PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2465

In Re: PATRICIA SUSAN PFISTER,

Debtor.

-------------------------------

ROBERT F. ANDERSON, 

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

ARCHITECTURAL GLASS CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior 

District Judge; Helen E. Burris, Bankruptcy Judge. (7:12-cv01825-HMH; 09-05670-hb; 10-80162-hb)

Argued: December 11, 2013 Decided: April 17, 2014

Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published 

opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in which Judge King 

joined. Judge Shedd wrote a dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Richard I. Simons, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, P.A., 

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Norman Epps, 

III, EPPS, NELSON & EPPS, Anderson, South Carolina, for 
2

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Marilyn E. Gartley, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, 

P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
3

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

Seven months before declaring bankruptcy, Patricia Pfister 

transferred her interest in real property to Architectural Glass 

Construction, Inc. (“AGC”), a corporation wholly owned by her 

husband. After a trial, the bankruptcy court made findings of 

fact and concluded on the basis of those findings that this 

conveyance was constructively fraudulent. The bankruptcy court 

therefore ordered AGC to reimburse the bankruptcy estate in the 

amount of $43,500. The district court found no fault in the 

bankruptcy court’s findings of fact, but nonetheless reversed. 

For the reasons that follow, we reverse in part, vacate in part, 

and remand the case to the district court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The following facts were found by the bankruptcy court or 

are otherwise undisputed.

On May 10, 2001, Mrs. Pfister and her husband, Phillip 

Pfister, acquired undeveloped real property in Greer, South 

Carolina. Branch Banking & Trust (“BB&T”), as mortgagee, 

entirely financed the transaction. Under the terms of the 

mortgage, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister granted the bank a security 

interest in the property and undertook to repay the loan.
4

Originally, Mr. Pfister intended to have his wholly owned 

corporation, AGC, buy the property. The company, not Mr. and 

Mrs. Pfister, would utilize the land. An initial contract 

specified AGC as the buyer, but on the date of purchase, Mr. 

Pfister changed his mind. On the advice of his accountant, Mr. 

Pfister opted to buy the land himself, then lease the property

to AGC. This, he believed, would lower the company’s taxes, 

benefiting him as the company’s sole owner. In furtherance of 

this intent, Mr. Pfister titled the property in the name of 

himself and Mrs. Pfister. As Mr. and Mrs. Pfister both 

testified on repeated occasions, the decision to title the 

property in their names –- not AGC’s -- was considered and 

intentional.

Ultimately, AGC never paid any rent to the Pfisters. 

Instead, AGC made mortgage payments directly to the bank. The 

Pfisters did not transfer title to AGC. Thus, although the 

company paid for the land, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister remained its 

record owners.

On January 24, 2002, the Pfisters refinanced their 

mortgage. In an agreement with South Trust Bank (“South 

Trust”), the Pfisters granted South Trust a security interest in 

the property in exchange for $168,000. In contrast to the 

mortgage with BB&T, the agreement with South Trust listed AGC as 

the borrower. As a result, the company bore legal 
5

responsibility for making the loan repayments. Of course, the 

new obligation did not change the parties’ pattern of practice: 

AGC continued, as it always had, to shoulder the property’s 

mortgage expense.

Over the next six years, the property was mortgaged several 

more times. In each case, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister granted the bank 

a security interest in the property. The mortgages differed, 

however, with respect to the identity of the borrower. One 

contract specified Mr. and Mrs. Pfister as the borrowers; others 

obligated AGC. Notwithstanding the borrower listed, AGC made 

all the loan repayments.

On December 31, 2008, AGC took out an $87,000 loan from 

Greer State Bank. As with the other loan agreements, Mr. and 

Mrs. Pfister pledged the property as collateral. In preparing 

the mortgage documents, however, the bank listed AGC, not Mr. 

and Mrs. Pfister, as the mortgagor. At closing, an attorney 

realized that AGC could not grant the mortgage because the 

company was not listed on the property’s deed. To rectify the 

problem, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister deeded the property to AGC in 

exchange for ten dollars consideration. With AGC now the record 

owner, the bank processed the mortgage as drafted.

Seven months later, on July 31, 2009, Mrs. Pfister filed 

for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Some months after that, 

the bankruptcy trustee moved to set aside the transfer of her 
6

interest in the property to AGC as a constructively fraudulent 

conveyance. In his complaint, the trustee alleged that Mrs. 

Pfister’s one-half interest in the property had a value of 

$270,000, but that she had disposed of the property for nominal 

consideration. Because Mrs. Pfister was insolvent at the time 

of the transfer, the transaction was assertedly avoidable under 

11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 544(b).

