[Cite as State v. Leonard, 2024-Ohio-2817.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

BLAKE LEONARD,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-230589

TRIAL NO. B-2203839

 O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause

 Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: July 26, 2024

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Schuh & Goldberg, LLP, and Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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WINKLER, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Blake Leonard appeals the judgment of the 

Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of rape. In three 

assignments of error, he argues that the indictment and bill of particulars were too 

vague to enable him to adequately prepare a defense; he contests the sufficiency and 

weight of the evidence underlying his conviction; and he argues that the trial court 

failed to comply with the sentencing requirements contained in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

We agree with Leonard that his sentence is contrary to law, because the trial court 

failed to inform him of all the statutorily-required sentencing notifications. 

Accordingly, we remand this matter for the limited purpose of permitting the trial 

court to provide the sentencing notifications required under the Reagan Tokes Law. 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶2} Leonard was indicted for one count of rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2), a first-degree felony, and the indictment stated that the offense 

occurred on or about December 15, 2021. Leonard then opted to proceed to a bench 

trial. At trial, the state presented the testimony of the victim and Lieutenant Kevin 

Corbett of the Loveland Police Department.

{¶3} The victim testified that she had been dating Leonard since 2019, and 

they had consensual sex over several hundred times during their relationship. She 

explained that sometimes Leonard would cover her mouth with his hand, or she would 

cover his mouth with her hand to keep each other quiet so family members would not 

hear them. 
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{¶4} She testified on cross-examination that she remembered that the rape 

had occurred shortly before her birthday, which was December 2. The victim 

explained that the rape occurred when Leonard had been spending the night at her 

home. Prior to going to sleep, Leonard had asked the victim to have sex and she said 

no. Approximately one and a half hours later, the victim awoke to Leonard on top of 

her engaging in vaginal intercourse. The victim immediately said “no” and “stop.” He 

then covered her mouth with his hand. She tried to push him off but was unable to do 

so.

{¶5} Lieutenant Corbett testified that the victim reported the crime in August 

2022, approximately nine months after it had occurred. In his investigation, he 

separately interviewed the victim and Leonard and obtained a search warrant for 

Leonard’s cell phone. On both Leonard’s phone and the victim’s phone, there were 

numerous text messages, beginning around the middle of December 2021, where 

Leonard confesses to raping the victim and asks for her forgiveness.

{¶6} Corbett testified that during the interview with Leonard, Leonard 

admitted to raping the victim, who was his girlfriend at the time. Corbett informed

Leonard that the victim was unsure of the exact date of the rape, but Corbett testified 

that Leonard had agreed that the rape occurred between November 2021 and 

December 2021.

{¶7} Leonard initially told Corbett that he had a disorder called “sexsomina”

and did not realize that he had raped the victim, but by the end of the interview, 

Leonard stated that he did not have that disorder. Leonard also expressed regret over 

raping the victim and told Corbett that the rape was a result of his pornography 

addiction. 
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{¶8} The defense presented the testimony of Zachary Waddell who has 

known Leonard for ten years. Waddell testified that he was also friends with the 

victim, and the victim often drove him to work in exchange for cash. Waddell testified 

that in March of 2022, while the victim was driving him home, she told him that as 

long as Leonard allowed her to keep using his credit card on her Apple Pay, she would 

not press charges for the rape. 

{¶9} The trial court found Leonard guilty of one count of rape and sentenced 

him to an indefinite prison term of four-to-six years. During the sentencing hearing, 

the trial court gave an abbreviated version of the notifications required under the 

Regan Tokes Law. 

Vagueness of Indictment 

{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Leonard asserts that the indictment and 

bill of particulars were too vague to enable him to prepare a defense and because of

the vagueness of the indictment, Leonard was convicted of a crime that was never 

presented to the grand jury.

{¶11} Because Leonard failed to object below or move to dismiss the 

indictment, he has waived all but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B). “To establish plain error, 

a defendant must show that (1) there was an error or deviation from a legal rule, (2) 

the error was plain and obvious, and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial. 

State v. Mohamed, 151 Ohio St.3d 320, 2017-Ohio-7468, 88 N.E.3d 935, ¶ 26, citing 

State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). 

{¶12} Leonard argues that the incorrect date listed in the indictment and the 

bill of particulars prejudiced his ability to present a meaningful defense at trial. But 

“[w]here the exact date and time of an offense are not material elements of a crime nor 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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essential to the validity of a conviction, the failure to prove such is of no consequence 

and it is sufficient to prove that the alleged offense occurred at or about the time 

charged.” State v. Ibrahim, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102114, 2015-Ohio-3345, ¶ 32, 

citing State v. Madden, 15 Ohio App.3d 130, 131, 472 N.E.2d 1126 (12th Dist.1984). 

With respect to the offense of rape, the precise date that it occurred is not an essential 

element of the crime. State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 171, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985); 

In re N.Z., 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2010-L-023, 2010-L-35 and 2010-L-041, 2011-Ohio6845, ¶ 53 (“[T]he specific date of sexual conduct is not an element of rape as defined 

in R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).”). Further, an indictment is not invalid for stating the time of 

the offense imperfectly. See R.C. 2941.08(C).

{¶13} Here, Leonard has not met the plain-error standard. First, there was no 

deviation from a legal rule because the indictment and bill of particulars were valid 

even with an imperfect date of the crime. Second, the inclusion of an imprecise date 

was not an obvious error because Leonard agreed that the rape had occurred between 

November 2021 and December 2021. Third, there is no evidence in the record that the 

lack of a specific date deprived him of preparing a defense. Although Leonard argues 

that he could have filed an alibi defense if he had known the exact date, that argument 

is speculative at best. 

{¶14} Because Leonard has not demonstrated that but for the imprecise date

in the indictment the outcome of the trial would have been different, we overrule his

first assignment of error.

Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence

{¶15} In his second assignment, Leonard challenges the sufficiency and 

weight of the evidence supporting his conviction. 
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In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether 

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing a challenge to the 

weight of the evidence, we sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’ We must review 

the entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the 

witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Baxter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180575, 2019-Ohio4855, ¶ 7. 

{¶16} To find Leonard guilty of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), the 

state had to prove that Leonard purposely engaged in vaginal intercourse with the 

victim by compelling her to submit by force or threat of force. 

{¶17} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we hold that 

there was sufficient evidence to support Leonard’s conviction. The victim testified that 

despite telling Leonard she did not want to have sex, she awoke later in the night to 

Leonard on top of her engaging in vaginal intercourse. She said “no” and told him to

“stop” but Leonard just covered her mouth with his hand. She then tried to push him 

off, but she was unable to do so. 

{¶18} With respect to the weight of the evidence, we cannot say that the trial 

court lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding Leonard 

guilty of rape given his confession to police and the numerous text messages on his 

phone asking the victim to forgive him for raping her. 

{¶19} The second assignment of error is overruled.
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Sentencing Notifications

{¶20} In his third and final assignment, Leonard argues that his indefinite 

sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to properly inform him of the

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications at the sentencing hearing. These notifications 

involve details about the indefinite-sentencing scheme contained in the Reagan Tokes 

Law. The state acknowledges that the trial court did not fully comply with the statute

but argues that the simplified form of the notifications given by the trial court was 

sufficient. We are unpersuaded.

{¶21} A trial court must advise a defendant of all five notifications set forth in

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) at the sentencing hearing. State v. Jackson, 1st Dist. Hamilton 

No. C-200332, 2022-Ohio-3449, ¶ 20. The failure to advise the defendant of any of 

the five notifications constitutes an error, and a remand is necessary for the limited 

purpose of permitting the sentencing court to provide the mandatory notifications.

{¶22} In State v. Greene, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220160, 2022-Ohio-4536, 

¶ 7, we noted that “these notifications include the salient features of the Regan Tokes 

Law—one of the chief purposes of which is to encourage good behavior by inmates in 

prison.” The notifications include:

(i) [t]hat it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released 

from service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum 

prison term imposed as part of the sentence * * *;

(ii) [t]hat the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut 

the presumption * * * if, at a hearing * * * the department makes 

specified determinations regarding the offender’s conduct while 

confined, the offender’s rehabilitation, the offender’s threat to 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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society, the offender’s restrictive housing, if any, while confined, 

and the offender’s security classification;

(iii) [t]hat if * * * the department at the hearing makes the specified 

determinations and rebuts the presumption, the department 

may maintain the offender’s incarceration after the expiration of 

that minimum term * * *;

(iv) [t]hat the department may make the specified determinations 

and maintain the offender’s incarceration * * * more than one 

time;

(v) [t]hat if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration 

of the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the 

sentence, the offender must be released upon the expiration of 

that term.

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v).

{¶23} Here, the trial court did not fully comply with the required notifications.

Instead, the trial court gave a simplified form of the notifications:

The Ohio Department of Corrections is going to determine whether or 

not you serve any time above the four years. There is a rebuttable 

presumption that you’ll be released after the four-year period; however, 

they may rebut this presumption. You’ll have a hearing before that 

happens. But at the end of the day, it’s the Ohio Department of 

Corrections that will determine whether or not you serve any time over 

those four years, up to six years in the Ohio Department of Corrections.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶24} The court’s notification did not inform Leonard of the circumstances 

that would cause the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) to 

extend his sentence above the minimum. See R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(ii). Given that 

one of the main purposes of the notifications is to encourage good behavior while in 

prison, it is pertinent for a defendant to understand that the ODRC could increase a 

defendant’s sentence above the minimum based on the defendant’s conduct in prison, 

the defendant’s rehabilitation, the defendant’s threat to society, the defendant’s 

classification or whether defendant was placed in restrictive housing in prison. The 

court’s notification also failed to inform Leonard that the ODRC could extend his 

sentence more than once, see R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(iv). Accordingly, we hold that the 

trial court did not comply with the required notifications under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

{¶25} Therefore, we sustain Leonard’s third assignment of error and remand 

this cause for the trial court to comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

Conclusion

{¶26} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and 

remand this matter for the limited purpose of permitting the sentencing court to 

provide the mandatory notifications as required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). We affirm 

the court’s judgment in all other respects. 

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

ZAYAS, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.