NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

CALEB CRAIG KENT BARTELS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 19-0660 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2017-001031-001

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Michelle L. Hogan

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Legal Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Cynthia D. Beck

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Voice for Crime Victims

By Colleen Clase, Jessica Gattuso, Krista Wood

Counsel for Crime Victims

FILED 8-6-2020
STATE v. BARTELS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Caleb Craig Kent Bartels appeals the superior court's order 

requiring him to pay restitution to R.Z.'s family.

1 We affirm the court's 

order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A more thorough recitation of the facts and procedural 

background underlying Bartels' convictions may be found in State v. Bartels, 

1 CA-CR 19-0338, 2020 WL 2213555 (Ariz. App. May 7, 2020) (mem.

decision) (affirming Bartels' convictions).

2

¶3 In brief, on January 14, 2017, R.Z. and Bartels' brother were 

socializing in R.Z.'s backyard when Bartels ambushed them. Bartels 

ultimately shot and killed R.Z. Id. at *1, ¶ 2. During the subsequent 

investigation, police noted that someone had vandalized R.Z.'s car –

scratched its paint and punctured its tires with a sharp object. Id. at ¶ 3. 

After Bartels' arrest, police obtained a search warrant for his vehicle, where 

they found a folding knife that could have been used to puncture the tires 

on R.Z.'s vehicle. The knife's width matched the width of the tire punctures, 

and black strands of unknown material were found inside the open area in 

the blade's handle. Police considered but did not obtain an analysis that 

could have definitively determined whether the knife was the same one that 

was used to vandalize R.Z.'s car. Police impounded the victim's vehicle and 

kept it for two years, pending the outcome of Bartels' trial. The vehicle 

lacked any tires when it was released to R.Z.'s family. 

1 Out of respect for his privacy, we refer to the victim by his initials.

2 Bartels and the State cite transcripts that were filed in Bartels' appeal 

in 1 CA-CR 19-0338 but not included in the record for this appeal. 

Nonetheless, we take notice of the transcripts filed in 1 CA-CR 19-0338 and 

have considered them in resolving this case.
STATE v. BARTELS

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 Bartels was charged with first-degree murder, aggravated 

assault, first-degree burglary, and criminal damage. He was convicted of 

the first three crimes, but acquitted of criminal damage. 

¶5 R.Z.'s family sought restitution, requesting, among other 

things, that Bartels pay for the cost to make the vehicle drivable. After two 

years in impound, the car needed an oil change, a new battery, and a new 

set of tires before it could be driven. The superior court granted this 

request. 

¶6 Bartels timely appealed the court's restitution order, and we 

have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Although other restitution was granted, Bartels only 

challenges the superior court's award of $792.57 for the oil change, battery, 

and new tires. He argues that the superior court erred by ordering him to 

pay for damage that was not directly linked to his criminal convictions. We 

review restitution orders for an abuse of discretion. State v. Linares, 241 

Ariz. 416, 418, ¶ 6 (App. 2017). "We view the facts and all reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to upholding the trial 

court's restitution order," State v. Lewis, 222 Ariz. 321, 323, ¶ 2 (App. 2009), 

but review questions of law de novo, Linares, 241 Ariz. at 418, ¶ 6.

¶8 "A person convicted of a crime is required to make restitution 

'in the full amount of the economic loss as determined by the court.'" State 

v. Leal, 248 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (App. 2019) (quoting A.R.S. § 13-603(C)). To be 

recoverable as restitution: "(1) the loss must be economic, (2) the loss must 

be one that the victim would not have incurred but for the criminal conduct, 

and (3) the criminal conduct must directly cause the economic loss." State 

v. Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, 298, ¶ 5 (App. 2004). Restitution may not be 

awarded if an expense is "too attenuated (either factually or temporally)" 

from the defendant's criminal conduct." Linares, 241 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 10. "The 

key to the analysis is reasonableness, which is determined on a case by case 

basis." Id. 