After a two-day trial in which a number of witnesses

testified, including both Mr. and Mrs. Pfister, the bankruptcy 

court found in the trustee’s favor. It determined that Mrs. 

Pfister held a one-half interest in the property, which she 

transferred to AGC in December 2008 for less than “reasonably 

equivalent value.” In so holding, the court rejected AGC’s 

argument that it had always owned the property by way of a 

resulting trust. The court concluded that prior to the December 

2008 transfer, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister owned the property free from 

any interest of AGC. Accordingly, the court held that Mrs. 

Pfister’s transfer of the property to AGC at that time -- seven 

months before filing her bankruptcy petition -- was a 

constructively fraudulent, voidable transfer.

The district court reversed. It accepted the facts as 

found by the bankruptcy court, but determined that AGC’s use of

the property and payment of the mortgage compelled reversal. 

The district court reasoned that the facts found by the 
7

bankruptcy court evidenced a resulting trust, pursuant to which 

AGC held equitable title to the property and Mrs. Pfister held 

only bare legal title. Because the district court concluded 

that the interest Mrs. Pfister held lacked any value at the time 

she conveyed it, the court held that Mrs. Pfister had not made a 

voidable, constructively fraudulent conveyance in December 2008.

The trustee noted a timely appeal.

II.

A bankruptcy estate includes all the property a debtor owns 

at the moment she files for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 

Under certain conditions, the bankruptcy estate also includes 

property the debtor disposed of before declaring bankruptcy. 

Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code permits the bankruptcy trustee 

to reclaim property the debtor fraudulently transferred before 

filing her petition. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 & 548.1

The Bankruptcy Code bars both actual and constructive 

fraud. See id. § 548(a)(1). Constructive fraud, the type at 

issue here, obtains when in the two years preceding bankruptcy, 

 1 Section 544(b) provides the trustee in bankruptcy with all 

the powers of an unsecured creditor under state debt collection 

law. Because an unsecured creditor may avoid a fraudulent 

transfer in South Carolina, see S.C. Code Ann. § 27-23-10(A), 

the trustee in bankruptcy may do the same. Of course, the 

trustee may also avoid fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. 

§ 548, irrespective of what state law provides.
8

an insolvent debtor transfers an asset for less than “reasonably 

equivalent value.” Id. § 541(a)(1)(B). If the debtor so 

transfers an asset, the trustee may avoid the transaction and 

reclaim the relinquished asset. Id. The transferee must 

surrender the property or provide the bankrupt’s estate with the 

asset’s cash equivalent. Id. § 550.

Although a trustee may reclaim a property interest that the 

bankrupt debtor has owned in the past, the trustee may not 

reclaim a greater property interest than that which the debtor 

actually owned. Mid-Atl. Supply, Inc. v. Three Rivers Aluminum 

Co., 790 F.2d 1121, 1124 (4th Cir. 1986). This rule becomes 

particularly important in the context of trusts. A trust severs

the legal and equitable interests in property, allowing the 

debtor to possess either the property’s equitable interest (a 

valuable asset) or bare legal title (a valueless asset). Cf.

id. at 1125; Epworth Children’s Home v. Beasley, 616 S.E.2d 710, 

718 (S.C. 2005). Property in which the debtor holds “only legal 

title and not an equitable interest . . . becomes property of 

the [bankruptcy] estate” -- and so becomes available to satisfy 

the debtor’s obligations -- “only to the extent of the debtor’s 

[bare] legal title.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(d). The equitable 

interest, owned by another, cannot be reached by the bankrupt 

debtor’s creditors. Id.
9

Here, the parties dispute the operation of a resulting 

trust, and thus, the value of the property interest transferred 

by Mrs. Pfister to AGC. On the one hand, AGC contends that a 

resulting trust arose in its favor because it made all the 

payments on the mortgage, which provided the funds to buy the 

property. According to AGC, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister retained only 

bare legal title (an asset without significant value), and so, 

Mrs. Pfister could not -- and did not -- transfer property for 

less than its value. See Mid-Atl. Supply, 790 F.2d at 1125. On 

the other hand, the trustee contends that the ownership of the 

property involved no resulting trust. The trustee maintains 

that the legal and equitable interests in the property were 

never divided, and thus, in December 2008, seven months before

declaring bankruptcy, Mrs. Pfister transferred something of 

value to AGC, i.e., her one-half interest in the property.

After finding the facts set forth above, the bankruptcy

court determined that there was “no justification for a 

resulting trust.” The district court expressly accepted the 

factual findings of the bankruptcy court, but nonetheless 

reversed. It held that Mrs. Pfister held only bare legal title 

to a one-half interest in the property, and that AGC, by 

operation of a resulting trust, was the property’s equitable 

owner. Accordingly, the transfer to AGC was not avoidable under 

the Bankruptcy Code.
10

On appeal, we review the factual findings of the bankruptcy 

court for clear error and the legal conclusions of the 

bankruptcy court and the district court de novo. Kielisch v. 

Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kielisch), 258 F.3d 315, 319 

(4th Cir. 2003). We look to South Carolina trust law to 

determine the parties’ property rights. Butner v. United 

States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).2

III.

Under South Carolina law:

The general rule is that when real estate is conveyed 

to one person and the consideration paid by another, 

it is presumed that the party who pays the purchase 

money intended a benefit to himself, and accordingly a 

resulting trust is raised in his behalf. . . . But 

when the conveyance is taken to a wife or child, or to 

any other person for whom the purchaser is under legal 

obligation to provide, no such presumption attaches. 

On the contrary, the presumption in such case is that 

the purchase was designed as a gift or advancement to 

the person to whom the conveyance is made.

Caulk v. Caulk, 43 S.E.2d 600, 603 (S.C. 1947) (internal 

citation omitted) (emphasis added).

 2 AGC contends that whatever we do on appeal is irrelevant 

because although the trustee appealed the district court’s 

imposition of a resulting trust, he failed to contest the 

court’s ultimate holding: that AGC possessed the property’s 

equitable interest. Appellee’s Br. 19–20. We disagree. The 

trustee properly appealed the antecedent issue: the existence 

of a resulting trust. If we find no resulting trust to exist, 

the court’s derivative ruling cannot stand.
11

Here, AGC paid for property deeded to Mrs. Pfister and her 

husband, Mr. Pfister. Because Mrs. Pfister is the wife of Mr. 

Pfister, and Mr. Pfister is the sole owner of AGC, South 

Carolina law presumes that the purchase was intended as a gift 

by Mr. Pfister to Mrs. Pfister. Windsor Props., Inc. v. Dolphin 

Head Constr. Co., 498 S.E.2d 858, 861 (S.C. 1998) (applying gift 

presumption to transfer from husband’s company to wife). 

Accordingly, a court must presume that when the property was 

titled in her name, Mrs. Pfister became the full owner of a onehalf interest in the property, holding both the land’s legal and 

equitable interests. See Baptist Found. for Christian Educ. v. 

Baptist Coll. at Charleston, 317 S.E.2d 453, 458 (S.C. 1984) 

(explaining that a gift involves “the transfer of title and

beneficial ownership”) (emphasis added).3

The gift presumption, of course, “is one of fact and not of 

law.” Caulk, 43 S.E.2d at 603. An opponent to a gift may rebut 

the presumption by offering clear and convincing evidence that a 

gift was never intended. Glover v. Glover, 234 S.E.2d 488, 489 

(S.C. 1977). If the party opposing a gift can establish a 

resulting trust’s existence, the party in whose name the asset 

 3 AGC inaccurately argues that the trustee raises the 

operation of a gift presumption for the first time on appeal. 

On the contrary, the record is replete with invocations of the 

gift presumption and the transfer’s intra-family nature. That 

the district court failed to apply the presumption is 

immaterial.
12

is titled will be stripped of any equitable interest in the 

property, retaining only bare legal title. McDowell v. S.C. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 370 S.E.2d 878, 880 (S.C. 1987) (per 

curiam) (explaining that a beneficiary of a resulting trust 

holds the equitable interest in property). In that instance, 

the titleholder is viewed as the asset’s trustee, who can 

exercise control over the property only for the benefit of the 

party who holds the property’s equitable interest, i.e., the 

property’s valuable interest. Id.

A party seeking to overcome the gift presumption and 

establish a resulting trust must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that (1) it paid for the property (or committed to pay 

for the property), (2) with the intent to own it, (3) on the 

date of purchase. Moore v. McKelvey, 221 S.E.2d 780, 781 (S.C. 

1976); Surasky v. Weintraub, 73 S.E. 1029, 1031 (S.C. 1912). 

The last requirement is important. South Carolina trust law is 

clear that a resulting trust “arises at the time . . . of [the] 

purchase, or not at all.” Larisey v. Larisey, 77 S.E. 129, 130 

(S.C. 1913) (emphasis added); see also Hodges v. Hodges, 133 

S.E.2d 816, 819–20 (S.C. 1963). “[T]he trust must be coequal 

with the deed, and cannot arise from any subsequent 

transactions.” Larisey, 77 S.E. at 130. That a party pays for 

property and/or intends to own it at some point in time fails to 

establish a trust. Green v. Green, 117 S.E.2d 583, 589 (S.C. 
13

1960). For a resulting trust to arise, payment and intent must 

coincide with a deed’s execution. Larisey, 77 S.E. at 130.

Here, it is undisputed that AGC committed to pay for the 

property under post-May 2001 mortgages and intended to own the 

property after the December 2008 transfer. But deferring, as we 

must, to the facts found by the bankruptcy court, we cannot 

conclude that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that these 

requirements were not met on the date of the May 2001 purchase. 

That contention must be rejected for two reasons.

First, with respect to the payment for the property, the 

bankruptcy court found that the property’s purchase was entirely 

financed by BB&T, and thus neither the Pfisters nor AGC paid for 

the property on the date of the land’s acquisition. The 

bankruptcy court did not even find that AGC committed to pay for 

the property on this date. Accordingly, AGC did not prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that it paid for the property or 

intended to pay for it on the date of the property’s purchase.

Second, and equally important, with respect to intent, the 

bankruptcy court found (and indeed, it is undisputed) that at 

the time of the property’s purchase, the parties contemplated a 

rental arrangement. That is, AGC would lease the property from, 

and pay rent to, the owners, Mr. and Mrs. Pfister. Accordingly, 

on the date of the purchase, the parties intended that AGC would 

serve as the property’s tenant, not the property’s owner. This, 
14

of course, belies any conclusion that AGC gained ownership of 

the property on the date of purchase. If AGC wished to lease 

the property, it could not have intended to own it. Thus, AGC 

also did not prove that it intended to own the property on the 

date of acquisition.

Reaching a different result, the district court emphasized 

AGC’s habitual payment of the loans on the property. These 

payments, however, standing alone, fail to supply the basis for

a trust. South Carolina law cabins the power of courts to 

institute equitable remedies. With respect to the imposition of 

a resulting trust, a court may sever an asset’s legal and 

equitable interests only if a party commits to pay for an asset 

on the date of purchase and intends to own it on that date. See

Hodges, 133 S.E.2d at 819–20; Larisey, 77 S.E. at 130; Surasky, 

73 S.E. at 1031. Here, the bankruptcy court found no 

justification for a resulting trust. We cannot hold that in so

concluding, the bankruptcy court clearly erred.4

 4 AGC has suggested that while the initial mortgage was “in 

the individual names” of Mr. and Mrs. Pfister, the initial note 

obligated AGC. This obligation, it argues, evidences the 

corporation’s commitment to pay for the property on the date of 

the land’s acquisition. But as AGC acknowledged at oral 

argument, it never sought to admit the note into evidence. 

Accordingly, neither we nor the bankruptcy court could examine 

the note. Nor does Mr. Pfister’s testimony regarding the 

company’s obligation under the note suffice to show AGC’s

commitment. In addition to being self-serving, the testimony 

violates Federal Rule of Evidence 1002, which recognizes the 

(Continued)
15

IV.

For these reasons, we reverse the district court insofar as 

it found a resulting trust to sever Mrs. Pfister’s legal and 

equitable interests in the property. Because the district court 

found a resulting trust to exist, it did not reach other issues

presented to it. We therefore vacate the judgment of the 

district court and remand the case to it for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART, 

AND REMANDED

 

inherent unreliability of oral testimony about the contents of a 

document and so requires a party to introduce an “original 

writing” to establish the document’s contents. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 1002; Fed. R. Evid. 1004; cf. United States v. Alexander, 

326 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that the Government

had to produce an original check where it sought to establish 

the terms of the check). In any event, the note obligation 

speaks only to the first prong of the resulting trust analysis: 

a commitment to pay for the property. AGC cannot show that it 

has satisfied the test’s second prong: an intent to own the 

property. As noted above, it is undisputed that AGC initially 

intended to lease the land.
16

SHEDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I agree with the district court that there was a resulting 

trust in favor of Architectural Glass Construction (“AGC”). 

Under South Carolina law, a resulting trust is an equitable 

remedy designed “to effectuate the intent of the parties in 

certain situations where one party pays for property, in whole 

or in part, that for a different reason is titled in the name of 

another.” Bowen v. Bowen, 575 S.E.2d 553, 556 (S.C. 2003). Here, 

there is a resulting trust in favor of AGC because the testimony 

regarding the intent of the parties is that Mrs. Pfister had 

mere legal title and that AGC is and always has been the 

equitable owner of the property.

