If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

COLLEEN E. CRANE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

September 12, 2024

v No. 369051

Oakland Circuit Court

Family Division

NATHAN G. CRANE, LC No. 2017-849887-DM

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and BOONSTRA and MARIANI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this child-custody dispute, plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order denying her

motion to modify legal custody and parenting time. Because disputed questions of fact remain 

regarding the existence of proper cause or a change of circumstances, the trial court abused its 

discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order

denying plaintiff’s motion and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

I. BACKGROUND

The parties divorced in September 2017 and shared joint legal and joint physical custody 

of their minor son, NGC.1 Their consent judgment of divorce gave the parties near-equal parenting 

time. The parties equally split parenting time during the summer and major academic breaks and 

alternated designated holidays. Defendant was granted overnight parenting time on alternating 

weekends from Friday night until Monday morning and overnight parenting time on Wednesdays 

and Thursdays during the week following his weekend parenting time. Similarly, plaintiff was 

granted overnight parenting time on alternating weekends and Mondays, Tuesdays, and Fridays 

 

1 The parties also share joint legal custody of their minor daughter, VKC, but because plaintiff 

only moved to change custody and parenting time with respect to NGC, VKC is not subject to this 

appeal.
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during the week following her weekend parenting time. Since then, the parties’ relationship has 

been fraught with poor communication and acrimony, to a point where the trial court appointed a 

guardian ad litem (GAL) to facilitate joint-custody matters.2 

In September 2023, plaintiff filed a motion seeking sole legal custody of NGC and a 

decrease in defendant’s overnight parenting time to only alternating weekends from Friday 

evenings to Sunday mornings. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was obstructionist and 

noncommunicative regarding all joint-custody matters and that defendant’s behavior was having 

a significant negative effect on NGC’s behavior, health, and well-being. Plaintiff attached several 

documents to her motion as evidence in support of her allegations. The GAL also provided the 

trial court with a comprehensive report that detailed her involvement in the case, her findings of 

fact, her recommendations regarding legal custody and parenting time, and a multitude of exhibits 

as evidence in support of her findings and recommendations. The GAL noted that she had become 

involved in the parties’ day-to-day decision-making regarding NGC’s education, participation in 

extracurricular activities, medical needs, and various appointments because defendant was 

“oppositional for no clear reason.” The GAL recommended that plaintiff be granted sole legal 

custody and that defendant’s parenting time be decreased as plaintiff requested because 

defendant’s “opposition [was] frequently contrary to” NGC’s best interests. 

At the hearing on plaintiff’s motion, plaintiff’s counsel argued that plaintiff’s request to 

modify custody and parenting time warranted an evidentiary hearing to address disputed factual 

issues. The trial court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing, held that plaintiff failed to meet her 

burden of showing proper cause or a change of circumstances, and denied her motion to change 

custody and parenting time. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

MCL 722.28 provides that when reviewing a lower court order in a child-custody dispute,

“all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge 

made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of 

discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” This Court applies “three standards of review 

in custody cases.” Stoudemire v Thomas, 344 Mich App 34, 42; 999 NW2d 43 (2022) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Factual findings, such as the lower court’s determination of whether 

a party demonstrated proper cause or a change of circumstances, are reviewed under the great 

weight of the evidence standard. Pennington v Pennington, 329 Mich App 562, 570; 944 NW2d 

 

2 Due to incidents involving VKC, the trial court granted defendant full physical custody of the 

children and granted plaintiff supervised parenting time with the children until Children’s 

Protective Services (CPS) had completed an investigation of VKC’s allegations against plaintiff. 

After the CPS investigation had concluded and VKC’s allegations were deemed unsubstantiated, 

plaintiff moved to restore her physical custody of the children. The court subsequently issued its 

November 2021 order, upon agreement of the parties, in which it restored plaintiff’s unsupervised 

parenting time with NGC. The order closely mirrored the parties’ original custody and parenting 

time arrangement set forth in the consent judgment of divorce, with the only notable difference 

being that defendant received weekday overnight parenting time on Wednesday nights only.
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131 (2019). “A finding of fact is against the great weight of the evidence if the evidence clearly 

preponderates in the opposite direction.” Id. “Discretionary rulings . . . are reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion. In child-custody cases specifically, an abuse of discretion retains the historic 

standard under which the trial court’s decision must be palpably and grossly violative of fact and 

logic.” Kuebler v Kuebler, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 362488); 

slip op at 7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal 

error. A trial court commits clear legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the 

law.” Pennington, 329 Mich App at 570 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[U]pon a finding 

of error, appellate courts should remand to the trial court unless the error was harmless.” Fletcher 

v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 882; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court should have, at a minimum, held an 

evidentiary hearing before concluding that she failed to meet the threshold issue of proper cause 

or a change of circumstances. We agree.

In a child-custody dispute, a custody order may only be modified “for proper cause shown 

or because of change of circumstances . . . .” MCL 722.27(1)(c). “[T]o establish ‘proper cause’

necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 

existence of an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court.” Vodvarka v 

Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 512; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). “The appropriate ground(s) should 

be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest factors, and must be of such 

magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being.” Id. “[T]o establish a ‘change of 

circumstances,’ a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions 

surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s wellbeing, have materially changed.” Id. at 513. A showing of “normal life changes,” good or bad, is 

insufficient. Id. “[I]f the movant does not establish proper cause or change in circumstances, then 

the court is precluded from holding a child custody hearing[.]” Id. at 508. 

This threshold requirement to changing custody is intended as “a barrier against removal 

of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive 

changes of custody orders,” and it is a factual determination that must be decided on a case-bycase basis. Id. at 509, 512 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This fact-intensive inquiry may 

involve an evidentiary hearing, but one is not necessarily required. Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich 

App 599, 605; 766 NW2d 903 (2009). For instance, an evidentiary hearing is not required when 

(1) the alleged facts are undisputed or (2) the alleged facts, even if true, are legally insufficient to 

demonstrate proper cause or a change of circumstances. Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. Whether 

an evidentiary hearing is necessary is a discretionary decision that depends on the facts of each 

case. Id. Such discretion is reflected in MCR 3.210(C)(8), which provides:

In deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary with regard to a 

postjudgment motion to change custody, the court must determine, by requiring an 

offer of proof or otherwise, whether there are contested factual issues that must be 

resolved in order for the court to make an informed decision on the motion.
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The trial court in this case denied plaintiff’s motion to change custody without holding an 

evidentiary hearing on the threshold issue of whether proper cause or a change of circumstances 

existed. The court, however, failed to adequately justify why such a hearing was not necessary, 

and the record belies that conclusion. See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512; MCR 3.210(C)(8). 

First, this is plainly not a case where “the facts alleged to constitute proper cause or a change of 

circumstances [are] undisputed.” Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512. While the parties agree that 

they struggle to coparent effectively, largely due to communication issues, they strongly dispute 

whether defendant is solely to blame for the coparenting issues and the impact of defendant’s 

actions on his relationship with NGC, his ability to provide care for NGC, and NGC’s emotional 

and mental health. 

Second, the record makes clear that plaintiff’s allegations were not so legally insufficient 

on their face that, if true, they would not constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances. See 

id. The bulk of plaintiff’s allegations were based on defendant’s alleged obstructionism and refusal 

to communicate with plaintiff and the GAL, and the trial court made clear that, based on the 

documents attached to plaintiff’s motion, the exhibits attached to the GAL’s report, and its own 

experience with the parties over the years, it did not believe that defendant was solely to blame for 

the parties’ poor coparenting and communication issues. We do not dispute this finding because 

it is supported by the record. The trial court, however, entirely failed to address plaintiff’s 

allegations regarding defendant’s ability to provide for NGC and the substantial negative impact 

that defendant’s behavior has had on NGC. For instance, plaintiff alleged that defendant 

repeatedly refused to take NGC to medical appointments, therapy appointments, and tutoring 

sessions if they were scheduled during his parenting time; failed to seek any medical care when 

NGC was seriously injured in an electric scooter accident; and got into two altercations with NGC. 

Plaintiff also alleged that defendant actively interfered with NGC’s education and extracurricular 

activities by dropping NGC off at school without his necessary school supplies and refusing to 

provide them when asked, thereby keeping NGC from taking a scheduled exam; dropping NGC 

off at school in the wrong uniform and refusing to provide him with the correct one when asked 

by NGC, thereby subjecting NGC to possible reprimand for noncompliance; and dropping NGC 

off at lacrosse practice without any of his equipment and refusing to provide it to him when asked 

by NGC. According to plaintiff, NGC has significant anxiety regarding parenting time with 

defendant, has demonstrated bad behavior and poor grades at school, does not want to stay in 

defendant’s home, and has turned to plaintiff for financial and emotional support with increasing 

frequency. If true, these allegations would constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances 

because they demonstrate something more than mere “normal life changes” and are relevant to 

several of the best-interest factors, including MCL 722.23(a) (love, affection, and other emotional 

ties between the parties and the child), (b) (capacity and disposition to give child love, affection, 

and guidance), (c) (capacity and disposition to provide child with food, clothing, medical care, or 

other remedial care), (h) (home, school, and community record), and (i) (reasonable preference of 

the child). See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 512-513. Thus, the trial court could not have denied 

plaintiff’s motion, without holding an evidentiary hearing, by accepting “as true the facts allegedly 

comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decid[ing] if they are legally 

sufficient to satisfy the standard.” Id. at 512.

Under MCR 3.210(C)(8), the trial court was required to decide whether an evidentiary 

hearing was necessary, “by requiring an offer of proof or otherwise,” where—as here—the alleged
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facts are disputed and the allegations, if true, would constitute proper cause and a change of

circumstances. See id. Instead, the trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff’s allegations without 

duly considering the necessity of an evidentiary hearing under MCR 3.210(C)(8). As a result, the 

trial court operated under the wrong legal framework and palpably abused its discretion. See 

Kuebler, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7.

This error by the trial court was not harmless, and instead necessitates remand for an 

evidentiary hearing on the threshold issue of proper cause or a change of circumstances. See 

Fletcher, 447 Mich at 882. The record makes clear that “there are contested factual issues” 

regarding plaintiff’s allegations that would warrant an evidentiary hearing under MCR 

3.210(C)(8). There are messages, for instance, between the parties in which defendant refused to 

take NGC to a dentist appointment because he believed that plaintiff unilaterally rescheduled the 

appointment to his parenting time. The GAL addressed the issue in an email and noted that, after 

further investigation, she determined that plaintiff had not rescheduled the appointment. Despite 

this, defendant still refused to take NGC to the appointment, necessitating plaintiff to take NGC to 

the appointment instead. Defendant had also admitted at the motion hearing that he had called 

NGC a “bitch” and a “mama’s boy” during an altercation that they had. There are also emails 

from the GAL indicating that NGC specifically requested that he attend his first day of school with 

plaintiff, despite that it fell on defendant’s parenting time, due to his anxiety regarding defendant 

taking him to school. The emails also indicated that, pursuant to the recommendation of NGC’s 

therapist, the frequency of NGC’s therapy increased to weekly appointments due to his increased 

anxiety. Further, plaintiff has personal knowledge of some of her allegations, including her 

interactions with NGC, her provision of necessities that defendant had refused to supply, such as 

school supplies, uniforms, sports equipment, and transportation to medical appointments and 

extracurricular activities, and her facilitation of activities, such as lacrosse and weekend work as a 

golf caddy. Defendant disputes plaintiff’s allegations and evidence, but this merely establishes 

that there are “contested factual issues that must be resolved in order for the court to make an 

informed decision on the motion.” MCR 3.210(C)(8). We therefore conclude that the trial court 

palpably abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, and we remand for an 

evidentiary hearing on whether proper cause or a change of circumstances warrants revisiting the 

existing custody arrangement. See MCR 3.210(C)(8); Kuebler, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 

7.

Relatedly, we further instruct the trial court to expressly determine NGC’s established 

custodial environment on remand. While the determination of a child’s established custodial 

environment need not be addressed in a request to modify custody until after the threshold burden 

of proper cause or a change of circumstances has been shown, Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 508-

509, it is nonetheless necessary to determine the established custodial environment in a request to 

modify parenting time to ensure that the appropriate evidentiary standard is applied, Stoudemire, 

344 Mich App at 44 (noting that “[a] mere adjustment in parenting time” only requires the movant 

to prove that the change is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence but that 

an adjustment in parenting time that would alter the child’s established custodial environment “is 

effectively a change in custody” and “mandat[es] application of the higher clear-and-convincingevidence standard under Vodvarka”). It is unclear from the existing record whether an established 

custodial environment existed with one or both of the parties, so this determination must be made 

on remand before the trial court can properly determine whether plaintiff’s request to modify 
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parenting time should be treated separately from her request to modify custody. See id. at 48

(noting that a trial court’s failure to make a finding regarding the existence of an established 

custodial environment necessitates remand “unless there is sufficient information in the record for 

this Court to make its own determination of this issue by de novo review”) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion to 

modify legal custody and parenting time, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Philip P. Mariani