Docket No. 97439. 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

JOHN A. DRIGGERS, Appellant. 

Opinion filed July 5, 2006.

CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion. 

Justices Fitzgerald and Garman concurred in the judgment 

and opinion. 

Justice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion, joined 

by Justices McMorrow and Kilbride. 

Justice Karmeier took no part in the decision. 

OPINION

Defendant, John A. Driggers, was charged by information 

with possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5 

(West 2000)) and unlawful possession of more than 2.5 but 

less than 10 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(b) (West 

2000)). The charges against defendant arose from a traffic stop 

where a drug-sniffing dog alerted to defendant=s automobile. 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the search 

and seizure were conducted illegally because the officer had 

no reasonable suspicion to justify the canine sniff and 

defendant did not consent to the search of his vehicle or his 
2 

person. Following a hearing, the circuit court of Champaign 

County denied defendant=s motion to suppress. 

Defendant thereafter agreed to a stipulated bench trial. The 

trial court found defendant not guilty on the charge of unlawful 

possession of cannabis, but found defendant guilty of 

possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court ordered 

defendant to pay a $750 fine and costs, and sentenced 

defendant to 180 days= incarceration. The appellate court 

affirmed defendant=s conviction and sentence. No. 4B01B1118 

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court 

then allowed defendant=s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d 

R. 315. For the reasons set forth, we affirm the judgment of the 

appellate court. 

BACKGROUND 

At the hearing on defendant=s motion to suppress, Officer 

James Sullivan testified that he is a K-9 officer with the Village 

of Rantoul. On July 7, 2000, Sullivan was on routine K-9 patrol, 

drug interdiction, when he observed a vehicle with a cracked 

windshield. Sullivan decided to run the plates of the vehicle and 

learned that the vehicle=s registration had expired. Sullivan 

followed the vehicle into a gas station and activated his lights. 

Sullivan called in the traffic stop and then approached the 

vehicle. Sullivan asked the driver, defendant, for his driver=s 

license and proof of insurance. Sullivan advised defendant of 

the reason for the stop. Defendant gave Sullivan his name and 

birth date, stating that although he had a driver=s license, he 

did not have it with him. Sullivan also asked defendant and his 

passenger, defendant=s stepson, if they had any prior contacts 

with the law. Defendant told Sullivan that he had been arrested 

in the past and that there were some drug charges, although 

he was not currently on probation. Defendant=s stepson stated 

that he had been arrested once for battery. Sullivan then went 

back to his squad car and ran a warrant check through the 

police dispatcher and ran a criminal history on his laptop 

computer. 

Sullivan learned that defendant had 13 prior arrests, 

including several arrests for drugs, and that defendant=s 
3 

stepson had three prior arrests. Sullivan testified that this 

information heightened his interest Ain the drug interdiction part 

of it,@ so he decided to walk his K-9 partner around the vehicle. 

Sullivan called for backup, which arrived within approximately 

45 seconds. Sullivan began writing defendant a warning ticket 

for the cracked windshield and expired license plates while he 

was waiting for the backup officer to arrive, but the ticket was 

not completed until after defendant had been arrested. Once 

the backup officer arrived, Sullivan walked the dog around 

defendant=s vehicle. The dog alerted to the driver=s door seams 

and the front wheel well area on the driver=s side. Sullivan told 

defendant and his stepson that the dog had alerted to their 

vehicle. Defendant responded that he had no idea why the dog 

would alert to his vehicle. Sullivan then asked defendant 

whether he would have a problem if Sullivan searched him and 

his vehicle. Defendant told Sullivan to Ago ahead@ and search. 

Sullivan searched defendant first, then searched the vehicle. 

When Sullivan searched defendant, he found a gold Aonehitter@ pipe in defendant=s left front pants pocket, with what 

appeared to be cannabis residue on it, and a small film canister 

containing what appeared to be cannabis. Sullivan showed the 

items to the backup officer, then advised defendant that he was 

under arrest and placed him in handcuffs. Sullivan testified that 

the entire stop took less than five minutes. 

Defendant testified at the hearing on his motion to suppress 

that his impression was that he did not have an option 

concerning the search because Sullivan was going to search 

anyway. On cross-examination, defendant stated that when 

Sullivan asked if he could search defendant and his vehicle, 

defendant said, AGo ahead.@

The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The trial court 

stated that the search and seizure in this case were 

reasonable. The trial court noted that the dog was used before 

the traffic stop had been concluded, and defendant=s consent 

to the search was lawfully given. There was no indication that 

defendant=s will was overborne. This was not a case where an 

unreasonable amount of time had elapsed, and Sullivan had 

used reasonable judgment under all the circumstances. 
4 

Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the parties 

proceeded with a stipulated bench trial. As noted, the trial court 

found defendant not guilty of unlawful possession of more than 

2.5 but less than 10 grams of cannabis, but found defendant 

guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. 

Defendant appealed the trial court=s denial of his motion to 

suppress, arguing that Sullivan did not have a reasonable 

suspicion sufficient to justify a canine sniff of his car. The 

appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the trial 

court=s ruling. No. 4B01B1118 (unpublished order under 

Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court held that the 

canine sniff of defendant=s vehicle was permissible under the 

circumstances of this case and that the canine sniff did not 

impermissibly prolong the detention or change the fundamental 

nature of the stop. The appellate court also found that 

defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his person. 

Justice Appleton, in dissent, stated that the trial court 

should have granted defendant=s motion to suppress because 

the seizure of defendant was unreasonable and in violation of 

the fourth amendment. No. 4B01B1118 (Appleton, J., 

dissenting). The dissent noted that the canine sniff was 

unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop, and there was no 

reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the canine sniff. 

Citing this court=s decision in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462 

(2002), the dissent stated that a police officer must have 

reasonable suspicion to justify a canine sniff of a vehicle 

stopped for a traffic violation. The dissent disagreed with the 

majority=s assertion that the existence of a prior criminal 

conviction for drugs was sufficient to establish the reasonable 

suspicion necessary to expand the scope of the interaction 

between defendant and Sullivan. 

This court allowed defendant=s petition for leave to appeal. 

177 Ill. 2d R. 315. 

ANALYSIS 

Where a motion to suppress involves credibility 

assessments or factual determinations, this court will reverse a 

trial court=s ruling only if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. 
5 

Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 274 (2002). The trial court=s ultimate 

ruling granting or denying a motion to suppress is reviewed de 

novo. Love, 199 Ill. 2d at 274. Because this appeal concerns 

the trial court=s ultimate ruling denying defendant=s motion to 

suppress, our review is de novo. 

At the outset, we note that defendant confines his argument 

on appeal to the fourth amendment to the United States 

Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV). Defendant does not 

argue that the search and seizure provision of article I, section 

6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, '6) 

provides broader protection than the fourth amendment. 

Defendant also does not argue that the search and seizure 

provision of the Illinois Constitution should not be interpreted 

and applied in lockstep with the United States Supreme Court=s 

interpretation and application of the search and seizure clause 

of the fourth amendment. Consequently, we confine our 

analysis to defendant=s fourth amendment claim. 

Before this court, defendant argues that because Officer 

Sullivan lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the canine sniff 

of defendant=s vehicle, the evidence seized as a result of the 

canine=s alert must be suppressed. Defendant claims that the 

only basis for conducting the canine sniff was defendant=s 

criminal history, as there were no suspicious activities or odors 

that would justify the search. Defendant contends that under 

the fourth amendment, the determination of whether a search 

is reasonable involves a two-step analysis: (1) whether the 

officer=s action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the 

search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 

which justified the interference in the first place. Defendant 

concedes that Sullivan=s initial actions in this case were 

justified, but argues that prior arrests alone, without 

contemporaneous, corroborating behavior, do not create a 

reasonable suspicion sufficient to enlarge the scope of the 

original detention to include a canine sniff of a vehicle during a 

routine traffic stop. 

In support of his argument on appeal, defendant argues 

that this case is analogous to People v. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d 

504 (2003), where this court held that the trial court should 

have granted defendant=s motion to suppress evidence 
6 

obtained after a police dog alerted to the defendant=s vehicle 

during a routine traffic stop. Defendant is correct that the facts 

of this case are analogous to the facts set forth in Caballes. In 

that case, the defendant was stopped for speeding by Illinois 

State Trooper Gillette. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 506. When 

Gillette radioed the police dispatcher to report the stop, Illinois 

State Trooper Graham overheard the transmission and 

decided to head to the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. 

Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 506. While Gillette was writing out a 

warning ticket for defendant, Graham walked his dog around 

respondent=s car. The dog alerted to the trunk of defendant=s 

car. Based upon the alert, the officers searched the trunk and 

found marijuana. The officers then arrested defendant. 

Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 507. The entire incident took less than 

10 minutes. 

This court initially held that the trial court should have 

granted defendant=s motion to suppress because the State had 

not offered sufficient justification for implementing the canine 

sniff. Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 509. The officers had not detected 

the odor of marijuana in the car, nor had they observed any 

other evidence suggesting the presence of illegal drugs. 

Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 509. This court stated that Athe police 

impermissibly broadened the scope of the traffic stop in this 

case into a drug investigation because there were no specific 

and articulable facts to support the use of a canine sniff.@

Caballes, 207 Ill. 2d at 509. 

The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated this 

court=s decision in Caballes. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 

405, 410, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 848, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005). 

The Supreme Court noted that this court had held that the use 

of the dog converted the encounter between the defendant and 

the officer from a lawful traffic stop into a drug investigation, 

and that this shift in purpose was unlawful because it was not 

supported by any reasonable suspicion that the defendant 

possessed narcotics. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d 

at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. The Supreme Court disagreed, 

stating that, Aconducting a dog sniff would not change the 

character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and 

otherwise executed in a reasonable manner, unless the dog 
7 

sniff itself infringed respondent=s constitutionally protected 

interest in privacy.@ Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 

847, 125 S. Ct. at 837. If official conduct does not 

A >compromise any legitimate interest in privacy,= @ it is not a 

search subject to the fourth amendment. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 

408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 837, quoting United 

States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100, 

104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984). Because any interest in 

possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate, 

governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of 

contraband does not compromise a legitimate privacy interest. 

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 

837. 

The Supreme Court therefore held that Athe use of a welltrained narcotics-detection dogBone that >does not expose 

noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from 

public view,= [citation]Bduring a lawful traffic stop, generally 

does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.@ Caballes, 543 

U.S. at 409, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 838. The Court 

noted that the dog sniff at issue was performed on the exterior 

of the respondent=s car while the respondent was lawfully 

seized for a traffic violation. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 160 L. 

Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 838. Therefore, any intrusion of the 

respondent=s privacy expectations did not rise to the level of a 

constitutionally cognizable infringement. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 

409, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 847, 125 S. Ct. at 838. The Court 

concluded: 

AA dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic 

stop that reveals no information other than the location 

of a substance that no individual has any right to 

possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.@

Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 848, 125 S. 

Ct. at 838. 

In this case, as in Caballes, there is no dispute that the 

duration of the stop, which was less than five minutes, was 

entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries 

incident to such a stop. The canine sniff in this case was 

performed on the exterior of defendant=s car while defendant 

was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Like the canine sniff at 
8 

issue in Caballes, the canine sniff in this case was conducted 

during a concededly lawful traffic stop and revealed no 

information other than the location of materials that defendant 

had no right to possess. The canine sniff, therefore, did not 

violate the fourth amendment. For that reason, the trial court 

properly denied defendant=s motion to suppress. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate 

court, affirming the trial court=s order denying defendant=s 

motion to suppress, is affirmed. 

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KARMEIER took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: 

Although defendant, in his brief, includes a citation to the 

search and seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution, he 

does not argue in any way that this provision affords him more 

protection than its federal constitutional counterpart, nor does 

he maintain that the state provision should be interpreted 

differently from the federal provision. Had he done so, those 

arguments would have been analyzed under this court=s recent 

decision in People v. Caballes, No. 91547 (May 18, 2006). 

Because defendant did not raise these state issues, this appeal 

raises solely a question of federal constitutional law, the 

resolution of which is controlled by the United States Supreme 

Court=s decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 

2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005). For that reason alone, I concur 

in the judgment of the court. 

JUSTICES McMORROW and KILBRIDE join in this special 

concurrence.