COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Cole 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

FRANK BENJAMIN EDWARDS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1095-96-2 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE 

 MARCH 11, 1997 

LESNEY D. EDWARDS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POWHATAN COUNTY 

Thomas V. Warren, Judge 

 Robert L. Isaacs for appellant. 

 No brief or argument for appellee. 

 Frank Benjamin Edwards (husband) appeals the equitable 

distribution decision of the circuit court awarding Lesney D. 

Edwards (wife) $50,266.45 from the sale of the marital residence. 

 The circuit court affirmed the commissioner's report and 

supplemental report which (i) ruled that an agreement signed by 

the parties in 1989 was an interim agreement which did not 

resolve the parties' equitable distribution interests in the 

marital residence and (ii) effected an equitable distribution of 

the parties' property. We affirm. 

 I. 

 The commissioner's hearing on equitable distribution issues 

was held in March 1993, and the commissioner filed a report on 

September 17, 1993. A supplemental hearing was held in March 

1994, and the commissioner filed a supplemental report on June 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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22, 1995. At issue was the effect of an agreement signed by the 

parties on the day wife left the marital residence. The one page 

agreement provided that wife was to move out of the marital 

residence until further negotiations between the parties took 

place. Wife testified that she signed the agreement because she 

wanted to leave some indication that she was not abandoning her 

interest in the property, but did not intend to give a gift of 

half-ownership to husband. Husband testified he understood the 

agreement to mean that the proceeds from the sale of the home 

would be split "half-and-half." 

 The commissioner's report, which was upheld by the trial 

judge, stated as follows, in relevant part: 

 Under Virginia Code section 20-155, as 

amended, married persons may enter into 

agreements with each other to settle their 

rights and obligations. The interpretation 

of such agreements is governed by regular 

contract law. In my judgment the August 19, 

1989, agreement is a binding contract. I do 

not, however, believe that the contract 

mandates that the proceeds of the sale from 

the Lee's Landing Property be divided equally 

between the parties. The key clause in the 

contracts reads, "BOTH PARTIES RETAIN EQUAL 

OWNERSHIP IN ABOVE PROPERTY IT'S [sic] 

IMPROVEMENTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTY UNLESS 

FURTHER ACTION DEEMS THIS CONTRACT VOID." 

 . . . In my judgment the phrase "retain 

equal ownership in above property" refers to 

continuance of the preexisting ownership of 

the property. In other words, Mr. and Mrs. 

Edwards agreed that they would each retain 

whatever interest they had in the property at 

the time the contract was signed. The 

contract does not say anything about selling 

the property or how the proceeds of a sale 

would be divided. If the parties had 

intended for the property to be sold, or for 

the proceeds of the sale to be divided in any 
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particular fashion, it would have been easy 

for them to say so. I conclude, therefore, 

that the August 19, 1989, contract was an 

interim agreement designed to protect Mrs. 

Edwards' preexisting ownership interest in 

the property, and that it does not require 

that the proceeds of the sale of the property 

be divided equally between the parties. 

 The initial question posed by this appeal is the meaning and 

effect of the agreement -- a legal issue. 

 [O]n appeal if all the evidence which is 

necessary to construe a contract was 

presented to the trial court and is before 

the reviewing court, the meaning and effect 

of the contract is a question of law which 

can readily be ascertained by this court. 

Property settlement and support agreements 

are subject to the same rules of construction 

and interpretation applicable to contracts 

generally. 

Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 180, 355 S.E.2d 342, 346 

(1987) (citations omitted). 

 The commissioner's conclusion was based upon a construction 

of the terms in the agreement. Because the construction of the 

agreement "can readily be ascertained by this court," id., we are 

not bound by the commissioner's legal conclusions. Upon our 

review, however, we hold that the plain language of the agreement 

supports the commissioner's finding that the agreement was never 

intended by the parties as their final property settlement 

agreement. Indeed, the agreement expressly refers to "future 

negotiations" between the parties and states that the parties 

"retain equal ownership." Those provisions clearly reflect the 

intention to retain the status quo until completion of a final 
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agreement. A plain reading of the agreement leads to the legal 

conclusion that its effect was the creation of an interim 

agreement designed to preserve the status quo. Therefore, we 

affirm the trial judge's decision to uphold the commissioner's 

interpretation of the contract. 

 II. 

 Husband also contends that the commissioner erred in not 

allowing him leave to change an answer to an interrogatory 

relating to the value of a life insurance policy. At the 

commissioner's hearing, husband testified that the value given in 

the answer was erroneous, yet husband did not know the correct 

value. The commissioner, determining that the case needed to be 

resolved, utilized the value listed in the answer. 

 A "'commissioner is a quasi judicial officer.'" Brown v. 

Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 234, 397 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1990) (citation 

omitted). The conduct of the commissioner's hearing, like the 

conduct of a trial, is committed to the sound discretion of the 

presiding judicial officer. See Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 2 

Va. App. 358, 365, 344 S.E.2d 389, 393 (1986). 

 Here, husband signed the interrogatory answers and asserted 

that the value of the life insurance policy was $2,358.91. At 

the March 25, 1993 commissioner's hearing, he claimed this figure 

was incorrect, yet did not know the correct figure. As of the 

filing of the commissioner's report on September 17, 1993, 

husband had not provided any additional evidence of the value of 
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the policy. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the 

commissioner abused his discretion in not granting husband leave 

to change his interrogatory answer. 

 III. 

 Husband contends that the commissioner erred in determining 

the monetary value of husband's pre- and post-marital 

contributions to the marital residence. On appeal, the circuit 

court's decision affirming the commissioner's report is presumed 

correct. 

 The commissioner's report is deemed to be 

prima facie correct. The commissioner has 

the authority to resolve conflicts in the 

evidence and to make factual findings. When 

the commissioner's findings are based upon 

ore tenus evidence, "due regard [must be 

given] to the commissioner's ability . . . to 

see, hear and evaluate the witness at first 

hand." Because of the presumption of 

correctness, the trial judge ordinarily must 

sustain the commissioner's report unless the 

trial judge concludes that it is not 

supported by the evidence. 

Brown v. Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 236, 397 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990) 

(citations omitted). "This rule applies with particular force to 

a commissioner's findings of fact based upon evidence taken in 

his presence, but is not applicable to pure conclusions of law 

contained in the report." Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 577, 318 

S.E.2d 292, 296 (1984) (citation omitted). This Court must 

affirm the trial court's decision unless it is plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2 Va. 

App. 463, 466-67, 346 S.E.2d 535, 536 (1986). 
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 In making a division under Code § 20-107.3, the commissioner 

found that, while the proceeds from the sale of the wife's 

previous home were transmuted into marital property, husband 

failed to present evidence quantifying the value of his 

post-marital monetary and nonmonetary contributions to that 

property. In reaching his decision as to the contributions of 

the parties, the commissioner considered the substantive monetary 

interest wife had in the property, husband's supervision of the 

construction of the marital residence, and the financial 

contributions which husband was able to prove. Based on the 

evidence which husband did produce, the commissioner credited him 

$13,500 for his service as general contractor on the marital 

residence and $3,276 for his documented expenditures. In sum, 

the commissioner recommended an award of $16,776 to husband and 

$50,266.45 to wife from the sale of the marital residence, with 

any remaining sale proceeds to be divided equally. 

 The circuit court found the commissioner's findings to be 

"reasoned," "measured" and "supported by credible evidence." 

Credible evidence supports the commissioner's factual findings 

and we cannot say that the commissioner or trial judge erred in 

valuing husband's contributions. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.