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VERMONT MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

v. BRUCE FERN, SR., ET AL.

(AC 37771)

Gruendel, Prescott and Bear, Js.*

Argued January 7—officially released May 24, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Fairfield, Hon. George N. Thim, judge trial referee.)

A. Jeffrey Somers, for the appellant (named

defendant).

Stuart G. Blackburn, with whom was Derek E. Donnelly, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

BEAR, J. The defendant Bruce Fern, Sr., appeals from

the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff,

Vermont Mutual Insurance Company. The plaintiff

brought this subrogation action against the defendant

and his son, the defendant Bruce Fern, Jr.,1to recover

damages resulting from a fire occurring on a residential

property on November 6, 2011. The defendant argues

that the court erred in determining that (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff’s insured and (2) the

defendant installed a boiler and was equally at fault

with his son. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In its memorandum of decision, the court made the

following findings of fact. The defendant and his son

both work as contractors, although only the defendant

is a registered improvement contractor. Although both

had some prior experience in installing new boilers,2

neither the defendant nor his son has the necessary

occupational license to engage in plumbing and piping

work or heating, piping, and cooling work.

Charles Loria (insured) was the owner of property

located at 155 Twin Lanes Road in Easton (property),

on which he possessed an insurance policy issued by

the plaintiff. At the time of the fire, the insured’s former

wife, Elizabeth Loria (occupant), lived on the property

with her children.3 She told investigators subsequent to

the fire that the defendant and his son had installed the

boiler about a week before the fire occurred.

On the day of the installation, the defendant and his

son arrived at the property, removed the old boiler, and

installed the new boiler. The defendant was responsible

for certain aspects of the installation of the new pipe

connecting the boiler to the chimney. This work

involved measuring the pipe, making the proper cuts,

and installing the adapter4

that connected the pipe and

chimney into the masonry. When installing the chimney

connector into the masonry, the defendant used a twoby-four board to knock the adapter into the chimney.

He also held the pipe in place while his son affixed the

adapter and the pipe to one another. No further action,

such as the use of cement or strapping the pipe in place,

was taken to secure the chimney connector into the

chimney. The defendant did not read the installation

manual for the boiler or speak with a building inspector

about the applicable regulations governing the installation of the boiler. The defendant’s son ignited the boiler,

but failed to make any adjustments to the appliance as

required by the manufacturer.

Approximately one week after the defendant and his

son installed the boiler, the chimney connector became

disconnected from the masonry.5 As a result, exhaust

gases from the boiler were directed onto the joists of

the basement ceiling and, over time, generated sufficient heat to start the fire. From the basement, the
fire spread to other parts of the property, resulting in

damages exceeding $350,000.

During the subsequent investigation into the fire, two

potential causes were identified as causing the fire.

First, the boiler had not been placed to the proper

settings and adjusted as required during the initial

installation; consequently, the boiler had been running

improperly and accumulated a large amount of soot.

Second, the chimney connector had not been cemented

into the chimney or secured in place by a separate piece

of equipment; consequently, it became dislodged from

the chimney. One of the investigators stated that, if the

chimney connector had been secured properly into the

chimney, the connector would not have become disconnected due to the improper installation and adjustment

of the burner.

In its amended complaint, the plaintiff asserted two

theories for recovery: (1) the defendant and his son

had acted negligently in installing the boiler (counts

one and three); and (2) they had breached an implied

covenant that all work would be performed in a workmanlike manner (counts two and four). Following a

trial to the court, the court issued its memorandum of

decision on February 26, 2015. Recounting the essentials of this chronology, the court found that both the

defendant and his son had violated various statutes and

regulations while installing the boiler. Consequently,

the court held that the defendant and his son had acted

negligently and violated an implied covenant that their

work would be done in a workmanlike manner, their

actions were the proximate cause of the fire, and they

were equally at fault. Therefore, the court found in favor

of the plaintiff on each count of its complaint. This

appeal followed.

I

On appeal, the defendant primarily asserts that the

court erred in finding that he owed a duty to the insured

or the occupant. The defendant asserts that the

resulting fire was unforeseeable to him because his role

in installing the boiler was relatively limited. In making

this argument, the defendant relies on the difference

in the type and character of his work when compared

to that of his son. In particular, the defendant asserts

that his son was the contractor retained or engaged by

the occupant, made the agreement to install the boiler,

held himself out as having the necessary skill and expertise to install the boiler, and, thus, had the ultimate

responsibility for verifying that the boiler was properly

installed. The defendant frames his personal involvement much more narrowly, contending that he was

merely a laborer or helper, rather than a subcontractor,

and claims as support that he took direction from his

son, was not paid for his labor, and never held himself

out as having any skill whatsoever in boiler installation.