¶9 Bartels argues the superior court abused its discretion because 

his criminal conduct "did not cause losses associated with the decision to 

impound the car for two years." Though Bartels does not argue that the 

initial impound of the vehicle was unrelated to his criminal acts, he asserts

that the damage to the vehicle was caused by the State's decision to keep it 

for two years. This decision, he claims, was "wholly unrelated to [Bartels'

criminal] conduct." We disagree.
STATE v. BARTELS

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 The dispositive question is whether the two-year impound of 

R.Z.'s vehicle, which rendered it inoperable, "flow[ed] directly from 

[Bartels'] criminal conduct, without the intervention of additional causative

factors." State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 7 (2002). The superior court 

found that R.Z.'s vehicle was impounded and retained in order "to assist in 

finding the victim's killer." Specifically, the court noted that police wished 

to determine whether the knife found in Bartels' vehicle caused the damage 

to the vehicle's tires. Bartels correctly notes the superior court's factual 

findings are entitled to deference but argues that this specific finding is 

clearly erroneous. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is 

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." State 

v. Burr, 126 Ariz. 338, 339 (1980) (quoting Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 

293 (2d Cir. 1976)). Under this highly deferential standard, we cannot say 

that the superior court was clearly erroneous.

¶11 Bartels claims that the superior court's factual finding is 

unsupported by the record. He notes that he was identified as a suspect in 

the murder of R.Z. within a week of the crime, and argues that this fact 

renders the duration of the vehicle's impound unreasonable. He also 

asserts that "the only reason to remove the tires was to compare the 

punctures with the knife found in [Bartels'] car." Because the comparative 

analysis was not done, Bartels argues that the length of time of the impound

was unrelated to the State's efforts to determine the identity of R.Z.'s 

murderer. However, Bartels ignores that the State used evidence regarding 

the tires, including pictures and testimony, to identify Bartels as the killer.

¶12 At trial, Bartels' counsel argued there was no evidence tying 

Bartels to the scene of the crime, outside of the allegedly questionable 

identification provided by Bartels' brother. The State introduced evidence, 

supra ¶ 3, to link the knife to the damage to R.Z.'s vehicle's tires, and 

specifically cited Bartels' possession of the knife in its closing argument as 

evidence to establish identity. Additionally, the State argued that the 

damage to the car and tires showed that someone was specifically targeting 

R.Z., in support of the argument that R.Z.'s murder was a targeted killing. 

The record supports the superior court's conclusion that the vehicle was 

impounded as evidence to identify R.Z.'s killer. Therefore, based on the 

facts of this case, we cannot say that the superior court acted unreasonably 

in awarding restitution. See Linares, 241 Ariz. at 419, ¶ 10. 

¶13 Finally, Bartels argues the damage was caused by the police's 

delay in releasing the vehicle, but he does not challenge the superior court's 

determination that the vehicle was impounded "pending the outcome of the 
STATE v. BARTELS

Decision of the Court

5

trial." The State impounded R.Z.'s vehicle to further the case and ultimately 

obtain Bartels' convictions for murder, aggravated assault, and burglary. 

The retention of evidence in furtherance of obtaining a criminal conviction 

was a natural consequence of Bartels' criminal conduct. See Wilkinson, 202 

Ariz. at 29, ¶ 7 (holding that restitution is appropriate for "those damages 

that flow directly from the defendant's criminal conduct"). 

¶14 We must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the 

light most favorable to the restitution order. Lewis, 222 Ariz. at 322, ¶ 2. 

Reviewing the record in this way, we do not find the duration of the 

impound, in this case, was an intervening factor rendering restitution 

inappropriate. "The trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence 

that the damage to [R.Z.'s car] was a direct result of defendant's [criminal 

conduct]." See State v. Lindsley, 191 Ariz. 195, 196-97 (App. 1997) (affirming 

restitution award for a wallet that was rendered unusable by odor caused 

when the defendant stored the wallet with marijuana); see also Linares, 241 

Ariz. at 419, ¶ 10 ("The key to the [restitution] analysis is reasonableness[.]"). 

As such, we affirm the restitution award. 

CONCLUSION

¶15 The superior court did not abuse its discretion when it 

determined that R.Z.'s vehicle was rendered inoperable as a result of 

Bartels' criminal conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court's 

restitution award for the $792.57 in costs incurred to make the vehicle 

drivable.