Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A04-1709-JT-2088 | February 28, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Larry D. Allen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of G.M.:

K.C. (Father),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

February 28, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

35A04-1709-JT-2088

Appeal from the Huntington 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

35C01-1705-JT-6

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] K.C. (“Father”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with 

his son, G.M., arguing that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions that resulted in G.M.’s removal or the reasons 

for placement outside the home will not be remedied; (2) a continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to G.M.’s well-being; and (3) 

termination of the parent-child relationship is in G.M.’s best interests. 

Concluding that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision 

to terminate the parent-child relationship, we affirm.1

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there is sufficient evident to support the termination of 

the parent-child relationship.

Facts

[3] G.M. was born in December 2014 with a congenital heart defect. He was also 

suffering from opiate withdrawal. He was immediately placed in a neonatal 

intensive care unit, and DCS removed him from his parents under an 

emergency order because M.M. (“Mother”) admitted using unprescribed pain 

 

1 Mother’s parental rights were terminated in a prior order.
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killers and heroin during her pregnancy and because Father refused to take a 

drug screen. Father stated that he was unable to “care for the child as he [was] 

on probation for rape and [was] not permitted to be around children 

unsupervised.” (DCS Exhibit P). A few days later, DCS filed a petition 

alleging that G.M. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) based on 

Mother’s drug use, Father’s inability to care for G.M. and refusal to take a drug 

screen, and G.M.’s drug withdrawal.2

[4] Later that month, Father agreed to take a drug screen, and his urine tested

positive for oxycodone. Three days later, Father’s urine tested positive for 

morphine, and he admitted that he had used heroin. After testing positive for 

opiates, Father began participating in a drug treatment program. However, he 

was subsequently discharged from the program because of inconsistent

attendance. In May 2015, the trial court revoked Father’s probation because of 

his positive drug tests and ordered him to serve the remainder of his suspended 

sentence for rape and burglary.

[5] G.M. was adjudicated to be a CHINS in September 2015. The trial court 

ordered Mother to participate in services, attend visitation, and submit to 

random urine drug screens. The court’s order further stated that Father could 

participate in services as he was able while incarcerated. 

 

2 G.M. was placed in foster care when he was discharged from the hospital in January 2015.
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[6] In March 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate both parents’ parental rights. 

The trial court granted the petition in August 2016. Both parents appealed. 

This Court affirmed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights but 

reversed the termination of Father’s parental rights because G.M. had not been 

removed from Father under a dispositional decree for at least six months as 

required by INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4. Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 909 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

[7] In May 2017, DCS filed a second petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. 

At the termination hearing, DCS Family Case Manager John Lane (“Case 

Manager Lane”) testified that Father had only seen G.M. a few times following 

G.M.’s birth. According to Case Manager Lane, Father could have had more 

visits with G.M. had Father agreed to submit to drug screens. After he was 

incarcerated, Father made no effort to communicate with G.M. or DCS until 

the second petition to terminate his parental rights had been filed. Case 

Manager Lane further testified that two and one-half year-old G.M. was

bonded to his foster parents, who had been able to care for his special needs. 

According to Case Manager Lane, termination was in G.M.’s best interests. 

[8] Department of Correction Case Worker Regan Dietz (“Case Worker Dietz”) 

testified that Father was not eligible to participate in any prison services at that 

time because of his poor conduct. According to Case Worker Dietz, in the 

previous year, Father had received several conduct reports for possession or 

destruction of state property, disorderly conduct, fleeing or interfering with 

staff, and refusing to obey an order. Father’s earliest release date at the time of 
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the hearing was July 2019. However, Case Worker Dietz testified that because 

Father had completed his college education while incarcerated, she had 

recommended him for a job that would reduce his sentence by six months.

[9] The testimony further revealed that G.M. had been hospitalized five times and 

had had three surgeries, including open heart surgery. According to the 

guardian ad litem (“GAL”), G.M.’s foster parents had provided care for his 

special medical needs, and G.M. was “thriving in the foster home.” (Tr. 83). 

The GAL further opined that termination was in G.M.’s best interest because it 

was “in his best interest to make permanent what . . . he knows his life to be at 

this point.” (Tr. 84-85). 

[10] Father testified that he did not “want to fall back into the same old lifestyle and 

use drugs again . . . .” (Tr. 99). When asked at the hearing what his “goal

[was] here today,” Father responded, “I just want to keep my parental rights, 

you know, I don’t want to lose the rights to him.” (Tr. 99). Father did not 

mention whether he had either thought about or secured employment or 

housing in anticipation of his release or how he planned to care for G.M.

[11] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order terminating Father’s 

parental rights. Father now appeals.

Decision

[12] Father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of his 

parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their 
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children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, the law 

provides for termination of that right when parents are unwilling or unable to 

meet their parental responsibilities. In re Bester, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.

2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents 

but to protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1999), trans. denied.

[13] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not weigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. 

Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support 

the judgment. Id. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and 

conclusions thereon, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment 

unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). In determining 

whether the court’s decision to terminate the parent-child relationship is clearly 

erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly 

and convincingly support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30.

[14] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by 

clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.

[15] Here, Father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the 

termination of his parental rights. Specifically, he contends that the evidence is 

insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that: (1) the 

conditions that resulted in G.M.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside 

the parent’s home will not be remedied; and (2) a continuation of the parentchild relationship poses a threat to G.M.’s well-being.

[16] At the outset, we note that INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the 

disjunctive. Therefore, DCS is required to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence only one of the three requirements of subsection (B). In re A.K., 924 

N.E.3d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We therefore discuss only whether there 

is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in G.M.’s removal 

or the reasons for placement outside the parent’s home will not be remedied.
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[17] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step 

analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the 

conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent’s 

fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id.

[18] Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol 

abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate 

housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 

1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider 

services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s response to those services 

as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id. Requiring trial courts 

to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding 

that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of his future behavior. E.M., 4 

N.E.3d at 643. 

[19] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that G.M. was removed from Father 

because of Father’s inability to care for G.M. and refusal to submit to drug 

screens. For more than two years, Father, who knew that his son had been 

born with a congenital heart defect, made no effort to communicate with G.M.
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or DSC. Recently, Father had been unable to participate in any prison 

programs because of his conduct, which included possession or destruction of 

state property, disorderly conduct, fleeing or interfering with staff, and refusing 

to obey an order. During his testimony, Father did not mention whether he 

had thought about or secured employment or housing in anticipation of his 

release or how he planned to care for G.M. This evidence supports the trial 

court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in G.M.’s removal or continued placement outside the home 

would not be remedied. We find no error.3 

[20] Father also argues that there is insufficient evidence that the termination was in 

G.M.’s best interests. In determining whether termination of parental rights is 

in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of 

the evidence. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to 

those of the child involved. Id. Termination of the parent-child relationship is 

proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. In 

re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court 

need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, 

 

3 We note that Father has cited several cases wherein both this Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have 

reversed the termination of parental rights where, as here, the parent was incarcerated. However, in those 

cases, the incarcerated parent had done things such as remaining in contact with the child, making 

substantial or remarkable self-improvement efforts while incarcerated, securing housing or employment in

anticipation of release, and taking steps to provide permanency for the child upon release. Here, Father has 

done none of these things. The trial court did not err.
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mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the 

parent-child relationship. In addition, a child’s need for permanency is a 

central consideration in determining the child’s best interests. In re G.Y., 904 

N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). Further, the testimony of the service providers 

may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. McBride v. 

Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003). 

[21] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Father made no effort to 

communicate with G.M. or DCS until DCS filed a second petition to terminate 

his parental rights. Meanwhile, G.M. is thriving in a stable and nurturing foster 

home with foster parents who have consistently provided for his special medical 

needs. In addition, both the DCS caseworker and the GAL both testified that 

termination is in G.M.’s best interests. This evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination is in G.M.’s best interests.

[22] We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear

error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 

1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial 

court. 

[23] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.