Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of A ppellate Proc edure 43(c) (2), Attorne y Gene ral Er ic Holder

has 1 be e n s ub sti tut e d f

or fo rm e r A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l A lbe rt o R. Go nza le s. 07

- 31 46

- ag Liao v. H o l d er 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 3 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 4 5

____________________________________ 6 7 August Term, 2008 8 9 (Argued: August 29, 2008 Dec ided: Marc h 4, 2009) 10 11 Docke t No. 07-3146-a g 12 13

____________________________________ 14 15 J I N YI L I AO, XIAO Z HI

WU, 16 17 Pe tit ion e rs , 18 19 – v. – 20 21 ERI C H . H OL DE R, JR., Attor ne y Ge ne ra l of

the Un ite d St ate s, 1 22 23 Re sp on de nt. 24

____________________________________ 25 26 Be fore : CAL AB RESI , SOTOMAYOR, B .D. PARKER, Circuit Judges

. 27

____________________________________ 28 29 Petition for reviewfrom an or der of the B oard of

I mmigration Appeals deny ing 30 Petitioners, a native c itiz en of China c laiming political per secution and he r Dominican- born son 31 applying f

or der ivative status, asylum and withholding of r emoval. The Boa rd af firmed the 32 decision of the Immigration J udg e, who, ba sed on a two month “Reside ncia” visa, found that 33 Petitioner was “f irmly rese ttled” in the Dominican Republic, a nd there fore ineligible f

or asylum.The re fer ence s here in are to the lead Petitioner, Jin Yi L iao, as Xia o Z hi Wu i s applying f or 2 derivative status based on the a pplication of his mother. 1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)( A)(vi) . We hold that such a tempora ry visa, without more, ca

nnot 2 establish that an applica nt has, under the “totality of the c ircumstance s” test employ ed by our 3 Circuit, been “ firmly rese ttled” in a third country as def ined in 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. Moreove r, we 4 find that the B oard’ s decision that Petitioner did not qualify for the e x ception to firm re settlement 5 for a

pplicants whose e ntry

into another c ountry

was a “nec essar

y conseque nce of

. . . flig ht from 6 p e r s e c u t i o n , ” 8 C
. F
. R
. § 2 0 8
. 1 5 ( a ) , w a s b a s e d o na m i s p e r c e p t i o no f

th e r e c o r d

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 7 we GR

AN T the pe tit ion

fo r r e vie w a

nd REM AN D t

he c a se to t

he B oa rd of I mmi g ra tio n App e a ls. 8 9 10

_________________________ 11 12 J OSHUA B ARDAVI D, Off ice of Stephanie Yutkin, New 13 York, N.Y ., for Petitioner

. 14 15 AL EXGO RI NG , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l ( Jef

fr e y S. 16 Buc holtz , Michelle Gor den L atour, a nd P. Michael Truma

n, 17 on the brief ), Of fi c e of I mmi g ra tio n L iti g atio n, U. S. 18 Depa rtment of Just ice, Washing ton, DC, for Respondent

. 19

_____________________________________ 20 21 CAL AB RESI , Circuit Judge : 22 Petitioners J in Yi L iao and Xia o Z hi Wu, m other a nd son, petition from the J une 25, 2007 23 order

of the B oard of

I mmigration Appeals (“ BIA”) dismiss ing the ir appe al and a ffirmingthe 24 de c isi on

of I mmi g ratio n Jud g e (“ I J”) Willi am Jankun, wh o d e nie d th e ir a pp lic atio ns fo r a sylum 25 and withholding of remova l. Petiti oner L iao applied f or asy lum based on political perse cution, 26 alleg ing that she left China whe n family planningauthorities threatened f orcibly to abort her 27 pregnancy . She first fled to the Dominica n Republic, and ther e g ave bir th to her son, Xiao Z hi 28 Wu, wh o is a

pp lyingfo r d e ri vativ e status . F ive months late r s he se ttl e d in the Un ite d St ate s, 2-3- 1 wher e she ha s had two more c hildren. The B I A af firmed the I J ’s dec ision, which, based on 2 Petitioner’s two month “Residencia ” visa, ha d found that Petitioner was “ firmly rese ttled” in the 3 Dominican Republic, a nd was ther efor e inelig ible for a sylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)( A)(vi)

. 4 We hold that a temporar y visa of such a

short term, without more, ca nnot establish that an 5 applicant ha s, under the “ totality of the c ircumstance s” test employ ed by our Circuit, bee n 6 “firmly

rese ttled” in a third country

. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. Moreove r, we find that the B I A’s 7 de c isi on

that Pe tit ion e r d id n ot q

ua lif y fo r t he e xce pti on

to f ir m r e se ttl e me nt f

or a pp lic ants wh os e 8 entry

into another c ountry

was a “nec essar

y conseque nce of

. . . flig ht from per secution,” 8 9 C.F.R. § 208.15(a) , was ba sed on a misper ception of the rec ord. We there fore g rant the pe tition 10 for r eview a

nd rema nd the ca se to the B I A. 11 BACK GR OUND 12 I. Liao’s Claim of P erse cution 13 Be cause the ag ency has not questioned Petitioner’s c redibility , we take the fa cts she has 14 asser

ted to be true

. See Yan C hen v. G onzales , 417 F.3d 268, 271- 72 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding 15 that, whe re the re is n o a dv e rs e c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio n in

the de c isi on

be ingre vie we d, we wi ll 16 assume that the pe titioner is credible) . L iao is a citizen and native of China who fled f

rom her 17 home country

to avoid forc ible abortion. In J anuar y 1992, L iao discover ed that she w as 18 pregnant. Since she w as not leg ally marrie d to the baby ’s father, he r cur rent husband D eZ hong 19 Wu, the Chi nese a uthorities considere d her pr eg nancy illega l. Consequently , when L iao was 20 “somewhat noticeably pregnant,” se vera l gove rnment off icer s came to her home one evening 21 and , s us pe c tin gsh e wa s p re g na nt, e du c ate d h e r a

bo ut t he imp or tanc e of c omp lyingwi th t

he bir th 22 control policy

. Th e se of fi c ia ls t old

he r t hat sh e “ wa s n ot a llo we d to g ive bir th t o a c hil d b e c a

us e-4- 1 [she ] did

no t ha ve a B ir th P e rm it f

ro m th e g ov e rnme nt, ” and that “ if [she ] wa s a c tua lly

pr e g na nt, 2 [she] must underg o [an] abortion.” She then re ceive d letters fr om the Chinese g overnme nt 3 telling he r to have an abor tion or “fa ce c onsequenc es.” F ear ing a forc ible abortion, L iao and 4 DeZ hongWu made arr ang ements for L iao to flee from China. They contra cted with a 5 “ sn ake he a d” to g e t a vis a and to t ra ns po rt L ia o to the Do min ic an Re pu bli c , whe re sh e arr ive d in 6 May

1992. 7 L iao was in the D ominican Republic for a total of ten months. Duringthat time, she 8 ne ith e r o bta ine d a

job no r l e arn e d Sp anis h. Whe n s he fi rs t arr ive d, sh e sp ok e wi th h e r b ro the r i n 9 China on the phone, a nd “he told [her] that the officia ls from the Street Committee wer e looking 10 fo r [h e r]” and

that “ he wa s d e ta ine d f

or a bo ut o ne we e k a

nd be ate n b e c a

us e he re fu se d to 11 cooper ate with the of ficials.” L iao’s brothe r told her “ not to go home.” Approxim ately five 12 months after le avingChina, on October 15, 1992, L iao g ave bir

th to her son Xiao Z hi Wu, who, 13 havingbeen bor

n there , is a native a

nd citizen of the Dominican Republic. Af ter g iving birth, 14 L iao stay ed in the Dominican Re public another five months, then left with her son and ente red 15 the United States without inspection or valid entry documents on or a

bout March 18, 1993. 1 6 S i n ce h er

arri v al i nth e U n i t edS t at es , wh i l e h er i m m i gra t i o np ro ce ed i n gs h av e b ee np en d i n g, 17 L iao and De Z hongWu, to whom s he is now for mally marrie d, have ha d two U.S. citiz en 18 c hil dr e n, c ur

re ntl y te e na g e rs . 19 II. Im m igration P roce edings 20 In Jun e 19 93 , L ia o ti me ly fi le d a n a pp lic atio n f

or a sy lum and wi thh old ingof

re mov a l, 21 alleg ing that she had e scape d forc ed abor tion by Chinese family

planningauthorities and f ear ed 22 perse cution upon return. An abbre viated ver sion of her pr ocee dings be fore immigration-5- 1 a uth or iti e s is a s f

oll ow s. 2 A. Liao’s First Procee ding 3 L iao appe are d for a merits hear ing be fore I J J ankun in support of he r application for 4 asylum and withholding in September 1999. Duringthis hearing , the I J declined to he ar 5 testimony

with respec t to L iao’s cla im for asylum based on her alleg ed re sistance to China’s 6 coer cive birth c ontrol prac tices bec ause L iao had a lrea dy prese nted testimony

on that issue in her 7 husband’s a sylum case. I J Sandy Hom had found L iao’s testimony in support of her husba

nd’s 8 application for

asylum inconsistent with her husband’s testimony , and ther efor e dete rmined that 9 his c la ims we re no t c re dib le . I J J ank un he ld t hat I J Hom ’s de c isi on

wa s b ind ingon

L ia o a s a 10 matter of what I J J ankun ca lled re s ju dic ata . 11 One issue that ha d not been r esolved in her husband’s c ase, how ever , was that of f irm 12 re se ttl e me nt i n th e Do min ic an Re pu bli c . L ia o te sti fi e d th at sh e wa s in the Do min ic an Re pu

bli c 13 as a r esult of her

flig ht from China. In his order, I J J ankun noted that L iao obtained a resident 14 vis a

fr om t he Do min ic an Re pu

bli c , whic h w a s e vid e nc e d b y a sta mp i n h e r p a ssp or

t th at sa id 15 “ Re sid e nc ia .” B e c a us e L ia o “ wa s g ive n p e rm iss ion to e nte r t he Do min ic an Re pu

bli c a s a 16 re sid e nt, ” the I J found that L ia o w a s “ fi rm ly

re se ttl e d” the re , a

nd he nc e un a

ble to e sta

bli sh 17 elig ibilit y

for a sylum in the United States. Upon appea l, the BIA re manded the c ase to I J J ankum 18 afte r finding(1) that the I J had er roneously applied the pr inciple of re s ju dic ata , and (2) that the 19 I J had

imp ro pe rl y

re lie d o n L ia o’ s untr ans late d p a ssp or t st amp i n f

ind ingthat L ia o w a s f

ir mly 20 rese ttled. 21 B. Liao’s Second Proce eding 22 Upon re mand to the I J , L iao testified ag ain in support of her application for

asylum and-6- 1 withholding. Althoug h the translation of the passport stamp from the D ominican Republic stated 2 that L iao was grante d “re sidency” in that country , L iao’s attorne y maintained that the stamp wa s 3 not conclusive e vidence of firm re settlement bec ause, inte r a lia , the visa expired on J uly 7, 1992, 4 which wa s within approxi mately a month of her

arr ival in the Dominican Republic. More over, 5 L iao’s counse l argued that she only fled to the Dominica

n Republic as a de sperate attempt to g et 6 a vis a any wh e re so sh e c ou ld q

uic kly le ave Chi na

to a vo id a n invo luntary

a bo rt ion , a nd tha t, a s a 7 result, she should not have be en conside red “ firmly rese ttled” there . Reaff

irming his prior 8 ho ldi ng , th e I J found that “ [a]f te r b e inga dmi tte d o n a

re sid e nt v isa ,” L ia o w a s f ir mly re se ttl e d in 9 the Do min ic an Re pu bli c and , h e nc e , s tatut or ily ine lig ibl e fo r a sylum

. 10 As to her withholdingclaim, the I J conclude d L iao had “ not presente d any testimony

or 11 background mater ial to indicate that she w ould have pr oblems with the family planning 12 authorities if she wa s to return to People’s Republic of China, as [L iao] readily

admitted her 13 children[,] one who is a citizen of the Dominican Republic a nd two who ar e citizens of the 1 4 U n i t e d

S t at e s , d o n o th av e t o r e tur nw i thh e r

t o [ th e ] P e o p l e ’ s R e p u

b l i c o f C h i n a . ” T h e B IA 15 aff

irmed the I J ’s dec ision, and L iao now appe als. 16 DI SCU SSIO N 17 On

a pp e a l, L ia o f

ir st a sse rt s th at th e B I A e rr on e ou sly fo un d th at sh e wa s “ fi rm ly 18 re se ttl e d” in t

he Do min ic an Re pu

bli c and the re fo re statut or ily

ine lig ibl e fo r a sy

lum . Sh e fi rs t 19 contends that the B I A, in basingits conclusion solely on the “Residenc ia” visa, e mploy ed the 20 wr on gle g a l st and ard . T his c ha lle ng e pr e se nts us wi th a qu e sti on of fi rs t im pr e ssi on fo r t his 21 Court—whether

a tempora

ry residenc e visa, without more, c an constitute an “ offe r of pe rmane nt 22 residenc e status,” a s require d for “ firm re settlement” unde r 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. Second, L iaoL iao also ar g ues that the I J violated her due proc ess rig hts by

failingto consider a ll of the 3 evidenc e submitted. There is no indication, however , that the I J or B I A fa iled to consider L iao’s evidenc e. The ag ency

is not required to “ expressly parse or re fute on the r ecor d eac h individual argument or piec e of e vidence offe red by the petitioner.” W

ei Guang W

ang v. Bd. of Imm igration Ap pe als , 437 F.3d 270, 275 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation and citation omitted). And we w il l g e n e r a ll y

p r e s u me th at t

h e a g e n c y “ h a s ta k e ninto a c c o un t a ll o f

th e e v id e n c e b e f

o r e [i t] , unless the re cord c ompellingly sug g ests otherwise.” See X iao Ji Chen v. U.S. D ep’t of Justice , 471 F.3d 315, 338 n.17 ( 2d Cir. 2006). -7- 1 argue s th at e ve n if sh e re c e ive d a

n o ff e r o f p e rm ane nt r e sid e nc e , s he qu a lif ie s f or an e xce pti on

to 2 the statutory

bar that prec ludes applications for asylum for those who we re r esettled in other 3 countries be fore comingto the United States. L iao furthe r ar g ues that the B I A, having 4 err oneously

found her

to be per manently rese ttled, wrong ly

evaluated her

case only under the 5 more string ent withholding standa rd. She conte nds that the ag ency should have found he r 6 e lig ibl e fo r a sylum

. 3 7 I. Stand ard of Review 8 Where, a s here , the B I A summarily aff irms an I J ’s dec ision with l ittle ex planation, we 9 direc tly

revie w the fa ctual and le g al finding s contained in the opinion of the I J as supplemented 10 by

the B I A. See Yan C

hen , 4 1 7 F. 3 d

at2 7 1
. T h i s C o urtre v i ew s th e a gen cy ’s fa ctu al fi n d i n gs 11 under the substantial evidence standard, which re quires that the I J ’s finding s be supported by 12 “re asonable , substantial and probative evidenc e in the re cord.” Lin Z hong v. U.S. De

p’t of 13 Justice , 4 80 F .3 d 1 04 , 1 16 (2 d Ci r. 20 07 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio ns omi tte d) ; Sall v. Gonzales , 437 14 F.3d 229, 232 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (joining the finding of our “ sister circ uits that the 15 ‘s ub sta

nti a l e vid e nc e ’ s tand ard

a pp lie s w he n r e vie wi ngfi nd ing s o f f ir m r e se ttl e me nt” ). Whil e 16 this is a highly

defe rential standa

rd, the Court will vacate and r emand f or newfinding s if the 17 ag ency ’s re asoningor its fac t-findingproce ss was suffic iently flawe d. Cao He Lin v. U.S. De p’t-8- 1 of Justice , 428 F.3d 391, 406 ( 2d Cir. 2005). In addition, we re view questions of law de novo

. 2 Se c aid

a-Ro sa le s v . I NS , 331 F.3d 297, 307 ( 2d Cir. 2003). 3 II. F ir m Re se tt le m e nt 4 The Immigration and Nationality Act provide s that an applica nt is not eligible for

asylum 5 if he or she was “ firmly rese ttled in another c ountry prior to ar

riving in the United States.” 6 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)( A)(vi) . Pursuant to Fede ral Regulations, “[a] n alien is consider ed to be 7 f i r m l y r e s e t t l e d

i f , p r i o r t o ar r i v a l i nth e U n i t e d

S t at e s , h e o r

s h e e n t e r e d

i n t o an o th e r

c o un tr y, 8 with, or while in that country , rec eived, a n offe r of pe rmane nt resident status, citizenship, or 9 so me oth e r t

y pe of pe rm ane nt r e se ttl e me nt. ” 8 C. F .R. § 2 08 .1 5. Th e re are tw o e xce pti on s to thi s 10 rule. An a

pplicant is not considere d firmly rese ttled if “entry

into that country

was a nece ssary 11 conseque nce of

his or her f

light fr om persec ution, that he or she r emained in that c ountry only as 12 long a s was nec essar y to arra ng e onwa rd trave l, and that he or

she did not establish signific ant 13 ties in that country .” Id. at § 2 08 .1 5( a ). Al te rn ativ e ly , a n a pp lic ant i s n ot c on sid e re d f ir mly 14 re se ttl e d d e sp ite an “ of fe r o f p e rm ane nt r e sid e nc e ” if the c on dit ion s o f r e sid e nc e “ we re so 15 substantially

and consc iously

restric ted by

the authority

of the c ountry

of re fug e that he or

she 16 was not in fac t resettled.” Id . at § 208.15(b). L iao’s cla ims on appeal g o both to whether she 17 rec eived a

n “off er of perma nent re sident status,” id. at § 208.15, and to whe ther she qua lifies for 18 the first of these exceptions, id. at § 208.15(a ). 19 A. Totali ty of the Circumstances 20 L ia o a

rgue s th at, b e c a

us e the B I A f

a ile d to e mpl oy

the “ tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s” te st 21 set forth in Sa ll , 437 F.3d at 233, it applied the wrongstandard in e valuatingwhether she 22 rec eived a

n “off er of perma nent re sident status” that would constitute firm re settlement. In Sa ll ,Th e B I A’ s o rd e r r e a ds : 4 The e vidence ref

lects that the [Petiti oner] was issued a resident visa f

or the Dominican Republic on May 7, 1992, and that she e ntere d that country on May 8, 1992. As such, the e vidence supports the Immigration J udg e’s c onclusion that the responde nt firmly

rese ttled in the Dominican Republic prior to he r ar rival in the United States in 1993. . . . [ C] f

. Sall v. Gonzales , 437 F.3d 229 ( 2d Cir. 2006) -9- 1 our Court clar ified the “ proper standards f

or re viewinga findingby an immigr ation judge (“I J ”) 2 that an asy

lum applicant has ‘f

irmly rese ttled’ in a third country befor e apply

ing f or asy lum in the 3 United States.” Id. at 230. Afte r re viewingthe holdings in c ases f rom diffe rent c ircuits, the 4 Court noted that in some circuits “f irm rese ttlement” ca

nnot be found a

bsent an off

icial (i.e., 5 g overnme ntal) off er of some kind of per

manent re settlement or an “ extended, undisturbed 6 residenc e in a third c ountry .” Id. at 232 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Our Court, howeve r, 7 de c ide d to a do pt a “ tot a lity of the a lie n’ s c ir c ums tanc e s” te st, the re by fo llo wi ngtho se c ir c uit s 8 which apply

a “br oader

conce ption of ‘firm re settlement.’” Id. (interna l quotation marks 9 omitted). In choosingto employ a “totality

of the c ircumstance s” test to deter mine whether

there 10 is an “off

er of perma nent re sidence ” under

8 C.F.R. § 208.15, the Court first rea soned that the 11 plain languag e of the regulation made cle ar that an offic ial g overnme nt offer was not nec essar

y 12 for a

person to be f

irmly settled in another c ountry . Sa ll , 437 F.3d at 233. Additionally , the 13 Court stated that the purpose of the re g ulations, which is “to provide re fug e to despe rate ref ug ees 14 wh o r e a c h o ur

sh or e s w ithno wh e re e lse to t ur n, ” c on c ur s w iththe br oa de r a nd mor e fl e xible 15 rea ding that gr ants asylum to “those applicants without alternative place s of re fug e abr oad, 16 reg ardle ss of whethe r a f ormal ‘of fer ’ of pe rmane nt settlement has bee n rec eived.” Id. 17 The I J and B I A’s conc lusion that L iao was pe rmane ntly rese ttled rested on the f

act that 18 L iao enter ed the c ountry with a re sident visa from the Dominica n Republic. Wit hout further

4(“totality of the c ircumstance s” test applies to question whethe r an a sylum applicant ha s firmly

rese ttled in a third country wher e the e vidence does not re fl e c t th at th e a

pp lic ant r e c e ive d a

n a c tua l of

fe r o f p e rm ane nt r e sid e nt s tatus in that country .) Prior to Sa ll , we ha d held that a tourist visa and a business visa did not constitut e off ers of 5 perma nent re sidency

that could g ive rise to “f

irm rese ttlement.” Se e re sp e c tiv e ly Nikolla Mushka v . I NS , 1 49 F e d. Ap p’ x 28 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 5) (t ouri st v isa ); Leong Leun Do v. Espe rdy , 309 F.2d 467, 472 (2d Cir. 1962) (business visa)

. -10- 1 inf or matio n, ho we ve r, it i s unc e rt a in whe the r t his vis a signif ie d th at L ia o c ou ld r e ma in 2 perma

nently in the country . The visa itself e x pired within a month of L iao’s ar rival in the 3 Do min ic an Re pu

bli c , a nd it i s unc le ar f

ro m th e re c or d whe the r t

he Do min ic an g ov e rnme nt w ou ld 4 have r enew ed her

visa had L iao attempted to extend its duration. We conclude that the I J and the 5 B I A w e re re qu ir e d to loo k b e y on d th e pr e se nc e of the “ Re sid e nc ia ” sta

mp i n L ia o’ s p a ssp or

t to 6 deter

mine whether

under the totality

of the c ircumstance s L iao re ceive d an “of fer of per manent 7 re sid e nt s tatus ” that w ou ld c on sti tut e “ fi rm re se ttl e me nt. ” 8 C. F .R. § 2 08 .1 5. We f ur the r h old 8 that a tempora

ry visa, such as this one, whic h expires after a short per iod, cannot on its own 9 c on sti tut e su

bs tanti a l e vid e nc e of

an “ of fe r o f p e rm ane nt r e sid e nt s tatus ” su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh 10 that an a

pp lic ant h a s b e e n “ fi rm ly re se ttl e d” in a

thi rd c ountr y . Ins te a d, the a g e nc y , to make its 11 de te rm inatio n, mus t e va luate the signif ic anc e of a ny su c h v isa , a lon gwi th o the r f a c tor s. 5 12 Acc ording ly , the B I A er red in finding , based solely on her te mporary

resident visa, that L iao was 13 perma

nently rese ttled in the Dominican Republic. 14 B. Exc eption to Firm Resettleme nt Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.15( a) 15 In addition, we find that the B I A’s dec ision that L iao did not qualify for one of the 16 exceptions list ed in 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 was ba sed on a misper ception of the rec ord and thus 17 require s remand. Se e Tia n- Y on g Ch e n v . I

NS , 359 F.3d 121, 127 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (statingthat-11- 1 re mand

may be a pp ro pr iate “ wh e re the a g e nc y ’s de te rm inatio n is ba se d o n a n in a c c ur ate 2 perc eption of the re cord, omitting pote ntially signific ant fa cts”). T hat is, even if L iao had 3 re c e ive d a

n “ of fe r o f p e rm ane nt r e se ttl e me nt” un de r t he “ tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s” te st 4 descr ibed above , the B I A er red in findingthat L iao “f ailed to submit or identify any evidenc e 5 which would re but the I mmigration J udg e’s f inding that she firmly

rese ttled in another c ountry 6 befor e comingto the United States.” Instead, the r ecor d ref lects that L iao has prof

fer ed 7 signific ant evidenc e re lated to the 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a ) exception. This exception provides that 8 e ve n if

an a pp lic ant h a s r e c e ive d a

n “ of fe r o f p e rm ane nt r e se ttl e me nt” in a thi rd c ountr y , s he wi ll 9 not be consider ed “f irmly rese ttled” if she c an demonstrate (1) that her e ntry into that country 10 was a

nece ssary

conseque nce of

her f light fr om persec ution, (2) that she re mained in the countr y 11 only

as longas nec essar

y to arra ng e onwa rd trave l, and (3) that she did not establish significa nt 12 ties in that country . 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a)

. 13 L iao’s asy lum application and her

hear ing te stimony

explain that she went to the 14 Dominican Republic be cause she fe are d forc ed abor tion and that the Dominican Republic w as 15 the country

to which she c ould secure immediate trave l. Second, L iao’s testimony makes c lear 16 that she stay ed in the Dominican Re public only long e noug h to arra

ng e onwa rd trave l. I n her 17 c a se , tr ave l w a s d e lay e d b y he r p re g na

nc y , b ut s he le ft

the c ountr

y fi ve months a ft e r g ivi ngbir th 18 to her son. The Gover nment contends that these five months are an unre asonable wait time and 19 that “Petitioners have offe red no e x planation, much less identified r ecor d evidenc e why it was 20 nece ssary

for L iao to rema in in the Dominican Republic for so many months before and af

ter 21 g iving birth if she was not re settled there .” Respondent’ s Br . at 26. L iao pre sented e vidence , 22 howeve r, that she ne eded to lea ve China immediately

beca use the fa mily planningauthorities-12- 1 we re purs uin ghe r, and e ve n b e at he r b ro the r. An d, it s e e ms t o u s a bs ur d th at, h avin gg ott e n into 2 the Dominican Republic, she should have, we ll along in he r pre g nancy , tried to enter the United 3 State s w ith out do c ume nts . It is e qu a lly se lf e vid e nt t hat it take s se ve ra l mo nth s a ft e r g ivi ngbir th 4 befor e one is a

ble to undertake international travel, e ven apa rt from the r isks of such trave l to a 5 newbor

n. L astly , L iao established no sig nificant ties in the countr y duringher te n months there. 6 For

example, she neither le arne d the languag e nor obta ined employ ment. 7 In sum, the BIA both misconstrued the re cord by failingto consider the a

bove re levant 8 fac ts and provided us with no substantive basis for its conclusion. See W

ei Guang W

ang v. BIA , 9 4 3 7 F
. 3 d

2 7 0 , 2 7 5 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( “ [ T ] h e B IA s h o u l d p r o v i d e u s w i thm o r e th an‘ c ur s o r y, 10 summa

ry or c on c lus or

y state me nts ,’ so tha

t w e are a ble to d isc e rn

its re a so ns fo r d e c lin ingto 1 1 af

fo rdre l i ef t o a p et i t i o n er . ” ( qu o t i n g Anderson v. M cElroy , 953 F.2d 803, 806 ( 2d Cir. 1992)). 12 “[T] he B I A’s denia l of relief can be aff

irmed only

on the basis ar

ticulated in the dec ision,” and 13 here that basis was suff iciently flawe d as to requir e re mand. Anderson, 953 F.2d 803 at 806. 14 III . Re m and t o t he BIA 15 Given the identifie d err ors in the B I A’s dec ision, we VACATE the B I A’s orde r of 16 deportation, GRANT the petition for re view, and REMAN D the ca se to the B I A for 17 rec onsideration consistent with this opinion. W e note, in passing , that as there is no longe r a 18 final orde r ag ainst Petiti oners, they may now also file a

succe ssive petition for re lief upon 1 9 d em o n s tra t i n g e ith e r chang ed per sonal circ umstances or country conditions that materially aff ect 20 their elig ibilit y

for a sylum. See Yuen Jin v. Muk asey , 538 F.3d 143, 152- 53, 156 (2d Cir. 2008) 21 (adoptingthe B I A’s rulingthat “an a lien may file a suc cessive a sylum application based on 22 chang ed per sonal circ umstances or chang ed countr

y conditions, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §-13- 1 1158(a) (2)( D),” as longas there is no final order of re moval, or within the 90-day deadline f

or a 2 motion to reopen, but that “a n alien under

a fina l removal orde r must file a succ essive asy lum 3 application in conjunction with a motion to reope n and in ac corda nce w ith those procedur al 4 require ments”).