1 ... T h is a p p e a l ar ise s o u t o f the o rd e r sign e d b y J u d g e B e rc h e lm a n n gr a n ting W a ltha ll, S a c h se & P ip e s In c .’s

m o t i o ns f

o r sum m ary jud gm en t an d t he jud gm en t en t ere d b y Jud ge P o zz a d en yi ng S p ring’s claim f o r att o rne y’ s f

ee s. i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 47 4- CV R o s e m ar y SPRING , Appellant
v . WA LTHA LL, SAC HSE & P IP ES , INC.,

Appellee Fr om the 407th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 05-CI -03089 Honora ble Kar en Pozz a, Judge Pre siding 1 Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: May 26, 2010 AF F I RME D I

N PA RT, REV ERS ED AN D REM AN DE D I N PA RT Rosemary

Spring a ppeals the take nothingjudgme nt on her c laims fo r d ef am ation, brea ch of contra ct, Fa ir L abor Standa rds Act violations, sexual harassment, a ssault, constructive discha rg e,
wr on g fu l in

jun c tio n a

nd atto rn e y ’s fe e s. We r e ve rs e and re mand in p art
.04
- 09
- 00 47 4- CV

- 2- BACK GR OUND S p r i n gw a s ane mp l o ye e o f W a l th a l l , S a c h s e & P i p e s , In c . ( “ W S P ” ) , ani n s ur an c e a g e n c y, until Februa

ry 2005, when she resi gned to open he r own insura nce a g ency . Shortly

afte r Spring ’s resig nation, WS P filed suit aga inst S pring for breac h of t he non-compete a nd non-pirac y

provisions in their employ

ment ag ree ment, theft of trade secr ets, brea ch of fiduciar y duty , unfair c ompetition by misappropriation and use , forf eiture of compensation, and i n j unctive re lief. Spring
c ounte rc la ime d f

or de fa matio n, br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, F a ir L a bo r S tand a

rd s A c t ( “ F L SA” ) v iol atio ns , se xua l ha ra ssm e nt, a ssa

ult , c on str uc tiv e dis c ha

rg e , wro ng fu l in

jun c tio n, and

atto rn e y ’s fe e s. WS P f iled three motions for summary judgme nt on Spring’s c ounterc laims. The trial cour t g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt a g a ins t Sp ri ngon a ll h e r c ounte rc la ims e xce pt t he atto rn e y ’s fe e s c la im. WS P tried its claims ag ainst Spring to a j u ry and lost. At the end of tr ial, Spring pr esente d her counter claim for the attorney ’s fe es she incurred in defe nding ag ainst WS P’s action to enfor ce the
covena nt not to compete. The tria l court denie d Spring’ s reque s t and re ndere d a take nothing judgme nt ag ainst all parties. Only Spring a ppeale d. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A traditional summary

judgme nt require s the movant to establish that there i s no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t and he is entitled t o judgme nt as a matter of law. T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a(c) ; KPM G P e at M ar wic k v. Harriso n Co . H

ou s. Fi n. Cor

p ., 988 S.W .2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). The
mov ant h a s th e burd e n to c on c lus ive ly dis pr ov e on e e le me nt o f the c ha lle ng e d ca us e of a c tio n o r t o conclusively

prove a ll of the eleme nts of an affirmative de fense
. Litt le v. Tex . Dep’ t of Cri m. Justice , 14 8 S.W.3 d 3 74 , 3 81 (T e x. 20 04 ); Pu ste jov sk yv . R ap id-

Am e ric an Cor

p ., 35 S.W .3d 643, 645-46 (Tex . 2 00 0) . E vid e nc e fa vo ra ble to t he no n- mov ant w ill be take n a s tr ue , a nd e ve ry re a so na ble04
- 09
- 00 47 4- CV

- 3- infere nce and any doubts will be resolved in the non- movant’s favor. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co. , 69 0 S. W.2 d 5 46 , 5 4 8
- 49 (T e x. 19 85 ). A m atte r i s c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh e d if re a so na ble pe op le c ou ld not differ as t o the conclusion to be dra wn from the e vidence
. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 814 (Tex. 2005). Whe n f i l i n ga n o - e v i d e n c e m o t i o nf

o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t , th e m o v an tmu s ts p e c i f i c a lly challeng e the e videntiary

support for an element of a cla im or defe nse. T EX . R. C IV . P. 16 6a (i ) c mt. (1997). T h e mo v an t is e n ti tl e d to s u mm ar y ju d g me n t if it c a

n p r o v e , a s a matt e r o f la w , th at the op po ne nt f

a iled to pr od

uc e le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt its the or y of lia bil ity or de fe ns e afte r ade quate time for d i s covery . T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a(i). Onc e the movant f iles a no-e vidence motion for summary

judgme nt, the responde nt has the burde n to produce summary judgme nt evidenc e ra ising a

g enuine issue of

materia l fac t on the challeng ed ele ment. Id .; Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004). Howe ver, the non-movant is not required to mar shal its proof; he nee d only

p re s en t s o m e evidenc e of pr obative value raisinga fa ct issue about which
rea sonable minds could diffe r. T EX . R. C IV . P. 16 6a (i ) c mt. (1 99 7) ; Johnson v. Brewer &Pritchard, P. C. , 73 S.W .3d 193, 2 0 7 (T ex . 2002)

. We view the evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the non-movant and disre g ard a ll contrary evidenc e and inf

ere nces. King Ranch, Inc. v . Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 750-51 (Te x . 2003). DI SCU SSIO N D E F AM AT I ON Spring c ontends she wa s defa med by WS P whe n one of its e mploy ees told third par ties she had stolen and de stroy ed customer information and files prior to he r resig nation. WS P a sserted f our g rounds for summar

y judgme nt on Spring’s de famation claim: ( 1) the stateme nts were protec ted by04
- 09
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- 4- a qualifie d privileg e; (2) the re is no evide nce that Spring “ did not eng ag e in the wr ong doing that she
c on te nd s w a s th e ba sis of the a lle g e d d e fa

mator y state me nts ;” (3 ) t

he re is n o e vidence that WSP made f alse or de famatory

statements re g ardingSpring to third par ties; and, (4) the re is no e vidence Spring w as har

med by the alleg ed stateme nts. In response to WS P’s moti o n for summary judgme nt, Spring filed the aff idavit of J err i Rhodes, who worke d for F amily Fa ith A ca d em y

and wa s responsible for coordinating a

nd purc ha sin gits ins ur anc e . Sp ri ngwa s th e a g e nt o n th e F amil y F a ithAc a de my

a c c ount whil e employ ed at WSP. J err i stated in her a ffidavit that Debbie Br ezezinski , a WSP employ ee, told her duringa telephone conver sation that Spring had stolen and destroy ed several of WS P’s hard c opy
and c omp ute r f

ile s. Jer ri atte ste d th at D e bb ie tol d h e r WSP ha d to c a ll a ll o f i ts c us tom e rs to o bta in information to rec onstruct its files beca use of Spring ’s ac tions. J err i also stated t hat she unde rstood this to m ean that WS P was ac cusingSpring of stealingand destroy

ing WSP’s customer information. For a private individ u al t o s u s tain a def amation claim, the plaintiff must prove that the de fe nd ant: (1 ) p ub lis he d a state me nt; (2 ) t

hat w a s d e fa

mator y c on c erni ng the pla int if

f; (3 ) whil e actingwith neg lige nce r eg ardingthe truth of the state ment. Se e W FA A- TV, In c . v . M

c Le mo re , 978 S.W. 2d 56 8, 57 1 (T e x. 19 98 ). An e mpl oye r h a s a

qu a lif ie d p ri vil e g e fo r c omm

un ic atio ns ma de in the course of an inve stigation following a repor t of employ ee wrong doing. Ra nd all ’s Fo od

Ma rk e ts, Inc. v . Johnson , 891 S.W .2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995). “The privileg e re mains i n t ac t as l ongas communications pass only to persons havingan intere st or duty in the matter to which the communications relate.” Id. W h et h er a qualified pr ivilege exis ts is a question of law. Calhoun v. Chase Manhattan Bank (

U.S.A.) , N.A ., 911 S.W .2d 403, 408 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
no wr it) . A dd iti on a lly , “ to i nv ok e the pr ivi le g e on summa ry jud g me nt, an e mpl oye r m us t04
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- 5- conclusively

establish that the alleg edly defa matory statement was made with an a bsence of malice .” Randall’s , 891 S.W .2d at 646. WS P argues the a lleg ed def amatory statements were made in the course of a n investigation, but did not prese nt any

evidenc e to support this contention. Wi thout evidence to establish that there
was an investigation, the purpose of the investigation, a nd that the information was g iven to parties with a cor

respondingduty

or intere s t , W S P d i d not conclusively establish its qualified privileg e. Mo re ov e r, WSP did no t ass e rt in t he tr ia l c ourt

or on a pp e a l th at th e a lle g e dly

de fa mator y state me nts
wer e made with the absenc e of ma lice. Ac cording ly , WS P was n o t entitled to summary judgme nt on the af firmative de fense of qualified pr ivilege
. See Randall’s , 891 S.W .2d at 646. WS P also sought summary judgme nt on the g round there was no evidenc e to establish Spring did no t e ng a g e in t

he wr on g do ingtha

t sh e c on te nd s w a s th e ba sis of a lle g e d d e fa

mator y state me nts
. Th is c on te nti on

is n ot a pr op e r gro un d f

or summa ry jud g me nt b e c a

us e Spr ingis a pr ivate ind ivi du a l, and the falsity

of the stateme nt is presumed. See H urlbut v. Gulf Atl. L ife Ins. Co. , 749 S.W .2d 762, 766 (Tex. 1987). The substantial tr uth of a statement is a

n aff irmative defe nse that must be proved by the def endant. Se e Tho ma s- Sm ith v . M ac k in , 2 38 S.W. 3d 50 3, 50 9 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Di st. ] 200 7, no pe t.) ; Randall’s , 891 S.W .2d at 646. Spring does not have the burden to prove the alleg ed stateme nts were false. Se e Grott i v . B e lo C or p ., 188 S.W .3d 768, 774 (T ex . App.—For t Worth 2006, pet. denied). B eca use WSP did not es t ab l ish the statements wer e substantially true, Spring did not h av e th e b ur d e nto r a is e a f a c t i s s u e o nth e f

a ls it y o f th e a ll e g e d ly

d e f amatory statements. Summary

judgme nt was not proper on this ground.04
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2 ... W SP al s o a r g u es on appe al t h at t h e def ama t i on cl ai m i s bar r ed by l i mi t at i on s ; h owe v er , l i mi t at i on s w as n ot ra ise d in a n y o f W S P ’s m o tio n s fo r su m m a ry j u d g m e n t. T h e re fo re , sum m a ry j u d g m e n t ca n no t b e su sta ine d o n this g r ou n d.
3 ... Re l a t i on - ba c k i s a do c t r i n e by w h i c h a n e a r l i e r - f i l ed pl e a di n g t ol l s t h e s t a t u t e of l i mi t a t i on s f

or c l a i ms ass ert ed in l at er ame nd ed pleadings , as l o ng as t he am end m ent s are not b ased o n new, dis t i nct , or d i f f erent t rans act i o ns o r o c c u rr e n c e s. T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E A NN . § 1 6 .0 6 8 (V e rn o n 2 0 0 8 ); s ee Lov at o v . Aus t i n Nur s i ng Ct r . , I nc ., 1 1 3 S .W .3 d 4 5 , 5 5 (T e x . A p p .— A u stin 2 0 0 3 )( re la tio n -b a c k d o c trine o rig ina te d a s e q u itab le re m e d y to e ff e c tua te ju stice ), a

f f ’d , 17 1 S.W
. 3 d 84 5 (T ex. 20 0 5 ).

- 6- WSP a lso a sse rt e d th e re is n o e vid e nc e that WSP made false or de fa mator y state me nts reg arding Spring to third parties or that Spring w as har

med by the statements. The aff

idavit of J err i Rh o d e s c l e ar l y r a i s e s a

f a c ti s s u e o nw h e th e r

d e f am at o r y s t at e m e n t s w e r e m a d e . A d d i t i o n a l l y, Spring’ s deposition testim ony that she did not rec eive business fr om one company beca use of the alleg ed stateme nts raises a f act issue on whe ther Springwas ha rmed. WSP wa s n ot e nti tle d to summa ry jud g me nt o n Sp ri ng ’s de fa matio n c la im. 2 B R EA C H O F C ONT RACT Spring a lleg ed WSP brea ched the ir 1993 employ ment contra ct by

failingto pay

her the
c omm iss ion s d

ue un de r the c on tr a c t. WSP mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt, a sse rt ingSpr ing ’s c la ims for br eac h of contra ct wer e bar red by limit ations beca

use Spri n g fi led her

counter claim on Marc h 24, 2005, and the c laims acc rued in J anuar y 2000, when the employ

ment ag ree ment was modified. In r e sp on se , Sp ri ngc on te nd s h e r c la ims a c c rued at each pay pe ri od wh e n s he wa s n ot p a id commissions in acc ordanc e with the t erms of the 1993 employ ment ag ree ment. She also argued the brea ch o f c o n tr a c t c la im is p e r mi tt e d un d e r th e r e lati o n - b a c k d o c tr in e b e c a u s e it ar is e s f

r o m the “same transac tion” as WSP ’s claims ag ainst her. 3 See T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 16.068 (Ve rnon 2008).04
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- 7- A four- y ear

statute of limit ations applies to c ontrac t actions. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 16 .0 04 (V e rn on

20 02 ). A c a

us e of a c tio n for br e a c h of c on tr a c t ge ne ra lly a c c ru e s at th e tim e of brea ch or wh en t h e claimant has notice of fa cts sufficie nt to place him on notice of the bre ach. Sti nev . S te war t , 8 0 S. W.3 d 5 86 , 5 92 (T e x. 20 02 ); Davis Apparel v. Gale- Sobel, a Div. of Ange lica Cor p ., 117 S.W .3d 15, 18 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, no pet.). A pa rty brea ches a

contra ct when h e o r s h e f

a il s to p e r f

o r m a d u ty o r v io late s an o b li g ati o n r e qu ir e d b y th e contra ct. Ho over v . Gr e go ry , 8 35 S.W. 2d

66 8, 67 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 19 92 , wri t de nie d) . Wh e n th e br e a c h r e late s to pay ment under a

contra ct that ca lls for fixed, pe riodic pay ments, a separ ate cause of ac tion accr ues for e ach missed pa

y ment. Davis Apparel , 1 17 S.W. 3d at 18 ; Interme dics, Inc. v . Grady , 683 S.W .2d 84 2, 84 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 84 , wri t r e f’ d n.r .e .) (“ [I ]f the te rm s of an a g re e me nt c a ll for pe riodic pay

ments duringthe cour se of the c ontrac t, a ca use of a ction for s u ch p aym ents may arise at the end of e ach pe riod, befor e t h e co n t ra ct i s completed” ). A c laim is ti me bar red if the pay ment was more than four y ear s overdue when suit is fil ed. Spin Doctor Golf, Inc. v . Payme ntech, L.P. , 296 S.W .3d 354, 362 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pe t. denied) ; Hollander v. Capon , 853 S.W .2d 723, 726-27 (Te x . App.—Houston [1stDist.] 1993, writ denied)
. Spring w as consider ed an independe nt contra ctor of WS P until 1993, when WSP and Spring enter ed into a wr itten employ ment ag ree ment. The e mploy ment ag ree ment included, among other things , a n o n -c o mp et i t i o nagr ee m en t , a n o n -p i ra cy co v en an t , an d

an agr ee m en tt o compensate Spring on a commission basis acc ordingto a sche dule attac hed to the agree ment. WS P alt ere d Spring’ s commission schedule numerous times during her t enure , which S pring conce des wa s allowed unde r the agree ment. In 1999, WS P de cided to cha ng e the manne r in which c ommissi ons would be calc ulated and pr ovided Spring with a document ref err ed to as “Rosema

ry Compensation” that had04
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- 8- an ef fec tive date of J anuar

y 1, 2000. Spring c ontends the cha ng e to the ca lculation of commissions provid ed fo r “commissi on splitt ing,” and this chang e bre ache d the 1993 agree ment. WS P and Spring’ s orig inal contra ct provided in pe rtinent part a s follows: “The Ag ency will pay the Employ ee compensation on sales in acc ordanc e with the Schedule as set forth in Exhi bit A attache d and made a par t here of.” The Schedule of Compensation in Ex hibit A to the 1993 ag ree ment provided: The Ag ency

will pay the Employ ee -40%- of first y ear commissions gene rate d by the Employ ee a

nd paid to the Ag ency . There afte r, t he Age ncy will pay the Employ ee - 20%- of rene wal commissions on personal lines but zero commis s i o n on persona l lin e s a uto bu sin e ss. The 1999 memora

ndum provided: Start ingfr om t

he date Janu ary

1, 20 00 a ll c omm iss ion s on ne wl y a c qu ir e d b us ine ss c an b e ne g oti ate d w iththe pr od uc e rs ba se d u

po n a n ag re e d u

po n p e rc e nta g e no t to e xce e d 6 0% , a

nd , in a ll c a se s, the arrangemen t is su bje c t to owne r a

pp ro va l. T his arr ang e me nt c an b e ne g oti ate d wit h mana g e me nt O R Ro se mary Spr ing , s ub

je c t to owner approva l. All prior commission arrang ements amongpro d u c e r s a r e n o t b e [sic] c ha ng e d, un le ss b y

owne r a pp ro va l.
WS P co n t en d s t hat Spring ’s claims ac crue d when the 1993 c ontrac t was modified by the “Rosemar y Memorandum,” which became effe ctive on J anuar y 1, 2000. WS P relies on Sun Medic al v. Ov erton , 864 S.W .2d 558 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1993, writ denied) to support its posi tion that limit ations beg an to run on the e ffe ctive date of the c ontrac t modification and not on ea ch date the actua l commissions wer e pai d
. The bre ach of employ ment contra ct in Su n M

e dic al related to a chang e in Over

ton’s sales ter

ritory
. Id . at 560. Afte r Over ton was terminate d, he wa s sued by Sun Medica l a n d h e counte rcla imed seekingrec overy of the c ommissi on on sales made by other sale sman in his old te rritory , claiminghis contrac t was bre ache d when his terr itory was c hang ed. Id . Over

ton
argue d li mit atio ns did no t beg in to ru n unti l the c on c lus ion of his se rv ic e s und e r t he c on tr a c t be c a

us e04
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- 9- his contrac t provided for

continuing pe rfor

mance . Id . Howeve r, the court de termined the a lteration of Ove rton’s terr itory

and t h er ef

o re his compe nsation, without proper notice to him, was unequivoca l, so that the brea ch of c ontrac t occur red when his terr itory

was c hang ed. Id . at 561. The holding in Sun Medic al

is inapplicable to this case beca use the modification of Spring ’s employ ment
a g re e me nt a ff

e c te d ho w he r c omm iss ion s c ou ld be calculated and had no immediate or unequivocal eff ect until eac h commission was neg otiated and pa id. Spring’ s employ

ment ag ree ment was a

“continuing co n t ra ct” with per iodic pay ment of commissions, and lim itations beg an for eac h alleg edly

defic i en t co mmissi on pay ment when the commission was paid. See Slusse r v. Un ion Bankers Ins. Co. , 7 2 S. W. 3 d 7 1 3 , 7 1 7 ( T e x. App.—Eastland 2002, no pe t.)(plaintiff’ s claims for a dditional commissi ons acc rued e ach time he
wa s p a id) ; Townewest Hom eowners Ass’n, Inc. v. W arner Commc’n Inc
. , 8 2 6 S. W. 2 d 6 3 8 , 6 4 0 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 92 , n o p e t.) (c ourt he ld whe n a g re e me nt c a lls fo r p e ri od ic pa y me nts duringcourse of the c ontrac t, cause of action for such pay ments arises at end of eac h period be fore contra ct is complete.)
. There fore , Spring’ s brea ch of c ontrac t claim is not barre d by limit ations for any alleg ed bre ach a

nd corr espondingdamag es for the four y ear s prec eding the date Springfiled her counter claim. Summary

judgme nt on Spring’s br eac h of contra ct claim wa s improper.

S EXU A L H ARAS S M E NT Spring ple d a hostile-wor k-environme nt theory

of g end er d i s crimi nation based on se x ual ha ra ssm e nt u

nd e r t he Te xas L a

bo r C od e and

Ti tle VI Iof

the Civ il Rig hts Ac t of

19 64 . Sp ri ngc la ims J ames Sac hse, pre sident of WSP , sexually hara ssed her

on at least thre e occ asions: once pushingher he a d into h is h ip a

nd patti nghe r h e a d; a

se c on d ti me thr

us tin ghis butto c ks int o h e r p e lvi c are a in
a cr owded e levator a

nd g rinding from side to side while laug hing; a nd on another

occa sion when he04
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4 ... T he F a ra g h e r/

E llerth a f

f i rma t i ve d ef

ense b ars the i m p o si t i o n o f vi cari o us l i ab i l i t y pred i cat ed on t he act i o ns o f a sup ervi sor if

the em p l o y er p roves: (1 ) t he em p l o y er exe rci sed reasonab l e care t o prevent and pro m p t l y co rr ect any s ex u al l y h ar as s i n g be h av i or , a n d ( 2) t h e pl ai n t i f f e mpl oy ee u n r ea s on abl y f ai l ed t o t ak e adv an t ag e of a n y pr ev en t i v e or c o rr e c tive o p p o rtu n iti e s p ro v id e d b y the e m p lo ye r o r to a v o id ha rm o the rw ise
. F aragher , 5 2 4 U .S . at 8 0 2 -0 8 ; E llerth , 524 U
. S. a t 765.

- 10- kis se d h e r c he e k a

nd ne c k. WSP so ug ht s umm ary jud g me nt o n Sp ri ng ’s se xua l ha ra ssm e nt c la im,
asser ting Springfailed to state a prima fa cie case of sexual harassment and the Fa ragh e r/E lle rth af fi rmative de fense
. 4 See F aragher v. City of Boca Raton , 5 2 4 U
. S. 7 7 5 , 7 8 0 , 8 0 7
- 0 8 , (1998); Bu rli ng ton In du s. , I

nc . v . E lle rth , 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). A plai n t iff asse rting a hostile-wor k-environme nt sex ual-ha rassment theor

y of job discrimination ag ainst h er empl oy er ha s the burden of establishing that: (1) she is a membe r of a protec ted class; (2) she wa s the vi ctim of uni nvited sexual hara ssment; (3) the ha rassment wa s based on sex; and (4) the har assment af fec ted a “ter

m, condition, or privileg e” of her e mploy

ment. See Ha rv ill v . W estw ar d Co mmc ’n s, L.L. C. , 433 F.3d 428, 434 ( 5th Cir. 2005). For c onduct to be actionable , a plaintiff must show “the workplac e was perme ated with dis criminatory intimi dation, ridicule, a

nd insult t hat is sufficiently sever e or pe rvasive to a lter the c ondition s o f t h e victim’s employ ment and cr eate a hostile or abusive workingenvironment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U. S. 1 7, 21 (1 99 3) (c itatio ns and int e rn a l quot atio n mar

ks omi tte d) . Se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt i s su ff

ic ie ntl y “seve re” or “pe rvasive” to alter the te rms, conditions, or privileg es of the victim’s e mploy ment when it can be sa id to c reate an “a busive workingenvironment.” See id. at2 4 (S ca l i a, J
. , co n cu rr i n g)

. The

“ a bu siv e ne ss” sta

nd ard is de sc ri be d by the Sup re me Court a s re qu ir ing “ e x tr eme ” co nd uc t, Faragher , 524 U. S. at 788 and “ take s a mid dle path b e tw e e n ma

kin ga c tio na

ble any c on du c t th at is
mere ly offe nsive and re quiring the conduct t o ca use a ta ng ible psy cholog ical injury .” Ha rri s , 510 U.S. at 21.04
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- 11- The wor k environment must be both objectively and subjec tively

made hostile or a

busive by the harassing conduct. Faragher , 5 2 4 U. S
. at 7 8 7
. “C o n d u ctth ati s n o ts ev er e o r p erv as i v e e n o u gh to c re ate an o bje c tiv e ly

ho sti le or

a bu siv e wo rk

e nv ir onme nt— a

n e nv ir onment th at a

re a so na ble person would f

ind hostil e or a

busive—is beyond [t he statute’s] purview.” Ha rri s , 510 U.S. at 211. In a sse ssi ngthe ob

je c tiv e ho sti lity

or a bu siv e ne ss o f t

he h a r a s s m e nt , t

h e dis c ri min ator

y c on du c t mu st be vie we d f

ro m th e pe rs pe c tiv e of

a reas on able pe rs on

in t he pla int if

f’ s p os iti on

in t he same circ umstances. Oncale v

. S u n downer Offshore Servs, I nc. , 52 3 U .S. 75 , 8 1 ( 19 98 ). Th e Sup re me Court ha s in str uc te d lo we r c ourt s to a

pp ly ob je c tiv e a bu siv e ne ss a s a le g a l thr e sh old to “ fi lte r o ut”
co mp la ints o f a ll e g e d h ar a s s me n t th at ar e n o t a c ti o n a b ly s e v e r e o r p e r

v a s iv e a s a matter of law
. Faragher , 524 U.S. at 787-88. The c ourts must consider the totality of t h e cir cumstance s, which include s th e f

r e qu e n c y o f th e d is c r im in ato r

y c o n d u c t; it s s e v e r it

y ; wh e th e r

th e c o n d

u c t w as phy sic a lly

thr e ate nin gor

humil iatin g , o r a

me re of fe ns ive utt e ra

nc e ; and wh e ther it

unre a so na

bly interfe red w ith the employ ee’ s work per formanc e. Id .; Ha rri s , 5 10 U.S. at 21. A hostile work environment claim is desig ned to address conduc t that is so severe or perva sive that it destroy s an employ ee’ s opportunity

to succe ed in the wor

kplace
. Sh e

ph e rd v . Co mp tro lle r o

f P ub licAc c ou nts , 168 F.3d 871, 874 ( 5th Cir.), cert. de nied , 528 U.S. 963 (1999). The c onduct descr ibed by Spring is similar to the ty pe of conduct Te x as cour

ts have de emed insufficient to c onstitut e actionable sexual ha rassment. For

example, in Staller v. Service Corp. Int’l , No . 0 4- 06 -0 02 12 -C V, 20 06 WL 30 18 03 9 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n Anton io Oc t. 25 , 20 06 , n o p e t.) (m e m. op.), the plaintiff a lleg ed two of he r super visors made sexually

inappropriate re marks to her such as “I ’ll bet y ou like it big,” whene ver she used t he wor d “big ” in conve rsation; commented to her about the size of her breasts; re fer red to male employ ees of the company

as her “lover ”; stood over he r04
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- 12- when she sat at her

desk and trie d to look down her shirt; came towar d her in a menac ing f

ashion as if to g rab he r in a sexual manner ; repe atedly indicated a desire to g o out and have a dr ink with her; and for bade he r fr om dating othe r employ ees. Id. at *5 . T his c ourt c on c lud e d the pla int if

f fa ile d to
e sta bli sha ho sti le wo rk

e nv iron men t claim a

nd a ff ir me d th e g ra

nti ng of a summa ry jud g me nt i n favor of the de fenda

nt. Id. Simi larl y , o ur

sis te r c ourt

a ff ir me d summ ary jud g me nt in favo r o f t he de fe nd ant o n a

ho sti le work e nvironment claim in Gar cia v. Schwab , 9 67 S.W. 2d 88 3, 88 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 1998, no pet.). In Ga rc ia , th e p l ai n t i ff ’s a l l e g a t i o n s aga i n s th er s u p er i o r i n cl u d edth e f

o l l o wi n g: staringat and c ommentin g o n h er b reasts; touching his g enitals; discussing hig hly persona l and sexual matters with her; re markingon her a ppear ance ; staringat and c ommenting on a photogr aph of a f e ma le c li e n t; c o mm e n ti n g o n th e a p p e ar an c e o f o th e r w o me n ; ma k in g r e p e ate d sexual ref ere nces she felt we re intended to arouse her; a nd insulti ngand y elling a

t her. Id. at 885. The c ourt deter mined the pl aintiff fa iled to raise a fac t issue reg ardingwhether the alleg ed conduc t affe cted a term, condition, or privileg e of he r employ ment. Id. at 887. The F ifth Circuit has also reje cted hostile work environment claims based upon fac ts more egr egi o u s th an th o s e a l l ege d b y S p ri n g. Fo r e x am p l e, in S

he ph e rd v . Co mp tro lle r o

f P ub licAc c ou nts , 168 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir.), cert. de nied , 528 U.S. 963 (1999), the plaintiff a lleg ed her cowor ker stood in front of her

desk and r emar

ked “your elbows a

re the same c olor as your nipples.” Id. at 872. The plainti ff also stated her cowor ker remar ked “y ou have big thighs” while he simulated looking under he r dre ss. Id. Th e alleg ed har asser alleg edly

stood over the plaintiff’ s desk on seve ral
occa sions a

nd tried to look down her clothing and “touche d her arm on sever al occ asions, rubbing one of his hands from her shoulder down t o her wrist while s tanding beside he r.” Id. Finally , on two04
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5 ... B ec au s e we af

f i r m W SP’ s s u mmar y j u dg men t on t h e g r ou n d Sa ch s e’ s c on du ct doe s n ot r i s e t o t h e l ev el of l ega l l y ac t i onabl e s exu al ha r as s ment , we do not add ress w he t her W SP es t abl i s hed t he F a ra g h e r/E llerth af f i rma t i ve d e fen se . F aragher , 5 2 4 U .S . at 7 8 0 , 8 0 7 -0 8 ; E llerth , 524 U
. S. a t 765.

- 13- occa sions, after c oming in late to a n office meeting , the alleg ed har asser “patted his lap a

nd rema rked [t o the plaintiff], ‘he re’ s y our seat.’” Id. The c ourt conc luded these a lleg ations did not establish an abusive wor

k environment. Id. at 872. Simi larly , in H

o c k m a n v . W es t w a rd C o m m c ’ n s , L.L. C. , 407 F.3d 317 ( 5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit af

firmed a summary judgme nt gr anted in fa

vor of the defe ndant despite the e x istence of more se vere alleg ations than those ra i s ed b y Spring. In Hock

man , the plaintiff cla imed her immediate supervisor c ommented on her body and her behind, m ade comments to her a bout the body of other e mploy ees, slappe d her behind with a new spaper , brushed up a g ainst her br easts and be hind,
atte mpt e d to kis s h e r, a sk e d he r to c ome in e arl y so the y c ou ld b e a lon e tog e the r, and on c e sto od

in the doorwa

y of the ladie s’ room to watc h plaintiff wash he r hands. Id. at 32 1- 22 , 3 28 . T he F if th Ci r c u it r e je c te d th e p la inti f

f ’ s h o s ti le w o r

k e n v ir o n me n t c la im

b e c a u s e it c o n c lu d e d

th e h ar a s s ing behavior was not so seve re or

perva sive as to af

fec t a term, condition, or privileg e of he r employ ment. Id. at 328-29. We hol d Spr ing wa s not sub je c te d to su c h s e ve re or

pe rv a siv e se xua l ha

ra ssm e nt t

hat w ou ld
cre ate a hostile or abusive wor

k environment a s to affe ct a ter m, conditi o n, or privileg e of
e mpl oy me nt o f a re a so na ble pe rs on

in S pr ing ’s po sit ion . A lth ou ghof fe ns ive , Sa c hs e ’s c on du c t is insufficiently

eg reg ious or extreme to support an actionable sexual harassment cla im. See H ockm an , 40 7 F .3 d at 32 8; Sh e

ph e rd , 168 F.3d at 873; Staller , 2 00 6 WL 30 18 03 9 at *1 ; Ga rc ia , 967 S.W .2d at 887. Summary

jud g me nt w a s p ro pe r o n Sp ri ng ’s se xua l ha ra ssm e nt c la im. 504
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- 14- A SS A U LT Spr ingargue s th e c on du c t th at su pp or ts h e r h ara ssm e nt c la im i s a lso a c tio na ble a s c ivi l assault. WSP moved for summar y judgme nt on Spring’ s assault claim asse rting Sachse w as ac ting outside the scope of

his authority

at the time of t h e alleg ed assa ult and there is no evidence of the int e nt e le me nt o f a ssa

ult
. C o n d u c tth at i s n o t a c t i o n a

b l e a s d i s c r i m i n at i o n un d e r th e T e x a s La b o r C o d e an d

T i t l e V II of t he C ivil Rights Act of 1964, may

be ac tionable as c ivil assault. See Twi gland F ashions, Lt d. v. Miller , No 03-07-00728, 2010 WL 850170, at*8 (Tex . App.—Austin Mar. 11, 2010, no pe t. h.). The elements for

civil assault mirror those r equire d for c riminal assault. S e e J o h n s o n v . D av is , 178 S.W .3d 230, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist] 2005 , p et. denied) . In the context of Spring’ s alleg ations of assault, a pe rson commits an assault if he intentionally or knowingly cause s phy sical contac t with another whe n the person knows or should rea sonably believe that the other will reg ard the contac t as o ff

en sive or provoc ative. SeeT EX . P EN . C ODE ANN . § 22.01(a) (3)( Ver non Supp. 20 07 ); see Umana v. Kroger Tex ., L.P. , 239 S.W .3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pe t.). To impose lia b i l i t y o n WS P for Sachse ’s alleg ed assa ult, Sachse’s a ctions must either be imputed to W SP or S achse ’s ac ts must be considere d those of the c ompany . Hamme rly Oaks, I nc. v. Edwards , 958 S.W .2d 387, 391 (Tex. 1997)
. Actions of a vice- principal of a co rporation committed in the workplac e may be dee med to be the a cts of the corporation itself and ar e imputed to t he c or po ratio n r e g ard le ss o f whethe r th e vi c e -p ri nc ipa l is a c tin gwi thi n th e sc op e of his employ ment when he commits an i n t en t i o n al t ort. GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruc e , 998 S.W .2d 605, 618 (Tex. 1999)(vice -principa l’s acts supportingintentional infliction of emotional distress were corpor ations’s ac ts). The summary judgme nt evidence es tablishes that Sachse is the pr esident of04
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- 15- WSP, is an ei g hty -f

ive pe rc e nt ow ne r o f WSP , a nd wa s Sp ri ng ’s su

pe rv iso r. Th is e vid e nc e ra ise s a fac t issue on whether

Sachse is a vic e princ ipal and thus his actions ca n be imputed to WS P. See id. As to the se c on d g ro un d fo r summa ry jud g me nt, Spr ingre lie s o n Sa c hs e ’s c on du c t to ra ise a fa ct issue on intent. Intent to commit assault may be infe rre d from the a ctor’s c onduct. Pineda v. City of Houston ,175 S.W .3d 27 6 , 2 8 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2004, no pet.)(c iting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965)( intent e stablished when fac ts de monstrate ac tor desire d to cause conseque nces of

his act, or he believes c onsequenc es ar e subst antially cer tain to result from it.); se e als o Umana , 2 39 S.W. 3d at 43 6. Spr ingde sc ri be d th e thr e e inc ide nts wi th S a c hs e and a ll involved phy sical t ouching (once pushing he r hea d into his hi p and pattingit; a second time thrusting his butto c ks int o he r pe lvi c are a in a c ro wd e d e le vator

and g ri nd ingfr om s ide to s ide a ll the wh ile laug hing; a

nd kissing Springon her c heek a nd neck) . Nina Carlile, Spring’s c o-employ ee, w itnessed the e le vator

inc ide nt a

nd te sti fi e d in

he r d e po sit ion

that he pu sh ed up ag a ins t Sp ri ngwi th h is “re are nd and rubbe d it ag ainst her.” B a se d o n Sa c hs e ’s c on du ct, we ho ld re a so na ble min ds c ou ld d if

fe r a s to wh e the r S a c hs e knew or should have re asonably believed that Spring would reg ard his a lleg ed conduct a s offe nsive
or pr ov oc ativ e . Summa

ry jud g me nt w a s im

pr op e r o n th e a ssa

ult c la im. C ON STRU C TI V E D I S CHARG E Spring c laims Sachse’s ha rassment a

nd WS P’s failure to pa

y her c ommissi ons compelled he r to resig n from WSP . WS P contends there is no evidence that Sachse’ s alleg ed conduc t was done wi th t he int e nti on of fo rc ingSpr ingto q uit . A lte rn ativ e ly , WSP a sse rt s th at a re a so na ble pe rs on

in Spring’ s position would not have f elt compelled to re sign.04
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- 16- Constructive dischar ge re quires a greater de g ree of har assment than that re quired to prove
a hostile e nvironment claim. Brown v . Ki nn e ySh oeCor

p ., 237 F.3d 556, 566 ( 5th Cir.), cert. de nied , 534 U.S. 817 (2001); Benningfield v. City of Houston , 1 5 7 F.3d 369, 378 ( 5th Cir. 1998), c e rt. denied, 526 U.S. 1065 (1999). Discr imination alone, without ag g ravating f actor s, is insufficient for a cla im of constructive discha rg e. Lan dg

ra f v . U SI Fi lm Prod

s. , 968 F.2d 427, 429- 30 (5th Cir. 1992), aff’d , 511 U.S. 244 (1994). As discussed above , Spring’ s sexual harassment cla ims fa il a s a matter of law. “Creation of a h o s t i l e w o rken v i ro n m en ti s a ne ce s s ary p re d i ca t e to a h o s t i l e- en v i ro n m en tco n s tru ct i v e d i s ch ar ge
case .” Pe nn . Sta te Po lic e v . S ud e rs , 542 U.S. 129, 149 (2004). Summary judgme nt was prope r on Spr ing ’s c on str

uc tiv e dis c ha

rg e c la im. F LSA C L A IM WSP wa s g ra

nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n Sp ri ng ’s F L SA o ve rt ime c la im on the g ro un d it is barr ed by limit ations. See 29 U.S.C. 255(a ). Spring contends he r cla ims are not bar red by limit ations beca use: (1) he r o ri gi n al co u n terc laim ga ve fa ir notice of he r cla im; (2) her ove rtime claim wa s tim e ly un de r t he re latio n- ba c k doc tr ine ; and , (3) e ve n if he r ove rt ime c la im wa s n ot p le d unti l Apr il 2007, a fa ct issue exist s as to whether WS P’s viola tions were w illful and subject to the three y ear statute of limitations. On M ar ch 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 , S p ri n g fi l eda c o un t er cl ai mas s ert i n g th e f o l l o wi n g: Fair Labor Standards Act . Plaintiff/Count er- Def endant’ s failure to pay

Ms. Spring any of the c ommissi on s owed f or the months of January and F ebrua

ry 2005 constitutes a violation of the Fa ir L abor Standa rds Act ( FL SA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq . Under the FL SA, the Plaintiff/Count er- Def endant is re q u ired to pay Ms. Spring wag es f o r a llh o u r s w o r k e d
. Pur suant to the FL SA, Defe ndant/Counter-Plaintiff see ks pa y me nt of a ll wa g e s owe d, liq uid ate d dama g e s, and atto rn e y ’s fe e s, int e re st, and a ll such other a

nd further relief to which she may

be entitled.04
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- 17- Texas follows the “ fair notice” standard f or pleading , which looks to whether the opposing party

can
asce rtain fr om t h e p l ea ding the nature and basic issues in controver sy and what testimony

will be rele vant. Ho riz on/CM

S H e alt hc ar e Cor p. v . A uld, 34 S.W. 3d

88 7, 89 7 ( Te x. 20 00 ). “ ‘Ape tit ion is sufficie nt if it gives fair and adequa te not ice of the fac ts upon which the plea der ba ses his claim. The purpose of

this rule is to give the opposing party information s ufficie nt to enable him to prepare a defe nse.’” Id
. (qu o t i n g Roark v. A llen , 633 S.W .2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982)). Spr ing ’s c ountercl aim re c ite d “ [Spr ing ] se e ks pa y me nt o f a ll w a g e s o we d .
. . .” We h old Spring’ s alleg ations in her orig inal counter claim wer e broad enoug h to pr ovide WS P f air notice of Spring’ s overtime cla im. Spring’s ove rtime claim for the two y ears p ri o r t o filing the orig inal counter claim is not tim e bar red. Spr inga lso ple d WSP wi llf ull y vio late d the F L SA. A w ill fu l vi olatio n g ive s r ise no t on ly to a cla im for three y ear s of unpaid wa g es, but also an e q u al amount of unpaid wa g es as liquidated damag es and attorney ’s fe es, which a re not available f

or a non- willful violation. 29 U.S.C

. §§ 215- 217; see M

cLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co. , 486 U.S. 128, 132 (1988). WS P sought summary judgme nt on the g round there is no e vidence it willfull y violated the F L SA. Un de r t

he F L SA, a

vio latio n is “ wi llf

ul” if the e mpl oye r e ith e r “ ‘k ne w o r s ho we d r e c kle ss disreg ard for . . . whether its conduct wa s prohibited by the statute.’” Reich v . Bay, Inc ., 23 F.3d 110, 1 1 7 (5 thC i r. 1 9 9 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Mc Lau gh lin , 486 U.S. at 133). “I f an e mploy er a cts unrea sonably , but
no t r e c kle ssl y , in

de te rm ini ngits le gal ob li gati on ” un de r t he F L SA, its a c tio n is no t w ill fu l. Mc Lau gh lin , 486 U.S. at 1 3 5 n . 1 3
. T he Supreme Court expl ained in Mc Lau gh lin that the willful04
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- 18- standard r equire s more than mer e neg lige nce, a nd more than a

mere failure to seek leg al advice about a potentially

difficult classific ation decision. Id . at 134-35. Spring r elies on the followingevidenc e to ra ise a fa ct issue on reckless di sreg ard: Spring ’s complaints to Sachse that she was entitled to overtime, whic h wer e “of fhande dly ” dismissed; and the testimony

of Randy Br istow, W SP’s treasurer and vice-pre sident in charg e of pa y roll, that he relied on his per sonal “pre sumptions” and “under standing ” about F L SA require men t s o b tained at
se min ars , a

nd that he did

no t c on su lt a

n atto rn e y re g ard ingtho se re qu ir e me nts
. We hold Spring did not raise a fac t issue on whether WS P kne w it did not comply with the FL SA or showed r eckle ss disreg ard f or whe ther it complied. The e vidence prese nted by Spring ma

y be su ff ic ie nt to ra ise a fa c t iss ue on ne g lig e nc e but is no t su ff ic ie nt to ra ise a

fa c t is su e on

re c kle ss disreg ard. See id. (findingof willfulness ca nnot be base d on neg lige nce or on g ood-fa ith but incor

rec t assumption that pay

plan complied with FL SA). The trial c ourt err ed in g rantingsummary judgme nt on the two y ear statute of limit ations on Spring’ s clai m t h at W SP vi olated the F L SA. Howeve r, the trial c ourt proper ly g rante d the no evidenc e mot ion for summ ary judgme nt under the three y ear statute of limitations because Spring did no t r a ise a fa c t is su e on

wh e the r WSP wi llf

ull y vio late d th e F L SA. Th e summa ry jud g me nt i s
reve rsed on Spring ’s FL SA claims under the two y ear statute of limitations and affirme d on Spring’ s claim for a

willful violation of the FL SA. W R ON GFUL I NJ UNCT I ON To avoid S p ri n g’s wrong ful injunction claim, WS P asserted in its motion for summary jud g me nt t

hat T e xas d oe s n ot r e c og nize a c a us e of a c tio n f or wr on g fu l in

jun c tio n b a se d o n th e fa c ts04
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- 19- pled b y S pring . Spring a lleg ed “B eca use the tempora

ry injunction entere d in this m atter w as wrong fully obtained, Springis entitled to recove r ag ainst the injunction bond as well as a ll damag es proxi mately

cause d by

WS P’s wrong ful injunction.” Texas rec og nizes two separate ca uses of action for wrong ful injunction, one upon the bond ordinarily filed to obta in the injunction, a nd the other for malicious p rosec ution. DeSantis v. W ac k e nh ut C or p ., 793 S.W .2d 670, 685 (Tex. 1990), cert. de nied , 498 U.S. 1048 (1991). The two actions diffe r in the kind of wrong which must be shown to establish liabilit y and in the amount of
rec overy . Id. A ca

use of action upon an inj unction bond is predicated upon a br eac h of the c ondition of the bond. Id . T he c la ima nt m us t pr ov e that th e te mpo ra ry inj un c tio n wa s iss ue d whe n it sh ou ld not have be en, and that it was later dissolved. Id . at 685-86. T h e cl ai m an t n eed not pr ove that the temporar y injunction was obtained maliciously or without probable c ause. Id. at 68 6. Th e purp os e of the bond is to protec t the defendant from the harm that may be caused as a result of the temporar y injunction, which is gr an t ed on the lower burde n of proof require d of the injunction plaintiff and defe ndant, pendingfull consideration of all issues. Id . The damag es under this claim are limited by the amount of the bond. Id
. A ca use of a ction for malicious prose cution require s the claimant prove the inj un c tio n s uit

wa s p ro se c ute d ma lic iou sly and wi tho ut p ro ba

ble c a us e , a nd wa s ter

min ate d in h i s fa v or. Id
. T h e in

ju n c ti o nd e f

e n d an t r e c o v e r s a c tu a l d ama g e s th at r e s u lt e d f r o m t h e p e r ma n ent injunction suit
. Id . Spring’ s counterc laim was suffic ient to give notice of both cau s es o f ac tion ref err ed to as wr ong ful injunction claims. See id. W S P wa s n o ten t i t l edt o s u m m ary j u d gm en tb as edo n i t s co n t en t i o nth atS p ri n g’s p l ea d i n gs failed to state a

claim for wrong ful injunction. Ce nte nn ial In s. Co. v . Com me rc ial Un ion In s. Cos

. , 803 S.W .2d 479, 482 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1991, no writ)(pa rty should not circumve nt04
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6 ... T h e t r i al c ou r t on l y a ddr es s ed t h e t h r es h ol d i s s u e of wh et h er Spr i n g wa s en t i t l ed t o at t or n ey ’ s f ee s an d n ot the a m o u n t o f t h e fee s.

