Filed 12/16/20 P. v. Beltran CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JULIO BELTRAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

B302561

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. TA144847)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed.

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline and Kristen J. Inberg, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Appellant Julio Beltran was convicted of four sexual 

offenses involving a neighbor’s child, Wendy Q., when she was 

10 years old or younger: two counts of sexual intercourse or 

sodomy (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a));

1 one count of forcible lewd 

acts (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)); and one count of oral copulation or 

sexual penetration (§ 288.7, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced 

appellant to 73 years in state prison. Appellant appeals from the 

judgment of conviction, contending the trial court erred in 

denying his motion to dismiss the venire after prospective jurors 

learned he was represented by a public defender; abused its 

discretion in admitting photos of the victim’s wrists showing a 

suicide attempt; and erred in failing to give a curative 

admonition or grant a mistrial after a law enforcement witness, 

holding the hand of her young child, walked past jurors outside 

the courtroom. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

BACKGROUND

When Wendy Q. was about six or seven years old, 

appellant’s wife Elizabeth Ortiz began babysitting her. Ortiz, 

appellant and their children lived on Elm Street, across the street 

from Wendy and her family. Wendy’s mother dropped her off 

about 7:00 a.m. and picked her up about 4:30 p.m. During the 

school year, Ortiz watched Wendy before school, took her to 

school, picked her up, and watched her until her mother came 

home. During the summer, Ortiz watched Wendy all day. On 

occasion, Ortiz watched Wendy on a Saturday.

According to Wendy, appellant was sometimes in the house 

while Ortiz was watching her. Ortiz would occasionally leave 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

Wendy and her children with appellant while Ortiz ran errands. 

Wendy usually went to Ortiz’s bedroom to watch her drive away. 

On one occasion, appellant followed her into the bedroom, and 

sexually assaulted her by pressing his penis into her vagina. She 

told him to stop but he did not. He said if she screamed he would 

hurt her parents. It was painful. When appellant stopped, 

Wendy went to the bathroom and saw a white liquid substance on 

her vagina, along with drops of blood.

Wendy’s mother later saw the blood on Wendy’s underwear, 

and asked her if she had fallen or someone had touched her. 

Wendy was scared and said nothing had happened.

When Wendy was eight years old, appellant and Ortiz 

moved to Cudahy. Ortiz continued to babysit Wendy for some 

period of time. Wendy testified that on one occasion appellant 

forced her to watch a pornographic video while he tried to insert 

his penis into her vagina. Ortiz came home and he stopped. On 

another occasion, appellant pulled Wendy onto his lap and she 

could feel his penis pressing into her thigh. She scratched his 

arm and he let her go. Wendy testified at trial that appellant 

touched her sexually a total of four times.

In 2017, Wendy eventually told her mother about 

appellant’s sexual assaults after she viewed a religious video. 

She said that she could not stand it anymore and wanted to 

commit suicide. In October 2017, Wendy and her parents went to 

a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) station and 

reported the abuse.

In November 2017, Wendy was interviewed by LASD 

Detective Tim Abrahams. Wendy stated appellant had sexually 

abused her six times in the first house and once in the Cudahy 
4

house. She specifically described the three incidents set forth 

above in some detail.

In December 2017, Wendy was examined by sexual assault 

nurse examiner Malinda Wheeler. Wheeler found clefts and 

transections in Wendy’s vagina, which were an indication of past 

penetrating trauma. Wendy’s physical condition was consistent 

with her account of sexual abuse.

In his defense, appellant called LASD Deputy Danielle 

Leos, who had interviewed Wendy when she first came to the 

sheriff’s station. Wendy told the deputy that the abuse occurred 

when she was in the first grade; during the summer of 2010; 

between October and December 2010; and when she was eight 

years old. Wendy’s mother told the deputy that Wendy’s behavior 

had changed about two years ago. Then, during a conversation 

about her bad grades, Wendy stated she had been sexually 

abused. She tried to commit suicide.

Appellant also called social worker Sergio Castellanos. 

Deputy Leos had spoken with the social worker about Wendy. 

Castellanos wrote in a report that Leos told him Wendy gave 

inconsistent accounts of her sexual abuse, stated that her abuser 

touched her under her clothing, and had first disclosed the abuse 

to her father’s girlfriend from Canada. Deputy Leos clarified at 

trial that these facts were from another case she was working on 

at the same time as Wendy’s case. Wendy never said she 

revealed her abuse to her father’s girlfriend from Canada.

Ortiz testified on appellant’s behalf that he worked full 

time at a Circle K convenience store when they lived on Elm 

Street. His hours were 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. Ortiz never 

left Wendy at the house while she ran errands. Ortiz only 
5

babysat Wendy for two or three months after Ortiz and her 

family moved to Cudahy.

Matthew Webb testified that from 2010 to 2012, appellant 

worked at the Circle K owned by Webb’s family. His hours were 

7:00 a.m. to about 4:00 p.m. on weekdays and a half day on 

Saturdays. Appellant was an exemplary employee and Webb 

could not recall a time when appellant asked to leave work early.

DISCUSSION

1. Appellant Was Not Prejudiced by the Disclosure That His 

Attorney Was a Public Defender.

During voir dire, prospective Juror No. 6 stated he was 

employed by the public defender’s office. In the course of 

questioning Juror No. 6 about his employment, the prosecutor 

revealed that appellant’s counsel was a public defender. At a 

sidebar, appellant’s counsel objected, noting that he had not 

identified himself as a public defender, and this was a matter of 

policy and strategy. The trial court agreed the prosecutor’s 

disclosure was “highly inappropriate” but found appellant was 

not prejudiced by the revelation. The trial court questioned Juror 

No. 6 briefly in front of the other prospective jurors, to make clear 

that Juror No. 6 did not know appellant’s counsel and had never 

interacted with him in any way whatsoever. The trial court then 

excused the juror. The court denied appellant’s subsequent 

request for a curative admonition or for dismissal of the entire 

venire, again finding there was no prejudice to appellant.

Appellant contends the trial court violated his 

constitutional right to trial by a fair and impartial jury when it 

refused to dismiss the venire. We agree the remark was 

inappropriate, but see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

determination that the remark was not prejudicial.
6

Both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a 

criminal defendant the right to a trial by a fair and impartial 

jury. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; 

People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 265; People v. Martinez

(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1460 (Martinez).) The trial court is 

charged with examining prospective jurors to determine whether 

bias or prejudice exists; the prosecutor and defense counsel may 

also examine the jurors. (People v. Castillo (2008) 

168 Cal.App.4th 364, 385.)

A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether 

possible prejudice against a defendant has “contaminated the 

entire venire to such an extreme” that discharge of the venire is 

necessary. (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 889.) A trial 

court’s ruling on a motion to discharge the entire venire will be 

affirmed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. (Martinez, 

supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1466–1467.)

“[A]s a general matter, it is unlikely that errors or 

misconduct occurring during voir dire questioning will unduly 

influence the jury’s verdict in the case. Any such errors or 

misconduct ‘prior to the presentation of argument or evidence, 

obviously reach the jury panel at a much less critical phase of the 

proceedings, before its attention has even begun to focus upon the 

penalty issue confronting it.’ ” (People v. Medina (1995) 

11 Cal.4th 694, 741.) Appellant has not cited, and we are not 

aware of, any cases finding prejudice from the disclosure that a 

defendant was represented by a public defender.

Here, appellant’s counsel objected to the disclosure of his 

status as a public defender primarily on the ground that it would 

indicate to prospective jurors that appellant was “indigent” and 

that studies have shown that there is an “inherent bias” against 
7

indigent people. He later added that it “infuriates” people that 

their taxes are paying for a defendant’s attorney. He also argued 

that this prejudice was exacerbated by appellant’s use of a 

Spanish translator, which itself might cause prospective jurors to 

speculate that appellant was undocumented. Appellant echoes 

these arguments on appeal.

There are no studies in the record showing people are 

inherently biased against “indigent” people, and thus no 

indication of what that concept means.2 There is also nothing to 

establish that people have any specific belief about how poor a 

criminal defendant must be before a public defender is appointed. 

In popular culture, criminal defendants are simply advised that if 

they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them. 

That does not imply indigence.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that some people 

have a bias against indigent people and believe a criminal 

defendant must be “indigent” if he has a public defender, the 

prospective jurors in this case were destined to learn of 

appellant’s approximate level of monetary worth through the 

evidence in this case. Appellant’s alibi was that he worked every 

weekday at a Circle K convenience store. Appellant’s longtime 

employer testified and described him as an exemplary employee 

who never asked to leave early. Thus, the evidence would show 

that appellant was employed fulltime and possessed a good work 

ethic. On this record, there is no reasonable probability or 

2 Appellant has cited a number of studies on appeal. They 

are not found in the trial court record and would not be an 

appropriate subject of judicial notice (which in any event 

appellant did not seek). We disregard those studies and 

argument based on them.
8

possibility that the disclosure that appellant had a public 

defender would have caused the jury to view him negatively 

because of his income level.

The second possible harm from the public defender 

disclosure was in fact identified by the trial court, who stated 

there is a “negative connotation that the public in general and 

jurors have of public defenders.” The court explained: “I was a 

public defender. They are some of the greatest lawyers you will 

ever run across. Not everybody shares that view.” The trial 

court, however, declined to dismiss the venire because “I think 

that you have carried yourself very well in this trial. I don’t 

think this is going to have any negative connotation.” The trial 

court was in the best position to observe the prospective jurors’ 

attitudes towards appellant’s counsel and to notice any change in 

demeanor or reaction when it was revealed he was a public 

defender. It was also reasonable for the court to conclude that 

because appellant’s counsel was doing very well in the voir dire 

proceedings, jurors would not view him as a substandard 

attorney.

More broadly, the trial court had the opportunity to observe 

the prospective jurors’ reactions a second time, when the court 

questioned Juror No. 6 about his work in the public defender’s 

office and then excused him. Following that interaction, the trial 

court again found no prejudice to appellant. The reasonableness 

of the court’s two determinations of no prejudice is supported by

the remainder of voir dire, which continued after Juror No. 6 was 

excused. 

Although the trial court did not question the prospective 

jurors about their feelings about appellant being represented by a 

public defender, the trial court repeatedly emphasized that jurors 
9

should be “fair, unbiased and unprejudiced” and should base 

their decision on the evidence and follow the court’s rulings and 

instructions. The court asked the jurors to disclose if they “might 

be bias[ed] or prejudice[d] in any way” or if they could not be “fair 

and impartial.” The court explained that the jurors had a duty to 

make such disclosure “even if you are not asked . . . we expect you 

to tell us if it is something that is going to impact your ability to 

be fair and impartial.” None of the prospective jurors disclosed 

any relevant bias or prejudice.

2. The Photograph of the Victim’s Cut Wrists Was Never 

Admitted into Evidence.

In his Opening Brief, appellant contended that the trial 

court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph of the 

victim’s cut wrists. The photograph was taken by Detective 

Abrahams when he conducted a follow-up interview with the 

victim in January 2019, after learning that the victim had 

attempted suicide. After respondent pointed out that appellant 

had overlooked the trial court’s subsequent ruling excluding the 

photograph, appellant contended that the photograph, “while not 

referenced further, was apparently admitted into evidence 

insofar as People’s Exhibits 1 through 6 were moved into 

evidence (CT 131; RT 4:1916).” We read the record differently.

It appears that although the wrist photograph was referred 

to as Exhibit 4, it was never formally marked. The court’s 

rulings concerning the photograph occurred on June 19, but the 

index to the reporter’s transcript does not show that an Exhibit 4 

was marked on that date. The index does show a photograph 

being marked as Exhibit 4 on June 20 at page 1835, as well as a 

disk being marked as Exhibit 5. The index shows both exhibits 

being admitted into evidence at page 1917. Page 1835 involves 
10

the direct examination of Nurse Wheeler. During this 

examination, the prosecutor stated: “I have a single sheet of 

paper that’s going to be People’s Exhibit--.” The court interjected 

“4.” The prosecutor stated that it was a photograph, and the 

record shows that the paper was marked as People’s Exhibit 4. 

The prosecutor then asked Nurse Wheeler: “And is this a picture 

of [the victim] on the day of your examination?” The nurse 

replied: “Yes.” The court replied: “So the disk itself will be 

marked People’s 5.” The prosecutor repeated: “People’s 5 for the 

disk, and 4 would be the photo.” The court agreed.

Thus, it is clear that the Exhibit 4 which was admitted into 

evidence was a photograph of the victim during her sexual 

assault examination at a hospital in December 2017, not a 

photograph of the victim’s cut wrists taken during a January 

2019 police interview. The 2019 wrist photograph was not 

admitted at trial.

3. Appellant Has Forfeited His Spectator Misconduct Claim.

When Deputy Leos told the court she had childcare issues 

on one of the days she was scheduled to testify, the court 

suggested the deputy bring the child to court and have her wait 

in the jury room while the deputy testified. Although Deputy 

Leos called as a defense witness, the prosecutor agreed to provide 

someone to sit with the child. On June 21, Deputy Leos came to 

court with her three-year-old daughter, walked by five jurors 

sitting in the hallway outside the courtroom, and entered the 

courtroom. No juror saw the child after that. 

Appellant contends Deputy Leos’s act of walking past the 

jurors with her child was prejudicial spectator misconduct. He 

contends that at a minimum the trial court erred in failing to 
11

instruct the jury not to consider the presence of the child in the 

hallway.

Although appellant brought the out-of-court conduct to the 

court’s attention, he did not request a curative admonition to the 

jury. We question whether the described act would in any way 

have caused jurors to find the deputy more sympathetic or 

credible, or to speculate that the child with the deputy was also a 

victim. If so, an admonition would have been sufficient to cure 

any possible harm. Thus, appellant has forfeited this claim. 

(People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 250; People v. Chatman

(2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 368.) Similarly, to the extent appellant 

contends a mistrial was warranted, he has forfeited this claim by 

failing to move for a mistrial. (People v. Carrasco (2014) 

59 Cal.4th 924, 965.)

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the 

claim had not been forfeited, the jurors were instructed not to let 

sympathy or bias towards witnesses influence their decision. 

Jurors were also instructed that their verdicts “must be based 

only on the evidence presented during trial in this court” and 

they “must not allow anything that happens outside of the 

courtroom to affect [their] decision.” Jurors are presumed to 

understand and follow their instructions. (People v. Sanchez

(2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) Appellant has not rebutted this 

presumption.

4. There Is No Cumulative Error.

Appellant contends that even if the errors in this case are 

not prejudicial when considered individually, the cumulative 

effect of the errors is prejudicial. We have found no errors to 

cumulate.
12

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, J.

We concur:

BIGELOW, P. J.

GRIMES, J.