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*********************************************** 
PETER WHITE v. LATIMER POINT CONDOMINIUM

ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.

(AC 41345)

Keller, Bright and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, an owner of a condominium unit that is part of the defendant

condominium association, sought, inter alia, a permanent injunction

against the association and the defendants J and E, owners of a neighboring condominium unit, to prevent J and E from rebuilding their unit,

pursuant to federal and town regulations, after the original unit sustained

storm damage. The plaintiff alleged that the rebuilding plan, as approved

by the association’s board, would decrease the plaintiff’s water views

of Long Island Sound to a percentage not permitted by the association’s

bylaws. Although the initial rebuilding plans did project a decrease of

the plaintiff’s water views in violation of the bylaws, the plan that was

approved actually projected an increase of the plaintiff’s water views

by over 2 percent with certain tree trimming and vegetation removal.

After the plaintiff appeal to the association’s board, which upheld the

approval of the construction application, he filed an action in the Superior Court, which rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the actions of the

association in approving the construction application of J and E were

improper. The plaintiff then appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia,

that the court rendered a judgment that was neither legally correct nor

factually supported by the record in that the court failed to make factual

findings to support its decision. Held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the defendants, as the record could be read to support the court’s conclusion

that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden; because the court’s

decision lacked detailed factual findings and a statement regarding its

legal bases, there was no way for this court to determine whether the

trial court found the plaintiff’s testimony or evidence concerning the

reduction in his primary water view not credible, whether it weighed

the evidence and found the defendants’ evidence more credible or simply

more persuasive, or whether something else persuaded the court that

the plaintiff had not met his burden, as the plaintiff, who argued that

the court failed to make any factual findings but did not seek an articulation or rectification of the court’s decision, did nothing to ensure that

this court would have a record on appeal that included such factual

findings and the legal bases for the court decision, there was no indication in the record that the trial court disregarded case law, as claimed

by the plaintiff, and in the absence of an articulation, this court presumed

that the trial court acted correctly and undertook a proper analysis of

the law.

Argued March 18—officially released August 13, 2019

Procedural History

Action for, inter alia, a permanent injunction to prohibit the defendant home owners from continuing construction on a new condominium unit, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New London and tried to the court, Hon. Joseph

Q. Koletsky, judge trial referee; judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Vincent John Purnhagen, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert B. Flynn, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

BRIGHT, J. The plaintiff, Peter White, appeals from

the judgment of the trial court, ruling in favor of the

defendants, Latimer Point Condominium Association,

Inc., (association), and Gennaro Modugno and Elizabeth Modugno, whom we collectively refer to as the

Modugnos, on the plaintiff’s complaint, which was

brought pursuant to General Statutes § 47-278.1 On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court misapplied

and disregarded relevant case law, that it failed to apply

properly the 10 percent rule contained in the association’s bylaws,2

that it ignored overwhelming evidence

that the association failed to comply with its tree trimming schedule, and that it rendered a judgment that is

neither legally correct nor factually supported by the

record. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following uncontested facts

and procedural history, which are relevant to the plaintiff’s appeal. The plaintiff is the owner of unit 23 at

the Latimer Point Condominiums (Latimer), a common

interest ownership community established pursuant to

General Statutes § 47-200 et seq. Latimer is situated on

Fishers Island Sound in Stonington. The Modugnos are

owners of unit 7 at Latimer. Unit 7 is situated between

unit 23 and Fishers Island Sound. All of the unit owners

at Latimer are organized as the association, and the

association is governed by a board of directors (board).

The association, pursuant to Article XIV of its bylaws,

has in place an Architectural Control Committee (committee) that is staffed and managed by volunteers.

Because of extensive storm damage to unit 7, the

Modugnos applied for approval from the committee to

build a new home, elevated in height, to meet the new

Federal Emergency Management Agency building standards and the town of Stonington’s zoning regulations.

The plaintiff objected to the application on the ground

that the new home would interfere substantially with

his water view, by obstructing that view by more than

the 10 percent allowed under the bylaws. In particular,

§ 14.1.2 of the bylaws provides, in relevant part, that

the association ‘‘shall ensure that no member’s water

view shall ever be diminished by more than 10 [percent]

due to cumulative constructions of other units and/or

the association, without the written consent of such

member(s) . . . . In the event any unit’s water view is

increased by action pursuant to [§] 14.2, or other means,

such increase shall be included in the 10 [percent] determination.’’ Section 14.2 provides, in relevant part, that

‘‘in order to reasonably preserve trees and vegetation

on members’ properties; and to enhance members’ . . .

existing water views from their units; the board and

the [committee] shall regulate the planting, cutting,

trimming and removal of trees, shrubs, hedges, and vegetation.’’
The committee retained Arthur Hayward, a licensed

land surveyor, to conduct a primary water view analysis

to determine whether the Modugnos’ proposed new

home would obstruct the plaintiff’s primary water view

to a degree greater than allowed by the bylaws. Hayward concluded that the Modugnos’ proposed house

would decrease the plaintiff’s water view by 15.4 percent if there was no offsetting vegetation removal and

trimming. With various vegetation removal and trimming, however, Hayward concluded that the plaintiff’s

water view after construction of the Modugnos’ new

house actually would increase by 41.2 percent. The

plaintiff offered no contrary evidence to the committee.

On the basis of Hayward’s conclusions, the committee determined that it was obliged to approve the

Modugnos’ proposal. Nevertheless, it did not order all

of the vegetation removal suggested by Hayward. In

particular, it ordered one tree trimmed, instead of

removed. As a result, Hayward recalculated the effect

on the plaintiff’s water view and determined that the

plaintiff’s water view still would be increased by a net

2.1 percent with the Modugnos’ proposed house and

the vegetation removal and trimming ordered by the

committee. Following the committee’s approval, the

plaintiff appealed to the board, which upheld the committee’s decision. The construction plans later were

approved by the Stonington Planning and Zoning Commission, and the Modugnos proceeded to build their

home.

During this process, the plaintiff filed an action in

the Superior Court, pursuant to § 47-278. In count one

of his amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the

committee and the association ‘‘failed to follow and

enforce the provisions of Article XIV of the bylaws for

construction projects as it pertains to unit owner water

view protection when it approved [the] Modugnos construction application [(application)] thereby negatively

impacting the primary water view of the plaintiff’s unit

in contravention of the bylaws.’’ He also alleged, in

count two, that the association was in violation of § 47-

278 because ‘‘the tree trimmings [were] not being carried out by the [association] as it resolved in September,

2005.’’3 The plaintiff sought a temporary and permanent

injunction enjoining the Modugnos from ‘‘commencing

or continuing with the construction’’ of their home,4 an

order requiring the committee and the association to

follow and enforce the bylaws, monetary damages,

costs and attorney’s fees, as well as any other legal or

equitable relief appropriate.

The case was tried to the court over five days.5 The

plaintiff’s only witness was himself. Relevant to this

appeal, the plaintiff testified, among other things, that

he, as a layperson, calculated the loss of his primary

water view from construction of the Modugnos’ house

as 16.3 percent without vegetation trimming and
removal and 15.4 percent with such trimming and

removal. The plaintiff based his calculations on a photograph of his primary water view on which he overlaid

grids to calculate the loss of his water view. He also

testified about a 2002 dispute with another neighbor

over the trimming of chokecherry trees, which resulted

in the committee in 2005 adopting a trimming schedule

for those trees. He further testified that the committee

had failed to trim the trees according to that schedule.

The defendants called four witnesses, including Hayward. Hayward testified about his training and experience as a licensed professional land surveyor since

1975. He then testified at length regarding the method

he used to reach the conclusions he reported to the

committee regarding the effect the Modugnos’ construction of their new house would have on the plaintiff’s

primary water view. In particular, he explained how he

determined that the house would reduce the plaintiff’s

water view by 15.4 percent without any vegetation

removal or trimming and would increase the plaintiff’s

water view by 2.1 percent with vegetation trimming and

removal as specified by the committee. He also testified

regarding the differences between his methodology and

that used by the plaintiff.

The defendants also presented Andrew Feinstein, the

chairman of the committee. Feinstein testified that he

was chairman during the period when the committee

approved the Modugnos’ application, and had been on

the committee since 2008. He testified about the process

by which the Modugnos’ application was approved. He

also testified about the committee’s process for trimming trees, and specifically about the chokecherry trees

on which the plaintiff testified. He testified as to when

the trimmings of the chokecherry trees took place and

testified that more extensive trimming of the trees has

occurred since approval of the Modugnos’ construction

in order to ensure that the plaintiff’s primary water

view is maintained.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered

judgment orally in favor of the defendants, concluding

that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the actions

of the association in approving the defendants’ construction application were improper. This appeal

followed.

The plaintiff claims that the court failed to apply

properly the 10 percent rule contained in the bylaws,

ignored overwhelming evidence that the association

failed to comply with its tree trimming schedule, and

rendered a judgment that is neither legally correct nor

factually supported by the record. The plaintiff also

complains throughout his appellate brief that the court

failed to make any factual findings, including his argument that ‘‘[b]ecause the trial court made absolutely

no findings of fact in its memorandum of decision, it

is impossible to determine how exactly the trial court
came to its conclusion that the defendants were in

substantial compliance with the bylaws. By reaching its

decision without making any findings of fact in support

thereof, the trial court was able to completely disregard

relevant case law . . . .’’ He also argues that ‘‘there

was no specific finding of fact by the trial court that,

due to the tree trimming and vegetation removal proposed by the [committee], the [Modugnos’] 2015 building application was brought into compliance with the

bylaws’ [10] percent rule.’’ On the basis of the limited

record before us, we conclude that the plaintiff’s claims

are fatally flawed.

When the facts underlying a claim on appeal are not

in dispute and that claim is subject to plenary review,

‘‘the precise legal analysis undertaken by the trial court

is not essential to the reviewing court’s consideration of

the issue on appeal.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Community

Action for Greater Middlesex County, Inc. v. American

Alliance Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 387, 396, 757 A.2d 1074

(2000). When, however, the plaintiff’s claim necessarily

challenges the court’s factual determinations, we

employ the clearly erroneous standard of review to the

court’s factual findings: ‘‘A finding of fact will not be

disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous . . . . In

applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings

of a trial court, we keep constantly in mind that our

function is not to decide factual issues de novo.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) MJM

Landscaping, Inc. v. Lorant, 268 Conn. 429, 436–37, 845

A.2d 382 (2004). Moreover, ‘‘[i]t is within the province

of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to

weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility and effect to be given the evidence. . . . Credibility must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold

printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness’

conduct, demeanor and attitude.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Wyatt Energy, Inc. v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC, 308 Conn. 719, 737, 66 A.3d 848 (2013).

At the outset, we observe that our review of the

plaintiff’s claims is not foreclosed completely but,

rather, is restricted severely by the following circumstances. First, we note that there is no indication in

the record before us that the trial court ‘‘completely

disregard[ed] relevant case law.’’ Although the court’s

decision in this case lacks detailed factual findings and

a statement regarding its legal bases, and although the

plaintiff raises this insufficiency throughout his appellate brief, the plaintiff did nothing to help ensure that

we would have a record on appeal that included such

factual findings and the legal bases for the court’s decision. In this case, the trial court rendered a short oral

decision, which stated in relevant part: ‘‘I find on all

counts for the [Modugos] and the [association]. The

plaintiff has failed to prove that there was other than

substantial compliance with the bylaws in respect to

the actions of the [b]oard in approving the . . . appli-
cation for the Modugno[s’] 2015 construction—the 2015

[a]pplication. . . . [J]udgment . . . enters for the

defendant[s]. . . . [T]he court finds that . . . the

plaintiff has failed to prove that the [b]oard’s action

approving the 2015 application was in any way

improper.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Second, although rendering judgment in favor of the

defendants on the entirety of the plaintiff’s complaint,

the court’s decision did not mention the second count

of the plaintiff’s complaint, regarding the tree trimming

schedule, in its decision. See United Amusements &

Vending Co. v. Sabia, 179 Conn. App. 555, 560–62, 180

A.3d 630 (2018) (Appellate Court unable to review

claims of error because trial court made no factual

findings related to claims and appellant did not

request articulation).6

Third, the plaintiff did not seek an articulation or a

rectification of the court’s decision pursuant to Practice

Book § 66-5, and he failed to alert the court to the fact

that its oral decision did not comply with the requirements of Practice Book § 64-1.

Practice Book § 64-1 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)

The trial court shall state its decision either orally or

in writing, in all of the following: (1) in rendering judgments in trials to the court in civil and criminal matters

. . . . The court’s decision shall encompass its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties and

the factual basis therefor. . . .

‘‘(b) If the trial judge fails to file a memorandum of

decision or sign a transcript of the oral decision in any

case covered by subsection (a), the appellant may file

with the appellate clerk a notice that the decision has

not been filed in compliance with subsection (a). The

notice shall specify the trial judge involved and the date

of the ruling for which no memorandum of decision

was filed. The appellate clerk shall promptly notify the

trial judge of the filing of the appeal and the notice.

The trial court shall thereafter comply with subsection

(a).’’ (Emphasis added.)

Practice Book § 66-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘A

motion seeking corrections in the transcript or the trial

court record or seeking an articulation or further articulation of the decision of the trial court shall be called

a motion for rectification or a motion for articulation,

whichever is applicable. Any motion filed pursuant to

this section shall state with particularity the relief

sought and shall be filed with the appellate clerk. Any

other party may oppose the motion by filing an opposition with the appellate clerk within ten days of the filing

of the motion for rectification or articulation. The trial

court may, in its discretion, require assistance from the

parties in providing an articulation. Such assistance

may include, but is not limited to, provision of copies

of transcripts and exhibits. . . .’’7
Consequently, in the present case, we lack the benefit

of any findings or legal bases for the decision of the

trial court, other than the court’s finding that ‘‘the plaintiff has failed to prove that there was other than substantial compliance with the bylaws in respect to the actions

of the [b]oard in approving the . . . application for the

Modugno[s’] 2015 construction—the 2015 [a]pplication.’’ ‘‘Where an appellant has failed to avail himself

of the full panoply of articulation and review procedures, and absent some indication to the contrary, we

ordinarily read a record to support, rather than to contradict, a trial court’s judgment.’’ Bell Food Services,

Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217 Conn. 476, 482, 586 A.2d 1157

(1991). Citing Bell Food Services, Inc., this court

recently reaffirmed that ‘‘our appellate courts often

have recited, in a variety of contexts, that, in the face

of an ambiguous or incomplete record, we will presume,

in the absence of an articulation, a trial court acted

correctly, meaning that it undertook a proper analysis

of the law and made whatever findings of fact were

necessary.’’ (Emphasis in original) Zaniewski v. Zaniewski, 190 Conn. App. 386, 396, A.3d (2019); see

also Sunset Gold Realty, LLC v. Premier Building &

Development, Inc., 133 Conn. App. 445, 456 n.7, 36 A.3d

243 (‘‘[b]ecause neither of the parties requested an articulation to fortify the record, to the extent that it is

unclear what the court relied on . . . we read an

ambiguous trial record to support, rather than undermine, the judgment’’), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 912, 40

A.3d 319 (2012).

The record in this case can be read in a number of

ways to support the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff

failed to meet his burden of proof. The court may have

found the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the reduction

in his primary water view not credible. Alternatively,

the court simply may have found Hayward’s testimony

more persuasive than that of the plaintiff. As noted

previously in this opinion, the plaintiff testified as a

layperson. Hayward has been a licensed professional

land surveyor for more than forty years. Furthermore,

the court was not required to accept the plaintiff’s proffered methodology over Hayward’s.

Indeed, during oral argument before this court, the

plaintiff’s attorney specifically was asked by Judge

Flynn: ‘‘Well, let me ask you something, there were two

views of the evidence, correct . . . one that the 10

percent rule was satisfied, and one that it was not?’’

Counsel responded: ‘‘Yes, Your Honor.’’ Counsel then

agreed that this required that he demonstrate clear error

in the trial court’s decision in order to be successful

on appeal. Nevertheless, because there was conflicting

evidence of compliance, and the court set forth no factual findings or legal bases in its decision, the plaintiff

cannot demonstrate clear error, and we will not presume it. The same is true with respect to the plaintiff’s
argument that the committee, the board, and the court

should not have relied on anticipated vegetation

removal and trimming to conclude that there was compliance with the 10 percent rule. The court may have

found the plaintiff’s testimony and other evidence

unpersuasive or it may have concluded that Feinstein’s

testimony was more believable.

In conclusion, the court found that the plaintiff did

not prove his case; we know nothing more than that.

There is no way for us to determine whether the court

found the plaintiff’s testimony and/or evidence completely noncredible, whether it weighed the evidence

and found the defendants’ evidence more credible or

simply more persuasive, or whether something else persuaded the court that the plaintiff had not met his

burden.

‘‘This court will neither speculate with regard to the

rationale underlying the court’s decision nor, in the

absence of a record that demonstrates that error exists,

presume that the court acted erroneously. See, e.g.,

State v. Milner, 325 Conn. 1, 13, 155 A.3d 730 (2017);

Stacy B. v. Robert S., 165 Conn. App. 374, 382, 140 A.3d

1004 (2016).’’ Rose B. v. Dawson, 175 Conn. App. 800,

805; 169 A.3d 346 (2017). ‘‘It is well settled that [we]

do not presume error; the trial court’s ruling is entitled

to the reasonable presumption that it is correct unless

the party challenging the ruling has satisfied its burden

demonstrating the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Ellen S. v. Katlyn F., 175 Conn. App. 559, 565,

167 A.3d 1182 (2017). Because the record can be read

to support the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed

to meet his burden, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the court erred.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion, the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 47-278 provides: ‘‘(a) A declarant, association, unit

owner or any other person subject to this chapter may bring an action to

enforce a right granted or obligation imposed by this chapter, the declaration

or the bylaws. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

‘‘(b) Parties to a dispute arising under this chapter, the declaration or the

bylaws may agree to resolve the dispute by any form of binding or nonbinding

alternative dispute resolution, provided: (1) A declarant may agree with the

association to do so only after the period of declarant control has expired;

and (2) an agreement to submit to any form of binding alternative dispute

resolution must be in a record authenticated by the parties.

‘‘(c) (1) (A) Except as otherwise provided under subdivision (2) of this

subsection, before an association brings an action or institutes a proceeding

against a unit owner other than a declarant, the association shall schedule

a hearing to be held during a regular or special meeting of the executive board

and shall send a written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested,

and by regular mail, to the unit owner at least ten business days prior to

the date of such hearing. Such notice shall include a statement of the nature

of the claim against the unit owner and the date, time and place of the hearing.

‘‘(B) The unit owner shall have the right to give testimony orally or in

writing at the hearing, either personally or through a representative, and

the executive board shall consider such testimony in making a decision

whether to bring an action or institute a proceeding against such unit owner.

‘‘(C) The executive board shall make such decision and the association

shall send such decision in writing by certified mail, return receipt requested,

and by regular mail, to the unit owner, not later than thirty days after
the hearing.

‘‘(2) The provisions of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not apply

to an action brought by an association against a unit owner (A) to prevent

immediate and irreparable harm, or (B) to foreclose a lien for an assessment

attributable to a unit or fines imposed against a unit owner pursuant to

section 47-258.

‘‘(d) (1) Any unit owner other than a declarant, seeking to enforce a right

granted or obligation imposed by this chapter, the declaration or the bylaws

against the association or another unit owner other than a declarant, may

submit a written request to the association for a hearing before the executive

board. Such request shall include a statement of the nature of the claim

against the association or another unit owner.

‘‘(2) Not later than thirty days after the association receives such request,

the association shall schedule a hearing to be held during a regular or special

meeting of the executive board and shall send written notice by certified

mail, return receipt requested, and by regular mail, to the unit owner at

least ten business days prior to the date of such hearing. Such notice shall

include the date, time and place of the hearing. Such hearing shall be held

not later than forty-five days after the association receives such request.

‘‘(3) The executive board shall make a decision on the unit owner’s claim

and the association shall send such decision in writing by certified mail,

return receipt requested, and by regular mail, to the unit owner, not later

than thirty days after the hearing.

‘‘(4) The failure of the association to comply with the provisions of this

subsection shall not affect a unit owner’s right to bring an action pursuant

to subsection (a) of this section.’’

2 Specifically, § 14.1.2 of the bylaws provides, in relevant part, that the

association ‘‘shall ensure that no member’s water view shall ever be diminished by more than 10 [percent] due to cumulative constructions of other

units and/or the association, without the written consent of such member(s) . . . .’’

3 On appeal, the plaintiff also claims a violation of General Statutes § 47-

75 (a), which provides: ‘‘Each unit owner, and the association of unit owners,

shall comply with this chapter, the condominium instruments, and the rules

and regulations adopted pursuant thereto. Failure to so comply shall be

ground for an action to recover damages or for injunctive relief, or for any

other relief to which the party bringing such action may be entitled. Such

action may be brought by the association of unit owners against any unit

owner or owners or, in any proper case, by one or more aggrieved unit

owners on their own behalf or as a class action. If any such action results

in a final judgment or decree in favor of the party instituting such action,

such judgment or decree may incorporate a provision for reasonable attorney’s fees, as specified in such judgment or decree, to be paid by the party

against whom such judgment or decree is entered.’’ The plaintiff, however,

did not allege such a violation in his complaint, nor did the trial court

mention this statute in its decision. Accordingly, we do not consider it.

4 The defendants argue, in part, as they did before the trial court, that the

plaintiff was not entitled to the injunctive relief sought because the

Modugnos had completed construction of their home, rendering their specifically requested relief moot, long before trial. They argue that the plaintiff

never sought a temporary injunction to stop the construction, and that the

plaintiff should be prohibited from modifying his requested relief to now

include a request that the court order the Modugnos to tear down a portion

of their completed home. The trial court did not rule on the mootness issue

because it concluded that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden on the

issue of whether the association had failed to comply with its bylaws.

5 The court consolidated for trial this case and a similar case in which

owners of another Latimer unit alleged that the Modugnos’ new house

improperly decreased their water view. Wojeck v. Latimer Point Condominium Assn. Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket

No. CV-11-6010879-S (January 7, 2014).

6 The defendants state in their brief that the plaintiff has appealed only

from the court’s judgment as to count one of his complaint, and that he

has not appealed from the court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on

count two. The plaintiff did not dispute this contention in his reply brief.

Although the plaintiff’s appeal form does not limit his appeal to count one

of his complaint, the plaintiff’s briefs do not address substantively count

two of his complaint, and the relief requested by the plaintiff on appeal

relates solely to count one. Consequently, to the extent the plaintiff did

appeal from the judgment rendered against him on count two of his com-
plaint, we deem any claims regarding that portion of the judgment abandoned. See Awdziewicz v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 122, 125 n.3, 115 A.3d 1084

(2015) (‘‘[when] an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a

bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]); Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital & Health

Center, Inc., 306 Conn. 304, 319, 50 A.3d 841 (2012) (‘‘[a]n appellant who

fails to brief a claim abandons it’’ [emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted]), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918, 133 S. Ct. 1809, 185 L. Ed. 2d

812 (2013).

7 Practice Book § 61-10 (b) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he failure of

any party on appeal to seek articulation pursuant to Section 66-5 shall not

be the sole ground upon which the court declines to review any issue or

claim on appeal.’’ The commentary to that section explains, however, that

‘‘subsection (b) is not intended to preclude the court from declining to

review an issue where the record is inadequate for reasons other than solely

the failure to seek an articulation, such as, for example, the failure to procure

the trial court’s decision pursuant to Section 64-1 (b) . . . .’’