NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIAN SEGOBIA II, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-55943 

D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01661-NLS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Nita L. Stormes, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 2, 2021

Pasadena, California

Before: IKUTA, BENNETT, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.

Claimant-Appellant Julian Segobia II appeals the denial of his applications 

for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

“We review the district court’s order affirming the [administrative law judge’s 

(“ALJ”)] denial of social security benefits de novo, and reverse only if the ALJ’s 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

SEP 23 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the 

ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than 

one rational interpretation, we must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported 

by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Id. at 1111.

1. Segobia suffers from schizophrenia. He argues that the ALJ erred by 

failing to give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the medical opinion of his 

treating psychiatrist, Dr. Palica. “As a general rule, more weight should be given to 

the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the 

claimant.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, “[t]o reject the 

uncontroverted opinion of a claimant’s physician, the ALJ must present clear and 

convincing reasons for doing so.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th 

Cir. 1989).

The ALJ satisfied that requirement by explaining the inconsistencies between 

the marked limitations on Segobia’s ability to work in Dr. Palica’s medical opinion 

and the “generally unremarkable” findings in several physicians’ mental status 

exams (“MSEs”), including Dr. Palica’s. “A conflict between a treating physician’s 

medical opinion and [her] own notes is a clear and convincing reason for not relying 

on the doctor’s opinion . . . .” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). Of course, “it is error for an ALJ to pick out 
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a few isolated instances of improvement over a period of months or years and to treat 

them as a basis for concluding a claimant is capable of working.” Garrison v. 

Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). But here, any instances of Segobia’s 

symptoms worsening were isolated setbacks in his overall “trajectory of 

improvement” spanning more than five years.

2. Segobia argues that the ALJ erred by failing to inquire into 

inconsistencies between the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony and the 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)—specifically, by failing to inquire into 

the discrepancy between the VE’s statement that DOT number 559.687-014 

corresponds to the job of a “packer” and the DOT itself, which in fact lists “ampoule 

sealer” at DOT number 559.687-014.

“When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE . . . evidence and 

the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before 

relying on the VE . . . evidence to support a determination or decision about whether 

the claimant is disabled.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (Dec. 4, 2000); see 

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ failed to do 

so here, instead asking the VE at the start of his testimony, “[i]f your testimony is 

inconsistent with the DOT, will you tell me whether or not I ask?” Cf. Rounds v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015). The VE agreed.

But here, the error was harmless because Segobia’s attorney stipulated to this 
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process of identifying conflicts between the VE’s testimony and the DOT. Even 

without that stipulation, the ALJ’s failure to inquire into the conflict would have 

been harmless, as the VE testified that “general office machine operator” is a second 

occupation appropriate for an individual with Segobia’s RFC and that there are 

266,000 jobs for that occupation existing in the national economy—a sufficient 

number.

1

 See Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1051 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 

Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 528 (9th Cir. 2014) (“25,000 jobs 

meets the statutory standard.”).

3. Segobia challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination for failing to 

“incorporate the ALJ’s own findings regarding Mr. Segobia’s mental impairments,” 

including Segobia’s “poor memory,” “limited insight that affects his concentration 

and ability to focus on tasks,” and “frequent social difficulties with friends and 

family members in stressful situations.” But the ALJ did incorporate those findings 

into Segobia’s RFC. The RFC addresses Segobia’s poor memory by limiting 

Segobia to “understand[ing], remembering, and carrying out simple, routine, and 

repetitive tasks.” It addresses Segobia’s inability to concentrate and focus on tasks 

1 Segobia cites our holding in Maxwell v. Saul, 971 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2020), 

that “two occupations do not constitute a ‘significant range of work.’” Id. at 1131. 

But Maxwell was interpreting a rule that applies only to “individuals of advanced 

age,” defined as individuals who are fifty-five or older. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. 

P, App. 2, Rule 202.00(c). Thus, Maxwell does not apply to Segobia, who was thirtyone when the ALJ denied his applications for social security benefits.
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by limiting Segobia to jobs with “standard industry breaks every two hours.” And 

it addresses Segobia’s social difficulties in stressful situations by limiting Segobia 

to “[non]interaction with the general public, and only occasionally work-related, 

non-personal, non-social interaction with coworkers and supervisors involving no 

more than a brief exchange of information or hand off of product.” 

4. Segobia argues that the ALJ failed to consider his ability to sustain 

work. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 724 (9th Cir. 1998). But the ALJ 

expressly considered Segobia’s allegation that “the severity of his psychological 

impairment has affected his ability to engage in work duties for a sustained period” 

and then discounted it, given that Segobia’s “statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with 

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Substantial evidence 

supports that determination, including Segobia’s unremarkable MSEs and his selfreports that he has successfully managed his symptoms with medication.

AFFIRMED.