UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL P. NELDER, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. KELLY WORLEY, Defendant - Appellee. No. 15-4048 (D. Utah) (D.C. No. 2:12-CV-00245-DB)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, HARTZ , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Michael P. Nelder is an inma te at Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF). Proceeding pro se, he filed suit u nder 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, asserting Eighth Amendment and due-process claims arising from his designation by defend ant Kelly Worley, a serg eant at CUCF, as a

* After examining the briefs and appellate reco rd, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34. 1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judg ment is not binding pr ecedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 16, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2

2 suspected Juggalo gang member. He appeals the dist rict court’s grant of summary judgment to Worley. 1 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Worley interviewed Nelder to determin e whether he had gang relationships. Although Nelder maintains that he told Worley he was not a Juggalo, but was friends with Juggalos, Worley categori zed Nelder as a suspected Jugg alo for his prison records. As a result, he was transferred to a segr egated housing unit with other suspected and known Juggalos. Other than designating Nelder a suspected Juggalo, Worley had no role in determining his security cl assification or housing assignm ent. According to Nelder, within two months of his being moved to se gregation, a Juggalo gang member assaulted him because he was not a Juggalo. Nelder did not report this assault to officials because he feared retaliation by the Juggalos. On appeal Nelder argues that his suspected-Juggalo classification amounted to “guilt by association” and violated his Fi fth and Fourteenth Am endment due-process rights. He stresses that his due-process cl aim “isn’t about housi ng, it’s about being wrongfully classified as a Juggalo.” Aplt. Br. at 4. He also argues that his placement in segregation was cruel and unusual punishme nt in violation of the Eighth Amendment

1 Nelder’s brief also names Steve Turley and A.C. Bigelow as appelle es. They were both named as defendants in Nelder’s original complaint; but they were omitted from his amended complaint. “[I]t is well establis hed that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and re nders it of no legal effect.” Davis v. TXO Prod. Corp. , 929 F.2d 1515, 1517 (10th Cir. 1991) (int ernal quotation marks omitted). Nelder therefore has no pending claim against Turley and Bigelow, and he has no right to relief against them on appeal.3

3 because Worley should have known that he would be subject to assault by Juggalo gang members if placed in segregation. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the same standards that the district court should ha ve applied.” Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal, 706 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if the plead ings and record show there is no genuine issue of material fact and th e moving party is entitled to judg ment as a matter of law. See Merrifeld v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs , 654 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 2011). We affirm the rejection of Nelder’s due -process claim. The Due Process Clause protects against the denial of “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. But Nelder complains only about his classifi cation as a gang member, not his housing. And being labeled does not, in itself, deny a person either liberty or property. See Paul v.
Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 708

‒ 709 (1976) (defamation by th e government, alone, does not deprive one of a protected liberty interest). We also affirm the denial of Nelde r’s Eighth Amendment claim. “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.”
Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (ellipsi s and internal quotation marks omitted). But “[b]ecause only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prison official must act with delib erate indifference to inmate health or safety to violate the inmate’s constitutional rights.” Castillo v. Day , 790 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotati on marks omitted). “Deliberate indifference4

4 has both an objective and a subjective component.” Id. To prevail on the objective component, the prisoner must s how that the harm he suffered “was sufficiently serious.”
Id. “To prevail on the subjectiv e component, the prisoner must show that the defendant knew the prisoner faced a subs tantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk.” Id. at 1021 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitte d). Nelder’s claim fails on the subjective prong. “[A] prison official must both be aw are of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Verdecia v. Adams , 327 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Ci r. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). But there is no evidence in the re cord that Worley ha d knowledge of an actual threat to Nelder’s safety. We AFFIRM the district court’s judg ment and GRANT Nelder’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge