NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ERIKA JACOBS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

MARICOPA INTEGRATED HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0277

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2018-050917

The Honorable John R. Hannah, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Erika Jacobs, Norman, Oklahoma

Plaintiff/Appellant

Campbell, Yost, Clare & Norell, P.C., Phoenix

By Sigurds M. Krolls, Rachel Anna DePena, Kevin R. Myer

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 2-26-2019
JACOBS v. MIHCS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Erika Jacobs appeals the superior court’s dismissal of her

complaint against Maricopa Integrated Health Care System (“MIHCS”) for 

defamation. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On June 11, 2017, Jacobs was admitted to MIHCS due to 

“pains in the lower extremities.” She stayed at the hospital overnight but 

left the next day—against medical advice—because she was “dissatisfied 

with their service.” Upon reviewing the discharge summary in her medical 

records, Jacobs noticed two comments made by Dr. Koruon Daldalyan that 

she believed to be untruthful. One comment stated Jacobs exhibited “odd 

behavior” during her stay; the other stated Jacobs was a “poor historian” of 

her medical history. Jacobs believed these statements were a form of

retaliation because she expressed her dissatisfaction with the staff before 

leaving MIHCS. She sought assistance from the medical administration to 

get the statements removed from her record, and a staff member directed 

Jacobs to file a complaint with the hospital’s medical records department.

¶3 Jacobs filed her complaint on a pre-printed form entitled 

“Request To Amend Protected Health Information.” The staff member told 

Jacobs she would receive a response in thirty days. When Jacobs did not 

hear back after thirty days, she sent another complaint via certified mail in 

August 2017.1

¶4 MIHCS responded to the second complaint letter in 

December 2017 notifying Jacobs that it would not remove Dr. Daldalyan’s 

statements. MIHCS further instructed Jacobs that, if she was still 

dissatisfied with the result of her complaint, she could “contact the Privacy 

Officer of Maricopa Integrated Health System regarding [her] complaint[]

 

1 This letter is not part of the record on appeal.
JACOBS v. MIHCS

Decision of the Court

3

. . . [or] file a complaint with The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services within 180 days of the date of [her] request.” After 

receiving MIHCS’ response, Jacobs filed a claim with the U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and she initiated this lawsuit in 

January 2018.

¶5 Jacobs alleged in the complaint that Dr. Daldalyan engaged in 

defamatory conduct and violated the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) when he included the “untruthful 

information” in her medical records. She also alleged the comments 

damaged her reputation because it created an inference to her subsequent

treating physicians that she is “untruthful” and suffers from “mental 

issue[s],” and demanded judgment in the amount of $5,000. MIHCS filed a 

motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6), arguing that, as a non-jural public entity, 

MIHCS could neither sue nor be sued in its own name, and that Jacobs’

claims were barred by the notice of claims statute, Arizona Revised Statutes 

(“A.R.S.”) section 12-821.01(A). The superior court granted the motion to 

dismiss, and Jacobs timely appealed.2

¶6 We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

ANALYSIS3

¶7 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). Coleman 

v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 (2012). When adjudicating a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, trial courts consider only the well-pled factual 

allegations contained in the pleadings. Id. at 356, ¶ 9. Dismissal under the 

rule is appropriate if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff would not be entitled 

to relief under any interpretation of the facts. Id. at ¶ 8.

¶8 Section 12-821.01(A) requires a plaintiff who wishes to bring 

an action against a public entity to file a notice of claim with the entity 

 

2 The superior court did not rule on the non-jural entity status defense 

raised by MIHCS, and appellee does not raise the issue on appeal; 

accordingly, we do not address it further. See ARCAP 13(b)(2).

3 In addition to the arguments set forth herein, Jacobs asserts that the 

superior court violated her Seventh Amendment rights. She provides no 

argument for her statement, and we therefore do not address it on appeal. 

See ARCAP 13(a)(6)-(7).
JACOBS v. MIHCS

Decision of the Court

4

“within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues.” Strict 

compliance with § 12-821.01(A) is generally required. See Falcon ex rel. 

Sandoval v. Maricopa Cty., 213 Ariz. 525, 527, ¶ 10 (2006) (“Actual notice and 

substantial compliance do not excuse failure to comply with the statutory 

requirements.”).

I. Jacobs’ 2017 Letters Did Not Comply with the Notice of Claim 

Requirement

¶9 Jacobs argues that both the request to amend her medical 

information and the letter sent in August 2017 satisfy the notice of claim 

requirement. MIHCS argues both documents are insufficient to satisfy the 

statutory requirement because she did not include language about a legal 

claim against MIHCS or a request to settle for a certain sum of money.

¶10 Section 12-821.01(A) requires a person pursuing a claim 

against a public entity to submit a notice of claim that contains facts 

sufficient to permit the public entity to understand the basis upon which 

liability is claimed and a specific amount for which the claim can be settled.

Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 295, ¶ 6 (2007).

In Deer Valley, our Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff did not file a valid 

notice of claim because she “fail[ed] to state a specific amount that she 

would accept to settle her claims.” Id. at 297, 299, ¶¶ 11, 23. The court 

explained, “the Legislature intended the 1994 [statutory] changes to 

establish specific requirements that must be met for a claimant to file a valid 

claim,” and therefore, “[c]laims that do not comply with A.R.S. § 12-

821.01.A are statutorily barred.” Id. at 295, 299, ¶¶ 6, 21.

¶11 Here, we agree with MIHCS that Jacobs failed to comply with 

the requirements of § 12-821.01(A). Her June 12, 2017 record-modification 

request did not include any language of a potential legal claim or specify a 

settlement amount.4 Likewise, her alleged letter sent August 2017 is 

 

4 Since the superior court complaint ultimately alleged monetary 

damages, Jacobs was required to quantify her damages claim and identify 

an amount she would accept to settle the dispute. Compare Yahweh v. City 

of Phoenix, 243 Ariz. 21, 23, ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (holding strict compliance with 

§ 12-821.01(A) applies when a plaintiff seeks monetary damages against a 

public entity), with State v. Mabery Ranch, Co., L.L.C., 216 Ariz. 233, 245, 

¶¶ 52-53 (App. 2007) (holding § 12-821.01(A) does not apply when “a 

private party seeks an injunction restraining conduct by a public entity”), 

and Martineau v. Maricopa Cty., 207 Ariz. 332, 337, ¶ 25 (App. 2004) (holding 
JACOBS v. MIHCS

Decision of the Court

5

insufficient to satisfy § 12-821.01(A). Although Jacobs characterized the 

letter as a “notice of claim” in her complaint and opening brief, the letter is 

not in the record and Jacobs offers no details as to the language of the 

letter—such as the amount of the settlement offer included in the letter or 

the specific facts she included that put MIHCS on notice of her claim. In 

short, even construing the facts in a light most favorable to her legal theory, 

Jacobs has failed to show that she complied with the statutory requirements 

of § 12-821.01(A) and that she is entitled to relief as a matter of law.

II. Jacobs Did Not State a Claim for Relief Under Federal Law

¶12 Jacobs argues in the alternative that a notice of claim was not

needed because her claim arises out of a federal law. Jacobs cites to the 

Arizona Attorney General’s handbook in support of her argument. The 

handbook states, “[a] notice of claim is not required for claims arising under 

federal law, whether suit is to be filed in federal or state court.” Ariz.

Attorney Gen. Agency Handbook, Chapter 13, § 13.5.1.6 (Rev. 2018).

MIHCS asserts Jacobs’ claim does not arise out of federal law, and she 

erroneously relies on laws inapplicable to “privacy-based torts” to avoid 

the notice of claim requirement.

¶13 A plaintiff’s claim “arises under federal law” if the federal law 

itself creates a cause of action or if a substantial question of federal law is a 

necessary element of the cause of action. Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. 

Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 862 F.Supp. 995, 999 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)

(internal citation omitted). If a plaintiff wants to assert a cause of action

under federal law, it must be discernible on the face of the complaint. 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“[T]he plaintiff [is] the 

master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive 

reliance on state law.”). Furthermore, a substantial question of federal law

is created only if the plaintiff’s complaint “necessarily draws into question 

the interpretation or application of [a] federal law.” Niagra Mohawk Power 

Corp., 862 F.Supp. at 999 (internal quotation omitted).

¶14 On appeal, Jacobs asserts her claim arose from Dr. 

Daldalyan’s violation of HIPAA, the federal law that forbids the 

documentation of false information on a patient’s medical records. Yet, in 

her complaint, Jacobs only asserted a state law defamation claim—and

simply alluded to a HIPAA violation. More importantly, HIPAA does not 

 

§ 12-821.01(A) does not apply when the complaint seeks a declaratory 

judgment to invalidate a public entity’s policy).
JACOBS v. MIHCS

Decision of the Court

6

create a private right of action for an individual plaintiff, so Jacobs could 

not have used that law as a basis for bringing any claim in state or federal 

court.

5 Webb v. Smart Document Sol., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Indeed, Jacobs states on appeal that she filed a claim with HHS, but she

does not clarify whether HHS decided to pursue the claim on her behalf.

Because Jacobs neither asserted a claim under HIPPA nor could have done 

so, her assertion that she did not have to comply with § 12-821.01(A) fails

as a matter of law.

III. Costs on Appeal

¶15 MIHCS requests this court award “its taxable costs.”

However, MIHCS does not specify whether it seeks costs on appeal or costs 

for defending the claim in its entirety.

¶16 Although A.R.S. § 12-341 mandates a trial court award costs 

to the “successful party” in a civil action, the trial court has great discretion 

in determining the “successful party.” Democratic Party of Pima Cty., v. Ford, 

228 Ariz. 545, 549, ¶ 15 (App. 2012). Here, the superior court dismissed 

Jacobs’ complaint with prejudice but did not award MIHCS its costs or 

determine it as the “successful party.” Therefore, we will not award 

MIHCS its costs for defending the action in superior court. Nonetheless, as 

the prevailing party in this appeal, MIHCS is entitled to recover its 

appellate costs, and we award those costs upon its compliance with Arizona 

Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. Henry v. Cook, 189 Ariz. 42, 43-44 

(App. 1996).

CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, the superior court’s judgment is 

affirmed.

 

5 HIPAA is enforced by HHS. Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th 

Cir. 2006). A person who feels their rights have been violated under HIPAA 

may file a claim with HHS, and the department then has the option to 

pursue legal recourse on the victim’s behalf. Id.