We disagree.
We begin by noting that the defendant’s argument

appears to confuse the existence of a duty with the

scope of that duty once one is found to exist;6thus, he

blends together two separate concerns. ‘‘The essential

elements of a cause of action in negligence are well

established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and

actual injury. . . . Contained within the first element,

duty, there are two distinct considerations. . . . First,

it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty,

and [second], if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate

the scope of that duty. . . . The issue of whether a

duty exists is a question of law . . . which is subject

to plenary review. We sometimes refer to the scope of

that duty as the requisite standard of care.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman

Catholic Diocesan Corp., 317 Conn. 357, 373, 119 A.3d

462 (2015).

‘‘A duty to use care may arise from a contract, from

a statute, or from circumstances under which a reasonable person, knowing what he knew or should have

known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature

of that suffered was likely to result from his act or

failure to act.’’ Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 186 Conn.

370, 375, 441 A.2d 620 (1982). Although ‘‘[t]he ultimate

test of the existence of a duty to use care is found

in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not

exercised . . . [f]oreseeability in this context is a flexible concept, and may be supported by reasonable reliance, impeding others who might seek to render aid,

statutory duties, property ownership or other factors.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Burns v. Board of Education, 228 Conn. 640, 647, 638

A.2d 1 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Haynes

v. Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 323, 101 A.3d 249 (2014).

In holding that the defendant was liable for the fire,

the court did not engage in a separate analysis concerning whether it was foreseeable that a fire could occur.

Instead, it relied on two groups of statutes and regulations that the defendant and his son contravened while

installing the boiler. It first noted that although neither

the defendant nor his son had the occupational license

required by statute for this work, they wilfully engaged

in this work and the fire was ‘‘[t]he harm that . . . the

licensing requirement was designed to prevent.’’ It also

noted that certain codes and standards promulgated by

the National Fire Protection Association (standards)

had been incorporated into our law and were not followed by the defendant. Thus, in effect, the court analyzed duty as a question of negligence per se under

these two groups of statutes and regulations.7

‘‘Negligence per se . . . serves to superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general

standard of care. . . . A violation of the statute or regulation thus establishes a breach of duty when (1) the

plaintiff is within the class of persons intended to be
protected by the statute, and (2) the injury is the type

of harm that the statute was intended to prevent. . . .

Although the plaintiff still must demonstrate the

remaining elements of negligence, the jury in a negligence per se case need not decide whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have

acted under the circumstances. [It] merely decide[s]

whether the relevant statute or regulation has been

violated. If it has, the defendant was negligent as a

matter of law.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 24–25,

60 A.3d 222 (2013).

‘‘Generally, our courts have treated a statutory violation as negligence per se in situations in which the

statutes or city ordinances at issue have been enacted

for the purpose of ensuring the health and safety of

members of the general public.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Shukis v. Board of Education, 122

Conn. App. 555, 580, 1 A.3d 137 (2010). Our Supreme

Court has held on prior occasions that legislative enactments that contain criminal penalties could qualify as

the statutory predicate for negligence per se claims.

See Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 100–102, 256

A.2d 246 (1969) (criminal penalty for violation of ordinance); Munroe v. Hartford Street Railway Co., 76

Conn. 201, 204, 56 A. 498 (1903) (violation of ordinance

misdemeanor punishable by fine).

‘‘[I]n determining whether a duty of care is owed

to a specific individual under a statute, the threshold

inquiry . . . is whether the individual is in the class of

persons protected by the statute.’’ Ward v. Greene, 267

Conn. 539, 548, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004). ’’In determining

the class of persons protected by a statute, we do not

rely solely on the statute’s broad policy statement.

Rather, we review the statutory scheme in its entirety,

including the design of the scheme as enacted.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 551.8

Turning first to the licensure requirements, General

Statutes § 20-330 et seq., our Supreme Court has stated

that ‘‘a primary purpose of the licensure requirement,

in addition to establishing a uniform, statewide system

of licensing, is to protect the public health and safety.’’

Hartford Hospital v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, 243

Conn. 709, 719–20, 707 A.2d 713 (1998). In a dissenting

opinion, Justice Berdon similarly stated that ‘‘[t]he primary purpose of the licensing requirement . . . was to

protect the general consuming public from unqualified

and/or unscrupulous contractors.’’ Id., 726. Discussing

the legislative history, he quoted one industry professional, who said that ‘‘the purpose of [General Statutes

§ 20-334] is to protect the public and maintain certain

minimum standards in competence to the public.’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 726, quoting Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hear-
ings, General Law, Pt. 3, 1965 Sess., pp. 1138–39.

Pursuant to § 20-334 (a), no person is allowed to

perform any work covered in chapter 393 of the General

Statutes unless they (1) possess a license in the covered

occupation or work, or (2) have appropriately registered as an apprentice and are subject to the regulations

governing that training. One such broad category requiring a license or permit is heating, piping, and cooling

work.9 General Statutes § 20-330 (5); see also Regs.,

Conn. State Agencies § 20-332-5. The requirement that

a contractor working in this field must be appropriately

credentialed is intended to ensure that the person performing the work has the requisite skill and knowledge

within the trade, or is at the very least supervised by

an individual with that skill and knowledge. See General

Statutes §§ 20-333 and 20-334 (a).10

Persons engaging in work without having the necessary license pursuant to these provisions of the General

Statutes may be subject to both criminal and civil consequences. As recognized by the court, wilfully engaging

in work covered by chapter 393 without the necessary

license or permit is a class B misdemeanor. General

Statutes § 20-341 (a). Other subsections provide civil

consequences by authorizing the appropriate board or

the Commissioner of Consumer Protection to impose

penalties on unlicensed individuals engaging in work

that requires a license under chapter 393; see General

Statutes § 20-341 (b); and by making violations of the

provisions of this chapter a basis for a claim pursuant

to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.11 See

General Statutes § 20-341 (d).

Finally, we note that the legislature explicitly has

defined circumstances where a license would not be

required to engage in otherwise covered work; see, e.g.,

General Statutes § 20-340; and our Supreme Court has

construed the exceptions strictly. See Hartford Hospital v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, supra, 243 Conn.

720. It is axiomatic that parties are presumed to know

the law. Provident Bank v. Lewitt, 84 Conn. App. 204,

209, 852 A.2d 852, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 924, 859 A.2d

580 (2004). The activities of the defendant and his son

do not fall within any of the exceptions to the licensure

requirement, and, therefore, the owner of the home,

whether the insured or the occupant, was within the

class of persons intended to be protected by the licensure requirement.12

With respect to the type of harm covered by this

statutory scheme, our Supreme Court has noted these

requirements are intended to ensure an appropriate

level of competence by individuals in the provision of

certain services to the public. See Hartford Hospital

v. Dept. of Consumer Protection, supra, 243 Conn. 720

(because nature of plumbing work in hospital is ‘‘critical

to health and safety of patients’’ and because of greater

public safety risks from faulty plumbing in entities pro-
viding services to the public, ‘‘it is likely that the legislature intended those performing such work to meet the

highest professional standards’’); see also id., 726 (Berdon, J., dissenting) (statement in legislative history

quoted by dissent that purpose of licensure statute is

to maintain minimum standards of competence for public). The statutory focus on ensuring appropriate competence is unsurprising, as there is a foreseeable risk

of harm to people and property from the improper

installation, maintenance, or operation of many of the

appliances involved in occupations and work covered

by chapter 393. Cf. State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 33–38,

627 A.2d 862 (1993) (affirming manslaughter conviction

of electrician, whose wiring of neighbor’s electric

heater in violation of code provisions and failure to

ensure necessary inspections resulted in fire and neighbor’s death); Reciprocal Exchange v. Altherm, Inc., 142

Conn. 545, 549–53, 115 A.2d 460 (1955) (affirming liability for servicers’ negligent failure to determine cause of

malfunctioning oil burner or warn ownerto discontinue

use of burner, which was factorin explosion); Beauvais

v. Springfield Institute for Savings, 303 Mass. 136, 142,

20 N.E.2d 957 (1939)(improperinstallation of oil burner

in commercial building resulted in explosion, which

caused tenant’s death); Executive Board of Missouri

Baptist General Assn. v. Campbell, 275 S.W.2d 388, 392

(Mo. App. 1955) (failure to properly adjust electrodes

in furnace burner resulted in explosion). Pursuant to

the regulatory scheme adopted in Connecticut for heating and cooling licenses, a license seeker must demonstrate that he both has the necessary experience and

training to qualify for the license that he seeks and

possesses a baseline proficiency of knowledge through

the examination itself. See footnote 11 of this opinion.

Thus, a fire resulting from the improper installation of a

heating apparatus by a statutorily unqualified individual

would be one such harm that the licensing statutes

were intended to prevent. Cf. Hartford Hospital v. Dept.

of Consumer Protection, supra, 719.13

Second, the court found that standards 31 and 211,

which have been incorporated into our state law,14 specified the manner in which a chimney connector must

be secured; a secure connection was required by these

standards and the manufacturer’s instructions; and the

chimney connector was required to be clamped and

cemented in place, but was not secured as required.

Pursuant to the applicable regulations governing the

installation of oil burners and provisions of our building

code, a chimney connector must be firmly cemented

to the masonry unless a thimble is used.15 There was

testimony at trial, however, that the preexisting concrete ring was not a thimble of the type required by

standard 31,16 and the defendant conceded at argument

before this court that the installed pipe was not

strapped, cemented, or secured as required by the applicable regulations. Thus, the defendant owed, and by
his own concession breached, a duty pursuant to these

regulations, regardless of his role in the process. See

Buravski v. DiMeola, 141 Conn. 726, 728–29, 109 A.2d

867 (1954) (‘‘It is, of course, the rule that when a person

violates a statute or an ordinance enacted forthe protection of the public, he is guilty of negligence as a matter

of law. . . . This rule applies even though the person

is ignorant of the existence of the statute or ordinance.

He is chargeable with knowledge on the theory that

ignorance of the law excuses no one.’’ [Citation

omitted.]).

The defendant has presented no case law in support

of his position that the injury was not foreseeable

because he was acting merely as a laborer, rather than

as a trained boiler installer. We reject his reliance on

this position for several reasons. To begin, the court

determined that the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff’s

insured arose primarily under legislative enactments,

not pursuant to the common-law duty to exercise due

care. Any subsequentforeseeability analysis concerning

the duty owed by the defendant under the statutory

scheme, therefore, would focus on the party injured

and the harm suffered; see Ward v. Greene, supra, 267

Conn. 555; and a defendant can be held liable even

without actual knowledge that his actions violated any

statute. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Frank Perrotti & Sons, Inc., 20 Conn. App. 253, 260, 566 A.2d 431

(1989) (defendant’s argument that it was unaware that

combustible liquid was in trash irrelevant when ordinance required it to separate out combustible

materials).17

Further, we note that not all injuries that potentially

might occur during the performance of work requiring

an occupational license are outside the realm of ordinary knowledge and experience. See Utica Mutual Ins.

Co. v. Precision Mechanical Services, Inc., 122 Conn.

App. 448, 456, 998 A.2d 1228 (expert testimony not

necessary to demonstrate failure of licensed plumber

to use reasonable care ‘‘in operating plumber’s torch

in vicinity of combustible materials’’), cert. denied, 298

Conn. 926, 5 A.3d 487 (2010). Thus, even if we were

to rely on the common-law test for determining the

foreseeability of an injury,18 we would conclude that

the injury in this case was foreseeable. The defendant

testified at trial that he knew that products such as the

boiler frequently come with instruction manuals and

that he was aware of the building codes and how to

find out what those codes require.19 If he had consulted

either the instruction manual for the boiler or a building

inspector, as he has done in the past when he had

questions about the applicable codes, he would have

been aware that the chimney connector here should

have been cemented or otherwise secured into the flue.

Additionally, specialized knowledge and training are

not required to know that the general purpose of a flue
or chimney is to carry heated gases away from a heatgenerating source. See, e.g., Random House Webster’s

Unabridged Dictionary (2d Ed. 2001) (defining chimney

as ‘‘a structure . . . containing a passage or flue by

which the smoke, gases, etc., of a fire or furnace are

carried off’’). Indeed, the defendant testified that he did

not need any instructions from his son to know that

the chimney connector must be secured as much as

possible. Because it is within the understanding of an

ordinary person that improperly installing the chimney

connector for an oil burner could lead to a fire, the

court reasonably could have found that the risk of fire

arising from an improperly secured chimney connector

either was, or at the very least should have been, foreseeable to the defendant.20 See Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320, 335, 107 A.3d 381 (2015) (‘‘[as]

long as harm of the general nature as that which

occurred is foreseeable there is a basis for liability even

though the manner in which the accident happens is

unusual, bizarre or unforeseeable’’ [internal quotation

marks omitted]); see also Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., supra, 317 Conn. 373–74.21

II

The defendant also claims that the court erred in

determining that the defendant ‘‘installed a boiler’’ and

was equally at fault with his son. We disagree.

‘‘[Q]uestions of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly

erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to

support it . . . or when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . Because it is the trial

court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine

credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . .

In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the

record to determine whether the [court] could have

reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .

Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . .

in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Burns v. Adler, 158 Conn. App. 766,

802, 120 A.3d 555, certs. granted, 319 Conn. 931–32, 125

A.3d 205, 206 (2015).

In its memorandum of decision, the court presented

the following account of the actions of the defendant

and his son while installing the boiler: ‘‘The defendants

worked nine hours together in the Loria residence on

November 2nd or 3rd. They removed the old boiler and

[chimney connector] and installed a new boiler and

[chimney connector]. [The defendant] cut pipes and

held them in place while his son soldered them together.

Both worked on installing the [chimney connector].

[The defendant] connected the end of the metal pipe to

the chimney, but did not cement it in place or otherwise

fasten it to the chimney. He merely pounded it in place
with a wood board. He did not read the manufacturer’s

instruction booklet or check with a building inspector.

His son turned on the oil-fired boiler, but did not make

any adjustments to the burner motor as required by the

manufacturer.’’ It then found that ‘‘the fire was proximately caused by [the defendant and his son’s] careless

and improper installation of the boiler and [chimney

connector],’’ and that they were equally at fault.

The defendant argues that the court erred in characterizing his participation and responsibility as equivalent to that of his son. The defendant notes thatthe court

made no specific finding that the defendant’s manner of

inserting the pipe into the chimney was negligent, but

‘‘simply treat[ed] [the defendant] as having undertaken

to install the boiler along with his son, and charge[d]

[the defendant] with negligence in the overall improper

installation of the boiler—the entire job. That conclusion is flawed, however, [insofar as it is based on the

arguments that the defendant’s] status with respect to

the job was as a laborer’’ and ‘‘it was the responsibility

of [the defendant’s son] to ensure that the new boiler

and all appurtenances were installed correctly.’’ In making this argument, the defendant has alleged facts that

the court did not find.

Although relying on certain facts throughout his brief

that the court did not adopt in its memorandum of

decision, the defendant points to no separate error in

the court’s findings beyond this particular characterization and presents no independent argument beyond his

conclusory position that the role of his son before and

during the installation of the boiler somehow neutralizes his own responsibility to act in compliance with

the applicable statutory provisions and in exercise of

due care. Further, the court’s recitation of the work

completed by the defendant and his son was an accurate, if truncated, recitation of the defendant’s and his

son’s testimony at trial about their actions at the property in late 2011. Although the court did not discuss in

detail the evidence showing that the defendant’s son

arranged many of the project’s details prior to the day

of the actual installation, both the defendant and his

son presented similar accounts of their work at the

property and used terms suggestive of joint efforts to

describe their labor.22 With respect to the installation

of the chimney connector itself, it is undisputed that

the defendant was responsible for preparing most of

the piping for the chimney connector, reinstalled the

end of the chimney connector into the flue, and held

the pipes while his son affixed them to one another.

The defendant’s son testified that he was not actively

supervising the defendant’s work in this respect,23 and

the defendant testified that he did not need any direction to reinstall the chimney connector or to know that

he had to make the connection as secure as possible.

We also note that the court explicitly found that it was

the defendant, not his son, who inserted the chimney
connector into the masonry and failed to properly affix

it, and the defendant does not challenge this finding

of fact.

Further, expert testimony offered at trial stated that

the fire was caused by the improper adjustment of the

boilerfollowing its initial ignition by the defendant’s son

and the failure of the defendant to secure the chimney

connector into the flue properly. These experts also

testified, however,that the failure to secure the chimney

connector properly into the chimney was primarily

responsible for the fire or, at the very least, that the

fire would have been significantly less likely to occur,

even with the improper adjustment of the boiler settings, if the connector had been secured properly. Thus,

despite the defendant’s reliance on certain assertions

and testimony presented at trial that were not adopted

by the court or challenged on appeal, it was not clearly

erroneous for the court to characterize the defendant’s

labors or responsibility for the resulting fire as equivalent to that of his son.

