In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16-3849

GOTOIMOANA SUMMERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:15-cv-00118 — Philip P. Simon, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 17, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2017

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and MANION and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Gotoimoana Summers appeals 

from the judgment of the district court affirming the Social 

Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. We affirm.
2 No. 16-3849

I.

On February 24, 2012, Gotoimoana Summers was fired 

from her job as a production-line worker in Elkhart, Indiana. 

She applied for disability insurance benefits shortly afterwards, alleging that she became disabled on the date she was 

fired. The Social Security Administration denied the application and scheduled a hearing before an administrative law 

judge at Summers’s request. Summers attended the hearing 

with counsel and testified that she was unable to work because of headaches, difficulty breathing, atrial fibrillation, 

and dizziness with blackouts. She also submitted medical evidence indicating that she suffered from depression, anxiety, 

obesity, and sleep apnea. She testified that before her most recent job, she worked for an RV supply company assembling

lightweight parts in an assembly line. Asked to describe a typical day, Summers replied, “Sometimes, I have bad days. 

Sometimes, I don’t think. Sometimes, I get depressed.”

Summers also made several inconsistent statements during the hearing, mostly about her work history and her use of 

drugs and alcohol. For instance, she initially testified that she 

left work for health reasons but then later admitted that she 

was fired. And she retracted her testimony that she had never 

used marijuana when the ALJ confronted her with records 

documenting her own previous admission to the contrary. 

Toward the end of the hearing, the ALJ asked a Vocational 

Expert whether a hypothetical individual who was limited to 
No. 16-3849 3

a restricted range of light work1 could perform any of Summers’s past jobs. The VE responded that such an individual 

could perform Summers’s past job as an assembler, as well as 

other jobs (such as inspector and hand packager, photocopy 

machine operator, and palletizer) that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy.

In November 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision concluding that despite her medical impairments, Summers retained the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform a 

substantially limited range of light work,2 including her past 

work as an assembler and the other work identified by the VE. 

The ALJ also found that Summers was “not entirely credible” 

in light of her repeated inconsistent statements. Ultimately, 

the ALJ determined that Summers was not disabled from the 

time of her alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s 

decision. 

The ALJ’s decision was upheld by the Social Security Appeals Council and became the final decision of the Commissioner. Summers appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the

 1 Light work is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 20 

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up 

to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.

2 An individual’s RFC is what she can still do despite her limitations. SSR 

96-8p. 
4 No. 16-3849

district court, and the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II.

We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it applies the correct legal standard and is supported by substantial evidence. Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Id. Our review is deferential; we will not reweigh the evidence 

or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ. Shideler v. 

Astrue, 688 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012).

Summers raises five issues on appeal. She raised the same 

issues below, and the district court very ably handled them in 

a thorough and lucid opinion. Because Summers has chosen 

to ignore the reasoning of the district court’s opinion and instead focus exclusively on the merits of the ALJ’s decision, 

we’ll keep our remarks short. See Castile, 617 F.3d at 926 (noting that an appellant who fails to address the district court’s 

analysis of the ALJ’s decision engages in a “‘risky tactic,’ especially ... where the district court [] issued a ‘thorough and persuasive opinion’”) (quoting White v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 654, 658 

(7th Cir. 2005)).

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Assessment

Summers argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is incomplete because it fails to include restrictions (like avoiding 

moving machinery and sharp objects) that would account for 
No. 16-3849 5

the risk of excessive bleeding potentially associated with her 

use of blood thinners.

We conclude that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported 

by substantial evidence. In a detailed 18-page, single-spaced 

decision, the ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical and other 

evidence and carefully considered each of Summers’s impairments and related functional deficits. The ALJ then assessed 

an RFC limiting Summers to a significantly reduced range of 

light work. For example, the ALJ found that Summers was 

substantially limited in her ability to push, pull, stand, walk, 

climb, crouch, crawl, kneel, sit, balance, and stoop; that she 

could perform only simple, repetitive tasks in a low-stress, socially undemanding work environment; and that she had to 

avoid concentrated exposure to humidity, extreme temperatures, and irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gas, and chemicals. These limitations generously account for the functional 

limitations that could reasonably be expected to result from 

Summers’s medical impairments. Summers offered no evidence that her use of blood thinners put her at risk of hemorrhaging or otherwise necessitated additional functional restrictions beyond those already incorporated in the RFC. We 

defer to the ALJ’s well-founded RFC assessment.

B. The ALJ Adequately Developed the Record

Summers next argues that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record by neglecting to inquire further into her testimony that she had “bad days.” According to Summers, further questioning may have revealed that her bad days were 

so severe or frequent as to preclude full-time work. 

This argument is frivolous. It was Summers’s burden, not 

the ALJ’s, to prove that she was disabled. See Meredith v. 
6 No. 16-3849

Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 1987); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1512(a)(1). The ALJ extensively questioned Summers at 

the hearing and gave her every opportunity to meet that burden by elaborating on the nature, frequency, and intensity of 

her symptoms and related functional limitations. Moreover, 

because Summers was represented by counsel at the hearing, 

she is presumed to have made her best case before the ALJ. 

Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir. 2007); cf. Nelson v. 

Apfel, 131 F.3d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen the claimant 

is unrepresented by counsel, the ALJ has a duty to ‘scrupulously 

and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all 

relevant facts.’”) (emphasis added). In short, the record includes ample evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision, and 

Summers has not identified any missing evidence that renders the record incomplete. Summers’s “[m]ere conjecture or 

speculation that additional evidence might have been obtained in the case is insufficient to warrant a remand.” See 

Binion v. Shalala, 13 F.3d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1994).

C. The ALJ Properly Considered Summers’s Obesity

Summers also argues that the ALJ failed to adequately 

consider her obesity. We see no basis for this argument. The 

ALJ identified Summers’s obesity as a severe impairment and 

thoroughly discussed its functionally limiting effects 

throughout the decision. The ALJ noted that Summers was 

5’2’’ and weighed at least 270 pounds since her alleged onset 

date, that her BMI was between 49 and 54, and that she was 

advised by her physicians to exercise and eat a healthy diet to 

lose weight. The ALJ also explicitly stated that the various 

postural and exertional limitations of the RFC “account for 

periods of shortness of breath, and [] recognize the mobility 
No. 16-3849 7

challenges that likely arise from obesity.” The ALJ even disagreed with the state-agency consultative physician’s opinion 

that Summers could perform work at the medium exertional 

level, explaining that the “extreme” “level of [Summers’s] 

obesity alone would likely result in decreased stamina that 

would make work at [the medium] level of exertion a challenge.” Finally, the ALJ noted that Summers weighed over 280 

pounds well before her alleged onset date but was still able to 

work during that time despite her obesity. The ALJ adequately considered the limiting effect of Summers’s obesity in 

combination with her other impairments, and reasonably 

concluded that Summers was capable of a reduced range of 

light work. See SSR 02-1p.

D. The ALJ Properly Found That Summers Was Not Temporarily Disabled

Summers argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that 

she was at least temporarily disabled from February 24, 2012,

to May 21, 2013.3 Summers suggests that the ALJ failed to consider her heart problems during that time.

This argument is without merit. The ALJ meticulously discussed the evidence regarding Summers’s heart problems

(and other health issues) from February 2012 up through the 

date of the ALJ’s decision. For example, the ALJ noted that, 

though Summers was diagnosed with atrial fibrillation in 

February 2012, she had no heart attacks or coronary artery 

disease, her cardiac exams showed mostly benign results, and 

her condition was controlled when she took her medications 

 3 A claimant may receive an award of temporary benefits if she is disabled 

for 12 months or longer, even if she later recovers sufficient health to return to work. See generally 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594.
8 No. 16-3849

as prescribed. For these reasons and the reasons discussed in 

the district court’s opinion, substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s decision that Summers was not disabled at any time after she was fired from her job in February 2012.

E. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility 

Finding

Summers next takes issue with the ALJ’s partially adverse 

credibility finding. She argues that the ALJ should have found 

her credible in light of her “consistent and arduous work history.”

We give the ALJ’s credibility finding “special deference” 

and will overturn it only if it is “patently wrong.” Eichstadt v. 

Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2008). As the ALJ noted,

Summers made a number of inconsistent statements concerning such questions as (1) when she stopped smoking; (2) when 

she stopped drinking alcohol and how much she used to 

drink; (3) whether she ever used marijuana; (4) whether (and 

why) she was fired from her most recent job; and (5) whether 

she returned to work after her alleged onset date. The ALJ 

added that Summers’s allegations of disabling limitations 

were also frequently inconsistent with the objective medical 

evidence. To name just one example among many, the ALJ 

noted that Summers’s allegations of dizziness, headaches, and 

blackouts conflicted with medical records showing that she 

consistently denied those symptoms. The ALJ properly took 

these inconsistencies into consideration when concluding that 

Summers’s subjective complaints of disabling limitations 

were “not entirely credible.” 

The ALJ did not commit reversible error by failing to explicitly discuss Summers’s work history when evaluating her 
No. 16-3849 9

credibility. See Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2016)

(“An ALJ is not statutorily required to consider a claimant’s 

work history[.]”). Although a consistent work history weighs 

in favor of a positive credibility finding, it is still just “one factor among many, and it is not dispositive.” Loveless v. Colvin, 

810 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016). See also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 

F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n ALJ’s adequate discussion 

of the issues need not contain a complete written evaluation 

of every piece of evidence.”) (internal marks omitted). 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED.