March 22, 1977

Washington, D.C., Hostage Situation: Basis for

Federal Jurisdiction

77-13 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

The United States Attorney for the District of Columbia is under the 

immediate supervision of the Attorney General, in a chain of command 

sense, because of the Federal Government’s responsibility for the District and the U.S. Attorney’s role as chief prosecutor of crimes arising 

under the District of Columbia Code. For this reason, and apart from 

any consideration of Federal jurisdiction based on violations of Federal 

law, the Attorney General has a basis on which to participate with the 

U.S. Attorney in formulating a response to situations such as this. 

Section 533 of Title 28 provides that the Attorney General may appoint 

officials to conduct investigations regarding official matters under the 

control of the Department of Justice. In our opinion, this statute provides the Attorney General, at least, with authority to provide investigative support to local officials in connection with actions of a local 

nature within the District. This conclusion arises from the relationship 

between the U.S. Attorney and the Department of Justice. This statute 

does not, of course, provide a basis for the assertion of Federal jurisdiction based on the commission of a substantive Federal offense.

In addition, with respect to the use of Justice Department personnel 

(the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example) in the investigative stages of the hostage incident, it is our conclusion that the FBI 

guidelines do permit the Bureau to conduct an investigation to determine whether a Federal substantive offense has been committed.

Finally, it is the conclusion of this Office that four Federal statutes 

furnish a possible basis for Federal jurisdiction, and they are as follows:

1. Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) it is unlawful for any person who has 

been adjudicated a mental defective or who has been committed to any 

mental institution to receive any firearm or ammunition that has been 

shipped or transported in interstate commerce. Firearms are not manufactured in the District. According to information we received, the 

leader of the group apparently responsible for this situation had been

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declared a mental defective. On the basis of these facts, it would appear 

that this statute was violated or that, at least, there was a reasonable 

basis for investigating to determine whether it had been violated.

2. Under 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2) it is a Federal offense for one to 

transport in commerce a firearm knowing or having reason to know or 

intending that it will be used unlawfully in furtherance of a civil 

disorder. “The term ‘civil disorder’ means any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, 

which cause an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to 

the property or person of any other individual.” 18 U.S.C. § 232(1). 

Our information established that there were more than three persons 

involved in this incident and clearly the remaining requirements of this 

definition were met. Likewise, the transportation-in-commerce requirement was met by virtue o f the definition of that term in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 232(2) which provides as follows:

The term ‘commerce’ means commerce (A) between any State or 

the District of Columbia and any place outside thereof; (B) between points within any State or the District of Columbia, but 

through any place outside thereof; or (C) wholly within the District of Columbia.

Again, the facts available to us indicate that this statute had been 

violated.

3. The Riot Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1), provides as follows:

W hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any 

facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including, but not limited to, the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, with 

intent—(A) to incite a riot; or (B) to organize, promote, encourage, 

participate in or carry on a riot; or (C) to commit any act of 

violence in furtherance o f a riot; or (D) to aid or abet any person 

in inciting or participating in or carrying on a riot or committing 

any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; and who either during 

the course of any such travel or use or thereafter performs or 

attempts to perform any other overt act for any purpose specified 

in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this paragraph [is guilty of 

a federal offense].

Our information was that the U-Haul truck used by those persons 

instigating this incident was rented in College Park, Maryland, thus 

apparently fulfilling the requirement of § 2101(a)(1). The term “riot” is 

defined in § 2102(a) in such a manner as to include the actions of those 

involved in this incident because there were acts of violence by an 

assemblage of at least three persons that constituted a clear and present 

danger of damage or injury to the person or property of other individuals. Therefore, it again appeared that, based on the information available to us, a Federal crime had been committed under this statute.

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4. One of the Civil Rights statutes, 18 U.S.C. §245, may also come 

into play here because of the apparently religious-based motives of the 

perpetrators of this incident, and because of the implications of their 

choice of the B’nai B’rith building and The Islamic Center and the 

occupants thereof as targets for their actions. It should be noted that 

this statute provides the weakest basis for the assertion of Federal 

jurisdiction. This is because this statute is designed to cover federally 

protected activities, such as voting, employment, jury duty in the 

United States courts, participation in Federal programs, education, 

travel and the use of certain facilities in connection with travel. It does 

not appear, or at least we did not have facts indicating, that these socalled federally protected activities were implicated by this incident 

except in perhaps a tangential manner.

J o h n M . H a r m o n

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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