[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11563

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CHRISTOPHER DIAZ, 

a.k.a. Chico,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00385-KKM-SPF-2

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Before GRANT, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Diaz appeals his 96-month total sentence for 

aiding and abetting the armed robbery of a United States mail carrier and the theft of a postal key. Diaz challenges the application of 

three Sentencing Guidelines offense-level enhancements, the government’s refusal to move for a one-level reduction pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

I.

Diaz entered a guilty plea to aiding and abetting a codefendant, Omar Miller, Jr., in the robbery of a United States mail carrier 

and putting the mail carrier’s life in jeopardy by the use of a firearm

during the robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2114(a) and 2; and 

aiding and abetting the theft of a postal key, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 1704 and 2. According to undisputed facts in the presentence investigation report, Diaz reached out over social media to 

find someone willing to rob a mail carrier, eventually contacting 

Betancourt Vega. Diaz communicated with Vega through phone 

calls and text messages, offering him money to commit the robbery, identifying a possible mail carrier and apartment complex to 

target, sending him photographs of a mail truck with a time stamp 

and a note saying “no cameras,” notifying him where cameras 

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might be located, giving him instructions on how to gain access to 

different mailboxes, and telling him where to go after the robbery. 

Vega recruited Miller to participate in the robbery. On the 

day of the robbery, Miller approached United States Postal Service 

mail carrier M.J. while she was delivering mail at an apartment 

complex in Tampa. Miller, who was wearing a ski mask and carrying a handgun, demanded M.J.’s “arrow key,” a universal device 

that can unlock several different types of mailboxes owned by the 

Postal Service. During the robbery, Miller racked the firearm and 

held it against M.J., and he told her that if she screamed, he would 

shoot her. He then directed her to the ground and pushed her face 

down before fleeing on foot and later getting into a car driven by 

Vega. 

Police identified the getaway car through surveillance video. 

They conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle and identified Vega as 

the driver and Miller as the passenger. A search of Vega’s cell 

phone revealed Diaz’s text messages with Vega and eventually led 

to Diaz’s arrest.

At sentencing, the district court increased Diaz’s Sentencing 

Guidelines base offense level as follows: two levels because the 

property of a post office was taken, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(1); six levels 

because a firearm was used in the commission of the offense,

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B); two levels because a person was physically restrained to facilitate the commission of the offense, 

§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B); and two levels due to Diaz’s role as a leader or 

organizer, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The district court reduced the total 

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by two levels for Diaz’s acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1(a). Based on the resulting offense level (30) and Diaz’s 

criminal history category (II), the district court calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months in prison. After hearing argument 

from the parties and allocution from Diaz, the district court sentenced Diaz to 96 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

In this appeal, Diaz argues that the district court erred in applying three of the offense-level enhancements when calculating 

his Guidelines range, and that the government acted in bad faith 

when it refused to move for an additional one-level reduction for 

providing timely notice of his intention to plead guilty. He also 

argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

II.

When evaluating Sentencing Guidelines calculations, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and “its application of those facts to justify a sentencing enhancement” de 

novo. United States v. Ware, 69 F.4th 830, 854 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). A district court’s enhancement of a defendant’s 

offense level based on his role as an organizer or leader is a finding 

of fact that we review for clear error. United States v. Phillips, 287 

F.3d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 2002). We consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

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III.

 We begin by considering Diaz’s objections to three Guidelines offense-level enhancements: the six-level enhancement for 

use of a firearm, the two-level enhancement for physical restraint 

of a person to facilitate the commission of the offense, and the twolevel enhancement for Diaz’s role as a leader or organizer.

A.

Diaz argues that the district court erred in applying a firearm 

enhancement because he had no possession or control over the 

firearm, did not provide it or direct its use, and had no knowledge 

of its intended use. Section 2B3.1 of the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines calls for a five-level enhancement if a firearm was “brandished or possessed,” and a six-level enhancement if a firearm was 

“otherwise used.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B)–(C). In determining 

whether to apply a Guidelines enhancement, “a district court must 

consider all relevant conduct attributable to the defendant.” United 

States v. Maddox, 803 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 2015). “Relevant 

conduct” includes all acts aided or abetted by the defendant. 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The district court may rely on the facts 

stated in the defendant’s presentence investigation report if the defendant does not clearly and specifically object to them. United 

States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1302 (11th Cir. 2024). 

Here, the district court did not err in applying the six-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B). Diaz pleaded guilty 

to aiding and abetting Miller in the commission of the robbery, and 

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according to the undisputed facts, Miller “otherwise used” a firearm by racking the gun and holding it to the victim. 

B.

A two-level sentencing enhancement applies for robberies 

where “any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Guidelines commentary defines physical restraint as “the forcible restraint of the 

victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” Id. § 1B1.1, 

comment. (n.1(L)). Our precedent “clearly indicates that when an 

armed robber uses the threat of deadly force with his firearm to 

compel a victim to move or to stay in place, the enhancement applies.” Ware, 69 F.4th at 854. 

In the face of this precedent, Diaz points to cases from other 

circuits requiring the use of physical force to apply the enhancement. We have rejected similar arguments before, and we reject 

them again here. Id. at 855. We are bound by our own precedent, 

which cannot be overridden by contrary opinions of other courts.

Id.; see United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 

2008). By threatening to shoot the victim and then forcing her to 

the ground at gunpoint and pushing her face down, Miller used the 

threat of deadly force to compel the victim to move and then to 

stay down. Diaz was subject to the enhancement based on Miller’s 

conduct because he aided and abetted that conduct. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The district court did not err in applying a twolevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). 

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C.

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant receives a 

two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant was an organizer, 

leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(c). In determining the applicability of this enhancement, 

courts consider the defendant’s: “(1) exercise of decision-making 

authority, (2) nature of participation in the commission of the offense, (3) recruitment of accomplices, (4) claimed right to a larger 

share of the fruits of the crime, (5) degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, (6) nature and scope of the illegal 

activity, and (7) degree of control and authority exercised over others.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005)

(quotations omitted); see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 comment. (n.4). The defendant need not be the sole leader of the conspiracy in order to

receive the enhancement. United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 

1169 (11th Cir. 2002). And “the assertion of control or influence 

over only one individual is enough to support a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.” United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000).

The district court here did not clearly err in applying a twolevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Diaz recruited Vega 

for the purpose of committing the robbery, instructed him to steal 

a particular kind of postal key, advised him of a potential target, 

provided camera locations, and told him where to take the key after the completion of the robbery. Given this recruitment, planning, and direction, the district court did not clearly err in finding 

that Diaz was a leader or organizer of the robbery scheme. See 

Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1355; Jiminez, 224 F.3d at 1251. Vega’s

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potential status as a second organizer or leader does not make the 

court’s application of the enhancement to Diaz clear error. See Vallejo, 297 F.3d at 1169.

IV.

We turn next to Diaz’s argument that the government did 

not act in good faith in failing to move for a reduction in his offense 

level under § 3E1.1(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines. That section 

instructs the sentencing court to reduce the defendant’s offense 

level by one level if the defendant qualifies for a reduction under 

§ 3E1.1(a) for accepting responsibility for his offense and the government makes a motion stating that the defendant has assisted authorities by timely notifying them “of his intention to enter a plea 

of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing 

for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate 

their resources efficiently.” U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(b). 

At Diaz’s sentencing, the district court found that Diaz qualified for a two-level reduction under § 3E1.1(a) for acceptance of 

responsibility, but the government refused to make a motion for 

an additional one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b). The prosecutor 

explained that Diaz had pleaded guilty less than two weeks before 

the scheduled trial date, causing the government to spend time and 

resources preparing the case for trial. Diaz objected, arguing that 

he had notified the government that he intended to plead guilty at 

least 90 days before the scheduled trial date, if only informally. But 

Diaz did not ask the district court for any relief; to the contrary, 

when the district court expressed doubt that it could act on the 

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objection, Diaz’s counsel appeared to agree, stating that the court 

could not force the government to file a motion. 

Diaz’s argument on appeal is unclear. He contends that the 

government’s true motive for not filing a § 3E1.1(b) motion was 

that he would not testify for the government at Miller’s trial, but 

he does not identify any error by the district court in relation to the 

government’s refusal. To the extent his briefing can be construed 

as arguing that the district court erred by not requiring the government to file a motion for the additional one-level reduction, his argument is barred by the invited error doctrine. That doctrine “precludes appellate review of an argument that a party expressly disclaimed before the district court.” United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 

1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).

In any event, the government adequately explained its refusal to move for a § 3E1.1(b) offense-level reduction. The prosecutor pointed out that the government had been forced to expend 

time and resources preparing for trial because Diaz had not entered 

a guilty plea until 13 days before the scheduled trial date. Diaz’s 

counsel stated that she had notified the government months earlier

that he would plead guilty, but she also acknowledged that she herself had prepared for trial because she was unable to communicate 

with Diaz until he arrived in the district from out of state shortly 

before the trial date. Not surprisingly, the record indicates that the 

government also prepared for trial, including drafting and filing 

proposed jury instructions, verdict forms, and voir dire questions. 

Because defense counsel evidently was unable to confirm Diaz’s 

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intention to plead guilty in time to “permit[] the government to 

avoid preparing for trial” and to allocate its resources efficiently, 

the district court was not required to compel the government to 

move for the additional one-level reduction—even assuming that 

it had the power to do so. U.S.S.G § 3E1.1(b). 

V.

Last, we consider Diaz’s argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if the district court “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant 

weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear 

error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States 

v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation 

omitted). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of 

showing that it is unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 

1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). We will vacate a defendant’s sentence 

as substantively unreasonable only if we are “left with the definite 

and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error 

of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1191 (quotation omitted).

We are not left with that conviction here. Contrary to Diaz’s 

argument, the district court specifically referenced Diaz’s mental 

health and substance abuse issues when considering his history and 

characteristics under § 3553(a). The court also considered Diaz’s 

sentencing memorandum, the presentence investigation report—

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which contained extensive information about his background, including his drug use and mental health history—and Diaz’s argument and allocution at the sentencing hearing. The court did not 

consider any improper or irrelevant factors. It considered and 

properly applied the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including Diaz’s 

history and characteristics, the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence, the need to protect the 

public, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities

“among defendants with similar records who have been found 

guilty of similar conduct.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2), 

§ 3553(a)(6).

As the district court explained, no unwarranted sentencing 

disparity exists between Diaz’s 96-month sentence and the sentences imposed on Vega (51 months) and Miller (26 months for the 

charges Diaz faced, plus a consecutive 84-month sentence for an 

additional firearm charge). That is because Vega and Miller were 

not similarly situated to Diaz. See id. § 3553(a)(6); United States v. 

Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (a well-founded sentencing disparity claim “assumes that apples are being compared to 

apples” (quotation omitted)). Vega received a reduced sentence 

based in part on his substantial cooperation with the government; 

his shorter sentence could not create an “unwarranted” disparity 

with Diaz’s because Diaz did not cooperate. See Docampo, 573 F.3d 

at 1101. And Miller, who received a total sentence of 110 months, 

had no criminal history, whereas Diaz had a significant history of 

criminal convictions as well as a new firearm charge based on his 

conduct while on pretrial release. 

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The district court appropriately accounted for Diaz’s personal history, his relative culpability, the need for specific deterrence in light of Diaz’s continuing criminal conduct after his arrest, 

and the need for general deterrence given the increase in local mailcarrier robberies. The 96-month sentence was significantly lower 

than the Guidelines range of 108–135 months, and far below the 

statutory maximum sentence of 300 months on count one of the 

indictment and 120 months on count two. See United States v. Hunt, 

526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Dougherty, 754 

F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the circumstances, Diaz’s 

sentence was well within “the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191. 

VI.

The district court did not err or clearly err in calculating 

Diaz’s Guidelines range, and its sentence of 96 months in prison 

followed by three years of supervised release was reasonable. We 

therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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