J-A26043-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ERIC SCOTT HECK,

Appellant No. 305 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 16, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0004604-2009

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2015

Appellant, Eric Scott Heck, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on January 16, 2015, following the revocation of his probation. On 

appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of sentence. For the 

reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

On August 9, 2010, Appellant pleaded guilty to charges of criminal 

trespass, theft by unlawful taking, and criminal mischief.1 That same day, 

the trial court sentenced him to not less than twenty nor more than sixty 

months’ intermediate punishment (IP). Appellant did not file a direct appeal.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 3503(a)(1)(ii), 3921(a), and 3304(a)(5), respectively. 
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On May 2, 2012, the trial court issued a bench warrant for Appellant 

because of a violation of probation. In December 2012, the trial court 

continued Appellant’s revocation hearing pending an evaluation of his 

eligibility for state IP (SIP). On April 23, 2013, the trial court revoked 

Appellant’s probation and sentenced him to not less than two years of SIP. 

On October 22, 2014, the Commonwealth received notice that

Appellant escaped from SIP and, therefore, had been expelled from it. (See 

N.T. Sentencing, 1/16/15, at 2). Because of that escape and criminal 

conduct Appellant committed during his escape, the Commonwealth charged 

him with additional crimes. (See id.).

On January 16, 2015, following a revocation hearing, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to not less than four nor more than eight years of 

incarceration for criminal trespass. The court credited Appellant for time 

served from July 28, 2009, through August 9, 2010, and from December 14, 

2012, to January 16, 2015. 

On January 26, 2015, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking 

modification of his sentence. On February 16, 2015, the trial court denied 

the motion. The instant, timely appeal followed. 

On February 19, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Appellant complied on March 4, 2015. On March 10, 2015, the 

trial court filed an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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 On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s postsentence motion for modification of sentence where Appellant’s 

sentence is excessive and unreasonable and constitutes too

severe of a punishment in light of the alleged gravity of the 

offense, the alleged probation violations, what is needed to 

protect the public, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 5).

On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence.2 In Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (en banc), an en banc panel of this Court held that “this Court’s scope 

of review in an appeal from a revocation sentencing includes discretionary 

sentencing challenges.” Cartrette, supra at 1034. Thus, Appellant’s claim 

is properly before us. 

The right to appeal the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not 

absolute. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 860 A.2d 122 (Pa. 2004). When an appellant 

challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed, he must 

present “a substantial question as to the appropriateness of the sentence[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). An appellant must, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

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2 We note that Appellant preserved his discretionary aspects of sentence 

claim by filing a timely post-sentence motion for reconsideration of 

sentence. See McAfee, infra at 275.
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Appellate Procedure 2119(f), articulate “a colorable argument that the 

sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary 

to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing scheme.”

Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 887 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). If 

an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement meets these prerequisites, we 

determine whether a substantial question exists. See Commonwealth v. 

Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc), appeal denied,

759 A.2d 920 (Pa. 2000). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which 

the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which 

are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (emphases in 

original).

Here, Appellant has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. 

(See Appellant’s Brief, at 8-10). In it, Appellant argues that the sentence 

was excessive and unreasonable and constitutes too severe a punishment 

because he pleaded guilty to the charges that constituted the basis for 

revocation and because the sentence of total confinement was more severe 

than his previous sentences of IP. (See id. at 9-10). This claim raises a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 98 

(Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013). 

[T]he imposition of sentence following the revocation of 

probation is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

which, absent an abuse of that discretion, will not be disturbed 

on appeal. . . . Once probation has been revoked, a sentence of 
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total confinement may be imposed if any of the following 

conditions exist: (1) the defendant has been convicted of 

another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that 

it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not 

imprisoned; or, (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the 

authority of court.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). 

Here, as discussed above, this is Appellant’s second revocation from 

IP. Further, Appellant’s probation violation was an escape that led to new 

criminal charges. (See Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/15, at 3). Thus, Appellant 

has twice demonstrated his inability to conform to the requirements of IP. 

(See id.). Lastly, Appellant’s sentence was well within the statutory limits.3 

(See id.). Thus, the record amply supports Appellant’s sentence of total 

confinement, and his claim that the sentence was unreasonable is frivolous. 

See Edwards, supra at 327. 

Further, even if this were not the case, Appellant’s one-paragraph 

argument that his sentence is excessive is underdeveloped. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 9-10). It is settled that “we do not accept bald 

assertions of sentencing errors. Rather, Appellant must support his 

assertions by articulating the way in which the court’s actions violated the 

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3 We note that the sentencing guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed 

following a revocation of probation. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 

A.3d 735, 741 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2014) 

(citation omitted).
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sentencing code.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Appellant failed to do so. (See Appellant ‘s 

Brief, at 9-10). Appellant’s issue does not merit relief. See Malovich, 

supra at 1252. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2015