United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 21, 2019*

Decided November 27, 2019 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2032 

SCOTT R. SCHMIDT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

WALWORTH COUNTY, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin. 

No. 19-C-0099 

Lynn Adelman, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Scott Schmidt appeals the denial of his costs and expenses as part of an otherwise 

successful motion to remand his case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). His 

complaint invokes Wisconsin law, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several clauses of the 

United States Constitution. Because the purported federal claims gave the defendants a 

reasonable basis to seek removal, the district court reasonably denied Schmidt his costs 

and expenses, so we affirm. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-2032 Page 2 

Schmidt’s complaint primarily asserts that Wisconsin officials violated state law 

when enforcing a state-court judgment against him. According to Schmidt, a Wisconsin 

circuit court entered a judgment against him for unpaid debts arising from a prior 

criminal case and certified the judgment to Wisconsin’s Department of Revenue. The 

Department then, contrary to state law, drew funds from two of his bank accounts to 

satisfy the judgment. In his complaint, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he also asserts that these 

officials violated the “Equal Protection” and “Ex Post Facto” clauses of the Constitution 

and “Due Process of Law.” 

The defendants removed the case to federal court. They asserted that the 

complaint presented a federal question under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Schmidt alleged 

several violations of the Constitution. Schmidt moved to remand, arguing that not all 

defendants consented to the removal and that his claims arose under state law. He also 

moved for his expenses and costs, contending that the defendants lacked an objectively 

reasonable basis for removal. 

The district court granted Schmidt’s motion to remand but denied the motion “in 

all other respects.” In doing so, it referenced an earlier order explaining that Schmidt 

did not allege federal claims under any of the three constitutional clauses detailed in his 

complaint. Violations of state law are not themselves violations of federal due process; 

Schmidt did not allege he was part of a class covered by the equal-protection clause; 

and the ex post facto clause does not apply to collecting criminal judgments. The court 

added that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine likely blocked some of these claims, too. 

See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The district court did 

not address the consent issue because, without subject-matter jurisdiction, it correctly 

decided that it had to remand the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

Schmidt appeals the denial of his costs and expenses. He argues that because in 

its remand order the district court never articulated why it denied his request for costs 

and expenses, it violated Circuit Rule 50 and thus abused its discretion. But even if 

Circuit Rule 50 applies to the ruling on Schmidt’s motion, this court may still evaluate 

the ruling when the “reasons are apparent from the record.” Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. Int’l 

Steel Servs., Inc., 283 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ettrick Wood 

Prods., Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Wolf v. Kennelly, 574 F.3d 406, 

410–11 (7th Cir. 2009). The cases Schmidt cites are distinguishable because in those cases 

we could glean no reasons from the record for the district courts’ remand decisions. 

Compare In re Shell Oil Co., 966 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992) (remanding where court 

had “no idea” of reasons underlying decision to remand), and Louis Vuitton, S.A. v. 
No. 19-2032 Page 3 

K-Econo Merch., 813 F.2d 133, 134–35 (7th Cir. 1987) (same, regarding findings of fact 

and law after bench trial), with In re Amoco Petrol. Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 707–09 (7th 

Cir. 1992) (noting lack of reasons in remand order but inferring from record). 

The court’s reasons for denying the request for costs and expenses are both 

apparent from the ruling that preceded the remand order and proper. In the briefing 

before the district court, Schmidt correctly stated that a district court may, upon 

remanding a case, award costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “only where the removing 

party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin 

Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005); see also Lott v. Pfizer, Inc., 492 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Thus the court was aware of the standard. It is also apparent from the earlier ruling that 

the district court properly applied that standard. It determined that the defendants had 

a reasonable basis to seek removal because the complaint named three federal-law bases 

for removal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). Although the court analyzed each asserted 

federal basis and decided that none stated a valid claim, the naming of the three in the 

complaint gave the defendants reasonable grounds to seek removal. 

Finally, Schmidt argues that the defendants’ lack of unanimous consent to 

removal was itself an unreasonable basis for removal. But this argument conflates the 

proper procedure for removal with removal jurisdiction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 

(describing procedure), with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (describing jurisdiction). Only the 

objective absence of the latter can justify an award of costs. See Martin, 546 U.S. at 141. 

As we have just explained, the complaint presented an apparent ground for removal 

jurisdiction and therefore a legitimate reason to deny an award of costs and expenses. 

AFFIRMED