O r i gi nal l y , t he Shr op s hi r es al s o s ued M r
. E s kes en, wh om t hey hi r ed t o i ns pect t he home pri or t o i t s pur cha s e, 1 b ut t hei r cl ai m agai nst hi m pro ceed ed t hrough arb i t rat i o n, and he was non- sui t ed i n t hi s act i o n.



### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE Jul y 8, 200 8 S es sio n MICH AEL SH ROPSHI RE v. B ETT Y ROACH Appeal f rom the Circ uit Court for Robertson County No. 11452 Ross H. Hicks, Ju dge

No. M2007- 02593-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Janu ary 30, 2009

A home seller

appea ls a jury verdic t finding that she intentionally misrepre sented water c onditions in the bas em en t i n connec tion with the sale of her home. Acc ording to the seller, the jur y verdic t was a g ainst the weig ht of the ev i d ence and the tr ial court e rrone ously allowed opinion testimony from the c ontrac tor who re paire d the wate r dama g e. We af firm, fin d i n g t h at materia l evidence s u p p o rt s t h a tt h e j u r

y v e r d i c tan d

t h a tth e tr i a l c o urtd i d

n o te r r i na l l o w i n g th e t e s t i m o n y. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , P.J .,M.S., delivered the opinion of the cour t, in which F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R . and A

NDY D. B E NN E TT , J J ., joined.
L ee B orthick, Spring field, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, B etty

Roach. Steve North, Mar

k No rt h , Madison, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellees, Micha el Shropshire a nd wife, Rebec ca Shropshire

. OP IN ION
I n Octobe r o f 2 005, Michae l and Rebec ca Shropshire boug ht a home in Gre enbrie r, Tenne ssee, f

rom Be tty Roach. The rea fter, the Shropshires s ued Mrs. Roach for damag es alleg ing 1 that Mrs. Roach intentionally failed to disc lose and made intentional misreprese ntations about water pr ob le ms i n th e ba se me nt of the ho me , a nd that th e y re lie d u po n th e se re pr e se ntatio ns or fa ilure s to the ir de tr ime nt whe n th e y

bo ug ht t he ho me . A c c or din g to t

he Shr op sh ir e s, the w a te r p ro ble ms i n the ba se me nt h ave re qu ir e d e xten siv e re pa ir s and c a us e d a de pr e c iatio n in the ho me ’s va lue . M rs
. Roach de nied making any intentional misrepre sentation about t he home. In addition, Mrs. Roach maintained that any

relianc e the Shropshires pl ace d on Mrs. Roach’ s alleg ed misrepr esentation wasO n a p p e a l, the S h ro p sh ire s a rg u e tha t M rs . R o a c h d id no t m o v e fo r a d ire c te d ve rd ic t at the c lo se o f t h e p ro o f. 2 T he t ri al co urt , how ever, ap p arent l y be l i eved M rs
. R o ach had s o m o ved s i nce t he t ri al co urt de ni ed t he m o t i o n. -2- mis pla c e d s inc e the ins pe c tio n r e po rt ob ta ine d b y

the Shr op sh ir e s b e fo re the sa le no te d p os sib le wate r p ro ble ms. On Octobe r 10, 2 0 07, the matter w as tried be fore a jury . The de fenda nt’s motion for a direc ted ver dict was denied at t he close of pl aintiffs’ proof, and Mrs. Roach’ s rene wed motion for direc ted ver dict was de nied at the c lose of t he proof. The jury returne d a ver dict for the Shropshire s 2 totaling $12,375.
Mrs. Roach moved f

or a ne w trial and a sserted, a mong othe r grounds, that the weight of the e vid e nc e wa s in su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the ve rd ic t, t

hat th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d w he n it

tw ic e de nie d M rs
. Roa c h’ s r e qu e st f

or a directed verdi c t, a

nd that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d w he n it

a llo we d p la int if

fs ’ witness, L ay

ne Ge eber s, to provide opinion testimony and exace rbate d this error by failing to give a c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n. On No ve mbe r 20, 20 07 , th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d th e ne w t

ri a l mo tio n, and

Mr s. Roach’s a ppeal e nsued. Mrs. Roach a

ppeals the jury awa

rd on the same g rounds she ra ised in her motion for a new t r i a l d i s c u s s e d

a b o v e
. E a c hg r o u n d

w i l l b e a d dr e s s e d

s e p ar a t e l y. I. V ERD I C T A GA I N ST T HE W EI GH T O F T HE E VI DE NCE We int erp re t M rs
. Roach’s a rgument on appea l to be that the trial cour t first should have direc ted the ver dict in her favor and, alternatively , should ha ve g rante d a new tria l on the g rounds that the ver dict was a gai n s t the weig ht of the evide nce. A s expl ained in Blackburn v . CSX Tra n s p o r ta ti o n, Inc. , M2006-01352-COA- R10-CV, 2008 WL 2278497 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2008) (no Te nn. R. A

pp. P. 11 application filed), the claim that a verdic t is ag ainst the weig ht of the e vid e nc e is g ro un ds fo r bot h a dir e c te d ve rd ic t and

a ne w tri a l, b ut t

he sta nd ard s to be applied by the tri al c ou rt in r

uli ngon the mot ion s v ary

sin c e the c on se qu e nc e s a re dif fe re nt:
I t is easy to fail to distinguish the unique aspe cts of a motion for a new t rial with a motion for judgme nt as a matter of law. While both may b e m ad e af

t er a jury has re nd e re d a

ve rd ic t, t he ir c on se qu e nce s a

re qu ite dif

fe re nt. Du e to t

he dif fe re nc e in conseque nces, tria l courts g ener ally apply differ ent standar ds to their consideration and dif fe re nt s tand ard s o f r e vie w a re a pp lic a ble on a pp e a l.
A re newe d motion for judgme nt as a matter of l aw may be joined, in the alter native, with a motion for a ne w trial under Rule 59. T h es e m o t i ons have wholly distinct functions and e ntirely

differ ent standar ds g overn the ir allowanc e. Ne verthe less there has bee n confusion and some courts per sist in stating, as the standard f or judg ment as a matter of law , the much more lenient t est that is applicable to a motion for a ne w-3-

trial when it is based on the g round t h at t h e v er dict is ag ainst the weig ht of the evidenc e. Th e c on tr a sts be tw e e n th e tw o mo tio ns are dr amatic . I f a mot ion fo r a new tr ia l is g ran t e d , t h e c a s e i s t r i e d a g a i n
. I f th e m o t i o n f o r j u d g m e n t a s a m a t t e r of la w i s g ra nte d, the c a se is at an en d. B e c a us e of the fi na lity

that th e latte r m oti on

ha s, it i s natura l that it shoul d be mea sured by a fa r more rig orous s tandar d. On a moti on for new tria l, the court has wide dis cre tion to order a new trial whene ver pr ejudicial er ror has occ urre d. On a motion for judg ment as a matter of law , i t h as no discre tion whatsoeve r and c onsiders only the questi o n of law whether there is sufficient evidenc e to ra ise a jury issue. On a motion for ne w trial the c ourt may consider the cre dibilit y

of witnesses a

nd the weig ht of the evidenc e. On a motion for judgme nt a s a matte r o f l aw, it m ay

no t. Al l of thi s h a s b e e n und e rs too d for so me tim e and

is t ho ro ug hly

se ttl e d in the c a se s. 9AWright, Mil l er & K ane, F ED ER A L P R AC TI C E AND P ROCE D U RE : C IV IL 2d§ 2531 (1995). Id ., at *3-4.
I n con si derin g a

mot ion fo r a dir e c te d v e rd ic t, t

he tr ia l c ourt

mus t take the str on g e st le g iti mate vie w o f t

he e vid e nc e in f

avo r o f the no nmo vin g pa rt y , a llo w a ll re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in favor of that par

ty , and disca

rd all counte rvailing evidenc e. Ne wc o m b v
. Ko h ler Company , 222 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 8 , 3 9 0 (T en n
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g Cra in v
. B enton , 8 23 S.W .2d 187, 195 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 91 )) ; Johnson v. Tenne ssee Farmrs M

ut. Ins. Co. , 205 S.W .3d 365, 370 (Tenn. 20 0 6 ). On the oth e r h and , if

a mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l is fi le d, the n the tr ia l court is und e r a duty to i nd e pe nd e ntl y weig h the evidenc e and de termine whe ther the e vidence “pre ponderates” in favor of or ag ainst the verdic t. W

oods v. He rman W

alldorf & Co., Inc. , 26 S. W.3 d 8 68 , 8 73 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 9) ; Sh iv e rs v. Ramse y , 9 37 S.W. 2d 94 5, 94 7 (T e nn . Ct. App . 1 99 6) ; W itte r Ne sb it , 878 S.W .2d 116, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). This role is ref err ed to in Tenne ssee a s that of a “ thirteenth juror.” Holden v. Rannick, 682 S.W .2d 903, 904-05 (Te nn. 1984). No one disputes that the trial court ap p l i ed the a pp ro pr iate sta

nd ard s to the tw o mo tio ns
. I t is well establis h ed t h at o nce a trial court ha s approve d a jury verdic t, the standard to be applied on appeal

to r e vie w the jur

y ve rd ic t is str ing ent , whe th er th e ch a lle ng e is t o th e fa ilure to g rant a direc ted verdict or a new tria l. The Supreme Court ha s clea rly provided the standa

rd we are to u se wh e n e nte rt a ini ngc ha lle ng e s to jur y fi nd ing s o f f

a c t: Th e app li cable sta

nd ard of re vie w i s se t out in

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure 13 (d ), wh ic h pr ov ide s, “ [f]in din g s of fa c t by a jur y in c ivi l a c tions sh a ll be set a side only

if there is no materia l evidenc e to support the verdict.” Discussing that standard of

revie w, we ha

ve stated:A t r i al cour t abus es i t s di s cr et i on “ onl y wh en i t appl i es an i ncor r ect l ega l s t andar d, or r eac hes a dec i s i on t hat 3 i s agai ns t l ogi c o r reas oni ng t hat caus es an i nj us t i ce t o t he part y comp l ai ni ng
. ” M er cer , 13 4 S.W

. 3 d 12 1 , 13 1 (T enn. 2 0 0 4 ) ( q uo t i ng St at e v
. Shi r l ey , 6 S

. W

. 3 d 24 3 , 24 7 (T enn. 19 9 9 ))

. -4- Whe n a dd re ssi ng wh e the r the re is ma te ri a l evi de nc e to sup po rt a ve rd ic t, a n a pp e llate court shall: (1) take the strong est leg itimate vie w of all the e vidence in favor of the ve rd ic t; ( 2) a ssume the tr ut h of a ll e vid e nc e that su pp or ts the ve rd ic t; ( 3) a llo w a ll re as o n ab l e i n fe re n ce s t o s u s t ai nt h e v er d i ct ; an d (4 ) d i s ca rdal l [ co un t erv ai l i n g] evidenc e. Crabtree Masonry Co. v. C & R Constr., Inc. , 575 S.W .2d 4, 5 (Tenn. 19 78 ); Black v . Quinn , 64 6 S.W. 2d 43 7, 43 9- 40 (T e nn
. Ap p. 19 82 ). Ap pe llate c ourt s shall neither r ewe igh th e evidence nor de cide whe re the preponde ranc e of the e vid e nc e lie s. I f t

he re c or d c on ta ins “ any

mate ri a l e vid e nc e to s up po rt the ve rd ic t, [t he jur y ’ s f in d in g s ] mu s t b e a f

f ir me d ; if it w e r e o th e r

w is e , th e p arti e s w o u ld be d ep ri v ed o f their c onstitut ional rig ht to trial by jury

. Crabtree Masonry Co. , 575 S.W .2d at 5.
W haley v . Perkins , 197 S.W .3d 665, 671 (Tenn. 2006)

. Once t h e t ri al cour

t has approve d the ver dict, on appea l we ar e to af firm the ver dict if the rec ord conta ins “any materia l evidenc e.” W ashington v. 822 Corp. , 4 3 S. W.3 d 4 91 , 4 94 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 00 ); B arrett v. Vann , E 2 0 0 6 -0 1 2 8 3 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 7 W L2 4 3 8 0 2 5 , at * 1 1 (T en n
. C t

. App. Au g
. 29 , 2 00 7) (n o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a pp lic a tio n f

ile d) ; Mabey

v. Maggas , M2006-02689-COAR3-CV, 2007 WL 2713 7 2 6 , at * 8 (T enn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2007) (no Te nn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (“B eca

use we find no err or in the trial cour t’s actions as thirtee nth juror, our re view of the appellants’ argument reg arding sufficie ncy of the evidenc e is subjec t to the well-established ‘m a te ri a l e vid e nc e ’ s tand ard ” )) ; Ballard v. Serodino, Inc. , E 2 0 0 4

- 0 2 6 5 6

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 5 WL 28 60 27 9, a t *3 (T e nn . Ct . App . O c t. 3 1, 20 05 ) ( no Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a pp lic a tio n f

ile d) ; Foster v. W ilson , W2003-00872-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL2086320, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2004) (no Te nn
. R. A

pp . P. 11 a

pp lic a tio n f

ile d) ; See P oole v. Kroger Co. , 604 S.W .2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1980)

. The Supreme Court has articulated an abuse of discretion st andar d in revie wing the gra nt or denia l of a new trial

when the issue w as not sufficie ncy o f t he evide nce. Ali v. Fisher , 145 S.W .3d 557, 564-65 (Tenn. 2004) (alleg ing err or of trial court conce rned court’s pre- trial ruling as to allocation of fa ult). We do not discern a substantive di ff ere nce a pplicable to the c ase be fore us betwee n the mate ri a l e vid e nc e sta

nd ard and the a bu se of dis c re tio n stand ard

. I f the re is n o mate ri a l e vid e nc e to su pp or t a ve rd ic t, the n the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n s inc e a pp ro vin g su c h a

ve rd ic t is a g a ins t log ic or re a so nin g
. Con se qu e ntl y , th e iss ue on a pp e a l is whe th er th ere is m a te ri a l e vid e nc e to 3 su pp or t th e jur y ’s ve rd ic t. Th e c rux of M rs . Roa c h’ s ar g ume nts a tta c kin g the jur y ve rd ic t is that th e re wa s n o ju sti fi a ble relianc e by the S hropshires on any statements m ade by Mrs. Roach since the Shropshires we re a war eJus t i f i abl e r el i anc e i s one e l ement of an i nt ent i onal mi s r epre s ent at i on cl ai m. I n or der t o be s ucc es s f ul o n a n 4 i n t en t i on al mi s r epr es en t at i on c l ai m, t h e r epr es en t at i on m u s t be of a f al s e e x i s t i n g or pas t ma t er i al f ac t w h i ch w as ma de kn owi ng l y , wi t hout bel i ef i n i t s t r ut h, or r eck l es s l y an d was r ea so nabl y r el i ed upon by t he pl ai nt i f f ca us i ng damage. W al ker v. Sun r i s e Po nt i ac - G M C Tr uck, I nc. , 24 9 S.W

. 3 d 30 1 , 31 1 (T enn. 20 0 8 ).

-5- of the water proble m due to Mr. Eskese n’s inspection. Consequently , Mrs. Roach a rgues, the Shr op sh ir e s c ann ot p re va il o n th e ir int e nti on a l mi sr e pr e se ntatio n c la im. 4
Th e R e s i d e n t i a l D i s c l o s u r e S t a t e m e n t p r o v i d e d t o th e S h r o p s h i r e s b y M r s
. R o a c h p r i or to closing answe red “ y es” to the que stion whether there were past or present wate r intrusions/standing water in the baseme nt. By

way of explanation, Mrs. Roach include d the statement “whe n a hea vy rain last y ear

some wate r in baseme nt.” Prior t o buying the house, t he Shropshires hire d Mr. Eskese n to inspect the home. Since Mr. Eskesen’ s repor t under “ minor problems” noted sig ns of moisture seepa g e in the base ment, Mrs. Roach argues that the Shropshires did not prove a re quired e lement of a misre prese ntation claim, namely justifiable relianc e. At trial, Mrs. Roach te stified that other than the single instance refe rre d to in the Disclosure State me nt, sh e ne ve r h a d s tand ingwate r i n th e ba se me nt. Ac c or din g to h e r, the on e tim e wate r d id ac cu m u l at e i nt h e b as em en ti t wa s go n e wi th i n an h o ur an d d i d n o tre qu i re v ac uu m i n g o r m o p p i n g. Her son, howeve r, testified that he used a shop va c to re move the standingwater

. The jury hear d testimony

from Mr. Shropshire about questions he as k ed M rs. R oach conce rning a dehumidifier she kept in the baseme nt. Mr . Shropshire testified Mrs. Roac h said that the dehumidifierwas in the ba sement to help with her grandda ug hter’s a llerg ies and that the baseme nt did not g et wet or flood. Mr. Stropshire testified that when he asked a bout the Disclosure Statement, Mrs. Roach said last y ear when it r ained hard the wall under the porc h was we t but that there had neve r bee n standing water in the base ment. Mr. Shropshire que stioned the inspector, who found sig ns of moisture in the base ment. Acc ording to Mr. Shropshire, while the inspec tor noted the sig ns of wate r, the ins pe c tor sa id it wa s con sis te nt wit h what Mrs . Ro a c h s a id. Th e ins pe c tor did not pull up the carpe t or remove the paneling

. At the home closing , Mr. Shropshire testified he asked Mrs. Roach direct l y ab o u t wh ether the base ment floor g ot wet and she said no. The inspec tor’s repor t failed to che ck the boxes that indicated “ Major Water Problems,” “Persistent F looding L ike ly ,” “ Pe rs ist e nt M ino r S e e pa g e L ike ly” and oth e r t y pe s o f w a te r p ro ble ms. Mrs. Roach r elies on Israel v. W illiams , M1999-02400-COA- R 3 -C V, 2000 WL1183081 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug

. 22, 2000) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed), whic h found that notice of water proble ms removed justifiable r eliance in a neg lige nt misreprese ntation claim. Mrs. Roach’ s r e li an c e o n Israel is mispl ace d for se vera l rea sons. First, Israel was de cided upon summary judgme nt with no disput ed issues of f act. He re, Mr . Shropshire and Mr s. R o ach give differ ent versions of her repr esentations, a nd the jury

rec onciled the disputed a rea s. Second, Is ra e l perta ined to n e g lig e nt mis re pr e se ntatio n and no t int e nti on a l mis re pr e se ntatio n a s a lle g e d b y the Shr op sh ir e s. T h i rd , the evidenc e of w ater damag e known to the buyers in Israel w a s mo r e e xte n s iv e th anthat-6-

known by the Shropshires, the a lleg ed misrepr esentations by Mrs. Roach we re more elabor ate, a nd the buy ers he re a sked for

more infor

mation than in Israel

. B a se d on the fo re g oin g , us ing the sta nd ard of re vie w f ro m W haley , we find there is material evidenc e to support the ver dict, and the jury verdic t is affirmed.
II. T E S T I M ONY O F L A Y N E G E E B E RS Be fore trial, the Shropshires identified the contra ctor who r epair ed the ba sement, L ay ne Gee bers, as a witness about t he repair work perf ormed. Counsel for Mrs. Roac h states in her br ief that in a pre -trial conf

ere nce she expressed no objec tions to Mr. Geebe rs testifying about repa irs but wo uld ob je c t to e xpe rt

te sti mony

fr om M r. Ge e be rs
. Acc ording to Mrs. Roach, Mr. Ge eber s inappropriately testified that the wate r dama g e to the baseme nt occur

red ove r a pe riod o f y ea rs an d that counsel for the Shropshires in their c losing argument inappropriately cited Mr. Ge eber s’ testimony to support this conclusion. The standard of revie w we are to e mploy to a ppeals based on the admissibilit y of evide nce is c le ar and we ll e sta

bli sh e d. Th e a dmi ssi bil ity of e vid e nc e is wi thi n th e dis c re tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt , and the de cision to admit or exclude evidence is rever sible only upon a cle ar a

buse of discr etion by the trial judg e. Me rc e r v. Va nd e rb ilt Un iv e rsi ty , 1 3 4 S

. W

. 3 d

at 1 3 1 (c i t i n g Ot is v . Ca mb rid geMu t. Fire Ins. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 442-43 (Te nn. 1992)). Se e Bi sc an v . B ro wn , 160 S.W .3d 462, 469 (Tenn. 2005)

. A t rial court abuses its discretion “only when it applies a n incorre ct leg al standar d, or re a c he s a

de c isi on that is a g a ins t lo g ic or re a so nin g that caus es an in jus tic e to t

he pa rt y complaining .” Merc er , 1 3 4 S

. W

. 3 d at1 3 1 (q u o t i n g State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 24 3 , 2 4 7 (Tenn. 1999)). Duringhis testimony , Mr. Geeber s testified that his examination of the dismantled basement sh ow e d e ff

lor e sc e nc e wh ic h is “ sa lts that c ome thr ou g h on c on c re te blo c k o ve r a

duratio n o f t ime when moisture c omes throug h that.” He testified that the fur ring strips applied to the brick wa ll as a me ans to f

a ste n a fi nis h w e re dis c olo re d and ro tti ng awa y . Mr

. Ge e be rs te sti fi e d that the se e ff e c ts happ en ed wh en floodingoccur s over time. The re w as no objec tion during his testimony , and c o u n s e l f o r M r s
. R o a c hc r o s s - e x am i n e d M r
. G e e b e r s o nth e a c c ur a c y o f th i s t e s t i m o n y. We do no t be lie ve a dmi ssi on of thi s pr oo f, e ve n a ssumin g c ou ns el h ad app ro pr iate ly objected, t o b e an a

b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n
. M r
. G e e b e r s w a s s im p ly e xp la in in g th e d e f

in it io n of e ff lor e sc e nc e and

the c on dit ion

of the ba se me nt w a lls a s h e fo un d th e m. Finally , with reg ard to the r equeste d curative instruction, e ven if Mr. G eebe r’s testimony was inadmissible, failure to g ive a c urative instruc tion is not reve rsible er ror. Reve rsal for

failure to give a spec ial instruction is appropriate “only when the imprope r denia l of a requ es t for a spe cial jury instruction ha s prejudice d the rig hts of the re questing party .” Johnson v. Tenne ssee Farme rs Mutual-7-

InsuranceCompany , 2 0 5 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 5 , 3 7 2 (T en n
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Sp e llm e y e r v
. Te nn
. Fa rm e rs M

ut. Ins. Co. , 879 S.W .2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993))

. I t is not sufficient that ref

usal to g rant the r equeste d instruction ma y have aff ecte d the resu l t ; “[ i ]t must affirmatively appea r that it did in fact do so.” Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 446 (Tenn. 1992)

. Johnson , 205 S.W .3d at 372.
Ba sed upon this rec ord, we do not find failu re t o gi v e a c urative instruc tion constitut ed re ve rs ibl e e rr or . T he jur

y ve rd ic t is a ff

ir me d. Cos ts of thi s a

pp e a l are ta xed

to t he a pp e lla nt, B e tty R o a c h , f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ PAT RI CI A J. CO TT REL L , P. J., M. S.