UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

HAIGHT, PENLAND, and WEIS1

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private First Class CORLEY Z. BLACK 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20140010 

Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center 

Douglas K. Watkins, Military Judge 

Lieutenant Colonel Tiernan Dolan, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Colonel Kevin Boyle, JA; Major Yolanda McCray Jones, JA; Captain 

Patrick A. Crocker, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel Mark H. Sydenham, JA; Major A.G. Courie III, JA; Major 

Daniel D. Derner, JA; Captain Nathan S. Mammen, JA (on brief). 

29 April 2016 

---------------------------------- 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

WEIS, Judge: 

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to his plea, of one specification of sexual assault in violation of Article 

120(b)(3), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(3) (2012) 

[hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of a 

dishonorable discharge and confinement for two years.2

 

1

 Judge WEIS took final action in this case while on active duty. 

2

 The military judge credited appellant with three days of pretrial confinement 

credit. 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

2 

 Appellant’s case is before this court for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. 

Of appellant’s two assignments of error, the following merits discussion but not 

relief: 

THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY OVERRULING 

DEFENSE HEARSAY OBJECTIONS BASED ON AN 

“OUTCRY” EXCEPTION THAT IS NOT CURRENTLY 

RECOGNIZED IN MILITARY LAW. 

We conclude the military judge abused his discretion in allowing certain 

statements by the victim into evidence, over defense objection, by applying an 

“outcry” exception independent of Military Rule of Evidence [hereinafter Mil. R. 

Evid.] 801 or 803.3 

 

 However, we further conclude this error was harmless in light of multiple 

similar statements of the victim received in evidence pursuant to a Mil. R. Evid. 

803(2) “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule. 

 

I. FACTS 

 In the early evening of 1 March 2013, the victim, Specialist (SPC) AL, and 

her best friend and roommate, Specialist SR, went to a restaurant/bar to meet with 

appellant and his friend, Private First Class (PFC) JJ, prior to a party planned for 

that evening. Everyone, with the exception of Specialist SR, consumed alcohol at 

the establishment. 

 Specialist SR, SPC AL, and PFC JJ were aware that appellant had previously 

reserved and paid for a nearby hotel room for the planned party. SPC AL was aware 

that “several people” had talked about a possible party at the hotel room and that 

throughout the evening PFC JJ was “desperately” trying to get others to come to the 

hotel room for a party. 

 

Specialist SR, however, had no plans to go to the hotel room party. Around 

2300, Specialist SR left the restaurant/bar because she was underage to consume 

alcohol and was bored. The appellant, SPC AL, and PFC JJ subsequently left the 

restaurant/bar and went to a CVS pharmacy store where SPC AL purchased alcohol 

for the planned party. The three proceeded to the hotel room and all consumed more 

alcohol. All three still held expectations of others showing up for the party; 

however, despite the efforts of all parties involved, no other persons ever appeared 

at the hotel room. Upon the suggestion of SPC AL, the three went to a nearby dance 

club where they consumed more alcohol. According to PFC JJ, appellant and SPC 

 

3

 The matter personally raised by appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 

12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), is without merit.
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

3 

AL were “drunk” when they left the dance club. SPC AL was stumbling and needed 

assistance getting back to the hotel room. 

 Appellant and PFC JJ ordered some food through room service. SPC AL felt 

sick, thought she might vomit, and fell asleep on a couch before the food arrived. 

Appellant and PFC JJ continued to drink after ordering room service; SPC AL did 

not consume any alcohol the remainder of the evening. PFC JJ could not wake up 

SPC AL when the room service food arrived and he never saw SPC AL awake during 

the remainder of the evening. SPC AL was fully clothed and sleeping on the couch, 

and appellant was still awake, when PFC JJ eventually fell asleep. 

 SPC AL testified that she awoke feeling the weight of appellant’s body on 

her. Her breasts were exposed and her tights were down around one of her legs. She 

fell back asleep. When she awoke a second time, appellant’s penis was inside her. 

She tried to push appellant off of her. She then told appellant to stop and he 

stopped, pulled up his trousers, and apologized. At that time, PFC JJ had passed out 

on the floor. SPC AL kicked PFC JJ but he did not wake up. SPC AL tried to stay 

awake but she again fell back asleep. 

 In the early morning hours, SPC AL awoke and telephoned Specialist SR and 

stated that she “had been raped” by appellant. PFC JJ awoke to find SPC AL on the 

telephone. SPC AL told PFC JJ that she had awoken with appellant’s “fingers inside 

her” and that appellant had “put his penis inside her.” Soon thereafter, someone 

arrived to take SPC AL from the hotel to the barracks. 

II. LAW 

 A military judge’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under an 

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. White, 69 M.J. 236, 239 (C.A.A.F. 

2010); United States v. Cucuzzella, 66 M.J. 57, 59 (C.A.A.F. 2008); United States v. 

Roberson, 65 M.J. 43, 45 (C.A.A.F. 2007). A military judge abuses his or her 

discretion when he or she is incorrect about the applicable law or improperly applies 

the law. United States v. Roberts, 59 M.J. 323, 326 (C.A.A.F 2004). 

 The abuse of discretion standard is a strict one, calling for more than a mere 

difference of opinion. The challenged action must be “arbitrary, fanciful, clearly 

unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” White, 69 M.J. at 239 (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

 If this court finds an abuse of discretion, it then reviews the prejudicial effect 

of the ruling de novo. Prejudice from an erroneous evidentiary ruling is evaluated 

by weighing “(1) the strength of the Government’s case, (2) the strength of the 

defense case, (3) the materiality of the evidence in question, and (4) the quality of 

the evidence in question.” Roberson, 65 M.J. at 47-48 (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

4 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Statement of Victim to Specialist SR Admitted as “Outcry Evidence” 

 At trial, Specialist SR testified as to her observations of and interactions with 

SPC AL the morning of the incident. Specialist SR testified that SPC AL called her 

early that morning “with a shakiness in her voice” and that “she sounded shaken . . . 

was crying a little bit, and . . . sounded kind of angry as well.” Specialist SR 

testified that SPC AL stated during the telephone conversation that “she had been 

raped.” Defense counsel’s hearsay objection to this statement was initially sustained 

by the military judge. 

 Specialist SR next testified that, in response to the telephone conversation, 

she waited for SPC AL to come to their barracks room. As a result, trial counsel 

argued that the telephonic statement by SPC AL was admissible as an “effect on the 

listener” exception to the hearsay rule. Defense counsel renewed the hearsay 

objection. The military judge observed that the “effect on the listener [argument] is 

extremely weak” but sua sponte concluded that the statement was “admissible as 

outcry evidence.” 

 Specialist SR further testified that, after the telephone conversation, SPC AL 

came to their barracks room “crying and shaking,” “angry and scared,” and stated 

that she “felt really dirty, and she just wanted to take a bath.” Specialist SR 

testified that she sat over SPC AL in the bathtub and “rubbed her head while she just 

talked about what happened.” When trial counsel asked Specialist SR what SPC AL 

had told her about the night before, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds: 

Q: And what happened next? 

A: Um, she just sat in the bathtub and cried. I sat over her, and I 

rubbed her head while she just talked about what happened. 

Q: And what did she say? 

A: She said that she had woken---- 

DC: Objection. 

MJ: Basis? 

DC: Hearsay. 

MJ: Government? 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

5 

ATC: It’s continuing under 803(3). It’s an excited utterance in 

accordance with the court’s ruling. 

MJ: I didn’t rule that it was an excited utterance. 

ATC: Admissible under--as outcry. 

. . . . 

MJ: All right. You want to be heard, Defense? 

DC: Well, I don’t believe a proper foundation has been laid if the 

government is going to offer under that basis, so I would renew my 

objection if asked that. 

MJ: Well which basis? 

DC: Um, on the excited utterance basis. 

ATC: The government withdraws its response as it relates to 803(3).

 The record reveals that, after this colloquy between the military judge and 

counsel, the witness, Specialist SR, did not answer the question of what SPC AL 

stated while in the bathtub. Thus, the sole statement to Specialist SR received in 

evidence as “outcry evidence” over defense objection was the telephonic statement 

by SPC AL to Specialist SR that “she had been raped.” 

B. Statements of Victim to PFC JJ Admitted as “Outcry Evidence” 

 The Article 32, UCMJ, hearing testimony of PFC JJ, which was read into 

evidence, reflects that, the morning of the incident, SPC AL told him that appellant 

had “touched her” and that “she was woken up to Black’s fingers inside of her, and 

that it was not welcomed . . . .” Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The 

military judge overruled the objection by concluding the statements were “proper 

outcry evidence.” These were the only statements by SPC AL to PFC JJ received in 

evidence as “outcry evidence” over defense objection. 

C. “Outcry” Evidence 

Appellant urges, as an assignment of error, that the “military judge erred by 

allowing numerous hearsay statements into evidence over defense objections by 

applying an ‘outcry’ exception independent of Mil. R. Evid. 801 and 803.” 

 As just outlined, the military judge admitted in evidence the following two 

statements of SPC AL, over defense objection, pursuant to an “outcry” exception: 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

6 

(1) telephonic statement to Specialist SR that she “had been raped”; and (2) 

statements to PFC JJ that appellant “had touched her” and that “she had woken up to 

[appellant’s] fingers inside her, and that it was not welcomed . . . .” 

 In so ruling, the record clearly reflects that the military judge described the 

“outcry” exception in precisely the terms used in the 1969 revised edition of the 

Manual for Courts Martial [hereinafter MCM, 1969]. Paragraph 142c (“Fresh 

complaint and lack of fresh complaint”) of the MCM, 1969 provided: 

In a prosecution for a sexual offense in which an alleged 

victim of either sex has testified that consent was lacking, 

evidence that the alleged victim made a complaint of the 

offense within a reasonable time after its commission is 

admissible for the purpose of corroborating the testimony 

of the victim, and this is so whether or not lack of consent 

is an element of the offense and even if the credibility of 

the victim has not been directly attacked. This evidence is 

to be restricted to proof that the complaint, including the 

identification of the offender, was made. A description of 

the details of the offense given during the course of 

making the complaint is not admissible under this rule. 

However, a description of the details of the offense related 

during the course of making the complaint may be 

received in evidence if admissible as evidence of a 

consistent statement for the purpose of corroboration 

under 153a, or if admissible under the spontaneous 

exclamation (142b), or any other, exception to the hearsay 

rule. 

 This “outcry” exception does not appear in the current Manual for CourtsMartial (i.e., the 2012 edition) or any of its recent updates or amendments. Manual 

for Courts-Martial, United States (2012 ed.) [hereinafter MCM, 2012]. However, 

defense and government appellate counsel agree that the term “outcry” as explained 

by the military judge is synonymous with the description of “fresh complaint” in the 

current version of the MCM. 

 As noted in United States v. Smith, “[A]n express exception for fresh 

complaint has been deleted as being unnecessary.” 14 M.J. 845, 846-47 (A.C.M.R. 

1982) (quoting Analysis of Military Rule of Evidence 412, 8 M.J. at CLVII). 

Nonetheless, “fresh complaint” evidence remains viable in military jurisprudence 

under certain circumstances. Evidence of fresh complaint, which is either nonhearsay under Mil. R. Evid. 801 or fits within an exception to the hearsay rule under 

Mil. R. Evid. 803, is relevant and admissible. Smith, 14 M.J. at 847; MCM, 2012, 

App. 22, Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, A22-36. Specifically, a “fresh 

complaint” by a victim of a sexual offense may, depending upon the circumstances, 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

7 

fall within a hearsay exception such as present sense impression, excited utterance, 

or then-existing mental, emotional or physical condition. MCM, 2012, App. 22, 

Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, A22-55. However, “[r]eference to ‘fresh 

complaint’ should be avoided as confusing and unduly restrictive.” Smith, 14 M.J. 

at 847 n.1. 

 In the instant case, we conclude that the military judge abused his discretion 

in allowing the statements at issue into evidence, over defense hearsay objection, 

through application of an “outcry evidence” exception independent of any analysis 

of Mil. R. Evid. 801 or 803. See United States v. Swift, ARMY 20100196, 2016 

CCA LEXIS 26, at *7-9 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 21 Jan. 2016) (mem. op.). 

D. No Prejudice Established 

 Having determined an abuse of discretion as to evidentiary rulings by the 

military judge, this court next reviews de novo any prejudicial effect of the 

erroneous rulings. United States v. Roberson, 65 M.J. 43, 47-48 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 

We find no prejudice in that certain similar statements made by SPC AL to PFC JJ 

were subsequently properly admitted in evidence by the military judge under an 

“excited utterance” hearsay exception and not as “outcry evidence.” Accordingly, 

evidence of SPC AL’s outcries were not only cumulative with her in-court account 

of what transpired but also with her admissible “excited utterances” regarding the 

incident. 

 Although defense and government appellate counsel both address any 

continuing viability of the “outcry exception” in military jurisprudence, neither 

acknowledges that certain statements made by SPC AL to PFC JJ were admitted in 

evidence, over defense hearsay objection, pursuant to a Mil. R. Evid. 803(2) 

“excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule. 

1. Victim Statements to PFC JJ—Excited Utterances 

 The trial colloquy reveals that several statements made by SPC AL to PFC JJ 

initially admitted in evidence by the military judge as “outcry” were later admitted 

under an “excited utterance” hearsay exception: 

A: [SPC AL] said that [appellant] put his penis in her. 

Q: Did she say they had sex? 

A. Um, I don’t— I don’t— I know for a fact that she said 

that he put his penis in her. 

Q: She say that he raped her? 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

8 

A: Um, I don’t remember. I really don’t remember. That 

was at that point, the way that she described the story, 

definitely it didn’t need to be said that that’s what she felt 

happened. 

Q: Describe that for me, I don’t understand. 

DC: Again, Your Honor. Same objection, hearsay. I 

think it has now gone beyond outcry to specifics of the 

outcry statement. 

MJ: Government? 

ATC: Your Honor, within the response he states the 

emotional stress of the event, and that the individual--that 

[SPC AL] is under the stress of that event and having an 

immediate response to it in her explanation of what was 

going on. 

MJ: Okay, and that’s relevant to me, how? 

ATC: Relevant as to---- 

MJ: To show her emotional state? Is that what you’re 

saying, or for a hearsay exception? 

ATC: To establish the emotional state that therefore goes 

to--is circumstantial evidence as to---- 

MJ: As circumstantial evidence that something happened? 

ATC: Yes, Your Honor. 

MJ: See you’re confusing me because there was a hearsay 

objection. 

ATC: My apologies, Your Honor. Normally you would 

have a foundation prior to the excited utterance, but this-- 

the line of questioning kind of builds. 

MJ: Okay, that’s why--that’s what I’m asking about. If 

this is for excited utterance or just circumstantial 

evidence of her emotional state to show that something 

happened. Two different things. 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

9 

ATC: I know they’re two separate things. I’ll answer the 

hearsay exception. I believe we have fallen with the 

excited utterance, but also the— could serve as a purpose 

to both. 

MJ: Well, okay. I’ll listen to more to see if we get to a 

foundation for excited utterance. 

ATC: Yes, Your Honor. 

Q: Describe that for me, I don’t understand. 

A. Um, the way that she--she kept saying that, um, it was 

unwanted and that she didn’t want it and she was very torn 

up, she was crying. And but the way--the story itself that 

she told, I remember--I don’t remember if she said it or 

not, but that was what I--that’s what I thought she was 

saying. That’s what I--that’s the story she told, was that 

she had been raped by Black. But I don’t know she 

actually said that. 

MJ: All right. So Defense, probably a better foundation 

for an excited utterance, so I’m overruling your objection. 

But the witness’ personal knowledge seems to be---- 

DC: I would agree, Your Honor. It seems to be that he is 

assuming stuff based on--not based on his memory. 

MJ: Well, assuming some stuff and not sure about his 

perceptions perhaps. I guess if that makes you feel better, 

that’s how I’m considering it. Government? 

ATC: I think, Your Honor---- 

MJ: I guess what I’m saying, it goes to the weight. But 

go ahead, government. 

ATC: Yes, Your Honor. As the responses indicated 

earlier, that were clear, that “I know that she said he put 

his penis into her” and then in his explanation he says that 

it’s unwanted. That she’s under the stress of the event, 

etc. So those subsequent statements, although he’s 

hedging, he was very clear in the beginning. And taking 

the testimony in its totality I think the testimony is clear. 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

10 

MJ: Well, I just ruled in your favor, Government. 

(emphasis added). 

 Moreover, another trial colloquy reveals that additional statements made by 

SPC AL to PFC JJ were admitted in evidence under the “excited utterance” 

exception to the hearsay rule and not as “outcry” evidence: 

Q: Do you remember how [SPC AL] woke you up? 

A: It was, um, it had to be more of a noise that she made. 

I don’t know if it was her talking or the door was shut. 

Something woke me up and she was active inside the 

room. 

Q: She didn’t come over and shake you? 

A: No. 

Q: Just her action in the room was enough to wake you 

up? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And then that’s when she--well, what did she first tell 

you? 

DC: Objection, hearsay. 

MJ: Government? 

ATC: This is an excited utterance, Your Honor, in 

accordance with prior testimony. Foundation has already 

been laid. 

MJ: Is this basically the same statement that I already 

ruled on? 

ATC: Yes, Your Honor. 

MJ: Defense, is there any difference here, or are you just 

noting your objection for the record? 

DC: There’s no difference in the contents, and I am 

noting the objection for the record. 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

11 

MJ: Overruled. 

A: That her--she was going to leave and to watch my 

friend Black around women. 

Q: And at that point [what] would you take that to mean? 

A: Um, I had no idea what that meant at first. I thought 

maybe he had, maybe he had said something. I in no way 

thought that this would be the issue. I thought maybe he 

said something or did something maybe--that maybe kind 

of creeped her out or something like that. 

Q: So I guess that though she didn’t indicate anything 

sexual assault oriented happen[ed] initially, right? 

A: No, not with that first statement. No. 

Q: What kind of inspired her to go on and make a second 

statement? 

A: Um, she was really shaken up and I think that I asked 

her to explain or asked what he did. And that’s when she 

said that he had touched her and she started talking about 

that. And at some point she sat down on the bed and told 

me that--that he had entered her vagina. 

Q: Okay. And I think you said actually that first time she 

told you she thought it was fingers? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Okay, was she clear about that at that point? 

A: Um, she said that there was a, um, a big wet spot on 

the couch and that--I don’t remember if she said that his 

fingers were in her, or had been in her. I don’t remember 

how she worded it. And then, but quickly after saying that 

she said--she sat down and she told me that she had--she 

said, 

DC: I’m going to object to that next statement as hearsay. 

MJ: Government? 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

12 

ATC: This is an ongoing excited utterance, Your Honor. 

MJ: Overruled. 

A: “That’s not all. He put it in me.” And I asked her 

what it was, and she said “his penis.” 

Q: Okay, what did you do at that point? I know you said 

you were upset. 

A: Yeah, I was upset. I was very hazy. I sat up in bed. 

I--my first thought was towards her and helping her out. I 

was upset at Black. I don’t remember what I said in 

regards to Black. I don’t remember really what I said to 

offer help to her. All of that is speculation on my part. 

But I do remember that I was very concerned for her and 

angry at the situation. 

(emphasis added). 

 The statements, admitted in evidence under an “excited utterance” hearsay 

exception, are substantially similar, if not the same, statements of SPC AL 

erroneously admitted under the “outcry exception.” Appellate defense counsel does 

not argue that the military judge erred in applying a Mil. R. Evid. 803(2) “excited 

utterance” hearsay exception to the statements. Moreover, we find no abuse of 

discretion by the military judge in this regard. Thus, we conclude that any error by 

the trial judge in admitting similar statements under the “outcry” exception to be 

harmless error. 

2. Victim Statement to Specialist SR 

 Although we find the military judge erred in admitting the telephonic 

statement of SPC AL that she “had been raped” in applying an “outcry” exception 

independent of an analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, we conclude such error 

was harmless. 

 SPC AL’s telephonic statement to Specialist SR that she “had been raped” 

may have been admissible under alternative viable theories.4 The statement may 

 

4

 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 58 M.J. 429, 433 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (“military 

judge’s error was harmless, because the military judge reached the correct result, 

albeit for the wrong reason”); United States v. Kindle, 45 M.J. 284, 288 (C.A.A.F. 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

13 

have been admissible under the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule. 

Mil. R. Evid. 803(2). The statement may have been admissible as non-hearsay 

offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper 

influence or motive. Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B); MCM, 2012, App. 22, Analysis of 

the Military Rules of Evidence, A22-53; see also State v. Graham, 815 N.W.2d 293, 

302 (S.D. 2012) (assertion in opening statement sufficient to permit admission of 

prior consistent statement to rebut a charge of recent fabrication); United States v. 

Morgan, 31 M.J. 43, 46 (C.M.A. 1990) (prior consistent statement admissible under 

Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) where defense counsel “raised two separate theories 

through his cross-examination of mother and child and his argument”). 

Additionally, the statement may have been used to evaluate the witness’ credibility, 

and not as substantive evidence, following impeachment of the witness. United 

States v. Coleman, 72 M.J. 184, 188 (C.A.A.F. 2013); see also United States v. 

Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2001). 

 However, because the military judge admitted the statement as “outcry” 

evidence, the record was not sufficiently developed as to any other possible theories 

as to admission of the statement. Thus, we are precluded from determining whether 

a sufficient alternative evidentiary foundation could have been established with 

respect to admission of the statement. For instance, we cannot conclude whether 

SPC AL’s statement to Specialist SR was made “while the declarant was under the 

stress of excitement cause by the event” or if the prior consistent statement was 

“made before the alleged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive 

occurred.” Mil. R. Evid. 803(2); United States v. McCaskey, 30 M.J. 188, 192 

(C.M.A. 1990); Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B); see also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 

150 (1995); Morgan, 31 M.J. 46. 

 Nonetheless, even assuming that SPC AL’s telephonic statement to Specialist 

SR was not admissible under any rule or theory, we determine the admission of the 

statement was harmless error in that the statement was cumulative with SPC AL’s 

in-court detailed testimony and also consistent with the properly admitted “excited 

utterances” made by SPC AL to PFC JJ minutes before the telephonic statement to 

Specialist SR. 

 

1996) (Gierke, J., concurring) (“[T]he military judge was correct in excluding . . . 

testimony as residual hearsay, but he was laboring under an incorrect view of the 

law. In short, he ruled correctly for the wrong reasons.”); United States v. 

Copeland, 21 C.M.R. 838, 863 (A.F.B.R. 1956) (“However, though the reason for 

the ruling was incorrect, the ruling itself was correct. . . . [T]he fact that the 

reasoning was wrong is of no consequence, for it is the judicial action and not 

judicial reason that determines the correctness of the trial proceedings.”); Robertson 

v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906-907 (Fla. 2002) (Even though a trial court’s ruling is 

based on improper reasoning, the ruling will be upheld if there is any theory or 

principal of law in the record which would support the ruling.). 
BLACK — ARMY 20140010 

14 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Upon consideration of the entire record, the finding of guilty and the sentence 

are AFFIRMED. 

Senior Judge HAIGHT and Judge PENLAND concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: