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******************************************************ALAN MEEKER v. CECILE MAHON ET AL. (AC 37841)
Lavine, Keller and Bear, Js. Argued March 1—officially released August 16, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, geographical area number eleven,

Spellman, J.)
R. Bradford Fawley, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Steven T. Kulig, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).Opinion BEAR, J. The plaintiff, Alan Meeker, appeals from the judgment ofthe trial court, rendered after a bench trial, infavorofthe defendants Cecile Mahonand David Mahon, Sr., nontenant cosigners ofa lease between the plaintiff and the defendant lessees, David Mahon, Jr., andMelissaChoquette (tenants).1The courtdetermined thatthe defendants were not liable for damages caused andrentowedbythetenants occurringafterSeptember 30, 2012, the expiration date of the lease. On appeal, theplaintiffclaimsthatthe courterred (1)inconcluding that the defendants, as cosigners of the lease, were responsible to the plaintifffor any unpaid damages and rent incurred only during the specifically defined term of the lease; and (2) in considering evidence extrinsic to the lease in order to discern the parties’ intent when the court determined that the intent ofthe parties was fully reflected in the four corners of the lease and no ambiguityhas been claimed oridentified. We affirmthe judgment of the trial court. On June 16, 2014, the plaintiff instituted this action for damages, resulting from the breach of a residential lease, againstthetenantsandthe defendants. Following
a two day trial, the court on March 16, 2015, rendered judgment in favor ofthe plaintiff on his claim for damages against the tenants. The court, however, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants as to all claims against them. This appeal followed.
The following factualfindings ofthe courtandprocedural history are relevant to this appeal. On or about September 16, 2011, the plaintiff entered into a written lease agreement for aterm beginning on September 16, 2011, and ending on September 30, 2012, with the tenants for a residential property in Danielson. The defendants cosigned the lease, agreeing to be ‘‘jointly liable for the lease, its payments, and other responsibilities, until the lease has expired

. . . .’’ After September 30, 2012, the endofthetermofthelease, thetenantscontinued to occupy the premises pursuant to a month-tomonth tenancy until May 5, 2014. The tenants failed to pay rent from April 1 to May 5, 2014, when they left the property. When the tenants vacated the premises, there was damage to the property that had not existed when the plaintiff visited the premises in November, 2012. The plaintiff hired a contractor to repair the damage.
In its memorandum of decision, the court, applying the usual civil fairpreponderance ofthe evidence standard, determined that whetherthe defendants could be held liable for damages to the property and fornonpayment of rent that occurred during the month-to-month tenancy created by the tenants’ consensual holdover
was a question of fact. The court reasoned: ‘‘The hold
over by the tenants in this case created a new tenancy,and while the original lease made the [tenants] subject to the terms and conditions of the original lease in the new month-to-month tenancy, the court finds by a preponderance ofthe evidence thatthe defendants

. . . as nontenant cosigners of the original written lease cannot be held liable for damages arising from the new month-to-month tenancy created by the lessee[s] holding over with the consent ofthe lessor.’’ The court also foundthattheguarantee ofthe defendantsasnontenant cosigners was not a term or condition of the original lease within the meaning of the holdover provision of the lease, but instead it was a contract separate from thatlease. Accordingly,the courtfoundthatanyliability ofthe defendants expired on September30, 2012, when the lease expired. Having already found that any damage to the property occurred after the plaintiff visited the property in November, 2012, the court found that the defendantswere notliable foranydamages claimed in this action because their liability was extinguished by the expiration of the lease on September 30, 2012. During the pendency of this appeal, and in compliance with an order of this court, the trial court issued
an articulation of its decision in which it clarified that the only evidence outside of the four corners of the lease that it considered was (1) the fact that the lease
was drafted by the plaintiff;2 and (2) that the plaintiff failed to show by apreponderance ofthe evidence that the intent of the parties was anything other than that shown in the document the plaintiff drafted and that
was initialed where agreed to by the defendants.
I
Theplaintiffclaimsthatthe courterredinconcluding that the defendants, as nontenant cosigners, were responsible to him forthe tenants’ obligations only during the term of the lease, which ended on September 30, 2012. Theplaintiffarguesthat, pursuanttotheunambiguous contract language, the defendants were liable foranydamagetothesubjectpropertyandnonpayment of rent after September 30, 2012. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the standard ofreview and guiding principles. The resolution ofthis appeal requires us to interpret the language of two written agreements: the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendants (guarantee),3 and the lease between the plaintiff and the tenants. The guarantee and the lease are contracts. See Welk v. Bidwell, 136 Conn. 603, 606, 73 A.2d 295 (1950) (lease); D’Amato Investments, LLC v. Sutton, 117 Conn. App. 418, 423, 978 A.2d 1135 (2009) (guarantee). The standard of review for contract interpretation is well established. ‘‘Although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question ofthe parties’ intent, is a question of fact

. . . [when] there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their

. . . commitments is a question oflaw [overwhichourreviewisplenary].’’ (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 7, 931 A.2d 837 (2007). Where the language ofan agreement is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, however, it is ambiguous. 19 Perry St., LLC v. Unionville WaterCo., 294 Conn. 611, 623, 987A.2d 1009 (2010). ‘‘Ordinarily, such ambiguity requires the use of extrinsic evidence by a trial court to determine the intent ofthe parties, and, because such adetermination is factual, it is subject to reversal on appeal only ifit is clearly erroneous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joseph General Contracting, Inc. v. Couto, 317 Conn. 565, 575, 119 A.3d 570 (2015). ‘‘[T]he determination

. . . whethercontractuallanguageisplainandunambiguous is itself a question of law subject to plenary review.’’ Cruzv. VisualPerceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 101–102, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). ‘‘[A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used by the parties.

. . . [A] contract is unambiguous when its language is clear and conveys a definite and precise intent.

. . . The court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.

. . . Moreover, themerefactthatthepartiesadvancedifferentinterpretations ofthe language in question does not necessitate
a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Amato Investments, LLC

v. Sutton, supra, 117 Conn. App. 424.
A
The plaintiff argues that the provisions of the two agreements establish that the parties intended to obligate the defendants to guarantee the performance of the tenants’ obligations under the lease until the final expiration ofany lease extensions, which included any holdovers. We disagree. ‘‘A guarant[ee] is a promise to answer for another’s debt, default, orfailure to perform a contractual obligation

.’’JPMorganChaseBank, N.A. v. WinthropProperties, LLC, 312 Conn. 662, 675, 94 A.3d 622 (2014). ‘‘[A] guarant[ee] agreement is a separate and distinct obligation from that of the note or other obligation.’’ Id. ‘‘[Guarantees] are

. . . distinct and essentially different contracts; they are between different parties, they may be executed at different times and by separate instruments, and the nature of the promises and the liability ofthe promisors differ substantially

. . . . The contract ofthe guarantor is his own separate undertaking in which the principal does not join.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carpenter

v. Thompson, 66 Conn. 457, 463–64, 34 A. 105 (1895). The independence ofthese contracts is not affected by the fact that they are executed contemporaneously or in the same document. See id.; 38 Am. Jur. 2d 950–51, Guaranty § 4 (2010).‘‘When two agreements

. . . are connected by reference and subject matter, both are to be considered in determining the real intent of the parties.

. . . Where

. . . the signatories execute a contract which refers to another instrument in such a manner as to establish that they intended to make the terms and conditions of that other instrument a part of their understanding, the two may be interpreted together as the agreement of the parties.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Regency Savings Bank v. Westmark Partners, 59 Conn. App. 160, 164–65, 756 A.2d 299 (2000).
Contracts must be given a reasonable interpretation andthewordsusedtheircommon, natural, andordinary meaning and usage; Auto Glass Express, Inc. v. HanoverIns. Co., 293 Conn. 218, 226, 975 A.2d 1266 (2009); unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended. Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores ofConnecticut, Inc., supra, 284 Conn. 8. ‘‘Generally, a word used by the parties in one sense will be given the same meaning throughout the contract in the absence of countervailing reasons.’’ 11 S. Williston, Contracts (4th Ed. 2012) § 32:6, p. 709.
Inthe present case, the defendants’ guarantee, which appeared on the last page of the lease document and
was entitled ‘‘Non tenant Co-signers,’’ provided, in its entirety: ‘‘By signing, we understand that we arejointly liableforthislease, itspayments, andotherresponsibilities, until the lease has expired, or until the landlord
securesanewlessee (inthecasethatthetenantschoose to vacate the premises prior to the term ofthis lease).’’ (Emphasis added.) Although the defendants’ guarantee is contained in the same document as the lease, that guarantee is a contract separate from the lease. Additionally, the guarantee is not of unlimited duration because there is an outside time limit on its applicability. It is effective ‘‘until the lease has expired.’’ Because the guarantee itself did not set forth a specific date, e.g., September 30, 2012, when the lease ended, we must look to the lease for that date. See Regency Savings Bank v. Westmark Partners, supra, 59 Conn. App. 164–65.
The lease provided in paragraph 3: ‘‘If the tenant decides to vacate the premises prior to the term of the lease, tenants will be responsible for monthly rent payments until the lease expires (September 30, 2012),
or until Owner secures another tenant, whichever happens first

. . . .’’ We read similar or identical terms and words throughout a contract to have a consistent meaning. Accordingly, the lease expired on September 30, 2012, which is consistent with the term ofthe lease set forth at the beginning of the document as running from September 16, 2011 through September 30, 2012. Consequently, the guarantee obligated the defendants to be jointly liable for the ‘‘lease, its payments andother responsibilities, until’’ September 30, 2012. The unambiguous language of the guarantee, read in conjunction with the unambiguous language of the lease, informs and supports our legal conclusion that the defendants’ liability for any ofthe tenants’ lease obligations did not include any ofthose obligations occurring
on dates afterthe lease expired on September 30, 2012.
B
The plaintiff argues, however, that the lease did not expire until any extensions of the lease expired and that the holdover ofthe tenants, contemplated in paragraph 17 of the lease, constituted an extension. We disagree.
The holdoverprovision contained in paragraph 17 of the lease provides: ‘‘Should Tenants remain in possession of the Premises with the consent of Owner after the expiration ofthis Lease, anewtenancy from month to month shall be created between Owner and Tenant whichshallbesubjectto alltheterms [and] condition[s] hereof, but shall be terminable on thirty days written notice served by either party to the other party.’’ The plaintiffarguesthatparagraph 17 does not create anew contract or lease, but merely extends the period ofthe tenants’ occupancy under the original lease. Relying
on principles governing extensions and covenants to renew,4 the plaintiff distinguishes paragraph 17 from a covenant to renew with a new lease for a distinct term and argues that it acts to extend the original lease with allofitstermsandconditions. Heargues, therefore, that the lease did not expire until the extensions expired.
This analysis is flawed, however, in its claimed application to the defendants’ guarantee. The plaintiff’s extension argument is inconsistent with the limit of the application of the guarantee to tenant obligations occurring on orbefore September 30, 2012, the defined expiration date ofthe lease. As a separate contract; see JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Properties, LLC, supra, 312 Conn. 675; the guarantee was not a term or condition of the lease. The text of the lease between the plaintiff and the tenants, for example, did notincorporate the guarantee betweenthe plaintiffand the defendants into the lease, and paragraph 17, the holdover provision, does not incorporate or otherwise refer to the guarantee. Conversely, the guarantee betweentheplaintiffandthe defendants didnotcontain any provision continuing or extending the defendants’ guarantee obligationbeyond September 30, 2012, inthe event ofthe creation ofanew month-to-month tenancy between the plaintiff and the tenants. Accordingly, the plain language and meaning ofthe relevant term ofthe guarantee between the plaintiff and the defendants is that the defendants’ guarantee ended when the lease expiredonSeptember30, 2012, and,thus,thepartiesdid not agree to hold the defendants liable for the tenants’ obligations occurring after that date.Moreover, while holding over under a lease could operate to extend the lease if that was provided for in the lease, the lease in this case does not include any such language. The holdover provision instead states that after the expiration of the lease—September 30, 2012—anewtenancyfrommonth-to-montharisesupon the agreement of the plaintiff on the same terms and conditions contained in the lease. Although many of the responsibilities and obligations between the plaintiff and the tenants remained the same as under the lease, the type oftenancy, notice provisions, and duration changed. Cf. FJKAssociates v. Karkoski, 52 Conn. App. 66, 68, 725A.2d 991 (1999) (‘‘Inthe case ofarental
on a month-to-month basis the tenancy is not regarded
as a continuous one. The tenancy for each month is
one separate from that of every other month. [Internal quotation marks omitted.]’’).
In Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990), the Supreme Court of Texas addressed a similar holdover provision when the plaintiff sought to hold a former cotenant liable after she vacated the premises. The original lease was one for a specific twelve month term, but the cotenant remained for longer than a year and subsequently defaulted. Id. The holdover clause in the lease in that case provided: ‘‘Should [the tenant] remain in possession of the demised premises with the consent of [the lessor] after the natural expiration ofthis lease, anewtenancy from year to year shall be created between [the lessor] and [the tenant] which shall be subject to all the terms and conditions hereof but shall be terminable by 60 days notice.’’ Id. The Texas Supreme Court held: ‘‘Under [our] common law holdover rule, a landlord may elect to treat a tenant holding over as either a trespasser or as a tenant holding under the terms of the original lease.5

. . . The lease incorporated this rule of holdover, providing that, ifthe landlord consent[ed], a ‘new tenancy’ would be created if the tenant remained in possession beyond expiration of the lease. The lease stated that this new tenancy would be subject to the
same terms and conditions as the original tenancy, except that the holdover tenancy would be ‘from year to year

. . . terminable by 60 days notice.’ Thus, under the express terms of the lease, this holdover tenancy
was anewtenancy ratherthan an extension orrenewal of the original lease.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote added.) Id., 571–72. Similarly, the holdover provision here did not extend the existing lease, but created a new tenancy from month-to-month.6
The trial court found that the plaintiff visited the property in November, 2012, and there was no damage to the premises atthattime. Thus, the claimed damages occurred after September 30, 2012. Additionally, the rent was not paid for April and May, 2014. The plaintiff does not challenge these findings. Consequently,because their liability ended when the lease expired on September30, 2012, andwas not extendedbythe terms ofeither ofthe two agreements, the defendants are not liable forthese claimed damages arising afterthat date.
II
The court noted in its memorandum of decision that the defendants and tenants initialed certainparagraphs of the lease. In its articulation, the court added that ‘‘the [plaintiff] failed to show

. . . that the intent of the parties was anything other than that shown in the document he drafted and [that] was initialed where agreed to by [the defendants].’’ (Emphasis added.) The court further statedthat, ifconcerns remained afterthe expiration of the original term of the lease about the tenants’ credit, ‘‘[the plaintiff] should have insisted on a [cosigner] forthe newtenancy created, as the original document he drafted was not initialed and agreed to by [the defendants] in the operative paragraph 17.’’ The court also noted that it considered that the plaintiff drafted the lease.
The plaintiffmakes several arguments that the court erred in considering extrinsic evidence in this case, including, inter alia, that the court improperly considered that he had drafted the lease.7 Because the only reasonable construction ofthe language ofthe guarantee, readin conjunctionwiththe lease, isthatthe defendants’ liability forthe obligations ofthe tenants did not extend to the tenants’ obligations occurring after the lease expired on September 30, 2012, we conclude that the relevant language of these agreements was unambiguous. Accordingly, we agree that the court’s consideration of any evidence extrinsic to these documents
was improper, as was its analysis of the guarantee as anissueoffact. Nevertheless, whenatrialcourtreaches
a correct decision but on improper grounds, this court may affirm if a proper basis exists to support the decision. Favorite v. Miller, 176 Conn. 310, 317, 407 A.2d 974 (1978); Geremia v. Geremia, 159 Conn. App. 751, 779, 125 A.3d 549 (2015). We conclude as a matter of law, pursuant to the unambiguous terms ofthe guarantee and separate lease, that the defendants have no liabilityto the plaintifffor any damages or nonpayment by the tenants occurring after September 30, 2012.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff brought this action against David Mahon, Jr., and Melissa Choquette as tenants for breach of a lease, and against Cecile Mahon and DavidMahon, Sr., as ‘‘nontenantcosigners.’’ DavidMahon,Jr., andChoquette havenotappealedthejudgmentofthetrial court. Accordingly, allreferences to the defendants in this opinion are to David Mahon, Sr., and Cecile Mahon. The record indicates that David Mahon, Sr., and David Mahon, Jr., are not in fact senior and junior. The case name and the trial court utilized these designations, however, and, for consistency, we will as well.

2 In its articulation, the court referred to the plaintiff as the ‘‘defendantappellant,’’ but, read in context, we interpret this usage to refer to the plaintiff.
3 The court characterized the defendants as guarantors and interpretedtheir agreement as a guarantee. The plaintiff does not now nor did he raise before the court any challenge to the characterization ofthe defendants as guarantors or the nature of their agreement as a guarantee. Any claim concerningwhetherthe contractuallanguageleadsto acontraryconclusion, therefore, has not been preserved. See White v. Mazda Motor ofAmerica, Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 619–20, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014) (‘‘[A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly raised at the trial level.

. . . The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention ofthe court theprecise matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ [Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Accordingly, we treat and refer to the agreement between the defendants and the plaintiff as a guarantee.
4 In distinguishing lease extensions from covenants to renew in lease agreements, our Supreme Court has stated that in the case of extensions, ‘‘the original lease operates as a continuous one, and the holding for a term exceeding the minimum provided in the agreement does not require any additional instrument to give it validity’’; City Coal Co. v. Marcus, 95 Conn. 454, 459, 111 A. 857 (1920); and ‘‘upon the performance of stipulated acts, the same lease continues in force during the additional period.’’ Carrano

v. Shoor, 118 Conn. 86, 93, 171 A. 17 (1934). Indeed, a lease extension has been defined as ‘‘a stipulation in a lease intended merely to lengthen its time upon the terms and conditions stated in the original lease

. . . .’’ 52 C.J.S. 97, Landlord & Tenant § 70 (2012).

5 Similarly, Connecticut law allows a holdover tenant to be considered as
atenantatsufferance; GeneralStatutes § 47a-3d;FJKAssociatesv.Karkoski, supra, 52 Conn. App. 68; or as a month-to-month tenant. General Statutes § 47a-3b; Bellini v. Patterson Oil Co., 156 Conn. App. 158, 164, 111 A.3d 987 (2015). Our law, however, does not impose the original lease terms upon parties who have not agreed that such terms apply to a holdover tenancy. United Social & Mental Health Services, Inc. v. Rodowicz, 96 Conn. App. 34, 40–41, 899 A.2d 85, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 920, 908 A.2d 546 (2006).

6 Theplaintiffalso arguesthat ‘‘tenancy’’ inthis instance merelyimplicates

anewperiod oftime. This argument, however, ignores the specific language of paragraph 17 of the lease that, in the event of the tenants’ holding over after September 30, 2012, with the plaintiff’s consent, ‘‘a new tenancy from month to month shall be created

. . . .’’ Additionally, the definition oftenancy advocated by the plaintiff does not impact our interpretation of the guarantee, becauseitdoesnotchangetheplainlanguagethatthe defendants’ liability was limited to the tenants’ obligations that arose prior to when the lease expired on September 30, 2012.

7 In particular, the plaintiff argues that the court improperly considered such evidence, ignoring paragraph 28 of the lease, which provides: ‘‘The parties acknowledge each to the other that they have reviewed this agreement and that the normal rule of construction to the effect that any ambiguities are to be resolved against the drafting party shall not be employedintheinterpretationofthisLease.’’Whenthelanguageinacontract is ambiguous, our courts construe those ambiguities against the drafter. Ramirez v. Health Net ofthe Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 13–14, 938 A.2d 576 (2008). ‘‘[This] doctrine, however, applies onlyafterthe courtdetermines that the language in the contract is ambiguous.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Dinardo Seaside Tower, Ltd. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 153 Conn. App. 10, 35, 100 A.3d 413, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 947, 103 A.3d 976 (2014).