2018 IL App (1st) 160120
 

No. 1-16-0120
 

Opinion filed June 28, 2018 

FOURTH DIVISION 

IN THE
 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
 

FIRST DISTRICT
 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of Cook County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 12 CR 1872603 

) 

PABLO COLON, ) The Honorable 

) Matthew E. Coghlan 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant Pablo Colon was convicted after a jury trial of first degree murder and 

sentenced to 40 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). 

¶ 2 On this appeal, defendant claims (1) that the trial court erred by allowing, as a tacit 

admission by defendant, the testimony of Wayne Kates recounting statements by Marco 

Ramirez and Daniel Guerrero that were made during a gang meeting at which defendant was 

present and that described the murder; (2) that the trial court erred by granting the State’s 

motion to admit proof of gang membership and affiliation, including expert testimony about 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-0120 

gangs and gang identification; (3) that the trial court erred by overruling defendant’s 

objection to the testimony of Mario Gallegos, the only eyewitness, who identified defendant 

as one of two people in a lineup who “kind of look like the people that were there the date it 

had occurred,” on the grounds that the tentative statement did not qualify as an identification 

and was more prejudicial than probative; (4) that the trial court erred by failing to grant 

defendant’s motion to suppress defendant’s statements to the police where the police did not 

inform him that he had a right to stop questioning at any time on the ground that the Illinois 

right to counsel is broader than the federal right and that suspects in Illinois should be 

informed of their right to terminate questioning at any time; (5) that defendant’s sentence of 

40 years was excessive and should be reduced to 20 years where defendant was 20 years old 

at the time of the offense and a minor participant; and (6) that defendant’s 40-year sentence 

was disproportionate to the 30-year sentence received by codefendant Gary Sams. 

¶ 3 For the following reasons we affirm. 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 In the Analysis of each claim below, we provide a detailed description of the 

evidence relevant to resolve that particular claim. 

¶ 6 In sum, the State’s evidence at trial established that on May 29, 2010, at midnight, a 

group of men, who belonged to the same gang, approached two men on a nearby street 

because one of the two men was wearing a red shirt, which was the color of a rival gang. One 

of the two men, Mario Gallegos, was able to escape, and he testified at trial as the State’s 

sole eyewitness. The other man, Alan Oliva, who was wearing the red shirt, was beaten to 

death. The State’s evidence included a videotaped confession by defendant describing his 

role in the offense, in which he admitted that he was the first person to approach the two 

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No. 1-16-0120 

men, that he was the one who demanded to know their gang affiliation, and that he kicked the 

murder victim in the head after the victim was down on the ground. The State’s evidence also 

included testimony by fellow gang member Kates, concerning statements made by two of the 

attackers at a subsequent gang meeting attended by defendant. Defendant’s statement to the 

police and Kates’s testimony varied from each other, in that defendant stated to the police 

that there were six to eight men and that they exited a party to approach the murder victim 

and the victim’s companion, while Kates reported that two of the attackers, Ramirez and 

Guerrero, claimed that they exited a vehicle with defendant and that they were the only three 

men to approach the murder victim and that the victim was alone. 

¶ 7 After listening to all the evidence, arguments and jury instructions, the jury convicted 

defendant of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 40 years with IDOC. 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed. 

¶ 8 ANALYSIS 

¶ 9 I. Kates’s Testimony 

¶ 10 Defendant claims that the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of Kates, which 

described statements made by fellow gang members, Ramirez and Guerrero. The statements 

by Ramirez and Guerrero were made during a gang meeting at which defendant was also 

present. The statements included Ramirez’s statement that the three men—Ramirez, Guerrero 

and defendant—exited a vehicle together in order to approach the victim and that “they just 

kept beating the guy until he stopped moving and then at that point, basically, they took off 

before the cops would come.” Since defendant was present at the gang meeting and did not 

object to Ramirez’s and Guerrero’s statements, the trial court admitted the statements as an 

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No. 1-16-0120 

“admission by silence” by defendant. See Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). 

Specifically, the trial court ruled: 

“Court feels it did qualify as an admission by silence. The defendant was present 

during this conversation. He was implicated, it would have been something that you 

would expect him to deny. Court will allow it to come in as an exercise of its 

discretion. Motion in limine denied.” 

For the following reasons, we cannot find that the trial court erred. 

¶ 11 A. Standard of Review 

¶ 12 The admission of evidence is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary rulings absent an abuse of discretion. 

People v. Romanowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 142360, ¶ 21 (citing People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 

404, 455 (2001)). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is 

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with 

it. People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23. However, to the extent that admissibility of 

evidence requires the interpretation of a rule and its intended scope, our review is de novo. 

Romanowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 142360, ¶ 21. De novo consideration means that we perform 

the same analysis that the trial court would perform. People v. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 

151307, ¶ 21. 

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant claims that he preserved this error for our review by objecting 

both at trial and in a posttrial motion, and the State does not argue otherwise. See People v. 

Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48 (“To preserve a purported error for consideration by a 

reviewing court, a defendant must object to the error at trial and raise the error in a posttrial 

motion.”). Since the issue was preserved for our review, if there was an error, the State would 

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No. 1-16-0120 

bear the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lerma, 

2016 IL 118496, ¶ 33. However, for the reasons discussed below, we do not find that an error 

occurred. 

