## NUMBER 13 - 20 - 00 096 - C R COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

ZACHARY LAUREL , Appellant,

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee.
On appeal from the 36 th District Court of San Patricio C ounty, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Longoria , Hinojosa , and Tijerina Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria Appellant Zachary Laurel appeals a judgment revoking his community supervision
and adjudicating him guilty of enticing a child , a third

- degree felony

. See T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. § 25.04. On January 21, 2020, at the hearing on the State’s amended motion to adjudicate guilt
, Laurel , via a signed stipulation and judicial confess ion, confessed and stipulated that the facts contained in the affidavit of Rosie A. Franco , incorporated i nto the2 State’s motion , were true . The trial court admitted the stipulation and judicial confession
into the record. Thereafter, t he trial court revoked Laurel’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty , and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See id . § 12.34. Laurel’s court

appointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm.
I. **A NDERS**  B RIEF Laurel’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support in
which s he states that she has reviewed the entire record in detail and has found no non

frivolous issues. See id . Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents

a thorough, professional evaluation of the record showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See ln re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 406

– 07 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“ln Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically
ad vance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State , 112 S.W.3d 340, 343

– 44 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)

. In compliance with High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State , 436 S.W.3d 313, 319

– 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Laurel ’s counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Laurel ’s counsel also informed this Court that s he has: (1) notified Laurel that she has filed an Anders brief and a motion to with draw, and attached3 documents to her notice to Laurel ; (2) informed Laurel of his right to file a pro se response
and to review the record preparatory to filing that response; (3) informed Laurel of his right to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided Laurel with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record with instruction to return the motion within ten days of the notice from appellate counsel, and provided this Court’s address. See Anders , 386 U. S. at 744; Kelly , 436 S.W.3d at 319

– 20; Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also ln re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. Adequate time has passed, and Laurel has not request e d the record or filed a pro se brief.
II. I NDEPENDENT R EVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 511.
We have reviewed the record and counsel ’s brief , and we have found no reversible

error. See Bledsoe v. State , 178 S.W.3d 824, 827

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at
509.
III. M OTION TO W ITHDRAW In accordance with Anders , Laurel’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744; see also ln re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State , 903 S.W.2d 776, 779

– 80 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an4 attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appella nt. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of t he date of this opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to Laurel and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. 1 See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 48.4; see also ln re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens , 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
IV. C ONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA Justice Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 5th day of August, 202 1

.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Laurel wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, see id. R. 68.3, and should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id

. R. 68.4.