# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0987 |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 6027 ta' Lulju 2017 |

ISSN 1977-0987

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 6027 ta' Lulju 2017

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Deċiżjoni dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-kondizzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjoni b’rispett lejn Veneto Banca S.p.A. | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Deċiżjoni dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-kondizzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjoni fir-rigward tal-Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. | 3 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2017/C 242/01

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Deċiżjoni dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-kondizzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjoni b’rispett lejn Veneto Banca S.p.A.

2

2017/C 242/03

Deċiżjoni dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-kondizzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjoni fir-rigward tal-Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

3

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| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Sommarju ta’ Deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea dwar l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għat-tqegħid fis-suq għall-użu u/jew l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-użu tas-sustanzi elenkati fl-Anness XIV tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar ir-reġistrazzjoni, il-valutazzjoni, l-awtorizzazzjoni u r-restrizzjoni ta’ sustanzi kimiċi (REACH) (Ippubblikat skont l-Artikolu 64(9) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat potenzjali mogħtija lil Landsvirkjun permezz ta’ garanziji mill-istati fuq kuntratti tad-derivattivi | 6 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2017/C 242/04

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

4

2017/C 242/05

Sommarju ta’ Deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea dwar l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għat-tqegħid fis-suq għall-użu u/jew l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-użu tas-sustanzi elenkati fl-Anness XIV tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar ir-reġistrazzjoni, il-valutazzjoni, l-awtorizzazzjoni u r-restrizzjoni ta’ sustanzi kimiċi (REACH) (Ippubblikat skont l-Artikolu 64(9) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  )

(Ippubblikat skont l-Artikolu 64(9) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006)

1

5

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

2017/C 242/06

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat potenzjali mogħtija lil Landsvirkjun permezz ta’ garanziji mill-istati fuq kuntratti tad-derivattivi

6

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| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Avviż ta’ kompetizzjonijiet miftuħa | 17 |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-każ M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-Każ M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific — Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | ATTI OĦRAJN |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Avviż ta’ Informazzjoni — Konsultazzjoni Pubblika — Indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi mill-Ġappun | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Notifika għall-attenzjoni ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, li l-ismijiet tagħhom ġew miżjuda fil-lista msemmija fl-Artikli 2, 3 u 7 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 881/2002 tas-27 ta’ Mejju 2002 li jimponi ċerti miżuri speċifiċi restrittivi diretti kontra ċerti persuni u entitajiet assoċjati mal-organizzazzjonijiet ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida permezz tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2017/1390 | 22 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Avviż ta’ kompetizzjonijiet miftuħa

17

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2017/C 242/08

Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-każ M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-Każ M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific — Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2017/C 242/10

Avviż ta’ Informazzjoni — Konsultazzjoni Pubblika — Indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi mill-Ġappun

20

2017/C 242/11

Notifika għall-attenzjoni ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, li l-ismijiet tagħhom ġew miżjuda fil-lista msemmija fl-Artikli 2, 3 u 7 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 881/2002 tas-27 ta’ Mejju 2002 li jimponi ċerti miżuri speċifiċi restrittivi diretti kontra ċerti persuni u entitajiet assoċjati mal-organizzazzjonijiet ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida permezz tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2017/1390

22

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| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE. |

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(1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE.

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

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II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/1

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Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2017/C 242/01)

Fl-14 ta’ Lulju 2017, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32017M8500. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32017M8500. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/2

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Deċiżjoni dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-kondizzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjoni b’rispett lejn Veneto Banca S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/02)

Fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2017, il-Bord Uniku ta’ Riżoluzzjoni ddeċieda ma jpoġġix lill-Veneto Banca S.p.A.taħt riżoluzzjoni. Din id-deċiżjoni kienet ibbażata fuq il-konklużjoni tal-kondizzjoni ta’ Artikolu 18(1)(c) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 806/2014 (1) ma ntlaħqitx. L-elementi ewlenin tad-deċiżjoni huma dawn li ġejjin:

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni: | fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Deċiżjoni Nru: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Indirizzati: | Banca d’Italia |
| Istituzzjoni: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Applikazzjoni għat-tniżżil fil-valur u konverżjoni tas-setgħat tal-istrumenti tal-kapital: | Le |
| Azzjoni ta’ riżoluzzjoni: | Le |
| Għajnuna tal-fondi: | Le |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni:

fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2017

Deċiżjoni Nru:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Indirizzati:

Banca d’Italia

Istituzzjoni:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Applikazzjoni għat-tniżżil fil-valur u konverżjoni tas-setgħat tal-istrumenti tal-kapital:

Le

Azzjoni ta’ riżoluzzjoni:

Le

Għajnuna tal-fondi:

Le

Iktar informazzjoni dwar din id-deċiżjoni tista’ tinstab fuq is-sit uffiċjali tal-SRB: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

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(1)  ĠU L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/3

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Deċiżjoni dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-kondizzjonijiet għal riżoluzzjoni fir-rigward tal-Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/03)

Fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2017, il-Bord Uniku ta’ Riżoluzzjoni ddeċieda ma jpoġġix lill-Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. taħt riżoluzzjoni. Din id-deċiżjoni kienet ibbażata fuq il-konklużjoni ta’ Artikolu 18(1)(c) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 806/2014 (1) ma ntlaħqitx. L-elementi ewlenin tad-deċiżjoni huma dawn li ġejjin:

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni: | fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Deċiżjoni Nru: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Indirizzati: | Banca d’Italia |
| Istituzzjoni: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Applikazzjoni għat-tniżżil fil-valur u l-konverżjoni tas-setgħat tal-istrumenti tal-kapital: | Le |
| Azzjoni ta’ riżoluzzjoni: | Le |
| Għajnuna tal-fondi: | Le |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni:

fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2017

Deċiżjoni Nru:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Indirizzati:

Banca d’Italia

Istituzzjoni:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Applikazzjoni għat-tniżżil fil-valur u l-konverżjoni tas-setgħat tal-istrumenti tal-kapital:

Le

Azzjoni ta’ riżoluzzjoni:

Le

Għajnuna tal-fondi:

Le

Iktar informazzjoni dwar din id-deċiżjoni tista’ tinstab fuq is-sit uffiċjali tal-SRB: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

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(1)  ĠU L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1.

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IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/4

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

Is-26 ta’ Lulju 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,1644 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 130,26 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4368 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,89275 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 9,5705 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,1152 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 9,2893 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 26,047 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 305,57 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,2613 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,5632 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 4,1406 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,4717 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,4576 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 9,0959 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,5678 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,5850 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 15,1998 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 7,8646 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,4128 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,9889 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 58,948 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 69,7050 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 38,996 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 3,6806 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 20,6644 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 74,9375 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,1644

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

130,26

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4368

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,89275

SEK

Krona Żvediża

9,5705

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,1152

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

9,2893

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

26,047

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

305,57

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,2613

RON

Leu Rumen

4,5632

TRY

Lira Turka

4,1406

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,4717

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,4576

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

9,0959

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,5678

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,5850

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 303,91

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

15,1998

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

7,8646

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,4128

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

15 507,48

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,9889

PHP

Peso Filippin

58,948

RUB

Rouble Russu

69,7050

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

38,996

BRL

Real Brażiljan

3,6806

MXN

Peso Messikan

20,6644

INR

Rupi Indjan

74,9375

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(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/5 |
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27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/5

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Sommarju ta’ Deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea dwar l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għat-tqegħid fis-suq għall-użu u/jew l-awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-użu tas-sustanzi elenkati fl-Anness XIV tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar ir-reġistrazzjoni, il-valutazzjoni, l-awtorizzazzjoni u r-restrizzjoni ta’ sustanzi kimiċi (REACH)

(Ippubblikat skont l-Artikolu 64(9) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006
   (1)
  )

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2017/C 242/05)

Deċiżjonijiet tal-għoti ta’ awtorizzazzjoni

| Referenza tad-Deċiżjoni (2) | Data tad-Deċiżjoni | Isem tas-sustanza | Detentur tal-awtorizzazzjoni | Numru tal-awtorizzazzjoni | Użu awtorizzat | Data ta’ skadenza tal-perjodu ta’ rieżami | Raġunijiet għad-Deċiżjoni |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | L-20 ta’ Lulju 2017 | Bis(2-metossietil)eter
  Numru tal-KE. 203-924-4,
  Numru tal-CAS: 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, l-Irlanda | REACH/17/8/0 | L-użu tad-diglim bħala solvent għall-proċess tal-manifattura ta’ intermedjarju għal konverżjoni ulterjuri f’kompost farmaċewtiku użat fil-prodotti mediċinali għat-trattament tal-mard respiratorju | It-22 ta’ Awwissu 2024 | — | Skont l-Artikolu (60)2 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006, ir-riskji għas-saħħa tal-bniedem li jkunu ġejjin mill-użu tas-sustanza huma verifikati b’mod xieraq. |

Referenza tad-Deċiżjoni (2)

Data tad-Deċiżjoni

Isem tas-sustanza

Detentur tal-awtorizzazzjoni

Numru tal-awtorizzazzjoni

Użu awtorizzat

Data ta’ skadenza tal-perjodu ta’ rieżami

Raġunijiet għad-Deċiżjoni

C(2017) 5025

L-20 ta’ Lulju 2017

Bis(2-metossietil)eter

Numru tal-KE. 203-924-4,

Numru tal-CAS: 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, l-Irlanda

REACH/17/8/0

L-użu tad-diglim bħala solvent għall-proċess tal-manifattura ta’ intermedjarju għal konverżjoni ulterjuri f’kompost farmaċewtiku użat fil-prodotti mediċinali għat-trattament tal-mard respiratorju

It-22 ta’ Awwissu 2024

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Skont l-Artikolu (60)2 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1907/2006, ir-riskji għas-saħħa tal-bniedem li jkunu ġejjin mill-użu tas-sustanza huma verifikati b’mod xieraq.

| — | Fil-preżent, ma jeżistu l-ebda alternattivi xierqa u għaddejja tfittxija għalihom fi programm ta’ sostituzzjoni għal seba’ snin. |
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—

Fil-preżent, ma jeżistu l-ebda alternattivi xierqa u għaddejja tfittxija għalihom fi programm ta’ sostituzzjoni għal seba’ snin.

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(1)  ĠU L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1

(2)  Id-Deċiżjoni tinsab fis-sit web tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market_mt

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INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/6

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Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat potenzjali mogħtija lil Landsvirkjun permezz ta’ garanziji mill-istati fuq kuntratti tad-derivattivi

(2017/C 242/06)

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 085/17/COL tat-3 ta’ Mejju 2017, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu din il-ġabra fil-qosor, l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi ġew mgħarrfa permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ dan l-avviż, l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex jibagħtu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni, fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni, lil:

| L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA |
| --- |
| Ir-Reġistru |
| 35, Rue Belliard |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

L-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA

Ir-Reġistru

35, Rue Belliard

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tressaq il-kummenti tista’ tinżamm kunfidenzjali jekk issir rikjesta bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għal tali rikjesta.

Ġabra fil-qosor

Il-proċedura

Permezz ta’ Email li ġġib id-data tal-24 ta’ Marzu 2015, l-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi talbu lill-Awtorità tikkjarifika jekk l-obbigazzjonijiet finanzjarji ta’ Landsvirkjun minn kuntratti tad-derivattivi jistgħux jiġu ggarantiti taħt l-iskema eżistenti ta’ garanziji tal-istat tal-Iżlanda. Dik l-iskema kienet is-suġġett tad-deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità Nru 159/13/COL (1).

Wara talbiet li saru, l-Awtorità rċeviet informazzjoni dwar il-miżura kkonċernata mill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi permezz ta’ ittri tal-11 ta’ Frar 2016 u tat-22 ta’ Marzu 2016. Barra minn dan, il-kwistjoni ġiet diskussa waqt laqgħa bejn l-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi u l-Awtorità f’Reykjavík fil-31 ta’ Mejju 2016. Wara l-laqgħa, l-Awtorità bagħtet ittra lill-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi li fiha ġie rreġistrat il-kontenut tal-laqgħa u ntalbu kjarifiki addizzjonali. Permezz ta’ Email li ġġib id-data tal-31 ta’ Ottubru 2016, l-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi rreaġixxu għall-ittra tal-Awtorità u ppreżentaw xi dokumenti addizzjonali.

