In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-1976

Rixson Merle Perry,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., William

J. Zuccaro, William M. Zuccaro, Robert

Zuccaro, and Daniel Carmin Tarry,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 C 4092--William T. Hart, Judge.

Argued January 4, 2000--Decided September 19, 2000

 Before Cudahy, Kanne, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit

Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. Rixson Perry is a

well- known user of this court’s services. See

Perry v. Sheahan, Nos. 99-1079, 99-2741, 2000 WL

1006950 (7th Cir. July 21, 2000); Perry v.

Sullivan, 207 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 2000); Perry v.

Village of Arlington Heights, 186 F.3d 826 (7th

Cir. 1999); Perry v. Pogemiller, 16 F.3d 138 (7th

Cir. 1993); and Perry v. Federal Bureau of

Investigation, 759 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1985), on

rehearing en banc, 781 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1986).

The present case arises out of his challenges to

the ordinances maintained by the Village of

Arlington Heights, Illinois, regarding the

seizure of abandoned automobiles. (His standing

to pursue some of these claims was at issue in

the earlier Arlington Heights litigation, 186

F.3d 826, supra.) In the course of challenging

the vehicle seizure ordinances, Perry claimed to

have discovered evidence of municipal corruption

that prompted him to sue Daniel Tarry, a Village

employee, and Globe Auto Recycling (Globe) under

the civil RICO provisions, 18 U.S.C. sec.

1964(c).

 Perry’s own RICO case was dismissed with

prejudice and is not now before us. Instead,

Perry purchased for $100 the claims of another
Arlington Heights resident, Roy Lahucik, and is

now pursuing those claims. The district court

dismissed the case on the ground that it was

barred by claim preclusion. This, we conclude,

was error. It is possible that the Lahucik claims

may be barred by the RICO statute of limitations,

but the record as it now stands is not developed

enough for us to make a judgment on that point.

We therefore remand the case to the district

court for further proceedings.

 Perry’s crusade against the Arlington Heights

vehicle seizure ordinance began on October 27,

1992, when Arlington Heights Code Enforcement

Officer Daniel Tarry ordered the seizure of

Perry’s 1975 Ford LTD. The Village ordinance then

permitted seizure of abandoned vehicles without

prior notice to the owner of record. In order to

get his vehicle back, Perry had to pay certain

fees, despite the fact that he was not given the

opportunity to have a hearing concerning the

validity of the seizure in the first place. Perry

sued both the Village and Tarry, claiming that

his federal due process rights have been violated

by the Village’s procedure. The district court

agreed, to the extent of granting partial summary

judgment in Perry’s favor on the question whether

the practice was unconstitutional. In the damages

phase of the case, however, Perry failed to

comply with various discovery requests, and

eventually the judge dismissed the action as a

sanction.

 Down but not out, Perry responded with a number

of actions based on the civil provisions of the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act, more commonly known as RICO. He believed

that Tarry and Globe, the company that the

Village used to provide towing services, were

engaged in a corrupt conspiracy to violate the

rights of the hapless individuals who left their

cars unattended on the streets of Arlington

Heights. This group of cases, exemplified by

Perry v. Tarry, No. 96-C-7027, 1997 WL 361453

(N.D. Ill. June 20, 1997), arose out of the

seizure of Perry’s own car. At least one of the

later cases was dismissed on res judicata

grounds, and an exasperated district judge

ordered that "in any civil litigation commenced

by Perry within this circuit against the

defendants involved in this motion, the

defendants may ignore his filing unless the court

explicitly orders them to respond." Perry v.

Tarry, No. 96-C-7027, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. Ill.

Apr. 16, 1997). 

 Determined to right the wrongs he perceived,

Perry then went out and paid Roy Lahucik $100 for

"all claims, demands, and causes of action of

whatever kind and nature" arising out of the
seizure and towing of Lahucik’s 1984 Chevy

Suburban. The assignment was dated July 1, 1998,

but the record does not reveal when the Suburban

was towed. On July 2, 1998, Perry was back in

court, suing in his capacity as Lahucik’s

assignee, again raising the RICO theory that had

failed in his own lawsuits. The district court

dismissed in a brief order relying on res

judicata. The order stated that "[t]he assignment

of the claim does not preclude privity," found

that all the requirements for claim preclusion

were satisfied, and bounced the case out. 

 It is impossible to fault the district judge

for having the reaction he did to this case. At

least with respect to the towing claims, Perry

has been an abusive litigant, and it is easy to

see why the judge concluded that the expedient of

persuading other individuals to assign their

claims to him should not be enough to avoid the

ban on Perry’s own filings. But we are concerned

with the breadth of the judge’s rationale, which

we think would--if generalized--cast doubt on

many legitimate assignments that occur every day

in the world of civil litigation. There are other

ways to control the misuse of judicial processes

by a person like Perry, which the court will be

free to consider on remand.

 The court’s claim preclusion rationale properly

focused on the three elements of federal claim

preclusion: identity of claims, identity of

parties, and a prior final judgment on the

merits. See, e.g., Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kagaku

Co., 121 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1997). The

only element at issue here is identity of

parties; Perry concedes that the claims were

exactly the same (in the sense that they arose

out of exactly the same ordinances and procedures

used by the Village) and that there was a prior

final judgment on the merits in his own case. But

what about the parties? Globe argues that if

Lahucik himself had brought the present case he

too would be claim precluded, because of the

"virtual representation" theory, but that is

wrong. Indeed, one of the cases on which Globe

relies is the district court’s opinion in Tice v.

American Airlines, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 928 (N.D.

Ill. 1997), which this court later reversed in

Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966

(7th Cir. 1998), expressly finding that the idea

of "virtual representation" cannot override an

individual’s right to his own day in court unless

the facts show a strong reason why the first

litigant was, in effect, a real representative

(not a virtual one) of the second. See also

DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 189 F.3d 650, 653

(7th Cir. 1999) (noting that this circuit takes

a "dim view of preclusion by virtual

representation in suits other than class
actions"). Perry was not Lahucik’s representative

in any sense of the term, and thus Lahucik would

have been fully entitled to bring the present

litigation on his own.

 The question thus becomes whether Lahucik’s

decision to assign his claim to Perry transforms

the claim from one that could be brought to one

that is barred by Perry’s earlier unsuccessful

efforts. We see no reason why this should be so.

Indeed, it is routine for institutions like banks

or insurance companies to take assignments of

large numbers of claims arising out of a single

transaction or occurrence, and given the vagaries

of litigation they undoubtedly win some and lose

some. The more common problem arises when the

assignor tries to evade claim preclusion by

selling the claim to another party; in that

situation, the district court’s statement that

assignment does not prevent a finding of privity

is certainly true. As the Supreme Court put it

long ago in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. City of

Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1918), "[t]he

ground upon which, and upon which alone, a

judgment against a prior owner is held conclusive

against his successor in interest, is that the

estoppel runs with the property, that the grantor

can transfer no better right or title than he

himself has."

 But we have the opposite situation here. The

applicable rule is therefore the one holding that

"the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor

and assumes the same rights, title and interest

possessed by the assignor." Plumb v. Fluid Pump

Service, Inc., 124 F.3d 849, 864 (7th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

So, even though Perry could receive no more than

Lahucik had, it is also true that he received no

less. Since Lahucik had the right to bring his

own claim, that is what he conveyed to Perry in

the assignment. See also Kane v. Magna Mixer Co.,

71 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that

assignee is bound by assignor’s waiver); Rhode

Island Hospital Trust Nat’l Bank v. Ohio Casualty

Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 74, 82 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting

that where judgment precedes assignment, assignee

is precluded in same manner as assignor).

 Globe also argues that Perry could have brought

Lahucik’s claim as part of his earlier

litigation, but that is also not correct.

Ordinarily, of course, people have no standing to

assert the rights of third parties. See, e.g.,

Retired Chicago Police Ass’n. v. City of Chicago,

76 F.3d 856, 862 (7th Cir. 1996). None of the

exceptions to that rule that permit jus tertii

litigation would have permitted Perry, without a

hint of consent from Lahucik, to litigate

Lahucik’s claims. And there is definitely no rule
(and never will be one, as far as we are

concerned) under which strangers to a lawsuit

might be precluded in a later action just because

the first litigant hypothetically could have

tried to persuade a court to certify a class. 

 Thus, the specific ground on which the district

court dismissed Perry’s action in his capacity as

Lahucik’s assignee was not correct. That does not

mean, however, that district courts are powerless

to prevent this genre of abuse. Even as an

assignee, Perry was subject to the normal

strictures of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, under which both parties and

their lawyers can be sanctioned for bringing

frivolous lawsuits. The string of defeats Perry

knew that he had suffered in his own suits gave

him a very good idea of the likelihood of success

another person would have on precisely the same

question. In addition, if the district court is

concerned that its earlier order attempting to

prevent Perry from cluttering up the court with

frivolous litigation was inadvertently too

narrow, it can always craft a broader injunction

that would cover the possibility of assignments.

 Last, Globe has vaguely argued that the Lahucik

claim is barred by the four-year RICO statute of

limitations. It has not developed that argument

in any detail, but given the district court’s

prior order telling Globe that it need not

respond to Perry at all, we do not think it

appropriate to find waiver on Globe’s part. The

greater problem with the limitations argument is

the lack of facts in the record that would permit

us to rule on it right now. The Supreme Court has

recently made clear the fact that the RICO

limitations period runs from "discovery of the

injury, not discovery of the other elements of a

claim." Rotella v. Wood, 120 S. Ct. 1075, 1081

(2000). The injury here would be the towing of

Lahucik’s Suburban. Even though Lahucik would not

have known at the time whether the towing was

wrong, the examples in Rotella drawn from the

area of medical malpractice demonstrate that this

makes no difference. He would have known that

something amounting to injury in fact had

occurred, and it would have been up to him to

inquire further to see if this was also a legal

wrong. Here, we know that Perry filed Lahucik’s

claim on July 2, 1998, but we have no idea when

the vehicle was towed. On remand, the district

court will be free to explore this defense if it

remains relevant to the litigation.

 We therefore REVERSE and REMAND this case to the

district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. Costs on appeal will be taxed

against Perry.
 Cudahy, Circuit Judge, concurring in the

judgment. I cannot agree that the essential

element of identity of parties is absent here.

Nonetheless, because I believe that the two

claims may not be identical, I concur in the

result.

 The majority cites the following as the

applicable rule: "the assignee stands in the

shoes of the assignor and assumes the same

rights, title and interest possessed by the

assignor." Slip Op. at 5, quoting Plumb v. Fluid

Pump Service, Inc., 124 F.3d 849, 864 (7th Cir.

1997). From this rule, the majority reasons that,

when Perry took the assignment of Lahucik’s

claim, Perry also took Lahucik’s right to bring

the claim. However, whether Perry bought a valid

claim from Lahucik--which be doubtless did--does

not resolve whether the parties in the previous

case and in this case are identical. The

inescapable fact is that Perry was the plaintiff

in the previous case and Perry is the plaintiff

in the present case. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 17(a) states that "every action shall

be prosecuted in the name of the real party in

interest." Further, "[t]he federal courts . . .

and all of the state courts . . . have been in

full accord in holding that the unconditional

assignee of a complete chose in action is the

real party in interest . . . ." Overseas

Development Disc Corp. v. Sangamo Construction

Co., Inc., 686 F.2d 498, 505 n. 17 (7th Cir.

1982) (quoting 3A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s

Federal Practice para. 17.09(1.-1) at 17-84) (now

found at 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s

Federal Practice sec. 17.11[1][a] (3d ed. 1998)).

Hence, the claim in the present case belonged to

Lahucik, but the party in the present case is

Perry. Put another way, Perry bought Lahucik’s

claim, but he did not buy his identity.

 The majority intimates two policy justifications

for grounding the reversal in a lack of identity

between parties. First, every individual has a

right to his day in court, and barring Perry

because of an identity of claims might impair

Lahucik’s right. But that cannot be so; the

majority correctly states that, regardless of

Perry’s initial failure on his claim, Lahucik was

entitled to bring his own claim in his own name.

At most, barring Perry from bringing the suit

because of his prior failure would reduce by one

the number of people interested in buying

Lahucik’s claim. 
 The majority also states that banks and

insurance companies routinely take assignments of

large numbers of claims arising out of a single

transaction or occurrence, "and given the

vagaries of litigation they undoubtedly win some

and lose some." Slip Op. at 5. However, banks and

insurance companies must buy the bulk of their

claims before litigating them. If a bank bought

a single claim, litigated it and lost, one might

argue that the bank is (or should be) precluded

from rustling up a second case to try its luck

again. The situation seems different when a bank

buys claims without any forewarning that the

claims lack merit and then pursues them

simultaneously to mixed results. In such cases,

as well as here, it may be more appropriate to

deny claim preclusion because the claims

themselves are different in some respects.

 In spite of the fact that an identity of

parties is present here, the result reached by

the majority is sustainable under another

analysis that seems to be more consistent with

the basic principles of claim preclusion. Beyond

the question of identity of parties lies the need

for identity of claims, and here the requirements

of claim preclusion may not be met. The present

RICO suit involves allegations of predicate acts

of acceptance of bribes and conspiracy. Since

Perry appears to have alleged a later terminal

date for the conspiracy than in his previous

complaints, he seems to have alleged new

predicate acts of bribery. Consequently, even

though Perry may have made a concession on this

point, there may well be different claims here.

So, even though the same party is bringing both

claims, the second claim may still survive

preclusion. However, on remand, Perry’s claim

should be limited to only the new dates of

conspiracy he has alleged.