COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Coleman and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued by teleconference 

CHARLES JUSTIN UTZ, S/K/A CHARLES JUSTIN UTZ, 

 A/K/A JUSTIN C. UTZ 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1188-97-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 OCTOBER 20, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 

 Sean D. O'Malie (Leon S. Demsky; Pelton, 

Balland, Young, Demsky, Baskin & 

O'Malie, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Charles Justin Utz appeals his convictions for the second 

degree murder of Jose Danilo-Alberto (the "victim") and for using 

a firearm in the commission of that murder. He contends the 

evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the 

convictions and that the trial judge erred in allowing expert 

testimony of "street-gang" culture. We disagree and affirm. 

 I. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 "Self-defense is an affirmative defense which the accused 

must prove by introducing sufficient evidence to raise a 

reasonable doubt about his guilt." Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. 

App. 68, 71, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1993). Whether the evidence 

raises such a reasonable doubt is a question of fact that will 
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not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by 

the evidence. See Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 979, 

234 S.E.2d 286, 292 (1977). Words alone, no matter how 

insulting, are not sufficient to justify assault. See Smith v. 

Commonwealth, 192 Va. 186, 189, 64 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1951); Roark 

v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 244, 252, 28 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1944). 

The trier of fact may infer malice from the deliberate use of a 

deadly weapon. See Perricllia v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 85, 91, 

326 S.E.2d 679, 683 (1985); Doss v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 

679, 685-86, 479 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1996). Moreover, "evidence of 

flight may be considered as evidence of guilt along with other 

pertinent facts and circumstances." Hope v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. 

App. 381, 386, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990) (en banc). 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). So viewed, the 

evidence proved that appellant possessed a concealed weapon that 

he used to fatally shoot the victim in the forehead at close 

range. Saul Palma, nicknamed "Primo," was a friend of the 

victim. Palma testified that he and the victim, nicknamed 

"Snoopy," had been outside, at night, near an apartment complex 

when some "yelling" attracted the victim's attention. The victim 

had been drinking. The victim and appellant exchanged insults 

and argued as the victim crossed a bridge and walked toward 
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appellant. Palma and one or two others followed the victim, who 

approached a group of approximately ten people in a parking lot. 

 Appellant and the victim stood face to face. The victim "raised 

his hands as if he was going to fight." Appellant "made a half 

turn" and fired a single shot at close range at the victim's 

head. After firing, appellant said two or three times to Palma 

and Palma's friends, "you want more." Palma stated that, as the 

victim approached, everyone with appellant "started walking away 

towards" their car. Appellant, however, "stayed on the sidewalk" 

and did not move or turn away as the victim approached him. 

After appellant shot the victim, he left in a car that was 

accompanied by another car. Palma never saw a gun or other 

weapon in the victim's hands and, as far as he knew, nobody in 

the group that he was with made any gestures indicating that they 

possessed a weapon. 

 William Martinez was with the victim and Palma and 

corroborated much of Palma's testimony. Martinez and Palma 

followed the victim toward the parking lot. Martinez never saw 

the victim with a weapon, nor did he see a weapon near the 

victim's body after the shooting. 

 Frank Saffelle, Jr. testified that he operates a tow truck 

that regularly patrols the parking lot where the shooting 

occurred. On the night of the murder, he towed a Ford Explorer 

from the parking lot to a storage lot a few miles away. After 

towing the Explorer, Saffelle returned to the parking lot. While 
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there, he heard "words [being] exchanged," then he heard a 

gunshot. Saffelle saw a car leave "with the lights out like in a 

real fast manner of leaving . . . immediately after the shot went 

off." 

 Shortly after the shooting, Officer James Wasem was told 

that the shooting suspects may have been "potentially involved in 

a tow dispute," so he proceeded to Saffelle's storage lot. About 

ninety minutes after the shooting, a car containing five males 

arrived at the lot. Appellant was one of the five occupants who 

were taken into custody. 

 Officer Andrew Baciocco arrived at the crime scene to 

recover and document any evidence. Baciocco testified that no 

weapons were found at or around the crime scene. 

 Officer Noel Hanrahan interviewed appellant following his 

arrest. After concluding a taped interview, appellant asked 

Hanrahan how the police caught him. Hanrahan testified: 

 He asked if we had followed the car that he 

was stopped in along with several others over 

by the tow company lot, if we had followed 

him from the apartment house. And I told 

him, no, that we had staked out Brownie's 

Ford Explorer at the tow lot. He put his 

head down, started shaking it back and forth, 

and said we'd never would have gotten him if 

he hadn't gone there. 

 Numerous friends of appellant who were present at the scene 

testified. Although they testified, contrary to the testimony of 

Palma and Martinez, that the victim kept a hand hidden under his 

shirt, none of those witnesses saw the victim brandish a weapon. 
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 Appellant testified that the victim approached him, cursing. 

 When the victim asked appellant "are you ready to die now, 

puto?," appellant said he "turned around and shot the gun." 

Appellant said he "thought he was going to die." On 

cross-examination, appellant testified that "[w]hen he was right 

behind me, I was looking out the corner of my eye, and when he 

said the last thing, I just turned and went like that. Boom." 

Appellant stated that the victim appeared to have a weapon 

because he had a "bulge" under his shirt. 

 The fact finder believed the Commonwealth's evidence and 

rejected the evidence presented by appellant, including his 

theory of self-defense. "The weight which should be given to 

evidence and whether the testimony of a witness is credible are 

questions which the fact finder must decide." Bridgeman v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). 

The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, was not inherently 

incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that appellant was guilty of second degree murder and the 

attendant firearm charge. 

 II. 

A. EVIDENCE OF GANG AFFILIATION AND CULTURE 

 On December 4, 1996, the trial court heard argument on a 

motion in limine concerning the Commonwealth's intent to 

introduce expert testimony from Detective Paul Kozich about the 

characteristics and culture of street gangs and, particularly, 
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about the gangs of which the victim and appellant were respective 

members. Appellant argued that such testimony was not probative 

of the ultimate issue in the case, namely, whether he acted in 

self-defense when he shot the victim, and, if probative, it was 

overly prejudicial. The Commonwealth asserted that the proposed 

testimony would be relevant to rebut appellant's self-defense 

claim and to show that appellant had a motive, other than 

self-defense, for shooting the victim. The trial court ruled 

that the testimony was "relevant to both the Commonwealth's case, 

their theory of their case, and to the defendant's theory of 

self-defense." However, the trial court also ruled that "[t]here 

should be limits. . . . I think you have to limit it to the 

areas that you were referring to today in your motions." In 

response to defense counsel's request that he "reconsider at a 

later point based on any authority that we may be able to come up 

with," the trial judge replied, "You can always do that." 

 "Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, 

however slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case." 

Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918, 434 S.E.2d 675, 

678 (1993). 

 [W]hen relevant evidence is offered which may 

be inflammatory . . . its relevancy "must be 

weighed against the tendency of the evidence 

to produce passion and prejudice out of 

proportion to its probative value." The 
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responsibility for balancing these competing 

considerations is largely within the sound 

discretion of the trial judge. And a trial 

court's discretionary ruling will not be 

disturbed upon appeal absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. 

Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986) 

(citations omitted). 

 Although motive is not a necessary element of murder, "'it 

is relevant and often most persuasive upon the question of the 

actor's intent.'" Archie v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 684, 690, 

420 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1992) (quoting Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 

Va. 214, 232, 294 S.E.2d 882, 892-93 (1982)). See also King v. 

Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 367, 416 S.E.2d 669, 677 (1992). 

 There is little Virginia case law addressing the 

admissibility of evidence of gang membership. In Payne v. 

Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 357 S.E.2d 500 (1987), the defendant 

was convicted of murdering an inmate with whom he was 

incarcerated. On appeal, Payne alleged that the trial court 

erroneously admitted "testimony from a fellow inmate that 

defendant wished to be a member of the 'Pagans' motorcycle group, 

which apparently had an active local chapter within the 

correctional facility." Id. at 465, 357 S.E.2d at 503. The 

fellow inmate testified that Payne told him that he needed to 

prove himself in order to become a member of the "group" and that 
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he would "'automatically become a Pagan' when he became a 

'killer.'" Id. Finding the evidence admissible, the Supreme 

Court held: 

 Even though the prosecution is not required 

to prove motive, evidence of motive is 

relevant to establish a defendant's intent. 

According to the evidence, the main reason 

that defendant killed the victim was because 

the victim may have "snitched" on defendant, 

who had planned to escape from the facility, 

and because the victim had reneged on a drug 

deal in which defendant had paid the victim 

$500 cash to procure drugs for him. An 

additional motive, according to the evidence, 

was defendant's desire to be feared as a 

killer in order to join the local chapter of 
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 the "Pagans." Manifestly, this evidence was 

relevant and properly admissible. 

Id. at 465-66, 357 S.E.2d at 503. 

