1

This is the most severe of four categories of prohibited

acts, carrying the highest range of sanctions. See Georgia State

Prison, Dept. of Inmate Rules and Discipline, Policy Statement

No. 590.1, at 27-33 (1985). 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 93-9282.

Jeffery Jerome WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Ronald FOUNTAIN; Fred Wilson; Michael Godwin; Aland A. Adams;

Albert G. Thomas; Lanson Newsome, Defendants-Appellees.

March 8, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Georgia. (No. CV692-065), Dudley H. Bowen, Jr., Judge.

Before KRAVITCH and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and HILL, Senior

Circuit Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

This is a § 1983 action brought by a prisoner, claiming that

he was subjected to disciplinary sanctions in violation of his

procedural due process rights. We hold that the prison

disciplinary proceedings complied with the minimum requirements of

due process.

I.

In August of 1991, Jeffery Jerome Williams, an inmate of the

Georgia State Prison at Reidsville, was sanctioned in prison

disciplinary proceedings for fighting with another inmate.

Williams was charged in a prison disciplinary report (filed by

prison official Ronald Fountain) with the "major infraction"1 of

engaging in a "physical encounter causing or intending to cause

serious injury" for striking another inmate in the head with a pool
 2

Williams declined to call any witnesses on his own behalf. 

His explanation for this omission is that none of the inmates who

observed the altercation were on friendly terms with him. 

cue during an altercation in the television room. An investigation

was conducted by hearings investigator Michael Godwin, who prepared

a report concluding that Williams was guilty as charged. The

report documents that this conclusion was based on the charging

staff's statements, confidential witness statements, and Williams's

own admission that he had participated in a fight with the other

inmate (though Williams denied that a pool cue was involved).

A disciplinary hearing was then conducted, prosecuted by

Donald Lewis and presided over by Fred Wilson. No witnesses were

presented by either side, 2

 and the investigating officer did not

testify. The disciplinary committee, relying on the investigation

report, found Williams guilty and sentenced him to twelve months of

disciplinary confinement, 45 days of store restriction, and 45 days

of incentive privilege restriction. Neither the investigation

report nor the disciplinary committee report indicates that the

reliability of the confidential witness statements had been

evaluated. Williams filed an administrative appeal, which was

denied in turn by the disciplinary appeals officer (Aland Adams),

the prison warden (Albert Thomas), and the deputy commissioner of

the Georgia Department of Corrections (Lanson Newsome).

Proceeding pro se, Williams filed a complaint in federal court

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Fountain, Wilson,

Godwin, Adams, Thomas, Lewis, and Newsome (collectively, "prison

officials") had deprived him of due process. Williams, who is

illiterate, also requested that counsel be appointed. The district
 3

Recently, in Sandin v. Conner, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.

2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court clarified the

circumstances in which disciplinary changes in a prisoner's

conditions of confinement will deprive him or her of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest:

States may under certain circumstances create liberty

interests which are protected by the Due Process

Clause. But these interests will be generally limited

to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding

the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give

rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own

force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.

--- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2300 (citations omitted).

The Court in Conner concluded that the sanctions

imposed on the inmate in that case did not impinge upon a

protected liberty interest. The majority noted that the

court first ordered that the case be dismissed as frivolous,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), but then reinstated the case upon

Williams's filing of an amended complaint. After the prison

officials answered the amended complaint and requested summary

judgment, court-appointed counsel filed a second amended complaint

and a response to the summary judgment motion. These filings

argued that the prison disciplinary proceedings violated Williams's

procedural due process rights because Williams was not allowed to

confront or cross-examine witnesses and his conviction was not

supported by a written statement articulating the evidentiary basis

for the disciplinary action. The district court entered an order

adopting the report and recommendation of a magistrate, granting

the prison officials' motion for summary judgment. Williams,

represented by new appointed counsel, now appeals.

II.

Williams raises two procedural due process issues.3 First, he
inmate was sentenced to only 30 days of segregated

confinement, the record showed that disciplinary segregation

mirrored conditions imposed on inmates segregated for other

reasons, and the inmate's disciplinary record was

subsequently expunged (thus preventing the offense from

affecting his chances of parole). --- U.S. at ----, 115

S.Ct. at 2300. Even on these facts, however, four Justices

would have held that the inmate was deprived of a protected

liberty interest. Because Williams's sanctions—especially

the full year of solitary confinement—represent

substantially more "atypical and significant hardship[s] ...

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life," we

assume that he suffered a liberty deprivation and was

entitled to due process. 

 4

Other circuits have agreed with Kyle in requiring prison

disciplinary committees to conduct and document evaluations of

confidential informants' credibility. See Brown v. Smith, 828

F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir.1987); Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d

1287, 1293 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct.

2251, 90 L.Ed.2d 697 (1986); Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 502

argues that his due process rights were violated by the prison

officials' failure to evaluate the credibility of confidential

informants who were relied upon in the investigation. Second,

discounting the confidential informant testimony, Williams argues

that the prison officials violated his due process rights by

failing to establish any record evidence in support of his

conviction.

 Although inmates subject to disciplinary actions may be

denied the right to identify and cross-examine adverse witnesses

when prison officials are concerned about reprisals, Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-70, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2980-81, 41 L.Ed.2d

935 (1974), due process requires that the record of disciplinary

proceedings document some good faith investigation and findings as

to the credibility of confidential informants and the reliability

of the information provided by them. Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d

1386, 1390-91 (11th Cir.1982).4

 The purpose of this requirement is
(3d Cir.1981), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct.

864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); see also Russell v. Coughlin, 774

F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (noting that although the Second

Circuit has not ruled on the issue, numerous district courts

within that circuit have required inmate disciplinary committees

to comport with the requirements of Kyle ). 

not only to foster the reliability of prison investigations within

the constraints of unique institutional concerns, but also to

enable meaningful appellate review of prison disciplinary

proceedings.

 In this case, there is no indication in the prison

disciplinary record that prison officials ever evaluated the

credibility of the confidential informants who provided information

in the course of Williams's investigation. Under Kyle, this

omission would be a clear violation of Williams's procedural due

process rights if the information provided by the confidential

witness statements were relied upon in determining Williams's

guilt. The government argues, however, that Williams's conviction

was not based on the testimony of confidential informants, as the

disciplinary committee report indicates that no confidential

information was considered by the committee. The committee report

also states, however, that the committee was relying on "charging

staff's statements and the investigation"; the investigation

report, in turn, states that the investigator's findings were based

on "confidential witness statements reviewed by this investigator."

By adopting the investigator's recommendation, therefore, the

committee, in determining guilt, indirectly relied upon the

confidential informant statements, the reliability of which had

never been explicitly established.
Nevertheless, the government is correct to this extent: if

the sanctions imposed by the disciplinary committee have a

sufficient evidentiary basis independent of any unreliable

information obtained from confidential informants, then procedural

due process concerns would be allayed. See Kyle, 677 F.2d at 1391

("The inquiry ... into the reliability of informers may be

diminished (or even satisfied) where there is corroborating

physical evidence of the information provided."); Young v. Jones,

37 F.3d 1457 (11th Cir.1994) (finding no due process violation

where confidential informant credibility not evaluated, but

sufficient corroborating evidence of the information supplied),

cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1437, 131 L.Ed.2d 317

(1995).

 A minimum requirement of due process is that conclusions of

prison disciplinary bodies be "supported by some evidence in the

record." Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution v. Hill,

472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).

"Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require

[a reviewing court's] examination of the entire record, independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing the

evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by

the disciplinary board." Id. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774.

The magistrate judge in this case found that the hearing

officer's "reasons may not have been extensive, but due process was

given. An appeals committee or other reviewing body, such as this

Court, can determine what evidence the hearing officer relied
 5

The disciplinary committee report states only that the

finding of guilt is based on "charging staff's statements and the

investigation." The investigation report offers

"investigation/confidential witness statements reviewed by this

investigator," the (tautological) fact that the "investigation

was observed by the investigator," and the charging officer's

statement in support of its conclusion that Williams is guilty as

charged. It is undisputed that no prison officers witnessed the

altercation at issue. This leaves Williams's statement, recorded

in the committee report, as the only basis (aside from

confidential informant statements) for the disciplinary action. 

 6Williams made this statement in an affidavit dated June 18,

1993, attached to his memorandum of law in opposition to the

prison officials' request for summary judgment. 

upon." As far as this court can determine, the disciplinary

committee relied upon, besides information provided by confidential

informants, nothing other than Williams's own statement: "There

was no pool stick involved, but we did have a fight."5

 On the unique facts of this case, however, this statement is

sufficient to meet the due process standard of Hill. Williams

admitted before the hearing officer that he engaged in the fight

during which the other inmate was injured; he only denies that he

hit the other inmate with a pool cue. (Williams asserts that the

other inmate was injured in the course of their "wrestling" or

"shoving" match when he slipped on spilled coffee. 6

) The charge

against Williams was "physical encounter causing or intending to

cause serious physical injury." Williams does not dispute that the

other inmate suffered "serious physical injury," nor does he

dispute that the "physical encounter" he engaged in was the "cause"

of the injury, in the ordinary sense of causation. An adequate

factual basis for Williams's punishment was therefore established

when Williams confessed to participating in the fight. Although

the disciplinary committee may not have chosen to impose such a
 7

Disciplinary segregation of up to 24 months is warranted

for all offenses involving physical violence, with the exception

of "striking another person," which can only be punished with up

to six months of segregated confinement. See Georgia State

Prison, Dept. of Inmate Rules and Discipline, Policy Statement

No. 590.1, at 27-33 (1985). 

severe sanction had the facts alleged by Williams been established,

it would have been within its authority to do so.7 Thus, although

the prison officials in this case tread precariously close to the

due process line, we cannot conclude that there is no evidence in

the record to support the disciplinary sanctions imposed on

Williams.

The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the

prison officials is therefore AFFIRMED.