Filed 5/18/22 U.S. National Bank Assn. v. Sepehry-Fard CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

U.S. NATIONAL BANK 

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FAREED SEPEHRY-FARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

 H047028

 (Santa Clara County

 Super. Ct. No. 17CV314286)

Defendant and appellant Fareed Sepehry-Fard seeks review of a trial court order 

denying his motion to recuse the law firm of Severson & Werson (Severson) as counsel 

for plaintiff and respondent U.S. National Bank Association (the Bank). Finding no 

error, we affirm the order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

The Bank, as trustee for Greenpoint Mortgage Trust Mortgage Pass-Through 

Certificates, Series 2007-AR2, commenced the underlying litigation by filing a complaint 

for unlawful detainer and damages against Sepehry-Fard in 2017, citing Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1161a.

2 The Bank alleged that it purchased certain real property 

1 Pursuant to this court’s April 2021 order limiting the issue on appeal to only the 

trial court’s order denying Sepehry-Fard’s motion to recuse Severson as counsel, our 

discussion will similarly be limited to facts and procedure related to that order.

2 Relevant to this appeal, the statute provides, “[A] person who holds over and 

continues in possession of . . . real property after a three-day written notice to quit the 

property has been served upon the person . . . may be removed therefrom as prescribed in 
2

located in Saratoga, California “at a trustee’s sale held in accordance with Civil Code 

section 2924, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust” that Sepehry-Fard

signed in January 2007, such that it was entitled to possession of the property, which was 

occupied by Sepehry-Fard at the time it filed the complaint.3 The Bank served a threeday notice to quit to Sepehry-Fard; the Bank then sought possession of the property and 

damages based on Sepehry-Fard’s failure to comply with the notice to quit. Severson is 

listed as the Bank’s attorney in the caption of the complaint. In signing the complaint, 

Severson stated it represented plaintiff Nationstar Mortgage LLC, a party not previously 

referenced in the complaint. A.J. Loll verified the complaint as “Attorney-In-Fact as 

Trustee of Nationstar Mortgage LLC.”

4

In September 2017, the Bank filed an ex parte request seeking permission to serve 

the complaint on Sepehry-Fard by posting pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

415.45, which the trial court granted. Shortly thereafter, Sepehry-Fard filed an answer to 

the verified complaint, admitting that he was in possession of the property, but denying 

that the Bank obtained valid title to the property based on alleged irregularities in the 

foreclosure process that lead to the trustee’s sale. In his answer, Sepehry-Fard did not 

allege that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him, or subject matter 

jurisdiction in the litigation.

this chapter: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 

2924 of the Civil Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by 

such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has 

been duly perfected.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a, subd. (b)(3).)

3 The Bank filed the complaint as a limited jurisdiction matter. Upon SepehryFard’s motion, the court reclassified the case from limited to unlimited jurisdiction in 

2019. 

4

In a motion for summary judgment filed in 2017, the Bank indicated that 

Sepehry-Fard borrowed funds from Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., secured by a 

deed of trust on the Saratoga property. Greenpoint assigned the deed of trust to 

Nationstar in 2013; Nationstar thereafter assigned it to the Bank in January 2017.
3

In January 2019, Sepehry-Fard filed a motion to recuse Severson as the Bank’s 

attorneys. Sepehry-Fard suggested he was seeking recusal based on the “alleged 

attorneys repeated concealment of evidence . . . and their clear and unambiguous ‘willful 

Brady violation’, Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [(Brady)]”; in addition to citing 

Brady, Sepehry-Fard argued Severson had a duty to produce discoverable exculpatory 

evidence under Penal Code section 1054.1 et seq. He cited Business and Professions 

Code sections 6068, subdivision (a) [“It is the duty of an attorney to . . . support the 

Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state.”] and 6106 [“The 

commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether the 

act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise, and whether 

the act is a felony or misdemeanor or not, constitutes a cause for disbarment or 

suspension.”], as well as former rule 5-220 of the California Rules of Professional 

Conduct, in support of his recusal request.5 

Sepehry-Fard argued recusal was proper, and the complaint subject to dismissal 

for lack of jurisdiction, because Severson purposefully filed the complaint as a limited 

jurisdiction matter, rather than an unlimited jurisdiction matter, in order to “steal” the 

property and Sepehry-Fard’s “significant” equity therein. He claimed an unlawful 

detainer proceeding was not the proper method by which the Bank could address its 

claims, as unlawful detainer proceedings were based in landlord-tenant law, and SepehryFard was an owner of the property, not a tenant. Sepehry-Fard asked the court to refer 

Severson to the Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar for disbarment, alleging 

that the firm engaged in additional unlawful conduct. To the extent any of the facts were 

5 Former rule 5-220 precluded a member of the California state bar from 

suppressing any evidence that the member or the member’s client had a legal obligation 

to produce. (See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 

13.) Current rule 3.4(b), adopted effective November 1, 2018, prior to Sepehry-Fard 

filing the recusal motion, provides, “A lawyer shall not . . . suppress any evidence that the 

lawyer or the lawyer’s client has a legal obligation to reveal or to produce[.]”
4

in dispute, he asked the court to refer the matter to a grand jury. He did not address his 

standing to seek Severson’s recusal, or the trial court’s inherent authority to recuse 

Severson as the Bank’s counsel.

The Bank opposed Sepehry-Fard’s motion for recusal, contending Sepehry-Fard

failed to cite any relevant law supporting the request. 

The trial court heard argument on Sepehry-Fard’s motion to recuse, along with 

several other motions, in February 2019.6It issued a written order on February 26, 2019, 

denying the motion for recusal on the grounds that it did “not set forth any cognizable 

legal basis for ‘recusal’ of Plaintiff’s counsel.” In addition, the court ruled on nine other 

motions filed by Sepehry-Fard, and two requests filed by the Bank. 

On February 26, 2019, Sepehry-Fard filed a notice of appeal from a January 2019 

order denying his request for an evidentiary hearing as to the Bank’s standing in the 

action. On February 28, 2019, Sepehry-Fard amended his notice of appeal to seek review 

of the January 2019 order, and the February 26, 2019 order ruling on his many motions, 

including the motion to recuse Severson. He filed a second amended notice of appeal in 

June 2019, and a third amended notice in December 2019, seeking to add review of 

additional orders to the instant appeal. In an order issued in April 2021, this court 

dismissed the February 26, 2019, June 5, 2019, and December 27, 2019 notices of appeal 

as premature as the trial court had not yet entered a final judgment, and the orders 

Sepehry-Fard included in those notices were not independently appealable. As for the 

February 28, 2019 notice of appeal, seeking review of the orders issued on February 26, 

2019, we ruled that only the order denying the motion to recuse Severson was appealable 

at that time, such that the appeal would proceed solely as to that order. 

6

In its written order, the trial court noted, “There was no court reporter present to 

transcribe the oral argument. [Fn. omitted.] For the parties’ convenience and to facilitate 

appellate review, the Court provides a written order memorializing its rulings on these 

motions and requests.” 
5

II. DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Motions

Prior to discussing the merits of Sepehry-Fard’s appeal from the motion to recuse 

Severson, we address motions brought by the parties in the course of briefing. 

1. Sepehry-Fard’s Requests for Judicial Notice and Motions to Augment

Prior to this appeal being fully briefed, Sepehry-Fard filed various requests for 

judicial notice and motions to augment the record on appeal which we deferred for 

consideration with the appeal. Since filing his reply brief, Sepehry-Fard has filed eight 

additional motions to augment the record on appeal, including two filed after this court 

ordered the cause submitted. 

When we review the correctness of a trial court’s order, we generally only 

consider matters that were part of the record at the time the trial court entered the order. 

(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons).) A 

party on appeal cannot use the augmentation process to present materials that were not 

before the trial court at the time of the order, including matters that occurred during the 

pendency of the appeal. (Ibid.; In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 456.) Nor do we 

normally take judicial notice of matters that were not before the trial court. (Vons, at 

p. 444.) The party seeking judicial notice must demonstrate the relevance of the 

materials to the dispositive issues in the appeal. (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 

42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4; Roth v. Jelley (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 655, 678, fn. 10.) 

Sepehry-Fard has not demonstrated that the materials with which he seeks to 

augment the record were before the trial court when it issued the order denying his 

motion to recuse Severson on February 26, 2019. Nor has Sepehry-Fard demonstrated 

that the subjects of his requests for judicial notice are relevant to the dispositive issue on 

appeal, namely the trial court’s alleged error in denying his motion to recuse Severson. 

Sepehry-Fard’s motions to augment the record (filed August 4, August 13, November 
6

127, and December 30, 2021, and January 24, February 3, March 16, and April 21, 2022), 

and his requests for judicial notice (filed June 1 and July 30, 2021), are denied.

2. The Bank’s Motion for Summary Affirmance or Dismissal, and 

Related Cross-Motion

After receiving Sepehry-Fard’s opening brief, the Bank filed a motion for 

summary affirmance or for dismissal of the appeal as frivolous. Sepehry-Fard opposed 

the motion and filed a separate cross-motion to strike the Bank’s motion. This court 

deferred ruling on both motions for consideration with this appeal. 

Sepehry-Fard does not cite in his cross-motion any basis to strike the Bank’s 

motion to dismiss outright. As he has not shown reason to strike the motion to dismiss, 

his cross-motion is denied. Nor has the Bank shown sufficient reason for this court to 

exercise its inherent power to dismiss appeals that are frivolous or taken solely for the 

purpose of delay. We exercise that power only in “the absolutely clearest cases[,]” where 

the frivolity is readily apparent and egregious. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 

115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1318; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) It 

is not enough that an appeal is simply without merit. “[T]he borderline between a 

frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is vague indeed. . . . The difficulty 

of drawing the line simply points up an essential corollary to the power to dismiss 

frivolous appeals: that in all but the clearest cases it should not be used.” (People v. 

Sumner (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 409, 415.) Given the nature of the underlying action, it is 

not readily apparent that this appeal is patently frivolous or brought for improper motive. 

(See Zimmerman v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 153, 160-161.) 

We deny the motion to dismiss.

7 This court’s March 1, 2022 order deferring ruling on several motions to augment 

erroneously indicated there were motions filed November 11 and November 12, 2021. 

The initial motion and an amendment thereto were filed November 12, 2021.
7

B. Failure to Comply with California Rules of Court

Sepehry-Fard represents himself in this appeal, as he did at the trial court. As a 

party representing himself, Sepehry-Fard “ ‘is entitled to the same, but no greater, 

consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ [Citations.] Accordingly, we may 

disregard factual contentions that are not supported by citations to the record [citation] or 

are based on information that is outside the record [citation]. [Fn. omitted.] We may 

disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority [citation] 

or are conclusory [citation]. . . . [W]e will bear in mind that an ‘ “order of the lower court 

is presumed correct.” ’ [Citation.] Therefore, [the appellant] has the burden of 

affirmatively showing any error. [Citation.]” (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 

Cal.App.5th 514, 520, rehg. den. (June 18, 2019), review den. (Aug. 21, 2019)

(Tanguilig).)

The Bank contends that this court need not address the substance of SepehryFard’s appeal, as his opening brief fails to comply with relevant California Rules of 

Court, such that he has forfeited any claim of error. In his 93-page appellant’s opening 

brief, Sepehry-Fard provides limited citation to the 13 volume clerk’s transcript he 

designated in this action. While his brief is not the model of clarity, Sepehry-Fard does 

include legal argument and citations. We will exercise our discretion to construe his brief 

liberally in an effort to determine the nature of Sepehry-Fard’s complaints but decline to 

search the portions of record not cited by Sepehry-Fard in his appellant’s opening brief to 

determine if they support his contentions on appeal. (See Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738.) We will address any insufficiencies in SepehryFard’s legal arguments in the discussion of the substance of his appeal. With these 

precepts in mind, we turn to the merits of Sepehry-Fard’s appeal.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion to Recuse Severson

At the time Sepehry-Fard filed this appeal, the underlying lawsuit had not yet gone 

to trial, and the trial court had not yet entered a final judgment. It is clear from the 
8

pleadings Sepehry-Fard has filed both here and in the trial court that he believes the trial 

court has made numerous errors in handling this case. The only issue we consider in this 

opinion is whether or not the trial court erred in denying Sepehry-Fard’s motion to recuse 

Severson as counsel for the Bank. In his motion, Sepehry-Fard included arguments 

regarding the propriety of the foreclosure and subsequent sale of his property, including 

whether or not he received proper notice of the trustee’s sale and concerns about the 

Bank’s standing to bring the underlying lawsuit. We will not address these issues in this 

opinion except to the extent they are relevant to Sepehry-Fard’s contentions that Severson 

should have been recused from representing the Bank in that lawsuit or are otherwise 

appropriate for our review. 

1. Standard of Review

We generally review a trial court’s decision on a recusal motion for abuse of 

discretion, accepting any factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence. 

(People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 1135, 1143.) “However, the trial court’s discretion is limited by the applicable 

legal principles. [Citation.] Thus, where there are no material disputed factual issues, the 

appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination as a question of law. [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.) In opposing Sepehry-Fard’s recusal motion, Severson did not dispute the facts 

alleged therein; it argued that Sepehry-Fard did not cite any legal authority in support of 

his request. Thus, we will review the matter de novo, considering the trial court’s 

determination as a question of law.

2. The trial court had jurisdiction over Sepehry-Fard and the subject 

matter of the lawsuit.

Sepehry-Fard contends that the trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction 

over him and did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit. He does not 

cite legal authority supporting his apparent contention that an alleged lack of jurisdiction 

requires the trial court to recuse Severson, and has not demonstrated that the trial court 
9

erred in denying the recusal motion on that basis. However, as an appellant may raise 

issues of fundamental jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over the parties and subject 

matter—for the first time on appeal, to the extent Sepehry-Fard generally contends the 

trial court did not have fundamental jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit, we will consider that 

issue. (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 807; People 

v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660.) 

Sepehry-Fard claims the Bank did not have him properly served with process, 

such that the trial court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over him. A party who has 

made a general appearance in an action waives a challenge based on lack of personal 

jurisdiction. (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 210.) A party makes a 

general appearance when he participates in the action or otherwise recognizes the 

authority of the court to hear the matter. (Ibid.) Such an appearance cures any defects in 

service. (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 

1135, 1145.) “Filing an answer on the merits constitutes a general appearance. (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 1014; [citation].)” (Ibid.) Here, Sepehry-Fard filed an answer to the Bank’s 

complaint in September 2017. He did not raise a defense based on lack of proper service 

or lack of personal jurisdiction over him. Nor does the record on appeal include any 

evidence that Sepehry-Fard filed a motion to quash service of the summons prior to 

answering, or that he otherwise challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction over him before 

generally appearing in the matter.8 The trial court had personal jurisdiction over 

Sepehry-Fard and did not err in denying the motion to recuse Severson on this basis.

“ ‘The principle of “subject matter jurisdiction” relates to the inherent authority of 

the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ [Citation.] Thus, in the 

absence of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court has no power ‘to hear or determine 

8

In January 2019, Sepehry-Fard filed a motion challenging both subject matter 

and personal jurisdiction, as well as a motion to dismiss the complaint or quash service of 

process. He filed these motions well after making a general appearance in the action.
10

[the] case.’ [Citation.] And any judgment or order rendered by a court lacking subject 

matter jurisdiction is ‘void on its face. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. 

Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196.) Relying on the trial court’s May 2018 order 

denying the Bank’s motion for summary judgment, Sepehry-Fard bases his contention 

that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction on claims that the unverified 

complaint filed by the Bank was incomplete and did not prove a claim under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1161a, the statute cited in the complaint.

9

 Sepehry-Fard does not 

cite any legal authority for his apparent contention that the alleged failure to properly 

state a cause of action deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. We are not

aware of any such authority. Nor does Sepehry-Fard cite legal authority indicating that 

Severson’s alleged knowledge that the complaint failed to properly state a cause of action 

justified granting the motion to recuse the firm as the Bank’s counsel. As already noted, 

ante, we need not consider legal arguments that are not supported by citation to legal 

authority. (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 520.) The record on appeal shows that 

the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit, as well as personal 

jurisdiction over Sepehry-Fard.

3. Sepehry-Fard did not have standing to seek recusal of Severson.

In order to seek disqualification of counsel, a party must have or have previously 

had an attorney-client relationship with the attorney, or some sort of other confidential or 

fiduciary relationship. (In re Marriage of Murchison (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 847, 851

(Murchison); Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 

1356-1357 (Great Lakes); accord Moreci v. Scaffold Solutions, Inc. (2021) 70 

Cal.App.5th 425, 432.

10) “[A] moving party must have standing, that is, an invasion of a 

9 See fn. 2, ante.

10 The appellate court issued the opinion in Moreci after this case was fully 

briefed. As the portion of the opinion cited herein adopts the holdings in Murchison and 

Great Lakes, we did not seek supplemental briefing to address the Moreci opinion.
11

legally cognizable interest, to disqualify an attorney.” (Great Lakes, at p. 1357.) A nonclient moving party does not have standing to bring a disqualification motion for the sole 

purpose of “ensur[ing] the integrity of the process and the fair administration of justice[]

[citation][,]” as those “ ‘lofty values’ ” do not implicate a “concrete and particularized” 

personal right of the non-client. (Id. at p. 1358.) “[I]mposing a standing requirement for 

attorney disqualification motions protects against the strategic exploitation of the rules of 

ethics and guards against improper use of disqualification as a litigation tactic. 

[Citations.]” (Ibid.)

Sepehry-Fard did not allege in his motion to recuse Severson that he has or 

previously had an attorney client relationship with the law firm. Nor did he allege 

another confidential or fiduciary relationship between himself and Severson. On appeal 

Sepehry-Fard does not address the substance of Severson’s contention that he lacked 

standing to seek Severson’s recusal from the case, aside from mentioning the argument in 

passing. Rather, in his reply brief, Sepehry-Fard cites to what he identifies as six “main 

issues” on appeal: his allegation that the Bank does not exist such that Severson cannot 

represent the Bank; his claim that Severson is “in contempt of well in excess of a dozen 

writs by failing to return the writs;” that Severson is in contempt of an order issued by the 

trial court in a prior lawsuit that has since been dismissed; that Severson knew that the 

Bank or its predecessors were sending Sepehry-Fard “inconsistent and unauthenticated 

amounts of alleged debt allegedly due;” that Severson at minimum knew that SepehryFard did not receive proper notice regarding the date and time of the trustee’s sale for the 

subject property; and, that Severson, despite its knowledge, continues to claim that there 

is nothing wrong with their conduct. Sepehry-Fard does not cite to any legal authority 

affording him standing to seek recusal of Severson based on any of these allegations. 

And the only issue we are considering on appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in 

denying the motion to recuse Severson. As we stated at the outset of this opinion, “[w]e 

may disregard legal arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority 
12

[citation] or are conclusory [citation]. . . . [W]e will bear in mind that an ‘ “order of the 

lower court is presumed correct.” ’ [Citation.] Therefore, [the appellant] has the burden 

of affirmatively showing any error. [Citation.]” (Tanguilig, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 520.) Sepehry-Fard has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred in denying 

the motion to recuse Severson.

III. DISPOSITION

The February 26, 2019 order denying Sepehry-Fard’s motion for recusal of 

Severson is affirmed.
_______________________________

Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________

 Grover, J.

__________________________________

 Lie, J.

U.S. Bank National Association v. Sepehry‐Fard

H047028