# Službeni list C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-1088 |
| --- | --- |
| Službeni list
  Europske unije | C 242 |
| | |
| Hrvatsko izdanje | Informacije i objave | Godište 60.27. srpnja 2017. |

ISSN 1977-1088

Službeni list

Europske unije

C 242

Hrvatsko izdanje

Informacije i objave

Godište 60.27. srpnja 2017.

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| Obavijest br. | Sadržaj | Stranica |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Informacije |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Neprotivljenje prijavljenoj koncentraciji (Predmet M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Odluka o procjeni uvjeta za sanaciju banke Veneto Banca S.p.A. | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Odluka o procjeni uvjeta za sanaciju banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. | 3 |

Obavijest br.

Sadržaj

Stranica

II   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE

Europska komisija

2017/C 242/01

Neprotivljenje prijavljenoj koncentraciji (Predmet M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Odluka o procjeni uvjeta za sanaciju banke Veneto Banca S.p.A.

2

2017/C 242/03

Odluka o procjeni uvjeta za sanaciju banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

3

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| | IV   Obavijesti |
| --- | --- |
| | OBAVIJESTI INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Tečajna lista eura | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Sažetak odluka Europske komisije o autorizacijama za stavljanje na tržište radi uporabe i/ili za uporabu tvari navedenih u Prilogu XIV. Uredbi (EZ) br. 1907/2006 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o registraciji, evaluaciji, autorizaciji i ograničavanju kemikalija (REACH) (objavljeno na temelju članka 64. stavka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | OBAVIJESTI U VEZI S EUROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM |
| | Nadzorno tijelo EFTA-e |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Poziv na podnošenje primjedbi u skladu s dijelom I. člankom 1. stavkom 2. Protokola 3. uz Sporazum među državama EFTA-e o osnivanju Nadzornog tijela i Suda u pogledu moguće državne potpore dodijeljene društvu Landsvirkjun u obliku državnih jamstava za ugovore o izvedenicama | 6 |

IV   Obavijesti

OBAVIJESTI INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE

Europska komisija

2017/C 242/04

Tečajna lista eura

4

2017/C 242/05

Sažetak odluka Europske komisije o autorizacijama za stavljanje na tržište radi uporabe i/ili za uporabu tvari navedenih u Prilogu XIV. Uredbi (EZ) br. 1907/2006 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o registraciji, evaluaciji, autorizaciji i ograničavanju kemikalija (REACH) (objavljeno na temelju članka 64. stavka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  )

(objavljeno na temelju članka 64. stavka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1907/2006)

1

5

OBAVIJESTI U VEZI S EUROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM

Nadzorno tijelo EFTA-e

2017/C 242/06

Poziv na podnošenje primjedbi u skladu s dijelom I. člankom 1. stavkom 2. Protokola 3. uz Sporazum među državama EFTA-e o osnivanju Nadzornog tijela i Suda u pogledu moguće državne potpore dodijeljene društvu Landsvirkjun u obliku državnih jamstava za ugovore o izvedenicama

6

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| | V   Objave |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVNI POSTUPCI |
| | Europski ured za odabir osoblja (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Obavijest o otvorenim natječajima | 17 |
| | POSTUPCI U VEZI S PROVEDBOM POLITIKE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Prethodna prijava koncentracije (Predmet M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett) – Predmet primjeren za primjenu pojednostavnjenog postupka (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Prethodna prijava koncentracije (Predmet M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | DRUGI AKTI |
| | Europska komisija |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Informativna obavijest – javno savjetovanje – Oznake zemljopisnog podrijetla iz Japana | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Obavijest upućena u skladu s Provedbenom uredbom Komisije (EU) 2017/1390 fizičkim osobama Alexandau Amonu Koteyu, Elshafeeu El Sheikhu, Muhammadu Bahrumu Naimu Anggihu Tamtomou, Maliku Ruslanovichu Barkhanoevu, Muradu Iraklievichu Margoshviliju i OMANU ROCHMANU te pravnim osobama, skupinama i subjektima HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa, čija su imena dodana na popis na koji se upućuje u člancima 2., 3. i 7. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 881/2002 od 27. svibnja 2002. o uvođenju određenih posebnih mjera ograničavanja protiv određenih osoba i subjekata povezanih s organizacijama ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom | 22 |

V   Objave

ADMINISTRATIVNI POSTUPCI

Europski ured za odabir osoblja (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Obavijest o otvorenim natječajima

17

POSTUPCI U VEZI S PROVEDBOM POLITIKE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA

Europska komisija

2017/C 242/08

Prethodna prijava koncentracije (Predmet M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett) – Predmet primjeren za primjenu pojednostavnjenog postupka (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Prethodna prijava koncentracije (Predmet M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

DRUGI AKTI

Europska komisija

2017/C 242/10

Informativna obavijest – javno savjetovanje – Oznake zemljopisnog podrijetla iz Japana

20

2017/C 242/11

Obavijest upućena u skladu s Provedbenom uredbom Komisije (EU) 2017/1390 fizičkim osobama Alexandau Amonu Koteyu, Elshafeeu El Sheikhu, Muhammadu Bahrumu Naimu Anggihu Tamtomou, Maliku Ruslanovichu Barkhanoevu, Muradu Iraklievichu Margoshviliju i OMANU ROCHMANU te pravnim osobama, skupinama i subjektima HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa, čija su imena dodana na popis na koji se upućuje u člancima 2., 3. i 7. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 881/2002 od 27. svibnja 2002. o uvođenju određenih posebnih mjera ograničavanja protiv određenih osoba i subjekata povezanih s organizacijama ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom

22

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| | (1)   Tekst značajan za EGP. |

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(1)   Tekst značajan za EGP.

1

| HR | |
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HR

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II Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE

Europska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/1

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Neprotivljenje prijavljenoj koncentraciji

(Predmet M.8500 – Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

(2017/C 242/01)

Dana 14. srpnja 2017. Komisija je donijela odluku da se ne protivi prethodno spomenutoj prijavljenoj koncentraciji te je ocijenila da je ona sukladna s unutarnjim tržištem. Odluka se temelji na članku 6. stavku 1. točki (b) Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1). Puni tekst odluke dostupan je samo na engleskom jeziku, a objavit će se nakon što se iz njega uklone sve moguće poslovne tajne. Odluka će biti dostupna:

| — | na internetskoj stranici Komisije posvećenoj tržišnom natjecanju, u odjeljku za koncentracije (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Odluke o spajanju mogu se pretraživati na različite načine, među ostalim po trgovačkom društvu, broju predmeta, datumu i sektoru, |
| --- | --- |

—

na internetskoj stranici Komisije posvećenoj tržišnom natjecanju, u odjeljku za koncentracije (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Odluke o spajanju mogu se pretraživati na različite načine, među ostalim po trgovačkom društvu, broju predmeta, datumu i sektoru,

| — | u elektroničkom obliku na internetskoj stranici EUR-Lexa (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=hr) pod brojem dokumenta 32017M8500. EUR-Lex omogućuje mrežni pristup europskom zakonodavstvu. |
| --- | --- |

—

u elektroničkom obliku na internetskoj stranici EUR-Lexa (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=hr) pod brojem dokumenta 32017M8500. EUR-Lex omogućuje mrežni pristup europskom zakonodavstvu.

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(1)  SL L 24, 29.1.2004., str. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/2 |
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27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/2

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Odluka o procjeni uvjeta za sanaciju banke Veneto Banca S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/02)

Dana 23. lipnja 2017. Jedinstveni sanacijski odbor odlučio je da se neće provoditi postupak sanacije u banci Veneto Banca S.p.A. Odluka se temelji na zaključku da uvjet iz članka 18. stavka 1. točke (c) Uredbe (EU) br. 806/2014 (1) nije ispunjen. Osnovni elementi odluke su sljedeći:

| Datum donošenja odluke: | 23. lipnja 2017. |
| --- | --- |
| Odluka br.: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Adresat: | Banca d’Italia |
| Institucija: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Primjena ovlasti za otpis i konverziju instrumenata kapitala: | Ne |
| Mjera sanacije: | Ne |
| Potpora iz Fonda: | Ne |

Datum donošenja odluke:

23. lipnja 2017.

Odluka br.:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Adresat:

Banca d’Italia

Institucija:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Primjena ovlasti za otpis i konverziju instrumenata kapitala:

Ne

Mjera sanacije:

Ne

Potpora iz Fonda:

Ne

Više informacija o odluci dostupno je na službenim internetskim stranicama SRB-a: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  SL L 225, 30.7.2014., str. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/3 |
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27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/3

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Odluka o procjeni uvjeta za sanaciju banke Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/03)

Dana 23. lipnja 2017. Jedinstveni sanacijski odbor odlučio je da se neće provoditi postupak sanacije u banci Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. Odluka se temelji na zaključku da uvjet iz članka 18. stavka 1. točke (c) Uredbe (EU) br. 806/2014 (1) nije ispunjen. Osnovni elementi odluke su sljedeći:

| Datum donošenja odluke: | 23. lipnja 2017. |
| --- | --- |
| Odluka br.: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Adresat: | Banca d’Italia |
| Institucija: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Primjena ovlasti za otpis i konverziju instrumenata kapitala: | Ne |
| Mjera sanacije: | Ne |
| Potpora iz Fonda: | Ne |

Datum donošenja odluke:

23. lipnja 2017.

Odluka br.:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Adresat:

Banca d’Italia

Institucija:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Primjena ovlasti za otpis i konverziju instrumenata kapitala:

Ne

Mjera sanacije:

Ne

Potpora iz Fonda:

Ne

Više informacija o odluci dostupno je na službenim internetskim stranicama SRB-a: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca.

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(1)  SL L 225, 30.7.2014., str. 1.

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IV Obavijesti

OBAVIJESTI INSTITUCIJA, TIJELA, UREDA I AGENCIJA EUROPSKE UNIJE

Europska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/4

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Tečajna lista eura (1)

26. srpnja 2017.

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | američki dolar | 1,1644 |
| JPY | japanski jen | 130,26 |
| DKK | danska kruna | 7,4368 |
| GBP | funta sterlinga | 0,89275 |
| SEK | švedska kruna | 9,5705 |
| CHF | švicarski franak | 1,1152 |
| ISK | islandska kruna | |
| NOK | norveška kruna | 9,2893 |
| BGN | bugarski lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka kruna | 26,047 |
| HUF | mađarska forinta | 305,57 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 4,2613 |
| RON | rumunjski novi leu | 4,5632 |
| TRY | turska lira | 4,1406 |
| AUD | australski dolar | 1,4717 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,4576 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 9,0959 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,5678 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,5850 |
| KRW | južnokorejski von | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | južnoafrički rand | 15,1998 |
| CNY | kineski renminbi-juan | 7,8646 |
| HRK | hrvatska kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,9889 |
| PHP | filipinski pezo | 58,948 |
| RUB | ruski rubalj | 69,7050 |
| THB | tajlandski baht | 38,996 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 3,6806 |
| MXN | meksički pezo | 20,6644 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 74,9375 |

Valuta

Tečaj

USD

američki dolar

1,1644

JPY

japanski jen

130,26

DKK

danska kruna

7,4368

GBP

funta sterlinga

0,89275

SEK

švedska kruna

9,5705

CHF

švicarski franak

1,1152

ISK

islandska kruna

NOK

norveška kruna

9,2893

BGN

bugarski lev

1,9558

CZK

češka kruna

26,047

HUF

mađarska forinta

305,57

PLN

poljski zlot

4,2613

RON

rumunjski novi leu

4,5632

TRY

turska lira

4,1406

AUD

australski dolar

1,4717

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,4576

HKD

hongkonški dolar

9,0959

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,5678

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,5850

KRW

južnokorejski von

1 303,91

ZAR

južnoafrički rand

15,1998

CNY

kineski renminbi-juan

7,8646

HRK

hrvatska kuna

7,4128

IDR

indonezijska rupija

15 507,48

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,9889

PHP

filipinski pezo

58,948

RUB

ruski rubalj

69,7050

THB

tajlandski baht

38,996

BRL

brazilski real

3,6806

MXN

meksički pezo

20,6644

INR

indijska rupija

74,9375

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(1)  Izvor: referentna tečajna lista koju objavljuje ESB.

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| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/5

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Sažetak odluka Europske komisije o autorizacijama za stavljanje na tržište radi uporabe i/ili za uporabu tvari navedenih u Prilogu XIV. Uredbi (EZ) br. 1907/2006 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o registraciji, evaluaciji, autorizaciji i ograničavanju kemikalija (REACH)

(objavljeno na temelju članka 64. stavka 9. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1907/2006
   (1)
  )

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

(2017/C 242/05)

Odluke o davanju autorizacije

| Upućivanje na odluku (2) | Datum odluke | Naziv tvari | Nositelj autorizacije | Broj autorizacije | Autorizirana uporaba | Datum isteka razdoblja preispitivanja | Obrazloženje odluke |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20. srpnja 2017. | Bis(2-metoksietil)eter
  EZ br. 203-924-4
  CAS br. 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, okrug Cork, Irska | REACH/17/8/0 | Uporaba diglima kao otapala u postupku proizvodnje intermedijera za daljnju pretvorbu u farmaceutski spoj koji se upotrebljava u lijekovima za bolesti dišnog sustava | 22. kolovoza 2024. | — | U skladu s člankom 60. stavkom 2. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1907/2006 rizici za zdravlje ljudi koji proizlaze iz uporabe te tvari podvrgnuti su odgovarajućoj kontroli. |

Upućivanje na odluku (2)

Datum odluke

Naziv tvari

Nositelj autorizacije

Broj autorizacije

Autorizirana uporaba

Datum isteka razdoblja preispitivanja

Obrazloženje odluke

C(2017) 5025

20. srpnja 2017.

Bis(2-metoksietil)eter

EZ br. 203-924-4

CAS br. 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, okrug Cork, Irska

REACH/17/8/0

Uporaba diglima kao otapala u postupku proizvodnje intermedijera za daljnju pretvorbu u farmaceutski spoj koji se upotrebljava u lijekovima za bolesti dišnog sustava

22. kolovoza 2024.

—

U skladu s člankom 60. stavkom 2. Uredbe (EZ) br. 1907/2006 rizici za zdravlje ljudi koji proizlaze iz uporabe te tvari podvrgnuti su odgovarajućoj kontroli.

| — | Trenutačno nema primjerenih alternativa te se za njima traga u okviru sedmogodišnjeg programa namijenjenog traženju zamjene. |
| --- | --- |

—

Trenutačno nema primjerenih alternativa te se za njima traga u okviru sedmogodišnjeg programa namijenjenog traženju zamjene.

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(1)  SL L 396, 30.12.2006., str. 1.

(2)  Odluka je dostupna na internetskim stranicama Europske komisije: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about_hr

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OBAVIJESTI U VEZI S EUROPSKIM GOSPODARSKIM PROSTOROM

Nadzorno tijelo EFTA-e

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/6 |
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27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/6

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Poziv na podnošenje primjedbi u skladu s dijelom I. člankom 1. stavkom 2. Protokola 3. uz Sporazum među državama EFTA-e o osnivanju Nadzornog tijela i Suda u pogledu moguće državne potpore dodijeljene društvu Landsvirkjun u obliku državnih jamstava za ugovore o izvedenicama

(2017/C 242/06)

Odlukom br. 085/17/COL od 3. svibnja 2017., koja se u nastavku ovog sažetka navodi na izvornom jeziku, Nadzorno tijelo EFTA-e pokrenulo je postupak u skladu s dijelom I. člankom 1. stavkom 2. Protokola 3. uz Sporazum među državama EFTA-e o osnivanju Nadzornog tijela i Suda. Islandskim tijelima poslan je primjerak odluke.

Nadzorno tijelo EFTA-e ovom obavijesti poziva države EFTA-e, države članice EU-a i zainteresirane strane na podnošenje primjedbi o predmetnoj mjeri u roku od jednog mjeseca od dana njezine objave na sljedeću adresu:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Islandska tijela bit će obaviještena o tim primjedbama. Zainteresirana strana koja podnosi primjedbe može u pisanom obliku, navodeći razloge zahtjeva, zatražiti da se njezin identitet ne objavi.

Sažetak

Postupak

Porukom e-pošte od 24. ožujka 2015. islandska su tijela zatražila od Nadzornog tijela da razjasni može li se za financijske obveze društva Landsvirkjun koje proizlaze iz ugovora o izvedenicama jamčiti u okviru postojećeg islandskog sustava državnih jamstava. Taj sustav bio je predmet Odluke Nadzornog tijela br. 159/13/COL (1).

Kao odgovor na zahtjeve Nadzorno tijelo primilo je od islandskih tijela informacije o predmetnoj mjeri u dopisima od 11. veljače 2016. i 22. ožujka 2016. Nadalje, o tom se predmetu raspravljalo na sastanku islandskih tijela i Nadzornog tijela u Reykjavíku 31. svibnja 2016. Nakon sastanka Nadzorno tijelo uputilo je islandskim tijelima dopis sa zapisnikom sa sastanka i zahtjevom za dodatna pojašnjenja. Porukom e-pošte od 31. listopada 2016. islandska tijela odgovorila su na dopis Nadzornog tijela i dostavila dodatne dokumente.

Činjenice

Društvo Landsvirkjun javno je partnerstvo uređeno Zakonom br. 42/1983 o društvu Landsvirkjun, kako je izmijenjen. Landsvirkjun je u zajedničkom vlasništvu državne riznice (99,9 %) i društva Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). Eignarhlutir ehf. društvo je s ograničenom odgovornošću u potpunom vlasništvu državne riznice. Društvo Landsvirkjun trenutačno je najveći proizvođač električne energije na Islandu, s tržišnim udjelom u domaćoj proizvodnji električne energije većim od 75 %, te je jedno od deset najvećih poduzeća za proizvodnju obnovljive energije u Europi.

Odjel za upravljanje javnim dugom („Government Debt Management” („GDM”)) dio je Središnje banke Islanda. Središnja banka Islanda neovisna je javna institucija u vlasništvu islandske države.

Društvo Landsvirkjun izloženo je valutnom (FX) i kamatnom riziku u svojem dužničkom portfelju. Landsvirkjun se koristi raznim oblicima ugovora o izvedenicama da bi kontrolirao svoj tržišni rizik i upravljao njime.

Trenutačno je mišljenje Nadzornog tijela na temelju dostupnih činjenica da je GDM društvu Landsvirkjun dodjeljivao jamstva za određene ugovore o izvedenicama barem od 2013. Odluka se odnosi na jamstva GDM-a za sljedeće ugovore o izvedenicama: valutni ugovori o razmjeni, ugovori o valutnim opcijama i kamatni ugovori o razmjeni.

U skladu s točkom 3.2. smjernica o državnim potporama u pogledu državnih jamstava („smjernice o jamstvima”) (2) da bi se isključilo postojanje elemenata državne potpore u pojedinačnom jamstvu, dovoljno je ispunjenje sljedećih kumulativnih uvjeta:

| (a) | zajmoprimac nije u financijskim teškoćama; |
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(a)

zajmoprimac nije u financijskim teškoćama;

| (b) | opseg jamstva može se pravilno odrediti u trenutku njegove dodjele; |
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(b)

opseg jamstva može se pravilno odrediti u trenutku njegove dodjele;

| (c) | jamstvo ne obuhvaća više od 80 % iznosa neotplaćenog zajma ili druge financijske obveze; i |
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(c)

jamstvo ne obuhvaća više od 80 % iznosa neotplaćenog zajma ili druge financijske obveze; i

| (d) | za jamstvo se plaća tržišna cijena. |
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(d)

za jamstvo se plaća tržišna cijena.

Preliminarno je stajalište Nadzornog tijela da jamstva koja je GDM dodijelio društvu Landsvirkjun za prethodno navedene transakcije izvedenicama ne ispunjavaju uvjete (b), (c) i (d). Sukladno tome, trenutačno se ne može isključiti postojanje elemenata državne potpore na temelju točke 3.2. smjernica o jamstvima.

Prvo, islandska tijela dosad nisu uspjela objasniti jesu li jamstva povezana s određenim obvezama, koji je najveći iznos jamstava i jesu li jamstva vremenski ograničena. Stoga, trenutačno je stajalište Nadzornog tijela da uvjet (b) iz točke 3.2. smjernica o jamstvima nije ispunjen.

Drugo, čini se da su jamstvima obuhvaćene sve financijske obveze koje Landsvirkjun ima na temelju predmetnih ugovora o izvedenicama. Islandska tijela dosad nisu dostavila nikakve informacije na temelju kojih bi se moglo procijeniti je li jamstvo ograničeno na 80 % nepodmirenih financijskih obveza. Nadalje, ne postoje informacije na temelju kojih bi se mogle kvantificirati financijske obveze društva Landsvirkjun koje proizlaze iz ugovora o izvedenicama za koje jamči GDM. Stoga je trenutačno je stajalište Nadzornog tijela da uvjet (c) iz točke 3.2. smjernica o jamstvima nije ispunjen.

Treće, u skladu sa smjernicama o jamstvima preuzimanje rizika u pravilu zahtijeva naknadu odgovarajućom premijom na iznos obuhvaćen jamstvom ili kontrajamstvom. U pogledu jamstava GDM-a za valutne ugovore o razmjeni i ugovore o valutnim opcijama čini se da Landsvirkjun ne plaća nikakvu premiju. U pogledu jamstava GDM-a za kamatne ugovore o razmjeni, islandska tijela tvrde da Landsvirkjun plaća odgovarajuću jamstvenu premiju na neto obveze iz ugovora o izvedenicama koje predstavljaju neto gubitak. Međutim, Nadzorno tijelo nije primilo dovoljno informacija o metodologiji koja je upotrijebljena za određivanje razina premije te stoga ni o tome može li se ta razina premije smatrati tržišnom cijenom.

Ocjena

Trenutačno je stajalište Nadzornog tijela da se jamstva koja su predmet ove odluke mogu smatrati prednošću u smislu pravila o državnim potporama. Nadalje, čini se da je mjera selektivne prirode te da bi mogla narušiti tržišno natjecanje i utjecati na trgovinu unutar EGP-a. U skladu s time Nadzorno tijelo ne može isključiti mogućnost da mjera predstavlja državnu potporu u smislu članka 61. stavka 1. Sporazuma o EGP-u. Islandska tijela dosad nisu iznijela argumente kojima bi se dokazalo da bi se moguća državna potpora o kojoj je riječ mogla smatrati spojivom na temelju članka 59. stavka 2. ili članka 61. stavka 3. Sporazuma o EGP-u.

Zaključak

S obzirom na navedena razmatranja Nadzorno tijelo donijelo je odluku o pokretanju službenog ispitnog postupka u skladu s dijelom I. člankom 1. stavkom 2. Protokola 3. uz Sporazum među državama EFTA-e o osnivanju Nadzornog tijela i Suda. Zainteresirane strane pozivaju se na podnošenje primjedbi u roku od jednog mjeseca od objave ove obavijesti u Službenom listu Europske unije.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
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(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
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(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  Odluka Nadzornog tijela br. 159/13/COL od 24. travnja 2013. o zatvaranju predmeta o postojećim potporama dodijeljenima društvima Landsvirkjun i Orkuveita Reykjavíkur u obliku neograničenih državnih jamstava (SL C 237, 15.8.2013., str. 3. i Dodatak o EGP-u br. 45, 15.8.2013., str. 28.).

1

(2)  SL L 105, 21.4.2011., str. 32. i Dodatak o EGP-u br. 23, 21.4.2011., str. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Objave

ADMINISTRATIVNI POSTUPCI

Europski ured za odabir osoblja (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/17

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OBAVIJEST O OTVORENIM NATJEČAJIMA

(2017/C 242/07)

Europski ured za odabir osoblja (EPSO) organizira sljedeće otvorene natječaje

| | ADMINISTRATORI I ASISTENTI U PODRUČJU ZGRADARSTVA |
| --- | --- |

ADMINISTRATORI I ASISTENTI U PODRUČJU ZGRADARSTVA

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Inženjeri u području upravljanja zgradama (uključujući inženjere zaštite okoliša i servisne inženjere) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) – Inženjeri u području upravljanja zgradama (uključujući inženjere zaštite okoliša i servisne inženjere)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3): | Profil 1.: Koordinatori/tehničari u području gradnje zgrada |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3):

Profil 1.: Koordinatori/tehničari u području gradnje zgrada

| | Profil 2.: Koordinatori/tehničari za klimatizaciju te elektromehaniku i elektrotehniku u području zgradarstva |
| --- | --- |

Profil 2.: Koordinatori/tehničari za klimatizaciju te elektromehaniku i elektrotehniku u području zgradarstva

| | Profil 3.: Asistenti za sigurnost na radu/sigurnost zgrada |
| --- | --- |

Profil 3.: Asistenti za sigurnost na radu/sigurnost zgrada

Obavijest o natječaju objavljena je na 24 jezika u
  Službenom listu Europske unije C 242 A od 27. srpnja 2017.

Dodatne informacije dostupne su na internetskim stranicama EPSO-a: https://epso.europa.eu/

---

POSTUPCI U VEZI S PROVEDBOM POLITIKE TRŽIŠNOG NATJECANJA

Europska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/18

---

Prethodna prijava koncentracije

(Predmet M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Predmet primjeren za primjenu pojednostavnjenog postupka

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | Komisija je 18. srpnja 2017. zaprimila prijavu predložene koncentracije u skladu s člankom 4. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1) kojom poduzetnik Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment”, Luksemburg), kupnjom udjela stječe, u smislu članka 3. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe o koncentracijama, kontrolu nad cijelim poduzetnikom Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett”, Ujedinjena Kraljevina). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija je 18. srpnja 2017. zaprimila prijavu predložene koncentracije u skladu s člankom 4. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1) kojom poduzetnik Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. („Letterone Investment”, Luksemburg), kupnjom udjela stječe, u smislu članka 3. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe o koncentracijama, kontrolu nad cijelim poduzetnikom Holland & Barrett International Limited („Holland & Barrett”, Ujedinjena Kraljevina).

| 2. | Poslovne su djelatnosti predmetnih poduzetnika sljedeće:
  —   Letterone Investment: međunarodna ulaganja usmjerena na sektore telekomunikacija i tehnologije, zdravstvene skrbi i prodaje na malo,
  —   Holland & Barrett: prodaja na malo, putem vlastite mreže trgovina i u internetu, proizvoda u području zdravlja i dobrobiti kao npr. vitaminskih dodataka i zdrave hrane. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Poslovne su djelatnosti predmetnih poduzetnika sljedeće:

—   Letterone Investment: međunarodna ulaganja usmjerena na sektore telekomunikacija i tehnologije, zdravstvene skrbi i prodaje na malo,

—   Holland & Barrett: prodaja na malo, putem vlastite mreže trgovina i u internetu, proizvoda u području zdravlja i dobrobiti kao npr. vitaminskih dodataka i zdrave hrane.

| 3. | Preliminarnim ispitivanjem Komisija je ocijenila da bi prijavljena transakcija mogla biti obuhvaćena područjem primjene Uredbe o koncentracijama. Međutim konačna odluka još nije donesena. U skladu s Obavijesti Komisije o pojednostavnjenom postupku za postupanje s određenim koncentracijama prema Uredbi Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (2) treba napomenuti da je ovaj predmet primjeren za primjenu postupka iz Obavijesti. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Preliminarnim ispitivanjem Komisija je ocijenila da bi prijavljena transakcija mogla biti obuhvaćena područjem primjene Uredbe o koncentracijama. Međutim konačna odluka još nije donesena. U skladu s Obavijesti Komisije o pojednostavnjenom postupku za postupanje s određenim koncentracijama prema Uredbi Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (2) treba napomenuti da je ovaj predmet primjeren za primjenu postupka iz Obavijesti.

| 4. | Komisija poziva zainteresirane treće osobe da joj podnesu moguća očitovanja o predloženoj koncentraciji.
  Očitovanja se Komisiji moraju dostaviti najkasnije 10 dana od datuma ove objave. Očitovanja se, uz naznaku referentnog broja M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett, Komisiji mogu poslati telefaksom (+32 22964301), e-poštom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ili poštom na sljedeću adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija poziva zainteresirane treće osobe da joj podnesu moguća očitovanja o predloženoj koncentraciji.

Očitovanja se Komisiji moraju dostaviti najkasnije 10 dana od datuma ove objave. Očitovanja se, uz naznaku referentnog broja M.8582 – Letterone/Holland & Barrett, Komisiji mogu poslati telefaksom (+32 22964301), e-poštom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ili poštom na sljedeću adresu:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  SL L 24, 29.1.2004., str. 1. („Uredba o koncentracijama”).

(2)  SL C 366, 14.12.2013., str. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/19

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Prethodna prijava koncentracije

(Predmet M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon)

(Tekst značajan za EGP)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | Komisija je 19. srpnja 2017. zaprimila prijavu predložene koncentracije u skladu s člankom 4. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1) kojom poduzetnik Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fischer”, SAD) kupnjom udjela stječe, u smislu članka 3. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe o koncentracijama, kontrolu nad poduzetnikom Patheon N.V. („Patheon”, Nizozemska). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Komisija je 19. srpnja 2017. zaprimila prijavu predložene koncentracije u skladu s člankom 4. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 139/2004 (1) kojom poduzetnik Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. („Thermo Fischer”, SAD) kupnjom udjela stječe, u smislu članka 3. stavka 1. točke (b) Uredbe o koncentracijama, kontrolu nad poduzetnikom Patheon N.V. („Patheon”, Nizozemska).

| 2. | Poslovne su djelatnosti predmetnih poduzetnika sljedeće:






  — | Thermo Fisher proizvođač je i dobavljač laboratorijske opreme, instrumenata za analizu i dijagnostiku te povezanih proizvoda i usluga; njegovo je sjedište u SAD-u i djeluje na međunarodnoj razini, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Poslovne su djelatnosti predmetnih poduzetnika sljedeće:

—

Thermo Fisher proizvođač je i dobavljač laboratorijske opreme, instrumenata za analizu i dijagnostiku te povezanih proizvoda i usluga; njegovo je sjedište u SAD-u i djeluje na međunarodnoj razini,

| — | Patheon je organizacija za razvoj i proizvodnju na temelju ugovora, koja pruža usluge povezane s aktivnim farmaceutskim sastojcima i dovršenim lijekovima; njegovo je sjedište u Nizozemskoj i djeluje na međunarodnoj razini. |
| --- | --- |

—

Patheon je organizacija za razvoj i proizvodnju na temelju ugovora, koja pruža usluge povezane s aktivnim farmaceutskim sastojcima i dovršenim lijekovima; njegovo je sjedište u Nizozemskoj i djeluje na međunarodnoj razini.

| 3. | Preliminarnim ispitivanjem Komisija je ocijenila da bi prijavljena transakcija mogla biti obuhvaćena područjem primjene Uredbe o koncentracijama. Međutim konačna odluka još nije donesena. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Preliminarnim ispitivanjem Komisija je ocijenila da bi prijavljena transakcija mogla biti obuhvaćena područjem primjene Uredbe o koncentracijama. Međutim konačna odluka još nije donesena.

| 4. | Komisija poziva zainteresirane treće osobe da joj podnesu moguća očitovanja o predloženoj koncentraciji.
  Očitovanja se Komisiji moraju dostaviti najkasnije u roku od 10 dana od datuma ove objave. Očitovanja se, uz naznaku referentnog broja M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V., Komisiji mogu poslati telefaksom (+32 22964301), e-poštom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ili poštom na sljedeću adresu:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisija poziva zainteresirane treće osobe da joj podnesu moguća očitovanja o predloženoj koncentraciji.

Očitovanja se Komisiji moraju dostaviti najkasnije u roku od 10 dana od datuma ove objave. Očitovanja se, uz naznaku referentnog broja M.8541 – Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V., Komisiji mogu poslati telefaksom (+32 22964301), e-poštom na adresu COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ili poštom na sljedeću adresu:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  SL L 24, 29.1.2004., str. 1. („Uredba o koncentracijama”)

---

DRUGI AKTI

Europska komisija

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/20

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INFORMATIVNA OBAVIJEST – JAVNO SAVJETOVANJE

Oznake zemljopisnog podrijetla iz Japana

(2017/C 242/10)

U okviru pregovora koji su u tijeku s Japanom o sporazumu o slobodnoj trgovini (dalje u tekstu „sporazum”), koji bi uključivao poglavlje o oznakama zemljopisnog podrijetla, japanske vlasti predložile su za zaštitu u okviru sporazuma priloženi popis oznaka zemljopisnog podrijetla. Europska komisija trenutačno razmatra hoće li te oznake zemljopisnog podrijetla biti zaštićene u okviru budućeg sporazuma kao oznake zemljopisnog podrijetla u smislu članka 22. stavka 1. Sporazuma o trgovinskim aspektima prava intelektualnog vlasništva.

Komisija poziva sve države članice, treće zemlje i sve fizičke ili pravne osobe s opravdanim interesom, koje imaju boravište ili poslovni nastan u državi članici ili trećoj zemlji, da ulože prigovor protiv navedene zaštite podnošenjem propisno obrazložene izjave.

Prigovori se moraju dostaviti Komisiji u roku od dva mjeseca od datuma objave ove obavijesti. Prigovori se šalju na sljedeću adresu e-pošte: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Prigovori se uzimaju u razmatranje samo ako su zaprimljeni u prethodno navedenom roku i ako se u njima dokazuje da bi na temelju zaštite predloženog naziva:

| (a) | naziv se podudara s nazivom biljne sorte ili životinjske pasmine, što bi potrošača moglo dovesti u zabludu o pravom podrijetlu proizvoda; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

naziv se podudara s nazivom biljne sorte ili životinjske pasmine, što bi potrošača moglo dovesti u zabludu o pravom podrijetlu proizvoda;

| (b) | naziv bio potpun ili djelomičan homonim s nazivom koji je već zaštićen u Uniji u skladu s Uredbom (EU) br. 1151/2012 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 21. studenoga 2012. o sustavima kvalitete za poljoprivredne i prehrambene proizvode (1) ili je dio sporazuma koje je Unija sklopila sa sljedećim zemljama:






  — | države SADC SGP-a (Bocvana, Lesoto, Mozambik, Namibija, Svazi i Južna Afrika) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

naziv bio potpun ili djelomičan homonim s nazivom koji je već zaštićen u Uniji u skladu s Uredbom (EU) br. 1151/2012 Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća od 21. studenoga 2012. o sustavima kvalitete za poljoprivredne i prehrambene proizvode (1) ili je dio sporazuma koje je Unija sklopila sa sljedećim zemljama:

—

države SADC SGP-a (Bocvana, Lesoto, Mozambik, Namibija, Svazi i Južna Afrika) (2)

| — | Švicarska (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

Švicarska (3)

| — | Koreja (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Koreja (4)

| — | Srednja Amerika (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

Srednja Amerika (5)

| — | Kolumbija, Peru i Ekvador (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Kolumbija, Peru i Ekvador (6)

| — | Crna Gora (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Crna Gora (7)

| — | Bosna i Hercegovina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosna i Hercegovina (8)

| — | Srbija (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Srbija (9)

| — | Moldova (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldova (10)

| — | Ukrajina (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukrajina (11)

| — | Gruzija (12) |
| --- | --- |

—

Gruzija (12)

| (c) | uzimajući u obzir ugled i poznatost žiga i duljinu njegove uporabe, potrošač bi mogao biti doveden u zabludu u pogledu pravog identiteta proizvoda; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

uzimajući u obzir ugled i poznatost žiga i duljinu njegove uporabe, potrošač bi mogao biti doveden u zabludu u pogledu pravog identiteta proizvoda;

| (d) | bilo ugroženo postojanje potpuno ili djelomično identičnog naziva ili žiga ili postojanje proizvoda koji su se zakonito nalazili na tržištu tijekom najmanje pet godina prije datuma objave ove obavijesti |
| --- | --- |

(d)

bilo ugroženo postojanje potpuno ili djelomično identičnog naziva ili žiga ili postojanje proizvoda koji su se zakonito nalazili na tržištu tijekom najmanje pet godina prije datuma objave ove obavijesti

| (e) | ili ako se na temelju dostavljenih podataka može zaključiti da je naziv čija se zaštita razmatra generički. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

ili ako se na temelju dostavljenih podataka može zaključiti da je naziv čija se zaštita razmatra generički.

Navedeni kriteriji ocjenjuju se u odnosu na područje Unije koje se u slučaju prava intelektualnog vlasništva odnosi samo na državno područje ili državna područja na kojima su navedena prava zaštićena. Moguća zaštita predmetnih naziva u Europskoj uniji ovisi o uspješnom završetku ovih pregovora te donošenju zakonskog akta.

Popis oznaka zemljopisnog podrijetla
   (13)

| Zaštićeni naziv u Japanu | Transkripcija (samo u informativne svrhe) | Kategorija i opis proizvoda |
| --- | --- | --- |
| „

  ”/„Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi” | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Svježa riba, rakovi, mekušci i proizvodi dobiveni od njih – školjkaši |
| „

  ”/„Tsurajima Gobou” | Tsurajima Gobou | Voće, povrće i žitarice, u prirodnom stanju ili prerađeni – čičak |
| „

  ” | Yamagata | Ostali proizvodi iz Priloga I. Ugovoru (začini itd.) – ostala fermentirana pića – seishu (sake) |
| „

  ”/„Maesawa Beef” | Maesawa Gyu | Svježe meso (i nusproizvodi klanja) – govedina |
| „

  ”/„Yonezawagyu” | Yonezawa Gyu | Svježe meso (i nusproizvodi klanja) – govedina |
| „

  ”/„Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi” | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Svježe meso (i nusproizvodi klanja) – govedina |
| „

  ”/„Nishio Matcha” | Nishio no Matcha | Ostali proizvodi iz Priloga I. Ugovoru (začini itd.) – zeleni čaj u prahu |

Zaštićeni naziv u Japanu

Transkripcija (samo u informativne svrhe)

Kategorija i opis proizvoda

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Svježa riba, rakovi, mekušci i proizvodi dobiveni od njih – školjkaši

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

Voće, povrće i žitarice, u prirodnom stanju ili prerađeni – čičak

Image

Yamagata

Ostali proizvodi iz Priloga I. Ugovoru (začini itd.) – ostala fermentirana pića – seishu (sake)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

Svježe meso (i nusproizvodi klanja) – govedina

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

Svježe meso (i nusproizvodi klanja) – govedina

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Svježe meso (i nusproizvodi klanja) – govedina

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Ostali proizvodi iz Priloga I. Ugovoru (začini itd.) – zeleni čaj u prahu

---

(1)  SL L 343, 14.12.2012., str. 1.

(2)  Odluka Vijeća (EU) 2016/1623 od 1. lipnja 2016. o potpisivanju, u ime Europske unije, i privremenoj primjeni Sporazuma o gospodarskom partnerstvu između Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i država SADC SGP-a, s druge strane (SL L 250, 16.9.2016., str. 1.).

(3)  Odluka 2002/309/EZ, Euratom Vijeća, i Komisije u pogledu Sporazuma o znanstvenoj i tehnološkoj suradnji, od 4. travnja 2002. o sklapanju sedam sporazuma sa Švicarskom Konfederacijom (SL L 114, 30.4.2002., str. 1.) te posebno Sporazum između Europske zajednice i Švicarske Konfederacije o trgovini poljoprivrednim proizvodima – Prilog 7.

(4)  Odluka Vijeća 2011/265/EU od 16. rujna 2010. o potpisivanju, u ime Europske unije, i privremenoj primjeni Sporazuma o slobodnoj trgovini između Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Republike Koreje, s druge strane (SL L 127, 14.5.2011., str. 1.).

(5)  Sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Srednje Amerike, s druge strane (SL L 346, 15.12.2012., str. 3.).

(6)  Sporazum o trgovini između Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Kolumbije i Perua, s druge strane (SL L 354, 21.12.2012., str. 3.) i Protokol o pristupanju uz Sporazum o trgovini između Europske unije i njezinih država članica, s jedne strane, i Kolumbije i Perua, s druge strane, kako bi se uzelo u obzir pristupanje Ekvadora (SL L 356, 24.12.2016., str. 3.).

(7)  Odluka Vijeća 2007/855/EZ od 15. listopada 2007. o potpisivanju i sklapanju Privremenog sporazuma o trgovini i trgovinskim pitanjima između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i Republike Crne Gore, s druge strane (SL L 345, 28.12.2007., str. 1.).

(8)  Odluka Vijeća 2008/474/EZ od 16. lipnja 2008. o potpisivanju i sklapanju Privremenog sporazuma o trgovini i trgovinskim pitanjima između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i Bosne i Hercegovine, s druge strane (SL L 169, 30.6.2008., str. 10. Protokol 6.).

(9)  Odluka Vijeća 2010/36/EZ od 29. travnja 2008. o potpisivanju i sklapanju Privremenog sporazuma o trgovini i trgovinskim pitanjima između Europske zajednice, s jedne strane, i Republike Srbije, s druge strane (SL L 28, 30.1.2010., str. 1.).

(10)  Odluka Vijeća 2013/7/EU od 3. prosinca 2012. o sklapanju Sporazuma između Europske unije i Republike Moldove o zaštiti oznaka zemljopisnog podrijetla poljoprivrednih i prehrambenih proizvoda (SL L 10, 15.1.2013., str. 1.).

(11)  Sporazum o pridruživanju između Europske unije i Europske zajednice za atomsku energiju te njihovih država članica, s jedne strane, i Ukrajine, s druge strane (SL L 161, 29.5.2014.).

(12)  Odluka Vijeća 2012/164/EU od 14. veljače 2012. o sklapanju Sporazuma između Europske unije i Gruzije o zaštiti oznaka zemljopisnog podrijetla poljoprivrednih i prehrambenih proizvoda (SL L 93, 30.3.2012., str. 1.).

(13)  Popis registriran u Japanu, koji su dostavile japanske vlasti u okviru pregovora koji su u tijeku.

---

| 27.7.2017 | HR | Službeni list Europske unije | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

HR

Službeni list Europske unije

C 242/22

---

Obavijest upućena u skladu s Provedbenom uredbom Komisije (EU) 2017/1390 fizičkim osobama Alexandau Amonu Koteyu, Elshafeeu El Sheikhu, Muhammadu Bahrumu Naimu Anggihu Tamtomou, Maliku Ruslanovichu Barkhanoevu, Muradu Iraklievichu Margoshviliju i OMANU ROCHMANU te pravnim osobama, skupinama i subjektima HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa, čija su imena dodana na popis na koji se upućuje u člancima 2., 3. i 7. Uredbe Vijeća (EZ) br. 881/2002 od 27. svibnja 2002. o uvođenju određenih posebnih mjera ograničavanja protiv određenih osoba i subjekata povezanih s organizacijama ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | U Odluci Vijeća (ZVSP) 2016/1693 (1) Unija se poziva da zamrzne financijska sredstva i gospodarske izvore članova organizacija ISIL-a (Da'esh) i Al-Qaide te s njima povezanih pojedinaca, skupina, poduzeća i subjekata, kako su navedeni na popisu sastavljenom u skladu s rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a 1267(1999) i 1333(2000), koji redovito ažurira odbor UN-a osnovan na temelju Rezolucije Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a 1267(1999).
  Popis koji je sastavio taj odbor UN-a obuhvaća:






  — | ISIL (Da’esh) i Al-Qaidu, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

U Odluci Vijeća (ZVSP) 2016/1693 (1) Unija se poziva da zamrzne financijska sredstva i gospodarske izvore članova organizacija ISIL-a (Da'esh) i Al-Qaide te s njima povezanih pojedinaca, skupina, poduzeća i subjekata, kako su navedeni na popisu sastavljenom u skladu s rezolucijama Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a 1267(1999) i 1333(2000), koji redovito ažurira odbor UN-a osnovan na temelju Rezolucije Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a 1267(1999).

Popis koji je sastavio taj odbor UN-a obuhvaća:

—

ISIL (Da’esh) i Al-Qaidu,

| — | fizičke ili pravne osobe, subjekte, tijela i skupine povezane s ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom i |
| --- | --- |

—

fizičke ili pravne osobe, subjekte, tijela i skupine povezane s ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom i

| — | pravne osobe, subjekte i tijela čiji je vlasnik ili koje kontrolira ili ih na drugi način podupire bilo koja od tih povezanih osoba, subjekata, tijela ili skupina. |
| --- | --- |

—

pravne osobe, subjekte i tijela čiji je vlasnik ili koje kontrolira ili ih na drugi način podupire bilo koja od tih povezanih osoba, subjekata, tijela ili skupina.

Radnje ili aktivnosti koje upućuju na to da su pojedinac, skupina, poduzeće ili subjekt „povezani s” ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom obuhvaćaju:

| (a) | sudjelovanje u financiranju, planiranju, olakšavanju, pripremi ili počinjenju djela ili aktivnosti ISIL-a (Da'esh) i Al-Qaide ili u suradnji s njima, pod njihovim imenom ili u njihovo ime ili kao podrška njima ili bilo kojoj njihovoj ćeliji, pridruženom članu, odcijepljenoj skupini ili izvedenoj skupini; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

sudjelovanje u financiranju, planiranju, olakšavanju, pripremi ili počinjenju djela ili aktivnosti ISIL-a (Da'esh) i Al-Qaide ili u suradnji s njima, pod njihovim imenom ili u njihovo ime ili kao podrška njima ili bilo kojoj njihovoj ćeliji, pridruženom članu, odcijepljenoj skupini ili izvedenoj skupini;

| (b) | isporučivanje, prodaju ili prijenos oružja i povezanog materijala bilo kome od njih; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

isporučivanje, prodaju ili prijenos oružja i povezanog materijala bilo kome od njih;

| (c) | vrbovanje za bilo koga od njih ili |
| --- | --- |

(c)

vrbovanje za bilo koga od njih ili

| (d) | podupiranje djela ili aktivnosti bilo koga od njih na neki drugi način. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

podupiranje djela ili aktivnosti bilo koga od njih na neki drugi način.

| 2. | Odbor Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a odobrio je 20. srpnja 2017. uvrštenje unosa Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa na popis Odbora za sankcije za ISIL (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidu.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa mogu u bilo kojem trenutku pravobranitelju UN-a dostaviti zahtjev, uključujući svu popratnu dokumentaciju, za ponovno razmatranje odluke o uvrštavanju na prethodno spomenuti popis UN-a. Zahtjev treba poslati na sljedeću adresu:





  United Nations - Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| SJEDINJENE AMERIČKE DRŽAVE |
| Tel. +1 212 963 2671 |
| Faks: +1 212 963 1300/3778 |
| E-pošta: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

Odbor Vijeća sigurnosti UN-a odobrio je 20. srpnja 2017. uvrštenje unosa Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa na popis Odbora za sankcije za ISIL (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidu.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa mogu u bilo kojem trenutku pravobranitelju UN-a dostaviti zahtjev, uključujući svu popratnu dokumentaciju, za ponovno razmatranje odluke o uvrštavanju na prethodno spomenuti popis UN-a. Zahtjev treba poslati na sljedeću adresu:

United Nations - Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

SJEDINJENE AMERIČKE DRŽAVE

Tel. +1 212 963 2671

Faks: +1 212 963 1300/3778

E-pošta: ombudsperson@un.org

Dodatne informacije potražiti na https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | Na temelju odluke UN-a iz stavka 2. Komisija je donijela Provedbenu uredbu (EU) 2017/1390 (2) o izmjeni Priloga I. Uredbi Vijeća (EZ) br. 881/2002 od 27. svibnja 2002. o uvođenju određenih posebnih mjera ograničavanja protiv određenih osoba i subjekata povezanih s organizacijama ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom (3). Izmjenama izvršenima u skladu s člankom 7. stavkom 1. točkom (a) i člankom 7.a stavkom 1. Uredbe (EZ) br. 881/2002 dodaju se imena fizičkih osoba Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeea El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtomoa, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija i OMANA ROCHMANA te pravnih osoba, skupina ili subjekata HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa na popis u Prilogu I. toj uredbi („Prilog I.”).
  Sljedeće se mjere iz Uredbe (EZ) br. 881/2002 primjenjuju na osobe i subjekte obuhvaćene Prilogom I.:






  1. | zamrzavanje svih financijskih sredstava i gospodarskih izvora koji pripadaju dotičnim osobama i subjektima ili su u njihovu vlasništvu ili posjedu te (opća) zabrana izravnog ili neizravnog stavljanja financijskih sredstava i gospodarskih izvora na raspolaganje dotičnim osobama i subjektima ili u korist tih osoba i subjekata (članci 2. i 2.a) i |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Na temelju odluke UN-a iz stavka 2. Komisija je donijela Provedbenu uredbu (EU) 2017/1390 (2) o izmjeni Priloga I. Uredbi Vijeća (EZ) br. 881/2002 od 27. svibnja 2002. o uvođenju određenih posebnih mjera ograničavanja protiv određenih osoba i subjekata povezanih s organizacijama ISIL-om (Da'esh) i Al-Qaidom (3). Izmjenama izvršenima u skladu s člankom 7. stavkom 1. točkom (a) i člankom 7.a stavkom 1. Uredbe (EZ) br. 881/2002 dodaju se imena fizičkih osoba Alexanda Amona Koteya, Elshafeea El Sheikha, Muhammada Bahruma Naima Anggiha Tamtomoa, Malika Ruslanovicha Barkhanoeva, Murada Iraklievicha Margoshvilija i OMANA ROCHMANA te pravnih osoba, skupina ili subjekata HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (PODRUŽNICA KOJA SE NALAZI U ALBU KAMALU, SIRIJSKA ARAPSKA REPUBLIKA), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed i Jund Al Aqsa na popis u Prilogu I. toj uredbi („Prilog I.”).

Sljedeće se mjere iz Uredbe (EZ) br. 881/2002 primjenjuju na osobe i subjekte obuhvaćene Prilogom I.:

1.

zamrzavanje svih financijskih sredstava i gospodarskih izvora koji pripadaju dotičnim osobama i subjektima ili su u njihovu vlasništvu ili posjedu te (opća) zabrana izravnog ili neizravnog stavljanja financijskih sredstava i gospodarskih izvora na raspolaganje dotičnim osobama i subjektima ili u korist tih osoba i subjekata (članci 2. i 2.a) i

| 2. | zabrana izravnog ili neizravnog pružanja, prodaje, dopreme ili prijenosa tehničkih savjeta, pomoći ili obuke u vezi s vojnim aktivnostima bilo kojoj predmetnoj osobi ili subjektu (članak 3.). |
| --- | --- |

2.

zabrana izravnog ili neizravnog pružanja, prodaje, dopreme ili prijenosa tehničkih savjeta, pomoći ili obuke u vezi s vojnim aktivnostima bilo kojoj predmetnoj osobi ili subjektu (članak 3.).

| 4. | Člankom 7.a Uredbe (EZ) br. 881/2002 predviđa se postupak preispitivanja u okviru kojeg se osobe uvrštene na popis mogu očitovati o razlozima tog uvrštenja. Osobe i subjekti koji su dodani u Prilog I. na temelju Provedbene uredbe (EU) 2017/1390 mogu od Komisije zatražiti obrazloženje zašto su uvršteni na popis. Zahtjev treba poslati na adresu:





  Europska komisija |
| --- | --- |
| „Restrictive measures” (Mjere ograničavanja) |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Člankom 7.a Uredbe (EZ) br. 881/2002 predviđa se postupak preispitivanja u okviru kojeg se osobe uvrštene na popis mogu očitovati o razlozima tog uvrštenja. Osobe i subjekti koji su dodani u Prilog I. na temelju Provedbene uredbe (EU) 2017/1390 mogu od Komisije zatražiti obrazloženje zašto su uvršteni na popis. Zahtjev treba poslati na adresu:

Europska komisija

„Restrictive measures” (Mjere ograničavanja)

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | Dotičnim se osobama i subjektima ukazuje i na mogućnost osporavanja Provedbene uredbe (EU) 2017/1390 pred Općim sudom Europske unije u skladu s uvjetima utvrđenima u članku 263. stavcima četvrtom i šestom Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Dotičnim se osobama i subjektima ukazuje i na mogućnost osporavanja Provedbene uredbe (EU) 2017/1390 pred Općim sudom Europske unije u skladu s uvjetima utvrđenima u članku 263. stavcima četvrtom i šestom Ugovora o funkcioniranju Europske unije.

| 6. | Isto tako, osobama i subjektima uvrštenima u Prilog I. napominje se da mogu podnijeti zahtjev nadležnim tijelima odgovarajuće države članice ili država članica koja su navedena na popisu iz Priloga II. Uredbi (EZ) br. 881/2002 kako bi dobili dopuštenje za korištenje zamrznutim financijskim sredstvima i gospodarskim izvorima za osnovne potrebe ili za određena plaćanja u skladu s člankom 2.a te uredbe. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Isto tako, osobama i subjektima uvrštenima u Prilog I. napominje se da mogu podnijeti zahtjev nadležnim tijelima odgovarajuće države članice ili država članica koja su navedena na popisu iz Priloga II. Uredbi (EZ) br. 881/2002 kako bi dobili dopuštenje za korištenje zamrznutim financijskim sredstvima i gospodarskim izvorima za osnovne potrebe ili za određena plaćanja u skladu s člankom 2.a te uredbe.

---

(1)  SL L 255, 21.9.2016., str. 25.

(2)  SL L 195, 27.7.2017., str. 11.

(3)  SL L 139, 29.5.2002., str. 9.

---