### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-30359 Summary Calendar

LEONARD M. PRICE, Plaintiff–Appellant
v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS; KAREN C. TURNER, in her capacity as Executive Director for Housing Authority of New Orleans; DESIRE AREA RESIDENTS COUNCIL; KATHLEEN MATTHEWS, in her capacity as president for Desire Area Residents Council and in her individual capacity; BONNIE ROGERS, also known as Bonnie Peters, in her capacity as vice president for Desire Area Residents Council and in her individual capacity; MARGARET MCMILLAN, in her capacity as treasurer for Desire Area Residents Council and in her individual capacity, Defendants–Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:09-CV-4257

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Novembe r 30, 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion s houldnot * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-30359 Document: 00511680363 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/30/2011No. 11-30359

Leonard Price, t h e Ap pellant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis filed suit against the Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”), the Desire Area Residents Council (“DARC”), and members of both organizatio n s (collectively the “Appellees”). He claims that the Appellees failed to provide him with economic opportunities allegedly guaranteed to him through a public housing redevelopment plan. The district court granted summary judgment to the Appellees. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In th e district court, Price pursued a bevy of claims arising out of a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) between HANO and DARC. The MOU states, in relevant part,
The Authority [HANO] will train residents for all types of economic opportunities, including but not limited to m a n agement, entrepreneurship, construction and maintenance. The Authority will hire resident s d u ring the planning, reconstruction and re-occupancy of Desire LA 1-14. The DARC will participate with the identification and selection of the Desire residents in hiring programs. The Authority will consider DARC or Desire Resident[s] for available contracts for any and all phases of planning, reconstruction, evaluation and monitoring of Desire, LA 1-14.
Price clai m e d u n d e r 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that he was denied due process because the Appellees (1) failed to provide him any job training or assistance, (2) failed to allow him t o participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the redevelopment, and (3) failed to give adequate notice of their m e e t i n g s. Additionally, Price alleged an (4) equal protection violation because of the hiring
pr a c t i c es of DARC and (5) a Louisiana state-law claim seeking to enforce the MOU as a third-party beneficiary thereof. On appeal, however , du e to th e poor briefing of his newly-obtained counsel, Price has waived nearly all of his claims for error. In his brief to this court, Price sets out four “Assignment[s] of Error,” b ut the brief never puts forth any
2 Case: 11-30359 Document: 00511680363 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/30/2011No. 11-30359

a r gu ment on these points; therefore, they are waived. Fed. R. App

. P

. 28(a)(9)(A); United States v. Jimenez , 509 F.3d 682, 695 (5t h C i r . 2007). Moreover, of the issues that were briefed, one is “A Summa ry Judgment Fradulentl y O b t ained Should be Annulled on Appeal.” In this section, the argument seems to be that the Appellees committed a fraud on the district court that ought to be corrected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). The only authority that Price’s counsel cites is the corresponding Louisiana rule, see La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 2004, and a case from this court i nterpreting that provision. Such an accusation of fraud without any factual or legal support is

1 also deemed waived. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A); Jimenez , 509 F.3d at 695. We do find two claims sufficiently briefed so as to preserve them for our review: (1) the district court erred in not finding a property i n t erest for the
purposes of Price’s due process claim and (2) the district court erred in finding that Price was not a third-party beneficiary t o t he MOU under Louisiana law. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc. , 641 F.3d 118, 124 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I n c. , 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In reviewing the record, all facts and inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id

.

It is uncle ar fr om the cit atio n, how ever, to wh at Pric e’s couns el is dir ect ing this cour t. 1 He r cit atio n is to “ St. Paul Me rcu ry Ins. Co. v. Wil li am son , 224 F.3d 425 ( 5th Cir

. 2000), ci ting Chia rel la v. U. S. , 100 S. Ct. 1108 [s ic]

. ” Now here in our opi nion in St. Paul Me rcu ry Insura nce do we cit e to Chia rel la

. This is not the only slo pp y cit a t i o n i n P r ice’ s couns el’s conf usi ng brie f. Earlie r, she app ears to quot e language fr om Ree se v. Mi am i- Da de Cnty. , 210 F. Sup p. 2d132 4 ( S. D. Fla

. 2002) , wh ich doe s not app ear in thatop inion. 3 Case: 11-30359 Document: 00511680363 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/30/2011No. 11-30359 III. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Due Process Claim Price argues that 24 C.F.R. pt. 135.1 gave him a property interest 2 protec t e d b y t h e Due Process Clause. He claims that the Appellees failed to provide him job training or assistance.
To state a claim under § 1983, [a] plaintiff[] must allege two elements: first, that they were deprived of a right or interest secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and second, that the deprivation occurred under color of state law.

. . . [ I ] n § 1983 suits alleging a violation of the Due Process C l a u s e o f the Fourteenth Amendment,

. . . [p]laintiffs must (1) assert a protected “liberty or property” interest and (2) show that they were deprived of that interest under color of state law.
Doe v. Rains Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist ., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). “In order for a person to have a property interest within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment, he ‘must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Blackburn v. City of Marshall , 42 F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

Par t 135. 1 s tat es , in rele vant par t, 2
The pur pos e of se cti on 3 of the Ho usi ng and Urb an De velop me nt Act of 1968 (12 U. S. C. [§ ] 1701u) (s ect ion 3) is to ensu re thatemp loym ent andothereconom ic opp ort uniti es genera ted by cer tain [D epa rtm ent of Ho usi ng and Urb an De velop me nt] f

i n a ncial ass ist ance sha ll, to the great es t exten t fea sib le, and cons ist ent wi th exis ting Fede ral, Sta te and loca l law s and regula tio n s , be dir ect ed to low - and very low -inc om e per so ns, par tic ularl y tho s e wh o are rec ipi ents of governm ent a ssi st ance for hous ing, and to bus ines s conc erns wh ich pr ovideec onom ic opp ort uniti es t o l ow - and very low -inc om e p ers ons . 24 C. F.R. 135 .1( a). 4 Case: 11-30359 Document: 00511680363 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/30/2011No. 11-30359

Part 135.1 states the purpose behind the enactment of 12 U.S.C. § 1701u. 3 The language of part 135.1, however, does not speak to any particular entitlement, but rather to the goals of C o n gr e s s i n enacting the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. The “vague and amorphous” provisions of part 135.1 is insufficient to support a finding that Price had a property right to anything. Anderson v. Jackson , 556 F.3d 351 , 3 5 6 ( 5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wilso n v. United States Dep’t of Agric. , 991 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The mere fact that a go v ernment program exists does not give a person a property interest in participating in the program.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). B. Third-Party Beneficiary Claim Price further argues that h e i s entitled to enforce the MOU because it includes a stipulation pour autrui ; that is, h e i s a third-party beneficiary. See L a . C iv . Code art. 1978. The Louisiana Supreme Court has laid out a tes t t o 4 determine if a c o n t ract intends to create a stipulation pour autrui : “1) the stipulation for a third party is manifestly clear; 2 ) t h e r e is certainty as to the

S ect ion 1701u st ates , in rele vant par t, 3
In othe r pr ogram s that pr ovi d e h o usi ng and com mun ity deve lop me nt ass ist ance , the Sec ret ary sha ll ens ure that , to the great es t extent fea sib le, and cons ist ent wi th exis ting Fede ral, Sta te, and loca l law s and regula tio ns, opp ort uniti es for tra ining and em plo yment aris ing in conne cti on wi th a hous ing rehabilit atio n (includ ing reduct ion and abate me nt of lead -bas ed paint hazard s) , hous ing cons tru cti on, or othe r publ ic cons tru cti on pr oject are given to low - and very lo w- inco me per so ns res idi ng wi thin the me tro pol itan area (or nonm etr opo lita n c ount y) in wh ich the pr ojectis lo cat ed.
12 U .S .C. § 1701u(c) (2) (A)

.

Sinc e fed eral j u r i s d i c t i o n over this clai m aris es out of st ate law , we app ly the 4 sub st antive law of the for um st ate. First Colo n y L if e Ins. Co. v. Sanf

ord, 555 F.3d 177, 181 (5t h Cir

. 2009) (cit ing Eri e R.R . Co. v. Tom pki ns , 304 U. S. 64, 78–79 (19 38))

. “ To d ete rm ine Louis iana law , we look t o the fina l dec isi ons of the Louis iana Sup rem e Court .” Brad le y v. Al ls tate Ins. Co. , 620 F.3d509 , 516 n.2 (5th Cir

. 2010)

. 5 Case: 11-30359 Document: 00511680363 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/30/2011No. 11-30359

benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the contract between the promisor and the promisee. Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary , 939 So.2d 1206, 1211 (La. 2006). Neither the benefit nor the beneficiary is manifestly clear in this instance. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellees. AFFIRMED.

6 Case: 11-30359 Document: 00511680363 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/30/2011