NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

GABRIEL PAUL HORCASITAS, Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0215 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2021-142720-001

The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Quinton S. Gregory

Counsel for Appellant

Lamm & Associates PLLC, Phoenix

By Jason D. Lamm

Co-Counsel for Appellee

Koplow Law Firm

By Lawrence S. Koplow

Co-Counsel for Appellee

FILED 4-4-2024
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 The State of Arizona appeals from an order vacating 

defendant Gabriel Horcasitas’ conviction and granting him a new trial

based on the State’s failure to comply with disclosure obligations. Because 

the State has shown no error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2021, Horcasitas and the victim were involved in a road 

rage incident in Chandler, Arizona. The trial evidence indicated that, when 

both vehicles were stopped at a red light, Horcasitas repeatedly honked at 

the victim. The victim got out of his truck and, while waving his arms and 

apparently shouting threats, approached Horcasitas’ car. After a few 

seconds, Horcasitas shot twice; one bullet killed the victim. During the 

investigation, police impounded cell phones from the victim and 

Horcasitas.

¶3 The State charged Horcasitas with: (1) first degree murder, a 

Class 1 dangerous felony; (2) second degree murder, a Class 1 dangerous 

felony; (3) drive by shooting, a Class 2 dangerous felony; and (4) three 

counts of endangerment (with different victims), each a Class 6 dangerous 

felony. Horcasitas disclosed various defenses, including justification, selfdefense, defense of others and accident. 

¶4 Trial began in March 2023. On the seventh day of trial, during 

the State’s case in chief, cross-examination of a detective revealed that 

police had conducted a “Cellebrite” analysis of the victim’s phone. The 

detective described Cellebrite as “a snapshot download of your phone as it 

is at the time [] it’s presented to . . . the computer crimes detective who does 

the download.” At sidebar, Horcasitas’ counsel asserted that the State had 

not disclosed the victim’s cell phone records, asking to further discuss the 

issue outside of the presence of the jury.
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The next morning, the State moved for a protective order 

addressing the victim’s Google Pixel 2XL cell phone. The motion noted that 

the police were in the possession of the victim’s cell phone, adding that 

“[d]ue to the nature of the media format and the quantity of the media data 

[on the cell phone], the victim’s identifying and/or locating information 

cannot be redacted.” The motion concluded that “the State is required to 

disclose” the victim’s cell phone “under Rule 15.1 of the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and [] defense counsel may find information . . . that 

implicates Brady v. Maryland,” 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The motion “asks that this 

Court order the . . . cell phone that belonged to the victim be disclosed,” 

subject to a protective order limiting disclosure of the victim’s identifying 

information.

¶6 In addressing the issue outside of the presence of the jury, 

Horcasitas’ counsel argued the State’s disclosure was untimely, coming 

during the third week of trial after he had “committed to defenses” and

“shaped defenses through testimony.” He added that “[g]oing through a 

Cellebrite analysis is extremely laborious,” involving “double-digit hours” 

and expert analysis, adding “that the expert whom I normally use is not 

available to do this anytime soon. So I think there certainly is prejudice at 

this point.” The State told the court it had “requested those [Cellebrite] 

records yesterday,” also referencing a “supplement that discusses those 

records with regard to Cellebrite and the download from the victim’s 

phone, so he was on notice that the information existed.” The State 

continued: “[w]e didn’t receive it, we didn’t request it, we didn’t ask for it, 

but [Horcasitas] was on notice that the information existed, and it wasn’t as 

if he made a request for it and we did not provide it to him.” 

¶7 Later during this exchange, the State indicated that the 

conclusion in the motion for protective order – that “the State is required to 

disclose” the victim’s cell phone – was “a standard motion for every 

victim’s phone.” The State added that the cell phone reports “may have” 

been first received “in our office this morning.” When discussing potential 

exculpatory information on the cell phone, the prosecutor responded that 

she “didn’t look at the phone,” later admitting that no lawyer in her office 

had done so.

¶8 Noting that the extent of any prejudice could not be 

determined until the disclosure was provided, Horcasitas reserved the right 

to move for a mistrial. After discussing the possibility of a mistrial, the 

superior court granted the motion for protective order, found a discovery 

violation by the State and deferred appropriate sanctions. The court then 
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

4

ordered the State to provide Horcasitas with the Cellebrite information that 

same day.

¶9 After five additional trial days, and deliberation, the jury 

returned split verdicts, finding Horcasitas: (1) not guilty of first-degree

murder; (2) not guilty of second-degree murder, but guilty of the lesser 

included offense of manslaughter by sudden quarrel or heat of passion; (3) 

not guilty of drive by shooting; and (4) guilty of one count of endangerment

and not guilty of the other two endangerment counts. 

¶10 Horcasitas filed a timely motion to dismiss with prejudice, or 

in the alternative, for a new trial. The motion argued that the Cellebrite 

analysis of the victim’s phone included exculpatory evidence not

previously disclosed, including texts relating to the victim’s mental state 

and tendency to “snap[]” while driving in the weeks leading up to the 

shooting. The State opposed the motion, arguing “there was no Brady or 

Rule 15 violation.” 

¶11 After oral argument, the court found that the text messages 

from the victim’s cell phone bolstered Horcasitas’ self-defense and related 

justifications and could have mitigated his punishment. The court also 

found the State had violated its disclosure obligations under both Brady and 

Rule 15.1(b)(8) because it failed to disclose the Cellebrite information to 

Horcasitas, so he “did not have the opportunity to ferret it out and [] present 

it to the jury.” The court ordered that the victim’s full Cellebrite report be 

turned over to Horcasitas but denied his request for production of the 

phone itself. Although noting the failure to disclose was not intentional, 

and a reluctance to set aside a jury verdict, the court granted Horcasitas’

motion for new trial and vacated the verdicts but denied his request for

dismissal with prejudice. Concluding the State “violated its Brady

obligations under Rule 15.1(B)(8) in not producing this information,” the 

court noted Horcasitas was entitled to put on a complete defense, that he 

was prevented from doing so by the failure to provide proper disclosure 

and concluded that the State “didn’t even have a lawyer look at it. That’s 

misconduct in this Court’s opinion. Therefore, I’m granting the Motion for 

New Trial.”
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

5

¶12 This court has jurisdiction over the State’s timely appeal

pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-

4033(A)(2024).

1

DISCUSSION

¶13 The superior court’s decision on a motion for new trial is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4 (1993). 

This discretion is particularly broad, given the trial judge “is in the best 

position to determine whether the evidence will actually affect the outcome 

of the trial.” State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304 ¶ 32 (2000). Significant 

deference is relevant here, where the same judge who presided over the 

trial is asked to assess whether a criminal defendant was able to present a 

complete defense in considering a motion for new trial. See generally State v. 

Fischer, 242 Ariz. 44, 50 ¶ 21 (2017) (describing, in reviewing an appeal from 

a new trial based on a claim the verdict was contrary to the evidence, the 

deference owed to the trial judge). 

¶14 The basis for the new trial was a finding that the State failed 

to comply with its disclosure obligations under both Brady and Rule 15.1.

In general, rulings on the adequacy of disclosure are also reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 205 ¶ 21 (2006) 

(citing State v. Piper, 113 Ariz. 390, 392 (1976)); State v. Arvallo, 232 Ariz. 200, 

206 ¶ 36 (App. 2013). Similarly, this court reviews the imposition of 

sanctions for non-disclosure for an abuse of discretion. Roque, 213 Ariz. at 

205 ¶ 21(2006) (citing State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 353–54 ¶ 40 (2004)).

I. The State Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Finding the 

State Violated Its Disclosure Obligations.

¶15 The State argues that it met its disclosure obligations under 

both Brady and Rule 15.1 because “the download of the [v]ictim’s cell phone 

was ‘made available’ to Horcasitas,” and “nothing on that phone had any 

relevance to his guilt.” While there is significant overlap between Brady and 

Rule 15.1, decades ago, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that they are not 

identical. The State’s disclosure obligation under Rule 15.1 “is broader than

the requirements of Brady. There may be violations of Rule 15.1, although 

arguably harmless, where there is no Brady violation.” State v. Jessen, 130 

Ariz. 1, 4 (1981). As applicable here, Rule 15.1(b)(8) directs the State to 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

6

“make available to the defendant” any information that “tends to mitigate 

or negate the defendant’s guilt or would tend to reduce the defendant’s 

punishment.”

A. The State Has Not Shown the Superior Court Abused Its 

Discretion in Finding the State Violated Its Disclosure 

Obligations Even Though the Evidence Was Provided to 

Horcasitas During Trial.

¶16 The State argues that it did not violate Brady because 

“Horcasitas received and could have made effective use of the disputed 

material at trial.” The analysis here, however, is under Rule 15.1, and the 

State has not cited authority suggesting the analysis is the same under that 

rule. Even if it is the same, although the State is not required to disclose 

Brady material before trial, “[d]isclosure must be made at a time when 

disclosure would be of value to the accused.” United States v. Gordon, 844 

F.2d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir. 1988).

¶17 Here, Horcasitas did not receive the Cellebrite information 

until cross-examination of the detective was finished and after the parties 

were two-thirds of the way through trial. Horcasitas then had to secure the 

services of an expert, who was unavailable during trial, and review

“thousands of text (SMS) and MMS messages.” Horcasitas had not finished 

that undertaking before jury deliberations, when he notified the court of 

several significant texts he found. Based on these facts, the superior court 

could reasonably conclude the State’s disclosure was too late to “be of value 

to the accused.” Gordon, 844 F.2d at 1403. Accordingly, the State has not 

shown the superior court abused its discretion.

B. The State Has Not Shown the Superior Court Abused Its 

Discretion in Finding the State Did Not Sufficiently 

Disclose the Cell Phone Download to Horcasitas.

¶18 The State argues it met its obligation to make the Cellebrite 

information available to Horcasitas because, a year before trial, it provided 

him with a police report. In that report, an officer wrote that on November 

17, 2021, he “viewed the forensic download of the victim’s cell phone for 

the time frame before, after, and during the incident. No items of 

evidentiary value were found. A copy of the forensic download has been 

preserved by the Computer Crimes Unit should it be needed.”

¶19 The superior court found that merely providing Horcasitas 

with a police report mentioning a “forensic download” was insufficient for 

the State to meet its disclosure obligations. The State “should have given 
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

7

the information. They should have given the Cellebrite information, and 

they should have had an attorney look at it.” 

¶20 “Simply stated, the rule is that the prosecution must turn over 

to the defendant full information regarding any exculpatory evidence it 

possesses unless the defendant actually has knowledge of such evidence.”

State v. Jones, 120 Ariz. 556, 560 (1978) (emphasis added). Here, though 

Horcasitas had notice that a “forensic download” existed, the record 

supports the superior court’s finding that he did not have any knowledge 

of the text messages relating to the victim’s mental state and driving 

tendencies. 

¶21 Jones, where the State interviewed the defendant’s associate 

but did not disclose several statements made during the interview, is 

analogous. There, the Arizona Supreme Court found that:

Under the facts revealed by the record, although 

the defendant knew that a witness was to be 

interviewed by the [S]tate, he did not know 

what exculpatory testimony, if any, would 

ultimately be revealed to the [S]tate at that 

interview . . . if [the State is] in doubt as to 

whether or not a defendant knows of certain 

exculpatory evidence already known to the 

[S]tate, reveal it.

Jones, 120 Ariz. at 560. Likewise, though Horcasitas may have been notified 

by the police report that a forensic download of the victim’s phone existed, 

he did not have knowledge of the exculpatory texts found in the download, 

especially when the report declares that “no items of evidentiary value” 

were found. On this record, the superior court properly could conclude that 

the State did not sufficiently disclose the cell phone download.

C. The State Has Not Shown the Superior Court Abused Its 

Discretion in Finding Rule 15.1(b)(8) Required the State to

Disclose the Cellebrite Information.

¶22 The State argues it did not violate Rule 15.1 because the text 

messages found on the victim’s phone are “non-material and nonexculpatory evidence.” Rule 15.1(b)(8), however, requires disclosure of 

information that “tends to mitigate or negate the defendant’s guilt or would 

tend to reduce the defendant’s punishment.” Again, on this record, the 

superior court properly could conclude that Rule 15.1(b)(8) required the 

State to disclose the text messages.
STATE v. HORCASITAS

Decision of the Court

8

¶23 The superior court found the Cellebrite information to be the 

kind of information Rule 15.1(b)(8) requires be disclosed, noting the State 

charged Horcasitas with first degree felony murder. The court added:

“Wouldn’t this information tend to mitigate or negate the defendant’s guilt 

down to a manslaughter charge or tend to reduce his punishment from 

felony murder down to what the jury found was manslaughter?” 

¶24 The State countered that Horcasitas had the opportunity to 

present his self-defense argument at trial. The superior court, however,

noted Horcasitas was “entitled to put on his complete defense,” meaning 

the State had an obligation to disclose the Cellebrite information:

If [Horcasitas] can argue self-defense, that tends 

to mitigate the punishment because the 

punishment for manslaughter is a lot less than 

drive-by shooting, felony murder . . . And this 

goes towards self-defense even more. I don’t 

know if it would have persuaded the jury 

otherwise . . . but [Horcasitas] should have had 

the opportunity to have that information so he 

could have used it in preparation for his defense 

in front of the jury.

¶25 Though the State argued otherwise, the superior court found 

the Cellebrite information was material to Horcasitas’ self-defense claim. 

See also Ariz. R. Evid. 401(b) (using, as a proxy for materiality, that “the fact 

is of consequence in determining the action”). On this record, the State has 

not shown the superior court abused its discretion in finding the text 

messages to be the kind of evidence that must be disclosed under Rule 

15.1(b)(8). 

CONCLUSION

¶26 The superior court’s order, finding the State unintentionally 

violated Rule 15.1 and vacating Horcasitas’ convictions and ordering a new 

trial, is affirmed.