J-S47014-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TIMOTHY DONNELL ANDERSON,

Appellant No. 1930 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000378-2010, CP-36-CR-0000419-

2010, CP-36-CR-0005069-2009

BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS, and JENKINS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2016

Appellant, Timothy Donnell Anderson, appeals from the order denying 

his first petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history of the case, as follows:

On November 23, 2009, the Attorney General filed an 

information docketed to No. 5069–2009 charging [Appellant], 

Timothy D. Anderson, with two counts of unlawful contact with a 

minor and one count of criminal use of communication facility. 

These offenses arose from [Appellant’s] contact with an agent of 

the Attorney General’s Office, posing as a 14 year old girl, via 

computer. In August and September, 2009, [Appellant] was in 

contact with the person he believed to be a 14 year old girl for 

the purpose of engaging in sexual activity with her. [Appellant] 

was arrested by law enforcement authorities when he arrived at

the pre-arranged meeting place. At the time of [Appellant’s] 

arrest, a cell phone was seized from him.
J-S47014-16

- 2 -

On February 19, 2010, the District Attorney of Lancaster 

County filed an information docketed to No. 419-2010 charging 

[Appellant] with aggravated indecent assault of a person less 

than 16, sexual abuse of children, unlawful contact with a minor 

and corruption of minors. These charges were the result of 

[Appellant’s] actions in contacting a 15 year old girl between 

November, 2008, and July 13, 2009, for the purpose of engaging 

in sexual activity. Eventually, [Appellant] met the victim at a 

swimming pool on July 13, 2009, at which time he digitally 

penetrated her vagina and photographed her vagina with his cell 

phone.

On April 9, 2010, the Attorney General filed a second 

information docketed to No. 378-2010 charging [Appellant] with 

five counts of unlawful contact with a minor, one count of 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, one count of sexual 

abuse of children, two counts of statutory sexual assault, one 

count of aggravated indecent assault and one count of criminal 

use of communication facility. The offenses charged on this 

docket occurred during July and August, 2009. [Appellant], 

using a computer, again contacted a 15 year old female under 

the guise of befriending her. He engaged in digital penetration, 

oral and vaginal intercourse and photographed her genitals with 

his cell phone.

[Appellant’s] suppression motion was denied on July 1, 

2011, and he proceeded with a jury trial on docket No. 419-

2010A. On July 20, 2011, he was found guilty of all offenses.

On September 12, 2011, [Appellant] was again found 

guilty after a jury trial of the offenses charged on docket No. 

5069-2009.

On docket No. 378-2010, [Appellant] waived his right to a

jury trial and was tried by the [c]ourt sitting without a jury. On 

October 28, 2011, [Appellant] was found not guilty of one count 

[each] of statutory sexual assault and aggravated indecent 

assault, but was found guilty of the remaining nine offenses.

On March 1, 2012, after a pre-sentence investigation, 

[Appellant] was sentenced to an aggregate term of not less than 

30 nor more than 60 years incarceration on all dockets. The 
J-S47014-16

- 3 -

[c]ourt also found that [Appellant] was a sexually violent 

predator.

On March 6, 2012, [Appellant] filed a motion to modify 

sentence which was denied on March 20, 2012. On April 18, 

2012, [Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior 

Court. On May 7, 2013, the Superior Court affirmed the 

judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 81 A.3d 

991[, 767 MDA 2012 (Pa. Super. filed May 7, 2013) 

(unpublished memorandum)].

On June 6, 2013, [Appellant] filed a petition for allowance 

of appeal in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. On [November 

25,] 2013, the Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s] petition, 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 622 Pa. 754, 80 A.3d 774 (table), 

[404 MAL 2013 (Pa. filed November 25, 2013)], and he did not 

seek further review.

On April 29, 2014, [Appellant] filed a pro se motion for 

post conviction collateral relief. Counsel was appointed to 

represent him, and on October 17, 2014, counsel filed an 

amended motion on his behalf. On January 28, 2015, an 

evidentiary hearing was held.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/21/15, at 1–4 (footnotes omitted).

The PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition on October 21, 2015. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Both Appellant and 

the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following single issue on appeal:

A. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] 

amended PCRA when counsel failed to properly litigate a 

meritorious motion to suppress evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (full capitalization omitted).

When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, this 

Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the 
J-S47014-16

- 4 -

conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016). The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for them in 

the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. 

Super. 2014).

To be entitled to PCRA relief, an appellant must establish, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that 1) his conviction or sentence resulted 

from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2); 

2) his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, id. at 

§ 9543(a)(3); and 3) the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial or 

on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic, or 

tactical decision by counsel. Id. at § 9543(a)(4).

While inartfully and inaccurately worded, Appellant is alleging trial 

counsel’s ineffective assistance in the manner counsel litigated his 

suppression motion. To plead and prove ineffective assistance of counsel a 

petitioner must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit; 

(2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual 

prejudice resulted from counsel’s act or failure to act. Commonwealth v. 

Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). A claim of 

ineffectiveness will be denied if the petitioner’s evidence fails to meet any 

one of these prongs. Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 

2010). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance of 
J-S47014-16

- 5 -

counsel. Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 114 A.3d 401, 410 (Pa. 2015). We 

have explained that trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 

pursue a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc). “We need not analyze the prongs of an 

ineffectiveness claim in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first 

any prong that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the 

applicable facts and circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 701 (Pa. 1998)).

The sole focus at the evidentiary hearing, the only issue identified in 

Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the issue raised on appeal is 

the allegation that trial counsel was ineffective in his argument concerning 

the suppression motion he filed. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth 

violated his constitutional rights “when it examined without a warrant the 

contents of a cell phone which was seized as a result of a warrantless arrest. 

The contents of a cell phone cannot be lawfully searched based on a valid 

warrantless arrest.” Appellant’s Brief at 11, 16. In support, Appellant cites 

Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), and 

Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407 (Pa. Super. 2014). Appellant does 

not contend the cellular telephone itself was unlawfully seized; rather, he 

claims, pursuant to Riley, that the contents of the telephone could not be 

searched without a warrant.
J-S47014-16

- 6 -

In rejecting Appellant’s claim, we rely on the PCRA court’s cogent and 

thorough explanation and disposition. The PCRA court stated as follows:

The sole issue presented is that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to specifically challenge the search of 

[Appellant’s] cell phone which revealed certain photographs of 

the victims and others that were used at trial. (N.T. January 28, 

2015, pp. 9, 12–13). In support of his position, [Appellant] cites 

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), and 

Commonwealth v. Stem, 96 A.3d 407 (Pa. Super. 2014).

In Riley v. California, decided June 25, 2014, the Supreme 

Court of the United States held that police must obtain a warrant 

to search the contents of a cell phone which is seized incident to 

arrest. Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2496. In Stem, decided July 11, 

2014, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was presented with the 

same issue that was decided by the Supreme Court in Riley—

whether police may search the contents of a cell phone seized 

incident to arrest without obtaining a warrant. Stem, 96 A.3d at 

409. Based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley, the 

Superior Court upheld the trial court’s order suppressing 

evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the defendant’s 

cell phone which was seized incident to arrest. Stem, 96 A.3d at 

414.

[Appellant] asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to argue at the suppression hearing that the search of the 

lawfully seized cell phone was illegal based on Riley and Stem. 

However, both these cases were decided after [Appellant’s] 

appellate rights were exhausted on direct review. The 

suppression hearing was held on July 1, 2011. . . .

Moreover, the record shows that the Commonwealth did 

obtain a warrant prior to searching the cell phone. Testimony at 

the suppression hearing established that [Appellant’s] cell phone 

was seized pursuant to a search incident to his arrest on 

September 11, 2009. (N.T. July 1, 2011, pp. 11, 21–22, 34–

35). On the same date, law enforcement officers obtained a 

warrant to search his home and person. (N.T. January 28, 2015, 

at 5–6; Def. Ex. 1). The warrant authorized the police to seize 

and examine the contents of all computers and electronic 

devices including cell phones. (Id., Def. Ex. 1). The contents of 
J-S47014-16

- 7 -

the cell phone were not examined until after the warrant was 

obtained. (N.T. July 1, 2011, pp. 48, 50–51).

While [Appellant] notes that the cell phone is not listed on 

the inventory for the search warrant, (Def. Ex. 1), this omission 

does not entitle him to relief. The cell phone was already in the 

possession of the police when the search of [Appellant’s] 

residence took place. Under the circumstances, the failure to list 

it on the inventory of items seized would be at most a technical 

oversight in violation of Pa.R.Cr[im].P. 20919 which would not 

affect any of [Appellant’s] substantive rights. “Nothing in the 

history of the Rules themselves, or related case law, mandates 

that every violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure—however 

technical—requires exclusion of evidence seized in the process. 

Rather . . . it is only where the violation implicates fundamental 

constitutional concerns that exclusion may be appropriate.” 

Commonwealth v. Ruey, 854 A.2d 560, 568 [Pa. Super. 2004] 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 407, n.14, 

586 A.2d 887, 903 n.14 (1991)). There is no question that 

[Appellant] knew the cell phone had been seized[,] as he 

challenged the admissibility of the evidence obtained from it. 

(N.T. July 1, 2011, pp. 7–8, 54–55; N.T. January 28, 2015, p.8).

19

 Rule 209(C) requires that an inventory of items 

seized shall be made by the law enforcement officer 

serving a search warrant. Pa.R.Cr[im].P. 209(C). In 

this case, the cell phone was not seized by the officer 

serving the search warrant, but by the officers who 

took [Appellant] into custody prior to the search of 

his residence. Since [Appellant] was searched 

incident to arrest, it may not be necessary to list the 

cellphone on the inventory for the search warrant. 

The Court need not resolve this question since the 

search of the contents of the cell phone was 

authorized by the search warrant.

Based upon the record, [Appellant] has failed to establish 

that his claim has arguable merit. Therefore, the [c]ourt need 

not consider whether he has satisfied the second and third 

prongs of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 614, 889 A.2d 501, 541 

(2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 29, 640 

A.2d 1251, 1265 (1994)).
J-S47014-16

- 8 -

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/21/15, at 7–10 (some footnotes omitted). We rely 

on the PCRA court’s reasoning and adopt it as our own.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/26/2016