United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-30483

____________

Tellin Fontenot, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 

Defendant—Appellee.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:20-CV-8

______________________________

Before Elrod, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff Fontenot worked in admissions for a satellite branch of 

Louisiana State University. After being passed over for several promotions 

and being transferred to another department, Fontenot filed a discrimination 

charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She then sued 

the University under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34, and a state-law analogue, the Louisiana Age 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 7, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Discrimination in Employment Act (LADEA), La. Stat. Ann. § 23:311 

(1999). Because all of Fontenot’s claims are either abandoned or prematurely 

brought, we AFFIRM the district court’s granting of summary judgment for 

LSU. 

I

Fontenot began working in the Division of Admissions and Recruiting 

at LSU when she was 49 years old. She applied for several promotions but 

did not receive them. About a year into her employment, Fontenot’s

recruiting role was converted to half-time. This caused her to spend the 

other half of her time at the University Registrar’s Office. One year later, her 

admissions position was eliminated entirely, due to changing University 

recruitment strategies. Fontenot was transferred to a position with identical 

title, pay, and benefits in the Division of Student Engagement. 

Dissatisfied with this, Fontenot filed a charge of discrimination with 

the EEOC and resigned several months later. In her EEOC charge, 

Fontenot checked the boxes for age and race discrimination. She did not 

check the boxes for retaliation or any other kind of unlawful treatment. The 

EEOC did not make a determination as to whether any statutes were 

violated, but it issued Fontenot a right-to-sue letter. Fontenot then filed a 

petition for damages in Louisiana state court, alleging discrimination based 

on age (but not race). 

LSU removed the case to federal court and requested summary 

judgment on all claims. The district court granted that motion, dismissing 

Fontenot’s federal ADEA claims with prejudice and dismissing Fontenot’s 

state-law LADEA claims without prejudice. Fontenot timely appealed.

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II

This court reviews “grants of summary judgment de novo, applying 

the same standard as the district court.” In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 

F.3d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 2022). “The court shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

“When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we are required to review 

all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Exelon 

Wind 1, L.L.C. v. Nelson, 766 F.3d 380, 394 (5th Cir. 2014).

There are no genuine factual disputes because under the Middle 

District of Louisiana’s local rules, Fontenot admitted to LSU’s statement of 

undisputed facts. See M.D. La. LR 56(f).

III

A

“A plaintiff abandons claims when [she] fails to address the claims or 

oppose a motion challenging those claims.” Terry Black’s Barbeque, L.L.C. 

v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450, 459 (5th Cir. 2022). In opposing 

summary judgment, Fontenot did not respond to LSU’s defenses against her 

federal ADEA claims or state LADEA failure-to-promote claim, so the 

district court held that those were abandoned. On appeal, Fontenot does not 

challenge the district court’s dismissal of those abandoned claims. 

Therefore, Fontenot’s only remaining claims are for retaliation and 

constructive discharge, both brought under the LADEA.

B

Before suing for retaliation and constructive discharge under the 

LADEA, Fontenot was required to provide LSU with 30 days’ written 

notice. La. Stat. Ann. § 23:303(C) (2008). She did not do this.

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“Louisiana state and federal courts applying Louisiana law have held 

the filing of an EEOC charge of discrimination satisfies” Louisiana’s notice 

requirement. Johnson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 767 F. Supp. 2d 678, 700 (W.D. 

La. 2011) (collecting cases). But they have held that such notice is limited 

“to the alleged discrimination detailed in the EEOC charge.” Id. To 

determine whether an EEOC charge provides sufficient notice under section 

23:303, Louisiana courts analogize to the exhaustion of administrative 

remedies in federal employment-discrimination cases. King v. Phelps Dunbar, 

L.L.P., 743 So. 2d 181, 187 (La. 1999). And in that context, we have held that 

discrimination claims are distinct from retaliation or constructive discharge 

claims, so the allegation of one in an EEOC charge does not exhaust a 

plaintiff’s remedies as to the other. See Randel v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 157 F.3d 

392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998).

The question before us, then, is whether Fontenot’s EEOC charge 

put LSU on notice of Fontenot’s intention to sue for retaliation and 

constructive discharge. The first hurdle is that Fontenot did not check either 

the “retaliation” or “other” boxes on the EEOC charging form. This 

procedural formality is not fatal, however, so long as the written portion of 

the charge could have put LSU on notice. See Clark v. Auger Servs., Inc., 443 

F. Supp. 3d 685, 708 (M.D. La. 2020). The entirety of the written portion of 

Fontenot’s EEOC charge is as follows:

I began my employment with Louisiana State University of 

Alexandria on March 21, 2016, most recently as an Enrollment 

Specialist, earning $32,000 per year. On July 21, 2017 I applied 

for a promotion as Senior Associate Director of Admissions 

and Recruiting. On July 25, 2017, I was called for a phone 

interview. I was not selected for promotion and I feel the 

questions asked of me were geared to me not getting the job. 

Ms. Kateline Nichols, WF, was hired. She has less 

qualifications tha[n] I do. Previously I had applied for several 

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promotions and I had not been selected either. The person 

hired are younger, white employees who have less 

qualifications than I do. 

On March 12, 2018, I was told that my job would be eliminated 

and that I would need to move into another Department. I was 

told this by my Supervisor, Shelley Gill, WF, and Amond 

Hammond, Interim Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs. If I 

did not accept the transfer I would not have a job. I was to be 

the Student Engagement Retention Specialist. On March 13, 

2018, I met with Mr. Moore, BM, who was the Vice Chancellor 

of Student Engagement. Mr. Moore told me if he had to 

advertise the job, he would not select me. Ms. Abbey Baine, 

WF, 30’s, and Mr. Moore would write out my new job 

description. Ms. Baine, was on my initial hiring committee. 

They scheduled me to meet with them again on March 28, 

2018. On March 27, 2018, Ms. Gill informed me that they 

would be taking my computer and I was to report to my new job 

on April 2, 2018. On April 5, 2018, Mr. Moore informed me 

that my start date would reflect March 28, 2018.

According to the company, I did not get my promotions 

because the committee said they had initially hired someone in 

my similarly protected as me. I believe that I have been 

discriminated against because of my race (B) in violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; and 

because of my age (50) in violation of The Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act of 19676, as amended.

No part of these facts suggests that Fontenot ever lodged a formal or 

informal complaint that she could have been retaliated against for making. 

Nor do the facts suggest that LSU created such a hostile environment that 

Fontenot was forced to resign, as would be required to support a constructive 

discharge claim. Fontenot did not introduce any other EEOC documents, 

such as an intake questionnaire or investigation notes. And Fontenot

presented no evidence that the EEOC took her charge and investigated for 

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retaliation. Fontenot also never amended her EEOC charge, nor did she 

seek leave to amend her complaint. 

Instead of arguing that her EEOC charge itself provided LSU with 

notice, Fontenot’s sole argument is that LSU should be charged with 

constructive notice of anything that could be included in “the scope of the 

EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the 

charge of discrimination.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 

466 (5th Cir. 1970). Fontenot’s reliance on that standard is mistaken.

In Sanchez, we allowed an amended complaint to relate back to the 

original, even though the amended complaint included new allegations of 

national-origin discrimination. But this was only because “the facts alleged 

in the complaint, and upon which both charges of sex and national origin 

discrimination were based, were identical.” Hornsby v. Conoco, Inc., 777 F.2d 

243, 247 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing Sanchez). Sanchez does not allow a 

plaintiff to avoid exhausting administrative remedies when his or her EEOC

charge “raise[s] different theories of recovery” and relies on different facts. 

Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 879 (5th Cir. 2003). 

The same conclusion follows for providing notice under section 

23:303 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. An EEOC charge cannot provide 

an employer with proper notice when the later-filed complaint adds “a new 

and independent charge . . . and new and independent facts to support this 

claim.” Hornsby, 777 F.2d at 247. “The consistent holdings in the case law 

indicate that the statute is to be imposed literally and any deficiency to the 

notice requirement is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim.” Miguel v. GEICO Gen. 

Ins. Co., 207 So. 3d 507, 511 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 

* * *

The district court properly granted summary judgment for LSU. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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