(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SMITH v. CAIN, WARDEN 

CERTIORARI TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT OF 

LOUISIANA, ORLEANS PARISH
 

No. 10–8145. Argued November 8, 2011—Decided January 10, 2012 

Petitioner Juan Smith was convicted of first-degree murder based on

the testimony of a single eyewitness. During state postconviction relief proceedings, Smith obtained police files containing statements by

the eyewitness contradicting his testimony. Smith argued that the

prosecution’s failure to disclose those statements violated Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U. S. 83. Brady held that due process bars a State

from withholding evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. See id., at 87. The state 

trial court rejected Smith’s Brady claim, and the Louisiana Court of 

Appeal and Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. 

Held: Brady requires that Smith’s conviction be reversed. The State

does not dispute that the eyewitness’s statements were favorable to

Smith and that those statements were not disclosed to Smith. Under 

Brady, evidence is material if there is a “reasonable probability that, 

had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. 449, 469–470. A “reasonable probability” means that the likelihood of a different result is 

great enough to “undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” 

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 434. Evidence impeaching an eyewitness’s testimony may not be material if the State’s other evidence

is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict. United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112–113, and n. 21. Here, however, the eyewitness’s testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime, 

and the eyewitness’s undisclosed statements contradicted his testimony. The eyewitness’s statements were plainly material, and the 

State’s failure to disclose those statements to the defense thus violated Brady. Pp. 2–4. 
 

 

2 SMITH v. CAIN 

Syllabus 

Reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, 

KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–8145 

JUAN SMITH, PETITIONER v. BURL CAIN, WARDEN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL 

DISTRICT COURT OF LOUISIANA 

[January 10, 2012]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Court. 

The State of Louisiana charged petitioner Juan Smith

with killing five people during an armed robbery. At 

Smith’s trial a single witness, Larry Boatner, linked Smith 

to the crime. Boatner testified that he was socializing at a 

friend’s house when Smith and two other gunmen entered 

the home, demanded money and drugs, and shortly thereafter began shooting, resulting in the death of five of

Boatner’s friends. In court Boatner identified Smith as 

the first gunman to come through the door. He claimed 

that he had been face to face with Smith during the initial

moments of the robbery. No other witnesses and no physical evidence implicated Smith in the crime.

The jury convicted Smith of five counts of first-degree

murder. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed Smith’s

conviction. State v. Smith, 797 So. 2d 193 (2001). The 

Louisiana Supreme Court denied review, as did this 

Court. 2001–2416 (La. 9/13/02), 824 So. 2d 1189; 537 U. S.

1201 (2003).

Smith then sought postconviction relief in the state 

courts. As part of his effort, Smith obtained files from the 
 

 

2 SMITH v. CAIN 

Opinion of the Court 

police investigation of his case, including those of the lead 

investigator, Detective John Ronquillo. Ronquillo’s notes

contain statements by Boatner that conflict with his testimony identifying Smith as a perpetrator. The notes from 

the night of the murder state that Boatner “could not . . . 

supply a description of the perpetrators other then [sic]

they were black males.” App. 252–253. Ronquillo also

made a handwritten account of a conversation he had with 

Boatner five days after the crime, in which Boatner said 

he “could not ID anyone because [he] couldn’t see faces” 

and “would not know them if [he] saw them.” Id., at 308. 

And Ronquillo’s typewritten report of that conversation 

states that Boatner told Ronquillo he “could not identify

any of the perpetrators of the murder.” Id., at 259–260. 

Smith requested that his conviction be vacated, arguing, 

inter alia, that the prosecution’s failure to disclose Ronquillo’s notes violated this Court’s decision in Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). The state trial court rejected Smith’s Brady claim, and the Louisiana Court of 

Appeal and Louisiana Supreme Court denied review. We 

granted certiorari, 564 U. S. ___ (2011), and now reverse.

Under Brady, the State violates a defendant’s right to

due process if it withholds evidence that is favorable to the

defense and material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment. See 373 U. S., at 87. The State does not dispute

that Boatner’s statements in Ronquillo’s notes were favorable to Smith and that those statements were not disclosed to him. The sole question before us is thus whether 

Boatner’s statements were material to the determination 

of Smith’s guilt. We have explained that “evidence is 

‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U. S. 449, 469–470 (2009). A 

reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant 

“would more likely than not have received a different 
 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

verdict with the evidence,” only that the likelihood of a 

different result is great enough to “undermine[] confidence

in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 

419, 434 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is

strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict. See 

United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112–113, and n. 21 

(1976). That is not the case here. Boatner’s testimony 

was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime. And 

Boatner’s undisclosed statements directly contradict his

testimony: Boatner told the jury that he had “[n]o doubt” 

that Smith was the gunman he stood “face to face” with on 

the night of the crime, but Ronquillo’s notes show Boatner 

saying that he “could not ID anyone because [he] couldn’t 

see faces” and “would not know them if [he] saw them.” 

App. 196, 200, 308. Boatner’s undisclosed statements 

were plainly material.

