* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 30 2004 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

HENRY F. BUTLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. THE BOEING COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 03-3108 (D.C. No. 01-CV-2433-KHV)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before KELLY , HARTZ , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff-appellant Henry Butler, proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant-appe llee The Boeing Company, and the denial of his motion to alter or amend thatjudgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Plaintiff had alleged employment discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On appeal, h e reargues facts presented to the district court, and he contends that the termin ation of discovery deprived him of due process under the law. Aplt. Br. at 2-3, 11 -20. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. On December 17, 2002, the district court granted de fendant summary judgment because plaintiff had “not shown that [def endant’s actions] were pervasive or severe enough to alter the terms, cond itions or privileges of his employment . . . . Moreover, plaintiff [had] not s hown that the alleged conduct was based on race.” Butler v. Boeing Co. , No. 01-2433-KHV, slip op. at 12 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2002). On January 1, 2003, plaintiff personally filed a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e), purportin g to sign on behalf of his attorney. On January 10, 2003, plaintiff’s attorne y filed a signed motion, substantially complying with the district court’s o rder to cure this deficiency. We thus treat the motion to alter or amend as having b een filed on January 1, 2003. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same legal standard used by the district court. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of-3-

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together w ith the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material f act and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R . Civ. P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reason able inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Byers v. City of Albuquerque , 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). After thorough review of the record, we agree that plaintiff failed to show that his perceived injuries on the job were pervasi ve or severe enough to alter the terms, conditions or privileges of his employment. Butler , No. 01-2433-KHV, slip op. at 12; Bolden v. PRC Inc. , 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994). Moreover, plaintiff failed to tie his perceived injuries to race. Butler , No. 01-2433-KHV, slip op. at 12; Trujillo v. Univ. of Colo. Health Sciences Ctr. , 157 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff recites a litany of slights and insults t hat are not necessarily connected, nor do they seem particu larly directed at him or his employment. For example, although plaintiff is an African-American man, in noting that other people promoted were Caucasian, h e fails to take into account their individual merit, experience, and relative qu alifications for the jobs to which they were promoted. “[N]ot every insult, slight, o r unpleasantness gives rise” to a-4-

valid employment discrimination claim. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh , 120 F.3d 1286, 1297 (3d Cir. 1997); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). We conclude that grant of summary judgmentfor defendant was appropriate. Generally, if a plaintiff files his motion to alteror amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) within ten days of the district court’s entry of judgment, we review the district court’s decision not to grant the motion for abuse of discretion. Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. , 225 F.3d 1179, 1186 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000). We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the districtcourt’s denial of the motion. Finally, we review district court decisions regardi ng discovery for abuse of discretion. GWN Petroleum Corp. v. OK-Tex Oil & Gas, Inc. , 998 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir. 1993). Discovery in this case closed wi th the entry of a pretrial conference order on August 7, 2002. Plaintiff move d to reopen discovery on September 24, 2002, nearly a month and a half afterthe scheduled close of discovery, and nearly a month after defendant had f iled for summary judgment. His motion also failed to show that additional disc overy was likely to lead to relevant evidence. We hold that the district courtdid not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery as i nappropriate.-5-

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for su bstantially the reasons stated. All other motions are DENIED as moot.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge