J-S04003-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NATHANIEL MCFADDEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1309 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered May 1, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0012458-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2024

Nathaniel McFadden appeals from the order that dismissed his petition 

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

Briefly, the history of this case is as follows. Appellant stabbed his 

sister, was charged with aggravated assault and possession of an instrument 

of crime, and pled guilty. On January 31, 2012, he was sentenced to eleven 

and one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by ten years of 

probation. He did not file an appeal. In 2016, while serving the probationary 

tail of his sentence, Appellant murdered his grandmother. Consequently, his 

probation was revoked and he was resentenced in 2018 to a term of one day 

to fifteen years of imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction. 

Appellant filed a PCRA petition on January 7, 2022, pleading an afterdiscovered evidence claim based upon his plea counsel’s failure to obtain a 
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mental health evaluation. See PCRA Petition, 1/7/22, at 4. Appellant 

asserted that the fact that he needed to have a mental health professional 

examine him in connection with the instant case was previously unknown to 

him, and that he learned of it on an undisclosed date “through the assistance 

of the law library and case law.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362 (2000) (holding capital defendant denied effective assistance of 

counsel by failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at penalty 

phase of trial), and Commonwealth v. Martin, 5 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2010) 

(regarding counsel’s effectiveness in deciding how to present mental health 

mitigation evidence)). He additionally attached to his PCRA petition a mental 

health evaluation report that was conducted in 2017 in connection with his 

murder case. Id. at Exhibit A.

The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a motion to withdraw and 

a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en 

banc), indicating that Appellant’s petition was untimely. Appellant submitted 

a response reiterating that he “did not know that [he] was supposed to receive 

a mental health evaluation until [he] was doing a PCRA for a case [he] was 

convicted of after this case.” Response, 1/11/23, at unnumbered 1. The PCRA 

court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition 

as untimely. Appellant filed a pro se response indicating on the one hand that 

he and his attorney could not have ascertained his mental state at the time of 
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his plea because Appellant “did not know there was anything wrong with [him]

at the time,” and on the other hand that he had informed his attorney that he 

took “medication for [his] mental illness which is schizophrenia.” Response, 

3/9/23. 

By order of May 1, 2023, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition and 

permitted counsel to withdraw. This timely appeal followed. The PCRA court 

directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and Appellant 

complied.1 Appellant presents the following question for our review: “[Were 

Appellant]’s Fifth Amendment rights violated due to the fact that he did not 

receive a mental health evaluation?” Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 2.

We begin with a review of the pertinent legal precepts. “In general, we 

review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA petition as to whether the 

findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and are free from legal 

error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022) 

(cleaned up). 

As to legal questions, we apply a de novo standard of review 

to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions, and this Court may affirm a 

PCRA court’s order on any legal basis. As to factual questions, our 

scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and 

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1

In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant again represented that he had informed 

plea counsel that he suffered from schizophrenia and was on medication for 

it, but counsel never sought a mental health investigation. He attached to the 

statement a 2012 chemical dependency evaluation which stated, inter alia, 

that Appellant acknowledged his diagnosis of schizophrenia, that he took 

prescription medication to treat it, and that he received monthly Supplemental 

Security Income benefits for it. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 6/2/23, 

at Exhibit B. 
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the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party in the lower court. Great deference is granted to 

the findings of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be 

disturbed unless they have no support in the certified record.

Id. (cleaned up). “It is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that the PCRA 

court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 

157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned up). 

It is well-settled “that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional 

and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over the petition 

and cannot grant relief.” Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 

(Pa.Super. 2022). Any PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date 

that the underlying judgment of sentence became final unless the petitioner 

pleads and offers to prove an enumerated timeliness exception. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Further, a petition invoking a timeliness exception 

“shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). 

Here, since Appellant did not file an appeal from his January 31, 2012 

judgment of sentence, it became final for purposes of challenges to his 

underlying convictions on March 1, 2012.2 Accordingly, his January 2022

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2 Appellant’s subsequent probation revocation and resentencing in this case 

started a new clock for PCRA claims related to the revocation proceeding and 

the new sentence. However, regarding challenges to his underlying 

convictions, “the revocation of Appellant’s probation did not ‘reset the clock’ 

for PCRA purposes.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 A.3d 1059, 1062 n.3 

(Pa.Super. 2011). 
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PCRA petition is facially untimely. In an attempt to obtain substantive review 

of his petition, Appellant invoked the PCRA’s newly-discovered-facts 

exception. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (providing an exception where 

“the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner 

and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). As 

we have summarized:

A petitioner satisfies the newly discovered facts exception when 

the petitioner pleads and proves that (1) the facts upon which the 

claim is predicated were unknown and (2) could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence 

requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular 

circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for 

collateral relief, but does not require perfect vigilance or 

punctilious care.

Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). 

“[T]he due diligence inquiry is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the 

circumstances presented. A petitioner must explain why he could not have 

obtained the new facts earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” 

Commonwealth v. Brensinger, 218 A.3d 440, 449 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en 

banc). 

Here, the documents proffered by Appellant established that he was 

aware of his schizophrenia diagnosis at least since 2013, and he underwent a 

mental health evaluation concerning his mental illness in 2017. Plainly, the 

fact of his illness was not newly discovered by Appellant in the year prior to 

the filing of his petition, and he does not assert that his condition prevented 

him from raising the claim earlier. As such “[a]ll the facts regarding 
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Appellant’s mental state, if not known, surely were ascertainable by the 

exercise of due diligence before Appellant’s [conviction].” Commonwealth 

v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 787 (Pa. 2000).

Further, neither Appellant’s discovery that his plea counsel may have 

been ineffective in not seeking a mental health evaluation, nor his unearthing 

of judicial decisions from 2000 and 2010 leading him to that discovery, could

be utilized as “newly-discovered facts” to satisfy the § 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

exception, even if Appellant filed his petition within one year of ascertaining 

them. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1285 (Pa. 2016)

(“[A] conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not a newly 

discovered ‘fact’ entitling Appellant to the benefit of the exception for newlydiscovered facts.” (cleaned up)); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 

1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“Our Supreme Court has consistently held that 

judicial opinions do not amount to new ‘facts’ under [§] 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the 

PCRA.”). 

In sum, Appellant failed to plead and offer to prove that the claim raised 

in his PCRA petition was premised upon newly-discovered facts that he could 

not have discovered earlier though the exercise of due diligence, and that he 

brought the claim within one year of the date it could have first been 

presented. Accordingly, the PCRA court properly dismissed his petition as 

untimely.

Order affirmed.
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Date: 3/26/2024