No. 14223 INTHE SUPREC4E CCUR!I'OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978

Claimant and Respondent,

THE REBER COMPANY, rnloyer, 

### and AFGOIWVT INSURANCE CaMPANY, Defendant and Appllant.

Appeal from: hbrkers' Canpensation Court Hon. William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Harris, Jackson & Wdo, Helena, Pbntana John 

### Grant argued, Helena, Pbntana For Respondent: Keller, Reynolds 

### ard Drake, Helena, Wntana Paul T. Keller argued, Helena, Wntana

Filed: Sutanitted: Novemkr 

### 14 1978 Decided: 

## NOV27 

## 1958Mr. 

### ~ustice Gene B. 

### Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. On ~uly 24, 

### 1973, while employed as a plumber by The ~eber Company, Howard Strandberg fellfrom a ladder and fractured his left

### hip. Argonaut Insurance Company, Reber Company's Plan 2 

### workers' compensation carrier, paid Strandberg temporary totaldisability. Strandberg, 53 

### years old atthe time

### of the accident, attempted toreturn towork for Reber inOctober, 1974, but found he 

### was unable tokeep up as a plumber, primarily because of pain and lack of mobility. After a period of two and one-half days, he had toterminate his employment. Since that 

### timehe has triedvarious jobs such as truck driving, irrigating and fencing but has been unable to find work involving sitting or standing that he could do for any lengthof time without experiencing pain. In 1977 Strandbergbegan to complain of back problems. At

### thispoint he petitioned theWorkers' Compensation Court for a hearing on his eligibility for permanent total disability. The casewas referred toa hearings examiner. Strandberg was subsequently examined by two orthopedic specialistswho testified, thatbecause of themanner in which his hip had healed, Strandberg had developed a Trendelenburg's gait, described asa "listinggaitover the hip," his leftleg had shortened measurably, and he walked with a 

### limp. These aftereffects of the fractured hip had in turn aggravated a 

### preexisting condition inStrandberg's spine known as spondylolisthesis, inwhich one vertebra is 

### not developed,resulting inan inability for Strandberg tobe

on his feetor do heavy work for any length of time. 

### While spondylolisthesis is 

### a chronic conditionwhich may become symptomatic with age, both examining physicianstestified they feltStrandberg's limp, 

### as a result of his fractured hip, accelerated and aggravated the preexisting condition. On the basis of thisundisputed testimony the hearings examiner made findings of factand conclusions of law favorable toStrandberg. The Workers' Compensation Court adopted these findings and conclusions and denied Argonaut's petition for 

### a rehearing. From the judgment and denial of the petition for a rehearing, Argonaut appeals. The issue

### we areasked todecide 

### is whether a person injured inan industrial accident 

### is entitled to compensationwhen an injury to one part of his body results inthe aggravation of a preexisting condition in another part 

### of the body. Wehold thathe 

### is and affirm the Workers' Compensation Court. Wehave long recognized the doctrine inMontana that an employee suffering from a preexisting condition is not denied compensation if the disability was aggravated or accelerated by an industrial injury. Clark v. Hilde Construction Co. (1978), Mont. 

### - 

## , 576 P.2d 1112, 

### 1114, 35 St.Rep. 353, 355; Bond 

### v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1977), Mont. 

## , 571 P.2d 372, 374, 34 St.Rep. 1237, 1240; Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum (1975), 166 Mont. 17, 28, 530 P.2d 433, 439. The rule 

### is thatwhen preexisting diseases

are aggravated by an injury and disabilities result, such disabilities aretobe treated and considered as the result of the injury. Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board (1955), 129Mont. 394, 403, 287 P.2d 256, 260. Appellant would now have us 

### limitthis doctrine to



### cases where the preexisting condition affected only that 

### part of the body subsequently injured in the industrialaccident. This we decline todo. Such a holding would force us into 

### a narrow and technical construction of the Workers' Compensation statutes and thus defeat the liberal and humane intention of the legislature inproviding for the benefit and protection of the injured worker. Garland v. Anaconda Co. (1978), Mont. 

## , 581 P.2d 431, 433, 35 St-Rep. 923, 926; Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, supra, 166 Mont. at26, 530 P.2d at438; Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison (1955), 128Mont. 570, 571, 280 P.2d 1086, 1087. Neither do previous cases suggest such a limited doctrine. Weallowed recovery inGaffney where a fall aggravated preexisting Parkinson's disease and cerebral arterial sclerosis both of which, likeStrandberg's spondylolisthesis,



### are progressive diseases of a degenerative nature. In Weakley v. Cook (1952), 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926, 

### a preexisting heart condition was aggravated when the claimant fellbackwards. In Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co. (1933), 95 Mont. 347, 26 P.2d 973, anunexpected back strain triggered preexisting Parkinson's disease of the nervous system. In both cases compensation was allowed. See also the recent case of Close v. St. Regis Paper Co. (19771, Mont. 

## , 573 P.2d 163, 34 St.Rep. 1528, where a blow to the claimant's head aggravated a dormant condition inher neck. This 

### is analogous to the injury to Strandberg's hip aggravating a dormant condition inhis lower back. Wehave alsoheld thatwhere an industrial accident causes preexisting psychological problems to flare up the claimant 

### is entitled tocompensation. Schumacher v. Empire SteelMfg. Co. (19771, 

### -Mont. 

### - 

## , 574 P.2d 987, 988, 34 St.Rep. 1112, 

### 1114. Clearly in these cases there 

### is

no connectionbetween the siteof the subsequent injury andthe preexisting condition and no suggestion that theremust be such a physical relationship. All that 

### is necessary 

### is that the accident aggravate or accelerate the preexisting disease or disability. Under such circumstances the claimant must "produce sufficient evidence, direct, indirect or circumstantial tocause inthe unprejudiced mind a conviction that such

### was the fact." Gaffney, 129Mont. at404-05, 287 P.2d at261. Proof that 

### it was medically possible for an industrial accident to aggravate a preexisting condition 

### is acceptableproof of disability. Vietsv. Sweet Grass County (1978), Mont

# .

, 583 P.2d 1070, 1072, 35 St.Rep. 1364, 1366-67. Here, - Strandberg

### metthisburden of proof as shown inpartby this excerpt from the deposition of one of the examining physicians, Dr. Harris Hanson: "Q. And how about his spondylolisthesis inhis back. Was 

### it affected by this injury? A. On the basis of what I found on the X-rays, I think thiswas a preexisting problem, but with his shortening and his limp, the spondylolisthesis and the degenerative changes about his back probably have been affected by 

### it yet. "Q. They have been aggravated, would you say? A. Yes." The deposition of Dr. Robert Seim, the examining doctor for Argonaut, 

### is tothe same effect. Likewise, undisputed evidence established that Strandbergwas unable toreturn to his former occupation or toperform any job formore than a couple of hours atany 

### time. On questions of fact, contained inthe record, our function inreviewing decisions of theWorkers' Compensation Court 

### is limited toascertaining whether substantial evidence exists to support the findings and conclusions of that court. If there 

### is substantial evidence to support the

### court's findings,we cannot overturn the decision. Jensen

v. Zook Bros. Construction Co. (1978), Mont. 

## , 582 P.2d 1191, 1193, 35 St.Rep. 1066, 1068. On the record before us we find the requisite substantial evidence to support the finding of the Workers' Compensation Court that Strandberg's industrial accident to his hip aggravated his preexisting spinal condition resulting in permanent total disability. Section 92-713,R.C.M. 1947,authorizes the reopening and proper adjustment of a workers' compensation case "[ilf aggravation 

# . 

# .. takes place or [is] discovered after 

# . 

# .. compensation [is] terminated in any case." This language indicates that the legislature recognized the possibility that aggravation of an injury may occur after the normal period of compensation has expired, as occurred here. The WorkerstCompensation Court acted correctly under the authorization of this statute. The judgment of the WorkerstCompensation Court is affirmed.

We Concur: 

# ?LLd Chief Justice 

# Gk!&4yJLP