UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4585

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RAMAR LESHAWN BARTEE, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00495-D-1)

Submitted: July 26, 2022 Decided: August 11, 2022

Before QUATTLEBAUM and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Jorgelina E. Araneda, ARANEDA LAW FIRM, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H. Miller, Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Booth, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Michael F. Easley, 

Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Daniel 

W. Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Romar Leshawn Bartee, Jr., was convicted after a jury trial of possessing a firearm 

as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and the district court sentenced 

Bartee to 78 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Bartee challenges his conviction on two 

grounds. First, Bartee contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction and that 

therefore the district court erred in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion. Second, Bartee 

argues that the district court erred in admitting several pieces of evidence. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

A district court, “on the defendant’s motion[,] must enter a judgment of acquittal of 

any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 29(a); United States v. Duroseau, 26 F.4th 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2022). We generally 

“review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion.” United States v. Moody, 2 

F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021). We draw all reasonable inferences from the facts when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, United States v. Denton, 944 F.3d 

170, 179 (4th Cir. 2019), and “will uphold the verdict if . . . it is supported by substantial 

evidence,” United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Substantial evidence “is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could 

accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant “legal question 

[is] whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “[a] defendant who brings a sufficiency challenge 

bears a heavy burden, as appellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is confined 

to cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Savage, 885 F.3d at 219 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), the government 

must prove (1) that the defendant knew he had been convicted of an offense punishable by 

a term exceeding one year of imprisonment, (2) that he knowingly possessed a firearm, and 

(3) that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. 

Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019); see United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 395 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Bartee contends that the evidence fails to establish that he knowingly possessed a 

firearm. We disagree. Law enforcement officers testified that they saw Bartee at the scene 

carrying a bag, that bag was discovered in a trash can where Bartee was apprehended, and 

the firearm was in the bag. Moreover, in recorded phone calls from prison, Bartee admitted 

that the gun was his. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found that 

Bartee knowingly possessed the firearm. 

Next, we review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2020). “A district court abuses its 

discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized 

factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, 

or commits an error of law.” United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2021) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We will not overturn a conviction due to an erroneous 

evidentiary ruling if the error is harmless—that is, if we can “say with fair assurance, after 

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pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v. Brizuela, 962 F.3d 

784, 798 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

First, Bartee contends that the district court erred in admitting still images of 

surveillance footage recorded by an officer’s cell phone, arguing that the images did not 

meet any of the exceptions under Fed. R. Evid. 1004. Notwithstanding Bartee’s Rule 1004 

argument, we find that the still images were admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 1003. Rule 

1003 provides that “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a 

genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the circumstances make it 

unfair to admit the duplicate.” A duplicate is “a counterpart produced by a mechanical, 

photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately 

reproduces the original.” Fed. R. Evid. 1001(e). Bartee did not and does not challenge the 

original’s authenticity or the accuracy of the reproductions. Therefore, we find that the 

images were admissible under Rule 1003.

Next, Bartee contends that the district court erred in admitting his booking 

photographs because they were not relevant and were more prejudicial than probative. 

“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the 

action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “[R]elevance typically presents a low barrier to admissibility.” 

United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 346 (4th Cir. 2003). “Indeed, to be admissible, 

evidence need only be worth consideration by the jury, or have a plus value.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

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However, a district court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403; see 

United States v. Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628, 643 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Rule 403 states that a district 

court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a 

danger of unfair prejudice or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” (cleaned up)). 

“[U]nfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the 

factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense 

charged.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, under Rule 403, relevant evidence is inadmissible “when 

there is a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and 

. . . this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” PBM 

Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “We will not overturn a Rule 403 decision except under the most 

extraordinary of circumstances, where a trial court’s discretion has been plainly abused.” 

Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 349-50 (4th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). 

Booking photographs are generally admissible if they are based on the defendant’s 

arrest for the instant offense, and the photo does not have any markings indicating that the 

defendant was incarcerated. United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir. 1979). 

Here, the photos were based on Bartee’s arrest for the instant offense and did not have any 

markings indicating that Bartee was incarcerated. If the photographs were more prejudicial 

than probative, any error was harmless; ample evidence supported Bartee’s conviction even 

without the booking photographs.

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Accordingly, we affirm Bartee’s criminal conviction and sentence. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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