In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3781

LEROY ANDERSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW MORRISON and MARCUS HOLTON,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 CV 8622 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MAY 6, 2016* — DECIDED AUGUST 26, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Leroy Anderson, an Illinois pris‐

oner, alleges that he fell and was knocked unconscious after

guards at Stateville Correctional Center ordered him to walk

                                                  * After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs

and the record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 14‐3781

handcuffed down stairs covered with milk and garbage. In his

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Anderson claims that the

guards violated the Eighth Amendment by subjecting him to

this hazard. The district court granted the defendants’ motion

to dismiss,ruling that slippery stairs do not pose a sufficiently

serious risk of harm to state a claim under the Eighth Amend‐

ment. Because Anderson faced not only stairs slicked with

milk, but also scattered trash and guards who required him

to negotiate his descent while unaided and cuffed behind his

back, the risk of serious harm was substantial. Therefore, we

vacate and remand.  

I. BACKGROUND

In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we “tak[e] all well‐pleaded allega‐

tions of the complaint as true and view[] them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742,

751 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). During a “shakedown” of several cells, the defend‐

ants handcuffed Anderson behind his back and ordered him

to walk down a set of stairs to wait in a holding area while his

cell was searched. These stairs were “covered [with] food,

milk, and other garbage, and had been for several days.” The

defendants refused Anderson’s request to help him walk. He

slipped and fell down a flight of thirteen stairs. He was

knocked unconscious and suffered “continuing and perma‐

nent” injuries.

Anderson sued the two guards who had ordered him

down the stairs. He alleged that by cuffing him, leaving the

greasy surface and debris in place, and refusing his request

for help, they were deliberately indifferent to the obvious risk
No. 14‐3781 3

of harm the stairs posed. The district court granted the de‐

fendants’ motion to dismiss. It recognized that prison condi‐

tions violate the Eighth Amendment if they pose a substantial

risk of serious harm and prison officials are deliberately indif‐

ferent to the risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837

(1994). It also acknowledged that Anderson adequately al‐

leged that the guards were deliberately indifferent to a risk of

harm. But, the district judge ruled, the risk was not substantial

enough. He relied heavily on our ruling in Pyles v. Fahim,

771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014), where an inmate slipped on stairs

wet with water from prisoners’ shower shoes. We held that

“slippery surfaces and shower floors in prison, without more,

cannot constitute a hazardous condition of confinement” that

violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 410–11.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Anderson persuasively distinguishes Pyles by

supplying the “more.” Unlike the prisoner in that case, who

was uncuffed, Anderson faced a hazard that posed, in three

respects, a significant risk of severe harm. First, the stairs were

not only slippery with milk, but also clogged with several

days’ of accumulated food and rubbish, creating an obstacle

course. Second, by handcuffing him behind his back, the

guards prevented Anderson from steadying himself to avoid

tripping, slipping, or tumbling down the flight of stairs.

Third, even though they knew that Anderson could not

steady himself, the guards refused to assist him. Anderson

has thus alleged circumstances perilous enough to constitute

“an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health,”

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993), and to state an

Eighth Amendment claim, see Powers v. Snyder, 484 F.3d 929,
4 No. 14‐3781

932 (7th Cir. 2007) (prison conditions that recklessly “endan‐

ger[]” a prisoner’s health state an Eighth Amendment claim);

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (“known or

obvious dangers” to health state a claim under Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments).

The defendants respond by arguing, unhelpfully, that the

risk of slipping in a prison shower does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. They cite cases in which our sister circuits have

ruled that keeping a violent prisoner shackled while he uses

the shower, see LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.

1993), and failing to drain standing water in a shower area

used by an inmate on crutches, see Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d

1028, 1031 (10th Cir. 2004), do not pose sufficient risks of harm

to state a claim. But these cases are distinguishable for two

reasons. First, plummeting down a flight of 13 steps presents

a far greater risk of physical injury than does slipping on a

shower floor. Second, the floors in LeMaire and Reynolds and

the stairs in Pyles were unavoidably wet: showers necessarily

produce wet floors, and in Pyles, the water on inmates’ shower

shoes inevitably tracked onto the exit stairway, see Pyles,

771 F.3d at 405. But here, stairs slicked with milk and cluttered

with garbage are not a necessary condition of prison. And by

cleaning the stairs, the high risk of serious harm would ebb.  

Prisons are not required to provide a “maximally safe en‐

vironment,” Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001),

but they must address easily preventable, observed hazards

that pose a significant risk of severe harm to inmates, see With‐

ers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 710 F.3d 688, 689 (7th Cir.

2013); Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2011); Gates v.

Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004). Forcing someone to

walk handcuffed and unaided down stairs needlessly strewn
No. 14‐3781 5

with easily removable milk, food, and garbage, as Anderson

alleges, poses an unreasonable peril.  

Of course, these are only allegations. Further proceedings

must determine their truth. We encourage the district court

on remand to consider recruiting counsel for Anderson. Cf.

Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 784 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]hether

there has been deliberate indifference on the part of a defend‐

ant is an issue that requires the subtle appreciation of legal

causation and of the duties imposed upon state prison offi‐

cials by the Eighth Amendment. Even a pro se litigant with a

meritorious claim may fail to grasp these subtleties.” (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND

for further proceedings.