1 I have urge d adopting a pr otocol i n which each case woul d be compared to fac tual ly s imil ar cases in whi ch

either a li fe sentence or capital punish ment wa s i mp osed to dete rmine whe ther t he case i s more consi stent with “li fe” (con tinued ...) 

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT NASHVILLE June 3, 2004Session
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GDONGALAY P. BERRY

Automa tic Appeal from th e Court o f Crimina l Appeals Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 96-B-866 J. Randall Wyatt, Judge

No. M2001-02023-SC-DDT-DD - Filed August 23, 2004

A DOLPHO A. B IRCH , J R ., J., c oncur ring an d dis senti ng.
I concur in the

conclusion of the majority that Ber ry’s convictions should be af firmed. As to the sentences of de ath, h owever, I continue to a dhere to my views e

xpressed in a long line of dissentsbeginning with State v. Chalmers , 28 S.W.3d 913, 920-25 (Tenn. 2000)(Birch, J., concurring

and dissenting), and

most recently ela

borated on in State v. Davidson , 121 S.W.3d 600, 629 -36 (Tenn. O ct. 20, 20 03)(Bir ch, J., disse

nting), that the c omparat ive proportionalit

y revie w protocol curren

tly e mbrace d by

the major ity i s inadequ

ate to shie ld defen

dants from the arbitrary

and dispropor tionate imposition of the death penalty. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D)(1995 Supp.). I ha

ve repe atedly

expresse d my

displeas ure with the current

protocol since the time of its adoptionin State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997). See State v. Holton , 126 S.W.3d 845, 872 (Tenn. 200 4) (Birch, J ., concu rring a nd dissent

ing); State v. Davidson , 121 S.W.3d 600, 629-36 (Tenn. 2003) (B irch, J., di ssenting ); State v. Carter , 114 S.W.3d 895, 910-11 (Tenn. 2003) (Birch, J., dissenting

); State v. R eid , 91 S.W.3d 247, 288-89 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. A

ustin , 87 S.W.3d 447, 467-68 (Tenn. 2002) ( Birch, J., dissenting ); State v. Stevens , 78 S.W.3d 817, 852 (Tenn. 20 02) (Bir ch, J., concurring

and disse nting); State v. McKinney , 74 S.W.3d 291, 320-22 (Tenn. 2002) (Birch , J., concu rring a nd dissent ing); State v. Bane , 57 S.W.3d 411, 431-32 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concurr ing and dissenting

); State v. Stout , 46 S.W.3d 689, 720 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., concur ring an d dissentin

g); Terry v. State , 46 S.W.3d 147, 167 (Tenn. 2001) (Birch, J., dissentin

g); State v. Sim s , 45 S.W.3d 1, 23-24 (Tenn. 20 01) (Birch , J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Keen , 31 S.W.3d 1 96, 233-34 (Tenn. 2000) (Birch, J., dissenting). As previous ly

discusse d, I b elieve that the thr ee basic problems with the c urrent proportionality

analy sis
are that: (1) the proportionality test is overbr oad, 1 (2) the p ool of cases used fo r compar ison is1 (.. .continu ed)

cases or “d eath” cases. See State v. McKinney , 74 S. W.3d at 321 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenti ng). The current protoc ol allows a finding proportionality if t he case is si milar to exis ting death penalty cases. In other wo rds, a case is dispr opo rtionate only if the ca se und er rev iew “is plainly lac king in circumstances consis tent with those in simi lar cas es in whi ch the dea th pe nalty has been i mposed.” Bland , 958 S.W .2d at 665 (emphasis added ).

2 In my view , exclud ing from com pariso n that gro up o f cases in w hich the State d id no t seek the death pena lty,
or in which no ca pital sentencing hearing wa s held, frustrates any meaningful com parison for p ropo rtionality purposes. See Bland , 958 S.W .2d a t 679 (Birc h, J., disse nting).

3 As I stated in my concurring/dissenting opinion in State v. Godsey , “ [t] he sc ope of t he ana ly sis employ ed by the majori tyappears to be rathe r amorphous and undef ined–expandin g, cont

racti ng, and s hif

tin g as the analy sis moves from case to case. ” 60 S.W .3d 759, 797 (Tenn. 2001 )(Birch, J., concurri ng and dissenting).

4 I also note that

in a recentstudy on the costs and the consequences of the death penalty conducted by the State Comp troller, one of the conclus ions was that prosecut ors across the stat e a re inco nsistent in the ir pursu it of the de ath pen alty, a fact that a lso co ntribute s to arb itrariness in the imp ositio n of the death pena lty. See John G. M organ, Comptroller

of the T reasu ry, Tenne ss ee’ s Dea th Penalty : Co st s an d Co nsequences 13 (J uly 20 04) , avail able at
ww w.co mp troller.sta te.tn.us /orea /repo rts

. -2- inadequate, 2 and (3) r

eview istoo subjective. 3 I have previously discussed, in depth, my perception that these flaws undermine the reliability of the curr e nt proportionality protocol. See State v. Go dsey , 60 S.W.3d at 793-800 (Birch, J., concurring and dissenting). I continue to adhere to m y viewthat the c

urrent c omparat

ive proportionalit

y pr otocol is woefully

inadequa

te to prote ct de fe nd an ts fr om th e a rb it ra ry o r d is pr op or ti on at e i mp os it io n o f t he de at h p en al ty. 4 Accordingly , I respectfully

dissent from that portionof the majority opinion affirmi ng the im position of

the deat h penalty in this case.

___________________________________ ADOL PHO A. BI

RCH, JR.