IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Paul Marazas, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 337 C.D. 2014

: Submitted: June 20, 2014

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Vitas Healthcare Corporation), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

OPINION 

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: August 11, 2014

Paul Marazas (Claimant) petitions for review of an order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that reversed the decision of a

Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) to grant Claimant’s claim petition. After a

remand, the WCJ awarded benefits, finding Claimant sustained his injury within 

the course and scope of his employment under Section 301(c) of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Act).1 The Board reversed, concluding Claimant’s injury only

related to work by way of his termination of the employment relationship. 

Claimant asserts judicial estoppel precludes denial of his employee status based on 

a prior related civil suit. Further, Claimant argues the Board erred as a matter of 

law in concluding he was not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of 

his injury. Based on the WCJ’s findings and credibility determinations, we reverse 

the Board and reinstate the WCJ’s order after remand.

 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §411(c).
2

I. Background

On the date of his injury, Claimant was employed by Vitas Healthcare 

Corporation (Employer) as a driver technician. He delivered and picked up 

medical equipment, including medical furniture, in New Jersey, Delaware and 

Pennsylvania. 

Following a weekend when he was on-call, Claimant reported for 

work at Employer’s premises to receive his daily itinerary. Upon arrival, Claimant

reviewed his list of assigned stops, in three states, which would take him until 

midnight to complete. Then, Claimant went to the office to advise his manager, 

Rita Carroll (Manager), that he was tired after the on-call weekend. There, he 

requested she remove some stops from his itinerary. Manager refused. 

After stating he could not continue under those conditions, Claimant 

turned in his keys and phone to Manager, indicating he quit. Manager informed 

Claimant that he needed to remove his personal belongings from the truck, and she 

escorted Claimant to do so pursuant to Employer’s policy. After removing items 

from the truck as directed, Claimant tripped over a pallet jack while walking to the 

warehouse on Employer’s premises. He fell on his left side, sustaining injuries. 

Manager observed Claimant’s fall. Subsequently, Manager walked Claimant to his 

vehicle, at which time Claimant left Employer’s premises. 

Days later, Claimant called Manager, advising her of his injury and 

requesting referral to a panel physician. Manager informed him such physicians 

were limited to active employees.
3

Initially, in 2007, Claimant filed a civil suit in the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas, Civil No. 07-13411, seeking damages for his injury as a 

business invitee. However, Claimant withdrew that action after Employer pled that 

Claimant was in the scope of employment at the time of his injury. Employer thus 

defended the case based on the exclusiveness of Claimant’s remedy under the Act. 

After withdrawing his civil suit, Claimant filed a claim petition, 

alleging work-related injuries to his left ankle and left knee, and upper, middle and 

lower back pain, sustained during the scope of his employment. The WCJ held a 

series of hearings where Claimant and Employer’s witness, Manager, testified.

Finding Claimant and his physicians credible,2the WCJ awarded benefits for a 

closed period, from November 7, 2005 through July 9, 2008. 

Specifically, the WCJ found that Manager witnessed Claimant’s fall, 

after he tripped on equipment owned by Employer on Employer’s premises. The 

WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony as to the circumstances surrounding his fall. 

The WCJ discredited Employer’s witnesses, finding them “unpersuasive,” other 

than to the extent that they corroborated Claimant’s fall on Employer’s premises. 

WCJ Decision, 5/28/09, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 13.

Employer appealed, arguing that Claimant terminated his employment 

prior to sustaining the injury, so that his injury was not covered by the Act. The 

Board vacated and remanded the WCJ’s order, directing the WCJ to assess whether 

Claimant was within the scope of employment at the time of his injury. 

 

2 Claimant’s medical condition is not challenged in this appeal.
4

The WCJ held a brief hearing on remand in order to admit certain 

documents into evidence. Over Employer’s objection, the WCJ admitted the 

complaint Claimant filed in the Court of Common Pleas, Employer’s answer and 

new matter, attested to by Manager, as well as the praecipe to withdraw. See WCJ 

Remand Hr’g, Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/12/10, at 7. Importantly, in the 

pleadings, Employer admitted Claimant was its employee, such that the Act 

provided an exclusive remedy.

On remand, the WCJ found that Claimant quit his employment prior 

to his injury. Nevertheless, she found Claimant was within the scope of his 

employment when he fell on Employer’s premises. Significantly, the WCJ found 

Claimant was furthering Employer’s interests at the time of injury because “[he] was 

injured where his Employer had directed him to go and perform a requested task.” 

WCJ Remand Op., 7/28/11, F.F. No. 3. She emphasized Claimant was “directed to 

return to his truck” and was “performing the required acts” when injured. Id.

In her remand opinion, the WCJ adopted her earlier decision in full, 

and supplemented it with specific findings regarding scope of employment. Again, 

the WCJ found a work-related injury and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. 

Employer appealed.

Applying this Court’s then recent decision in Little v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (B&L Ford/Chevrolet), 23 A.3d 637 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011), the Board again reversed the WCJ. The Board reasoned Claimant was not 

within the scope of employment at the time of his injury because he quit before he 
5

fell. His injury occurred as a consequence of the final act of employment. Thus, 

under Little, the Board concluded Claimant’s injury was not compensable.

Claimant now petitions for review.3

II. Discussion

As an initial matter, Claimant argues Employer is judicially estopped 

from asserting he was not an employee at the time of his injury because of its 

admissions in a civil suit arising from the same injury. Claimant sued Employer as 

a business invitee in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. As a defense, 

Employer alleged Claimant’s injury occurred while he was an employee. 

Claimant also assigns legal error to the Board in concluding that he was 

not within the course and scope of employment at the time of his injury. Employer 

contends that because Claimant quit his employment immediately prior to the work 

injury, he was no longer in the scope of employment. We address each issue in turn.

A. Judicial Estoppel

First, Claimant argues that Employer’s admissions regarding his status 

as an employee in pleadings in the civil suit estop Employer from denying that fact 

in the workers’ compensation proceeding. He contends Employer is bound by 

those prior inconsistent statements and the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies.

 

3 Our review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were supported 

by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether constitutional rights 

were violated. Cooney v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Patterson UTI, Inc.), __ A.3d __, (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 1681 C.D. 2013, filed June 12, 2014), 2014 WL 2615423.
6

As to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, this Court recognizes: 

‘[a]s a general rule, a party to an action is estopped from 

assuming a position inconsistent with his or her assertion in a 

previous action, if his or her contention was successfully 

maintained. Accordingly, judicial estoppel is properly applied 

only if the court concludes the following: (1) that the appellant 

assumed an inconsistent position in an earlier action; and (2) 

that the appellant's contention was “successfully maintained” 

in that action.’

Canot v. City of Easton, 37 A.3d 53, 60 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (quoting Black v. 

Labor Ready, Inc., 995 A.2d 875, 878 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

As a preliminary matter, we note the WCJ did not err in admitting 

Employer’s prior inconsistent statements from the prior civil action on remand. 

Tarr v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (McInnes Steel Co.), (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2280 

C.D. 2011, filed Jan. 23, 2013), 2013 WL 3961026 (unreported). A WCJ may 

consider prior inconsistent statements when assessing witness credibility. Id.

We also reject Employer’s argument that Claimant waived the judicial 

estoppel argument because he did not raise it to the Board, prior to the remand. 

The Board vacated the WCJ’s initial order, in Claimant’s favor, and remanded for 

more specific findings regarding Claimant’s employment status. Notably, the 

Board’s order on remand did not preclude the acceptance of additional evidence. 

Over Employer’s objection, the WCJ admitted pleadings from the civil suit. Such 

evidence was relevant to determining Claimant’s employment status, for which the 

Board sought specific findings. Given Claimant’s success before remand, and the 
7

lack of restrictions on additional evidence on remand, we discern no merit in the 

waiver argument. Therefore, we will assess the merits of the judicial estoppel issue.

The purpose of judicial estoppel is to ensure the parties do not play 

“fast and loose” with the facts in order to suit their interests in different actions 

before different tribunals. Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189 

(Pa. 2001); Trowbridge v. Scranton Artificial Limb Co., 747 A.2d 862, 865 (Pa. 

2000) (“the purpose of the doctrine is to uphold the integrity of the courts by 

preventing parties from abusing the judicial process by changing positions as the 

moment requires”) (citations omitted); Gross v. City of Pittsburgh, 686 A.2d 864 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). 

Employer conflates judicial estoppel with the doctrines of res judicata 

and collateral estoppel. Unlike those other doctrines, judicial estoppel does not 

require actual litigation to a final order. In re Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d 616, 

623 n.4 (Pa. 2003) (explaining judicial estoppel differs from collateral estoppel, 

which requires a final order). The reason for applying the equitable remedy of 

estoppel is the maintenance of two seemingly inconsistent positions, and thus a 

lack of candor with the tribunal and an affront to the integrity of the courts.

In this case, Employer primarily argues that Claimant was not an 

employee in the scope of employment at the time he fell. Employer maintains 

Claimant quit prior to his injury, and thus severed the employment relationship and 

the protections for workers’ compensation that it affords. This is in marked 
8

contrast to Employer’s allegations while defending a suit Claimant filed in 

Delaware County. 

Specifically, in its answer and new matter filed December 7, 2007, 

Employer admitted an employment relationship with Claimant on the date of the 

injury. Further, Employer averred: “At the time of [Claimant’s] accident, 

[Claimant] was on Answering Defendant’s premises within the course and scope of 

his employment.” See Employer’s Br. at 11 (citing Answer and New Matter 

Paragraphs 4 and 6). Therefore, Employer defended the civil action by denying

Claimant’s status as a business invitee; rather, Employer contended Claimant’s 

“claims are barred by the [Act] ... as the injuries alleged took place on the 

premises of his employer while acting in the scope of his employment.” Id. (citing 

Answer and New Matter Paragraph 8). Allegedly in reliance on these 

representations, Claimant withdrew the civil action on January 7, 2008. 

To estop later inconsistent statements, the original statements must be 

verified or sworn. Buehler v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 124 A. 325 (Pa. 1924). As 

Manager verified the content of Employer’s pleadings, that element is met. 

Moreover, admissions are limited to facts as opposed to legal 

conclusions. That the Act serves as Claimant’s exclusive remedy constitutes a 

legal conclusion, not an admission. However, Employer admitted in the civil suit 

that Claimant was an employee of Employer “within the course and scope of 

employment” at the time of his injury. Employer’s Br. at 11. This may be 
9

construed as an admission of fact on which Employer reversed its position in the 

current litigation.

Such inconsistent representations raises the specter of impropriety that 

judicial estoppel was designed to avoid. Therefore, we evaluate whether 

Employer’s inconsistent position satisfies the second element of judicial estoppel.

For judicial estoppel to attach, the position asserted also must have 

been “successfully maintained.” Stated differently, the prior inconsistent statement 

must persuade the decision-maker. Phila. Suburban Water Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. 

Comm’n, 808 A.2d 1044 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002); see also Buehler (employer who 

mounted successful defense of jurisdiction, resulting in dismissal of action, is 

estopped from asserting inconsistent position in subsequent action); Wallace v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bethlehem Steel/Pa. Steel Tech.), 854 A.2d 613 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2004) (successfully maintain element not met when party does not 

advance the inconsistent position to gain unfair advantage in the later proceeding); 

Thompson v. Anderson, 632 A.2d 1349 (Pa. Super. 1993) (finding by arbitrators of 

intentional act estopped same party from arguing negligence in civil action). 

Our courts interpret “successfully maintain” as different than litigating 

to conclusion. In re Adoption of S.A.J. Settlement of a claim, despite binding the 

parties and ending an action, does not equal “successfully maintain.” Assoc. Hosp. 

Serv. of Phila. v. Pustilnik, 439 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1981); Phila. Suburban Water Co.
10

Thus, our courts uphold the “successfully maintain” element of judicial estoppel 

based on the action of a decision-maker, not the actions of the parties. Id. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Claimant’s act of voluntarily withdrawing his civil 

action does not qualify. 

The reasoning of the Superior Court in Ham v. Gouge, 257 A.2d 650 

(Pa. Super. 1969), applying judicial estoppel in the workers’ compensation context, 

guides us here. Ham involved an action for personal injuries where the injured 

party asserted estoppel against his employer based on the denial of an employment 

relationship in his workers’ compensation claim. The injured plaintiff in Ham

asserted that he withdrew his prior action (his workers’ compensation claim), 

based on his employer’s representations in a pleading. Based on the pleadings in 

the prior action, Ham withdrew his compensation claim and pursued a civil suit for 

personal injuries, believing his employer agreed no employment relationship 

existed. The Superior Court held that withdrawal of a claim did not support

estoppel in a subsequent action.

The Superior Court emphasized the necessity for an adjudication or 

decision based on the material statement at issue. The decision-maker must rely on 

the prior inconsistent statement in reaching its result. In Ham, “all that is present 

here is an unadjudicated inconsistent position taken by defendant in a prior 

proceeding voluntarily withdrawn by plaintiff.” Id. at 653. 
11

Here, as in Ham, there was no legal compulsion requiring Claimant’s

withdrawal. Employer cannot be estopped from taking a position contrary to the 

one it never established. 

Further, the party who asserts estoppel must prove the essentials 

thereof by unequivocal evidence. Blofson v. Cutaiar, 333 A.2d 841 (Pa. 1975). 

There is no evidence to support Claimant’s alleged detrimental reliance, and the 

WCJ made no findings in this regard. We decline to base our decision on mere 

suppositions, particularly as Claimant possessed equal knowledge as to his 

employment status. 

For all the foregoing reasons, we decline to apply judicial estoppel 

here.

B. Scope of Employment

Whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of his 

employment is a legal determination to be made based on the WCJ’s factual 

findings. Lewis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Andy Frain Servs., Inc.), 29 A.3d 

851 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). 

Here, the WCJ found that Claimant quit before he became injured. 

WCJ Remand Op., F.F. No. 3. However, there is no dispute that Claimant’s injury 

occurred on Employer’s premises. Relevant here, the WCJ also found that, in 

addition to being on Employer’s premises, Claimant was acting at Employer’s 

direction, under Manager’s supervision, to perform the required task of cleaning out 
12

his truck when he fell. Id. Based on these findings, she concluded Claimant 

remained in the scope of employment at the time he was injured.

The phrase “arising in the course of employment” in Section 301(c)(1) 

of the Act is construed to include injuries sustained in furtherance of the business 

or affairs of the employer, as well as certain other injuries which occur on premises 

occupied or controlled by the employer. Hoffman v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Westmoreland Hosp.), 741 A.2d 1286, 1287 (Pa. 1999).

“The operative phrase ‘actually engaged in the furtherance of the 

business or affairs of the employer,’ which is usually expressed as ‘in the course of 

employment,’ must be given a liberal construction.” Wetzel v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Parkway Serv. Station), 92 A.3d 130, 136 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)

(quoting Lewis, 29 A.2d at 862); Mann v. City of Phila., 563 A.2d 1284 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1989).

This Court explained injuries may be sustained in the course of 

employment in two distinct situations: 

(1) where the employee, whether on or off the employer’s 

premises, is injured while actually engaged in the furtherance 

of the employer’s business or affairs, or (2) where the 

employee although not actually engaged in the furtherance of 

the employer’s business or affairs (a) is on the premises 

occupied or under the control of the employer ...; (b) is 

required by the nature of his employment to be present on his

employer’s premises; and (c) sustains injuries caused by the 

condition of the premises or by operation of the employer’s 

business or affairs thereon.
13

O’Rourke v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Gartland), 83 A.3d 1125, 1131-32 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Slaugenhaupt) v. U.S. Steel Corp., 376 A.2d 271, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977)).

In analyzing the element “furthering the interest of the employer,” this 

Court explained that once an employee is on an employer’s premises, the act of 

going to or leaving the employee’s work station is a necessary part of that 

employee’s employment, and thus furthering the employer’s interests. Allegheny 

Ludlum Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Hines), 913 A.2d 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2006). More important than the temporal proximity of the injury to a claimant’s 

shift is the claimant’s purpose or activities during the time of injury. Ace Wire 

Spring & Form Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Walshesky), __ A.3d __, (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 1916 C.D. 2013, filed June 10, 2014), 2014 WL 2576059, *7-8.

By removing his belongings from Employer’s truck under Manager’s 

supervision, Claimant was furthering Employer’s interests. The WCJ found

Claimant was acting pursuant to Manager’s direction to remove his belongings and 

clean out Employer’s truck, and was under Manager’s supervision while doing so. 

WCJ Remand Op., F.F. No. 3. Thus, he was under Employer’s control at the time

of his injury. 

Additionally, in the alternative, an employee may be found to be 

within the scope of employment, even when not furthering an employer’s interests. 

O’Rourke. Significantly, Section 301(c)(1) of the Act “does not preclude a 

claimant from seeking benefits for such an injury after the employment 
14

relationship has ceased” provided he can establish the injury occurred in the course 

of employment. Little, 23 A.3d at 645 n.11.

Employer predicates its argument on the proposition that an employee

may not be determined to be within the scope of employment after that 

employment has ended. In support of its position, Employer relies on Little.

4

In Little, a former employee received a termination letter in the mail. 

He died of heart failure at home two days after receiving the letter. His wife 

alleged he obsessively reviewed the letter, and paced. While reading the 

termination letter, the claimant suffered a fatal heart attack.

This Court in Little concluded that the claimant was not furthering his 

employer’s interests at the time he died. Aside from the fact that the employment 

relationship was severed before the claimant received the termination letter, the 

final act regarding his employment occurred days prior to his death.

This case is distinguishable from Little in several material respects. 

First, Claimant’s injury here occurred on Employer’s premises. In Little, the 

claimant had the heart attack in his own home. Second, Claimant sustained the 

injury on his last day of employment, in temporal proximity to quitting, within a 

 

4

Employer also cites two other cases as relevant to our analysis: Moberg v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Twining Village), 995 A.2d 385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (regarding 

claimant’s admitted status as applicant, not employee at the time of injury) and Wright v. 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Larpat Muffler, Inc.), 871 A.2d 281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) 

(regarding claimant’s pursuit of personal business when injured on way to parking lot). As 

neither case involves a former employee or a similar situation, the cases are inapposite.
15

reasonable time of being required to be on premises. See Port Auth. of Allegheny

Cnty. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (D’Agostino), 444 A.2d 837 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1982) (employee’s death in employer’s parking lot 90 minutes after the end of his 

shift was compensable because presence on employer’s premises for this additional 

period of time was not unreasonable). By contrast, Little was terminated by letter, 

and died days after his employer severed the employment relationship. Third, 

when Claimant’s injury occurred, he was performing a task requested by 

Employer. In Little, the claimant was not only terminated, he was also not 

performing any task related to his employment when he was pacing in his own 

home. 

We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the party who 

prevailed before the factfinder, the WCJ. Sell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (LNP 

Eng’g), 771 A.2d 1246 (Pa. 2001); Waldameer Park, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Morrison), 819 A.2d 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Further, we draw all 

reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence in support of the factfinder’s 

decision in the prevailing party’s favor. Id. Here, Claimant prevailed before the 

WCJ. 

Moreover, as factfinder, the WCJ “has exclusive province over 

questions of credibility and evidentiary weight” and “is free to accept or reject the

testimony of any witness ... in whole or in part.” Greenwich Collieries v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Buck), 664 A.2d 703, 706 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). 

This Court may overturn a “credibility determination only if it is arbitrary and 

capricious or so fundamentally dependent on a misapprehension of facts, or so 
16

otherwise flawed, as to render it irrational.” Casne v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(STAT Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14, 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

Here, the WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony regarding the 

circumstances surrounding his fall. The WCJ explicitly stated she found 

Employer’s witnesses “unpersuasive.” WCJ Decision, 5/28/09, F.F. No. 13. 

Claimant’s testimony supports the finding that he was required to remove his 

belongings from the truck. Id., F.F. No. 5; WCJ Hr’g, N.T., 5/6/2008, at 11, 15; 

Claimant’s Dep. Tr., 10/3/2008, at 7.

Little is instructive as to how this Court analyzes a case when an 

employee is a former employee at the time of sustaining injury. See also Hepp v. 

Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (B.P. Oil Co.), 447 A.2d 337 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) 

(evaluating claim of employee injured at home post-termination by employer; 

reasoning terminated employee must establish injury arose in course of 

employment, in which location is one factor and activities another). 

Relevant here, in Little we noted that termination of the employment 

relationship does not bar workers’ compensation benefits. In Little, we concluded 

that “where a work injury appears to bear no relationship to events associated with 

employment activities ... but rather relates to a final act that is only work-related 

insofar as the event alters the employment relationship ... an injury associated with 

that final act does not arise in the course of employment.” Id. at 644-45. We then 

proceeded to interpret “course of employment,” using the three factors (on 
17

employer’s premises, required to be on premises, and injured due to a condition of 

the premises) traditionally applied.

The WCJ assessed these factors, and determined Claimant was 

performing a “required task” of cleaning out his truck at the time he was injured. 

WCJ Remand Op., F.F. No. 3. The WCJ properly based her decision on the 

activities Claimant was performing at the time of his injury. She found he was on 

Employer’s premises, and was acting on Employer’s direction at the time he was 

on the premises, and was injured by tripping over Employer’s pallet on the 

warehouse floor.

Here, Claimant makes the case that he was both on Employer’s 

premises and furthering Employer’s interests when he sustained injuries. Although

Claimant quit before he was injured, he was still within the scope of employment

because he was acting at Employer’s direction, and thus furthering Employer’s 

interests. Because substantial evidence supports the WCJ’s findings, we reinstate 

the WCJ’s order.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, because Claimant was within the course 

and scope of employment at the time of injury, the Board’s order is reversed, and 

the WCJ’s order on remand, circulated July 28, 2011, is reinstated.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Paul Marazas, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 337 C.D. 2014

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Vitas Healthcare Corporation), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 11th day of August, 2014, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board dated February 19, 2014, is REVERSED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge