United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-60031

Summary Calendar

____________

John Milton Saquing, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Jeworski Mallett, Acting Commissioner, Mississippi Department of 

Corrections; Gloria Perry, Medical Director, Mississippi Department of 

Corrections; One Unnamed Physician, Medical Doctor; Ronald 

Ellzy Woodall, South Mississippi Correctional Institution Medical 

Director; One Unnamed Director, of Wexford Medical; Wexford 

Medical, as an entity; One Unnamed Director, of Centurion 

Medical; Centurion Medical, as an entity; John Doe, Director of 

Records; Governor Tate Reeves, in his official capacity, 

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:20-CV-182

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit 

Judges.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 15, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Per Curiam:*

John Milton Saquing, Mississippi prisoner # 114935, appeals the 

dismissal of his Section 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. He also challenges the denial of his motions to issue subpoenas, to 

amend or supplement his complaint to add new defendants and claims, and 

to appoint counsel. He requests leave to file a reply brief out of time, which 

is GRANTED, and to strike the appellees’ letter brief, which is DENIED. 

We review a dismissal on “summary judgment de novo, using the same 

standard as that employed by the district court.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 

F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) 

does not allow an inmate to file a Section 1983 complaint “until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a). Saquing’s argument, liberally construed, is that the 

Administrative Remedy Program (“ARP”) provided by the Mississippi 

Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) was not a legitimately available 

remedy. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016).

As part of the ARP, Saquing filed the relevant grievance in January 

2020, raising claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs 

and requesting monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. The ARP 

rejected this grievance because the program was not empowered to award 

monetary damages. The ARP was not unavailable simply because monetary 

relief was unavailable. Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 161 (5th Cir. 2020). 

Because ARP remedies were “available” under the PLRA, Saquing was 

required to file a corrected grievance within five days of receiving the 

rejection per ARP rules. See id. He did not do so.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

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As to his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, Saquing’s lack 

of understanding of the ARP does not excuse his failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. Davis v. Fernandez, 798 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 

2015). Saquing suggests his failure to exhaust should be excused for equitable 

reasons, but exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Valentine, 978 F.3d 

at 161–62. Saquing also contends that he did not have Internet access, a 

physical copy of the MDOC’s Inmate Handbook, or any instructions on how 

to remedy his rejected grievance. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 643–44. The record 

demonstrates, however, that Saquing requested and received a current copy 

of MDOC’s Standard Operating Procedure 20-08, which explained the ARP 

procedures. See Huskey v. Jones, 45 F.4th 827, 831 (5th Cir. 2022). 

Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to 

the defendants. See id. at 832–33. Further, the district court did not err by 

dismissing the case with prejudice because any grievance related to the 

allegations in the complaint would be untimely pursuant to the ARP. See 

Dawson Farms, LLC v. Farm Serv. Agency, 504 F.3d 592, 607 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Regarding Saquing’s challenges to the denial of his motions to amend 

his complaint, to issue subpoenas, and to appoint counsel, the defendants 

assert that we lack jurisdiction because Saquing failed to designate these 

specific orders in his notice of appeal, which cited only the order granting 

summary judgment. See Pope v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 937 F.2d 258, 266 

(5th Cir. 1991). With liberal construction, however, it is clear that Saquing 

intended to appeal the entire case, so we have jurisdiction to consider the 

final judgment and any orders issued prior to it. Trust Co. Bank v. U.S. 

Gypsum Co., 950 F.2d 1144, 1147–48 (5th Cir. 1992).

In his motions to join new defendants, Saquing failed to allege that the 

proposed defendants were personally involved in or causally connected to the 

deprivation of any constitutional right. See Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 

768 (5th Cir. 1983). Moreover, as to the proposed defendants VitalCore

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Health, the VitalCore CEO, and two MDOC doctors, Saquing failed to allege 

any specific actions undertaken by any specific proposed defendant or 

affiliated person. See id. (requiring personal involvement or a “causal 

connection” between a constitutional violation and a defendant’s actions for 

liability). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

leave to supplement the complaint with such futile claims. See Haggard v. 

Bank of Ozarks Inc., 668 F.3d 196, 202 (5th Cir. 2012).

Concerning Saquing’s appeal of the denial of his motions to issue 

subpoenas, the materials sought were “unreasonably cumulative or 

duplicative” to the extent that he sought discovery of his medical records 

from MDOC and the Southern Eye Center. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(b)(2)(C)(i). As to the subpoenas directed at Centurion Medical and 

VitalCore, the requested contracts between MDOC and those entities were 

irrelevant to Saquing’s claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical 

needs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (b)(2)(C)(iii). Additionally, Saquing did 

not state, either in the district court or on appeal, how the discovery sought 

would have changed the nature of his complaint. Accordingly, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions to issue subpoenas. 

See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 876 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Finally, addressing the denial of Saquing’s numerous motions for 

appointment of counsel, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

finding that he failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Thompson 

v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 67 F.4th 275, 283 (5th Cir. 2023). To the extent 

Saquing challenges the district court’s refusal to appoint a fellow inmate as 

counsel, his arguments fail. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021–22

(5th Cir. 1998). AFFIRMED.

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