UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ SARAH LEE GOSSETT PARRISH, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. ARVEST BANK, Defendant - Appellee. No. 17-6042 (D.C. No. 5:15-CV-00913-HE) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BRISCOE , O’BRIEN , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Sarah Lee Gossett Parrish appeals from the dismissal of her second amended class action complaint (“ Complaint”) for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U. S.C. § 1291, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 20, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 I. Background Parrish filed her Complaint against Arve st Bank on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. She included cl aims for actual fraud, constructive fraud, false representation/deceit, breach of fiduc iary duty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. In support of her fraud cl aims, she alleges Arvest made false or misleading statements in its Electronic Fund Transfer Agreement and Disclosure (“EFTA”) and in certain marketing material s, which led customers to believe their transactions would be debited chronologica lly, i.e., in the orde r transactions are initiated (or in the case of checks, in the order they are presented). But, and contrary to the misrepresentations, Arvest actually posts all transactions in “batches” by transaction type at the end of each business day. She claims the batching process manipulates the posting order of transactions to maximize the number of insufficient funds and overdraft fees (“NSF/OD Fees”) it imposes on customers. More specifically, she alleges the batching causes transactions to be posted in the following order: POS transactions, 1 other debit transactions, check transactions, ACH transactions, 2 and other types of transactions. Mo reover, she claims transactions of the same type are not necessarily posted in chronological orde r within a batch.

1 According to the EFTA, wh ich Parrish attached to he r Complaint, POS stands for “Point-of-Sale.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 251. A POS transaction occurs when a customer uses a CheckCard to purchase goods and services from a participating merchant. See id.

2 ACH stands for “Automated Clearing House,” a network through which bank customers can pay certain bills electr onically. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 252.3 In sum, Parrish claims Ar vest’s false and misleading statements regarding the chronological posting of transactions leav es its customers unable to determine (before initiating and completing a transacti on) whether it will result in an NSF/OD Fee. She alleges generally that Arvest assessed one or more NSF/OD Fees on multiple occasions when her ch eck register showed a positive balance, and she claims she would have incurred fewer NSF/OD Fees on other occasions had Arvest posted her transactions chronologically. She also alleges fraud based on the account information Arvest displays via its online and mobile banking platforms, in wh ich it misrepresents customers’ account balances to be accurate, “rea l-time” balances, when they are actually inaccurate, “false” balances because of Arvest’s posting process. Sh e claims to have relied on inaccurate account balances in initiating and co mpleting transactions and, as a result, incurred unexpected NSF/OD Fees. 3 In addition to her fraud claims, Parrish alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the EFTA, and unjust en richment based on the same factual allegations. The district judge decided Parrish’s Comp laint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because: 1) her fraud claims do not allege with particularity any misrepresentation by Arvest that it posts transactions inst antaneously or in

