1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-21-00266-CR

________________

JULIE ANN HERRERA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the 75th District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CR34606

________________________________________________________________________ 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Julie Ann Herrera appeals her conviction for possession of a controlled 

substance greater than four grams and less than two hundred grams. See Tex. Health 

& Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42. After a jury found 

Herrera guilty of the aforementioned crime, she plead true to one enhancement 

paragraph, and was sentenced to fifteen years’ incarceration in the Texas Department 
2

of Criminal Justice. In one issue on appeal, Herrera challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence that she had possession of the controlled substance. We affirm.

Background

We limit the recitation of the background information to the single issue 

presented to the Court. Sergeant Paul Young testified that he has been employed by 

the Liberty County Sheriff’s Office for nine years. During his career he has 

investigated “numerous” substance abuse cases, detailing that methamphetamines, 

in particular, are prevalent in Liberty County. 

In January 2019, Young was investigating a report of a stolen gooseneck

trailer and an RV in Liberty County. In the course of his investigation, he located 

what he believed to be the stolen RV. He spoke to a man named Rodney Steward, 

who stated the RV belonged to his deceased mother. He described the size of the RV 

as “20 to 25 feet[,]” with one main bedroom. Young noted that the RV had been 

spray painted, decals removed, and had fictitious license plates. Young made the 

decision to impound the RV, to determine whether the RV was stolen by locating a 

second vehicle identification number on the RV. 

Young stated that Herrera was Steward’s girlfriend and was inside the RV in 

the “main master bedroom.” When he entered the RV, Young observed bags and 

baskets with female clothing in both the front of the RV and the bedroom. He 

believed the arrangement of the bags indicated that the female lived in the RV, and
3

were not placed as “as if someone just came and stayed the night or anything.” 

Young conducted an inventory of the RV, and was told by Steward that there was a 

handgun in the RV bedroom. He went into the RV, found Herrera lying in bed, and 

told her to get her identification. He described the bedroom as a “very small room[,]”

7 by 7 feet wide, with a double sized bed and a foot and half of space around the rest 

of the bed. He went to the bedroom to recover the handgun, and found a “zip lock 

bag containing a large amount of suspected methamphetamines laying on the 

floorboard or on the floor at the foot of the bed.” He stated the bag was open and 

“anyone could see it.” At that point, his investigation changed because he believed

the occupants of the trailer were selling methamphetamines. A further search 

revealed two glass pipes on the nightstand next to Herrera with methamphetamine 

residue. He also found digital scales, packing material, used syringes, items with 

methamphetamine residue in the bedroom cabinets above the bed, and additional

bags of methamphetamine. The bags of methamphetamine were found on the floor 

by the bed, in the cabinet above the bed and in Steward’s jacket in the bedroom. The 

bedroom cabinets also contained “a lot of their personal items and everything.” 

Young stated that several items, which he never identified, were in Herrera’s “arms 

reach.” He did not believe a reasonable person would be in the RV bedroom and not 

notice the methamphetamine. Photographs of the bedroom and the 

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were admitted into evidence. He testified 
4

a total of five bags of methamphetamine were recovered, four in the bedroom and 

one in another room. Based on this information, Young arrested both Steward and 

Herrera. 

The defense presented three witnesses.1 Denis Loonam testified that Herrera 

lives on his property and was living at his property in January 2019. He admitted on 

cross-examination that Herrera is not confined to his property and “[s]he could come 

and go as she pleased[.]”

Steward testified that he was arrested in January 2019 and subsequently pled 

guilty to the offense of possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamines. He 

was sentenced to fifteen years’ incarceration. He testified that he possessed and 

controlled the drugs and that Herrera had nothing to do with the drugs. According to 

Steward, Herrera had only visited the RV “like once[,]” prior to being arrested in

January 2019. He agreed that the RV bedroom was small and that Herrera was in 

close proximity to the drugs and paraphernalia in the bedroom. 

A jury found Herrera guilty of possession of a controlled substance, and 

subsequently sentenced her to fifteen years’ incarceration. She timely appealed.

1 The third witness was an employee of the District Clerk’s office presenting 

certified copies of Steward’s criminal conviction. 
5

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her only issue on appeal, Herrera challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

that she was in possession of the methamphetamines found in the RV. In her brief, 

she argues that the contraband was not affirmatively linked to Herrera to infer her 

knowledge of the drugs and, therefore, establishing a knowing possession. 

According to Herrera, the State failed to show that she possessed the 

methamphetamine found in the bedroom of the RV because she did not own the RV. 

Herrera argues that her mere presence in the bedroom of the RV is not enough to 

establish that she knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. The State contends 

that there are multiple affirmative links connecting Herrera with the 

methamphetamine.

In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder 

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the ultimate authority on the credibility of the 

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Penagraph v. State, 623 

S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). An appellate court may not 

sit as a thirteenth juror and substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by re-
6

evaluating the weight and the credibility of the evidence. Dewberry v. State, 4 

S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. A 

reviewing court must give full deference to the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. If the record contains 

conflicting inferences, we must presume the jury resolved such facts in favor of the 

verdict and defer to that resolution. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899 n.13; Clayton v. 

State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In addition, we “determine 

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and 

cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

verdict.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17. We treat direct and circumstantial evidence 

equally. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

A person commits an offense of possession of a controlled substance “if the 

person knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled substance listed in Penalty 

Group 1 or 1-B, unless the person obtained the substance directly from or under a 

valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of professional 

practice.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115(a), (d). This is a 

second-degree felony offense if “the controlled substance possessed is, by aggregate 

weight, including adulterants or dilutants, four grams or more but less than 200 

grams.” Id. § 481.115(d). “‘Possession’ means actual care, custody, control, or 
7

management.” Id. § 481.002(38). “To prove unlawful possession of a controlled 

substance, the State must prove that: (1) the accused exercised control, management, 

or care over the substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was 

contraband.” Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), 

abrogated on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 n.32 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2015).

Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must 

establish that the defendant’s connection with the drug was more than 

fortuitous. This is the so-called “affirmative links” rule which protects 

the innocent bystander–a relative, friend, or even stranger to the actual 

possessor–from conviction merely because of his fortuitous proximity 

to someone else’s drugs. Mere presence at the location where drugs are 

found is thus, insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or 

control of those drugs. However, presence or proximity, when 

combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial (e.g., 

“links”), may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (footnotes omitted). 

Because the “‘affirmative links’ rule is not an independent test of legal 

sufficiency[,]” the Court of Criminal Appeals uses the term “‘link’ so that it is clear 

that evidence of drug possession is judged by the same standard as all other 

evidence.” Id. at 161 n.9.

Reviewing courts have developed several factors showing a possible 

link between the accused and contraband, including: (1) the accused’s 

presence when the search was conducted, (2) whether the contraband 

was in plain view, (3) the accused’s proximity to and the accessibility 

of the contraband, (4) whether the accused was under the influence of 

narcotics when arrested, (5) whether the accused possessed other 
8

contraband or narcotics when arrested, (6) whether the accused made 

incriminating statements when arrested, (7) whether the accused 

attempted to flee, (8) whether the accused made furtive gestures, (9) 

whether there was an odor of contraband, (10) whether other 

contraband or drug paraphernalia were present, (11) whether the 

accused owned or had the right to possess the place where the 

contraband was found, (12) whether the contraband was found in an 

enclosed place, (13) whether the accused was found with a large 

amount of cash, and (14) whether the conduct of the accused indicated 

a consciousness of guilt.

Roberts v. State, 321 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. 

ref’d).

Herrera contends the evidence is insufficient to show that she possessed the 

methamphetamine found inside the bedroom of the RV where she was arrested 

because (1) the RV belonged to Steward and he owned the drugs, (2) a third 

individual was not arrested although the drugs were in plain view, (3) no evidence 

was produced that the female clothing found at the scene belonged to her, and (4) 

any evidence that Herrera wanted her belongings is different from ownership of that 

space. The record shows that Herrera was not in exclusive possession of the bedroom 

where the controlled substance was found. Thus, additional facts and circumstances 

must link Herrera to the contraband in such a way that the jury could conclude that 

she had knowledge of the contraband and exercised control over it. See Roberson v. 

State, 80 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d). 

Although the contraband was not in Herrera’s exclusive possession, the jury could 

infer that Herrera intentionally or knowingly possessed the contraband if there are 
9

sufficient independent facts and circumstances justifying such an inference. See Tate 

v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 6.03(a), (b). The State is not required to present evidence on each factor to 

show a link between Herrera and the methamphetamine, and the absence of a factor 

is not evidence of innocence that must be weighed against the factors that are present. 

See Espino-Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2019, pet. ref’d).

The jury could have rationally concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Herrera possessed the methamphetamine found in the bedroom. Testimony showed 

that the bedroom was very small, the contraband was in plain view of anyone in the 

bedroom, and in close proximity to Herrera. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (using 

the accessibility and plain view as one of the factors to determine possession). There 

were two glass pipes that were found on the nightstand next to the bed where Herrera 

was sleeping, and Young testified that methamphetamine and paraphernalia were

also in the cabinets above the bed which included personal belongings. Id. Female 

clothing was also found in the RV and Herrera expressed interest in retrieving her 

belongings after her arrest. Steward testified Herrera was his girlfriend, and that the 

other woman was only visiting for the day. Young also stated that he believed the 

clothing was indicative of someone staying long term in the RV. See Jackson v. 

State, 495 S.W.3d 398, 406-07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) 
10

(concluding affirmative links of possession when male clothing found in apartment

not owned by appellant). While there was contradictory evidence that Steward solely 

possessed the drugs, and that Herrera did not live in the RV and only visited once, 

the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to testimony is for the jury to 

determine, and the jury as the fact finder may choose to believe or disbelieve some

or all of the testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008). 

In summary, the logical force of all the circumstantial evidence, combined

with reasonable inferences, is sufficient to show that Herrera had actual care, 

custody, control, and management of the methamphetamine found in the bedroom. 

See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 166. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the State, the jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

Herrera committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance. See Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319; see also Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We overrule this issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Herrera’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court.
11

AFFIRMED.

 JAY WRIGHT 

Justice

 

Submitted on May 5, 2023

Opinion Delivered December 13, 2023

Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.