IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MARCO KEON RANDLES, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0307

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2011-149985-001

The Honorable Edward W. Bassett, Judge

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By David Simpson

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Appellant

OPINION

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Donn Kessler joined.
STATE v RANDLES

Opinion of the Court

2

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Marco Keon Randles appeals his conviction and 

sentence for first degree premeditated murder. Randles raises two issues

on appeal. First, Randles contends that Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

section 13-751, which permits a juvenile to be sentenced to life in prison 

without the possibility of release on parole prior to serving 25 years, is 

unconstitutional. Second, Randles claims the trial court abused its 

discretion by precluding his expert from testifying about the alleged effects 

of alcohol consumed by the victim. For the reasons set forth below, we 

affirm Randles’ conviction and sentence as modified.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In September 2011, Randles, who was seventeen-years old at 

the time, murdered the victim by hitting him repeatedly in the head with a 

brick. The state subsequently charged Randles with first degree 

premeditated murder. 

¶3 The jury found Randles guilty of first degree murder. The 

trial court sentenced Randles to life in prison without the possibility of 

parole until he served a minimum term of 25 years pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-

751. Randles timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Unconstitutional Sentence

¶4 We review claims regarding the constitutionality of a criminal 

sentencing statute de novo. State v. Bomar, 199 Ariz. 472, 475, ¶ 5, 19 P.3d 

613, 616 (App. 2001); see State v. Stummer, 219 Ariz. 137, 141, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 

1043, 1047 (2008) (constitutionality of statutes reviewed de novo); State v. 

Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007) (same).

¶5 In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012), the United 

States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars sentencing 

juveniles to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility 

of parole. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 15. Randles, a 

juvenile, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s 

verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against defendant. State v. 

Vandever, 211 Ariz. 206, 207 n.2, 119 P.3d 473, 474 n.2 (App. 2005).
STATE v RANDLES

Opinion of the Court

3

until he served 25 years. A.R.S. § 13-751(A) (2011). Although Randles is 

eligible for release on parole after serving 25 years, at the time of his 

sentencing, Arizona’s sentencing statutes had abolished parole and, 

therefore, did not provide a mechanism for imposing parole. See A.R.S. § 

41-1604.09(I) (2011) (stating that parole is only available “to persons who 

commit[ed] felony offenses before January 1, 1994”). Thus, based on Miller, 

Randles argues that his sentence is unconstitutional. 

¶6 We note that at the time of Randles’ sentencing, he was 

eligible for release by “commutation” of his sentence by the Board of 

Executive Clemency. See A.R.S. § 31-402 (listing procedures for 

commutation). However, the United States Supreme Court held in Solem v. 

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 282, 300-01 (1983) that a statutory scheme which only 

provides for release by commutation does not provide a meaningful 

opportunity for release. Thus, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 57, 79 (2010), 

the Court stated that Florida’s statutory scheme, which had abolished 

parole for life sentences and only provided release based on executive 

clemency, did not provide a meaningful opportunity for a juvenile to obtain 

release from a life sentence. 

¶7 On April 22, 2014, after Randles was sentenced, the 

Governor signed H.B. 2593 into law. H.B. 2593, 51st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. 

(Ariz. 2014). That legislation adds A.R.S. § 13-716, which provides in 

relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other law, a person who is sentenced to life 

imprisonment with the possibility of release after serving a 

minimum number of calendar years for an offense that was 

committed before the person attained eighteen years of age is 

eligible for parole on completion of service of the minimum 

sentence, regardless of whether the offense was committed on or 

after January 1, 1994. (Emphasis added).

In addition, H.B. 2593 amends A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I), stating that parole 

applies to “[a] person who is sentenced to life imprisonment and who is 

eligible for parole pursuant to section 13-716.” A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I)(2).

¶8 If statutory “language is clear and unambiguous, we must 

give effect to that language and need not employ other rules of statutory 

construction.” State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 333, 942 P.2d 1159, 1165 (1997.) 

In construing the subject statutes, we give every word and phrase its “usual 

and commonly understood meaning unless the legislature clearly intended 

a different meaning.” Bilke v. State, 206 Ariz. 462, 464-65, ¶ 11, 80 P.3d 269, 
STATE v RANDLES

Opinion of the Court

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271-72 (2003) (quoting State v. Korzep, 165 Ariz. 490, 493, 799 P.2d 831, 834 

(1990)).

¶9 Here, the language in A.R.S. § 13-716 and A.R.S. § 41-

1604.09(I)(2) satisfies the requirements of the Eighth Amendment by 

expressly providing that juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment

shall be eligible for parole upon completion of their minimum sentence 

“regardless of whether the offense was committed on or after January 1, 

1994.” A.R.S. § 13-716; see A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I)(2). This language is in 

agreement with the legislative history in passing H.B. 2593. See House 

Summary, H.B. 2593, 51st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (“HB 2593 . . . states 

that a person sentenced to life in prison for an offense committed before 18 

years of age is eligible for parole upon completion of the minimum 

sentence.”). 

¶10 This change in the law is applicable to all such sentences, and 

accordingly, applies retroactively to Randles’ sentence in this case.2 See,e.g., 

State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 602, 886 P.2d 1354, 1358 (1994) (holding that 

defendant’s challenge to execution by lethal gas as cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Eighth Amendment was rendered moot by statutory 

change permitting option of execution by lethal injection). Pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 13-4037, we therefore modify Randles’ sentence in accordance with 

the recently enacted legislation. Accordingly, Randles’ constitutional claim 

is moot.

II. Preclusion of Expert Opinion on Effects of Alcohol

¶11 At trial, Randles maintained he acted in self-defense. Randles 

based this defense in part on the victim’s autopsy report. According to the 

report, the victim’s blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) was 0.13; in 

addition, the report showed the presence of cocaine metabolites in the 

victim’s system. Based on this evidence, Randles argued that the victim’s 

cocaine and alcohol consumption made him violent and aggressive, thereby 

justifying Randles’ use of lethal force in self-defense. 

¶12 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prevent 

Randles’ expert witness, Mark Stoltman, a forensic toxicologist, from 

testifying about the effects of cocaine and alcohol on the victim. Stoltman’s 

 

2 The Governor signed H.B. 2593 on April 22, 2014, and the Second 

Regular Session for the Fifty-first Legislature ended April 24, 2014; as a 

result, the effective date for the new law is July 24, 2014. Ariz. Const. art. 

IV, pt. 1, § 1(3). 
STATE v RANDLES

Opinion of the Court

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proffered testimony included his opinion that consumption of alcohol and 

cocaine can, as a general matter, make people aggressive, paranoid and 

violent. In response to the State’s motion, Randles argued that Stoltman’s 

testimony supported his assertion that the victim was the aggressor, and

therefore was essential to his claim of self-defense. 

¶13 The court held a pretrial hearing at which Stoltman testified.

After the hearing, the court ruled that Stoltman could testify about the 

effects of cocaine, including the “crash phase” and “withdrawal 

symptoms,” such as “hyper somnolence, irritability, psychosis, and 

aggression.” However, the court precluded Stoltman from testifying about

the effects of alcohol. The court based its decision on State v. Plew, 155 Ariz. 

44, 745 P.2d 102 (1987), which held that testimony as to the effects of alcohol 

was not a proper subject for expert testimony, because the subject was 

“generally thought to be a matter of common knowledge.” Id. at 47, 745 

P.2d at 105.

¶14 On the first day of trial, defense counsel asked the court to 

reconsider its decision and also provided the court with a chart concerning 

the stages of alcohol intoxication prepared by Dr. Kurt M. Dubowski, Ph.D., 

of the University of Oklahoma, Department of Medicine. The court 

affirmed its prior ruling, and consequently Stoltman testified only as to the 

potential effects of cocaine. 

¶15 On appeal, Randles argues that the trial court’s ruling 

precluding Stoltman’s testimony as to the effects of alcohol was reversible 

error. We disagree.

¶16 We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, 49, ¶ 29, 

97 P.3d 865, 874 (2004). One of the primary concerns in the admission of 

expert testimony is “whether the subject of inquiry is one of such common 

knowledge that people of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as 

intelligently as the expert witness or whether, on the other hand, the matter 

is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert 

would assist the trier of fact.” State v. Dixon, 153 Ariz. 151, 155, 735 P.2d 

761, 765 (1987); see also, Ariz. R. Evid. 702(a) (expert testimony is admissible 

if expert’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 

the trier of fact . . . understand the evidence or . . . determine a fact in issue”).

¶17 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding Stoltman’s testimony as to the effects of alcohol. Outside of the 

driving while intoxicated context, our supreme court has consistently 
STATE v RANDLES

Opinion of the Court

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explained that expert testimony regarding the effects of alcohol intoxication 

is generally inadmissible because the subject is one that is within the 

common knowledge and experience of most jurors. Plew, 155 Ariz. at 47, 

745 P.2d at 105 (citation omitted) (stating that the effect of alcohol 

intoxication is a subject of common knowledge and not a proper subject for 

expert testimony); see also State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 407, 844 P.2d 566, 

574 (1992) (holding that the general effects of alcohol on the human body 

and a person’s ability to reason are within the common knowledge and 

experience of a jury; as a result, no expert testimony is necessary to assist 

the trier of fact); State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 514-15, 733 P.2d 1090, 1097-98 

(1987) (holding that trial court properly excluded expert testimony in a 

sexual assault case; court precluded expert testimony that alcohol 

consumption by the victim may have reduced victim’s sexual inhibitions 

and increased his sexual aggressiveness); State v. Means, 115 Ariz. 502, 504, 

566 P.2d 303, 305 (1977) (doctor’s testimony that alcohol affects human 

behavior “sometime[s] very adversely” is a matter of common experience 

and knowledge and a jury could intelligently determine issue based on its 

own ordinary judgment and practical experience).

¶18 Moreover, despite the trial court’s ruling, Randles suffered no 

prejudice. The jury heard a considerable amount of testimony about the 

victim’s consumption of alcohol and cocaine. The victim’s aunt testified 

that both the victim and Randles had consumed alcohol while at the party. 

The jury learned from the State’s forensic pathologist that the victim had a 

BAC of 0.13 at the time of death and that he had also ingested cocaine at 

some time prior to that. On cross-examination, the pathologist also noted 

that from the alcohol level in the victim’s blood and urine, it appeared that 

the victim had probably been “higher” and was more likely “going down” 

to the 0.13 BAC and “could have been drunker” leading up to the crime. In 

addition, based on Stoltman’s expert testimony regarding the effects of 

cocaine, the jury also had evidence that someone coming down after 

cocaine use could experience “nervousness, agitation, irritability, paranoia, 

[and] even delusions.”

¶19 Based on this evidence, Randles was able to support his claim 

of self-defense by arguing that the victim’s ingestion of both cocaine and 

alcohol had made the victim the aggressor. This evidence, in combination 

with the common knowledge that alcohol can cause belligerence and 

aggressiveness, allowed the jury to fully evaluate Randles’ self-defense 

claim. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused

its discretion in precluding the expert testimony on the effects of alcohol. 
STATE v RANDLES

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III. DNA Testing Fee

¶20 The trial court ordered Randles to submit to DNA testing and 

to “pay the applicable fee for the cost of that testing in accordance with 

A.R.S. § 13-610.” This court recently held that A.R.S. § 13-610 does not 

require a convicted defendant to pay for the costs of his DNA testing. State 

v. Reyes, 232 Ariz. 468, 472, ¶¶ 11-13, 307 P.3d 35, 39 (App. 2013). We 

therefore vacate the order requiring Randles to pay for the cost of DNA 

testing. 

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Randles’ conviction. We 

also affirm Randles’ sentence as modified.