Il-fatti

Landsvirkjun hija kumpanija ta’ sħubija pubblika rregolata permezz ta’ Att Nru 42/1983 dwar Landsvirkjun, kif emendata. Landsvirkjun hija proprjetà konġunta tat-Teżorerija tal-Istat (99,9 %) u Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). Din tal-aħħar hija kumpanija b’responsabbiltà limitata li hija kollha kemm hi proprjetà tat-Teżorerija tal-Istat. Landsvirkjun bħalissa hija l-akbar kumpanija li tipproduċi elettriku fl-Iżlanda, u tgawdi minn aktar minn 75 % sehem mis-suq tal-ġenerazzjoni tal-elettriku domestiku u waħda mill-akbar għaxar kumpaniji tal-enerġija rinnovabbli fl-Ewropa.

Il-Ġestjoni tad-Dejn tal-Gvern (“ĠDG”) hija unità fi ħdan il-Bank Ċentrali tal-Iżlanda. Il-Bank Ċentrali tal-Iżlanda hija istituzzjoni pubblika indipendenti, proprjetà tal-istat Iżlandiż.

Landsvirkjun hija esposta għar-riskju tat-tisrif tal-iskambju tal-munita barranija (“FX”) kif ukoll għar-riskju fuq ir-rati tal-imgħax fil-portafoll tagħha tad-dejn, Landsvirkjun tuża diversi forom ta’ kuntratti tad-derivattivi biex tikkontrolla u tiġġestixxi r-riskju tas-suq tagħha.

Skont kif l-Awtorità tifhem il-fatti bħalissa, ĠDG tat garanziji lil Landsvirkjun fuq ċerti kuntratti tad-derivattivi tal-anqas sa mill-2013. Id-deċiżjoni tolqot il-garanziji tal-ĠDG fuq il-kuntratti tad-derivattivi li ġejjin: Swaps FX, opzjonijiet FX u swaps tar-rati tal-imgħax.

Taħt il-punt 3.2 tal-linji gwida dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat (“Linji Gwida dwar il-Garanzija”) (2), it-twettiq tal-kundizzjonijiet kumulattivi li ġejjin huwa suffiċjenti biex tiġi eliminata l-preżenza ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat f’garanzija individwali.

| (a) | Min jissellef ma jkunx f’diffikultà finanzjarja; |
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(a)

Min jissellef ma jkunx f’diffikultà finanzjarja;

| (b) | L-ammont tal-garanzija jista’ jitkejjel b’mod xieraq meta din tingħata; |
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(b)

L-ammont tal-garanzija jista’ jitkejjel b’mod xieraq meta din tingħata;

| (c) | Il-garanzija ma tkoprix aktar minn 80 % tas-self pendenti jew obbligu finanzjarju ieħor; kif ukoll |
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(c)

Il-garanzija ma tkoprix aktar minn 80 % tas-self pendenti jew obbligu finanzjarju ieħor; kif ukoll

| (d) | Jitħallas għall-garanzija prezz orjentat għas-suq. |
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(d)

Jitħallas għall-garanzija prezz orjentat għas-suq.

L-Awtorità hija tal-fehma preliminari li l-garanziji mogħtija mill-ĠDG lil Landsvirkjun fuq it-tranżazzjonijiet ta’ derivattivi li jissemmew hawn fuq ma jissodisfawx il-kundizzjonijiet (b), (c) u (d). Għaldaqstant, f’dan l-istadju, il-preżenza tal-elementi ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat ma tistax tiġi eliminata abbażi tal-punt 3.2 tal-Linji Gwida ta’ Garanzija.

L-ewwel nett, l-awtoritajiet tal-Iżlanda sa issa ma kinux fil-pożizzjoni li jispjegaw jekk il-garanziji humiex marbuta ma’ obbligi speċifiċi, x’inhu l-ammont massimu tal-garanziji, u jekk il-garanziji humiex limitati bħala żmien. Għalhekk, l-Awtorità bħalissa hija tal-fehma li l-kundizzjoni (b) tal-punt 3.2 tal-Linji Gwida ta’ Garanzija mhix sodisfata.

It-tieni, il-garanziji jidher li jkopru l-obbligi finanzjarji kollha li Landsvirkjun għandha taħt il-kuntratti ta’ derivattivi rispettivi. L-awtoritajiet tal-Iżlanda sa issa ma pprovdew l-ebda informazzjoni li biha jkun jista’ jiġi evalwat jekk il-garanzija hix limitata għal 80 % tal-obbligi finanzjarji pendenti. Barra minn dan ma hemm l-ebda informazzjoni li permezz tagħha jkunu jistgħu jiġu kkwantifikati l-obbligi finanzjarji ta’ Landsvirkjun taħt il-kuntratti tad-derivattivi li huma ggarantiti mill-ĠDG. Għalhekk, l-Awtorità bħalissa hija tal-fehma li l-kundizzjoni (c) tal-punt 3.2 tal-Linji Gwida ta’ Garanzija mhix sodisfata.

It-tielet, taħt il-Linji Gwida ta’ Garanzija, it-teħid tar-riskju normalment għandu jiġi remunerat permezz ta’ primjum xieraq fuq l-ammont garantit jew kontragarantit. Għar-rigward tal-garanziji tal-ĠDG fuq l-swaps FX, l-opzjonijiet FX, Landsvirkjun ma jidhirx li tħallas xi primjum. Għar-rigward tal-garanziji tal-ĠDG dwar is-swaps tar-rata tal-imgħax, l-awtoritajiet Iżlandizi jsostnu li Landsvirkjun tħallas primjum xieraq ta’ garanzija fuq obbligazzjonijiet netti ta’ kuntratti tad-derivattiti li juru telf nett għal Landsvirkjun. Madankollu, l-Awtorità ma rċevietx informazzjoni suffiċjenti dwar liema metodoloġija ntużat biex jiġi konkluż il-livell tal-primjum u jekk dan il-livell ta’ primjum jistax jitqies bħala l-prezz tas-suq.

Valutazzjoni

L-Awtorità bħalissa hija tal-fehma li l-garanziji indirizzati f’din id-deċiżjoni jistgħu jikkostitwixxu vantaġġ fi ħdan it-tifsira tar-regoli dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat. Apparti minn hekk, il-miżuri jidhru li huma selettivi min-natura tagħhom u suxxettibbli li jfixklu l-kompetizzjoni u jolqtu l-kummerċ fi ħdan iż-ŻEE. Għal dan l-għan, l-Awtorità ma tistax teskludi li l-miżura tikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-Istat fis-sens tal-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE. F’dan l-istadju, l-awtoritajiet Iżlandiżi għadhom ma ressqu ebda argument li juri li l-għajnuna mill-Istat potenzjalment involuta tista’ tiġi kkunsidrata kompatibbli mal-Artikolu 59(2) jew 61(3) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ proċedura ta’ investigazzjoni formali f’konformità mal-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jissottomettu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità Nru 159/13/COL tal-24 ta’ April 2013 biex tingħalaq il-każ rigward l-għajnuna eżistenti mogħtija lil Landsvirkjun u Orkuveita Reykjavíkur permezz ta’ garanziji illimitati tal-Istat (ĠU C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 u s-Suppliment taż-ŻEE Nru 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

1

(2)  ĠU L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 u s-Supplement taż-ŻEE Nru 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

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V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/17

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AVVIŻ TA’ KOMPETIZZJONIJIET MIFTUĦA

(2017/C 242/07)

L-Uffiċċju Ewropew għas-Selezzjoni tal-Persunal (EPSO) qed jorganizza l-kompetizzjoni ġenerali li ġejja:

| | AMMINISTRATURI u ASSISTENTI FIS-SETTUR TAL-BINI |
| --- | --- |

AMMINISTRATURI u ASSISTENTI FIS-SETTUR TAL-BINI

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Inġiniera fil-ġestjoni tal-bini (inklużi l-inġiniera ambjentali u tas-servizzi) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Inġiniera fil-ġestjoni tal-bini (inklużi l-inġiniera ambjentali u tas-servizzi)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3) | Profil 1. Koordinaturi/tekniċi tal-kostruzzjoni tal-bini |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3)

Profil 1. Koordinaturi/tekniċi tal-kostruzzjoni tal-bini

| | Profil 2. Koordinaturi/tekniċi tal-bini fl-arja kondizzjonata u l-inġinerija elettromekkanika u elettrika |
| --- | --- |

Profil 2. Koordinaturi/tekniċi tal-bini fl-arja kondizzjonata u l-inġinerija elettromekkanika u elettrika

| | Profil 3. Assistenti fis-sigurtà tal-bini/sigurtà okkupazzjonali |
| --- | --- |

Profil 3. Assistenti fis-sigurtà tal-bini/sigurtà okkupazzjonali

L-avviż tal-kompetizzjoni huwa ppubblikat f’24 lingwa f’
  Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea C 242 A tas-27 ta’ Lulju 2017.

Tista’ ssib aktar informazzjoni fuq is-sit web tal-EPSO: https://epso.europa.eu/

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PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/18

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Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni

(Il-każ M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | Fit-18 ta’ Lulju 2017, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriża Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. (“Letterone Investment”, il-Lussemburgu), takkwista fis-sens tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll tal-impriża Holland & Barrett International Limited kollha kemm hi (“Holland & Barrett”, ir-Renju Unit), permezz tax-xiri ta’ ishma. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Fit-18 ta’ Lulju 2017, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriża Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. (“Letterone Investment”, il-Lussemburgu), takkwista fis-sens tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll tal-impriża Holland & Barrett International Limited kollha kemm hi (“Holland & Barrett”, ir-Renju Unit), permezz tax-xiri ta’ ishma.

| 2. | L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:
  —   għal Letterone Investment: Investiment internazzjonali li jiffoka fuq investimenti fis-setturi tat-telekomunikazzjonijiet u t-teknoloġija, tal-kura tas-saħħa u l-bejgħ bl-imnut.
  —   għal Holland & Barrett: bejgħ bl-imnut ta’ prodotti tas-saħħa u l-benessri, bħal, pereżempju, supplementi tal-vitamini u ikel għas-saħħa permezz tan-netwerk tagħha ta’ ħwienet f’toroq prinċipali u online. |
| --- | --- |

2.

L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:

—   għal Letterone Investment: Investiment internazzjonali li jiffoka fuq investimenti fis-setturi tat-telekomunikazzjonijiet u t-teknoloġija, tal-kura tas-saħħa u l-bejgħ bl-imnut.

—   għal Holland & Barrett: bejgħ bl-imnut ta’ prodotti tas-saħħa u l-benessri, bħal, pereżempju, supplementi tal-vitamini u ikel għas-saħħa permezz tan-netwerk tagħha ta’ ħwienet f’toroq prinċipali u online.

| 3. | Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta’ ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (2) ta’ min jinnota li dan il-każ jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal trattament skont il-proċedura stipulata f’dan l-Avviż. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta’ ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (2) ta’ min jinnota li dan il-każ jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal trattament skont il-proċedura stipulata f’dan l-Avviż.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil terzi persuni interessati biex jibagħtulha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.
  Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bir-referenza M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett, f’dan l-indirizz:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil terzi persuni interessati biex jibagħtulha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bir-referenza M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett, f’dan l-indirizz:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-“Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet”).

(2)  ĠU C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

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| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/19 |
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27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/19

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Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni

(Il-Każ M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific — Patheon)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | Fid-19 ta’ Lulju 2017, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriża Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. (“Thermo Fisher”, l-Istati Uniti tal-Amerka) takkwista, fis-sens tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll tal-impriża Patheon NV (“Patheon”, in-Netherlands) permezz tax-xiri ta’ ishma. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Fid-19 ta’ Lulju 2017, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha l-impriża Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. (“Thermo Fisher”, l-Istati Uniti tal-Amerka) takkwista, fis-sens tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll tal-impriża Patheon NV (“Patheon”, in-Netherlands) permezz tax-xiri ta’ ishma.

| 2. | L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:






  — | Thermo Fisher hija manufattriċi u fornitriċi ta’ tagħmir tal-laboratorju, strumenti analitiċi, dijanjostika, u prodotti u servizzi relatati. Il-kwartieri ġenerali tagħha jinsabu fl-Istati Uniti tal-Amerika u hija attiva internazzjonalment. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:

—

Thermo Fisher hija manufattriċi u fornitriċi ta’ tagħmir tal-laboratorju, strumenti analitiċi, dijanjostika, u prodotti u servizzi relatati. Il-kwartieri ġenerali tagħha jinsabu fl-Istati Uniti tal-Amerika u hija attiva internazzjonalment.

| — | Patheon hija organizzazzjoni tal-iżvilupp b’kuntratt u tal-manifattura li toffri ingredjenti farmaċewtiċi attivi u servizzi ta’ prodotti tal-mediċini lesti. Il-kwartieri ġenerali tagħha jinsabu fin-Netherlands u hija attiva internazzjonalment. |
| --- | --- |

—

Patheon hija organizzazzjoni tal-iżvilupp b’kuntratt u tal-manifattura li toffri ingredjenti farmaċewtiċi attivi u servizzi ta’ prodotti tal-mediċini lesti. Il-kwartieri ġenerali tagħha jinsabu fin-Netherlands u hija attiva internazzjonalment.

| 3. | Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil terzi persuni interessati biex jibagħtulha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.
  Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bir-referenza M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. — Patheon NV, f’dan l-indirizz:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil terzi persuni interessati biex jibagħtulha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bir-referenza M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. — Patheon NV, f’dan l-indirizz:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-“Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet”).

