IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 08–0057

Filed July 10, 2009

BEVERLY MANNES,

Appellee,

vs.

FLEETGUARD, INC., and 

TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellants.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County, 

James M. Drew, Judge.

Employer challenges district court’s decision remanding workers’ 

compensation case. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 

PART, AND REMANDED.

Richard G. Book of Huber, Book, Cortese, Hape, & Lanz, P.L.C., 

West Des Moines, for appellants.

Mark S. Soldat of Soldat & Parrish-Sams, P.L.C., West Des Moines, 

for appellee.
2

STREIT, Justice.

Beverly Mannes filed two workers’ compensation claims against 

her employer, Fleetguard, Inc. The deputy commissioner awarded her 

benefits for one injury but not the other because she was unable to 

demonstrate she was injured on the specific date alleged. On judicial 

review, the district court remanded the case to determine whether 

Mannes suffered an injury on a different date. On remand, the deputy 

commissioner determined Mannes suffered an injury (albeit on a slightly 

different date) and awarded her permanent partial disability benefits. 

The decision did not address temporary benefits, penalty benefits, costs, 

or the full responsibility rule. On judicial review, the district court 

remanded the case to address these issues. Fleetguard appealed. 

Because temporary partial benefits cannot be awarded as a matter of law 

where there has been no reduction in income, the district court erred in 

remanding the case on that issue. However, remand is appropriate on 

the other issues since the commissioner did not rule on them.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Beverly Mannes began working for Fleetguard and its predecessor 

in 1972 as a product assembler and a forklift operator. During her thirty

years of employment, Mannes sustained a multitude of injuries during 

the course of her employment,1

 1

Mannes hurt her back in 1975, was diagnosed with carpal tunnel in 1976, 

which resulted in surgery on her right hand, fractured her foot in 1978, developed 

bilateral knee pain in 1981, had surgery on her left hand for carpal tunnel in 1982, 

developed back pain in 1984, developed neck problems in 1987, which led to numbness 

in her right arm and fingers, developed a bunion in 1994 that resulted in surgery, was 

diagnosed with spondylolisthesis in 1997, experienced more problems related to her 

carpal tunnel in 1998, injured her hip in 1999, tore her left rotator cuff in 1999, which 

resulted in surgery, and experienced more problems related to her carpal tunnel in 

2000.

but was not paid permanent disability for 

any of these conditions. In 1998, Mannes was diagnosed with multiple 
3

sclerosis. In May 2000, Mannes began complaining about right wrist 

discomfort. She saw a number of physicians, went to occupational 

therapy, and in 2001 was diagnosed with bilateral chronic degenerative 

changes and chronic overuse syndrome in the wrists consisting of low 

grade deQuervain’s tenosynovitis and CMC joint strain bilaterally. She 

was transferred to work in a slow department because of the restrictions 

related to her wrists. Two months later, Mannes began complaining of 

back, neck, and shoulder pain. Physical therapy was unsuccessful in 

alleviating the pain. In September 2001, she was diagnosed with 

degenerative cervical disc disease.

In October 2001, Mannes filed petitions for workers’ compensation 

benefits for two injuries: an overuse injury to both arms alleged to have 

been suffered on May 16, 2000, and an overuse injury to her neck and 

shoulders alleged to have been suffered on September 1, 2001. The 

deputy commissioner concluded Mannes sustained a twenty percent

industrial disability, entitling her to temporary partial disability benefits 

from July 27, 2000 to January 4, 2001 and ten weeks of permanent 

partial disability with respect to the May 16, 2000 injury. Her claim for 

benefits relating to the September 1, 2001 injury was denied, because 

she did not prove that this date was the date she sustained an injury. 

She was taxed costs for this claim. Her claim for penalty benefits was 

also denied. The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed the 

decision.

On judicial review, the district court remanded the case to 

determine whether or not Mannes suffered from a cumulative neck and 

back injury, and if so, when it manifested itself. The court of appeals 

affirmed the district court. On remand, the deputy commissioner 

concluded Mannes sustained a cumulative injury to her neck and 
4

shoulders which arose out of and in the course of employment on 

September 5, 2001. The deputy commissioner determined Mannes 

suffered an industrial disability of ten percent to the body as a whole and 

was entitled to fifty weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. The 

issue of costs was not addressed. Mannes’s request for rehearing was 

denied.

On judicial review, the district court determined the agency’s 

decision failed to address the issue of temporary partial benefits, costs, 

penalty benefits, and the full responsibility rule related to the September 

5 injury and remanded the case to the agency. Fleetguard appealed, 

asserting Mannes was not entitled to temporary partial benefits as a 

matter of law because there was no evidence in the record demonstrating 

a reduction in Mannes’s income. Fleetguard also contends remand was 

inappropriate because (1) Mannes did not preserve error with respect to 

taxation of costs, (2) Mannes was not entitled to penalty benefits as a 

matter of law, and (3) the commissioner’s ruling was consistent with the 

full responsibility rule. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, 

which affirmed the district court’s decision remanding on all issues.

II. Scope of Review.

We review the commissioner’s legal findings for correction of errors 

at law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (m) (2009). “Our task is to determine 

whether the district court, acting in its appellate capacity in these 

judicial review proceedings, applied the law correctly.” Noble v. Lamoni 

Prods., 512 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Iowa 1994). We are bound by the 

commissioner’s findings of fact so long as those findings are supported 

by substantial evidence. Excel Corp. v. Smithart, 654 N.W.2d 891, 896 

(Iowa 2002); Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
5

III. Merits.

A. Temporary Partial Disability Benefits. Mannes made a claim 

for temporary partial benefits relating to the September 2001 injury for 

the period of October 11, 2001 to February 21, 2002. The commissioner 

only awarded temporary partial benefits for the May 16, 2000 injury. 

Mannes filed an application for rehearing on the issue of temporary 

partial benefits for the September 2001 injury, which was denied. On 

judicial review, the district court remanded because it was “unable to 

determine whether the deputy actually considered Mannes’s claim.”

Fleetguard contends the district court erred in remanding the issue 

of whether Mannes is entitled to temporary partial benefits for the 

September 2001 injury because, as a matter of law, Mannes is not 

entitled to temporary partial benefits as there was no evidence in the 

record demonstrating a reduction in Mannes’s income during the period 

claimed (October 11, 2001 to February 21, 2002). We agree.

An employee is entitled to receive temporary partial benefits when 

the employee is temporarily, partially disabled and accepts suitable work 

consistent with his or her disability. Iowa Code § 85.33(3) (2001). 

Employers pay temporary partial benefits “because of the employee’s 

temporary partial reduction in earning ability as a result of the 

employee’s temporary partial disability.” Id. § 85.33(2). Subsection 4 

provides a means for calculating temporary partial benefits:

The temporary partial benefit shall be sixty-six and twothirds percent of the difference between the employee’s 

weekly earnings at the time of injury . . . and the employee’s 

actual gross weekly income from employment during the 

period of temporary partial disability.
6

Id. § 85.33(4). The statute in itself suggests that temporary partial 

benefits can only be awarded if the employee experiences an actual 

reduction in wages. Id.

Mannes asserts that temporary partial benefits should be based on 

earning capacity, not on an actual reduction in wages. Relying on the 

holding in Oscar Mayer Food Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 831 (Iowa 

1992), Mannes contends that, in determining temporary partial benefits, 

a “showing of actual diminution in earnings will not always be necessary 

to demonstrate an injury-induced reduction in earning capacity.” As 

“compensable disabilities will often be present despite the fact that the 

employee has not, as yet, suffered any actual diminution in earning 

capacity,” the agency uses earning capacity rather than actual earnings 

to determine industrial disability. Oscar Mayer, 483 N.W.2d at 831. 

However, in Oscar Mayer, the court was concerned with establishing 

permanent industrial disability under Iowa Code section 85.34, not 

temporary benefits under section 85.33. Id.; see also St. Luke’s Hosp. v. 

Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Iowa 2000) (where employee had permanent 

partial industrial disability, not necessary to show actual reduction in 

employee’s earnings).

Permanent benefits and temporary benefits are very different. 

Temporary benefits compensate the employee for lost wages until he or 

she is able to return to work, whereas permanent benefits compensate 

either a disability to a scheduled member or a loss in earning capacity 

(industrial disability). Compare Iowa Code § 85.33, with id. § 85.34. 

Permanent partial industrial disability benefits “measure[] the extent to 

which the injury impairs the employee in the ability to earn wages.” 

Simbro v. Delong’s Sportswear, 332 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Iowa 1983). 

Conversely, temporary partial benefits are designed to reimburse the 
7

employee while he or she was temporarily disabled and still working for 

the employer (albeit in a different position). Iowa Code § 85.33; see also 

Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 604–05 (Iowa 2005) 

(“Temporary total disability compensation benefits . . . are made to 

partially reimburse the employee for the loss of earnings while the 

employee is recuperating from the condition the employee has suffered.”). 

Temporary benefits are “ordinarily established by direct evidence of 

actual wage loss.” 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ 

Compensation Law § 80.03[2], at 80–5 (2009).

As permanent benefits and temporary benefits compensate the 

injured employee for different things, we should not automatically apply 

standards governing the determination of permanent benefits to 

temporary benefits. There is no need to apply case law on permanent 

disability benefits from section 85.34 to define “temporary partial 

reduction in earning ability” under section 85.33. Section 85.33 clearly 

defines the purpose of temporary partial benefits and subsection (4) sets 

forth a formula for calculating temporary partial benefits, based on 

actual reduction of income. Thus, as a matter of law, temporary partial 

benefits cannot be awarded where there has been no reduction in

income. The district court erred in remanding the case on that issue.

B. Costs. In the first proceeding, the deputy commissioner 

determined Mannes had not suffered an injury on September 1, 2001 

and taxed the costs of that proceeding to Mannes. On remand, the 

commissioner concluded Mannes suffered an injury (on September 5, 

2001) and was entitled to disability benefits. However, on remand, the 

issue of costs was not addressed. In the petition for rehearing, Mannes 

noted this deficiency. The petition was denied. On judicial review, the 
8

district court determined the agency failed to address the costs issue and 

remanded the case.

Fleetguard contends error was not preserved on this issue because 

the district court did not address the issue of costs during the first 

judicial review proceeding, and Mannes did not file a motion to enlarge 

the ruling. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) 

(“When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a 

party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a 

ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.”). We agree with the district 

court that, by remanding the case “for further action consistent with this 

ruling,” the district court did address the issue of re-taxation of costs. 

Therefore, error was preserved. The district court did not err in 

remanding the case to determine the issue of costs.

C. Penalty Benefits. Fleetguard argues the district court erred in 

remanding the issue of whether penalty benefits should be awarded 

because Mannes was not entitled to them as a matter of law.

Under Iowa Code section 86.13, an employee is entitled to penalty 

benefits “[i]f a delay in commencement . . . of benefits occurs without 

reasonable or probable cause or excuse . . . .” Here, the district court 

remanded the case because the deputy commissioner did not rule on 

Mannes’s claim for penalty benefits. It concluded “it would not be 

appropriate for this court to pass on the merits of the claim without first 

having a ruling from the commissioner.” We agree. The first time 

Mannes’s claim was before the agency, the commissioner determined 

Mannes did not prove an injury on September 1, 2001, and thus, this 

issue was not addressed. On remand, the deputy commissioner also 

failed to rule on the issue, even though it was potentially applicable. In 

her application for rehearing, Mannes requested the commissioner 
9

resolve the penalty issue. Rehearing was denied. We agree with the 

district court that remand is appropriate as the commissioner never 

ruled on the issue of penalty benefits.

D. Full Responsibility Rule. Fleetguard also argues the district 

court erred in remanding the issue of whether the full responsibility rule 

was followed because the commissioner’s ruling was consistent with the 

full responsibility rule.

Under the full responsibility rule, “ ‘[w]hen there are two successive 

work-related injuries, the employer liable for the second injury “is 

generally held liable for the entire disability resulting from the 

combination of the prior disability and the present injury.” ’ ” Smithart, 

654 N.W.2d at 897 (quoting Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 

258, 265 (Iowa 1995)). Thus, when a worker suffers a disability that is 

caused by two separate injuries, the worker will receive a greater total 

compensation than if the disability resulted from a single cumulative 

injury. Id.

In the first proceeding, the commissioner determined Mannes 

suffered a twenty percent industrial disability resulting from a May 2000 

injury. In the remand decision, the commissioner determined Mannes 

sustained a ten percent loss of earning capacity from the September 

2001 injury and concluded Mannes “suffered from a ten percent 

permanent partial industrial disability.” In the remand decision, the 

commissioner made no mention of the full responsibility rule.

On judicial review, Mannes asserted the commissioner should have 

applied the full responsibility rule in determining her disability. As it 

was unclear whether the commissioner considered the full responsibility 

rule in determining Mannes’s disability, the district court remanded the 

case “for clarification on whether the full responsibility rule was followed 
10

and, if not, a redetermination of industrial disability.” We agree that 

remand is appropriate since the commissioner did not address whether 

the full responsibility rule was considered.

IV. Conclusion.

Because temporary partial benefits cannot be awarded as a matter 

of law where there has been no reduction in income, the court erred in 

remanding the case on that issue. However, remand is appropriate on 

the other issues since the commissioner did not rule on them. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED.