J-S31007-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ZACHARY T. WILSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2988 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0929501-1986

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2018

Appellant, Zachary T. Wilson, appeals pro se from the order denying his

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural issues of this 

case as follows:

[Appellant] Zachary Wilson was tried and convicted of first 

degree murder on January 7, 1988, and was sentenced to death 

for the 1981 shooting of Jamie Lamb. The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court upheld this conviction on November 9, 1994. 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1994). [Appellant]

subsequently filed a petition under the Post–Conviction Relief Act 

and the [c]ourt’s denial of the petition was upheld on appeal on 

November 19, 2004. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 861 A.2d 919 (Pa. 

2004). [Appellant] subsequently filed a federal petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus based on alleged Brady violations by the 

prosecution. The federal district court granted [Appellant’s]

petition on August 9, 2006, and was upheld on appeal on 

December 23, 2009. Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651 (3rd Cir. 

2009). [Appellant] was subsequently retried in April 2013, with 
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the Commonwealth no longer seeking the death penalty. That 

trial resulted in a hung jury. Thereafter, the matter was 

reassigned to the undersigned trial judge.

On April 1, 2014, following a jury trial before this [c]ourt, 

[Appellant] was again convicted of one count each of first degree 

murder (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502) and possessing an instrument of 

crime (18 Pa.C.S. § 907). The [c]ourt immediately imposed the 

mandatory sentence of life in prison for the murder charge (18 

Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1)), with no further penalty on the charge of 

possessing an instrument of crime. [Appellant] filed post–

sentence motions, which the [c]ourt denied on July 24, 2014. On 

[June 3, 2016], the Superior Court affirmed [Appellant’s]

judgment of sentence. [Appellant] was represented at trial, at 

sentencing, and on direct appeal by Michael Wiseman, Esquire and 

Benjamin Marshal, Esquire.

[Appellant] then filed a pro se petition under the Post -

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) on July 26, 2016. David 

Rudenstein, Esquire[,] was appointed to represent [Appellant] on 

January 6, 2017. On May 25, 2017, pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988), Mr. Rudenstein filed a 

letter stating there was no merit to [Appellant’s] claims for

collateral relief. See Finley Letter of David Rudenstein, filed 

5/25/2017 (“Finley Letter”). On June 23, 2017, the [c]ourt issued 

notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“907 Notice”), of its

intention to dismiss [Appellant’s] PCRA Petition without an 

evidentiary hearing. [Appellant] responded to the [c]ourt’s 907 

Notice on July 19, 2017. On August 25, 2017, the [c]ourt formally 

dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA Petition and granted Mr. 

Rudenstein’s motion to withdraw his appearance.

[Appellant timely] . . . appealed the [c]ourt’s dismissal of 

his PCRA Petition, raising a total of 22 issues, some duplicative, in 

a Statement of Errors and a Supplemental Statement of Errors.

See 1925 (b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal (“Statement of Errors”) at ¶¶ A-J; Supplement 1925 (b) 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal 

(“Supplemental Statement of Errors”) at ¶11 A-L.

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/18/17, at 1-2. 
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Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we restate 

here verbatim:

A. WHETHER APPELLANT SHOULD BE GRANTED AN ARREST OF 

JUDGMENT/DISMISSAL AS HE WAS WRONGFULLY 

PROSECUTED GIVEN THAT THE MUNICIPAL COURT [JUDGE 

LIPSCHUTZ] DISMISSED HIS CASE WITH PREJUDICE [AND 

DISCHARGED HIM] ON MAY 27, 1982 [AND THE 

COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO FILE A RULE 132 MOTION AND 

OBTAIN APPROVAL FOR THE REINSTITUTING OF THE 

DISMISSED CASE NEARLY 5 YEARS LATER, AS REQUIRED 

BY PA.R.CRIM.P. 544 (A -B), DUE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL 

PROTECTION OF THE LAW]?

B. WHETHER APPELLANT SHOULD BE GRANTED RELIEF IN 

SOME FORM GIVEN THAT THE SUPERIOR COURT 

MISCONSTRUED THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND WAS LEAD 

TO RELY ON FABRICATED AND/OR [KNOWINGLY USED] 

PERJURED TESTIMONY [NEVER CORRECTED BY THE

COMMONWEALTH]?

C. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT-MATTER 

JURISDICTION TO PROCEED TO THE MERITS OF 

APPELLANT’S ISSUES WHEN APPELLANT WAS ON DIRECT 

APPEAL AND APPELLANT COUNSEL FAILED TO CONSULT 

APPELLANT ABOUT FILING A PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF

APPEAL TO THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT TO 

REVIEW ISSUES E-J BELOW AND APPELLANT FILED A 

TIMELY PCRA PETITION RAISING THOSE ISSUES SHOWING 

HE DESIRED COUNSEL TO FILE A PETITION FOR 

ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL ON DIRECT APPEAL?

D. WHETHER THE PCRA COURT ERRED IN FILING TO GRANT 

AN APPEAL NUNC PRO TUNC FOR APPELLANT TO FILE A 

PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL TO THE 

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT WITH THE APPOINTMENT 

OF NEW COUNSEL IN LIGHT OF APPELLANT COUNSEL’S 

FAILURE TO DO SO AND PCRA COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO FILE 

AN AMENDED PETITION RAISING ALL PRIOR COUNSELS’

(TRIAL AND APPELLANT) INEFFECTIVENESS?

E. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 

APPELLANT’S PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS TO BAR RE-
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PROSECUTION ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS OR, 

ALTERNATELY, TO CONDUCT A HEARING ON WHETHER THE 

PROSECUTOR INTENTIONALLY WITHHELD BRADY 

EVIDENCE [IN LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S FEBRUARY 

28, 2017 DECISION RENDERED IN COMMONWEALTH-VJAWAYNE K. BROWN; COMMONWEALTH -V -RICHARD 

BROWN; AND COMMONWEALTH-V-AQUIL BOND, 2017 

PA.LEXIS 476 (NO. 384 EAL 2016, NO. 385 EAL 2016, NO. 

386 EAL 2016) AND NO FACTUAL FINDINGS EVER BEING 

MADE BY THE ORIGINAL TRIAL JUDGE, OR A HEARING ON 

FURTHER TESTIMONY, REGARDING THE INTENT OF THE 

PROSECUTOR]?

F. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND VIOLATED THE 

APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT EXCLUDED 

DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO WOULD HAVE PLACED AN 

INCULPATORY STATEMENT IN PROPER CONTEXT, THUS 

CHALLENGING THE COMMONWEALTH’S THEORY THAT THE 

STATEMENT SHOWED CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT?

G. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED 

MICHAEL PATTERSON’S TESTIMONY THAT “TURTLE” TOLD 

HIM THAT APPELLANT WAS THE SHOOTER AND OTHER 

TESTIMONY SUGGESTING THAT TURTLE WAS AN 

EYEWITNESS WITH THE ERROR ALLOWING THE

COMMONWEALTH TO BENEFIT FROM ITS EARLIER BRADY 

VIOLATIONS ALL VIOLATING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 

THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION?

H. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED 

PRIOR STATEMENTS OF EDWARD JACKSON THAT 

IMPROPERLY BOLSTERED HIS IN COURT TESTIMONY?

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED A PORTION OF THE 

APPELLANT’S 1988 PENALTY PHASE TESTIMONY WHICH 

SAID TESTIMONY VIOLATING THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO 

DUE PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE IT WAS THE PRODUCT OF 

EARLIER BRADY VIOLATIONS?

J. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

MOTIONS MADE DURING AN AFTER TRIAL FOR DISCOVERY 

OF THE MEDICAL REASONS FOR THE FIVE-DAY DELAY OF 

EDWARD JACKSON’S TESTIMONY?
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K. WHETHER TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL RENDERED 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH 

AMENDMENT, FOR FAILING TO: (1) PROVIDE EVIDENCE IN 

THE RECORD ON APPEAL TO SUPPORT HIS JUDGE 

BRONSON ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO 

INQUIRE INTO THE MEDICAL RECORDS OF EDWARD 

JACKSON TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE HAD A PROBLEM 

WITH ALCOHOL AND DRUGS, EVIDENCE THAT APPEARED 

AT THE NOVEMBER 24, 1997 PCRA HEARING AND 

ESTABLISHED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH HAD

DELIBERATELY MISLED THE APPELLATE COURT IN ITS 

APPELLEE BRIEF IN REGARDS TO JACKSON’S ALCOHOL AND 

DRUG PROBLEM; AND (2) CONSULT WITH APPELLANT 

ABOUT FILING A TIMELY PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF 

APPEAL IN THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AND 

CERTIORARI ON DIRECT APPEAL, WHERE APPELLANT FILED 

A TIMELY PCRA PETITION RAISING THE SAME CLAIMS AND 

SHOWING HIS DESIRE TO DO SO ?

L WHETHER PCRA COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, 

IN FAILING TO FILE AN AMENDED PETITION TO RAISE THE 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF ALL PRIOR COUNSEL?

Appellant’s Brief at vi-vii.

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 

649, 651 (Pa. Super.2013). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Id.

We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the certified 

record before us, and the PCRA court’s opinion. We conclude that the record 

supports the PCRA court’s determination, and we discern no error in its 

analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the August 25, 2017 order based on the PCRA 
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court’s opinion, and we adopt its analysis and reasoning as our own.1 The 

parties are directed to attach a copy of the PCRA court’s December 18, 2017 

opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/17/18

____________________________________________

1 We note that the order in which the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s issues 

varies from the order of Appellant’s issues listed in his Statement of Issues 

Involved. Nevertheless, the PCRA court addressed each of Appellant’s issues. 
Circulated 08/2212FJtEf:18 PM 

DEC 18 2017 

Office of Judicial Record: 

AppealS/Post Trial 

CP-51-CR-0929501-1986 

,_---·---------� I 

CP-51-CR-0929501-1986_ Comm. v. Wilson. Zachary 

I Op��n 

I 

L IIIII HlUIIII 

� -- -- - . -...- .. __ ·---- _., 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

v. 

ZACHARY WILSON 

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

OPINION 

BRONSON, J. December 18, 2017 

Defendant Zachary Wilson was tried and convicted of first degree murder on January 

7, 1988, and was sentenced to death for the 1981 shooting of Jamie Lamb. The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court upheld this conviction on November 9, 1994. Commonwealth v, Wilson, 649 

A.2d 435 (Pa. 1994). Defendant subsequently filed a petition under the Post-Conviction 

ReJief Act and the Court's denial of the petition was upheld on appeal on November 19, 2004. 

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 861 A.2d 919 (Pa. 2004). Defendant subsequently filed a federal 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on alleged Brady violations by the prosecution. The 

federal district court granted defendant's petition on August 9, 2006, and was upheld on 

appeal on December 23, 2009. Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651 (3rd Cir. 2009). Defendant was 

subsequently retried in April 2013, with the Commonwealth no longer seeking the death 

penalty. That trial resulted in a hung jury. Thereafter, the matter was reassigned to the 

undersigned trial judge. 

On April 1, 2014, following a jury trial before this Court, defendant was again 

convicted of one count each of first degree murder ( 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502) and possessing an 

instrument of crime (18 Pa.C.S. § 907). The Court immediately imposed the mandatory 

sentence of life in prison for the murder charge ( 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(l )), with no further 

penalty on the charge of possessing an instrument of crime. Defendant filed post-sentence 
motions, which the Court denied on July 24, 2014. On July 6, 2016, the Superior Court 

affirmed defendant's judgment of sentence. Defendant was represented at trial, at sentencing, 

and on direct appeal by Michael Wiseman, Esquire and Benjamin Marshal, Esquire. 

Defendant then filed a prose petition under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (''PCRA") 

on July 26, 2016. David Rudenstein, Esquire was appointed to represent defendant on January 

6, 2017. On May 25, 2017, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988), Mr. Rudenstein filed a letter stating there was no merit to defendant's claims for 

collateral relief. See Finley Letter of David Rudenstein, filed 5/25/2017 ("Finley Letter"). On 

June 23, 2017, the Court issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 ("907 Notice"), of its 

intention to dismiss defendant's PCRA Petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant 

responded to the Court's 907 Notice on July 19, 2017. On August 25, 2017, the Court 

formally dismissed defendant's PCRA Petition and granted Mr. Rudenstein's motion to 

withdraw his appearance. 

Defendant has now appealed the Court's dismissal of his PCRA Petition, raising a total 

of 22 issues, some duplicative, in a Statement of Errors and a Supplemental Statement of 

Errors. See 1925 (b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal ("Statement of 

Errors") at 11 A-J; Supplement 1925 (b) Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on 

Appeal ("Supplemental Statement of Errors") at ,i,i A-L. The issues set forth in the Statement 

of Errors are listed verbatim below in their entirety, without corrections (block capitals 

omitted): 

A. Whether appellant should be granted an arrest of 

judgment/dismissal as he was wrongfully prosecuted given that the 

municipal court (Judge Lipschutz) dismissed his case with prejudice 

(and discharged him) on May 27, 1982 (and the Commonwealth 

failed to file a Rule 132 motion and obtain approval for the 

reinstituting of the dismissed case nearly 5 years later, as required 

by Pa.R.Crim.P. 544 (A-B), due process and the equal protection of 

the law)? 

2 
B. Whether appellant should be granted relief in some form given that 

. the Superior Court misconstrued the facts of the case and was lead 

to rely on fabricated and/or (knowingly used) perjured testimony 

(never corrected by the Commonwealth)? 

C. Whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's pre-trial motions to 

bar re-prosecution on double jeopardy grounds or, alternately, to conduct a 

hearing on whether the prosecutor intentionally withheld Brady evidence 

(in light of the Supreme Court's February 28, 2017 decision rendered in 

Comrnonwealth-b-Jawayne K. Brown; Cornmonwealth-v-Richard Brown; 

and Comrnonwealth-v-Aquil Bond, PA.Lexis 476 (No. 384 EAL 2016, No. 

385 EAL 2016, No. 386 EAL 2016) and no factual findings ever being 

made by the original trial judge, or a hearing on further testimony, 

regarding the intent of the prosecutor)? 

D. Whether the trial court erred and violated the appellant's right to 

due process when it excluded defense witnesses who would have 

placed an inculpatory statement in the proper context, thus 

challenging the Commonwealth's theory that the statement showed 

consciousness of guilt? 

E. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted Michael Patterson's 

testimony that "Turtle" told him that appellant was the shooter and 

other testimony suggesting that Turtle was an eyewitness with the 

error allowing the Commonwealth to benefit from its earlier Brady 

violations all violating due process of law and the right to 

confrontation? 

F. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted prior statements of 

Edward Jackson that improperly bolstered his in court testimony? 

G. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it 

admitted a portion of the appellant's 1998 penalty phase testimony 

violating the appellant's right to due process of law because it was 

the product of earlier Brady violations? 

H. Whether the trial court erred when it denied notions made during an 

after trial for discovery of the medical reasons for the five-day delay 

of Edward Jackson's testimony? 

l. Whether trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance, 

in violation of the sixth amendment, for failing to provide evidence 

in the record on appeal to support his Judge Bronson erred in failing 

to allow the defense to inquire into the medical records of Edward 

Jackson to determine whether he had a problem with alcohol and 

drugs, evidence that appeared at the November 24, 1997 PCRA 

hearing and established the Commonwealth had deliberately misled 

the appellate court in its appellee brief in regards to Jackson's 

alcohol and drug problem? 

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J. Whether PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in violation 

of the sixth amendment, in failing to file an amended petition to 

raise the ineffective assistance of all prior counsel? 

Statement of Errors at,, 'A-J. The issues set forth in the Supplemental Statement of Errors are 

listed verbatim below in their entirety, without corrections (block capitals omitted): 

A Whether appellant should be granted an arrest of 

judgment/dismissal as he was wrongfully prosecuted given that the 

municipal court (Judge Lipschutz) dismissed his case with prejudice 

[and discharged him] on May 27, 1982 (and the Commonwealth 

failed to file a Rule 132 motion and obtain approval for the 

reinstituting of the dismissed case nearly 5 years later, as required 

by Pa.R.Crim.P 544 (A-B), due process and the equal protection of 

the law)? 

B. Whether appellant should be granted relief in some form given that 

the Superior Court misconstrued the facts of the case and was lead 

to rely on fabricated and/or (knowingly used] perjured testimony 

[ never corrected by the Commonwealth)? 

C. Whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed 

to the merits of appellant's issues when appellant was on direct 

appeal and appellant counsel failed to consult appellant about filing 

a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court to review issues E-J below and appellant filed a timely PCRA 

petition raising those issues showing he desired counsel to file a 

petition for allowance of appeal on direct appeal? 

D. Whether the PCRA court erred in filing to grant an appeal nunc pro 

tune for appellant to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court with the appointment of new counsel 

in light of appellant counsel's failure to do so and PCRA counsel's 

failure to file an amended petition raising all prior counsels' (trial 

and appellant) ineffectiveness? 

E. Whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's pre-trial 

motions to bar re-prosecution on. double jeopardy grounds or, 

alternatively, to conduct a hearing on whether the prosecutor 

intentionally withheld Brady evidence (in light of the Supreme 

Court's February 28, 2017 decision rendered in Commonwealth-vJawayne K. Brown; Cornmonwealth-v-Richard Brown; 

Cornmonwealth-v-Aquil Bond, Pa.Lexis 476 (No. 384 EAL 2016, 

No. 386 EAL 2016) and no factual findings ever bring made by the 

further testimony, regarding the intent of the prosecutor)? 

F. Whether the trial court erred and violated the appellant's right to 

due process when it excluded defense witnesses who would have 

placed an inculpatory statement in the proper context, thus 

4 
challenging the Commonwealth's theory that the statement showed 

consciousness of guilt? 

G. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted Michael Patterson's 

testimony that "Turtle" told him that appellant was the shooter and 

other testimony suggesting that Turtle was an eyewitness with the 

error allowing the Commonwealth to benefit from its earlier Brady 

violations all violating due process of law and the right to 

confrontation? 

H. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted prior statements of 

Edward Jackson that improperly bolstered his in court testimony? 

I. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion when it 

admitted a portion of the appellant's 1988 penalty phase testimony 

which said testimony violating the appellant's right to due process 

of law because it was the product of earlier Brady? 

J. Whether the trial court erred when it denied motions made during 

an after trial for discovery of the medical reasons for the five-day 

delay of Edward Jackson's testimony? 

K. Whether trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance, 

in violation of the sixth amendment for failing to: (1) provide · 

evidence in the record on appeal to support his Judge Bronson erred 

in failing to allow the defense to inquire into the medical records of 

Edward Jackson to determine whether he had a problem with 

alcohol and drugs, evidence that appeared at the November 24, 

1997 PCRA hearing and established that the Commonwealth had 

deliberately misled the appellate Court in its appellee brief in 

regards to Jackson's alcohol and drug problem; and (2) consult with 

appellant about filing a timely petition for allowance of appeal in 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and certiorari on direct appeal, 

where appellant filed a timely PCRA petition raising the same 

claims and showing his desire to do so? 

L. Whether PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in violation 

of the Sixth Amendment, in failing to file an amended petition to 

raise the ineffective assistance. of all prior counsel? 

Supplemental Statement of Errors at 11 A-L. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's 

claims are without merit or are waived, and the PCRA Court's order dismissing his PCRA 

Petition should be affirmed. 

5 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

This Court set forth the relevant facts in its opinion regarding defendant's direct appeal 

as follows. 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Newtown Township 

Police Lieutenant Charles Schuck, Philadelphia Police Lieutenant Daniel 

Judge, Philadelphia Police Detectives William Wynn (Ret.), Christopher Starr 

(Ret.), Lawrence Gerrard (Ret.), Leon Lubiejewski (Ret.), Roger Harmon 

(Ret.), and Gregory Rodden, Philadelphia Police Officer Raymond 

Andrejczak:, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Gary Collins, Michael 

Patterson, Robert Biggins, Harold Higgins, Quma Lamb, Cathy Lamb, and 

Edward Jackson. Defendant presented the testimony of Albert Levitt. Viewed 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the 

evidence established the following. 

Ronnie Williams was defendant's adopted brother.1 After Williams was 

murdered, defendant came to believe that Williams had been killed by Jamie 

Lamb.2 N.T. 3/26/14 at 15. Michael Patterson, who knew both defendant and 

Lamb, spoke with defendant about Lamb sometime prior to August 3, 1981.3 

During that conversation, defendant told Patterson that he had heard Lamb 

"had something to do with killing [Ronnie Williams]," and that defendant "was 

going to get with Jamie," regardless of how long it took. N.T. 3/25/14 at 203- 

204. 

On August 3, 1981, at approximately 1 :00 pm, Patterson went to Gainer's Tire 

Shop located at Fox Street and Lippincott Street in North Philadelphia. There, 

outside the shop, were defendant, Rodney Wells,

4 and ford Howard. N.T. 

3/25/14 at 190-193. While this group was together, Lamb, Kenny Mozelle, 

Jeffrey Rahming,5 "Peanut,"6 and Carl Rowland walked past. N.T. 3/25/14 at 

193-194. Lamb was heading to the Sweet Joy Lounge, where his younger 

sister worked, at the comer of 24th Street and Allegheny Street in North 

Philadelphia. N.T. 3/25/14 at 80; 3/26/14 at 68-69. As he passed, Lamb 

smiled at defendant, who appeared angry in response. N.T. 3/25/14 at 194-195. 

Shortly after Lamb left, defendant, Howard, and Wells all left the Tire Shop, 

walking in the same direction that Lamb had gone. N.T. 3/25/14 at 196. 

Defendant was wearing a dark "applejack" style hat. N.T. 3/25/14 at 197-198, 

257-258. 

Minutes later, Lamb was in the back of the Sweet Joy Lounge. Defendant 

entered the lounge, walked into the rear section, and shot Lamb five times. 

N.T. 3/25/14 at 286; 3/27/14 at 99-102; 3/31/14 at 35-36. Defendant then 

attempted to flee the lounge, but tripped over Edward Jackson, one of the 

1 Ronnie Williams was also referred to as defendant's cousin Jock. N.T. 3/25/14 at 203-204; 3/26/14 at 16-17. 

2 Lamb's full name was William Jamar Lamb. N.T. 3/27/14 at 118. 

3 Patterson was also known as Buck. N.T. 3/25/14 at 253. · 

4 Wells was also known as Hoppa. N.T. 3/25/14 at 191. 

5 Rahming was also known as Turtle. N.T. 3/31114 at 172. 

6 Peanut's real name was not revealed during the trial. 

6 
patrons who had fallen to the floor when the shooting started. N.T. 3/31/14 at 

36. Jackson was able to view defendant's face before defendant stood up and 

ran out of the building. N.T. 3/31/14 at 36-37. Upon exiting, defendant ran 

into a Cadillac, which sped away from the scene and failed to stop at a red 

light. N.T. 3/25/14 at 255-256, 260; 3/27/14 at 75-76. Wells owned a Cadillac 

Eldorado at the time of the shooting. N.T. 3/25/14 at 202. 

At approximately l: 15 p.m., Patterson saw Rowland running down the street, 

yelling "[cJome on, y'all, come on, come on," and that "[tjhe little short guy 

just killed Jamie, they just passed us down there by the car." N.T. 3/25/ 14 at 

I 99. Rowland further stated that "the little short guy" had just been with 

Howard and Wells. N.T. 3/25/14 at 199-200. 

A few days after Lamb's death, Patterson was on the phone with defendant 

when Patterson stated, "Turtle says you killed Jamie." N.T. 3/25/14 at 201. 

Defendant replied that "Turtle needed to keep his name out of his mouth ... 

before he get plucked." N.T. 3/25/14 at 201. 

On March 3 l, 1982, Jackson attended a line up and purposefully misidentified 

the shooter, selecting someone other than defendant. N.T. 3/31/14 at 43"44. 

Jackson did this because he had been visited by two men with a gun, 

approximately five months earlier, who told him to "mind [his] own business 

and don't say nothing to the cops about nothing." N.T. 3/31/14 at 41. Jackson 

informed homicide detectives that same day that he purposefully selected the 

wrong person. N.T. 3/31/ 14 at 45. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed November 26, 2014, at pp. 2-4. 

III. DISCUSSION 

If court-appointed counsel for a PCRA petitioner determines that the issues the 

petitioner raises for collateral review are meritless, and the PCRA court concurs, counsel may 

withdraw and the petitioner may proceed prose, by privately retained counsel, or not at all. 

Finley, 550 A.2d at 218. To be permitted to withdraw, petitioner's counsel must file a nomerit letter, or "Finley letter," deta�ling the nature and extent of counsel's review and listing 

each issue the petitioner wished to raise, with counsel's explanation as to why the issues are 

meritless. Commonwealth v, Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 (Pa. 2009) (quoting Finley, 550 A.2d at 

215). After reviewing a Finley letter, the PCRA court is required to independently review the 

record to evaluate the petitioner's claims. Id. A PCRA petition may be dismissed without a 

hearing if the Court determines that there are no claims of arguable merit and no purpose 

7 
would be served by further proceedings. Commonwealth v. Lignons, 971 A.2d 1125, 1143 

(Pa. 2009); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1 ). 

Some of defendant's claims are premised upon his contention that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Pennsylvania law, counsel is presumed to be 

effective and the burden to prove otherwise lies with the petitioner. Commonwealth v. 

Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 728 (Pa. 2000), n.10 (citing Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 

A.2d 242, 250 (Pa. 1998)). To obtain collateral relief based on the ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below accepted standards of 

advocacy and that as a result thereof, the petitioner was prejudiced. Strickland v. Washing/on, 

466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In Pennsylvania, the Strickland standard is interpreted as requiring 

proof that: ( l) the claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim had arguable merit; (2) counsel's 

actions lacked any reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the 

petitioner prejudice. Commonweallh v. Miller, 987 A.2d 638, 648 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth 

v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1987). To satisfy the third prong of the test, the petitioner must 

prove that, but for counsel's error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 899 A.2d I 067, 1084 (Pa. 

2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If the PCRA court determines that any one of the 

three prongs cannot be met, then the court need not hold an evidentiary hearing as such a 

hearing would serve no purpose. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 

2008), appeal denied, 956 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2008). 

1. CLAIMS FROM ST A TEMENT OF ERRORS 

A. Previous Dismissal of the Case with Prejudice 

Defendant first alleges that he "should be granted an arrest of judgment/dismissal as he 

was wrongfully prosecuted given that the municipal court (Judge Lipschutz) dismissed his 

case with prejudice ( and discharged him) on May 27, 1982 .... " Statement of Errors at 1 A 

8 
This claim could have, but was not, raised on a direct appeal. It is therefore waived. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (''an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so 

before trial, at trial, [or] on appeal"); see Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240 (Pa. 

2001). 

B. Superior Court Error in Misconstruing Facts 

Defendant next claims that he is entitled to relief as the Superior Court "misconstrued 

the facts of the case." Statement of Errors at 1 B. The PCRA court, however, is without 

jurisdiction to review a decision of the Superior Court. 

C. Double Jeopardy 

Defendant next alleges that the "the trial court erred in denying the appellant's pre-trial 

motions to bar re-prosecution on double jeopardy grounds or, alternately, to conduct a hearing 

on whether the prosecutor intentionally withheld Brady evidence .... " Statement of Errors at 1 

C. This claim was raised in defendant's direct appeal and rejected by the Superior Court. See 

Superior Court Opinion, filed 6/3/ l 6 at pp. 4-8. Because this claim was previously litigated 

on defendant's direct appeal, it is not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) 

& 9544(a)(2); see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016). 

D. Excluding Defense Witnesses at Trial 

Defendant next alleges that the "trial court erred and violated the appellant's right to 

due process when it excluded defense witnesses who would have placed an inculpatory 

statement in proper context. . . " Statement of Errors at 1 D. This claim was raised in 

defendant's direct appeal and rejected by the Superior Court. See Superior Court Opinion, 

filed 6/3/16 at pp. 9-12. Because this claim was previously litigated on defendant's direct 

appeal, it is not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) & 9544(a)(2); see 

Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272. 

9 
E. Admission of Michael Patterson's Testimony 

Next, defendant claims "the trial court erred when it admitted Michael Patterson's 

testimony that 'Turtle' told him that appellant was the shooter and other testimony suggesting 

that Turtle was an eyewitness with the error allowing the Commonwealth to benefit from its 

earlier Brady violations . .. " Statement of Errors at 1 E. This claim was raised in defendant's 

direct appeal and rejected by the Superior Court. See Superior Court Opinion, filed 6/3/16 at 

pp. 9-12. Because this claim was previously litigated on defendant's direct appeal, it is not 

cognizable under the PCRA. 42 P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) & 9544(a)(2); see Johnson, 139 A.3d 

at 1272. 

F Prior Statements of Edward Jackson 

Next, defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting prior statements of 

Edward Jackson because they improperly bolstered his in-court testimony. Statement of 

Errors at 1 F. This claim was raised in defendant's direct appeal and rejected by the Superior 

Court. See Superior Court Opinion, filed 6/3/16 at pp. 21-28. Because this claim was 

previously litigated on defendant's direct appeal, it is not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 

P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) & 9544(a)(2); see Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272. 

G. Admission of Penalty Phase Testimony from Prior Trial 

Next, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted a 

portion of his 1988 penalty phase testimony. Statement of Errors at 1 G. This claim was 

raised in defendant's direct appeal and rejected by the .superior Court. See Superior Court 

Opinion, filed 6/3/16 at pp. 29-31. Because this claim was previously litigated on defendant's 

direct appeal, it is not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) & 9544(a)(2); 

see Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272. 

lO 
H Denial of Motions for Discovery regarding Witness Edward Jackson 

Next, defendant claims that that the trial court erred in denying his motions seeking 

discovery pertaining to the medical reasons for the five-day delay in the testimony of 

Commonwealth witness Edward Jackson. Statement of Errors at, H. This claim was raised 

in defendant's direct appeal and rejected by the Superior Court. See Superior Court Opinion, 

filed 6/3/16 at pp. 31-33. Because this claim was previously litigated on defendant's direct 

appeal, it is not cognizable under the PCRA. 42 P.A.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) & 9544(a)(2); see 

Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272. 

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel regarding Edward Jackson's Medical Records 

Defendant next claims that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for not 

presenting evidence regarding Edward Jackson's prior drug and alcohol problems in order to 

support the claim that the trial court erred in denying defendant access to Jackson's medical 

records. Defendant cites to testimony from a hearing held in 1997 regarding a prior PCRA 

petition, in which Jackson admitted that he had a history of alcohol abuse. Statement of 

Errors at, I. 

First, trial counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to obtain and present 

evidence of Jackson's drug and alcohol problems, since he made every possible effort to do 

so. When Jackson failed to appear for trial due to a claimed illness, the prosecutor asked for a 

brief continuance and presented a note from Jackson's doctor stating that Jackson had the flu 

and was unable to attend court. N.T. 3/27/2014 at 6-7. Notwithstanding the doctor's note, 

counsel demanded access to the medical records to determine if the actual problem was 

related to "alcohol, drugs, some other illness that may impact on credibility, his ability to 

recall[.]" N.T. 3/27/14 at 8. Because the Court had observed Jackson in court the day before 

exhibiting flu-like symptoms, and since the doctor's note stated that Jackson had the flu, the 

Court denied the request. N.T. 3/27/2014 at 9. 

11 
Moreover, when Jackson subsequently testified at the trial, counsel attempted to ask 

him on cross-examination whether he had "a history of alcohol problems." N.T. 3/31/2014 at 

98-99. 

7 Jackson admitted that he had "quite a bit to drink" just before the shooting, allowing 

counsel to argue that he was an impaired witness. N.T. 3/31/2014 at 99. There was nothing 

more that trial counsel could do. 

As for appellate counsel, it is true that the Superior Court, in rejecting defendant's 

claim that the Court erred in denying defendant access to Jackson's medical records, stated 

that there was no evidence in the record that Jackson suffered from drug or alcohol problems, 

and that defendant did not point to any such evidence in his brief. See Superior Court 

Opinion, filed 6/3/16 at pp. 33. However, even if appellate counsel had marshalled all of the 

evidence of alcohol consumption and presented it to the Superior Court, it would not have 

changed the Superior Court's decision. As the Superior Court stated, the decision whether to 

allow access to Jackson's medical records was vested in the discretion of the trial court. 

Superior Court Opinion, filed 6/3/16 at pp. 33. Here, the trial court had personally observed 

Jackson demonstrating flu-like symptoms, and his flu was confirmed by a doctor's note. Also, 

as the Superior Court noted, "defense counsel was free to cross-examine Jackson regarding 

any factor that may have impacted his ability to testify truthfully or recall the events in 

question," Superior Court Opinion, filed 6/3/16 at pp. 33, and defense counsel did so 

extensively. Counsel brought out in detail Jackson's crimen falsi conviction, the poor lighting 

conditions, Jackson's prior inconsistent statements, his lack of opportunity to observe, his 

consumption of alcohol on the day of the shooting, his prior misidentification at a lineup, and 

other factors bearing upon credibility. N.T. 3/31/2014 at 64-120, 136-139. A fishing 

1 The Court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to this question, but permitted counsel to ask about 

Jackson's alcohol consumption on the day of the murder and before speaking to the police. N.T. 3/31/2014 at 98- 

100. 

12 
expedition into Jackson's medical records was not appropriate and could not have affected the 

outcome of defendant's trial. No· relief is due. 

J Ineffective Assistance of PCRA Counsel 

Defendant next contends that "PCRA Counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in 

violation of the Sixth Amendment in failing to file an amended petition to raise the ineffective 

assistance of all prior counsel." Statement of Errors at 1 J. Defendant fails, however, to 

identify the specific claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that PCRA counsel should 

have raised. Accordingly, this claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 954 A.2d 

1222, 1228 (Pa. Super. 2008), app. denied, 964 A.2d 893 (Pa. 2009) (where a defendant 

makes a vague and generalized objection on appeal that leaves the trial court to guess at his 

claims, those claims are deemed to have been waived). 

2. CLAIMS FROM SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF ERRORS 

Ten of the claims set forth in defendant's Supplemental Statement of Errors are 

identical to claims set forth in his Statement of Errors and are, therefore, not addressed further 

below. The duplicative claims are as follows, with the corresponding letter headings from the 

Statement of Errors set forth in parentheses: A (A above); B (B above); .E (C above); F (D 

above); G (E above); H (F above); I (G above); J (H above); K (I above); and L (J above). 

The remaining two claims are addressed below, preserving the letter headings from the 

Supplemental Statement of Errors for ease of reference. 

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

Defendant next claims that he is entitled to relief since: 1) the Court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of defendant's PCRA petition while defendant's 

direct appeal was pending; and 2) appellate counsel failed to consult with defendant about 

filing a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Supplemental 

,, 

Statement of Errors at 1 C. 

13 
As to the first of defendant's claims, the Court did not rule on the merits of defendant's 

PCRA petition while his case was pending on direct appeal. On July 6, 2016, the Superior 

Court affirmed defendant's judgment of sentence. Defendant did not file his PCRA petition 

until July 26, 2016, and the Court did not rule on the petition until August 25, 2017. 

Accordingly, this claim is without merit. 

As for defendant's claim that appellate counsel failed to consult with him about filing 

a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this claim was never 

presented to the PCRA court and is therefore waived. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d l 080, 

l 084-85 (Pa. Super. 2014) (issues not raised in the PCRA court in a PCRA petition, amended 

petition, or 907 response, are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

D. Failing to Reinstate Defendant's Right to Seek Supreme Court Review 

Defendant next claims that "the PCRA Court erred in fia]iling to grant an appeal nunc 

pro tune for appellant to file a petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court with the appointment of new counsel in light of appellant counsel's failure to do so and 

PCRA counsel's failure to file an amended petition raising all prior counsels' (trial and 

appellant) ineffectiveness." Supplemental Statement of Errors at 1 D. This c1aim was never 

presented in the PCRA court and is therefore waived. Rigg, 84 A.3d at 1084 (issues not raised 

in the PCRA court in a PCRA petition, amended petition, or 907 response, are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). 

14 
IV. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court's order dismissing defendant's PCRA 

petition should be affirmed. 

BY THE COURT: 

GLENN B. BRONSON, J 

15 
Commonwealth v. Zachary Wilson 

Type of Order: 1925(a) Opinion 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

CP-51-CR-0929501-1986 

l hereby certify that 1 am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the person(s), and 

in the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P.114: 

Defense Counsel/Party: 

Zachary Wilson 

AM-8465 

SCI Graterford 

P.O. Box 244 

Graterford, PA 19426-0246 

Type of Service: 

District Attorney(s ): 

Type of Service 

() Personal (X) First Class Mail () Other, please specify: 

Hugh J. Bums, Jr., Esquire 

Chief, Appeals Unit 

Philadelphia District Attorney's Office 

Three South Penn Square 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

() Personal (X) First Class Mail ( ) Other, please specify: 

Additional Counsel/Party: 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esquire 

Prothonotary 

Office of the Prothonotary- Superior Court 

530 Walnut Street, Suite 315 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

Type of Service: () Personal (X) First Class Mail () Other, please specify: 

Aaron . Wicker 

Law Clerk to Hon. Glenn B. Bronson 

) 

i