No. 14223 

IN THE SUPREC4E CCUR!I' OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1978 

Claimant and Respondent, 

THE REBER COMPANY, rnloyer, 

and 

AFGOIWVT INSURANCE CaMPANY, 

Defendant and Appllant. 

Appeal from: hbrkers' Canpensation Court 

Hon. William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Harris, Jackson & Wdo, Helena, Pbntana 

John Grant argued, Helena, Pbntana 

For Respondent: 

Keller, Reynolds ard Drake, Helena, Wntana 

Paul T. Keller argued, Helena, Wntana 

Filed : 

Sutanitted: Novemkr 14 1978 

Decided : 

NOV 2 7 1958 
Mr. ~ustice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

On ~uly 24, 1973, while employed as a plumber by The 

~eber Company, Howard Strandberg fell from a ladder and 

fractured his left hip. Argonaut Insurance Company, Reber 

Company's Plan 2 workers' compensation carrier, paid Strandberg temporary total disability. 

Strandberg, 53 years old at the time of the accident, 

attempted to return to work for Reber in October, 1974, but 

found he was unable to keep up as a plumber, primarily 

because of pain and lack of mobility. After a period of two 

and one-half days, he had to terminate his employment. 

Since that time he has tried various jobs such as truck 

driving, irrigating and fencing but has been unable to find 

work involving sitting or standing that he could do for any 

length of time without experiencing pain. 

In 1977 Strandberg began to complain of back problems. 

At this point he petitioned the Workers' Compensation Court 

for a hearing on his eligibility for permanent total disability. The case was referred to a hearings examiner. 

Strandberg was subsequently examined by two orthopedic 

specialists who testified, that because of the manner in 

which his hip had healed, Strandberg had developed a Trendelenburg's gait, described as a "listing gait over the 

hip," his left leg had shortened measurably, and he walked 

with a limp. These aftereffects of the fractured hip had in 

turn aggravated a preexisting condition in Strandberg's 

spine known as spondylolisthesis, in which one vertebra is 

not developed, resulting in an inability for Strandberg to be 

on his feet or do heavy work for any length of time. 

While spondylolisthesis is a chronic condition which 

may become symptomatic with age, both examining physicians 
testified they felt Strandberg's limp, as a result of his 

fractured hip, accelerated and aggravated the preexisting 

condition. 

On the basis of this undisputed testimony the hearings 

examiner made findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to Strandberg. The Workers' Compensation Court adopted 

these findings and conclusions and denied Argonaut's petition for a rehearing. From the judgment and denial of the 

petition for a rehearing, Argonaut appeals. 

The issue we are asked to decide is whether a person 

injured in an industrial accident is entitled to compensation when an injury to one part of his body results in the 

aggravation of a preexisting condition in another part of 

the body. We hold that he is and affirm the Workers' Compensation Court. 

We have long recognized the doctrine in Montana that an 

employee suffering from a preexisting condition is not 

denied compensation if the disability was aggravated or 

accelerated by an industrial injury. Clark v. Hilde Construction Co. (1978), Mont. - , 576 P.2d 1112, 1114, 

35 St.Rep. 353, 355; Bond v. St. Regis Paper Co. (1977), 

Mont. , 571 P.2d 372, 374, 34 St.Rep. 1237, 1240; 

Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum (1975), 166 Mont. 17, 28, 530 

P.2d 433, 439. The rule is that when preexisting diseases 

are aggravated by an injury and disabilities result, such 

disabilities are to be treated and considered as the result 

of the injury. Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board (1955), 

129 Mont. 394, 403, 287 P.2d 256, 260. 

Appellant would now have us limit this doctrine to 

cases where the preexisting condition affected only that 

part of the body subsequently injured in the industrial 
accident. This we decline to do. Such a holding would 

force us into a narrow and technical construction of the 

Workers' Compensation statutes and thus defeat the liberal 

and humane intention of the legislature in providing for the 

benefit and protection of the injured worker. Garland v. 

Anaconda Co. (1978), Mont. , 581 P.2d 431, 433, 35 

St-Rep. 923, 926; Rumsey v. Cardinal Petroleum, supra, 166 

Mont. at 26, 530 P.2d at 438; Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison 

(1955), 128 Mont. 570, 571, 280 P.2d 1086, 1087. 

Neither do previous cases suggest such a limited doctrine. We allowed recovery in Gaffney where a fall aggravated preexisting Parkinson's disease and cerebral arterial 

sclerosis both of which, like Strandberg's spondylolisthesis, 

are progressive diseases of a degenerative nature. In 

Weakley v. Cook (1952), 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926, a 

preexisting heart condition was aggravated when the claimant 

fell backwards. In Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co. (1933), 

95 Mont. 347, 26 P.2d 973, an unexpected back strain triggered preexisting Parkinson's disease of the nervous system. 

In both cases compensation was allowed. 

See also the recent case of Close v. St. Regis Paper 

Co. (19771, Mont. , 573 P.2d 163, 34 St.Rep. 1528, 

where a blow to the claimant's head aggravated a dormant 

condition in her neck. This is analogous to the injury to 

Strandberg's hip aggravating a dormant condition in his 

lower back. We have also held that where an industrial 

accident causes preexisting psychological problems to flare 

up the claimant is entitled to compensation. Schumacher v. 

Empire Steel Mfg. Co. (19771, - Mont. - , 574 P.2d 987, 

988, 34 St.Rep. 1112, 1114. Clearly in these cases there is 

no connection between the site of the subsequent injury and 
the preexisting condition and no suggestion that there must 

be such a physical relationship. 

All that is necessary is that the accident aggravate or 

accelerate the preexisting disease or disability. Under 

such circumstances the claimant must "produce sufficient 

evidence, direct, indirect or circumstantial to cause in the 

unprejudiced mind a conviction that such was the fact." 

Gaffney, 129 Mont. at 404-05, 287 P.2d at 261. Proof that 

it was medically possible for an industrial accident to 

aggravate a preexisting condition is acceptable proof of 

disability. Viets v. Sweet Grass County (1978), Mont . 

- , 583 P.2d 1070, 1072, 35 St.Rep. 1364, 1366-67. Here, 

Strandberg met this burden of proof as shown in part by this 

excerpt from the deposition of one of the examining physicians, Dr. Harris Hanson: 

"Q. And how about his spondylolisthesis in his 

back. Was it affected by this injury? A. On 

the basis of what I found on the X-rays, I think 

this was a preexisting problem, but with his 

shortening and his limp, the spondylolisthesis 

and the degenerative changes about his back 

probably have been affected by it yet. 

"Q. They have been aggravated, would you say? 

A. Yes." 

The deposition of Dr. Robert Seim, the examining doctor 

for Argonaut, is to the same effect. Likewise, undisputed 

evidence established that Strandberg was unable to return to 

his former occupation or to perform any job for more than a 

couple of hours at any time. 

On questions of fact, contained in the record, our 

function in reviewing decisions of the Workers' Compensation 

Court is limited to ascertaining whether substantial evidence 

exists to support the findings and conclusions of that 

court. If there is substantial evidence to support the 
court's findings, we cannot overturn the decision. Jensen 

v. Zook Bros. Construction Co. (1978), Mont. , 582 

P.2d 1191, 1193, 35 St.Rep. 1066, 1068. On the record 

before us we find the requisite substantial evidence to 

support the finding of the Workers' Compensation Court that 

Strandberg's industrial accident to his hip aggravated his 

preexisting spinal condition resulting in permanent total 

disability. 

Section 92-713, R.C.M. 1947, authorizes the reopening 

and proper adjustment of a workers' compensation case "[ilf 

aggravation . . . takes place or [is] discovered after . . . 

compensation [is] terminated in any case." This language 

indicates that the legislature recognized the possibility 

that aggravation of an injury may occur after the normal 

period of compensation has expired, as occurred here. The 

Workerst Compensation Court acted correctly under the authorization of this statute. 

The judgment of the Workerst Compensation Court is 

affirmed. 

We Concur: 

?LLd Chief Justice Gk!&4yJLP