[Cite as State v. Atkins, 2013-Ohio-2446.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : 

 : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

-vs- : 

 : Case No. 12-CA-90 

HOLLY A. ATKINS : 

 : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Municipal 

Court, Case No. 12TRC07743 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 7, 2013 

APPEARANCES: 

For Appellant: For Appellee: 

William T. Cramer 

470 Olde Worthington Road, Suite 200 

Westerville, Ohio 43082 

 Amy S. Weeks 

40 West Main Street 

Newark, Ohio 43055 

 

 
Baldwin, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Holly Atkins appeals from the denial by the Licking 

County Municipal Court of her Motion to Suppress. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of 

Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE 

{¶2} On July 3, 2012, appellant was cited for operating a motor vehicle while 

under the influence of alcohol and with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (A)(1)(d) and a marked lanes violation in 

violation of R.C. 4511.33. At her arraignment on July 10, 2012, appellant entered a 

plea of not guilty to the charges. 

{¶3} A hearing on appellant’s Motion to Suppress was held on September 14, 

2012. At the hearing, defense counsel indicated to the trial court that appellant was 

challenging the stop of her vehicle. 

{¶4} At the hearing, Trooper Daniel Moran, Jr. of the Ohio State Highway 

Patrol testified that, on July 3, 2012, he was working from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. The 

Trooper was in uniform in a marked cruiser when he was notified that a dispatcher had 

received a cell phone call. The call was from a caller who was following appellant’s 

vehicle eastbound on Interstate 70. The caller informed the dispatcher that the vehicle 

was all over the road and also indentified the driver as a young woman with dark hair. 

The caller further stated that the vehicle almost went into the median. According to the 

caller, the woman was driving a black vehicle with the windows down. Trooper Moran 

did not know the sex of the caller. 
{¶5} After receiving information from the dispatcher, Trooper Moran tried to 

catch up with the vehicle. He testified that he caught up with the vehicle east of State 

Route 158 and that the caller confirmed through the dispatcher that the Trooper had 

the correct vehicle. The Trooper then stopped appellant’s vehicle. 

{¶6} When asked during the hearing if he had noticed any traffic violations 

before stopping appellant’s vehicle, Trooper Moran testified that, “as it traveled up the 

exit ramp in the middle lane it moved over a solid white line and moved to the left lane 

which both lanes were turning or turn lanes to the north on State Route 37.” 

Transcript at 7-8. 

{¶7} After July 3, 2012, the Trooper learned that the caller’s name was Ann 

and that there was an individual named Duane in the car with Ann at the time. Trooper 

Moran testified that he spoke with Duane who confirmed the information that the 

dispatcher had relayed to him on July 3, 2012. 

{¶8} On cross-examination, Trooper Moran testified that he did not observe 

any erratic driving while following appellant’s vehicle and that the lane change was the 

only violation that he claimed to have observed. He testified that the windows were 

down in the vehicle and that the driver was a young woman with dark hair. Trooper 

Moran further testified that he stopped appellant for a marked lanes violation because, 

after signaling, she had crossed over a solid line into another lane. 

{¶9} Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on September 18, 2012, the trial 

court overruled appellant’s Motion to Suppress. The trial court, in its Judgment Entry, 

found that Trooper Moran had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the 

information the he had received from the dispatcher and that he was justified in 
stopping appellant. The trial court, in its Judgment Entry, noted that appellee had 

conceded that Trooper Moran did not witness appellant commit any traffic violations. 

{¶10} Thereafter, on October 10, 2012, appellant entered a plea of no contest 

to the offenses of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in 

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle with a concentration 

of .08 of one gram or more of weight of alcohol per 210 liters of breath in violation of 

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d). Appellant was found guilty of such charges. The marked lanes 

charge was dismissed. Appellant was fined $375.00 and her driver’s license was 

suspended for a period of one year. In addition, appellant was placed on probation for 

a period of one year under specified terms. 

{¶11} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal: 

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATED CONSTITUTION AND THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 14, BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS 

EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING A TRAFFIC STOP BASED ON AN ANONYMOUS 

TELEPHONE TIP WHERE THE CLAIMS OF ERRATIC DRIVING WERE NOT 

CORROBORATED. 

I 

{¶13} Appellant, in her sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court 

erred in overruling her Motion to Suppress. We disagree. 

{¶14} Appellate review of a trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress 

involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 332, 

713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the 
role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to 

evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 154, 1996-Ohio-134, 

661 N.E.2d 1030. A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if 

they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 

142, 145, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist.1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate 

court must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial 

court's conclusion, whether the trial court's decision meets the applicable legal 

standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 42, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1993), 

overruled on other grounds. 

{¶15} There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on a motion 

to suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact. 

In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the 

trial court's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, State v. 

Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 

597 N.E.2d 1141(4th Dist 1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to 

apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate 

court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See, Williams, supra. 

Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or 

final issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an 

appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's 

conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. 

State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994). 
{¶16} In the case sub judice, appellant challenges the stop of her vehicle. An 

investigative stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution if the police have reasonable suspicion that “the person stopped is, or is 

about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 

101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Reasonable suspicion can arise from information 

that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). But it requires something more 

than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.“ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “[T]he Fourth Amendment requires at least a 

minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 

119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). 

{¶17} While appellant argues that the informant in this case was an 

anonymous informant, we disagree. Courts have recognized three categories of 

informants: (1) citizen informants; (2) known informants, i.e., those from the criminal 

world who have previously provided reliable tips; and (3) anonymous informants, who 

are comparatively unreliable. Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 300, 1999-

Ohio-68, 720 N.E.2d 507. 

{¶18} As cautioned by the court in Weisner : “the United States Supreme Court 

discourages conclusory analysis based solely upon these categories, insisting instead 

upon a totality of the circumstances review, it has acknowledged their relevance to an 

informant's reliability. The court has observed, for example, that an anonymous 

informant is comparatively unreliable and his tip, therefore, will generally require 

independent police corroboration. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 329, 110 S.Ct. at 
2415, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308. The court has further suggested that an identified citizen 

informant may be highly reliable and, therefore, a strong showing as to the other 

indicia of reliability may be unnecessary: ‘[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes 

forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to 

criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge 

unnecessary.’ Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233–234, 103 S.Ct. at 2329–2330, 76 

L.Ed.2d at 545.” Id at 300. 

{¶19} The court In Weisner, in further addressing the higher reliability of the 

identified citizen informant, stated, in relevant part, as follows: 

 In light of these principles, federal courts have routinely credited the 

identified citizen informant with greater reliability. In United States v. Pasquarille

(C.A.6, 1994), 20 F.3d 682, 689, for instance, the Sixth Circuit presumed the 

report of a citizen informant to be reliable because it was based on firsthand 

observations as opposed to “ ‘idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture,’ ” quoting 

United States v. Phillips (C.A.5, 1984), 727 F.2d 392, 397. Likewise, the Tenth 

Circuit has held that the statement of an ordinary citizen witness is entitled to 

more credence than that of a known informant. “ ‘Courts are much more 

concerned with veracity when the source of the information is an informant from 

the criminal milieu rather than an average citizen * * * in the position of a crime 

* * * witness.’ ” Easton v. Boulder (C.A.10, 1985), 776 F.2d 1441, 1449, quoting 

LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978) 586–587. See, also, Edwards v. Cabrera

(C.A.7, 1995), 58 F.3d 290, 294. 
 Many Ohio appellate courts have also accorded the identified citizen witness 

higher credibility. In fact, several have used this principle to uphold a telephone 

tip made in fact situations nearly mirroring this one. In State v. Loop (Mar. 14, 

1994), Scioto App. No. 93CA2153, unreported, 1994 WL 88041, for instance, 

the court held that a telephone call from a citizen stating that a motorist might 

be having a seizure was sufficient to justify an investigative stop that produced 

evidence of drunken driving. The court reasoned that “ ‘[i]nformation from an 

ordinary citizen who has personally observed what appears to be criminal 

conduct carries with it indicia of reliability and is presumed to be reliable.’ ” Id.

at 5, quoting 301 State v. Carstensen (Dec. 18, 1991), Miami App. No. 91–CA–

13, unreported, at 4, 1991 WL 270665. The Carstensen court found a stop 

based upon a 911 call describing a drunk driver sufficiently justified, although 

the informant there was unidentified. See, also, Fairborn v. Adamson (Nov. 17, 

1987), Greene App. No. 87–CA–13, unreported, at 4–5, 1987 WL 20264; State 

v. Jackson (Mar. 4, 1999), Montgomery App. No. 17226, unreported, at 5, 1999 

WL 115010, observing generally that “ ‘a tip from an identified citizen informant 

who is a victim or witnesses a crime is presumed reliable, particularly if the 

citizen relates his or her basis of knowledge,’ ” quoting Centerville v. Gress 

(June 19, 1998), Montgomery App. No. 16899, unreported, at 4–5, 1998 WL 

321014.... 

 Courts have been lenient in their assessment of the type and amount of 

information needed to identify a particular informant. Many courts have found, 

for instance, that identification of the informant's occupation alone is sufficient. 
In United States v. Pasquarille, supra, the court concluded that, although the 

informant's name was unknown, information that he was a transporter of 

prisoners was enough to remove him from the anonymous informant category. 

Likewise, in Edwards v. Cabrera, supra, the court was satisfied with the 

knowledge that the informant was a bus driver whose identity was 

ascertainable. See, also, State v. Loop, supra. Furthermore, at least one court 

has considered simple face-to-face contact to be enough. In State v. Ramey

(1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 409, 717 N.E.2d 1153, the court held that an 

unnamed informant who flagged down an officer to provide information 

concerning a suspected drunk driver was in no way “anonymous”: “There is 

nothing even remotely anonymous, clandestine, or surreptitious about a citizen 

stopping a police officer on the street to report criminal activity.” Id. at 416, 717 

N.E.2d at 1158. 

{¶20} Id at 300-301. 

{¶21} In the case sub judice, we find that the information provided by the caller 

was sufficient to identity the caller and to remove the caller from the category of an 

anonymous informant. We find that the caller provided sufficient information to Trooper 

Moran so as to be identifiable. As is clear from the record, the Trooper was later able to 

determine the caller’s name and the name of the caller’s passenger and, in fact, spoke 

with such passenger. In addition, as is stated above, the caller remained on the phone 

with the police dispatcher throughout the incident. We find such continued contact 

enhanced the caller’s credibility. As noted by the court in Weisner, “greater credibility 

may be due an informant such as this who initiates and permits extended police 
contact rather than one who phones in a tip and retreats from any further police 

interaction.” Id at 302. Accordingly, we consider the citizen informant in this case to 

have identified herself sufficiently to accord her greater reliability than an anonymous 

informant. 

{¶22} Having resolved this issue, we further find that the informant's basis of 

knowledge also furthers her credibility. Typically, a personal observation by an 

informant is due greater reliability than a secondhand description. Weisner, supra at 

302, citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 233–234. “Here, the citizen's tip constituted an 

eyewitness account of the crime. [The citizen’s] version of that night was not mere 

rumor or speculation—it was a firsthand report of the events as they happened. Also 

significant is the fact that the tip was an exact relay of the circumstances as they were 

occurring. Immediately upon witnessing the events, the citizen described them to the 

dispatcher. This immediacy lends further credibility to the accuracy of the facts being 

relayed, as it avoids reliance upon the informant's memory.” Id. 

{¶23} Finally, we find that the informant’s motivation supports the reliability of 

the tip. Id. In the case sub judice, the caller informed the dispatcher that appellant’s 

vehicle was all over the road and that appellant’s vehicle almost went into the median. 

The caller was reporting from the perspective of another motorist sharing the road with 

an erratic driver. As such, we can reasonably infer that the caller considered appellant 

to be a threat to both herself and to other motorists and, in calling the dispatcher, was 

motivated by a desire to eliminate a risk to public safety rather than by any dishonest 

or questionable goals. 
{¶24} In short, we find that the informant’s tip was trustworthy and due 

significant weight. We further find that the informant was an identified citizen who 

based her knowledge upon observations made as the events occurred. The tip, 

therefore, merits a high degree of credibility and value such that it does not require 

independent police corroboration. The Trooper, therefore, was justified in making a 

investigative stop of appellant based upon such tip from an identified citizen informant. 

{¶25} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶26} Accordingly, the judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is 

affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Wise, P.J. and 

Delaney, J. concur. 

HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN 

HON. JOHN W. WISE 

HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY 

CRB/dr