Rel: June 14, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0134

_________________________

Stacy G. Coats and Kendall Coats 

v. 

Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, and J. Jason Ayers

Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court

(CV-16-75)

SHAW, Justice.

Stacy G. Coats and her husband Kendall Coats, the plaintiffs in this 

private right-of-way condemnation case, appeal from a summary 
SC-2023-0134

2

judgment in favor of the defendants, Sandra F. Ayers, Tommy J. Ayers, 

and J. Jason Ayers. We reverse and remand. 

Facts and Procedural History

The Ayerses own several adjoining parcels of real property 

(collectively referred to as "the Ayers property") that, together, are 

generally bordered to the west by Old Moores Bridge Road and to the east 

by a parcel of land that was once owned by Billy Guin, Stacy's father, and 

is now owned by Stacy. Jason resides on the Ayers property, part of 

which is also leased to others as farmland. A private, dirt "farm road" 

crosses the middle of the Ayers property from Old Moores Bridge Road 

on the property's western boundary to the property's eastern boundary. 

That road is used by the Ayerses and their lessees to access portions of 

the Ayers property. 

Stacy's property that lies to the east of the Ayers property ("the 

section 15 property") is a large, 543-acre parcel of land. It stretches from 

the Ayers property on its western border east to New River Road, which 

runs along a portion of the section 15 property's northeastern border. The 

section 15 property is bisected from north to south by a meandering 

stretch of the Sipsey River. The section 15 property is low-lying wetland 
SC-2023-0134

3

that is often flooded. It is used for hunting and fishing and is unsuitable 

for any other use.

A third parcel of land that is approximately 160 acres ("the section 

10 property") lies to the north of, but does not border, both the Ayers 

property and the section 15 property. The section 10 property was once 

owned by James Prewitt, Stacy's uncle, and is currently owned by Stacy. 

It is also low-lying wetland that is often flooded and is used for hunting 

and fishing. 

The property between the section 10 property and the Ayers 

property and the section 15 property, which various maps in the record 

indicate is owned by "T.H. Robertson & Sons, Inc.," is an intervening 

fourth parcel of land ("the Robertson property"). 

In the late 1980s, when Guin owned the section 15 property and 

Prewitt owned the section 10 property, the two were given permission to 

use the farm road to access the western portion of the section 15 property, 

where Guin kept a boat. Both were given keys to a gate on the farm road, 

and certain conditions were imposed, such as prescribing when the farm 

road could be used during hunting season and directing that others would 

not be allowed to use it unaccompanied by Guin or Prewitt. It appears 
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from the record that Prewitt used the farm road to access the section 15 

property and then crossed from it over the Robertson property on foot or 

by boat to access the section 10 property. 

In 2011, Prewitt transferred the section 10 property to Stacy, and 

she began using the farm road to access the western portion of the section 

15 property and, in turn, the section 10 property to the north. In 2014, 

she used the farm road with two friends to go hunt on the section 10 

property. She was confronted by Jason and Tommy, who indicated that 

she did not have permission to use the farm road. Stacy apparently 

believed that, because she owned the section 10 property, she could use 

the farm road as Prewitt had, and she had been doing so since 2011. 

In 2015, Guin transferred to Stacy an 80-acre portion of the section 

15 property ("the 80-acre portion"). The 80-acre portion, on the western 

edge of the section 15 property, borders the eastern boundary of the Ayers 

property, including where the farm road on the Ayers property meets the 

section 15 property. The 80-acre portion lies to the west of the Sipsey 

River. 

The Coatses filed in the Tuscaloosa Probate Court an "Application 

for Condemnation of Right-of-Way and Request for Injunctive Relief"
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pursuant to § 18-3-1, Ala. Code 1975.1 That application sought a rightof-way across the Ayers property to provide access to the "nearest public 

road," that is, Old Moores Bridge Road. 

The probate court ultimately concluded that the Coatses had

established that Stacy's property was landlocked and granted them "a 

convenient right-of-way not exceeding thirty feet in width, over [the 

Ayers] property from Old Moores Bridge Road." The probate court's order 

appointed a local surveying company to suggest a location for, and to 

survey, a right-of-way, and the surveying company concluded that "the 

only logical means" of accessing Stacy's property was the farm road. The 

probate court subsequently entered an order granting the Coatses the 

right of reasonable and lawful use of the described right-of-way over the 

farm road.

The Ayerses timely appealed the probate court's judgment to the 

Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. Following discovery, the Ayerses filed a motion 

for a summary judgment in their favor on the ground that Stacy's

property "is no longer landlocked." Focusing on the 80-acre portion, the 

1It is unclear why Kendall Coats was named as a plaintiff; he does 

not appear to own any of the properties at issue in this case.
SC-2023-0134

6

motion alleged that, as the result of Guin's death on May 1, 2022, Stacy 

had inherited or was due to inherit the remaining section 15 property. 

As a result, the Ayerses argued, the 80-acre portion "merged" with the 

remaining section 15 property from which it had previously been carved 

out, resulting in Stacy's ownership of "one singular plot of land" that 

touches New River Road. Thus, according to the Ayerses, the right-ofway previously requested by the Coatses was, as a result of the abovedescribed events, no longer a necessity because the 80-acre portion was 

"no longer landlocked."

The Ayerses specifically relied on, among other evidence, Stacy's 

deposition testimony, in which she confirmed both Guin's recent death 

and the contents of his will, pursuant to which, as his only heir, she stood 

to inherit his entire estate, which included the remaining section 15 

property. She also conceded that the inherited property abutted New 

River Road. She denied, however, that she had "complete access" to the 

80-acre portion and to the section 10 property because, she said, to get to 

them from New River Road, she would have to cross the Sipsey River. 

Stacy further indicated that the 80-acre portion is the driest portion of 

the section 15 property, explaining that it is not underwater "all through 
SC-2023-0134

7

the year." Stacy also reiterated in her deposition testimony that the 

section 10 property was landlocked and confirmed that, despite the fact 

that the section 10 property is neither adjacent nor contiguous to the 

Ayers property, she had previously used the farm road to reach it, 

presumably from the section 15 property. When asked about the 

Robertson property, which she would also have to cross to access the 

section 10 property, Stacy answered as follows: "Well, ... that property 

is owned by the bank but we've ... got verbal permission from them to 

cross that."

The Ayerses further submitted the deposition testimony of Guin, 

taken before his death. Guin explained that he had given the 80-acre 

portion to Stacy, in part because she otherwise had no access to the 

section 10 property and because, he said, she needed a place to park 

vehicles "because she can't carry a vehicle to her land." He described the 

80-acre portion as the driest portion of his original 543-acre parcel and 

noted that he also had chosen it because it "was the closest" to the farm 

road across the Ayers property. His testimony also suggested that, 

because of flooding, a boat is often necessary to access the section 15 

property from New River Road.
SC-2023-0134

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In opposition to the Ayerses' summary-judgment motion, the 

Coatses relied on the deposition testimony of Stacy and Guin regarding

the swampy topography of the section 15 property and the fact that the 

section 10 property remained landlocked. More specifically, they argued: 

"It is undisputed that the Sipsey River runs down the middle of [the 

section 15 property], thus creating a 'landlocked' portion to the west of 

the Sipsey River." Thus, the Coatses maintained that, although a portion 

of the section 15 property "touches a public roadway, there is no 

reasonably adequate means to access the western portion of the property" 

across the Sipsey River or to access the section 10 property. As to the 

Robertson property, Stacy's affidavit indicated that she had "never been 

denied permission to cross this property to access the [section 10] 

property."

The Coatses also provided affidavit testimony from Keith Andrews, 

the owner of a "construction company that specializes in building 

highways, bridges and civil infrastructure." According to Andrews, the 

construction of a road and an elevated bridge across the Sipsey River to 

allow the western portion of the section 15 property to be accessed from 

the eastern portion "would not be feasible" because of the extensive 
SC-2023-0134

9

permitting process and that "the cost of construction, if ever permitted, 

would vastly exceed the value of the property." He estimated a total 

project cost of "at least two to five million dollars, depending on the 

materials to be used, to construct a bridge over the Sipsey River on [the 

section 15 property] and to construct access to the bridge."

During the ensuing hearing on the Ayerses' summary-judgment 

motion, the Coatses' counsel identified both the section 10 property and 

the 80-acre portion as the properties to which they sought access. 

Counsel further noted that the section 10 property was still "landlocked." 

The Ayerses, on the other hand, pointed out that the section 10 property 

was not contiguous to their property and that there was no access to it 

from the farm road: "So [Stacy is] not gaining access to the [section 10 

property by way of the farm road] if a condemnation [is] allowed." 

