# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 21, 2019 *

Decided November 27, 2019

Before DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
No. 19-2032

SCOTT R. SCHMIDT, Plaintiff-Appellant ,

v

.
WALWORTH COUNTY, et al., Defendants-Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 19-C-0099

Lynn Adelman, J udge

.
O R D E R
Scott Schmidt appeals the denial of his cost s and expenses as part of an otherwise successful motion to remand his case to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). His complaint invokes Wisconsin law, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several clauses of the United States Constitution. Because the purp orted federal claims gave the defendants a reasonable basis to seek removal, the distri ct court reasonably denied Schmidt his costs and expenses, so we affirm.

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts an d legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 19-2032 Page 2

Schmidt’s complaint primarily asserts that Wisconsin officials violated state law when enforcing a state-court judgment agains t him. According to Schmidt, a Wisconsin circuit court entered a judgment against hi m for unpaid debts arising from a prior criminal case and certified the judgment to Wisconsin’s Department of Revenue. The Department then, contrary to state law, drew funds from two of his bank accounts to satisfy the judgment. In his complaint, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he also asserts that these officials violated the “Equal Protection” and “Ex Post Facto” clauses of the Constitution and “Due Process of Law.”

The defendants removed the case to fe deral court. They asserted that the complaint presented a federal question un der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Schmidt alleged several violations of the Constitution. Schm idt moved to remand, arguing that not all defendants consented to the removal and that his claims arose under state law. He also moved for his expenses and costs, contending that the defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal.
The district court granted Schmidt’s motion to remand but denied the motion “in all other respects.” In doing so, it referenced an earlier order explaining that Schmidt did not allege federal claims under any of the three constitutional clauses detailed in his complaint. Violations of state law are not th emselves violations of federal due process; Schmidt did not allege he was part of a cl ass covered by the equal-protection clause; and the ex post facto clause does not apply to collecting criminal judgments. The court added that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine likely blocked some of these claims, too. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The district court did not address the consent issue because, withou t subject-matter jurisdiction, it correctly decided that it had to remand the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Schmidt appeals the denial of his costs and expenses. He argues that because in its remand order the district court never artic ulated why it denied his request for costs and expenses, it violated Circuit Rule 50 and thus abused its discretion. But even if Circuit Rule 50 applies to the ruling on Schm idt’s motion, this court may still evaluate the ruling when the “reasons are apparent from the record.” Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. Int’l Steel Servs., Inc. , 283 F.3d 867, 872 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Ettrick Wood Prods., Inc. , 916 F.2d 1211, 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Wolf v. Kennelly , 574 F.3d 406, 410–11 (7th Cir. 2009). The cases Schmidt cites are distinguishable because in those cases we could glean no reasons from the record fo r the district courts’ remand decisions. Compare In re Shell Oil Co. , 966 F.2d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992) (remanding where court had “no idea” of reasons underl ying decision to remand), and Louis Vuitton, S.A. v.No. 19-2032 Page 3

K-Econo Merch. , 813 F.2d 133, 134–35 (7th Cir. 1987) (same, regarding findings of fact and law after bench trial), with In re Amoco Petrol. Additives Co. , 964 F.2d 706, 707–09 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting lack of reasons in rema nd order but inferring from record).
The court’s reasons for denying the requ est for costs and expenses are both apparent from the ruling that preceded the remand order and proper. In the briefing before the district court, Schmidt correctly stated that a district court may, upon remanding a case, award costs under 28 U. S.C. § 1447(c) “only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp. , 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005); see also Lott v. Pfizer, Inc. , 492 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2007). Thus the court was aware of the standard. It is also apparent from the earlier ruling that the district court properly applied that stan dard. It determined that the defendants had a reasonable basis to seek removal because the complaint named three federal-law bases for removal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). Although the court analyzed each asserted federal basis and decided that none stated a valid claim, the naming of the three in the complaint gave the defendants reasonable grounds to seek removal.
Finally, Schmidt argues that the defend ants’ lack of unanimous consent to removal was itself an unreasonable basis fo r removal. But this argument conflates the proper procedure for removal with removal jurisdiction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (describing procedure), with 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (describin g jurisdiction). Only the objective absence of the latter can justify an award of costs. See Martin , 546 U.S. at 141. As we have just explained, the complaint presented an apparent ground for removal jurisdiction and therefore a legitimate reason to deny an award of costs and expenses.

AFFIRMED