SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3818-21 

P.W.B., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

T.R.B., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Submitted November 6, 2023 – Decided April 15, 2024 

Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, 

Docket No. FM-08-0325-17.

T.R.B., appellant pro se. 

Scher and Isenberg, LLC, attorneys for respondent 

(Lynda M. Scher, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3818-21

Defendant, T.R.B. ("Tara"),1 appeals from two family court orders. The 

first is a March 14, 2022 supplemental order2 in which the trial court determined 

the amount of plaintiff P.W.B. ("Peter's") child support obligation and granted 

his request for counsel fees and costs against Tara. The second is a July 14, 

2022 order in which the trial court denied Tara's motion for reconsideration of 

the March 14, 2022 order, request to modify child support, and Peter's request 

for counsel fees in connection to Tara's motion. Having reviewed the 

contentions in light of the facts and applicable law, we find no error in the trial 

court's orders, and accordingly affirm. 

I.

 We glean the following facts from the record. The parties were married 

on October 15, 2004 and had one child, "Amy," born in August 2010, who 

suffers from an undisclosed medical diagnosis for which she has a Section 504 

educational plan. On October 3, 2017, a dual final judgment of divorce (DFJD) 

was entered which incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). The 

MSA consists of four documents: 1) a fourteen-page parenting agreement; 2) the 

1

 We use fictitious names to protect the identity of the underaged child born of 

the marriage. 

2

 The March 14, 2022 order was a supplemental order to a January 6, 2022 

order. 
3 A-3818-21

terms of the MSA; 3) the personal property agreement; and 4) the life insurance 

and retirement funds agreement. 

 Despite this detailed MSA, less than one month later, on November 14, 

2017, Tara filed the first in a series of post-judgment motions. Relevant to Amy, 

there were motions regarding Amy's therapy, seeking clarification of the 

parenting time agreement with respect to pick up times, requiring Peter provide 

vacation details, and seeking modification of child support. The results of the 

motions were mixed, but the court twice denied Tara's motions for modification 

of child support because she failed to demonstrate changed circumstances. The 

court also initially denied Tara's request that she be allowed to provide medical 

insurance coverage for Amy because she failed to show a substantial change in 

circumstances or demonstrate Peter's insurance caused a financial burden 

justifying modification of the MSA. The court also denied Tara's request that 

Peter provide all statements for an account he purportedly opened for his 

girlfriend from the date the account was opened until January 1, 2018. The court 

noted Tara had the opportunity to engage in full discovery during the divorce 

litigation. 

 On March 26, 2021, the court entered an order granting Tara's request 

permitting her to provide primary medical coverage for Amy. That created a 
4 A-3818-21

substantial change in circumstances requiring recalculation of child support. 

During a September 9, 2021 counsel-only conference, a new trial judge ordered 

the parties to exchange financial information within three weeks and submit 

supplemental child support calculations. During that telephone conference, 

counsel for plaintiff requested the court permit a subpoena for year-to-date 

records of Tara's sales and commissions from a real estate agency that employs 

her part time and issues a 1099 at the end of the year, and a financial application 

she had submitted to purchase a new car. Counsel for Tara did not object. The 

court allowed the information to be subpoenaed. 

 Thereafter, on September 23, 2021, without any discussion with the court, 

Tara issued five subpoenas requesting Peter's financial information from five 

different institutions: American Federal Credit Union (AFCU), TD Bank, 

Independence Blue Cross (IBC), AMNJ, a subsidiary of IBC, and a Jeep 

dealership. The subpoenas to AFCU and TD Bank requested copies of all of 

Peter's bank account statements, cancelled checks, deposits and withdrawals for 

accounts in Peter's name or for accounts Peter shared with another person or 

entity from January 1, 2017, through the date of the subpoena. The subpoena to 

IBC, Peter's employer, requested a copy of Peter's employment contract, all 

fringe benefits, retirement benefits, copies of Peter's personal records, W-2 
5 A-3818-21

statements and wage statements, payroll records, schedules, and hourly rate 

schedules for all employees, and whether or not Peter had flexibility to work 

from home. Tara requested the documents starting from January 1, 2017, to the 

date of the subpoena. On September 27, 2021, Peter moved to quash the 

subpoenas served upon the AFCU, TD Bank, AMNJ, and IBC.3 

 On January 6, 2022, the parties appeared before the trial court on the 

motions. The trial court found Tara acted in bad faith with respect to her use of 

subpoenas, and stated that sending out the subpoenas was a: 

complete dereliction of what the [c]ourt ordered and 

what I talked about at the time of the [counsel-only] 

conference. [Peter] just wanted to know. [Peter] found 

it difficult to believe that you made just one little bit of 

money selling real estate in a market that's really hot. 

And I said, you know what? I think you have the right 

to get that information. . . . But your attorney sent out 

subpoenas to everybody dating back . . . to 2017. 

That is absolute insanity and it is a perversion and a 

complete misrepresentation of what I would allow to

have occurred. 

. . . . 

[T]he only issue that needed to be determined was a

child support issue, and in lieu of that you sought, 

through your attorney, to file a motion to re-litigate 

3

 Peter did not object to the subpoena sent to the Jeep dealership which requested 

information in connection to the purchase of his Jeep in 2020. 
6 A-3818-21

issues that were just decided by [the previous judge] 

. . . . I'm not going to take kindly to that, which is why 

I ordered counsel fees. That's bad faith. . . . 

The trial court also heard argument at that hearing regarding whether the 

number of overnights Amy was entitled to spend with Peter, as set forth in the 

parenting plan, was the correct number of overnights for calculating the new 

child support figure. Tara claimed Amy experienced difficulty sleeping away 

from her for the previous two years due to separation anxiety and, therefore, 

refused to sleep at Peter's home overnight. Peter asserted Tara was engaged in 

parental alienation. Tara asserted Amy's therapist had suggested both parents 

force Amy to spend the allotted overnights at Peter's home. Tara noted Peter 

"made a choice and his choice was, [Amy] doesn't have overnights anymore if 

she doesn't want them." Tara insisted Amy should not be given a choice 

regarding whether she wanted to have overnights at Peter's home, stating when 

Amy calls to come home Tara has to "rearrange my entire life. . . . Like, do you 

understand I'm an adult and I have a curfew? Like, this is ridiculous. I don't 

have any time to myself." Tara also claimed because she has more overnights 

with Amy than the custody agreement originally stated, she is paying more. 

The trial court found Peter was acting in the child's best interest because 

of her unique mental health condition and refused to sanction him. Tara stated 
7 A-3818-21

that she was being faulted instead of Peter. In response the trial court stated 

"[i]t's all about you; right, ma'am? Is it all about you?" 

The court found Tara acted in bad faith and, therefore, ordered her to pay 

Peter's counsel fees on the motion to quash, the trial court stated: 

the case law that deals specifically with the issue of 

attorney's fees, as sending a message if you will, to 

prevent vexatious, duplicitous type of litigation. I can't 

reward somebody. I can't. 

How should I have [Peter] incur all his counsel fees 

when [his counsel] was absolutely correct. That filing 

of that cross-motion, which really wasn't even a crossmotion, seeking . . . relief, most of which was addressed 

[by the previous judge]. 

And some of the allegations within the [c]ertification, 

which turned out to not be true, misleading at best if not 

outright false, and to seek all this information and then 

to file something. . . . 

. . . . 

You need to move on, ma'am, and . . . because I feel it's 

necessary. That part of the counsel fee adjustment

would be to say, you need to understand that you cannot 

file motions, which are without merit, or to request 

information, which is not provided by court rules or 

otherwise ordered by the court. 

The court entered an order granting Peter's request to quash the four 

subpoenas issued by Tara. The court ordered Peter and Tara to exchange 

updated, accurate, and completed case information statements, federal tax 
8 A-3818-21

returns, copies of W-2 and 1099 statements, and child support calculations. It 

awarded Peter counsel fees and costs for the filing of his motion and stated it 

would determine the amount of fees upon receiving the updated financial 

information. 

 On February 21, 2022, Peter submitted a letter to the court enclosing his 

child support calculations based on his financial information and the financial 

information Tara provided him by email several days earlier, noting he used the 

New Jersey Child Support Guidelines (NJCSG) to calculate child support. 

On February 23, 2022, Tara submitted a letter to the court enclosing her 

child support calculations and alleging Peter underreported his income because 

he excluded pre-tax available benefits he had utilized, including contributions 

to his 401(k)-retirement account. 

 On March 14, 2022, the court entered a supplemental order on the issue 

of child support accompanied by a memorandum of decision. The court held 

Peter's child support obligation was $151 per week effective from the filing of 

his motion on September 27, 2021. After a review of the parties' financial 

documents and the February 21, 2022 letter from Peter, the court found the letter 

accurately reflected the appropriate child support calculation. The court also 
9 A-3818-21

granted Peter's request for counsel fees and costs for having to file the motion 

to quash and ordered Tara to pay Peter $6,407.50 in counsel fees. 

In reaching its conclusion with respect to counsel fees, the court analyzed 

the factors set forth in RPC 1.5 and Rule 5:3-5. The court held Tara engaged in 

bad faith. It explained, 

[Tara] sent out multiple subpoenas in a post-judgment 

motion without leave or permission from the [c]ourt. 

The only issue before the [c]ourt was the financial

position of the parties so that the [c]ourt could address 

the basic issue of child support to be paid. Instead, 

[Tara] sent subpoena's out to various banking 

institutions seeking documents dating back to 2017. 

The parties were divorced in 2017 and the issue only 

involved present income. In addition, [Tara] filed a 

cross motion which essentially mimicked that which 

was presented to the prior Judge and already 

adjudicated. . . . This is a vexatious litigation with the 

purpose of abusing the process, abusing the subpoena 

power of the [c]ourt and harassing [Peter]. This is now 

the second time that [Tara] has been accused of bad 

faith by the [c]ourt and has been ordered to pay counsel 

fees. 

On April 6, 2022, Tara filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 

2022 order. Tara argued the court incorrectly calculated the parties' income. 

Tara also requested the court apply Peter's child support arrears as a credit to the 

attorney's fees that she was ordered to pay. Peter cross-moved again for counsel 

fees. 
10 A-3818-21

On May 11, 2022, the trial court heard oral argument on the motion for 

reconsideration. Tara argued Amy has not benefitted from Peter's good fortune, 

specifically his bonus, since the inception of child support. She noted the MSA 

did not include Peter's work bonus but, because his work bonus is part of his 

income, it should have been included. Tara also claimed Peter submitted 

erroneous calculations with respect to child support contrary to the NJCSG 

because the child support should be recalculated to conform to the amount of 

overnights actually taking place. 

On July 14, 2022, the court entered an order accompanied by a 

memorandum of decision finding Tara failed to establish the requisite burden on 

her motion for reconsideration, the child support calculation was not incorrect, 

and the calculation of child support was accurately based on financial 

information provided by the parties and in accordance with the NJCSG. The 

court explained, in calculating Tara's income, it used the information she 

supplied to the court. The court recognized the deductions in Tara's tax returns 

as permissible for IRS purposes, but not admissible for the calculation of child 

support. The trial court noted Peter was allowing Amy to spend overnights at

Tara's home temporarily instead of forcing her to come to his home and found 
11 A-3818-21

that decision was in Amy's best interest. It also noted there was an allegation of 

parental alienation against Tara. 

The court denied Tara's request to credit Peter's child support arrears 

toward her court-ordered attorney's fees in the March 14, 2022 order. The court 

explained "[c]hild support paid through probation is child support meant for the 

benefit of the child [and] [t]he attorneys fee assessed by the [c]ourt is unrelated 

to the care of the child." The court denied Peter's request for attorney's fees and 

costs related to the reconsideration motion. 

This appeal followed. 

II. 

The findings of fact of family part judges are afforded considerable 

deference due to their special expertise in the family part. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 

N.J. 394, 413 (1998). A reversal of a trial court finding is appropriate only in 

circumstances where the "factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial 

judge went 'so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made.'" AvelinoCatabran v. Catabran, 445 N.J. Super. 574, 587 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)). Family part 

judges are afforded greater discretion and "particular leniency" when 

interpreting family-related agreements. Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45–46 
12 A-3818-21

(2016) (quoting Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007)). A trial court's 

interpretation of the law is not given special deference and is reviewed de novo. 

A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 180 (App. Div. 2019). 

Pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 a motion for reconsideration "shall state with 

specificity the basis on which it is made, including a statement of the matters or 

controlling decision that counsel believes the court has overlooked or as to 

which it has erred . . . ." Reconsideration "is not appropriate merely because a 

litigant is dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion. 

. . ." Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010). "[A] 

motion for reconsideration provides the court, and not the litigant, with an 

opportunity to take a second bite at the apple to correct errors inherent in a prior 

ruling." Medina v. Pitta, 442 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App. Div. 2015); see also N.J. 

Practice, Civil Practice Forms § 105:47 (James H. Walzer) (6th ed. 2023) ("[I]n 

practice the motion [for reconsideration] requires a showing of law or facts 

presented in the motion papers that were overlooked or misapprehended and 

would result in a different result.").

In her brief Tara raises a host of issues, makes wide-ranging allegations 

of Peter's conduct during and after the marriage, and the conduct of prior trial 

judges. However, only the two orders on appeal are before us. See Kopec v. 
13 A-3818-21

Moers, 470 N.J. Super. 133, 153 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Hayes v. Delamotte, 

231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018)) (noting "appeals are taken from orders and judgments" 

rather than opinions or reasons provided for the court's conclusions). Tara 

asserts she was not orally ordered to pay the full cost of family therapy at the 

January 6, 2022 hearing, but was ordered to pay the full cost of family therapy 

in the January 6, 2022 order, a ruling she argues is inconsistent with the NJCSG. 

Tara posits she earns less than Peter and, at one point, the family was in therapy 

with a provider that did not take insurance, causing her to endure a large 

financial burden. She argues family therapy should be divided on a "pro rata" 

basis. 

The record reflects Tara suggested Amy see two licensed family therapists 

that were local and in-network, and requested the court order Peter to research 

the professionals and select one because Tara did not approve of the previous 

therapist. The court ordered Peter to research the two therapists and select one. 

Because Tara prevailed in changing medical coverage to coverage she provided,

received a credit for providing medical coverage in the child support calculation, 

and selected two therapists that were in network, Tara failed to demonstrate she 

had any out-of-pocket therapy fees not covered by her insurance. Therefore, the 
14 A-3818-21

court's order that Tara bear all therapy costs was supported by substantial 

credible evidence in the record and will not be disturbed. 

The counsel fee award. 

Tara claims she was acting on the advice of counsel when she served the 

subpoenas and did not act in bad faith. Counsel fee determinations made "by 

trial courts will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only 

because of a clear abuse of discretion." Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 

167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 

(1995)). Abuse of discretion is found when a decision is "made without a 

rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested 

on an impermissible basis." US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 

467 (2012) (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 123 (2007)). 

Furthermore, a trial judge need not consider every factor of Rule 5:3-5(c) in 

order to determine an award of attorney's fees. Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 

552, 586 (App. Div. 2013). As long as the "factual findings [are] adequately 

justif[ied]" the trial judge need not analyze every factor. Ibid. 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 provides that a court, when awarding attorney's fees to a 

party, is required to consider the factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5(c), the financial 

circumstances of the parties, and the good or bad faith of either party. 
15 A-3818-21

In a nutshell, in awarding counsel fees, the court must 

consider whether the party requesting the fees is in 

financial need; whether the party against whom the fees 

are sought has the ability to pay; the good or bad faith of

either party in pursuing or defending the action; the nature 

and extent of the services rendered; and the reasonableness 

of the fees. 

Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94-95 (2005) (emphasis omitted). 

"Examples of bad faith include misusing or abusing process, seeking relief 

not supported by fact or law, intentionally misrepresenting facts or law, or otherwise 

engaging in vexatious acts for oppressive reasons." Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. 

Super. 332, 367 (App. Div. 2017). The economic position of the parties will be 

largely irrelevant where one party acts in bad faith "because the purpose of the 

award is to protect the innocent party from unnecessary costs and to punish the 

guilty party." Yueh v. Yueh, 329 N.J. Super. 447, 461 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting 

Kelly v. Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303, 307 (Ch. Div. 1992)). 

 The trial court's finding Tara acted in bad faith is supported by the record. 

The court included the analysis of each factor for both RPC 1.5 and Rule 5:3-5(c) in 

its March 14, 2022 opinion. It correctly found Tara was attempting to re-litigate the 

divorce proceedings and attempting to obtain documents she was not entitled to that 

were not relevant to the calculation of child support. 
16 A-3818-21

 The Child Support Calculation.

Tara argues the trial court erred by failing to deduct Peter's 401(k) 

distributions from his gross income and failing to do so was a deviation from 

the NJCSG. Tara's argument stems from Peter's Case Information Statement, 

where he reported he contributed $12,000 to his 401(k) for the year 2021 and 

listed that amount as part of the deductions with respect to his net year-to-date 

income. However, the court did not calculate child support based upon Peter's 

CIS or his net income. The court calculated child support based upon Peter's 

gross income, inclusive of the $12,000 he contributed to a 401(k). Peter's letter 

to the court and proposed child support guidelines both use Peter's gross wages, 

including any bonuses, and there is no deduction in the support guidelines for 

any retirement contributions for Peter, only Tara. 

Affirmed.