ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of -- ) 

) 

Tug Hill Construction, Inc. ) 

) 

Under Contract No. W9126G-09-D-0006 ) 

APPEARANCE FOR THE APPELLANT: 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

ASBCA No. 57825 

Brian R. Dugdale, Esq. 

Varela, Lee, Metz & Guarino 

McLean, VA 

Thomas H. Gourlay, Jr., Esq. 

Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 

Charles L. Webster III, Esq. 

Cindy E. Shimokusa, Esq. 

Engineer Trial Attorneys 

U.S. Army Engineer District, Fort Worth 

OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MCILMAIL 

The government entered into a firm, fixed-price contract with appellant for 

construction work at Fort Bliss, Texas. Appellant seeks additional compensation for 

utility system work in excess of its original price. The Board conducted an eight-day 

hearing, on the issue of entitlement only. The Board finds that appellant is not entitled 

to additional compensation, and denies the appeal. 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

1. On 9 April 2010, a Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued by the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (government or USACE) for Phases 3 and 4 of the Fort 

Bliss Combat Aviation Brigade Additional Infrastructure Project (CAB 3 & 4) to the 

five contractors in the government's Fort Bliss infrastructure multiple award task order 

contract (MATOC) (R4, tab 3). The proposed task order was to be awarded on a firm 

fixed-price basis to the lowest priced acceptable offeror (R4, tab 4 ). 

2. The scope of work for the project included the demolition of certain sections 

of existing utility systems and the construction of new primary electric, water, sanitary 

sewer, communications, and natural gas utilities systems. The new utilities would 

subsequently be connected back to the existing main utility systems. (R4, tab 3 at 

55-57, 99) Further, the delivery order provides: 
SPECIAL NOTICE: 

The existing Fort Bliss Main Post Utility Systems are 

privately owned. This scope of work includes coordinating 

project utility requirements with the owners of the 

privatized utility systems. Typically Utility owners will 

remove existing utilities, install new primary utility 

systems and make final connections between the new 

systems and existing. However, contractors shall be 

responsible for negotiating and finalizing utility system 

work with the utility providers. The Contractor will 

include its cost for such work in its cost proposal. 

(R4, tab 4 at 40) We find that the language of the Special Notice is unambiguous, and 

put offerors on notice that they were to make arrangements, or at least conduct 

discussions with, the utility providers, and account for whatever resulted from those 

arrangements or discussions in their cost proposals. 

3. Three offerors submitted proposals for the delivery order: appellant, 

J.D. Abrams, and Sundt Construction (Sundt) (R4, tab 29; tr. 7/148, 8/118). 

4. The Fort Bliss water utility provider was Fort Bliss Water Services 

Company (FBWS), the electric utility provider was Rio Grande Electric Cooperative, 

Inc. (RGEC), and the gas utility provider was Texas Gas (tr. 7/130). FBWS and 

RGEC became the owners of the Fort Bliss utility systems through a privatization 

effort that resulted in the utility providers entering into 50-year contracts with the 

Army. Thus, the Army gave these two utility owners service contracts that obligate 

them to operate and maintain their respective systems and to provide utility services to 

Fort Bliss. (R4, tabs 15, 16). We find that these contracts allow the utility owners to 

act as autonomous entities with respect to their respective utilities on Fort Bliss. 

5. Appellant was aware of the Special Notice as early as 11 May 2010, prior to 

submitting its proposal (supp. R4, tab 137; tr. 1171, 171-73). On that date, in addition 

to extending the proposal submission deadline to 24 May 2010 at 2:00 pm, the 

government amended the RFP to add the Special Notice to the Scope of Work (supp. 

R4, tabs 38-41). 

6. On 19 May 20 I 0, appellant received word from a company named 

CF Jordan that, with respect to CAB 3 & 4, "[FBWS] is going to be doing the 

water/sewer" (supp. R4, tab 148 at 827). 

2 
7. On 19 May 2010, Sundt posted the following (Inquiry No. 3276130) on the 

government's "ProjNet"1 system, with respect to CAB 3 & 4: 

Please clarify the Special Notice regarding coordination 

and negotiations with the owners of privatized utilities. 

Based upon the language provided, bidders should include 

in their cost proposal: Costs of work typically performed 

by the utility owners. Fees charged by the utility owner, 

such as design review, connection, and inspections. Costs 

for all other work required to conform with the contract 

documents. Are these assumptions correct? Finally, 

should the contractor assume, depending on the utility 

owner, the contractor may be required to sub-contract 

directly with the utility owner in order to complete the 

work? 

(Supp. R4, tab 45 at 77) 

8. Prior to submitting their cost proposals, Sundt and J.D. Abrams contacted 

FBWS and RGEC. RGEC would not provide a price quote for the delivery order 

electrical utility system work, but, on 20 May 2010, FBWS provided a quote of 

$11,071,000 to Sundt and J.D. Abrams for the water utility system work. (Supp. R4, 

tabs 146, 151; tr. 7 /144-48, 8/117-20). 

9. Also on 20 May 2010, a company named Helix Electric, Inc. (Helix), passed 

along to appellant a message that Helix had received from RGEC regarding CAB 3 & 

4, in which RGEC stated: 

We are the owners of the Ft. Bliss power distribution 

system. Please ask your general contracting POC or your 

USACE POC to contact us about the work required for 

CAB phases 3 & 4. 

(Supp. R4, tab 144 at 819) On the same day appellant contacted RGEC, and asked, 

with respect to CAB 3 & 4, "[ c ]an you explain the work to be completed on this 

project by the ... contractor and what role [RGEC] will play in the project please" (supp. 

R4, tab 150 at 832). The purpose of appellant's question was to seek clarification "as 

1 The ProjNet inquiry system is a public electronic bulletin board where offerors may 

ask the USACE for clarification on a solicitation (see tr. 1/126). It allows 

offerors to view all previously-submitted inquiries, and responses, and to add 

new inquiries (R4, tab 3 at 75). 

3 
to what [appellant's] role was going to be and what [RGEC's] role was going to be" 

(tr. 11121). On 21May2010, RGEC replied: 

RGEC's typical role involves anything with the electrical 

utility system. We are responsible for all of the demolition 

of existing and installation of new distribution utilities .... 

We have yet to receive clear plans so I am unable to fully 

comment on the work to be completed on the project. If 

this doesn't answer your question, please let me know and 

I can try to provide you with better information. 

(Supp. R4, tab 150 at 831) 

10. On 21 May 2010, Sundt posted the following (Inquiry No. 3283285) on 

ProjNet, with respect to CAB 3 & 4: 

[RGEC] has informed the General Contractors that they 

will not be providing pricing for at least (3) three weeks. 

In addition, [RGEC] is not going to approve the existing 

design. [FBWS] has only provided conceptual budgetary 

numbers that are not contractually binding. [FBWS] says 

that firm pricing will be available in the next month. 

[FBWS], Texas Gas, and [RGEC] are not going to allow 

the ... contractors to self-perform the work.... Given that we 

are not going to receive pricing, we are requesting a 

suitable time extension for the privatized utility contractors 

to provide firm price quotations. 

(Supp. R4, tab 45 at 77-78) 

11. The government did not respond to Inquiry Nos. 3276130 and 3283285 

(supp. R4, tab 45 at 77-78). 

12. On the morning of 22 May 2010, Steve Haskins, appellant's estimating 

manager and purchasing manager (tr. 1/58), emailed Jeffrey Kellogg, appellant's 

president and sole owner (tr. 1/147), bringing to Mr. Kellogg's attention Inquiry 

No. 3283285, which was included in an attachment to that email (supp. R4, tab 155 

at 837, 843-44). The attachment also contained Inquiry No. 3276130 (supp. R4, 

tab 155 at 843-44). That evening, Mr. Haskins raised with Mr. Kellogg the issue of 

"risks" with respect to CAB 3 & 4, including "impacts of Special Note," and 

"Attorney fees to carry, if any" (supp. R4, tab 156 at 845). 

4 
13. On the morning of 24 May 2010, at 10:02 am, appellant was told by a 

company named SBC Global that it had learned that, with respect to CAB 3 & 4, 

"[RGEC] will not let anyone do their work on this project," "[RGEC] does not like the 

[government's] design and intends to redesign the project," and "[RGEC] will not 

have a price for this for 3 to 4 weeks." SBC Global also told appellant: 

With this as it is please proceed as you see fit with the bid I 

sent you. It would be bad if the cost I gave you is less than 

[RGEC] quotes and someone gets stuck." 

(Supp. R4, tab 157 at 846) 

14. On 24 May 2010, at 1 :43 pm, appellant submitted its proposal (supp. R4, 

tab 159 at 850). 

15. We find that appellant did not seek price quotes from FBWS or RGEC 

before submitting its proposal, and moreover, never contacted FBWS regarding CAB 

3 & 4 before submitting that proposal (tr. 1/132-33, 2/76). 

16. On 16 June 2010, USACE awarded Delivery Order No. 0006, pursuant to 

Contract No. W9126G-09-D-0006, to appellant for the fixed price sum of $28,024,550 

(R4, tab 4 at 1, 4). 

17. On 24 August 2010, appellant informed the government that it had received 

pricing from RGEC and FB WS that was higher than the pricing that appellant had 

included in its proposal (app. supp. R4, tab 292 at 586). Appellant requested that the 

government "direct the Utility Providers to provide competitive pricing" (id. at 587). 

18. On 2 September 2010, the contracting officer (CO) informed appellant by 

letter that appellant's "sole remedy is to continue negotiating with the utility providers 

until a reasonable price is obtained" (app. supp. R4, tab 295 at 2). 

19. On 9 September 2010, John Moreno, the government's deputy program 

manager, stated in a meeting the day before with RGEC and FBWS (and others, but 

not appellant) that, with respect to CAB 3 & 4: 

[I]t was clear in the amendment that was put out to their 

contractors that they were supposed to coordinate with the 

[utility providers] for pricing and if they did not do that 

this was now their problem. 

(Tr. 5/74, 93-95; app. supp. R4, tab 301 at 141-42, ,-r 7) 

5 
20. By letter dated 24 September 2010, FBWS informed appellant that its 

revised pricing was its final position. FBWS added: 

Per COE Amendment 2, the MA TOC contractors were to 

have contacted the Utility providers, (FBWS for water and 

waste water) for pricing, prior to bid submission. 

Although other MA TOC contractors made contact with 

FBWS, [appellant] did not. Had [appellant] followed the 

instructions in Amendment 2, FB WS strongly feels this 

pricing issue could have been avoided. 

(Supp. R4, tab 192) 

21. In November 2010, appellant entered into a service agreement with FBWS, 

agreeing to pay $11,726,123 for water utility system work at Fort Bliss (supp. R4, tab 210). 

22. In January 2011, appellant entered into a service agreement with RGEC, 

agreeing to pay $8,821,602.99 for electric utility system work at Fort Bliss (supp. R4, 

tab 223). 

23. In March 2011, appellant presented a certified claim to the CO for 

$11,357,528.20 (R4, tab 26 at 30). Appellant claimed that its cost proposal had 

included $5,867,800 for FBWS's scope of work, and $5,973,050 for RGEC's scope of 

work (id. at 3). Appellant asserted that the government had breached the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, including by not helping appellant negotiate 

with FBWS and RGEC (R4, tab 26). 

24. On 31 October 2011, the CO issued a final decision denying appellant's 

certified claim (R4, tab 2). 

25. Appellant timely filed this appeal on 2 November 2011. 

DECISION 

The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

Appellant contends that the government breached the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing after the award by not helping appellant negotiate with the utility 

providers after appellant was awarded the delivery order. We reject that contention. 

The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot expand a party's contractual 

duties beyond those in the express contract. Metcalf Construction Co. v. United 

States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The implied duty of good faith and fair 

dealing is limited by the original bargain: it prevents a party's acts or omissions that, 

6 
though not proscribed by the contract expressly, are inconsistent with the contract's 

purpose and deprive the other party of the contemplated value. Id. Pursuant to the 

Special Notice, the government hired appellant to coordinate, negotiate, and finalize 

the utility systems work with the utility providers (finding 2); the implied duty of good 

faith and fair dealing did not require the government to help appellant perform that 

work, or to help appellant obtain lower prices from the utility providers. Not helping 

appellant negotiate with the utility providers was not inconsistent with the delivery 

order's purpose and did not deprive appellant of the contemplated value of the delivery 

order; the delivery order nowhere implies that the government was required to 

intervene in the negotiations, and did not deprive appellant of any of the contemplated 

value of the delivery order.2 Cf Bell/Heery v. United States, 739 F.3d 1324, 1331-35 

(Fed. Cir. 2014) (allegations that government failed to engage state agency regarding 

contractor's excavation permit application did not state a claim of breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where contract provided that "[t]he 

Contractor shall, without additional expense to the Government, be responsible for 

obtaining any necessary licenses and permits"). To the contrary, appellant agreed to a 

fixed price for a scope of work that included negotiating with the utility providers; 

whether that price covered the eventual cost of the scope of work was appellant's risk. 

On this point the Special Notice is unambiguous: the scope of work "include[d] 

coordinating project utility requirements with the owners of the privatized utility 

systems," that "contractors shall be responsible for negotiating and finalizing utility 

system work with the utility providers," and that "[t]he Contractor will include its cost 

for such work in its cost proposal" (finding 2). Appellant agreed to perform the 

delivery order work for the fixed price of $28,024,550 (finding 16) without having 

first negotiated the work with the utility providers (finding 15); consequently, 

appellant, not the government, assumed the risk that the work would cost more than 

appellant anticipated when it submitted its proposal. See Spindler Constr. Corp., 

ASBCA No. 55007, 06-2 BCA ~ 33,376 at 165,462-63. Therefore, although appellant 

contends that FB WS and RGEC charged more than appellant anticipated for utility 

system work, and that the process of coordinating, negotiating, and finalizing 

agreements with the utility providers otherwise increased its costs, appellant bore that 

risk when it submitted its proposal. 

2 Appellant does not appear to rely upon the 9 September 2010 statement made by 

John Moreno, the government's deputy program director, during a meeting with 

the utility providers (finding 19). In any event, we find that Mr. Moreno's 

statement did not breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. That 

statement merely reflected the government's view, consistent with the 

unambiguous language of the Special Notice (finding 2), that appellant was 

responsible for coordinating and negotiating utility systems work with the 

utility providers. 

3 Appellant raises no issue with respect to Texas Gas. 

7 
Appellant contends that the government breached the implied duty of good faith 

and fair dealing because, appellant contends, the government controlled the utility 

providers through other contracts, but did not exert that control to help appellant 

negotiate with the utility providers. A contractor does not assume the risk of 

interference with its performance by the government's other contractors who are also 

under the control of the government. See Toombs & Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 34590 et al., 

91-1BCA~23,403 at 117,423 (government's failure to assure timely performance of its 

asbestos contractor breached duty to cooperate with construction contractor whose 

performance was delayed). However, in this matter, appellant does not demonstrate that 

the government possessed rights pursuant to contracts with the utility providers that it 

failed to exercise to address the utility provider's conduct. In this respect this appeal is 

different from American International Constructors, Inc., ENG BCA Nos. 3633, 3667, 

77-2 BCA ~ 12,606, upon which appellant heavily relies. There, the government entered 

into a contract with a construction company that required the construction company to 

use a particular shipper with which the government also had a contract. Id. at 61,098. 

The shipper delayed performance, delaying the construction contractor's performance. 

Id. at 61, 103. That Board held that the government breached the implied duty of good 

faith and fair dealing by failing to exercise its rights under its contract with the shipper 

to assist the construction contractor in its problems with the shipper. Id. at 61, 106-07. 

However, the Board relied for that holding upon specific provisions of the government's 

shipping contract, including a provision that would have allowed for the use of vessels 

not owned by the shipping contractor in the event of the shipper's failure to perform. 

ld.4 Here, appellant does not point to any provision of any contract between the 

government and RGEC or FBWS to support its contention that the government 

possessed control arising from its contracts with the utility providers that the 

government failed to exercise. 