- 20- protec tive features of specia l exception proce dure by urg ing motion for summary judgme nt on the pleading s or by

other mea

ns when plaintiff’ s pleading s fail to state a claim). WSP did not file a noe vid e nc e or

tr a dit ion a l mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt on S pring ’s wr on g fu l in jun c tio n c la im. S ummary judgme nt is im proper when the only

g round i s the par

ty ’s fa ilure to state a c ause of action. Tex. De pt. of Corr

s. v. He rring , 513 S.W .2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974). We reve rse a nd rema nd the orde r g ra nti ngWSP’ s mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt o n Sp ri ng ’s wr on g fu l in jun c tio n c la im. A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES Finally , Spring c ounterc laimed for attorney ’s fee s pursuant to se ction 15.51(c) of the Te x as Business a

nd Commerce Code . Spring sought recove ry of t he attorney ’s fees i ncurr ed in defending ag ainst WS P’s suit t o enfor ce t h e non-compe te and non- pirac y provisions in their employ ment ag ree ment. The iss ue of attorney s’s fee s was presented to the t rial j udg e at the end of the jury trial
on WS P’s claims ag ainst Spring. The t rial court denied Spring’s claim and entered findings of fac t and conc lusions of law. 6 Spring c ontends she e s ta b li s h ed the non- compete a nd non-pirac y

provisions in h e r 1 99 3 co nt ract wer e ov e rb ro a d a s a matte r o f l aw, and

that WSP so ug ht t o e nf or c e tho se provisions to a g reater e x tent than nec essar y . The Te x as Covenants Not To Compete A ct applies to non-c ompete c o v en an t s in personal service s ag ree ments when t he promisee seeks to enf orce the cove nant to a g reater e x tent than
nece ssary to protect its g oodwill or other business intere sts. T EX . B US . AND C OM . C ODE ANN . subchapte r E et. seq . ( Ve rn on 20 02 ). Se c tio n 1 5. 51 (c ) p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art :04
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- 21- I f t he pr ima ry purp os e of

the a g re e me nt t o whic h th e c ov e na nt i s anc ill ary

is t o obligate the promisor to re nder p er s onal servic es, the promisor e stablishes that the pr omi se e kn e w at th e tim e of the e xec uti on

of the a g reem ent that

the c ov e na

nt d id not contain limitations as to time, g eog raphic al ar ea, a nd scope o f activity

to be restra ined that wer e re asonable and the limitations im posed a greater re straint than nece ssary to protect the g oodwill or other business intere st of t he promisee , and the pr omi se e so ug ht t o e nf

or c e the c ov e na

nt to a greate r e xtent th at w a s n e c e ssa ry to protec t the g oodwill or other business intere st of the promi see, the court may awa rd the pr omi so r t

he c os ts, inc lud ingre a so na ble atto rn e y ’s fe e s, a c tua lly and re a so na bly incurre d by

the promisor in defe nding the action to enf orce the cove nant.
T EX . B US . & C OM . C ODE ANN . § 15.51(c) (Ve rnon 2002). Be cause the s tatute provides “the cour t
may awa rd ” atto rn e y ’s fe e s, the awa rd of atto rn e y ’s fe e s is wi thi n th e tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n a nd is not mandatory
. Bouquet v. H erring , 972 S.W .2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998)(statutes providing pa rty “may
rec o v e r , ” “ s h a ll b e aw ar d e d , ” o r “ is e n ti tl e d

to ” att o r n e y s f e e s ar e ma

n d ato r y an d s tatute s tha t provide c ourt “may

awa rd” a re pe rmissive and require abuse of discretion to over

turn order g ranting or deny ing a war d). The pa

rty claimingabuse of

discretion has the burden on ap peal to show the abuse of discretion. Clade v. Larsen , 838 S.W .2d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, wr it denied). Acc ording ly , Spring must demonstrate the trial cour t abused its discretion in denying he r attorne y ’s fee s. A t ri al cour

t abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitra ry , unrea sonable, a

nd without
re fer ence to guidingprinciples. Goode v . Shoukfeh , 9 4 3 S. W. 2 d 4 4 1 , 4 4 6 ( T e x. 1 9 97). When
re vie wi nga

tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on fo r a bu se of dis c re tio n, we mus t vi e w the e vid e nc e in t he light m os t favor able to the trial court’s ruling and indulge ever y presumption in its favor. Ph ill ips &Ak e rs, P. C.
v . Co rn we ll , 927 S.W .2d 276, 279 (Tex
. App.—Houst on [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ.). We may not
reve rse f or an a buse of discr etion beca

use we disag ree with the trial court’ s decision as long as that decision wa s within t h e t ri al court’s discretionary authority
. Beaumont Bank , N.A. v. Buller , 80604
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- 22- S.W. 2d 22 3, 22 6 ( Te x. 19 91 ). An a bu se of dis c re tio n d oe s n ot e xist if the tr ia l c ourt bases its decision on conf

licting e vidence and some e videnc e supports the trial cour t’s decision. Exe cutive Tele-Communication Syste ms, Inc. v . Buchbaum , 669 S.W .2d 400, 403 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ). The only evidence pre sented duringthe benc h trial was a short excerpt of de position testimony of WSP ’s pre sident, J ames Sac hse. Sachse’s testimony established that Springdid not
wr ite or se rv ic e mari ne ins ur anc e , co ntr a c tor ’s c ov e ra g e , o r m oto r t ru c k c arg o c ov e ra g e , o r a

va ri e ty of other ty pes of cover ag e, while working at WSP . Sachse a dmitted the injunction prohibit ed Spring from wor king a s an age nt in competition with W SP wit hin a 25 mile radius of WSP’s principal place of business on any

line of insuranc e and c ontactingany of its 5000 customers. A pre dicate to an aw ar d o f att o r n e y ’ s f e e s is p r o o f th at ( 1 ) WS P kn e w at th e time the employ ment ag ree ment was e x ecute d that the cov en an t d i d not contain limitations as to time, g eog raphic al ar ea, a

nd scope of

activity to be re strained that wer e re as o n able a nd the limitations imposed a g reater re straint than nec essar y to protect WSP ’s g oodwill or other business intere st, and (2 ) WSP so ug ht to e nf

or c e the c ov e na

nt to a g re ate r e xtent tha

n wa s ne c e ssa

ry to p ro te c t it s g oo dw ill or other business interest. Under section 15.51, Spring w as re quired to establish these f acts be fore the trial cour

t could exercise its discre tion to award attorney ’s fe es. See T EX . B US . & C OM . C ODE ANN . § 1 5. 51 (c ) ( Ve rn on

20 02 ). Sa c hs e ’s te sti mony did no t e sta bli shthe se fa c tor s.04
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7 ... B ec au s e we h ol d t h e t r i al cou r t di d not abu s e i t s di s cr et i on , w e n ee d n ot a ddr es s w h et h er t h e ex pi r at i on of the inj u n c tio n re n d e re d S p rin g ’s cla im fo r a tto rn e ys’s fee s m o o t.

- 23- Ba sed on the re cord be fore us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing Spring her attorney ’s fe es. We aff irm the t ake nothing judgment on Spring ’s claim for attorney ’s fe es under section 15.51 of the B usiness and Commerce Code. 7 CO NC LU SION The trial c ourt’s judg ment is af f ir me d on Spring’ s sexual harassment, construc tive discharg e, and attorne y ’s fe es cla ims. The judgment i s reve rsed a nd rema nded on Spring ’s def

amation, bre ach of c on tr a c t, a ssa

ult , F L SA, and

wr on g fu l in

jun c tio n c la ims
.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice