UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7630

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY JENKINS, a/k/a Domonique Jenkins, a/k/a Todd 

Jenkins, a/k/a Tone,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:93-cr-00081-2)

Submitted: April 19, 2012 Decided: June 15, 2012

Before WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Anthony Jenkins, Appellant Pro Se. William David Muhr, 

Melissa Elaine O’Boyle, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Anthony Jenkins appeals the district court’s 

order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006) motion to reduce 

his sentence. Jenkins was sentenced to life imprisonment in 

1994 after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and 

possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). The district 

court subsequently granted the Government’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 

motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance, 

reducing Jenkins’ sentence to 270 months’ imprisonment. 

Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) 

§ 1B1.10 (2011), when a defendant’s applicable Guidelines range 

has been lowered by an amendment to the Guidelines, the district 

court may reduce the defendant’s term of imprisonment pursuant 

to § 3582. We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 186 

(4th Cir. 2010). A district court abuses its discretion when it 

relies upon an erroneous factual or legal premise. DIRECTV, 

Inc. v. Rawlins, 523 F.3d 318, 323 (4th Cir. 2008). 

Generally, a district court “may not, upon a motion 

for a reduction of sentence, sentence the defendant to a term of 

imprisonment that is below the amended guidelines range.” 

United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2010). 

(citing USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)). However, when the “original 
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term of imprisonment imposed was less than the term . . . 

provided by the guidelines range applicable to the defendant at 

the time of sentencing, a reduction comparably less than the 

amended guidelines range . . . may be appropriate.” Id. We

recently held that the “original term of imprisonment” means 

“the sentence the defendant is serving at the time he makes his 

Section 3582(c)(2) motion.” Id. at 202. Thus, “when a 

defendant is serving a below-guidelines sentence as a result of 

a Rule 35 motion by the government, if the defendant makes a 

motion under section 3582(c)(2), his sentence may be further 

reduced comparable to the previous reduction received.” Id. at 

203. 

Jenkins was held responsible for 5.67 kilograms of 

cocaine base. Although Jenkins was subject to an advisory 

Guidelines range of life imprisonment at the time of his 

sentencing, under the Guidelines as amended pursuant to the Fair 

Sentencing Act of 2010, Jenkins’ advisory Guidelines range is 

now 324 to 405 months’ imprisonment.1 USSG § 2D1.1. Although 

Jenkins’ current sentence of 270 months is below the amended 

Guidelines range, the district court had the discretion to 

further reduce Jenkins’ sentence to reflect the reduction 

 1 Amendment 750, which amended the Guidelines in accordance 

with the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, became retroactive on 

November 1, 2011. USSG § 1B1.10(c) (2011).
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previously granted for his substantial assistance to the 

Government. 

In denying Jenkins’ motion, however, the district 

court failed to provide an explanation for its decision. We are 

therefore unable to assess whether the district court abused its

discretion in denying Jenkins’ motion.2

 Accordingly, we vacate 

the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration of the 

§ 3582 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

 2 It is possible, for example, that the district court 

denied Jenkins’ motion under the misapprehension that § 3582 did 

not authorize a further reduction of Jenkins’ sentence. Or it 

may be that the district court fully appreciated its authority 

to further lower Jenkins’ sentence and declined to do so for 

sound reasons well within its discretion. We simply do not 

know. Our decision to vacate the district court’s order, then, 

should not be construed on remand as any indication on our part 

that we have prejudged the appropriate resolution of Jenkins’ 

§ 3582 motion. That decision is properly reserved in the first 

instance for the district court.