If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

LISA MONTRIEF, DEAN T. MONTRIEF, STEVE 

BAILEY, DANIEL MILLS, JANET M MILLS, 

COLIN ROEHM, ANJLIA MASLAK, TRUMAN 

CARRICO, KIMBERLY SELLERS CARRICO, 

JOSEPH R. RINE, LEESA R. RINE, MICHAEL 

RINE, JOSEPH DOWNARD, MARTHA DROW, 

VICTORIA L. ROBERTS, CHIP ROBERTS, 

DARWIN SCHOEFF, JOANNE SCHOEFF, DAVID 

SQUIRES, HELEN SQUIRES, RONALD G. 

JOHNSON, WILLIAM A. BEDELL, DONALD 

SCHROEDER, MARJORIE MONAGIN, 

BARBARA KORICAN, KEITH PRICE, JUDITH 

BAILEY, WILLIAM BAILEY, JOE E. O’NEAL, 

KAREN KOYKKA O’NEAL, and TECUMSEH 

MILLS AIRPORT LLC,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

UNPUBLISHED

April 27, 2023

v No. 360437

Lenawee Circuit Court

MACON TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

MUSTANG MILE SOLAR ENERGY LLC, and 

CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,

LC No. 2021-006726-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SWARTZLE and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In 2018, defendant, the Macon Township Board of Trustees, amended its zoning ordinance 

so that the development of industrial-size solar farms could be permitted as a special use. Based 

upon the procedure set forth in the amended zoning ordinance—which the parties refer to as the 

Solar Ordinance—defendant Mustang Mile Solar Energy LLC applied for a special land use permit 

(SLUP) that would permit it to develop an industrial solar farm in Macon Township. Thereafter, 

on May 10, 2021, the Macon Township Board approved Mustang Mile’s SLUP. In a separate 
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case, plaintiffs, all of whom are land owners in Macon Township, have challenged the Macon 

Township Board’s decision to grant the SLUP. In this case, plaintiffs brought an action in the trial 

court seeking a declaratory judgment that the Solar Ordinance was invalid and unenforceable 

because its passage violated the notice requirements in the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act 

(MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq. and because it violated the procedural requirements set forth in 

Section 18.12(2) of Macon Township’s zoning ordinance. Plaintiffs requested that the court 

declare that the May 10, 2021 SLUP approved under the Solar Ordinance also be declared invalid 

and that Macon Township be enjoined from relying on the Solar Ordinance to grant SLUPs in the 

future. Defendants—Macon Township, Mustang Mile, and Consumers Energy Company—each 

moved for summary disposition.1 Relevant to this appeal, they alleged that plaintiffs lacked 

standing to challenge the Solar Ordinance. The trial court agreed and entered an order dismissing 

Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. Plaintiffs appeal as of right that order. For 

the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiffs 

lacked standing to pursue their challenge to the Solar Ordinance.

I. BASIC FACTS

Sometime in 2017, Invenergy, LLC—a multinational power generation company—

approached individuals in Macon Township about amending the Macon Township Zoning 

Ordinances to include industrial-size solar farms as a special land use in districts zoned industrial 

or agricultural. In January 2018, the matter went before the Macon Township Planning 

Commission, which recommended that the Macon Township Zoning Ordinances be so amended. 

The Township approved the amendments on April 2, 2018. The preamble to the amendment, 

which was codified as Ordinance No. 2018-01, provides:

An ordinance to amend Article VII of the Macon Township Zoning 

Ordinance by replacing Section 7.03 regarding solar energy facilities within the 

Township; adding large solar energy facilities (Solar Farms) to the listing of special 

land uses in the Agricultural (AG) and Industrial (I) Districts; and the replacement, 

deletion, and addition of associated definitions to Article XX. [Emphasis deleted.]

A copy of Ordinance 2018-01, i.e., the Solar Ordinance, was attached to the April 2, 2018 

Township Board’s meeting minutes.2

Following the 2018 amendment, a representative from Invenergy regularly attended 

meetings of the Planning Commission and the Township Board. The representative kept both the 

Planning Commission and the Township Board up-to-date on matters such as its efforts at securing 

 

1 Consumers Energy and Mustang Mile moved to intervene as of right, and the trial court entered 

a stipulated order granting the motion.

2 Based on the record before this Court, it does not appear that the Township Board provided any 

notice to the landowners affected by the 2018 amendment. Because this appeal involves only the 

trial court’s determination that plaintiffs lacked standing, the issue of whether the Solar Ordinance 

was, in fact, amended in violation of the MZEA and the procedures set forth in Macon Township 

Ordinance, Art. XVIII, § 18.12(2), is not presentably before this Court.
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leases for a planned solar project, obtaining environmental and engineering studies, preparing the 

SLUP, the timeline for submitting the SLUP, and the possibility of selling the completed solar 

project to a utility. The Invenergy representative raised questions before the Board that led to the 

Board determining that amendments needed to be made to the Solar Ordinance.

To be sure, the Township Board twice voted to amend the Solar Ordinance. First, on 

December 2, 2019, the Board voted to approve an amendment to the fee schedule set forth in the 

Macon Township Zoning Ordinance, and a copy of that amendment was attached to the meeting 

minutes as Resolution 2019-3. Second, ostensibly because Invenergy needed additional time to 

complete the solar project once it was started, the Planning Commission recommended that Macon 

Township Ordinance, Art. XVI, § 16.09 be amended to allow additional time for the completion 

of the project. On November 12, 2020, the Township Board voted to approve that amendment. 

Thereafter, on December 7, 2020, the Township Board approved an ordinance “amending and 

readopting Article VII of the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance.” That amendment is codified 

as Ordinance No. 2020.

3

On October 28, 2020, Invenergy, acting through its subsidiary, Mustang Mile, submitted 

its SLUP to the Township. The Planning Commission recommended that the SLUP application 

be denied.4 However, on May 10, 2021, the Township Board voted 3-2 to approve the SLUP. As 

stated above, plaintiffs challenged the Board’s actions on two fronts: first, they filed a notice of 

appeal of the decision to grant the SLUP, and second, they filed the instant action seeking a 

declaratory judgment that the Solar Ordinance was invalid and unenforceable because it was 

passed in violation of the notice provisions in the MZEA and the Township’s Zoning Ordinances.5 

Thereafter, defendants each filed motions for summary disposition, alleging—as relevant to this 

appeal—that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their action for declaratory relief. The trial court 

found that plaintiffs lacked standing and summarily dismissed their claim for declaratory and 

injunctive relief. Plaintiffs appeal as of right that order.

 

3

Interestingly, the Township Board provided notice before “amending and readopting” the Solar 

Ordinance in 2020. Again, however, the merits of the notice issue is not presently before this 

Court.

4 Notably, at this point, the community had finally become aware of the Solar Amendment and the 

anticipated industrial solar farm that was planned for their community; based on the record before 

this Court, it appears that the community was overwhelming opposed to the solar project. Based 

on the public comments, it appears that many individuals were blindsided when they learned of 

the projects existence despite the fact that the Planning Commission and the Township Board had 

been considering the matter for a few years.

5 Plaintiffs also brought a claim for taking without just compensation/inverse 

condemnation/regulatory taking. However, the trial court dismissed that Count for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs have not appealed that decision.
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II. STANDING

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by dismissing Count I of their complaint under 

MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of standing). We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for 

summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 

362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). “Whether a party has standing is a question of law that is 

reviewed de novo.” Mich Ass’n of Home Builders v City of Troy, 504 Mich 204, 212; 934 NW2d 

713 (2019). Likewise, we review de novo questions of court rule and statutory interpretation. 

Safdar v Aziz, 501 Mich 213, 217; 912 NW2d 511 (2018).

B. ANALYSIS

“Standing is not contingent of the merits of the case.” Tennine Corp v Boardwalk 

Commercial, LLC, 315 Mich App 1, 7; 888 NW2d 267 (2016). Rather, “[t]he purpose of the 

standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ensure sincere 

and vigorous advocacy.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 355; 792 

NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As explained by our Supreme Court:

[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, 

whenever a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to 

establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Where a cause of action is not 

provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant 

has standing. A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special 

injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner 

different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the 

Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [Id. at 372.]

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment under MCR 2.605, which is the court rule that 

governs a trial court’s authority to enter a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs requested that the court 

declare the Solar Ordinance invalid and unenforceable, and that the SLUP approved on May 10, 

2021, was also void and unenforceable because it was based on the invalid and unenforceable Solar 

Ordinance. “The Declaratory Judgment rule was intended and has been liberally construed to 

provide a broad, flexible remedy with a view to making the courts more accessible to the people.” 

Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 588; 267 NW2d 72 (1978). A litigant has standing to 

seek a declaratory judgment if the “litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605.” Lansing Sch 

Edu Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372. Under MCR 2.605(A)(1), “[i]n a case of actual controversy,” a court 

“may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking a declaratory 

judgment.” The court rule “incorporates the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.” Int’l 

Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Central Mich 

Univ Trustees, 295 Mich App 486, 495; 815 NW2d 132 (2012) (UAW). “An ‘actual controversy’

under MCR 2.605(A)(1) exists when a declaratory judgment is necessary to guide a plaintiff’s 

future conduct in order to preserve legal rights.” Id. “The requirement prevents a court from 

deciding hypothetical issues.” Id. “The essential requirement of an ‘actual controversy’ under the 

rule is that the plaintiff pleads and proves facts that demonstrate an adverse interest necessitating 

the sharpening of the issues raised.” Id. (citation omitted). “Though ‘a court is not precluded from 
-5-

reaching issues before actual injuries or losses have occurred,’ there still must be ‘a present legal 

controversy, not one that is merely hypothetical or anticipated in the future.’ ” League of Women 

Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 506 Mich 561, 586; 957 NW2d 731 (2020) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

“[T]he purpose[s] of a declaratory judgment [are] to enable the parties to obtain 

adjudication of rights before an actual injury occurs, to settle a matter before it ripens into a 

violation of the law or a breach of contract, or to avoid multiplicity of actions by affording a 

remedy for declaring in expedient action the rights and obligations of all litigants.” UAW, 295 

Mich App at 496 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there is an actual controversy 

between the parties because the Township amended its zoning ordinance in a manner that allegedly 

violated the notice requirements of the MZEA and the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance. An 

amendment enacted in violation of the MZEA is invalid and unenforceable. See Korash v City of 

Livonia, 388 Mich 737, 746; 202 NW2d 803 (1972) (stating that an amendment to a zoning 

ordinance “enacted by a procedure different from and contrary to the procedure required by” the 

MZEA is invalid). And, although the Solar Ordinance itself did not cause any direct harm, 

plaintiffs pleaded facts showing that it was passed in anticipation of Invenergy seeking to obtain a 

special use permit allowing for the development of an industrial-size solar farm. Indeed, prior to 

the granting of the SLUP, the Solar Ordinance was amended to allow for a more generous 

timeframe for Invenergy to complete the solar project.

Moreover, plaintiffs pleaded the need for future clarification and guidance in relation to 

the validity of the Solar Ordinance. They alleged that the Solar Ordinance was invalid and that 

actions detrimental to their unique interests as land owners had already been taken in reliance on 

that Ordinance. Specifically, prior to the 2018 Solar Ordinance, solar farms were not permissible 

as a special use in agricultural and industrial districts in Macon Township. After the amendment, 

such uses were permitted. And, as reflected in plaintiffs’ pleadings and supporting affidavits, the 

anticipated harm caused by the Solar Ordinance has, in fact, already occurred. Indeed, on May 10, 

2021, the Township Board granted a SLUP to Mustang Mile to develop and maintain a solar farm 

in Macon Township. Thus, this is not a case where plaintiffs speculated that an action detrimental 

to them might occur in the future. Because there is, on this record, an actual controversy for which 

guidance on the future conduct of the parties is necessary, a declaratory judgment determining that 

the Solar Ordinance is either valid or invalid will shape the parties’ future conduct as it relates to 

the SLUP that has already been granted. The preservation of plaintiffs’ legal rights depends upon 

a determination as to the Solar Ordinance’s validity.

Additionally, in their pleadings and supporting affidavits, plaintiffs pleaded numerous 

special injuries arising from the combination of the allegedly invalid 2018 Solar Ordinance and 

the subsequent granting of the SLUP, including that they were land owners of properties either 

adjacent to or negatively affected by the planned placement of the solar farm. Overall, the alleged 

harms included interference and deprivation of the quiet enjoyment of their homes and properties. 

More specifically, however, plaintiff Tecumseh-Mills Airport, for example, alleged that the glare 

from the solar panels would cause hazardous flying conditions and that the placement of the panels 

could impact the ability of pilots to make emergency landings in the area. Multiple plaintiffs also 

asserted that they would be harmed by the glare from the panels and from blinking lights associated 

with the solar farm. They also alleged that the location of the solar panels would destroy the nature 

and character of their farming community. Plaintiffs note that the solar farm’s fencing will be a 
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six-foot chain link fence topped with barbed wire. One plaintiff’s property will be almost entirely 

surrounded by the fence; however, several plaintiffs expressed concern with the fence’s 

appearance and its affect on wildlife. Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that they would be harmed by 

decreased property values, impacts to their view, noise pollution, light pollution, and increased 

traffic. There were also concerns about the destruction of farm land caused by drainage issues 

arising from the solar farm and by the diversion of wildlife caused by the solar farm and its 

fencing.

6

The harms alleged are akin to the injuries that were alleged in Connell v Lima Twp, 336 

Mich App 263, 276; 970 NW2d 354 (2021). The injuries in Connell included loss in property 

value, exposure to fumes, dust, and industrial notice, exposure to “a stark, gray monolithic building 

with boarded-up windows,” increased traffic, and legal expenses. Id. The Connell Court held that

because the plaintiffs were adjacent property owners and had allegedly sustained the above 

injuries, “they have standing to challenge the conditional rezoning because they have a substantial 

interest that is detrimentally affected in a manner distinct from that of the general public.” Id. 

at 291 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In its order granting summary disposition, the trial court recognized the harm alleged, but 

ultimately reasoned that because the Solar Ordinance did not cause any harm to plaintiffs, plaintiffs 

did not have standing. In order to determine that there was no harm, however, the trial court relied 

upon an alternative reality in which the ordinance was amended, but no SLUP was granted. In this 

case, the unrefuted facts show that the ordinance was amended and a SLUP was granted under that 

amended ordinance. The fact that the ordinance amendment alone did not cause the harm does not 

negate the fact that actual harm has been alleged in this case. The harm predicted by the passing 

of the amendment is, therefore, not hypothetical.

Plaintiffs also contend that, in this case, the Macon Zoning Ordinances expressly provide 

them with a legal cause of action. “[A] litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of 

action.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372. Macon Township Zoning Ordinance, Art. XXI, 

§ 21.06, provides:

The Township Board or its duly authorized representative is hereby charged 

with the duty of enforcing the Ordinance and said Board is hereby empowered, in 

the name of said Macon Township to commence and pursue any and all necessary 

and appropriate actions and/or proceedings in the Circuit Court of Lenawee County, 

Michigan, or any other court having jurisdiction, to restrain and/or prevent any noncompliance with or violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance, and to 

correct, remedy and/or abate such non-compliance or violation. And it is further 

provided that any person aggrieved or adversely affected by such a non-compliance 

 

6 Although the alleged harms are more particularly identified in the supporting affidavits than in 

the pleadings, leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” MCR 

2.118(A)(2).
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or violation may institute suit and/or join the Township Board in such a suit to abate 

the same. [Emphasis added.]

Defendants contend that this provision would allow plaintiffs to seek to “abate a non-compliance 

or violation of the Zoning Ordinance.” They assert that plaintiffs challenge to the validity of the 

Solar Ordinance is, therefore, not provided for under Art. XXI, § 21.06. We disagree.

In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the Township Board violated Macon Township 

Zoning Ordinance, Art. XVIII, § 18.12(2), which provides:

2. Procedure. The procedure for making amendments of this Ordinance 

shall be as follows:

a. Each petition for amendment by one or more owners of property shall be 

submitted to the Township Clerk who shall refer the same for recommendation to 

the Planning commission who shall report the receipt of a requested zoning change 

to the Township Board at its next meeting.

b. Where an individual parcel of property has to be rezoned, notice of public 

hearing shall be given by first class mail to all property owners and occupants of 

one and two family dwellings, of property, any part of which lies within three 

hundred (300) feet from the boundary of the property to be rezoned. Notice shall 

be addressed to the person whose name is shown as owner upon the tax rolls of the 

Township.

c. After initial consideration, the Planning commission shall hold the public 

hearings as required by law.

d. Notice of public hearings on any petition for amendment of this 

Ordinance which proposes to change Land Use Districts as shown on the Zoning 

Map within five hundred (500) feet of the boundary of adjacent townships or 

municipalities may be sent to the Planning Commission or other zoning agencies 

representing such townships or municipalities in order that coordination with

adjacent zoning ordinances may be promoted[.]

e. The petition, if approved by the Planning Commission shall be submitted 

to the Lenawee County Planning Commission for review.

f. Following action by the Lenawee County Planning Commission the 

petition may be reviewed, and action taken, by the Township Board in accordance 

with State law. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, a violation of the amendment procedure set forth in Macon Township Ordinance Art. XVIII, 

§ 18.12(2) is a violation of the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance. As a result, Art. XXI, § 21.06 

of the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance expressly provides that persons aggrieved by or 

adversely affected by the alleged violation of the zoning ordinance have a legal cause of action. 

And, because the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance expressly provides that any actions taken 

by the Township Board during the amendment be in accordance with state law, the failure to 
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comply with the notice provisions set forth in the MZEA when amending the zoning ordinance, 

would also be a violation of the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance. Although defendants may 

contend that no violation of Art. XVII, § 18.12(2)—or of the MZEA—occurred, such an argument 

goes to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim, not to whether or not they have standing to pursue such 

claim. See Tennine Corp, 315 Mich App at 7.

Moreover, plaintiffs are adversely affected by the allegedly invalid Solar Ordinance 

because it was already used to grant a SLUP to Mustang Mile which, as detailed in their complaint 

and supporting affidavits, allegedly affects them detrimentally in a manner different from the 

general public.7 Plaintiffs also allege that if the proper procedure had been followed, they would 

have received notice of the 2018 amendment to the Solar Ordinance. They contend that, if they 

had such notice, they could have attempted to file a petition to place the amended portion of the 

zoning ordinance on the ballot for the approval by the electors residing in the zoning jurisdiction. 

See MCL 125.3402. On this record, we conclude that because the 2018 amendment to the Solar 

Ordinance was allegedly passed in violation of the zoning ordinance (which incorporates the 

requirements of state law) and because plaintiffs were adversely affected by that violation, they 

have a legal cause of action to challenge the violation of the ordinance.

In sum, plaintiffs’ interest in the issue presented in this lawsuit is sufficient to ensure 

sincere and vigorous advocacy. A declaratory judgment, moreover, is necessary to guide the 

parties’ future conduct in order to preserve legal rights. One SLUP has already been granted under 

the Solar Ordinance and its approval has allegedly harmed plaintiffs in a manner different from 

the general public. The issue is more than merely hypothetical or speculative, and the parties have 

demonstrated an adverse interest necessitating the sharpening of the issues raised. Plaintiffs raise 

significant questions regarding the validity of the Solar Ordinance and whether the SLUP issued 

in reliance upon it interfered with their property rights. Because they have a sufficient personal 

stake in the outcome of the litigation that differs from that of the general public, they have standing 

to maintain their suit for declaratory judgment against defendants. Additionally, plaintiffs have 

standing because Macon Township Zoning Ordinance, Art. XXI, § 21.06, provides them with a 

legal cause of action to challenge the alleged violation of the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance’s 

notice requirements. The trial court erred by granting the motion for summary disposition based 

upon a lack of standing.8

 

7 We note that defendants do not argue that plaintiffs are not aggrieved by or adversely affected 

by the alleged violation of the Macon Township Zoning Ordinance. Rather, they only argue that 

the section does not apply because plaintiffs are not challenging a violation of the ordinance.

8

In their brief on appeal, defendants contend that notice was provided and that no violation of the 

MZEA occurred because the Solar Ordinance was a text amendment, not a rezoning decision. 

Such arguments, however, go to the merits of plaintiffs claim, not whether plaintiffs have standing 

to pursue their claim. Accordingly, we decline to address them.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction, nor do we 

impose costs.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney