# Den Europæiske Unions C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0871 |
| --- | --- |
| Den Europæiske Unions
  Tidende | C 242 |
| | |
| Dansk udgave | Meddelelser og oplysninger | 60. årgang27. juli 2017 |

ISSN 1977-0871

Den Europæiske Unions

Tidende

C 242

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

60. årgang27. juli 2017

---

| Informationsnummer | Indhold | Side |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Meddelelser |
| | MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Afgørelse om vurdering af afviklingsbetingelserne for Veneto Banca S.p.A. | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Afgørelse om vurdering af afviklingsbetingelserne for Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. | 3 |

Informationsnummer

Indhold

Side

II   Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2017/C 242/01

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Afgørelse om vurdering af afviklingsbetingelserne for Veneto Banca S.p.A.

2

2017/C 242/03

Afgørelse om vurdering af afviklingsbetingelserne for Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

3

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| | IV   Oplysninger |
| --- | --- |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Euroens vekselkurs | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Oversigt over Europa-Kommissionens afgørelser om godkendelser af markedsføring med henblik på anvendelse og/eller om godkendelser af anvendelse af stoffer, der er opført i bilag XIV til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006 om registrering, vurdering og godkendelse af samt begrænsninger for kemikalier (REACH) (Offentliggjort i henhold til artikel 64, stk. 9, i forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE |
| | EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende mulig statsstøtte ydet til Landsvirkjun ved hjælp af statsgarantier i forbindelse med derivataftaler | 6 |

IV   Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2017/C 242/04

Euroens vekselkurs

4

2017/C 242/05

Oversigt over Europa-Kommissionens afgørelser om godkendelser af markedsføring med henblik på anvendelse og/eller om godkendelser af anvendelse af stoffer, der er opført i bilag XIV til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006 om registrering, vurdering og godkendelse af samt begrænsninger for kemikalier (REACH) (Offentliggjort i henhold til artikel 64, stk. 9, i forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  )

(Offentliggjort i henhold til artikel 64, stk. 9, i forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006)

1

5

OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

2017/C 242/06

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende mulig statsstøtte ydet til Landsvirkjun ved hjælp af statsgarantier i forbindelse med derivataftaler

6

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| | V   Øvrige meddelelser |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER |
| | Det Europæiske Personaleudvælgelseskontor (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Meddelelse om almindelig udvælgelsesprøve | 17 |
| | PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag M.8541 — Thermo Fischer Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | ANDET |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Meddelelse — Offentlig høring — Geografiske betegnelser fra Japan | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Meddelelse til Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa, som ved Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 er føjet til den liste, der er omhandlet i artikel 2, 3 og 7 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 af 27. maj 2002 om indførelse af visse specifikke restriktive foranstaltninger mod visse personer og enheder, der har tilknytning til ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne | 22 |

V   Øvrige meddelelser

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER

Det Europæiske Personaleudvælgelseskontor (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Meddelelse om almindelig udvælgelsesprøve

17

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

2017/C 242/08

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag M.8541 — Thermo Fischer Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

ANDET

Europa-Kommissionen

2017/C 242/10

Meddelelse — Offentlig høring — Geografiske betegnelser fra Japan

20

2017/C 242/11

Meddelelse til Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa, som ved Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 er føjet til den liste, der er omhandlet i artikel 2, 3 og 7 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 af 27. maj 2002 om indførelse af visse specifikke restriktive foranstaltninger mod visse personer og enheder, der har tilknytning til ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne

22

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   EØS-relevant tekst. |

---

(1)   EØS-relevant tekst.

1

| DA | |
| --- | --- |

DA

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II Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/1

---

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2017/C 242/01)

Den 14. juli 2017 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med det indre marked. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1). Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32017M8500. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32017M8500. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten.

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(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/2

---

Afgørelse om vurdering af afviklingsbetingelserne for Veneto Banca S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/02)

Den 23. juni 2017 traf Den Fælles Afviklingsinstans afgørelse om ikke at afvikle Veneto Banca S.p.A. Denne afgørelse blev truffet på grundlag af den konklusion, at betingelsen i artikel 18, stk. 1, litra c), i forordning (EU) nr. 806/2014 (1) ikke var opfyldt. Hovedelementerne i denne afgørelse er som følger:

| Dato for vedtagelse af afgørelsen: | 23. juni 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Afgørelse nr.: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Modtager: | Banca d'Italia |
| Institut: | Veneto Banca S.p.A. |
| Udøvelse af beføjelserne for nedskrivning og konvertering af kapitalinstrumenter: | Nej |
| Afviklingsforanstaltning: | Nej |
| Støtte fra en afviklingsfond: | Nej |

Dato for vedtagelse af afgørelsen:

23. juni 2017

Afgørelse nr.:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Modtager:

Banca d'Italia

Institut:

Veneto Banca S.p.A.

Udøvelse af beføjelserne for nedskrivning og konvertering af kapitalinstrumenter:

Nej

Afviklingsforanstaltning:

Nej

Støtte fra en afviklingsfond:

Nej

Yderligere oplysninger om denne afgørelse findes på SRB's websted: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

---

(1)  EUT L 225 af 30.7.2014, s. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/3

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Afgørelse om vurdering af afviklingsbetingelserne for Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

(2017/C 242/03)

Den 23. juni 2017 traf Den Fælles Afviklingsinstans afgørelse om ikke at afvikle Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. Denne afgørelse blev truffet på grundlag af den konklusion, at betingelsen i artikel 18, stk. 1, litra c), i forordning (EU) nr. 806/2014 (1) ikke var opfyldt. Hovedelementerne i denne afgørelse er som følger:

| Dato for vedtagelse af afgørelsen: | 23. juni 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Afgørelse nr.: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Modtager: | Banca d'Italia |
| Institut: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A. |
| Udøvelse af beføjelserne for nedskrivning og konvertering af kapitalinstrumenter: | Nej |
| Afviklingsforanstaltning: | Nej |
| Støtte fra en afviklingsfond: | Nej |

Dato for vedtagelse af afgørelsen:

23. juni 2017

Afgørelse nr.:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Modtager:

Banca d'Italia

Institut:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza S.p.A.

