Filed 1/20/23 Castronovo v. Castronova CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CATHERINE CASTRONOVO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

MARY ELLEN CASTRONOVO, as 

Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

 D079272

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-

00045254-PR-TR-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Jeffrey S. Bostwick, Judge. Affirmed.

Samantha Castronovo, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Catherine Castronovo, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sandra Bonds-Hickey; Karcher Harmes and Kathryn E. Karcher, for 

Defendant and Respondent.

Following a bench trial in a probate proceeding, Catherine and 

Samantha Castronovo appeal from the trial court’s order denying their 
2

petition to invalidate a trust and trust amendment created by their late 

mother, Mary Castronovo.1 

As we will explain, we conclude that neither Catherine nor Samantha 

have asserted meritorious appellate arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s order denying the petition to invalidate. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mary and Sam Castronovo had three children: Mary Ellen, Catherine,

and Samantha. In 2007, Mary and Sam each created a will, which set forth 

the following disposition of their property after the last of them died: $10,000 

to Samantha “with consideration for past consideration paid to her”; oneeighth of the net estate to Catherine “with consideration for past 

consideration paid to her”; one-eighth of the net estate to each of three 

grandchildren; and the balance of the net estate to Mary Ellen, including “the

residence and contents.” Sam died in June 2015. A few months after Sam’s 

death, Mary created a trust titled The Mary F. Castronovo Trust Dated 

September 30, 2015 (the Trust), which named Mary and Mary Ellen as cotrustees. 

The Trust stated that upon Mary’s death, the property of the Trust 

would be distributed as follows: (1) Mary Ellen would get real property in 

Alameda, California, as well as all Trust assets that remained after the 

distributions to other parties; (2) Samantha would get $10,000; (3) Catherine 

would get one-eighth of the Trust assets; and (4) three grandchildren would 

each get one-eighth of the Trust assets. The Trust stated that for both 

1 Because the relevant family members all share the same last name, we 

will refer to them by their first names for the sake of clarity, and we intend 

no disrespect by doing so. 
3

Samantha and Catherine, the amount of each of their distributions was “with

consideration for past distributions paid to her.” 

In February 2017, Mary created a First Amendment to the Trust (the 

First Amendment). The First Amendment changed the distribution of the 

Trust assets in the following respects: (1) Mary Ellen was given an 

additional real property, located in Oceanside, California; and (2) the $10,000 

given to Samantha would be reduced by any damages caused by Samantha or 

her family to a real property in San Diego, owned by the Trust, where 

Samantha was residing. 

Mary died on June 28, 2017, making Mary Ellen the sole trustee of a 

now-irrevocable trust.2

On November 27, 2017, Catherine and Samantha (represented by 

counsel) filed a petition to invalidate the Trust and the First Amendment (the 

Invalidation Petition). The Invalidation Petition alleged three theories of 

invalidity: (1) Mary lacked capacity to create the Trust and the First 

Amendment; (2) Mary was unduly influenced by Mary Ellen in creating those 

documents; and (3) Mary created the Trust and First Amendment under a 

mistake of fact which arose from diminished mental capacity or undue 

influence. 

On March 5, 2018, Mary Ellen, on behalf of herself as a beneficiary, 

filed a petition seeking an order disinheriting Samantha and Catherine on 

2 The parties inform us that Mary Ellen died in September 2021. The 

respondent’s brief, filed by the Trust, explains that this action may continue 

in Mary Ellen’s name pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 368.5. 

(Code Civ. Proc., § 368.5 [“An action or proceeding does not abate by the 

transfer of an interest in the action or proceeding or by any other transfer of 

an interest. The action or proceeding may be continued in the name of the 

original party, or the court may allow the person to whom the transfer is 

made to be substituted in the action or proceeding.”].) 
4

the grounds that their petition violated the Trust’s no contest clause (the 

Disinheritance Petition). 

In June 2019, Catherine (represented by counsel) filed an ex parte 

application requesting an order requiring a preliminary distribution to 

Catherine from the Trust estate in the amount of $10,000. On July 5, 2019, 

the trial court granted the request on the condition that Catherine execute a 

note for the amount of the distribution secured by her residence, with the 

Trust to be placed in secured position immediately behind prior secured 

creditors.

On November 8, 2019, Catherine (now representing herself), filed an ex 

parte application stating that she objected to the lien as a condition of the 

preliminary distribution. On November 19, 2019, the trial court denied the 

ex parte application, explaining that it was an improper request for 

reconsideration of its July 5, 2019 ruling. 

The trial court held a bench trial on the Invalidation Petition and the 

Disinheritance Petition. The trial took place on six days between November 

2020 and April 2021. The Trust was represented by counsel during the trial.

Samantha and Catherine represented themselves. The trial was held 

remotely due to the pandemic. Several witnesses testified in addition to 

Samantha, Catherine and Mary Ellen. Those witnesses included (1) Mary’s 

estate planning attorney; (2) an attorney whom Mary retained in 2016 to 

start the process of evicting Samantha from real property; (3) Mary’s primary 

care physician; and (4) a social worker who interacted with Mary in the 

hospital in 2017. 

The trial court ruled from the bench on the last day of trial and then 

issued a written ruling on May 18, 2021. The trial court denied both the 

Invalidation Petition and the Disinheritance Petition. 
5

With respect to the Invalidation Petition, the trial court explained that 

Samantha and Catherine had not met their burden to establish that Mary 

created the Trust or the First Amendment under circumstances indicating 

lack of capacity or undue influence.3 

The trial court explained that “the only testimony offered suggesting 

Mary lacked capacity was from Catherine and Samantha,” which was 

“contradicted by no less than four professionals, two of whom Mary did not 

hire.” The trial court explained, “There is simply no independent evidence 

that Mary did not understand the nature of her actions in executing the 

Trust or the [First] Amendment, the nature of her property or the nature of 

her relations, or those persons whose interests are affected by the Trust and 

the [First] Amendment. There is simply no evidence that Mary suffered from 

any mental deficit that would rebut the presumption that she had capacity 

when she executed the Trust and the [First] Amendment.” 

Regarding undue influence, the trial court explained that “the 

professionals’ testimony rebuts Catherine and Samantha’s arguments on this

theory.” The trial court stated that “the only evidence suggesting undue 

influence is Samantha’s and Catherine’s unpersuasive self-serving 

testimony,” but that “[t]he professionals’ testimony demonstrates that none of 

the factors of undue influence is present.” Among other things, the 

professionals “each testified that Mary was not vulnerable. There is no 

evidence that Mary Ellen ever assumed authority over Mary or that other 

tactics of undue influence existed. . . . There was no evidence of coercion 

presented to the Court.” 

3 Moreover, because the cause of action alleging mistake of fact was 

premised solely on the theory of lack of capacity or undue influence, the trial 

court ruled that claim was also not meritorious. 
6

With respect to the Disinheritance Petition, the trial court determined 

it was not meritorious because a reasonable person could have concluded

there was a reasonable likelihood that the relief requested in the Invalidation 

Petition would be granted after further investigation or discovery. 

Samantha and Catherine both filed notices of appeal and appellate 

briefs. Samantha and Catherine are both self-represented. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Catherine’s Appellate Briefing

Catherine filed both an opening appellate brief and a reply brief. 

Catherine’s opening brief contains 19 pages of discussion, and her reply brief 

contains 15 pages of discussion. 

We begin our discussion of Catherine’s briefing by reviewing the rules 

governing an appellant’s burden to submit briefing that conforms to the 

applicable rules and sets forth cogent and cognizable legal argument. “The 

most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is presumed 

correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its favor, and 

ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (City of Santa Maria v. 

Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “In order to demonstrate error, an 

appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument 

supported by legal analysis and citation to the record. Rather than scour the 

record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has waived a point urged 

on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record. 

[Citations.] Similarly, we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not 

supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by 

which the appellant reached the conclusions [it] wants us to adopt.” (Id. at 

pp. 286-287.) A party’s brief must “[s]tate each point under a separate 
7

heading or subheading . . . , and support each point by argument and, if 

possible, by citation of authority.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)

“Appropriate headings require litigants to ‘ “present their cause 

systematically and so arranged that those upon whom the duty devolves of 

ascertaining the rule of law to apply may be advised, as they read, of the 

exact question under consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it 

from the mass.” ’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) 

“ ‘Mere suggestions of error without supporting argument or authority 

other than general abstract principles do not properly present grounds for 

appellate review.’ ” (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 

1457.) “ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine 

the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’ ” (Flores v. 

Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 204

(Flores).) “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to 

support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the 

point as forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 

1014, 1075.) 

We are mindful that Catherine represents herself, which, for a person 

untrained in the law may be a difficult task. Nevertheless, “as a party 

appearing in propria persona, [she] ‘is entitled to the same, but no greater, 

consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (Tanguilig v. Valdez

(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.) “ ‘[A]s is the case with attorneys, [selfrepresented] litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.’ ” (Stover v. 

Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 31; see also Flores, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 205 [“The same rules apply to a party appearing in propria persona as to 

any other party.”].) 
8

We have closely reviewed both of Catherine’s briefs. Although lengthy, 

Catherine’s appellate briefing does not make any specific legal arguments, is 

not organized under specific argument headings, and does not support its 

discussion with any citations to the record or to any appropriate legal 

authority. Because of these deficiencies, we are unable to ascertain the legal 

arguments, if any, that Catherine intends to advance. We therefore conclude 

Catherine has forfeited her appellate claims by not adequately developing 

them in the manner required for appellate review. 

B. Samantha’s Appellate Briefing

Samantha filed an opening appellate brief setting forth five pages of 

substantive discussion. Samantha’s brief advances cognizable legal 

arguments, accompanied by citation to legal authority, and it attempts to 

provide citations to the record. Although Samantha’s arguments are 

disorganized and challenging to follow, we conclude that they are sufficiently 

developed for us to address them on the merits.

1. The Trial Court’s Exclusion of Two Witnesses on Relevance 

Grounds

We first address Samantha’s contention that the trial court erred in 

excluding evidence about the circumstances of Mary’s death. We apply an 

abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the trial court’s decision to 

exclude evidence. (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 46 [“ ‘ “A trial court’s 

exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence is reviewable for 

abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court 

exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner 

that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ”].)

a. Dr. Magana

In her arguments challenging the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, 

Samantha principally focuses on the contention that the trial court erred 
9

with respect to its rulings concerning Dr. Marisa Magana, whom Samantha 

and Catherine called as a witness at trial.

Dr. Magana works in the intensive care unit at the hospital where 

Mary died. Dr. Magana had no specific memory of treating Mary in the 

hospital. However, Samantha attempted to have Dr. Magana authenticate 

and provide testimony about a hospital record relating to Mary’s death, 

which Samantha referred to as a “death summary.” 

Due to difficulties arising from the remotely-held trial, Dr. Magana did 

not have the death summary in front of her during her testimony and was 

accordingly unable to answer questions about it. Samantha asked the trial 

court whether it would “be possible to complete questioning for this moment 

but reserve the right to bring [Dr. Magana] back” after she had the document 

in front of her. Opposing counsel responded by moving to have Dr. Magana 

excused altogether on the ground that Dr. Magana did not have any 

information that was relevant to the issues before the court, namely the 

validity of the Trust and the First Amendment. The trial court agreed with 

opposing counsel and excused Dr. Magana. As the trial court explained, “The

topic of the lawsuit is, as counsel pointed out, not a wrongful death action.” 

Samantha challenges the trial court’s ruling, which she characterizes 

as “not allow[ing]” the death summary “to be uploaded during a remote trial.” 

Samantha argues that “[i]n a regular courtroom trial she could have simply 

walked the evidence across the room to be authenticated.” In support of her 

argument that “[t]he trial court erred in not allowing evidence to be uploaded 

during the remote hearing” (underscoring omitted), Samantha cites an 
10

inapposite provision of the Evidence Code4 and she generally asserts that the

trial court’s ruling violated “[o]ne of the basic rules of evidence.” 

Samantha’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling fails because it does not 

grapple with the basis for the trial court’s ruling concerning Dr. Magana. 

Samantha focuses only on her inability to upload the death summary 

document during the remotely-held trial. However, regardless of Samantha’s 

problems with attempting to present the document to Dr. Magana during the 

remotely-held trial, Samantha was ultimately unable to obtain Dr. Magana’s 

testimony regarding the document for a different reason, which she does not 

acknowledge or address in her appellate briefing. Specifically, the trial court 

ruled that Dr. Magana’s testimony would not be relevant to any of the issues 

presented at trial. 

Only relevant evidence is admissible (Evid. Code, § 350), and “[t]he 

trial court has broad discretion . . . in determining the relevance of evidence”

(People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 900). Here, the Invalidation 

Petition alleged Mary lacked capacity and was unduly influenced when she 

executed the Trust in September 2015 and the First Amendment in February 

2017. Mary died on June 28, 2017, after a brief hospitalization, which began 

on June 23, 2017. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the 

circumstances surrounding Mary’s death in June 2017, which was several 

months after she executed the First Amendment in February 2017 were not 

relevant to those issues. 

4 Specifically, Samantha quotes Evidence Code section 911, which states 

that a person does not have a privilege to refuse to be a witness or produce 

evidence. That provision is inapplicable here because the issue is whether 

the trial court was within its discretion to make the challenged evidentiary 

ruling, not whether any witness had a privilege to refuse to participate.
11

Throughout her appellate briefing, as she did during the trial, 

Samantha makes statements suggesting that the issues properly before the 

trial court included an exploration of Mary Ellen’s role during Mary’s death. 

For example, in her appellate brief Samantha states that Mary Ellen “had 

access to [Mary] in the days before her passing and made decisions about 

[Mary’s] care that caused her questionable needless passing with sedative 

care rather than ‘lifesaving’ care.” She also contends that Mary Ellen made 

“critical decisions regarding the care of [Mary]” that “eventually led to the 

decision of her being given a med that caused cardiac arrest” and did not 

allow “basic resuscitation to be performed to bring [Mary] to life again.” 

(Underscoring omitted.) However, as the trial court reasonably concluded 

during the trial, such allegations were not within the scope of the issues 

presented by the Invalidation Petition, which was focused on the question of 

whether Mary lacked capacity or was subject to undue influence at the time 

she created the Trust and the First Amendment.

At oral argument, Samantha argued that testimony about the 

circumstances of Mary’s death was relevant, and should have been admitted 

by the trial court, based on what she referred to as “the slayer’s rule.” 

Although Samantha did not provide a citation for that rule, we infer she is 

referring to Probate Code section 250. That provision states that “[a] person 

who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any of 

the following: (1) Any property, interest, or benefit under a will of the 

decedent, or a trust created by or for the benefit of the decedent or in which 

the decedent has an interest . . . .” (Prob. Code, § 250, subd. (a).) It also 

states that “[a]ny nomination in a will or trust of the killer as executor, 

trustee, guardian, conservator, or custodian which becomes effective as a 

result of the death of the decedent shall be interpreted as if the killer had 
12

predeceased the decedent.” (Id., § 250, subd. (b)(3).) As we understand 

Samantha’s argument, evidence about the circumstances of Mary’s death was

relevant to show that Mary Ellen was disqualified as a beneficiary and as a 

trustee under Probate Code section 250. For two reasons, we reject 

Samantha’s attempt to rely on “the slayer’s rule” to establish that the trial 

court abused its discretion in excluding evidence about the circumstances of 

Mary’s death. First, Samantha did not identify “the slayer’s rule” when 

arguing in the trial court for the admission of testimony about the 

circumstances of Mary’s death. Accordingly, the trial court cannot be faulted 

for failing to allow testimony on that basis. Second, the Invalidation Petition 

did not seek relief against Mary Ellen based on Probate Code section 250. 

Thus, even if Samantha had requested that certain testimony be admitted 

based on Probate Code section 250, the trial court would have been within its 

discretion to exclude it as irrelevant to any issue raised by the pleadings. 

b. Dr. Levin

Samantha’s appellate briefing also takes issue with a second 

evidentiary ruling by the trial court excluding evidence about the 

circumstances of Mary’s death.

Samantha and Catherine sought to present the expert testimony of 

Dr. Mark Levin. During trial, before allowing Samantha or Catherine to 

elicit expert testimony from Dr. Levin, the trial court permitted opposing 

counsel to conduct voir dire examination of him. During voir dire

examination, Dr. Levin testified that the scope of his expert opinion 

concerned only whether there was a possibility that Mary might have 

survived on June 28, 2017, if more aggressive measures were used to treat 

her. Dr. Levin also stated that he had no opinion about Mary’s mental 

capacity or whether she was subject to undue influence. After voir dire, 
13

opposing counsel moved to exclude Dr. Levin on the ground that his planned

testimony was “absolutely irrelevant to the claims in this case, which are the 

claims that the 2015 Trust and the 2017 [First] Amendment should be 

declared void because of undue influence or lack of mental capacity.” The 

trial court granted the motion to exclude Dr. Levin, explaining that “[t]he 

witness can offer no expert opinion on any issue relevant to these 

proceedings.” 

Samantha does not present any specific legal argument challenging the 

trial court’s ruling regarding Dr. Levin, but she does complain in general that 

“[m]edical expert testimony was not allowed” even though “[t]he medical 

expert was ready and available to give . . . testimony at trial.” Whatever 

specific legal challenge Samantha might intend to raise with respect to the 

trial court’s ruling regarding Dr. Levin, it would fail for the same reason as 

the challenge regarding the evidence Samantha sought to illicit through Dr. 

Magana. As we have explained, the trial court was well within its discretion 

to conclude that evidence concerning Mary’s death was irrelevant to the 

matters at issue during the trial. 

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding on 

Undue Influence

Samantha’s final challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding that Catherine and Samantha failed to meet 

their burden to prove Mary was subject to undue influence when she created 

the Trust or First Amendment. We apply a substantial evidence standard 

when, as here, we review a challenge to a trial court’s findings of fact during 

a bench trial. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) “Under 

this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to 

support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most 
14

favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in 

support of the findings.” (Ibid.)

The definition of “undue influence,” as defined by statute in Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 15610.70, subdivision (a), applies in probate 

litigation. (Prob. Code, § 86.) “ ‘Undue influence’ means excessive persuasion 

that causes another person to act or refrain from acting by overcoming that 

person’s free will and results in inequity.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.70, 

subd. (a).) As the statutory language provides, in determining undue 

influence a court should consider the vulnerability of the victim, the 

influencer’s apparent authority, tactics used to unduly influence, and the 

equity of the result. (Ibid.)

In its ruling, the trial court set forth a lengthy explanation of the 

evidence that led it to find that Samantha and Catherine did not meet their 

burden to establish that Mary was subject to undue influence at the time she 

executed the Trust or the First Amendment. Specifically, as the trial court 

observed, multiple professionals testified that they did not see any indication 

that Mary Ellen exercised undue influence over Mary. These professionals 

included Mary’s primary care doctor, the estate planning attorney who 

drafted the Trust and the First Amendment, and the social worker who met 

with Mary in the hospital shortly before her death. The trial court concluded 

that “[t]he professionals’ testimony demonstrates that none of the factors of 

undue influence is present.” 

Based on our review of the trial transcript, the trial court’s description 

of the evidence is accurate, and its finding regarding undue influence is 

supported by substantial evidence. Multiple witnesses offered testimony that 

reasonably supports the trial court’s finding that Catherine and Samantha 
15

failed to meet their burden to prove that Mary was subject to undue influence 

when she entered into the Trust and the First Amendment. 

With respect to the trial court’s finding on undue influence, Samantha 

contends that “the judge in the trial court did bad law and erred in his 

decision by saying the only professionals’ opinions were in support of Mary 

Ellen.” Samantha points to two instances of witness testimony that, in her 

view, undermine the trial court’s finding regarding undue influence. We 

consider each in turn.

First, Samantha argues that Mary’s estate planning attorney, Michael 

McCarthy, testified that “he had not been present with [Mary] 24/7 and could 

not guarantee there was no undue influence.” Although Samantha does not 

provide an exact record citation, she is apparently referring to the following 

exchange during her examination of McCarthy:

“Q. Can you be sure [Mary] had no input from anyone 

regarding the trust in between the meetings you had with her 

forming the draft through the signing of the final document?

“A. No, she could have talked to anybody.

“Q. So you’re not sure if there was anyone, if anyone else, 

influencing how the draft and final document was written?

“A. I saw no influence.

“Q. You saw no influence based—is it correct that you saw no 

influence based only on what you saw at your professional 

offices?

“A. Correct.

“Q. And is it true that there were many hours, if not days, in 

between creating the drafts and then signing the final document?

“A. Very true.” 
16

We understand the point that Samantha effectively highlighted 

through her cross-examination: there could have been influence brought to 

bear on Mary that McCarthy did not witness. However, on appeal, in a 

review for substantial evidence “ ‘ “[i]t is not our role to reweigh the evidence, 

redetermine the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, and we will not disturb the judgment if there is evidence to 

support it.” ’ ” (Orange Catholic Foundation v. Arvizu (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 

283, 292.) Despite McCarthy’s limited opportunities to interact with and 

observe Mary during the period when she entered into the Trust and the 

First Amendment, the trial court nevertheless was entitled to credit 

McCarthy’s testimony and to give it weight as one component of its finding 

that Samantha and Catherine failed to meet their burden to prove that Mary 

was subject to undue influence when she executed those documents. 

Second, Samantha argues that the social worker who interacted with 

Mary during her last hospitalization in June 2017 “admitted in testimony she 

had not verified Mary Ellen was carrying paperwork that showed she had 

power of attorney to make life and death decisions for Mary.” In our 

assessment, this fact has little, if any, relevance to the issue of whether 

substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding on undue influence. As 

we have explained, the relevant time frame for the undue influence claim is 

during September 2015 and February 2017 when the Trust and the First 

Amendment were executed. Whatever a social worker may have been told 

about a power of attorney during Mary’s last hospitalization in June 2017 is 

not relevant to whether Mary was subject to undue influence in earlier time 

periods. 
17

In sum, we conclude that Samantha has not succeeded in establishing 

that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding on undue 

influence.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying the Invalidation Petition is affirmed. 

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.