The State and the dissent advance various reasons why

the jury might have discounted Boatner’s undisclosed 

statements. They stress, for example, that Boatner made

other remarks on the night of the murder indicating that

he could identify the first gunman to enter the house, but 

not the others. That merely leaves us to speculate about 

which of Boatner’s contradictory declarations the jury

would have believed. The State also contends that Boatner’s statements made five days after the crime can be 

explained by fear of retaliation. Smith responds that the 

record contains no evidence of any such fear. Again, the 

State’s argument offers a reason that the jury could have 

disbelieved Boatner’s undisclosed statements, but gives us

no confidence that it would have done so. 

The police files that Smith obtained in state postconviction proceedings contain other evidence that Smith contends is both favorable to him and material to the verdict. 

Because we hold that Boatner’s undisclosed statements 
 

4 SMITH v. CAIN 

Opinion of the Court 

alone suffice to undermine confidence in Smith’s conviction, we have no need to consider his arguments that the 

other undisclosed evidence also requires reversal under 

Brady. 

The judgment of the Orleans Parish Criminal District

Court of Louisiana is reversed, and the case is remanded 

for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 10–8145 

JUAN SMITH, PETITIONER v. BURL CAIN, WARDEN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE ORLEANS PARISH CRIMINAL 

DISTRICT COURT OF LOUISIANA 

[January 10, 2012]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

The Court holds that Juan Smith is entitled to a new 

murder trial because the State, in violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), did not disclose that the 

eyewitness who identified Smith at trial stated shortly

after the murders that he could not identify any of the 

perpetrators. I respectfully dissent. In my view, Smith

has not shown a “reasonable probability” that the jury 

would have been persuaded by the undisclosed evidence. 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U. S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion 

of Blackmun, J.). That materiality determination must be

made “in the context of the entire record,” United States v. 

Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976), and “turns on the cumulative effect of all such evidence suppressed by the government,” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 421 (1995).

Applying these principles, I would affirm the judgment 

of the Louisiana trial court. 

I 

The evidence presented at trial showed the following 

facts. On March 1, 1995, Larry Boatner and several 

friends gathered at Rebe Espadron’s home in New Orleans. Boatner and others were drinking and talking in 

the kitchen when Boatner heard the loud sound of a car 

without a muffler outside. As Boatner opened the kitchen’s

outside door to investigate the noise, armed men pushed 
 

 

 

 

2 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

their way through the door, demanding drugs and money.

Tr. 153–154 (Dec. 5, 1995). The first man though the door 

put a gun in Boatner’s face and pushed him backwards. 

Id., at 154–155. The men initially ordered Boatner and 

his friends to the floor, but then ordered Boatner to stand 

up. At that time, the man who had been the first one 

through the door placed his gun under Boatner’s chin. Id., 

at 156–157. When Boatner asked what the men wanted 

him to do, the first man struck Boatner on the back of the 

head with his gun, knocking Boatner back to the ground. 

Id., at 157–158. 

After hearing the commotion, Espadron emerged from a 

back bedroom, where she had been when the men entered 

the house. As Espadron opened an inside door leading to

the kitchen, a man with a “covering” over his mouth pointed his gun at her face and ordered her to the floor. Id., at 

70–71. Disregarding his command, Espadron ran back 

toward the bedroom, at which point the intruders opened 

fire. Id., at 71–72, 159. 

When the shooting was over, four people lay dead. A 

fifth person, 17-year-old Shelita Russell, was mortally 

wounded and died later at the hospital. Of those originally gathered in the house, the only survivors were Boatner, 

who suffered a severe laceration to his head from the first 

man’s blow but was otherwise uninjured; Espadron, who 

escaped unharmed; and Reginald Harbor, who had remained in a back bedroom during the shooting. The police

also found a man named Phillip Young at the scene.

Young was alive but had suffered a gunshot wound to the 

head. Because Boatner, Espadron, and Harbor had never 

seen Young before, the police surmised that Young had 

been one of the perpetrators.1 

—————— 

1Young was indicted along with Smith for the murders, but he was 

deemed incompetent to stand trial due to the brain damage he suffered 
 

 

 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

New Orleans police officer Joseph Narcisse was a first

responder to the scene of the shooting. He testified at trial 

that he encountered Boatner in the bathroom of Espadron’s home, where Boatner was attempting to care for the 

laceration to his head. According to Narcisse, “Mr. Boatner . . . had let inside the perpetrators and did see them.” 

Id., at 21 (Dec. 4, 1995). Narcisse further explained that 

Boatner “had a description” of the person that he saw, the

details of which Narcisse could not recall. Id., at 32. 

Detective John Ronquillo, the lead investigator of the 

shootings, testified that Boatner had described the first

man through the kitchen door as having a “short-type

haircut,” “a lot of golds in his teeth,” and “brown-ski[n].”2 

Id., at 115 (Dec. 5, 1995). Ronquillo further testified that

Boatner could describe no other perpetrator, but that

Boatner had viewed the first man twice: once when the 

man initially came through the door and again when

Boatner was ordered to stand up and the man held a gun 

to his chin. Id., at 117–118. 

Ronquillo also testified that, during the four months 

following the shootings, Boatner viewed 14 six-person

photograph arrays of potential suspects—only one of 

which contained a picture of Smith. Id., at 89–100. Three 

weeks after the crime, Ronquillo presented Boatner with 

one of the arrays that did not include a picture of Smith. 

Ronquillo recalled that Boatner noted that one man in the

array had a “similar haircut” and “a similar expression on 

his face” as the “gentleman that came into the house 

initially with the gun that [Boatner] confronted,” but that 

—————— 

as a result of being shot. 1 Record 49. 2 “Golds” are permanent or removable mouth jewelry, also referred to 

as “grills.” See Mouth Jewelry Wearers Love Gleam of the Grill, South 

Florida Sun-Sentinel, Feb. 4, 2007, p. 5, 2007 WLNR 2187080. See also 

A. Westbrook, Hip Hoptionary 59 (2002) (defining a “grill” as a “teeth 

cover, usually made of gold and diamonds”). 
 

 

4 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Boatner “was positive this wasn’t the individual.” Id., at 

97; see also 5 Record 828. A few months later, Ronquillo

presented Boatner with the array that included a photograph of Smith. Tr. 99–101 (Dec. 5, 1995). Ronquillo

testified that Boatner identified Smith “immediately,” 

stating, “‘This is it. I’ll never forget that face.’” Id., at 

100. Of the 84 photographs that Boatner viewed, Smith’s 

photograph was the only one that Boatner identified. 

Boatner identified Smith again when he was called to

the stand during Smith’s trial. Boatner testified that 

Smith’s face was the “[s]ame face,” id., at 174, and that 

Smith’s mouth was the “[s]ame mouth” “full of gold,” ibid., 

as that of the first man who came through the kitchen

door on the night of the attack. Boatner also testified that 

Smith’s hair at trial was “shaved on the sides” as it was 

during the crime, but that “the top was a little bit lower”

at the time of the murders. Id., at 165. Boatner explained that, during the attack, he had focused on the first

man through the door—who was unmasked—but that he 

“didn’t notice” the faces of any of the other assailants or 

whether they were masked. Id., at 154. On crossexamination, Boatner testified that he had described the 

first man’s build, haircut, and gold teeth jewelry to the

police. Id., at 178. 

Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Smith of firstdegree murder. Following the conclusion of direct review, 

Smith petitioned the trial court for postconviction relief. 

Smith argued that the State had failed to disclose various

police notes revealing favorable evidence material to 

Smith’s guilt. As relevant here, those items include pretrial statements by Boatner; statements by victim Shelita

Russell and Espadron’s neighbor, Dale Mims; a pretrial 

statement by firearms examiner Kenneth Leary; statements by cosuspect Robert Trackling and Trackling’s 

fellow inmate, Eric Rogers; and a statement by cosuspect 

Phillip Young. After holding a 4-day evidentiary hearing, 
 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the postconviction judge—who had also presided over 

Smith’s 2-day trial—denied Smith’s Brady claims. 

Like the postconviction court below, I conclude that

Smith is not entitled to a new trial under Brady. In my

view, Smith has not established a reasonable probability 

that the cumulative effect of this evidence would have 

caused the jury to change its verdict. 

II
 

A 

Smith first identifies two undisclosed statements by 

Boatner, which the Court concludes are “plainly material.” 

Ante, at 3. First, a note by Ronquillo, documenting a 

conversation he had with Boatner at the scene, states that 

Boatner “could not . . . supply a description of the perpetrators other th[a]n they were black males.” 5 Record 809. 

Second, a handwritten note by Ronquillo, documenting a

phone conversation he had with Boatner on March 6, five

days after the murders, states that “Boatner . . . could not

ID anyone because couldn’t see faces . . . glanced at 1st 

one—saw man—through door—can’t tell if had—faces 

covered didn’t see anyone . . . Could not ID—would not 

know them if—I saw them.” 13 id., at 2515. Ronquillo’s

typed summary of this note states that Boatner advised 

him that he “could not identify any perpetrators of the

murder.” 5 id., at 817. 

Smith is correct that these undisclosed statements could 

have been used to impeach Boatner and Ronquillo during

cross-examination. But the statements are not material 

for purposes of Brady because they cannot “reasonably be

taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to

undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U. S., at 

435. When weighed against the substantial evidence that 

Boatner had opportunities to view the first perpetrator, 

offered consistent descriptions of him on multiple occasions, and even identified him as Smith, the undisclosed 
 

 

6 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

statements do not warrant a new trial. 

The evidence showed that, notwithstanding Ronquillo’s

on-scene note, Boatner offered a description of the perpetrator at the scene. Officer Narcisse testified that Boatner 

provided him with a description of the perpetrator that

Boatner saw. Narcisse’s testimony thus corroborated

Boatner’s trial testimony that he saw the first man and 

described him to police.3 Narcisse’s testimony also mitigated the impeachment value of Ronquillo’s on-scene note

by indicating that, although Boatner may have provided

no detailed description to Ronquillo at the scene, Boatner 

had described the first man to another officer.4 

In any event, Ronquillo’s notes reflect that Boatner 

provided a description of the first perpetrator at the police 

station only a few hours after the shootings occurred. Tr. 

403 (Jan. 22, 2009). Boatner was asked if he could “describe the subjects wh[o] shot the people in the house.” 5 

Record 866. He responded: “I can tell you about one, the 

one who put the pistol in my face, he was a black male 

with a low cut, gold[s] in his mouth . . . about my complexion, brown skinned.” Ibid. When asked, “[Y]ou say you 

—————— 

3 In a pretrial hearing, Boatner testified that he “gave a description

to the officer that came to the scene.” Tr. 24 (Oct. 27, 1995). Boatner 

responded negatively when asked whether this officer was Detective 

Ronquillo. Ibid. Boatner further testified that he told the officer that 

the first man through the door was “heavy built with his hair with a

fade, with a little small top with a lot of gold teeth in his mouth.” Ibid. 

That testimony was consistent with the testimony that Boatner and

Officer Narcisse gave at trial. 4Moreover, Boatner’s reticence toward Ronquillo at the scene of the 

crime was entirely understandable. As Ronquillo noted at the postconviction hearing, “there were dead bodies everywhere,” and Boatner was

“a little shook up.” Id., at 402–403 (Jan. 22, 2009). Similarly, Narcisse

testified at trial that Boatner, while “not as frantic” as Espadron, was a

“bit emotional” when Narcisse encountered him at the scene. Id., at 34 

(Dec. 4, 1995). 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

can’t describe any of the other shooters besides the one

who put the gun in your face after you opened the door,”

Boatner replied, “No, I can’t.” Ibid. In his brief, Smith 

cites this station house statement as an example of favorable, undisclosed evidence. But this statement actually 

corroborates Boatner’s trial testimony that he saw and 

described the first perpetrator to police and that he did not 

get a good look at the other assailants. Moreover, the 

description Boatner provided was consistent with Smith’s 

appearance. The Court completely ignores Boatner’s

station house statement, but our cases instruct us to 

evaluate “the net effect of the evidence withheld by the 

State” in assessing materiality. See Kyles, supra, at 421– 

422. 

The evidence not only shows that Boatner described the

first perpetrator twice in the immediate aftermath of the 

crime, but also that Boatner described him again three

weeks later when he viewed a photograph array and eliminated a similar-looking individual. The evidence before 

the jury further indicated that, several months after the 

crime, Boatner confidently identified Smith in an array,

after evincing a discriminating, careful eye over a 4-month

investigative period. What is more, the reliability of 

Boatner’s out-of-court identification was extensively tested

during cross-examination at Smith’s trial. In particular,

Boatner was asked whether the fact that he saw Smith’s 

picture in a newspaper article naming Smith as a suspect

had tainted his identification. Boatner did not waiver, 

responding, “I picked out the person I seen come in that

house that held a gun to my head and under my chin and 

the person that was there when all my friends died.” Tr. 

190 (Dec. 5, 1995). That Boatner credibly rejected defense 

counsel’s “suggestion” theory is supported by the fact that

Boatner did not identify cosuspect Robert Trackling—

whose photograph was included in a separate array shown 

to Boatner on the same day that Boatner identified 
 

8 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Smith—even though Trackling’s picture was next to 

Smith’s in the same newspaper article. 5 Record 833, 835. 

When weighed against Boatner’s repeated and consistent descriptions and confident out-of-court and in-court

identifications, Boatner’s March 6 statement is also immaterial. As an initial matter, Ronquillo’s note of his March 

6 conversation with Boatner contains an internal contradiction that undercuts its impeachment value. Although

the note states that Boatner “didn’t see anyone,” it also

states that Boatner “glanced at 1st one—saw man—

through door.” 13 id., at 2515. The latter part is consistent with Boatner’s repeated statements that he only 

saw the first man through the door. Moreover, the jury

would have evaluated any equivocation in Boatner’s 

statement in light of the fact that he made it a mere five

days after a traumatic shooting, when the perpetrators

were still at large. The jury would have considered Boatner’s trial testimony that, following the murders of his

friends, he began having nightmares, had difficulty sleeping, quit his job, and began drinking heavily—so much so 

that he checked into a hospital for substance abuse treatment and grief counseling. Tr. 162–163, 170–171, 182 

(Dec. 5, 1995). Any impeachment value in the March 6 

note would have been further mitigated by the fact that,

as Ronquillo explained, “on the night of the incident

[Boatner] said that he could [identify someone] and he 

gave a description that was very close to Mr. Smith’s 

description.” Id., at 401 (Jan. 22, 2009). And, following 

his March 6 conversation with Ronquillo, Boatner viewed

numerous photograph arrays, described the first perpetrator, and ultimately identified him as Smith.

Of course, had the jury been presented with Ronquillo’s 

notes of Boatner’s on-scene and March 6 statements, it 

might have believed that Boatner could not identify any of

the perpetrators, but a possibility of a different verdict is 

insufficient to establish a Brady violation. See Strickler v. 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 291 (1999); see also Agurs, 427 

U. S., at 109–110 (“The mere possibility that an item of 

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or 

might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” Rather, 

a “petitioner’s burden is to establish a reasonable probability of a different result.” Strickler, supra, at 291. 

Instead of requiring Smith to show a reasonable probability that Boatner’s undisclosed statements would have 

caused the jury to acquit, the Court improperly requires 

the State to show that the jury would have given Boatner’s

undisclosed statements no weight. See ante, at 3 (“[T]he

State’s argument offers a reason that the jury could have 

disbelieved Boatner’s undisclosed statements, but gives us

no confidence that it would have done so”). But Smith 

is not entitled to a new trial simply because the jury

could have accorded some weight to Boatner’s undisclosed 

statements. Smith’s burden is to show a reasonable probability that the jury would have accorded those statements 

sufficient weight to alter its verdict. In light of the record

as a whole—which the Court declines to consider—Smith 

has not carried that burden. 

B 

Smith also argues that statements by Shelita Russell 

and Dale Mims documented in Ronquillo’s handwritten 

notes could have been used to impeach Boatner’s identification of Smith because the statements indicate that 

the perpetrators were masked. One undated note, which 

contains several entries about various aspects of the investigation, states, “female—face down against cabinets—

conscious.” On the next line, the note continues, “said—in 

kitchen saw people barge in—one—black cloth across

face—first one through door—[no further statement].” 13 

Record 2556. When cross-examined during the postconviction hearing about whether this note documented the 
 

 

10 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

statement of Russell, Ronquillo confirmed that the note 

was in his handwriting, but he testified that he never 

talked to Russell, that he did not know when the note was 

made, and that someone else could have relayed the information to him. Tr. 415–418 (Jan. 22, 2009).5 I will 

assume arguendo that, had this note been disclosed, it 

would have been admissible at Smith’s trial as a dying 

declaration of Russell.6 But the note would have had 

minimal impeachment value because, contrary to Smith’s 

assertions, it is ambiguous in light of the context in which 

the statement was made. Officer Narcisse testified that 

Russell was conscious and able to talk, but that she was in 

“bad condition.” Id., at 20 (Dec. 4, 1995). Similarly, Reginald Harbor testified that, as Russell lay wounded, she 

was “whining” and he “didn’t catch nothing [t]hat she 

said.” Id., at 205 (Dec. 5, 1995). And, although Smith

contends that the note says “exactly” that the “first person

through the door had a black cloth across his face,” that

is not how the note reads. Reply Brief for Petitioner 11 

(emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted)

(hereinafter Reply Brief). The note first states that the 

declarant “saw people barge in,” then states “one—black 

—————— 

5Russell did not make this statement to Officer Narcisse. He testified that Russell “was not able to give us any information or any details

of what had happened.” Id., at 20. 6Louisiana law provides that “[a] statement made by a declarant 

while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or

circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death[,]” is “not

excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.” La. Code Evid. Ann., Art. 804(B)(2) (West Supp. 2012). Assuming this statement was actually Russell’s, it likely qualifies as a dying

declaration. At trial, Boatner testified that, in the aftermath of the 

shooting, Russell told him, “Feel like I’m about to die.” Tr. 161 (Dec. 5, 

1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Espadron also testified that

Russell told her, “I’m gonna die,” and, “Don’t let me die.” Id., at 73–74 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 11 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

cloth across face—first one through door—[no further 

statement].” 13 Record 2556 (emphasis added). It is at 

least as logical to read this statement as indicating only

that “one” of the “people” had a “black cloth across [his]

face.” Russell, suffering from fatal wounds, said nothing 

further after “first one through door,” and it is impossible 

to know whether the “first one” was also the “one” with a 

“black cloth across [his] face.” 

The second statement Smith identifies is that of Dale 

Mims, who lived down the street from Espadron’s home 

and who heard the shooting. A note by Ronquillo states

that Mims saw four males fleeing Espadron’s home, “all 

wearing mask[s].” Id., at 2518. Like Russell’s purported

statement, this statement has minimal impeachment

value in light of the record. Mims’ undisclosed statement 

does not address whether some or all of the perpetrators

were masked inside Espadron’s home.7 Moreover, had 

Mims been called as a witness at trial, he presumably 

would have testified, as he did at the postconviction hearing, that he was “positive” that he only saw three perpetrators fleeing, and that, of those three, only two were

masked. Tr. 269, 271–273, 275 (Jan. 13, 2009). 

Both Russell’s purported statement and Mims’ testimony are consistent with Boatner’s testimony that he did not 

know whether any of the other perpetrators were masked, 

id., at 154 (Dec. 5, 1995), and with Officer Narcisse’s and 

Espadron’s testimony that the single perpetrator whom

Espadron observed was wearing some sort of face cover-

—————— 

7Smith ridicules the “exceedingly peculiar” notion that the perpetrators would have remained unmasked inside Espadron’s home, only to 

mask themselves before leaving the scene. Reply Brief 12–13. But that 

notion is eminently reasonable if the perpetrators intended to massacre 

the witnesses who were inside the home—as they did—and were 

concerned only with disguising themselves from neighbors outside who

might see or hear the burglary. 
 

 

 

 

12 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

ing, id., at 30–31 (Dec. 4, 1995); id., at 71 (Dec. 5, 1995).

Thus, the totality of the evidence indicates that some, but

not all, of the perpetrators were masked, a conclusion that

in no way undermines Boatner’s consistent assertions that 

the only perpetrator he saw was unmasked. 

C 

Smith also contends that Ronquillo’s undisclosed note

documenting a pretrial statement by firearms examiner 

Kenneth Leary is material for purposes of Brady. The 

note states that “Leary advised Ronquillo that the 9MM 

ammunition confiscated from [the scene of the murders] 

was typed to have been fired from a[n] [Intratec], ‘Mac[-] 

11’ model type, semi automatic weapon.” 5 Record 831. 

According to Smith, this statement conflicts with Leary’s 

trial testimony that the 9-millimeter ammunition found 

at the scene “was fired by one particular weapon, one 9-

millimeter handgun,” Tr. 132 (Dec. 5, 1995), because an 

Intratec or Mac-11 pistol is not a “handgun.” Smith further argues that Leary’s pretrial statement could have

been used to exculpate Smith, whose guilt the prosecution 

attempted to show by calling a pathologist to testify that 

Shelita Russell’s wounds could have been inflicted by a 

9-millimeter “handgun,” id., at 39 (Dec. 4, 1995), and by 

calling Boatner to testify that the gun Smith held under

his chin was a 9-millimeter silver “hand gun,” id., at 157 

(Dec. 5, 1995).

Contrary to Smith’s contentions, Leary’s pretrial statement does not undermine the evidence presented at trial. 

Leary’s pretrial statement is consistent with his and

Boatner’s trial testimony because an Intratec or Mac-11

pistol is a 9-millimeter handgun. Smith concedes that 

such a weapon uses 9-millimeter cartridges. Brief for 

Petitioner 48. Moreover, a “handgun” is simply “[a] firearm that can be used with one hand,” American Heritage

Dictionary 819 (3d ed. 1992), and no one disputes that an 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 13 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Intratec or Mac-11 pistol can be used with one hand.

Smith nonetheless insists that, “as a colloquial matter,

machine pistols of the Intratec or MAC-11 type would be

considered automatic or semiautomatic weapons, rather 

than handguns.” Reply Brief 18. But even assuming that

Smith is correct, he fails to explain why Leary, a firearms

expert, would have been expected to use colloquial rather

than technical terminology.8 

The record also makes clear that, when Boatner used 

the term “handgun,” he did not understand it to exclude 

automatic or semiautomatic machine pistols. In the immediate aftermath of the murders, as well as at trial, 

Boatner stated that a second perpetrator carried a “Ma[c]

10” or “Tech Nine” “Uzi” type weapon, Tr. 159, 179 (Dec. 5, 

1995); 5 Record 809, 813, 866, and Boatner described that 

weapon as a “handgun,” id., at 809. Moreover, Boatner’s 

pretrial description of the silver or chrome “handgun” that

the first man held was consistent with Leary’s undisclosed

statement that the gun that fired the 9-millimeter ammunition found at the scene was a semiautomatic weapon. In 

his station house statement, Boatner described the first 

man’s weapon as a “big,” “automatic pistol.” Id., at 813, 

866. Because Leary’s pretrial statement is neither impeaching nor exculpatory, Leary’s undisclosed statement 

cannot form the basis of a Brady violation. See Strickler, 

—————— 

8Smith argues that Leary himself considered an “[Intratec] or ‘Mac[-]

11’ ” model type to be different from a 9-millimeter handgun. Smith 

relies on the fact that Leary’s pretrial statement indicated that the 

ammunition recovered from the scene did not come from the handgun 

recovered from Donielle Bannister, another suspect in the murders. 

Id., at 18. Leary’s pretrial statement did not describe the handgun

recovered from Bannister as a 9-millimeter, contrary to Smith’s representation. More importantly, Leary’s statement suggests only that 

Bannister’s handgun did not fire the 9-millimeter ammunition found at

the scene, not that Leary did not consider an “[Intratec] or ‘Mac[-]11’ ” 

model type to be a handgun. 
 

 

14 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

527 U. S., at 281–282 (To make out a Brady violation, “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 

impeaching”). 

D 

Smith next points to purportedly exculpatory and material undisclosed pretrial statements made by Robert 

Trackling, a member of the “Cut Throat Posse” street gang

with which Smith was allegedly associated, and by Eric

Rogers, an inmate who was incarcerated with Trackling.

5 Record 845. Police notes reflect that Eric Rogers gave an

interview to investigators on May 19, 1995, during which 

he described a conversation that he had with Trackling 

while in prison. During that conversation, Trackling 

described the murders at Espadron’s home and stated that

he had committed the crime along with “Fat, Buckle, and

a guy they call uh, Short Dog.” Id., at 841. According to 

Rogers, Fat’s real name was “Darnell [Donielle] Banister,” 

Buckle’s real name was “Contez [Kintad] Phillips,” and 

Short Dog’s real name was “Juan.” Id., at 843–844. 

Smith contends that Rogers’ interview was exculpatory

in two respects. First, he points to the following comment

by Rogers later during the interview: “They call Contez

Philip Buckle, they call Darnell Banister Fat, Short Dog

that’s what they call him, they call Robert Home.” Id., at 

845. Smith suggests that Rogers’ prior identification of 

“Short Dog” as “Juan [Smith]” was equivocal in light of his 

later statement that “Short Dog” was a man named “Robert Home.” Reply Brief 21. Second, Smith asserts that 

disclosure of Rogers’ interview would have led the defense 

and the jury to learn of Rogers’ allegation—made for the 

first time 10 years after Smith’s trial—that the police had 

asked him to implicate Juan Smith as “Short Dog,” Tr. 

284–285 (Jan. 13, 2009). 

Neither argument is persuasive. If the jury had learned 
 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

of Rogers’ statement, it would have heard information

directly inculpating Smith as “Short Dog,” a perpetrator of 

the shootings. Rogers’ physical description of “Short 

Dog”—“he[’s] short[,] he[’s] got golds going across his 

mouth[,] and . . . he’s like built,” 5 Record 844–also corroborated Boatner’s description of the first man through the 

door as having a “mouth full of gold” and a “heavy” build. 

Furthermore, Smith ignores other inculpatory information 

documented in Ronquillo’s notes of Rogers’ statement.

Those notes reflect Trackling’s own interview with police

on June 1, 1995, in which Trackling identified Phillips, 

Bannister, and “Juan Smith” as the perpetrators of the 

murders at Espadron’s home. Id., at 832; see also id., at 

854–855. Trackling’s statement only strengthens the 

inculpatory nature of Rogers’ interview. 

Further, the jury assuredly would not have believed 

Smith’s suggestion that Rogers identified “Short Dog” as a 

man named “Robert Home.” When this statement is taken 

in context, it appears that Rogers was describing the 

nickname—“Home”9—of Robert Trackling, the “Robert” 

whom Rogers had repeatedly referenced throughout his 

interview. See id., at 839–850. Indeed, Rogers’ phraseology, “they call Robert Home,” was consistent with his previous comments that “[t]hey call Contez Philip Buckle,” 

and “they call Darnell Banister Fat.” Id., at 845 (emphasis 

added). Unsurprisingly, in the thousands of pages of 

—————— 

9See 2 Dictionary of American Regional English 1064–1065, 1069 (F.

Cassidy & J. Hall eds. 1991) (defining “Home” as “a term of address 

used by two black people either from the same Southern state or simply

from the South,” similar to “homey” or “home boy”); 2 Green’s Dictionary of Slang 828 (2010) (defining “home,” an abbreviation of homeboy,

as “a friend, often used in direct address”); Concise New Partridge

Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English (T. Dalzell & T. Victor 

eds. 2008) (defining “home” as “a very close male friend,” an abbreviation of “Homeboy”). 
 

16 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

record material, I have not found, nor have the parties

cited, a single reference to anyone named “Robert Home.” 

If the jury had heard Rogers’ postconviction testimony

that police asked him to implicate Smith and that Trackling’s description of the murders did not include Smith, Tr.

284–285 (Jan. 13, 2009), it would have weighed Rogers’ 

allegation against Trackling’s own statement to the police

that Smith had participated in the murders at Espadron’s

home, 5 Record 832. The prosecution also would have

called Smith’s sister, Trinieze Smith, to testify that she

believed her brother was known as “Short Dog,” as she did 

at the postconviction hearing. Tr. 371 (Jan. 14, 2009). On 

this record, the undisclosed statements by Rogers and

Trackling actually strengthen rather than weaken confidence in the jury’s guilty verdict.10 

E 

Finally, Smith argues that an undisclosed handwritten 

note by Ronquillo documenting a statement by Phillip 

Young—the man found injured at the scene and suspected 

of having participated in the crime—is also material evidence warranting a new trial. At trial, Ronquillo testified 

that he met with Young while Young was hospitalized as a

result of permanent brain damage suffered in the shoot- 

—————— 

10Detective Byron Adams, who took Rogers’ statement, did not testify

at the postconviction hearing because he had died in the meantime. He 

thus had no opportunity to address Rogers’ recantation or his newly 

minted allegation that Detective Adams asked Rogers to implicate 

Smith. Smith argues that “there is no reason to believe that . . . Adams

would have contradicted Rogers—much less that the jury would have

believed [him] if [he] did.” Reply Brief 21. But Smith offers no support

for his dubious assertion that Detective Adams would have admitted to 

framing Smith, or that, had the detective denied the allegation, the jury 

would have believed Rogers—a convicted murderer who never explained any motive Adams would have had to frame Smith—over the 

detective. 
 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 17 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

ings. Id., at 102 (Dec. 5, 1995). According to Ronquillo,

Young “was strapped to a chair. He really couldn’t talk, 

[h]e mumbled. He could use his left hand, that was all. 

He couldn’t walk or anything. He was fed through a tube 

by the people there. He was in really bad shape.” Id., at 

102–103. When asked whether Young was able to communicate with him “at all,” Ronquillo responded, “No. I 

couldn’t understand anything that he was saying.” Id., at 

103. 

The undisclosed note from Ronquillo’s meeting with

Young reads as follows: “Short Dog/Bucko/Fats—No—

Didn’t shoot me—No—Not with me when went to house— 

Yes—one of people in house shot me—No—Not responsible—‘Posse’—Didn’t drive to house—‘Posse’—Yes—Knows 

names of perps—Yes—Drove in car—Yes—girlfriend’s 

car.” 13 Record 2568. Smith contends that this note is 

exculpatory in that it suggests that he was “not involved”

in the shootings. Brief for Petitioner 43. 

Young’s statement is only exculpatory if Smith concedes

(as the statement asserts) that he is, in fact, “Short Dog”

and a member of the “Cut Throat Posse.” Such a concession would only have strengthened the inculpatory value

of the statements by Rogers and Trackling indicating that 

Smith was the “Short Dog” who committed the murders at

Espadron’s home. In any event, the exculpatory value of 

the note is minimal for several other reasons. First, it is 

unclear whether Ronquillo’s note reflects a statement by 

Young that the “Posse” was not responsible for shooting

the victims or a statement that the “Posse” was not responsible for shooting Young. Further, the statement that 

“Short Dog” and others were not with Young when he went 

to the house is certainly not a clear statement that “Short

Dog” did not commit the murders, especially in light of 

evidence in the record that the assailants used two cars on 
 

 

18 SMITH v. CAIN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the night of the murders.11 Second, had the jury learned 

of Ronquillo’s note, it would have presumably heard Ronquillo testify, as he did at the postconviction hearing, that 

he was not even sure whether his note actually reflected

statements by Young, given that Young “couldn’t talk,”

was “jumbled,” could only “kind of move his head,” and 

sometimes would just sit and stare when Ronquillo asked 

a question.12 Tr. 423–424 (Jan. 22, 2009). Accordingly,

Ronquillo explained, “I never had hide nor hair actually of 

what [Young] said.” Id., at 423. 

The jury thus would have evaluated Ronquillo’s note, of 

unclear exculpatory value on its face, against a backdrop

of doubt as to what, if anything, Young actually communicated. The jury also would have weighed this evidence 

against the strongly inculpatory nature of Boatner’s descriptions and identifications and Rogers’ and Trackling’s

statements, which corroborated Boatner’s identification. 

When all of the evidence is considered cumulatively, as it 

must be, Smith has not shown a reasonable probability 

that the jury would have reached a different verdict. 

—————— 

11 In his station house statement, Boatner explained that the loud car

that arrived at Espadron’s home was white. 5 Record 866. In Rogers’ 

interview with the police, Rogers said that Trackling escaped from

Espadron’s home in a burgundy car. Id., at 842. 12Smith also contends that the defense could have used the undisclosed note to impeach Ronquillo’s trial testimony that Young was not 

able to communicate with him “at all.” That argument lacks merit. 

Ronquillo’s trial testimony, when read in context, does not suggest that

no communication occurred. Rather, Ronquillo made clear that he 

simply “couldn’t understand anything that [Young] was saying.” See Tr. 

103 (Dec. 5, 1995) (emphasis added). That testimony is consistent with

the garbled nature of the note, and the note thus would have had little,

if any, impeachment value. 
 

 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 19 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

* * * 

The question presented here is not whether a prudent 

prosecutor should have disclosed the information that 

Smith identifies. Rather, the question is whether the cumulative effect of the disclosed and undisclosed evidence 

in Smith’s case “put[s] the whole case in such a different

light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles,

514 U. S., at 435. When, as in this case, the Court departs 

from its usual practice of declining to review alleged misapplications of settled law to particular facts, id., at 456 

(SCALIA, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and KENNEDY and 

THOMAS, JJ., dissenting), the Court should at least consider all of the facts. And, the Court certainly should not 

decline to review all of the facts on the assumption that

the remainder of the record would only further support 

Smith’s claims, as the Court appears to have done here. 

Ante, at 3–4. 

Such an assumption is incorrect. Here, much of the 

record evidence confirms that, from the night of the murders through trial, Boatner consistently described—with 

one understandable exception—the first perpetrator 

through the door, that Boatner’s description matched

Smith, and that Boatner made strong out-of-court and incourt identifications implicating Smith. Some of the undisclosed evidence cited by Smith is not favorable to him 

at all, either because it is of no impeachment or exculpatory value or because it actually inculpates him. Because 

what remains is evidence of such minimal impeachment 

and exculpatory value as to be immaterial in light of the 

whole record, I must dissent from the Court’s holding that

the State violated Brady.