COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

CURTIS LEON BELL 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2356-95-4 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 FEBRUARY 18, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William L. Winston, Judge 

 Denman A. Rucker (Rucker & Rucker, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General; Kimberley A. Whittle, Assistant 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Curtis Leon Bell appeals his conviction of distribution of 

cocaine and distribution of cocaine within one thousand feet of a 

school property. Bell raises two questions on appeal: did the 

trial court err (1) in admitting into evidence oral statements by 

Bell, lab reports, and a map, all of which had not been disclosed 

to Bell's trial counsel pursuant to a discovery order; and (2) in 

denying his request for a mistrial based upon the failure of the 

Commonwealth to disclose the identity of a confidential 

informant. Because the Commonwealth had disclosed the 

information to earlier counsel, and because the Commonwealth has 

no duty to redisclose information every time counsel changes, we 

affirm. 

 Bell and the Commonwealth offered conflicting versions of 

the facts. Undercover officer King testified that on May 18, 
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1993, he and a confidential informant rode together to Culpeper 

Street, a known open-air drug market, with the intent to purchase 

cocaine. Upon their arrival, King testified that the 

confidential informant pointed out Bell and another man standing 

in a group as likely drug dealers. The confidential informant 

then exited the vehicle. King stated that he watched the 

informant walk down the street and that the informant never met 

with Bell. Instead, Bell broke away from the group and 

approached King's car. At the car, Bell inquired about how much 

money King had with him. King replied that he had $150 and 

testified that Bell then sold him $150 worth of cocaine. King 

and Bell then exchanged pager numbers in order that King could 

contact Bell to make future purchases. 

 King testified that immediately following the transaction he 

reported what had taken place to Lt. Medairos, a fellow officer 

who had been involved with the operation but who did not observe 

the transaction. Subsequently, Medairos prepared a police report 

indicating that the informant had made contact with Bell and had 

been involved in bringing Bell to King's car. However, at trial, 

Medairos testified that although it was the original plan for the 

informant to introduce King to Bell, "actually . . . Mr. Bell 

walked right over to Mr. King." 

 King testified that on May 25, 1993, he again met with Bell 

and purchased $300 worth of cocaine from him. King testified 

that he was alone when he met with Bell. Detective Fernandez, 

who was also involved with the operation on May 25, testified 
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that he did not see the informant with King on the day of the 

transaction. 

 Bell testified that on both May 18 and May 25, the informant 

was with King. Bell stated that on May 18, 1993, the informant 

went to Bell's home and at the informant's request Bell went out 

to acquire some cocaine for the informant's boss. Bell said that 

he returned with cocaine and delivered it to the informant who 

went outside and got into King's car. Bell stated that a few 

minutes later he proceeded to King's car and informed King that 

the informant had the cocaine. 

 Bell testified that on May 25, he was again contacted by the 

informant who "begged" Bell to supply additional cocaine for the 

informant's boss. Bell stated that he met with the informant and 

King and that at their urging he acquired an additional $300 

worth of cocaine, which he gave to the informant. 

 Bell was indicted on August 16, 1993 on two counts of 

distribution of cocaine and one count of distribution of cocaine 

within one thousand feet of a school zone. Stephen Crum was 

appointed to represent Bell in a number of cases, including this 

case. Prior to proceeding in any of the trials, Bell discharged 

Mr. Crum and retained Clarence Stanback. Mr. Stanback 

represented Bell in several trials, but was replaced in February, 

1995 by counsel who represented Bell on trial of the charges now 

on appeal. 

 During trial, Bell's counsel moved for a mistrial arguing 

that he had only learned of the involvement of the informant the 
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day before trial and it had been incumbent upon the Commonwealth, 

given the extensive involvement of the informant, to reveal to 

present counsel the identity of the informant. A hearing on the 

extent of the informant's involvement was conducted during trial, 

in the absence of the jury. During this hearing, Bell's first 

attorney, Mr. Crum, testified that he had been granted open 

discovery and that while reviewing the prosecutor's files, he had 

discovered and taken notes on a police report which indicated the 

informant had significant involvement in the cocaine 

transactions. Mr. Crum testified that he turned his notes over 

to Mr. Stanback when Mr. Crum was replaced as counsel by Mr. 

Stanback. Bell's present counsel stated that he had been 

notified by Mr. Stanback the day before trial that Mr. Stanback 

had found Mr. Crum's notes regarding a police report detailing 

the informant's involvement. These notes were delivered to 

Bell's counsel the day before trial. At the conclusion of the 

hearing the trial court found that there had not been sufficient 

involvement of the informant to require disclosure of the 

informant's identity and accordingly, the trial court denied 

Bell's motion for a mistrial. 

 Bell also objected to the introduction into evidence of 

conversations between Bell and King, certificates of analysis, 

and a map of the area of the second transaction. Counsel argued 

that the items should have been excluded because they had not 

been provided to Bell's present counsel prior to trial. The 

Commonwealth argued the items should be admitted because they had 
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been provided to one of Bell's two prior attorneys. The trial 

court admitted the items into evidence. 

Admission of Evidence

 Bell contends that the Commonwealth violated its discovery 

obligation by failing to provide Bell's present counsel with 

copies of laboratory reports, of Bell's statements to King, and 

of a map. Bell's first and second attorneys were each provided 

these materials during discovery. Bell's first attorney had 

open-file discovery and accordingly had direct access to all of 

the Commonwealth's information. Bell's second attorney had 

written discovery which the record indicates the Commonwealth 

complied with, again making available to Bell's counsel the 

requisite information. 

 "When an accused is represented by counsel, the requirements 

of Rule 3A:11 . . . are satisfied when defense counsel is 

afforded the opportunity to inspect the Commonwealth's evidence." 

Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 120, 360 S.E.2d 352, 356 

(1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1015 (1988). The record supports 

the trial court's conclusion that the Commonwealth complied with 

the discovery order by exhibiting the items of evidence to Bell's 

first two attorneys. We find nothing in the law of Virginia 

which would require the Commonwealth, under the facts and 

circumstances of this case, having once disclosed the information 

to Bell's original attorneys, to yet again provide this same 

information to Bell's latest attorney. Accordingly, the trial 

court committed no error in admitting the evidence. 
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Confidential Informant

 In the midst of trial Bell's counsel asked the trial court 

to declare a mistrial on the basis that the Commonwealth had 

failed to disclose the identity of a confidential informant Bell 

claimed had extensively participated in the purchases made on May 

18 and May 25. The record proves that the Commonwealth disclosed 

to Bell's prior counsel the involvement of the informant. For 

the same reasons stated above, the Commonwealth had no duty to 

redisclose the same information to new counsel. Further, the 

record indicates that Bell himself knew the informant, although 

he was unaware of the informant's status as an informant. 

Accordingly, Bell's motion for a mistrial was without merit. 

 Affirmed.