[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12470

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DAMON DELVION COOPER, 

a.k.a. Mike, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00014-HES-MCR-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-12470

Before GRANT, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Damon Cooper, a federal prisoner who is currently serving 

a 72-month term of imprisonment, filed a pro se motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), claiming 

that he had underlying health conditions that increased his risk of 

severe illness or death from COVID-19. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) 

permits a district court to reduce a term of imprisonment upon a 

defendant’s motion “after the defendant has fully exhausted all 

administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to 

bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days 

from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s 

facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The 

district court denied Cooper’s motion without prejudice after 

concluding that Cooper had failed to exhaust his administrative 

remedies as § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires. Cooper unsuccessfully 

moved for reconsideration, and then appealed.

While his appeal was pending, Cooper filed a second motion 

for reconsideration. He stated that he submitted a request to his 

warden after the district court denied his initial motion for 

compassionate release and that more than 30 days passed before he 

received a response rejecting his request. The district court 

construed his second motion for reconsideration as a renewed 

motion for compassionate release. The court concluded that 

Cooper had satisfied the exhaustion requirement by submitting a 

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20-12470 Opinion of the Court 3

request to the warden and waiting at least 30 days before filing the 

motion. It then denied the motion on the merits, concluding that 

he did not show “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a 

sentence reduction and that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) did not support a reduction. See id.

Cooper’s appeal challenges the district court’s denial of his 

initial motion for compassionate release and his first motion for 

reconsideration, not its denial of his renewed motion for 

compassionate release on the merits. We are obligated to assess 

whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal, which is a question 

of law that we review de novo. See Hall v. Sec’y, Alabama, 902 

F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018); United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 

1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). A case becomes moot “when it no 

longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court 

can give meaningful relief.” Hall, 902 F.3d at 1297 (quotation 

omitted). The relief Cooper seeks in his appeal is a remand for the 

district court to rule on the merits of his motion for compassionate 

release. Because he has already received a ruling on the 

merits—the relief he now seeks—the appeal is moot.

Cooper contends that the appeal is not moot because the 

district court’s erroneous denial of his motion could aid him in a 

later request for early termination of supervised release, which 

creates “a concrete interest, however small,” in the outcome of the 

appeal. Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quotation 

omitted). But any decision this Court made as to whether Cooper 

initially satisfied the exhaustion requirement would have no effect 

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-12470

on the district court’s denial of his renewed motion on the merits, 

which Cooper does not challenge here.

Cooper also argues that an exception to the mootness 

doctrine applies because the case is capable of repetition, yet 

evading review. See Hall, 902 F.3d at 1297. We disagree. The issue 

he highlights—what satisfies the requirement under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 

that 30 days must lapse from the time the warden receives a request 

to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf—is not “in its duration 

too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration.” 

Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) 

(quotation omitted). That question will be reviewable whenever a 

district court, without ruling on the merits, denies a motion for 

compassionate release on the ground that the motion was filed 

before the required lapse of time had occurred. The appeal 

therefore does not fall within this narrow exception. See id.

The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.1

1An earlier panel of this Court denied the government’s motion to dismiss the 

appeal as moot, but that ruling is not binding here. See 11th Cir. R. 27-1(g).

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