NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 22-2385

__________

BRIAN A. PICCINETTI,

on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

v.

CLAYTON, MYRICK, MCCLANAHAN & COULTER, PLLC;

INTERNAL CREDIT SYSTEMS, INC.; ROBERT J. NAUSEEF; 

THEODORE LACHMAN

Theodore Lachman,

 Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-16-cv-04032)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Tonianne J. Bongiovanni (by consent)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 2, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 5, 2023)

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OPINION*

___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Theodore Lachman appeals the District Court’s order granting 

judgment against him and awarding attorney’s fees to the appellee. For the reasons 

detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

Plaintiff/appellee Brian Piccinetti filed an amended complaint alleging that several 

defendants had violated the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act. On behalf of all 

defendants—including Lachman—attorney Christopher Dalton settled the case. The 

settlement agreement provided that the various defendants would be jointly and severally 

liable to Piccinetti; that they would pay Piccinetti $2,500; that Piccinetti would be the 

prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees; that the defendants waived any 

objections to service; and that the parties consented to permit a Magistrate Judge to 

determine appropriate attorney’s fees. See ECF No. 57-1 (email memorializing oral 

agreement). 

Piccinetti filed a motion for attorney’s fees, claiming that he was owed $31,176. 

ECF No. 47-1. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion in part, ordering the defendants 

to pay $23,361. However, Lachman, now represented by new counsel, then sought to 

dismiss the action, claiming both that he was never properly served and that Dalton was 

not his attorney and thus lacked authority to bind him to a settlement. The Magistrate 

Judge held a hearing at which Lachman and Dalton testified. See ECF No. 86. 

Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge ruled that Dalton represented Lachman and had 

authority to settle. See ECF No. 87. Plaintiff then asked to amend the judgment to 

enlarge the attorney’s fees order to cover the fees incurred in litigating Lachman’s motion 
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to dismiss, which the Magistrate Judge granted, increasing the award to $48,911. See

ECF No. 93. Lachman appealed.1

In his appellate brief, Lachman makes two arguments. First, he argues that he did 

not consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge and that the Magistrate Judge 

therefore lacked authority to enter judgment. Second, he contends that he was never 

served with the amended complaint and that the District Court lacked personal 

jurisdiction over him.2

 We generally exercise de novo review over these issues. See

Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 205 n.9 (3d Cir. 2022); McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic 

Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1998). 

However, both of Lachman’s arguments run headlong into the settlement 

agreement, in which the defendants “consent[ed] to magistrate judge jurisdiction,” and 

“waive[d] any challenge to service of process.” ECF No. 57-1. These stipulations are 

facially adequate. That is, the expression of consent is sufficiently clear to satisfy 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), see Hatcher v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 323 F.3d 513, 515–16 

(7th Cir. 2003); Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999), and it is 

1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After filing his notice of appeal, 

Lachman also filed a motion to vacate judgment, which the District Court denied. 

Because Lachman did not file a new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the order 

denying his motion to vacate, we lack jurisdiction to consider that order. See generally

Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008).

2 Lachman has forfeited any arguments that he has not developed in his brief. See In re 

Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[B]ecause they fail to develop [two] 

argument[s] in their opening brief, the Court holds that the [appellants] have forfeited

these claims.”); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) 

(noting that pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other 

litigants”).
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permissible for counsel, rather than the party, to convey consent, see United States v. 

Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 1999); cf. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 

925, 932 (1991). Further, defects in service and personal jurisdiction can be waived. See

Danziger & De Llano, LLP v. Morgan Verkamp LLC, 948 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2020); 

Grand Ent. Grp., Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 492 (3d Cir. 1993).

Thus, Lachman’s arguments can prevail only if he establishes that he is not bound 

by the settlement agreement. In the District Court, he argued that Attorney Dalton 

represented only the other defendants, not him, and thus lacked authority to settle the case 

on his behalf. Under New Jersey law, which the District Court applied without objection, 

see generally Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1033 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991), “stipulations 

made by attorneys when acting within the scope of their authority are enforceable against 

their clients,” Jennings v. Reed, 885 A.2d 482, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)

(quotation marks, ellipses omitted). Authority to settle “may ‘be created by written or 

spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the 

agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act on the principal’s account.’” Id.

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 26 (1958)).

The District Court held a hearing and concluded that Dalton’s account—in which 

he said that he discussed the settlement with Lachman and obtained his approval before 

agreeing to it—was more credible than Lachman’s. We would upset this ruling only 

upon a showing of clear error. See Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1031 n.5; Lahue v. Pio Costa, 

623 A.2d 775, 788–89 (App. Div. 1993). Lachman has failed to present any arguments 

as to why the Court erred in reaching this conclusion, and the issue is arguably forfeited. 
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See supra n.2. In any event, given Dalton’s clear testimony and an email in which 

Lachman responded that a proposed settlement “looked good,” we discern no error. See 

generally Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“Where there 

are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot 

be clearly erroneous.”). Further, Lachman has asserted no other argument as to why the 

settlement agreement should not bind him.

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.