United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 23, 2012

Decided August 30, 2012

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 12-2065

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LEOBARDO LARA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Western Division

No. 12 CR 500019-1

Frederick J. Kapala,

Judge.

O R D E R

This is Leobardo Lara’s second trip to the court of appeals in connection with criminal

charges that have been brought against him. The nature of the case has changed, however.

In the first round, Lara had been charged with possession of marijuana with intent to

distribute and with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, in violate of 21 U.S.C. §§

846 and 841(a)(1). Along with some co-defendants, he appealed from his conviction on

those charges and won a new trial. See United States v. Pillado, 656 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2011).

On remand, however, the government abandoned the drug charges and chose to proceed

with an information charging him with being an alien who is illegally in the United States

and possesses a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Upon his appearance

before the district court on March 19, 2012, Lara waived his right to an indictment by a

grand jury and entered a plea of guilty to the information. On April 19, 2012, he appeared

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 12-2065 Page 2

for sentencing. The district court concluded that his offense level was a 15 and his criminal

history category was I; this yielded an advisory guideline range of 18 to 24 months. The

court imposed a sentence of 24 months, but it also deemed this sentence fully served,

because by that time Lara had been in custody for 31 months. The court fined Lara

$10,112.94, but it ruled that this fine had been satisfied by his earlier payment in connection

with the earlier conviction, and it concluded that the $100 assessment could also be applied

from the earlier case. Upon his release from custody, Lara was remanded to the custody of

the U.S. Marshal pending removal proceedings; his release also began his three-year period

of supervised release.

Lara has now appealed from his new conviction, but his appointed attorney has

concluded that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw, citing Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967). Lara has not responded to our notice pursuant to Circuit Rule 51(b). Our

review is thus confined to the potential issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief.

See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Lara does not wish to challenge his guilty plea, and so counsel appropriately refrains

from addressing any issues connected with it. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671-72

(7th Cir. 2002). Counsel has reviewed the district court’s application of the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines in arriving at Lara’s advisory sentencing range, as well as the court’s

application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and he sees no possible arguments that might be

advanced on appeal. Before sentencing, Lara and the government anticipated both the

offense level of 15 and the criminal history category of I that the court computed.

Counsel notes that Lara was not assigned any criminal history points, and so it is

impossible to raise any issue about that aspect of his sentence. As for his offense level, the

court began with a base level of 14, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6) (the guideline that

applies to prohibited persons, a term defined in cmt. app. n. 3 to include any person

described in § 922(g)). (We note that the court may have referred to § 2K2.1(a)(6)(B), which

in turn refers to § 922(d) offenses rather than § 922(g) offenses, but this error was harmless

because the same 14-level baseline applies to prohibited persons. See § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A).) The

base offense level was increased by four pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), because Lara

possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense – that of possessing 883

kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute. Although this had been the subject of

Lara’s first appeal, this time around he agreed to the four-level enhancement as part of his

negotiated plea agreement. His admission that a felony was being committed while he

possessed the gun (an admission he made both in the plea agreement and during his

colloquy with the court) forecloses him from raising any argument with respect to the fourlevel adjustment in his offense level.

Finally, the district court’s decision to impose a sentence within the properly computed
No. 12-2065 Page 3

guideline range is entitled to an appellate presumption of reasonableness. See Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Nothing in this record comes close to overcoming that

presumption.

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.