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ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/20

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AVVIŻ TA’ INFORMAZZJONI — KONSULTAZZJONI PUBBLIKA

Indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi mill-Ġappun

(2017/C 242/10)

Fil-kuntest tan-negozjati li għaddejjin bħalissa mal-Ġappun għal Ftehim ta’ Kummerċ Ħieles (minn hawn ’il quddiem “il-Ftehim”), li jinkludi kapitolu dwar l-Indikazzjonijiet Ġeografiċi, l-awtoritajiet Ġappuniżi ppreżentaw il-lista mehmuża ta’ Indikazzjonijiet Ġeografiċi, biex jiġu protetti skont il-Ftehim. Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea bħalissa qiegħda tikkunsidra jekk dawn l-Indikazzjonijiet Ġeografiċi għandhomx jiġu protetti skont il-Ftehim bħala Indikazzjonijiet Ġeografiċi, skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 22(1) tal-Ftehim dwar l-Aspetti tad-Drittijiet tal-Proprjetà Intellettwali Relatati mal-Kummerċ.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil kwalunkwe Stat Membru jew pajjiż terz, jew kwalunkwe persuna fiżika jew ġuridika li għandha interess leġittimu, li hi residenti jew stabbilita fi Stat Membru jew f’pajjiż terz, biex tressaq oppożizzjoni għat-tali protezzjoni billi tibgħat dikjarazzjoni sostanzjata kif xieraq.

Id-dikjarazzjonijiet ta’ oppożizzjoni għandhom jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni fi żmien xahrejn mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż. Id-dikjarazzjonijiet ta’ oppożizzjoni għandhom jintbagħtu f’dan l-indirizz elettroniku: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Id-dikjarazzjonijiet ta’ oppożizzjoni għandhom jiġu eżaminati biss jekk jaslu qabel id-data stabbilita hawn fuq u jekk dawn ikunu juru li l-protezzjoni tal-isem propost:

| (a) | toħloq kunflitt mal-isem ta’ varjetà tal-pjanti jew ta’ razza tal-bhejjem u b’hekk il-konsumatur jista’ jitfixkel dwar x’inhu l-oriġini vera tal-prodott; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

toħloq kunflitt mal-isem ta’ varjetà tal-pjanti jew ta’ razza tal-bhejjem u b’hekk il-konsumatur jista’ jitfixkel dwar x’inhu l-oriġini vera tal-prodott;

| (b) | tkun kompletament jew parzjalment omonima mal-protezzjoni ta’ isem li diġà huwa protett fl-Unjoni skont ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta’ Novembru 2012 dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel (1), jew tkun tinsab fil-ftehimiet li l-Unjoni kkonkludiet mal-pajjiżi li ġejjin:






  — | L-Istati EPA SADC (inklużi l-Botswana, il-Lesoto, il-Mozambique, in-Namibja, is-Swaziland u l-Afrika t’Isfel) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

tkun kompletament jew parzjalment omonima mal-protezzjoni ta’ isem li diġà huwa protett fl-Unjoni skont ir-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-21 ta’ Novembru 2012 dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel (1), jew tkun tinsab fil-ftehimiet li l-Unjoni kkonkludiet mal-pajjiżi li ġejjin:

—

L-Istati EPA SADC (inklużi l-Botswana, il-Lesoto, il-Mozambique, in-Namibja, is-Swaziland u l-Afrika t’Isfel) (2)

| — | L-Iżvizzera (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Iżvizzera (3)

| — | Il-Korea (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-Korea (4)

| — | L-Amerika Ċentrali (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Amerika Ċentrali (5)

| — | Il-Kolombja, il-Perù u l-Ekwador (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-Kolombja, il-Perù u l-Ekwador (6)

| — | Il-Montenegro (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-Montenegro (7)

| — | Il-Bożnija-Ħerzegovina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-Bożnija-Ħerzegovina (8)

| — | Is-Serbja (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Is-Serbja (9)

| — | Il-Moldova (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-Moldova (10)

| — | L-Ukrajna (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

L-Ukrajna (11)

| — | Il-Georgia (12) |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-Georgia (12)

| (c) | fid-dawl tar-reputazzjoni u l-fama ta’ marka kummerċjali u t-tul ta’ żmien li tkun ilha tintuża, tista’ tqarraq bil-konsumatur dwar l-identità vera tal-prodott; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

fid-dawl tar-reputazzjoni u l-fama ta’ marka kummerċjali u t-tul ta’ żmien li tkun ilha tintuża, tista’ tqarraq bil-konsumatur dwar l-identità vera tal-prodott;

| (d) | tipperikola l-eżistenza ta’ isem jew ta’ marka kummerċjali kompletament jew parzjalment identiċi, jew tipperikola l-eżistenza ta’ prodotti li jkunu ilhom fis-suq b’mod legali għal mill-inqas ħames snin qabel id-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

tipperikola l-eżistenza ta’ isem jew ta’ marka kummerċjali kompletament jew parzjalment identiċi, jew tipperikola l-eżistenza ta’ prodotti li jkunu ilhom fis-suq b’mod legali għal mill-inqas ħames snin qabel id-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż;

| (e) | jew jekk jistgħu jagħtu dettalji li bihom wieħed jista’ jikkonkludi li l-isem li għalih qed titqies il-protezzjoni huwa ġeneriku. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

jew jekk jistgħu jagħtu dettalji li bihom wieħed jista’ jikkonkludi li l-isem li għalih qed titqies il-protezzjoni huwa ġeneriku.

Il-kriterji msemmija hawn fuq għandhom ikunu evalwati b’rabta mat-territorju tal-Unjoni, li fil-każ tad-drittijiet tal-proprjetà intellettwali jirreferi biss għat-territorju jew għat-territorji fejn dawn id-drittijiet huma protetti. Il-protezzjoni possibbli ta’ dawn l-ismijiet fl-Unjoni Ewropea hija soġġetta għall-konklużjoni b’suċċess ta’ dawn in-negozjati, kif ukoll għall-att legali sussegwenti.

Lista tal-Indikazzjonijiet Ġeografiċi
   (13)

| Isem Protett fil-Ġappun | Traskrizzjoni (għal skopijiet ta’ informazzjoni biss) | Kategorija u deskrizzjoni tal-prodott |
| --- | --- | --- |
| “

  “/“ Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi” | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Ħut frisk, krustaċi u molluski, u prodotti magħmulin minnhom — frott tal-baħar bil-qoxra |
| “

  “/“ Tsurajima Gobou” | Tsurajima Gobou | Frott, ħaxix u ċereali, friski jew ipproċessati — bardana |
| “

  ” | Yamagata | Prodotti oħra tal-Anness I għat-Trattat (ħwawar; eċċ.) — xorb ieħor iffermentat — seishu (sake) |
| “

  “/“Maesawa Beef” | Maesawa Gyu | Laħam frisk (u l-ġewwieni) — ċanga |
| “

  “/“ Yonezawagyu” | Yonezawa Gyu | Laħam frisk (u l-ġewwieni) — ċanga |
| “

  “/“ Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi” | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Laħam frisk (u l-ġewwieni) — ċanga |
| “

  “/“ Nishio Matcha” | Nishio no Matcha | Prodotti oħra tal-Anness I għat-Trattat (ħwawar; eċċ.) — trab tat-te aħdar |

Isem Protett fil-Ġappun

Traskrizzjoni (għal skopijiet ta’ informazzjoni biss)

Kategorija u deskrizzjoni tal-prodott

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Ħut frisk, krustaċi u molluski, u prodotti magħmulin minnhom — frott tal-baħar bil-qoxra

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

Frott, ħaxix u ċereali, friski jew ipproċessati — bardana

Image

Yamagata

Prodotti oħra tal-Anness I għat-Trattat (ħwawar; eċċ.) — xorb ieħor iffermentat — seishu (sake)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

Laħam frisk (u l-ġewwieni) — ċanga

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

Laħam frisk (u l-ġewwieni) — ċanga

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Laħam frisk (u l-ġewwieni) — ċanga

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Prodotti oħra tal-Anness I għat-Trattat (ħwawar; eċċ.) — trab tat-te aħdar

---

(1)  ĠU L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill (UE) 2016/1623 tal-1 ta’ Ġunju 2016 dwar l-iffirmar, f’isem l-Unjoni Ewropea, u l-applikazzjoni proviżorja ta’ Ftehim ta’ Sħubija Ekonomika bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, min-naħa l-waħda, u l-Istati EPA SADC, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 250, 16.9.2016, p. 1).

(3)  Id-Deċiżjoni 2002/309/KE, Euratom, tal-Kunsill, u tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Ftehim dwar Kooperazzjoni Xjentifika u Teknoloġika tal-4 ta’ April 2002 dwar il-konklużjoni tas-seba’ Ftehimiet mal-Konfederazzjoni Żvizzera (ĠU L 114, 30.4.2002, p. 1), u b’mod partikulari l-Ftehim bejn il-Komunità Ewropea u l-Konfederazzjoni Żvizzera dwar kummerċ fi prodotti agrikoli — l-Anness 7.

(4)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2011/265/UE tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2010 dwar l-iffirmar, f’isem l-Unjoni Ewropea, u l-applikazzjoni provviżorja tal-Ftehim ta’ Kummerċ Ħieles bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, min-naħa waħda, u r-Repubblika tal-Korea, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 127, 14.5.2011, p. 1).

(5)  Ftehim li jistabbilixxi Assoċjazzjoni bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, minn naħa waħda, u l-Amerika Ċentrali min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 346, 15.12.2012, p. 3).

(6)  Il-Ftehim Kummerċjali bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, minn naħa waħda, u l-Kolombja u l-Perù, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 354, 21.12.2012, p. 3) u l-Protokoll tal-Adeżjoni mal-Ftehim Kummerċjali bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, minn naħa waħda, u l-Kolombja u l-Perù, min-naħa l-oħra, biex tittieħed inkonsiderazzjoni l-adeżjoni tal-Ekwador (ĠU L 356, 24.12.2016, p. 3).

(7)  Id-Deċiżjoni 2007/855/KE tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta’ Ottubru 2007 dwar l-iffirmar u l-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim Provviżorju dwar il-kummerċ u materji relatati mal-kummerċ bejn il-Komunità Ewropea, minn naħa waħda, u r-Repubblika tal-Montenegro, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 345, 28.12.2007, p. 1).

(8)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2008/474/KE tas-16 ta’ Ġunju 2008 dwar l-iffirmar u l-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim Proviżorju dwar il-kummerċ u materji relatati mal-kummerċ bejn il-Komunità Ewropea, min-naħa l-waħda, u l-Bożnija-Ħerzegovina, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 169, 30.6.2008, p. 10. — il-Protokoll 6).

(9)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2010/36/KE tad-29 ta’ April 2008 dwar l-iffirmar u l-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim Provviżorju dwar il-kummerċ u materji relatati mal-kummerċ bejn il-Komunità Ewropea, min-naħa l-waħda, u r-Repubblika tas-Serbja, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 28, 30.1.2010, p. 1).

(10)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2013/7/UE tat-3 ta’ Diċembru 2012 dwar il-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u r-Repubblika tal-Moldova dwar il-protezzjoni ta’ indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi ta’ prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel (ĠU L 10, 15.1.2013, p. 1).

(11)  Il-Ftehim ta’ Assoċjazzjoni bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Istati Membri tagħha, minn naħa waħda, u l-Ukrajna, min-naħa l-oħra (ĠU L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3).

(12)  Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill 2012/164/UE tal-14 ta’ Frar 2012 dwar il-konklużjoni tal-Ftehim bejn l-Unjoni Ewropea u l-Georgia dwar il-protezzjoni ta’ indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi ta’ prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel (ĠU L 93, 30.3.2012, p. 1).

(13)  Lista mogħtija mill-awtoritajiet Ġappuniżi fil-qafas tan-negozjati li għaddejjin bħalissa, irreġistrata fil-Ġappun.

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| 27.7.2017 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 242/22

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Notifika għall-attenzjoni ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa, li l-ismijiet tagħhom ġew miżjuda fil-lista msemmija fl-Artikli 2, 3 u 7 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 881/2002 tas-27 ta’ Mejju 2002 li jimponi ċerti miżuri speċifiċi restrittivi diretti kontra ċerti persuni u entitajiet assoċjati mal-organizzazzjonijiet ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida permezz tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni (UE) 2017/1390

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill (PESK) 2016/1693 (1) titlob lill-Unjoni biex tiffriża l-fondi u r-riżorsi ekonomiċi tal-membri tal-organizzazzjoni ta' ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida u ta' individwi, gruppi, impriżi u entitajiet oħrajn assoċjati magħhom, imsemmijin fil-lista mħejjija skont l-UNSCR 1267(1999) u 1333(2000) li għandha tiġi aġġornata b'mod regolari mill-Kumitat tan-NU stabbilit skont l-UNSCR 1267(1999).
  Il-lista mħejjija minn dan il-Kumitat tan-NU tinkludi:






  — | ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill (PESK) 2016/1693 (1) titlob lill-Unjoni biex tiffriża l-fondi u r-riżorsi ekonomiċi tal-membri tal-organizzazzjoni ta' ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida u ta' individwi, gruppi, impriżi u entitajiet oħrajn assoċjati magħhom, imsemmijin fil-lista mħejjija skont l-UNSCR 1267(1999) u 1333(2000) li għandha tiġi aġġornata b'mod regolari mill-Kumitat tan-NU stabbilit skont l-UNSCR 1267(1999).

Il-lista mħejjija minn dan il-Kumitat tan-NU tinkludi:

—

ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida;

| — | persuni fiżiċi jew ġuridiċi, entitajiet, korpi u gruppi assoċjati ma' ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida; kif ukoll |
| --- | --- |

—

persuni fiżiċi jew ġuridiċi, entitajiet, korpi u gruppi assoċjati ma' ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida; kif ukoll

| — | persuni ġuridiċi, entitajiet u korpi li huma proprjetà ta’ kull waħda minn dawn il-persuni, entitajiet, korpi u gruppi jew huma kkontrollati minnhom, jew b’xi mod iservu ta’ appoġġ għalihom. |
| --- | --- |

—

persuni ġuridiċi, entitajiet u korpi li huma proprjetà ta’ kull waħda minn dawn il-persuni, entitajiet, korpi u gruppi jew huma kkontrollati minnhom, jew b’xi mod iservu ta’ appoġġ għalihom.

Atti jew attivitajiet li jindikaw li individwu, grupp, impriża, jew entità huma “assoċjati ma’” ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida, jinkludu:

| (a) | il-parteċipazzjoni fl-iffinanzjar, l-ippjanar, l-iffaċilitar, it-tħejjija jew it-twettiq ta’ atti jew attivitajiet li jsiru minn, flimkien ma’, taħt isem, f’isem jew b’appoġġ għal ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida jew minn kull ċellola, grupp affiljat, grupp żgħir li jinqata’ minnha jew derivat tagħha; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

il-parteċipazzjoni fl-iffinanzjar, l-ippjanar, l-iffaċilitar, it-tħejjija jew it-twettiq ta’ atti jew attivitajiet li jsiru minn, flimkien ma’, taħt isem, f’isem jew b’appoġġ għal ISIL (Da'esh) u Al-Qaida jew minn kull ċellola, grupp affiljat, grupp żgħir li jinqata’ minnha jew derivat tagħha;

| (b) | il-forniment, il-bejgħ jew it-trasferiment ta’ armi u materjal relatat lil xi ħadd minnhom; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

il-forniment, il-bejgħ jew it-trasferiment ta’ armi u materjal relatat lil xi ħadd minnhom;

| (c) | ir-reklutaġġ għal kull wieħed minnhom; jew |
| --- | --- |

(c)

ir-reklutaġġ għal kull wieħed minnhom; jew

| (d) | xi forma oħra ta’ appoġġ għall-atti jew l-attivitajiet ta’ xi wieħed minnhom. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

xi forma oħra ta’ appoġġ għall-atti jew l-attivitajiet ta’ xi wieħed minnhom.

| 2. | Il-Kumitat tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-NU fl-20 ta’ Lulju 2017 approva ż-żieda tal-entrati ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa mal-lista tal-Kumitat tas-Sanzjonijiet tal-ISIL (Da’ esh) u Al-Qaida.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa jistgħu fi kwalunkwe ħin jippreżentaw talba lill-Ombudsperson tan-NU, flimkien ma’ kwalunkwe dokumentazzjoni ta’ appoġġ, sabiex terġa' tiġi kkunsidrata d-deċiżjoni biex jiġu inklużi fil-lista tan-NU msemmija hawn fuq. Dawn it-talbiet għandhom jintbagħtu fl-indirizz li ġej:





  United Nations - Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Tel: +1 212 963 2671 |
| Faks: +1 212 963 1300/3778 |
| Posta elettronika: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

Il-Kumitat tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-NU fl-20 ta’ Lulju 2017 approva ż-żieda tal-entrati ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa mal-lista tal-Kumitat tas-Sanzjonijiet tal-ISIL (Da’ esh) u Al-Qaida.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa jistgħu fi kwalunkwe ħin jippreżentaw talba lill-Ombudsperson tan-NU, flimkien ma’ kwalunkwe dokumentazzjoni ta’ appoġġ, sabiex terġa' tiġi kkunsidrata d-deċiżjoni biex jiġu inklużi fil-lista tan-NU msemmija hawn fuq. Dawn it-talbiet għandhom jintbagħtu fl-indirizz li ġej:

United Nations - Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel: +1 212 963 2671

Faks: +1 212 963 1300/3778

Posta elettronika: ombudsperson@un.org

Għal aktar informazzjoni mur fuq https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | Minbarra d-deċiżjoni tan-NU msemmija fil-paragrafu 2, il-Kummissjoni adottat ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) 2017/1390 (2), li jemenda l-Anness I tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 881/2002 tas-27 ta' Mejju 2002 li jimponi ċerti miżuri speċifiċi restrittivi diretti kontra ċerti persuni u entitajiet assoċjati mal-organizzazzjonijiet ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida (3). L-emendi, skont l-Artikolu 7(1)a u 7a(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002, iżidu l-ismijiet ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa mal-lista ta’ Anness I ta’ dak ir-Regolament (“Anness I”).
  Il-miżuri li ġejjin tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002 japplikaw għall-individwi u l-entitajiet li jinsabu fl-Anness I:






  (1) | l-iffriżar tal-fondi u tar-riżorsi ekonomiċi kollha li jappartjenu lill-individwi u l-entitajiet ikkonċernati, jew li huma proprjetà tagħhom jew miżmuma minnhom, u l-projbizzjoni (fuq kulħadd) milli jagħmel disponibbli fondi u riżorsi ekonomiċi lill-individwi u l-entitajiet ikkonċernati jew għall-benefiċċju tagħhom, kemm direttament kif ukoll indirettament (l-Artikoli 2 u 2a); kif ukoll |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Minbarra d-deċiżjoni tan-NU msemmija fil-paragrafu 2, il-Kummissjoni adottat ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) 2017/1390 (2), li jemenda l-Anness I tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 881/2002 tas-27 ta' Mejju 2002 li jimponi ċerti miżuri speċifiċi restrittivi diretti kontra ċerti persuni u entitajiet assoċjati mal-organizzazzjonijiet ISIL (Da'esh) u Al Qaida (3). L-emendi, skont l-Artikolu 7(1)a u 7a(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002, iżidu l-ismijiet ta’ Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (IL-FERGĦA TINSAB F’ALBU KAMAL, IR-REPUBBLIKA GĦARBIJA SIRJANA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa mal-lista ta’ Anness I ta’ dak ir-Regolament (“Anness I”).

Il-miżuri li ġejjin tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002 japplikaw għall-individwi u l-entitajiet li jinsabu fl-Anness I:

(1)

l-iffriżar tal-fondi u tar-riżorsi ekonomiċi kollha li jappartjenu lill-individwi u l-entitajiet ikkonċernati, jew li huma proprjetà tagħhom jew miżmuma minnhom, u l-projbizzjoni (fuq kulħadd) milli jagħmel disponibbli fondi u riżorsi ekonomiċi lill-individwi u l-entitajiet ikkonċernati jew għall-benefiċċju tagħhom, kemm direttament kif ukoll indirettament (l-Artikoli 2 u 2a); kif ukoll

| (2) | il-projbizzjoni tal-għoti, il-bejgħ, il-forniment jew it-trasferiment ta’ pariri tekniċi, assistenza jew taħriġ relatati ma’ attivitajiet militari lil kull individwu jew entità kkonċernata, kemm direttament kif ukoll indirettament (l-Artikolu 3). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

il-projbizzjoni tal-għoti, il-bejgħ, il-forniment jew it-trasferiment ta’ pariri tekniċi, assistenza jew taħriġ relatati ma’ attivitajiet militari lil kull individwu jew entità kkonċernata, kemm direttament kif ukoll indirettament (l-Artikolu 3).

| 4. | L-Artikolu 7a tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002 jipprovdi għal proċess ta’ rieżami meta jiġu ppreżentati l-osservazzjonijiet dwar ir-raġunijiet għall-inklużjoni fil-lista minn dawk li jkunu elenkati. L-individwi u l-entitajiet miżjudin fl-Anness I permezz tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 2017/1390 jistgħu jagħmlu talba lill-Kummissjoni biex isiru jafu r-raġunijiet għall-inklużjoni tagħhom fil-lista. Din it-talba għandha tintbagħat lil:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| “Restrictive measures” |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

L-Artikolu 7a tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002 jipprovdi għal proċess ta’ rieżami meta jiġu ppreżentati l-osservazzjonijiet dwar ir-raġunijiet għall-inklużjoni fil-lista minn dawk li jkunu elenkati. L-individwi u l-entitajiet miżjudin fl-Anness I permezz tar-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) Nru 2017/1390 jistgħu jagħmlu talba lill-Kummissjoni biex isiru jafu r-raġunijiet għall-inklużjoni tagħhom fil-lista. Din it-talba għandha tintbagħat lil:

European Commission

“Restrictive measures”

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Qed tinġibed ukoll l-attenzjoni tal-individwi u tal-entitajiet ikkonċernati għall-possibbiltà li jikkontestaw ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) 2017/1390 quddiem il-Qorti Ġenerali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, f'konformità mal-kundizzjonijiet stipulati fir-raba' u fis-sitt paragrafi tal-Artikolu 263 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Qed tinġibed ukoll l-attenzjoni tal-individwi u tal-entitajiet ikkonċernati għall-possibbiltà li jikkontestaw ir-Regolament ta' Implimentazzjoni (UE) 2017/1390 quddiem il-Qorti Ġenerali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, f'konformità mal-kundizzjonijiet stipulati fir-raba' u fis-sitt paragrafi tal-Artikolu 263 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

| 6. | Għall-korrettezza, qed tinġibed l-attenzjoni tal-individwi u l-entitajiet inklużi fl-Anness I għall-possibbiltà li jressqu applikazzjoni quddiem l-awtoritajiet kompetenti fl-Istat(i) Membru/Membri rilevanti, kif elenkati fl-Anness II tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002, sabiex jiksbu awtorizzazzjoni biex jużaw fondi u riżorsi ekonomiċi ffriżati għal bżonnijiet essenzjali jew għal pagamenti speċifiċi skont l-Artikolu 2a ta' dan ir-Regolament. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Għall-korrettezza, qed tinġibed l-attenzjoni tal-individwi u l-entitajiet inklużi fl-Anness I għall-possibbiltà li jressqu applikazzjoni quddiem l-awtoritajiet kompetenti fl-Istat(i) Membru/Membri rilevanti, kif elenkati fl-Anness II tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2002, sabiex jiksbu awtorizzazzjoni biex jużaw fondi u riżorsi ekonomiċi ffriżati għal bżonnijiet essenzjali jew għal pagamenti speċifiċi skont l-Artikolu 2a ta' dan ir-Regolament.

---

(1)  ĠU L 255, 21.9.2016, p. 25.

(2)  ĠU L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 11.

(3)  ĠU L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9.

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