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Filed 3/1/22 P. v. Rivas CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT DANIEL RIVAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164271

(Kern County 

Super. Ct. No. BF173704A)

A jury convicted Robert Daniel Rivas of multiple crimes 

after he attacked two victims with a machete.1 He asserts that 

his conviction for aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205)2 must 

be reversed for insufficient evidence, and he argues that the trial 

court erred in returning an initial set of verdict forms to the jury 

after determining they were irregular. We reject both 

contentions and affirm the judgment.

1 This matter was transferred by California Supreme Court 

Order on December 20, 2021 from the Fifth Appellate District 

(No. F080845) to the First Appellate District.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND

A.

After learning that his ex-girlfriend, G., was becoming 

romantically involved with another man, Rivas broke into the 

apartment where she was staying and tried to attack her with a 

machete. When she fled the apartment, Rivas followed her into a 

nearby Starbucks shop, where he struck her repeatedly with the 

machete. The attack on G. ended when a good Samaritan named 

B. intervened. G. and B. each sustained multiple injuries.

B.

An amended information charged Rivas with aggravated 

mayhem (§ 205; counts four (G.) and six (B.)). In addition, the 

amended information charged him with first degree burglary 

with another person present (§§ 460, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. 

(c)(21); count one), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. 

(a)(1); counts two (G.) and nine (B.)); attempted murder (§§ 187, 

subd. (a), 664; counts three (G.) and five (B.)); infliction of 

corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count seven (G.)); and resisting 

arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count eight). The amended 

information alleged that Rivas personally used a deadly or 

dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) in relation to counts 

one, three, five, and seven; and that he inflicted great bodily 

injury (§ 12022.7, subds. (a), (e)) as to counts three, five, and 

nine. 

The jury initially returned a set of verdict forms that the 

court determined were improperly filled out. The court informed 

the jury: “I’m going to send you back just to review it in certain 

areas so I don’t - - we don’t misinterpret what you put on the 

verdict form.”3

3 Although the initial verdict forms are sealed, by order of 

this court Rivas has been provided with information about the 
3

After resuming deliberations, the jury ultimately found 

Rivas guilty of assault with a deadly weapon (counts two and 

nine); attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192, subd. (a), 664) 

as to G., a lesser included offense of attempted murder (count 

three); aggravated mayhem as to G. (count four); mayhem (§ 203), 

a lesser included offense of aggravated mayhem, as to B. (count 

six); infliction of corporal injury as to G. (count seven); and 

resisting arrest (count eight). The jury found true the 

enhancements for great bodily injury and personal use of a 

deadly or dangerous weapon. In addition, the jury found Rivas 

not guilty of burglary and attempted murder as to B. (counts one 

and five).

DISCUSSION

A.

Rivas contends that his conviction for aggravated mayhem 

(§ 205; count four) is unsupported by substantial evidence. We 

disagree.

We review the entire record in the light most favorable to 

the judgment below and may reverse “only if ‘ “it appears ‘that 

upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 

evidence to support’ ” ’ ” the judgment. (People v. Sanford (2017) 

11 Cal.App.5th 84, 91 (Sanford).) Substantial evidence is 

evidence that is “ ‘solid, substantial, and . . . reasonably inspire[s] 

confidence’ ” that the accused committed the charged crime. 

(People v. Lara (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 296, 320.) We “ ‘ “presume 

in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the [fact 

finder] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” ’ ” 

(Sanford, supra, at p. 91.)

A conviction for aggravated mayhem “requires proof the 

defendant specifically intended to maim—to cause a permanent 

contents of the forms and an opportunity to raise any related 

claims.
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disability or disfigurement.” (People v. Szadziewicz (2008) 161 

Cal.App.4th 823, 831 (Szadziewicz), disapproved on another

ground in People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 214.) A jury may 

not find a specific intent to maim based only on evidence that the 

victim actually suffered a permanent injury; “ ‘ instead, there 

must be other facts and circumstances which support an 

inference of intent to maim rather than to attack 

indiscriminately.’ ” (Szadziewicz, supra, at p. 831.) The jury may 

infer a specific intent to maim from factors including “ ‘ the 

circumstances attending the act, the manner in which it is done, 

and the means used[.]’ ” (Ibid.) For example, evidence of a 

focused, controlled, or directed attack may provide substantial 

evidence of the requisite specific intent. (Ibid.)

Rivas argues that the evidence demonstrated an unfocused 

or indiscriminate attack on G. rather than a controlled and 

directed one. However, there was sufficient evidence from which 

a rational jury could infer that Rivas had a specific intent to 

maim G. To begin with, his decision to use a 16-inch long 

machete (that curves to a point, with a serrated edge on the back 

side) in the attack supports such an inference. (Cf. People v.

Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 195-196 [“Any reasonable 

person would know that repeatedly striking a person’s body with 

the metal fitting of a hose and placing a burning hot knife against 

the person’s skin would likely cause permanent disfigurement”].) 

Further, the jury could reasonably conclude that the attack 

was focused on G.’s right leg, where she suffered four separate 

injuries and required surgery. According to an officer who 

administered first aid at the Starbucks, G.’s leg was where most 

of the blood was coming from, and he had to apply a tourniquet. 

The jury viewed photographs showing a gash that ran the length 

of G.’s right thigh, from her upper thigh to her knee, which 

required approximately 32 staples to close. Photographs also 

showed a hole in her right leg that was approximately two inches 
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long and one inch wide; G. was left with this open wound, which 

apparently could not be stitched or stapled, for about three 

months. In addition, she suffered two other wounds to her right 

leg, including one that was approximately two inches long and 

required approximately 12 staples to close. G. testified that as a 

result of these injuries, she no longer had full use of her right leg 

and foot and had to use a brace and an ankle or foot monitor to 

assist her when walking. Although G. also suffered smaller cuts 

on her arms, hand, chest, abdomen, and back, the jury could 

reasonably infer that Rivas intended to maim her leg but inflicted 

the other cuts because she put her arms out and grabbed the 

machete to protect herself and struggled to get away. (See 

Szadziewicz, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 831-832 [finding 

substantial evidence that defendant had an intent to maim 

because he focused his attack on the victim’s face and neck even 

though defendant also cut the victim’s hand, hip, and chest when 

victim resisted].) 

Other evidence supported a conclusion that this was a 

calm, calculated, and deliberate attack rather than a random 

explosion of violence. (See People v. Ferrell (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 

828, 835-836 [finding substantial evidence of intent to disable the 

victim permanently where the defendant acted “calmly and 

deliberately” during the attack]; People v. Park (2003) 112 

Cal.App.4th 61, 69-70 [finding substantial evidence that the 

defendant had an intent to maim where, inter alia, defendant 

had a motive for the attack and had the presence of mind to 

follow his victims to a second location].) Upset that G. was 

romantically involved with someone else, Rivas began the attack 

at the apartment, where he first tried to cut her. When G. ran 

from the apartment, he stood there for a few seconds and then 

walked out. After Rivas arrived at the Starbucks, he walked into 

the store in pursuit of G., again not running. G. testified that 

during the attack, they spoke to one another, Rivas was “cool,” 

and he took the time to count down “five, four, three.” After the 
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attack, he walked out of the Starbucks at a leisurely pace. In 

sum, substantial evidence supported the aggravated mayhem 

conviction.

B.

Rivas contends that the guilty verdict on count six (the 

lesser included offense of mayhem (§ 203) and the true findings 

on the enhancements (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e), 12022, subd. (b)(1)) 

for count three (the lesser included offense of attempted 

voluntary manslaughter as to G. (§§ 192, subd. (a), 664)) must be 

reversed because the trial court violated section 1161 in 

returning the initial set of verdict forms to the jury. However, we 

conclude that the court’s actions were consistent with section 

1161.

Section 1161 prohibits a court from asking the jury to 

reconsider a verdict of acquittal. It provides that “[w]hen there is 

a verdict of conviction, in which it appears to the Court that the 

jury have mistaken the law, the Court may explain the reason for 

that opinion and direct the jury to reconsider their verdict . . . but 

when there is a verdict of acquittal, the Court cannot require the 

jury to reconsider it.” When the jury’s verdict is ambiguous or 

unintelligible, however, the court may return the verdict to the 

jury. (People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 532 (Carbajal).) 

In such circumstances, “asking the jury to clarify its verdict

d[oes] not contravene” the statute “because it [i]s not possible to

understand whether the jury ha[s] actually convicted or acquitted

the defendant of the specified counts. Clarification [i]s necessary 

to determine whether there [i]s an intelligible verdict at all.” 

(Ibid.)

Here, although Rivas contends that “in effect” the jury 

initially acquitted him of mayhem in count six and returned “not 

true” findings for the enhancements on count three, we conclude 

that the trial court properly returned the initial verdicts on these 

counts because they were ambiguous and unintelligible.
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With respect to count six, the lesser included offense of 

mayhem, the record reflects that the jury foreperson signed on 

the signature line for “guilty,” but the signature was crossed out. 

The jury left the signature line for “not guilty” blank. Similarly, 

with respect to both enhancements for the lesser included offense 

on count three, the jury foreperson signed on the line under 

“true,” but a line was drawn through each signature. The jury 

left the signature lines for “not true” blank for both 

enhancements. 

Thus, the initial verdict forms indicate that the jury voided

the “guilty” and “true” verdicts. (Cf. People v. Brown (2016) 247

Cal.App.4th 211, 229 [“[t]he jury’s act of crossing out the date and

signature and writing ‘withdrawl [sic]’ and ‘void’ in large letters

across the face of the form” acted to void the verdict choice].) 

However, since the “not guilty” and “not true” signature lines

were also blank, the initial verdict forms did not indicate whether

the jury intended to return “not guilty” or “not true” verdicts. 

Neither did the jury inform the court that it had deadlocked on

these counts, instead telling the court it had reached a verdict.4 

Because it was not possible to determine the jury’s intent under

these circumstances,the court did not err in seeking clarification. 

For the same reason, we reject Rivas’s argument that the court

violated his constitutional rights when it returned the initial

verdicts.

We need not reach Rivas’s remaining arguments.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

4 The court had instructed the jury that if “all of you cannot 

agree on a verdict for the lesser crime, complete and sign the 

verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime and inform me 

only that you cannot reach an agreement about the lesser crime.” 
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_______________________

BURNS, J. 

We concur:

____________________________

JACKSON, P.J. 

____________________________

SIMONS, J.

A164271