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STATE v. WILSON

Cite as 306 Neb. 875

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Brady J. Wilson, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed August 21, 2020. No. S-19-638.

1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question 

of law, which an appellate court reviews independently.

2. Convicted Sex Offender: Statutes: Legislature: Intent. Nebraska’s 

Sex Offender Registration Act is a civil regulatory scheme intended 

by the Legislature to protect the public from the danger posed by sex 

offenders.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory language is to be given its plain 

and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, 

direct, and unambiguous.

4. Statutes. A court must attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, 

and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as 

superfluous or meaningless.

5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. A collection of statutes pertaining to a 

single subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunctively 

considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature, so 

that different provisions are consistent, harmonious, and sensible.

6. Statutes: Legislature: Presumptions: Judicial Construction. In determining the meaning of a statute, the applicable rule is that when the 

Legislature enacts a law affecting an area which is already the subject 

of other statutes, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of the 

preexisting legislation and the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court 

construing and applying that legislation.

7. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The intent of the Legislature may be 

found through its omission of words from a statute as well as its inclusion of words in a statute.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

08/28/2020 08:07 AM CDT
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Cite as 306 Neb. 875

Appeal from the District Court for Hamilton County: 

Rachel A. Daugherty, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark Porto, of Porto Law Office, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E. 

Duffy for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Papik, J.

After accepting Brady J. Wilson’s no contest pleas to first 

degree sexual assault and another related charge, the district court sentenced him. As part of sentencing, it found 

that Wilson committed an aggravated offense under the Sex 

Offender Registration Act (SORA) and was thus subject to a 

lifetime registration requirement. Wilson appeals the district 

court’s finding that he committed an aggravated offense. We 

find that the district court did not err and affirm.

BACKGROUND

Charges and Convictions.

In December 2018, the State charged Wilson by information with three counts of first degree sexual assault and one 

count of visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State later filed 

an amended information charging Wilson with one count of 

first degree sexual assault and one count of attempting to possess a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving 

a child.

Under the plea agreement, Wilson agreed to plead guilty 

or no contest to the charges in the amended information. The 

State also agreed to dismiss charges against Wilson in another 

case involving the same victim. At the plea hearing, Wilson 

stated that he wished to plead no contest to both charges in the 

amended information.
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The State provided a factual basis for the charges at the 

plea hearing. With respect to the first degree sexual assault 

charge, the prosecutor stated that after initially communicating 

on a social media application, Wilson, who was then 21 years 

old, met the victim, a 15-year-old female, in September 2018. 

Wilson brought alcohol to the meeting, and both he and the 

victim consumed it, with the victim drinking to the point of 

intoxication. Wilson then drove to a rural area and attempted 

to have sexual intercourse with the victim. The victim said that 

she did not want to have sexual intercourse, but ultimately sexual intercourse occurred. Wilson later admitted to an investigator that the victim said no when he attempted to have sexual 

intercourse with her.

Wilson’s counsel subsequently confirmed that Wilson did 

not dispute the factual basis. The district court also confirmed 

with Wilson that he still wished to plead no contest. After 

doing so, the district court accepted the pleas and found Wilson 

guilty of both counts alleged in the amended information.

Sentencing.

A few months later, the district court held a sentencing 

hearing. The district court sentenced Wilson to 6 to 10 years’ 

incarceration for first degree sexual assault and 1 to 3 years’ 

incarceration for attempted possession of a visual depiction of 

sexually explicit conduct involving a minor.

Of relevance to this appeal, the district court stated that 

because of the nature of his crimes, Wilson was subject to 

the requirements of SORA. The district court also stated that 

it had found that “the offense for which you have been convicted is an aggravated offense as defined by [Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-4001.01 (Reissue 2016)], and you are therefore required 

to register for life.”

On the same day as the sentencing hearing, the district court 

also entered a written judgment and sentencing order. In it, the 

district court again stated that it had found that Wilson had 
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committed an aggravated offense and was therefore required 

to register under SORA for life.

Wilson timely appealed.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Wilson assigns a single error on appeal. He contends that the 

district court erred by determining that Wilson committed an 

aggravated offense and is therefore required to register under 

SORA for life.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s factual determination that a defendant’s crime 

was an aggravated offense under SORA is reviewed as a question of the sufficiency of the evidence. See, State v. Norman, 

285 Neb. 72, 824 N.W.2d 739 (2013); State v. Hamilton, 277 

Neb. 593, 763 N.W.2d 731 (2009).

[1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which 

an appellate court reviews independently. State v. Clemens, 300 

Neb. 601, 915 N.W.2d 550 (2018).

ANALYSIS

Statutory Background.

[2] There is no dispute in this case that as a result of his 

conviction of first degree sexual assault, Wilson is now subject to SORA. SORA is a civil regulatory scheme intended 

by the Legislature to protect the public from the danger posed 

by sex offenders. Hamilton, supra. Generally, SORA requires 

individuals that plead guilty to or are convicted of certain 

enumerated offenses to register with the county sheriff in the 

counties where they reside, work, and attend school. See State 

v. Ratumaimuri, 299 Neb. 887, 911 N.W.2d 270 (2018). SORA 

requirements may also apply to individuals that plead guilty to 

or are convicted of other offenses. Ratumaimuri, supra. Wilson 

was convicted of first degree sexual assault under Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 28-319 (Reissue 2016), a conviction that makes him 

automatically subject to SORA’s requirements. See Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 29-4003(1)(a)(i)(C) (Reissue 2016).
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Those persons to whom SORA requirements apply generally must register “during any period of supervised release, 

probation, or parole” and then must continue to comply with 

SORA for a registration period following “discharge from 

probation, parole, or supervised release or release from incarceration, whichever date is most recent.” See Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-4005(1) (Reissue 2016). Section 29-4005(1) sets forth 

three different registration periods. The registration period 

is 15 years if the offender was convicted of a registrable 

offense not punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year. 

§ 29-4005(1)(b)(i). The registration period is 25 years if the 

offender was convicted of a registrable offense punishable 

by imprisonment for more than 1 year. § 29-4005(1)(b)(ii). 

Relevant to this appeal, the registration period is life if the 

offender was convicted of a registrable offense punishable 

by imprisonment for more than 1 year and was convicted of 

an aggravated offense. § 29-4005(1)(b)(iii). SORA defines 

“[a]ggravated offense” as

any registrable offense under section 29-4003 which 

involves the penetration of, direct genital touching of, 

oral to anal contact with, or oral to genital contact with 

(a) a victim age thirteen years or older without the consent 

of the victim, (b) a victim under the age of thirteen years, 

or (c) a victim who the sex offender knew or should have 

known was mentally or physically incapable of resisting 

or appraising the nature of his or her conduct.

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4001.01 (Reissue 2016).

Parties’ Positions on Appeal.

Both Wilson and the State contend on appeal that the district court erred by finding that Wilson committed an aggravated offense and is therefore required to register for life, but 

for different reasons. The State asserts that after amendments 

to SORA in 2009, sentencing courts have no role to play in 

determining whether a defendant committed an aggravated 

offense and is thus obligated to register for life. According 
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to the State, the Nebraska State Patrol is now responsible for 

making that determination in all cases.

Wilson, on the other hand, argues that sentencing courts 

must make the determination as to whether a defendant committed an aggravated offense. He contends, however, that the 

district court erred by finding that he committed an aggravated offense.

Ultimately, we disagree with both the State and Wilson. As 

we will explain, we disagree with the State that the district 

court committed reversible error by making a finding as to 

whether Wilson committed an aggravated offense and we disagree with Wilson that the district court committed reversible 

error by making the finding it did.

State’s Argument.

We begin with the State’s argument that we should vacate 

the portion of the sentence in which the district court found 

that Wilson committed an aggravated offense and is thus 

required to register for life. Prior to statutory amendments to 

SORA in 2009, there was no question that a sentencing court 

was to make a determination as to whether a registrable offense 

under SORA rose to the level of an aggravated offense. Our 

opinion in State v. Hamilton, 277 Neb. 593, 763 N.W.2d 731 

(2009), discussed sentencing courts’ authority to find that an 

offense was aggravated. As we discussed in Hamilton, that 

authority was made clear by a provision within a prior version 

of SORA that directed sentencing courts to make the finding 

of an aggravated offense part of the sentencing order. See Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 29-4005(2) (Reissue 2008).

As alluded to above, however, the State believes that sentencing courts no longer have the authority to find that an 

offense is aggravated. The State believes that amendments to 

SORA enacted in 2009 placed the sole authority to determine 

whether an offense is aggravated with the State Patrol.

[3-5] The State’s argument requires us to interpret the current version of SORA. In doing so, we are guided by familiar 

principles. Statutory language is to be given its plain and 
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ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to 

interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words 

which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. State v. Dean, 288 

Neb. 530, 849 N.W.2d 138 (2014). A court must attempt to 

give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be avoided, 

no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous 

or meaningless. Id. A collection of statutes pertaining to a 

single subject matter are in pari materia and should be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent 

of the Legislature, so that different provisions are consistent, 

harmonious, and sensible. State v. Montoya, 305 Neb. 581, 941 

N.W.2d 474 (2020).

The principal statute upon which the State relies for its 

argument is Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4013(5) (Reissue 2016), 

which provides that certain officials within the State Patrol 

“shall have access to all documents that are generated by any 

governmental agency that may have bearing on sex offender 

registration and community notification.” Section 29-4013(5) 

goes on to state that “[a]ccess to such documents will ensure 

that a fair determination of what is an appropriate registration period is completed using the totality of all information 

available.” This language, the State suggests, places the sole 

authority to determine whether an offense was aggravated with 

the State Patrol.

We observe initially that it is not obvious to us that this 

language confers as much authority on the State Patrol as the 

State contends. It would seem there would be a clearer and 

more direct way to confer such authority on the State Patrol. 

Moreover, the State has a difficult task before it to reconcile 

its position with another provision of SORA: Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-4007(1)(a)(i) (Cum. Supp. 2018). That statute provides 

that when sentencing a person for a registrable offense under 

SORA, the court has a duty to provide the defendant with 

written notification of the duty to register and that the written notification shall, among other things, inform the defendant of “the duration of time he or she will be subject to the 

act.” § 29-4007(1)(a)(i). This language replaced the former 
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language requiring sentencing courts to make a finding that 

the defendant committed an aggravated offense part of the 

sentencing order.

The obvious question for the State raised by this language 

is: How is the court to inform the defendant of the duration 

of time he or she will be subject to SORA at sentencing if 

that determination is made later by the State Patrol? On this 

question, the State takes the position that the language of 

§ 29-4007(1)(a)(i) obligates the sentencing court to provide the 

defendant with only a list of possible registration periods, i.e., 

that the registration period might be for 15 years, it might be 

for 25 years, and it might be for life.

We need not decide today whether the sentencing court 

meets its obligation under § 29-4007(1)(a)(i) by providing 

the defendant with only a range of possible registration periods. But given the direction to sentencing courts to notify the 

defendant of “the duration of time he or she will be subject to 

the act,” § 29-4007(1)(a)(i) (emphasis supplied), we cannot say 

that sentencing courts lack authority to find that the offender 

committed an aggravated offense and to inform the defendant 

that he or she is thus required to register for life. Moreover, we 

see nothing in SORA that indicates that when the sentencing 

court concludes that the defendant committed an aggravated 

offense and advises the defendant of a lifetime registration 

obligation, the State Patrol has authority to make a contrary 

determination. In making this statement, we are aware of Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 29-4006(7) (Reissue 2016), which obligates the 

State Patrol to notify a person subject to SORA of his or her 

registration duration. We see no indication that in carrying out 

this notification obligation, the State Patrol can contradict a 

sentencing court’s finding that the defendant committed an 

aggravated offense.

Our conclusion that the State Patrol cannot make a different determination regarding an offender’s registration duration 

after the sentencing court finds an aggravated offense should 

not be understood to foreclose the State Patrol from playing 

any role in determining the registration duration for offenders 
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subject to SORA. Section 29-4013(5) gives it authority to 

determine the “appropriate registration period” and, if possible, that language must be given some effect. See State 

v. Dean, 288 Neb. 530, 849 N.W.2d 138 (2014). But under 

§ 29-4005(2) (Reissue 2016), the State Patrol is clearly given 

authority to reduce the registration period for some offenders from 15 years to 10 years under certain circumstances. In 

addition, Wilson suggests the language of § 29-4013(5) gives 

the State Patrol the authority to determine the registration 

duration for those offenders subject to SORA as a result of 

out-of-state convictions where the sentencing court would not 

make a finding that the offense was an aggravated one under 

SORA. But again, it is not necessary to decide the full scope 

of the State Patrol’s authority in this case. It is sufficient today 

to hold that the sentencing court has the authority to find that 

the defendant committed an aggravated offense and that the 

State Patrol lacks the authority to subsequently make a different determination.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the State’s suggestion that 

the district court committed reversible error because it included 

its finding that Wilson committed an aggravated offense and 

is thus required to register for life in both its oral pronouncement of his sentences and the written sentencing order. On 

this point, the State relies on State v. Nelson, 27 Neb. App. 

748, 936 N.W.2d 32 (2019), a recent opinion of the Nebraska 

Court of Appeals. In Nelson, the Court of Appeals concluded 

that the district court erred by including a finding in the oral 

pronouncement of a sentence that the defendant committed 

an aggravated offense and was thus required to register for 

life. The court reasoned that this was error, because after the 

2009 amendments to SORA, sentencing courts are to inform 

the defendant of his registration duration through a written notification.

The State appears to understand the 2009 amendments to 

SORA to require the district court to inform the defendant 

of the duration of his registration obligation under SORA in 

a written notification separate from the sentence. That may 
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well be the case, but we do not believe it follows that the 

district court commits reversible error if its sentencing order 

provides that it has found that the defendant committed an 

aggravated offense and has a resulting lifetime registration 

obligation. To the extent Nelson suggests otherwise, it is disapproved. Wilson makes no argument on appeal that the district 

court failed to provide notice of the duration of his registration 

obligation under SORA in some format other than in the sentencing order, and we thus do not consider that issue.

Wilson’s Argument.

Having concluded that the district court had the authority 

to make a determination regarding whether Wilson committed an aggravated offense, we turn to Wilson’s argument that 

it erred by concluding he did. Wilson’s argument, much like 

the State’s, relies heavily on amendments to SORA enacted 

in 2009. He claims that as a result of those amendments, the 

district court must make its determination about whether the 

offense was aggravated solely by considering the elements of 

the offense of conviction. The court cannot, Wilson asserts, 

consider the facts underlying the conviction.

In yet another similarity to the argument advanced by the 

State, Wilson’s argument would clearly lack merit if made prior 

to the 2009 amendments to SORA. As noted above, this court 

addressed this very issue in State v. Hamilton, 277 Neb. 593, 

763 N.W.2d 731 (2009). In Hamilton, we laid out a number of 

reasons why we interpreted SORA to authorize a sentencing 

court, in determining whether an offense was aggravated, to 

consider any information in the record, including the factual 

basis for a plea-based conviction and information contained in 

the presentence report. Those reasons included our assessment 

that if the Legislature intended to require that the presence of 

aggravation be derived solely from the elements of the offense, 

it could have used specific language to that effect as it has in 

other statutes. Hamilton, supra.

In concluding in Hamilton that the pre-2009 amendment 

version of SORA allowed sentencing courts to consider any 
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information in the record, we also relied on the purposes of 

SORA. We noted that in enacting SORA, the Legislature made 

findings that sex offenders present a high risk to reoffend 

and that efforts to protect communities from sex offenders 

are impaired by a lack of information about where previous 

offenders live, work, and attend school. We also observed 

that by requiring shorter registration requirements for some 

offenders but lifetime registration requirements for those that 

commit aggravated offenses, the Legislature demonstrated an 

intent to provide enhanced assistance to law enforcement and 

protection to the public regarding those that commit aggravated offenses. We concluded that this purpose would be 

frustrated if a person who had in fact committed an act that 

would meet the definition of an aggravated offense “would be 

exempted from the lifetime registration requirement simply by 

pleading to a lesser offense.” Hamilton, 277 Neb. at 601, 763 

N.W.2d at 737.

Wilson contends that the 2009 amendments to SORA 

changed what the district court may consider in determining whether the defendant committed an aggravated offense. 

In support of this argument, he relies heavily on dicta in 

State v. Nelson, 27 Neb. App. 748, 936 N.W.2d 32 (2019). In 

Nelson, prior to finding that the district court erred by including a finding of aggravation in the pronouncement of the 

sentence, the Court of Appeals stated that in the amendments 

to SORA, the Legislature “clearly eliminated the court’s role 

in separately determining the fact of whether an aggravated 

offense occurred by reviewing the record.” 27 Neb. App. at 

760, 936 N.W.2d at 40. The Court of Appeals understood 

the 2009 amendments to limit the sentencing court’s inquiry 

“to whether the defendant has been convicted of an aggravated offense.” Id. The Court of Appeals found that the 

Legislature had made this change by removing the language 

in § 29-4005(2) (Reissue 2008) formerly requiring that, with 

respect to a finding of an aggravated offense, “‘[a] sentencing 

court shall make that fact part of the sentencing order’” and 

replacing it with language in § 29-4005(1)(b)(iii) (Reissue 
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2016) stating that the defendant had a lifetime registration 

requirement if convicted of a registrable offense punishable 

by imprisonment for more than 1 year “‘and was convicted 

of an aggravated offense.’” Hamilton, 277 Neb. at 760, 936 

N.W.2d at 40, 41.

[6,7] We disagree with the Court of Appeals that the 2009 

amendments to SORA changed what a sentencing court may 

consider in determining whether the defendant committed an 

aggravated offense. Two principles of statutory interpretation factor heavily in our reasoning. First, in determining 

the meaning of a statute, the applicable rule is that when the 

Legislature enacts a law affecting an area which is already 

the subject of other statutes, it is presumed that it did so with 

full knowledge of the preexisting legislation and the decisions of the Nebraska Supreme Court construing and applying that legislation. McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 

303 Neb. 552, 931 N.W.2d 120 (2019). Second, the intent of 

the Legislature may be found through its omission of words 

from a statute as well as its inclusion of words in a statute. 

Stewart v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 294 Neb. 1010, 885 N.W.2d 

723 (2016).

Under the first principle of statutory interpretation, the 

Legislature is presumed to have knowledge of our decision 

in Hamilton interpreting the prior version of SORA to allow 

sentencing courts to consider all information in the record to 

determine whether an aggravated offense had been committed. Given this presumed knowledge, one would expect the 

Legislature to have clearly expressed any change to our interpretation of SORA in Hamilton. We see no such expression, 

and thus the canon of interpretation regarding legislative omission comes into play.

Further, the two reasons for our interpretation in Hamilton 

that we summarized above remain just as applicable after 

the 2009 amendments as before. There is still no language 

in SORA expressly providing that whether an offense is 

aggravated is to be determined solely with reference to the 

elements of the convicted offense. And we do not understand 
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the 2009 amendments to SORA to have fundamentally 

changed its general purpose or its means of achieving that 

purpose by requiring certain offenders to register for life. 

SORA’s purpose would be frustrated just as much after the 

2009 amendments as before if defendants who actually committed aggravated offenses could avoid lifetime registration 

requirements by pleading to an offense with elements that did 

not necessarily constitute an aggravated offense.

Neither are we persuaded by Wilson’s invocation of legislative history. Wilson claims that two items within the legislative 

history of the 2009 SORA amendments support his interpretation. He points to language in which the introducer stated 

that under the bill, “[l]ength of registration is based solely 

on the convicted offense(s).” See Introducer’s Statement of 

Intent, L.B. 285, Judiciary Committee, 101st Leg., 1st Sess. 

(Mar. 18, 2009). He also directs us to testimony of the bill’s 

sponsor in committee in which the sponsor indicated that 

the bill would move the focus from subjectively determining whether an offender is likely to reoffend to whether the 

offender had objectively been convicted of a particular crime. 

This legislative history, Wilson asserts, shows the Legislature 

intended to have courts no longer determine whether the conduct was aggravated with reference to all available information 

in the record.

We do not understand the legislative history Wilson relies 

on to be relevant to the question of whether the sentencing 

court can consider all information in the record in determining whether an offense is aggravated. One of the effects of the 

2009 amendments to SORA was to remove sentencing courts’ 

authority to find that a defendant was a sexually violent predator. Under the prior version of the statute, a finding that the 

defendant was a sexually violent predator would subject the 

defendant to a lifetime registration requirement. § 29-4005(3) 

(Reissue 2008). A “[s]exually violent predator” was defined 

to be a person convicted of one or more registrable offenses 

and “who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 

disorder that makes the person likely to engage in sexually 
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violent offenses.” § 29-4005(4)(c) (Reissue 2008). The prior 

version of SORA thus made the registration period for offenders depend upon whether the sentencing court found they were 

likely to reoffend. We understand the legislative history Wilson 

relies on to refer to the elimination of that authority in the 

2009 amendments.

Now that we have determined that the district court could 

consider any information in the record, including the factual 

basis for Wilson’s plea and information contained in the presentence report, we turn to the question of whether the district 

court erred in determining that Wilson committed an aggravated offense. We have previously held that a finding necessary 

to make a defendant subject to SORA if convicted of a crime 

that is not inherently sexual in nature must be established by 

clear and convincing evidence. See State v. Norman, 282 Neb. 

990, 808 N.W.2d 48 (2012). We believe the same burden of 

proof would apply here. We are thus required to affirm if, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

any rational trier of fact could have found with a firm conviction that Wilson committed an aggravated offense. See State v. 

Norman, 285 Neb. 72, 824 N.W.2d 739 (2013).

Wilson acknowledges that because of the victim’s age in 

this case, she could not legally consent to sexual activity with 

him. He claims, however, that the aggravated offense definition in SORA is framed in terms of actual consent, rather than 

legal consent. And he argues that there is insufficient evidence 

to show that the victim did not actually consent to the sexual 

intercourse at issue.

We find it unnecessary to determine whether Wilson’s interpretation of consent in § 29-4001.01(1) is correct. Even assuming the aggravated offense definition is framed in terms of 

actual consent, we find that the district court could have 

reasonably found with a firm conviction that the offense was 

aggravated.

As we described above, in the factual basis provided by 

the State and to which Wilson did not object, it was stated 

that Wilson supplied the victim with alcohol, that she drank 
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to the point of intoxication, and that despite her communicating that she did not want to have sexual intercourse, sexual 

intercourse occurred. In addition, there is information in the 

presentence report that the victim reported that she had no 

memory of the encounter with Wilson, that she did not consent, and that she did not even know what happened until 

Wilson contacted her the next day and said he hoped she was 

not angry that they had sex.

Based on this information, the district court could have reasonably found with a firm conviction that, even setting aside 

the victim’s inability to legally consent, she did not actually 

consent to sexual intercourse with Wilson and thus the offense 

was aggravated under § 29-4001.01(1)(a). Based on this same 

information, the district court could also have reasonably found 

with a firm conviction that Wilson knew or should have 

known that the victim was physically incapable of resisting 

or appraising the nature of her conduct and thus the offense 

was aggravated under § 29-4001.01(1)(c). See In re Interest 

of K.M., 299 Neb. 636, 644, 910 N.W.2d 82, 88 (2018) (“law 

of sexual assault has traditionally recognized certain circumstances under which an individual lacks the capacity to consent 

to sexual conduct and where sexual contact with that person 

thus constitutes sexual assault: where the victim is severely 

intoxicated”). We thus reject Wilson’s argument that the district 

court erred by finding that he committed an aggravated offense 

under SORA.

CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not err in determining that 

Wilson committed an aggravated offense and was thus subject 

to a lifetime registration obligation under SORA, we affirm.

Affirmed.