1996 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-22-1996

US Underwriters Ins v. Liberty Mutl Ins Co

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 95-1558

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1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

No. 95-1558 

 

U.S. UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE CO.; 

MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY 

v. 

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; 

PERLOFF BROTHERS, INC. a/k/a 

PERLOFF, INC. 

 Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 

 and their insured, Perloff 

 Brothers, Inc., 

 Appellants. 

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 93-cv-05015) 

 

Argued: February 5, 1996 

 

 Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, ROTH and SAROKIN, 

Circuit Judges 

(Opinion Filed March 22, l996) 

 

Bernard E. Jude Quinn, Esq. (Argued) 

German, Gallagher & Murtagh 

200 South Broad Street 

5th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19102 

 Attorney for Appellee U. S. Underwriters Ins. 
2 

Christopher P. Seerveld, Esq. (Argued) 

Post & Schell 

1800 JFK Boulevard 

19th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorney for Appellee Maryland Casualty 

Andrew B. Klaber, Esq. (Argued) 

Weber, Goldstein, Greenberg & Gallagher 

1811 Chestnut Street 

6th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorney for Appellants 

 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 In this diversity action, we must determine whether the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would consider certain conduct as 

falling within the definition of "use or maintenance of a motor 

vehicle," as defined by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial 

Responsibility Law's ban on subrogation for certain types of 

insurance benefits, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1720. We predict that the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would conclude that a driver who 

slips on grease from a nearby kitchen when he steps on the ground 

while alighting from a car is not engaged in use or maintenance 

of a motor vehicle. We will therefore reverse the decision of 

the district court. 

I. 
3 

 The district court disposed of this case on motion for 

summary judgment. We have jurisdiction over the appeal from the 

district court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Subject matter jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We 

exercise plenary review over the district court's order, both as 

an appeal from grant of summary judgment, Petruzzi's IGA 

Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d 

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993), 

and because the dispute requires only an interpretation of law, 

Matter of Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1280 (3d Cir. 1991). 

II. 

 The parties agree on the relevant facts. On November 

27, 1987, Robert Hilpl parked his car in the parking lot of the 

St. Johns Neumann Nursing Home. Hilpl was employed as a bid 

manager for Perloff Brothers, Inc., and had arrived at the 

nursing home to meet with representatives of Woods Management 

Services, a company that operated the nursing home's kitchen. 

Woods Management was a prospective customer of Perloff Brothers, 

and Hilpl intended to present the Woods representatives with 

calendars, planning guides, and other business-related paperwork. 

 After parking his car and turning off the engine, Hilpl 

began to exit the vehicle. He placed his left foot on the ground 

and started to stand up, pushing off with his right foot from 

inside the vehicle. In the process, Hilpl slipped on a pool of 

grease or similar substance that had coated a section of the 

parking lot. He fell, striking his back on the sill of the car 
4 

door. At oral argument, the parties appeared to concede that the 

grease emanated from the nursing home's kitchen. 

 Hilpl's employer, Perloff Brothers, accepted 

responsibility for the injury, treating it as a work-related 

incident covered by the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 

77 P.S. §§ 1-1602. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company ("Liberty 

Mutual"), the workers' compensation carrier for Perloff, provided 

Hilpl with lost wage benefits and medical benefits. As of June 

30, 1993, benefits totaled $285,875.82. At the time of oral 

argument, benefits exceeded $400,000. 

 In addition to receiving benefits, Hilpl brought a 

third party action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, 

seeking damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident. 

Hilpl sued Woods Management, Neumann Nursing Home, and the 

nursing home's parent organization, the Archdiocese of 

Philadelphia. Pursuant to 77 P.S. § 319, Liberty Mutual acquired 

a subrogation lien on the proceeds of this action by operation of 

law. 

 On June 30, 1993, the Common Pleas action was settled 

for $800,000. As part of the settlement, U.S. Underwriters 

Insurance Co., the insurer of the nursing home, and Maryland 

Casualty Co., the insurer of Woods Management, (hereinafter, 

collectively, "the Tort Liability Insurers") agreed to assume 

responsibility for all amounts that had accrued on Liberty 

Mutual's subrogation lien on or before the settlement date. 

 On October 1, 1993, the Tort Liability Insurers filed a 

declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District Court for the 
5 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking to invalidate the 

subrogation lien pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1720. Section 1720 

bars a compensation insurer's right of subrogation to recover 

workers' compensation benefits from an insured's third-party tort 

recovery if the insured's injuries arose from the maintenance or 

use of a motor vehicle. The parties filed cross motions for 

summary judgment, and on June 8, 1995, the district court entered 

judgment for plaintiffs. Liberty Mutual appealed. 

III. 

 This controversy is easily located within the landscape 

of Pennsylvania law. It takes place at the intersection of the 

Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 P.C.S.A. §§ 1-1602, 

and the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 1701-1798. Hilpl and his injury are clearly subject to the 

provisions of Workers' Compensation Act. Section 319 of that act 

grants a workers' compensation insurer subrogation rights to an 

employee's recovery from a third party tortfeasor. Section 1720 

of the Financial Responsibility Law limits that right, barring 

subrogation where an employee's injury arose out of the 

maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.1

 

1

 This section provides: 

§ 1720. Subrogation

 In actions arising out of the 

maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there 

shall be no right of subrogation or 

reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery 

with respect to workers' compensation 

benefits . . .. 

Id.; Walters v. Kamppi, 545 A.2d 975 (Pa. Commw. 1988) (applying 

plain meaning of statute to bar subrogation), appeal denied, 544 
6 

 The current dispute turns on the meaning of 

"maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" as defined by § 1720. The 

Tort Liability Insurers contend, and the district court agreed, 

that Hilpl's actions in exiting his car fell within the scope of 

maintenance or use. Liberty Mutual argues otherwise, claiming 

that Hilpl's injury did not manifest the degree of causal 

connection to the vehicle required by the Pennsylvania courts. 

 The answer to this question is obviously controlled by 

state law. We therefore begin with the relevant statute. 

Unfortunately, none of the terms in the phrase "arising out of 

the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle" are among those 

defined in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1702, the list of statutory definitions 

for the Financial Responsibility Law. The terms are also absent 

from the general definition section for the Vehicle Code. 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 102. There is therefore no controlling statutory 

provision for this case.2

 

A.2d 512 (Pa. 1989). The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently 

repealed § 1720's prohibition with respect to worker's 

compensation benefits, leaving in place its bar on subrogation 

rights for other types of compensation. Act of July 2, 1993, § 

25(b), 1993 Pa. Laws 190-44. Pennsylvania courts have 

interpreted this amendment as prospective only. Fulmer v. 

Pennsylvania State Police, 647 A.2d 616 (Pa. Commw. 1994); Byard 

F. Brogan, Inc. v. W.C.A.B., 637 A.2d 689 (Pa. Commw. 1994); see 

also Carrick v. Zurich-American Ins. Group, 14 F.3d 907 (3d Cir. 

1994) (predicting prospective application). 

2

 The Tort Liability Insurers correctly point out that 

Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. 

§1921(c)(5), advises that former law on the subject may be 

considered in ascertaining the legislature's intent when the 

words of a statute are not explicit. For our purposes, however, 

we must first look to controlling state authority, and prior 

enactments are only persuasive, not binding. 
7 

 Absent controlling statutory authority, we turn to the 

decisions of the highest state tribunal to answer a question of 

state law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has not 

ruled on the terms of this provision. 

 When a state's highest court has not spoken on a 

subject, we must attempt to predict how that tribunal would rule. 

Kowalsky v. Long Beach Township, 72 F.3d 385, 387 (3d Cir. 1995). 

In making such determinations, we give due deference to the 

decisions of lower Pennsylvania courts. Winterburg v. Transp. 

Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 1995). The rulings of 

intermediate appellate courts must be accorded significant weight 

and should not be disregarded absent a persuasive indication that 

the highest state court would rule otherwise. City of 

Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 123 (3d 

Cir. 1993); Rolick v. Collins Pine Co., 925 F.2d 661, 664 (3d 

Cir. 1991). In the current case, existing decisions of 

Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court provide ample 

guidance for us to resolve this dispute. 

 We begin with Lucas-Raso v. American Mfrs. Ins. Co., 

657 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 668 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 

1995), a recent case in which the meaning of "maintenance and 

use" under the Financial Responsibility Law was squarely before 

the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The court surveyed the relevant 

Pennsylvania case law, placing particular reliance on the 

adoption in Alvarino v. Allstate Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 18, 20 (Pa. 

Super. 1988), of an interpretation of "arising out of ownership, 

maintenance or use" announced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
8 

in Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Casualty 

Co., 170 A.2d 571 (Pa. 1961). In Manufacturers, the Supreme 

Court had held: "Arising out of 'means causally connected with, 

not proximately caused by.' 'But for' causation, i.e., a cause 

and result relationship is enough to satisfy this [requirement]." 

