AFFIRM as MODIFIED; Opinion Filed May 6, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-00999-CR

No. 05-19-01001-CR

PABLO PACHECO RAMIREZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. F17-76295-V & F17-76296-V

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Schenck, Molberg, and Nowell

Opinion by Justice Nowell

The State charged Pablo Pacheco Ramirez with aggravated sexual assault of 

a child (trial court cause number F17-76295-V) and indecency with a child (trial 

court cause number F17-76296-V). He waived his right to a jury trial and entered a 

plea of no contest. After hearing evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty in 

both cases. He was sentenced to twelve years’ confinement. 

In three issues, he argues the evidence is insufficient to support both 

convictions and his plea of no contest was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily. In his fourth issue, he requests we modify the judgment in trial court 
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cause number F17-76296-V to delete duplicative court costs. We modify the 

judgment in trial court cause number F17-76296-V and affirm as modified. We 

affirm the trial court’s judgment in trial court cause number F17-76295-V.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

1. Legal Standards

In his first and second issues, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to 

support his convictions.1 We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

on a criminal offense for which the State has the burden of proof under the single 

sufficiency standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Acosta 

v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Under this standard, the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2011). This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve 

conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences 

 

1 Appellant entered a no contest plea, which had the effect of admitting all material facts alleged in the 

formal charge and alleviating the State from proving appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Article 1.15 of the code of criminal procedure 

only requires substantiation of a no contest plea. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15; see Menefee, 287 

S.W.3d at 13. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on a plea of no contest, we determine 

whether the evidence embraces each essential element of the offense charged. See id. 

However, in this case, the record shows the parties and trial court conducted the trial as though appellant 

pleaded not guilty and the State was required to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In light of that, appellant requests we review the evidence under the standard set forth in

Jackson v. Virginia, and the State agrees. Because the parties agree, we apply the Jackson v. Virginia

sufficiency standard. 
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from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. Therefore, in analyzing legal sufficiency, we 

determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined 

and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the verdict. Id. 

We do not resolve conflicts of fact, weigh evidence, or evaluate the credibility 

of the witnesses as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 

S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Instead we determine whether both the 

explicit and implicit findings of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the adjudication. Adelman 

v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). When the record supports 

conflicting inferences, we presume the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of 

the verdict and defer to that determination. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The 

factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and their testimony’s weight. 

See Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

As applicable in this case, a person commits the offense of aggravated sexual 

assault of a child if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the sexual organ of 

the child to contact the sexual organ of the actor and the child is younger than 

fourteen years of age at the time of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021. 

Further, as applicable in this case, a person commits the offense of indecency with a 

child if a person engaged in sexual contact with a child younger than seventeen years 

of age. See id. § 21.11(a)(1). 
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2. Facts Presented to Trial Court

The complainant, B.P., is appellant’s niece. She was eleven years old at the 

time of trial. Appellant lived in B.P.’s grandparents’ house where B.P. regularly 

spent the night. B.P. enjoyed going to her grandparents’ house where she played

with appellant’s children, her cousins. 

B.P. testified that one night when she was nine years old and spending the 

night at her grandparents’ house, she and her cousins slept in appellant’s room. She 

was awakened in the middle of the night when a lamp was turned on; she saw 

appellant sitting on the floor and looking at books. When she got out of bed and sat 

down next to him, appellant asked whether she knew what sex is and showed her a 

book about sex. When he asked whether she wanted him to show her what sex is, 

she declined. B.P. testified appellant then went to his daughter2 who was sleeping, 

pulled down her pants and his pants, and “began to rape her in front of me.” 

Appellant asked B.P. if she wanted to do the same thing and she said no. Appellant 

continued asking. She testified: “After that I kept hesitating, but then I gave in and 

I was on my back, and he got on top of me, he pulled down my pants and he put the 

covers over us and he stuck his penis into me but not all the way.” She explained he 

put his penis into her vagina. 

 

2 Appellant’s daughter is older than B.P. and has spina bifida.
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The next morning appellant called B.P. into his room. He told her if she 

rubbed his penis that it would grow bigger and, she testified, “then I don’t remember 

the conversation but it ended up me putting my hands inside his pants and rubbing 

on his penis.” After she stopped touching his penis, she turned around, took off her 

pants and underwear, and he “proceeded to rub his penis on my butt.”

B.P.’s mother described B.P.’s outcry to her; B.P.’s mother’s testimony about 

what B.P. told her mirrors the testimony B.P. provided in the trial court. 

3. Analysis

B.P. testified about the incidents with which appellant was charged. She

stated appellant put his penis in her vagina and, in a separate incident, rubbed his 

penis on her “butt.” This Court previously has held that “[t]he testimony of the child 

victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for sexual assault.” Lee v. State, 

186 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet ref'd); see TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 38.07 (“A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 20A.02(a)(3), (4), (7), or 

(8), Section 22.011, or Section 22.021, Penal Code, is supportable on the 

uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the victim informed 

any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within one year after the 

date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred.”). B.P.’s testimony alone, 

which embraces every essential element of the offenses charged, is sufficient to 

support the convictions. Additionally, B.P.’s testimony was corroborated by her 

mother’s testimony about B.P.’s outcry. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
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favorable to the trial court’s findings of guilt, we conclude a rational trier of fact 

could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

We overrule appellant’s first and second issues.

B. Plea of No Contest

In his third issue, appellant asserts his plea of no contest was not entered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, in violation of his constitutional right to 

due process. Appellant argues the record shows he did not understand his plea based 

on the fact he “vehemently contest[ed] the accusation.” 

A plea of no contest or guilty must be free and voluntary. See Briggs v. State, 

560 S.W.3d 176, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 

26.13(b) (“No plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court 

unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and 

voluntary.”); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998) (“A plea of guilty 

is constitutionally valid only to the extent it is ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’”). 

“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, 

intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 

likely consequences.” United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). When a 

defendant enters into a plea, attesting he understands the nature of his plea and that 

it is being made knowingly and voluntarily, he has the burden on appeal to show his 

plea was involuntary. Briggs, 560 S.W.3d at 187.
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During a pre-trial hearing, the trial court informed appellant that if the State 

proved he was guilty, then the trial court was authorized to find appellant guilty; the 

trial court informed appellant about the ranges of punishment, including applicable 

terms of incarceration. The trial court informed appellant he would be required to 

register as a sex offender and, because he was not a citizen of the United States, he 

could be denied admission to the country, denied naturalization, or be deported. 

Appellant stated he understood each of these statements. The trial court then asked 

whether, knowing everything that was explained, did appellant “wish to waive or 

give up your right to a jury trial and enter your pleas on [sic] No Contest at this 

time?” Appellant replied “Yes, sir.” Appellant’s counsel then informed the trial 

court: “Your Honor, I’ve spent many months counseling, advising with Pablo and 

I’m convinced that he understands the concept of the Waiver of Jury, the concept of 

how any finding of guilty in each of these cases will impact him for immigration 

purposes. And he enters respective pleas of No Contest in these cases.” On the day 

of trial, the trial court again informed appellant of the charges against him, which he 

stated he understood. The trial court again confirmed appellant’s plea of no contest, 

and accepted the plea.

 Nothing in this record shows appellant did not enter his plea freely and 

voluntarily. Rather, the record shows appellant understood the charges against him, 

ranges of punishment, and potential immigration consequences. He then chose to 
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plead no contest. Based on this record, we conclude appellant has not met his burden 

to show his plea of no contest was involuntary. We overrule appellant’s third issue. 

C. Modification of Judgment

In his fourth issue, appellant requests we delete duplicative costs from the 

judgments in trial court cause number F17-76296-V because the trial court may 

assess costs only once against a defendant when disposing of multiple cases in a 

single criminal action. The State agrees.

“In a single criminal action in which the defendant is convicted of two or more 

offenses or of multiple counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court 

cost or fee only once against the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 

102.073(a). For purposes of this rule, a person convicted of more than one offense 

in the same trial is convicted of those offenses in a “single criminal action.” Burton 

v. State, No. 05-18-00608-CR, 2019 WL 3543580, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 

5, 2019, no pet.) (citing Hurlburt v. State, 506 S.W.3d 199, 201–04 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2016, no pet.)). When two or more convictions arise from a single criminal 

action, “each court cost or fee the amount of which is determined according to the 

category of offense must be assessed using the highest category of offense that is 

possible based on the defendant’s convictions.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 

102.073(b). 

It is undisputed that the two cases at issue in this appeal were prosecuted in 

the same trial. The record shows $574.00 in court costs were assessed in each case. 
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Examining the Criminal Court Fee Docket, it is clear those costs are duplicative. 

Because the costs assessed in trial court cause number F17-76296-V are duplicative, 

we reform the judgment in that case to delete the improper fees. See Rubio v. State, 

No. 05-17-00621-CR, 2018 WL 3424362, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 6, 2018, 

pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We sustain appellant's fourth 

issue.

D. Conclusion

We modify the judgment in trial court cause number F17-76296-V and affirm 

as modified. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in trial court cause number F17-

76295-V.

/Erin A. Nowell/

ERIN A. NOWELL

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

190999F.U05
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

PABLO PACHECO RAMIREZ, 

Appellant

No. 05-19-00999-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1776295-V.

Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. 

Justices Schenck and Molberg 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 6th day of May, 2020.
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

PABLO PACHECO RAMIREZ, 

Appellant

No. 05-19-01001-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-1776296-V.

Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell. 

Justices Schenck and Molberg 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

MODIFIED as follows:

We DELETE the court costs of $574.00

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 6th day of May, 2020.