United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19-1677 

CHRISTOPHER CASTAGNA; GAVIN CASTAGNA, 

Plaintiffs, Appellees, 

v. 

HARRY JEAN; KEITH KAPLAN; DARAN EDWARDS, 

Defendants, Appellants. 

JEAN MOISE ACLOQUE; GARY BARKER; MICHAEL BIZZOZERO; TERRY 

COTTON; RICHARD DEVOE; JON-MICHAEL HARBER; CLIFTON HAYNES; GAVIN 

MCHALE; KAMAU PRITCHARD; WILLIAM SAMARAS; STEPHEN SMIGLIANI; 

ANTHONY TROY; JAY TULLY; BRENDAN WALSH; DONALD WIGHTMAN; JAMES 

DOE, Individually; JOHN DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2; JOHN DOE 3; JOHN 

DOE 4; JOHN DOE 5; JOHN DOE 6; JOHN DOE 7; JOHN DOE 8; JOHN 

DOE 9; JOHN DOE 10; JOHN DOE 11; JOHN DOE 12, 

Defendants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. Indira Talwani, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Stahl, and Kayatta, 

Circuit Judges. 

 Nicole M. O'Connor, Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel, 

City of Boston Law Department, with whom Eugene L. O'Flaherty, 

Corporation Counsel, City of Boston Law Department, and Matthew M. 

McGarry, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Boston Law 

Department, were on brief, for appellants. 
 Paul J. Klehm, with whom Benjamin L. Falkner and Krasnoo, 

Klehm & Falkner LLP were on brief, for appellees. 

April 10, 2020 
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This appeal raises the issue of 

whether the three defendant Boston police officers were entitled 

to qualified immunity for entering through the open door of a house 

under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's 

warrant requirement. We hold that the officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity under these circumstances. We reverse the 

judgment for the plaintiffs and remand for the district court to 

enter judgment for the defendants. 

I. 

Qualified immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than 

a mere defense to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 

526 (1985) (emphasis omitted). As such, a typical § 1983 defendant 

raises the qualified immunity defense in a motion to dismiss or 

motion for summary judgment. Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 

45, 52 (1st Cir. 2005). The officers in this case did not raise 

their specific qualified immunity defense until they filed a motion 

for judgment as a matter of law at the end of the jury trial, to 

which the jury ruled for the officers. But this case's "unusual 

posture does not affect the viability of the qualified immunity 

defense." Id. at 53. 

"[W]hen a qualified immunity defense is pressed after a 

jury verdict, the evidence must be construed in the light most 

hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial." Id. (quoting 

Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 1999)). We first 
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recite the facts in the light most favorable to appellants Daran 

Edwards, Harry Jean, and Keith Kaplan. Then we discuss this 

lawsuit's procedural history. 

A. Facts 

On March 17, 2013, the appellees, brothers Christopher 

and Gavin Castagna, hosted a St. Patrick's Day party for their 

friends at Christopher's apartment, located on the first floor of 

a three-story building at the intersection of East 6th Street and 

O Street in South Boston. The party was large enough that 

Christopher and Gavin moved furniture in advance of the party's 

start to accommodate the number of guests and purchased a keg of 

beer. One of the police officers later estimated that when he 

arrived at the scene there were as many as thirty guests there. 

As one guest testified, St. Patrick's Day in Boston is basically 

"a big party throughout the entire city." 

By early evening, many of the guests at the Castagnas' 

party were intoxicated. Different guests estimated that they drank 

"between [twelve] and [fifteen] beers," eleven to thirteen beers,

"ten beers," and "seven or eight beers" that day, respectively. 

At 5:54 p.m., someone called 911 to report a loud party 

at the intersection of East 6th Street and O Street, the 

intersection where Christopher's apartment was located. At 7:29 

p.m., police dispatch directed a group of officers to respond to 

the call. The officers sent were part of a unit composed of seven 
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officers, including Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan. Although the unit 

normally worked in another neighborhood in the city, the officers 

had been reassigned to South Boston for the St. Patrick's Day 

holiday to supervise the parade in the morning and control "loud 

crowds, partying, [and] fighting" in the afternoon and evening. 

Many of the officers had done similar work on St. Patrick's Day in 

prior years.

The seven officers arrived at the scene at approximately 

7:38 p.m. At that point in the evening, Christopher's apartment 

was the only one near the intersection with any observable signs 

of a party.

When Kaplan arrived on the scene, he heard screaming, 

music, and talking coming from Christopher's apartment. As he 

approached the apartment, Kaplan saw two or three guests leave the 

party. He thought one may have turned around and gone back inside, 

possibly to warn the others. In Kaplan's opinion, "[t]hey looked 

like they were underage." When he got close to the apartment, 

Kaplan could see into it because the "door was wide open." He 

also could see through the top of the window that there were people 

drinking inside. He testified that his first objective after 

arriving at the apartment was "to make contact with the owners." 

Edwards gave a similar account. When he arrived, he 

also heard loud music and, through an open window, saw people 

drinking, some of whom he believed to be underage.
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Jean arrived slightly after his fellow officers. He 

also heard music, saw that the front door was open, and noticed 

through the window that the people inside were drinking. He, too, 

believed that some of the guests were underage.1 As he approached 

the apartment, Jean "saw a young male come stumbling outside" onto 

the public sidewalk. Jean testified that the young man "walked 

around like -- you know, like a circle or half-circle, and then he 

hurled over, vomiting, and he did that twice. And then he stumbled 

back into the address that we were looking at." 

Kaplan reached the apartment door and yelled "hello" 

several times and then "Boston Police." No one answered. 

According to Kaplan, "[w]hen no one answered, we kind of walked 

in."

At that point, none of the officers were intending to 

arrest anyone at the party, for underage drinking or any other 

crime. Kaplan explained that this response was in line with the 

police department's normal practice for responding to noise 

complaints: "Typically, we would just knock on the door, try to 

see who the owners are and tenants and have them turn the music 

down, shut the doors, keep the windows up and keep everything 

1 Christopher, the host, admitted that he did not know the 

age of every guest at his party and did not ask to see anyone's 

identification. In addition, many of the guests who were of legal 

drinking age were only a few years older than twenty-one. One 

guest admitted at trial that at the time of the party she could 

have looked underage.
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inside." Indeed, several of the officers did not have their 

handcuffs on them, which would have been necessary to make an 

arrest, explaining that they left them behind to lighten their 

load during a long day walking the parade route. 

The officers explained at trial that there were two 

reasons for entering the home that evening: (1) to respond to the 

noise complaint by finding the homeowners and having them lower 

the volume of their music and (2) to make sure that any underage 

drinkers were safe, including the young-looking man who had vomited 

outside the home and returned inside.

Kaplan explained that "[o]f course, there's safety 

involved when there's underage drinkers." His goal was "to make 

sure everyone was safe, community caretaker, . . . trying to make 

sure that there weren't any other underage drinkers in there or 

that nobody was sick and nobody was throwing up." Jean testified 

that his intention when entering the home "was strictly just . . . 

the well-being check, . . . doing community caretaker work, and to 

speak to the owner, . . . to locate him, speak to him what's going 

on . . . because it was spilling onto the sidewalk."

The guests were in the middle of a dance competition 

when the police entered through the open door, and they did not 

immediately respond. Eventually, when they noticed the officers, 
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the guests turned off the music.2 Kaplan explained that there had 

been a complaint of underage drinking and asked for the homeowners.

There was a lull in which no one answered. Eventually 

some of the guests told the police that the owner's name was 

"Chris," but he was not in the room and was "in the back or the 

bathroom or something to that effect." Jean and another officer 

went to look for Christopher while the others stayed in the kitchen 

with most of the guests.

The officers explained at trial why it was important to 

talk to the owner of the property even though there was no longer 

any disruptive, loud music. Jean testified: "[H]e's the person 

in control of the apartment . . . . He's the one who would probably 

authorize all these people to be here. . . . I don't know if it's 

an abandoned apartment and they're just throwing a party in it." 

Edwards agreed that it was important to talk to the homeowner 

"[b]ecause the homeowner is the person who's in charge of the 

apartment."

As Jean and the other officer made their way down the 

back hall, one of the guests heard them remark that they smelled 

2 One party guest testified that that she thought the music 

had been turned off. The police officers testified that their 

general practice was to have the music turned down when responding 

to noise complaints. The police officers were not asked at trial 

if the music was turned off or merely down when they initially 

entered the apartment. We assume arguendo the music was turned 

off. 
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drugs. The two officers knocked on the door of what they thought 

was the bathroom but was in fact Christopher's bedroom. According 

to Jean, the officers thought, "[w]e're going to let this guy use 

the bathroom, and then we'll talk to him, you know. We were 

patient. We had no problem." Jean eventually realized that the 

room they were waiting outside of was probably not a bathroom when 

he heard multiple voices coming from inside it, so he knocked on 

the door again. That was when Christopher and Gavin, who were 

inside with two other guests, heard the knocking at the door. 

Christopher opened the door for the officers. Christopher 

testified that this was the first time he realized police were in 

the apartment. 

After Christopher opened the door for Jean, Jean 

announced himself as "Boston Police." Jean observed that 

Christopher appeared to have been drinking and noticed that there 

was marijuana in the bedroom. Christopher saw Jean looking at the 

marijuana, and in response he pushed Jean, slammed the door on 

Jean's foot, and held the door there.3 Jean pushed the door back 

open, freeing his foot, and walked into the room.

3 Under state law in 2013, possession of less than one 

ounce of marijuana was a civil offense, subjecting the offender to 

a fine and forfeiture of the marijuana. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, 

§ 32L (repealed 2017). The marijuana found in Christopher's room 

was seized and he was cited for it.
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Edwards and Kaplan, who noticed that Jean and the other 

officer were missing, went to the back rooms to look for them. At 

that point Edwards and Kaplan were still trying to figure out who 

the homeowners were so that the officers could respond to the loud 

party complaint. 

In the bedroom, Christopher shoved Jean a second time 

and the conflict between the officers and the party guests 

escalated. Other officers were called as back-up. Eventually, 

several of the guests and both brothers were arrested on various 

charges. The rest of the details about what happened in the 

bedroom and after the other responding officers arrived are not 

relevant to this appeal.4

B. Procedural History 

 Christopher and Gavin sued the twenty Boston Police 

Officers who were involved in breaking up the party and arresting 

them, including Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan. The Castagnas brought 

civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 

12, §§ 11H and 11I, as well as state tort claims for false 

imprisonment, assault and battery, false arrest, and malicious 

prosecution. By the start of the trial, the district court had 

4 The sole claim on appeal is the unlawful entry claim, 

which was brought against only Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan and 

relates just to the conduct described above. 
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dismissed several claims and removed from the lawsuit thirteen of 

the twenty defendants. 

The trial was held over eight days between June 11 and 

21, 2018. The Castagnas each advanced seven claims, brought 

variously against the seven remaining police officer defendants: 

unlawful entry under § 1983, unlawful seizure under § 1983, 

excessive force under § 1983, violation of the First Amendment 

under § 1983, assault and battery, false arrest, and malicious 

prosecution. The unlawful entry claim was brought against officers 

Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan only. 

As to the unlawful entry claim, the district court 

declined to instruct the jury on the community caretaking exception 

to the warrant requirement over the defense's objections, 

explaining that it was not adequately defined in the law. Instead 

the jury was instructed on the exigent circumstances exception 

only, and the court stated that it would consider arguments about 

community caretaking in the context of qualified immunity after 

the jury returned its verdict.5

5 The jury instructions for the unlawful entry claim were 

as follows: 

Under the Fourth Amendment, no person shall be 

subjected to a warrantless search of his or 

her home except under exigent circumstances, 

that is, circumstances requiring immediate 

action and with probable cause. 

 Probable cause exists if the facts and 

circumstances known to the Defendant are 

sufficient to warrant a reasonable police 
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Before the jury returned with its verdict, Edwards, 

Jean, and Kaplan filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 

in which they argued that their entry into both the apartment and 

the bedroom was justified by the community caretaking exception to 

the warrant requirement. Further, they argued that were entitled 

to qualified immunity on the same grounds and because the law on 

community caretaking in 2013 did not clearly establish that their 

entry violated either brother's constitutional rights. 

The jury reached a unanimous verdict in favor of all of 

the defendants on all counts. As to the unlawful entry claim under 

§ 1983, the jury was asked on the verdict form if Christopher or 

Gavin had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Edwards, 

Kaplan, or Jean had violated their constitutional rights by 

entering either Christopher's apartment or specifically his 

bedroom on March 17, 2013. The jury responded "no" to each 

question for each of the three officers. The district court denied 

as moot Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan's motion for judgment as a matter 

officer in believing that the plaintiff has 

committed or is committing a crime. 

 Circumstances requiring immediate action 

are limited to the following: 

1. hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 

2. threatened destruction of evidence; 

3. risk of escape; and 

4. threat to the lives and safety of the 

public, the police, or the plaintiff.
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of law on the unlawful entry claim in light of the jury verdict in 

their favor. 

On July 20, 2018, the Castagnas moved for a new trial, 

arguing that "the jury's finding that Defendants Kaplan, Edwards 

and Jean are not liable to Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

the unlawful entry into Christopher Castagna's home, or, at the 

very least, into Christopher Castagna's bedroom," is "against the 

law, the weight of credible evidence and constitutes a miscarriage 

of justice."6 

On January 17, 2019, the district court granted the 

Castagnas' motion for a new trial, finding "that the verdict is 

against the law as to the warrantless entry into the home and that 

the warrantless entry on the facts at trial is not protected by 

qualified immunity." The court said the entry into the bedroom 

claim was merely a subset of the entry into the home claim, thereby 

saying it was not an independent claim. 

Because the only issues still to be resolved at that 

point in the proceedings were legal issues, instead of holding a 

6 The Castagnas also argued that a new trial was warranted 

because "the Court improperly instructed the jury regarding 

disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace" and "in her closing, 

Defendants' counsel made improper references to Plaintiff 

Christopher Castagna being a racist, even though there was no 

evidence at trial that demonstrated that he was a racist, and the 

Court's curative instruction to the jury failed to cure the error." 

The district court rejected these arguments, and the plaintiffs 

have not appealed these denials. 
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new trial, the court instructed the Castagnas to move orally under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 for the court to amend the judgment so that 

Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan would be liable for the unlawful entry 

claim. Without conceding their liability, the three officers moved 

for a ruling that the Castagnas had not proven a right to any 

damages beyond nominal damages.

On June 28, 2019, the district court amended its judgment 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 so that it reflected a judgment in favor 

of Christopher and Gavin and against Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan as 

to the § 1983 unlawful entry claim. The court awarded the two 

brothers one dollar in nominal damages from each of the three 

officers. The court did not disturb any of the other jury 

verdicts. 

This timely appeal followed.7

7 Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan make two arguments on appeal 

that we do not reach because we hold that they were entitled to 

qualified immunity. 

 First, they argue that the Castagnas "made a strategic 

choice" not to bring a motion for judgment as a matter of law, and 

in fact, were the parties to initially suggest a jury instruction 

on exigent circumstances. When the district court gave the 

instruction, they did not object. Having made these strategic 

choices, the officers argue, it was an abuse of discretion for the 

district court to then grant the Castagnas a new trial to save 

them from the consequences of those choices. Specifically, the 

officers argue that the district court misapplied the legal 

standards for granting a new trial by conducting a purely legal 

analysis, rather than one "keyed to the trial's fairness." In 

their view, the fact that the district court declined to actually 

hold a new trial and instead heard oral cross-motions pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 only highlighted why the trial was fundamentally 
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II. 

Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan were entitled to qualified 

immunity for the unlawful entry claim under a community caretaking 

theory.8 As we explain below, neither part of the test for 

defeating qualified immunity has been met: the officers' entry 

into the home was in fact constitutional under the community 

caretaking exception and it was not clearly established at the 

time of their entry that the community caretaking exception would 

not give them an immunity defense.9 

fair and the new trial motion never should have been granted in 

the first place.

Second, the officers argue that, even assuming the 

district court's premise that it could grant a new trial motion in 

these circumstances, the court was wrong to find that the jury's 

verdict was against the law or weight of credible evidence. There 

was sufficient evidence for the jury to have considered and applied 

the emergency aid part of the exigent circumstances exception to 

the warrant requirement. Any finding to the contrary must have 

been based on the court's own assessment of witness credibility, 

which would be error. And even though the jury was never 

instructed on the community caretaking exception to the warrant 

requirement, "there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 

consider and decide the applicability of the community caretaking 

exception, [so] the jury's decision in [the officers'] favor was 

not unfair and did not affect [the Castagnas'] substantial rights."

Again, we do not reach these arguments. 

8 On appeal, the officers also argue that they are entitled 

to qualified immunity because their entry fell within the emergency 

aid exception to the warrant requirement. We need not reach this 

argument. 

 9 As to qualified immunity for community caretaking, the 

officers argue, 

[q]ualified immunity impacts the instant case 

in two ways. First, as a general matter, the 

doctrine is "an immunity from suit" and so if 
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As to the claim made at trial that the entry into the 

bedroom constituted a separate offense, it is waived. It is waived 

because the district court did not grant a new trial on that ground 

and plaintiffs have not cross-appealed. It is also waived because 

it has not been briefed as required on appeal. See United States 

v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 

A. Qualified Immunity Framework 

When sued in their individual capacities, government 

officials like police officers Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan are immune 

from damages claims unless "(1) they violated a federal statutory 

or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct 

was 'clearly established at the time.'" Eves v. LePage, 927 F.3d 

575, 582-83 (1st Cir. 2019) (en banc) (quoting District of Columbia 

it applied here, the District Court should not 

have permitted Plaintiffs to proceed further 

against Defendants. White v. Pauly, 137 S. 

Ct. 548, 551 (2017). Second, qualified 

immunity is intertwined with the standard for 

a new trial; specifically, Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 61 provides that no error "is 

ground for granting a new trial [or] setting 

aside a verdict" unless "justice requires 

otherwise," and further, that "the court must 

disregard all errors and defects that do not 

affect any party's substantial rights." 

Consequently, if Defendants were entitled to 

qualified immunity, then a verdict in favor of 

Defendants did not affect Plaintiffs' 

substantial rights. 

Because we hold that that the defendants were entitled 

to immunity and thus should not have had judgment entered against 

them, we do not analyze the issue in relation to the standard for 

a new trial. 
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v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). Courts may analyze either 

part of the test first. See id. at 584. 

The "clearly established" inquiry itself has two 

elements. The first is focused on whether the law was 

"'sufficiently clear' such that every 'reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing' is unlawful." Id. at 583 

(alterations omitted) (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 589). 

Qualified immunity is supposed to "protect 'all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Id. 

(alteration omitted) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 

(2017)). 

Because of that, the right that was allegedly violated 

must be defined "in a particularized sense so that the contours of 

the right are clear to a reasonable official." Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 

658, 665 (2012)). "[E]xisting precedent must have placed the 

statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (quoting 

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). In Eves v. LePage, 

this court sitting en banc found that the defendant was entitled 

to qualified immunity where "it is 'at least arguable'" that the 

defendant's actions were constitutional, id. (quoting Reichle, 566 

U.S. at 669), and where "[t]here was no 'controlling authority' 

or even a 'consensus of cases of persuasive authority,'" id. at 

584 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). 
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The second element "focuses on the objective legal 

reasonableness of an official's acts," and "[e]vidence concerning 

the defendant's subjective intent is simply irrelevant." Id. at 

583 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting 

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588, 590 (1998)). This 

element provides "some breathing room for a police officer even if 

he has made a mistake (albeit a reasonable one) about the 

lawfulness of his conduct." Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 10 (1st 

Cir. 2019) (quoting Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 155 (1st 

Cir. 2018)). 

B. The Officers Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Under 

the Community Caretaking Exception Their Entry Through the Open 

Door of the Home Did Not Violate Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights 

 Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan are entitled to qualified 

immunity for entering Christopher's apartment under the first 

prong of the test for qualified immunity. See Eves, 927 F.3d at 

584. The entry did not violate the Castagnas' constitutional 

rights because the officers were allowed to enter the apartment 

through the open door under the community caretaking exception to 

the warrant requirement. 

 The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. 

IV. In general, "warrantless entries into a home 'are 

presumptively unreasonable.'" Morse v. Cloutier, 869 F.3d 16, 23 
- 19 - 

(1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 

(1980)). 

 There are exceptions to the warrant requirement. One is 

the community caretaking exception, first described by the Supreme 

Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Cady, police 

officers searched a disabled car without a warrant because they 

believed that there was a gun in the car's trunk and the car was 

vulnerable to vandals. 413 U.S. at 448. The Court held that the 

search was constitutionally permissible because it was a 

reasonable exercise of the officers' "community caretaking 

functions," explaining that officers are often called on to act in 

ways "totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal 

statute." Id. at 441. This circuit has long applied the community 

caretaking exception described in Cady in the context of 

automobiles. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 

F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991). 

 This year, after the district court in this case issued 

its decision, this court held that the community caretaking 

exception could be used to justify police officers' entry into 

homes as well. Caniglia v. Strom, 953 F.3d 112, 124 (1st Cir. 

2020). Police are entitled to enter homes without a warrant if 

they are performing a community caretaking function and their 

actions are "within the realm of reason." Id. at 123 (quoting 
- 20 - 

Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 786). We apply the analysis laid 

out in Caniglia and hold that the officers' entry was justified 

under the community caretaking exception to the warrant 

requirement. 

 When determining whether the officers' actions are 

protected by the community caretaking exception, we "look at the 

function performed by [the] police officer." Id. at 125 (quoting 

Matalon v. Hynnes, 806 F.3d 627, 634 (1st Cir. 2015)). The 

function performed must be "distinct from 'the normal work of 

criminal investigation'" to be within "the heartland of the 

community caretaking exception." Id. (quoting Matalon, 806 F.3d 

at 634-35). Actions within that heartland include actions taken 

to "aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential 

hazards from materializing, and provide an infinite variety of 

services to preserve and protect community safety." RodriguezMorales, 929 F.2d at 784-85 (citing Wayne LaFave, Search and 

Seizure § 5.4(c) (2d ed. 1987)); see also Wayne LaFave, Search and 

Seizure § 5.4(c) (5th ed. 2012) (similar). 

 Here, the function being performed by Edwards, Jean, and 

Kaplan was a community caretaking one. When the officers arrived 

at the scene, they saw intoxicated guests who appeared to be 

underage entering and exiting a party freely through an open door. 

Jean saw a guest that looked underage leave the house, throw up 

twice outside, and then reenter the apartment. The party was loud 
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enough to be heard from the street. In their efforts to have the 

music turned down and make sure any underage guests were safe, 

they were aiding people who were potentially in distress, 

preventing hazards from materializing, and protecting community 

safety. 

 In determining whether the officers' actions are 

protected by the community caretaking exception, we also must 

"balance . . . the need for the caretaking activity and the 

affected individual[s'] interest in freedom from government 

intrusions" to determine if the officers' actions were 

reasonable.10 Caniglia, 953 F.3d at 125. 

The officers acted reasonably. The officers had an 

implicit invitation to go up on the porch and knock on the 

apartment's door. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). 

The officers did not enter the home until announcing themselves 

and failing to get the guests' attention. They needed to get the 

attention of the homeowner because he is the person ultimately 

responsible for the impact of the party on the neighborhood. 

Because they were responding to a 911 call reporting a noise 

10 In Caniglia, this court declined to decide whether 

probable cause or merely reasonableness was necessary to seize the 

plaintiff under the community caretaking exception, noting that 

the standard in that case might be higher because it is "of a 

greater magnitude than classic community caretaking functions like 

vehicle impoundment." Caniglia, 953 F.3d at 127. In this appeal, 

we apply our traditional reasonableness test. 
- 22 - 

complaint, the officers knew that people in the neighborhood were 

disturbed by the party. In addition, underage drinkers pose a 

safety risk. This is especially true on a holiday known for 

drinking and one that requires extra police officers to be deployed 

throughout the city. 

Given the open front door, the people coming in and out 

of that open door at will, the evident lack of supervision by the 

owner of who entered, and the owner's failure to respond, any 

expectation of privacy was greatly diminished. It was objectively 

reasonable for an officer to have on-going concerns about noise 

complaints and underage drinking and determine that they might be 

easily resolved by entering through an open door (the same one the 

guests were coming and going through freely) to bring these 

complaints to the owner's attention.11

 The officers' actions do not implicate any of the 

"limitations" on the community caretaking doctrine. Caniglia, 953 

F.3d at 126. Nothing the officers said or did reasonably raises 

the possibility that they were relying on concerns about the noisy, 

11 In a 28(j) letter, the plaintiffs argue that Caniglia 

allows warrantless entry into homes under the community caretaking 

exception only when there is immediate danger. Not so. Caniglia 

happened to implicate the specific community caretaking function 

of trying to prevent someone in a state of crisis from using 

firearms. 953 F.3d at 125. That serious risk of harm was balanced 

against relatively serious government incursions on the 

individual's personal freedoms. Id. Police officers perform a 

variety of functions when in their community caretaking role, not 

all of which must implicate a risk of imminent harm. 
- 23 - 

open, and unsupervised party as "a mere subterfuge for 

investigation" of a crime. Id. (quoting Rodriguez-Morales, 929 

F.2d at 787). Even if they had been motivated in part to enforce 

underage drinking laws, for example, "the possible existence of 

mixed motives will not defeat the officer's . . . entitlement to 

the exception." Matalon, 806 F.3d at 635; see also Caniglia, 953 

F.3d at 128 (applying the community caretaking exception where the 

plaintiff was "imminently dangerous" to others and thus had the 

potential to commit a criminal offense). 

 The officers were able to give "specific articulable 

facts," Caniglia, 953 F.3d at 126 (quoting United States v. King, 

990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir. 1993)), to show their actions were 

"justified on objective grounds," id. (quoting Rodriguez-Morales, 

929 F.2d at 787). They were able to describe specific observations 

about the party, its effect on the neighborhood, and their reasons 

for being concerned about at least some of the guests' safety. 

They could articulate why it was necessary to enter the home to 

talk to the homeowner when they could not get anyone's attention 

from outside of the house. The plaintiffs try to undermine this 

by arguing that the officers' actions, such as not immediately 

searching out the vomiting teenager, for example, show a subjective 

lack of concern for the party guests' safety. But the proper test 

is objective, and people who are below the legal drinking age and 

apparently sick from alcohol are an objective safety risk. 
- 24 - 

 Further, the officers' actions "dr[e]w their essence" 

from "sound police procedure." Id. (citing Rodriguez-Morales, 929 

F.2d at 785). As said in Caniglia, "sound police procedure" is 

defined "broadly and in practical terms." Id. The definition 

"encompasses police officers' 'reasonable choices' among available 

options." Id. (quoting Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 787). There 

is no requirement that the officers had to have waited for a longer 

period outside the door, for example, in the hopes that someone 

eventually would hear them and fetch the owners without them ever 

entering the home. There is "no requirement that officers must 

select the least intrusive means of fulfilling community 

caretaking responsibilities." Id. (quoting Lockhart-Bembery v. 

Sauro, 498 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2007)). 

C. The Officers Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because in 

2013 the Law Was Not Clearly Established that Entering the Home 

Was Unconstitutional Under the Community Caretaking Exception 

 The officers are entitled to qualified immunity under 

the second prong of the qualified immunity test as well. See Eves, 

927 F.3d at 584. In 2013, there was no clearly established law 

that the officers' entrance into the apartment fell outside of the 

scope of the community caretaking exception. 

As said, this circuit had not explicitly held until this 

year that the community caretaking exception could be applied to 

homes. Before 2013, some circuits had held that Cady's community 

caretaking exception applies only to automobiles, not homes. See 
- 25 - 

Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2010) 

(collecting cases). But three other circuits before that date had 

applied the exception to homes as well as automobiles. See United 

States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2006); United 

States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1520-23 (6th Cir. 1996);12 United 

States v. York, 895 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1990). And 

neither the First Circuit nor the Supreme Court had held that the 

exception was limited to automobiles. In Lockhart-Bembery, this 

circuit did not limit the exception's application to the mere 

search of a car; it upheld an order by police officers to move a 

car off the side of a public road for safety reasons. 498 F.3d at 

75-77. 

There was no consensus of persuasive authority at the 

time of the officers' entry that the community caretaking exception 

could only apply to automobile searches. We reached the same 

conclusion in MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 

2014), an opinion that post-dates the Castagnas' party by a year 

but relies on precedents that all pre-date the party. In 

MacDonald, this court explained that "the scope and boundaries of 

12 The Sixth Circuit wrote about "exigent circumstances" as 

well as community caretaking, but we still understand this case as 

applying a version of the community caretaking exception. As we 

discussed in MacDonald v. Town of Eastham, 745 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 

2014), "courts do not always draw fine lines between the community 

caretaking exception and other exceptions to the warrant 

requirement." Id. at 13. 
- 26 - 

the community caretaking exception [were] nebulous [in 2014]," but 

precisely because of this legal uncertainty, the court determined 

that the law was not clearly established that community caretaking 

could not apply to searches of a home. Id. at 14. 

 Nor was there a consensus of authority in 2013 that the 

specific circumstances surrounding the officers' entry into 

Christopher's apartment made their entry an unreasonable 

application of the community caretaking doctrine. This circuit's 

pre-2013 community caretaking decisions had established a 

framework for when the exception might apply to officers' searches. 

These decisions were the basis for the law applied in Caniglia. 

 The community caretaking exception is a recognition that 

[t]he policeman plays a rather special role in 

our society; in addition to being an enforcer 

of the criminal law, he is a "jack-of-allemergencies," W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 

§ 5.4(c) (2d ed. 1987), expected to aid those 

in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent 

potential hazards from materializing, and 

provide an infinite variety of services to 

preserve and protect community safety. . . . 

The rubric is a catchall for the wide range of 

responsibilities that police officers must 

discharge aside from their criminal 

enforcement activities. 

Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 784-85. 

The imperatives of the Fourth Amendment are 

satisfied in connection with the performance 

of non-investigatory duties, including 

community caretaking tasks, so long as the 

procedure involved and its implementation are 

reasonable. [Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.3d at 

785.] The community caretaking doctrine gives 
- 27 - 

officers a great deal of flexibility in how 

they carry out their community caretaking 

function. See id. The ultimate inquiry is 

whether, under the circumstances, the officer 

acted "within the realm of reason." Id. at 

786. Reasonableness does not depend on any 

particular factor; the court must take into 

account the various facts of the case at hand. 

Lockhart-Bembery, 498 F.3d at 75 (some citations omitted). In 

2013, like today, "[t]here [was] no requirement that officers must 

select the least intrusive means of fulfilling community 

caretaking responsibilities." Id. at 76. 

 The officers in 2013 also could have looked to other 

circuits that had had applied the community caretaking exception 

to warrantless entries into homes in circumstances analogous to 

this case. The Sixth Circuit, in Rohrig, held that police officers 

were permitted to enter a home without a warrant to search for the 

homeowner where they were responding to a noise complaint, knocked 

on the door and received no response, the door was open, and the 

officers announced their presence. 98 F.3d at 1509. The court 

understood this entry as an example of the officers exercising 

their "community caretaking functions," id. at 1521 (citing Cady, 

413 U.S. at 441), and said that their actions were reasonable 

"because nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires us to set aside 

our common sense," id. 

 Similarly, in York, the Fifth Circuit held that the 

community caretaking exception applied to officers' entry into a 
- 28 - 

home when they were protecting guests who were removing their 

belongings from the house of a host who had become abusive and 

threatening. 895 F.2d at 1029-30. The court in York found it 

relevant that the host was exhibiting drunken behavior and was 

posing a risk of harm to others. Id. at 1030. 

 The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Arnold, 

affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, holding that 

the community caretaking exception provided the police officer 

with a lawful basis for entering a home. Quezada, 448 F.3d at 

1007-08. In that case, an officer attempting to serve a child 

protection order became concerned that the homeowner was in the 

house but somehow unable to respond. Id. at 1008. He knocked on 

the apartment door, which swung open on his knocking, and announced 

himself by yelling into the apartment several times. Id. at 1006. 

When he heard no response, he entered the home. Id. 

 Given this legal background, the officers could not have 

been on notice that their actions would clearly violate the 

Castagnas' constitutional rights. The officers testified that 

they were not intending to arrest anyone at the party; as in 

Rohrig, they merely wanted to make sure the music was turned down 

so it would stop disturbing the neighbors. As in York, they were 

concerned with mitigating the risk of harm of excessive 

drunkenness. Like the officer in Quezada, the police officers 

here knocked on the door and announced themselves before entering. 
- 29 - 

Their actions were at least arguably within the scope of the 

community caretaking exception. And for many of the same reasons 

discussed earlier in the opinion, their actions were at least 

arguably reasonable under the law in 2013. 

 As this circuit held in MacDonald, a similar case in 

which officers announced their presence at an open door, received 

no reply, and entered a home without a warrant, "neither the 

general dimensions of the community caretaking exception nor the 

case law addressing the application of that exception provides the 

sort of red flag that would have semaphored to reasonable police 

officers that their entry into the plaintiff's home was illegal." 

745 F.3d at 15. "Qualified immunity is meant to protect government 

officials where no such red flags are flying, and we discern no 

error in the application of the doctrine to this case." Id. 

(citation omitted). 

D. Plaintiffs Waived the Argument that the Officers Violated 

Their Rights by Remaining in the House After the Music Was Turned 

Off 

 We briefly address the claim that the officers are 

separately liable for violating the Castagnas' constitutional 

rights, not only by entering the apartment originally, but by 

remaining in the apartment after the music was turned off and going 

toward the bedroom to look for the homeowner.13 Although the 

13 The testimony taken in the light most favorable to the 

defendants shows that the officers knocked on the bedroom door and 
- 30 - 

officers' decision to remain in the apartment is more problematic 

than their decision to enter the apartment originally, the 

Castagnas have waived the argument that this is a separate 

violation of their rights. 

 The argument that there are two separately actionable 

Fourth Amendment claims in this case was made in the district 

court, but in its new trial order, the district court did not 

analyze the unlawful entry claim that way. The plaintiffs did not 

take a cross-appeal from the ruling that the entry into the bedroom 

claim was not independent of the entry into the home claim. 

 Regardless, the argument is waived for lack of developed 

argument on appeal. The plaintiffs' statement of issues only 

discusses the claim about the initial unlawful entry into the 

home.14 The only legal support provided by the plaintiffs for 

their contention that these should be analyzed as separate claims 

are two inapposite district court opinions. See Barbosa v. Hyland, 

Christopher answered it. When Christopher saw Jean looking at the 

marijuana in his bedroom, he intentionally slammed the door on 

Jean's foot. Once he did that, Jean would have been entitled to 

enter the bedroom to arrest Christopher. 

14 Plaintiffs' briefing suggests there are potentially two 

actionable claims where they argue in the alternative that 

"[a]ssuming arguendo that Defendants' initial minimal entry was 

permissible for the purpose of gaining the attention of the guests, 

they could go no further after doing so" because "they had 

accomplished their goal" of turning off the music and were not 

trying to help the teenager who had twice vomited outside.
- 31 - 

No. 11-11997-JGD, 2013 WL 6244157 (D. Mass. Dec. 2, 2013); Walker 

v. Jackson, 952 F. Supp. 2d 343 (D. Mass. 2013).15 Arguments made 

perfunctorily and without developed argumentation are waived. 

See, e.g., Jordan v. Town of Waldoboro, 943 F.3d 532, 546-47 (1st 

Cir. 2019) (citing Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17). 

III. 

We reverse the judgment for the Castagnas and remand 

for the district court to enter judgment for Edwards, Jean, and 

Kaplan. 

15 Walker discussed the emergency aid exception, not the 

community caretaking exception. The district court in Walker found 

that an officer who searched the home after two other officers had 

already completed a search was not covered by the exception. 952 

F. Supp. 2d at 349-50. In Barbosa, the district court specified 

that the officers "did not enter or remain in the house for any 

reasons supported by the community caretaking doctrine," but both 

aspects of the claim are analyzed together. 2013 WL 6244157, at 

*7-9.