Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1701-CR-103 | August 7, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas W. Julian,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 7, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

84A01-1701-CR-103

Appeal from the Vigo Superior 

Court.

The Honorable David R. Bolk, 

Judge.

Trial Court Cause Nos.

84D03-1506-F5-1427 

84D03-1507-FC-1653

84D03-1605-F5-1364

84D03-1606-FA-1505

Friedlander, Senior Judge
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1701-CR-103 | August 7, 2017 Page 2 of 6

[1] Thomas W. Julian appeals his fifty-five-year sentence upon his convictions of 

two counts of child molesting as Level 1 felonies,

1

two counts of child molesting

as Class C felonies,

2

and one count of child exploitation as a Level 5 felony.3

[2] Julian’s sole issue on appeal is whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of his offenses and his character.

[3] In May 2015, the Indiana State Police received a flash drive that had been 

found in a gas station parking lot. The flash drive contained images and 

recordings of nude children and of children engaged in sexual acts. The person 

who submitted the flash drive to the State Police recognized Julian’s voice as 

well as the interior of Julian’s home on the flash drive images. Following an 

investigation, Julian was charged in four different cause numbers with three

counts of child molesting as Class A felonies, two counts of child molesting as 

Level 1 felonies, four counts of child molesting as Class C felonies, two counts 

of child molesting as Level 4 felonies, five counts of child exploitation as Level 

5 felonies, four counts of child solicitation as Class D felonies, two counts of 

child solicitation as Level 5 felonies, one count of rape as a Class B felony, and 

two counts of possession of child pornography as Level 6 felonies.

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2014).

2

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b) (1998) and (2007).

3

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-4 (b)(1) (2014).
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[4] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Julian pleaded guilty to two counts of child 

molesting as Level 1 felonies, two counts of child molesting as Class C felonies, 

and one count of child exploitation as a Level 5 felony, with all remaining 

charges dismissed. The parties argued sentencing to the court with the 

agreement that Julian’s aggregate sentence would be no less than twenty years 

and no more than sixty years. The trial court sentenced Julian to an aggregate 

sentence of fifty-five years. Julian now appeals.

[5] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized 

by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we determine 

that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender. Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 

Sentencing is primarily a discretionary function in which the trial court’s 

judgment should receive considerable deference. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 

111 (Ind. 2015). Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling 

evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as 

accompanied by restraint and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character 

(such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Id. 

The defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or her 

sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 2006).

[6] We begin by looking at the nature of the offenses. Julian acknowledges that his 

offenses are “disturbing.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Julian molested and exploited 

several children between 2007 and 2015 and maintained nude and sexual 

images and videos of the children on a flash drive. Julian, a man of sixty-nine 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A01-1701-CR-103 | August 7, 2017 Page 4 of 6

years at the time of sentencing, engaged in sexual intercourse or other sexual 

conduct with K.R., a child of thirteen, and H.M., when H.M. was eleven and 

twelve years of age; engaged in fondling or touching with M.M.E., a child 

under fourteen years of age, and M.S., when M.S. was between the ages of six 

and twelve; and managed or produced a performance that included sexual 

conduct by B.J.M., a child under eighteen. 

[7] With regard to the character of the offender, we note that, in sentencing Julian, 

the trial court placed great emphasis on the fact that Julian’s crimes of 

molestation and exploitation involved multiple victims, and for that reason, the 

court characterized Julian as a “serial child molester.” Sentencing Tr. pp. 30, 

31. The court also acknowledged and considered as aggravating the fact that 

Julian was in a position of trust with many, if not all, of his victims, and Julian 

concedes this fact in his brief to this Court. See Appellant’s Br. p. 8.

[8] Julian asserts that his criminal history is of limited significance. Although the 

trial court considered this a mitigating factor, we observe that while Julian

appeared to have been a law-abiding citizen for a substantial period, it was 

during this time that he engaged in acts of molestation and exploitation of 

multiple children without discovery. Julian also mentions in his brief that he 

was in the Navy and served in Vietnam; however, he testified at his sentencing 

hearing that he was discharged from the military for a conviction of possession 

of stolen property. 
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[9] Further, he claims he was diagnosed with antisocial character disorder in 1968,

for which he was never provided treatment. No evidence links Julian’s crimes 

and his disorder; in fact, there was neither mention of this disorder at the 

sentencing hearing nor a request for treatment. See Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 

1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating there must be nexus between defendant’s 

mental health and crime in question in order for mental history to be considered 

mitigating factor).

[10] Finally, Julian contends that although he accepted responsibility for his actions 

and spared the victims from having to testify at trial, he received no real benefit 

from pleading guilty because, due to his age and health problems, his sentence 

amounts to a life sentence. A guilty plea can show that a defendant accepts 

responsibility for his actions. Haggard v. State, 771 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2002), trans. denied. And, generally, a guilty plea saves judicial time and 

resources, as well as sparing the victim’s family the trauma of a trial. Sensback v. 

State, 720 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. 1999). Nevertheless, a plea of guilty is not 

automatically a significant mitigating factor that must be credited by the trial 

court; rather, the determination is fact-sensitive. Trueblood v. State, 715 N.E.2d 

1242 (Ind. 1999). “For instance, a guilty plea does not rise to the level of 

significant mitigation where the defendant has received a substantial benefit 

from the plea or where the evidence against him is such that the decision to 

plead guilty is merely a pragmatic one.” Wells v. State, 836 N.E.2d 475, 479

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Even though the trial court assigned 

significant weight to this mitigator, we note that Julian received a substantial 
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benefit in exchange for his plea of guilty in that he had the opportunity to argue 

for a sentence of only twenty years while also having a maximum cap on his 

sentence. In addition, other numerous charges, which could have resulted in a 

sentence of over 100 years, were dismissed by the State. Further, the State had 

significant evidence against him in the form of testimony from his victims and

the flash drive containing his voice and images of the interior of his home. 

Thus, it could be said that Julian’s decision to plead guilty was a pragmatic one 

for which he received a substantial benefit. 

[11] In this case, we find that sentence revision is supported neither by the nature of 

the offenses nor by character traits of the offender. Julian has failed to carry his 

burden of persuading this Court that his sentence is inappropriate. In light of 

the foregoing, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

[12] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.