Filed 2/14/23 P. v. Williams CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

 

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

WONE WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B318495 

 Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

SA094125

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.

Michele A. Douglass, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and Blake Armstrong, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Wone Williams pleaded no contest to domestic violence. 

The trial court placed Williams on probation and issued a 10-year 

criminal protective order safeguarding the victim. While on 

probation, Williams again pleaded no contest to the charge of 

attempted murder of the same victim. While incarcerated for 

this latest crime, he threatened the victim’s life. At the probation 

violation hearing, Williams yelled and screamed when referring 

to the victim. The court issued a new 10-year criminal protective 

order and imposed prison time. 

On appeal, Williams challenges only the latter protective 

order, arguing it exceeded the court’s authority. We affirm. 

Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

I

In 2016, Williams pulled a pocketknife on his former 

girlfriend during an argument and left a five-inch laceration on 

her face. He was on probation at the time for a domestic violence 

offense against the same woman. He pleaded no contest to 

inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his child within seven 

years of a prior domestic violence offense (section 273.5, subd. 

(f)(1)). 

The court put Williams on probation and required him to 

complete a 52-week domestic violence program. It issued a 10-

year protective order specifying the victim as the protected 

person and read the order aloud to Williams. The court issued 

the order as a condition of probation under section 1203.097 and 

under section 273.5, subdivision (j). This is the 2016 protective 

order. It expires on December 21, 2026. 

The court later learned Williams had tried to kill the same 

victim in 2019, again while he was on probation. Court records 

showed he had entered a no contest plea to attempted murder in 
3

March 2021 in a separate case and had received a seven-year 

prison sentence. 

The court revoked probation and held a probation violation 

hearing in February 2022. The victim spoke at the hearing and 

said Williams continued to call and threaten her. After his most 

recent conviction, he called from jail to say “when he gets out, he 

was going to set [her] on fire and watch [her] burn.” She was “in 

total fear.” He already had stabbed her 17 times. 

Williams grew angry after the victim spoke at the hearing. 

He yelled and screamed. 

The court found Williams had failed to obey all laws and 

had violated the conditions of his probation. It sentenced him to 

16 months in state prison (consecutive to his other sentence) and 

issued a new 10-year protective order under sections 136.2 and 

273.5, subdivision (j). (Williams does not acknowledge the former 

provision was a basis for the order, and the prosecution appears

to view it as inapplicable.) This is the 2022 protective order. It 

expires on February 4, 2032. 

Williams’s counsel objected to this protective order. The 

court explained the circumstances justifying the order and stated 

its intent to issue a protective order for the longest term possible. 

Earlier the court had noted Williams’s unruly behavior at the 

hearing and his criminal history and had agreed “he’s 

dangerous.” 

II

Williams argues the trial court exceeded its authority in 

issuing the 2022 protective order because the statute permits 

only one order for a maximum term of 10 years issued at the time 

of conviction and does not allow these orders to be “based solely 

on a violation of probation.” 
4

Williams cites no case supporting his reading of the statute, 

and the prosecution admits it could not locate a case on point. 

We independently interpret a statute in a manner 

consistent with the statute’s purpose. If possible, we read the 

statute to conform to the spirit of the act. (People v. 

Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 210; see also People 

v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 709–710 (Vega).) 

The statute at issue provides:

Upon conviction under subdivision (a), the sentencing 

court shall also consider issuing an order restraining 

the defendant from any contact with the victim, 

which may be valid for up to 10 years, as determined 

by the court. It is the intent of the Legislature that 

the length of any restraining order be based upon the 

seriousness of the facts before the court, the 

probability of future violations, and the safety of the 

victim and their immediate family. This protective 

order may be issued by the court whether the 

defendant is sentenced to state prison or county jail, 

or if imposition of sentence is suspended and the 

defendant is placed on probation. 

(§ 273.5, subd. (j).)

The statute requires sentencing courts to consider a 

restraining order against a defendant convicted of domestic 

violence. It does not limit this requirement to the initial or 

original sentencing. Nor does it prohibit a sentencing court from 

issuing a restraining order after a probation violation. It says 

nothing about successive restraining orders or situations where a 

defendant is sentenced more than once. 
5

In this case, there were two sentencing proceedings 

separated by about five years. There is no apparent intent in the 

statute to tie the sentencing court’s hands should a heightened 

danger persist at a later sentencing. The statute authorized the 

sentencing court to issue the 2022 protective order. It in fact 

required the court to consider such an order. This reading is 

consistent with the statute’s purpose, which is to protect domestic 

violence victims and to deter this type of violence. (See Vega, 

supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 710; People v. Mora (1996) 51 

Cal.App.4th 1349, 1355 [“The Legislature’s enactments reflect a 

societal determination that domestic violence—once viewed as a 

purely private matter in which the state was reluctant to 

interfere—will no longer be tolerated.”].)

This victim needed further protection. Between the two 

sentencing proceedings in this case, Williams pleaded no contest 

to attempting to murder her. His crimes against this victim were 

escalating. A 52-week domestic violence program did not deter 

him. While incarcerated after his latest conviction, he called to 

threaten her life. He raged at her during the 2022 sentencing 

hearing. 

A new 10-year protective order covering this victim was 

appropriate and was consistent with the seriousness of the facts 

here, the probability of future violations, and the victim’s safety. 

(§ 273.5, subd. (j).) 

Contrary to Williams’s arguments, the 2022 protective 

order was not “based solely on a violation of probation.” And the 

court’s limited sentencing options following a probation violation 

do not limit the options concerning protective orders.

///

 
6

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

STRATTON, P. J. 

VIRAMONTES, J.