J-S13014-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

VINCENT WALKER,

Appellant No. 992 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 31, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002005-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2020

Appellant, Vincent Walker, appeals from his judgment of sentence of 66 

months’ to 15 years’ imprisonment for persons not to possess firearms and 

carrying a firearm without a license.1 Appellant argues that the trial court 

erred by denying his motion to suppress because the two arresting officers

lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and search him. We affirm.

The trial court accurately summarized the evidence adduced during the 

suppression hearing as follows:

The only witness called was Officer Tyler Auerbeck of the 

Harrisburg Police Bureau. Office Auerbeck testified that on March 

30, 2018, he was dispatched to 346 South 14th Street in 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 6106, respectively.
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Harrisburg.2 A caller, Casey Miller, had stated that there were 

multiple males in that area fighting and throwing liquor bottles 

and rocks. Officer Auerbeck did not speak to Ms. Miller herself; 

rather, he received the information from a dispatcher. Officer 

Auerbeck and Officer Pucciarello (who drove separately in 

response to the call) both arrived in police vehicles and parked in 

the area of 14th and Swatara Streets with only their headlights 

on. Officer Auerbeck observed five or six males congregating in 

the area and, as soon as he and Officer Pucciarello pulled up, the 

men started to disburse in separate directions. 

When asked about the area, Officer Auerbeck testified that it was 

a residential neighborhood, and he had responded numerous 

times in the past to the same location for calls involving drugs, 

weapons, firearms, assaults, and robberies. He confirmed that it 

was a high-crime area. When Officer Auerbeck got out of his car, 

he started walking towards the intersection at 14th and Swatara 

Streets with Office Pucciarello walking behind him. When Officer 

Auerbeck first noticed [Appellant], he was walking in the officers’

direction. At that time, [Appellant] was about fifteen (15) feet 

away and Officer Auerbeck said to him, “hey look—got to talk to 

you real quick.” [Appellant] responded by putting his head down, 

turning away from the officers, and put his hands in his front 

pockets. At that point, both officers told [Appellant] to “show us 

your hands; talk to us.” Officer Auerbeck testified that they 

wanted to talk to [Appellant] about the call he received about the 

fighting and rock-throwing, as he typically gets calls in that area 

to investigate disorderly conduct of a fighting nature. Next, 

Officer Auerbeck again asked [Appellant] to stop, and informed 

him that it is an investigation. [Appellant] continued to walk, and 

the officer asked him to stop again. At this point, [Appellant was]

approximately five (5) feet away, and he walked past the officers. 

He was wearing a hoodie, his hands were still in his pockets, and 

he quickened his pace. Officer Auerbeck was not sure if 

[Appellant] had a weapon on him, but was concerned about 

[Appellant]’s movements, as he continued walking and did not 

stop.

____________________________________________

2 The suppression hearing transcript reflects that the dispatch took place at 

approximately 1:40 a.m., and that Officer Auerbeck was a couple of blocks 

away from the scene when he received the dispatch. 
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Eventually [Appellant] took off running, and Officer Auerbeck 

engaged in a short foot pursuit. Officer Auerbeck gained control 

of [Appellant] by grabbing his back and left arm and eventually 

pinning him; Officer Pucciarello assisted Officer Auerbeck in taking 

[Appellant] to the ground. The officers struggled to get to his 

hands, as [Appellant] kept pulling away; eventually he was 

apprehended and cuffed. [Appellant] was searched by the officers 

for contraband. Numerous rocks were found in his hooded 

jacket/jeans pocket, along with a small baggie of marijuana and 

a silver H&R caliber revolver pistol. The revolver was loaded.

On cross-examination, Officer Auerbeck established that the only 

description that he received from dispatch was that that the 

individuals involved in the disturbance were possibly darkskinned, and there was no description of clothing. It was also 

confirmed that Officer Auerbeck was not able to make contact with 

Ms. Miller, the woman who made the call complaining of the 

disturbance.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/19, at 1-3.

After the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, he proceeded 

to a bench trial and was convicted of the aforementioned firearms offenses. 

The court imposed sentence on the same day, and this timely appeal followed. 

Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal: 

Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence, 

including the firearm found in Appellant’s possession, where 

Appellant was seized by police without reasonable suspicion and 

subsequently searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

When addressing an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress evidence:
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Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 

and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where 

. . . the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns 

on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it 

is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are 

subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783-84 (Pa. Super. 2012).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect the people from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 

302 (Pa. 2014). Lyles explained:

Jurisprudence arising under both charters has led to the 

development of three categories of interactions between citizens 

and police. The first, a “mere encounter,” does not require any 

level of suspicion or carry any official compulsion to stop and 

respond. The second, an “investigatory detention,” permits the 

temporary detention of an individual if supported by reasonable 

suspicion. The third is an arrest or custodial detention, which 

must be supported by probable cause.

Id. Since there is no dispute that the arresting officers in this case conducted 

an investigatory detention, we focus our attention on the standards for 

reasonable suspicion.
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Police may briefly detain a person for an investigatory detention if they 

have an objectively reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot. 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 2011). Reasonable 

suspicion

is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the 

sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 

information that is different in quantity or content than that 

required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that 

reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less 

reliable than that required to show probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts, and it 

must be assessed based upon the totality of the circumstances viewed through 

the eyes of a trained police officer.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 

667, 672 (Pa. Super. 2009). The totality of the circumstances element does 

not permit “divide and conquer” analysis in which the officer examines each 

individual factor in isolation. Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 772 

(Pa. Super. 2014). Facts that may appear innocent in isolation may, when 

viewed together, warrant further investigation in the eyes of a trained officer. 

Id. Courts “must give due weight to the specific reasonable inferences the 

police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 14 A.3d 89, 96 (Pa. 2011). Reasonable 

suspicion does not require that the activity in question be unquestionably 

criminal before an officer may investigate further. Davis, 102 A.3d at 1000. 
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Federal jurisprudence sets forth the reasonableness standard for Article 

I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Brown, 

996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010). “Both constitutions provide equivalent 

protections for purposes of an investigative detention analysis.” Id.

Viewed together, multiple facts gave the officers reasonable suspicion 

to detain Appellant for an investigatory detention. The police received a report 

at nighttime from an identified caller, Casey Miller, that multiple males at 346 

South 14th Street were fighting and throwing rocks and bottles. The fact that 

a disclosed caller gave the tip enhanced its reliability, because a disclosed 

caller places herself at risk of prosecution for filing a false claim if the tip is 

untrue, whereas an anonymous source faces no such risk. See, 

Commonwealth v. Barber, 889 A.2d 587, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005); see also 

United States v. Vandergroen, —F.3d—, 2020 WL 3737376, *3 (9th Cir., 

July 7, 2020) (bar employee who provided tip to police that he saw man with 

gun in the bar was “undoubtedly reliable,” where informant “provided his 

name and employment position, making him a known, and therefore more 

reliable, witness”). Officer Auerbeck was several blocks away when he 

received a radio dispatch about the incident, and he drove to the scene, which 

was a high-crime area. Officer Pucciarello drove to the scene as well in a 

separate patrol vehicle. Upon their arrival, the officers observed five or six 

males congregating at the scene, a fact consistent with Miller’s tip, who 

dispersed upon the officers’ arrival. As the officers walked towards the 
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intersection, Appellant walked towards them, and Officer Auerbeck said, “hey 

look—got to talk to you real quick.” Instead of stopping, Appellant reacted 

suspiciously by putting his head down, turning away, and placing his hands in 

his pockets. Both officers directed Appellant to “show us your hands [and]

talk to us,” but he quickened his pace and walked past the officers with his 

hands in his pockets. He then began running, and the officers apprehended 

him after a struggle. In short, the tip from a disclosed caller, the officers’ 

observations at the scene consistent with this tip, the high-crime nature of 

this location, and Appellant’s nervous and evasive behavior collectively 

created reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. 

Commonwealth v. McCoy, 154 A.3d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(defendant’s evasive and suspicious behavior in a high crime area on a 

particularly cold winter night, along with his unprovoked flight, gave officers 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, justifying investigatory 

stop); Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(“nervous, evasive behavior and headlong flight all provoke suspicion of 

criminal behavior in the context of response to police presence”).

For these reasons, the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to 

suppress. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/11/2020