3 Parrish clarifies that he r fraud claims “do not ch allenge Arvest’s chosen posting order, nor do they attempt to require Arvest to make particular disclosures to its customers.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 11.4 chronological order; 2) the facts she a lleges in her fiduci ary duty claim do not support a fiduciary relati onship between Arvest and its customers; 3) her breach-of-contract claim is in firm because Arvest did not promise in the EFTA to provide account balances reflecting in stantaneous posting, and she does not adequately plead facts supporting her genera l allegation that Arvest breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair de aling; and 4) her unjust enrichment claim does not state a plausible basis to infe r that Arvest’s conduct was unfair, unconscionable, and oppressive. II. Discussion We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). George v. Urban Settlement Serv. , 833 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2016). “We accept a plaintiff’s well-pleaded fact ual allegations as true and determine whether the plainti ff has provided enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks om itted). “[A] claim is facially plausible if the plaint iff has pled factual content th at allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable fo r the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The pl ausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it as ks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that ar e merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A put ative class action complaint should be5 dismissed if the named plaintif f’s individual claims fail to state a claim for relief. See Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C. , 434 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding class-action alle gations were properly dismis sed where plaintiff failed to state a claim on his own behalf). A. Fraud Claims A stricter pleading standard applie s to Parrish’s fraud claims. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), “a party must state with part icularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . . Malice, intent, know ledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” “More sp ecifically, this court requires a complaint alleging fraud to set forth the time, place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and th e consequences thereof.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc. , 203 F.3d 1202, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000). 1. Alleged Misrepresentation s Regarding Chronological Processing of Transactions Parrish does not claim Arvest explicitly stated that it posts transactions chronologically, rather that it made misleadi ng statements in the EFTA and in certain marketing materials, which cr eated the false impression it does so, when in fact it does not—it batch posts transactions at the end of each business day. She first points to the following statem ent in the EFTA: “Each time you use your CheckCard, the amount of the transac tion will be debited from your designated account.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 252. Emph asizing the words “each time,” she alleges that, although this statemen t “may or may not imply th at the posting will be6 instantaneous, it clearly does imply that tran sactions will be deb ited in the order in which they occur.” Id. at 240. Moreover, she says , Arvest reinforced this implication in a pamphlet titled “How to Keep Good Bank Records” by advising customers to “enter every transa ction as soon as possible.” Id. at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted). She alleges th at, by specifically telli ng customers “Check numbers do not always clear in num erical order or immediately,” id. at 230-31 (internal quotation marks omitted), the pam phlet suggests other transactions do post chronologically. The district judge concluded the stat ement in the EFTA about accounts being debited “each time” a customer uses a debit card “ does not say or imply that the posting will be instantaneous,” nor does the pamphlet suggest that non-check transactions are posted immedi ately or chronologically. Id. at 371. Parrish complains that the judge fa iled to view the facts she alleged in the light most favorable to her position and did not addre ss her contention regarding chronological (as opposed to immediate) posting. When c onsidered together, she urges, the EFTA and the pamphlet create a fa lse impression that customers’ accounts are debited in the order their transactions occur. Arvest contends its “each time” stat ement in the EFTA addresses only the mechanics of how a CheckCard works, i.e., indicating th at each POS transaction will result in a debit to the cu stomer’s account. It points to language in the pamphlet telling customers, “The debit card purchas e amount may show one day as verification7 and then will be processed as the actual purchase amount in one or more days and they may not be the same amount.” Id. at 289. 4 The district judge is corr ect: Parrish fails to alle ge a misrepresentation by Arvest. Her fraud allegations do not plausibly show what she claims: that the EFTA or the pamphlet actually represents that CheckCard or other transactions will be posted in chronological order. Her allegations are, at be st, “merely consistent with” her claim that Arvest made false representations. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is not enough and our saying so does not merely choose one plausible interpretation over a nother. Arguments about plausibility must be rationally based; they are not all equally meritorious. Parrish relies heavily on Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA , 704 F.3d 712, 730 (9th Cir. 2012), in which the Ninth Ci rcuit affirmed a holding that Wells Fargo violated California’s unfair competition la w “by making misleading statements likely to deceive its customers.” We do not see the facts in Gutierrez as sufficiently similar to those presented here. There Wells Far go posted debit-card purchases in the order of highest to lowest dollar amount, whic h increased the number of NSF/OD Fees

4 Although Parrish did not a ttach a copy of the pamphlet to the Complaint, she did refer to it and the document is central to her fraud claims. Because Parrish has not disputed the authenticity of the pam phlet document Arvest submitted with its motion to dismiss, we consid er that document as part of Parrish’s Complaint. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[I]f a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the document is referred to in the compla int and is central to the plaintiff’s claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss.”).8 customers incurred. See id. at 716-17. 5 But contrary to its actual practice, Wells Fargo explicitly told custom ers in marketing materials th at check card transactions “generally reduce the balan ce in your account immediatel y,” “the money comes right out of your checking account the minut e you use your debit-card,” and POS purchases are deducted “immedia tely” or “automatically” from a customer’s account. Id. at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Parrish readily acknowledges, she does not allege any such explicit representations by Arvest in the EFTA or the pamphlet regarding chronological posting. She nonetheless points to allegations in her Complaint similar to the facts recited in Gutierrez , in particular Arvest’s display of transactions in chronological order via its online and mobile banking pl atforms and its advi ce to customers to maintain accurate ch eck registers. In Gutierrez , the district j udge found similar practices to have bolstered Wells Fargo’ s numerous explicit statements regarding immediate debiting of transactions. See Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 730 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by Gutierrez , 704 F.3d at 730. But it did not rely on thes e practices alone in finding that Wells Fargo had “promoted a false perception that debit-card purchases would be deducted from [customers’] accounts in the order transacted.” Id .; see also id. at 1116-17

5 In striking contrast, Parrish does not allege Arvest posts debit-card transactions in high-to-low order. She does claim check transactions have a higher median transaction value than ACH transac tions, and that Arvest batch posts checks before ACH transactions. But she also alle ges that Arvest posts POS and other types of debit transactions first, and she does not claim these t ypes of transactions have a higher median transaction value th an check or ACH transactions.9 (listing numerous explicit statements by Wells Fargo regarding immediate balance reductions). Moreover, Parrish also fail s to allege facts demons trating her reliance on any misrepresentation by Arvest regarding chro nological posting. Under Rule 9(b), she must allege with particularity the “conse quences” of Arvest’s false statements. Koch , 203 F.3d at 1236; see also George , 833 F.3d at 1256 (holding allegations “identify[ing] the actions the plaintiffs took in reliance on [the] misrepresentations, [and] detail[ing] the injuries they suffered as a result” were sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b)). Here, she alleges only two specific inst ances in which she incurred unexpected NSF/OD Fees on her Arvest acco unts. Her allegations rega rding transactions on July 2-3, 2012, fail to show she would have in curred fewer fees had he r transactions been posted chronologically. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 232-34. Parrish now maintains these allegations are not intended to demonstrate her reliance. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 4. That leaves her allegations regard ing an NSF/OD Fee she incurred on July 13, 2015. But these allegations also do not relate to Parr ish’s claim of reliance on chronological posting of transactions. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 236-37. Nor are her other broad allegations rega rding her reliance sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b). See Koch , 203 F.3d at 1236-37 (affirming dismi ssal of fraud clai ms based on broad allegations that “set fort h none of the specific and required allegations,” id. at 1237).10 2. Alleged Inaccurate and Unreliable Account Balances Parrish also attempts to allege a fraud claim related to the account balance information available to customers through Arvest’s online and mobile banking platforms. She alleges she believed, due to Arvest’s mi srepresentations, that it provided “real-time account balances” throu gh these services. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 236. Parrish claims she initiated and completed transactions in reliance on these account balances, incurring unexpect ed NSF/OD Fees as a result. To the extent she relies on alleged mi srepresentations by Arvest regarding chronological posting, this claim fails for th e reasons explained above. But Parrish also points to the following language in the EFTA:
ONLINE & MOBILE BANKING – Y ou may use your access code to perform the following func tions through our intern et banking or mobile banking solutions:

 Initiate transfers of funds betw een your Arvest Bank accounts.

 Check your Arvest Bank account ba lance(s), and the credits and debits that have pos ted to your accounts. Id. at 252. She argues Arvest misrepresent s through this language that it displays accurate account balances via its online and m obile banking systems when in fact it does not. Once again, Parrish must allege a plau sible fraud claim with particularity. According to the Complaint: [O]n July 8, 2015, Parrish mistakenly wrote a check from her bank account ending in 9398, believing she had done so from a different account. When she realized her error over the week end, Parrish checked the balance reflected on Arvest’s online banking system . It reflected that the check had not processed and there were sufficient funds in the account. Parrish relied11 on this representation, which ultimatel y proved to be false, and waited until the following Monday mornin g to deposit additional funds in the account. On Monday, July 13, 2015, Arvest’s online banking system indicated that Arvest had in fact processed and posted the check prior to Parrish’s deposit, contrary to the representation upon wh ich Parrish relied over the weekend. As a result of this reliance, Parrish incurred an unexpected NSF/OD Fee. Id. at 236-37. These fraud allegations do not survive a motion to dismiss. Parrish claims she checked her on line balance once at some undisclosed point during a weekend, noting her check had not yet clea red. She alleges vaguely there were “sufficient funds” in her account at that time, but she does not say her check was the only transaction affecting the account. Sh e states that she decided to delay—not forgo—making a deposit. Ultimately, Parri sh fails to explain how Arvest’s posting of her check at some point before she put more money in her account on the following Monday demonstrates that the on line balance Arvest displayed over the weekend was “false” at that ti me. Parrish’s allegations do not allege with specificity a plausible fraud claim against Arvest. We affirm the district j udge’s dismissal of Parrish’s fraud claims. She did not “nudge[]” these claims “ac ross the line from con ceivable to plausible.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6

6 Parrish’s constructive fraud claim fail s for the same reasons as her other fraud claims. Moreover, she does not allege facts supporting her two theories why Arvest had a duty to disclose information about its posting prac tices. She alleges no partial, misleading disclosure by Arvest giving rise to a duty to speak. Nor, as we explain next, does she allege facts supporting a finding that Arvest has a fiduciary relationship with its customers.12 B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Oklahoma law, a bank does not owe its customers fiduciary duties absent a written agreement: Unless a state or national bank shall have expressly agreed in writing to assume special or fiduciary duties or obligations, no such duties or obligations will be imposed on the bank with respect to a depositor of the bank . . . and no special or fiduciary relationship shall be deemed to exist. Okla. Stat. tit. 6, § 425. Parrish’s br each-of-fiduciary-duty claim was dismissed because she failed to a llege an express written agreemen t to assume such duties. The judge also held her allegation of a spec ial relationship betw een Arvest and its customers—based on Arvest’s superior knowledge of it s posting processes and its customers’ lack of sophisticati on—failed as a matter of law. See First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Vinita v. Kissee , 859 P.2d 502, 51 0-11 (Okla. 1993). In support of her fiduciary duty argument Parrish points to Arvest’s agreement in the EFTA to provide accurate, real-tim e account balance information through its online and mobile banking platforms. Banks have always been expected to provide accurate account information, but that does not transform a creditor-debtor relationship between a bank and its customer s into a special rela tionship giving rise to fiduciary duties, and we fail to see how the offering of what has now become routine banking services will do so. Parrish has offered no contrary authority. We

see no error.13 C. Breach of Contract Parrish initially contends her Compla int states a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dea ling. She cites cases in which other courts have refused to dismiss implied-covenant cl aims with fact patter ns similar to those she has alleged. In particular, she notes her allegations rega rding Arvest’s posting process, its failure to fu lly inform customers regarding that process, and its misleading statements regarding chronological posting. But she does not tether these allegations to anything Arvest agreed to do , but has not performed in good faith. In the cases she relies on, the plaintiffs allege d that banks failed to exercise good faith in performing express contractual terms gran ting them discretion to post transactions in any order. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig. , 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1314-16 (S.D. Fla. 2010). Since she does not point to any similar allegation in her Complaint she fails to demonstrate how the district judge e rred in concluding her general allegation regarding Arve st’s breach of the implied covenant is insufficient to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Parrish also alleges Arvest breached its agreement in the EFTA to provide accurate and reliable account balance inform ation via its online and mobile banking platforms. As noted above, the EFTA provid es that, via these sy stems, customers can initiate transfers between their Arvest ac counts, as well as check their “account balance(s), and the credits a nd debits that have posted to [their] accounts.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 252. She construes this la nguage as an agreement to provide current, real-time balance informa tion, which she claims Ar vest breached by displaying14 inaccurate account balances. By exampl e, she alleges that Arvest does not instantaneously process transfers between Ar vest accounts, even when it represents through a customer’s online or mobile account balance it has done so. See id. at 236. And she claims to have relied on that in accurate online and mobile account balance information in initiating and completing transactions. As a result, she overdrew her accounts and incurred unexpected NSF/OD Fees. In dismissing this claim, the distri ct judge incorporated the following reasoning from a previous dismissal order: The complaint asserts that Arvest breached the [EFTA] by providing inaccurate account balances, but it is not apparent what makes the balances inaccurate. Plaintiff’s argument is esse ntially that an “accurate” balance is only one which reflects instantaneous posting of transactions. But the agreement promises no such thing an d there is no apparent reason for concluding that transactions posted by size or some other batching process result in balances that are other than “accurate” for purposes of the agreement. Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 220. But the EFTA tells custom ers they can use Arvest’s online and mobile banking platforms to check their account bala nces and the credits and debits that have posted

to their accounts. Parrish a lleges, to the cont rary, that account information Arvest makes available through its online and m obile banking platforms does not accurately reflect actual account balan ces. Her example of Arvest not carrying out an intra-bank transfer, while displaying the transfer as completed, i llustrates how an online or mobile banking account balance could be inaccurate. Unlik e her fraud claims, Parrish was not required to plead this clai m with particularity. And her allegations15 are not, as Arvest maintains, merely conclusory. Accep ting her allegations as true and construing them in a light most favorable to her, she has a lleged enough facts to plausibly state a facially valid claim to relief. Arvest asserts the form agreements governing Parrish’s use of its online and mobile banking platforms do not warrant these systems as e rror free and also disclaim liability for customers’ reliance upon them. But Parrish’s claim is based on the EFTA, which she attached to her complaint. She does not rely on or attach the other agreements Arvest cite s. We do not consider thes e other agreements because “[o]ur role is to assess wh ether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim upon which re lief may be granted.” U.S. ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah , 472 F.3d 702, 713 (10th Cir. 2006). We affirm the district j udge’s dismissal of Parrish’s claim asserting breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but reverse its dismissal of her claim asserting Arvest breach ed the EFTA by providing inaccurate account balance information to customers through its online and mob ile banking platforms. D. Unjust Enrichment Parrish asserts an unjust-enrichment claim as an alternative to her breach-of-contract claim. She first maintains this claim is based upon Arvest’s alleged misrepresentations regarding chronological posti ng of transactions and the resulting increase in NSF/OD Fees Arvest imposes. Because she fails to allege a misrepresentation by Arvest regarding chro nological posting, thes e allegations do not support a claim for unjust enrichment.16 Parrish also asserts her unjust-enrichment claim is based on the allegedly false account balance information Arvest provide s through its online and mobile banking platforms. We have affirmed dismissal of her fraud claim base d on these allegations because she did not plead with particular ity any false account balance information pertaining to her own accounts. But we ha ve reversed the dismissal of Parrish’s breach-of-contract claim based on inaccura te balance information displayed via Arvest’s online or mobile banking system s. Under Oklahoma law, Arvest says, quasi-contractual remedies su ch as unjust enrichment ar e not available where an enforceable contract governs th e parties’ relationship. Pa rrish does not address this contention in her reply brief. In Oklahoma “a party is not entitled to pursue a claim for unjust enrichment when it has an adequate remedy at law for breach of contract.” Am. Biomedical Grp., Inc. v Techtrol, Inc. 374 P.3d 820, 828 (Okla. 2016). 7 We have cited “the hornbook rule that quasi-contractual re medies . . . are not to be created when an enforceable express contract regulates th e relations of the parties w ith respect to the disputed issue.” Member Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Am . Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Sapulpa , 130 F.3d 950, 957 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing 1 Jose ph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts § 1.20 (rev. ed. 1993)). We applied this rule in a case where the plainti ff tried to allege an unjust-enrichment claim to recover unpaid royalties. See Elliott Indus. Ltd. P’ship v.

7 This rule does not apply when a part y is seeking to rescind the contract, see Roberson v. PaineWebber, Inc. , 998 P.2d 193, 200 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999), but Parrish does not seek to rescind the EFTA.17 BP Am. Prod. Co. , 407 F.3d 1091, 1107-09 (10th Ci r. 2005). We affirmed a summary judgment because “the claim for unpaid royalties is grounded in the parties’ contractual relationship.” Id. at 1117. Parrish presents no argument as to why this rule does not bar her unjust-enrichment claim. We therefore affi rm the dismissal of her claim on that basis. III. Conclusion The district court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings cons istent with this order and judgment.

Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge