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Filed 5/14/24 In re T.G. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re T.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C098900

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JV138965)

The juvenile court committed T.G. to the Valley Oak Youth Academy (VOYA), a

secure youth treatment facility (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 875, subd. (a)),

1 setting the baseline 

term of confinement at four years and the maximum term of confinement at seven years 

four months with 1,823 days of custody credit.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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T.G. now contends (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering a VOYA 

secure youth treatment facility commitment, (2) the juvenile court should have applied 

the custody credit to the baseline term of confinement, and (3) the disposition minute 

order must be corrected.

We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing T.G. 

to VOYA. But we will remand the matter for recalculation of the baseline term of 

confinement, direct the juvenile court to correct the disposition minute order, and 

otherwise affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

In 2017, the People filed a wardship petition alleging that T.G. (then 16 years old)

stole a 2012 Nissan Altima and bought or received the same stolen car. T.G. admitted a 

misdemeanor violation in exchange for probation. The juvenile court approved the 

parties’ agreement and placed T.G. on probation for six months.

In 2018, the People filed a wardship petition charging T.G. with murder and 

asserting a firearm enhancement allegation. The detention report indicated that T.G. 

and two adults chased the victim and shot him. A stolen nine-millimeter Glock was 

recovered at T.G.’s home and linked to the spent casings recovered near the victim’s 

body. The People moved under section 707 to have T.G. declared unfit for treatment 

within the juvenile justice system.

T.G. admitted voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) with a firearm 

enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and agreed to a stipulated commitment 

to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). In exchange, the People agreed not to seek 

transfer to adult criminal court. The juvenile court adjudged T.G. a ward of the court and 

committed him to DJJ with custody credit.

A May 2021 annual DJJ case review recommended T.G.’s continued placement 

and confirmed his projected board of parole review date of June 2024. The report stated: 

“[T.G.] has not made any progress in addressing his primary treatment objectives this 
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year. He continues to resort to anti-social coping skills to resolve peer conflict and get 

his needs met. [T.G.’s] desire for peer approval is the motivation behind his criminal and 

addictive behavior. He was transferred to a higher level of treatment due to his risk in the 

areas of Violence/Aggression, Adaptive Skills, and Attitudes. He continues to remain a 

significant health and safety risk to the community. The Glen Hall Treatment Team 

recommends [T.G.] continue facility placement in order for him to develop strengths in 

his primary treatment objectives.”

But in December 2022, the probation department filed a petition to set aside T.G.’s 

DJJ commitment based on statutory changes brought about by Senate Bill No. 823 (2019-

2020 Reg. Sess.) requiring youth previously committed to DJJ to be returned to their 

county of commitment for a new disposition hearing.

According to a DJJ transfer report, a comparison of T.G.’s original scores on the 

California Youth Screening Instrument to his most recent assessment showed that he was 

at higher risk and need, scoring moderately high in both categories, and his overall 

strength rating had declined from moderate to low. T.G.’s individual change plan noted 

he had engaged in violent behavior in the past six months and that he believed violence 

was a justified reaction to small things. The plan stated T.G. would benefit from 

substance abuse treatment. His case plan recommended continued work on aggression 

and violence, among other things. T.G. was affiliated with the Del Paso Heights Blood 

DPH street gang. He graduated from high school in 2019 and worked as a dayroom 

manager. He failed a college course at DJJ and refused to attend more because he was 

not interested in the classes offered. T.G.’s case plan said he was “poorly qualified for 

most employment opportunities” and encouraged him to obtain employment that would 

assist in his reentry. T.G.’s reentry plan was to complete the reentry group and be 

discharged to his grandfather.

The probation department recommended a commitment to VOYA. It described 

the treatment programs available at VOYA, including behavior treatment interventions, 
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cognitive behavior interventions for substance abuse, post-secondary educations 

opportunities, and vocational programs. Probation subsequently asked that T.G.’s 

commitment to DJJ be set aside and that T.G. be returned to Sacramento County for a 

new disposition hearing. The juvenile court dismissed probation’s original section 731.1 

petition, granted the new petition, and set the matter for a contested disposition hearing.

The probation department filed a second probation report, recommending a 60-day 

commitment to juvenile hall and assessment by a reentry team. The reported provided an 

update on T.G.’s behavior at DJJ. T.G.’s rating had been downgraded due to “physical 

altercations, not following staff directives, and possession of a controlled substance.” 

But he had completed multiple interventions and journals.

At the contested disposition hearing, T.G.’s counsel argued against a secure youth 

treatment facility commitment, noting T.G.’s positive behavior since he was returned 

to Sacramento. T.G.’s counsel argued T.G. could be safely treated in the community. 

The People disagreed, arguing a VOYA commitment was appropriate given T.G.’s 

offense and his behavior at DJJ, notwithstanding his recent progress.

The juvenile court agreed with the People and committed T.G. to VOYA, stating: 

“The Court has read and considered both of the reports from probation and the briefings 

from counsel and considered the arguments and the presentation from the family. [¶] 

The Court takes judicial notice of all prior findings, orders, and judgments, and 

proceedings. The Court has considered a number of factors, including the severity of the 

offense, the role of the offense, and the harm done to the victims, the prior delinquent 

history, the programming and treatment and education offered in the VOYA program. [¶] 

And whether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning 

the youth to an alternate less restrictive disposition available to the Court, as well as any 

specific factors related to age, maturity, emotional health, et cetera. [¶] The Court finds 

that a less restrictive alternative disposition is unsuitable, and the subject is committed to 

a secured youth treatment facility, VOYA.”
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The juvenile court set T.G.’s baseline term of confinement (§ 875, subd. (b)) 

at four years and the maximum term of confinement (§ 875, subd. (c)) at seven years 

four months with 1,823 days custody credit.

DISCUSSION

I

T.G. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering a VOYA 

commitment. We disagree.

A

Until recently, DJJ was “the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe 

juvenile offenders.” (In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 899, 902.) DJJ was 

previously known as the California Youth Authority. (Id., at p. 906, fn. 4.) In 2020,

the Legislature enacted juvenile justice realignment by passing Senate Bill No. 823

(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 337). Implementing the Legislature’s juvenile 

justice realignment program required the eventual closure of DJJ and the transfer of its 

responsibilities to California counties. (§ 736.5, subd. (a).) The county-level equivalent 

of DJJ is a secure track commitment, also known as a secure youth treatment facility. 

(§§ 875, 875.5.)

Section 875, subdivision (a)(3) authorizes commitment to a secure youth treatment 

facility if a ward meets certain criteria and “[t]he court has made a finding on the record 

that a less restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” The juvenile 

court must base its determination “on all of the following criteria: [¶] (A) The severity 

of the offense or offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated, 

including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to victims[;]

[¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including the adequacy and success of 

previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward[;] [¶] (C) Whether the 

programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure youth treatment 

facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and security needs of the ward[;] [¶] 
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(D) Whether the goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning 

the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is available to the court[;] [¶] 

(E) The ward’s age, developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual 

orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special needs affecting 

the safety or suitability of committing the ward to a term of confinement in a secure 

youth treatment facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)

We review the juvenile court’s commitment decision for abuse of discretion, 

indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court’s decision. (In re 

Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) “ ‘A trial court abuses its discretion 

when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.’ ” (In re 

Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.) There is no abuse of discretion where the 

commitment is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Angela M., at p. 1396.)

B

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s commitment decision. T.G.’s 

voluntary manslaughter offense was extremely serious. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3)(A).) The 

victim was chased, shot, and died, and a gun tied to the crime was found in T.G.’s home. 

T.G. agreed to the original DJJ commitment as part of a plea agreement, reducing the 

charges against him from first degree murder to voluntary manslaughter and eliminating 

the People’s effort to prosecute T.G., who was then 18 years old, in the adult criminal 

system.

T.G.’s rehabilitation efforts have been mixed. Although there is evidence of some 

positive steps and recent improvement, there is also evidence of continuing concerns. 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that VOYA could meet 

T.G.’s needs. The DJJ transfer report indicated T.G. needed to work on his aggression 

and violence, his social networks, and his employment skills. T.G. had a high school 

diploma and worked as a dayroom manager, but he lacked the skills needed for most 

employment opportunities. Substance abuse treatment was recommended. According 
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to the probation department’s February 21, 2023 report, VOYA offered behavior 

treatment interventions, cognitive behavior interventions for substance abuse, postsecondary educations opportunities, and vocational programs, including opportunities in 

construction and the culinary arts.

There is also substantial evidence that the goals of rehabilitation and community 

safety could not be met by assigning T.G. to a less restrictive placement. A 2021 annual

case review stated that T.G. continued to remain a significant health and safety risk to 

the community. The December 2022 DJJ transfer report said T.G.’s scores indicated he 

was at higher risk and need, scoring moderately high in both categories, and that his 

overall strength rating had declined from moderate to low. The probation department’s 

May 2023 behavioral update said T.G.’s behavior management grade had been 

downgraded because of physical altercations, the failure to follow staff directives, and 

the possession of a controlled substance.

T.G.’s age also supports the juvenile court’s commitment decision. (§ 875, 

subd. (a)(3)(E)). At the time of the commitment decision, T.G. was 22 years old.

Having reviewed the section 875, subdivision (a)(3) factors, the juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion.

II

T.G. next contends the juvenile court should have applied his 1,823 days of 

custody credit to his baseline term of confinement. Specifically, he claims that both his 

confinement custody credit and precommitment custody credit should reduce the baseline 

term. The People agree that remand for recalculation of the baseline term of confinement 

is required in light of statutory changes to the methodology for calculating baseline 

confinement.

Based on changes in the law, T.G. may now ask to receive credit for all 

programs completed or substantially completed at DJJ. (See § 875, subd. (b)(2) 

[amended by Senate Bill No. 134 (2023-2024 reg. sess.) (Stats. 2023, ch. 47, § 30), 
8

effective July 10, 2023].) In addition, the baseline commitment term for voluntary 

manslaughter has changed from four years (§ 875, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, 

§ 30808, subd. (a)(1)) to a range of three to five years. (§ 875, subd. (b)(1), (h); Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.806(d) [effective July 1, 2023].) While retroactivity is not directly 

addressed by the statutory changes, it appears T.G. is entitled to the benefit of these 

ameliorative amendments to his nonfinal judgment given that they might result in a 

reduction to his baseline term of confinement. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 

628; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 748.)

Having reached this conclusion, we do not address the parties’ arguments as to 

whether precommitment credit should be available to reduce the baseline term or should 

be solely applied to T.G.’s maximum term of confinement. Such arguments may be 

asserted on remand.

III

In addition, T.G. claims the disposition minute order must be corrected.

We do not agree with T.G.’s argument that the minute order must be corrected 

to reflect the oral pronouncement of the maximum term of confinement. Although 

the relevant juvenile court comment was not easy to follow, we interpret it as explaining 

the maximum confinement time left after the application of credit. The juvenile court did 

not say T.G.’s maximum confinement time, before the application of credit, was two 

years four months. The minute order is correct in stating that the maximum confinement 

time is seven years four months. But there is a typographical error on the minute order 

that we will direct the juvenile court to correct. In referring to the days of credit, the 

minute order states “dats” when it should say “days.”

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order setting T.G.’s baseline confinement term (§ 875, 

subd. (b)) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a redetermination of the baseline 

confinement term based on applicable law. The juvenile court is further directed 
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to correct the June 22, 2023 minute order by changing “dats” to “days.” The judgment 

is otherwise affirmed.

 /S/

MAURO, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 /S/

DUARTE, J.

 /S/

FEINBERG, J.