NUMBER 13-20-00096-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

ZACHARY LAUREL, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 36th District Court 

of San Patricio County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant Zachary Laurel appeals a judgment revoking his community supervision 

and adjudicating him guilty of enticing a child, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE 

ANN. § 25.04. On January 21, 2020, at the hearing on the State’s amended motion to 

adjudicate guilt, Laurel, via a signed stipulation and judicial confession, confessed and 

stipulated that the facts contained in the affidavit of Rosie A. Franco, incorporated into the 
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State’s motion, were true. The trial court admitted the stipulation and judicial confession 

into the record. Thereafter, the trial court revoked Laurel’s community supervision, 

adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment in the Institutional 

Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See id. § 12.34. Laurel’s courtappointed appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738, 744 (1967). We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Laurel’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support in 

which she states that she has reviewed the entire record in detail and has found no nonfrivolous issues. See id. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents 

a thorough, professional evaluation of the record showing why there are no arguable 

grounds for advancing an appeal. See ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–07 n.9 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“ln Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically 

advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record 

references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) 

(citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel 

Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), Laurel’s 

counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error 

in the trial court’s judgment. Laurel’s counsel also informed this Court that she has: (1) 

notified Laurel that she has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, and attached 
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documents to her notice to Laurel; (2) informed Laurel of his right to file a pro se response

and to review the record preparatory to filing that response; (3) informed Laurel of his 

right to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) 

provided Laurel with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record with 

instruction to return the motion within ten days of the notice from appellate counsel, and 

provided this Court’s address. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–

20; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.

Adequate time has passed, and Laurel has not requested the record or filed a pro se brief.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 

488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible 

error. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the 

nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the 

brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met 

the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 

509.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, Laurel’s appellate counsel has filed a motion to 

withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 

(citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an 
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attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the 

appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to 

withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) 

(citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date 

of this opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to Laurel 

and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.1 See TEX. R. APP.

P. 48.4; see also ln re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 

670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the

5th day of August, 2021.

1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Laurel wish to seek further review of this case by 

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary 

review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed 

within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion 

for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for 

discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals, see id. R. 68.3, and should 

comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.