* District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by desingation.

1 Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-30091

BERTNEY LANGLEY, et al.

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

JAY DARDENNE, Senator,

Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant,

EDWIN W. EDWARDS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

(94-1953)

January 12, 1996

Before DAVIS AND PARKER, Circuit Judges; BUNTON, * District Judge.

PER CURIAM: 1

Six members of the Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana and one Louisiana state senator brought

suit against the Secretary of the De part ment of the Interior; Edwin W. Edwards, Governor of the

S t at e o f Lo uisiana; and Harold Monteau, Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief which would prevent casino gaming on the Coushatta tribal2

lands.

The District Court, Honorable Ed win F. Hunter presiding, dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint

holding that the Plaint iffs did not have standing to challenge the tribal gambling compact entered

pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). We think the District Court was correct.

We review de novo a District Court's standing determination, employing an approach that,

in practice, differs little from that used to r eview mo t ions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). In conducting our review, we are obliged to accept as true all material

allegations of the complaint, and construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. W arth v.

Seldin

, 422 U.S. 490, 501. The issue here is whether Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claim

in federal court under the IGRA. Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the

proper party to bring a particular matter to the Court for adjudication. Erwin Chemerinsky, F ederal

Jurisdiction § 2.3 at 48 (1989).

The IGRA was passed to establish a statutory framework for the regulation of Indian gaming.

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721. Specifically, the Act provides that:

Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if

gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within

a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such

gaming activity.

25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).

F or a party to sue for declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the Secre tary's

decision to place property into trust for the purpose of gaming was arbitrary and contrary to law and

alleging tha t t he State of Louisiana was without the statutory or legal authority to enter into the

gaming compact, the party must first have legal standing. For the Appellants to have standing, they

must meet three requirements:

1) the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' --an invasio n o f a legally

protected interest--and such injury must be concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent as opposed to merely hypothetical or conjectural;

2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct of which the

plaint iff complains, that is, the injury must be 'fairly traceable' to the challenged action

of the defendant and not the result of the actions of some third party; and3

3) it must be likely, rather than merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed

by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , -- U.S. --, --, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).

The Appellants can be grouped into two categories for determining standing. The six

members of the Coushatta Tribe are one class of Appellants. Louisiana State Senator Jay Dardenne

is a separate class. The tribe members will be discussed first.

A. The Tribal Appellants

In Willis v. Fordice

, No. 94-60299, slip op. 3, (5th Cir. 1995), we held that individual tribal

members who disagree with the tribe's decision to bring gaming to the reservation do not have

standing to assert his or her claims in federal court. The appellant in W illis alleged that the opening

o f a casino on tribal lands would "cause damage to his tribal homeland by increasi ng crime and

altering the community 'in a manner hostile to his traditional and religious beliefs.'" Further, appellant

claimed that the casino would attract competitors to threaten his Indian novelty shop. Like Willis

,

the A ppellant tribal members alleged that the opening of the casino on tribal lands would result in

a"diminution of the aesthetics of the tribal homeland with a threat to the continued viability of their

cultural heritage." This alleged injury, like that in W illis

, does not meet the Lujan injury requirement.

The injury Appellants claim is not a direct economic injury as it was in the cases that have allowed

indivi dual t ribal members to litigate claims under the IGRA. S ee United States Ex Rel. Mosay v.

Buffalo Bros. Mgm

t. 20 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1995), cert denied

, 115 S.Ct. 185 (1994); Ma xam v.

Lower Sioux Indian Comm.

, 829 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mn 1993); Ross v. Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe

,

809 F. Supp. 738 (D. S.D. 1992). Furthermore, inso much as t he Appellants allege a "procedural

injury" as a result of not having gaming established on the reservation in accord with the procedures

of the IGRA, the presence of a "procedural injury" will not cure the absence of a direct injury. S ee

Lujan 112 S.Ct. at 2142. Because the tribal Appellants have not satisfied W illis' particularized harm

requirement nor established that they have a l egally pro t ected right to be free from gambling, and

Appellants have not met the first prong of the Lujan tes t , it is this Court's opinion that the tribal

Appellants lack standing to pursue their action.4 B. Louisiana State Senator

State senator Jay Dardenne intervened in this action pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. It is unclear from the Magistrat e Judge's order granting intervention whether

Dardenne was allowed to intervene as a matter of right, or under the permissive intervention rules.

In any event, an intervenor may not continue a suit in the absence of the or iginal party wi thout

showing that he fulfills the standing requirements of Article III. Rohm & Hass Texas, Inc. v. Ortiz

Bros. Insulation, Inc. , 32 F.3d 205, 208 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994).

Senator Dardenne argues that he has standing to maintain this suit because it is necessary to

protect the effectiveness of his right to vote in the state legislature on whether to permit gaming at

the casino site. State legislators have standing to challenge official actions in certain limited

circumstances. K ori oth v. Briscoe

, 523 F.2d 1271, 1277 (5th Cir. 1975). For example, a legislator

can sue on the grounds tha t his effectiveness as an elected representative has been diminished.

Coleman v. Miller 307 U.S. 433 (1939). However, the refusal of another branch of government to

follow law that was passed by a legislator does not qualify as the type of "loss of effecti veness"

required for standing. Chiles v. T hornburgh , 865 F.2d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 1989). Senator

Dardenne's interest in the enforcement of Louisiana law is not enhanced because he helped pass the

law. In fact, his interest is "indistinguishable from that of any other citizen." H arrington v.

Schlesin g er

, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975). Standing cannot be based on an interest which is

held in com

mo n by all citizens of the state. S ee Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop the

War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974). For these reasons, we do not think Senator Dardenne has Article

III standing.

The District Court's order dismissing Appellants' complaint is hereby affirmed.