COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Huff, O’Brien and AtLee

Argued at Lexington, Virginia

RUANTA DEANGELAO PRICE

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 0985-22-3 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.

NOVEMBER 21, 2023

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE

Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge

Brett P. Blobaum, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent 

Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

Timothy J. Huffstutter, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. 

Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for the City of Danville convicted appellant 

Ruanta Deangelao Price of strangulation, in violation of Code § 18.2-51.6.

1

 He received a sentence 

of five years’ imprisonment, with three years suspended and one year and six months of supervised 

release. On appeal, Price argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

1 The court acquitted Price of brandishing a firearm, possessing a firearm after having 

been convicted of a nonviolent felony, and two counts of assault and battery, stemming from 

incidents on another date.

UNPUBLISHED
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I. BACKGROUND2

Kristy Custer began dating Price in November 2021. On January 22, 2022, they were 

together at her apartment when Price became angry because Custer had disabled the text message 

notifications on her phone. They had previously fought over messages other men had sent to 

Custer. Price accused Custer of “being sneaky” and “up to no good.” Although Custer showed 

Price the messages on her phone, he seized it and threw it across the room. An argument ensued.

During this argument, Price pushed Custer onto her bed, placed his hands around her throat, and 

squeezed with “medium pressure.” Custer did not “remember breathing,” testifying that “[i]t only 

lasted a few seconds, I’m sure. But it felt like . . . it felt like a long time.”

Price released Custer but then pushed her back onto the bed and again squeezed her neck, 

this time with “[d]efinitely more than medium” pressure. She explained that “[t]his time it was 

more, it was harder to breathe. [A]nd I felt like I was getting ready to pass out.” Custer repeated

that it was difficult to breathe; her “airway was closing up,” and she “felt like [she] was gonna pass 

out and throw up.” She further testified that she was unable to stand after Price released his grip on 

her neck: “I felt like I was, like, my legs were weak. Like I had no control over [th]em. I was 

falling pretty much, and [Price] made a comment about me not being able to stand up, falling 

around.” Custer “was having a hard time trying to catch [her] breath to breathe.” Price continued to 

press Custer about the messages on her phone while scrolling through the contents and sending 

messages, pretending to be her, in an attempt to prove that she was being unfaithful.

2

“Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the 

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 

Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). This 

standard “requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and 

all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
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Meanwhile, Custer’s coworker, Lisa Pearman, had been trying to contact her. Growing 

worried, she asked police to perform a welfare check on Custer. When the responding officer spoke 

with Custer at her residence, she told him that she was “okay,” but “just hadn’t felt that well that 

day.” Custer testified that Price asked about the officer after he left, describing Price as “nervous.” 

Pearman arrived at Custer’s home a short time later and asked Custer if she was okay; Custer 

“shook [her] head, yes,” but “really didn’t say yes or no,” but “made eye reactions . . . , just kind of 

blinked her eyes.”

Custer testified that she was winking and blinking her eyes “trying to give [Pearman] a 

signal,” and told Pearman that she was not alone. Pearman invited Custer to lunch, and Custer 

accepted. Pearman noticed that Custer was “very distressed and upset.” Custer said she needed to 

go get dressed, and Pearman said that if Custer was not out of the apartment in ten minutes, 

Pearman would call police again. Price left the house in a separate vehicle when Custer left with 

Pearman.

At lunch, Custer told Pearman about Price’s attack. Pearman noticed that Custer had bruises 

and marks on her neck and arms and that the neck marks were “fresh.” Pearman asked Custer if she 

wanted to leave the apartment, but Custer declined and returned there after lunch. Custer went to 

the hospital the next day where she reported the attack.

While Custer was at the hospital, Courtney Moss, a forensic nurse, performed an 

examination on her and later testified as an expert at Price’s trial. At trial, the Commonwealth

introduced several photographs of Custer’s injuries, taken during Moss’s examination and in the 

days immediately following the assault. Moss observed three marks on Custer’s head and neck, two 

on her chest, six on her arms, eight on her left leg, and seven on her right leg. Moss recounted

Custer’s report of the January 22 attack, given at the exam, stating that Custer reported she had 

difficulty breathing, nausea, and feelings of faintness. Moss opined that Custer’s faintness, nausea, 
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and “weakness or numbness” in the arms and legs were consistent with carotid artery and jugular 

vein compression and that Custer’s trouble breathing was consistent with tracheal compression.

Moss measured Custer’s neck during the initial examination and then again at a follow-up visit on 

February 9, 2022; the results indicated that Custer’s neck had been swollen on January 23, which

Moss described as “consistent with pressure being applied and causing injury or trauma to those 

tissues.”

Custer testified that she did not speak with Price for several days after January 22. When 

Price texted her, they discussed koala bears and her joking that she’d like to have one as a pet. In 

the text exchange, Custer said she was “[j]ust dreaming,” and Price responded, “[y]eah you do that a 

lot that’s why I almost killed you.” Custer reported the attack to police on February 9, 2022, after 

her follow-up visit with Moss. At trial, she explained her delay in reporting, saying that she “kept 

going back and forth in [her] mind if [she] wanted to go through with it or not.” She decided to 

make the report after learning that her neck had been swollen on her initial visit after the 

strangulation incident.

Price testified that he broke up with Custer on February 4, 2022. Price denied sending the

text stating that he had almost killed Custer and claimed that Custer was attacking him during the 

January 22 altercation, when he had to “pry” her off him.

The circuit court convicted Price of strangulation, for which he received a sentence of five 

years’ imprisonment, with three years suspended and one year and six months of supervised release. 

This appeal followed.
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II. ANALYSIS

Price argues that Custer’s testimony was inherently incredible, and therefore the evidence 

was insufficient to convict him of strangulation. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is 

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does 

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. 

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted 

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by 

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

“Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the 

[factfinder], which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they 

testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (first alteration in original) 

(quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “This Court must ‘accept the 

trial court’s determination of the credibility of witness testimony unless, “as a matter of law, the 

testimony is inherently incredible.”’” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 328 (2018)

(quoting Nobrega v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 508, 518 (2006)). “Witness testimony will not be 
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found inherently incredible ‘unless it is “so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to 

believe it” or “shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which 

reasonable men should not differ.”’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 239-40 (2022) 

(quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018)).

B. The evidence was sufficient to convict Price of strangulation

“Any person who, without consent, impedes the blood circulation or respiration of another 

person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such person 

resulting in the wounding or bodily injury of such person is guilty of strangulation, a Class 6 

felony.” Code § 18.2-51.6(A). To secure a conviction for strangulation, the Commonwealth must 

prove that the act caused a bodily injury consisting of “damage or harm or hurt that relates to the 

body”; an “impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty”; or “impairment 

of a physical condition.” Ricks v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 470, 479 (2015). Bodily injury need not 

include “any observable wounds, cuts, or breaking of the skin” or “proof of ‘broken bones or 

bruises.’” Id. (quoting English v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 711, 719 (2011)). “[I]nternal 

injuries—no less than external injuries—fall within the scope of Code § 18.2-51.” Id. (alteration in 

original) (quoting English, 58 Va. App. at 719). The element of bodily injury may be proven by any 

injury, “no matter how temporary,” including rendering the victim unconscious. Id. at 478, 480 

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(5)(E)).

Price asserts that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to sustain the strangulation 

conviction because Custer was “inherently incredible as a matter of law” and that the court therefore

erred in denying his motion to strike. In support of this argument, Price points to Custer’s statement 

to the officer conducting the welfare check on the day of the incident that she was “okay” and just 

not feeling well that morning. He further notes her decision to have lunch with a friend shortly after 

the attack and her continued contact with him. Also weighing against Custer’s credibility, in Price’s 
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estimation, was her delay in reporting the incident to law enforcement “for over two weeks.” Price 

characterizes this behavior as “contrary to human experience.” “Without the inherently incredible 

testimony,” he tells us, the “evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of strangulation.” We 

disagree.

“Potential inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact finder. We do not revisit 

such conflicts on appeal ‘unless “the evidence is such that reasonable [persons], after weighing the 

evidence and drawing all just inferences therefrom, could reach but one conclusion.”’” Towler v. 

Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Molina v. 

Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338, 369, aff’d, 272 Va. 666 (2006)). Neither the delay in reporting 

knowledge of a crime nor the mere fact that a witness has been impeached renders the witness’s 

testimony inherently incredible. See Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006) (“The 

mere fact that a witness may have delayed in reporting knowledge of a case . . . does not necessarily 

render the testimony unworthy of belief.”); Ray v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 291, 306 (2022)

(holding that “the mere fact that a witness’[s] testimony may have been impeached does not 

necessarily render the testimony inherently incredible”). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is 

‘so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or 

things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald, 295 

Va. at 487 (quoting Juniper, 271 Va. at 415).

Whatever “incongruities” Price finds in her testimony, Custer’s account of the strangulation 

itself was consistent. Moreover, Pearman testified that Custer was “distressed and upset” on the day 

of the attack. She also noticed “fresh” marks on Custer’s neck. Moss, a qualified forensic nurse 

with experience evaluating strangulation cases, noted three marks on Custer’s head and neck, along 

with other injuries. Moss opined that Custer’s reported symptoms were consistent with 

compression of the carotid artery, jugular vein, and trachea. Moss also found that Custer had 
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suffered swelling in her neck, which was “consistent with pressure being applied and causing 

trauma or injury to those tissues.” In short, the physical evidence was consistent with Custer’s 

account of the attack.

We acknowledge, as the circuit court did, that there were “some interesting incongruities in 

the evidence and the actions of the individuals involved” because “sometimes people who are in an 

emotional state do not act in a logical or rational way.” But any contradictions in a witness’s

testimony goes to the credibility and the weight of that testimony. Simpson v. Commonwealth, 

199 Va. 549, 557 (1957). It is not, as Price argues, “contrary to human experience” that a domestic 

violence victim might be hesitant to report an attack when the assailant is physically in her presence, 

or that there may be many other reasons to be reluctant to report the crimes of her romantic partner. 

Because there is nothing in this record to suggest that Custer was inherently incredible, it was up 

to the circuit court, sitting as factfinder, to judge Custer’s credibility. “When the law says that it 

is for the [factfinder] to judge of the credibility of a witness, it is not a matter of degree.” Sidya 

v. World Telecom Exch. Commc’ns, LLC, 301 Va. 31, 37 (2022) (quoting Simpson, 199 Va. at

557). According the proper deference to the factfinder’s evaluation of Custer’s credibility, and 

noting the overwhelming consistencies between the physical evidence and Custer’s account of the 

attack, the circuit court did not err in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Price 

was guilty of strangulation.

III. CONCLUSION

The circuit court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to support Price’s conviction 

for strangulation. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.