NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 23-2106 

__________ 

LAWRENCE BRANDON, 

 Appellant 

v. 

CAMBRIA COUNTY TRANSIT AUTHORITY; DOUGLAS W. FYOCK 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-22-cv-00085) 

District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

March 29, 2024 

Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: April 3, 2024) 

___________ 

OPINION*

___________ 

PER CURIAM 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

 Pro se appellant Lawrence Brandon appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 

civil rights case for failure to state a claim. We will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court. 

I.

 Brandon filed a complaint against the Cambria County Transit Authority 

(“CamTran”) and one of its drivers, Douglas W. Fyock (“Fyock”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. DC ECF 4. His complaint alleged that the defendants had violated his right to 

travel under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he had been injured by Fyock’s 

negligence after Fyock slammed the bus doors on him. Id. Defendants moved to dismiss 

Brandon’s complaint for failure to state a claim, and the District Court granted the 

motion. DC ECF 14. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the case on the 

grounds that the facts contained in Brandon’s complaint did not implicate the right to 

travel, and because § 1983 does not allow for negligence claims. DC ECF 14. This appeal 

followed. CA ECF 1. 

II. 

 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the 

District Court’s grant of the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Newark 

Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). 
3 

III. 

 We agree with the District Court that Brandon has failed to state a claim under the 

Fourteenth Amendment. DC ECF 14 at 2. Brandon’s complaint alleges that he has been 

prevented from utilizing the CamTran buses only in the Johnstown area. Based on the 

principle that the Constitution only protects the general right to travel, but not travel via a 

particular method, “[b]urdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the 

right to interstate travel.” Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 

934 F.3d 283, 295 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 

1999)). Because Brandon has merely asserted that he has been prevented from accessing 

a single mode of intrastate transport, his complaint was properly dismissed as it fails to 

state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

Nor has Brandon stated a claim for negligence against Fyock under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. “[N]egligence claims are not encompassed within § 1983,” and as a result, his 

negligence claim is not cognizable under that law. Davidson v. O’Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 

826 (3d Cir. 1984).1 We are satisfied that it was unnecessary to grant leave to amend 

because any amendment would have been futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 

F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

1

 On appeal, Brandon argues that the District Court erred by not applying state negligence 

law to his claim. CA ECF 10 at 6. The District Court stated that, to the extent the claim 

sounded in state law, it would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. This was 

well within its discretion. See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 2000) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)).