Filed 9/3/14 In re Phillip B. CA2/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

In re PHILLIP B., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law. 

 B251991 

 (Los Angeles County 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent. 

 v. 

LORI M., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 Super. Ct. No. CK96496) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Annabelle Cortez, Judge. Affirmed. 

Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, 

and John Savittieri, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
2 

 Lori M. (mother), mother of Phillip B. (born November 2002), appeals from a 

final judgment terminating jurisdiction of the juvenile court over Phillip pursuant to 

Welfare & Institutions Code section 361.2.1 Mother challenges the adequacy of the 

juvenile court’s final custody and visitation order entered in the case. We find no error 

and affirm the judgment. 

COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Family information 

The family consists of mother, Joshua B. (father), and Phillip.2 At the relevant 

times Phillip was living with father pursuant to a family law order granting father full 

physical custody. Mother had alternating weekend visits with Phillip. Mother’s male 

companion was Christopher M. (Christopher). 

 Phillip’s half-sibling, K. M. (born January 2007) lived in Iowa with her father, 

Michael M. (Michael), by agreement between mother and Michael. 

Referrals and investigation 

 The investigation of the family by the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) began on July 10, 2012, when DCFS received a 

referral alleging that that an incident of domestic violence had taken place between 

mother and Christopher while Phillip was visiting mother. When interviewed, then nineyear-old Phillip reported that mother and Christopher had an argument and he was 

frightened. Christopher started kicking things and screaming. Phillip’s half-sister was 

also visiting mother’s home at the time. Phillip reported that he and his sister went 

outside and a neighbor kept them safe. Phillip reported that he was afraid to go back to 

his mother’s house. 

 In October 2012, DCFS received another referral alleging that Phillip was a victim 

of severe neglect and emotional abuse by father. The reporting party stated that there was 

 1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless 

otherwise indicated. 

2 Father is not a party to this appeal. 
3 

an ongoing custody dispute, and that father was alienating Phillip from mother and 

“brainwashing” him. The reporting party also stated that father was ignoring Phillip’s 

dental and medical needs, was an alcoholic and drove with Phillip in the car while drunk, 

and had a history of psychiatric problems. In addition, the reporting party stated that 

Phillip told mother at their last visit in August 2012 that he no longer wanted to live. 

 When a social worker met with father in July 2012, father reported that Phillip had 

been seeing a therapist for about three months due to his issues with his mother and some 

bullying that was going on at school. Father said that Phillip had been living with him for 

almost four years and it was going well. Father’s parents helped out and Phillip enjoyed 

being with them. Father admitted to a history of substance abuse but stated that he had 

been sober for eight years. Father’s last arrest was in 2008 for DUI. He reported a 

psychiatric hospitalization in 2002, but denied current mental health problems. Father 

stated that he occasionally smoked marijuana for back pain and was in the process of 

obtaining a medical marijuana card. 

 On July 25, 2012, father tested positive for marijuana. Father’s fiancé, Mary, 

tested positive for opiates and hydrocodone. 

 Father said that he stopped allowing Phillip to visit mother after the July 2012 

incident. Phillip had been frightened and was often afraid to go to mother’s home. 

Phillip’s last visit with mother was in August 2012. Father did not want to force Phillip 

to visit with mother. Father provided the social worker with a copy of the Los Angeles 

County Superior Court family law order. 

 Mother was also interviewed in July 2012. She stated that she and Christopher 

had a fight because he arrived home late from work on a night when they planned to have 

a family night with the children. Mother said her neighbors overreacted and called the 

police. She said the neighbors called the police all the time to harass them because they 

wanted her and Christopher’s property. Mother stated that when police arrived, an 

officer informed her that Phillip had reported that mother or Christopher threatened to use 

a gun during the fight. Mother admitted that there was a loaded gun in the house, but 
4 

stated that it was in a locked safe and denied that either she or Christopher threatened to 

use it during the fight. 

 Mother reported using marijuana for anxiety and medical reasons, including 

during her pregnancies because she did not believe that it would affect the babies. 

Mother had a medical marijuana card and presented it to the social worker. Mother 

declined DCFS’s request that she submit to a drug test, stating that she did not have 

transportation to the drug testing location. 

 Mother denied a history of mental illness. The social workers noted that mother 

became irate, emotional and tearful when discussing the referrals, her lack of contact with 

her children, and her personal history. DCFS requested that mother participate in an 

upfront assessment, which would include a mental health screening. Mother declined. 

Mother abruptly ended her first interview with DCFS and asked the social worker not to 

return. 

 Mother reported that she and father had a history of domestic violence, but that 

she had only had verbal disputes with K.’s father, Michael, and Christopher. Mother said 

she and father did not get along. She claimed that father was a drug and alcohol abuser, 

and it was her belief that father used these substances in Phillip’s presence. She stated 

that father drove under the influence of alcohol with Phillip in the car. She also said 

father was bipolar and had at least one prior psychiatric hospitalization in 2002. Mother 

believed father was not taking Phillip to the dentist or doctor or providing for his basic 

needs. 

 Mother had a video camera mounted to her front door and a sign reading “[S]mile, 

you are being video taped.” Mother explained she was taking precautions to protect her 

property because she was having problems with the neighbors and things were being 

stolen. 

 Phillip was also interviewed. He related that at the time of the July 2012 incident 

he was visiting with mother. K. was also visiting from Iowa. Mother was angry because 

Christopher arrived home late from work. Phillip said they were screaming and arguing 

but did not hit each other, and that they calmed down after five or ten minutes. Phillip 
5 

and K. were nervous and scared. During the fight, a neighbor came and took him and K. 

to the neighbor’s house, at which time he disclosed that mother kept a gun in a safe. 

 Phillip said that mother usually starts the fights with Christopher. Phillip reported 

that he once saw mother pin Christopher to the floor. 

 Phillip said he had not visited mother since the July 2012 incident. He was not 

sure he wanted to because he was afraid that she would be angry because he reported the 

incident to his therapist. Phillip informed the social worker that mother hit him in the 

past. He was afraid because mother had a gun. Phillip said Christopher treated him well. 

 Phillip said father did not hit him and Mary treated him well. He stated that he 

never saw father intoxicated or using drugs. Phillip denied that father drove drunk when 

he was in the car. Philip admitted that he did not want to live when he was in second 

grade. But things were currently better and he no longer wanted to die. He reported 

problems at school and had been suspended and expelled. 

 Father’s companion, Mary, was also interviewed. She stated that she was 

concerned for Phillip’s safety while in mother’s care. Phillip had insomnia on some 

nights and did not want to visit with mother. Mary denied that she abused substances. 

She stated that she took medication and showed the social worker the prescription bottles. 

Mary informed the social worker that she was arrested for driving under the influence in 

2006, for which she was convicted and served a jail sentence. She denied that she or 

father currently drive after drinking. 

 Christopher, mother’s companion, reported that he had a good relationship with 

Phillip and missed him. Christopher stated that he and mother had verbal disputes and 

admitted that during the last one they went a little overboard. Christopher denied a 

history of substance abuse or mental illness. 

 Michael, father of K., was interviewed by Iowa child protective services social 

workers. He reported that K. had been in his care for more than three years. K. had not 

been to visit mother since the incident in July 2012. 
6 

Section 300 petition and detention 

 On November 9, 2012, DCFS secured a warrant for removal of Phillip from 

mother only. 

 On November 16, 2012, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Phillip. 

Under section 300, subdivision (a) (serious physical harm), counts 1 and 2, DCFS alleged 

that mother physically abused Phillip and that mother and Christopher engaged in violent 

altercations in the child’s presence. Under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to 

protect), counts 1 through 4, DCFS alleged that mother had a history of illicit drug use 

and is a current abuser of marijuana, that father had a history of illicit drug use and is a 

current abuser of marijuana, that mother previously physically abused Phillip, and that 

mother and Christopher engaged in a violent altercation in the child’s presence. 

 The detention hearing occurred on the same day. Mother and father were present 

and were appointed counsel. The court found a prima facie case to detain Phillip from 

mother’s custody. The child was released to father. The court ordered monitored visits 

for mother. The matter was set for adjudication on December 12, 2012. 

Subsequent interviews 

On December 6, 2012, the DCFS social worker telephoned mother to schedule an 

interview. Mother immediately became defensive. Mother refused to meet with social 

workers from DCFS’s Glendora office and requested that her case be transferred to 

another DCFS office. Mother told the social worker that she had contacted the 

Department of Justice and the Board of Supervisors to file a complaint and lawsuit 

because her civil rights had been violated. She stated that unless her case was “thrown 

out, someone files an appeal or retracts all the statements that have been falsified” against 

her, she would proceed with the lawsuit. 

 The same day, the social worker interviewed father and Phillip, who repeated in 

substance what they had previously said in interviews. Phillip provided additional detail 

about the July 2012 incident. He stated that during the argument, Christopher began 

kicking things. One object bounced close to mother, making her more upset. A neighbor 

heard the argument and came over to get him and K. out of the house. Phillip mentioned 
7 

the gun because he was afraid that mother or Christopher might use it. The neighbor then 

telephoned the police. 

 Phillip stated that he had not visited mother since the July 2012 incident. When 

the social worker explained the meaning of monitored visits, Phillip indicated that he was 

more inclined to visit if there was someone there to protect him. 

 DCFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain the counts alleging the July 

2012 incident, as well as the counts alleging mother’s and father’s substance abuse. 

DCFS recommended that the juvenile court dismiss the counts alleging physical abuse by 

mother. DCFS recommended that mother participate in a mental health assessment, 

parenting and domestic violence programs, random drug testing, and enroll in a substance 

abuse treatment program if she missed a test or tested positive for drugs. 

Intervening events 

 In February 2013, DCFS reported that mother sent a text message to the personal 

cell phone of one of the social workers and stated that she had the social worker’s home 

address. Mother reportedly claimed that her private investigator discovered information 

about the social worker that would possibly cause her to be fired. Mother claimed that 

the DCFS Glendora office would be cleaned out because she was in the process of having 

a lot of people fired based on the information she obtained. DCFS requested a court 

order preventing mother from contacting the social worker on her cell phone or at her 

home address, but allowing mother to communicate with the social worker using her 

work telephone or office address. 

 In February 2013, mother reported to DCFS that she was not receiving visits with 

Phillip, commenting “[T]his is total parent alienation.” Father reported that Phillip was 

afraid to visit mother. 

 In March 2013, DCFS reported to the juvenile court that mother expected to have 

surgery on her back, and was suffering from medical problems, causing her to cancel 

visits with Phillip. DCFS reported that Phillip was doing well with father and 

recommended that the juvenile court terminate jurisdiction with a family law order 
8 

granting joint legal custody to the parents, physical custody to the father, and monitored 

visits for mother. 

First amended section 300 petition and supplemental report 

 On July 24, 2013, DCFS filed a first amended section 300 petition. In addition to 

the counts alleged in the November 16, 2012 petition, DCFS alleged that mother 

fabricated stories and that Phillip was afraid to have contact with mother without a 

monitor. The petition further alleged that mother’s emotional and mental instability 

caused Phillip to experience anxiety and distress. 

 On July 26, 2013, DCFS reported to the juvenile court that Phillip began visiting 

mother in February 2013. Some visits went well and others did not. Phillip was angry 

after some visits with mother and described her as “lightning in a bottle.” In July 2013, 

Phillip requested that visits with his mother be stopped for three weeks. DCFS 

recommended to the juvenile court that mother’s visits should be in a therapeutic setting 

once Phillip was ready to resume the visits. 

 DCFS reported that mother appeared on television news on June 21, 2013, in a 

segment reporting a protest at DCFS headquarters. Mother reportedly showed a picture 

of Phillip on the news, and claimed he arrived at one of her monitored visits with a black 

eye. Mother said she confronted father about Phillip’s black eye and that DCFS 

consequently told her that she could not see Phillip any longer. DCFS requested that the 

juvenile court order mother not to discuss the case with the news media to protect 

Phillip’s privacy. 

 On August 30, 2013, DCFS recommended that the juvenile court sustain the first 

amended petition, and issue a family law order granting joint legal custody to the parents, 

sole physical custody to father, and monitored visits for mother in a therapeutic setting. 

Jurisdiction/disposition hearing 

 The jurisdictional hearing was continued in December 2012, March 2013, July 

2013, August 2013, and September 2013 for various reasons including discovery, 

mother’s poor health and anticipated surgery, and the appointment of a new attorney for 

mother. 
9 

 On October 1, 2013, the juvenile court convened for a combined jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing. Mother and father appeared before the court. Father testified that 

Phillip was anxious after his visits with mother. Father stated that Phillip told him in 

recent months that he did not want to visit with mother. Father testified that Phillip had 

some visits with mother that went well. On other occasions, Phillip was angry after the 

visits. 

 Christopher also testified. He stated that the July 2012 incident was a small 

dispute. He denied that there was any cursing, and denied that there were any guns 

involved. He also denied that mother had ever pinned him to the floor or injured him at 

any time. 

 The juvenile court sustained count b-4, concerning the altercation between mother 

and Christopher in July 2012, and count c-1, alleging that mother has shown emotional 

and mental instability and that Phillip was afraid to visit with her. The court dismissed 

the remaining counts in the interests of justice. 

 The court then proceeded to disposition. The court declared Phillip a dependent 

and removed Phillip from mother’s custody. The court ordered joint legal custody to the 

parents, sole physical custody to father, and monitored visits for mother “in a therapeutic 

setting by a professional monitor or as mutually agreed upon by the mother and the 

father.” When making its findings, the court stated, “[T]he evidence before the court 

shows that Phillip is well cared for and is safe in the father’s custody.” The court 

terminated jurisdiction pursuant to section 361.2, but stayed the order for father’s counsel 

to prepare the family law order. 

Family law order and appeal 

 On October 3, 2013, the juvenile court reconvened to receive the proposed family 

law order. Mother and father did not appear before the court. The court’s minute order 

from the hearing reads: “Matter is heard by way of submitted case form.” A form with 

the heading “Submitted Case Form” was filed with the court and contained the signatures 

of the attorneys for DCFS, Phillip, mother, and father. The form states, “The foregoing 

contains all of the issues agreed upon by the parties. It is respectfully requested that no 
10 

additions or modifications be made by the Court, absent the matter being called with an 

opportunity for the parties to be heard.” 

 The juvenile court signed the family law order, which permitted mother visitation 

rights as set forth on form JV-205. The attached form JV-205 allows mother supervised 

visitation with “[a] professional monitor or any monitor agreed on by parents.” The court 

lifted the stay of the order terminating dependency jurisdiction. 

 On October 8, 2013, mother filed her notice of appeal from the court’s orders of 

October 1, 2013. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Mother’s contention on appeal 

Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the family law order is couched in 

language so vague and ambiguous that it furnishes her with no adequate standards for 

identifying a change of circumstances. Mother argues that the uncertainty created by the 

absent guidance denies her due process and renders the visitation order fatally flawed. 

Mother seeks remand with directions to the juvenile court to correct the family law order 

to identify the conduct or behavior she needs to change in order to secure liberalized 

visits with Phillip. 

II. Forfeiture 

 We first address DCFS’s contention that mother forfeited this claim by failing to 

object in the juvenile court. DCFS argues that mother and her counsel were present at the 

disposition hearing, where the court ordered “monitored visitation for the mother in a 

therapeutic setting by a professional monitor or as mutually agreed upon by the mother 

and the father.” Mother’s counsel requested that mother not be required to pay for the 

monitored visits, but stated no other objection. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated jurisdiction, stayed the order 

of termination, ordered father’s counsel to prepare the family law order, and continued 

the matter for receipt of the family law order. 

 On October 3, 2013, the juvenile court received from the parties the submitted 

case form and the proposed family law order to which mother now objects. Mother’s 
11 

counsel signed the submitted case form and by doing so, informed the court that “the 

issues [were] agreed upon by the parties.” 

 Therefore, DCFS argues, not only did mother fail to object to the visitation order 

at the disposition hearing, she consented to the order when her counsel submitted the case 

form to the juvenile court. As such, DCFS argues, mother’ current objections are waived. 

 Application of the forfeiture rule in a dependency proceeding, where the terms of a 

visitation order are challenged, was discussed by the Supreme Court in In re S.B. (2004) 

32 Cal.4th 1287 (S.B.), superseded by statute on another ground, see In re M.R. (2005) 

132 Cal.App.4th 269, 273-274. The high court stated, “a reviewing court ordinarily will 

not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in 

the trial court. . . . The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the 

attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]” (S.B., supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 1293, fn. omitted.) The court confirmed that “[d]ependency matters are not 

exempt from this rule. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) 

 The Supreme Court noted that “application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic. 

[Citations.]” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) However, the high court made it clear 

that an appellate court’s discretion to consider forfeited claims “should be exercised 

rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) This is 

especially true in dependency cases, where “considerations such as permanency and 

stability are of paramount importance. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

 In S.B., the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal did not err in exercising 

its authority to entertain mother’s challenge to a visitation order notwithstanding 

mother’s failure to object in the trial court. “The appeal presented an important issue of 

law: whether a juvenile court in a dependency case may delegate to the child’s legal 

guardian the authority to decide whether a parent may visit the child, a question that has 

divided the Courts of Appeal.” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1293-1294.) 

 DCFS argues that no similar important issue of law is at issue in this appeal. 

Father was not granted the authority to decide whether mother could visit. 
12 

 Mother concedes that the issue was not preserved for appeal. However, in contrast 

to DCFS, mother argues that she does present an important issue which will serve as a 

guide in the future: the extent of the precision required to be set forth in a custody and 

visitation order. 

 Mother cites only one case in support of her position: In re S.J. (2008) 167 

Cal.App.4th 953 (S.J.). In S.J., the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to modify the visitation order at issue in that case. In 

discussing the applicability of a certain statute, the court noted that the mother had not 

raised the issue in any of her petitions to the trial court -- instead, the Riverside County 

Department of Social Services (department) raised the issue for the first time in its brief. 

Mother then filed a supplemental response. (Id. at pp. 962-963.) The court concluded 

that the statute did not apply. (Id. at pp. 963-964.) Nothing in the S.J. opinion suggests 

that the issue before us in this case is of such importance that it must be decided in spite 

of mother’s forfeiture. 

 Mother’s alleged uncertainty regarding the precise conduct or behavior that she 

must change in order to secure a modification to the visitation order is not the type of 

important legal issue such as the one that was raised in S.B. Mother does not question the 

interpretation of a statute, or the applicability of a statute to the matter before us. Instead, 

her complaint involves her own uncertainty regarding the circumstances needed to justify 

liberalization of visitation. There is no suggestion that this issue has “divided the Courts 

of Appeal,” as did the issue of statutory interpretation set forth in S.B. (S.B., supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 1294.) Therefore, because the Supreme Court has cautioned that we should 

exercise our discretion to consider forfeited issues “rarely and only in cases presenting an 

important legal issue” (id. at p. 1293), we hold that mother’s claim is forfeited and 

decline to exercise our discretion to consider it. 

III. The juvenile court’s visitation order is not unconstitutionally vague 

Mother forfeited her argument that the family law order is unconstitutionally 

vague. However, we note that even if mother had not forfeited this argument, we would 
13 

conclude that the order is sufficient. A trial court visitation order is reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard. (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48.) 

 The juvenile court’s order is not vague. It provides that mother will have 

supervised visitation according to a schedule determined by the parents. Mother’s visits 

will be monitored by a professional monitor or any monitor agreed on by the parents. 

Mother presents no authority suggesting that the conduct or behavior that she should 

change must be set forth in the visitation order. 

 Mother has had ample notice of the conduct in need of correction. The allegations 

against mother were articulated in the sustained first amended section 300 petition, and 

discussed at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. Further, as DCFS points out, section 

827.10 authorizes DCFS to provide juvenile case files and records to participants in a 

related family law matter, including the judge in the family law case, the parent or 

guardian, or any attorney for a party to the family law case. (§ 827.10, subds. (a)(1), 

(a)(2), (a)(3).) Thus, mother not only has had ample notice of the conduct in need of 

correction, she also has access to the investigative records leading up to the juvenile 

court’s order. 

In support of her argument, mother cites In re Mariah T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 

428, 434 (Mariah T.), for the proposition that an order is unconstitutionally vague when 

“men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 

application.” The Mariah T. court was addressing the constitutionality of Section 300, 

subdivision (a). In concluding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, the court 

noted that “the dependency statutes may not forbid or require conduct in terms so vague 

“‘“‘that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 

to its application . . . .’”’ [Citation.]” The court did not address the standard for an 

unconstitutionally vague visitation order, and did not suggest that a family law order must 

specifically address the behaviors at issue when granting a parent monitored visitation. 

 Mother also cites Martino v. Concord Community Hospital Dist. (1965) 233 

Cal.App.2d 51, 60 (Martino). The Martino court addressed a hospital’s requirements for 

appointment to its medical staff. One of the requirements for hospital staff membership 
14 

was that the applicant take an examination “of ‘those phases of medicine and surgery 

which we require our Staff members to be qualified in.’” (Id. at p. 54.) The appellant 

claimed that the examination requirement was invalid because it was in excess of the 

hospital’s authority and was “vague, ambiguous and uncertain.” (Id. at p. 57.) The Court 

of Appeal concluded that the hospital improperly required applicants to “take tests 

covering far more than his competence in his own particular field of medicine,” and that 

“the examination requirement is couched in such vague and ambiguous language as to 

furnish the committee with no adequate standards for applying said requirement.” (Id. at 

p. 60.) Again, the court did not address the standard for an unconstitutionally vague 

visitation order, and did not suggest that such an order must specifically address the 

parental behaviors requiring monitored visitation. 

 Mother has failed to show reversible error. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

 ____________________________, J. 

 CHAVEZ 

We concur: 

__________________________, Acting P. J. 

ASHMANN-GERST 

__________________________, J.* 

FERNS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.