# FILED November 23, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Court Clerk IN THE C OURT O F APPE ALS AT KNO XVILLE

JAMES M. BEAM and JOYCE A. BEAM, ) Knox Chancery Individ ually a nd as Next ) C.A. No. 03A01-9802-CH-00055 of Kin of KAREN H. BEAM, Deceased, ) and Next Friend of LANCE B. BEAM, ) A Minor, ) ) ) Plaintiffs-Appel

lees )

) ) HON. FREDE RICK D. MCDON ALD vs. ) CHANCELLOR ) ) UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBIL E ) ASSOCIATION, and/or USAA CASUALTY ) INSURANCE COMPANY, and/or USAA ) GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, ) ) ) AFFIRMED IN PART, Defendants-Ap

pellants ) REVERSED IN PART AND

) REMANDED

FRANCIS A. CAI

N and BEVERL

Y DEAN NELMS, F

rantz, McConnell, &

Seymour, L

LP, Knoxville, for Appe

llants.
MARK E. FLOYD , Pryor, Fly nn, Priest & Harb

er, Knoxville, for A

ppellees.

O P I N I O N
McMurr ay, J.
This appeal involves the determination of whether there is insuran ce co verage on three separate insurance policies — two automobile policies and a per sonal umbrella policy. The plaintiffs,James and Joyce Beam, had purc

hased in s urance coverage from the defendant, United Ser vices Automobile Associa tion (USAA). The p

laintiffs, whose d

aughter was kil

l ed in a n2

automobile

accident, filed a declaratory action ag ainst USAA seeking a judgment as to whether uninsuredmotorist (UM) coverage was included under their personal um

brella policy and whether USAA had acted in

"bad faith" by

denying coverage. I

n its answer, USAA denied that the plaintiffs could recover under

bothautomobile policies and under their personal umbrella policy. With court approval,the plaintiffs ame nded their complaint to allege that the two automobile policies could be "stacked," thereby allowing them a g reater recovery.
Each party filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of "stacking" the UM coverage. The trial court granted partial summary judgment

in favor of

the Beams on the issue of stacking. One month later, the second issue, regarding umbrella UM coverage, wa s heard by the trial court withouta jury. Again, the trial court ruled in favor of the Be ams, holding that they

did have UM coverage under their personal umbrella policy at the time of the accident. USA

A now appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the automobile policies and reverse the judgment of the tri al c our t as to t he u mbr ell a po lic y.
USAA presents two issues for our consideration:

1. Whether

the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judg

ment to it on the issue of "stacked" uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage; and 2. Whether

the trial court erred in finding UM coverage u nder the Beams' personal umbrella policy even though James Beam

signed a form rejecting UM coverage.

The Beams had three insura nce poli cies with USAA at the time of the accident. First, the Tennesseeautomobile policy, number 00122 83 80U 7105 0, provided for UM cov er age bodily limits of $300,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. This policy insured three vehicles: a 1989 Volvo, a 1989 Pontiac, anda 19 96 C hev rol et C ama ro. Sec ond , th e Pe nns ylva nia aut omo bil e po lic y,3

number 00122 83 80U 7104 0, provided for UM and underinsured motorist bodily injury limits of $300,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, as well as providing for "stacked" coverag e. The Pennsylvani

a automobile policy insured one vehicle, a 1979Volvo, that was garaged in Pennsylvania. Mr. Beam, an air

line pilot, used tha

t vehicle in Pennsylvania whenever he flew there. Third, the Tennessee umbrella policy, number 00122 83 80 70U, provided for up to $5 million in coverage.

In 1993, the Beams moved from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvani a, to Knoxville, Tennesse

e. In early March1994, after the Beams' move to Knoxville, USAA sent the Beams a UM rejection form for their personal umbrell

a policy. This

rejection form was sent approximately two months before the time for the renewal of the policy. On March 21, 1994, a USAA servic e representativ

e spoke by telephone to Mrs. Beam a n d told her that the Tennessee umbrella UM rejection form had been mailed. Mrs. Beam indicated that she would discuss the matter with her husband.

On April 4, 1994, approximately one month after the umbrella UM rej ection fo rm was mailed to James Beam, USAA had not received a response from the Beams. Therefore, under Tennessee law, the umbrella policy was renew ed to inc lude UM coverage. On April 5, 1994, James Beam calledUSAA to inquire about the UM coverage under his umbrella policy and about the pre mium for the coverage. According to the computer documentation prepared by the US AA servi ce representativeat the time of the conversation, Mr. Beam indicated that he would probably return the umbrella UM rejection for

m: "He said he will probably return form — I said I will hold transaction until renewal — If form recd — no act ion — If not, will add UM 5 m illion to umb renewal ."

Mr. Beam signed

the rejection form

for UM coverage under his personal umbrella policy on April1, 1994. Although the umbr ella policy, including the UM coverage, had alrea dy been renewed, the policy was amended to exclude the umbrella UM coverage onc e USAA received the U M4

r ejection form, and the Beams received a credit of $144.90 to their account for the umbre lla U M coverage.

In January 1996, Mr. Beam purchased a 1996 Camaro for his daug hter Karen who turned sixteen the following month and added this car to his existing Tennessee automobile insurance policy through USAA. In February 1996, KarenBeam turned sixteen, and she too was added to the Beams' Tennessee autom

obilepolicy. On September 9, 1996, Karen Beam was driving the Camaro when it w as s tru ck b y a

vehicle driven by

Karen Pappas. Ka

ren Beam was kil

led, and Lanc

e Beam, a passenger in the Camaro, was injured.

The Beams filed a negligence action against Karen Pappa s. Ms. Pappas had bodi ly inju ry limits of $25,000 per per son and $5 0,000 per accide nt under her liabi

lity insuranc

e policy with HoraceMann Insu ranc e Co mpa ny. Although Horace Mann indicated to the Beams that it would pay its full policy limits of $50,000 to them, they contend that the coverag es under Pappas' insurance and the UM coverages on

their two automobil

e policies will

not compensate them for all the damages
as a result of

the accident. Therefore, they seek to collect under the UM provision of

their umbrella pol icy.

We address first the issue of whether the UM coverage provided by the Penn sylvani a automobile

policy can be "stacked" onto the UM coverage provided by the Tennessee a

utomobile pol icy, thereby allowing the Beams a gre ater recovery. USAA contends that the legislative intent of the UM statute in Tennessee is that stacking of coverages is not permitted.

Minimum policy limits not increased
. — Nothing contained in this part shall be construed as requiring the forms of coverage provided pursuant to this par t , whether alone or in com bination with similar coverage afforded under other automobile

liability policies, to afford limits in excess of those that would be5

afforded had the insured the

reunder been in

volved in an acci

dent with a motorist who was insured under

a policy of l

iability insur

ance with the minimum limits described in § 55-12-107, or the

uninsured motorist l

iabilit y limit s of the insured's policy if such limits ar e high er th an the limits described in § 55-12-107. Such forms of coverage may include

such terms, exclusio

ns, limitations, cond

itions, and offset

s, which are desig

ned to avoid duplic

ation of insuranc

e, and other bene

fits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1205 (1994).
Moreover, USAA a

rgues that our Su

preme Court and th

is Court have interpreted this s

tatute to mean that

t he stack ing or duplication of automobile insurance coverages is not perm itted in Te nnessee, ci ting State Automobile Mut ual Ins. Co. v. Cummin gs , 519 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn. 1975) and Jones v. Mulkey , 620 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn. App. 1981).

The Beams argue that the P ennsylvania

automobil e policy provi des "stacked " UM coverage on its face, and thus, they are entitled to recover under the UM provisions of the Tennessee policy
as well as the Pennsylvania policy. The plaintiffs assert that Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 56-7-1205 "does not prohibit an insurance company from expressly pro v iding broader coverage than may be required." Specifically

, they point to

the Pennsylv

ania automobile

policy which provides for stacked
covera ges. The Beam s argue that following the accident USAA notified them in writing that the coverage under the Pennsy lvania automobil e policy could be "stacked" o nto the UM c overage under the Ten nes see a uto mob ile pol icy.

As USAA notes in its brief, the trial court in making its decision regarding the stacking of coverages relies on a stipulation be tween th e parties that an additional amount in

the Beams' premiumwas charged

for stacked cov

erage under t

he Pennsylva

nia automobile policy. However, at trial it was discovered that because the Beams had only one vehic le cover e d under the Pennsylvani

a automobile

policy, they had

not been charged an additional amount in their premium1 T.C.A. § 56-7-1201, by its own terms, applies on ly to policies del ivere d ,

issued for delivery or renewed in this sta te ... . 6 forstacked coverage. USAA asserts that whether there was a premium diffe rential is irre levan t because under Tennessee law, the stacking of insurance covera ges is not permissible.

In our analysis of

this issue, we will f

irst look to

the Tennessee UM statute and the case law that interprets that statute. First, Tennessee Code Annotated § 5 6-7-120 5 indicates on its face an inten t to guar antee coverag e only within c

ertain limits. I

n interpreting t

his statute, our Supr

eme Courtin Cummings noted that the UM statute "evinces a legislativepurpose to provide recovery only up to the minimum sta tutory limit." Cummings , 519 S.W.2d at 775. Like the Supreme Court i n Cummings , t his Court in Jones v. Mulkey , 620 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn. App. 1981), felt bound by the statute in its ruling that

stacking of cov

erages is not pe

rmissible. We too ar

e bound by the

statute in this cases involving policies issued in Tenn essee and subject to interpretation under Tennessee Law. 1 We are not required to apply Tennessee L aw, however, to a policy issued in Pennsylvania and subject to interpretation under the laws of Pennsylvania. We are at liberty to apply Pennsy lvania law unless it is in conflict with the public policy

of this state. In Pen nsylvania, "st acking" is permitted andit is expr ess ly provided in the Pennsylvania policy that the covera ge may be stacked. As we ha ve previously noted, the public policy in this state as established by the legislature"evinces a legislative purpose to provide recovery only up to the minimum statutory lim it. " Thi s is not to s ay, however, that public policy prohibits parties f

rom con tracting for insurance in excess of the minimum statutory lim

it. It appear

s that our public pol

icy is directe d toward a duplication of benefitsor

a "double recovery." See T.C.A. § 56-7-1205. Hence, since there is quite obviously no
roomfor a "double recovery" under the facts and circumstances o

f this case, it is not

in conflict with outpublic policy to enforce the provision s of the P ennsylvania insurance policy which a llow stacking. "All through the legal history of our State the courts have ha d not only the power

butare7

constantly

enforcing rig

hts of actions aris

ing under the la

ws of anoth

er state whi ch require the ascertainment

and application of the law of the foreign state, and this we have done even when the law of the foreign state be different from our own. The only exception being where the law of the foreign state be against the public policy of our Stat e. See Whitlow v. N.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. , 114 Tenn. 344, 357, 84 S.W. 618, 68 L.R.A. 503 (1904)." Zurick v. Inman , 221 Tenn. 393, 426 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1968).

Under Pennsylvania l aw, stacking is expre ssly permitte

d. Pennsylva

nia's Motor Vehi

cle Financial Respon

sibility law pr

ovides as follows:
§1738. Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Benefits and Option to Waive
. (a) Limit

For Each Vehicle — When more than one

(1) vehicle is

insured under one or more policies providing uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the stated limit for unin

sured or underin

sured coverag

e shall apply

separately

to each v ehicle so insured. The limits of coverages available under this subchapter for a n insuredshallbe the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured . (Emphasis added).
Further, the courts of Pennsylvania have expressly appr oved stacking of coverage to the limits of coverage or to the extent of the insured's damages, whichever is less. See Harleysvil le Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling , 241 A.2d 112 (Pa. 1968).
We, therefore, find no error in t he trial court's judgment allowing stacking of the Pen nsyl van ia p oli cy and the Ten nes see a uto mob ile pol icy.

We turn now to the issue of whether the B eams had UM cover age under th

eir person al umbrella policy. USAA contends that James Beam rejected UM coverag e on his umbrella policy
on April 1, 1 994 . It further asserts that once UM coverage has bee n rejected by an insured, such8

coverage cannot be added until the insurer is notified in writing of the desire to add the coverage . USAA argues that Mr.

Beam never re

quested that UM co

verage be add

ed to his personal umbre

lla policy after having reject

ed the coverage. Th

erefore, USAA m

aintains that when

the Beams' daughter was killed on September 9, 1996, the Beam s did not have UM cover age under thei

r personal umbrella policy because Mr. Beam had re jected such coverage in April 1994.

In support of its argument, USAA relies on the following provision of the Tennessee UM statute:
However, any named insured may rejec t in writing suc h uninsure d motoris t coverage completely

or select lower limits of

s uch coverage but not less than the minimum coverage limits in § 55-12-107. Any document signed by the named insured or legal representativewhich initially rejects such cov

erage or sele

cts lower limits sha

ll b e binding upon every

insured to whom suc

h policy app

lies, and shall be c

onclusively presumedto become a part of the policy or contract when issu ed or delivered, irrespectiveof whether phy sically attache d thereto. Unless the named insured subsequently

requests such coverage in wr iting, th e rejected coverage need not be included in or supplemental to any continuation, renewal, reinstatement,

or replacement of such policy, or the trans fer of ve hicles insured thereunder, where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connectio

n witha policy previously issued by the same insurer; provided, that whenever a new application is submitted in connection w ith any renewal, reinstatement or replacement

transaction, the

provisions of this se

ction shall apply

in the same manner as when a new policy is being issued. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a)(2) (Supp. 1997).

USAA contends that

"[t]he umbrella policy was maintained from 1986 through the time of the acciden t un der po licy nu mber 0 0122 8 3 80 70 U and w as sim ply ren ewed yea r afte r year." It further ar gues that af

ter Mr. Beam signed the UM rejection form in 1994, no new application for umbrella insurance was e

ver submitted. Also, it notes t hat the Beams received an adjustment of $144.90 on their billing statement when Mr. Beam rejected UM coverage.9

The Beams argue that the addition of

the 1996 Camaro in January 1996 and the addition of KarenBeam in February 1996 to their existing insurance coverage with USAA were "applica

tions" for coverage. Their argument rests on the last sentence in Tennes see Code An notated § 56-7- 1201(a)(2): "whenever a new application is submitted in connection with any renewal, reinstatement
or replacement tra

nsaction, the prov

isions of this

section shall appl

y in the same

manner as when a
new policy is bei

ng issued." The

refore, they

contend that bec

ause they had not

specifically

rejected UM coverage on their personal umbrella policy reg arding the se two "appl ications, " UM coverage would have been aut omatic und er Tennessee law, and con sequently, UM coverage would have been in effect at the time of the accident.

In addition, the Beams assert that they never received any notification from USAA that UM coverage had

been removed fr

om their umbrella policy. The Beams note that the umbrella policy that became effective on May 3, 1994, a month after Mr. B eam had rejected UMcove rage, stated
on the declaration page that UM coverage was included. They maintain that in the two years after Mr. Beam rejected umbrella UM coverage, he never re ceived any indication that

he no longer had UM coverage.

In its ruling, the trial court commented on two provisions of the umbrella UM reje

ction form. The court noted the statement "[p]lease complete the rejection order

form on the rever

se and return it within th e next ten d ays." The court o bserved tha t "on the rev erse there's various choices to be checked off and the final statement again stating that if you do not sign and return this rejection form within ten days, uninsured

motorist will be added to your policy and you'll be charged accor dingly." The trial court concluded that in "[r]eading all the documents, there

is no indication in

the renewal that we can see that would alert an ordinary person that something nee ded to be done to include uninsured motorist coverage."10

USAA argues that the trial court failed to construe the policy

as a whole. Specifically, USAA notes that the form also states "[i]f this is a new policy, please return this form with your a pplication. If it is a renewal, return thi s only if you desire a chang e, or have not previously signed a rejection form, within the

next ten days." USAA

maintains that the r

ejection form "s

pecifically

addresses a renewaland without ambig uity clear ly instructs

the insured to return the form if a change is desired with respect to previously rejected coverage."

Insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction an d enfo rcement as contr

acts gene ral ly. See Hurley v. Tennessee Framers Mut. I ns . C o. , 922 S.W.2d 887 (Tenn. App. 1995). Insurance contracts are to be

construed in such a way "as to give effect

to the intention and

express language of the parties." Blaylock & Brown Constr., Inc . v. AIU Ins. Co. ,796 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tenn. App. 1990). To de termine whether there was a renewal of an existing policy or whe ther a
new policy was issued, one should look to the intent of the contracting parties as evidenced by the policy itself. Lewis

v. Western Assur. Co. , 175 Tenn. 37, 130 S.W.2d 982 (1939). The intention of the parties should be determined from the construction of the insurance contract as a whole. Burns
v. Temperature Control Co. , 52 Tenn. App. 51, 371 S.W.2d 804 (1962). The words expressing the parties' intentions should be given their usual, natural and ordinary meaning. Taylor v. Whit e Stores, Inc. , 707 S.W.2d 514 (Tenn. App. 1985).
In our discussion of the personal umbrella policy in this case, we note that it is

undisputed that on April 1, 1994 Mr. Beam signed a form rejecting umbrella UM coverage. The Beams, who hadhad a personal umbrella policy with USAA since 1986, had never had UM coverage u

nder their
um b rella policy. How

ever, the Beam

s argue that the

ir addition of the 1 996 Camaro and the ir daughter to their ex isting ins urance cover age with USAA constituted "applications" for insurance11

under Tennessee C ode Annotat ed § 56-7-12 01(a)(2), an d as such, p rovided UM coverage automatically under Tennessee law.

To determine whether therewas a new policy or a renewal, w

e must look at the lan

guage in the policy as evi dence of the parties' intentions. The statement "RENEWAL OF Policy Numbe r USAA 00122 83 80 7OU" appears at the top of the pers onal umbrella policy declarations page. Also, on the lower

part of the pag

e is the following

statement: "For

m and Endorsement

(s) made part of this policyat time of issue: REMA IN IN EF FECT (REFER TO PREVIOUS POLICY):" At the bottom of the same pag

e is the stateme

nt, "ATTACH

THIS DECLARATION TO PREVI OUS POLICY" in capital letters and bold type. Clearly, the policy language indicates a renewal and not an application for coverage.

In addition, Tennessee's UMstatute clearly provides the procedure for adding UM coverage once it has been r

ejected:
Any document signed by the named insured or legal rep resentative which initially rejects such cov

erage or sele

cts lower limits shall be binding upon every insuredto whom such policy applies, and shall be conclusiv

ely presume

d to become a part of the policy or

contract when

issued or delivered, irrespective of whether physically attached thereto. Unle ss the named insur ed subsequently req uests such coverage in w

riting, the reje

cted cover age need not be included in or supplemental to any contin uation, renewal

, rein statement, or replacement of such pol icy, or the transfer of vehicles insured thereunder, where the named insured had rejected the coverage in connection with a policypreviously i

ssued by the

same insurer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-7-1201(a)(2).
The record revea

ls that the Beams were well aware of the situat ion regardin g UM coverage under their umbrella policy. First, USAA sent Mr. Beam a letter dat ed March 2, 1994 in which USAA explai ned the procedur e for rejecting

UM coverage in

Tennessee. Sec

ond, Mr. Beam a

n d12

Mrs. Beam both discussed umbrella UM coverage with a USAA service representative. A representativespoke with Mrs. Be am o n March 21, 1994 regarding the rejection form that was mailed to the Beams. Mrs. Beam indicated

to the representa

tive that she would d

iscuss the matter withher husband. On April 4, 1994, USAA had not received a response from the Beams regarding the umbrella UM rejection form, so UM coverage wa s included, as expla

ined in the letter s

ent to Mr. Beam. On April 5, 1994, Mr . Beam called USAA to discuss the rejection form and the premium for UM coverage on the umbrella policy . Accord ing to the computer documentation entered by the USAA service r epresentative a t the time of the con

versation, Mr. B eam indicated tha t he would probably return the

rej ect ion for m, t here by rej ect ing U M co vera ge on the umb rel la p oli cy. La stl y, Mr. Beam signed the U M rejection form on April 1, 1994 and sent the form to USAA. USAA posted a credit of $144.90 for the umbrella UM coverage on May 3, 1994.

Mr. Beam argues that USAA did not tell him that UM coverage was not included under his personal umbrella policy and that he was uninformed regar ding his insurance coverages. We find this argument unpersuasive in light of the fact that Mr. Beam signed the UM rejection form himself andin light o f all the communication between USAA and the Beams concerning this matter. Mr. Beam testified that the signature on the UM rejection form appeared to be his, although he could not remember signing the form. Moreover, the record reflects that Mr. Beam, a

n airline pilot, is no

t a neophyte regarding insurance matters. The computer documentation of telephone conver sations betweenUSAA and Mr. Beam indicates that he frequently inqu ired abou t insurance prem iums, deductible

limits, and other aspects of his insurance coverage. The USAA computer documentation also reveals that Mr. Beam inquired about insurance coverage re

garding his

daughter's bo yfriend's
use of one of th

e fam ily's vehicles, his daughter's move from a lear ner's permit to driver's license, andoth er sim ilar details regarding insurance coverage for his fa mily. Consequently, we cannot accept Mr. Beam's argument that he was uninformed or unsophisticated regar ding matters of2 T.C.A. § 56-7-1201 (a)(3) was amended effective July 1, 1996 to provided that

uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage need no t be provided in this state by an excess or umbrella policy of insurance. 13 insurance. Mr. Beam signed the rejection form, so he knew or should have kn own what he was doing by that act.

In the final a

nalysis, we

conclude that th

ere was no UM coverage under the umb rel la p oli cy.
Assuming, however, for

the purposes of discussion and for no other reason, that the u

mbrella policy does provide UM co

verage, unque

stionably it is

a policy issued under Tennessee law and is
a "policy delivered, issued for delivery or re new ed in this state." T herefore, it is su

bject to application of Tennessee law. As hereinbefore noted, Tennessee law prohibits the stacking of UM coverage. See Cummi ngs , supra., and T.C.A. § 56-7-1205.
Accordingly, we reverse the j udgment of t he trial cou rt and find that UM cov erage was not avai lab le t o th e Bea ms u nde r th eir umb rel la p oli cy. 2

We do not believe that the record supports a finding that US AA act ed in "bad faith" by denying coverage.

We affirm the judg

ment of the trial c

ourt allowing a s

tacking of the Pe

nnsylvania

policy with the Tennessee Policy. We reverse the judgment of the trial court that there was UM coverage under the umbrella policy and that the umbrella policy coverage could be stacked with the other polic

ies. This case is remande

d to the trial court

f or such further

action as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are asse

ssed equally

between the par

ties.

______________________________ Don T. McMu rray, Judge14

CONCUR:

___________________________________ Houston M. Goddard, P residing J udge

___________________________________ Herschel P. Franks, Ju dgeIN THE C OURT O F APPE ALS AT KNO XVILLE
JAMES M. BEAM and JOYCE A. BEAM, ) Knox Chancery Individ ually a nd as Next ) C.A. No. 03A01-9802-CH-00055 of Kin of KAREN H. BEAM, Deceased, ) and Next Friend of LANCE B. BEAM, ) A Minor, ) ) Plaintiffs-Appel

lees ) )

) HON. FREDE RICK D. MCDON ALD vs. ) CHANCELLOR ) ) UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBIL E ) ASSOCIATION, and/or USAA CASUALTY ) INSURANCE COMPANY, and/or USAA ) GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, ) ) AFFIRMED IN PART, Defendants-Ap

pellants ) REVERSED IN PART AND ) REMANDED JUDGMENT This appeal came on to be heard upon the reco rd f rom the Cha ncer y Cou rt o f Kn ox C oun ty, briefs and argument of

counsel. Upon consideration thereof, this Court is of opinion that there was error in the tria

l court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court allowing a stacking of the Pennsylv

ania policy with the Tennessee Policy. We reverse the judgment of the trial court that there was UM coverage under the umbrella policy and that the umbrella policy cove

rage could be s

tacked with the oth

er policies. This case is remanded to the trial court for such further act ion as may be n ecessary. Costs of the appeal are asse

ssed equally

between the par

ties.
PER CURIAM