¶ 14 B. The Tacit Admission Rule 

¶ 15 The statements at issue were admitted pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 801 (eff. 

Oct. 15, 2015), which both defines hearsay and specifies that certain statements are not 

considered hearsay. The rule defines “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 

matter asserted.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). The rule then specifies that certain 

statements are simply “not hearsay.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(d) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Thus, these 

statements are not exceptions to the rule against hearsay; rather, they are simply not hearsay 

to begin with. These statements include a “Statement by Party-Opponent.” Ill. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). A statement by a party opponent includes “a statement of 

which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) 

(eff. Oct. 15, 2015). 

¶ 16 Adopted statements include what the case law calls a “tacit admission”1 

or, as the 

trial court described it, an “admission by silence.”2 The “tacit admission rule” is well 

established in our case law. See People v. Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67 (“the 

tacit admission rule”); People v. Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1013 (2003) (“the tacitadmission rule”); People v. Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d 721, 734 (2002) (a statement is 

admissible as a “tacit admission” “if sufficient evidence supports a finding that, in light of the 

1

Before 2015, Rule 801(d)(2) was titled “Admission by Party-Opponent.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Thus, courts used the term “tacit admission.”

2

See People v. Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d 532, 536 (1992) (using the term “ ‘an admission by 

silence’ ” (quoting People v. Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d 574, 583 (1984))). 

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No. 1-16-0120 

totality of the circumstances, a defendant remained silent when faced with an incriminating 

statement, which, if untrue, would normally call for a denial”); Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 

535 (discussing “the rule” concerning “a tacit admission”); People v. Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 

3d 38, 53 (1990) (“When a statement is made in the presence and hearing of an accused, 

incriminating in character, and such a statement is not denied, contradicted or objected to by 

him, both the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it are admissible in a criminal trial 

as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth.”). 

¶ 17 The tacit admission rule provides, “When a statement that is incriminating in nature is 

made in the presence and hearing of an accused and such statement is not denied, 

contradicted, or objected to by him, both the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it 

are admissible in a criminal trial as evidence of the defendant’s agreement in its truth.” Soto, 

342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013; Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67; Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 

3d at 734; Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 535-36; Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 53; Miller, 

128 Ill. App. 3d at 583. Our case law has uniformly found that silence can constitute assent. 

Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67; Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013; Campbell, 332 Ill. 

App. 3d at 734; Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 535-36; Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 53 

(“assent may be manifested by silence”); Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 583 (when “silence is an 

admission of guilt, proof of a defendant’s silence is essential to the admission of the 

declaration”). 

¶ 18 The necessary elements for admissibility under the tacit admission rule are (1) that 

the statement incriminates the defendant such that the natural reaction of an innocent person 

would be to deny it, (2) that the defendant heard the statement, and (3) that the defendant had 

an opportunity to reply or object and instead remained silent. Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 

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No. 1-16-0120 

102325, ¶ 67; Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013; see also Campbell, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 734; 

Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 535-36; Childrous, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 53; Miller, 128 Ill. App. 

3d at 583. 

¶ 19 The statement need not be made “in an accusatory tone,” so long as it is “evident 

that defendant was being painted or portrayed as a participant in illegal and prohibited 

activity.” Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 584; Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013 (quoting Miller for 

the same point). In Goswami, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 535, the appellate court suggested the need 

for “an accusative statement,” when it stated that “a defendant’s silence following an 

accusative statement may be considered as a tacit admission.” While the statement must be 

“accusative” in that it charges the defendant with participation in an illegal activity, Miller 

and Soto establish that the tone in which the statement was made need not be accusative. 

Miller, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 584; Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. 

¶ 20 C. Testimony at Issue 

¶ 21 We describe here in detail the specific testimony at issue. 

¶ 22 Kates testified that, on August 21, 2010, he went with his brother, Walter Mullenix, 

to “a gang meeting” at Bernard Monreal’s house. The assistant state’s attorney (ASA) asked 

who was at Monreal’s house, and Kates identified the people there as (1) himself, (2) Kates’s 

brother, (3) defendant, (4) Ramirez, (5) Guerrero, and (6) Monreal. The topics discussed at 

the meeting were “the transferring of power from Bernard Monreal to [Kates’s] brother,” the 

lack of guns, and the gang’s lack of presence on the street. Kates observed that “there wasn’t 

enough people hanging out, outside.” With respect to the lack of presence, Kates asked “why 

there wasn’t anyone out there [?]” and Marco Ramirez replied that “the area was hot.” At this 

point in Kates’s testimony, the ASA inquired again who was there, specifically asking, 

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No. 1-16-0120 

“During this conversation who was present with you?” (Emphasis added.) Kates answered, 

“It was me, my brother Walter, Bernard Monreal, Daniel Guerrero, Marcos Ramirez and 

[defendant].” Thus, there were only 6 people at the meeting and all 6 were present at this 

point in the conversation. 

¶ 23 Kates testified that the meeting occurred in Monreal’s living room. The ASA asked, 

“how close were you to each other during the time you had this discussion?” Kates replied a 

“couple [of] feet.” Kates testified that Ramirez then explained why the area was hot. Ramirez 

stated that on May 29, 2010, he was driving in a vehicle with defendant, Daniel Guerrero and 

a man known as “Chucky” when they spotted a man who looked “like a rival gang member 

or a flake.” Ramirez stated that “they pulled into the alley behind a restaurant called a 

barbecue patio and at that point Marcos Ramirez said that [Ramirez], Daniel Guerrero and 

[defendant] exited the vehicle.” Ramirez stated that they wanted to check if the man had any 

gang tattoos or gang affiliation. When Ramirez asked the man what gang he belonged to, he 

responded that he did not belong to a gang and then turned and tried to run away. 

¶ 24 Kates testified that Guerrero stated that “he caught up to the guy and he hit him with a 

baseball bat and he fell down.” Then Ramirez stated that “he ran up to him and he started 

stabbing him while he was on the ground.” Ramirez stated that “he was trying to stab him in 

the head.” Ramirez further stated that “they just kept beating the guy until he stopped moving 

and then at that point, basically, they took off before the cops would come.” 

¶ 25 Kates testified that Monreal, Guerrero, Ramirez, Mullenix and defendant were all 

members of the Satan Disciples gang that Kates also belonged to. 

¶ 26 On cross, Kates testified that the only two people who talked about the murder at the 

meeting were Ramirez and Guerrero and that defendant did not make any statements that he 

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No. 1-16-0120 

stabbed anyone or wielded a baseball bat. In addition, Kates testified that, during the 

meeting, defendant never made any statements admitting any activities on the date of the 

murder. Kates testified that he arrived at the meeting at 11 a.m. and he was there an hour. 

¶ 27 D. Elements of Tacit Admission Rule 

¶ 28 The first requirement of the tacit admission rule actually has two parts: that the 

statement was incriminating and that the natural reaction of an innocent person would be to 

deny it. E.g. Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67; Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. 

Ramirez’s statement that “they just kept beating the guy until he stopped moving” implicated 

defendant in the murder. (Emphasis added.) Ramirez stated that defendant had exited the 

vehicle with Ramirez and Guerrero; thus, all three of them exited together as one unit to 

approach the victim. The fact that they continued to move as one unit was evidenced by 

Ramirez’s subsequent statement that “they drove off before the cops would come.” 

(Emphasis added.) These statements of “they” included defendant since defendant had 

arrived at the scene in the same vehicle and exited it with Ramirez and Guerrero. Ramirez’s 

and Guerrero’s description of their own acts of stabbing and beating were the initial acts in 

one course of conduct that ended with their “beating the guy until he stopped moving.” Thus, 

Ramirez’s and Guerrero’s statements implicated and incriminated defendant. 

¶ 29 The natural reaction of an innocent person would have been to deny it or, at least, to 

deny his own involvement. E.g. Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67; Soto, 342 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1013. At this point in the meeting, Ramirez was trying to explain to Kates why the 

area was so “hot” with police that the gang could no longer maintain a presence on the street. 

Kates, according to his testimony, was the brother of the person now taking over the “power” 

of the gang. If defendant was not at fault for this turn of events, one would expect him to 

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protest to the gang leadership—who were demanding an explanation—that he was not one of 

the people who had beaten an innocent man to death, thereby leading to the extreme police 

presence on the street. However, defendant remained silent, thereby indicating his assent to 

Ramirez’s and Guerrero’s statements, including Ramirez’s statement that “they just kept 

beating the guy until he stopped moving.” (Emphasis added.) 

¶ 30 The second requirement is that the defendant heard the statement. E.g. Donegan, 

2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67; Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. Kates testified that there 

were only six people at the meeting, that the six of them were meeting in a living room, and 

that they were only a couple of feet away from each other. Immediately before Kates testified 

about Ramirez’s and Guerrero’s description of the murder, the ASA asked, “During this 

conversation who was present with you?” (Emphasis added.) Kates answered, “It was me, 

my brother Walter, Bernard Monreal, Daniel Guerrero, Marcos Ramirez and [defendant].” 

Thus, given the small size of the meeting, the physical proximity of the participants to each 

other, the private and confidential nature of the meeting space, and Kates’s testimony about 

who was present for “this conversation,” we cannot find that the trial court erred in 

concluding that defendant heard Ramirez’s and Guerrero’s statements. 

¶ 31 The third requirement is that the defendant had an opportunity to reply or object 

and instead remained silent. E.g. Donegan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102325, ¶ 67; Soto, 342 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1013. In Kates’s testimony, there was no indication that defendant was prevented 

at this meeting of only six people from objecting or replying. In addition, the crossexamination established that defendant was silent concerning the murder during the meeting. 

Thus, all three requirements for admission under the tacit admission rule were satisfied, and 

we cannot find that the trial court erred by admitting these statements. 

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No. 1-16-0120 

¶ 32 II. Gang Evidence 

¶ 33 Second, defendant claims that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion 

in limine and admitting proof of gang membership and affiliation, including expert 

testimony. The State claims that this evidence was relevant to establish motive and common 

design. In response, defendant argues that, aside from Kates’s testimony discussed above, 

there was no evidence that defendant knew of a common gang purpose or motive for the 

murder and that defendant’s statements to the police “contained no hint of a gang motive.” 

¶ 34 “Evidentiary rulings regarding gang-related evidence are reviewed for abuse of 

discretion.” People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 232 (2001); People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 

53, 102 (2003); People v. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d 481, 489-90 (1991). Although there is 

“widespread disapproval that exists toward street gangs,” a defendant may not insulate the 

fact finder from the fact of his gang membership, despite prejudice toward it, if that fact is 

relevant to understanding the case. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 488-89; People v. Smith, 141 Ill. 

2d 40, 58 (1990) (although “in metropolitan areas, there may be strong prejudice against 

street gangs,” such evidence need not be excluded if relevant). It is left to the discretion of 

the trial court to weigh the probative value and prejudicial effect of this evidence to 

determine whether it should be admitted in any given case. Gonzalez, 142 Ill. 2d at 489. As 

we observed above, an abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is 

arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with 

it. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 23. 

¶ 35 “Gang membership evidence is admissible only when there is sufficient proof that the 

membership is related to the crime charged.” Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 232; Johnson, 208 Ill. 

2d at 102; Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58 (admissibility requires “sufficient proof that such 

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No. 1-16-0120 

membership or activity is related to the crime charged”). If the State does establish a 

relationship between membership and the crime charged, it must also show that membership 

is “relevant to an issue in dispute” and that “its probative value is not substantially 

outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 232; Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 

102; People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 118 (1994). “One of the purposes for which gang 

evidence is admissible is to ‘provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act.’ ” Villarreal, 

198 Ill. 2d at 233 (quoting Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58); see also Smith, 141 Ill. 2d at 58 

(“admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise 

inexplicable act”). 

¶ 36 Defendant’s statement to the police, by itself, established that the murder was gangrelated and gang-motivated and that, specifically, defendant’s participation in the offense was 

gang-related and gang-motivated. 

¶ 37 Before we discuss defendant’s statement, we observe that his statement contained 

jargon and nicknames, and we provide here the definition and explanation for these terms 

given by a fellow gang member, Kates, during Kates’s trial testimony. For example, he 

testified that to “check” someone meant “to see if they have any gang affiliation or gang 

tattoos.” Kates also testified that “Klepto” was the nickname of fellow gang member 

Ramirez. 

¶ 38 In part of defendant’s videotaped statement to the police, defendant stated that he 

(defendant) was at a party when “Klepto” (Ramirez) entered the party and stated that he 

(Ramirez) had observed members of “the Counts” at a nearby gas station. Immediately after 

Ramirez’s announcement, six to eight people exited the party. Defendant described how he 

approached the murder victim and “checked” him and what happened next: 

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“Yeah, I’m the one who checked dude. I was like what’s up n***, what y’all is? And 

right away first n*** took off running and then boy was just stuck right there. Klep 

hit him in [the] back with the bat. First dude went down, the dude that was right there, 

I think that might have been the dude that got stabbed. I’m not sure cause I don’t 

know which one got stabbed. Klep hit him in the back. Boom. F*** the other dude 

took off across the street, couple of people went chasing after him but he was gone. 

Came back. Everybody was just like whooping him. I kicked him probably in the 

face. Yeah I kicked him in the face. That’s when he must’ve got stabbed.” 

¶ 39 Later in the statement, defendant stated: 

“When I checked dude right here, he stands up to me. You know what I’m sayin[g]. 

*** Everybody’s trying to circle around him. *** He’s already like this, looking 

around. Boom. This guy gets cracked in the back. *** This dude is already on the 

floor. People are kicking him, punching—there’s just a crowd. That’s why I’m 

sayin[g] I don’t know who stabbed him really cause there was a crowd. So I turned 

around, he’s right there. By that time, I kick him, bow, you know what I’m sayin[g]. I 

might have said a couple of things to him. You know what I mean. By that time, f***, 

there was just like cars on the street. Cars started beeping. Like started pulling over. 

You know what I’m sayin[g]. I ran; I was the first one there and I was the first one to 

run.” 

¶ 40 Later in his statement, defendant repeated: “I was the first one to talk to the dude. 

And I checked him, whatever. F***, before the dude even saying anything he was—started 

getting a whopped. You know he got hit by the bat.” 

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¶ 41 In his statement, defendant emphasized the importance of gang affiliation and colors 

in the murder, stating: “I was the first one, so I seen them. They’re wearing all red. You 

know what I’m saying? That’s the Counts’ colors.” After observing these colors, defendant 

demanded of the murder victim: “ ‘What’s up b***? You know what I’m saying? What the 

f*** you all doing? It’s the wrong side.’ ” After that, “everbody’s punching and kicking him. 

*** I’m not going to lie. Kicked him, Ugh!” 

¶ 42 Thus, defendant’s statement establishes that defendant was the first person to 

approach the murder victim and that defendant’s primary purpose in approaching the victim 

was to establish whether the victim was a member of a gang and, if so, which one. While the 

gang testimony may have had a prejudicial, even horrifying, impact on the jury, it would be 

impossible to understand why this group of men would spontaneously exit a party and beat 

an innocent passerby to death without this evidence, in particular, the victim’s wearing of the 

color red, which was the color of a rival gang. As a result, we can find no error here by the 

trial court in granting the State’s motion and admitting gang evidence. 

¶ 43 III. Gallegos’s Identification 

¶ 44 Third, defendant claims that the trial court erred by admitting, over defendant’s 

objection, certain testimony by Mario Gallegos, one of the two victims of the attack and the 

only eyewitness to testify at trial. Gallegos testified that he had selected defendant at a prior 

lineup as being someone who “ kind of look[ed] like the people that were there the date it had 

occurred.” Defendant claims that this testimony was too speculative to be relevant and too 

inconclusive to qualify as an identification. The trial court found that Gallegos’s 

identification was “tentative” but that his tentativeness went to weight not admissibility. For 

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No. 1-16-0120 

the following reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

this testimony. 

¶ 45 Concerning the lineup that he viewed on September 12, 2012, Gallegos testified on 

direct examination: 

“[ASA]: Showing you what has been marked as People’s Identification— 

photograph marked as People’s Exhibit No. 19. Do you recognize what’s depicted in 

that photograph? 

GALLEGOS: Yeah, I see the lineup.
 

[ASA]: This is a lineup you viewed?
 

GALLEGOS: Yes.
 

[ASA]: Do you remember seeing that lineup back in 2012?
 

GALLEGOS: Yes, I do. 

[ASA]: Is there anybody in that lineup that you told the police officers you
 

recognized? 

GALLEGOS: I pointed out two of them. 

[ASA]: Going from left to right on the photograph itself, starting here on the left 

side, going to the right, which person did you identify in that photograph? 

GALLEGOS: Two in the middle. 

[ASA]: Two in the middle? 

GALLEGOS: Yeah. 

[ASA]: What did you tell the officers pertaining to your identification of these 

two individuals at that time? 

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No. 1-16-0120 

GALLEGOS: They kind of look like the people that were there the date it had 

occurred. 

[ASA]: This is going back to the incident when you and Alan were struck with the 

bat? 

GALLEGOS: Yes. 

[ASA]: You told them that they kind of look like the persons? 

GALLEGOS: Yes.” 

¶ 46 Immediately after the above testimony, defense counsel objected to its admission on 

the basis that it was inconclusive. At the ensuing sidebar, the ASA stated that defendant was 

one of the two people whom Gallegos testified “kind of look like the people that were there.” 

The trial court agreed with defense counsel that this identification was “tentative” but ruled 

that the tentativeness of the identification “go[es] towards weight rather than its 

admissibility” and, thus, it was admissible. 

¶ 47 After the sidebar, Gallegos further testified: 

“[ASA]: Again Mr. Gallegos, you told us moments ago I believe that the two 

individuals in the middle that you say that look—well, tell me again, what do you 

recognize them as? 

GALLEGOS: As the guys that were there. 

[ASA]: You said earlier that guys, you believe they were the guys over there or 

possibly the guys? 

GALLEGOS: Possibly.” 

¶ 48 On cross, Gallegos testified: 

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No. 1-16-0120 

“DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you saw this actual, physical lineup in September 

of 2012, you indicated that you made an identification of two people, is that correct? 

GALLEGOS: Yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Number two and number three, is that right? 

GALLEGOS: Yes. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: You’re not—you were unable to positively determine that 

either number two or number three were there, is that correct? 

GALLEGOS: That’s possible. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Just possible. 

GALLEGOS: It’s possible. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: When you say either two or three could have been there, 

is your testimony that it may have been either of these two people or that possibly 

both of them were there or both of them weren’t there? 

GALLEGOS: I wasn’t—well, possibly like I said. They were Hispanic.” 

¶ 49 On cross, Gallegos further testified: 

“DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mario, you’re not really certain that [defendant] was 

there on 34th Street, my client, the individual you saw in that lineup in September of 

2013? 

GALLEGOS: I said possibly. 

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Possibly. It’s possible he may not, is that correct? 

GALLEGOS: Possibly, like I said.” 

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¶ 50 Whether a trial court erred in admitting a statement as a prior statement of 

identification is generally an issue that a reviewing court will reverse only for an abuse of 

discretion. People v. Temple, 2014 IL App (1st) 111653, ¶ 33. As we observed above, an 

abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or 

unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the 

trial court. Temple, 2014 IL App (1st) 111653, ¶ 33. 

¶ 51 As we also observed above, Rule 801 of the Illinois Rules of Evidence defines both 

what statements constitute hearsay and what statements do not constitute hearsay. Ill. R. 

Evid. 801 (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). The rule provides that a statement is not hearsay, if, in a 

criminal case, (1) “the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing,” (2) the declarant is “subject 

to cross-examination concerning the statement,” and (3) the statement is “one of 

identification of a person made after perceiving the person.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (eff. 

Oct. 15, 2015). In the case at bar, Gallegos (1) testified at trial and (2) was subject to crossexamination. However, defendant claims that the State failed to establish the third 

requirement because the statement was too inconclusive to qualify as a statement “of 

identification.” Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). 

¶ 52 In addition, defendant argues that the statement should have been excluded pursuant 

to Illinois Rule of Evidence 403, which provides, in relevant part, that, “[a]lthough relevant, 

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury.” Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2011). Defendant argues that the statement was too speculative to qualify as relevant. 

¶ 53 People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210 (2002), is instructive. In Tisdel, the defendant argued 

that the trial court erred in admitting, as identification evidence, testimony by State witnesses 

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that they had viewed prior lineups containing persons other than defendant and had not made 

an identification. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d at 215. The supreme court construed “ ‘statements of 

identification’ to include the entire identification process.” Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d at 219. In 

reaching this conclusion, the supreme court observed that defense counsel had an opportunity 

to, and did, in fact, cross-examine the witnesses extensively. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d at 221; see 

also Ill. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015) (for a prior identification to be admissible 

in a criminal case, the declarant must be “subject to cross-examination concerning the 

statement”). Similarly, in our case, the statement was part of the identification process and 

was subject to cross-examination at trial. 

¶ 54 In addition, in reaching its finding, the Tisdel court relied on Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 

188 (1972). Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d at 220. Normally, to assess identification testimony, Illinois 

courts consider the five factors set forth in Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200: (1) the witness’s 

opportunity to view the defendant during the offense, (2) the witness’s degree of attention at 

the time of the offense, (3) the accuracy of any prior description by the witness, (4) the 

witness’s level of certainty at the identification, and (5) the length of time between the crime 

and the identification. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307-08 (1989). The court takes all five 

factors into consideration, as well as all the circumstances. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-200. The 

witness’s level of certainty is only one of the five factors. See People v. Allen, 376 Ill. App. 

3d 511, 524 (2007) (studies show that there are “low correlations between the witness’s 

confidence and the accuracy of her identification”). In sum, we cannot find that the trial court 

abused its discretion by admitting the lineup testimony as a prior statement of identification, 

where defendant’s argument is based on only one of the Biggers factors, where the Illinois 

Supreme Court in Tisdel found that the entire identification process qualifies as a statement 

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of identification, and where defendant had an opportunity to, and did, in fact, cross-examine 

the witness extensively concerning the statement and the tentative nature of his identification. 

¶ 55 Defendant further argues that the statement’s probative value was outweighed by its 

prejudice and that Gallegos identified defendant only because he was “Hispanic.” Gallegos’s 

“Hispanic” comment was brought out on cross-examination when defense counsel was 

pressing Gallegos to explain what Gallegos meant when he had stated that defendant was 

“possibly” there. Gallegos replied, “I wasn’t—well, possibly like I said. They were 

Hispanic.” A trial witness’s statement about an offender’s ethnicity is admissible as a 

statement of prior identification, which then may be tested and explored on crossexamination. See Temple, 2014 IL App (1st) 111653, ¶¶ 30, 41 (a witness’s prior statement 

that she observed “a white male when she looked out her window” was properly admitted as 

a statement of identification, where the declarant was available for cross-examination at 

trial). On appeal, defendant does not argue that the lineup was unduly suggestive. Thus, we 

cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by finding that any prejudicial effect of 

Gallegos’s lineup testimony was outweighed by its probative value. 

¶ 56 IV. Miranda Warnings 

¶ 57 Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress 

his statement to the police, on the ground that the police did not advise him of his right to 

stop the questioning. On appeal, defendant acknowledges that some Illinois courts have 

found that police are not required, as part of their Miranda warnings, to inform a suspect that 

he has the right to halt questioning at any time.

3 However, defendant argues that these cases 

3

People v. Merrero, 121 Ill. App. 3d 716, 722 (1984) (“although an individual has the right to cut 

off questioning at any time, Miranda does not require that the individual be informed of this right as part 

of the warnings”), overruled on other grounds by People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 286 (2009); People v. 

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are decades-old and that “the Miranda rights should include an explicit warning that the 

accused has the right to cut off or terminate questioning at any time.” In addition, defendant 

argues that, even if “the federal Miranda guarantee does not assure such a right,” such a right 

is provided by the Illinois constitution. See People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 442 (1994) 

(“Authorities must inform suspects that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be 

provided, and that they may ask for one at any time and upon doing so, the interrogation 

must cease.”). 

¶ 58 Both the State and defendant agree that de novo review is appropriate for this 

question, which is solely a question of law. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 21 (a pure 

question of law is reviewed de novo). 

¶ 59 Normally, “when a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involves 

factual determinations and credibility assessments, the ultimate ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous.” People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 430-31 

(2001). “This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the trial court is in 

a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of witnesses, observe the 

witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony.” Sorenson, 196 Ill. 

2d at 431. However, a court will “review de novo the ultimate question of the defendant’s 

legal challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress.” Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431. In the 

case at bar, when deciding defendant’s pretrial suppression motion, the trial court did not 

hear any live testimony; rather it reviewed only the relevant portion of defendant’s 

videotaped statement. As a result, the evidence before the trial court and the evidence before 

Hudson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 813, 814 (1972) (Defendant “was not advised that he could have stopped the 

questioning at any time. Such warning, however, is not essential.”); People v. Washington, 115 Ill. App. 

2d 318, 328 (1969) (“[i]t was not necessary that defendant be informed that he could terminate the 

questioning at any period”). 

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us is the same. Thus, we agree with the parties that we should conduct a de novo review, 

which means that we perform the same analysis that a trial court would perform. Jones, 2018 

IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 21. 

