RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4746-15T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.A.C., JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF TYL.A.C. and TYM.A.C.,

Minors.

_________________________________

Submitted March 1, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Simonelli, Carroll and Gooden 

Brown. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex 

County, Docket No. FG-07-0131-16.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Theodore J. Baker, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

March 7, 2017
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Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Chanel 

J. Van Dyke, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minors (Toya Davis, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

Defendant M.A.C., Jr., the biological father of TYL.A.C., 

born in 2013, and TYM.A.C., born in 2014, appeals from the June

22, 2016 Family Part judgment for guardianship, which terminated 

his parental rights to the children.1 On appeal, defendant 

challenges the trial judge's finding that respondent New Jersey 

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) proved 

prong three of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing 

evidence. Defendant argues that: (1) the Division did not make 

reasonable efforts to provide tailored services given his 

intellectual deficits and mental health condition, or accomplish 

reunification with him; and (2) the judge committed reversible 

error in rejecting his adoptive godmother, K.L., and uncle, C.W., 

as alternatives to termination. We affirm.

We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's 

involvement with the family. Instead, we incorporate by reference 

 

1 The judgment also terminated the parental rights of the 

children's biological mother, defendant T.J.C., who executed an 

identified surrender to the foster parent who wants to adopt the 

children. T.J.C. does not appeal. 
3 A-4746-15T3

the factual findings set forth in Judge Linda Lordi Cavanaugh's

comprehensive and well-reasoned June 15, 2016 written opinion. 

However, we add the following comments.

Defendant has a history of drug use, lack of employment, lack 

of stable housing, intermittent incarcerations, and schizophrenia, 

for which he unilaterally stopped taking medication. He became 

involved with the Division in 2013, shortly after TYL.A.C. was 

born. Defendant's involvement with the Division was marked by his 

non-compliance with the numerous services the Division offered, 

inconsistent visitation with the children, missing status, and 

failure to address the issues that led to the children's removal 

and continued placement in foster care. The Division's undisputed 

expert evidence confirmed that despite the array of services the 

Division provided to defendant, he was unwilling or unable to 

overcome or remove the harms facing the children, and was not a 

viable parenting option at the time of the guardianship trial or 

in the foreseeable future.

Defendant had offered K.L. as an alternative placement 

option, but the Division ruled her out twice. She was ruled out 

based on a home assessment and failure to take the necessary steps 

to enable her to be considered as a viable placement option, and 

later ruled out on best interests grounds based on the results of 

the bonding evaluations between her and the children, and between 
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the foster parents and the children. The undisputed expert bonding 

evidence confirmed that the children had no bond with K.L.,

whereas, they were securely attached to their foster mother and 

would suffer serious and enduring harm if removed from her, which 

K.L. could not mitigate. Defendant did not identify C.W. until 

December 2015, approximately six months before the guardianship 

trial began in June 2016, and he was unavailable to be assessed 

until several weeks later. The Division ruled him out on best 

interests grounds. Neither K.L. nor C.W. appealed the Division's 

determinations.

Judge Cavanaugh reviewed the evidence presented at the trial, 

made meticulous factual findings as to all four prongs of N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a), and thereafter concluded the Division met by clear 

and convincing evidence all of the legal requirements for a 

judgment of guardianship. The judge's opinion tracks the statutory 

requirements of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), accords with N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420 (2012), N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88 (2008), In re 

Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999), In re Guardianship 

of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365 (1999), and N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), and is more than amply 

supported by the record. F.M., supra, 211 N.J. at 448-49. 

Affirmed.