J-S60030-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ODILIE B. CERRITOS

Appellant No. 2244 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered November 22, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

Criminal Division at No: CP-14-0000048-2013

BEFORE: OTT, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 16, 2015

Appellant, Odilie B. Cerritos, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County entered on November 22, 

2013. Appellant challenges the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence 

supporting Appellant’s conviction for violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1) 

(driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance—general 

impairment). Upon review, we affirm. 

The trial court summarized the underlying facts and procedural history 

as follows:

Corporal Brian Rose with the Ferguson Township Police 

Department testified at the [n]on-[j]ury [t]rial. On October 28, 

2012, he was going on roving DUI patrol and at about 2:28 

a.m., he was on North Atherton Street near the intersection of 

Vairo Boulevard when his attention was drawn to a green Jeep 

Cherokee. He observed the Jeep stop approximately ten yards 

short of the stop line at a red light. Corporal Rose testified that 

stopping short of the line is a violation of the [V]ehicle [C]ode, 
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although at that time he did not realize as much. He described 

stopping ten yards short of the line as behavior that would “get 

his attention.” When the light turned green, Corporal Rose’s 

vehicle and the Jeep proceeded north[-]bound. The Jeep was in 

the left lane and switched lanes to get behind Corporal Rose’s 

vehicle and then returned to the left lane after a short amount of 

time to pass him. He further stated that switching lanes to get 

behind a police cruise[r] and then switching lanes again to pass 

a cruiser is out of the ordinary. Corporal Rose ran the 

registration and noted the registration was cancelled for 

nonpayment of insurance. The Jeep pulled into Denny’s 

restaurant and Corporal Rose pulled in behind it. When asked to 

produce her license, insurance and registration, [Appellant] had 

some trouble locating the items. Corporal Rose detected the 

odor of alcohol on [Appellant], her eyes were watery and glassy 

and her speech was somewhat slurred[,] which he described as 

“mush mouth.” He also noted in his report that her face was 

flushed.

. . . .

Corporal Rose administered the field sobriety tests in Denny’s 

parking lot. Out of eight clues on the walk and turn test she was 

assessed six[,] which was an unsatisfactory performance. She 

performed satisfactorily on the one-legged stand. Corporal Rose 

determined [Appellant] was incapable of safe driving and she 

was placed under arrest. Corporal Rose transported [Appellant] 

to the Central Booking Station for a blood test. . . . [A witness 

for the Commonwealth] testified that . . . the [Blood Alcohol 

Content (BAC)] results related to the samples tested was 0.080 

gram per deciliter. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/14, at 1-3 (citation to notes of testimony omitted). 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Was the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth 

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that on the 

night in question, Appellant was rendered incapable of 

safely operating a motor vehicle because of alcohol 

consumption, specifically did the evidence[,] viewed in a 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner and giving the Commonwealth the benefit of all 

reasonable inferences therefrom, establish the charge [of] 
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Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, 75 [Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 3802(a)(1)] beyond a reasonable doubt?

II. Was the [v]erdict contrary to the weight of the evidence in 

that the evidence preponderated sufficiently against the 

verdict so that a serious miscarriage of justice had resulted 

with respect to the conviction?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

In reviewing a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

apply the following standard:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, 

support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every 

element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, 

part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the 

province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s 

burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any 

doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact 

finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a 

matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 313 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient 

evidence to prove Appellant was substantially impaired for purposes of 
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Section 3802(a)(1).1 To this end, Appellant points to evidence in the record 

showing she was not substantially impaired to drive safely. Appellant’s Brief 

at 14-15. The argument is misplaced, for several reasons.

Appellant’s argument is a challenge to the weight of the evidence, not 

to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant notes that Officer Rose testified 

that Appellant’s “exit of the vehicle was normal, she was steady on her feet, 

she stood normally, she walked normally, and she was not disheveled in 

appearance.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant also avers Officer Rose 

“claimed” that Appellant “stepped off the line during the [walk and turn] 

test, but he could not recall at what step she allegedly stepped off the line 

nor could he recall where she allegedly missed heel to toe.” Id. “Ultimately,

Officer Rose begrudgingly admitted that [Appellant] did more things right 

the evening of her arrest than she did wrong.” Id. at 15. 

Appellant is in essence asking this Court to reweigh the evidence 

against the Commonwealth, and make credibility determinations in her 

____________________________________________

1 Section 3802, in relevant part, reads:

(a) General impairment.--

(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual 

physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a 

sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is 

rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in 

actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle. 

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).
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favor. Such a position, however, is untenable in light of the sufficiency of 

the evidence standard of review. Under that standard, the evidence must be 

assessed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict 

winner, not Appellant. Mollett, 5 A.3d at 313. Furthermore, this Court 

does not make credibility determinations and cannot reweigh the evidence. 

Id.

Nonetheless, Appellant argues the fact that “Officer Rose followed 

[Appellant] for a quarter of mile and at no time was [Appellant]’s driving to 

be erratic[,]” as proof she was not substantially impaired to drive. 

Appellant’s Brief at 14. The argument is without merit. 

Evidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor to a 

finding of guilt under the relevant statute. The Commonwealth 

may prove that a person is incapable of safe driving through the 

failure of a field sobriety test. [Commonwealth v. Palmer, 

751 A.2d 223 (Pa. Super. 2000)]; see also Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 831 A.2d 636 (Pa. Super. 2003).

Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Applying the proper standard of review for a sufficiency claim, we 

agree with the trial court’s finding that the evidence was in fact sufficient to 

find Appellant guilty of DUI—general impairment. Specifically, the trial court 

found:

Corporal Rose reasonably noted concerns that drew his attention 

concerning [Appellant]’s driving[,] including stopping thirty feet 

before the stop line and switching lanes to pass his cruiser. . . . 

Once he encountered [Appellant], he detected the odor of 

alcohol and noticed that she had watery and glassy eyes and 

slurred speech . . . . He also perceived her face to be flushed. 

Although she passed the one-legged stand, she scored 6 of 8 
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clues on the walk-and-turn test for an unsatisfactory 

performance. Furthermore, she did admit to drinking that 

evening. Her BAC result was 0.80. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/27/14, at 5. Thus, we conclude the evidence was 

sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1).

Next, Appellant argues the guilty verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. In support, Appellant relies on the same reasons advanced for her 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant also 

argues the “scope of appellate review of an [o]rder denying a new trial on 

the basis of the weight of the evidence is identical to the standard

employed by the trial court[.]” Id. (emphasis added).2 Appellant concludes 

“the trial court simply accepted the officer’s ultimate opinion that [Appellant] 

____________________________________________

2

It appears that Appellant miscomprehends the distinction between our 

scope and standard of review. As shown above, Appellant refers to our scope 

of review and standard of review interchangeably. Scope of review and 

standard of review, however, are two distinct and separate concepts. Our 

Supreme Court noted:

“Scope of review” and “standard of review” are often-albeit 

erroneously-used interchangeably. The two terms carry distinct 

meanings and should not be substituted for one another. “Scope 

of review” refers to “the confines within which an appellate court 

must conduct its examination.” Coker v. S.M. Flickinger 

Company, Inc., [] 625 A.2d 1181, 1186 ([Pa.] 1993). In other 

words, it refers to the matters (or “what”) the appellate court is 

permitted to examine. In contrast, “standard of review” refers to 

the manner in which (or “how”) that examination is conducted. 

In Coker we also referred to the standard of review as the 

“degree of scrutiny” that is to be applied.

Morrison v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 646 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. 1994). 
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was incapable of safe driving when the facts revealed at trial did not support 

the officer’s opinion.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. 

Unfortunately, this claim is waived, for several reasons. A claim that a 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence must be raised in a motion for a 

new trial either (1) orally on the record, before sentencing; (2) in a writtenpresentence motion; or (3) in a post-sentence motion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). 

Failure to properly preserve the claim results in waiver, even if the trial court 

addresses the weight of the evidence in its opinion. Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth 

v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2012)). It is axiomatic that a 

party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a).

Appellant did not provide any indication on how and when she raised 

and preserved her weight of the evidence claim for our review. Accordingly, 

her weight of the evidence claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), 

2119(e); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 671 (Pa. 

Super. 2009).3 Additionally, “it is not the responsibility of this Court to scour 

____________________________________________

3

In Williams, we noted:

Pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant must 

specify where in the record this issue was preserved. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) and 2119(e). In his brief, [a]ppellant does 

not indicate where the issue was preserved in the trial court, nor 

does he even allege that he raised the issue[.] Consequently, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the record to prove that an appellant has raised an issue before the trial 

court, thereby preserving it for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. 

Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 502 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2008). Nonetheless, upon review 

of the record it appears Appellant did not raise this claim in a motion for a 

new trial with the trial court as required under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).4

Appellant also does not appreciate the differences between a 

sufficiency of the evidence and a weight of the evidence claim, by failing to 

articulate any separate argument for her weight of the evidence claim. The 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

we are constrained to deem this issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

Williams, 980 A.2d at 671.

4 At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, but before the verdict, Appellant 

asked the trial court to “dismiss” the charges on sufficiency and weight of 

the evidence grounds. N.T. Trial, 9/4/13, at 68. It appears the next time 

Appellant challenged the weight of the evidence was in her Rule 1925(b) 

statement, which is insufficient for preserving it for appellate review. See 

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483 (Pa. 2009). In Sherwood, 

the Supreme Court noted:

Regarding [a]ppellant’s weight of the evidence claim[,] we note 

that [a]ppellant did not make a motion raising a weight of the 

evidence claim before the trial court as the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure require. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). The fact 

that Appellant included an issue challenging the verdict on 

weight of the evidence grounds in his 1925(b) statement and the 

trial court addressed [a]ppellant’s weight claim in its Pa.R.A.P 

1925(a) opinion did not preserve his weight of the evidence 

claim for appellate review in the absence of an earlier motion.

Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
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two challenges are not the same, and failure to recognize this distinction 

also may result in waiver. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 

751-52 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Birdseye, 637 A.2d 1036, 1039-40 

(Pa. Super. 1994) (“Because [appellants] failed to distinguish between their 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims and presented no argument 

regarding the weight of the evidence, we deem their weight of the evidence 

issue waived.”).

Appellant finally ignores that the weight of evidence standard applied 

by appellate courts is not identical to the standard employed by the trial 

court, and failure to address the proper standard may result in a waiver of 

the weight of the evidence claim. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 

A.2d 915, 926 (Pa. 2009).

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of 

review applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, 

an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination 

that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against 

the weight of the evidence and that a new trial 

should be granted in the interest of justice.
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[Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753] (emphasis added) [(internal 

citations omitted)].

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial 

court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of 

judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a 

dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the 

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving 

effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be 

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to 

prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary 

actions. Discretion is abused where the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, 

but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

or where the law is not applied or where the record 

shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will.

[Id.] (quoting Coker[, 625 A.2d at 1184-85]).

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013). 

Here, Appellant did not advance any argument on how the trial court 

abused its discretion in not granting a motion for a new trial (a motion she 

apparently never made) based upon a weight of the evidence claim. 

Appellant merely challenges the trial court’s credibility determinations, which 

we cannot reweigh. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 107 

(Pa. 2004) (“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, 

which is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and to assess the 

credibility of the witnesses. . . . This Court cannot substitute its judgment 

for that of the [finder of fact] on issues of credibility.”) (citations omitted). 
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“Because Appellant fails to address the standard by which this Court reviews 

a weight of the evidence claim and makes no effort to demonstrate an abuse 

of discretion by the trial court,” Johnson, 985 A.2d at 926, she is not 

entitled to any relief on her weight of the evidence claim. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Ott joins the memorandum.

Judge Jenkins concurs in result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/16/2015