IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30359

Summary Calendar

LEONARD M. PRICE, 

Plaintiff–Appellant

v.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS; KAREN C. TURNER, in her

capacity as Executive Director for Housing Authority of New Orleans;

DESIRE AREA RESIDENTS COUNCIL; KATHLEEN MATTHEWS, in her

capacity as president for Desire Area Residents Council and in her individual

capacity; BONNIE ROGERS, also known as Bonnie Peters, in her capacity as

vice president for Desire Area Residents Council and in her individual

capacity; MARGARET MCMILLAN, in her capacity as treasurer for Desire

Area Residents Council and in her individual capacity, 

Defendants–Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:09-CV-4257

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 30, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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Leonard Price, the Appellant, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

filed suit against the Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”), the Desire

Area Residents Council (“DARC”), and members of both organizations

(collectively the “Appellees”). He claims that the Appellees failed to provide him

with economic opportunities allegedly guaranteed to him through a public

housing redevelopment plan. The district court granted summary judgment to

the Appellees. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the district court, Price pursued a bevy of claims arising out of a

memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) between HANO and DARC. The MOU

states, in relevant part,

The Authority [HANO] will train residents for all types of economic

opportunities, including but not limited to management,

entrepreneurship, construction and maintenance. The Authority

will hire residents during the planning, reconstruction and

re-occupancy of Desire LA 1-14. The DARC will participate with the

identification and selection of the Desire residents in hiring

programs. The Authority will consider DARC or Desire Resident[s]

for available contracts for any and all phases of planning,

reconstruction, evaluation and monitoring of Desire, LA 1-14.

Price claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that he was denied due process because

the Appellees (1) failed to provide him any job training or assistance, (2) failed

to allow him to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the

redevelopment, and (3) failed to give adequate notice of their meetings. 

Additionally, Price alleged an (4) equal protection violation because of the hiring

practices of DARC and (5) a Louisiana state-law claim seeking to enforce the

MOU as a third-party beneficiary thereof. 

On appeal, however, due to the poor briefing of his newly-obtained counsel,

Price has waived nearly all of his claims for error. In his brief to this court, Price

sets out four “Assignment[s] of Error,” but the brief never puts forth any

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argument on these points; therefore, they are waived. Fed. R. App. P.

28(a)(9)(A); United States v. Jimenez, 509 F.3d 682, 695 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Moreover, of the issues that were briefed, one is “A Summary Judgment

Fradulently Obtained Should be Annulled on Appeal.” In this section, the

argument seems to be that the Appellees committed a fraud on the district court

that ought to be corrected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). The

only authority that Price’s counsel cites is the corresponding Louisiana rule, see

La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 2004, and a case from this court interpreting that

provision. Such an accusation of fraud without any factual or legal support is 1

also deemed waived. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A); Jimenez, 509 F.3d at 695.

We do find two claims sufficiently briefed so as to preserve them for our

review: (1) the district court erred in not finding a property interest for the

purposes of Price’s due process claim and (2) the district court erred in finding

that Price was not a third-party beneficiary to the MOU under Louisiana law. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same standards as the district court. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 641

F.3d 118, 124 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where the

movant shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In reviewing the

record, all facts and inferences are construed in the light most favorable to the

non-movant. Id. 

It is unclear from the citation, however, to what Price’s counsel is directing this court. 1

Her citation is to “St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425 ( 5th Cir. 2000), citing

Chiarella v. U. S. , 100 S. Ct. 1108 [sic].” Nowhere in our opinion in St. Paul Mercury

Insurance do we cite to Chiarella. This is not the only sloppy citation in Price’s counsel’s

confusing brief. Earlier, she appears to quote language from Reese v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 210

F. Supp. 2d 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2002), which does not appear in that opinion.

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Due Process Claim

Price argues that 24 C.F.R. pt. 135.1 gave him a property interest 2

protected by the Due Process Clause. He claims that the Appellees failed to

provide him job training or assistance. 

To state a claim under § 1983, [a] plaintiff[] must allege two

elements: first, that they were deprived of a right or interest secured

by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and second, that

the deprivation occurred under color of state law. . . . [I]n § 1983

suits alleging a violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, . . . [p]laintiffs must (1) assert a protected

“liberty or property” interest and (2) show that they were deprived

of that interest under color of state law.

Doe v. Rains Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). “In order for a person to have a property interest within the ambit of

the Fourteenth Amendment, he ‘must have more than an abstract need or desire

for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,

have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.’” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42

F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577

(1972)).

 Part 135.1 states, in relevant part, 2

The purpose of section 3 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (12

U.S.C. [§] 1701u) (section 3) is to ensure that employment and other economic

opportunities generated by certain [Department of Housing and Urban

Development] financial assistance shall, to the greatest extent feasible, and

consistent with existing Federal, State and local laws and regulations, be

directed to low- and very low-income persons, particularly those who are

recipients of government assistance for housing, and to business concerns which

provide economic opportunities to low- and very low-income persons.

24 C.F.R. 135.1(a).

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Part 135.1 states the purpose behind the enactment of 12 U.S.C. § 1701u.3

The language of part 135.1, however, does not speak to any particular

entitlement, but rather to the goals of Congress in enacting the Housing and

Urban Development Act of 1968. The “vague and amorphous” provisions of part

135.1 is insufficient to support a finding that Price had a property right to

anything. Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also Wilson v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 991

F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The mere fact that a government program

exists does not give a person a property interest in participating in the program.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

B. Third-Party Beneficiary Claim

Price further argues that he is entitled to enforce the MOU because it

includes a stipulation pour autrui; that is, he is a third-party beneficiary. See

La. Civ. Code art. 1978. The Louisiana Supreme Court has laid out a test to

4

determine if a contract intends to create a stipulation pour autrui: “1) the 

stipulation for a third party is manifestly clear; 2) there is certainty as to the

 Section 1701u states, in relevant part, 3

In other programs that provide housing and community development

assistance, the Secretary shall ensure that, to the greatest extent feasible, and

consistent with existing Federal, State, and local laws and regulations,

opportunities for training and employment arising in connection with a housing

rehabilitation(including reduction and abatement of lead-based paint hazards),

housing construction, or other public construction project are given to low- and

very low-income persons residing within the metropolitan area (or

nonmetropolitan county) in which the project is located.

12 U.S.C. § 1701u(c)(2)(A). 

Since federal jurisdiction over this claim arises out of state law, we apply the 4

substantive law of the forum state. First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 181

(5th Cir. 2009) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938)). “To determine

Louisiana law, we look to the final decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.” Bradley v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 620 F.3d 509, 516 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010).

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benefit provided the third party; and 3) the benefit is not a mere incident of the

contract between the promisor and the promisee. Joseph v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No.

2 of Parish of St. Mary, 939 So.2d 1206, 1211 (La. 2006). Neither the benefit nor

the beneficiary is manifestly clear in this instance. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the Appellees.

AFFIRMED.

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