Further, they argued that, because Stacy, owing to Guin's death, now 

owns the entire section 15 property, including the 80-acre portion, she 

has access to the section 15 property from New River Road. 

Subsequently, the circuit court entered a judgment granting the 

Ayerses' summary-judgment motion. That judgment states, in pertinent 

part:
SC-2023-0134

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"In Southern Railway Company v. Hall, [267 Ala. 143,] 

100 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 1958), the Alabama Supreme Court 

explained [the predecessor to § 18-3-1, Ala. Code 1975] as 

follows:

"'The obvious purpose of the statute is to 

provide a means whereby a landowner, enclosed 

on all sides by lands of others and unable to get to 

his land from a public road or highway, can get 

relief by condemning a right of way to it across 

intervening land. However, if such landowner 

already has a reasonably adequate way to and 

from his land, there is no field of operation for the 

statute. ... If an existing access is reasonably 

adequate for the purpose of giving the landowner 

an outlet to a public road or highway, there is no 

basis under the statute for condemning another 

outlet across the intervening land. ... 

"'....

" '"... The statute does not 

contemplate granting one citizen or 

corporation a right of way through the 

property of another citizen or 

corporation as a matter of mere 

convenience or as a mere matter of 

saving expense. ... The right to the 

control and use of one's property is a 

sacred right, not to be lightly invaded 

or disturbed. When property may be 

taken from a citizen for any purpose by 

law, the method for so doing must be 

strictly pursued, and the party seeking 

to take the property of another must 
SC-2023-0134

11

come squarely within the statute."'

"[267 Ala. at 146-47,] 100 So. 2d at 724, 725 [(quoting Roberts 

v. Prassenos, 219 Miss. 486, 69 So. 2d 215, 216, 217 (1954))] 

(emphasis added).

"Here, the death of Mr. Guin and [Stacy's] inheritance 

of the remaining 463 acres [of the section 15 property]

provided [the Coatses] with access. The evidence is 

undisputed that [the inherited] property connects to New 

River Road. ... New River Road ... gives them reasonable 

access to their property. The fact that the [Coatses] are 

limited on how deep they can go into their property before 

coming to swampy land, or the Sipsey River, is a separate 

issue from their ability to access the property from a public 

road.

"As stated by the Alabama Supreme Court, 'the party 

seeking to take the property of another must come squarely 

within [§ 18-3-1, Ala. Code].' The [Coatses] here do not come 

squarely within the statute. Accordingly, the court 

determines from the undisputed evidence that the [Ayerses']

motion is due to be and [is] hereby GRANTED, and that 

judgment is entered in favor of [the Ayerses]."

(Capitalization and emphasis in original.)

The Coatses subsequently filed a postjudgment motion in which 

they contended that a factual dispute remained as to the reasonableness 

of their available access to both the section 10 property and the 80-acre 

portion. They further argued that the circuit court's judgment failed to 

address the section 10 property, which their predecessors in interest had 
SC-2023-0134

12

historically accessed by first using the farm road to access the section 15 

property. Following the denial of their postjudgment motion, the Coatses

appealed.

Standard of Review

" '"This Court's review of a summary 

judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We 

apply the same standard of review as the trial 

court applied. Specifically, we must determine 

whether the movant has made a prima facie 

showing that no genuine issue of material fact 

exists and that the movant is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. 

Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. 

Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004). In

making such a determination, we must review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 

(Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie 

showing that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to 

produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence 

of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. 

SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 

794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-

12. '[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such 

weight and quality that fair minded persons in the 

exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably 

infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' 

West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 

2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)."'
SC-2023-0134

13

"Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Dow 

v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 

2004))."

Brown v. W.P. Media, Inc., 17 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Ala. 2009).

Discussion

I.

On appeal, the Coatses contend that genuine issues of material fact 

exist as to whether they are entitled to a right-of-way under § 18-3-1, 

thus precluding summary judgment. Section 18-3-1 provides, in 

pertinent part:

"The owner of any tract or body of land, no part of which 

tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to any public 

road or highway, shall have and may acquire a convenient 

right-of-way ... over the lands intervening and lying between 

such tract or body of land and the public road nearest or most 

convenient thereto ...."

(Emphasis added.) 

"Section 18-3-1 gives owners of land that is not adjacent 

or contiguous to any public road or highway the right to obtain 

a right-of-way to the nearest or most convenient public road. 

Our supreme court has held that 'under § 18-3-1, a landowner 

is not entitled to condemn a right-of-way across a neighbor's 

intervening land if the landowner has an existing, reasonably 

adequate means of access to his property, or if he could 

construct such access without prohibitive expense.' Ex parte 

Cater, 772 So. 2d [1117] at 1121 [(Ala. 2000)] (emphasis 
SC-2023-0134

14

supplied); see also Southern Ry. Co. v. Hall, 267 Ala. 143, 100 

So. 2d 722 (1957). To determine whether a landowner has a 

reasonably adequate means of access, this court considers 

whether the access is unobstructed and unquestioned. 

Section 18-3-1 does not authorize 'the taking of lands of 

another as a mere matter of convenience,' and 'the burden is 

on the petitioner for a right of way to show that he has no 

reasonably adequate outlet.' Southern Ry. Co., 267 Ala. at 

147, 146, 100 So. 2d at 725."

Key v. Ellis, 973 So. 2d 359, 365-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (footnote 

omitted). When an owner's property is not adjacent to a public road or 

highway, which is often referred to as the property being "landlocked," § 

18-3-1 allows the property owner to seek a right-of-way over the 

intervening lands of another if there exists no other reasonably adequate

means of access to the property or if such access could not otherwise be 

constructed without prohibitive expense. 

There appear to be two theories to the Coatses' claim below; they 

assert that they are entitled to a right-of-way over the farm road either 

(1) to access the section 15 property or (2) to access the section 10 

property. We address each theory in turn. 

II.

On appeal, the Coatses first contend that the portion of the section 

15 property lying west of the Sipsey River, including the 80-acre portion, 
SC-2023-0134

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is "landlocked" or otherwise has no access to a public road. 

The primary issue is whether the section 15 property, including the

80-acre portion, constitutes a single "tract or body of land." If so, then a 

part of it "is adjacent or contiguous to [a] public road or highway," namely 

New River Road on its eastern border, and, thus, under the plain 

language of § 18-3-1, the Coatses cannot seek a right-of-way under that

Code section. The Ayerses argued, and the circuit court essentially held, 

that the 80-acre portion and the remaining section 15 property "merged" 

into a single tract or body of land when Stacy became the owner of both, 

and that single tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to a public 

road. On appeal, the Coatses do not argue that the 80-acre portion and 

the remaining section 15 property were not "merged." Instead, they 

contend that, because of the swampy nature of the property and the fact 

that it is bisected by the Sipsey River, not all of the section 15 property 

can be accessed from New River Road. Thus, they assert, they have no 

reasonable means to access the western portion of the section 15 property 

and the acquisition of a right-of-way under § 18-3-1 over the Ayers

property is, therefore, appropriate in these circumstances. 

In support of their position, the Coatses cite this Court's decision in 
SC-2023-0134

16

Ex parte Cater, 772 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. 2000). In Cater, the plaintiff, Etoile 

Nichols, owned a 191-acre parcel of property that was bisected by a creek. 

No portion of Nichols's property abutted a public road. 772 So. 2d at 

1118. The portion to the east of the creek was accessible from a public 

road by a private road. Nichols claimed that the portion to the west of 

the creek was "landlocked." It, however, could be accessed by a private 

gravel road that ran west from that portion of Nichols's property, across 

the property of a third party, and then across the property of the 

defendant, Lula Dell Cater, to a public road. Further, the western 

portion of Nichols's property was once accessed by another private road 

that ran south to Highway 21. That second private road was in disrepair 

and impassible during the winter. 772 So. 2d at 1118. Nichols 

commenced an action under § 18-3-1, seeking a right-of-way over the 

private gravel road across Cater's property so that she could access the 

western portion of her property. 

The trial court found that the right-of-way that Nichols sought was 

the "'nearest and most convenient means of access to her'" property. 772 

So. 2d at 1119. Other means of access to the western portion of her 

property would require the construction of roadbeds and would not be 
SC-2023-0134

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readily suitable for use in the winter; further, accessing the western 

portion of her property from the eastern portion would require the 

construction of a bridge over the creek. Therefore, the trial court 

concluded that the burden that would be imposed on Cater by creating a 

right-of-way over the private gravel road on her property was less than 

the burden that would be imposed on Nichols by constructing and using

another means of access. 772 So. 2d at 1119.

On appeal, Cater argued that the trial court had erred in granting 

Nichols a right-of-way when she had two other "reasonably adequate 

means of access," namely, building a bridge over the creek or repairing 

the other private road to Highway 21. In support, she cited this Court's 

decision in Southern Railway Co. v. Hall, 267 Ala. 143, 100 So. 2d 722 

(1958). This Court quoted extensively from Southern Railway, including 

the following passage:

"'The obvious purpose of the statute is to provide a 

means whereby a landowner, enclosed on all sides by lands of 

others and unable to get to his land from a public road or 

highway, can get relief by condemning a right of way to it 

across intervening land. However, if such landowner already 

has a reasonably adequate way to and from his land, there is 

no field of operation for the statute. ... If an existing access is 

reasonably adequate for the purpose of giving the landowner 

an outlet to a public road or highway, there is no basis under 
SC-2023-0134

18

the statute for condemning another outlet across the 

intervening land. ... We do not think the purpose of the 

statute was to do more than to assure that land which is not 

adjacent or contiguous to a public road or highway can be 

reached from such a road or highway.'"

Cater, 772 So. 2d at 1120 (quoting Southern Ry., 267 Ala. at 146, 100 So. 

2d at 724-25) (emphasis added). In addressing this language, the Court 

in Cater stated: "[U]nder § 18-3-1, a landowner is not entitled to condemn 

a right-of-way across a neighbor's intervening land if the landowner has 

an existing, reasonably adequate means of access to his property, or if he 

could construct such access without prohibitive expense." 772 So. 2d at

1121. The Court ultimately held that, because Nichols had not 

demonstrated that building a bridge over the creek or improving and 

using the private road to Highway 21 "would be prohibitive," Nichols had 

not established that she was entitled to a right-of-way over Cater's 

property under § 18-3-1. Id. Therefore, the trial court's decision was 

reversed. 

In this case, the Coatses argue that the western portion of the 

section 15 property, including the 80-acre portion, is "landlocked" like the 

property at issue in Cater and that there is a genuine issue of material 

fact, thus precluding summary judgment, regarding whether there is an 
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existing, reasonably adequate means to access that property other than 

the proposed right-of-way over the farm road. The Coatses argue that, 

unlike Nichols in Cater, who did not demonstrate that building a bridge 

or improving and using the alternative private road would be prohibitive, 

they have submitted substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding whether constructing a bridge over the Sipsey 

River is a feasible means to access the western portion of the section 15 

property.

In Cater, it was undisputed that the property at issue was 

"landlocked" and not adjacent to any public road. 772 So. 2d at 1118. In 

addressing whether Nichols had an "existing, reasonably adequate 

means of access to [her] property," id. at 1121, the Court was not applying 

a test to determine whether the property was "landlocked" or was not 

"adjacent or contiguous to any public road or highway," which is the

prerequisite to the application of § 18-3-1. Instead, the Court relied on 

that language in determining whether Nichols, the owner of landlocked 

property, had another means to access her property without the need to 
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acquire a right-of-way in the first place.2 The plain language of § 18-3-1 

does not allow landowners to seek a right-of-way over the property of 

another simply because they have no reasonable, adequate means to 

access parts of their property; instead, one may seek to acquire a rightof-way when "no part" of their "tract or body of land is adjacent or 

contiguous to any public road or highway." In this case, the section 15 

property, which, without dispute, includes the "merged" 80-acre portion, 

is adjacent to New River Road, which is a public road.3

The Coatses argue that, in Cater, the western portion of Nichols's 

property was allegedly "landlocked" because it was separated from the 

eastern portion of her property by a creek. This Court, however, did not 

address whether this fact meant that, for purposes of § 18-3-1, either 

portion of Nichols's property was disconnected from property that was

"adjacent or contiguous to any public road or highway." Instead, none of 

2The same was true in Southern Railway, supra, and Key, supra;

the plaintiffs in those cases each sought a right-of-way to access land that 

undisputedly was not adjacent to a public road.

3The result might be different if a parcel of land, because of its 

physical features, may be deemed a separate "tract" or "body" as those 

terms are used in § 18-3-1. However, there is no argument on appeal as 

to the meaning of those terms. Therefore, we do not address that issue. 
SC-2023-0134

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the property at issue abutted a public road. Thus, the threshold 

circumstance upon which § 18-3-1 is premised -- that the property is not 

adjacent to a public road -- was not disputed in that case. Because the 

Coatses have not established the existence of a genuine issue of material 

fact regarding whether the section 15 property, including the 80-acre 

portion, which is a single tract or body of land, is not adjacent or 

contiguous to any public road or highway, § 18-3-1 does not supply a 

means to acquire a right-of-way to that property. 

