Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 125 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION III 

No. CV-15-206

MONA B. SLOOP and the MONA B. 

SLOOP REVOCABLE TRUST

 APPELLANTS 

V.

SALLY ANN KIKER and RUSSELL L.

KIKER, INDIVIDUALLY and as

TRUSTEES of the SALLY ANN 

KIKER REVOCABLE TRUST and the

RUSSELL L. KIKER REVOCABLE 

TRUST

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered: February 24, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE NEWTON COUNTY 

CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. CV2013-48-1]

HONORABLE SHAWN A. WOMACK,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

CLIFF HOOFMAN, Judge

Appellants Mona B. Sloop and the Mona B. Sloop Revocable Trust (“Sloop”) appeal 

from a summary-judgment order in favor of appellees Russell and Sally Kiker, individually

and as trustees of their respective trusts (“the Kikers”).

1 We affirm the summary-judgment 

order. 

 The Kiker trusts own a house on 134.5 acres in Newton County. On January 26, 

2012, appellant Sloop contracted to purchase the house and the land for $850,000. The 

contract contained the following down-payment provision: 

The nonrefundable down payment shall be $350,000, due upon execution of this 

contract by both parties, and the balance to be paid in full on or before January 1, 

 

1 We will not differentiate between the parties and their trusts unless the context 

dictates otherwise.
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2 

2013. No interest shall be paid on the unpaid balance until January 1, 2013. If for 

unforeseen reasons, there is still a balance due after this date, an additional grace 

period of six months may be granted by the Seller, with interest accruing at local 

bank retail interest rate. Time is of the essence in satisfying the terms of this contract.

In the event closing does not occur on or before August 31, 2013, this contract shall be null 

and void, the down payment shall be retained by Seller. Buyer, if then occupying the 

property shall vacate the property . . . . 

(Emphasis supplied.) 

 Sloop made the $350,000 down payment on January 26, 2012. That same day, the 

parties executed two additional documents: a warranty deed and a lease/caretaker 

agreement. The deed recited that the Kikers, as trustees, conveyed the property to Sloop as 

trustee of her own trust. It further contained a full metes-and-bounds description of the 

property, which the contract had described only by street address. The lease/caretaker 

agreement essentially allowed Sloop to live on the property as a tenant until the $500,000 

balance due was paid, subject to an August 31, 2013 deadline. Sloop assumed occupancy of 

the property in the summer of 2012. 

Sloop did not pay the $500,000 balance by January 1, 2013. As the August 31, 2013

deadline approached, she informed the Kikers that she would also not be able to pay the 

balance by that date. As a result, the Kikers entered into a listing agreement with a realestate agent on July 24, 2013, in an attempt to sell the property. Sloop remained on the 

premises during this time.

Efforts to sell the property were unsuccessful, and the listing agreement ended on 

September 1, 2013. On or about September 6, 2013, the Kikers served Sloop with a notice 

to vacate the premises. The notice stated that the lease/caretaker agreement had expired and 
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3 

that Sloop had missed the August 31, 2013 deadline to pay the balance due on the property, 

requiring her to forfeit her $350,000 nonrefundable down payment.

Sloop refused to vacate the property, and the Kikers filed suit against her in Newton 

County Circuit Court. Their complaint sought an order removing Sloop from the property 

and a declaration that they were entitled to retain the $350,000 down payment. Sloop 

voluntarily abandoned the property a month after the complaint was filed, but she filed a 

counterclaim asking that the Kikers return her $350,000 down payment.

 The Kikers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the real-estate contract 

unambiguously provided that the $350,000 down payment was nonrefundable, given that

Sloop had failed to pay the balance due by August 31, 2013. Sloop responded that the down 

payment constituted an improper penalty under Arkansas law; that the parties’ contract 

violated the Statute of Frauds because it lacked a sufficient property description and failed

to identify the sellers; and that the Kikers waived the August 31, 2013 deadline. In 

connection with her waiver argument, Sloop filed an affidavit stating that the Kikers had 

agreed to return the down payment to her if the property sold for more than $850,000 upon 

being listed with the real-estate agent. 

After a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting the Kikers’ motion for 

summary judgment. The order did not address Sloop’s penalty or waiver arguments but 

instead granted summary judgment on the ground that any uncertainties in the real-estate 

contract were cured by the warranty deed—a clear reference to Sloop’s Statute-of-Frauds 

argument. Sloop now appeals from the summary-judgment order. 
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4 

Sloop first contends that the $350,000 nonrefundable down payment represents an 

unenforceable penalty. See generally Alley v. Rodgers, 269 Ark. 262, 599 S.W.2d 739 (1980); 

McIlvenny v. Horton, 227 Ark. 826, 302 S.W.2d 70 (1957) (recognizing that a stipulateddamages provision in a contract may constitute an unenforceable penalty if it does not meet 

certain criteria). We cannot reach Sloop’s argument on this point because the circuit court 

did not rule on it. 

An appellant has the burden to obtain a ruling on an issue in order to preserve the 

issue for appeal. Ark. Lottery Comm’n v. Alpha Mktg., 2012 Ark. 23, 386 S.W.3d 400. In the 

absence of a ruling, the appellate court will not reach the issue; nor will we presume a ruling 

from the circuit court’s silence. Id. Applying these principles, our courts have held that, 

when a circuit court’s order specifies a particular ground for the court’s decision, that ground 

alone is subject to our review. See Tillman v. Raytheon Co., 2013 Ark. 474, 430 S.W.3d 698; 

TEMCO Constr., LLC v. Gann, 2013 Ark. 202, 427 S.W.3d 651; Hurst v. Ark. Radiology 

Affiliates, P.A., 2015 Ark. App. 333. Other arguments that the appellant raised below but 

did not obtain a ruling on are not preserved for appeal, and we are precluded from addressing

them. Tillman, supra; TEMCO, supra; Hurst, supra. By contrast, if the circuit court’s order is 

more in the nature of a “blanket” decision and does not articulate a particular basis for its 

ruling, then the order encompasses all of the issues presented to the circuit court in the 

parties’ briefs and arguments. See generally Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Ft. Smith Sch. Dist., 

2015 Ark. 81, 455 S.W.3d 294; Asset Acceptance, LLC v. Newby, 2014 Ark. 280, 437 S.W.3d 

119 (citing Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, 430 S.W.3d 49). 
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Here, the circuit court’s summary-judgment order was not a “blanket” ruling. 

Rather, the order discussed and ruled on Sloop’s Statute-of-Frauds argument without 

deciding whether the $350,000 down payment constituted a penalty. Therefore, based on 

the above-cited authorities, Sloop’s penalty argument is not reviewable by this court. 

Sloop’s claim that the Kikers waived the August 31, 2013 payment deadline is 

likewise procedurally barred. Sloop made her waiver argument during the summaryjudgment hearing, and the circuit court appeared to consider and reject it. However, the 

waiver issue was not addressed in the court’s summary-judgment order. As our supreme 

court has recognized, “the written order controls.” Nat’l Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Coleman, 370 

Ark. 119, 121, 257 S.W.3d 862, 863 (2007).2

 

Turning to the issue that was ruled on below, Sloop argues that the circuit court 

erred in determining that the parties’ real-estate contract satisfied the Statute of Frauds. We 

see no error on this point. 

The Statute of Frauds provides that a contract for the sale of land must be in writing 

to be enforceable. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-59-101(a)(4) (Repl. 2011). Additionally, the contract 

must contain certain essential information, such as the terms and conditions of the sale, the 

price to be paid, the time for payment, and a description of the property. See Van Dyke v. 

 

2 Sloop cites Bayer Cropscience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, 385 S.W.3d 822, for the 

proposition that an oral ruling on a motion is sufficient. Bayer involved a ruling on a 

preliminary motion in a case that subsequently went to trial. The case at bar involves a 

dispositive summary-judgment ruling, which must necessarily be reduced to writing and 

entered of record to be effective. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 (2015); Ark. Sup. Ct. Admin. 

Order No. 2(b)(2) (2015).
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Glover, 326 Ark. 736, 934 S.W.2d 204 (1996); Price v. Willbanks, 2009 Ark. App. 849, 374 

S.W.3d 28. 

Sloop contends that the contract in this case was deficient because it did not name 

the Kiker trusts as sellers of the property and did not contain a sufficient description of the 

property. However, as noted by the circuit court, the warranty deed that the parties 

executed on the same day as the real-estate contract named the Kiker trusts as grantors and 

provided a formal, legal description of the property. Generally, instruments executed at the 

same time by the same parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same 

transaction, are, in the eyes of the law, one instrument and will be read and construed 

together. Graves v. Graves, 7 Ark. App. 202, 646 S.W.2d 26 (1983). Moreover, if a contract 

furnishes a means by which realty can be identified—a key to the property’s location—the 

Statute of Frauds is satisfied. Baker v. Taylor & Co., 218 Ark. 538, 237 S.W.2d 471 (1951). 

Here, the contract’s designation of the premises by street address met this requirement. 

Creighton v. Huggins, 227 Ark. 1096, 303 S.W.2d 893 (1957); Price, supra. 

Sloop also cites what she refers to as an ambiguity in the contract, arising from the 

fact that the contract calls for a six-month grace period if the balance is not paid by January 

1, 2013, but also provides for a nine-month payment extension until August 31, 2013. The 

law does not favor the destruction of contracts over uncertainty. Price, supra. This is 

particularly true where, as here, the contract contained an express deadline of August 31, 

2013, which the parties treated as operative throughout the case.

 Affirmed. 

 VAUGHT and BROWN, JJ., agree. 
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7 

Patterson Law Firm, P.A., by: Jerry D. Patterson; and Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., 

by: Tasha C. Taylor and Andrew M. Taylor, for appellants.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings LLP, by: Kyle R. Wilson, Michael A. Thompson, and R. 

Aaron Brooks, for appellees.