2020 UT App 3

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

STEVEN DENNIS SKINNER,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20180584-CA

Filed January 3, 2020

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Vernice S. Trease

No. 141907373

Debra M. Nelson and Brady Smith, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and John J. Nielsen, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and

DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Seeking a “dominant/submissive” experience, Steven 

Dennis Skinner summoned a professional escort to his 

apartment in the wee hours of the morning. When the escort 

objected to some of the acts in which Skinner wanted her to 

participate, he produced a gun and forced her to perform sexual 

acts to which she had not consented. Eventually, the two of them 

fought over the gun, and it discharged, hitting the escort and 

injuring her; in the resulting confusion, the escort somehow 

gained control of the gun and shot Skinner several times, 

injuring him. A jury later convicted Skinner on four counts of 

aggravated sexual assault, as well as one count of theft by 
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receiving stolen property. Skinner appeals, arguing that the 

evidence was insufficient to convict him of any offense. We reject 

Skinner’s arguments and affirm his convictions.

BACKGROUND1

¶2 In 2014, V.M. worked as an escort for a business known 

as the Dollhouse. Clients seeking the services of an escort 

contact the Dollhouse, and the company’s phone operator—a 

sort of dispatcher—then contacts the individual escorts and 

tells them the identity of the client and where to meet. At 

approximately 3:00 a.m. one morning, the Dollhouse phone 

operator contacted V.M. and told her that a client, Skinner, had

requested a “submissive person” and that he wanted “some 

sort of dominating” experience. V.M. drove to the address the 

phone operator had provided, which turned out to be 

Skinner’s apartment. Skinner met her at her car and escorted 

her inside, at which point V.M. collected a $200 “show-up” fee, 

by which Skinner purchased one hour of V.M.’s time. At that 

point, pursuant to company protocol, V.M. called the phone 

operator and reported that she was in the apartment and had 

collected the “show-up” fee, and that the clock could start on

Skinner’s hour.

¶3 V.M. had to give half of the “show-up” fee to the 

Dollhouse, but was entitled to keep the other half, plus any tips

the client might provide. V.M. told Skinner that, for a tip, she 

would be “more entertaining.” In response, Skinner stated that 

 

1. “When reviewing a jury verdict, we examine the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 

favorable to the verdict, and we recite the facts accordingly. We 

present conflicting evidence only when necessary to understand 

issues raised on appeal.” State v. Tulley, 2018 UT 35, ¶ 4 n.1, 428 

P.3d 1005 (quotation simplified).
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“he likes whips and cuffs and stuff.” Because V.M. was “trying 

to get the money,” she did not immediately reject Skinner’s 

suggestions, instead saying “we’ll see.” Skinner paid V.M. an 

additional $200 tip, and V.M. then took off her clothes, leaving

on only her bra and underwear. Soon thereafter, Skinner 

produced a whip and told V.M. that he wanted to use it on her; 

after expressing initial objections, V.M. agreed to let Skinner use 

the whip, but only if Skinner used it “really lightly.” As Skinner 

whipped V.M., he instructed her to call him “sir.” At some point, 

the whipping became too hard for V.M.’s liking, and she asked 

Skinner to stop. Skinner complied, but became frustrated that 

V.M. would “not agree[] to do what he want[ed].” Skinner then 

went into a back room, leaving V.M. alone in the living room.

¶4 After sitting alone for a few minutes in the living room, 

V.M. became worried that Skinner had been gone for “too long,” 

so she walked toward the back room to “see what was going 

on.” From the doorway to the room, V.M. observed Skinner 

“facing the wall” and “[s]taring down, looking at something.”

Concerned that Skinner “looked really odd and suspicious,” 

V.M. decided to text the Dollhouse phone operator to inform her 

that Skinner was “acting a little bit odd,” and she returned to the 

living room to retrieve her phone, which was in her purse on the 

couch. But before V.M. could send the message, Skinner 

appeared behind her, wielding a “long” handgun. Skinner held 

the gun to the back of V.M.’s head and knocked the phone out of 

her hand, causing it to land between the wall and the couch.

With the gun still against V.M.’s head, Skinner told her that she 

was “going to do what the f*** I say”; he then forced V.M. to “get 

down on [her] knees” and perform oral sex on him, even though 

V.M. testified that she had not agreed to do so. Skinner forced 

V.M. to continue until Skinner ejaculated in her mouth.

¶5 After that, Skinner continued to demand that V.M. 

perform various sex acts, including anal sex, and ordered her to

“bend over on the couch” with her back to him while he 
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20180584-CA 4 2020 UT App 3

“rubb[ed]” and “push[ed]” himself against her in an attempt to

insert his penis into her anus. Skinner also inserted his fingers 

into V.M.’s anus and rubbed his penis against her vagina. But 

Skinner was unable to maintain an erection, so he ordered V.M. 

to “get him hard again” by performing additional oral sex.

Skinner continued this “back and forth”—with V.M. performing 

oral sex followed by unsuccessful attempts to perform anal sex—

for what seemed to V.M. like “a long time.”

¶6 Eventually Skinner grew tired of this routine, and placed 

the gun down on the couch. With V.M. still bent over facing the 

couch and Skinner behind her with his stomach against her back, 

Skinner wrapped his left arm around V.M.’s neck and began to 

choke her. As V.M. began to black out, she reached for the gun.

At that point, Skinner went for the gun as well, and “a little 

tussle” ensued. The gun went off twice, hitting V.M. both times:

once in her left leg, where the bullet entered the outside of her 

calf and exited on the inside of her knee; and once in her left 

hand, where the bullet entered her palm and exited the top of 

her hand. Despite having been shot, V.M. continued to struggle 

with Skinner until she gained control of the gun. Then, using her 

right hand, V.M. shot at Skinner “as many times” as she could,

hitting him three times: once in his left abdomen, once in his left 

upper arm, and once on his right inner thigh.

¶7 After shooting Skinner, V.M. “picked up [her] leg,” which 

was “hanging off” with “the bone coming out,” and dragged 

herself out of the apartment. Once outside, V.M. continued to 

drag herself down the outside stairs, all the while “yelling for 

help.” A neighbor responded to her pleas and called the police 

and paramedics.

¶8 When officers arrived at Skinner’s apartment complex, 

they found the neighbor sitting with V.M., who was lying at the 

bottom of the stairs to the apartment. V.M. was “naked for the 

most part,” covered in blood, and “screaming that she had been 
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20180584-CA 5 2020 UT App 3

shot.” V.M. told officers that a man upstairs had a gun. Officers 

noticed that there was “quite a bit of blood on the stairs” so they 

followed its trail, which led to Skinner’s apartment. Officers 

found the door to the apartment open and, through the door, 

saw Skinner lying across a chair naked and covered in blood, 

with multiple gunshot wounds. When asked about the gun, 

Skinner told officers, “[I]t’s her gun, she brought it.”

¶9 V.M. and Skinner were taken to a hospital where they 

both underwent surgeries to treat their gunshot wounds. V.M. 

suffered fractures to her femur, tibia, and left hand, and has

required multiple reconstructive surgeries. Skinner suffered 

injuries to his colon, diaphragm, liver, ribs, and left arm.

¶10 During a search of Skinner’s apartment, which was in

complete “disarray,” officers found three bullet holes: one in the 

wall above the television, one in the window, and one in the wall 

by the couch. There were copious amounts of blood throughout 

the apartment, including “a lot of blood from the kitchen”; blood 

on the couch; a blood trail from the front door into the 

apartment; and a pool of blood just inside the front door.

Although there were blood stains on the exterior side of the front 

door, there were no visible stains on the interior of the door, and 

neither the doorknob nor the dead bolt on the door was tested 

for blood. There were also blood spatter stains on “the wall 

directly behind the couch, the wall on the side of the couch, and 

the ceiling.” Tissue was found on the walls, ceiling, and 

bookshelf. A crime scene technician took blood swabs from the 

areas that were “the most saturated with blood,” but 

unfortunately the swabs became contaminated before they could 

be tested for DNA. No tissue was collected for DNA testing.

¶11 Officers recovered a gun from the front room, and located 

two gun cases in the back room. One of the cases was empty and 

was made for a Ruger GP100 357 magnum revolver—the same 

brand and make of gun found in the front room. Subsequent 
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investigation indicated that this firearm did not belong to 

Skinner and had been reported stolen.

¶12 After completing its investigation, the State charged 

Skinner with four counts of aggravated sexual assault, one count 

of theft by receiving stolen property for possessing the gun, and 

one count of aggravated assault. On the State’s motion, the 

aggravated assault charge was eventually dismissed, and 

Skinner was tried before a jury on the remaining five counts.

¶13 At trial, the State introduced test results that showed 

Skinner’s DNA and amylase (saliva) on V.M. Her oral and 

perianal swabs tested positive for seminal fluid and her breast 

swabs tested positive for saliva, all of which contained DNA 

consistent with Skinner’s. Skinner’s penile swabs tested positive 

for saliva and DNA consistent with V.M.’s. Also, the gun’s 

owner (Owner) testified, and explained that he knew Skinner 

because his mother (Mother) was friends with Skinner and had 

invited Skinner to live at her house for a time. Owner testified 

that the Ruger revolver recovered at the scene belonged to him, 

and had been gifted to him by Mother. Although Owner did not 

live with Mother when Skinner was there, Owner left many of 

his belongings at her house, including the gun. About a month 

after Skinner moved out, Owner noticed that his gun was 

missing, and he called the police and reported it stolen, 

identifying the gun by its serial number. Owner maintained that 

he had never given Skinner permission to keep the gun or even 

take it from Mother’s house.

¶14 The defense called two witnesses: a police officer 

(Sergeant) and a forensic expert (Expert). Sergeant testified that 

he had been undercover in a previous prostitution sting in which 

V.M. had offered to masturbate him for $200. Expert opined 

extensively on the physical evidence in the case, specifically on 

V.M.’s and Skinner’s relative positions during the shooting and 

“the events immediately surrounding the gunshots.” After 
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20180584-CA 7 2020 UT App 3

reviewing (among other things) crime scene photographs, police 

reports, lab and medical reports, and transcripts of the 

preliminary hearing, Expert testified that he did not see evidence 

consistent with “what [he] would expect from [V.M.’s] 

description” of the shooting. Expert first testified about the shot 

to V.M.’s leg. Expert explained that if V.M. had been shot in the 

leg while kneeling on the couch—as she had testified—there 

would likely be “a good deal more blood on the couch,” 

including blood spray in an exit gunshot pattern.

¶15 Expert also noted three issues with V.M.’s account of her 

and Skinner’s relative positions during the shooting. First, if 

V.M.’s knee had been on the couch when the gun went off,

“there’s no place to put the gun and aim it the way that it goes 

through her leg. The couch gets in the way.” Second, if Skinner 

had been behind V.M. holding the gun in his right hand and 

“aiming so that he’s shooting . . . [V.M.] in the back of her calf,” 

Skinner would have also been pointing the gun at himself. Third, 

if V.M.’s leg had been shot while she was kneeling on the couch, 

“the exit injury to her thigh would’ve also potentially resulted in 

the exit injury to her torso” because the gun would have been 

pointing upwards resulting in the bullet “coming out higher 

than it’s going in on the leg.”

¶16 Expert then testified about the shot to V.M.’s hand. Expert 

stated that the entry wound was on the inside of V.M.’s left palm 

and the exit wound was on the outside. He opined that V.M.’s 

hand “wouldn’t have been functional” after it was shot. Expert 

then explained a number of issues surrounding the shooting that 

he had identified. First, if V.M. and Skinner had been positioned 

as V.M. described at the time of the shooting, the exit wound on 

the back of V.M.’s hand could only have occurred if her hand 

was “turned completely around.” Second, the blood spatter 

evidence and the lack of bullet damage was not consistent with 

V.M.’s claim that she had been kneeling on the couch with 

Skinner behind her when he shot her hand. Specifically, there 
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20180584-CA 8 2020 UT App 3

was no blood spatter on the couch or the surrounding walls, nor 

was there any bullet damage to the couch or walls, as would be 

expected if V.M.’s version of events were true. Third, there was 

blood spatter evidence consistent with V.M.’s hand wound that 

was located “in the exact opposite direction of what [V.M.] had 

described in her testimony.”

¶17 Lastly, Expert testified that the revolver in this case was 

relatively easy to discharge, requiring only three pounds of 

pressure. He also testified that it is difficult, “particularly in a 

situation where there’s a lot of emotion” and stress, for a novice

to shoot a handgun accurately. Furthermore, most individuals 

use two hands when shooting a handgun because doing so 

increases accuracy and provides stability when the gun recoils.

As such, Expert concluded that the damage to V.M.’s left hand 

had in effect rendered it useless, and she would not have been 

able to use that hand to steady the gun or cock the hammer back.

¶18 At the close of the State’s evidence Skinner made an oral 

motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence 

presented was not sufficient for the jury to find Skinner guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Skinner’s argument was brief; he 

argued simply that the State’s evidence was “solely based on 

testimony” from V.M., and noted that, while “some additional 

DNA evidence may or may not corroborate that testimony,” it 

was insufficient to convict him “without additional forensic 

evidence” to support it. Skinner did not ask the trial court to 

disregard any evidence, and made no specific argument that 

V.M.’s—or any other witness’s—testimony was inherently 

improbable. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury 

convicted Skinner on all counts.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶19 Skinner now appeals, asserting that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the jury’s verdict on any of the counts. With 
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20180584-CA 9 2020 UT App 3

regard to the theft count, Skinner makes a traditional sufficiencyof-the-evidence argument, asserting that the State’s evidence 

was insufficient to support his conviction. “When a jury verdict 

is challenged on the ground that the evidence is insufficient, we 

review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be 

drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.” State v. 

Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 503 (quotation 

simplified). After reviewing the evidence in this manner, “we 

will uphold the trial court’s decision if . . . we conclude that 

some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find 

that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶20 With regard to the sexual assault counts, however, 

Skinner’s argument is more nuanced. Rather than make a 

traditional sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, Skinner asks us 

to disregard V.M.’s testimony as “inherently improbable,” see

State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 14, 210 P.3d 288, before assessing 

the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on the sexual assault 

counts. We “accord deference to the trial court’s ability and 

opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor,” and 

therefore review deferentially a trial court’s decision to decline 

to disregard a witness’s testimony due to inherent improbability, 

reversing the trial court’s decision only if it was “clearly 

erroneous.” Salt Lake City v. Northern, 2013 UT App 299, ¶ 6, 318 

P.3d 775 (quotation simplified). 

ANALYSIS

I. The Sexual Assault Convictions

¶21 Skinner first raises an insufficiency-of-the-evidence 

challenge to his four convictions for aggravated sexual assault.

His argument on appeal is a specific one: he asserts that his 

sexual assault convictions should be reversed because “the 

verdicts were based on testimony that was inherently 
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improbable.” Citing State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288, he

contends that V.M.’s testimony—which provided the basis for 

the sexual assault convictions—“was materially inconsistent, 

patently false, and lacked corroboration with the forensic 

evidence at the scene.”

¶22 Skinner maintains that he preserved this issue for appeal 

by making his general motion for a directed verdict at trial. In 

the alternative, in the event that we find the issue unpreserved, 

he asks us to review it for plain error. Accordingly, we begin our 

analysis by considering whether Skinner properly preserved this 

issue for appellate review.

A

¶23 Appellate courts “generally will not consider an issue 

unless it has been preserved for appeal.” Patterson v. Patterson, 

2011 UT 68, ¶ 12, 266 P.3d 828. “To preserve an issue for appeal, 

a party must present it to the trial court in such a way that the 

trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.” State v. 

Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, ¶ 13, 437 P.3d 1266 (quotation 

simplified). Put differently, an issue is preserved “[w]hen the 

specific ground for an objection is clear from its context.” State v. 

Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1168. In the context at issue 

here, we have stated that a directed verdict motion that “makes 

general assertions but fails to assert the specific argument raised 

on appeal . . . is insufficient to preserve the more specific 

argument for appeal.” State v. Gallegos, 2018 UT App 112, ¶ 14, 

427 P.3d 578 (quotation simplified).

¶24 Moreover, we have recently noted that a claim—under 

Robbins—that a particular witness’s testimony is inherently 

improbable is not the same as a claim that the State’s evidence is 

insufficient. See Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, ¶¶ 12–19. Indeed, a 

Robbins claim is a unique thing. Ordinarily, courts are not “in the 

business of reassessing or reweighing evidence” already 

considered by a jury, and conflicts in the evidence are almost 
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 11 2020 UT App 3

always resolved “in favor of the jury verdict.” State v. Prater, 

2017 UT 13, ¶ 32, 392 P.3d 398. But our supreme court has carved 

out a narrow exception to this general rule, under which a court 

may choose to disregard a particular witness’s testimony as 

“inherently improbable.” Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 13. However, a

trial court may do so “only in those instances where (1) there are 

material inconsistencies in the testimony and (2) there is no other 

circumstantial or direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.

¶ 19. Moreover, “[t]he existence of any additional evidence 

supporting the verdict prevents the judge from reconsidering the 

witness's credibility.” Id.; see also Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 38 

(explaining that the Robbins court, in disregarding testimony,

relied on “the inconsistencies in the [witness’s] testimony plus

the patently false statements the [witness] made plus the lack of 

any corroboration”).

¶25 A generalized challenge to the sufficiency of the State’s 

evidence, by contrast, does not necessarily include an assertion 

that any particular witness’s testimony is “inherently 

improbable.” Indeed, we clarified in Doyle that a Robbins claim 

“may be a component of an insufficiency challenge, but not 

every insufficiency challenge raises a Robbins issue.” Doyle, 2018 

UT App 239, ¶ 19. After all, a defendant who raises a general 

sufficiency challenge asks a court to examine the evidence, 

including “all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it,” 

to determine if “some evidence exists” that could support the 

verdict. See State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 503

(quotation simplified). In conducting this inquiry, it is ordinarily 

not the court’s place to disregard any particular items of 

admitted evidence; rather, a court should examine all admitted 

evidence to determine if “some evidence exists” that could 

support the verdict. Id. (quotation simplified); see also State v. 

Salgado, 2018 UT App 139, ¶ 37, 427 P.3d 1228 (“If there is any

evidence, however slight or circumstantial, which tends to show 

guilt of the crime charged, the court must submit the case to the 

jury.” (emphasis added) (quotation simplified)).
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 12 2020 UT App 3

¶26 When making a Robbins claim, by contrast, a defendant 

raises a whole “new legal theory.” See Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, 

¶ 19. In a Robbins claim, a defendant specifically asks the court to 

disregard a particular witness’s testimony as “inherently 

improbable.” Id. (stating that the “new legal theory” inherent in 

a Robbins claim is that “the insufficiency should be reviewed 

only after [the targeted witness’s] testimony is ignored as 

‘inherently improbable’”). Essentially, a defendant who raises a 

Robbins claim in the context of a directed verdict motion for 

insufficiency is asking the court, in conducting its sufficiency-ofthe-evidence review, to examine only a particular subset of the 

admitted evidence, and to disregard certain witness testimony 

before undertaking that review. See id.

¶27 In Doyle, we held that the defendant had failed to 

preserve a Robbins claim for appellate review when he made 

only a general motion for directed verdict on insufficiency 

grounds, arguing that the evidence was “inconclusive and 

speculative.” Id. ¶¶ 12–19. We noted that, at the trial court level, 

the defendant had not specifically asked the court to exclude or 

disregard any particular evidence, and that his effort to raise a 

Robbins claim on appeal went “far beyond what was argued in 

the motion for a directed verdict.” Id. ¶ 19. We stated that the 

trial court, upon receiving a motion for directed verdict arguing 

insufficiency, would not have understood “from context” that 

the defendant was making a Robbins challenge. Id. We noted 

that, in the motion made at the trial court level, “[t]here was 

never any argument that [the witness’s] testimony was so 

inherently improbable that it should be disregarded before 

analyzing the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.” Id. Under such

circumstances, we deemed the defendant’s Robbins claim 

unpreserved, and reviewed it only for plain error.

¶28 We discern no meaningful differences between the 

situation presented in Doyle and the situation presented here. 

Skinner’s directed verdict motion, like the one made in Doyle, 
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20180584-CA 13 2020 UT App 3

was general, asserting that the evidence that the State presented 

was insufficient, but not asking that any particular testimony be 

disregarded as inherently improbable “before analyzing the 

sufficiency of the State’s evidence.” See id. Skinner argued simply 

that the State’s case “was solely based” on V.M.’s testimony, 

which, while possibly corroborated by DNA evidence, was 

unsupported—and perhaps partially contradicted by—“forensic 

evidence.” At no point did Skinner mention Robbins or any 

related case law, or give the trial court any other indication that 

he was raising a Robbins claim.2

¶29 On appeal, by contrast—apparently tacitly 

acknowledging that, if V.M.’s testimony is included in the 

calculus, sufficient evidence exists to support his convictions for 

aggravated sexual assault3—Skinner asks us to disregard V.M.’s 

 

2. Skinner asserts that the trial court, in ruling on the directed 

verdict motion, recognized the motion as one grounded in 

Robbins, because the court mentioned that it was “following the 

caselaw regarding how the Court should go about doing this, 

and how the Court should view the evidence,” and because it 

indicated that it was denying the motion because the State had 

“produced believable evidence of each and every element” of the 

offenses charged “from which a jury acting reasonably could 

find the defendant guilty.” In our view, Skinner overreads these 

general statements from the trial court, which certainly do not 

leave us with the impression that the trial court believed it was 

ruling on a Robbins claim.

3. By making a general insufficiency argument before the trial 

court in connection with his directed verdict motion, Skinner 

preserved for appeal the issue of whether, considering all of the 

evidence presented at trial, sufficient evidence existed to support 

his convictions. However, Skinner does not press this issue on 

appeal, and instead argues solely that we should disregard 

(continued...)
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 14 2020 UT App 3

testimony as inherently improbable under Robbins before 

undertaking our assessment of the sufficiency of the State’s 

evidence. But this issue—this “new legal theory,” see Doyle, 2018 

UT App 239, ¶ 19—was never raised before the trial court. As in 

Doyle, this theory “goes far beyond what was argued” in 

Skinner’s motion for a directed verdict. Id. In arguing that V.M.’s 

testimony should be excluded as inherently improbable, Skinner 

is not merely asking us to find that the evidence presented was 

insufficient. Instead, he is asking us to disregard V.M.’s 

testimony in its entirety and then evaluate whether the State’s 

evidence—without V.M.’s testimony—is sufficient to support a 

conviction. A defendant who wants a trial court to disregard a 

witness’s testimony under Robbins before, or in connection with, 

undertaking a sufficiency-of-the-evidence review must make 

that request known to the trial court so that the court has an 

opportunity to rule on the issue. Because Skinner did not ever 

make such a request to the trial court, he did not properly 

preserve it for our review on appeal. Accordingly, we review the 

issue only for plain error.

B

¶30 In order to demonstrate that a trial court committed 

plain error, an appellant must show that “(1) an error exists; 

(2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 

(3) absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 

more favorable outcome.” State v. Graves, 2019 UT App 72, ¶ 18, 

442 P.3d 1228 (quotation simplified). In this context, where 

Skinner asserts that the trial court committed plain error in 

 

(...continued)

V.M.’s testimony under Robbins, and only then consider the

sufficiency of the State’s evidence. Accordingly, we do not 

further address any issues regarding the general sufficiency of 

the State’s evidence, when V.M.’s testimony is included.
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20180584-CA 15 2020 UT App 3

failing to sua sponte disregard V.M.’s testimony as inherently 

improbable, Skinner must demonstrate not only that, had 

Skinner raised the issue below, it would have been error for the 

trial court to fail to disregard V.M.’s testimony, but also that 

V.M.’s testimony was so obviously and fundamentally faulty 

that the trial court should have stepped in and excluded that

testimony from the equation without specifically being asked to 

do so. Skinner cannot make this showing here, because on these 

facts it would not have been error at all—let alone obvious 

error—to deny Skinner’s Robbins motion even if it had been 

clearly and timely made.

¶31 In Robbins, our supreme court emphasized the narrowness

of the exception it was announcing, and held that a court 

may “reevaluate the jury’s credibility determinations” only 

where a witness presents testimony that is inherently 

improbable and there is no additional evidence of the 

defendant’s guilt. State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ¶ 19, 210 P.3d 288. 

In Prater, the court again examined the scope of the 

exception, recognizing that in Robbins, the witness’s 

inconsistent testimony, standing alone, was not enough to 

allow the court to reassess the witness’s credibility. State v. 

Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 38, 392 P.3d 398. Rather, it “was the 

inconsistencies in the [witness’s] testimony plus the patently 

false statements the [witness] made plus the lack of any 

corroboration.” Id. More recently, we have emphasized that 

the Robbins exception is “narrow” and that “[i]t is difficult 

to successfully establish such a claim on appeal,” see State v. 

Cady, 2018 UT App 8, ¶¶ 17–18, 414 P.3d 974; see also State v. 

Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶ 23 n.6 (stating that “[a] case which 

actually falls within the Robbins-Prater rubric is exceedingly 

rare,” and noting that “we have not found a single Utah decision 

examined under that rubric that has reversed a verdict since 

Robbins”), and that “any additional evidence supporting the 

verdict would preclude a judge from reconsidering a witness’s 

credibility,” see Rivera, 2019 UT App 188, ¶ 24. Thus, under 
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20180584-CA 16 2020 UT App 3

Robbins and Prater, an inherent improbability claim will 

necessarily fail where any evidence corroborates the witness’s 

testimony.

¶32 In this case, V.M.’s overall account was at least 

partially corroborated by other evidence. For instance, DNA and 

saliva tests conclusively showed that there had been sexual 

contact between V.M. and Skinner. Specifically, V.M.’s oral and 

perianal swabs tested positive for seminal fluid and her breast 

swabs tested positive for saliva, all of which contained DNA 

consistent with Skinner’s. Skinner’s penile swabs also tested 

positive for saliva and DNA consistent with V.M.’s. In addition, 

V.M.’s wounds, and the copious blood found at the scene, 

corroborated her testimony that she had been shot. Thus, there 

exists evidence at least partially corroborating V.M.’s version of 

events.

¶33 Skinner argues, however, that the existing corroborating

evidence does not go to the issue of whether the sexual acts were 

consensual, which is where this case’s true fault line lies. As 

Skinner points out, the corroborating evidence bolsters other 

(less controversial) aspects of V.M.’s account—such as her claims

that she had been shot, and that sexual contact occurred between 

her and Skinner—but does not necessarily back up her claim that 

she did not consent to sexual contact with Skinner. 

¶34 But Skinner misses the point. Corroborating evidence 

sufficient to defeat a Robbins claim does not have to corroborate 

the witness’s account across the board, in every particular. It just 

has to provide a second source of evidence for at least some of 

the details of the witness’s story. See Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶ 38 

(stating that a “lack of any corroboration” is required to sustain a 

Robbins claim (emphasis added)); see also Rivera, 2019 UT App 

188, ¶ 24 (stating that “any additional evidence supporting the 

verdict would preclude a judge from reconsidering a witness’s 

credibility”). Indeed, in a very similar context, we have already 
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 17 2020 UT App 3

held that a Robbins claim fails when the witness’s overall 

account is bolstered by other evidence, even if that other 

evidence does not shed light on whether the witness consented 

to sexual activity. See State v. Crippen, 2016 UT App 152, ¶¶ 15–

16, 380 P.3d 18 (stating that, although the defendant’s 

“statements during the jailhouse phone call” that he had 

engaged in sexual activity with the witness “were not evidence 

of a lack of consent, those statements do tend to corroborate [the 

witness’s] overall account,” and holding that the witness’s 

testimony was therefore “not inherently improbable”).3F

4 The 

corroborating evidence that exists here is enough to render 

Skinner’s Robbins claim invalid. 

¶35 While there were some inconsistencies between V.M’s 

testimony and Expert’s testimony, including blood spatter 

evidence and the positions of V.M. and Skinner during 

the shooting, it is ordinarily not the job of the court to 

decide whether V.M.’s testimony is believable. Indeed, “the jury 

was not obligated to believe [V.M.’s] account of events, and it 

was the jury’s duty—not the appellate court’s—to weigh that 

evidence and make a determination of fact.” See id. ¶ 16 

(quotation simplified). “Disregarding witness testimony” as 

inherently false or improbable “should be an uncommon course 

of action,” which courts should take “only when the witness’s 

credibility is so far impeached as to be unbelievable by a 

reasonable jury.” Id. (quotation simplified). In this case, the trial 

 

4. Indeed, by the same token, many of the inconsistencies 

Skinner sees in V.M.’s testimony—which mostly have to do with 

the details of the shooting—likewise do not directly bear on her 

claim that she did not consent to the sexual contact. Where 

Skinner mounts an argument for inherent improbability based 

upon tangential inconsistencies in V.M.’s overall story, the State 

is entitled to rebut that argument with evidence that 

corroborates other tangential elements of V.M.’s overall story. 
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 18 2020 UT App 3

court did not plainly err by allowing the jury to judge the 

competing witnesses’ testimonies, and therefore did not plainly 

err by failing to sua sponte declare V.M’s testimony inherently 

improbable.

II. The Theft by Receiving Stolen Property Conviction

¶36 Next, Skinner argues that his conviction for theft by

receiving stolen property should be reversed because the 

evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. In making this 

argument, Skinner does not ask us to disregard the testimony of

any witness as inherently improbable; instead, he makes the 

same general sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument he made to 

the trial court in connection with his directed verdict motion. 

Thus, this claim is preserved, and we review it accordingly. As 

noted above, we will uphold the trial court’s denial of Skinner’s 

motion if “we conclude that some evidence exists from which a 

reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Hirschi, 2007 

UT App 255, ¶ 15, 167 P.3d 503 (quotation simplified).

¶37 A person is guilty of theft by receiving stolen property if 

that person “receives, [or] retains . . . the property of another 

knowing that the property is stolen, or believing that the 

property is probably stolen,” and intends “to deprive the owner” 

of it. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019).5 The 

State’s argument, on this count, was that the gun Skinner used to 

confront V.M. actually belonged to Owner, and that Skinner 

intended to keep it for his own and did not have Owner’s 

permission to possess it.

 

5. Because there have been no material changes to the language 

of the statute since the time of the incident in question, for the 

sake of convenience we cite to the most recent version of the 

statute. See State v. Lopez, 2019 UT App 11, ¶ 25 n.3, 438 P.3d 950.
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 19 2020 UT App 3

¶38 The State’s position was supported by at least “some 

evidence.” See Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ¶ 15 (quotation 

simplified). Indeed, Owner testified that the gun belonged to 

him but it had gone missing from Mother’s house approximately 

one month after Skinner (who had temporarily been living at the 

house) moved out. Because Owner did not give anyone 

permission to move the gun, he promptly called police, provided 

them its serial number, and reported it stolen. After the shooting, 

police found a gun and matching case during a search of 

Skinner’s apartment. The make and model matched that 

reported as stolen by Owner. But when questioned by the police, 

Skinner stated that V.M. had brought the gun to his apartment.

¶39 Skinner acknowledges Owner’s testimony, but contends 

that it is not enough, by itself, to support the verdict, because the 

State did not present any evidence about whether Mother might 

have given Skinner permission to possess the gun. But Skinner 

does not argue, or even imply, that Mother’s testimony would 

have differed in any material respect from Owner’s. And more 

to the point, Owner’s testimony is alone sufficient to support the 

conviction. He testified that Mother had gifted him the gun, and 

that therefore he—and not Mother—owned it, and that he had 

not given Skinner permission to possess it. While the State could 

have chosen to present evidence from other witnesses, including 

perhaps Mother, to buttress Owner’s testimony, the fact that it 

chose not to do so does not render Owner’s testimony 

insufficient. We perceive no error in the trial court’s denial of 

Skinner’s motion for directed verdict on the theft count.

CONCLUSION

¶40 We conclude that Skinner failed to preserve his Robbins

objection to V.M.’s testimony, and that the trial court did not err 

at all, let alone plainly, in failing to sua sponte disregard V.M.’s 

testimony in connection with its sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

examination on the aggravated sexual assault counts. In 
State v. Skinner

20180584-CA 20 2020 UT App 3

addition, we conclude that the trial court committed no error in 

denying Skinner’s directed verdict motion on the theft count.

¶41 Affirmed.