Filed: 4/7/06 NO. 

4-05-0237 

 IN THE APPELLATE COURT 

 OF ILLINOIS 

 FOURTH DISTRICT 

BRITTNEY A. WEBB, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

JESSE WHITE, Secretary of State, 

State of Illinois, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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Appeal from 

Circuit Court of 

Sangamon County 

No. 04MR378 

Honorable 

Leo J. Zappa, Jr., 

Judge Presiding. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the 

court: 

Plaintiff, Brittney A. Webb, filed an action in the 

Sangamon County circuit court for administrative review of the 

decision of defendant, Jesse White, Illinois Secretary of State 

(Secretary), denying her petition for rescission or modification 

of the 12-month suspension of her driver's license and privileges. The circuit court affirmed the Secretary's decision. 

Plaintiff appeals. We reverse. 

 I. BACKGROUND 

On December 7, 2003, plaintiff and several friends went 

to the High Dive, an establishment that serves liquor in Champaign, Illinois, to dance. Plaintiff was 20 years old at the 

time but could enter the establishment because she was over the 

age of 19. The friends accompanying plaintiff were also under 

the age of 21. They sat around a table and then plaintiff "and a 

couple of girlfriends went to the dance floor" and danced for 15 
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to 20 minutes. Nobody at the table had ordered any alcohol prior 

to them dancing. Plaintiff saw her friend Joey when they returned to the table. Plaintiff took two or three "big gulps" of 

his drink, which she thought was Pepsi because Joey was 20 years 

old and did not have "a record of drinking there." After taking 

her big gulps, she realized it was Captain Morgan and Coke. 

Approximately 30 minutes later, the Champaign police 

conducted a "raid" to catch underage drinkers. Although plaintiff denied having the cup with the alcohol when the police 

arrived, the ordinance violation report (OVR) stated "subject was 

found in High Dive with a mixed drink." Plaintiff took a portable breath test and registered a 0.005 blood-alcohol concentration (BAC). A police officer issued plaintiff an OVR charging 

her with violating section 5-65(a) of the Municipal Code of 

Champaign (Municipal Code) (Champaign Municipal Code _5-65(a) 

(2002)). Section 5-65(a) of the Municipal Code prohibits the 

purchase or possession of alcohol by persons under 21 years of 

age. The OVR gave plaintiff notice to appear in Champaign County 

circuit court on January 23, 2004, if she did not pay the $280 

fine by December 28, 2003. 

On January 14, 2004, the City of Champaign (City) filed 

a complaint alleging plaintiff violated the Municipal Code. On 

February 6, 2004, plaintiff pleaded guilty. On March 28, 2004, 

the Secretary suspended plaintiff's driver's license and driving 

privileges for 12 months pursuant to section 6-206(a)(38) of the 

Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(38) (West 2002)). 
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Section 6-206(a)(38) of the Vehicle Code gives the Secretary the 

discretionary authority to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing 

that the person has been convicted of a violation of section 6-20 

of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (Act) (235 ILCS 5/6-20 (West 

2002)) or a similar local ordinance. The docket sheet reflects 

that on April 16, 2004, the City represented to the court that 

the matter had been satisfied and plaintiff had paid her $280 

fine and court costs. On the City's motion, the cause was 

dismissed. 

After an informal hearing, the Secretary issued plaintiff a restricted driving permit (RDP). On July 28, 2004, the 

Secretary held a formal hearing on plaintiff's application for 

"driving relief." Plaintiff sought the rescission or early 

termination of the suspension otherwise set to terminate on March 

28, 2005. 

The hearing officer found plaintiff's testimony she 

only took a few gulps was not credible because the friends she 

was with also tested positive for alcohol. This indicated the 

group went to the High Dive with the intention of consuming 

alcohol. The hearing officer concluded plaintiff failed to 

submit sufficient evidence to warrant rescission or modification 

of the order of suspension and recommended plaintiff's petition 

be denied. On August 9, 2004, the Secretary adopted the hearing 

officer's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations, and denied plaintiff's petition. 
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On September 10, 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint in 

the Sangamon County circuit court seeking administrative review 

of the Secretary's decision. 

 II. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, plaintiff argues (1) the Secretary's decision was improper as a matter of law and (2) the Secretary abused 

his administrative discretion in not rescinding or substantially 

modifying the suspension. We agree with plaintiff's second 

argument. 

Although neither party raises the issue, we initially 

note it can be argued this case is moot. The record indicates 

plaintiff's suspension was to end in March 2005. Further, 

Champaign dismissed the case against defendant after she paid her 

fines. Thus, the violation of the Municipal Code is no longer on 

her record. However, moot issues may be considered under the 

public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. In re Louis 

S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777, 838 N.E.2d 226, 230 (2005). 

Inasmuch as the issue is the kind likely to recur and evade 

review given the short duration of the action, we conclude the 

case comes within a narrow exception to the mootness doctrine. 

See People v. Anderson, 167 Ill. App. 3d 308, 310, 521 N.E.2d 

148, 149 (1988) (applying exception to mootness doctrine when 

summary suspension had already ended). 

On appeal from the circuit court's judgment, we review 

the Secretary's decision and not that of the circuit court. See 

Gumma v. White, 345 Ill. App. 3d 610, 618, 803 N.E.2d 130, 137 
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(2003). 

Section 6-206(a)(38) of the Vehicle Code gives the 

Secretary the discretion to suspend or revoke the driving privileges of a person under 21 years of age if that person is convicted of a violation of section 6-20 of the Liquor Control Act 

or a similar provision of a local ordinance. 625 ILCS 5/6-

206(a)(38) (West 2002). As stated, the Secretary suspended 

plaintiff's driver's license for 12 months pursuant to section 6-

206(a) of the Vehicle Code. Our research revealed no cases 

involving the suspension of a minor's license pursuant to section 

6-206(a)(38) of the Vehicle Code. However, based on the facts 

present in this case, we conclude the Secretary abused his 

discretion under section 6-206(a) of the Act by suspending 

plaintiff's driving privileges for 12 months. 

Section 1001.460(d) of Title 92 of the Illinois Administrative Code discusses requests for modification or revocations 

and suspensions of driving privileges and states the following in 

pertinent part: 

"[t]he period of a discretionary suspension 

may be reduced for good cause shown. Factors 

to consider include prior revocations or 

suspensions *** and the seriousness of the 

offenses. The petitioner must demonstrate 

that he/she is a low risk for repeating 

his/her behavior in the future. Other factors may be considered by the hearing offi-
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cer." 92 Ill. Adm. Code _1001.460(d) (Conway 

Greene CD-ROM June 2003). 

Here, plaintiff has no prior revocations or suspensions. Plaintiff was not driving or even in a vehicle when 

approached by the police. She voluntarily submitted to testing, 

thereby conducting herself in a manner favored by the law were 

she a driver under the zero-tolerance statute. The offense to 

which plaintiff pleaded guilty is not a serious one in the City 

of Champaign's eyes, for it dismissed the complaint after plaintiff paid her fine. Further, as discussed below, the 12-month 

suspension of plaintiff's driving privileges is a much harsher 

punishment than she would have received had she been driving with 

the same alcohol concentration in her system. 

Although the zero-tolerance statute (625 ILCS 5/11-

501.8 (West 2002)) is not at issue in this case, we look at it 

and the penalties for violating it for guidance. We do this 

because the zero-tolerance statute punishes drivers plaintiff's 

age who drink alcohol and drive. 

A minor who drinks and drives is more dangerous to 

himself or herself, and the public, than someone such as plaintiff who was not drinking and driving. Yet the Secretary punished plaintiff four times more severely than the General Assembly saw fit to set the minimum punishment for a zero-tolerance 

offender who was drinking and driving but agreed to testing. 

"The zero-tolerance statute, which came 

into effect on January 1, 1995, is set forth 
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in section 11-501.8 of the Vehicle Code (625 

ILCS 5/11-501.8 (West 1998)). The statute 

provides in subsection (a) that, if a person 

under the age of 21, while operating a motor 

vehicle on the public roads of this state, is 

arrested for any traffic violation and the 

arresting officer 'has probable cause to 

believe that the driver has consumed any 

amount of an alcoholic beverage,' the driver 

'shall be deemed to have given consent to a 

chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or 

urine for the purpose of determining the 

alcohol content of the person's blood.' 625 

ILCS 5/11-501.8(a) (West 1998). When the 

conditions in subsection (a) are met and the 

driver is asked to submit to testing, the 

driver must be warned that his driving privileges may be suspended if he refuses to submit to the testing or if he submits to the 

test and the test reveals an alcohol concentration greater that 0.00. 625 ILCS 5/11-

501.8(c) (West 1998). After being warned, if 

the driver refuses to submit to testing or if 

he submits to testing and the testing establishes an alcohol concentration greater than 

0.00, the officer 'shall immediately submit a 
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sworn report to the Secretary of State' certifying whether the driver submitted to testing or refused. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.8(d) (West 

1998)." (Emphasis in original.) Gumma v. 

White, 216 Ill. 2d 23, 33, 833 N.E.2d 834, 

840-41 (2005). 

Section 6-208.2 of the Vehicle Code sets forth the 

provisions for restoration of driving privileges of persons under 

21. 625 ILCS 5/6-208.2 (West 2002). Unless a minor's suspension 

based upon consumption of alcohol by a minor or refusal to submit 

to testing has been rescinded by the Secretary in accordance with 

subsection (c)(3) of section 6-206 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 

5/6-206(c)(3) (West 2002)), a person whose privilege to drive has 

been suspended under section 11-501.8 is not eligible for restoration of the privilege until six months from the date of the 

suspension for refusal or failure to complete a test to determine 

alcohol concentration under section 11-501.8, or three months 

from the date of a suspension imposed following the minor's 

submission to a chemical test which disclosed an alcohol concentration greater than 0.00 under section 11-501.8. 625 ILCS 5/6-

208.2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002). 

Further, in looking at this state's consent statute 

(625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 2002)), our supreme court has stated 

the following: 

"The implied-consent statute serves the 

legislative purpose of promoting highway 
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safety by assisting in the determination of 

whether drivers suspected of intoxication are 

in fact under the influence of alcohol. 

[Citation.] The threat of summary suspension 

for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test 

motivates drivers to take the test, thereby 

allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of intoxication." People v. Wegielnik, 

152 Ill. 2d 418, 425, 605 N.E.2d 487, 490 

(1992). 

Thus, the implied-consent statute gives drivers motivation to 

cooperate with police and submit to chemical testing so that they 

avoid summary suspension. This reasoning applies equally under 

the implied-consent provision of the zero-tolerance statute (625 

ILCS 5/11-501.8(a) (West 2002)). 

As stated, we recognize plaintiff's license was not 

suspended under the zero-tolerance statute. Rather, plaintiff's 

license was suspended under section 6-206(a)(38) of the Vehicle 

Code, which gives the Secretary discretionary authority to 

suspend a person's driving privileges if she is convicted of a 

violation of section 6-20 of the Liquor Control Act or a similar 

provision of a local ordinance. 625 ILCS 5/6-206(a)(38) (West 

2002). 

If plaintiff had been driving and submitted to testing 

which disclosed a 0.005 alcohol concentration, she would be 

eligible for restoration of her driving privileges after three 
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months (625 ILCS 5/6-208.2(a)(2) (West 2002)); and if she was 

driving and refused to submit to testing, thus conducting herself 

in a manner disfavored by law, she would be eligible for restoration of her driving privileges after only six months (625 ILCS 

5/6-208.2(a)(1) (West 2002)). In fact, the penalty the Secretary 

imposed on plaintiff is equal to the penalty she would have 

received under the zero-tolerance statute had she been a driver 

who had been previously suspended under section 11-501.8 of the 

Vehicle Code and submitted to a test that disclosed an alcohol 

concentration greater than 0.00. See 625 ILCS 5/6-208.2(a)(4) 

(West 2002). 

The Secretary has clearly abused the discretion given 

to him by section 6-206 of the Vehicle Code. The Secretary's 

exercise of his discretion should have been guided by the punishments set forth by the legislature that we described above for 

minor drivers who drink and drive. We discern no rational reason 

for the Secretary's decision to more severely punish a nondriver 

who had a BAC of 0.005 than a driver with an equal BAC. 

Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of the 

Secretary's action. It is not clear to us under what theory 

plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the Secretary's 

action; her arguments could be interpreted as (1) a 

proportionate-penalties argument, (2) an equal-protection argument, or (3) that section 6-206(a)(38) is unconstitutional as 

applied to her because her license was suspended for 12 months 

while the statutory penalty for somebody the same age as plain-
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tiff who was driving an automobile and submitted to a 

Breathalyzer test that revealed a BAC over 0.00 is only 3 months. 

 We need not address plaintiff's constitutional argument in light 

of our conclusion the Secretary abused his discretion in not 

modifying plaintiff's suspension. "[A] reviewing court will not 

address constitutional questions if the case may be disposed of 

on other grounds." People v. Wenger, 258 Ill. App. 3d 561, 567, 

631 N.E.2d 277, 281 (1994). 

 III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court's 

judgment. 

Reversed. 

 APPLETON and COOK, JJ., concur.