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******************************************************STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM

CONWAY HARPER (AC 37022)
DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Bear, Js. Argued April 4—officially released August 2, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, geographical area number twenty,

Holden, J.)
Richard Emanuel, for the appellant (defendant). Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr., state’s attorney, KatherineDonoghue, deputy assistant state’s attorney, and Ori Beeri, legal intern, for the appellee (state).Opinion SHELDON, J. The defendant, William Conway Harper, appeals from the judgment of conviction renderedagainsthim afteracourttrial on charges ofcriminal trespass in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-109 (a) and possession of less than onehalfounce ofmarijuanainviolation ofGeneral Statutes § 21a-279a (a).1 On appeal, the defendantclaims (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his challenged convictions and (2) thatthe trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana seized from avehicle in whichhe was apassengeruponwhich the latter conviction was based. We reverse the defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass in the third degreeonthegroundofinsufficientevidence,butaffirm his conviction for possession of marijuana upon concluding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support that conviction and that the court properly denied his motion to suppress. After a pretrial hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court found the following facts. On the evening of July 13, 2012, Officers Julio Rodriguez and Steven Luciano ofthe Norwalk Police Department
wereworkingasmembers ofaspecialservicesunitthat patrolled Norwalk housing areas, looking for criminal activity such as narcotics transactions and trespassing. As part of their regular routine, the officers patrolled all ofthe housing projects in Norwalk due to numerous complaints by local residents about ‘‘intruders bringing in drugs, gangs, violence, and [a]ffecting the quality of their’’ lives.
OnJuly 13, 2012, atapproximately9p.m., the officers enteredtheparkinglotofahousingprojectat 16 School Street in Norwalk, which is a dead end, by making a left turn from the main driveway, then a quick right turn, whichputthemattherearofthepropertybetween buildings five and one. They observed that ‘‘No Trespassing’’ signs were posted throughout the property. At the far end of the parking lot there was a dumpster, which was surrounded on three sides by a fence that bore a ‘‘No Trespassing’’ sign. The officers parked their marked police cruiserbehind aHondaAccord that was parked next to the dumpster. Then they observed the defendant, who appeared to be startled by their presence, emerge from behind the dumpster and walk quicklyandnervouslytotheHonda,withhisheaddown, tryingto avoid eye contactwiththe officers. He entered the passenger side of the vehicle.
The officers then observed another male, Kyle Freitag, emerge from behind the dumpster and walk nervouslytothe Honda, alsowithhisheaddown andtrying to avoid eye contact with them, before entering the driver’s side of the Honda. After entering the vehicle, Freitag put it in reverse and tried to leave the area, buthe was unable to do so because the police cruiser was parked immediately behind him.
Luciano testified that, due to his frequent patrols of 16 School Street, he had become familiar with most of the residents of the property, but he did not recognize eitherofthemenintheHondaasaresident. Theofficers
ran the license plate ofthe Honda through the Department of Motor Vehicles’ database and discovered that the vehicle was not registered to anyone residing at 16 School Street. On that basis, aware of the constant complaints of residents about trespassers on the property, the officers exitedtheircruiserto determine what, if any, reason the two men had for being on the premises. While walking toward the Honda, the officers encountered Mary Horelick, a resident of 16 School Street, who told them that she did not know the men in the Honda, one ofwhomhadjusturinatedonherfence. Upon nearing the Honda, however, the focus of the officers’ investigation changed when they smelled ‘‘the pungent strong odor of marijuana,’’ coming from the vehicle. This finding led them to call in a canine unit to search the vehicle’s interior. Shortly thereafter, Officer GarrettKrugerandhis dog, Kimbo, arrivedonthe scene and conducted a search of the Honda. The search revealed a bag ofmarijuana on the floor ofthe vehicle,
nearthe front passenger seat, where the defendant had beensitting.2As aresultofthis discovery, the defendant
was placed under arrest. Despite the officers’ original intentions when they first approached the Honda, they
never questioned either the defendant or Freitag as to why they were at 16 School Street on the evening in question.
After a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree and sentencedto atermofninetydaysincarceration, execution suspended, and one year of probation. The court also found the defendant guilty of possession of less than one-halfounce ofmarijuana and sentenced him on that charge to a fine of $150. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as they pertain to each of the defendant’s claims on appeal.
I
The defendant first claims thatthe evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support either of his challenged convictions. ‘‘In [a defendant’s] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

. . . [w]hether we review the findings of a trial court or the verdict ofajury, our underlying task is the same.

. . . We first review the evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We then decide whether, upon the facts thus established and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the trial court orthejury could reasonably have concludedthat the cumulative effect of the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

. . . In assessing the defendant’s claim that the evidence against him was insufficient to establish his guilt

. . . we must look to the trial court’s findings of fact.

. . . [W]e give great deference to the findings of the trial court because ofits function to weigh and interpret the evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.

. . . ‘‘In evaluating evidence that could yield contrary inferences, the trier offact is not required to accept as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence.

. . . The trier [offact] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.

. . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis ofinnocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidencethatsupportsthe [trieroffact’s] verdictofguilty.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149, 157–58, 49 A.3d 962 (2012). With these principles in mind, we address the charges of which the defendant was convicted in turn.
A
The defendant first claims that the evidence presentedattrialwasinsufficientto supporthis conviction for criminal trespass in the third degree. The state charged the defendant, by way of an amended long form information dated June 24, 2014, with ‘‘enter[ing]

. . . the property comprising a public housing project locatedat 16 School Street, whichispostedin amanner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders, knowing that he did not have a license or privilege to do so, in violation of

. . . § 53a109 (a).’’3 In his brief to this court, the defendant concedes that the state proved that he entered the subject premises, but argues that it failed to prove that the premises were ‘‘posted in a manner prescribed by law
or reasonably likely to come to the attention ofintruders’’ and that he entered those premises knowing that he did not have a license or privilege to do so. Onthe charge ofcriminaltrespassinthethirddegree, the trial court concluded that the defendant ‘‘did enter
or remain in the premises, to wit, and, posted in a
mannerprescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of the intruders, knowing he did not have license or privilege to do so.’’
In determining that the premises were posted in a
manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders, the court credited the testimony of Aurora Holley, an ‘‘occupant specialist’’ employed by the Norwalk Housing Authority, which owns the housing projectlocated at 16 School Street. Holleytestifiedthat ‘‘NoTrespassing’’ signs are posted throughout the property at 16SchoolStreet, asrequiredbylaw.4Lucianotestified that, on the night in question, he observed two such signs, one posted at the only entrance to the premises andthe otherposted on afence nearthe dumpsternext towhichtheHondawasparked.Althoughthedefendant rightly notes that those signs are not depicted in any of the photographs that were admitted into evidence attrial, andarguesthattheremayhavebeeninsufficient lighting for the defendant to see those signs, the court
was free to credit Luciano’s testimony that the signs
were present and visible to a person in the defendant’s position on that evening. We thus conclude that the court’s determination that the premises were posted in
a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of the defendant was well supported by the evidence adduced at trial.
The defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that he did not have a license or privilege to be on the premises at 16 School Street. ‘‘A person acts ‘knowingly’ with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (12). Thus, to prove that the defendant knew that he did not have a license or privilege to be at 16 School Street, the state was necessarily required to prove that, in fact, he did not have such a right or privilege. The defendant claimed at trial, as he does
now on appeal, thathe hadbeeninvitedto thepremises at 16 School Street, to meet a friend who then resided there, in order to accompany her to her twenty-first birthday party. In support of that claim, the defendant offered the testimony of Tiffany Hall, of 16 School Street, who testified, inter alia, that she had invited the defendant, with whom she had been friends for eight
or nine years, to her twenty-first birthday party, which she was throwing that evening at alocal pub. Hall testified that she had handed the defendant an invitation to her party, a copy of which was admitted into evidence
as‘‘Defendant’sExhibitC,’’ataboutsixorseveno’clock

on the evening ofJuly 13, 2012. Although the invitation indicated that the party would begin at 9 p.m. that evening at a local pub, Hall testified that all of the partygoershadbeentoldtomeetherat 16SchoolStreet, where they would follow her in her limousine to the party. Hall testified that, while she was walking from herapartmentonthepremisestoherlimousine, shesaw the defendantandFreitagbeingarrested, promptingher to call out to them, ‘‘Yo, you good?’’5 She testified that she did not tell the arresting officers that the defendant and Freitag were there for her party because other officers were blocking her from reaching them.
In finding the defendant guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree, the court concluded: ‘‘[T]here’s noevidence at all, that I can see, or reasonable inference therefrom, regarding criminal trespass in the third degree, that [the defendant] hadaprivilegeto bethere.’’ In so concluding, the court improperly shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that he had a license or privilege to be on the premises at 16 School Street, rather than placing the burden on the state to prove that he had no license or privilege to be there. It is axiomatic that the defendant does not bear the burden of disproving the statutory elements of any crime with which he has been charged. Specifically, as it relates to the defendant’s claim that he was on the premises that evening because one of its residents had invited him to be there, this court has held that when a defendant claims a license or privilege to be present on the basis of the consent of the property owner, it is ‘‘the state’s burden, in establishing

. . . unlawful[ness]

. . . to prove that no such consent had been given.’’ Statev. Grant, 6 Conn. App. 24, 31, 502 A.2d945 (1986). Here, the defendant claimed that he had been invited to 16 School Street by Hall to follow her limousine to herbirthdayparty, which was being held at alocal pub. The trial court stated that it found Hall’s testimony to be ‘‘credible,’’ but determined that, because the invitationthatwas admittedinto evidence indicatedthe location of the party was a local pub, without making any mention of 16 School Street, there was ‘‘nothing to support th[e] inference’’ that Hall told the defendant to meet at 16 School Street.6
The defendant’s explanationthat he hadbeen invited by Hall to meet at her apartment complex to go to her party is supported by the fact that he was there at the time indicated on the invitation. Moreover, Luciano testified that the dumpster next to which Freitag’s Honda had been parked was located on the northwestern portion of the property at 16 School Street. Hall testified that she resided in building 5. State’s exhibit 14, which is the ‘‘16 School Street Site Plan,’’ indicates that building 5 is also located on the northwestern portion of the property. The defendant’s location in that
area was therefore consistent with his claim that he
was on the property to meet up with Hall. We thus conclude that the court’s determination that there was
no evidence fromwhich it couldfindthatthe defendant had been invited to 16 School Street is contradicted by the record. Even, however, if the court had found Hall to be ‘‘incredible,’’ which it did not, mere disbelief of her testimony that she had invited the defendant to meet her at 16 School Street on the evening of his arrest would furnish no basis for concluding, to the contrary, that the defendant had no license or privilege to be at 16 School Street at the time of his arrest, much less that he knew that he had no such license or privilege. See State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 633–34, 490 A.2d75 (1985). The state was required to present affirmative evidence to support those essential statutory elements, but it failed to do so. The state argues that itpresented sufficient evidence from which the trial court reasonably could have inferred that the defendant had not been invited to 16 School Street, based upon his and Freitag’s suspicious behavior when they first saw the police and the fact that one or both of them urinated on an outside fence
on the premises instead ofusing aresident’s bathroom. To this the state adds that neither the defendant, Freitag, nor Hall when she walked by them, ever told the arresting officers that she had invited them to meet her there that evening. The state argues that the foregoing conductofthedefendantisinconsistentwiththatwhich would have been expected from one who believed himselftobe lawfullyonaparticularproperty. We disagree.
To begin with, the defendant’s and Freitag’s nervous conduct on seeing the officers was consistent with that of anyone who encounters law enforcement personnel after being discovered urinating in public or while possessing illegal contraband. It reveals nothing about whether or not they had been invited by a resident to be onthe premises that evening. Furthermore, once the officers approachedthem as theysat inthe Hondaafter trying unsuccessfullyto back out oftheirparking place
near the dumpster, the new focus oftheir investigation became the marijuanawhose pungent odor was clearly detectible from outside the vehicle. Because the officers, fromthatpointforward, concentratedtheirefforts
on searching the vehicle for contraband, they never questioned the defendant and Freitag about their reasons for being on the premises that evening or gave them any reason to believe that offering an explanation
on that subject would, inter alia, enable them to avoid criminaltrespasscharges, aidtheircause, oraffecttheir fate in relation to the marijuana. For similar reasons, Hall had no reason to tell the officers, when she saw the defendant and his companion being arrested for unknown reasons, that they were present on the premises that evening as her guests. She was not questioned
onthatsubject andhadno reasontovolunteerinformation concerning it. Moreover, even ifany ofthe foregoing evidence could have supported the inference that the defendant and his companion did not believe that they had a license orprivilege to be at 16 School Street that evening, such ambiguous conduct didnot establish that they in fact had no license or privilege to be there. This scant evidence was simply insufficient to prove by any standard, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew that he did not have a license
or privilege to be on the premises at 16 School Street. We thus agree with the defendant that the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal trespass inthe third degree, because there is no reasonable view of the evidence that supported a finding ofguilty.
B
The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidencesupportinghisconvictionofpossessionofless than one-half ounce of marijuana pursuant to § 21a279a (a). Because the marijuana seized in this case was not found on the defendant’s person, the state was required to prove that he constructively possessed it, and the defendant argues that the state failed to do so. We disagree. ‘‘[General Statutes] 51-164n (i) provides that in any trial for the alleged violation of § 21a-279a (a), the burden of proof shall be by the preponderance of the evidence, rather than the higher criminal standard—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—that governs most other violations andinfractions.’’Statev.Menditto, 315 Conn. 861, 875, 110 A.3d 410 (2015). Thus, ‘‘[i]n orderto prove that a defendant is guilty of possession of narcotics

. . . the state must prove [by a preponderance of the evidence] that the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of a narcotic substance.

. . . Actual possession requires the defendant to have had direct physical contact with the narcotics.

. . . Constructive possession, on the other hand, is possession without direct physical contact.

. . . To prove either actual or constructive possession of a narcotic substance, the state must establish [by a preponderance ofthe evidence] thatthe accused knew ofthe character of the drug and its presence, and exercised dominion and control over it.

. . . ‘‘Where

. . . the [narcotic substance] was not found
on the defendant’s person, the state must proceed on the theory of constructive possession

. . . . One factor that may be considered in determining whether a defendant is in constructive possession of narcotics is whether he is in possession ofthe premises where the narcotics are found.

. . . Where the defendant is not in exclusive possession ofthe premises where the narcotics are found, it may not be inferred that [the defendant] knew of the presence of the narcotics and had control of them, unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to buttress such
an inference.

. . . In determining whether the attendant incriminating circumstances support an inference of constructive possession, the proper focus is on the relationship betweenthe defendant andthe contraband found in the apartment rather than on the relationship between the defendant and the apartment itself.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotationmarks omitted.)Statev. Nova, 161 Conn. App. 708, 718–19, 129 A.3d 146 (2015).
In finding the defendant guilty by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court noted the training and experienceofRodriguezandLuciano, andcreditedtheir testimony that they smelled what they believed to bemarijuana when they approached Freitag’s Honda— Rodriguez from the driver’s side and Luciano from the passenger side. The trial court credited Luciano’s testimony that the defendant, who had been sitting in the passenger’s seat, exhibited behavior consistent with being underthe influence ofmarijuana, namely, ‘‘glassy eyes, slurred words.’’ Luciano testified that the defendant reached down toward the floor ofthe vehicle with his left hand prior to complying with Luciano’s order to exit the vehicle. While the vehicle was searched by the canine unit, Luciano testified that the defendant became nervous and fidgety. Aplastic bag ofmarijuana
was discovered on the floor near the passenger seat.
The discovery ofthe marijuananear the seat that the defendant was sitting in, and his gesture toward the bag of marijuana prior to exiting the vehicle demonstrated his knowledge that the bag was present and his
concern about it being discovered. His nervous behavior and his demonstration of symptoms ofbeing under the influence of marijuana are sufficient to prove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the defendant was in constructive possession of the marijuana. Although the defendant argues that the evidence at trial could beconstruedinamannerconsistentwithhisinnocence, it is the role of this court to determine whether the findings made by the trial court are reasonably supported by the record, not to consider alternative views ofthe evidence. We conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and thus that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictionofpossessionoflessthanone-halfounce ofmarijuana.
II
The defendant also claims that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that he is entitled to a new trial on the basis of that error on the charge ofpossession ofless than one-halfounce ofmarijuana. The defendant claims that the search ofthe vehicle and the seizure ofthe marijuana on the evening in question
was conducted pursuant to an unlawful stop that was notjustified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. We disagree. ‘‘Ourstandard ofreview ofatrial court’s findings and conclusions in connection with amotion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record

. . . . [W]here the legal conclusions ofthe court are challenged, we must determinewhethertheyare legallyandlogicallycorrect and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision

. . . . [T]he trial court’s conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts.

. . . ‘‘The law governing investigatory detentions is alsowell settled. Underthe fourth amendmentto the United States constitution and article first, §§ 7 and 9, of our state constitution, apolice officerispermittedinappropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer believes, based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest.

. . . Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objectivestandardthatfocusesnotontheactualstateof mind ofthe police officer, but on whether areasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.

. . . ‘‘[I]njustifyingtheparticularintrusionthepolice officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.

. . . [A]n investigative stop can be appropriate even where the police have not observed aviolationbecause
a reasonable and articulable suspicion can arise from conduct that alone is not criminal.

. . . In evaluating the validity of such a stop, courts must consider whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.

. . . This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.

. . . ‘‘Consequently, [w]e do not consider whether the defendant’s conductpossiblywas consistent with innocentactivitybut, rather, whethertherationalinferences that can be derived from it reasonably suggest criminal activity to a police officer.

. . . When reviewing the legality of a stop, a court must examine the specific information available to the police officer at the time of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to be derived therefrom.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peterson, 320 Conn. 720, 730–32, A.3d (2016). Here, the defendant and the state disagree as to what constituted the allegedly unlawful stop. The defendant argues that the stop occurred when Freitag put the vehicle in reverse and was prevented from leaving because the police cruiser was behind it, and thus that anyevidencerelieduponbythetrialcourtthatoccurred after that point, such as the officers’ testimony that they smelled marijuana as they approached the vehicle
or the officers’ conversation with Horelick, could not have been considered as contributing to a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The state argues that the court did not make an explicit determination as to when the vehicle was stopped, but clearlyand properly considered the totality of the circumstances of the entire encounter, including events that occurred after Freitag had put the vehicle in reverse to attempt to leave. We need not resolve this dispute because we conclude that the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was sufficient to support a finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion at the time Freitag put his car in reverse to attempt to drive away, and the defendant has asserted no independent challenge to the subsequent search of the vehicle that
was conducted on the basis of additional information that came to the officers’ attention after the stop.
The court specifically noted that Rodriguez and Lucianopatrolledtheareafrequentlyaspartofaspecial services unit to investigate constant complaints of ‘‘intrudersbringingindrugs, gangs, [and] violence.’’ The court found that the officers were familiar with and knew most of the residents of 16 School Street, and at 9 p.m. on July 13, 2012, they saw two men, whom they did not recognize as residents of 16 School Street, emergefrombehindadumpster, whichwassurrounded
on three sides by a fence, upon which was posted a ‘‘No Trespassing’’ sign, and walk nervously and quickly to avehicle whiletryingto avoid eye contactwiththem. On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that the court properly determined that the police officers had
a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop and thus that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. The judgment of conviction of criminal trespass in the third degree is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment of acquittal on that charge. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendantwas also chargedwithpossession ofaweapon in amotor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 (a) and carrying a pistol withoutapermitinviolationofGeneralStatutes § 29-35 (a). Hewasacquitted of those charges.

2 The search of the vehicle also revealed two firearms. As noted, the defendant was acquitted of both weapons offenses with which he was charged.

3 General Statutes § 53a-109 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed

or privileged to do so: (1) Such person enters or remains in premises which

are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or are fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, orwhich belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) such person enters or remains in any premises for the purpose ofhunting, trapping or fishing; or (3) such person enters or remains on public land which is posted in a manner prescribed by law orreasonably likelyto come to the attention ofintruders oris fenced

or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.’’

4 Holley also testified that guests of residents of 16 School Street are permitted and, ifthey have not had a criminal record within five years, they do not need to be accompanied by the resident who had invited them. Because the defendant did not have a criminal record, this testimony does not appear to be relevant.

5 Luciano confirmed that he heard Hall yell out to the defendant.

6 The court explained: ‘‘The inference to draw, if any, was that sometime from the two hours, or so, of when it was handed to [the defendant], if I believe the testimony of Ms. Hall, then she would have told him, verbally,to meet at 16 School Street.

‘‘She testified, and corroborated, that at the time the limo was there, she utteredthe words, yo, are you good, quote unquote, whichwas corroborated by Officer Luciano. ‘‘And as to whether or not she knew anything about the arrest that was being affected and the police activity—or the reason for the police activity,

was not on this record. And that lends itselfto speculation and conjecture.’’