IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1994

Filed February 7, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ELIJAH DANIEL DAVIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Adair County, Scott J. Beattie, 

Judge.

Elijah Daniel Davis appeals his conviction for homicide by vehicle and his

sentence for child endangerment. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE 

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Elijah Daniel Davis appeals his conviction and sentence, contending that 

there is insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for homicide by vehicle and 

the district court abused its discretion when sentencing him for child 

endangerment. Because substantial evidence supports the verdict, we affirm his 

conviction for homicide by vehicle. But because the district court abused its 

discretion when imposing the fine for child endangerment, we vacate this portion 

of the sentence and remand for resentencing on this issue.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On May 8, 2020, bystanders came upon a gruesome scene: a smoking van, 

a mangled, custom-built hot rod, and a bloody body lying partially in the road. One 

couple stopped their vehicle and approached the crash, where they found a crying, 

bleeding six-year-old and Davis rummaging through the smoking van. Davis was 

“hobbling” because a bone was protruding out of his leg, and he told the couple, “I 

got to go.” He handed off his son to them, took his backpack, and limped to another 

vehicle that had just stopped at the crash site. Davis demanded that the driver of 

the vehicle take him to his father’s house, and the driver complied. During their 

short drive, Davis was yelling erratically on the phone and acting “agitated, angry, 

anxious, in a hurry.” The driver also noticed the odor of “skunk” that he compared 

to marijuana emitting from the backpack. Eventually, the driver dropped Davis off 

at a house he indicated and returned to the accident.

Meanwhile, emergency services had responded to the scene in Davis’s 

absence. The couple had attempted to clean up the child and reported their 

concerns to police that Davis may be impaired. The other man involved in the 
3

collision was identified and found to be dead. An autopsy later revealed he had 

injuries consistent with being ejected from his vehicle during the crash.

Davis returned to the scene soon after without the backpack, where he was 

treated for his injuries before being taken to the hospital. Based on concerns that 

Davis was driving impaired, a drug recognition expert interviewed him at the 

hospital. His findings were that Davis was under the influence of both marijuana 

and methamphetamine. Samples of Davis’s blood and urine were tested and 

showed positive for marijuana, amphetamine, and methamphetamine. Davis was 

charged with homicide by vehicle and child endangerment.

After trial, a jury found Davis guilty as charged. The district court sentenced 

Davis to consecutive prison terms, for a total of twenty-seven years, and a 

suspended fine of $855. Davis appeals.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Davis first contends that insufficient evidence supports his homicide-byvehicle conviction. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of 

errors at law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). “In conducting 

that review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict,” which is binding on our 

court if “supported by substantial evidence.” Id. To determine if a verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that 

may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (quoting 

State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)).

Because Davis concedes he was driving with controlled substances in his 

system, the State only had to prove that his “act or acts unintentionally caused the 
4

death of [the victim].” Namely, it was required to establish that Davis’s own 

impairment caused the crash and subsequently the victim’s death. Viewing the 

evidence in the State’s favor, substantial evidence supports Davis’s conviction. 

The State provided ample evidence that established Davis was impaired and 

caused the victim’s death. The testimony of multiple expert witnesses established 

that the controlled substances in Davis’s system were enough to cause 

impairment; in fact, the toxicologist testified that the amount of methamphetamine 

was typical of “levels we see in a driving impairment case” and even potentially 

“toxic.” He also testified that Davis’s high level of pain tolerance despite sustaining 

a compound fracture was consistent with impairment. Further, several 

eyewitnesses described Davis’s strange and erratic behavior following the crash. 

He left his young child with near-strangers, fled the scene of a death he caused, 

managed to function while deeply injured, and acted angry and animated. His 

concern was not for his own bleeding son nor the victim lying in the road but for

retrieving his “skunk”-scented backpack and taking it to a relative’s house. 

Similarly, the State also provided ample evidence explaining that Davis’s

impairment caused the victim’s death, including photos of the wreckage and victim, 

with accompanying explanations by crash analysts and medical experts. These 

experts described the extent of the victim’s injuries and their cause. These injuries 

were consistent with Davis driving while impaired and causing a fatal crash.

While Davis argues that distracted driving was more likely to have caused

the death than his impairment, this is not the standard we use. Instead, the crime 

“doesn’t require that the intoxicated operation alone cause the harm; the State 

need only prove it was one of potentially many causes of the death.” State v. 
5

Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Iowa 2020) (emphasis added). Moreover, while 

Davis provided some evidence to suggest that distracted driving may have been a 

factor, the jury was free to ignore this in favor of the overwhelming evidence of 

Davis’s impairment. See State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1990) (“Even 

if the testimony of a witness as to a fact is not controverted by other testimony, the 

finder of fact may reject the testimony if found not to be credible.”); see also State 

v. Noll, No. 12-0166, 2013 WL 85932, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (“It is the 

jury’s function to determine credibility and resolve discrepancies in the evidence.”). 

Because there is sufficient evidence to establish guilt, the district court did not err 

in convicting Davis.

III. Sentencing Discretion.

Finally, Davis argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing 

the $855 fine. We review sentencing decisions for correction of errors at law, but 

“we reverse a sentence only if there was an abuse of discretion or defect in the 

sentencing procedure.” State v. Gay, No. 19-1354, 2021 WL 4889239, at *3 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021). “A district court’s failure to exercise sentencing discretion 

requires resentencing” and is considered an abuse of discretion. Id. at *3–4. In 

determining if a court exercised such discretion, we consider “whether the court 

knew of its discretion” under the applicable code sections. Id. at *4.

When sentencing Davis, the district court noted, “There is no fine or crime 

services surcharge on [Count 1], but there is a fine associated with the child 

endangerment section, and that is a fine in the amount of $855.” The minimum 

fine for child endangerment, an aggravated misdemeanor, was increased from

$625 to $855 on July 15, 2020. 2020 Iowa Acts ch. 1074 §§ 46(2), 93. We apply 
6

the statute in effect at the time of the offense itself to prevent constitutional 

implications. See State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 122–23 (Iowa 2018) (finding 

the imposition of a surcharge effective post-offense date violated both the U.S. and 

Iowa Constitutions’ ban on ex post facto punishments). Because the act of child

endangerment occurred on May 8, 2020, the minimum fine was $625. Although 

the court had discretion to impose a higher fine, its explanation does not reflect an 

exercise of discretion in choosing the amount. Instead, it shows the court 

incorrectly believed the minimum fine was $855. We therefore vacate this portion 

of the sentence and remand for resentencing. See State v. Ayers, 590 

N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1999) (“Failure to exercise that discretion calls for a vacation 

of the sentence and a remand for resentencing.”).

IV. Disposition.

Because sufficient evidence supports the verdict, we affirm Davis’s 

conviction. But because the district court abused its discretion when imposing the 

fine, we vacate that portion of the child-endangerment sentence and remand for 

resentencing.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.