In summation, the defendant engaged in specialized

work that he knew or should have known required a

professional license that he did not possess. The defendant failed to take necessary precautions when doing

this specialized work that required a licensed professional and failed to install the chimney connector in

accordance with applicable law and regulations.

Accordingly, the defendant failed to exercise due care

when undertaking this specialized endeavor. Because

the risk of a fire was both within the contemplation of

the applicable statutes and regulations of which the

defendant was in violation, and the damages sustained

were a foreseeable result of the improper installation

of the chimney connector to the oil-fired boiler, the

defendant’s arguments that he did not owe a duty to

the plaintiff’s insured are without merit.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of

the date of oral argument.

1 Because Bruce Fern, Jr., is not a participant in this appeal, hereafter we

will refer to Bruce Fern, Sr., as the defendant in this opinion.

2 Specifically, the court described their experience as follows: ‘‘[The defendant] and [his son] have limited experience in installing boilers. Thirty years

ago, [the defendant] helped a friend install a boiler. A long time ago, [the

defendant’s son] installed two boilers.’’

3 Neither the occupant nor the children were home at the time of the fire

or for almost twenty-four hours prior to the fire.

4 The defendant’s son testified that an adapter, or reducing collar, is the

conical piece of metal that connected the pipe from the boiler to the flue.

5 Evan Haynes, a licensed mechanical engineer who assisted in the investigation, determined that one of two causes likely resulted in the chimney

connector becoming disconnected: ‘‘[The chimney connector] could simply

just fall out through vibration or use. It also could fall out because of delayed

ignition scenarios where, because the boiler is not running properly and is

not set up properly, you could have delayed ignition of oil creating a puff

that could push [the connector] out.’’

6 For instance, despite his general contention that he owed no duty, the

defendant asserts in his brief that ‘‘it would appear to be against public
policy to hold a gratuitous helper to the same standard of care as a skilled

tradesman.’’ Indeed, at oral argument before this court, the defendant stated

that part of his argument concerned the applicable standard of care for any

duty that he might have owed in this case.

7 Depending on the particular statute, however, a statutory violation might

not constitute negligence per se, but could establish a prima facie case of

negligence or could provide evidence of negligence. See Ward v. Greene,

267 Conn. 539, 548, 839 A.2d 1259 (2004).

8 This potential class of persons may be quite broad. See Wright v. Brown,

167Conn. 464, 469, 356A.2d 176 (1975)(with respect to quarantine provisions

of General Statutes § 22-358, ‘‘the class of persons protected is not limited;

rather the statute was intended to protect the general public or, as stated

by the trial court, members of the community’’ [internal quotation marks

omitted]).

9 General Statutes § 20-330 (5) defines ‘‘heating, piping and cooling work’’

as ‘‘(A) the installation, repair, replacement, maintenance or alteration of

any apparatus for piping, appliances, devices or accessories for heating

systems, including sheet metal work, (B) the installation, repair, replacement, maintenance or alteration of air conditioning and refrigeration systems, boilers, including apparatus and piping for the generation or

conveyance of steam and associated pumping equipment and process piping

and the installation of tubing and piping mains and branch lines up to

and including the closest valve to a machine or equipment used in the

manufacturing process, but excluding millwright work, and (C) on-site operation, by manipulating, adjusting or controlling, with sufficient technical

knowledge, as determined by the commissioner, (i) heating systems with a

steam or water boiler maximum operating pressure of fifteen pounds per

square inch gauge or greater, or (ii) air conditioning or refrigeration systems

with an aggregate of more than fifty horsepower or kilowatt equivalency of

fifty horsepower or of two hundred pounds of refrigerant. . . .’’

10 This purpose is more apparent from the regulations defining the particular licenses that may be issued by the Heating, Piping, Cooling, and Sheet

Metal Work Board. See Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 20-332-5. Each of these

licenses contain explicit limitations on who is able to acquire that license

by defining the necessary training or experience required; see id., § 20-332-

5 (a) (examination for unlimited heating-cooling contractor’s license only

available after ‘‘two (2) years as an unlimited licensed journeyperson or

equivalent experience and training’’); or by limiting the type of projects on

which, or the manner in which, the holder may work. See id., § 20-332-5 (g)

(limited heating contractor license allowed to work only on ‘‘hot water or

steam heating systems for buildings not over three stories high with a total

heating load not exceeding 500,000 BTU’s and steam pressure not exceeding

fifteen pounds’’ as well as related gas systems and ‘‘oil burners handling

up to five gallons per hour’’); see also id., § 20-332-5 (j) (limited heating

journeyperson may install, service, and repair gas or oil fired burners ‘‘only

while in the employ of a contractor licensed for such work’’). To acquire a

license, an individual must score at least 70 percent on the examination.

Id., §§ 20-332-10a and 20-332-11a.

11 General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides: ‘‘No person shall engage in

unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in

the conduct of any trade or commerce.’’ A cause of action may be brought

by ‘‘[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property,

real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or

practice prohibited by section 42-110b.’’ General Statutes § 42-110g (a).

12 The attempt by the defendant to analogize his situation to that of a

neighbor assisting a homeowner in installing a boiler in the latter’s home

is not persuasive: unlike the actions of the defendant and his son here, the

homeowner’s actions in the hypothetical at the very least could fall within

an explicit exception to the licensure requirement. See General Statutes

§ 20-340 (11) (‘‘[t]he provisions of this chapter shall not apply to . . . persons engaged in the installation, maintenance, repair and service of glass

or electrical, plumbing, fire protection sprinkler systems, solar, heating,

piping, cooling and sheet metal equipment in and about single-family residences owned and occupied or to be occupied by such persons; provided

any such installation, maintenance and repair shall be subject to inspection

and approval by the building official of the municipality in which such

residence is located and shall conform to the requirements of the State

Building Code’’).

13 In response to the questions of this court during oral argument, the

defendant asserted that the purpose of the licensure statute was to protect
the public from unscrupulous contractors. While true, it is not, however,

the only purpose. See Hartford Hospital v. Dept. of Consumer Protection,

supra, 243 Conn. 719–20. Additionally, the defendant has not asserted on

appeal that the failure to have the necessary occupational license is not a

ground to assert a negligence per se claim because the failure to have that

license was not the proximate cause of the fire.

14 The court stated that standards 31 and 211 were part of our state’s fire

code. It did not explain, however, which portions of the fire code incorporated these standards.

We note that the provisions of our state fire safety code and our state

fire prevention code generally do not apply to private single-family dwellings

such as the property; see General Statutes § 29-292 (a) (1); Regs., Conn.

State Agencies §§ 29-291a-1a (d) and 29-292-1e (b); and did not apply under

the statutes and regulations in effect in 2011. See General Statutes (Rev. to

2011) § 29-292 (a); Regs., Conn. State Agencies (Rev. to 2011) §§ 29-291a-1

(d) (repealed May 7, 2015) and 29-292-1e (b) (amended effective October 2,

2012). Other applicable statutes and regulations, however, contain materially

similar requirements; see footnote 16 of this opinion; and the defendant has

not challenged the court’s judgment on these grounds. See footnote 17 of

this opinion.

15 Standard 31 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The chimney connector shall

extend through a chimney wall to the inner face or liner but not beyond,

and shall be firmly cemented to masonry. A thimble shall be permitted to

be used to facilitate removal of the chimney connector for cleaning, in

which case the thimble shall be permanently cemented in place with hightemperature cement.’’ National Fire Protection Assn., NFPA 31: Standard

for the Installation of Oil-Burning Equipment (1992 Ed.) § 1-7.2.4, p. 31-12.

Under the regulations in effect in 2011, this standard was incorporated by

reference as our state’s regulations on the installation and operation of oil

burning equipment; see Regs., Conn. State Agencies (Rev. to 2011) § 29-317-

3a (a) (repealed May 7, 2015); and private residential dwellings are not

excepted. See General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 29-317 (a) and (b); Regs.,

Conn. State Agencies (Rev. to 2011) § 29-317-1a (b) and (d) (repealed May

7, 2015). (Pursuant to amendments ultimately effective January 1, 2013,

however; see Public Acts 2010, No. 10-54, §§ 1 and 6; Public Acts 2009,

No. 09-177, § 7; regulations adopted pursuant to this authority are now

incorporated into the state fire prevention code. See General Statutes § 29-

317 [a].) Additionally, § 1805.2 of the 2003 International Code for One- and

Two-Family Dwellings portion of the 2005 State Building Code provides in

relevant part: ‘‘A connector entering a masonry chimney shall extend

through, but not beyond the wall and shall be flush with the inner face of

the liner. Connectors, or thimbles where used, shall be firmly cemented

into the masonry.’’

16 The expert relied on standard 211 to address whether the concrete ring

was a ‘‘thimble’’ as that term is used in standard 31. Standard 211 provides

in relevant part: ‘‘Thimbles for chimneys or vent connectors shall be fireclay

. . . galvanized steel of minimum thickness of 24 ga[u]ge, or material of

equivalent durability. Thimbles shall be installed without damage to the

liner. The thimble shall extend through the wall to, but not beyond, the

inner face of the liner and shall be firmly cemented to masonry.’’ National

Fire Protection Assn., NFPA 211: Standard for Chimneys, Fireplaces, Vents,

and Solid Fuel-Burning Appliances (1992 Ed.) § 3-1.8.1, p. 211-18. Thus,

because the clay ring was only two inches long and did not extend to the

vertical flue, the expert explained, it was not a ‘‘thimble’’ as that term is

used in standard 31. The defendant has not asserted on appeal that either

the court’s reliance on this testimony orits application ofthe law was in error.

17 ‘‘In cases involving the doctrine of negligence per se . . . the defendant

ordinarily may avoid liability upon proof of a valid excuse or justification.’’

Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 235 Conn. 360, 376, 665 A.2d 1341 (1995),

quoting 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A (1965). The defendant, on

appeal, has focused primarily on whether a duty existed and has not provided

any separate argument that his failure to abide by either the licensure

requirements or state building code was excused or justified.

18 ‘‘[O]ur threshold inquiry has always been whether the specific harm

alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendant. . . . By that is

not meant that one charged with negligence must be found actually to have

foreseen the probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted

was foreseeable, but the test is, would the ordinary [person] in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate

that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result? . . .
The idea of risk in this context necessarily involves a recognizable danger,

based upon some knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable

belief that harm may possibly follow. . . . Accordingly, the fact finder must

consider whether the defendant knew, or should have known, that the

situation at hand would obviously and naturally, even though not necessarily,

expose [the plaintiff] to probable injury unless preventive measures were

taken.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic

Diocesan Corp., supra, 317 Conn. 373–74.

19 We also note that the defendant has worked as a registered home

improvement contractor for several decades.

20 Even if the court premised the defendant’s liability on his breach of a

common-law duty to exercise reasonable care, the court would be permitted

to rely on standards 31 and 211. To the extent that the defendant and his

son were required to, and did, abide by these standards or similar statutes

and regulations, compliance alone does not preclude liability for negligence.

See Allison v. Manetta, 284 Conn. 389, 403, 933 A.2d 1197 (2007) (‘‘[w]hile

violation of a statute is negligence, compliance with a statute is not necessarily due care’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Josephson v.

Meyers, 180 Conn. 302, 307–308, 429 A.2d 877 (1980) (duty of care satisfied

by complying with statute ‘‘where the facts are similarto those contemplated

by the statute and no special or unusual circumstances or dangers are

present’’). Alternatively, a court can consider a party’s failure to abide by

even technically inapplicable statutes as evidence of negligence. See Considine v. Waterbury, 279 Conn. 830, 860–69, 905 A.2d 70 (2006) (failure to abide

by building code provisions that were technically inapplicable to property

because they were adopted after construction nonetheless may constitute

evidence of failure to exercise due care).

21 The defendant also argues that public policy is against recognizing that

he owed a duty in this case because ‘‘it would appear to be against public

policy to hold a gratuitous helper to the same standard of care as a skilled

tradesman.’’ He has offered no law or analysis in support of this contention,

however, and we will not consider it. See Zappola v. Zappola, 159 Conn.

App. 84, 86–87, 122 A.3d 267 (2015).

22 For instance, the defendant provided the following summary of his and

his son’s work: ‘‘We went there in the morning and disconnected the furnace

and moved it out. And then they brought a new furnace. We moved it in.

Got it repiped.’’ His son described their labors similarly.

23 Although the defendant testified that his position was wholly subservient

to his son’s directions, both with respect to the general project and with

respect to the particular act of constructing and installing the chimney

connector, the court was not required to credit this testimony. See Burns

v. Adler, supra, 158 Conn. App. 802.