagi člena 59(2) ali 61(3) Sporazuma EGP.

Zaključek

Nadzorni organ se je na podlagi zgoraj navedenih ugotovitev odločil, da začne formalni postopek preiskave v skladu s členom 1(2) dela I Protokola 3 k Sporazumu med državami Efte o ustanovitvi nadzornega organa in sodišča. Zainteresirane strani lahko predložijo svoje pripombe v enem mesecu od objave tega obvestila v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
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(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
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(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
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(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
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(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  Odločba Nadzornega organa št. 159/13/COL z dne 24. 4. 2013 o zaključku postopka v zadevi v zvezi z obstoječo pomočjo, dodeljeno družbama Landsvirkjun in Orkuveita Reykjavíkur prek neomejenih državnih poroštev (UL C 237, 15.8.2013, str. 3, in Dopolnilo EGP št. 45, 15.8.2013, str. 28).

1

(2)  UL L 105, 21.4.2011, str. 32 in Dopolnilo EGP št. 23, 21.4.2011, str. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Objave

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/17

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RAZPIS JAVNIH NATEČAJEV

(2017/C 242/07)

Evropski urad za izbor osebja (EPSO) organizira javna natečaja:

| | UPRAVNI USLUŽBENCI in STROKOVNO-TEHNIČNI USLUŽBENCI V STAVBNEM SEKTORJU |
| --- | --- |

UPRAVNI USLUŽBENCI in STROKOVNO-TEHNIČNI USLUŽBENCI V STAVBNEM SEKTORJU

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Inženirji za upravljanje stavb (vključno z okoljskimi inženirji in inženirji za stavbno tehniko) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Inženirji za upravljanje stavb (vključno z okoljskimi inženirji in inženirji za stavbno tehniko)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3) | Profil 1: koordinatorji/tehniki za gradnjo stavb |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3)

Profil 1: koordinatorji/tehniki za gradnjo stavb

| | Profil 2: koordinatorji/tehniki za gradnjo stavb na področjih klimatizacije, elektromehanike in elektrotehnike |
| --- | --- |

Profil 2: koordinatorji/tehniki za gradnjo stavb na področjih klimatizacije, elektromehanike in elektrotehnike

| | Profil 3: strokovno-tehnični uslužbenci za varnost pri delu/varnost stavb |
| --- | --- |

Profil 3: strokovno-tehnični uslužbenci za varnost pri delu/varnost stavb

Razpis natečajev je objavljen v
  Uradnem listu Evropske unije C 242 A z dne 27. julija 2017 v 24 jezikovnih različicah.

Dodatne informacije so na voljo na spletišču urada EPSO: https://epso.europa.eu/.

---

POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/18

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Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije

(Zadeva M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Zadeva, primerna za obravnavo po poenostavljenem postopku

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | Komisija je 18. julija 2017 prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment“, Luksemburg), z nakupom delnic pridobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) uredbe o združitvah nadzor nad celotnim podjetjem Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett“, Združeno kraljestvo). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija je 18. julija 2017 prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment“, Luksemburg), z nakupom delnic pridobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) uredbe o združitvah nadzor nad celotnim podjetjem Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett“, Združeno kraljestvo).

| 2. | Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:
  —   za Letterone Investment: mednarodne naložbe, usmerjene v naložbe v sektorjih telekomunikacij in tehnologije, zdravstva in prodaje na drobno,
  —   za Holland & Barrett: trgovina na drobno z izdelki na področju zdravja in dobrega počutja, kot so na primer vitaminska dopolnila in živila za zdravo prehrano, prek svoje mreže trgovin na glavnih nakupovalnih ulicah in prek spleta. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:

—   za Letterone Investment: mednarodne naložbe, usmerjene v naložbe v sektorjih telekomunikacij in tehnologije, zdravstva in prodaje na drobno,

—   za Holland & Barrett: trgovina na drobno z izdelki na področju zdravja in dobrega počutja, kot so na primer vitaminska dopolnila in živila za zdravo prehrano, prek svoje mreže trgovin na glavnih nakupovalnih ulicah in prek spleta.

| 3. | Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se za priglašeno koncentracijo lahko uporabljala uredba o združitvah. Vendar končna odločitev o tem še ni sprejeta. V skladu z Obvestilom Komisije o poenostavljenem postopku obravnave določenih koncentracij na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (2) je treba opozoriti, da je ta zadeva primerna za obravnavo po postopku iz Obvestila. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se za priglašeno koncentracijo lahko uporabljala uredba o združitvah. Vendar končna odločitev o tem še ni sprejeta. V skladu z Obvestilom Komisije o poenostavljenem postopku obravnave določenih koncentracij na podlagi Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (2) je treba opozoriti, da je ta zadeva primerna za obravnavo po postopku iz Obvestila.

| 4. | Komisija zainteresirane tretje osebe poziva, naj ji predložijo morebitne pripombe glede predlagane transakcije.
  Komisija mora pripombe prejeti najpozneje v 10 dneh po datumu te objave. Pripombe z navedbo sklicne številke M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett se lahko Komisiji pošljejo po telefaksu (+32 22964301), po elektronski pošti na naslov COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ali po pošti na naslov:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija zainteresirane tretje osebe poziva, naj ji predložijo morebitne pripombe glede predlagane transakcije.

Komisija mora pripombe prejeti najpozneje v 10 dneh po datumu te objave. Pripombe z navedbo sklicne številke M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett se lahko Komisiji pošljejo po telefaksu (+32 22964301), po elektronski pošti na naslov COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ali po pošti na naslov:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  UL L 24, 29.1.2004, str. 1 (uredba o združitvah).

(2)  UL C 366, 14.12.2013, str. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/19 |
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27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/19

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Predhodna priglasitev koncentracije

(Zadeva M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | Komisija je 19. julija 2017 prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fischer“, ZDA) z nakupom delnic pridobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) uredbe o združitvah nadzor nad podjetjem Patheon N.V. („Patheon“, Nizozemska). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija je 19. julija 2017 prejela priglasitev predlagane koncentracije v skladu s členom 4 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004 (1), s katero podjetje Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fischer“, ZDA) z nakupom delnic pridobi v smislu člena 3(1)(b) uredbe o združitvah nadzor nad podjetjem Patheon N.V. („Patheon“, Nizozemska).

| 2. | Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:
  —   Thermo Fisher: proizvajalec in dobavitelj laboratorijske opreme, analitičnih instrumentov, diagnostike in povezanih proizvodov in storitev. Podjetje ima sedež v ZDA in je dejavno na mednarodni ravni,
  —   Patheon: organizacija za pogodbeni razvoj in proizvodnjo, ki ponuja storitve v zvezi z aktivnimi farmacevtskimi sestavinami in končnimi zdravili. Podjetje ima sedež na Nizozemskem in je dejavno na mednarodni ravni. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Poslovne dejavnosti zadevnih podjetij so:

—   Thermo Fisher: proizvajalec in dobavitelj laboratorijske opreme, analitičnih instrumentov, diagnostike in povezanih proizvodov in storitev. Podjetje ima sedež v ZDA in je dejavno na mednarodni ravni,

—   Patheon: organizacija za pogodbeni razvoj in proizvodnjo, ki ponuja storitve v zvezi z aktivnimi farmacevtskimi sestavinami in končnimi zdravili. Podjetje ima sedež na Nizozemskem in je dejavno na mednarodni ravni.

| 3. | Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se za priglašeno koncentracijo lahko uporabljala uredba o združitvah. Vendar končna odločitev o tem še ni sprejeta. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Po predhodnem pregledu Komisija ugotavlja, da bi se za priglašeno koncentracijo lahko uporabljala uredba o združitvah. Vendar končna odločitev o tem še ni sprejeta.

| 4. | Komisija zainteresirane tretje osebe poziva, naj ji predložijo morebitne pripombe glede predlagane transakcije.
  Komisija mora pripombe prejeti najpozneje v 10 dneh po datumu te objave. Pripombe z navedbo sklicne številke M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V. se lahko Komisiji pošljejo po telefaksu (+32 22964301), po elektronski pošti na naslov COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ali po pošti na naslov:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija zainteresirane tretje osebe poziva, naj ji predložijo morebitne pripombe glede predlagane transakcije.

Komisija mora pripombe prejeti najpozneje v 10 dneh po datumu te objave. Pripombe z navedbo sklicne številke M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V. se lahko Komisiji pošljejo po telefaksu (+32 22964301), po elektronski pošti na naslov COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ali po pošti na naslov:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  UL L 24, 29.1.2004, str. 1 (uredba o združitvah).

---

DRUGI AKTI

Evropska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/20 |
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27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/20

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INFORMATIVNO OBVESTILO – JAVNO POSVETOVANJE

Geografske označbe Japonske

(2017/C 242/10)

V okviru trenutnih pogajanj z Japonsko o sporazumu o prosti trgovini (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sporazum), ki vsebuje tudi poglavje o geografskih označbah, so japonski organi predložili priloženi seznam geografskih označb za zaščito v okviru sporazuma. Evropska komisija trenutno proučuje, ali naj se te geografske označbe zaščitijo v okviru prihodnjega sporazuma kot geografske označbe v smislu člena 22(1) Sporazuma o trgovinskih vidikih pravic intelektualne lastnine.

Komisija poziva države članice ali tretje države ali katere koli fizične ali pravne osebe z zakonitim interesom, ki imajo stalno prebivališče ali sedež v državi članici ali tretji državi, da vložijo ugovor zoper takšno zaščito z vložitvijo ustrezno utemeljene izjave.

Komisija mora ugovor prejeti v dveh mesecih od datuma objave tega obvestila. Ugovor se pošlje na elektronski naslov: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu.

Ugovor se pregleda le, če je prejet v zgoraj navedenem roku in če je v njem v zvezi z zaščito predlaganega imena utemeljeno naslednje:

| (a) | predlagano ime bi bilo v nasprotju z imenom rastlinske sorte ali živalske pasme, zaradi česar je verjetno, da bi zavedlo potrošnika glede resničnega porekla proizvoda; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

predlagano ime bi bilo v nasprotju z imenom rastlinske sorte ali živalske pasme, zaradi česar je verjetno, da bi zavedlo potrošnika glede resničnega porekla proizvoda;

| (b) | predlagano ime bi bilo v celoti ali delno enakozvočno imenu, ki je v Uniji že zaščiteno v okviru Uredbe (EU) št. 1151/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. novembra 2012 o shemah kakovosti kmetijskih proizvodov in živil (1) ali je navedeno v sporazumih, ki jih je Unija sklenila z naslednjimi državami:






  — | državami SADC, ki izvajajo SGP (Bocvana, Lesoto, Mozambik, Namibija, Svazi in Južna Afrika) (2), |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

predlagano ime bi bilo v celoti ali delno enakozvočno imenu, ki je v Uniji že zaščiteno v okviru Uredbe (EU) št. 1151/2012 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 21. novembra 2012 o shemah kakovosti kmetijskih proizvodov in živil (1) ali je navedeno v sporazumih, ki jih je Unija sklenila z naslednjimi državami:

—

državami SADC, ki izvajajo SGP (Bocvana, Lesoto, Mozambik, Namibija, Svazi in Južna Afrika) (2),

| — | Švico (3), |
| --- | --- |

—

Švico (3),

| — | Korejo (4), |
| --- | --- |

—

Korejo (4),

| — | Srednjo Ameriko (5), |
| --- | --- |

—

Srednjo Ameriko (5),

| — | Kolumbijo, Perujem in Ekvadorjem (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

Kolumbijo, Perujem in Ekvadorjem (6),

| — | Črno goro (7), |
| --- | --- |

—

Črno goro (7),

| — | Bosno in Hercegovino (8), |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosno in Hercegovino (8),

| — | Srbijo (9), |
| --- | --- |

—

Srbijo (9),

| — | Moldavijo (10), |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldavijo (10),

| — | Ukrajino (11), |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukrajino (11),

| — | Gruzijo (12); |
| --- | --- |

—

Gruzijo (12);

| (c) | predlagano ime bi lahko zaradi ugleda, slovesa in trajanja uporabe blagovne znamke potrošnika zavedlo glede prave identitete proizvoda; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

predlagano ime bi lahko zaradi ugleda, slovesa in trajanja uporabe blagovne znamke potrošnika zavedlo glede prave identitete proizvoda;

| (d) | predlagano ime bi ogrozilo obstoj popolnoma ali delno identičnega imena ali blagovne znamke ali obstoj proizvodov, ki so bili zakonito na trgu že najmanj pet let pred datumom objave tega obvestila; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

predlagano ime bi ogrozilo obstoj popolnoma ali delno identičnega imena ali blagovne znamke ali obstoj proizvodov, ki so bili zakonito na trgu že najmanj pet let pred datumom objave tega obvestila;

| (e) | ali če se lahko zagotovijo podatki, na podlagi katerih je mogoče sklepati, da je ime, za katero se proučuje zaščita, generično. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

ali če se lahko zagotovijo podatki, na podlagi katerih je mogoče sklepati, da je ime, za katero se proučuje zaščita, generično.

Zgoraj navedena merila se ocenijo glede na ozemlje Unije; v primeru pravic intelektualne lastnine to pomeni samo ozemlje ali ozemlja, kjer so navedene pravice zaščitene. Morebitna zaščita teh imen v Evropski uniji je odvisna od uspešnega zaključka zadevnih pogajanj in poznejšega pravnega akta.

Seznam geografskih označb
   (13)

| Zaščiteno ime na Japonskem | Prečrkovanje (samo v informativne namene) | Kategorija in opis proizvoda |
| --- | --- | --- |
| „

  “ / „Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi“ | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | sveže ribe, mehkužci in raki ter iz njih pridobljeni proizvodi – lupinarji |
| „

  “ / „Tsurajima Gobou“ | Tsurajima Gobou | sadje, zelenjava in žita, sveži ali predelani – repinec |
| „

  “ | Yamagata | ostali proizvodi iz Priloge I k Pogodbi (začimbe itn.) – druge fermentirane pijače – seishu (sake) |
| „

  “ / „Maesawa Beef“ | Maesawa Gyu | sveže meso (in klavnični izdelki) – govedina |
| „

  “ / „Yonezawagyu“ | Yonezawa Gyu | sveže meso (in klavnični izdelki) – govedina |
| „

  “ / „Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi“ | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | sveže meso (in klavnični izdelki) – govedina |
| „

  “ / „Nishio Matcha“ | Nishio no Matcha | ostali proizvodi iz Priloge I k Pogodbi (začimbe itn.) – zeleni čaj v prahu |

Zaščiteno ime na Japonskem

Prečrkovanje (samo v informativne namene)

Kategorija in opis proizvoda

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

sveže ribe, mehkužci in raki ter iz njih pridobljeni proizvodi – lupinarji

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

sadje, zelenjava in žita, sveži ali predelani – repinec

Image

Yamagata

ostali proizvodi iz Priloge I k Pogodbi (začimbe itn.) – druge fermentirane pijače – seishu (sake)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

sveže meso (in klavnični izdelki) – govedina

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

sveže meso (in klavnični izdelki) – govedina

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

sveže meso (in klavnični izdelki) – govedina

Image

Nishio no Matcha

ostali proizvodi iz Priloge I k Pogodbi (začimbe itn.) – zeleni čaj v prahu

---

(1)  UL L 343, 14.12.2012, str. 1.

(2)  Sklep Sveta (EU) 2016/1623 z dne 1. junija 2016 o podpisu, v imenu Evropske unije, in začasni uporabi Sporazuma o gospodarskem partnerstvu med Evropsko unijo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter državami SADC, ki izvajajo SGP, na drugi strani (UL L 250, 16.9.2016, str. 1).

(3)  Sklep 2002/309/ES (Euratom) Sveta in, glede sporazuma o znanstvenem in tehnološkem sodelovanju, Komisije z dne 4. aprila 2002 o sklenitvi sedmih sporazumov s Švicarsko konfederacijo (UL L 114, 30.4.2002, str. 1) ter zlasti Sporazum med Evropsko skupnostjo in Švicarsko konfederacijo o trgovini s kmetijskimi proizvodi – Priloga 7.

(4)  Sklep Sveta 2011/265/EU z dne 16. septembra 2010 o podpisu Sporazuma o prosti trgovini med Evropsko unijo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Republiko Korejo na drugi strani v imenu Evropske unije in o njegovi začasni uporabi (UL L 127, 14.5.2011, str. 1).

(5)  Sporazum o pridružitvi med Evropsko unijo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Srednjo Ameriko na drugi strani (UL L 346, 15.12.2012, str. 3).

(6)  Trgovinski sporazum med Evropsko unijo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Kolumbijo in Perujem na drugi strani (UL L 354, 21.12.2012, str. 3) ter Protokol o pristopu k Trgovinskemu sporazumu med Evropsko unijo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Kolumbijo in Perujem na drugi strani, da se upošteva pristop Ekvadorja (UL L 356, 24.12.2016, str. 3).

(7)  Sklep Sveta 2007/855/ES z dne 15. oktobra 2007 o podpisu in sklenitvi Začasnega sporazuma o trgovini in trgovinskih zadevah med Evropsko skupnostjo na eni strani in Republiko Črno goro na drugi strani (UL L 345, 28.12.2007, str. 1).

(8)  Sklep Sveta 2008/474/ES z dne 16. junija 2008 o sklenitvi Začasnega sporazuma o trgovini in trgovinskih zadevah med Evropsko skupnostjo na eni strani ter Bosno in Hercegovino na drugi strani (UL L 169, 30.6.2008, str. 10 – Protokol 6).

(9)  Sklep Sveta 2010/36/ES z dne 29. aprila 2008 o podpisu in sklenitvi Začasnega sporazuma o trgovini in trgovinskih zadevah med Evropsko skupnostjo na eni strani in Republiko Srbijo na drugi strani (UL L 28, 30.1.2010, str. 1).

(10)  Sklep Sveta 2013/7/EU z dne 3. decembra 2012 o sklenitvi Sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Republiko Moldavijo o zaščiti geografskih označb za kmetijske proizvode in živila (UL L 10, 15.1.2013, str. 1).

(11)  Sporazum o pridružitvi med Evropsko unijo in njenimi državami članicami na eni strani ter Ukrajino na drugi strani (UL L 161, 29.5.2014).

(12)  Sklep Sveta 2012/164/EU z dne 14. februarja 2012 o sklenitvi Sporazuma med Evropsko unijo in Gruzijo o zaščiti geografskih označb za kmetijske proizvode in živila (UL L 93, 30.3.2012, str. 1).

(13)  Seznam imen, registriranih na Japonskem, ki so ga predložili japonski organi v okviru trenutnih pogajanj.

---

| 27.7.2017 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 242/22

---

Obvestilo za Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa, ki so dodani na seznam iz členov 2, 3 in 7 Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 881/2002 z dne 27. maja 2002 o posebnih omejevalnih ukrepih za nekatere osebe in subjekte, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, na podlagi Izvedbene uredbe Komisije (EU) 2017/1390

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | V Sklepu Sveta (SZVP) 2016/1693 (1) je Unija pozvana, naj zamrzne sredstva in gospodarske vire članov organizacij ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida ter drugih posameznikov, skupin, podjetij in subjektov, povezanih z njima, kakor so navedeni na seznamu, sestavljenem glede na RVSZN 1267(1999) in 1333(2000), ki ga mora odbor ZN, ustanovljen v skladu z RVSZN 1267(1999), redno posodabljati.
  Seznam, ki ga je sestavil ta odbor ZN, vsebuje:






  — | organizaciji ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

V Sklepu Sveta (SZVP) 2016/1693 (1) je Unija pozvana, naj zamrzne sredstva in gospodarske vire članov organizacij ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida ter drugih posameznikov, skupin, podjetij in subjektov, povezanih z njima, kakor so navedeni na seznamu, sestavljenem glede na RVSZN 1267(1999) in 1333(2000), ki ga mora odbor ZN, ustanovljen v skladu z RVSZN 1267(1999), redno posodabljati.

Seznam, ki ga je sestavil ta odbor ZN, vsebuje:

—

organizaciji ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida,

| — | fizične ali pravne osebe, subjekte, organe in skupine, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, ter |
| --- | --- |

—

fizične ali pravne osebe, subjekte, organe in skupine, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, ter

| — | pravne osebe, subjekte in organe, ki so v lasti ali pod nadzorom katere koli od teh povezanih oseb, subjektov, organov in skupin, ali jih ti kako drugače podpirajo. |
| --- | --- |

—

pravne osebe, subjekte in organe, ki so v lasti ali pod nadzorom katere koli od teh povezanih oseb, subjektov, organov in skupin, ali jih ti kako drugače podpirajo.

Dejanja ali dejavnosti, ki kažejo na „povezanost“ posameznikov, skupin, podjetij ali subjektov z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida, vključujejo:

| (a) | sodelovanje pri financiranju, načrtovanju, omogočanju, pripravi ali izvedbi dejanj ali dejavnosti organizacij ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida ali katere koli njune celice, podorganizacije, odcepljene skupine ali podskupine, v povezavi z njimi, pod njihovim imenom, v njihovem imenu ali v njihovo podporo; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

sodelovanje pri financiranju, načrtovanju, omogočanju, pripravi ali izvedbi dejanj ali dejavnosti organizacij ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida ali katere koli njune celice, podorganizacije, odcepljene skupine ali podskupine, v povezavi z njimi, pod njihovim imenom, v njihovem imenu ali v njihovo podporo;

| (b) | dobavo, prodajo ali posredovanje orožja in z njim povezanega materiala komur koli od njih; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

dobavo, prodajo ali posredovanje orožja in z njim povezanega materiala komur koli od njih;

| (c) | novačenje za kogar koli od njih ali |
| --- | --- |

(c)

novačenje za kogar koli od njih ali

| (d) | druga dejanja ali dejavnosti v podporo kogar koli od njih. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

druga dejanja ali dejavnosti v podporo kogar koli od njih.

| 2. | Odbor Varnostnega sveta ZN je 20. julija 2017 sklenil, da na zadevni seznam doda Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa lahko varuhu človekovih pravic ZN kadar koli predložijo zahtevo za ponovno proučitev odločitve o njihovi uvrstitvi na navedeni seznam ZN s priloženimi dokazili. Zahtevo je treba poslati na naslednji naslov:





  United Nations – Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Tel. +1 2129632671 |
| Faks +1 2129631300/3778 |
| E-naslov: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

Odbor Varnostnega sveta ZN je 20. julija 2017 sklenil, da na zadevni seznam doda Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa lahko varuhu človekovih pravic ZN kadar koli predložijo zahtevo za ponovno proučitev odločitve o njihovi uvrstitvi na navedeni seznam ZN s priloženimi dokazili. Zahtevo je treba poslati na naslednji naslov:

United Nations – Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel. +1 2129632671

Faks +1 2129631300/3778

E-naslov: ombudsperson@un.org

Več informacij je na voljo na https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | Komisija je na podlagi odločitve ZN iz odstavka 2 sprejela Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1390 (2), ki spreminja Prilogo I k Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 881/2002 z dne 27. maja 2002 o posebnih omejevalnih ukrepih za nekatere osebe in subjekte, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida (3). Sprememba, sprejeta v skladu s členom 7(1)(a) in členom 7a(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 881/2002, dodaja Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa na seznam iz Priloge I navedene uredbe (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Priloga I).
  Za posameznike in subjekte, vključene v Prilogo I, se uporabljajo naslednji ukrepi iz Uredbe (ES) št. 881/2002:






  (1) | zamrznitev vseh sredstev in gospodarskih virov, ki pripadajo zadevnim posameznikom in subjektom, so v njihovi lasti ali ti posamezniki in subjekti z njimi razpolagajo, ter (splošna) prepoved neposrednega ali posrednega dajanja sredstev in gospodarskih virov tem posameznikom in subjektom na voljo ali v njihovo korist (člena 2 in 2a); ter |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Komisija je na podlagi odločitve ZN iz odstavka 2 sprejela Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1390 (2), ki spreminja Prilogo I k Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 881/2002 z dne 27. maja 2002 o posebnih omejevalnih ukrepih za nekatere osebe in subjekte, povezane z organizacijama ISIL (Daiš) in Al-Kaida (3). Sprememba, sprejeta v skladu s členom 7(1)(a) in členom 7a(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 881/2002, dodaja Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeeja El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtoma, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija, OMANA ROCHMANA, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (POSLOVALNICA V KRAJU ALBU KAMAL, SIRSKA ARABSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELATA AL-THAHABA, Jaysha Khalida Ibn al Waleeda, Junda Al Aqsa na seznam iz Priloge I navedene uredbe (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Priloga I).

Za posameznike in subjekte, vključene v Prilogo I, se uporabljajo naslednji ukrepi iz Uredbe (ES) št. 881/2002:

(1)

zamrznitev vseh sredstev in gospodarskih virov, ki pripadajo zadevnim posameznikom in subjektom, so v njihovi lasti ali ti posamezniki in subjekti z njimi razpolagajo, ter (splošna) prepoved neposrednega ali posrednega dajanja sredstev in gospodarskih virov tem posameznikom in subjektom na voljo ali v njihovo korist (člena 2 in 2a); ter

| (2) | prepoved neposredne ali posredne odobritve, prodaje, dobave ali posredovanja tehničnih nasvetov, pomoči ali usposabljanja v zvezi z vojaškimi dejavnostmi kateremu koli od zadevnih posameznikov in subjektov (člen 3). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

prepoved neposredne ali posredne odobritve, prodaje, dobave ali posredovanja tehničnih nasvetov, pomoči ali usposabljanja v zvezi z vojaškimi dejavnostmi kateremu koli od zadevnih posameznikov in subjektov (člen 3).

| 4. | Člen 7a Uredbe (ES) št. 881/2002 določa postopek revizije sprejete odločitve, kadar osebe, uvrščene na seznam, predložijo pripombe na razloge za uvrstitev na seznam. Posamezniki in subjekti, dodani v Prilogo I z Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1390, lahko od Komisije zahtevajo, da obrazloži njihovo uvrstitev na seznam. To zahtevo je treba poslati na naslov:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| “Restrictive measures” |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/ Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Člen 7a Uredbe (ES) št. 881/2002 določa postopek revizije sprejete odločitve, kadar osebe, uvrščene na seznam, predložijo pripombe na razloge za uvrstitev na seznam. Posamezniki in subjekti, dodani v Prilogo I z Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1390, lahko od Komisije zahtevajo, da obrazloži njihovo uvrstitev na seznam. To zahtevo je treba poslati na naslov:

European Commission

“Restrictive measures”

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/ Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Obenem je treba zadevne posameznike in subjekte opozoriti na možnost, da v skladu s pogoji iz četrtega in šestega odstavka člena 263 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije v postopku pred Splošnim sodiščem Evropske unije izpodbijajo Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1390. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Obenem je treba zadevne posameznike in subjekte opozoriti na možnost, da v skladu s pogoji iz četrtega in šestega odstavka člena 263 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije v postopku pred Splošnim sodiščem Evropske unije izpodbijajo Izvedbeno uredbo (EU) 2017/1390.

| 6. | Zaradi pravne varnosti je treba posameznike in subjekte, vključene v Prilogo I, opozoriti, da lahko pri pristojnih organih v zadevni državi članici oziroma zadevnih državah članicah, kakor so navedeni v Prilogi II k Uredbi (ES) št. 881/2002, vložijo zahtevo za pridobitev dovoljenja glede uporabe zamrznjenih sredstev in gospodarskih virov za nujne potrebe ali posebna plačila v skladu s členom 2a navedene uredbe. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Zaradi pravne varnosti je treba posameznike in subjekte, vključene v Prilogo I, opozoriti, da lahko pri pristojnih organih v zadevni državi članici oziroma zadevnih državah članicah, kakor so navedeni v Prilogi II k Uredbi (ES) št. 881/2002, vložijo zahtevo za pridobitev dovoljenja glede uporabe zamrznjenih sredstev in gospodarskih virov za nujne potrebe ali posebna plačila v skladu s členom 2a navedene uredbe.

---

(1)  UL L 255, 21.9.2016 str. 25.

(2)  UL L 195, 27.7.2017, str. 11.

(3)  UL L 139, 29.5.2002, str. 9.

---