In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 05-4631

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIE A. JOHNSON, also known as TWAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 03 CR 20097—Michael P. McCuskey, Chief Judge.

___________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2006—DECIDED JUNE 4, 2007

____________

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Willie A. Johnson pled guilty

to the charge of conspiracy to distribute 50 or more

grams of cocaine base (“crack”) in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 846. Following a sentencing

hearing, the district court calculated the Sentencing

Guidelines range, and found that Johnson’s offense level

was 33, and that his criminal history category was I. The

district court further found that Johnson was subject to

a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c),

as an “organizer, leader, manager or supervisor” of the

criminal activity. His advisory Guidelines range was thus
2 No. 05-4631

135 to 168 months. The district court then considered the

factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and imposed a sentence of 168 months. Johnson appeals, arguing that the

district court improperly determined that the two-level

enhancement was appropriate as an “organizer, leader,

manager or supervisor.”

As part of his plea of guilty, Johnson admitted that on

or about January 9-10, 2002, Johnson was involved in a

conspiracy in which he provided more than 50 grams of

powder cocaine to be cooked into crack cocaine by Andre

Enoch and transported to Macon County to be sold as

crack cocaine. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)

detailed the underlying conduct, gleaned from investigative reports prepared by the FBI, the Illinois State

Police, the Decatur Police Department, and statements

of cooperating individuals such as Johnson’s co-conspirators David Marshall and Andre Enoch. Marshall and

Enoch provided statements indicating that Johnson was

the source of the cocaine and the coordinator of the

operations. Moreover, Marshall cooperated with the

government in recording conversations relating to drug

transactions, and law enforcement officers were able to

corroborate some of the information provided by Marshall

through those recordings as well as through direct observations and other means. For instance, in a recorded

telephone conversation on June 29th, 2001, Marshall

asked Johnson to send someone to Decatur to pick up

some of the money Marshall owed Johnson for a prior drug

deal, and to return jet skis that had been borrowed from

Marshall. Later that day, a person named “Terrel” drove

to Decatur in a van registered to Johnson with the jet

skis, and received $5000 from Marshall to give to Johnson

as payment for the prior drug debt. Marshall told Terrel

that he would meet Johnson in Chicago later in the week

with the rest of the money owed. On July 3rd, Marshall

met with Johnson at his home and paid the remaining
No. 05-4631 3

$6000. Marshall wore a body wire and was under surveillance for that meeting. Therefore, the observed events

and the recordings provided support for Marshall’s statements that Johnson was a source of drugs, who dispatched

individuals to deliver drugs or pick up payments. Similarly, Marshall stated that on a number of occasions,

Johnson’s uncle, Percy Allen, transported a kilo of cocaine

from Johnson to Decatur for Marshall. Allen later confirmed that on at least one occasion, he had transported

a kilo of cocaine to Marshall that Marshall had purchased from Johnson.

Despite that evidence, Johnson disputed at sentencing

that he was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor

of that conspiracy. Specifically, Johnson asserts that the

district court’s finding was clear error, because the court

based its determination on unreliable evidence and

failed to properly inquire into the reliability of the evidence or make explicit fact findings supporting its conclusion.

We review a district court’s determination of role in the

offense for clear error, and will reverse only if after

reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United

States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 779, 789 (7th Cir. 2005).

Moreover, a district court in determining a sentence is

not bound by the same stringent evidentiary standards

as are applicable in a criminal trial. United States v.

Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 543 (7th Cir. 1995). Hearsay, for

instance, may be considered at sentencing even if it

would not have been admissible at trial, and has been

characterized as an integral part of the sentencing process. Hankton, 432 F.3d at 790; United States v. Badger,

983 F.2d 1443, 1459 (7th Cir. 1993). A court at sentencing

“ ‘may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope,

largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he

may consider, or the source from which it may come.’ ” Id.,
4 No. 05-4631

quoting United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1268 (7th

Cir. 1991). The caveat is that the defendant has a due

process right to be sentenced on the basis of reliable

information. Taylor, 72 F.3d at 543. Accordingly, under

the Guidelines the court must limit consideration to

information that has “ ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to

support its probable accuracy.’ ” United States v. Roche,

415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a).

Johnson asserts that the district court erred in relying

on the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) in finding

that the enhancement was appropriate. He maintains

that he had raised sufficient concerns about the reliability of the information in the PSR but that the district

court failed to then make a searching inquiry into the

reliability of the information as is required. In objecting

to the PSR in the district court, Johnson first contended

that the statements by Marshall and Enoch were unreliable because they were facing criminal charges and were

attempting to better their own situations by implicating

him. We have repeatedly held, however, that even the

testimony of a potentially biased witness is sufficient to

support a finding of fact. United States v. Zehm, 217 F.3d

506, 514 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Galbraith, 200

F.3d 1006, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000). In fact, the district court

may credit testimony that is “totally uncorroborated and

comes from an admitted liar, convicted felon, or large

scale drug-dealing, paid government informant.” United

States v. Romero, 469 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th Cir. 2006),

quoting United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 690 (7th

Cir. 2003) et al. Accordingly, their status as self-interested

co-conspirators does not thereby render the information inherently unreliable.

Johnson next asserts that the PSR inaccurately recounted that in a recorded conversation of January 9th,

Marshall told Johnson that he wanted Johnson or Enoch
No. 05-4631 5

to bring him nine ounces of crack cocaine. At the sentencing hearing, the government agent testified that Marshall

initially spoke with Johnson in that conversation but

did not discuss the drug transaction, and then Marshall

conversed with Enoch and told Enoch that he should tell

“Cuz” to have Enoch bring down nine ounces of crack

cocaine. The agent testified that in the context of that

conversation, the term “Cuz” applied to Johnson. Marshall

also indicated that Johnson avoided direct conversations

or transactions regarding drugs. Although the PSR

inaccurately recounts the conversation, that is irrelevant

because Johnson acknowledges in his brief that “[i]t

appears that the district court ultimately rejected the

notion that Johnson was involved in this drug conversation.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. Johnson’s only argument

as to this alleged error, then, appears to be that the

inconsistency between the recorded conversation and the

PSR calls into question the reliability of the PSR as a

whole. An isolated error that is not relied upon by the

court, however, does not call into question the report in

its entirety, particularly where the rest of the report

did not rely on any recordings and Johnson makes no

argument of any similar factual inaccuracies elsewhere.

Moreover, the lack of direct participation by Johnson

in that portion of the conversation does not absolve him

of any role as leader or organizer. Johnson cannot claim

that he was uninvolved in that transaction, as his guilty

plea acknowledges that he was the source of the drugs

that were supplied to Enoch following that conversation,

who then cooked it into crack cocaine to forward to Marshall. Statements by Marshall and Enoch indicated that

Johnson was the one who supplied the drugs to be cooked

into crack on that and other occasions and that he coordinated the deliveries to Marshall. That Johnson sought

to limit his criminal exposure by not engaging in direct

communications regarding the drug deals does not render
6 No. 05-4631

unreliable the statements of Enoch or Marshall, and in

fact that is perfectly consistent with the position of a

leader or supervisor. It is hardly unusual for a supervisor

to limit his criminal exposure, and for the underlings to

be more exposed in a drug conspiracy.

Johnson’s objections ultimately hinge on his belief that

the statements by Marshall and Enoch should not have

been relied on by the district court because they were

uncorroborated by recordings or other similar evidence,

and that Marshall and Enoch had a motive to lie. That

argument predominated in Johnson’s brief and at the

sentencing hearing, at which the lack of corroboration

was repeatedly raised. But we rejected a similar argument in United States v. Galbraith, 200 F.3d 1006, 1012

(7th Cir. 2000). Galbraith complained in that case about

the district court’s decision to credit information provided

by George Songer, a person who had been convicted of

prior drug offenses and was facing possible drug

charges himself, and who claimed to have knowledge of

additional drug amounts involving Galbraith. In addition

to questioning Songer’s motives, Galbraith decried the

lack of corroboration of Songer’s testimony. We held in

Galbraith that “these facts do not necessarily render him

unreliable.” Id. In fact, in Galbraith we upheld the district court’s reliance on Songer’s statements, even though

we were disturbed by “the fact that Songer’s two interviews yielded vastly different information.” Id. We concluded that the district court did not err in crediting

Songer’s testimony as to 148 grams and discrediting other

testimony as to a larger amount, because the testimony

as to the 148 grams “bore indicia of reliability—facts and

details—that were missing from the statement regarding the larger amount.” Id. at 1013.

Johnson has far less indicia of unreliability than were

present in Galbraith. There are no internal inconsistencies identified here, and we have squarely rejected
No. 05-4631 7

the notion that corroboration is required in order for a

district court to find statements reliable. Instead, “the

hallmark of reliability is consistency of facts and details. . . . We require only that the testimony be consistent,

or that the trial judge provide an explanation for crediting

one of the witness’s inconsistent statements over the

others.” Zehm, 217 F.3d at 514; Galbraith, 200 F.3d at

1012. That standard is met here. The statements are

consistent, and in fact are corroborated by the recordings

and observed activities.

Johnson’s remaining argument, that the district court

failed to articulate fact findings underlying its § 3B1.1

enhancement and that the evidence was insufficient to

support that enhancement, fares no better. Under the

Commentary to § 3B1.1, in determining whether the

enhancement applies,

[f]actors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger

share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature

and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of

control and authority exercised over others.

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, Application Note 4. The district court

identified each of those factors and found that the record

supported the enhancement for each of them. Johnson

nevertheless challenges those findings, asserting that

the factual findings were not based on the record or on

reliable evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.

This argument ultimately rests on the same challenge to

the reliability of the statements by Marshall and Enoch,

which we have already rejected. When those statements

are considered, the record provides ample support for the

district court’s decision to apply the enhancement. Johnson
8 No. 05-4631

has failed to demonstrate that the district court committed

clear error in applying the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. The

decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—6-4-07