This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 MESA STEEL, INC. and 2 DAVID MITTLE, 3 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants-Appellants, 4

v. No. 34,546 5 STEPHEN DENNIS and JOYCE DENNIS, 6 Defendant/Counterplaintiffs-Appellees. 7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 8 Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge 9 Law Office of David E. Mittle 10 David E. Mittle 11 Santa Fe, NM 12 for Appellants 13 Law Offices of Brian K. Branch 14 Brian K. Branch 15 Sean P. McAfee 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellees 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 ZAMORA, Judge. 20
{1} Appellants Mesa Steel, Inc. and David Mittle (“Appe llants”) appeal from the 212 district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Stephen and Joyce 1 Dennis (“Appellees”), and denying Appellants’ motion to compel. This Court issued 2 a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Appellants have filed a memorandum in 3 opposition, which this Court has duly considered. Unpersuaded, we affirm the district 4 court’s grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, because we conclude that 5 Appellants were barred from bringing the current claim, we do not address their claim 6 of error regarding the denial of their motion to compel. 7
{2} In this Court’s calendar notice, we pointed out that the district court granted 8 summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the basis that Appellants had not 9 established any claim to the settlement proceeds on the grounds of double recovery 10 given that the doctrine of double recovery onl y applies where a joint obligation exists. 11 [CN 2] We noted that Appellants had the burden of overcoming this Court’s 12 presumption of correctness in the district court’s rulings and demonstrating that the 13 district court’s ruling was in error. [CN 3 (citing Corona v. Corona , 2014-NMCA14 071, ¶ 26, 329 P.3d 701 (“The appellate court presumes that the district court is 15 correct, and the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the district court 16 erred.”)] We pointed out that, while Appe llants cited numerous cases, those cases did 17 not support the proposition that double recovery applies in circumstances where no 18 joint obligation exists. We also noted thatthe broad language of the Mutual Release 193 and Settlement Agreement (“the Agreemen t”) covered any clai ms Appellants had 1 raised in the current litigation that were related to the purchase of Mesa Steel from 2 Appellees. [CN 4-5] On these bases, we proposed to affirm. 3
{3} In response to this Court’s proposed affirmance, Appellants contend that the 4 fact pattern presented by this case creates a novel circumstance and that we should 5 extend the general principle of law thata wrongdoer should not be entitled to double 6 recovery to circumstances wh ere no joint obligation exists. [MIO 4, n. 6] In addition, 7 Appellants continue to argue that the re lease language in the Agreement “is limited 8 to those claims that could have been brought in the [original lawsuit between the 9 Dennises and Mittle]” and that the claim ag ainst Appellees for double recovery could 10 not be brought in the original litigation. [MIO 14] We remain unpersuaded by 11 Appellants’ argument that the release does not extend to the claims raised in this case 12 and, therefore, affirm. 13
{4} Appellants refer this Court to language contained in four sections of the 14 Agreement in support of their contention that the release is limited to those claims 15 “that could have been brought in the Lawsuit.” [MIO 14 (citing the Agreement at 16 ¶ I.B, ¶ II.A, ¶ II.B, and ¶ III)] . While we note that two of the provisions indicate that 17 the parties are releasing all claims that coul d have been brought in the original lawsuit 184 [RP 141-42 ( ¶ II.A, ¶ II.B)], we also point out that there is much broader release 1 language contained elsewhere in the agreement. Specifically, Paragraph I.B provides: 2 Dennis, Mesa Steel, Inc., and Mittle de sire to compromise and settle all 3 claims arising out of or related to the sale of Mesa Steel, Inc., including 4 all claims and counterclaims brought and which could have been brought 5 in the Lawsuit, and any other claims arising out of, related to or in any 6 manner concerning the matters set forth herein , absolutely and to the 7 fullest extent permitted by law or equity[.] 8 [RP 140-41 (emphasis added)] In addition, Paragraph III, titled “Further Description 9 of Claims Released,” provides: 10 With the exception of the covenants and agreements to be performed by 11 the parties in satisfaction of the terms of this . . . Agreement as further set 12 forth herein, which undertakings are expressly not released, the parties 13 hereto, respectively, by this Agreemen t, release, discharge and acquit the 14 parties that they are hereby releasing, respectively, of andfrom all 15 claims , actions, demands, causes of acti on, charges, expenses, costs, loss 16 and damage of every nature and descri ption, known or unknown, past, 17 present or future, arising out of or related to the matters set forth in the 18 Litigation , including claims for reimbursement, payment of costs and 19 expert witness fees. 20 [RP 142 (emphasis added)] 21
{5} While Appellants focus on one portion of the Agreement, it appears Appellants 22 have disregarded the more general mutual release agreement language set forth above. 23 That language releases “all claims, acti ons, demands, causes of action, charges, 24 expenses, costs, loss and damage of every nature and description, known or unknown, 25 past, present or future, arising out of or related to the matters set forth in the 265 Litigation , including claims for reimbursement , payment of costs and expert witness 1 fees.” [RP 142 (emphasis added)] The malpractice suit and Appellants’ resulting 2 declaratory judgment action and request for offset and reimbursement clearly arise out 3 of and are related to the matters set forth in the original litigation between Appellants 4 and the Dennises. Moreover, Appellants’ claim for reimbursement in this action 5 appears to have been specifically re leased in the language set out above. 6
{6} To the extent Appellants assert in their memorandum in opposition that 7 affidavits submitted in response to Appellees’ motion for summary judgment “clearly, 8 and unambiguously affirm that it was not th e intent nor expectation of either Mittle 9 or Mesa Steel that the . . . Agreement w ould act as a release to the proceeds of an 10 attorney malpractice suit, if any[,]” [MIO 14] we disagree. The affidavits submitted 11 below by Appellants [RP 112-14, 115-16] merely assert that “[t]he provision in the 12 . . . Agreement . . . that I shall cooperatewith counsel in any action or proceeding 13 against Hickey et[] al. is not a release of Hickey or his law firm or a release of any 14 judgment or settlement the Dennises might have obtained [from] Hickey or his law 15 firm.” [RP 113] The affidavit goes on to say that “[t]he provision means what it 16 says—I will cooperate and tes tify truthfully. To argue it is a release is a non sequitar 17 [sic].” [RP 113; see also RP 115, Affidavit of Mesa Steel (“The provision in the 18 . . . Agreement . . . that Mittle shall cooperate with counsel in any action or proceeding 196 against Hickey et[] al. is not a release of Hickey or his law firm or a release of any 1 judgment or settlement the Dennises might have obtained [from] Hickey or his law 2 firm. The provision was never intended to bea release of Hickey or his law firm by 3 Mesa Steel or a release of any judgment or settlement the Dennises might obtain 4 against Hickey or his law firm either in law or equity.”)]. 5
{7} These affidavits create no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the 6 language contained in Paragraph III—wherein Appellants release the Dennises from 7 “all claims . . . known or unknown, past, present or future, arising out of or related to 8 the matters set forth in the Litigation, including claims for reimbursement, payment 9 of costs and expert witness fees”—is ambiguous, as neither affidavit makes any 10 reference to this provision. [RP 142] Becau se the provision contained in Paragraph 11 III of the Agreement is clear and unambi guous on its face, and because Appellants 12 failed to establish any ambiguity arising fro m that specific provision, we conclude that 13 the district court did not err in determini ng that Appellants had released any claim to 14 reimbursement from the Appellees, given th e broad language contained in Paragraph 15
III. See Hansen v. Ford Motor Co. , 1995-NMSC-044, ¶ 32, 120 N.M. 203, 900 P.2d 16 952 (“A release is contractual in natureand as such our primary objective in 17 construing its terms is to give effect to the intent of the parties.”); H-B-S P’ship v. 18 Aircoa Hosp. Servs., Inc ., 2005-NMCA-068, ¶ 19, 137 N.M. 626, 114 P.3d 306 197 (stating that contracts are interpreted cons istently with their plain meaning, giving 1 meaning to each word or phras e within the context of the entire contract, and are given 2 a reasonable construction). 3
{8} Moreover, to the extent Appellants wereasserting a claim against John Hickey, 4 Appellants specifically released Appellees ’ attorney in Paragraph II.B of the 5 Agreement for all claims that were raised or could have been rais ed in the Litigation. 6 [RP 141-42 (stating that David Mittle and Mesa Steel “forever release and discharge 7 Stephen W. Dennis, Joyce N. Dennis, Sam Goldenerg & Associates, Inc., . . . and all 8 of their predecessors and successors, . . . employers, employees and insurers, attorneys 9 from any and all claims, demands, damages, suits or causes of action of whatsoever 10 kind or nature, which are or could have been the basis for a claim which was filed in 11 . . . Cause No. D-0101-CV-2008-01603”)] Thus, to the extent Appellants’ current suit 12 is premised on a claim against John Hickey , rather than the Appellees, our rules of 13 civil procedure would have permitted the inclusion of claims against John Hickey in 14 the original litigation, where the claims arose out of the same common nucleus of 15 facts. See Rule 1-013 NMRA; Rule 1-014 NMRA. Furthermore, to the extent that 16 Appellants wished to reserve a claim agains t John Hickey, no such express reservation 17 exists. See Hansen , 1995-NMSC-044, ¶ 32 (indicating that potential tortfeasors that 188 are not a party to the settlement may s till be released where they are named or 1 identified in a release agreement). 2
{9} Also in response to this Court’s proposed affirmance, Appellants also argue that 3 public policy requires that injured pers ons should be benefitted, rather than 4 wrongdoers, and that wrongdoers should not en joy “windfalls.” Appellants contend 5 that there are genuine issues of materi al fact as to whether Appellees are 6 “wrongdoers” and as to whether the rec overy is a “windfall.” Although there are 7 ample contract-based reasons for affirming th e district court’s ruling, we also note that 8 Appellants’ argument that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether 9 Appellees are “wrongdoers” and as to whether th e recovery is a “windfall” is not 10 compelling. First, because we agree that there is no joint obligation, those facts, even 11 if they existed, would not impact the di sposition of this case because the doctrine of 12 double recovery only applies where a joint ob ligation exists. Second, simply asserting 13 that there are facts, without providing eviden ce of said facts, is insufficient to defeat 14 summary judgment. See Roth v. Thompson , 1992-NMSC-011, ¶ 17, 113 N.M. 331, 15 825 P.2d 1241 (“Upon the movant making a prima facie showing, the burden shifts 16 to the party opposing the motion to demonstr ate the existence of specific evidentiary 17 facts which would require trial on the merits.”); Dow v. Chilili Coop. Ass’n , 1986- 18 NMSC-084, ¶ 13, 105 N.M. 52, 728 P.2d 462 (stating that “[ a] party may not simply 199 argue that such facts might exist, nor may it rest upon the allegations of the 1 complaint”). 2
{10} As a result, we conclude that summaryjudgment was proper. Accordingly, for 3 the reasons stated above, we affirm. 4
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

6 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 7 WE CONCUR: 8

9 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 10

11 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 12