20Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187Because plaintiffs have failed to show that the IEP isinappropriate, they are not entitled to reimbursement for thecosts of B.J.’s DTT program.See School Comm. ofBurlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985).Furthermore, because B.J. was offered a FAPE, the districtcourt was correct in dismissing the remaining claims.III.For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district courtisaffirmed.1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0119P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0119p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________EDWINBURILOVICH;LINDABURILOVICH, as next friendson behalf of their son, BradleyBurilovich,Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.BOARD OFEDUCATION OF THELINCOLNCONSOLIDATEDSCHOOLS;RONGREINER,individually,Defendants-Appellees.;>1No. 98-2187Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.No. 97-72191—Bernard A. Friedman, District Judge.Argued: November 4, 1999Decided and Filed: April 4, 2000Before: KEITH, NORRIS, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.2Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187_________________COUNSELARGUED:Richard J. Landau, DYKEMA GOSSETT, AnnArbor, Michigan, for Appellants. Michael A. Eschelbach,THRUN, MAATSCH & NORDBERG, Lansing, Michigan,for Appellees.ON BRIEF:Richard J. Landau, DYKEMAGOSSETT, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellants. MichaelA. Eschelbach, Timothy R. Winship, THRUN, MAATSCH& NORDBERG, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees._________________OPINION_________________ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs EdwinBurilovich and Dr. Linda Burilovich (“plaintiffs”), acting onbehalf of their autistic son Bradley (“B.J.”), sued the Board ofEducation of the Lincoln Consolidated Schools and its specialeducation director (“defendants”) under the Individuals withDisabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et.seq. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s grant of summaryjudgment for defendants, maintaining that a proposal to placeB.J. in a mainstream kindergarten violated procedural andsubstantive provisions of the IDEA. For the followingreasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.I.B.J. was born on November 15, 1990. At an early age, hisparents noticed that his language skills were significantlydelayed. When he was three, plaintiffs sought assistance fromtheir local school district, Lincoln Consolidated Schools. B.J.was evaluated by a Multidisciplinary Evaluation Team(“MET”) at Willow Run Community Schools, which wasproviding Preprimary Impaired (“PPI”) services for Lincoln.The MET generated an Individualized Education Program(“IEP”), providing B.J. with nonclassroom PPI services, alongwith speech and language therapy.No. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.19for B.J. Dr. Burilovich felt that when B.J. had less DTT, hetended to be less social, to engage in less speech, and toincrease his self-stimulation. She felt he was very different inschool, and that he would be totally overwhelmed in amainstream class. Dr. Meinhold testified that B.J. would notbenefit from mainstream kindergarten, even with a one-to-oneparaprofessional. Dr. Holmes also indicated that DTT wouldbe better than kindergarten for B.J., noting that B.J. would notbenefit from being with peers until he developed bettercommunication skills.The district’s witnesses, on the other hand, saw problemswith DTT. Dr. Mesibov indicated that the DTT proposalemphasized B.J.’s deficits, not his strengths, and that isolatingB.J. would only make his social relationships worse. Mr.Greiner stated that the staff never wanted the DTT proposalbecause they thought it would be bad for B.J. Some of theconcerns expressed over the proposal were that DTT, unlikethe school program, did not account for a naturalenvironment, peer reinforcement, or independence. Staffmembers also had problems with DTT because it appeared tobe a package deal, without individualization for B.J. EvenDr. Meinhold acknowledged that B.J. would learn inkindergarten, just not in his area of weakness.The district court reviewed the testimony and concludedthat the school’s proposal was the only one tailored to B.J.’sneeds, holding that the SHO’s findings were well supportedby the evidence. Given the differing opinions on both sidesas to the best program for B.J. and the reasonable bases in therecord for the opinions, we emphasize that courts should not“substitute their own notions of sound educational policy forthose of the school authorities which they review.”Rowley,458 U.S. at 206. Giving due weight to the SHO’s decision,we conclude that the IEP was designed to allow B.J. toachieve his maximum potential.Cf.Renner, 185 F.3d at 644-46 (finding IEP substantively valid under similarcircumstances).18Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187will be defective if it fails specifically to address regression,nor do plaintiffs posit any argument that would persuade thiscourt that we should so hold.Plaintiffs further maintain that the district court improperlyresolved a material question of fact by deferring to the SHO’sdecision perceived by the court as discrediting plaintiffs’expert, Dr. Meinhold. Review of the SHO’s opinion revealsthat, while the SHO said that he discounted (not“discredited”) Dr. Meinhold’s testimony, the SHO actuallydid consider her proposed DTT package when assessingwhether B.J.’s unique needs were met. There is no issue ofmaterial fact because the SHO’s findings did take intoaccount Dr. Meinhold’s views. After independent review ofthe record, and giving due weight to the SHO’s decision, weagree with the SHO’s conclusion.7. Whether the IEP was Designed to Allow B.J. to Attainhis Maximum PotentialPlaintiffs maintain that there was conflicting testimonyaddressing the question of whether the IEP would allow B.J.to attain his “maximum potential.” Plaintiffs suggest that theonly expert opinion based upon a professional, individualassessment of B.J. showed that he needs an intensive programof individualized, one-to-one instruction. Plaintiffs note thatdefendants’ expert, Dr. Gary Mesibov, had never met B.J.,while plaintiffs’ experts, Drs. Meinhold and Holmes, had metand observed B.J. Plaintiffs also indicate that other defensewitnesses included school district staff, some of whom hadnever met B.J. or who had only met him once. Plaintiffsreiterate their assertion that the IEP was based on theavailability of resources and experience of school personnel,not B.J.’s needs. Plaintiffs also cite several cases approvingof DTT. Finally, plaintiffs maintain that the IDEA’s goal thata student be in the least restrictive environment did not weighin favor of the district’s IEP because B.J. was not ready forthe fully mainstreamed class suggested by the IEP.Independent review of the record confirms that the partieshad widely differing views of the best method of educationNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.3On February 24, 1994, B.J. was evaluated by Dr. Luke Tsaiat the University of Michigan Adult/Child PsychiatricHospitals. Suzanne Boyer, B.J.’s teacher, was present for thelast part of the appointment. Dr. Tsai diagnosed B.J. asautistic; Dr. Burilovich later hand-delivered a copy of Dr.Tsai’s evaluation to Ms. Boyer. This evaluation was notplaced in B.J.’s school file.Plaintiffs began researching educational approaches totreating autism. They learned of an approach developed byDr. Ivar Lovaas, called discrete trial training (“DTT”). DTTemphasizes heavy parental involvement, early intervention,and treatment in the home and elsewhere in the community,rather than in professional settings. Plaintiffs started a homebased DTT program for B.J.In June 1994, Dr. Burilovich wrote to Willow Run’sSuperintendent, Dr. Yomtoob, expressing her concerns aboutthe downsizing of the Willow Run infant-toddler program andB.J.’s being given only three hours of instruction a week.That letter also indicated that B.J. was autistic.In September 1994, Lincoln notified B.J.’s parents that itwas transferring B.J. from the Willow Run program to theLincoln PPI program. On October 1, 1994, the parentsconsulted with Dr. Patricia Meinhold, a psychology professorat Western Michigan University, who concluded that B.J. wasan appropriate candidate for DTT and suggested the parentsrequest assistance from their school district. An IEPCommittee meeting (“IEPC”) was held with the school. Theresulting IEP placed B.J. in the district’s PPI program 2.5hours a day, four days a week, with 40-80 minutes per weekof speech and language therapy. The parents requested thatpart of B.J.’s school time be used for DTT, but the district didnot include DTT in the IEP. B.J.’s teacher Betsy McMillinoffered to, and did, provide DTT therapy for a half hourbefore the school day began.B.J.’s home program continued to develop. ByThanksgiving he was receiving at least 20 hours per week ofDTT. The parents decided to reduce B.J.’s school4Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187participation to two days a week following Christmasvacation; his time spent on DTT increased to 20-25 hours aweek. According to plaintiffs, in the first half of 1995, B.J.made progress with his language and imitative skills, but wasnot involved in classroom activities. By the last half of 1995,B.J. was averaging 25-30 hours of home-based DTT. OnNovember 28, 1995, Mr. Burilovich visited B.J.’s classroomand made a videotape. The parents maintain that the behavioron the videotape confirmed Dr. Burilovich’s concerns thatB.J.’s behavior in school was more regressed than at home.On July 1, 1995, defendant Ronald Greiner became theDirector of Special Education for the Lincoln ConsolidatedSchools. He began working with the Burilovich family in thefall of 1995 and an IEPC for B.J. was held on December 1,1995. On December 7, 1995, Mr. Greiner sent a letter toplaintiffs memorializing conversations he had with them andsetting out the district’s perspective on an appropriateprogram for B.J. The letter also indicated that the parents hadmentioned they were having some medical evaluationscompleted addressing autism, and asked for access to thatinformation. In response, plaintiffs requested an independenteducational evaluation (“IEE”) by Dr. Meinhold. Plaintiffslater provided Mr. Greiner with a copy of Dr. Tsai’s March1994 evaluation. In January 1996, Mr. Greiner initiated anevaluation of B.J. for autism. The evaluation included somehome observation by the school psychologist, school socialworker, and Mr. Greiner.Another IEPC was scheduled for March 18, 1996. Beforethat meeting, Dr. Meinhold submitted a report that includeda formal written program proposal for B.J. At the meeting,Mr. Greiner proposed a program predominantly consisting ofDTT, accepting the goals and objectives developed by Dr.Meinhold, and providing for staff training by Dr. Meinhold.According to Mr. Greiner, he proposed the plan involvingDTT because he wanted to avoid conflict and a due processhearing. The staff, however, did not support the proposal.While most of the meeting was taped, the proposal was notwritten in a formal IEP. The parties disagree over the reasonNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.175Although plaintiffs characterized this issue as a procedural violation,we view it as an alleged substantive violation because the requirement thatthe IEP be designed to meet the child’s unique needs is derived from thedefinition of “special education” in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16).See Dong,197 F.3d at 802.any other program.5To support this allegation, plaintiffspoint to the testimony of Amy Stamps, the schoolpsychologist, who indicated that the school personnel was nottrained sufficiently to provide B.J. with DTT. Ms. Stamps’testimony does not support plaintiffs’ assertion, however,because the record indicates that she still had concerns aboutDTT even when she assumed that personnel could be properlytrained.The district court and the SHO correctly determined thatdefendants’ program took B.J.’s unique needs intoconsideration. As the district court pointed out, defendants’program set goals for B.J. and created a detailed dailyschedule to address each of the goals with a programincluding both group instruction and one-on-one therapy. Incontrast, the court noted that it did not see how the parents’proposed “standard” 40 hours of DTT therapy “was tailoredto B.J.’s needs.” The court later stated that the “school’sproposal is the only one which took into consideration B.J.’sgoals and abilities, and developed a plan specifically toaccommodate him.” After reviewing the record, and givingdue weight to the SHO’s opinion, we agree with the districtcourt that the IEP did take into account B.J.’s unique needs.See Renner, 185 F.3d at 644 (determining that IEP addressedchild’s unique needs in case involving similar circumstancesto the present case).Plaintiffs also suggest that the IEP did not address B.J.’sunique needs because it did not mention B.J.’s home programof DTT or his potential for regression. They rely on a case inwhich a district court ruled against a change in placement dueto a risk of regression.See Delaware County IntermediateUnit No. 25 v. Martin K, 831 F. Supp. 1206, 1229 (E.D. Pa.1993). We do not read the case as saying that an IEP always16Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187development for chronological age, as measured by morethan 1 developmental scale, which cannot be resolved bymedical or nutritional intervention. This definition shallnot preclude identification of a child through existingcriteria within R 340.1703 to R 340.1710 or R 340.1713to R 340.1715.Id.The only case cited by plaintiffs to suggest a time limitationis readily distinguishable. InMetropolitan Nashville &Davidson County School System v. Guest, 900 F. Supp. 905(M.D. Tenn. 1995), the court held that a school system hadviolated its obligations under the IDEA to identify, locate, andevaluate children needing special education by delaying twomonths in identifying a disabled child and an additional fourmonths in properly evaluating him. The court emphasizedthat while the Sixth Circuit has recognized that technicaldefects do not result in a violation of the IDEA if there is nosubstantive deprivation, “[s]ix months without appropriateservices, however, is one-sixth of a three-year-old’s life.”Id.at 908. That case involved the initial identification andevaluation of the child, not the reevaluation at issue with B.J.Plaintiffs maintain that the delay in this case was not just atechnical defect, given the more intensive programmingavailable for autistic students. Yet plaintiffs do not suggesthow the delay could have caused a substantive problem withB.J.’s IEP, since by the time the March and May IEPCsoccurred, B.J. had been certified as autistic. For thesereasons, plaintiffs have failed to explain the relevance of thefailure to recertify B.J. sooner, even if a time limitation wasapplicable.6. B.J.’s Unique NeedsPlaintiffs suggest that the IEP failed to take B.J.’s uniqueneeds into consideration, asserting that the district proposedthe IEP because its personnel had insufficient experience forNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.5why there was no written document. Nonetheless, theparticipants left with the understanding that Dr. Meinholdwould begin training the staff the next week. That trainingsession was later canceled, according to Mr. Greiner, becauseof recent snow days.After the meeting, Mr. Greiner realized that the staff did notthink DTT was a good program for B.J. Mr. Greiner metprivately with his staff on April 16 and 26, 1996 to discussDTT and develop a new proposal. A proposal was draftedand sent to the parents, with goals similar to those proposedby Dr. Meinhold, but without any DTT. Instead, the proposalplaced B.J. in a mainstream kindergarten class with one-toone support from a trained paraprofessional.An IEPC was scheduled for May 17, 1996, to which Dr.Meinhold was not invited. At the May IEPC, plaintiffs hadserious concerns about placing B.J. in a mainstreamkindergarten program without any DTT and discussed whythe proposal differed from the March proposal for B.J.According to defendants, Mr. Greiner tried to explain therationale for the proposal, but the parents were not interestedin hearing details. Plaintiffs signed the IEPC, noting theirdisagreement, on May 23, 1996.Pursuant to the IDEA, the parents requested an impartialdue process hearing before a local hearing officer (“LHO”).The LHO decided in favor of B.J.’s parents, finding that theMarch 1996 oral proposal was an IEP that should beimplemented, and directing the district to reimburse theparents for the expenses of providing DTT at home. Bothparties appealed aspects of the decision. The state hearingreview officer (“SHO”) reversed the LHO, finding that no IEPhad been created in March and the May IEP was valid. TheSHO determined that the May IEP was developed withoutprocedural or substantive violations and provided a freeappropriate public education (“FAPE”) designed to maximizeB.J.’s potential, in accordance with federal and state law. TheSHO also denied reimbursement to the parents.6Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court appealing theSHO’s determination and alleging violations of the IDEA, theRehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Michigan Handicappers’ CivilRights Act. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgmentaddressing all counts of the complaint; plaintiffs filed amotion for partial summary judgment addressing their IDEAclaim. The district court granted defendants’ motion anddenied plaintiffs’ motions for partial summary judgment andfor reconsideration. The court determined that the parentshad the burden of proof. Looking at specific issues raised, thecourt first held that the timing of B.J.’s recertification asautistic was acceptable. Second, the court determined that thedistrict had conducted a proper evaluation of B.J. and theprofessionals involved were qualified. Third, the court foundthat B.J.’s parents were sufficiently included in the IEPCprocess. Fourth, the court found that the district’s proposalwas designed to address B.J.’s unique needs. Finally, after anindependent review of the evidence, the court agreed with theSHO that the May IEP allowed B.J. to attain his maximumpotential. Because the school’s IEP was appropriate, thecourt held that the parents were not entitled to reimbursement.The court dismissed the remaining claims, holding that theyfailed because the court had found in defendants’ favor as tothe IEP.The district court apparently believed that the parties hadsubmitted the case for review of the administrative decisionon the record. Because plaintiffs dispute that the case wassubmitted in that manner, we will treat the cause as havingbeen submitted on summary judgment.II.A. Standard of ReviewThe IDEA was designed to give children with disabilitiesa free appropriate public education designed to meet theirunique needs.See20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(a)(16), 1412 (West1990) (current versions at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(25), 1412(West 2000));see also Renner v. Board of Educ., 185 F.3dNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.15placement options were not considered. Both the LHO andthe SHO determined that the evaluation was adequate.Plaintiffs have not made a persuasive argument otherwise,especially considering the district had before it previousevaluations of B.J. and Dr. Meinhold’s report. Nor haveplaintiffs shown how there is a genuine issue of material factas to whether B.J. needed a new evaluation before developinghis May 1996 IEP. As the district court pointed out, B.J. wasevaluated in early 1996 and “neither plaintiffs nor defendantsargue that a new evaluation would have yielded differentresults.”5. Timely Recertification of B.J.Plaintiffs also maintain that defendants failed to timelyrecertify B.J. by waiting until 1996 to certify him as autistic,even though defendants knew he was diagnosed as autistic in1994. Defendants dispute the date they learned of B.J.’sautism diagnosis. Plaintiffs cite the portion of the IDEA thatsets out the requirements for an application for funds underthe IDEA. One of the requirements is that a state or localeducational agency “provide satisfactory assurance thatpayments . . . will be used for excess costs directlyattributable to programs which . . . provide that all children. . . who are handicapped . . . and are in need of specialeducation and related services will be identified, located, andevaluated.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (West 1990)(current version with differences in language at 20 U.S.C.A.§ 1414 (West 2000)). This statutory provision does notindicate specific time periods for such evaluation. There arealso no time requirements in the Michigan rule relied upon bythe district court.SeeMich. Admin. Code r. 340.1711 (Supp.1983). In relevant part, that rule states:“Preprimary impaired” means a child through 5 years ofage whose primary impairment cannot be differentiatedthrough existing criteria within R 340.1703 to R340.1710 or R 340.1713 to R 340.1715 and whomanifests an impairment in 1 or more areas ofdevelopment equal to or greater than 1⁄2 of the expected14Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-21874Plaintiffs assert that the change in placement was from B.J.’s homeDTT program to a fully mainstreamed school program. They cite nosupport for their assertion that the home DTT was B.J.’s previousplacement. The record indicates that B.J. was subject to an IEP developedin October, 1994, but B.J.’s parents unilaterally reduced his schoolparticipation in 1995. On the other hand, defendants fail to explain whythe change from the 1994 IEP to the 1996 IEP would not be a significantchange in placement.But cf. Dong, 197 F.3d at 801 (noting SHO’sfinding that a change in placement from a half-day to a full-day is typicalwhen a child turns five years of age).preponderance of the evidence” that the district’s staffmembers were unqualified. The district court reviewed thequalifications of the district’s staff and concluded that therewas “no evidence” they were unqualified. This holdingindicates that plaintiffs did not meet their summary judgmentburden of coming forward with evidence to create a genuineissue as to qualifications. Plaintiffs have failed to suggest onappeal how they would demonstrate a genuine issue.Therefore, while the district court cited the wrong standard,the holding was correct.The parties also engage in a debate over whetherMichigan’s “maximum potential” standard requires thedistrict to hire “top-notch consultants” and to have personnelknowledgeable about programs related to the needs of everydisabled child. Because plaintiffs have failed to raise agenuine issue as to whether there were personnelknowledgeable about DTT at the meeting and failed to arguewhether Dr. Meinhold would be a top-notch consultant, wedecline to address the argument.4. Evaluation of B.J. Before IEPPlaintiffs argue that the district did not conduct a requiredcomprehensive evaluation of B.J. before making a significantchange in his placement.4Assuming that there was aproposed significant change in placement, we must addresswhether the evaluation in February 1996 was adequate.Plaintiffs maintain it was inadequate because B.J. wasevaluated solely for the purpose of recertification andNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.7635, 644 (6th Cir. 1999). There are two parts to a court’sinquiry in suits brought under 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) (West1990) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(i)(2) (West2000)). First, the court determines whether the state hascomplied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA.SeeBoard of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Second,the court assesses whether the IEP developed through theact’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the childto receive educational benefits.See id.at 206-07. Michiganhas added to this standard by requiring that an IEP bedesigned to develop the “maximum potential” of a child.Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§ 380.170(a), 380.170(a),380.1711(17)(a), 380.1751(1) (West 1997).This court reviews both the procedural and substantivematters under a standard of “modified de novo review.”Renner, 185 F.3d at 641;see Metropolitan Bd. of Pub. Educ.v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 463-64 (6th Cir. 1999). This standardof review stems from the Supreme Court’s holding that courtsmust give “due weight” to the state administrativeproceedings.Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. InRowley, the Courtlooked at the procedural safeguards in the IDEA thatindicated that a court “shall receive the record [sic] of the[state] administrative proceedings, shall hear additionalevidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision onthe preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief asthe court determines is appropriate.”Id.at 205 (quoting 20U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) (West 1990)). The Court held that“[t]he fact that § 1415(e) requires that the reviewing court‘receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings’carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shallbe given to these proceedings.”Id.at 206.This court has not elaborated on the meaning of “dueweight.”See, e.g.,Doe v. Metropolitan Nashville Pub. Sch.,133 F.3d 384, 386-87 (6th Cir.),cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47(1998) (declining to resolve the meaning of due weight8Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-21871Other circuits have adopted a variety of interpretations of “dueweight.”See, e.g.,Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.1999) (courts, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency,must consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to thehearing officer’s resolution of each material issue; after suchconsideration the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or inwhole, bestowing increased deference upon the hearing officer where herfindings are thorough and complete);Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes,119 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1997),cert. denied, 523 U.S. 137 (1998) (thelevel of deference is less than required under the substantial evidence test,but consideration should be given to the state hearing panel’s opportunityto observe the demeanor of the witnesses);Teague Indep. Sch. Dist. v.Todd L., 999 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1993) (court’s review is “virtuallyde novo”);Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4thCir. 1992) (findings of fact are entitled to be considered prima faciecorrect; the court must explain its reasons if it will not follow thefindings);Doe v. Alabama State Dep’t of Educ., 915 F.2d 651,657 n.3(11th Cir. 1990) (the extent of deference to be given the administrativefindings of fact is an issue left to the discretion of the district court; thecourt must consider the administrative findings of fact, but is free toaccept or reject them).definitively).1We have held that a court cannot simply adoptthe state administrative findings without an independent reexamination of the evidence.See id.We have also indicatedthat the weight due will vary, depending on whether the courtis reviewing procedural or substantive matters and whethereducational expertise is essential to the administrativefindings.With regard to procedural matters, a court should “strictlyreview an IEP for procedural compliance,” although technicaldeviations will not render an IEP invalid.Dong v. Board ofEduc., 197 F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 1999);see also Doe v.Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (6th Cir. 1990). TheSupreme Court has emphasized the importance Congressattached to the IDEA’s procedural safeguards:[T]he congressional emphasis upon full participation ofconcerned parties throughout the development of the IEP,as well as the requirements that state and local plans besubmitted to the Secretary for approval, demonstrates thelegislative conviction that adequate compliance with theNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.13views through letters and telephone conversations withdistrict staff.Cf. Dong, 197 F.3d at 802 (finding that parentswere afforded opportunity to participate, despite schooldistrict’s failure to reconvene an IEPC after receiving a letterfrom parents, when parents attended and expressed theirviews at two IEPCs). Furthermore, plaintiffs have cited nosupport for their implicit assertion that schools may neverdiscuss a child’s IEP, goals, objectives, or educationalmethodology out of the presence of the parents. For thesereasons, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they weredenied participation in the IEPC process.3. Qualifications of District StaffPlaintiffs also argue that the district failed to consult withknowledgeable professionals regarding B.J.’s placement asrequired by IDEA regulations.See34 C.F.R.§ 300.533(a)(3)(1996) (current version at 34 C.F.R § 300.533 (1999))(requiring that the school district “[e]nsure that the placementdecision is made by a group of persons, including personsknowledgeable about the child, the meaning of the evaluationdata, and the placement options”). Plaintiffs maintain thatbecause they preferred Lovaas-style DTT therapy, at least onedecision-maker should have been well-versed in thattreatment. More specifically, plaintiffs argue that the districtshould have, but did not, consult Dr. Meinhold.This court has rejected “the contention that [a schooldistrict] must include an expert in the particular teachingmethod preferred by the parents in order to satisfy therequirement that the IEPC include persons knowledgeableabout ‘placement options.’”Dong, 197 F.3d at 801;see alsoRenner, 185 F.3d at 644. Furthermore, the record indicatesthat Marianne Miller, a teacher consultant for the district, hadexperience using DTT. The district also had Dr. Meinhold’sreport and was able to consider it at the IEPC.See Dong, 197F.3d at 801 (noting that the IEPC had a report from plaintiffs’speech therapist, who utilized DTT).Plaintiffs also point out that the district court used thewrong standard when it found they had failed to prove “by a12Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-21871. Existence of March 1996 IEPPlaintiffs argue that the district court erred in determiningthat there never was a March 1996 IEP. They maintain thatdespite the absence of a written document the evidence showsthat Mr. Greiner did not intend his proposal to be tentativeand planned to implement the IEP. Federal law and Michiganregulation, however, both indicate that an IEP is a writtendocument.See20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(19) (West 1990)(current version at 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(11) (West 2000));Mich. Admin. Code r. 340.1721e (Supp. 1995). Therefore,plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claim that an IEP existed inMarch when there was no written document until May.Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the doctrine of promissory estoppelshould apply to Mr. Greiner’s statements in the Marchmeeting is equally unpersuasive. Congress created specificprocedures under the IDEA for developing an IEP, whichinclude a review process should a party such as plaintiffs bedissatisfied with the eventual IEP or the delay in creating one.2. April 16 & 26 MeetingsNext, plaintiffs argue that they were denied meaningfulparental participation in the IEPC process because they werenot invited to two meetings in April 1996.See34 C.F.R.§ 300.345, 34 C.F.R. § 300, app. C, No. 26 (1996) (currentversions at 34 C.F.R. § 300.345, 34 C.F.R. § 300, app. A, No.5 (1999)). Defendants counter that the meetings on April 16and 26 were staff meetings that plaintiffs were not entitled toattend. The SHO and district court agreed with defendants’characterization of the meetings and plaintiffs do little tosuggest that the meetings were in fact IEP meetings.Cf.34C.F.R. § 300, app. C, No. 55 (1996) (current version at 34C.F.R. § 300, app. A, No. 32 (1999)) (indicating that districtstaff may prepare information before meeting with parents).Plaintiffs have not indicated how they were prevented fromparticipating in the development of the IEP. The parentsattended a December 1996 IEPC, strongly expressed theirviews at the March 1996 IEPC, had the opportunity toparticipate in the May 1996 IEPC, and also expressed theirNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.9procedures prescribed would in most cases assure muchif not all of what Congress wished in the way ofsubstantive content in an IEP.Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Furthermore, “[i]f the proceduralrequirements of the IDEA are met, greater deference is to beafforded to the district’s placement decision.”Dong, 197F.3d at 800.As for substantive issues, “[t]he ‘preponderance of theevidence’ language in the [IDEA] ‘is by no means aninvitation to the courts to substitute their own notions ofsound educational policy for those of the school authoritieswhich they review.’”See Thomas v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ.,918 F.2d 618, 624 (6th Cir. 1990) (quotingRowley, 458 U.S.at 206). The Supreme Court has pointed out that:In assuring that the requirements of the Act have beenmet, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their viewof preferable educational methods upon the States. Theprimary responsibility for formulating the education to beaccorded a handicapped child, and for choosing theeducational method most suitable to the child’s needs,was left by the Act to state and local educational agenciesin cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child.Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 (footnote omitted). Indeed, federalcourts are generalists with no expertise in the educationalneeds of handicapped children and will benefit from thefactfinding of a state agency, which is presumed to haveexpertise in the field.SeeRenner,185 F.3d at 641;ClevelandHeights-Univ. Heights City Sch. Dist. v. Boss, 144 F.3d 391,398-99 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that the due weight standard ofreview “militates against second guessing the educationalexpertise of the administrative officers and conclusionspredicated upon these [sic] expertise”).Therefore, when reviewing an IEP we must keep in mindthat the state and local educational agencies are deemed topossess expertise in education policy and practice. The focusof the Supreme Court and this court upon the presumed10Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.No. 98-2187educational expertise of state and local agencies leads to theconclusion that the amount of weight due depends uponwhether such expertise is relevant to the decision-makingprocess. As a result, less weight is due to an agency’sdeterminations on matters for which educational expertise isnot relevant, so that a federal court would be just as wellsuited to evaluate the situation. More weight is due to anagency’s determinations on matters for which educationalexpertise would be relevant. Furthermore, while the courtmay not substitute its own view for that of the state and localeducational agencies,see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, thedeference due to the administrative findings is less than thatgenerally accorded to administrative decisions, whereby thecourt will uphold a decision if it is supported by “substantialevidence.”See5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 1996);cf. Rowley,458 U.S. at 205 (discussing legislative history of IDEArejecting substantial evidence standard).This court recently described the substantial evidence testas one in which an agency’s findings would be set aside onlywhen the record clearly precludes the administrative decisionfrom being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of thetestimony of witnesses, the agency’s informed judgment onmatters within its special competence, or both.See LoralDefense Sys.-Akron v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 436, 448 (6th Cir.1999). Because administrative findings in IDEA cases shouldbe afforded less deference than that given to agencies underthe substantial evidence test, and in view of the IDEA’spreponderance of the evidence standard, we hold thatadministrative findings in an IDEA case may be set aside onlyif the evidence before the court is more likely than not topreclude the administrative decision from being justifiedbased on the agency’s presumed educational expertise, a fairestimate of the worth of the testimony, or both. A courtshould defer to the administrative findings only wheneducational expertise is relevant to those findings and thedecision is reasonable. By so deferring, “due weight” willhave been given to the state administrative proceedings. Wealso reiterate that, when there is a conflict between theholdings of the local and state hearing officers, the court mustNo. 98-2187Burilovich, et al. v. Bd. of Educ., et al.112Plaintiffs spent some time arguing this point in their briefs, but wesee no need for further discussion in light of this court’s prior holdings onthis point.3Because we treat this case as submitted on summary judgment,plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal as to who bears the burden of proof areirrelevant. Moreover, as we recently held, the party challenging the termsof an IEP should bear the burden of proving that the placement was notappropriate, even in a case involving Michigan’s maximum potentialstandard.See Dong, 197 F.3d at 799-800.defer to the state hearing officer’s decision in reviewing therecord on appeal.2See Renner, 185 F.3d at 641 (holding thatcourt must defer to the final decision of the state authorities).In a case involving a motion for summary judgment, thecourt should still apply modified de novo review, but mustensure that there are no genuine issues regarding the factsessential to the hearing officer’s decision.See MetropolitanNashville Pub. Sch., 133 F.3d at 387. In rendering itsdecision, the court may still rely upon the hearing officer’spresumed educational expertise, as long as the material factsunderlying the officer’s determination are not in dispute.3B. DiscussionPlaintiffs raised numerous issues in their brief. With regardto procedural matters, plaintiffs argue that an IEP wasfinalized in March, not May, of 1996; two meetings in April1996 were IEPC meetings from which the parents wereexcluded; the school district failed to consult withknowledgeable professionals regarding B.J.’s placement; hewas not properly evaluated; and he was not timely recertifiedas autistic. Plaintiffs contend that even if the proceduralrequirements of the IDEA were met, the IEP wassubstantively invalid because it failed to address B.J.’s uniqueneeds and was not designed to allow him to attain hismaximum potential. Each issue will be addressed in turn.