In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: January 19, 2022

S21A1088. WARD v. CARLTON.

 NAHMIAS, Chief Justice.

The Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections,

Timothy Ward,1 appeals the habeas court’s order granting relief to 

petitioner Lewis Carlton on the ground that the trial court lacked 

authority to revoke Carlton’s probation arising from his 2012 

convictions by guilty pleas before the probationary period of the 

criminal sentences began. The Commissioner argues that the trial 

court was authorized by statute and precedent to revoke Carlton’s 

probation before it began. Carlton responds that the habeas court 

 1 Both Commissioner Ward and Robert Adams, Jr., Warden of the 

Jenkins Correctional Facility, were named as parties in the habeas court. The 

notice of appeal listed both parties in the case caption as “Respondents” but 

referred only to “Respondent Ward” in the text. In this Court, the appellant’s 

brief includes only Commissioner Ward as the “Appellant/Respondent” in the 

case caption and in the text. It is unclear from the record why Warden Adams 

is no longer a party or if his removal was intentional. Carlton appears to 

remain incarcerated at the Jenkins Correctional Facility. 
2

was correct in granting relief because the trial court lacked such 

authority. He also claims that the trial court’s actions rendered his 

guilty pleas unknowing and invalid because he would not have 

entered the pleas had he known that his probation could be revoked 

before the probationary period began – claims that the habeas court 

ruled that the trial court should address in the first instance in the 

context of a motion for out-of-time appeal. For the reasons explained 

below, we conclude that the habeas court erred both in ruling that 

the trial court could not revoke Carlton’s probation and in not ruling 

on Carlton’s invalid-plea claims as well as other claims he asserted. 

We therefore reverse the habeas court’s judgment in part and 

remand the case for further consideration consistent with this 

opinion.2

1. The record shows the following. 

(a) Carlton’s 2012 Criminal Convictions and Sentences

On September 20, 2012, a Cobb County grand jury indicted 

 2 As discussed in footnote 10 below, Carlton does not dispute the habeas 

court’s rejection of three of his claims, so those portions of the judgment stand.
3

Carlton for three counts of interstate interference with custody, four 

counts of impersonation of a public employee (a Division of Family 

and Children Services worker), two counts of burglary, two counts 

of criminal attempt to commit aggravated stalking, and two counts 

of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping. On October 15, 2012, 

Carlton entered a negotiated Alford3 plea to three counts of 

impersonation of a public employee (Counts 4, 6, and 7), and the 

remaining counts were nolle prossed.

The trial court sentenced Carlton to serve five years in prison 

on Count 4, a consecutive split sentence of five years – one year to 

serve in prison and four years to serve on probation – on Count 6, 

and a consecutive five years to serve on probation on Count 7, for a 

total sentence of six years to serve in prison and nine years to serve 

on probation.4 On the sentencing disposition form for Count 4, the 

 3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) 

(1970). 

4 The Commissioner’s brief incorrectly says that Carlton received a split 

sentence of four years to serve in prison with the one-year balance to serve on 

probation, and thus also says incorrectly that his total sentence was nine years 

in prison and six years on probation.
4

general and other terms of probation section was struck through, as 

were the words “see Addendum ‘A’ for special conditions of 

probation.” The sentencing disposition forms for Counts 6 and 7

included general terms and conditions of Carlton’s probation, as well 

as special conditions of his probation reflected in an Addendum A. 

The special condition at issue in this case said, “Defendant shall 

have no contact with his children unless an order from the Cobb 

County juvenile court allows it.” Carlton did not appeal.

(b) The Probation Revocation Proceeding

About two years later, on October 3, 2014, while Carlton was 

incarcerated based on his sentence on Count 4, the State filed a 

petition to revoke his probation, alleging that he had violated the 

special condition by attempting to contact his children by telephone 

and mail on three occasions at their adoptive parents’ residence. On 

November 17, the petition was amended to add that Carlton had 

violated the first general condition of his probation, which was “not 

to violate the criminal laws of any government unit,” alleging that 

he had committed the offense of aggravated stalking by attempting 
5

to contact his children by mail. 

At the revocation hearing held on September 30, 2015, 

Carlton’s counsel argued that the trial court did not have the 

authority to revoke Carlton’s probation because he was still serving 

the confinement portion of his sentence and the probated period had 

not yet begun. Relying on Postell v. Humphrey, 278 Ga. 651 (604 

SE2d 517) (2004), the trial court determined that it had the 

authority to revoke Carlton’s probation prior to the beginning of the 

probationary period. 

On October 1, 2015, the trial court issued a revocation order, 

finding that Carlton had violated the terms of his probation by 

attempting to contact his children by telephone and mail and by 

committing criminal attempt to commit aggravated stalking.5 The 

court revoked six years of Carlton’s probation based on the violations 

of his probation conditions, ordered that he serve that time 

 5 The habeas court noted in its final order that the trial court used a form 

order which incorrectly states that Carlton waived his right to a hearing on the 

probation revocation matter.
6

consecutive to the six years he was already sentenced to serve in 

prison, and modified his probation terms in an addendum.6 Carlton 

filed an application for discretionary appeal of the revocation order, 

but the Court of Appeals dismissed the application as untimely.

(c) This Habeas Proceeding

On December 28, 2018, Carlton, acting pro se, filed the habeas 

corpus petition now at issue – his third habeas petition – in the

Baldwin County Superior Court, challenging the validity of his 

original convictions and the trial court’s revocation order on seven 

grounds. On June 9, 2019, he amended his petition to add an eighth 

ground. After Carlton was transferred to the Jenkins Correctional 

Facility, the habeas case was transferred to the Jenkins County 

Superior Court (“habeas court”). On January 6, 2020, Carlton 

amended his petition again to raise a ninth ground, and at the 

evidentiary hearing on February 18, 2020, he amended the petition 

 6 Carlton refused to sign the revocation order and the addendum. 
7

to add a tenth ground.7 The ten grounds were as follows: 

1. Due process violation in that the trial court revoked 

Carlton’s probation before he began it and before he 

entered probation before being released from prison. 

2. Equal protection violation because Carlton was said to 

have violated a condition of probation before the 

conditions began.

3. Ineffective assistance of plea counsel in that counsel 

told Carlton that no condition of his probation would 

begin until he was released from the prison sentence, 

reported to his probation office within 48 hours of his 

release, and signed probationary documents, and that 

probation conditions would not interfere with his 

parental rights.

4. Due process violation because Carlton’s probationary 

term was revoked prematurely based on statutory 

provisions that were vague, ambiguous, and overbroad 

provisions in OCGA §§ 17-10-1 (a) (4), 17-10-1 (7) (A), 

and 42-8-34 (g).

5. Cruel and unusual punishment in that one of the 

special conditions of probation is that Carlton is 

banned from every county in Georgia except for Echols 

County, and he has been unable to abide by this 

condition due to Cobb County and the Department of 

Corrections forcing him to be in confinement outside of 

Echols County.

6. Due process challenge to OCGA § 17-10-1 (a), claiming 

that the statute violates Carlton’s right to due process 

because it is ambiguous, overbroad, and 

unconstitutional.

7. Guilty plea not knowingly and intelligently entered 

because the trial court and Carlton’s trial attorneys 

 7 There was no testimony at the evidentiary hearing, and the parties 

tendered only documents into evidence. 
8

specifically stated that the conditions of probation 

would not be active until he was released from prison 

and that his convictions would not contribute to his 

parental rights being terminated.

8. Ineffective assistance of probation revocation counsel.

9. Illegal conviction in that impersonation of a public 

employee is not a crime as contemplated by OCGA § 16-

10-23.

10. Void indictment as to Counts 4, 6, and 7 in that the 

indictment was void on its face because it did not allege 

any of the essential elements contained in the statute. 

(d) The Attempted Aggravated Stalking Case

Meanwhile, in August 2018, Carlton was tried and convicted in 

Cobb County of criminal attempt to commit aggravated stalking, the 

conduct that was in part the basis for his probation revocation. He

appealed, and on June 29, 2020 – after the habeas hearing – the 

Court of Appeals reversed those convictions based on the erroneous 

admission of bad-character evidence. See Carlton v. State, 356 Ga. 

App. 1, 7-10 (846 SE2d 175) (2020).

In the appeal, Carlton also argued, among other things, that 

because the State did not introduce evidence of a no-contact order 

that was “in effect” at the time he sent a postcard and letter to his 

children, there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the 
9

proof at trial. See id. at 4. See also OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) (defining 

aggravated stalking to require proof that the defendant stalked the 

victim in violation of a court order then “in effect”). In the course of 

its discussion of that issue, the Court of Appeals stated that the nocontact probation condition in Carlton’s 2012 criminal sentence 

“pertained only to Counts 6 and 7, which he was not yet serving at 

the time he sent the postcard and letter [to his children’s residence].” 

Carlton, 356 Ga. App. at 5. In a footnote, the court elaborated:

On Count 4, Carlton was sentenced to five years to serve, 

with no probation. And Carlton’s sentence on Counts 6 

and 7 was to be served consecutively to Count 4. Carlton 

was sentenced on Count 4 less than two years before he 

sent the postcard and the letter. The State presented no 

evidence that he had transitioned, for any reason, to 

serving his sentence on Count 6 or 7. Accordingly, there 

is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that 

at the time he sent the postcard and letter Carlton was 

subject to the no-contact provision pertaining to Counts 6 

and 7 of the Criminal Sentence.

Id. at 5 n.4. Based on this analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded

that there was a variance between the indictment and the evidence, 

but then held that the variance was not fatal because Carlton’s

letters had violated the no-contact provision in an earlier juvenile 
10

court order and he had not claimed surprise. See id. at 4-6.

(e) The Habeas Court’s Final Order

On March 2, 2021, the habeas court granted relief to Carlton 

in a 10-page final order. After summarizing the procedural history, 

the grounds Carlton raised, and the factual background, the order

concludes that Carlton’s probation revocation claims were not 

impermissibly successive, despite his two earlier habeas cases in 

Chatham County and Wheeler County. In Carlton’s first habeas 

case, the Chatham County Superior Court had granted him relief 

based on its determination that the statute he had pled guilty to 

violating, OCGA § 16-10-23, was unconstitutionally vague, but this 

Court reversed that decision. See Kennedy v. Carlton, 294 Ga. 576, 

576 (757 SE2d 46) (2014). The Wheeler County Superior Court had 

then dismissed as successive Carlton’s second habeas petition, 

which he had amended to include claims about his probation 

revocation.

The habeas court in this case pointed out that it was not 

possible for Carlton to have raised the claims relating to his 
11

probation revocation in his first, Chatham County habeas case, 

because the revocation had not yet occurred, so the claims could not 

have been successive in his second, Wheeler County habeas case. 

The habeas court noted that the Wheeler County court’s final order 

did not include any factual findings addressing Carlton’s amended 

claims relating to the revocation, and the Wheeler County court

never made a determination of whether those claims were 

procedurally barred or defaulted. 

The habeas court also noted that the Court of Appeals’ 

dismissal of Carlton’s untimely application for discretionary appeal 

of the probation revocation order would generally operate as a final 

judgment that would foreclose consideration of any grounds 

subsequently raised relating to the revocation order (that is, the 

claims would have been procedurally defaulted or barred in his new

habeas petition, despite the Wheeler County court’s making no such 

rulings). However, the habeas court said that “subsequent findings 

in a published opinion by the Court of Appeals of Georgia strongly 

suggest that the trial court may have been without jurisdiction to 
12

revoke Carlton’s probation at the time of the revocation.”8 The 

habeas court concluded that “the claims relating to the [trial] court’s 

revocation of Carlton’s probation are not successive[.]”9

The “Analysis” section of the habeas court’s order then begins 

by explaining that “Georgia’s customary procedural default rule . . . 

does not apply to a claim that a criminal conviction or sentence was 

void on jurisdictional or other grounds,” citing Tolbert v. Toole, 296 

Ga. 357, 361 & n.8 (767 SE2d 24) (2014). The court said that – based 

“on the substance of Carlton’s claims on the whole” – the evidence 

before the court demonstrated that “Carlton’s [revocation] sentence 

is void as a matter of law because the probation revocation 

proceedings were likely void ab initio in that the [trial] court lacked 

jurisdiction.”

 8 We note that the parties had not filed any briefs regarding the Court of 

Appeals’ intervening decision in Carlton’s attempted aggravated stalking case, 

nor did the habeas court ask the parties to do so.

9 Even if erroneous (as it appears it was), the Wheeler County court’s 

ruling that Carlton’s revocation claims were successive would seem to be res 

judicata in this subsequent habeas proceeding. However, while the habeas 

court appears to have had access to the record of the Wheeler County habeas 

case, that record is not in the appellate record here, and the Commissioner 

does not enumerate error regarding the successiveness issue in his appeal.
13

Next, the habeas court noted that “distilled to its essence,” 

Carlton’s argument was that the terms of his negotiated guilty pleas

were broken and that he was subject to punishment that the law 

does not allow. Carlton “aver[red]” that when he entered the 

negotiated plea, his understanding was that the special condition of 

probation prohibiting contact with his children would not be 

effective unless and until the resolution of proceedings in the Cobb 

County Juvenile Court, where there was a pending matter regarding 

the termination of his parental rights. Carlton had consistently 

maintained that he was told by the Division of Family and Children

Services that he would need to demonstrate a meaningful 

relationship with his children in order to avoid termination of his 

parental rights. Carlton’s probation was revoked during the time 

that he was serving his sentence of confinement on Count 4, which 

included no period of probation. He argued that he could not have 

been subject to the special condition of probation during that time. 

He further averred that if he had known that he would be subject to 

the no-contact condition as applied by the court, he would not have 
14

pled guilty.

The habeas court pointed out that although the trial court 

pronounced that the first special condition of probation was “you 

shall have no contact with the children unless and until an order 

from the Cobb County juvenile court allows you to do so,” the trial 

court also told him:

Mr. Carlton, you’re going to be on probation with me for 

approximately nine years. During that period of time, I 

think it goes without saying that you and I just don’t need 

to see each other in this courtroom during that period of 

time, and I expect you to abide by each and every one of 

the terms and conditions of probation that I set forth for 

you just a moment ago.

(Emphasis in habeas court’s order; footnote omitted). The habeas 

court said that this language supported Carlton’s argument “that 

his understanding was that the [trial] court intended him to abide 

by the special conditions of probation only upon the start of the 

probated period.”

Under the heading “New Facts,” the habeas court then 

explained that it had “become aware” of the Court of Appeals opinion 

in Carlton’s attempted aggravated stalking case. Pointing to the 
15

fatal-variance discussion in that opinion, the habeas court 

concluded: 

According to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Carlton had 

not transitioned into serving the probated portions of his 

sentences under Counts 6 and 7, and there was no 

probationary period attached to the maximum sentence of 

confinement under Count 4, which he was serving at the 

time his probation was revoked. In other words, Carlton’s 

probation could not have been revoked based on a 

violation of probationary terms that applied to a 

probationary period [that] had not yet begun.

In a footnote, however, the habeas court recognized that the Court 

of Appeals had not applied an “aggregate sentence” analysis, citing 

Layson v. Montgomery, 251 Ga. 359 (306 SE2d 245) (1983), and 

Parrish v. Ault, 237 Ga. 401 (228 SE2d 808) (1976).

The habeas court next discussed “Out of Time Appeal 

Considerations.” The court said that “[b]ased on the evidence, 

Carlton should be entitled to pursue out-of-time appeal remedies,” 

and the record did not “show that Carlton has availed himself of that 

procedure.” Even though the habeas court recognized that a 

petitioner can seek an out-of-time appeal in a habeas proceeding, the 

court concluded that “any claims that relate back to Carlton’s guilty 
16

plea in 2012[] are not yet ripe for consideration in habeas,” and 

“[j]udicial economy would be better served if Carlton sought that 

relief in the trial court.” Considering “specific claims raised in the 

[habeas] petition,” the court ruled that ground 5 was meritless 

because of the amendment of Carlton’s probation order and grounds 

9 and 10 were procedurally barred by rulings in Carlton’s first 

habeas case.

At the end of this section, the habeas court said that while it 

“ha[d] not specifically enumerated the Grounds addressed, as raised 

in [Carlton’s] Petition, the [c]ourt has considered all of Carlton’s

claims in substance rather than strict construal of each individual 

claim.” (Emphasis in original). The court concluded: 

Based upon the . . . determinations by the Court of 

Appeals of Georgia relating to the very matters before the 

[trial] court at the probation revocation hearing on 

October 1, 2015, this [c]ourt must GRANT habeas corpus 

relief because an alternative result would directly 

contradict determinations made by the Court of Appeals 

of Georgia.

In a footnote, the habeas court stated that “[h]abeas courts are 

bound by determinations made by the Court of Appeals of Georgia, 
17

even if erroneous,” citing Buckner v. Barrow, 297 Ga. 68 (772 SE2d 

703) (2015).

Finally in the “Conclusion” of the order, the habeas court said 

that Carlton had raised a “meritorious due process argument that 

warrants granting Writ of Habeas Corpus,” and remanded Carlton 

to the custody of the trial court where he “may be entitled to pursue 

additional post-conviction remedies.”

On March 11, 2021, the Commissioner filed a motion for 

reconsideration, arguing that the trial court had the authority to 

revoke Carlton’s probation before the probationary period began. Six 

days later, the habeas court summarily denied the motion. The 

Commissioner then filed this appeal.

2. The Commissioner contends that the habeas court erred 

when it granted relief on the ground that the trial court did not have 

the authority to revoke Carlton’s probation when the probationary 

period of his 2012 sentences had not yet begun. We agree.

OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) says, in pertinent part:

The judge imposing the sentence is granted power and 
18

authority to suspend or probate all or any part of the 

entire sentence under such rules and regulations as the 

judge deems proper, . . . including the authority to revoke 

the suspension or probation when the defendant has 

violated any of the rules and regulations prescribed by the 

court, even before the probationary period has begun[.]

In Postell v. Humphrey, 278 Ga. 651 (604 SE2d 517) (2004) – the 

case on which the trial court relied in revoking Carton’s probation –

this Court explained that the General Assembly had amended 

OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) in 2001 to “provide expressly that 

sentencing judges [are] authorized ‘to revoke . . . probation . . . even 

before the probationary period has begun.’” Id. at 652 (quoting the 

statute). See also Layson, 251 Ga. at 360 (upholding “the revocation 

of the probated portion of a sentence based on a separate crime 

committed during the portion of the [split] sentence to be served in 

confinement”); Parrish, 237 Ga. at 401-402 (holding that “a trial 

judge can revoke a probated sentence that is to begin at a future 

date,” and explaining that whether a defendant’s sentences on four 

felony counts – a split sentence of three years to serve in prison and 

two years on probation on the first count, followed by five-year 
19

concurrent probation sentences on the other three counts – were 

“considered one sentence or four sentences is immaterial for 

practical purposes” when “[t]he ten years was imposed by the same 

trial judge at the same time”). Thus, the Commissioner is correct 

that, under OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) and our precedent, the trial 

court was authorized to revoke Carlton’s probation even before the 

probationary period of his sentences began.

The habeas court did not appear to dispute this proposition. 

Instead, the habeas court indicated that it felt bound to grant relief 

on Carlton’s claim that the trial court was unauthorized to revoke 

his probation because the Court of Appeals had said, in the course 

of deciding Carlton’s appeal from his attempted aggravated stalking 

convictions, that Carlton was not yet subject to the no-contact 

probation condition at the time he violated that condition, as he was 

still serving his confinement sentence on Count 4 of his original case 

and had not yet “transitioned” into serving his probationary 

sentences on Counts 6 and 7. Although the habeas court did not cite 

Postell, it recognized that the Court of Appeals’ discussion was 
20

inconsistent with the analysis set forth in Layson and Parrish. 

Nevertheless, the habeas court relied on Buckner for the 

proposition that it was “bound by determinations made by the Court 

of Appeals of Georgia, even if erroneous.” Buckner held that “if an 

issue is raised and resolved on direct appeal from a criminal 

conviction, the habeas court is bound by the appellate ruling and 

cannot reexamine it, even if it appears erroneous[.]” 297 Ga. at 69. 

See also Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 354 (466 SE2d 837) (1996) 

(noting that, under the law of the case doctrine, the habeas court 

was bound by a prior ruling on direct appeal “regardless of whether 

that ruling may be erroneous”). The principle set forth in Buckner

does not apply, however, under the circumstances of this case.

While appealing his convictions for attempted aggravated 

stalking – not the trial court’s separate and earlier revocation of his 

probation, which he was unsuccessful in trying to appeal – Carlton 

argued that there was a fatal variance between his attempted 

aggravated stalking indictment and the proof at trial because the 

State failed to introduce evidence of a no-contact order in effect at 
21

the time he sent the postcard and letter to his children. See Carlton, 

356 Ga. App. at 4. The Court of Appeals did not address, much less 

resolve, the issue of whether the trial court in Carlton’s earlier 

public-employee-impersonation case had authority to revoke his 

probation before he began serving the probationary period of his 

sentences, which is an issue governed by the plain text of OCGA 

§ 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A) and our decisions in Postell, Layson, and 

Parrish. Instead, the Court of Appeals decided the legally distinct 

question of whether Carlton had violated a court order then “‘in 

effect’” as that term is used in the aggravated stalking statute. 

Carlton, 356 Ga. App. at 5 (quoting OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) and citing 

only a Court of Appeals case interpreting that statute). We need not 

and do not decide whether the Court of Appeals’ discussion of 

Carlton’s sentences with respect to the latter statutory question was 

correct, as that question is not presented here and it is clear that the 

court did not issue a ruling on the revocation-authority issue that 

Carlton raised in this habeas case, which means that the law of the 

case doctrine applied in cases like Buckner does not apply here. See 
22

Currid v. DeKalb State Court Probation Dept., 285 Ga. 184, 186 n.5 

(674 SE2d 894) (2009) (explaining that the law of the case doctrine 

applies only to issues expressly ruled on previously, not an “implied” 

ruling on an issue not addressed in the previous decision); Woodrum

v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 360 Ga. App. 126, 129 (860 SE2d 

900) (2021) (same). See also DeHart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 

381, 387 (509 SE2d 913) (1998) (Carley, J., concurring) (explaining 

that “[a]lthough this appeal does involve the same parties as [in an 

earlier decision], it arises in the context of separate litigation 

wherein a different question is presented for resolution,” so the 

earlier decision does not constitute law of the case).

Accordingly, the habeas court was not bound by the Court of 

Appeals’ inapposite ruling and instead should have decided 

Carlton’s revocation-authority claim on its merits. And because 

OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (1) (A), Postell, Layson, and Parrish make it 

clear that such a claim has no merit, we reverse the habeas court’s 

grant of relief on that ground.
23

3. As outlined in Division 1 above, Carlton raised 10 grounds 

in his habeas petition as amended, but the habeas court ruled 

expressly only on ground 1 (granting relief) and grounds 5, 9, and 10

(denying relief). Rather than individually addressing the remaining 

six grounds, the habeas court noted that it had “considered all of 

Carlton’s claims in substance rather than strict construal of each 

individual claim.” (Emphasis in original). The court ruled, however,

that Carlton was entitled to pursue out-of-time appeal remedies in 

the trial court, so his claims related to his 2012 guilty plea 

convictions were not yet ripe for consideration in habeas and

“[j]udicial economy would be better served if Carlton sought that 

relief in the trial court.” 

The habeas court cited no authority, and we see no basis, for 

declining to address claims that properly can be raised in a habeas 

proceeding because such claims might also be raised in the judicially 

created – and recently questioned – out-of-time appeal process in the 

trial court, especially when doing so may allow a habeas petitioner

to circumvent the statute of limitations and other statutory 
24

provisions that apply to habeas actions.10 See Schoicket v. State, ___ 

Ga. ___, ___ (865 SE2d 170, 172-173) (2021); Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 

363, 379-382 (834 SE2d 769) (2019) (Peterson, J., concurring 

specially). We therefore also reverse the habeas court’s judgment to 

the extent the court declined to address Carlton’s claims.

On remand, the habeas court should rule on Carlton’s claims 

related to his 2012 guilty pleas. It is unclear which of Carlton’s other 

claims the habeas court believed were “in substance” the same as 

his ground 1 (or perhaps were mooted by the court’s grant of relief 

on that ground).11 On remand, and consistent with our reversal of 

 10 In this respect, we note that in the habeas court, the Commissioner 

argued that Carlton’s claims related to his 2012 guilty plea convictions (which 

the Commissioner identified as grounds 3, 5, and 7) were untimely under 

OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) (1), which says that “[a]ny [post-conviction habeas] action 

. . . shall be filed . . . within four years in the case of a felony . . . from . . . [t]he 

judgment of conviction becoming final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]” In response, Carlton argued 

that the limitation period did not begin to run until the probation revocation 

order was issued on October 1, 2015, relying on OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) (4), which 

extends the habeas filing deadline to four years after “[t]he date on which the 

facts supporting the claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” The habeas court’s order does not address the 

timeliness of Carlton’s claims, although ground 5 was denied on the merits.

11 The Commissioner asserts that the habeas court granted relief only on 

ground 1, and denied relief on the remaining grounds. Carlton argues that the 

habeas court implicitly granted relief on all grounds except ground 5, which 
25

the court’s grant of relief on ground 1, the court should address any 

remaining grounds as well, making sure to provide the required 

“written findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the 

judgment is based.” OCGA § 9-14-49.

Judgment reversed in part, and case remanded with direction. 

All the Justices concur.

 

the habeas court expressly ruled was meritless, and grounds 9 and 10, which 

the habeas court expressly determined were procedurally barred. But in any 

event, Carlton did not seek review of and does not dispute the habeas court’s 

rulings rejecting grounds 5, 9, and 10, so those portions of the habeas court’s 

order stand.