In its order, the bankruptcy court offered no analysis for 

its one-sentence conclusion that there was no resulting trust. 

However, a review of the bankruptcy court’s comments during the 

trial reveals that the bankruptcy court misunderstood the 

requirements for a resulting trust. The court stated, “Every bit 

of testimony that I heard is that [the property] was supposed to 

be deeded in the name of the individuals, and that’s not a 

mistake.” J.A. 1537 (emphasis added). The court later explained 

that it did not believe there was a resulting trust, stating 

that “[h]ere the intention of the parties was that the property 

was to be deeded in the individual names.” J.A. 1544 (emphasis 

added). Apparently, the bankruptcy court believed the 
17

intentional act of putting Mrs. Pfister’s name on the deed was 

the “intent” that proved that she was the equitable owner of the 

property. That is incorrect. 

Under South Carolina law, courts impose resulting trusts 

when property is paid for by one party but titled in the name of 

another. See Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 489 S.E.2d 472, 

475 (S.C. 1997). Thus, with real estate, a resulting trust is 

necessary only where property is deeded in the name of someone 

other than the equitable owner. It is simply incorrect to 

conclude, as the bankruptcy court did, that because the property 

was deeded in Mrs. Pfister’s name, AGC—whom the Pfisters 

intended to own the property and who indisputably paid for the 

property—is not entitled to a resulting trust. 

The controlling question is not what name is on the deed, 

as the bankruptcy court seemed to believe, but rather whom the 

parties intended to own the property at the time the property 

interest was created, that is, at the real estate closing. Here, 

the testimony clearly and convincingly indicates that AGC is, 

and was always intended to be, the equitable owner of the 

property. Mr. and Mrs. Pfister both testified that they put the 

deed in their individual names based on advice from their 

accountant to claim a rental arrangement for tax purposes, but 

that the property was intended to be owned by AGC. J.A. 1260-61, 

1353-54. AGC’s intent to own the property at the time the 
18

property interest was created is corroborated by AGC’s actions 

both before and after the interest arose.1 AGC had the pre-deed 

plat prepared in its name, J.A. 439-40, and AGC, not Mrs. 

Pfister, executed the note which supplied the purchase price for 

the property, J.A. 1474-75.2 Furthermore, the two buildings 

erected on the property were financed with loans made in AGC’s 

name, and AGC made every payment on any and all obligations 

 1 While AGC’s intent is critical at the time the property 

interest was created, its actions taken both before and after 

confirm its intent at the time the interest arose. 

2 Contrary to the majority’s assertion, we may properly 

consider evidence concerning the note despite the fact that AGC 

did not admit the note itself into evidence. Although Federal 

Rule of Evidence 1002 generally requires a party to introduce an 

“original writing” to prove the contents of a document, that 

Rule—like most evidentiary rules—is subject to waiver where, as 

here, no objection was made to the admissibility or relevance of 

evidence offered to prove the contents of the document. See, 

e.g., Ridgway v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs, Inc., 114 F.3d 94, 

98 (6th Cir. 1997). Moreover, Mr. Pfister’s testimony, while 

“self-serving,” was clearly admissible. See, e.g., U.S. v. 

Sklena, 692 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To say that evidence 

is ‘self-serving’ tells us practically nothing: a great deal of 

perfectly admissible testimony fits this description.”); In re 

Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129, 153 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Of course, the 

fact that their denials were self-serving does not mean that 

such testimony would not be admissible at trial . . . .”). In 

any event AGC also offered the testimony of Greg Sisk, 

previously a commercial lender at BB&T, regarding the contents 

of the note, J.A. 1474-75; Sisk’s testimony is not self-serving. 

Further, it is undisputed that AGC signed the note and 

obtained the money to purchase the property at closing. The 

majority assertion that AGC did not pay because BB&T financed 

the transaction is at best puzzling. 
19

attached to the property or the improvements. In re Pfister, 

2012 WL 1144540, at *1 (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 4, 2012).

This case is straightforward—the bankruptcy court was 

incorrect, and the district court was correct, in understanding 

when a resulting trust occurs. Under South Carolina law, a 

resulting trust arises in favor of AGC “to effectuate the intent 

of the parties” because AGC paid for property “that for a 

different reason [was] titled in the name of [Mrs. Pfister].” 

See Bowen, 575 S.E.2d at 556. For that reason, I would affirm 

the district court. Therefore, I dissent.