Filed 6/29/23 P. v. Coughlin CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ZACHARY BARKER 

COUGHLIN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B315841

(Super. Ct. No. 20CR06975)

(Santa Barbara County)

Zachary Barker Coughlin appeals from the judgment 

entered after a jury had found him guilty of committing multiple 

sex offenses against four women – Jane Does 1 through 4. With 

the exception of Jane Doe 2, appellant videotaped the commission 

of the offenses. Appellant notes, “Most of the sexual activity that 

formed the basis for the charges took place in [his] bus that was 

filled with mirrors and contained video equipment.” 

Appellant contends: (1) a search warrant authorizing the 

search of his cell phone, laptops, and hard drives violated the 

Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement; (2) he was 
2

denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 

because his trial counsel failed to properly challenge the search 

warrant; (3) the trial court erroneously ordered his legs shackled 

during the trial; (4) the court erroneously precluded him from 

arguing that a woman may consent in advance to the commission 

of sex acts upon her while she is unconscious; and (5) the court 

abused its discretion in allowing the jury to watch videos of his 

commission of charged and uncharged sex offenses. We affirm.

Guilty Verdicts and Appellant’s Sentence1

The jury convicted appellant of sexual penetration by a 

foreign object upon an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 289, 

subd. (d));2 sexual penetration by a foreign object upon an 

intoxicated person (§ 289, subd. (e)); forcible sexual penetration 

by a foreign object with true findings on kidnapping allegations 

(§§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), 667.61, subds. (a)(d)(2), (b)(e)(1)); rape of 

an intoxicated person (§ 261, subd. (a)(3)); two counts of rape of 

an unconscious or asleep person (§ 261, subd. (a)(4)(A)); three 

counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); forcible rape with true 

findings on kidnapping allegations (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 667.61, 

subds. (a)(d)(2), (b)(e)(1)); kidnapping to commit rape (§ 209, 

subd. (b)(1)); two counts of forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. 

(c)(2)(A)); and forcible oral copulation of an unconscious person 

(§ 287, subd. (f)(1)). The jury found true an allegation that in the 

present case appellant had been convicted of committing sex 

1 We omit a summary of the evidence presented at trial. 

The facts underlying appellant’s convictions are immaterial to 

the issues on appeal.

2 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to 

the Penal Code.
3

offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (c), 

(e)(4)). 

The trial court sentenced appellant to prison for an 

aggregate determinate term of 20 years plus an aggregate 

consecutive indeterminate term of 125 years to life. 

Sealed Search Warrants and Supporting Affidavits

This case involves two search warrants and supporting 

affidavits. The trial court ordered the documents sealed. On 

June 13, 2022, appellant’s counsel filed in this court an 

application to unseal the documents. The application stated: 

“The trial court originally ordered the [documents] sealed 

because the [affidavits] referred to the [confidential citizeninformants] by name . . . . [¶] However, appellant presently 

challenges the denial of the motion to suppress evidence gained 

as a result of the search warrants. . . . [S]ome information 

needed to rule on the motion is contained in the sealed 

documents.” (See People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 971 [“all 

or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if 

necessary to . . . protect the identity of a confidential 

informant”].)

We denied the application to unseal the documents. We 

granted counsel’s request for a copy of the sealed record on 

appeal, which includes the documents in question. We ordered 

counsel to “not make copies of these documents or reveal the 

contents of these documents to his client.” 

Appellant’s counsel subsequently filed a publicly-available 

opening brief citing extensively to the sealed documents. 

“Nothing filed publicly in the reviewing court – including any . . . 

brief . . . – may disclose material contained in a record that is 

sealed . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.46(g)(1).) Pursuant to 
4

Rule 8.46(g)(2)(A) and (B), counsel should have filed a “public 

redacted version” and a confidential “unredacted version” of the 

opening brief.

In this opinion we refer to facts in the sealed documents 

that counsel disclosed in his opening brief. These facts were 

earlier disclosed in appellant’s publicly-filed motion to suppress 

evidence. The trial court did not order the motion sealed. It is 

included in the publicly-available clerk’s transcript. The motion 

identified the confidential informants by their initials and 

contained no contact information for the informants. The sealed 

documents, in contrast, disclosed the informants’ full names. We 

set forth only those facts necessary to adequately consider the 

issues on appeal. In Sager v. County of Yuba (2007) 156 

Cal.App.4th 1049, 1051, the record was sealed, but the court 

concluded it “must discuss some facts in order to provide an 

opinion ‘in writing with reasons stated’ as required by the 

California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.)”

First Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit

Appellant does not contest the validity of the first search 

warrant and supporting affidavit. In the affidavit, the affiant set 

forth facts supporting his belief that appellant was stalking two 

women in violation of section 646.9. The affiant declared: “Based 

on my training and experience, I know that those involved in the 

crime of stalking will oftentimes use cell phones, laptops, . . . and 

other devices . . . for . . . communication with their victims. I also 

know that [they] . . . will also keep photos of victims/ residences/ 

workplaces . . . on cell phones, laptops[,] . . . and portable digital 

storage devices that may be found in the possession of the 

suspect. I therefore request that a search warrant be authorized 

to search [appellant’s] residence, a red and black converted school 
5

bus . . . so that these items may be found and seized.” Based on 

the affidavit, a magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the 

search of appellant’s bus for “[a]ll cell phones” and electronic 

storage devices. 

Second Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavit

Appellant contests the validity of the second search 

warrant. In the supporting affidavit, the affiant declared that on 

May 18, 2020, deputy sheriffs had made a traffic stop of 

appellant’s bus. During a search of the bus pursuant to the first 

search warrant, they seized five cell phones, three laptop 

computers, and a black bag containing several hard drives. The 

affiant believed that these items may contain evidence relevant 

to the stalking investigation. He requested that the items be 

searched for the period “between [January 1, 2019] and [May 19, 

2020], the period of time that will include events leading up to 

the day of the first meeting between Victim #1 and [appellant] 

and [appellant’s] arrest the night on [May 18, 2020].” 

The second search warrant authorized a search of the 

seized items for “all data that constitutes evidence and 

instrumentalities of violations of . . . [section] 646.9 PC [stalking] 

by [appellant], including communications referring to or relating 

to this investigation involving any or all of the following 

people . . . : [warrant stated names of the two confidential 

informants whom appellant had allegedly stalked].” 

Evidence Discovered During Search

Pursuant to Second Search Warrant

During the search pursuant to the second search warrant, 

law enforcement officials discovered approximately 7,000 videos 

and 158,000 photographs. “[A] lot of [the videos] were duplicates 

of basically the same event.” Some of the videos and photographs 
6

depicted appellant’s commission of sex acts upon women. The sex 

acts did not involve the stalking victims identified in the search 

warrants and supporting affidavits.

The jury watched videos depicting the charged sex offenses 

committed by appellant against Jane Does 1, 3, and 4. It also 

watched videos depicting uncharged sex offenses committed by 

appellant against Jane Does 5 and 6. The People graphically 

describe the videos at pages 11-20 of respondent’s brief. 

The Second Search Warrant Did Not Violate the

Fourth Amendment’s Particularity Requirement

Appellant contends the second search warrant “lacked any 

meaningful limits [on the search] and therefore violated the 

particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”3 (Bold 

omitted.) “The Fourth Amendment requires that a search 

warrant describe with particularity ‘the place to be searched, and 

the person or things to be seized.’ (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.)” 

(People v. Balint (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 205-206.) “The 

purpose of the ‘particularity’ requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment is to avoid general and exploratory searches by 

requiring a particular description of the items to be seized.” 

(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1296.) 

“‘[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under 

the authority of “general warrants” were the immediate evils that 

motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.’ 

[Citation.] The particularity requirement of the Fourth 

Amendment helps to ensure that a search or seizure ‘will not 

3 Appellant does not contend the search warrant affidavit

failed to establish probable cause for the search. Appellant 

alleges, “There may have been probable cause to search [his] 

devices for evidence of stalking . . . .” 
7

take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches

. . . the Framers intended to prohibit.’” (People v. Robinson (2010) 

47 Cal.4th 1104, 1132 (Robinson).)

“However, a warrant ‘need only be reasonably specific’ 

[citation], and ‘the specificity required “varies depending on the 

circumstances of the case and the type of items involved.”’ 

[Citations.] The constitutional and statutory requirements of 

particularity are satisfied if the warrant ‘imposes a meaningful 

restriction upon the objects to be seized.’ [Citation.] The 

requirement of reasonable particularity ‘is a flexible concept, 

reflecting the degree of detail available from the facts known to 

the affiant and presented to the issuing magistrate.’” (Robinson, 

supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

“Whether a warrant’s description of property to be seized is 

sufficiently particular is a question of law subject to independent 

review by an appellate court. [Citation.] In considering whether 

a warrant is sufficiently particular, courts consider the purpose of 

the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and ‘the total 

circumstances surrounding the case.’ [Citation.] A warrant that 

permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some 

circumstances, and the warrant’s language must be read in 

context and with common sense.” (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 

Cal.4th 110, 133-134.)

Appellant argues: “The [second search] warrant allowed the 

police to search every application, file, and piece of data on the 

phones and hard drives. The searches could have been limited to 

the individuals identified in the stalking cases, and could have 

used specific key words . . . or derogatory comments consistent 

with cyber stalking. But there were no limits (other than the 

dates mentioned [the period between January 1, 2019 and May 
8

19, 2020]) and police were permitted to rummage through 

appellant’s entire life, all of the privacies of life one keeps on his 

cell phones and computers, and discover evidence it would argue 

to be rape — which was unrelated to the stalking case they were 

investigating. . . . [A]n investigation into potential stalking did 

not permit a fishing expedition into appellant’s life that revealed 

potential sex offenses involving . . . other . . . women.” 

The second search warrant’s description of the scope of the 

search complied with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 

requirement. The warrant did not authorize an exploratory 

search. It limited the search to evidence concerning the criminal 

offense of stalking. The warrant authorized a search for 

“evidence . . . of violations of . . . [section] 646.9 PC [stalking] by 

[appellant], including communications referring to or relating to 

this investigation involving . . . the [two stalking victims 

identified in the search warrants and supporting affidavits].” 

“‘[A] warrant may satisfy the particularity requirement 

either by [(1)] identifying the items to be seized by reference to a 

suspected criminal offense or by [(2)] describing them in a 

manner that allows an executing officer to know precisely what 

he has been authorized to search for and seize.’” (United States v.

Cobb (4th Cir. 2020) 970 F.3d 319, 329 (Cobb).) Here, the second 

search warrant clearly satisfied the first criterion. It 

“‘identif[ied] the items to be seized by reference to a suspected 

criminal offense’” – the stalking of two women named in the 

warrant. (Ibid.; see United States v. Palms (10th Cir. 2021) 21 

F.4th 689, 700 [as to search of defendant’s cell phone, “the 

warrant’s limitation to evidence of the crime of human trafficking 

satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement”];

United States v. Hall (7th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3d 988, 996-997 [“we 
9

hold that the search warrants were written with sufficient 

particularity because the items listed on the warrants were 

qualified by phrases that emphasized that the items sought were 

those related to child pornography”]; United States v. Castro (6th 

Cir. 2018) 881 F.3d 961, 965 [“A warrant that empowers police to 

search for something satisfies the particularity requirement if its 

text constrains the search to evidence of a specific crime”]; United

States v. Bishop (7th Cir. 2018) 910 F.3d 335, 337 [“It is 

enough . . . if the warrant cabins the things being looked for by 

stating what crime is under investigation”].)

Appellant does not claim, and could not validly claim, that 

the seizure of the videos of his sex crimes with other women was 

unlawful because the second search warrant did not authorize 

their seizure. The police lawfully seized these videos under the 

plain view doctrine. (See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 

U.S. 443, 465 [“An example of the applicability of the ‘plain view’ 

doctrine is the situation in which the police have a warrant to 

search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the 

search come across some other article of incriminating 

character”]; United States v. Williams (4th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3d 

511, 522 [plain view doctrine applied to discovery of child 

pornography while conducting computer search under warrant 

authorizing search for evidence of crimes involving threats of 

bodily harm and harassment by computer].)

“‘[T]he requirement that a search warrant describe its 

objects with particularity is a standard of “practical accuracy” 

rather than a hypertechnical one.’ [Citations.] The rule against 

excessive parsing of the language used in a warrant . . . militates 

in favor of truthfinding in criminal investigations, a value of 

significant importance to the public safety and societal order.” 
10

(People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 

96.) “So long as the warrant describes the items to be seized with 

enough specificity that ‘the executing officer is able to distinguish 

between those items which are to be seized and those that are 

not,’ [citation], the particularity standard is met.” (United States

v. Blakeney (4th Cir. 2020) 949 F.3d 851, 862.) The particularity 

standard was met here.

Appellant Was Not Denied His Constitutional

Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

Appellant maintains he was denied his constitutional right 

to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed 

to challenge the second search warrant under the Electronic 

Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA, § 1546 et al.). “‘[T]o 

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

first show counsel’s performance was “deficient” because his 

“representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms.” 

[Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from 

counsel’s performance or lack thereof. [Citations.] Prejudice is 

shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

. . .’” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721.) The defendant 

“must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable 

reality,’ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or 

omissions of counsel.” (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 

937.)

Appellant asserts, “The warrant here failed because it did 

not specify any apps or files where there might be evidence of 
11

cyberstalking.” Thus, the warrant “violated the heightened 

particularity requirements described in section 1546.1(d)(1)” of 

the CalECPA. Section 1546.1, subdivision (d)(1) provides, “The 

warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be 

seized by specifying, as appropriate and reasonable, the time 

periods covered, the target individuals or accounts, the 

applications or services covered, and the types of information 

sought . . . .” (Italics added.)

Appellant has not carried his burden of showing that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial because 

counsel failed to argue that, in violation of section 1546.1(d)(1), 

the second search warrant “did not specify any apps or files 

where there might be evidence of cyberstalking.” Appellant does 

not refer us to any evidence in the record showing that law 

enforcement personnel knew or reasonably should have known 

which apps or files might contain evidence of stalking. “[I]t is 

impossible to tell what a computer storage medium contains just 

by looking at it.” (United States v. Hill (9th Cir. 2006) 459 F.3d 

966, 973; see also Cobb, supra, 970 F.3d at 329-330 [court 

rejected defendant’s argument that “the police could not search 

the computer because the police could not foretell the murder 

evidence that was located on the computer or the location of that 

evidence within the contents of the computer”].)

Appellant Was Not Prejudiced by the Court’s

Order that He Be Shackled during the Trial

The trial court found that appellant “poses a significant 

security risk.” It ordered that he be restrained with leg shackles. 

The chains would be covered with tape so they would not make a 

clanking noise. The court observed: “We . . . have a black table 

skirt around both Counsel tables which blocks the view from 
12

the . . . jurors of any of those shackles. [¶] The Sheriff’s 

Department does a very good job of ensuring that the jurors and 

prospective jurors never see or know that the defendant is being 

moved . . . .” The court said it would take additional measures to 

assure that the jury was not aware of the shackling. 

Appellant maintains the trial court erred in ordering the 

restraint. “‘[A] criminal defendant may be subjected to physical 

restraints in the jury’s presence upon “a showing of a manifest 

need for such restraints.” [Citations.] . . .’ . . . The trial court’s 

determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v.

Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1259 (Williams).)

We need not consider whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. If it had abused its discretion, “[appellant] cannot 

demonstrate prejudice. ‘“[W]e have consistently held that 

courtroom shackling, even if error, [is] harmless if there is no 

evidence that the jury saw the restraints, or that the shackles 

impaired or prejudiced the defendant’s right to testify or 

participate in his defense.”’” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

905, 935.) There is no such evidence here. Appellant testified at 

trial. “No evidence suggests the restraint . . . affected his 

[testimony or] demeanor or impaired his ability to communicate 

with defense counsel.” (Williams, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1259.)

Advance Consent Is Not a Defense to Sex

Acts Committed upon an Unconscious Woman

The People made a pretrial motion “to preclude the defense 

from arguing that prior consent by any victim for [appellant] to 

engage in sexual activity with her while she is asleep or 

unconscious is a valid defense.” Relying on People v. Dancy 

(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 21 (Dancy), the trial court granted the 

motion. Appellant asserts, “The holding in Dancy is fatally 
13

flawed and deprived [him] of his Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendment right to present a defense.” 

In Dancy the appellate court rejected the defendant’s 

argument “that a man who intentionally engages in sexual 

intercourse with an unconscious woman, knowing that she is 

unconscious, does not harbor general criminal intent . . . if he 

reasonably believes that the woman has consented in advance or 

would have consented if she had been conscious.” (Dancy, supra, 

102 Cal.App.4th at p. 36, fn. omitted.) The court explained: “The 

concept of an ‘advance consent’ to unconscious sexual intercourse 

is based on a fallacy. A decision to engage in sexual intercourse 

is necessarily an ad hoc decision made at a particular time with 

respect to a particular act. While a woman may expressly or 

impliedly consent to conscious sexual intercourse in advance, she 

remains free to withdraw that consent, and ordinarily has the 

ability to do so since she is conscious. Even if a woman expressly 

or impliedly indicates in advance that she is willing to engage in 

unconscious sexual intercourse, a man who thereafter has sexual 

intercourse with her while she is unconscious necessarily 

deprives her of the opportunity to indicate her lack of consent. 

The inherent risk that a man may misinterpret a woman's prior 

statements or conduct weighs strongly against recognizing 

‘advance consent’ as a defense to rape of an unconscious person 

since the woman's lack of consciousness absolutely precludes her 

from making her lack of consent known at the time of the act. It 

follows that a man who intentionally engages in sexual 

intercourse with a woman he knows to be unconscious harbors a 

‘wrongful’ intent regardless of whether he believes that she has 

(or she actually has) consented in advance to the act.” (Id. at p. 

37.)
14

We find the reasoning of Dancy persuasive and follow it 

here. The trial court did not err in precluding appellant from 

arguing that advance consent is a defense to the commission of 

sex acts upon an unconscious person.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in

Allowing the Jury to Watch Videos of Appellant’s Sex Offenses

Appellant claims that, in violation of Evidence Code section 

352 (section 352) and his right to due process, the trial court 

abused its discretion in allowing the jury to watch 

“inflammatory” videos of his commission of sex offenses against 

Janes Does 1 and 3 through 6. Appellant protests that he “was 

convicted in a ‘trial by video’” that “increased the chance that the 

jurors would vote to convict [him] because they hated him rather 

than because he had actually raped the women who entered his 

bus.” 

Section 352 provides, “The court in its discretion may 

exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 

necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 

danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of 

misleading the jury.”

“Trial courts enjoy ‘“broad discretion”’ in deciding whether 

the probability of a substantial danger of prejudice substantially 

outweighs probative value. [Citations.] A trial court’s exercise of 

discretion ‘will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial 

court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or 

patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage 

of justice.’” (People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 167-

168 (Holford).) 
15

“The prejudice which exclusion of evidence under

. . . section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage 

to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative 

evidence. ‘[A]ll evidence which tends to prove guilt is prejudicial 

or damaging to the defendant's case. The stronger the evidence, 

the more it is “prejudicial.” The “prejudice” referred to in . . .

section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an 

emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which 

has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, 

“prejudicial” is not synonymous with “damaging.”’” (People v.

Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638, italics added.)

“‘“On appeals challenging discretionary trial court rulings, 

it is appellant’s burden to establish an abuse of discretion. . . .”’” 

(Geffcken v. D’Andrea (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1307.) 

Appellant has failed to carry his burden of showing that the trial 

court abused its discretion. The videos of Jane Does 1, 3, and 4 

depicted appellant’s commission of charged sex offenses. 

Therefore, the videos were extremely probative. They were the 

only evidence available where the victim was unconscious during 

the commission of the sex offenses.

The videos of Jane Does 5 and 6 depicted appellant’s 

commission of uncharged sex offenses. The videos were 

admissible under Evidence Code section 1108. “When a 

defendant is accused of a sex offense, Evidence Code section 1108 

permits the court to admit evidence of the defendant’s 

commission of other sex offenses, thus allowing the jury to learn 

of the defendant’s possible disposition to commit sex crimes. 

[Citation.] The court has discretion under Evidence Code section 

352 to exclude the evidence if it is unduly prejudicial. [Citation.] 

The evidence is presumed admissible and is to be excluded only if 
16

its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value 

in showing the defendant’s disposition to commit the charged sex 

offense or other relevant matters.” (People v. Cordova (2015) 62 

Cal.4th 104, 132.)

The circumstances of the uncharged sex offenses against 

Jane Does 5 and 6 are similar to the circumstances of the charged 

offenses. Thus, the videos of Jane Does 5 and 6 were highly 

probative as to appellant’s commission of the charged offenses. 

(People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 917 [“the probative 

value of ‘other crimes’ evidence is increased by the relative 

similarity between the charged and uncharged offenses”].) But 

“[a]dmissibility under Evidence Code section 1108 does not 

require that the sex offenses be similar; it is enough the charged 

offense and the prior crimes are sex offenses as defined by the 

statute. [Citation.] That criterion is clearly met here.” (People v.

Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 50.) 

The videos of the uncharged offenses were “no more

inflammatory than [the videos of] the charged offenses, so [the] 

additional prejudicial effect [of the uncharged-offense videos] was 

minimal. For the same reason, it was unlikely the jury would 

return a guilty verdict based upon the uncharged misconduct 

rather than the charged offenses.” (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 

Cal.4th 380, 408.)

Accordingly, the trial court acted well within its discretion 

in permitting the jury to watch the videos. “Having concluded 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under section 352, 

we must also reject [appellant’s] argument that he was deprived 

of his constitutional [due process] right to a fair trial.” (Holford, 

supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.) 
17

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

CODY, J.
Von Deroian, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Patrick Morgan Ford, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.