NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 08-2518

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v.

RANDOLPH SANDERS,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 07-cr-366)

District Judge: Hon. James T. Giles

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 16, 2010

Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.

(Filed December 17, 2010)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Randolph Sanders appeals a May 14, 2008 judgment of the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to a mandatory minimum 

term of imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement. His attorney has moved to withdraw 
2

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). For the reasons that follow, we will 

grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment.

I. Background

On November 14, 2006, Sanders was stopped by two police officers after failing 

to use a turn signal while crossing two lanes of traffic. Upon approaching the vehicle to 

investigate, one of the officers observed a bag containing a white powdery substance on 

the floor behind the passenger seat. Sanders was cited for an illegal lane change, and the 

officers seized the bag, which contained 995 grams of cocaine.

Sanders was indicted for possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 

cocaine. The government filed an Information Charging Prior Offenses, pursuant to 21 

U.S.C. § 851, which listed three convictions Sanders had in 1997, including one for 

possession with intent to deliver cocaine. After the District Court denied Sanders’s 

motion to suppress, the parties entered into a written plea agreement, whereby Sanders 

pled guilty to the sole count of the indictment. In the plea agreement, Sanders 

“voluntarily and expressly waived all rights to appeal ... his conviction, sentence, or any 

other matter relating to [his] prosecution” with the limited rights reserved to appeal the 

District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress and the District Court’s sentencing.

The Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentencing range of 57-71 months; 

however, the provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) provided for a 

mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and maximum of life imprisonment due 

to Sanders’s prior conviction for a felony drug offense. At the change of plea hearing, 

the District Court informed Sanders that he was facing a mandatory 10 year sentence in 
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accordance with the plea agreement. The Court also advised and confirmed that Sanders 

understood the scope and conditions of his express waiver of his rights to appeal. In May 

2008, Sanders was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, 8 years’ supervised release, a 

$5,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment.

Five days after sentencing, Sanders’s attorney filed a Notice of Appeal and, 

thereafter, a motion to withdraw as counsel in the case. The District Court granted the 

motion to withdraw and ordered new counsel to be appointed. Newly appointed counsel

also filed a motion to withdraw and a supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), expressing his belief that Sanders’s “appeal present[ed] no issue of 

even arguable merit.” Sanders did not file a brief.

II. Discussion1

Under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel may seek to withdraw 

from representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal if there are no nonfrivolous 

issues to appeal. United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000). We exercise 

plenary review to determine whether there are any such issues. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 

U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (“[T]he appellate court ... must ... itself ... decide whether the case is 

wholly frivolous.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Whether an issue is 

frivolous is informed by the standard of review for each potential claim raised. See 

United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th Cir. 2002).

 

1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
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We implement Anders through our Local Appellate Rule (“L.A.R.”) 109.2(a), 

which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that 

the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 

motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the 

United States. The United States must file a brief in response. Appellant 

may also file a brief in response pro se. ... If the panel agrees that the 

appeal is without merit, it will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose 

of the appeal without appointing new counsel.

3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2010). We ask two principal questions when counsel proceeds 

under Anders: whether counsel has “adequately fulfilled” the requirements of L.A.R. 

109.2(a), and whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous 

issues. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 

With respect to the first question, the fulfillment of the requirements of L.A.R. 

109.2(a) often turns, as it does here, on the adequacy of counsel’s supporting brief. To be 

adequate under L.A.R. 109.2(a), an Anders brief must (1) “satisfy the court that counsel 

has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues,” Youla, 241 F.3d at 

300; (2) identify issues that might arguably support appeal, see Smith v. Robbins, 528 

U.S. 259, 285 (2000); and (3) “explain why th[ose] issues are frivolous[,]” Marvin, 211 

F.3d at 780. “Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim[,]” but he or she 

must still conscientiously examine the record. Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 

With respect to the second question, we review the record to determine whether 

the appeal “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 

U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988). When the Anders brief is adequate, we confine our review to 
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portions of the record implicated by the Anders brief. Youla, 241 F.3d at 301. When the 

Anders brief is inadequate, we may expand our review to portions of the record 

implicated in the defendant’s pro se brief or other filings that provide “guidance 

concerning the issues [the defendant] wishes to raise on appeal.” Id. Regardless of the 

adequacy of the Anders brief, we may affirm the District Court without appointing new 

counsel if we find, after reviewing the record, that the “frivolousness [of the appeal] is 

patent.” United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

A. Adequacy of the Anders Brief

The Anders brief identifies four potentially appealable issues: whether the 

sentence exceeded the statutory maximum; whether the District Court erroneously 

departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines; whether the District Court abused its 

discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence above the Sentencing Guideline range; 

and whether the District Court erred in denying Sanders’s motion to suppress. 

Particularly in light of the plea agreement’s limitations on Sanders’s appeal rights, the 

Anders brief demonstrates that counsel adequately examined the record and properly 

identified each issue which might arguably support an appeal. Furthermore, we are 

satisfied that counsel accurately explained in the Anders brief why the issues on appeal 

are frivolous. Accordingly, we conclude that counsel’s Anders brief is adequate.

B. No Nonfrivolous Issues

Because the Anders brief is adequate, we limit our review to the portions of the 

record implicated by the Anders brief. 
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1. Sanders’s Sentence

We review de novo a District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines 

and scrutinize for clear error any findings of fact used in calculating the sentence. United 

States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Sanders had a prior conviction 

for a felony drug offense, he faced a mandatory minimum term of 10 years’ 

imprisonment and maximum term of life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).2 The

10 year sentence imposed by the District Court was within the statutorily prescribed 

guideline range, and was, in fact, the minimum permitted. Any issue raised with respect 

to Sanders’s sentence would thus be frivolous. 

2. Denial of Motion to Suppress

We review the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying 

facts and conduct plenary review of the District Court’s application of the law to those 

facts. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002). In denying Sanders’s 

motion to suppress, the District Court found the testimony of the arresting officer about

Sanders’s traffic violation to be credible. Accordingly, the District Court upheld the 

subsequent seizure of narcotics that the officers observed in plain view.

A police officer may lawfully stop a motorist if the officer observes a violation of 

a state traffic regulation. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (holding 

that “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable 

 

2

See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is 

greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required 

minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).
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cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”). Once lawfully detained, an officer 

may then seize any incriminating evidence that is in plain view. See Horton v. 

California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990) (“[T]he seizure of an object in plain view does not 

involve an intrusion on privacy.”). 

Here, the record clearly establishes that the arresting officers observed Sanders 

violate the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code when he failed to use a turn signal while changing 

lanes. Sanders has presented no evidence to counter the officers’ observations. 

Therefore, the arresting officers were authorized to stop and detain Sanders in order to 

investigate the traffic violation. While doing so, the officers observed in plain view a 

package that contained a large quantity of white powder and they lawfully seized it. 

Accordingly, we agree with counsel’s Anders brief that there is no nonfrivolous issue 

relating to the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the District 

Court’s judgment.