FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-3415

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ADRIAN P. SMITH,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Mark Borello, Judge.

April 25, 2018

B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

Appellant was convicted of manslaughter by culpable 

negligence and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, with a 15-

year minimum-mandatory term, and designated as an Habitual 

Felony Offender and Prison Releasee Reoffender. At trial, the 

jury found by special interrogatory that the victim’s death was 

“caused by the neglect of [Appellant], a caregiver.” 

The victim was a four-month-old infant. Appellant forcibly 

thrust a baby wipe down the infant’s mouth and into his throat so 

deeply that he asphyxiated. The emergency room physician had 

to remove the foreign object from the infant’s mouth with forceps. 

Expert testimony established that the infant could not have 
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ingested the wipe on his own volition. The foreign object had 

blood on it that was attributed to an injury to the infant’s mouth, 

a torn frenulum, that bled on the wipe as it was forcibly shoved 

into the infant’s throat. 

Although Appellant was charged with second-degree murder, 

the jury returned a verdict of guilt for the lesser-included crime of 

manslaughter. This court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and 

sentence, without opinion, in Smith v. State, 25 So. 3d 1229 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2010). In Appellant’s first collateral case, he claimed 

defense counsel was ineffective and sought relief under Florida 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. That motion was denied by 

the trial court, and this court affirmed, without opinion, in Smith 

v. State, 129 So. 3d 1072 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). 

Appellant’s second postconviction motion was filed under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), where he asserted 

that the trial court improperly designated him as a Prison 

Releasee Reofffender, because he had not been released from 

prison within three years of the date he committed the 

manslaughter. The trial court denied the claim. This court 

affirmed in Smith v. State, 151 So. 3d 44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014),

rev. denied, 163 So. 3d 513 (Fla. 2015), where we held that 

Appellant did qualify for the designation as a Prison Releasee 

Reoffender, based on his return to prison for a violation of 

conditional release and his subsequent second release from 

prison within three years of the date of the crime. 

In this collateral appeal, Appellant’s fourth appearance in 

this court, he asserts that his Habitual Felony Offender 

designation is an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.800(a), because one of his qualifying felonies, a 1996 

conviction for attempted burglary, was not valid. Appellant relies 

on Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620, 627 (Fla. 2000), where the 

Florida Supreme Court held that Chapter 95-184, Laws of 

Florida, violated the single-subject rule of Article III, section 6 of 

the Florida Constitution. We note that in Heggs, the supreme 

court held that certain sentences imposed under the legislation 

were invalid during a very limited time period, which expired 

approximately two decades ago. 
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Regardless, Appellant cannot challenge his Habitual Felony 

Offender sentence in an unrelated case by attempting to attack 

the 1996 conviction for burglary used to habitualize him under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. Appellant was 

required to move to vacate his 1996 conviction in a separate 

proceeding, filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, 

within two years of the date his conviction became final. But a 

motion attacking the 1996 conviction would clearly be untimely

at this point. 

As we stated in State v. Williams, 854 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2003), and reiterate here, rule 3.800(a) does not authorize a 

legal challenge to a conviction: “Because Rule 3.800 provides 

only an avenue for correcting, modifying, or reducing a sentence,” 

Appellant’s challenge to an underlying conviction could not be 

considered in the trial court under this limitation of Florida Rule 

of Criminal Procedure 3.800. Id. at 217. 

Thus, although it was not the reason for the trial court’s 

ruling denying relief here, we affirm on this basis. See Childers 

v. State, 936 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), rev. denied, 939 

So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2006) (affirming trial court ruling on different 

ground under “tipsy coachman” doctrine). 

AFFIRMED.

WOLF and RAY, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Adrian P. Smith, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Barbara Debelius, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.