 Although gang membership alone is not evidence of a 

defendant's prior bad conduct, a juror might associate a 

defendant with such an affiliation as a person of bad character 

or someone prone to aggressive or violent behavior. Therefore, 

we analyze the admissibility of such evidence under the prior bad 

act standard. Evidence of prior bad conduct is not admissible to 

prove that the defendant is a person of bad character and more 

likely to commit the offense charged; however, it is admissible 

in certain situations. As with all evidence deemed relevant, 

before it can be admitted, the trial judge must balance its 

relevance against the resultant prejudice. 

 "Evidence of other independent acts of an 

accused is inadmissible if relevant only to 

show a probability that the accused committed 

the crime for which he is on trial because he 

is a person of bad or criminal character." 

However, such evidence is admissible when it 

is "relevant to an issue or element in the 

present case." "[I]f such evidence tends to 

prove any of the relevant facts of the 

offense charged and is otherwise admissible, 

it will not be excluded merely because it 

also shows him to be guilty of another 

crime." 

 Accordingly, we have held that evidence 

of prior bad acts may be properly admitted 

 (1) to prove motive to commit the 

crime charged; (2) to establish 

guilty knowledge or to negate good 

faith; (3) to negate the 

possibility of mistake or accident; 

(4) to show the conduct and feeling 
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 of the accused toward his victim, 

or to establish their prior 

relations; (5) to prove 

opportunity; (6) to prove identity 

of the accused as the one who 

committed the crime where the prior 

criminal acts are so distinctive as 

to indicate a modus operandi; or 

(7) to demonstrate a common scheme 

or plan where the other crime or 

crimes constitute a part of a 

general scheme of which the crime 

charged is a part. 

 "With respect to these exceptions, the test 

is whether 'the legitimate probative value 

outweighs the incidental prejudice to the 

accused.'" 

Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 220, 223-24, 481 S.E.2d 

479, 481 (1997) (citations omitted). See also Guill v. 

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 140-41, 495 S.E.2d 489, 492-93 (1998) 

(discussing and analyzing "intent" exception to rule; test for 

admission of evidence of other crimes requires a "causal relation 

or logical connection" between past conduct and charged offense 

to be admissible under that exception) (citation omitted). 

 While commonly recognizing that evidence 

identifying a defendant as a member of a gang 

may be prejudicial, since juries may 

associate such groups with criminal activity 

and improperly convict on the basis of 

inferences as to the defendant's character, 

many courts have held that such evidence may 

nevertheless be admissible if it is 

sufficiently relevant to a proper issue in 

the case, weighing this probative value 

against the danger of unfair prejudice. Gang 

membership has frequently been found to be 

probative and admissible, for example, as 

evidence of a possible motive for the crime, 

particularly in homicide cases where the 

defendant and his victim are shown to have 
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 been members of rival gangs; as an indication 

of possible bias on the part of defense 

witnesses who are shown to be members of the 

defendant's gang . . . . Courts holding that 

such evidence should have been excluded in 

the case at hand have generally held that it 

had not been shown to be probative of the 

issues presented, that the point it related 

to was relatively minor, or that point could 

have been made with other, less prejudicial 

evidence. 

John E. Theuman, Admissibility of Evidence of Accused's 

Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R.4th 775 (1985). See also id. (Supp. 

1997) (citing additional cases). 

 In United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 47 (1984), Ehle, a 

government witness, implicated Abel in a robbery in which Ehle 

was also involved. Abel called Mills, an inmate, as a witness. 

See id. Mills, who was not involved in the robbery, testified 

that Ehle told him that he "intended to implicate [Abel] 

falsely." Id. In rebuttal, the government recalled Ehle, who 

testified that he, Abel, and Mills were members of a secret 

prison gang. See id. Although Abel did not testify, the Court 

ruled that the government's witness could testify about the 

gang's tenets and that such evidence was admissible to impeach 

Mills and to show his bias. See id. at 49. 

 Other jurisdictions addressing the admissibility of evidence 

of gang membership or gang activity make a threshold 

determination whether such evidence is relevant to an issue in 

the case.1

 If the evidence is deemed relevant, the trial court 

 

 1Most of the cases cited in this discussion suggest that the 

gang-related evidence was admitted in the prosecution's 
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must decide whether its admission constitutes unfair prejudice.2

case-in-chief. In such cases, the prosecution was required to 

lay a proper foundation by closely linking the gang-related 

evidence to the charged offense. Cf. Guill, 255 Va. at 140, 495 

S.E.2d at 492 (requiring causal relation or logical connection). 

 2See, e.g., Siler v. State, 705 So. 2d 552, 556-59 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 1997) (admission of past gang-related activity and 

rivalry was directly relevant to show motive and state of mind; 

due to its direct relevance, it was not overly prejudicial); 

State v. Romero, 870 P.2d 1141, 1147-48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) 

(evidence of defendant's gang affiliation established a link 

between the crime and gang rivalry and was relevant to establish 

motive; trial court properly balanced probative value with 

prejudice); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 738 (Cal. 1997) (in 

gang-related case, gang evidence is admissible if relevant to 

motive or identity, so long as probative value not outweighed by 

prejudicial effect), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1169 (1998); State 

v. Taylor, 687 A.2d 489, 500 (Conn. 1996) (finding evidence of 

gang affiliation relevant and not overly prejudicial to establish 

motive for murder), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2515 (1997); People 

v. Knox, 608 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining 

that gang-related evidence "is only admissible where there is 

sufficient proof that gang membership or activity is related to 

the crime charged"; holding that gang-related evidence was 

sufficiently linked to offense and was, therefore, admissible to 

provide motive for otherwise inexplicable murder); State v. 

Toney, 862 P.2d 350, 352-53 (Kan. 1993) (evidence of defendant's 

gang membership and expert testimony about gang conduct was 

relevant and admissible in government's case-in-chief to show 

motive for murder); Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 529-31 (Miss. 

1996) (upholding admission of evidence of defendant's involvement 

in gang that had rivalry with victim's gang to show motive for 

otherwise unexplained assault; finding that probative value 

outweighed danger of unfair prejudice); Tinch v. State, 946 P.2d 

1061, 1064-65 (Nev. 1997) (upholding admissibility of evidence of 

gang affiliation where it was relevant to charged offense and 

probative value was not substantially outweighed by danger of 

unfair prejudice; "conclud[ing] that the [gang-related] evidence 

was relevant to the gang enhancement charge and could show 

motive"); People v. Connally, 481 N.Y.S.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. App. 

Div. 1984) (limited evidence of gang affiliation was relevant and 

admissible to prove motive and intent); State v. Campbell, 901 

P.2d 1050 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that evidence of 

defendant's gang affiliation was sufficiently linked with crime 

and was probative to show motive and premeditation, supporting 

state's theory of case; trial judge carefully limited evidence so 

as to avoid undue prejudice). 
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 Here, the gang-related evidence was relevant to establish a 

motive for the murder and was probative of appellant's intent. 

Moreover, the record fails to show that the trial judge abused 

his discretion in finding that its probative value was outweighed 

by any incidental prejudice. 

B. EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT GANGS 

 "Expert testimony is appropriate to assist triers of fact in 

those areas where a person of normal intelligence and experience 

cannot make a competent decision." Swiney v. Overby, 237 Va. 

231, 233, 377 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1989). The expert testimony must 

be relevant, and the trial judge must determine whether the 

subject matter of the testimony is beyond a lay person's common 

knowledge and whether it will assist the trier of fact in 

understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue. 

See Farley v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 495, 498-99, 458 S.E.2d 

310, 312 (1995). "The admission of expert testimony is committed 

to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse a 

trial court's decision only where that court has abused its 

discretion." Brown v. Corbin, 244 Va. 528, 531, 423 S.E.2d 176, 

178 (1992). 

 Despite our extensive body of law regarding expert 

witnesses, whether an expert can provide testimony about gang 

culture and characteristics is an issue of first impression in 

Virginia. Therefore, we look to other jurisdictions for 

guidance. 

 A witness qualifies as an expert if "because 
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of his skill, training, or experience, he is 

better able to form a more accurate opinion 

as to the matter under consideration than is 

an ordinary person." . . . [S]pecialized 

formal training [i]s unnecessary, . . . [and] 

experience alone [can] qualify one as an 

expert, . . . . [A]s long as the testimony 

is based upon information of the "type 

reasonably relied upon by experts in the 

field," it would be proper to admit it. 

People v. Ayala, 567 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990) 

(holding that police officer with two years experience 

investigating gang-related criminal activities "possessed a 

greater knowledge of gang activity than would be available to the 

average person") (citations omitted). 

 "An expert need not acquire his [or her] knowledge through 

personal experience" as long as he or she possesses "specialized 

knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Campbell, 

901 P.2d 1050, 1056 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing expert 

testimony of gang terminology, gang interactions with other 

gangs, and types of activities in which gangs involved to 

establish premeditation, intent and motive at murder trial). See 

also People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 739 (Cal. 1997) (upholding 

qualification of police officers as gang experts and admission of 

their testimony regarding gang behavior and motives); People v. 

Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713, 720-21 (Cal. 1996) (subject matter of the 

culture and habits of criminal street-gangs was sufficiently 

beyond common experience that witness with special knowledge or 

matter in question may qualify as expert), cert. denied, 118 
- 15 - 

S. Ct. 148 (1997). 

 Detective Kozich had been a police officer since 1979. At 

the time of trial, he was "detailed to the ATF Gang Task Force in 

Northern Virginia." He received "over 300 hours of training 

involving drug gangs or drug investigations and much of that has 

to do with gang investigations." In addition, Kozich received 

"approximately 200 hours of gang-related training" conducted by 

"various experts from Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, DEA, FBI, 

[and] INS." Kozich explained that he teaches classes and 

conducts lectures about gangs for numerous law enforcement 

organizations and civic groups. He testified that, "on a 

national level, I get information bulletins from virtually all 

over the country." 

 On a more regional level, [he is] a member of 

a group called MARGIN, which stands for Metro 

Area Regional Gang Investigative Network. 

That's a group of investigators from the 

Washington Metropolitan area. There are 

approximately 52 agencies which range from 

Baltimore down to Stafford County. And 

[they] meet once a month, and [they] exchange 

information on gangs because gangs very often 

cross jurisdictional boundaries. 

 Kozich has conducted surveillance of local gangs, and he 

regularly receives reports from the local police regarding gang 

activity. He explained that he was familiar with appellant's 

gang and with the victim's gang. 

 Kozich described the two kinds of gangs which exist in the 

area. According to Kozich, "[t]here is either a gain- or 

economic- or asset-type of gang or the other type would be a 
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turf-oriented gang." Kozich was familiar with the gang of which 

appellant was a member, the Tiny Rascals Gang ("TRG"), and the 

gang of which the victim was a member, Mal Sal Latruca3

 ("MS"). 

Kozich characterized both gangs as "turf-oriented" gangs. He 

explained: "[T]he individuals that are involved in these gangs 

are not involved for the purpose of profit like a, for example, a 

drug gang would be. These individuals are there often for self 

identity, and, . . . sometimes the gang becomes a sort of 

substitute family for the individual members." Kozich further 

explained that, because a "turf-oriented" gang's "motive is not 

profit, very often . . . the leader is the person who is most 

notorious or the most violent or the person who has the gun at 

the time." 

 On cross-examination, Kozich agreed that the victim lived in 

the area where the shooting occurred and that appellant and his 

friends were likely on "turf" claimed by the MS gang, of which 

the victim was a member. Kozich also agreed that when a gang 

member approaches someone with his hand concealed, "[i]t could 

mean that he's armed." 

 Based on Kozich's extensive experience with and knowledge of 

gangs, he was qualified to testify as an expert. Because the 

subject matter was beyond the common knowledge and experience of 

ordinary jurors, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 

 3In the transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine, 

the prosecutor referred to the victim's gang as "Mara Salva 

Chuka." 
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allowing Kozich to testify about gang culture in order to show 

motive and intent and to rebut appellant's claim of self-defense. 

 Moreover, the evidence showed that the victim was a member of 

another gang that occupied the area where the shooting occurred. 

 That evidence was beneficial to appellant and supported his 

theory that the victim was the aggressor, thus belying the 

prejudice that appellant claims he suffered. 

 At trial, Kozich was asked to define a gang. He explained: 

 The way we define a gang in Arlington County 

is when a group meets a certain criteria. 

And those -- that criteria is five or more 

people, they have a unique name, they display 

symbols, which is usually in the form of hand 

signs or tatoos or the things they use in 

graffiti, they claim some kind of turf, they 

associate on a regular basis, and most 

importantly they're involved in some sort of 

criminal or illegal activity. 

 Defense counsel objected, the jury was excused, and 

appellant moved for a mistrial. The trial judge refused to grant 

a mistrial but admonished counsel to "[c]lear that up" lest he 

"instruct them." After the jury returned, the prosecutor asked 

Kozich, "[I]s it fair to say that not everyone in a gang commits 

a crime?" Kozich agreed. 

 Appellant failed to argue on appeal that the trial judge 

erred in refusing to grant a mistrial. Instead, he contends 

Kozich's statement further prejudiced him. Appellant conceded in 

his brief that "the Trial Court gave a curative instruction," but 

he contends that "it is impossible to expect ordinary persons to 

completely erase what they have just heard." In a written 
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stipulation received by the jury, appellant admitted to a prior 

conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. Moreover, two of 

appellant's witnesses, Joy Nouanelady and Marcus Lee, admitted 

having prior convictions that were proper subjects of 

impeachment. Because of the prompt corrective action taken 

regarding Kozich's statement, and in light of the fact that the 

jury was aware of criminal convictions involving appellant and 

two of his witnesses, we find no additional, excessive prejudice 

requiring reversal. 

 Accordingly, the convictions appealed from are affirmed. 

 Affirmed.