FIFTH DIVISION January 7, 2011 No. 1-08- 3090 IN THE APP ELL ATE C OURT

OF IL LINO IS FIRST JUDICI AL DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS,

Plai ntif f-A ppel le e, v. CA LVER T WHITE, De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appe al fro m the Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Coo k C oun

ty No. 07 CR 14329 Ho no r ab le Mar y Marg ar et Bro snaha n, Judge Presidin

g. JUDGE EPSTEIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Jus t ices Fit zge ra ld Smith a nd Jo sep h Go rd on c onc ur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. OPINION Defendant Cal vert Wh ite appeals fr om a burgl ary conv iction in October 2008 following a jury trial. He maintain s he is ent itled to a new t rial bas edon the prosecutor’s closing argument; the tria l court ’s all eged failure to comply wit h Supr eme Court Ru le 431 (b) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (b), eff. May 1,2007);and t he tri al court

’s alleged ly improper admission of def

endant’s two prior convictions.Defe ndant further claim

s the tri al court
un co nst it ut io na lly

enhanc ed his se nt ence unde r se ct ion 5 -5 -3 (c )( 8) of t he Unified Co de o f Cor re ct ions (7 30 I LCS 5/ 5- 5- 3( c) (8 ) ( West 200 8) ), war ra nt inga res en tenc i ng. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. BACK GROUND Defend ant was arrested for burglar y on June 28, 2007, sh ort ly after 1:30 a.m . He to ok a de coy purse from

an un ma rked police car. Defe

ndan t t estif ie d at t r ial t ha t he t o o k t he pu r se , as we ll1-08-3090

2

asa c arton

of ci ga rette s a nd a b ottl e, f

rom t he ca r, believing the y belonge d t o “S lim ,” so meone he knew. Slim a lleg ed ly

dire ct ed d efenda nt t o t ake t he it ems o ut o f t he ca r an d w at ch t he m wh ile S lim
ran i nto a li quor sto re that was about to close. Defendan t was arr ested when he start ed to cross t he street, al l eged l y i nten di ng to m erel y si t at the b us stop across

the street an

d wai t for Sl i m . The State cal

l ed th ree wi tnes ses . Of

f i cer B ri an R od rigu ez t est ifi ed t hat he wa s pa rt of t he bur gl ary invest igat ion o n June 28, 200 7, t hat led t o d efenda nt ’s ar re st . T he area at which de fendant
was arres ted

al l eg edl y ha d a n on goi ng prob l em of the f ts f rom ca rs . O f f i cer Rodri gu ez ’s

rol e w as to wat ch t he decoy purse that had be en plac ed o n t he pa sseng er sea t of t he unmar ked po lice car . T he car was approxi

ma tely 45 to 50 f

eet aw ay f rom h i m , w i th i ts windo ws c omp lete ly open. Defend ant alle ge dly approac he d the car, looked in

si de, backed up, and turned h is head f rom si de to side. He then appr oachedthe car a second tim e and rem oved the purse through the passen ger win dow. Offi cer Rodriguez

did no t see defend ant t alk ing t o an yo ne no rdid he no t ice an yo ne ar o un d h im. Defend ant then alle gedl y pl aced the purse unde

r hi s arm and wal ked awa y f rom th e ca

r, cross i n g th e stre et. Of f i cer R odri guez radi oed other of

f i cers and des cri

be d def endan t, who wa s the

n a rrested
. Off ic er Bi ll y Todde, another

member o f the invest igat ion t eam, t est ifi ed t hat he pa rk ed t he
unm arked car at th e sc ene, place d t he de co y pur se o n t he fro nt sea t , lo wer ed t he windo ws, and wal ked away . He then en

tered another unmarked ca r to awai t further in

structions f

rom Of fi cer Rodriguez. Afte r be ing no t ifi ed t hat defend ant had

t ake n t he pu rse , O ffi

cer To dde re t ur ned t o t he
sce ne and stopped defen

dant in the mi ddle of the street, about 30 f

eet fro m the car . H e fo und t he purs e i n de f endan t’s pos ses sion an

d arre sted h

i m . Officer M ar k S chlink, t he St at e’s r ebut t al witne ss, affirmed Officer To dde ’s t est imony and1-08-3090

3

added t ha t de fen da nt wa s c ar rying o nly t he de co y pu r se an d n o t hing els e. T he St at e a lso o ffer ed , in
r eb ut t al, certi f

i ed cop i esof de f en da nt’ s tw o m

i sdem ea nor reta i l the f t con vi cti ons f rom May 20, 1999, and May 17, 1999 (People’s Exh

ibits 2 an d 3). The trial

court adm

itted those convictions, but barred t he in tro duction of def

endan t’s two o ther

mi sdem eanor theft convi

ctions f rom 1998 and 1 999 , finding that t he prej udic ia

l i mpa ct out wei ghed the probativ e val ue. Def endan t’s c onv i cti ons were adm

itted
so lely t o impe ac h his tes ti

mony . Non ethel es s, th e p ros ecutor

ar gue d in clos ing t hat : “T he de fendant is a thief , and you know he’s a

thief be caus e of

People’s Exh i bi t No. 2 and Peopl

e’s Exh i bi t No. 3.” Def enda nt did not obj ect. The tri al court later i

nstructed the

j urors that: “Any evi dence that was recei

v ed fo r a lim

ited pur po se sho uld no t be considered

by youf or a n y oth er pu rp ose . Y ou sh oul

d di sreg ard te sti

mon y an d e x h i b i ts whi ch the C ourt has

ref use d or stricken
. The evi dence wh ic h you s hou ld co nsider co nsist s o nly of the t est imony of t he wi tnes ses and the ex hi bi ts wh i ch the C ourt has

rece i ve d. * * * Ope ningst at ement s ar e made by the a t t or neys t o a cqu aint you w ith t he f ac ts they ex pe ct t o pr o ve . Clo sing ar gu me nt s ar e made by the a t t or neys t o d iscuss t he fac t s a nd cir cu mst an ce s in t he ca se an d t he y sho uld be co nfined t o t he evidenc e and to reasonab l e i

nf eren ces that ca n b e draw n f rom th e ev i den ce. Nei ther open i ng s tatem en ts nor c l osi

ng a rgum en ts are evi dence, as we tal

ked about ear lier, a nd anyst at eme nt o rar gu men t mad e b y t he law yer s w hic h is not based on any of the evi

dence sh ould be dis regarded.1-08-3090

4 * * * Evidence of d efenda nt ’s pr eviou s co nvictio n of a ny offense may be
con si de red by you on l y asi t may ef f ec t hi s b el i evab i l i ty asa w i tne ss esan

d m us t not be co nsider ed byyou as ev ide nce of h is guil t o f the of fen se whi ch i s he is charged. ” The j ur y re tur n ed a g ui l ty ve rdi ct. D ef en da nt th en f i l ed a m oti on f oracq uit t al and a new t rial, a rg uing that the Stat e had n

ot sustain ed i ts burden an

d that his prior convi

ctions were i

nadm is sible. T he
m otion wasden i ed. At sen tenc i ng, t he tr ial cou rt inqui

red whet her t he part ies wish ed t o amend defendant’s pr ese nt encing i

nv es ti ga ti on re po rt (P SI ). Defend ant dec lined t o d o s o, and t he Stat e corrected t wo convicti ons, without any

obje ction. The State then argued i n a ggrav ati on tha t a mandatory

Class X sentence sh oul d b e i m pos ed be ca us e d ef en da nt a l l eg edl y ha d “ [a] 199 1 c onv

i cti on f or pos se ss i on f

or a contro ll ed substance wi

th i nte nt to d el i ve r, w hi ch wa s a cl as s 1 . A nd the re i s a 199 9 c onv

i cti on f or del i very of a co nt ro lled subs t ance , w hich was also a class 1. ” Altho ugh t he PS I sho ws t hat defend ant was co nvicte d fo r d elivery o f a co nt ro lled subs t ance in 1990 , not 19 99 , de f en da n t’ s counsel , w ho argue d i n m i tig ati on, di

d not obj ect to the pros ecutor’ s statemen t or attemp t to correct it. The tri al court im posed a Cl

ass X sen tence, f i ndi ng: “In tak i n g i n to ac cou n t, there i s a lo t of misdemea nor co nvictio ns in the defendant’s histo ry, a nd it s t ru e t hat he do es ha ve fivepr ior felony co nvictio ns, t he last of wh i ch wa s i n, wa s f rom a 199 0 cas e, later i

n 19 91, so s ome

17 y ears be fo r e t his
cas e occu rred. So I’ m

taki ng a l l of th ose f actors i nto con siderati

on. Based upon the defe

ndan t’s backg roun d, I f i nd h e i s su bj ect to mandatory1-08-3090

5

class X se nt enc i ng, b as ed up o n t he t wo co nvic t io ns h igh ligh t ed by t he St at e. I ’ll sentencet he de fendant t o s ix years, t he minim um sent ence unde r t he law, in th e Il l i noi s De partm en t of Corre cti ons.” Defend ant did no t o bje ct t o t he se nt en ce no rdid he f il e a post -sentencing m

ot ion. He nevertheles s maintains his s en t en ce wa s u nc o nst it ut io na lly enh anced, that the trial

court erredin

adm ittin g hi s two prior thef t conv i cti ons, a nd th at i t fa i l ed to com

pl y wi th Ru l e 431 (b). AN AL YSIS A. De fen da nt Ha s F o r feit ed His Ru le 4 31 ( b) Cla im Am ende d Suprem

e Court Rul e 431(b ) ma

ndates : “The courtshal

l ask each poten

tia l j uror, in div idua ll y or i n a group, whether that juro r u nder st ands and a cce pt s t he fo llowing pr inciples: ( 1) t hat t he de fen da nt is presum ed in nocent of the ch

arge(s) agai

nst hi m or her; (2) that before a defe ndan t can be con v i cte d th e S tate m us t prov e th

e def en da n t gui l ty b ey on d a re as on ab l e doub

t; (3) t hat t he d efe nda nt is no t re qu ire d t o o ffer any e vide nce o n his o r h er o wn b eha lf; and (4 ) t hat t he defen

da nt’s f ail ure to testi f

y can not be he l d aga i nst hi m or her; howe ver, no i nqu i ry of a prospe cti ve j uror sh al l be made i nto the d ef endan t’s f ail ure to test if y wh en the defendan

t o bj ects. The cour t’s method o f i

nquiry sh all p r o vid e e ach

j ur or a n opp ortu n i ty to re spo nd to specifi c que st ions co nc er ning t he pr inc iple s s et o ut in t his s ec t io n. ” I ll. Sup. C t. R. 431(b), ef

f . May 1, 2007
. A s rec en tl y ex pl ai n ed b y our su pr em e c our t:1-08-3090

6 “The la nguage of R

ule 431(b) i s clear and un

am bi guous. The rule states that t he tr ial cou rt ‘shall

ask’ pote nt ial juro rs w het her t hey unde rst and a nd ac cep t t he
enum erated pri nc i pl es. W hi l e the prospe cti ve j urors ma

y b e questioned

ind ividua lly
or i n a gr o up , t he met ho d o f inq uir y mus t ‘p r o vid e e ac h ju r o ran o pp o r t un it y t o re spo nd to spe ci f i c que sti ons c once

rni ng th e Rul e 431 (b) pri

nc i pl es.’ The comm

ittee
comm ents em phasi ze t hat t rial co ur t s may not simply give ‘a br oa d st at ement of t he ap plic ab le law fo llo we d b y a g en er al ques ti on con cern i n g th e j ur or’ s wi l l i

n gn es s to foll ow t he law.’ 177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Co mm ittee Co mm

ents. Ru le 431(b), therefore, man dates a speci fi

c question an

d r e sponse pro cess. The tr i al cou rt m us t ask e ach

pote n ti al j ur or w h eth er h e or sh e u n ders tands and
ac ce pts eac hof the pri

nci ple s i n the rule. The questioni

ng m ay be perf ormed ei ther ind ividua lly

or in a group , but the ru

l e re qui res an oppor tun i ty f or a res pon se f rom each pr os pec t ive juro r o n thei r unders tand i ng a nd a cce ptance of those p ri nc i pl es.” People v. Thompson , No. 1090 33, sl i p op. at 6 (October 21 , 2010)
. Here, t he trial court instruct ed the jurors:

“Un der our law , a d efe nd an t is presum ed to be in

nocent of the ch

arge pla ced agains t hi m . The p res

um ption of innoce nce s t ays wit h t he de fendant t hro ugho ut t he wh o le trial

even durin g your deli berations on the verdict and it’s not o vercome unless f rom lookin g at all of the evi dence i n the case you are conv

in ced be yo nd a r ea so na ble doubt that the def

endan t is gui l ty. The defend ant is not re quir ed t o p ro ve his innoc ence and t hat means t he1-08-3090

7

defend ant do es no t have t o c all any witnes ses, t he de fen da nt himse lf doe s n ot h av e to t es t ify, that’s t ru e in thi s ca se a nd in ever y criminal case a cr os s t he co unt ry. T he
rea son f or th at i s i

t’s the State ’s bu rde n of prov i ng som eb od y gui

lty bey ond a
r ea so na ble doub

t by the m se l ve s. The de f en da nt d oesnot h ave to p ut on

any evi dence at all .” The court conti

nued : “As I jus t st at ed a co uple o f mi nut es a go , t he defend ant in this case j ust li

ke
ever y crim in al case across out countr y i s presum ed to be in

nocent of the ch arg e agains t him, and w hat t hat means i s th at h e d oes n ’t h av e to put an

y evi den ce f orward
on his o wn b eha lf, h e m

us t b e p roven

gui l ty bey ond a reasonabl

e doubt by

the Stat e. Raise your ha nd i f you don’ t unde

rstan d tha t. Nobody

i s rais in g yourhand as I
ex pected - - I’m sorry, you are ra

i si ng y our ha nd. W ha t is your na me, m a’a m . PROSP ECTIVE J

UROR : Ess i e Bowm

an . THE CO URT: Okay
. PROSPECTIVE JUROR : I he ar ev er yt hing yo u a r e s aying bu t I do n’t pic k a ll that, I h av e sp eci al ne ed, pe opl e h el

p m e wh en I - THE CO UR

T: M s. Bow

man , w h at I ’m goi n g to a sk th e at t o rne ys t o do is
wri te down y

our name s o if

you ha ppen to be any

of the people t

hat we t al

k to ind ivid ua lly, Ms . Bo wma n, I wil l t alk t o yo u m o r e f ul ly ab o ut t ha t , o ka y. PROSP ECTIVE J

UROR : Oka

y . THE CO URT: Th

erear e no ot her hands ra ised. Ot her t han Ms. Bo wman, is1-08-3090

8

there any body here even

thou gh y

ou underst an d, an ybo dy h er e w ho ha s s o me f und am en tal probl em wi th tha t corner stone of

our cri m i na l j ustice sy stem . (No resp onse .) THE COURT: Nobody i s rai si ng thei r hand.” The trial court suf fi ci ently compl ie d wi t h Ru le 4 31 (b ) w it h r es pe ct t o t he S t at e’ s bu rd en o f pr o o f, defendant’s evident iary bur den, and t he pr esu mpt ion o f innocenc e. Defend ant dis agrees, arguin g that t he trial court ’s i nqui ry i mproperl y “ bl urred the disti

nction b etween

t he individuals p rinciples a nd did not af f ord the pro sp ec t ive ju ro rs a n ade qua t e o ppo rt unit y to expr ess d ou bt or bias abo ut t he individual co ncep t s.” This ar gument fails. We have alrea dy held t hat Rule 4 31( b) “does no t ide nt ify

or di ctate a p arti cul ar met hod olo gy for est ablishing t he und erstan di ng or a cce ptance of the v en i re as to those pri

nc i pl es. I mp o r t an t ly, t he r ule sp eak s o f ‘principles ’ inst ead of q ues t ions. Likew ise, t he
r ule does not set o ut t hese pri nci ple s i n the f orm of questions to be posed in ha e c verba. Nor doe s th

e r ul e p rov i de f or a n y ‘m ag i c w ord s’ or ‘ ca

tech i sm ’ i n ord er to satisf y i ts man date.” People v. Vargas , 39 6 Ill. App. 3d 4 65, 472 (20 09) ; People v. Digby , N o. 1- 09- 090 2, slip op . a t 7 ( No vember 2 4, 201 0) (“Ru le 431 (b) does n ot di cta te a part icul ar methodo logy f

or est abl ish in g the veni

re’s understanding or accept ance of those pri nc i pl es” ). The trial

court suf fi ci ently in quired wh ether the potential

j uror s u nd ers tood and accepted the State ’sbur

den of proof, de f

endan t’s evi den tia ry bur den , and the

presum pti on of i nn ocence. As f or t he f our th princi

ple i n Rule 431(b), t he trial court instruct ed the jurors: “[D] efenda nt do esn’t have t o p re sent any evidenc e, t hat means he doe sn’t1-08-3090

9 have t o t es t ify on h is o wn b eha lf. If the de f en da nt d ec i de s n ot to tes ti f y on his
ownbeh al f, that’s one of

hi s righ ts, gu ar an t ee d t o him as a c it ize n o f t his
coun try and y ou must not and cannot hold it again st hi m. Is there an

yb ody here wh o couldn’t f

oll ow the law i

n that regard? (No resp onse .) THE COURT: Nobody i s rai si ng thei r hand.” While t his was s ufficient t o d et er mine whet her t he jur or s ac cep t ed d efenda nt ’s r ight no t t o t es t ify, it did no t as k w he t he rt he po t en t ial jur o r s u nd er st o o d t ha t r igh t . T his in qu iry d o es no t sa t isfy Rule 431(b). De fen da nt did not, however, raise this i ssue i n the trial co ur t . Alt ho ug h t ha t wo uld ge ne r ally waive the alle ged

er r o ro n a pp ea l (People v. Enoch , 122 Ill . 2d176, 186 (1988) (“fai lure to raise a

n is sue in a wr itt en mot ion fo r a new t rial re sult s in a wa iver o f tha t issue o n app eal”) ) d efenda nt cla ims Ru le 431 (b ) ob

j ec ti ons may not b e w ai

ve d or, al tern ati ve l y , ap pl i ca ti on of the wai

ver ru le sho uld be relax ed f or Rule 431 (b) c l ai

m s. Our supr em e court rec en

tly rej ected b oth arg

um en ts, howe ver, statin g: “To pr es er

v e a cl ai m f or re v i ew , a de f en da n t m us t b oth ob j ec t at t r ia l and in cl ude the alle ged error in a wri tt en posttrial

m oti on. [ Cit at io n. ] He r e, de fen da nt did not ob j ec t to th e tr

i al cou rt’ s f ai l ur e to c om

pl y wi th Rule 4 31( b) or incl

ude that issue in hi s postt rial

motion. A

ccordingl y, we agree

that defenda

nt hasf orf ei ted appe l l ate
r ev iew o f his c laim. In support o f h

is argumen t o n relaxi

ng the f orfei tur e rule, de fen

dant rais es what this court has term

ed the ‘ Sprinkl

e doctr in e.’ We recen

tly expl ai ned that under1-08-3090

10

t he Sprinkl

e doctri ne , the f orfe i ture rule m

ay be rel axed wh en a trial judge oversteps his o rhe r au t ho r it y in

the pre senc e of

the j ury orwh en co un se l ha s be en effe ct ive ly prevented from objecting because it wo uld have ‘ “f all en on deaf ear s.” ’ People v. Hanson, No. 106566, sli

p op. at 33 (June 24, 2010), quot in g McLaurin, 235 Ill . 2d at 488. The fai

lure to preserve an

error will be ex cused under the Sprinkl

e do ct rine
o nly in extraordinary

ci rcumstances, however, such as when a judge

ma kes i n appr opri ate

r ema r ks t o a ju ry o rr elie s o n so cia l co mment ar y inst ea d o f ev ide nc e in imposing a dea

th se nten ce. [C i tations.] We have s t re ssed t he impor t ance of a pplying t he fo r feit ur e r ule uni

f orml y ex cept i n c omp el l i ng s i tuati ons b eca

use f ail ure to raise
a cl ai m prope r ly den i es

th e tr i al cou rt a n opp ortu n i ty to co rre ct a

n er ror o r gra n t a new tri al , thus

was tin g ti me an d j udicial resourc es. [C i

tation .] In thi s case, there

is no in dic ation that the trial

court would ha

ve i gnored an obj ec ti on to the Rul e 431(b) questioni ng. We pres

ume that the tri

al courtwo uld have compl ie d wi th th e m an da tory l an gua geof Suprem e C ourt R ule 4 31( b)ha d the error been pointed out at tria

l . Moreov er, def

endan t does n ot argue that the tri

al court oversteppedits a ut hor ity in the jury’s p re senc e. A simple objec t ion would h ave al lowed the trial court to correct the error dur in g voir dire. Accordin

gly , we concl ude there is no c omp elling

reason to relax the f

orfei ture rule i n thi s case.” Thompson , Slip op. at 9-10. The sa me r es ul t i s w ar ra n ted h er e. De f

en da n t h as n ot de mo nst ra t ed t hat his objec t ion wo uld have been dis regarded by

the c ou rt nor has he est ablished a ny ot her co mpelling rea so n for re laxing t he1-08-3090

11

forfe iture rul e. Wh ere, as i n thi s case, “the def

endan t fails to ma ke a ti mel y ob j ec ti on an d th eref oref orf ei ts review, the r evi

ewi ng court wil

l [n onethel ess] exa

mi ne the record only

for pl ai n error.” People v. McLaurin , 235 Ill . 2d 478, 495 (2009). “Plai n error is a n

arrow and li

mi ted exception to the general wai ver rul e.” Peo

ple v. Pas tori

no, 91 I ll. 2d 17 8, 18 8 ( 19 82 )
. I t ap pl ies o nly “when (1) a clear or obvious error occur red and the evidence is so clo se ly bal anced that th e error

al on e th re ate n ed to ti p the sc al

es of j us ti ce ag ai n st th e def en da n t, regardless of

the serious ne ss

of the err or, or (2) a c l ea r or obvio us e rr or oc cur re d and that error is so seri ous that it aff ected the fai

rness of the defendant’s trial

an d chal le nged the in tegrity of the judi ci al pr oc ess, re gar dless o f the clos enes s o f the evi dence.” Peo

ple v. Piat

kow ski, 225 Il l . 2d 551 , 565 (2 007). “In a pl ai n-error review, the b

urden of persuasi

on remai ns on the def

endan t.” McLaurin , 23 5 I ll. 2d at 495. Defend ant clai

m s b oth prong s of

pl ai n-e rror revi ew. Th

e f i rs t pr ong app lies “wher e t he evi dence i n a c as e is s o cl

ose l y b al an ce d th at th e j ur y ’s gui l ty ver dict may have res

ul ted f rom the err or and not t he ev

ide nce.” Peo ple v. Her

ron, 21 5 I ll. 2 d 1 67 , 17 8 ( 20 05 )
. T he co ur t mu st “consi der whether t he o ut co me of d efenda nt ’s t rial may have bee n affect ed by t he t rial cour t’s failure to ask pot entia l juro rs if t hey *** unde rst oo d t hat defend ant had t he r ight not t o t est ify *** . T he de fendant must est ablish that

the error alone could have led to his conviction .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) People v. Willis, 402 Ill . App. 3d 47, 54 ( 20 10 )
. T ha t ha s no t be en do ne he r e. E ve n if t he ev ide nc e w as clo se ly bal anced, the trial

court ’s f ai lure to in

quire wh ether the potential

juro rs u nder st oo d de fendant ’s r ight1-08-3090

12

not t o t est ify was of no co nseq uenc e since d efenda nt t est ifi ed a t t rial and t he t rial co ur t instr uct ed t he pot entia l j uror s of de f en da nt’ s ri gh t not to te sti

f y . No p l ai n e rror occurred un de r th e f i rs t pron g of
revi ew. Wi

th respect to the second prong, de fen da nt cla ims t he t r ial c o ur t ’s er r o rde pr ive d h im o f a fair trial by an i mpa rtial jury. Defen

dant has n ot provided an

y e vi dence, h owever, demonstrat in

g that the jury was bi ased. As rece

ntly cl arif ie d by our sup re me co ur t , mer e violat ion o f Rule 43 1( b) does not ren de r a j ury bi as ed nor wa rra nt a utom ati c re ve rs al un de r th e s ec ond

pron g of pl ai n- err orreview: “A fi ndi ng that defen

dant was tried

by a bi ased jury wo uld ce rt ainly satisfy the
sec ond pr o ng o f pla in- er r o rr ev iew be ca us e it wo uld affe ct his r igh t t o a fa irtrial and chal le nget he i n teg ri ty of the j udi ci al proc es s. C

ri ti cal l y , h owe ve

r, d ef en da nt h asnot presented any evi dence that the j ury was

biased i n thi s case. Defe

ndan t has the burden of p er sua sion o n t his issue. We cannot pre sume the j ury was bi ased sim ply because the trial court erred in

conductin

g the Rul e 431(b) questioni ng. * * * Our am endm ent to Rule 431(b) does not indi cate that co mplia nc e w it h t he rule is n ow i n di sp ensa b l e to a fa ir t r ial. As w e h av e e xp laine d, t he failu r e t o co nd uc t Ru le 431 (b) qu es t io ning do es no t ne ce ss ar ily re su lt in a biased j ury, regardless of wh ether that qu es t io ning is ma

ndatory or permi ssi

ve un der our rule. Al

thought he amend ment to the rule s ervesto promote t he sel ection of an

impart ial jury by m

aking q ues t ioning
man da t o ry, Rul e 431(b) questioni ng i s onl y one me thod o f h el pin g to ensure t he
se l ec ti on of a n i m partial j ury . [Ci tation .] It is not t he onl

y m eans of achi evi ng that1-08-3090

13

obje ctive
. A violat ion o f Rule 43 1( b) does n ot i m pl i ca te a f un da men tal righ t or constitutional

pr ot ect ion, bu t o nly invo lve s a vio lat io n o f t his court’s rules. [C i tation .] De sp i te ou r a mendment to the rule, we can not conclude that

Rule 4 31( b) q ues t ioning is in dis pensable to the selection of an

im partial jury.” Thompson , Sli

p op. at 11-12. Sin ce there is

no evi dence h ere that defen

dant’s j ury was

biased , the second p rong of pl ai n- err or r ev iew is ina pp lica ble
. De fen da nt ha s fo r feit ed his R ule 43 1( b) cla im.

B. Defen dant’s Two Prior Thef

t Convi ctions W

ere Properly

Adm itted “A tri al cou rt’ s r ul i ng on th e adm i ss i bi l i ty of o t he r - cr imes ev ide nc e w ill not be r ever sed abse nt an ab us e of dis cr et io n. [ Cit at io ns. ] An a bu se o f dis cr et io n o cc ur s w he r e t he t r ial c o ur t ’s rulin g is
ar bit r ar y, fan

ci ful or where no reasonabl

e person woul d tak e the

vi ew ad opted by the tri al court.” People v. Childress , 338 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 54 0, 545 ( 2003) . Def endan t ma i ntai ns here tha t the tri al court errone ousl

y adm i tted his two pri

or mi sdemean or thef t conv i cti ons. “Evi dence of pri orcon v i cti on s is a dm i ss i b l e f or i m pe ach men t purposes if

(1) t he wi tn es s’ s cri me w as pu n i sh ab l e b y de ath or by im pr isonment for mor e t han o ne year, or t he cr ime i

n v ol v ed di sh on esty or f al se sta tem en t re ga rdl es s of th e pun i sh men t; (2) t he wit ness’ s co nvictio n or re lease fr om co nfinem en t, whi ch ev er date

i s later, occurred less tha n 1 0 ye ar s be fo r e t he da t e o f t r ial; an d ( 3) t he da ng er o f un fair pr ej udic e doe s n

ot s ub sta n ti al l y outw ei gh th e p rob ati

v e v al ue of th e c on v i cti on. ” People v. Whirl , 351 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 46 4, 466- 67 (20 04). Defend ant claims his tw o c onvict ions w er e o f mi nimal pro bat iveval

ue an d w er e h igh ly pr eju dic ial, that the trial

court fai le d to suf fi ci ently wei gh the ag e of

thecon vi cti ons, a nd th at the tri al court1-08-3090

14

overlooked defen

dant’s productive l

if estyl e si nce 1999. “Tri al judge s are given

factors t o use when

conductin

g the bal anci ng test-an exercise i n d i screti on. Th es e i

nc l ude the na ture of the pri orco nvictio n, it s re cenc y and si m i l ari ty t o t he pr ese nt char ge, ot her circu msta nces sur ro unding t he pr ior co nvictio n, and t he lengt h of

the wi tne ss ’s cri m i na l rec ord. [Ci

tati on. ] Con vi cti ons of t he sa me cri me f or whi ch the def endan t is on tri al shoul d be

adm i tted ‘s pari ngl y .’ [C i tation .] Howev er, t he supr

em e court f ound n o error where the tri al

j udge i n a bur gl ary case al lowed t he de fendant to be i

m peac he d wi th two pri or burg l ary

convi ctions.” Stokes v. City of Chicago , 333 Il l . Ap p. 3d 27 2, 279- 80 (20 02). “The t rial co ur t has d iscre t ion in t he balanc ing t est and in de t er mini ng whether a

pri or con vi cti on is adm is si ble. [Ci tation .] Howev

er, the tri al c o ur t sho uld no t ap ply t he ba lan cin g t es t mec ha nic ally [ci tation ], and the record mus

t incl ude some i

ndication that the trial

courtwa s a

wa re of i ts d i screti on to exclud e a p rio r c onvict ion [ ci tation].” W hirl , 35 1 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 467 . The tri

al cou rt n ee d n ot ar t iculat e all the f

ac tors c ons i de red

i n i ts a ppl i ca ti on of the b alanci

ng te st. People v. Atkinson , 186 I ll. 2d 450, 462-63 ( 19 99 ). Th e r ec ord h ere c l ea rl y re v ea l s th at th e tr i al cou rt w as aw are of i ts di scre ti on an d e x ercise d i

t: “I unde rst and t he argumen t s o f bo t h o f t he pa r t ies an d I t hink t ha t t he r e is alw ays a ca re ful balancing t est t o be per for med whe n admit t ing proof of ot her crim

es. In t his case , c er t ainly the de fendant is charged wit h bur glar y and t he element is did he intend t o co mmit a theft , so cert ainl y i t is somewhat prejudicial

that the de fendant’s f i ve pri orfelony co nvictio ns t hat fall wit hin t he s co pe o f Montgomery are all thefts.1-08-3090

15 On t he o t her hand, t hat has t o be balance d ag ainst t he de fendant ’s t est imony and hi s credibi

li ty. I t hi nk i n this cas e, weighi

ng the pro bative v

alue versu s t he prejudi ci al ef f ect, I f i nd th at i t is relev an t for th e j urors t o t ak e in t o a cco unt t he
co nvictio ns listed und er A and B, thos e tw o reta i l the f ts. I thi nk tha t su f f i ce s, f or purposes of a llowing th e j ur orsan opp ortu n i ty to ev al ua te th e def en da n t’s cr ed i b i l i ty i n l i ght of his b ackg round
. W i th r es pe ct t o misd eme an o r s t ha t yo u lis t in C, D a nd E wh ich ar e a ga in a ll th ef ts from ‘98 an d ‘ 99, I’ m not g oi ng to al l owt hos e t o c ome int o e vidence . I t hink that wo uld be t oo pr ejudicial t o let in fi ve o f the m. I t hink t hey are go ingt o be ab le to we igh h is cr ed ibility su ffi cient l y wi th two of

the el i gi bl e f i ve m i sdem ea nor convi ctions. So that wil

l b e m y rul in g on that.” Rather t han “ver bal homag e” t o t he balanc ing t est , t he tri al court’s ruli

ng dem onstrates reasoned app licatio n. Whi

le defendant’s conv

i cti ons werenot recent, it cannot be sai d on the record sub judice that t he trial

court applie d the bal

anci ng test im properly . That ot hers m

ay have reached a

different
r es ult does n

ot rende r the tri al court’s deci sion erron eous. People v. Chapman , 26 2 I ll. App. 3d 439, 461 (1992) (“A rev

ie win g co ur t may n o t simp ly su bs ti tute i ts j udg men t f or th at of t he t r ial cou

rt on a m atter wi thi n the tri al court’s di scre tion ”). The tri al

court did not ab

use i ts di scre tion
. C. The Prosecuto r’s Cl

osin g Argum ents, Though Im

proper, Were Not Substanti al ly Prejudi ci al “It is well e stablis

hed that prosecuto rs are aff orded wi de lat it ude in closing
argu men t, and im

prope rr ema r ks will no t mer it r ev er sa l un les s t he y re su lt in
su b sta ntial pre j udi ceto the

de f en da nt. [Ci tati on. ] In rev i ew i ng al l eg ati ons of1-08-3090

16

prosecuto rial

m i sc ond uc t, th e c l osi

ng arg um en ts of b oth th e S tate and t he de fendant must be exam in ed i n th ei r en ti rety , an d the c om pl ai ne d-of r ema r ks mus t be pla ce d in th ei r p rop er con tex t. ” Peo ple v. Kitchen, 159 Il

l . 2d 1, 38 -39 (19 94). Here, the prose cutor argued i n cl osi ng: “Your verdict sho uld be ba se d o n e vid en ce an d t he ev ide nc e in thi s c as e c omesf

rom t he witne sses’ testim

ony a nd the ev ide n ce in thi s case com

es f rom the exh

ibits that have been entered. The def

endan t is a thi ef

, an d y ou kn ow he’ s a thi ef be ca us e of Peo ple’s Ex

hi bi t No. 2 an

d Pe ople’ s Ex

hi bi t No. 3 [def

endan t’s pr i or conv i cti ons]
. The de fend ant pa int s a nice pic t ur e o f himself n ot d oing a ny thin g wrong but that doesn’t m ean that he was

n’t doin g any thin g wrong.” T his argum

en t was c l earl

y i m proper a nd c ontrary

t o t he law g ove rning admission of prior co nvi ctions. People v. Williams , 161 Ill . 2d 1 , 39-4 0 (1994) (“It is a f undam ental tenet of our crim

in al jus tice system *** that t he i

ntroduct ion of

evi dence of oth er cri mes to s h ow or

su gg est a prop ensi

ty to co mmit cr ime is an i

mproper purpose and i s prohibited”). Wh il e we do not in any way co ndo ne t he pr os ecu t or ’s ar gument , d efenda nt wai v ed th e iss ue b y f ai l i n g to objec t dur ing clos ing o r t hro ugh a post-t rial moti on. “ Gene

ral l y , f ai l ure to obj ec t to an

y i m prop r iety in co unse l’s clos ing ar gument re su l ts in wai ver unl ess comm

ents are so infla mmat o ry and pr eju dic ial t ha t [ de fen da nt ] is d en ied a fa ir trial .” Limanow

ski v. Ashland Oil Co. , 275 Il l . Ap p. 3d 11 5, 118 ( 1995)
. “In rev ie win g comm ents m ade at cl osin

g argumen

ts, t hi s court asks whether or not t he comm

ents engen

der substantial

prejudi ce ag ain st a d efe nd an t su ch t ha t it is im po ssi ble to say wh ethe r or not a verdi

ct of g uil t resul ted f rom th em . [Ci tation .]1-08-3090

17

Mi sconductin

cl osi n g a rgum en t i s s ub sta n ti al an d w ar ra n ts reversal

and a n ew trial if t he impr o pe rr ema r ks co nst it ut ed a ma t er ial fa ct o rin a de fen da nt ’s co nvic ti on . [Ci tation .]. If t he jur y cou ld have reached a contrary verdict had the i

mproper rem

arks not been ma de, or t he revi

ewi ng c our t cannot say that the prosecutor’s im proper remarks did no t co nt ribut e t o t he de fendant ’s co nvictio n, a new t rial sho uld be gran ted.” People v. Wheeler

, 226 Il l . 2d 92, 1 23 (20 07). We are not persuaded on the record sub judice that co unsel ’s comm ent was so improper o r so prejudi ci al asto wa rra nt a ne w tri al , pa rti cul arl y i n l i gh t of t he t rial co ur t ’s su bseq uent admo nishment to th e j ur y th at: “Any ev i den ce th at w as r ece ived fo r a lim ited pur po se sho uld no t be considered

by you fo r a ny ot her pur po se. Yo u sho uld d isreg ar d t est imony and ex h i b i ts whi ch the C ourt has

ref use d or stricken
. The evi dence wh i ch you s hou l d c ons i der con

sists onl y of the tes ti mony of t he wi tnes ses and the ex hi bi ts wh i ch the C ourt has

rece i ve d. * * * Ope ningsta

tem en ts a remade b y th e a ttorn ey s to ac qu ai

n t y ou wi th th e f ac ts they expect to pro ve. Cl

osin g arg ument s ar e made by the a t t or neys t o d iscuss t he fact s and circu msta nces in the c ase and t hey sho uld be confi ned to the evi dence

and to reasonab l e i

nf eren ces that ca n b e draw n f rom th e ev i den ce. Nei ther op ening sta

tem en ts n or c l osi n g a rgum en ts are evi dence, as we tal

ked about ear lier, a nd any st at ement or ar gum en t mad e b y the l aw yers wh i ch i s n ot based1-08-3090

18

on any of the evi

dence sh ould be dis regarded. * * * Evidence of d efenda nt ’s pr eviou s co nvictio n of a ny offense may be
con si de red by you on l y asi t may ef f ec t hi s b el i evab i l i ty asa w i tne ss esan

d m us t not be co nsid er ed by yo u a s e vid en ce o f his gu ilt of the of f en se w hi ch i s he i s ch

arged .” We are n ot persua ded that def

endan t was den i ed a f ai r tri al
. Defend ant maintains reversal i s n onetheless

warra nted be caus e the

und erl y i ng e vi den ce h ere was cl osely

bal anced. Agai

n, pl ai n e rror r ev i ew may be i nv oke d w he re “a c l ea r or ob vi ouserr or occurred and the evi

dence is so cl ose l y ba l an ce d that the error a

l one threa ten ed to ti p the s cal esof jus ticeaga inst t he de fendant , r ega rd less o f the ser iou sness of t he error.” Piat kow ski, 225 Ill . 2d at 565. The evidenc e her e wa s no t , ho weve r, clos ely balanced . While de fendant and the polic e off i cers c al le d by the

State prov i de d c om pe ti ng ve rs i ons of the even ts, th e Sta te al so i ntr oduc ed two of defendant’s pri

orcon v i cti on s to impeach d efenda nt ’s t est imony cre dibili t y. We ar e no t co nvinced t he pro se cut or ’s i sol ated m

i sstatemen

t duri ng c l osi ng m ay ha ve l ed to the j ury ’sverdict. Pl ai n erro r revi ew i s i

na ppl i cab l e. D. Defen

dant’s Sen

tence Is Af

fi rmed Defend ant argues t hat t he t rial co ur t unco nst itu t ionally im po sed a Class X se nt ence unde r t he
se cti on 5-5-3(c)(8) o f the Un

if ie d Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5- 5- 3(c)(8)) (West 2008) because t he St at e did no t pr ove the statutory el em ents therei n be yond a reasonabl e doubt and the trial courti m perm i ss i b l y re l i ed on de f en da n t’s pr es en ten ci n g i n v esti ga ti on repor t (P SI) to det er mine

t he ti m i ng of de f en da nt’ s p riorcr imes and c onvict ions. “To be sent ence d und er t he Class X pr ovisio n,1-08-3090

19

a defendan t must have previ

ously been twice convi

cted o f a Cl

ass 2 or gr eat er class felo ny, and t he
com m i ss i on and co nvictio n dat es o f the pr ior felonies mus t have occurred in the c hronologi cal

order
m andated by the statut e.” People v. Williams , 149 Ill . 2d 467, 473 (1992). Section 5-5-3( c)(8 )
man da tes , i n re l ev an t pa rt: “W hen a d ef en da nt, ove r th e ageof

21 y ea rs , i s c onv

i cte d of a Class 1 or a Class 2 fe lo ny, aft er having t wice be en co nvicte d in any stat e or federal court of an off ense that co nt ain s t he sa me el em ents as an of f en se now cl as si f i ed i n I l l i noi s a s a Cl as s 2 or great er Classf

elony and suc h cha rges areseparately

brought and tried an

d aris e out of di f f eren t seri es o f acts, s

uch def endan t sha l l be sen tenc ed as a Cl ass X of f ender. T his paragrap h shal

l n ot apply unl ess ( 1) t he first felony was co mmi t t ed a fte r t he effect ivedate of this

am endatory Ac

t o f 1977; and (2) the second f el ony was com m i tted af ter con v i cti on of th e f i rs t; and (3) the thi

rd fel ony was comm

itted after convi ction of the s econd.” 730 IL CS 5/5 -5-3(c )(8) (W est 200 8). Defend ant clai

ms h is sen tence was unconstitut ional ly enhan ced because the St ate fail

ed to establi sh t he t imi ng o f his prio r o ffenses be yond a re aso nable do ubt and t hat it is “co nst itu t ionally insuffi cient f ora s en ten ci n g j udge to re ly on l es ser ev

i de nc e– such

asa PS I draf

ted by the A dul t Prob ati on Departmen

t–when det er mini ng the existence of s en

tenc e-en ha nc i ng f acts.” The State res ponds , inter alia , tha t de f en da nt h asf orf ei ted thi s iss uebe ca us e h e di d n ot objec t or fil

e a p os t sent encing moti on. Defend ant “ may

ch al l en gethe con sti tutiona l i ty of a st at ut e at any

tim e.” People v. Wagener, 196 Ill. 2d 269 , 2 79 ( 200 1) . We have alrea dy held, how ever , su bseq uent to Shepard v. United States , 544 U. S. 13, 16- 26 ( 200 5) , t hat sec t ion 5- 5- 3( c)( 8) i s n ot un con sti tut io na l a nd th

at the f actors1-08-3090

20

thereunder

need n ot be proven bey

ond a reasonabl

e doubt. People

v. Yancy , 368 Ill . App. 3d 381, 393 (2005); accord Pe o

p l e v . M a t th ews , 362 Ill . App. 3d 953 (2005) , appeal denied, 219 Ill . 2d583 (2006 ), and People

v. Rivera , 362 Ill . App. 3d 815 (2005) , appeal denied, 218 Il l . 2d 553 (2006 ). Moreov er, a trial

co ur t may rely on a PSI to im pose a Class X se nten ce. River a, 362 Ill . App. 3d at 821 (“a presentence repo rt, li ke the o ne i

n the in stant case, is ge ner ally a reliable so ur ce fo r t he purpo se of i

nqu i ri ng i nto a de f endan t’s cri m i na l history ”); Yancy , 3 68 I ll. App. 3d a t 393 (ho ldingthat “in f i nd i ng tha t an en ha nc ed sente nc e w aswa

rra nte d, th e s en ten ci ng cou rt wa s enti

tl ed to rel y on evi dence *** in defen dant’s PSI”) . Here, def

enda nt’s PS I s h ows tw o felony drugs co nvi

ctions: Fe br ua ry 9, 19 90 , an d F eb rua ry 14 , 19 91
. De fen da nt ’s I llino is Stat e Police cri mi nal hi story record, in cl uded aspa rt of the PSI, shows that t he second of fen se occurred on August 2, 1990. Defendant’s Class X se nten ce is af f i rmed. CONCLUSION We affirm defenda nt ’s co nvictio n and s ent ence . Alt hou gh t he t r ial c o ur t did no t fullyco mply wi th Rul e 431 (b), defen

dant forfe ited

t ha t iss ue by fa iling t o t imely o bje ct , an d p lain- er r o rr ev iew is in applic abl e. The t rial co ur t did no t er r in ad mitt ingdefend ant ’s t wo pr ior t heft co nvictio ns, a nd t he the prosecuto r’s cl

osin g argumen

ts, t hough i

mproper, were not so prejudic ia l a s to warrant a new tria l
. Af f i rmed.