Udøvelse af beføjelserne for nedskrivning og konvertering af kapitalinstrumenter:

Nej

Afviklingsforanstaltning:

Nej

Støtte fra en afviklingsfond:

Nej

Yderligere oplysninger om denne afgørelse findes på SRB's websted: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

---

(1)  EUT L 225 af 30.7.2014, s. 1.

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IV Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/4

---

Euroens vekselkurs (1)

26. juli 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | amerikanske dollar | 1,1644 |
| JPY | japanske yen | 130,26 |
| DKK | danske kroner | 7,4368 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,89275 |
| SEK | svenske kroner | 9,5705 |
| CHF | schweiziske franc | 1,1152 |
| ISK | islandske kroner | |
| NOK | norske kroner | 9,2893 |
| BGN | bulgarske lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjekkiske koruna | 26,047 |
| HUF | ungarske forint | 305,57 |
| PLN | polske zloty | 4,2613 |
| RON | rumænske leu | 4,5632 |
| TRY | tyrkiske lira | 4,1406 |
| AUD | australske dollar | 1,4717 |
| CAD | canadiske dollar | 1,4576 |
| HKD | hongkongske dollar | 9,0959 |
| NZD | newzealandske dollar | 1,5678 |
| SGD | singaporeanske dollar | 1,5850 |
| KRW | sydkoreanske won | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | sydafrikanske rand | 15,1998 |
| CNY | kinesiske renminbi yuan | 7,8646 |
| HRK | kroatiske kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | indonesiske rupiah | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | malaysiske ringgit | 4,9889 |
| PHP | filippinske pesos | 58,948 |
| RUB | russiske rubler | 69,7050 |
| THB | thailandske bath | 38,996 |
| BRL | brasilianske real | 3,6806 |
| MXN | mexicanske pesos | 20,6644 |
| INR | indiske rupee | 74,9375 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

amerikanske dollar

1,1644

JPY

japanske yen

130,26

DKK

danske kroner

7,4368

GBP

pund sterling

0,89275

SEK

svenske kroner

9,5705

CHF

schweiziske franc

1,1152

ISK

islandske kroner

NOK

norske kroner

9,2893

BGN

bulgarske lev

1,9558

CZK

tjekkiske koruna

26,047

HUF

ungarske forint

305,57

PLN

polske zloty

4,2613

RON

rumænske leu

4,5632

TRY

tyrkiske lira

4,1406

AUD

australske dollar

1,4717

CAD

canadiske dollar

1,4576

HKD

hongkongske dollar

9,0959

NZD

newzealandske dollar

1,5678

SGD

singaporeanske dollar

1,5850

KRW

sydkoreanske won

1 303,91

ZAR

sydafrikanske rand

15,1998

CNY

kinesiske renminbi yuan

7,8646

HRK

kroatiske kuna

7,4128

IDR

indonesiske rupiah

15 507,48

MYR

malaysiske ringgit

4,9889

PHP

filippinske pesos

58,948

RUB

russiske rubler

69,7050

THB

thailandske bath

38,996

BRL

brasilianske real

3,6806

MXN

mexicanske pesos

20,6644

INR

indiske rupee

74,9375

---

(1)  Kilde: Referencekurs offentliggjort af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

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| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/5

---

Oversigt over Europa-Kommissionens afgørelser om godkendelser af markedsføring med henblik på anvendelse og/eller om godkendelser af anvendelse af stoffer, der er opført i bilag XIV til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006 om registrering, vurdering og godkendelse af samt begrænsninger for kemikalier (REACH)

(Offentliggjort i henhold til artikel 64, stk. 9, i forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006
   (1)
  )

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2017/C 242/05)

Afgørelser om meddelelse af godkendelse

| Henvisning til afgørelsen (2) | Dato for afgørelsen | Stof | Indehaver af godkendelsen | Godkendelsesnr. | Godkendt anvendelse | Frist for fornyet vurdering | Begrundelse for afgørelsen |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20. juli 2017 | Bis(2-methoxyethyl)ether
  EF-nr. 203-924-4
  CAS-nr. 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Irland | REACH/17/8/0 | Anvendelse af diglym som opløsningsmiddel i fremstillingen af et mellemprodukt bestemt til videre forarbejdning til en farmaceutisk forbindelse, der anvendes i lægemidler til behandling af luftvejssygdomme | 22. august 2024 | — | De risici for menneskers sundhed, der følger af anvendelsen af stoffet, er styret på hensigtsmæssig vis, jf. artikel 60, stk. 2, i forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006. |

Henvisning til afgørelsen (2)

Dato for afgørelsen

Stof

Indehaver af godkendelsen

Godkendelsesnr.

Godkendt anvendelse

Frist for fornyet vurdering

Begrundelse for afgørelsen

C(2017) 5025

20. juli 2017

Bis(2-methoxyethyl)ether

EF-nr. 203-924-4

CAS-nr. 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Irland

REACH/17/8/0

Anvendelse af diglym som opløsningsmiddel i fremstillingen af et mellemprodukt bestemt til videre forarbejdning til en farmaceutisk forbindelse, der anvendes i lægemidler til behandling af luftvejssygdomme

22. august 2024

—

De risici for menneskers sundhed, der følger af anvendelsen af stoffet, er styret på hensigtsmæssig vis, jf. artikel 60, stk. 2, i forordning (EF) nr. 1907/2006.

| — | Der findes i øjeblikket ingen egnede alternativer, og der søges efter dem som led i et 7-årigt erstatningsprogram. |
| --- | --- |

—

Der findes i øjeblikket ingen egnede alternativer, og der søges efter dem som led i et 7-årigt erstatningsprogram.

---

(1)  EUT L 396 af 30.12.2006, s. 1.

(2)  Afgørelsen findes på Europa-Kommissionens hjemmeside: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about_da

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OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/6

---

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende mulig statsstøtte ydet til Landsvirkjun ved hjælp af statsgarantier i forbindelse med derivataftaler

(2017/C 242/06)

Ved beslutning nr. 085/17/KOL af 3. maj 2017, der er gengivet på det autentiske sprog efter dette sammendrag, har EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden indledt proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. De islandske myndigheder er blevet underrettet ved kopi af denne afgørelse.

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden giver hermed EFTA-staterne, EU-medlemsstaterne og interesserede parter en frist på en måned efter offentliggørelse af denne meddelelse til at fremsende deres bemærkninger til den pågældende foranstaltning til:

| EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| --- |
| Register |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

Register

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

Bemærkningerne vil blive videresendt til de islandske myndigheder. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

Sammendrag

Sagsforløb

Ved e-mail af 24. marts 2015 anmodede de islandske myndigheder Tilsynsmyndigheden om at undersøge, om Landsvirkjuns finansielle forpligtelser hidrørende fra derivatkontrakter kan garanteres inden for rammerne af Islands eksisterende garantiordning. Denne ordning var genstand for Tilsynsmyndighedens afgørelse nr. 159/13/KOL (1).

Tilsynsmyndigheden modtog efter anmodning herom oplysninger om de pågældende foranstaltninger fra de islandske myndigheder ved skrivelser af henholdsvis 11. februar 2016 og 22. marts 2016. Sagen blev desuden drøftet på et møde mellem de islandske myndigheder og Tilsynsmyndigheden i Reykjavik den 31. maj 2016. Efter mødet tilstillede Tilsynsmyndigheden de islandske myndigheder et referat af mødet og anmodede om yderligere oplysninger. Ved e-mail af 31. oktober 2016 besvarede de islandske myndigheder Tilsynsmyndighedens skrivelse og vedlagde nogle yderligere dokumenter.

Sagens faktiske omstændigheder

Landsvirkjun er et offentligt kommanditselskab, der reguleres af lov nr. 42/1983 om Landsvirkjun, som ændret. Landsvirkjun ejes i fællesskab af Staten (99,9 %) og Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). Sidstnævnte er et aktieselskab, som fuldt ud ejes af staten. Landsvirkjun er i øjeblikket det største elproduktionsselskab i Island med en markedsandel på over 75 % af den indenlandske elproduktion, og det er en af de ti største virksomheder, der producerer vedvarende energi i Europa.

Den offentlige gældsforvaltning (herefter »GDM«) er en enhed under den islandske centralbank. Den islandske centralbank er en selvstændig offentlig institution, der ejes af den islandske stat.

Landsvirkjun er følsom overfor udsving i valutakurserne (herefter »FX«) og i renten på sin gældsportefølje. Landsvirkjun anvender forskellige former for derivataftaler for at kontrollere og forvalte sin markedsrisiko.

Tilsynsmyndigheden er af den opfattelse, at GDM i hvert fald siden 2013 har ydet garantier til Landsvirkjun i forbindelse med visse derivataftaler. Beslutningen vedrører GDM's garantier i relation til følgende derivatkontrakter: FX-swaps, FX-optioner og renteswaps.

Ifølge punkt 3.2 i retningslinjerne for statsgarantier (herefter »retningslinjerne«) (2) er det for at udelukke, at der foreligger elementer af statsstøtte i forbindelse med en individuel garanti, tilstrækkeligt, at følgende kumulative betingelser er opfyldt:

| a) | låntageren er ikke en kriseramt virksomhed |
| --- | --- |

a)

låntageren er ikke en kriseramt virksomhed

| b) | garantiens størrelse kan måles på korrekt vis på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien ydes |
| --- | --- |

b)

garantiens størrelse kan måles på korrekt vis på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien ydes

| c) | garantien dækker højst 80 % af de enkelte udestående lån eller andre finansielle forpligtelser på den ene side, og |
| --- | --- |

c)

garantien dækker højst 80 % af de enkelte udestående lån eller andre finansielle forpligtelser på den ene side, og

| d) | der betales markedspris for garantien. |
| --- | --- |

d)

der betales markedspris for garantien.

Det er Tilsynsmyndighedens foreløbige opfattelse, at de garantier, som GDM har ydet til Landsvirkjun i forbindelse med ovennævnte derivattransaktioner, ikke opfylder betingelserne i litra b), c) og d). Det kan derfor ikke på nuværende tidspunkt på grundlag af punkt 3.2 i retningslinjerne udelukkes, at der foreligger elementer af statsstøtte.

For det første har de islandske myndigheder hidtil ikke været i stand til at forklare, om garantierne er knyttet til bestemte forpligtelser, om der gælder et maksimalt beløb for disse garantier, og om garantierne er tidsbegrænsede. Tilsynsmyndigheden er derfor for nuværende af den opfattelse, at betingelsen i litra b), i punkt 3.2 i retningslinjerne ikke er opfyldt.

For det andet synes garantierne at dække alle de finansielle forpligtelser, som Lansdsvirkjun har ifølge de forskellige derivataftaler. De islandske myndigheder har indtil videre ikke fremlagt nogen oplysninger, der gør det muligt at vurdere, om garantien er begrænset til 80 % af de udestående finansielle forpligtelser. Der er desuden heller ingen oplysninger, der gør det muligt at kvantificere Landsvirkjun's finansielle forpligtelser ifølge de derivatkontrakter, der er garanteret af GDM. Tilsynsmyndigheden er derfor på nuværende tidspunkt af den opfattelse, at betingelsen i litra c), i punkt 3.2 i retningslinjerne ikke er opfyldt.

For det tredje følger det af retningslinjerne, at der normalt bør betales en rimelig præmie for at bære risikoen for det garanterede eller modgaranterede beløb. For GDM-garantierne for FX-swaps og FX-optioner synes Landsvirkjun ikke at betale nogen præmie overhovedet. For så vidt angår GDM-garantierne for renteswaps hævder de islandske myndigheder, at Landsvirkjun betaler en passende garantipræmie på de nettoforpligtelser, der følger af derivataftalerne, hvilket resulterer i et nettotab for Landsvirkjun. Tilsynsmyndigheden har imidlertid ikke modtaget tilstrækkelige oplysninger om, hvilken metode, der blev anvendt ved fastsættelsen af præmiens størrelse, og den kan derfor ikke vurdere, om præmien kan anses for at svare til markedsprisen.

Vurdering

Tilsynsmyndigheden er af den opfattelse, at de i denne afgørelse omhandlede garantier kan udgøre en fordel som omhandlet i statsstøttereglerne. Foranstaltningerne synes desuden at have en selektiv karakter og kan derfor fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen inden for EØS-området. Tilsynsmyndigheden kan således ikke udelukke, at den pågældende foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1. De islandske myndigheder har på nuværende tidspunkt ikke fremført nogen argumenter til støtte for, at den potentielle statsstøtte kan betragtes som værende forenelig med EØS-aftalen under henvisning til dennes artikel 59, stk. 2, eller artikel 61, stk. 3.

Konklusion

På baggrund af ovenstående har Tilsynsmyndigheden besluttet at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure i overensstemmelse med artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. De berørte parter opfordres til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger hertil senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
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(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
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(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
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(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
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(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
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(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
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(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
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(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
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(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
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(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
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(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
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(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
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(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
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(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
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(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
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(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
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(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
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(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
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(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
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(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
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(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
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(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
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(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
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(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
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(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
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(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
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(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
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(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
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(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
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(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
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(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 159/13/KOL af 24. april 2013 om at afslutte sagen vedrørende eksisterende støtte ydet til Landsvirkjun og Orkuveita Reykjavíkur ved hjælp af ubegrænsede statsgarantier (EUT C 237 af 15.8.2013, s. 3, og EØS-tillæg nr. 45 af 15.8.2013, s. 28).

1

(2)  EUT L 105 af 21.4.2011, s. 32, og EØS-tillæg nr. 23 af 21.4.2011, s. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/109/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

---

V Øvrige meddelelser

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER

Det Europæiske Personaleudvælgelseskontor (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/17

---

MEDDELELSE OM ALMINDELIG UDVÆLGELSESPRØVE

(2017/C 242/07)

Det Europæiske Personaleudvælgelseskontor (EPSO) afholder følgende almindelige udvælgelsesprøver:

| | ADMINISTRATORER OG ASSISTENTER INDEN FOR BYGGESEKTOREN |
| --- | --- |

ADMINISTRATORER OG ASSISTENTER INDEN FOR BYGGESEKTOREN

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Ingeniører inden for området bygningsforvaltning (herunder miljøingeniører og serviceingeniører) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Ingeniører inden for området bygningsforvaltning (herunder miljøingeniører og serviceingeniører)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3) | Jobprofil 1. Koordinatorer/teknikere til bygningskonstruktion |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3)

Jobprofil 1. Koordinatorer/teknikere til bygningskonstruktion

| | Jobprofil 2. Bygningskoordinatorer/teknikere inden for områderne luftkonditionering og elektromekanisk og elektrisk ingeniørarbejde |
| --- | --- |

Jobprofil 2. Bygningskoordinatorer/teknikere inden for områderne luftkonditionering og elektromekanisk og elektrisk ingeniørarbejde

| | Jobprofil 3. Assistenter inden for områderne sikkerhed på arbejdspladsen og bygningssikkerhed |
| --- | --- |

Jobprofil 3. Assistenter inden for områderne sikkerhed på arbejdspladsen og bygningssikkerhed

Meddelelsen om udvælgelsesprøverne er offentliggjort på 24 sprog i
  Den Europæiske Unions Tidende C 242 A af 27. juli 2017.

Yderligere oplysninger findes på EPSO's hjemmeside: https://epso.europa.eu/

---

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/18

---

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion

(Sag M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | Den 18. juli 2017 modtog Europa-Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. (»Letterone Investment«, Luxembourg) gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver kontrol over hele Holland & Barrett International Limited (»Holland & Barrett«, Det Forenede Kongerige), jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Den 18. juli 2017 modtog Europa-Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved Letterone Investment Holdings S.A. (»Letterone Investment«, Luxembourg) gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver kontrol over hele Holland & Barrett International Limited (»Holland & Barrett«, Det Forenede Kongerige), jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b).

| 2. | De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:






  — | Letterone Investment er et internationalt investeringsselskab, som investerer i tele- og teknologisektoren, sundhedssektoren og detailsektoren. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:

—

Letterone Investment er et internationalt investeringsselskab, som investerer i tele- og teknologisektoren, sundhedssektoren og detailsektoren.

| — | Holland & Barrett driver detailsalg af helse- og velværeprodukter såsom vitamintilskud og helsekostprodukter gennem sit netværk af gade- og onlinebutikker. |
| --- | --- |

—

Holland & Barrett driver detailsalg af helse- og velværeprodukter såsom vitamintilskud og helsekostprodukter gennem sit netværk af gade- og onlinebutikker.

| 3. | Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Europa-Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under fusionsforordningen. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. Det bemærkes, at denne sag eventuelt vil blive behandlet efter den forenklede procedure i overensstemmelse med en meddelelse fra Kommission om en forenklet procedure for behandling af bestemte fusioner efter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Europa-Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under fusionsforordningen. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. Det bemærkes, at denne sag eventuelt vil blive behandlet efter den forenklede procedure i overensstemmelse med en meddelelse fra Kommission om en forenklet procedure for behandling af bestemte fusioner efter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (2).

| 4. | Europa-Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede parter til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.
  Alle bemærkninger skal være Europa-Kommissionen i hænde senest 10 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett sendes til Europa-Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301), pr. e-mail (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:





  Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- | --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for fusioner |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

4.

Europa-Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede parter til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.

Alle bemærkninger skal være Europa-Kommissionen i hænde senest 10 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett sendes til Europa-Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301), pr. e-mail (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for fusioner

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1 (»fusionsforordningen«).

(2)  EUT C 366 af 14.12.2013, s. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/19

---

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion

(Sag M.8541 — Thermo Fischer Scientific/Patheon)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | Den 19. juli 2017 modtog Europa-Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. (»Thermo Fisher«, USA) gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver kontrol, jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), over Patheon N.V. (»Patheon«, Nederlandene). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Den 19. juli 2017 modtog Europa-Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc. (»Thermo Fisher«, USA) gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver kontrol, jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), over Patheon N.V. (»Patheon«, Nederlandene).

| 2. | De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:






  — | Thermo Fischer fremstiller og leverer laboratorieudstyr, analyseudstyr, diagnostik og dertil knyttede produkter og tjenesteydelser. Virksomheden har sit hovedsæde i USA og er aktiv internationalt |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:

—

Thermo Fischer fremstiller og leverer laboratorieudstyr, analyseudstyr, diagnostik og dertil knyttede produkter og tjenesteydelser. Virksomheden har sit hovedsæde i USA og er aktiv internationalt

| — | Patheon beskæftiger sig med udarbejdelse af kontrakter og produktionsorganisation. Virksomheden tilbyder aktive farmaceutiske ingredienser og tjenesteydelser i forbindelse med færdigproducerede lægemidler. Den har sit hovedsæde i Nederlandene og er aktiv internationalt. |
| --- | --- |

—

Patheon beskæftiger sig med udarbejdelse af kontrakter og produktionsorganisation. Virksomheden tilbyder aktive farmaceutiske ingredienser og tjenesteydelser i forbindelse med færdigproducerede lægemidler. Den har sit hovedsæde i Nederlandene og er aktiv internationalt.

| 3. | Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Europa-Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under fusionsforordningen. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Europa-Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under fusionsforordningen. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil.

| 4. | Europa-Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.
  Alle bemærkninger skal være Europa-Kommissionen i hænde senest 10 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.8541 — Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V. sendes til Europa-Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301), pr. e-mail (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:





  Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- | --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for fusioner |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

4.

Europa-Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.

Alle bemærkninger skal være Europa-Kommissionen i hænde senest 10 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.8541 — Thermo Fischer Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V. sendes til Europa-Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301), pr. e-mail (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for fusioner

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1 (»fusionsforordningen«).

---

ANDET

Europa-Kommissionen

| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/20

---

MEDDELELSE — OFFENTLIG HØRING

Geografiske betegnelser fra Japan

(2017/C 242/10)

I forbindelse med de igangværende forhandlinger med Japan om en frihandelsaftale (i det følgende benævnt »aftalen«), som indeholder et kapitel om geografiske betegnelser, har de japanske myndigheder fremlagt vedlagte liste over geografiske betegnelser, der skal beskyttes i henhold til aftalen. Europa-Kommissionen vurderer i øjeblikket, om disse geografiske betegnelser skal beskyttes i henhold til den fremtidige aftale som geografiske betegnelser, jf. artikel 22, stk. 1, i aftalen om handelsrelaterede intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder.

Kommissionen opfordrer alle medlemsstater, tredjelande eller fysiske eller juridiske personer, der har en legitim interesse, og som har bopæl eller er etableret i en medlemsstat eller et tredjeland, til at rejse indsigelse mod en sådan beskyttelse ved at fremsende en behørigt begrundet erklæring.

Indsigelserne skal være Kommissionen i hænde senest to måneder efter datoen for offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse. Indsigelserne sendes til følgende e-mailadresse: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Indsigelserne behandles kun, hvis de modtages inden for ovennævnte tidsfrist, og hvis de godtgør, at beskyttelse af den foreslåede betegnelse:

| a) | kolliderer med navnet på en planteart eller en dyrerace og derfor vil kunne vildlede forbrugerne med hensyn til produktets virkelige oprindelse |
| --- | --- |

a)

kolliderer med navnet på en planteart eller en dyrerace og derfor vil kunne vildlede forbrugerne med hensyn til produktets virkelige oprindelse

| b) | er helt eller delvis enslydende med en betegnelse, som allerede er beskyttet i EU i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 af 21. november 2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsvarer og fødevarer (1), eller indgår i de aftaler, som Unionen har indgået med følgende lande:






  — | SADC-ØPA-landene (bestående af Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland og Sydafrika) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

er helt eller delvis enslydende med en betegnelse, som allerede er beskyttet i EU i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 af 21. november 2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsvarer og fødevarer (1), eller indgår i de aftaler, som Unionen har indgået med følgende lande:

—

SADC-ØPA-landene (bestående af Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland og Sydafrika) (2)

| — | Schweiz (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

Schweiz (3)

| — | Korea (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Korea (4)

| — | Mellemamerika (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

Mellemamerika (5)

| — | Colombia, Peru og Ecuador (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Colombia, Peru og Ecuador (6)

| — | Montenegro (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Montenegro (7)

| — | Bosnien-Hercegovina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosnien-Hercegovina (8)

| — | Serbien (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Serbien (9)

| — | Moldova (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldova (10)

| — | Ukraine (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukraine (11)

| — | Georgien (12) |
| --- | --- |

—

Georgien (12)

| c) | kan vildlede forbrugerne med hensyn til produktets sande identitet som følge af et varemærkes anseelse og omdømme og varigheden af dets anvendelse |
| --- | --- |

c)

kan vildlede forbrugerne med hensyn til produktets sande identitet som følge af et varemærkes anseelse og omdømme og varigheden af dets anvendelse

| d) | skader en helt eller delvist enslydende betegnelse eller et varemærke eller produkter, som lovligt har været markedsført mindst fem år forud for datoen for offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse |
| --- | --- |

d)

skader en helt eller delvist enslydende betegnelse eller et varemærke eller produkter, som lovligt har været markedsført mindst fem år forud for datoen for offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse

| e) | eller hvis de påviser forhold, hvoraf det kan sluttes, at den betegnelse, der ønskes registreret, er en artsbetegnelse. |
| --- | --- |

e)

eller hvis de påviser forhold, hvoraf det kan sluttes, at den betegnelse, der ønskes registreret, er en artsbetegnelse.

Ovennævnte kriterier vil blive vurderet i forhold til Unionens område, som i forbindelse med intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder kun refererer til det eller de områder, hvor de pågældende rettigheder er beskyttet. Den eventuelle beskyttelse af disse betegnelser i Den Europæiske Union afhænger af, om disse forhandlinger får en vellykket afslutning og munder ud i en efterfølgende retsakt.

Liste over geografiske betegnelser
   (13)

| Beskyttet betegnelse i Japan | Transskription (kun til vejledende brug) | Produktkategori og -beskrivelse |
| --- | --- | --- |
| »

  «/»Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi« | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Fisk, krebsdyr, bløddyr, ferske, og produkter på basis heraf — skaldyr |
| »

  «/»Tsurajima Gobou« | Tsurajima Gobou | Frugt, grøntsager og korn, også forarbejdet — burre |
| »

  « | Yamagata | Andre produkter i bilag I til traktaten (krydderier m.m.) — andre gærede drikkevarer — seishu (sake) |
| »

  «/»Maesawa Beef« | Maesawa Gyu | Kød (og slagteaffald), fersk — oksekød |
| »

  «/»Yonezawagyu« | Yonezawa Gyu | Kød (og slagteaffald), fersk — oksekød |
| »

  «/»Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi« | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Kød (og slagteaffald), fersk — oksekød |
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  «/»Nishio Matcha« | Nishio no Matcha | Andre produkter i bilag I til traktaten (krydderier m.m.) — grøn te, pulveriseret |

Beskyttet betegnelse i Japan

Transskription (kun til vejledende brug)

Produktkategori og -beskrivelse

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Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Fisk, krebsdyr, bløddyr, ferske, og produkter på basis heraf — skaldyr

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Tsurajima Gobou

Frugt, grøntsager og korn, også forarbejdet — burre

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Yamagata

Andre produkter i bilag I til traktaten (krydderier m.m.) — andre gærede drikkevarer — seishu (sake)

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Maesawa Gyu

Kød (og slagteaffald), fersk — oksekød

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Yonezawa Gyu

Kød (og slagteaffald), fersk — oksekød

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Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Kød (og slagteaffald), fersk — oksekød

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Andre produkter i bilag I til traktaten (krydderier m.m.) — grøn te, pulveriseret

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(1)  EUT L 343 af 14.12.2012, s. 1.

(2)  Rådets afgørelse (EU) 2016/1623 af 1. juni 2016 om undertegnelse på den Europæiske Unions vegne og midlertidig anvendelse af den økonomiske partnerskabsaftale mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og SADC-ØPA-landene på den anden side (EUT L 250 af 16.9.2016, s. 1).

(3)  Rådets og Kommissionens afgørelse 2002/309/EF, Euratom for så vidt angår aftalen om videnskabeligt og teknologisk samarbejde af 4. april 2002 om indgåelse af syv aftaler med Det Schweiziske Forbund (EFT L 114 af 30.4.2002, s. 1), særlig aftalen mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab og Det Schweiziske Forbund om handel med landbrugsprodukter — bilag 7.

(4)  Rådets afgørelse 2011/265/EU af 16. september 2010 om undertegnelse på Den Europæiske Unions vegne og midlertidig anvendelse af frihandelsaftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Republikken Korea på den anden side (EUT L 127 af 14.5.2011, s. 1).

(5)  Aftale om oprettelse af en associering mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Mellemamerika på den anden side (EUT L 346 af 15.12.2012, s. 3).

(6)  Handelsaftale mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Colombia og Peru på den anden side (EUT L 354 af 21.12.2012, s. 3) og tiltrædelsesprotokollen til handelsaftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Colombia og Peru på den anden side for at tage hensyn til Ecuadors tiltrædelse af aftalen (EUT L 356 af 24.12.2016, s. 3).

(7)  Rådets afgørelse 2007/855/EF af 15. oktober 2007 om undertegnelse og indgåelse af interimsaftalen om samhandel og handelsrelaterede anliggender mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab på den ene side og Montenegro på den anden side (EUT L 345, 28.12.2007, p. 1).

(8)  Rådets afgørelse 2008/474/EF af 16. juni 2008 om undertegnelse og indgåelse af interimsaftalen mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab på den ene side og Bosnien-Hercegovina på den anden side om handel og handelsanliggender (EUT L 169 af 30.6.2008, s. 10 — protokol 6).

(9)  Rådets afgørelse 2010/36/EF af 29. april 2008 om undertegnelse og indgåelse af interimsaftalen om samhandel og handelsrelaterede anliggender mellem Det Europæiske Fællesskab på den ene side og Republikken Serbien på den anden side (EUT L 28 af 30.1.2010, s. 1).

(10)  Rådets afgørelse 2013/7/EF af 3. december 2012 om indgåelse af aftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og Republikken Moldova om beskyttelse af geografiske betegnelser for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer (EUT L 10 af 15.1.2013, s. 1).

(11)  Associeringsaftale mellem Den Europæiske Union og dens medlemsstater på den ene side og Ukraine på den anden side (EUT L 161 af 29.5.2014).

(12)  Rådets afgørelse 2012/164/EF af 14. februar 2012 om indgåelse af aftalen mellem Den Europæiske Union og Georgien om beskyttelse af geografiske betegnelser for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer (EUT L 93 af 30.3.2012, s. 1).

(13)  Liste, som de japanske myndigheder har indgivet inden for rammerne af de igangværende forhandlinger, og som er registreret i Japan.

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| 27.7.2017 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 242/22

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Meddelelse til Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa, som ved Kommissionens gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 er føjet til den liste, der er omhandlet i artikel 2, 3 og 7 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 af 27. maj 2002 om indførelse af visse specifikke restriktive foranstaltninger mod visse personer og enheder, der har tilknytning til ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | I Rådets afgørelse (FUSP) 2016/1693 (1) opfordres Unionen til at indefryse midler og økonomiske ressourcer, der tilhører medlemmer af ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne samt andre personer, grupper, virksomheder og enheder, der er knyttet til dem, og som er opført på den liste, der er opstillet i medfør af FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution (UNSCR) 1267(1999) og 1333(2000), og som ajourføres regelmæssigt af FN's Sanktionskomité, som er nedsat i medfør af UNSCR 1267(1999).
  Den liste, som FN's Sanktionskomité har opstillet, omfatter:






  — | ISIL (Da'esh) og Al Qaida |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

I Rådets afgørelse (FUSP) 2016/1693 (1) opfordres Unionen til at indefryse midler og økonomiske ressourcer, der tilhører medlemmer af ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne samt andre personer, grupper, virksomheder og enheder, der er knyttet til dem, og som er opført på den liste, der er opstillet i medfør af FN's Sikkerhedsråds resolution (UNSCR) 1267(1999) og 1333(2000), og som ajourføres regelmæssigt af FN's Sanktionskomité, som er nedsat i medfør af UNSCR 1267(1999).

Den liste, som FN's Sanktionskomité har opstillet, omfatter:

—

ISIL (Da'esh) og Al Qaida

| — | fysiske eller juridiske personer, enheder, organer og grupper med tilknytning til ISIL (Da'esh) og Al Qaida og |
| --- | --- |

—

fysiske eller juridiske personer, enheder, organer og grupper med tilknytning til ISIL (Da'esh) og Al Qaida og

| — | juridiske personer, enheder og organer, som ejes eller kontrolleres af eller på anden måde støtter en af disse tilknyttede personer, enheder, organer og grupper. |
| --- | --- |

—

juridiske personer, enheder og organer, som ejes eller kontrolleres af eller på anden måde støtter en af disse tilknyttede personer, enheder, organer og grupper.

Handlinger eller aktiviteter, der viser, at en person, gruppe, virksomhed eller enhed »har tilknytning« til ISIL (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida, omfatter:

| a) | deltagelse i finansiering, planlægning, forberedelse eller udførelse af handlinger eller aktiviteter udført af, sammen med, under navn af, på vegne af eller til støtte for ISIL (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida eller enhver celle, affilieret gruppe, fraktion eller afledt gruppe heraf |
| --- | --- |

a)

deltagelse i finansiering, planlægning, forberedelse eller udførelse af handlinger eller aktiviteter udført af, sammen med, under navn af, på vegne af eller til støtte for ISIL (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida eller enhver celle, affilieret gruppe, fraktion eller afledt gruppe heraf

| b) | levering, salg eller overførsel af våben og dertil hørende materiel til alle sådanne |
| --- | --- |

b)

levering, salg eller overførsel af våben og dertil hørende materiel til alle sådanne

| c) | rekruttering for alle sådanne eller |
| --- | --- |

c)

rekruttering for alle sådanne eller

| d) | anden form for støtte til alle sådannes handlinger eller aktiviteter. |
| --- | --- |

d)

anden form for støtte til alle sådannes handlinger eller aktiviteter.

| 2. | Den 20. juli 2017 godkendte FN's Sikkerhedsråd tilføjelsen af punkterne Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa til den liste, som føres af FN's ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-sanktionskomité.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa kan til enhver tid med den fornødne dokumentation rette en anmodning til FN's ombudsmand om, at beslutningen om at optage dem på ovennævnte FN-liste tages op til fornyet overvejelse. Anmodningen stiles til følgende adresse:





  United Nations — Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| USA |
| Tlf. +1 212 963 2671 |
| Fax +1 212 963 1300/3778 |
| E-mail: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

Den 20. juli 2017 godkendte FN's Sikkerhedsråd tilføjelsen af punkterne Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa til den liste, som føres af FN's ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-sanktionskomité.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (FILIAL BELIGGENDE I ALBU KAMAL, DEN SYRISKE ARABISKE REPUBLIK), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa kan til enhver tid med den fornødne dokumentation rette en anmodning til FN's ombudsmand om, at beslutningen om at optage dem på ovennævnte FN-liste tages op til fornyet overvejelse. Anmodningen stiles til følgende adresse:

United Nations — Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

USA

Tlf. +1 212 963 2671

Fax +1 212 963 1300/3778

E-mail: ombudsperson@un.org

Yderligere oplysninger findes på https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting.

| 3. | På grundlag af den FN-beslutning, der er nævnt under punkt 2, vedtog Kommissionen gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 (2) om ændring af bilag I til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 af 27. maj 2002 om indførelse af visse specifikke restriktive foranstaltninger mod visse personer og enheder, der har tilknytning til ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne (3). Ved den ændring, som foretages i henhold til artikel 7, stk. 1, litra a), og artikel 7a, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002, tilføjes Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa til listen i bilag I i den pågældende forordning (»bilag I«).
  Følgende foranstaltninger i forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 finder anvendelse på de personer og enheder, som er opført i bilag I:






  1) | indefrysning af alle midler og økonomiske ressourcer, der tilhører, ejes eller besiddes af de pågældende personer og enheder, og forbud (gældende for alle) mod direkte eller indirekte at stille midler og økonomiske ressourcer til rådighed for eller til rådighed til fordel for de pågældende personer og enheder (artikel 2 og 2a) og |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

På grundlag af den FN-beslutning, der er nævnt under punkt 2, vedtog Kommissionen gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 (2) om ændring af bilag I til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 af 27. maj 2002 om indførelse af visse specifikke restriktive foranstaltninger mod visse personer og enheder, der har tilknytning til ISIL- (Da'esh) og Al-Qaida-organisationerne (3). Ved den ændring, som foretages i henhold til artikel 7, stk. 1, litra a), og artikel 7a, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002, tilføjes Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed og Jund Al Aqsa til listen i bilag I i den pågældende forordning (»bilag I«).

Følgende foranstaltninger i forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002 finder anvendelse på de personer og enheder, som er opført i bilag I:

1)

indefrysning af alle midler og økonomiske ressourcer, der tilhører, ejes eller besiddes af de pågældende personer og enheder, og forbud (gældende for alle) mod direkte eller indirekte at stille midler og økonomiske ressourcer til rådighed for eller til rådighed til fordel for de pågældende personer og enheder (artikel 2 og 2a) og

| 2) | forbud mod direkte eller indirekte at yde, sælge, levere eller overføre teknisk rådgivning, teknisk bistand eller oplæring i militær virksomhed gældende for alle de pågældende personer og enheder (artikel 3). |
| --- | --- |

2)

forbud mod direkte eller indirekte at yde, sælge, levere eller overføre teknisk rådgivning, teknisk bistand eller oplæring i militær virksomhed gældende for alle de pågældende personer og enheder (artikel 3).

| 4. | Hvis de pågældende parter, der er blevet opført på listen, fremsætter bemærkninger hertil, foretages der en revurdering, jf. artikel 7a i forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002. De personer og enheder, der opføres i bilag I ved gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390, kan anmode Kommissionen om at få oplyst, hvad der ligger til grund for deres opførelse på listen. En sådan anmodning stiles til:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| »Restrictive measures« |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

4.

Hvis de pågældende parter, der er blevet opført på listen, fremsætter bemærkninger hertil, foretages der en revurdering, jf. artikel 7a i forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002. De personer og enheder, der opføres i bilag I ved gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390, kan anmode Kommissionen om at få oplyst, hvad der ligger til grund for deres opførelse på listen. En sådan anmodning stiles til:

European Commission

»Restrictive measures«

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

| 5. | De pågældende personer og enheder gøres tillige opmærksom på, at gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 kan indbringes for Den Europæiske Unions Ret, jf. artikel 263, stk. 4 og 6, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde. |
| --- | --- |

5.

De pågældende personer og enheder gøres tillige opmærksom på, at gennemførelsesforordning (EU) 2017/1390 kan indbringes for Den Europæiske Unions Ret, jf. artikel 263, stk. 4 og 6, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde.

| 6. | For god ordens skyld gøres de personer og enheder, der er opført i bilag I, opmærksom på, at de har mulighed for at indgive en ansøgning til de kompetente myndigheder i den eller de relevante medlemsstater, der er opført i bilag II til forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002, med henblik på at opnå tilladelse til at anvende indefrosne midler og økonomiske ressourcer til basale behov eller specifikke betalinger, jf. forordningens artikel 2a. |
| --- | --- |

6.

For god ordens skyld gøres de personer og enheder, der er opført i bilag I, opmærksom på, at de har mulighed for at indgive en ansøgning til de kompetente myndigheder i den eller de relevante medlemsstater, der er opført i bilag II til forordning (EF) nr. 881/2002, med henblik på at opnå tilladelse til at anvende indefrosne midler og økonomiske ressourcer til basale behov eller specifikke betalinger, jf. forordningens artikel 2a.

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(1)  EUT L 255 af 21.9.2016, s. 25.

(2)  EUT L 195 af 27.7.2017, s. 11.

(3)  EFT L 139 af 29.5.2002, s. 9.

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