III.

The Coatses also contend that they established the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment,

regarding whether they were entitled to the proposed right-of-way over

the farm road to provide access to the section 10 property. As noted 

above, the section 10 property lies to the north of both the Ayers property 

and the section 15 property and is separated from those properties by the 

Robertson property. Stacy, and her predecessor in title, Prewitt, 

previously used the farm road to access the western portion of the section 

15 property (at the 80-acre portion) and then cross over the Robertson

property to the section 10 property. The Coatses contend that the section 
SC-2023-0134

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10 property is undisputedly not adjacent or contiguous to any public road 

or highway, that the farm road can be used to provide access from a public 

road to the section 10 property, and that the circuit court failed to address 

this theory in its judgment.4 

The Ayerses contend, however, that, because the farm road does not 

lead to the section 10 property, the Coatses "will still have to cross the 

land of another" -- that is, the Robertson property -- "to access" the section 

10 property and, thus, that the proposed right-of way "will not afford the 

Coats[es] reasonably adequate access." Ayerses' brief at 24. They 

contend that there is no right to seek a right-of-way for "'almost access' 

to landlocked property," id. at 25, and they note that the Coatses did not 

commence an action to acquire a right-of-way over the Robertson 

property. 

A similar issue was addressed in Tate v. Loper, 459 So. 2d 892 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 1984). In that case, the Lopers owned a parcel of land that, like 

4In their response to the summary-judgment motion, the Coatses

alleged that, even though Stacy now owns all of the section 15 property, 

including the 80-acre portion, the section 10 property "was and still 

remains landlocked." In their postjudgment motion, the Coatses noted 

that the circuit court "did not address this particular parcel of property[,] 

which is also the subject of ... [their] action."
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the section 10 property, was not adjacent or contiguous to a public road 

or highway. 459 So. 2d at 894. They sought a right-of-way over what 

was described as the "old woods road," which ran across the Tates' 

neighboring property and then over the property of a third party to a 

public highway. The trial court awarded a right-of-way over the "old 

woods road" on the Tates' property. On appeal, the Tates challenged 

whether a right-of-way could be awarded on only a portion of the route 

that would provide access to landlocked property:

"The Tates ... contend that condemnation is improper 

because there is a landowner whose land intervenes between 

the public highway and the [Tates' land]. In other words, the 

Lopers must go through the Tates' land and then the 

intervening landowner's land before reaching the highway. ... 

The Tates contend that the statute does not provide for 

condemning only a portion of the land between the public 

highway and the [Lopers' land]." 

459 So. 2d at 895. 

The Court of Civil Appeals found this argument to be without 

"merit," stating:

"As mentioned earlier, § 18-3-1 has no field of operation 

where a landowner already has reasonable access to the 

public highway. In the present case, the Lopers have 

permission from the intervening landowner to cross his land 

on the 'old woods road,' the very road that runs through the 

Tates' land and was condemned as a right-of-way. Obviously, 
SC-2023-0134

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the Lopers have reasonably adequate access through this land 

to the highway so that any attempt to condemn for a right-ofway under § 18-3-1 would appear to be futile."

Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted). 

In this case, Stacy testified in her deposition that she had "verbal 

permission" to cross the Robertson property from the western portion of 

the section 15 property, and she testified in an affidavit that she had 

never been denied permission to cross the Robertson property. The 

Coatses further presented substantial evidence demonstrating that they 

have no "existing, reasonably adequate means of access" to this 

landlocked property, Key, 973 So. 2d at 366 (emphasis omitted), because

they have presented evidence indicating that they cannot travel from 

New River Road across the section 15 property to where they can in turn 

access the section 10 property from it over the Robertson property. There 

is substantial evidence, however, demonstrating that the farm road could 

provide the access that they need. Because there is substantial evidence 

demonstrating that the Coatses have permission to cross the Robertson 

property, Tate indicates that there is no requirement that they seek a 

right-of-way over it. Thus, the circuit court erred in entering a summary 

judgment in favor of the Ayerses. 
SC-2023-0134

25

Conclusion

Because the section 10 property is "landlocked" for purposes of § 18-

3-1, and because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether the Coatses have an existing, reasonable means to access that 

property, the circuit court's judgment is reversed and the case is 

remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.