2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-12-2002

Friedrich v. Cadle Co

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket No. 01-2583

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Recommended Citation

"Friedrich v. Cadle Co" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 271.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/271
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 __________ 

 No. 01-2583 

 __________ 

 

 JAMES S. FRIEDRICH, 

 Appellant 

 

 v. 

 THE CADLE COMPANY, an 

 Ohio Corporation 

 __________ 

 

 ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-00450 

 District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 

 __________ 

 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 April 9, 2002 

 __________ 

 

 Before: McKEE, BARRY, and ALARCON, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion Filed: April 12, 2002 ) 

 ____________ 

 

 OPINION 

 ____________ 

 

BARRY, Circuit Judge 

 This is a dispute about the post-judgment conduct of a creditor seeking to enforce a 

judgment. In 1994, The Cadle Company obtained a judgment against James S. Friedrich 

on three defaulted promissory notes in the amount of $191,422.79. Almost eight years 

later, the bulk of the judgment, plus interest, remains unpaid. In March 2000, Friedrich 

commenced this action seeking an injunction and alleging (1) that Cadle has not availed 

itself of the remedial procedures contained in the promissory notes; (2) that Cadle has not 

attempted to obtain possession of the notes; and (3) that Cadle has failed to make any 

effort to collect amounts due under a collateral assignment executed by Friedrich on the 

notes. On May 21, 2001, the District Court granted Cadle’s motion for summary 

judgment. We have jurisdiction over Friedrich’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 

will affirm. 

 In granting summary judgment in favor of Cadle, the District Court held that the 

allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint, standing alone, could not defeat 

summary judgment, that there was no evidence in the record suggesting that Cadle had 

failed to satisfy its obligations under the notes or had engaged in improper behavior, and 

that the Court would not entertain Friedrich’s efforts to re-open the 1994 litigation 

because the time for challenging that judgment had long since passed. 

 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, 

and apply the well-settled standards for summary judgment: The burden is on the moving 

party to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Bailey v. United 
Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2002). We review the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. A non-moving party, however, "will not be able to 

withstand a motion for summary judgment merely by making allegations; rather, the party 

opposing the motion must go beyond its pleadings and designate specific facts by use of 

affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing there is a 

genuine issue for trial." In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 

2002). 

 Friedrich’s contentions on appeal can be generally broken down into three 

categories. First, Friedrich claims that the allegations in his complaint and the 

corresponding denials in Cadle’s answer preclude summary judgment. Friedrich is wrong 

as the above-quoted language from Ikon Office Solutions makes abundantly clear. 

 Second, Friedrich points to some deposition testimony relating to the process by 

which Cadle acquired the notes and the compensation allegedly paid to the predecessor in 

interest of the notes. This evidence cannot defeat summary judgment because, as the 

District Court found, it is not material to the allegations of post-judgment misconduct by 

Cadle, and is simply a belated effort by Friedrich to re-litigate the 1994 judgment against 

him. 

 Finally, Friedrich points to deposition testimony which he contends demonstrates 

that Cadle failed to comply with its obligations under the notes. This testimony is 

unavailing for several reasons. First, the promissory notes themselves do not impose an 

obligation on Cadle to go after any supposed collateral prior to obtaining and enforcing a 

judgment the result of Friedrich’s default. Second, Friedrich admitted in his deposition 

that he did not know what Cadle did or did not do in seeking to collect the monies due. 

Third, there is simply no evidence suggesting that Cadle engaged in any post-judgment 

fraud or other wrongdoing. Instead, the record indicates that Cadle attempted to collect 

on the notes and explored other avenues of compensation. Indeed, it is undisputed that 

Cadle determined that two of the notes were worthless, and that Cadle received only 

$6,568.48 in proceeds from the sale of the partnership the subject of the third note. 

 For all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court 

granting summary judgment in favor of Cadle. 

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 

 Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 

 /s/ Maryanne Trump Barry 

 Circuit Judge