¶ 60 For this claim, defendant relies primarily on our supreme court’s decision in 

McCauley, where our supreme court stated in dicta: “Authorities must inform suspects that if 

they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided, and that they may ask for one at any 

time and upon doing so, the interrogation must cease.” McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 442. In 

McCauley, our supreme court held that, when an attorney came to the police station where 

the defendant was being interrogated and the police refused either to tell the defendant that 

his attorney was present or to allow the attorney access to his client, the police violated the 

defendant’s right to counsel under the Illinois Constitution. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 423-24; 

see also People v. Pitchford, 314 Ill. App. 3d 72, 78 (2000). Our supreme court held that, 

although the police did not violate defendant’s right to counsel under the United States 

Constitution, they did violate this right under the Illinois Constitution: 

“Regardless of the United States Supreme Court’s current views on waiver of the 

right to counsel under the Federal Constitution, the law in Illinois remains that ‘when 

police, prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse an attorney appointed or 

retained to assist a suspect access to the suspect, there can be no knowing waiver of 

the right to counsel if the suspect has not been informed that the attorney was present 

and seeking to consult with him.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 

424-25 (quoting People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1982)); see also Pitchford, 314 

Ill. App. 3d at 78. 

¶ 61 The McCauley court explained: 

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“Our State constitutional guarantees simply do not permit police to delude custodial 

suspects, exposed to interrogation, into falsely believing they are without immediately 

available legal counsel and to also prevent that counsel from accessing and assisting 

their clients during the interrogation.” McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 423-24; see also 

Pitchford, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 78-79. 

¶ 62 In the case at bar, defendant does not claim that his attorney was at the police station 

when defendant was being interrogated. Rather, he claims, based on McCauley, that the 

police were required to inform him, prior to questioning and as part of their Miranda 

warnings, that he had the right to terminate questioning at any time. Defendant does not cite a 

single Illinois case, in the almost 25 years since McCauley was decided, that cites McCauley 

for such a proposition or that holds what he asks us to hold based on it. Nor can we find one. 

Thus, we decline his invitation to expand the required Miranda warnings. 

¶ 63 V. Sentencing 

Defendant’s remaining claims on appeal concern his sentence: (1) that his 40-year 

sentence is excessive and should be reduced to 20 years; (2) that his 40-year sentence is 

disproportionate to the 30-year sentence received by codefendant Gary Sams; and (3) that the 

trial court failed to consider, in mitigation, defendant’s youth at the time of the incident and 

defendant’s prior work record. For the following reasons, we do not find that the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining defendant’s sentence. 

¶ 64 The sentencing range was between 20 and 60 years, and the State asked for the 

“fullest” sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2010) (“Imprisonment shall be for a 

determinate term of (1) not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years ***.”). However, 

defendant received a sentence exactly in the middle of the sentencing range. At sentencing, 

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the trial court articulated its reasons for selecting 40-year and 30-year sentences for 

defendant and codefendant Sams, which we provide here in full: 

“THE COURT: Well, where do I begin? Certainly I wish that I could offer some 

explanation or answer to families from both sides in this case. Sometimes there are no 

answers. Why does evil exist in the world? Why do innocent people have to suffer? I 

don’t know. It is awful, senseless, and it is a tragedy for both sides. Three lives have 

been lost, and three families are broken and in pain. The [victim’s] family will never 

be able to visit their son except in a cemetery, and [defendant’s] and [codefendant 

Sam’s] families, at least they will be able to visit their sons in the penitentiary, but 

certainly that is not [a] consolation to them. 

The Court has had the opportunity to review the Pre-Sentence Investigations, the 

letters submitted on behalf of all sides, letters in mitigation for [codefendant Sams], I 

have considered the certificates and this addendum for [defendant], certainly the 

victim impact statements are moving and speak greatly of the loss and pain that the 

family and friends of the [victim’s] family are suffering. 

[Codefendant Sams] is 39 years old now. I have reviewed his background. It does 

appear that he had[,] while he was involved actively in the gang when he was 

younger, he had turned his life around to a certain extent. He was working as a 

laborer. There are letters of recommendation, letter of good deeds that he had done 

for his friends and his family. [Codefendant’s counsel] read one of those letters here 

in open court, and now, because of his senseless and stupid act on that night in May, 

he has ruined his life and severely damaged the life of those who love him. All of that 

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is now flushed down the toilet for his willingness to participate in the beating of 

somebody simply because he is wearing the wrong color shirt. 

With regard to [codefendant] Sams, after considering all the factors in aggravation 

and mitigation, his rehabilitative potential, judgment is entered on Count 1, and the 

Court finds an appropriate sentence to be 30 years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections. 

With regard to [defendant], [he] is a younger man. He was on probation at the 

time that this occurred, which the Court does find aggravating. He was still the Court 

believes an active member of the gang. I think he is still an active member of the 

gang. I don’t believe him when he says he is not. The Court heard his statement. The 

Court believes that he exhibited a certain amount of relish in describing what he did, 

and he was more active. He was the first one off the porch to beat these guys who he 

thought were rival gang members. 

I have considered his statements, all the factors in aggravation and mitigation, 

including his rehabilitative potential, and judgment is entered on the finding. The 

Court finds an appropriate sentence to be 40 years in the Illinois Department of 

Corrections.” 

¶ 65 “A reviewing court gives substantial deference to the trial court’s sentencing decision 

because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a much 

better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral 

character, mentality, environment, habits, and age.” People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; 

People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). Thus, a sentence within the appropriate 

sentencing range is usually accorded great deference. People v. Anaya, 2017 IL App (1st) 

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150074, ¶ 102. Although Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) grants a reviewing court the 

power to reduce a sentence or the degree of an offense, our supreme court has cautioned that 

this power should be used cautiously and sparingly. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212. As a result, 

an appellate court “may not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212; see also Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36 (“a reviewing court may 

not modify a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion”). Our supreme court has 

found that, with respect to a sentence, an abuse of discretion occurs when the sentence is 

greatly at variance with the spirit or purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the 

nature of the offense. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36; Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212. A 

reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it 

would have weighed various sentencing factors differently. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213. 

¶ 66 First, defendant observes that he obtained his GED in 2007, that he was only 20 years 

old in 2010 when this offense occurred, that between 2010 and 2012 he was employed as a 

forklift operator, and that his stepmother testified at sentencing that he was a good father, 

son, and brother. Although defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider his youth, 

the trial court specifically observed that defendant was “a younger man.” However, the trial 

court then observed that defendant was also on probation at the time of the offense “which 

the Court does find aggravating.” The presentence investigation report reveals that defendant 

was on probation for possession of a stolen vehicle when the current offense occurred.4 In 

addition, the trial court found that defendant was, and still is, an active gang member. During 

the sentencing hearing, defendant stated to the court: “I am not a gang member anymore, and 

4

With respect to defendant’s probation, the ASA argued at sentencing that defendant “was given a 

chance” and “what did he do? He committed murder.” The ASA argued, “The Judge that gave him that 

probation I am sure wishes that he gave him something more now, but no Judge can look in the future and 

tell that then.” 

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I have not been for a long time. I had tattoos removed, moved out of the area where they are 

located, tried to better my life, and stopped all contact with them.” However, the trial court 

found, specifically, that it had made a credibility determination and that it did not believe 

defendant when he stated that he was no longer a gang member. After observing defendant’s 

demeanor first-hand, as well as all the evidence at trial, the trial court found “I don’t believe 

him when he says he is” no longer an active gang member. A reviewing court owes great 

deference to a trial court’s credibility determinations. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d at 431 (“the trial 

court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of witnesses, observe the 

witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in the witnesses’ testimony”). Thus, we cannot 

find that the trial court abused its discretion when considering defendant’s age, education, 

employment history, and familial roles in light of his probation status and gang membership. 

¶ 67 In particular, defendant argues that the trial court failed to consider his young age. In 

support, defendant quotes the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 

543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005), stating: 

“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less 

supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is 

evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be 

misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult ***.” 

At the time of the offense, defendant was 20 years old, which is years away from juvenile status. 

“When the legislature draws lines with respect to age, there will always be people who are close 

to the line.” Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 73. Defendant asks us to consider a difference of 

years—not two days or two weeks, but years from juvenile status. “Since there will always be a 

defendant close to the legislative line, the statute at issue provided the judiciary with the ability 

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to exercise discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence within a particular range.” Jones, 

2018 IL App (1st) 151307, ¶ 73. In the case at bar, the trial court utilized that discretion to 

fashion an appropriate sentence. 

¶ 68 Defendant also claims that he had a minor role in the offense. While it is true that 

others stabbed or beat the victim with a bat, defendant admitted in his statement to the police 

that he was the first one to approach the murder victim, that he was the one who asked the 

victim for the victim’s gang affiliation, and that he kicked the victim in the head when the 

victim was already down. At sentencing, the trial court considered defendant’s statement to 

the police, observing: “The Court heard his statement. The Court believes that [defendant] 

exhibited a certain amount of relish in describing what he did and he was more active. He 

was the first one off the porch to beat those guys who he thought were rival gang members.” 

Thus, the trial court did not find that defendant’s role in the offense was minor, and on 

appeal, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in making this finding. 

¶ 69 Next, defendant claims that his 40-year sentence was disproportionate because his 

codefendant Sams received 30 years. However, as we explained above, the trial court did not 

find defendant’s role as minimal as defendant claims. When defendant moved the trial court 

to reconsider his sentence on the ground that it was disproportionate to codefendant Sam’s 

sentence, the trial court explained that, most “importantly, I feel that [defendant’s] 

involvement in the offense was greater than that of [codefendant Sam’s]” because defendant 

was “leading the charge, so to speak, which the court felt deserved a more severe sentence 

than that of [codefendant Sams].” 

¶ 70 In sum, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

defendant. 

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¶ 71 As a final matter, defendant asks to review his sentence not only for an abuse of 

discretion but also de novo to consider whether the trial court complied with the Illinois 

constitutional provision requiring that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to 

the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful 

citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Defendant bases this claim primarily on a recent 

decision in which the Fifth District stated that it “encourage[d] our supreme court” to review 

the issue of whether the standard of review employed in sentencing should be expanded to a 

two-part process. People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 22. In a two-part process, 

sentences would “be reviewed [de novo] to determine whether the trial court followed the 

constitutional and statutory guidelines in addition to whether the trial court abused its 

discretion.” (Emphasis added.) Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 22. However, the Fifth 

District concluded: 

“After careful consideration, we decline to abandon our supreme court’s 

application of the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing sentences. Our supreme 

court has extensively considered the propriety of using the abuse of discretion 

standard in reviewing sentences and has repeatedly upheld the use of this standard. As 

an appellate court, we are bound to follow the decisions of our supreme court and 

have no authority to overrule them.” Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 21. 

Like our sister district, we decline defendant’s invitation to employ a different standard of 

review, and instead employ the standard required by our supreme court. 

¶ 72 CONCLUSION 

¶ 73 For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence. 

¶ 74 Affirmed. 

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