Id. at 573. Alvarino applied this definition to § 1720. 

 The Lucas-Raso court then stressed the importance of 

the causation element. First, the causation inquiry serves the 

legislature's purpose in passing motor vehicle insurance 

legislation, namely "to compensate losses directly resulting from 

motoring accidents and to leave injuries tangential to driving to 

other systems of compensation. Id. at 3 (citing Prudential 

Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 493 A.2d 731 (Pa. 

Super. 1985)). Even more importantly, causation ensures that 

injuries suffered by a victim arise from the use of the motor 

vehicle itself. Id. In other words, "[t]here must be a link 

between the injury and the motor vehicle before compensation will 

be awarded." Id. at 4. 

 The court next applied these principles to the facts of 

the case. In Lucas-Raso, the plaintiff had been injured when 

walking around the back of her car to reach the driver's side. 

The plaintiff alleged that despite her physical position outside 

the vehicle, she was nevertheless an occupant of the car. The 

court considered this claim, noting that "it is not disputed that 

'maintenance and use' is presumed if occupancy can be shown." Id. 

The Superior Court ultimately ruled that she was not an occupant. 

More importantly for the current case, the court then made clear 
9 

that occupancy alone would not satisfy § 1720's requirement of 

maintenance and use. As the court explained, "Even if we agreed 

that . . . [the victim] was an occupant, she must still prove the 

existence of a causal connection between the injuries sustained 

and the maintenance and use of the motor vehicle." 657 A.2d at 

4. 

 We believe that Lucas-Raso accurately captures the 

state of Pennsylvania law on maintenance and use of a motor 

vehicle. If nothing else, Lucas-Raso and the cases it surveys 

make clear that the crucial point for triggering § 1720's 

maintenance and use prohibition is a causal connection between 

vehicle and injury. We therefore turn to that element. 

 In assessing whether the necessary causal nexus exists, 

we could--as the parties wish--struggle with the legal equivalent 

of angels and pinheads. For example, the vehicle obviously was, 

in a sense, a cause of the accident: Hilpl was alighting from 

the car when he fell; the car was a part of the stream of events 

that lead to his injury. Viewing causation in these terms, 

however, makes it essentially all-encompassing: If not for the 

unfortunate coincidence of a multitude of causes, Hilpl, his car, 

and a layer of grease might not have combined so painfully on 

that late November day. This approach to causation would bring 

§1720 into play whenever an automobile was even tangentially 

related to an accident, since absent the car, the accident 

arguably might not have occurred. This in turn would contravene 

the Pennsylvania Superior Court's repeated cautions that the 

Financial Responsibility Law was not intended to be a general 
10 

liability statute, but rather a system of compensation for 

"losses directly resulting from motoring accidents." 657 A.2d at 

3. Nevertheless, so the counterargument goes, here the car was

involved. 

 Fortunately, we can avoid this debate. It is a matter 

of hornbook tort law that every incidental factor that arguably 

contributes to an accident is not a "but for" cause in the legal 

sense. See Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, 43 A. 420 (Pa. 

1899). Our survey of Pennsylvania cases demonstrates that the 

Commonwealth's understanding of "use of a motor vehicle" simply 

will not encompass the causal nexus at issue here. See Smith v. 

United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 572 A.2d 785, 787 (Pa. Super. 1990) 

(rejecting claim that injury from hay thrown from hayride arose 

from maintenance or use of a motor vehicle), appeal dismissed, 

601 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1991); Roach v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 

550 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Super. 1988) (rejecting claim that bus 

passenger injured in fight between two other passengers arose out 

of maintenance or use of motor vehicle); Alvarino v. Allstate 

Ins. Co., 537 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding that injury to 

child bitten by dog while passenger in car did not arise from use 

of motor vehicle); Camacho v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 460 A.2d 353 

(Pa. Super. 1983) (holding that injury to driver from explosive 

thrown into his car by passenger in passing automobile did not 

arise out of maintenance or use of vehicle), aff'd, 473 A.2d 1017 

(Pa. 1984); Schweitzer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 452 A.2d 735 

(Pa. Super. 1982) (holding that injuries to woman, who was pushed 

into her automobile and beaten inside automobile by operator of 
11 

motorcycle, did not arise out of maintenance and use of motor 

vehicle); Erie Ins. Exchange v. Eisenhuth, 451 A.2d 1024 (Pa. 

Super. 1982) (rejecting claim that injuries to automobile 

passenger shot by police officer in pursuing vehicle arose out of 

maintenance or use of automobile); see also Pecorara v. Erie Ins. 

Exchange, 596 A.2d 237 (1991) (rejecting as absurd a literal 

interpretation of "used by any person . . . employed . . . in the 

automobile business" because such interpretation would prohibit 

"coverage for an accident . . . if [the owner] had lent his dump 

truck to a friend to haul lumber to a campsite, if that friend 

also happened to be an employee of an automobile business"); 

Ferry v. Protective Indem. Co., 38 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. 1944) 

(refusing coverage for injury caused to pedestrian while truck 

driver was loading truck); cf. Walters v. Kamppi, 545 A.2d 975 

(Pa. Commw. 1988) (finding requirements of § 1720 met where truck 

driver was injured in automobile accident caused by slippery 

substance on highway from allegedly negligent road maintenance), 

appeal denied, 554 A.2d 513 (Pa. 1989). We also note that the 

words "occupying, entering into, or alighting from a motor 

vehicle," which appeared in the definition of "use or 

maintenance" under the old Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle 

Insurance Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.106 (repealed), were not included 

when the legislature replaced the No-Fault Act with the Financial 

Responsibility Law. We believe that this action shows a 

legislative intent consistent with the Pennsylvania Superior 

Court's understanding. Hilpl's activity does not fall within the 
12 

meaning of § 1720, as intended by the legislature and interpreted 

by the courts. 

 In concluding that there was no causal connection 

between Hilpl's alighting and his subsequent accident, we place 

particular reliance on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's 

discussion in Ohio Casualty Group of Ins. Cos. v. Bakaric, 513 

A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. 1986), appeal denied, 520 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 

1987). In Bakaric, a husband injured his wife by shooting her in 

the face with a handgun. There was evidence that the discharge 

occurred as the husband forced his wife into the driver's seat of 

their automobile and then pushed her across the seat to the 

passenger's side. Id. at 463 n.1. The court refused to 

interpret the incident as resulting from the use of a motor 

vehicle "since it is not clear in this instance that entering or 

loading the vehicle caused the injuries." Id. at 465. The court 

then explained that: 

A lay person's consideration of this factual 

situation . . . would probably produce a 

conclusion that any damages awarded [the 

couple] would not result from the use of an 

automobile by them, but from the wanton use 

of a gun. We believe that the proper legal 

conclusion should be the same. 

Id. at 466 (quoting slip op. of trial court). 

 The sentiments expressed in Bakaric convey our view of 

the present case. Pennsylvania law makes clear that "maintenance 

or use of a motor vehicle" requires causation. The court must 

determine the "instrumentality used to cause the injury." Spisak 

v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 478 A.2d 891, 893 (Pa. Super. 1984). 

A layman would understand that the instrumentality used to cause 
13 

the injury in the case at bar was the substance on the surface of 

the parking lot. The cause of Hilpl's injury was the fact that 

he slipped on grease, and all the clever arguments of skilled 

legal advocates cannot alter this central event. It was "mere 

fortuity" that Hilpl was still partially in his car when he 

slipped. Pecorara, 596 A.2d at 240. Causation, however, 

requires more than "mere happenstance." Roach, 550 A.2d at 1349. 

IV. 

 We therefore conclude that the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania would hold that an individual who slips on grease 

from a nearby kitchen when he steps on the ground while alighting 

from his automobile has not been injured as a result of 

maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Consequently, § 1720 of 

the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law will 

not apply, and Liberty Mutual retains its subrogation lien. We 

will reverse the decision of the district court. 
2 

U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. 

No. 95-1558 

SLOVITER, Chief Judge, Dissenting. 

The issue is whether the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which had a long 

of protecting the recovery of damages for injuries incurred by the drivers and occu

of automobiles, would have permitted the workers' compensation carrier in this case 

subrogated to the recovery received by the driver. At the time of the accident in 

question, the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 P

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720, explicitly barred a workers' compensation carrier from 

subrogation for benefits paid if the injuries arose "out of the maintenance or use 

motor vehicle." See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720 (1984). The driver in this cas

Robert Hilpl, was injured while alighting from the vehicle when he slipped and inju

himself by landing on the vehicle. I believe that under these facts the Supreme Co

Pennsylvania would have held that Hilpl was engaged in the "use" of that vehicle. 

 The MVFRL replaced the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 

Stat. Ann. § 1009.101-1009.701 (repealed effective Oct. 1, 1984), which had defined 

"maintenance or use of a vehicle" as "maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a ve

including, incident to its maintenance or use as a vehicle, occupying, entering int

alighting from it." (Emphasis added). The MVFRL continues to use the phrase "maint

or use" but does not define it. Thus, the strongest argument for the majority's po

is that there is no longer language explicitly covering alighting from a vehicle in 

new law's reference to the "maintenance or use" of the vehicle. 

However, there is no legislative history to indicate that by enacting the 

the Pennsylvania legislature intended to exclude accidents occurring when a person 
3 

vehicle. Moreover, Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann

1921(c)(5), provides that it is appropriate to consider former law where legislativ

intent is unclear. Significantly, Pennsylvania intermediate courts have looked to 

statutes and case law interpreting these statutes to determine whether an injury "a

out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." See, e.g., Alvarino v. Allstate 

Co., 537 A.2d 18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (analyzing prior statute and case law to det

that dog bite did not arise out of use of motor vehicle); Roach v. Port Authority o

Allegheny County, 550 A.2d 1346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (analyzing prior statute and 

law to determine that injury resulting from fight on bus did not arise out of use o

vehicle). 

 In a recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case, the court reaffirmed that 

"maintenance or use" of a vehicle is presumed if the injured party is an "occupant" 

vehicle at the time of the accident. Lucas-Raso v. American Manufacturers Ins. Co.

A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). I do not understand the majority to dispute that 

was an "occupant" of his car at the time of the accident. See Tyler v. Insurance C

N. Am., 457 A.2d 95, 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (person alighting from vehicle still 

occupant); Frain v. Keystone Ins. Co., 640 A.2d 1352, 1357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (e

vehicle is transaction essential to its use). It follows that Hilpl was "using" hi

vehicle when he was injured. 

 In Lucas-Raso, upon which the majority relies, the court found no "use" b

case is distinguishable. When the plaintiff fell in a parking lot it was not while 

was alighting but while she was walking around her car with the intent of entering 

She did not come into any contact with the vehicle in the course of her fall, and i

indeed stretch "maintenance or use" language to encompass "intended use." In contr

this case Hilpl had never completely disengaged from his use of the car. 

Hilpl described his position at the time of the accident in the following 

picturesque manner: 
4 

Q. Where was your weight? Was your weight on your feet at that poi

you rose from the seat? 

A. No. My weight was still on -- my butt was still, like, in the c

my feet went out from under me. You know, if you could only picture 

know, you're getting out of the car and getting out of it front ways

you have all of this and you're inching out and your feet go out fro

underneath of you, like that (Witness indicating), and then you come 

and boom. 

Q. So when your back hit the rocker panel -- what you mean by the r

panel, I'll call the -- 

A. Where the door closes. 

Q. The threshold of the door? 

A. Yes. 

Q. The bottom part that's parallel to the ground? 

A. No, the top part. 

Q. Well -- 

A. Where the door closes. Where that silver thing is. 

Q. Okay. Where the floor ends and the door part begins. 

A. Yes. 

Q. Okay. Now, when you came down, did you come down on to that roc

panel, that silver part you just mentioned? 

A. Yes. That's solid iron. That's only a silver plate over that.

Q. And that silver plate is still within the car; correct? 

A. Oh, yes. 

Q. And, so, your back hit that portion still within the car? 

A. Yes. 

Q. After your back hit that portion, what did your body do? 

A. I slid down on the ground. 

App. at 194. 
5 

 The majority appears to base its decision that Hilpl was not "using" his 

when he was in the process of alighting from it and injured himself on the car's ro

panel on the fact that the car didn't cause the injury. While it may be true that 

ultimate cause of Hilpl's injury was the grease left on the parking lot which he ca

contact with, there seems to be no dispute that his injuries resulted from his phys

contact with a portion of the car as he was exiting from it. 

The majority concedes that under Pennsylvania law the causal connection r

is not proximate cause; "but for" causation is sufficient. See Alvarino, 537 A.2d 

21 ("but for" causation is sufficient as long as there is connection greater than m

happenstance between injuries sustained and insured vehicle). That "but for" causa

evident in this case. But for the manner in which Mr. Hilpl exited his car, and bu

the fact that he landed on the rocker panel of his car, this accident would not hav

happened. Thus, Mr. Hilpl's accident and injuries were directly related to his use 

car. It is not helpful to speculate whether a different accident might have happen

he slipped on a slippery substance elsewhere in the parking lot. Thus, I belie

Pennsylvania courts would hold that Hilpl was vehicle oriented, because he was stil

partially in the car, the keys remained in the ignition and he was "inching out." 

 I would therefore affirm the decision of the district court.