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Filed 5/25/23 P. v. Paulson CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LANCE ALLAN PAULSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A163471

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. 05-181374-0)

Defendant Lance Allan Paulson appeals his conviction for first degree 

murder, asserting the trial court improperly instructed the jury with a 

modified flight instruction. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant and the victim, Steve Gagnon, were longtime friends who 

saw each other on a regular basis. On April 2, 2017, defendant and Gagnon 

planned to meet at Gagnon’s house to watch a television show. Gagnon 

invited defendant to arrive around 6:00 p.m. 

The following day, Gagnon did not report to work, and his supervisor 

was unable to reach him. Another supervisor went to Gagnon’s house to 

check on him. After arriving at Gagnon’s home, the supervisor either 

knocked on the door or rang the bell. Defendant answered the door. The 
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supervisor observed defendant looked like “someone who had been in a fight 

or beat up” because his teeth appeared to be knocked out, one eye was 

bulging and black and blue, there was a cut on his head, and there was “blood 

splatter” on his shirt. The supervisor asked defendant if he was okay, to 

which he responded affirmatively. 

The supervisor then asked if Gagnon was home. Defendant stated 

Gagnon was sleeping. The supervisor asked if he could come in and wake up 

Gagnon. Defendant allowed the supervisor to enter and indicated toward the 

bedroom where Gagnon’s body was located. After observing Gagnon lying on 

his stomach in blood, the supervisor left the house and called 911. 

Several officers arrived and one took defendant into custody. Detective 

Corporal Brian Elder observed defendant’s black eye, an injury under

defendant’s chin that appeared consistent with a gunshot, injuries to the top 

of defendant’s forehead at the hairline, and injuries to his mouth that made 

speech difficult. Inside the house, blood was present in numerous areas, 

including the bathroom floor, a Swiffer mop in the closet, the handle of a 

sliding glass door, bedroom walls, the bed in the master bedroom, and the 

kitchen sink and floor. Gagnon was observed lying on the floor in a pool of 

blood. There were no drag marks or other evidence indicating Gagnon had 

been moved to the location where he was found.

The police also located a Colt 1911, .45-caliber, semiautomatic pistol

with blood on it and three rounds in the magazine. A shell casing was also 

stuck in the gun’s chamber, which a firearms expert explained could occur if 

something prevented the gun from fully cycling and ejecting the cartridge 

case, such as the user did not hold the gun firmly enough or held it at an 

awkward angle when firing. Two empty .45-caliber shell casings were located 

in the hallway and one in the bedroom near Gagnon. Three corresponding 
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bullet holes were located in the bedroom wall across from the hall. The

firearms expert determined the casings were all from the Colt pistol. The 

pistol’s serial number matched that of a pistol owned by defendant’s 

stepfather. 

Police also located a bullet hole in the living room window near the 

front door, along with blood on the living room floor, living room couch, wall 

above the couch, and a hat on the corner of the couch. A crime scene analyst 

testified the bullet hole and blood spatter on the wall were consistent with 

defendant shooting himself. A forensic pathologist testified a bullet being 

fired through someone’s head could cause a black eye, and a bullet entering 

under the chin in the middle of the head would likely cause two black eyes. 

B. Procedural Background

The Contra Costa County District Attorney charged defendant with 

first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) The information further 

alleged personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. 

(Id., § 12022.53, subd. (d).)

During trial, the prosecution requested the court provide an instruction 

entitled “Consciousness of Guilt.” That instruction stated: “If the defendant 

attempted to kill himself after the crime was committed, that conduct may 

show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude the defendant attempted 

to kill himself, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that 

conduct. However, evidence that the defendant attempted to kill himself 

cannot prove guilt by itself.” Defendant objected to the proposed instruction, 

asserting the record did not support a finding that he attempted suicide or 

that any such attempt was made to avoid arrest or prosecution. The trial 

court overruled defendant’s objection, noting, “Courts have long held any 

conduct of a defendant subsequent to the commission of the crime tending to 
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show consciousness of guilt is relevant and admissible.” It explained “there 

has been some evidence that if believed by the jury could have them find that 

the defendant’s attempted suicide was evidence of his consciousness of guilt.” 

The court subsequently gave the requested instruction. 

The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true 

the firearm enhancement. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive 

prison terms of 25 years to life for murder, and 25 years to life for the firearm 

enhancement. Defendant timely appealed. 

II. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court improperly gave an 

instruction entitled, “Consciousness of Guilt.”1 He contends the instruction 

was improper because there was no evidence defendant attempted suicide in 

an effort to evade or hinder prosecution. 

A. CALCRIM No. 372

The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on flight whenever the 

prosecution relies on evidence of flight to show consciousness of guilt. (Pen. 

Code, § 1127c; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521–522.) “ ‘ “ ‘[F]light 

requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away 

haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to 

1 The instruction at issue was designated CALCRIM No. 371, entitled 

“Consciousness of Guilt.” However, we refer to it as CALCRIM No. 372 

because the instruction is actually a modified version of CALCRIM No. 372, 

entitled “Defendant’s Flight.” The model CALCRIM No. 372 states: “If the 

defendant fled [or tried to flee] (immediately after the crime was committed/ 

[or] after (he/she) was accused of committing the crime), that conduct may 

show that (he/she) was aware of (his/her) guilt. If you conclude that the 

defendant fled [or tried to flee], it is up to you to decide the meaning and 

importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled [or 

tried to flee] cannot prove guilt by itself.”
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avoid being observed or arrested.’ ” ’ [Citation.] While physical flight to 

evade capture or escape from custody are two obvious examples of relevant 

conduct, the courts have long held ‘ “[a]ny conduct of a defendant subsequent 

to the commission of the crime tending to show consciousness of guilt is 

relevant and admissible . . . .” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]here need only be some 

evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support 

the suggested inference [of consciousness of guilt].’ ” (People v. Pettigrew

(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 497–498, italics added by Pettigrew (Pettigrew).) 

“ ‘The evidentiary basis for the flight instruction requires sufficient, not 

uncontradicted, evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 499.)

We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Mitchell

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) Reversal is required only if the instructional error 

resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. 

Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

In Pettigrew, the court held it was error to instruct on flight, pursuant 

to CALCRIM No. 372, where there was no evidence the defendant attempted 

to flee after the crime or escape from custody after his arrest. (Pettigrew, 

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.) After his arrest, however, the defendant 

twice tried to hang himself with his clothing in his jail cell. (Id. at p. 488.)

Under the circumstances, the Pettigrew court determined it would have been 

appropriate for the trial court to draft an instruction based on the pattern 

instructions and relevant cases regarding the defendant’s suicide attempts as 

evidence of consciousness of guilt. (Id. at pp. 499–500.)

Defendant contends that here, unlike in Pettigrew, the instruction is 

inapplicable because he did not attempt suicide post-arrest or take actions 

prior to his arrest that were designed to impede the investigation. He notes 
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he remained in the house, did not dispose of the gun or conceal evidence, 

allowed Gagnon’s body to be discovered, and complied with police directives. 

However, Pettigrew did not limit its holding to post-arrest suicide 

attempts. To the contrary, that court acknowledged “ ‘ “[a]ny conduct of a 

defendant subsequent to the commission of the crime tending to show 

consciousness of guilt is relevant and admissible . . . .” ’ ” (Pettigrew, supra, 

62 Cal.App.5th at p. 497, italics omitted, italics added.) Here, trial testimony 

indicated (1) defendant had injuries to the area under his chin, to his mouth,

tongue, and the top of his forehead, and had a black eye; (2) the injuries to 

the area under defendant’s chin and his forehead were consistent with a 

gunshot; and (3) black or swollen eyes are often a sign of being shot in the 

head. An officer responsible for crime scene processing also testified the 

evidence from the living room, including bullet hole in the window and blood 

spatter on the wall above the sofa, were consistent with defendant shooting

himself. In addition, while the exact timing of defendant and Gagnon’s 

interactions are uncertain, the record indicates Gagnon did not move from 

the spot where he was found after being shot. An officer also testified the 

weapon was found “stovepiped,”2 which suggested the last shot could have 

been a suicide attempt. 

Defendant contests the sufficiency of this evidence. For example, he 

contends a suicide attempt would have caused two black eyes rather than 

one, and the crime scene analyst had limited knowledge of blood spatter 

analysis and bullet trajectories. However, these arguments are appropriate 

for the jury to consider when assessing whether defendant attempted suicide. 

It does not undermine the appropriateness of the instruction, as “ ‘[t]he 

2 “Stovepiping” refers to a firearm malfunction in which a bullet casing 

is stuck inside the gun’s chamber. 
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evidentiary basis for the flight instruction requires sufficient, not 

uncontradicted, evidence.’ ” (Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 499.)

We thus conclude evidence from the crime scene, together with the 

injuries to defendant’s face, could support a reasonable inference defendant 

attempted to commit suicide, reflecting consciousness of guilt. The trial court 

instructed the jury with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 372, that it 

could use such evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether 

defendant had attempted to commit suicide and, if so, what importance 

should be attached to that attempt. It further instructed that evidence 

defendant made such plans could not prove guilt by itself. On this record, 

defendant has not shown the instruction was erroneous as a matter of law or 

unsupported by sufficient evidence. (Accord, People v. Coffman and Marlow

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 102 [“facts giving rise to an inference of consciousness of 

guilt” do not need to be conclusively established; “there need only be some 

evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support 

the suggested inference”].)3

B. Harmless Error

In any event, even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 372, we conclude the error was harmless. “The instruction did 

not assume that flight was established, but instead permitted the jury to 

3 Defendant also objects to much of the evidence being circumstantial. 

But he fails to cite any authority suggesting juries cannot rely on such 

evidence. To the contrary, such evidence is admissible and trial courts only 

must “instruct the jury regarding how to evaluate circumstantial evidence 

‘ “. . . when the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to 

prove guilt.” ’ ” (People v. Contreras (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 587, 591.) Here, 

the court did so by instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 223 (“Direct and 

Circumstantial Evidence: Defined”) and 224 (“Circumstantial Evidence: 

Sufficiency of Evidence”). 
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make that factual determination and to decide what weight to accord it.” 

(People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182–1183.) Moreover, the evidence 

of Gagnon’s injuries, defendant’s presence at Gagnon’s house during the time 

of the incident, and that the weapon belonged to defendant’s stepfather all 

support the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability the 

jury would have reached a more favorable result in the absence of the 

instruction.

III. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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MARGULIES, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BOWEN, J.*

A163471

People v. Paulson

 Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.