Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2140 | April 11, 2019 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dylan A. Vigh

Law Offices of Dylan A. Vigh, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Haile S. Long,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 11, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2140

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kimberly S. 

Dowling, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

18C02-1611-F2-18

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2140 | April 11, 2019 Page 2 of 7

[1] Haile Long (“Long”) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of eight drug 

related offenses. He argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to a public trial. Specifically, he contends that the trial court’s act of 

asking the public not to enter and exit the courtroom in the middle of testimony 

equated to a total exclusion of members of the public. Concluding that there 

was no Sixth Amendment violation, we affirm the trial court.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether Long’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was 

violated. 

Facts

[3] In 2016, the Muncie Narcotics Unit (“MNU”) conducted an investigation of 

Long using a confidential informant and four controlled drug buys. All of the 

controlled buys occurred at Long’s auto business. After the fourth controlled 

buy, the MNU applied for, and was granted, a search warrant for Long’s auto 

business. 

[4] Based upon the controlled buys and what was recovered from the search, the 

State charged Long with the following: Level 2 felony dealing cocaine; Level 2 

felony dealing a narcotic drug; three counts of Level 3 felony dealing cocaine;

Level 5 felony dealing a Schedule IV controlled substance; Level 6 felony 

maintaining a common nuisance; and Class A misdemeanor dealing marijuana. 
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[5] Long’s jury trial began in May of 2018 and lasted three days. At the start of the 

second day of trial, the trial court noted that it had “put a sign on the door 

asking people not to enter and exit in the middle of testimony,” explaining that 

it was “happening a lot yesterday and it was very distracting.” (Tr. Vol. II at 

130). The trial court also asked counsel for both sides to “police your own to 

the best of your ability” and asked the prosecutor’s staff to “try not to leave in 

the middle of testimony.” (Tr. Vol. II at 130). Long did not object or otherwise 

voice any concerns about this. 

[6] Shortly after the first witness began testifying on the second day, spectators 

entered the courtroom. The trial court interrupted the examination, stating,

“[s]ir, sir there’s a sign on the door that there’s not going to be people entering 

and exiting during court, all right. So you guys can come in and have a seat but 

you stay until there’s a break. I don’t want people coming in and out during 

testimony today, all right. Thank you.” (Tr. Vol. II at 133). During a break 

later that morning, the trial court stated:

All right, some folks came in during some of that 

testimony after I gave an earlier admonishment. So let me 

just say this one more time, I don’t want comings and 

goings during testimony today. It’s very distracting. 

Yesterday was very distracting. So you can leave and 

come during breaks. If you are outside the courtroom and 

testimony has already started, you are to stay outside the 

courtroom until we take our next break when you can 

come back in, okay. And I would appreciate you not 

leaving in the middle of testimony just because it takes, 

you know, the attraction [sic] away from the witness, 

okay.
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(Tr. Vol. II at 194-95). Long never objected or voiced any concerns about the 

trial court’s statements.

[7] Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court took a recess before the 

start of closing arguments. It advised those present that there would be a 15-

minute break and that there would be an officer “standing at the door.” (Tr. 

Vol. III at 228). The court continued, “[i]f you’re in here when closings start, 

fine. You’re staying until they are over. If you’re not in here when closings

start, you’re not coming in to listen to closings, okay.” (Tr. Vol. III at 228-29). 

Long again did not object or voice any concerns about this. Thereafter, the jury 

found Long guilty as charged on all eight counts. The trial court sentenced 

Long to an aggregate, executed term in the Department of Correction for

twenty-six-and-a-half (261⁄2) years. Long now appeals. 

Decision

[8] Long argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public 

trial.1 Long is correct that the United States Constitution provides him with 

the right to a public trial. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment to the United 

 

1

In addition to the Sixth Amendment, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides that “[i]n all 

prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial . . . .” While Long cites the Indiana 

Constitution, he makes no separate argument under the Indiana Constitution. Our supreme court has held 

that when a party, though citing Indiana constitutional authority, presents no separate argument specifically 

treating and analyzing a claim under the Indiana Constitution distinct from its federal counterpart, we 

resolve the party’s claim “on the basis of federal constitutional doctrine and express no opinion as to what, if 

any, differences there may be” under the Indiana Constitution. Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ind. 

1997). 
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States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” The right to a public trial 

has long been recognized as a fundamental right of the accused. Williams v.

State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ind. 1997). It protects the accused by allowing the 

public to assess the fairness of the proceedings. Id. A public trial helps ensure a 

fair trial because “the presence of interested spectators may keep [the accused’s] 

triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of 

their functions . . . .” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984). 

[9] The State argues that Long has waived his claim regarding his right to a public 

trial because he did not raise an objection below in the trial court. We agree. 

As a general rule, a party may not present an argument or issue on appeal 

unless the party raised that argument or issue before the trial court. Washington 

v. State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). Because Long failed to object and 

preserve the issue at trial, despite having multiple opportunities to do so, he has 

waived consideration of this issue on appeal. See Williams, 690 N.E.2d at 166 

(holding that because the defendant raised no objection to the use of a metal 

detector and wand below, his claim that this violated his right to a public trial 

was waived on appeal).

[10] Waiver notwithstanding, the record reveals no basis for Long’s argument that 

there was a violation of his right to a public trial. Long argues that there was a 

“total exclusion of the public during witness testimony and closing 

arguments . . . .” (Long’s Br. 12). The State argues that the “trial court did not 

exclude or bar any person, let alone the entire public, from observing any part 
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of the trial.” (State’s Br. 20). We agree with the State. Both a common sense 

reading of “exclusion,” and, more importantly, the cases interpreting the right 

to a public trial, conceive of an exclusion as an affirmative act specifically 

barring some or all members of the public from attending a proceeding. 

Williams, 690 N.E.2d at 168 (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 39). This exclusion 

requires some showing that the court, “by order or otherwise, physically 

prevented the public from attending.” Id. (citing United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 

F.3d 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1994) (denial of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 

to a public trial requires some affirmative act by the trial court meant to exclude 

persons from the courtroom)).

[11] This case presents an issue of trial management, and a trial court is given

latitude to manage the courtroom and maintain order and decorum. Marcum v. 

State, 725 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2000). Here, the trial court posted the sign asking 

spectators to only enter or exit during breaks precisely because the “comings 

and goings” of spectators proved to be “very distracting” and was “happening a 

lot” during testimony on the first day of trial. (Tr. Vol. II at 133, 130). No one

was ever removed from the courtroom or prevented from entering. Indeed, the 

record reveals that members of the public came into the courtroom when the 

sign was on the door. Because the trial court did not engage in “an affirmative 

act specifically barring some or all members of the public[,]” nor did it 

physically prevent members of the public from attending, we hold that the trial 
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did not exclude any members of the public. Williams, 690 N.E.2d at 168. 

Accordingly, Long’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was not violated.2

[12] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Altice, J., concur.

 

2 To the extent that Long argues that the trial court failed to consider the four Waller factors set forth by the 

United States Supreme Court, this argument has no merit. Because we hold that the trial court did not 

exclude the public from the courtroom, this obviated the need for a Waller analysis. 

Additionally, Long’s argument that he did not voluntarily waive his right to a public trial is also without 

merit. The record is clear that Long received a public trial. Thus, Long did not waive his right to a public 

trial.