In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-4158

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MYRIS MATTHEWS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 2:99CR20007-001--Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.

Argued June 14, 2000--Decided July 19, 2000

 Before Cudahy, Flaum, and Manion, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Circuit Judge. Myris Matthews pleaded

guilty to one count of possession of cocaine base

("crack") with the intent to distribute. See 21

U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 240

months imprisonment and five years supervised

release. Matthews appeals his sentence, arguing

that the district court erred by giving him a

two-level upward adjustment for a supervisory

role under U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(c). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

 While investigating the Gangster Disciples

street gang in Decatur, Illinois, agents assigned

to the Illinois State Police Task Force X

arranged several controlled buys of crack from

Matthews. The upward adjustment for his role in

the offense was based on two of these buys, both

of which preceded the crack offense charged in

the indictment. The first transaction occurred on

January 25, 1999. On that day, Matthews was paged

by a confidential source ("CS") who knew him as

"Twin" and who had bought crack cocaine from him

previously. Matthews returned the call, which was

recorded, and told the CS to go to 1336 East

Walnut Street in Decatur. The CS, wearing a wire

and under surveillance, went to the address,

where he was met by an unidentified woman. The CS

told her that Twin had sent him to buy crack, and

she acknowledged that Twin had alerted her that
he would be arriving. The woman let the CS into

the kitchen and said she would sell him two rocks

of crack for $40. When the CS replied that he

always got a better deal from Twin, she responded

that he could wait for Twin if he wanted a better

deal. The CS purchased the crack cocaine.

 The second transaction occurred the following

day, January 26, 1999. The CS again telephoned

Matthews and arranged to purchase powder cocaine

at the Walnut Street address. Upon arriving at

the house, the CS was met by Matthews and an

unidentified man. Again, the CS wore a wire and

was under surveillance until he entered the

house. The government alleges that the

unidentified man was in possession of the cocaine

and gave it to the CS at Matthews’ direction. The

parties agree that Matthews, not the unidentified

man, negotiated the price, but disagree as to who

was in possession of the cocaine. Matthews argues

that the government’s evidence established that

the unidentified man was not in any way involved

in the transaction.

 After several more transactions between the CS

and Matthews, the agents obtained a search

warrant for the Walnut Street address. Upon

arriving at the house, the agents encountered

Matthews and searched him, finding crack, cash,

and a key. Matthews told the agents that the key

was to his father’s house. Matthews’ father

allowed agents to search his house without a

warrant. He directed the agents to a bedroom that

Matthews used. There the agents found crack,

cash, marijuana, and a gun.

 After Matthews pleaded guilty, the probation

officer recommended a two-level upward adjustment

for Matthews’ supervisory role, explaining that

"the defendant exerted control over the

unidentified female and male that took part in .

. . the controlled deliveries." Matthews filed

objections to the Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR"),

arguing that he did not exert control over any

individual during the transactions on January 25

and January 26. After hearing testimony from the

agent who monitored the wire worn by the CS and

counsel’s arguments at the sentencing hearing,

the district court concluded that the upward

adjustment was warranted and adopted the

probation officer’s recommendation.

II. DISCUSSION

 We review an upward adjustment for a

defendant’s aggravating role in an offense for

clear error. United States v. Billingsley, 115

F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1997). Whether the

defendant played an aggravating role is a

question of fact that is clearly erroneous "only
if, after reviewing the entire evidence, we are

left with the definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed." United States v.

Granado, 72 F.3d 1287, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). If

the fact finder chooses between two permissible

views of the evidence, the choice is not clearly

erroneous. Id. 

 A two-level upward adjustment is warranted under

U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(c) if "the defendant was an

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor" in the

criminal activity. Application Note 4 provides

factors to be used in determining whether a

defendant falls under any of these categories.

Those factors are: (1) the exercise of decision

making authority; (2) the nature of participation

in the commission of the offense; (3) the

recruitment of accomplices; (4) the claimed right

to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; (5)

the degree of participation in planning or

organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope

of the illegal activity; and (7) the degree of

control and authority exercised over others.

U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(c), comment. (n.4). "Although

control over other participants is a significant

factor, . . . [n]o single factor is essential to

determine whether a sentence should be adjusted

under sec. 3B1.1, nor must equal weight be given

to each factor." United States v. Bush, 79 F.3d

64, 67 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal citations

omitted). "Thus, for example, even if a defendant

did not exercise control, an [upward adjustment]

under sec. 3B1.1 may apply so long as the

criminal activity involves more than one

participant and the defendant played a

coordinating or organizing role." Id. 

 Matthews argues that the evidence related to

the January 25 drug deal does not support a

finding that he exercised any control over the

unidentified woman who sold the crack to the CS.

We disagree. At the very least, Matthews played

a coordinating or organizing role that was

sufficient for an upward adjustment under sec.

3B1.1(c). See Billingsley, 115 F.3d at 465

(upward adjustment pursuant to 3B1.1(c) was not

clearly erroneous even though district court did

not explicitly find that defendant "controlled"

other participants). Matthews coordinated the

transaction by setting the time and location of

the deal. He also called the unidentified woman

to let her know that the CS would be arriving.

Moreover, the female’s statement indeed evidenced

Matthews’ control over her. When the CS balked at

the price, the woman responded that he would have

to wait for Matthews if he wanted a better price.

A reasonable inference from this statement is

that Matthews, not the woman, had the authority

to negotiate the price. Matthews argues that this
statement meant only that the CS was welcome to

buy from him if the CS did not like the woman’s

price, and, in his view, the appropriate

inference to draw is that he was involved as a

middleman--he merely directed the CS to a crack

house where drugs could be purchased. The

district court was thus presented with two

permissible views of the evidence, and did not

clearly err by choosing to believe that the

female’s statement evidenced Matthews’ control

over her. See Granado, 72 F.3d at 1290 (affirming

upward adjustment based on district court’s view

of the evidence).

 Matthews also argues that the second transaction

on January 26 did not occur as described in the

PSR. The PSR recounts that Matthews negotiated

the price and then directed an unidentified man

to give the drugs to the CS. Matthews, however,

asserts that the unidentified man did not have

the drugs in his possession. Rather, he argues

that the evidence established that he alone

negotiated the deal and that he was the one who

gave the CS the drugs. Matthews points to

testimony at the sentencing hearing that, he

alleges, contradicts the PSR. On direct

examination, agent Richard Hughes, who monitored

the wire worn by the CS and heard the

transaction, testified that the unidentified man

"brought several packages of cocaine out of his

pocket" and was directed by Matthews to give the

CS "three for the price of $40." But Matthews

points to the following exchange on Hughes’

cross-examination as proof that it was he, not

the unidentified man, who gave the drugs to the

CS:

Q: And on that occasion, it was actually Mr.

Matthews who gave the confidential source a--it

was powder cocaine in exchange for the $40 that

you had given the confidential source, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: It was not the unidentified black male who

supplied your confidential source with any drugs

on that occasion; isn’t that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And it was Mr. Matthews personally who supplied

the--and it was powder cocaine on that occasion,

correct?

A: Yes.

 We are troubled by this seemingly contradictory

testimony. Although the responses to the first

and third questions in the above exchange are

unclear due to the compound nature of the

questions, the agent clearly responds to the
second question by stating that the unidentified

man was not the one to give the drugs to the CS.

The government did not object to this line of

questioning nor did it respond to Matthews’

argument at the sentencing hearing based on this

apparently inconsistent testimony. In its brief

on appeal, the government sets aside the effect

of the agent’s response to the second question

and simply insists that the testimony was not

contradictory. If the unidentified man did not

give the drugs to the CS, there is no evidence

that Matthews played a supervisory or organizing

role in the January 26 transaction. We find that

the record does not support the finding that

Matthews played an aggravating role in this

transaction. See United States v. Mankiewicz, 122

F.3d 399, 405-06 (7th Cir. 1997) (prior to the

imposition of upward adjustment pursuant to

3B1.1(c), government must establish that the

defendant had some real and direct influence on

other participants); United States v. Mustread,

42 F.3d 1097, 1103 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that,

at a minimum, defendant must exert some real and

direct influence). Because of the significant

difference that even a two-level upward

adjustment can have on the length of a sentence,

we underscore that a defendant’s role must be

clear prior to imposing an upward adjustment

pursuant to 3B1.1(c). 

 However, regardless of the uncertainty

surrounding the January 26 transaction, Matthews

was still eligible for the upward adjustment

based on the January 25 transaction. See United

States v. Sierra, 188 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.

1999) (noting that section 3B1.1(c) "only

requires that the defendant directed one

person").

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, Matthews’ sentence is

Affirmed.