Appellant further contends that the government's alleged breaches of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing include policy, program, and contract 

formation actions that the government took before awarding the delivery order. We 

reject that contention as well. The government could not have breached the covenant 

of good faith and fair dealing by its pre-award conduct because the covenant did not 

exist until the contract (that is, the contract at issue in this matter, Delivery Order 

No. 0006) was signed. See Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 692 F.3d 1365, 1372 

(Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CAE USA, Inc., ASBCA No. 58006, 13 BCA ~ 35,323 at 

173,390 (rejecting allegations of breach of the implied covenant based solely on preaward conduct). Although every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 

faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement, that duty does not deal 

with good faith in the formation of a contract. Scott Timber, 692 F.3d at 1372 (quoting 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1981)). 

4 In any event, decisions of other Boards are not binding on this Board. 

8 
To be sure, pre-contract actions by the government can bear on the question of 

whether the government has complied with its obligations that are eventually imposed 

by the contract. Id. For example, if the contract obligates the government to take 

action within a reasonable period, delays by the government even before contract 

signing may bear on the reasonableness of delays during the period that the contract is 

in force. Id. However, this is not such a case. The contract did not obligate the 

government to help appellant negotiate with the utility providers; therefore, none of 

the pre-contract events that resulted in the contract assigning that obligation to 

appellant are relevant to whether the government breached the contract. Nor is this a 

case in which parties' pre-controversy actions are relevant in determining what the 

parties intended by agreeing to contract language whose precise meaning is not clear. 

See Metcalf Construction, 742 F.3d at 997. Here, the Special Notice is clear and 

unambiguous: it assigned to appellant the responsibility to negotiate with the utility 

providers (finding 2). 

Appellant appears to suggest that the government was obligated to have taken 

the utility providers' property (app. reply at 32-33, 37). If so, we reject that 

suggestion. Of course, the government possesses the power, as sovereign, to take 

private property. See El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 

1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, an act or omission of the government as 

sovereign is not itself a breach of a government contract; for a sovereign act or 

omission to result in a contract breach, the contract must have promised that the 

sovereign act would not occur, or that it would occur and did not. See Connor Bros. 

Constr. Co. v. United States, 550 F.3d 1368, 1371-72, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, 

appellant points to no provision of the delivery order that provides that the government 

would exercise its sovereign power to take the utility providers' property. 

Superior Knowledge 

Appellant contends that before awarding the delivery order, the government 

withheld knowledge that the utility providers took the position that only they could 

perform Fort Bliss utility system work, and that the utility providers could not estimate 

the cost of such work, or would charge a premium for that work. To the extent that 

appellant asserts a "superior knowledge" claim, that claim fails. The superior 

knowledge doctrine imposes upon a contracting agency an implied duty to disclose to 

a contractor otherwise unavailable information regarding some novel matter affecting 

the contract that is vital to its performance. Scott Timber, 692 F.3d at 1372. However, 

where a contractor has the opportunity before contract entry to obtain the knowledge 

that the government has, the government's knowledge is not superior. See Grumman 

Aerospace Corp. v. Wynne, 497 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

9 
Here, the information that appellant contends the government withheld was 

otherwise available; indeed, before submitting its proposal, appellant learned much of 

that information. Appellant learned from RGEC that "RGEC's typical role involve[d] 

anything with the electrical utility system," that RGEC was "responsible for all of the 

demolition of existing and installation of new distribution utilities," and that RGEC 

was "unable to fully comment on the work to be completed on the project" (finding 9). 

Appellant read in Inquiry No. 3283285 that pricing from RGEC and FBWS was not 

available, and that RGEC and FBWS were not going to allow contractors to 

self-perform (findings 10, 13). Appellant had Inquiry No. 3276130, which raised the 

issue whether "the contractor [should] assume, depending on the utility owner, [that] 

the contractor may be required to sub-contract directly with the utility owner in order 

to complete the work" (finding 7). And only hours before submitting its proposal, 

appellant heard from SBC Global that "[RGEC] will not let anyone do their work," 

and that the cost proposal that appellant had received from SBC Global for electrical 

utility system work might end up being less than what RGEC would charge 

(finding 13). With and despite that knowledge, appellant submitted its proposal, 

evidently having decided that the "risks" that appellant's estimator had raised with 

appellant's owner two days earlier were worth taking (findings 13, 14). 

In addition, information regarding what FBWS might charge for water utility 

system work was available before appellant submitted its proposal, from FBWS. Had 

appellant contacted FBWS before submitting its proposal, it might have received (as 

did J.D. Abrams and Sundt) an $11,071,000 estimate for the water utility system work 

(finding 8), an amount in the same range as the eventual $11,726,123 that FBWS 

ultimately charged appellant for that work (finding 21). 

Constructive Change 

Appellant contends that the government constructively changed the delivery 

order by requiring appellant to contract with the utility providers (as opposed to 

allowing appellant to perform the utility system work itself), inconsistent with the 

delivery order's provisions.5 To demonstrate a constructive change, appellant must 

show ( 1) that it performed work beyond the contract requirements, and (2) that the 

additional work was ordered, expressly or impliedly, by the government. Bell/Heery, 

5 The Board allows the post-hearing amendment to appellant's complaint, and finds 

jurisdiction to entertain appellant's "constructive change" argument. Although 

appellant did not present that theory in its claim to the CO, it bases that theory 

upon the same operative facts that it presented to the CO. ACE Constructors, Inc. 

v. United States, 499 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Those facts included that, 

on 2 September 2010, the government sent appellant the letter in which the CO 

stated that appellant's "sole remedy is to continue negotiating with the utility 

providers until a reasonable price is obtained" (R4, tab 26 at 7 & ex. 6). 

10 
739 F.3d at 1335. Appellant does not meet that test. Appellant does not demonstrate 

that interacting with the utility providers was performance of work beyond the 

requirements of the delivery order (or that the utility providers performed any 

"additional work"). After all, pursuant to the Special Notice, appellant's scope of 

work expressly included "coordinating project utility requirements with the owners of 

the privatized utility systems," and "negotiating and finalizing utility system work with 

the utility providers" (finding 2). That means that however the utility systems work 

was to be accomplished, coordination, negotiation, and finalization of that work with 

the utility providers would be required; contrary to any suggestion by appellant that it 

could perform the utility system work without involving the utility providers at some 

stage (even if only to negotiate with the utility providers that appellant would 

"self-perform").6 Indeed, appellant ultimately performed the coordination, 

negotiation, and finalization with the utility providers that produced the service 

agreements-albeit several months after award (findings 21-22). 

Moreover, appellant does not demonstrate that the government dictated any 

term of either service agreement, much less that any such term is "additional" to the 

delivery order. In that regard, appellant does not demonstrate that the government 

mandated that it hire the utility providers to perform the utility systems work; the CO's 

2 September 2010 statement that appellant's "sole remedy [was] to continue 

negotiating with the utility providers until a reasonable price is obtained" (finding 18) 

was in response to appellant's request for help with the utility providers' pricing 

(finding 17), and was consistent with the Special Notice's provision that "contractors 

shall be responsible for negotiating and finalizing utility system work with the utility 

providers" (finding 2). Because the delivery order also provided that "[t]he Contractor 

will include its cost for such work in its cost proposal" (finding 2), appellant bore the 

risk of the cost of that work. 

It is always more difficult to negotiate after the fact when, as in this case, 

appellant was clearly put on notice to coordinate with the utility providers prior to bid 

submittal (finding 2). Here, appellant did not (finding 15), and must bear the cost of 

its decision. For these reasons, appellant is not entitled to any additional compensation 

for utility system work. 

6 At least as late as 20 May 2010, appellant appeared to take the position that the 

utility providers would be involved in the accomplishment of the utility system 

work. On that date, appellant contacted RGEC for clarification "as to what 

[appellant's] role was going to be and what [RGEC's] role was going to be" 

(finding 9). 

11 
CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, the appeal is denied. 

Dated: 16 October 2014 

I concur 

0 ON 

Administrative Judge 

Acting Vice Chairman 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

Administrat ve Judge 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I concur 

~ Administrative Judge 

Acting Chairman 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 57825, Appeal of Tug Hill 

Construction, Inc., rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

12 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

R.ecorder,Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals