[Cite as State v. McLaughlin, 2011-Ohio-4070.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

DOUGLAS S. SMITH 

 Appellee 

 v. 

SOMIER L. McLAUGHLIN 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 25507 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. 2001-05-01898 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: August 17, 2011 

 

 CARR, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Somier McLaughlin, appeals the order of the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, that modified the payee for purposes of child 

support. This Court dismisses the appeal because the order from which Ms. McLaughlin has 

appealed is not final and appealable. 

{¶2} Ms. McLaughlin and appellee, Douglas Smith, are divorced. In 2007, Mr. Smith 

moved to modify the parties’ parental rights, and Ms. McLaughlin moved to modify Mr. Smith’s 

child support obligation. The trial court modified Mr. Smith’s parenting time and, based on its 

conclusion that one of the parties’ children did not live with Ms. McLaughlin, terminated child 

support with respect to that child. This Court reversed with regard to the child support, noting 

that Ms. McLaughlin remained the child’s residential parent and concluding that the child 

support obligation did not depend on where the child lived. Smith v. McLaughlin, 9th Dist. No. 

24890, 2010-Ohio-2739, at ¶29. Specifically, we concluded that “[a]ssuming the trial court 
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correctly found that J.B.S. is living with his maternal grandparents rather than his mother, the 

trial court erred by holding that, for that reason, J.B.S. is not entitled to the financial support of 

his father.” Id. at ¶65. We also emphasized that “[t]he only issue before this Court in regard to 

the termination of child support is whether Mr. Smith’s support obligation depends on whether 

J.B.S. is living with his mother or her parents.” Id. at ¶29. Having reversed solely on that issue, 

we remanded the matter “for proceedings consistent with [the] opinion.” Id. at ¶66. 

{¶3} On June 28, 2010, Ms. McLaughlin filed a motion for reconsideration of our 

decision under App.R. 26(A). On the same date, she also moved the trial court to modify Mr. 

Smith’s child support obligation with respect to J.B.S. “pursuant to *** the remand and mandate 

from the Ninth District Court of Appeals.” The trial court reinstated Mr. Smith’s child support 

obligation “retroactive to the date it was terminated[,]” but also concluded that Mr. Smith should 

pay the support to the maternal grandparents for any period of time when J.B.S. resided with 

them. Ms. McLaughlin appealed. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

ISSUING ITS JULY 9, 2010, JUDGMENT ENTRY IN REGARD TO CHILD 

SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD; AND ITS DECISION IS 

CONTRARY TO OHIO LAW.” 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

“THE TRIAL COUT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT TO BE PAID TO THE GRANDPARENTS 

WHERE THE GRANDPARENTS DO NOT HAVE LEGAL CUSTODY OF 

THE CHILD; AND APPELLANT IS THE RESIDENTIAL PARENT AND 

LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE CHILD.” 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AS ITS 

JULY 9, 2010, JUDGMENT ENTRY FAILS TO COMPLY WITH MARKER V. 

GRIMM AND BY FAILING TO PROPERLY DETERMINE A CHILD 
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SUPPORT ORDER FOR THE PARTIES’ MINOR CHILD AND/OR ATTACH 

REVISED CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES TO ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY.” 

{¶4} Ms. McLaughlin’s assignments of error are that the trial court erred by reinstating 

Mr. Smith’s child support obligation, but ordering it to be paid to a third party. 

{¶5} We are obligated to raise sua sponte questions related to our jurisdiction. 

Whitaker–Merrell Co. v. Geupel Constr. Co., Inc. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 184, 186. This Court 

has jurisdiction to review judgments, decrees, and final orders. See R.C. 2505.03. We have 

concluded that a judgment must inform the parties of the relief awarded in a way that is definite 

and unambiguous and “should contain all the information necessary to understand its effect.” 

Landis v. Associated Materials, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 06CA0005, 2006-Ohio-5060, at ¶10. When a 

purported judgment uses confusing or ambiguous language or fails by virtue of being indefinite 

to speak to a disputed matter, this Court does not have jurisdiction, and an appeal from the 

judgment must be dismissed. See id. 

{¶6} In this case, the trial court’s order states: 

“[C]hild support for [J.B.S.] is reinstated retroactive to the date it was terminated 

by this Court. However, inasmuch as child support is for the benefit of the child, 

[who] is entitled to financial support from both of his parents, the child support 

should be paid to the parent or person who is providing care and shelter for the 

child. 

“* * * 

“Accordingly, the reinstated child support obligation of Father shall be paid to the 

grandparents with whom [J.B.S.] resided for those periods of time that he did not 

reside with the Mother.” 

The order is indefinite in several ways, most notably because it does not identify the party to 

whom the support should be paid, the means by which payment is to be made, or the periods of 

time for which payment should be made to Ms. McLaughlin versus J.B.S.’s grandparents. It 

therefore fails to sufficiently inform the parties of their rights and obligations. 
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{¶7} We also conclude that the order is not final and appealable under R.C. 

2505.02(B)(2) as an order “that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding.” 

Divorce is a special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02(A)(2). State ex rel. Papp v. James (1994). 

69 Ohio St.3d 373, 378. Nonetheless, an order “affects a substantial right” only if appropriate 

relief would be foreclosed in the future without an immediate appeal. Southside Community 

Develop. Corp. v. Levin, 116 Ohio St.3d 1209, 2007-Ohio-6665. Once the trial court 

unambiguously determines the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to child support, 

Ms. McLaughlin will have an effective remedy by appealing that judgment. 

{¶8} The trial court’s order neither unambiguously determines the rights and 

obligations of the parties nor “affects a substantial right” under R.C. 2505.02. As a result, the 

order is not final and appealable, and the appeal is dismissed. 

Appeal dismissed. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 
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BELFANCE, P. J. 

DICKINSON, J. 

CONCUR

APPEARANCES:

JOSEPH G. STAFFORD and GREGORY J.MOORE, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant. 

DOUGLAS SMITH, pro se, Appellee.