* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. Proc. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is subs tituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/29/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

DOROTHY R. JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-5242 (D.C. No. 94-C-372-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ***** Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge , United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by design ation. -2- Before TACHA, ALDISERT, *** and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Dorothy R. Jones appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Servi ces denying her applications for social security disability insurance and supple mental security income benefits. We exercise jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Claimant’s applications were denied initially and o n reconsideration. She subsequently requested and received a hearing befor e an administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony fro m claimant and Cheryl Mallon, a vocational expert. Applying the five-ste p evaluation sequence, see Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing the five steps in detail), the ALJ concluded the analysis atstep four, determining that claimant had the residual functional capacity to re turn to her past relevant work as-3-

a janitor, housekeeper, or electronics assembler. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court affirmed the decision o f the Secretary, claimant appeals, and we affirm. At step four, claimant bears the burden of establis hing that she is unable to return to her past relevant work. See Nielson v. Sullivan , 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993). We review the Secretary’s decisi on to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evide nce and whether correct legal standards were applied. Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “We examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the wei ght of the Secretary’s decision and, on that basis, determine if the substantiality of the evidence test has been met.” Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1991). We may neither reweigh the evidence no r substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary. Id. at 800. Claimant is a forty-five-year-old woman with a highschool education and vocational training in electronics and as a nurses’ aide. She last worked in January 1991, when she sustained on-the-job injurie s to her neck, shoulder, and back while working as a janitress for a building ma intenance company. Claimant alleges that these injuries, plus arthritis, diabet es mellitus, gastroenteritis, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, prevent her from working.-4-

The ALJ concluded that, although claimant suffers f rom severe impairments, she did not have an impairment or comb ination of impairments which meets or equals the severity of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ concluded that clai mant retained the residual functional capacity to perform work at the medium e xertional level, limited to occasional bending, squatting, crawling, and climbi ng, and therefore could return to her past relevant work as a janitor, housekeeper , or electronics assembler. On appeal, claimant argues that (1) the ALJ erred i n failing to consider the report of Dr. Richard D. Cooper as substantial evid ence of her disability, (2) the ALJ’s determination that claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work, as she actually performed i t, was not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the ALJ erred in find ing claimant’s testimony not credible. Claimant, who was represented by counsel , did not raise these issues in the district court. Because there are no “compelli ng reasons” to consider these waived arguments on appeal, we decline to do so. S ee Crow v. Shalala , 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). Claimant also argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the report of consulting physician Dr. E. Joseph Sutton, II, whic h claimant alleges was incomplete and defective. Because this argument wa s raised in the district court1 20 C.F.R § 404.1519n(a)(1) and (2) provide that a “ [c]omprehensive

general medical examination” should last at least t hirty minutes, and a “[c]omprehensive musculoskeletal or neurological ex amination” should last at least twenty minutes. Section 404.1519n(b) sets fo rth the preferred content of the examination report. -5- and thoroughly discussed by the magistrate judge inhis order of September 14, 1995, it is properly before this court for review. Claimant alleges that, contrary to the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519n, Dr. Sutton spent only ten to fifteen min utes with her, did not review her medical records, and did not take x-rays. 1 She contends that these omissions rendered Dr. Sutton’s report incomplete, defective, and lacking in substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s denial of benefits. We agree with the magistrate judge that it was clea r from Dr. Sutton’s report that he had reviewed claimant’s medical hist ory. Dr. Sutton completed a residual functional capacity evaluation which was s upported by the findings in his report. His report indicates that the time spent w ith claimant was adequate and, contrary to claimant’s allegation, there was no ind ication that further x-rays were warranted. The magistrate judge also noted that claimant had n ot sought consistent medical treatment, creating gaps in her medical rec ords. In addition to Dr. Sutton’s report, however, the ALJ considered an examination by Dr. Cooper, another consulting physician, performed eleven months after claimant’s injury;-6-

the medical notes of Dr. Reed, the physician who tr eated claimant at the time of her injury; and various other medical examinations sought for essentially transitory problems. Therefore, it is clear that the ALJ considered all of the medical evidence as well as claimant’s testimony before concluding thatshe was capable of performing her past relevant work. The ALJ’s decis ion was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment of the United S tates District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Ruggero J. Aldisert Senior Circuit Judge