### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 19, 200 8 METRO POLI TAN GOVE RNMENT OF NASHVI LLE AND

DA VID SON CO UN TY, TEN NES SEE v . W A L T E R

C U O ZZO Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 05C-3309 Thom as W. Brothers, Judge

No. M2007- 01851-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 25, 2008

Walter Cuozz o (“the defe ndant”) was found g uilty of traf fic violations in ge nera l sessions court. He appea led to circ uit court but failed to comply with a local r

ule that provides “ an appel l an t [ on an appea l from g ener al sessions court] has forty five (45) day s to secure a t ri al d ate f rom the cour

t.” B e c a us e of thi s f a ilure , th e c ir c uit

c ourt dis mis se d th e de fe nd ant’ s a pp e a l. We a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded
C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D

. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. L EE , J J ., joined.
Walter Cuozz o, Old Hickory , Tenne ssee, a ppellant, pro se.
Andre w D. McClana

han and K evin C

. Klein, Nashvill e, Tennessee , for the a ppellee, Me tropolitan Gover nment of Na shville and Davidson County , Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION
I

. On August 25, 2005, the defe ndant was c harg ed by a Metropolitan Police De partment off icer with obstructi n g a t ra ff

ic lane a nd disobeying a

lawful orde r of a

police off

icer . The de fenda

nt sig ne d the c itatio n fo rm , a c kn ow le dg ing re c e ipt of the c itatio n. Th e a lle g e d v iol a tio ns oc c ur re d in the southbound traff

ic lane of Gallatin Road at or ne ar its intersec tion with Briley Parkway . The de fe nd ant cl a ims in h is b ri e f t hat he sto pp e d h is v e hic le in o rd e r t o a dv ise the of fi c e r o f t he po ssi ble pr e se nc e of

a de a d b od y lyinga lon g the sid e of the hig hw ay
. At a he ari ng in the Da vid so n Co un ty Gene ral Sessions Court on October 20, 2005, the def

endant was found g uilty of both cha rg es. The-2-

defe ndant subsequently

pursued a de novo appea l to the Davidson County Circuit Court (“the trial court” ).
I n connec tion with his appea l, the defe ndant receive d a document from the tria l court entitled “NOT I CE TO APPEL L ANT.” The doc ument, dated Oc tober 25, 2005, re flec ts the following ins tr uc tio n a pp e ari ngin b old

le tte rs : As the Appe llant, it is y our re sponsibili ty to take the ne cessa

ry steps to h a ve thi s c a se se t on

the do c ke t w ith in 4 5 d ay s o f its arr iva l in Circuit Court[ .]
The notice further

provided that [i ]f the case is not set within 45 day s of its a rrival in Circ uit Court, an order will be enter ed makingthe judgm en t of the Ge nera l Sessions Court the j u d gm ent of the Circ uit Court with costs t axed to the a pp e lla nt. Th is i s in accor da

nc e wi th L oc a l Ru le 20 (b ). Yo u w ill re c e ive no a dd iti on a l no tic e wh e n th e c a se arr ive s in Cir c uit Court

. The a ppeal wa s lodge d in the trial court on Oc tober 28, 2005.
On Dec ember

8, 2005 – 41 day s after t h e ca se’s “ arr ival in Circuit Court” – the defe ndant fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss the c ha

rg e s o r f or summa ry jud g me nt a

nd a se pa ra te mot ion to s e t th e c a se fo r t ri a l. H e fa ile d, ho we ve r, to not ic e the Me tr op oli tan G ov e rnme nt ( “ Me tr o” ) f or a he ari ngon

his motions. About t hree wee ks later, the de fenda nt, proce eding pro se, c ontacted c ounsel for Me tro by e ma il t o disc us s his ca se
. At that time , Met ro ’s c ouns e l adv ise d th e de fe nd ant i n a re sp on siv e e ma il a s f oll ow s: “ I f you pl an to pr e ss o n w ithy our a pp e a l, you

ne e d to c a ll the c le rk ’s of fi c e and se t a time for y our motions to be hear d and send me notice ther eof.” Howeve r, t he defenda nt failed to set either of his moti ons for a hear ing a nd otherwise f

ailed to obtain a date from the c ourt for a hear ing on his a pp e a l. On May 3, 2007 – more than one y ear and six months a fter the appea l was filed – the tr ial court e ntere d an orde r dismissing the def endant’ s appea l beca

use the c ase ha d not been se t f or trial within 45 day s of the appe al beingfiled in the trial court as require d by Rule 20(b) of the L ocal Rules of Practice for the Circuit Court, Chance ry Court, Criminal C ourt, and Probate Court of Davidson County (“ L oc a l Ru le 20 (b )” ), wh ic h r ule pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: Once t h e wa rr ant being appe aled is re ceive d by and filed w ith the Circuit Court Cl erk, the appellant ha s the duty to se t the appea l for a he ari ngbe fo re a

tr ia l ju dg e . T he a

pp e lla nt h a s f or ty fi ve (4 5) da

y s to se c ur e a tr ia l date fr om t

he c ourt . T his tim e is c ou nte d f ro m th e date the Circuit Court Clerk files the appe ale d war rant. I f the a

ppellant fa ils to s e c ur e thi s o rd e r w ith in t he 45 da y tim e pe ri od , an or de r w ill-3- be ente red making the judgme nt of the Ge nera l Sessions C ourt the judgme nt of the Circuit Court with costs t axed to the appellant. At th e ti me the a

pp e a l is pe rf

e c te d in the Cle rk ’s of

fi c e , th e c le rk

sh a ll g ive the a pp e lla nt o r t he a pp e lla nt’ s atto rney writte n n oti c e of thi s rule.
I nre s p o n s e t o t h e o rd e ro f d i s m i s s al , t h e d ef en d an tfi l eda m o t i o nt o al t er o r a m en d

. Fo l l o wi n g a hear ing on the matter, the tria l court ente red a n order on J une 2 9 , 2 0 0 7, denying the motion. The court fur ther orde red that the defe ndant’s appe al be dismissed. The c ourt specif ically found that the defe ndant under stood the require ments of the notice he rec eived “bec ause [he] filed a motion to set within 45 day s.” The court’s orde r held that the de fenda nt “fa iled to set his Moti on to Set for hea ring letting his appe al re main idle for ne arly one y ear and six months, whic h constitutes a classic case of fa ilure to p ro se c ute .” Th e de fe nd ant t he n f ile d th is a pp e a l.
II.
Th e de fe nd ant r a ise s f

ive iss ue s, wh ic h ta

ke n v e rb a timfr om h is b ri e f, are a s f oll ow s: 1. [S imultaneously ] with filing the Motion to set Trial Date, R 10, the de fe nd ant f

ile d a Mo tio n to Di smi ss/ Sum mary [Judg me nt] outlining why

this c ase should not proce ed which w ent unanswe red and undenie d there fore sho u l d have be en g rante d under TRCP 8.04 an d (l o ca l ru l e) L R

2 6

. 0 4 g. 2. Th e loc a l r

ule c ite d fo r d ism iss a l ha s c on tr oll ingse ttl e d la w b y thi s c ourt c iti ng2 a dd iti on a l cases fr om t his jur isd ic tio n a

nd a State Statute TCA 16-15-729 which pr ohibi t s dismis sal based on technica lities or proce dures a nd mandates that the case b e hear d on its me ri ts/ fa c ts. 3. Application of the r

ules wer e bias[ed] and prejudicial a g ainst the defe ndant and only

applied to him. See issue # 1 and L R 26.05 (R 31, 33) whe re the prosec utor could have and [i n my opinion] should have se t th e date a t any

tim e he wa

nte d in c lud ingbu t no t li mit e d to respondingto issue # 1.
4. I t c an r e a so na

bly [be ] ar g ue d th a t th e c ity

ha s th e re sp on sib ili ty

in a de novo trial to pr osecute their ca se as the de fenda nt has no ca se he wi sh e s to pr os e c ute and

no c ha rg e s to de fe nd

a g a ins t.
5. Th e def

e nd ant w a s in

c omp lia nc e wi th r

ule 20 a s h e wa s to ld i t me ant w he n h e tim e ly

fi le d h is M oti on

to S e t and

de c ide d b y

thi s-4- Court in Pi eny v United I mports which cited 2 other Appellate Court case s from this jurisdiction and TCA 16-15-729.
III

. A d ism iss a l pu

rs ua nt to L oc a l Rule 20 (b ) is an a log ou s to a de fa ult jud g me nt u

nd e r T e nn . R. Civ. P . 55.01 or involuntary dismiss al for f

ailure to prose cute unde r Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02( 1), as the purp os e of

L oc a l Ru le 20 (b ) is to a ssu re that c a se s a

pp e a le d f ro m g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ourt to c ir c uit court a re trie d with dispatch. Cro m-Cla rk Tr ust v . M c Do we ll , No. M2005-01097-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 2737828, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. M .S., filed S eptember 25, 2006). See Sellers v. Anderson , No. 01A01-9703- CV-00114, 1997 WL653914, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. M .S., filed October 22, 1997). The trial c ourt’s dec ision to di smiss t his case pur suant to L ocal Rule 20(b) is subject to reviewunder an a bu se of dis c re tio n s tand ard . U nd e r the a bu se of dis c re tio n sta

nd ard , a tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g sh ou ld be upheld if rea sonable mi nds could di sag ree as to the propr iety of the de cision made. Sum m ers v. Cherokee Children & Fam ily Service s, Inc. , 112 S.W .3d 486, 530 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) ( citing Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)). A trial court abuses its discretion only when it applies an incorr ect leg al standard or rea ches a decision which is a g ainst logic or re asoning or that cause s an i njustice to the party complaining

. Summ e rs , 112 S.W .3d at 530. The a buse of discr etion standard doe s not permit the appellate court to substitut e it s judgme nt for that of t he trial court. Id. The burden of

establishing a

n abuse of discretion is on the par

ty seekingto overturn the tr ial court’s ruling on appea l. Id. (c i t i n g Ballard v. Herzke , 924 S.W .2d 652, 659 (Tenn. 1996) ).
I V.
A

. Th e de fe nd ant fi rs t ass e rt s tha t he wa s ent itl e d to dismi ssa l or summ ary jud g me nt i n th is c a se purs ua nt t o T e nn. R. Ci v. P

. 8. 04 and L oc a l Ru le 26 .0 4( g ). He argue s it wa s Me tr o th a t w a s in d e f a u lt f o r n o t a n s w e r in g h is mo ti o nto d is mi s s b e c a u s e a “ n o nan s w e r

is a n o nd e f e n s e o r an admission that the motion is true.” The defe ndant contends that if the trial cour t was g oing to make any ru lin g su a sp onte it sho uld have be e n to g ra nt t he mot ion to d ism iss , a s th a t mo tio n w a s th e on ly pleadingactua lly

befor e it. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.04 provides that averme nts in a pleadingto which a responsive plea ding is require d are deeme d admitted if not denied in a r espon s i v e p l ea d ing. H oweve r, whe n no re sp on siv e pl e a din g is f

ile d, the op po sin g pa

rt y mus t in vo ke the de fa

ult jud g me nt p ro c e dure s in Tenn. R. Civ. P

. 5 5 ra ther than w ait until trial and then invoke Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.04. Sm ith v. Smith , 64 3 S.W. 2d

32 0, 32 3 ( Te nn . 1 98 2) ; Story v. Lanier , 166 S.W .3d 167, 182-83 (Te nn. Ct. App. 20 04 ). L oc a l Ru le 26 .0 4( e ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: Re sp on se s to mot ion s, inc lud ingc ounte r- a ff ida vit s, de po sit ion s, br ie fs or any oth e r matte rs pr e se nte d in o pp os iti on to m oti on s, mus t-5- be filed w ith the clerk’ s office by the close of business on the Monday b e f o r e t h e F r i d ay on whi c h th e mo tio n is to b e he ar d

. (Emphasis added.) Under L ocal Rule 26.04, motions are routinely g rante d if unopposed. See Sta te ex rel. Pope

v. Xantu s Healthpl

an of Tenn., In c. , N o
. M 2 0 0 0

- 0 0 1 2 0

- COA-R10- CV , 2 0 0 0 WL 63 08 58 , at *12 (T e nn . Ct. App . M.S. , fil e d May 17 , 200 0) . Sinc e the de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to dis mis s wa s uno pp os e d, the de fe nd ant a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt

sh ou ld h a ve g ra

nte d it

. The de fenda

nt’s argument lacks mer it because he fa iled to follow the local rule s requiring that he se t a

he ari ng date on his mot ion s. B e c a us e no he ari ngdate wa s se t, t he tim e fo r M e tr o to fi le a re sponse to his moti on was ne ver trig g ere d. Acc ording ly , the def endant wa s not entitled to have his mot ion

to d ism iss g ra

nte d p ur su ant t o L oc a l Rule 26 .0 4. Hi s c on te nti on un de r T e nn . R. Civ . P. 8. 04 fa ils be c a

us e he did

no t in vo ke the de fa

ult jud g me nt pr oc e dure s pur su ant to Te nn . R. Civ . P. 55. The de fenda

nt is not entitled to relief pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.04 or L ocal Rule 26.04(g ).
B

. The de fenda

nt’s second issue asserts t hat Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729 a nd Pieny v. U

nited Im ports, In c. , No. M 2004-01695-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 2140853 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed September 6, 2005) , prohibit dismiss al of his appea l. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729 ( Supp. 2007), pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: No civil case , orig inating in a g ener al sessions court a

nd car ried to a hig he r c ourt , sh a ll be dis mis se d by su c h c ourt fo r any in for mal ity wh a te ve r, bu t sh a ll b e tr ie d o n it s mer its ; and the c ourt sh a ll a llo w a ll amendments in the for

m of action, the parties there to, or the statement of the c a us e of a c tio n, ne c e ssa

ry to r e a c h th e me ri ts, up on su c h te rm s as may b e d e e me d

ju s t a n d p r o p e r
. T h e tr ia l s h a ll b e d e n ovo, inc lud ingdama g e s.
I n Wa re v . Meh ar ry Me d. Col

l. , 898 S.W .2d 181, 184 (Tenn. 1995) , the Tenne ssee Supre me Court no te d a s f oll ow s: De novo a

ppeals fr om the g ener al sessions co u rts differ from other ty pes of a ppellate pr ocee dings. The circ uit court does not revie w the g ener al s essions court’s decision. Ho he nb e rg Br os . Co . v . M

iss ou ri Pac. R.R. , 5 86 S.W. 2d

11 7, 11 9 ( Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 79 ). Ra the r, it provides the pa

rties an e ntirel y n ew t ri al as if no other trial had occur red a nd as if the c ase ha d orig inated in the circ uit c ourt. Teague v. Gooc h , 2 06 Te nn . 2 91 , 2 96 , 333 S .W .2 d 1 , 3 (1 96 0) ; Odle v. McCo r mack , 185 Tenn. 439, 445, 206 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1947); Braverm an v. Roberts Cons tr. Co. , 74 8 S. W.2 d 4 33 , 4 35 (T e nn . Ct

.-6- App. 1987); L awr ence A. P ivnick, Tenne ssee Ci rcuit Court Practice , § 3-10, at 115 (3d e d. 1991) (“ Pivnick”).
Thus , T e nn . Co de Ann. § 1 6- 15 -7 29 re qu ir e s th a t c a se s a pp e a le d f rom gen e ra l se ssi on s c ourt to c ir c uit c ourt be tr e a te d as tho ug h the y or ig inate d in the c ir c uit c ourt , th e re by

a llo wi nga me ndme nts to the pleading s, the ac tion, and the par ties. Wa re , 898 S.W .2d at 184-185.
H o w e v e r , t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s a

p p e a l w a s n o t d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e o f an“ i n f o r m a l i t y” contemplated under Te nn. Code Ann. § 16-15- 729. The statute doe s not abrog ate a circ uit court’s authority to dismi ss an appe al for failure to comply with a rule of

proce dure like L ocal Rule 20(b)

. Trial cour ts have c lear

authority to adopt local rule s of practice to supplement the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil P roce dure. Te nn. S. Ct

. R. 18(a); Te nn. Code Ann. §§ 16-2- 511, 16-3-407 ( 1994). F urther, they have br oad author ity

to control their docke ts and the proced u re s i n t h eir c ourts. Hessm er v. Hessm er , 138 S.W .3d 901, 904 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). T enn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729 doe s not suspend the cour

t’s ability to enforc e a pr ocedur al rule de signe d t o i n s u re that appellants from g ener al sessions court pursue their appeals i n an expeditious manner. Unde r the fa cts of this case , the def endant fa i l ed t o obtain a trial date within 45 day s after perf ectinghis appea l from g ener al sessions court. He allowed his ca se to lang uish for over 18 mont h s
. We hold that the trial court proper ly acte d within its sound discretion whe n it entere d its order dismissing the de fenda nt’s case

. The a ction dismiss in g t h e defe ndant’s appe al pursuant to L ocal Rule 20(b) does not run af oul of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 15-729.
The de fenda

nt arg ues that our de cision in Pieny v. United Im ports, In c. , 2005 WL 2140853 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), supports his posit ion in this case. We disag ree . I n Pie ny , the trial cour t a dd re sse d a n a pp e a l f ro m g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ourt in w hic h th e a pp e a lin g pa

rt y ha d f ile d a mot ion to set within 45 da

y s of the appea l be ing filed in c ircuit court but ha d failed to se cure a trial date dur ing the s ame 45- day

period. Id

. a t* 1

. T h e t r i a l c o u rtd i s m i s s e d t h e a p p e a l b e c a

u s e o f t h i s f a i l u r e
. In reve rsing the trial cour

t, we re lied in Pie ny

upon our dec ision in May v. Woodlawn Mem orial Park, Inc. ., No. M2001-02945-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 31059223 at *2 (Te n n
. C t

. Ap p . M.S., filed September 17, 2002) in which we note d that

it would fly

in the fac e of justice to require that the matter a ctually be se t wi thi n the fo rt

y -f ive (4 5) da

y pe ri od pr e sc ri be d by L ocal Rule 20(b). Such a

holding c ould open the rule to ab u s e and contrave ne the purpose be hind the Te nn esse e Ru le s o f Civ il Pro c e du re . Pie ny , 2005 WL 2140853 at *4. I n the ca se now be fore us, the defe ndant fa iled, fo r som e 18 months, to set his motion for a hear ing as require d by the local r ule. In Pie ny , we too k is su e wi th the tr ia l c ourt ’s be lie f that the a pp e a l ha d to be se t wi thi n th e c ri tic a l 45 -d ay pe ri od . O ur

ho ldi ngin Pie ny ha s n o b e ari ngwh a tso e ve r o n th e fa c ts n owbe fo re us
.-7- C

. The defe ndant next asser

ts that the application of the rules wa s biased ag ainst him and that Metro should have set the date for t h e h ea ri n g on his moti ons and the trial of his appea l. The de fe nd ant r e lie s o n L oc a l Ru le 26 .0 5( a ), wh ic h p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: Do c ke tin g of a mot ion wi ll be c omp le te up on fi lin g the mot ion

wi th the Chance ry , Probate a

nd Circuit Court Cl erks, pr ovided it contains notice of a

hear ing da

te. I f n o h ea ring date is re quested upon the filing of the motion, either counse l ma y file a notice of hea

ring for a previously

filed motion and serve opposing c ounsel and/or pa rty

. The de fenda

nt’s arg ument fails bec ause he has m ade no showing that the rules we re a pplied in a biased f

ashi o n against him. He a sserts that Metro should have set his motion t o dismiss for he ari ng and his a

pp e a l for tr ia l for him , impl ying that the ru le s of p ro c e du re sh ou ld n ot a

pp ly to h im sin c e he wa s p ro c e e din g pr o se
. Th is c on te nti on is w ith ou t me ri t. T he tr ia l c ourt c ou ld n ot e xcu se the def endant f rom complying w ith t h e same substantive and proc edura l rules that Metro wa s expected to observe

. See Hessemer , 13 8 S.W. 3d a t 90 3; Hodges v. Attorney General , 43 S.W .3d 91 8, 92 0 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ). Pr o se pa rt ie s are no t e xcu se d f

ro m c omp lyingwi th t

he a pp lic a ble substantive and proc edura l law. Irv in v . City of Cla rk sv ill e , 767 S.W .2d 649, 652 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). They

must follow the same proc edura l an d s u b stantive law a s the repr esente d party

. Id. Pur su ant t o L oc a l Ru le 20 (b ), the de fe nd ant h a d th e du ty to s e c ur e the tr ia l date fo r his a pp e a l. Un d er t h i s R u l e, M et ro h adn o d

u t y t o s et ei t h er

o f t h e d ef

en d an t ’s m o t i o n s fo r h ea ri n g.
D

. L astly , the def

endant e ssentially

argues that he c omplied with L ocal Rule 20(b) by filing the motion to s et. We disag ree
. The dismissal of a c ase f

or fa ilure to comply

with L ocal Rule 20(b) is analog ous to gr anting a def ault judgme nt. Defa

ult judgments ar e not f

avore d, and thus Te nn. R. Civ. P. 55.02 pe rmits trial courts to set aside de fault judg ments in acc ordanc e with T en n . R. Civ. P . 60.02(1). See Keck v
. Nationw ide Sys., Inc. , 499 S.W .2d 266, 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). When deciding whether to set aside a defa ult judgment, cour

ts should construe the rules liberally and shoul d set the def ault aside whene ver the re is a rea sonable doubt about the justness of dismissing the c ase be fore it can be he ard o n i t s m er its. See Tennessee D ep’t of Hum an Servs. v. Barbee , 6 8 9 S. W. 2 d 8 6 3 , 8 6 6

- 6 7 ( T enn. 1985). The c ourts should focus principa lly on whether

the def ault was w illful, whether the nondefa ulting par ty ’s ability

to present his or her claim will be prejudice d, and whether the def aulting party has a c olorable de fense to the claim. See Nelson v. Sim pson , 82 6 S.W. 2d 48 3, 48 5 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1991).
The c ircumstance s in this case do not favor g rantingthe def endant a ny relief . He wa s awa

re of, and ha d notice of, his duty to se cure the trial date for his a ppeal. He may

not have known, at the-8-

time of the filing of his motion t o s et on Dec ember 8, 2005, that he also ne eded to sc hedule that mot ion fo r he ari ng
. Ho we ve r, up on c on ta c tin g c ouns e l f

or Me tr o, he wa s a dv ise d th a t he ne e de d to contac t the cler

k’s offic e to set the motion for a hear ing. He then neg lected his appea l for over 18 months. His negle ct of the appea l de monstrates a total la ck of conce rn for the appea l he initiated.
I n h is br ie f, the de fe nd ant qu ote s the ru le ind ic a tin g that the tr ia l c ourt wa s to pr ov ide him “an e ntirely

new tria l as if no other tria l had occ urre d,” and ar gu es t h er efor e that unless Metro broug ht t h e ca s e b ef

ore the court, “ there is no case.” The de fenda nt claims that the “burde n of proof” is on Metro “to acc use and prove that an of fense has bee n committed.” He a sserts that “the trial court is w ithout jurisdiction and author ity to uphold a prior ‘judg ment’ that ac cordingto [ Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15- 729] never happe ned.” T hese sta te ments of the def

endant support the c onclusion that he per

haps purpose fully

and willfully

neg lected his a

ppeal, possibly

unmindful that a dismissal of the a ppeal would make the g ener al sessions judgme n t t he judg ment of the trial c ourt. I n any e ve nt, the de fe nd ant’ s ar g ume nts mis s the mark be c a us e the tr ia l c ourt ’s du ty

to c on du c t “ an e nti re ly new tr ial ” do e s n ot c ome int o p lay un le ss t he de fe nd ant t a ke s th e ne c e ssa ry ste ps to p ur su e his appea l. This he did not do. Any claim by

the def endant that he wanted to pur sue his appeal seems dising enuous consideringthe 18 months of neg lect. The defe ndant was only stirred to a ction by the trial cour t’s sua sponte dismissal of his a ppeal. Under the fac ts of this c ase, dismiss al of the appe al was a n act wi thi n th e dis c re tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

. V

. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is aff irmed. Costs on appea l are taxed to the appellant, Walter Cuo zzo. T his c a se is r e mand e d to the tr ia l c ourt fo r c oll e c tio n of c os ts a sse sse d b e low , p ur su ant t o applicable law.

___________________________________ CHARL ES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE