Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 54A01-1502-CR-61 | September 4, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark Small

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jonathan Paul Graham,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 4, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

54A01-1502-CR-61

Appeal from the Montgomery 

Superior Court

The Honorable Heather Dennison, 

Judge

Cause No. 54D01-1410-F6-3649

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jonathan Graham (Graham), appeals his sentence after 

pleading guilty to one Count of possession of paraphernalia, a Class A 

misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(a)(1); two Counts of contributing to the 

delinquency of a minor, I.C. § 35-46-1-8(a), Class A misdemeanors; and one 

Count of maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-

13(b)(1). 

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Graham raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial 

court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to consider Graham’s guilty 

plea and mental illness as mitigating factors.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On October 31, 2014, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report

that on October 21, 2014, Graham had smoked marijuana with his fifteen-yearold step-daughter, J.L., and also with J.L.’s friends, D.C., aged fourteen, and 

B.C., aged fifteen, in Graham’s apartment in Crawfordsville, Indiana. On the 

same day, DCS went to the apartment to investigate. When they questioned 

Graham and his wife, Krystal Graham (Krystal), about the claims, they both 

denied the allegations. While speaking with the adults, J.L. arrived and agreed 

to speak privately with DCS. J.L. admitted that she smoked marijuana with 
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Graham. Again, DCS questioned Graham and Krystal, and Graham admitted 

to the accusations. 

[5] On the same day, the State filed an Information, charging Graham with Count 

I, possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; Count II, possession of 

marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; Counts III, IV, and V, contributing to the 

delinquency of a minor, Class A misdemeanors; Count VI, neglect of a 

dependent, a Level 6 felony; and Count VII, maintaining a common nuisance, 

a Level 6 felony. 

[6] On February 5, 2015, Graham entered into a plea agreement with the State 

where he admitted to Counts I, IV, V, and VII, in exchange for the State’s 

dismissal of Counts II, III, and VI. The plea agreement left Graham’s sentence 

to the trial court’s discretion. The trial court then held Graham’s guilty plea 

hearing, and Graham admitted the factual basis for his plea. Graham’s 

sentencing hearing was heard on the same day. As for aggravating factors, the 

trial court identified Graham’s juvenile adjudication for theft and forgery as 

well as seven felonies and five misdemeanor convictions as an adult. In 

addition, the trial court identified Graham’s long use of drugs dating back to his 

teenage years. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances. For Counts 

IV, and V, the trial court sentenced Graham to concurrent sentences of one year 

each in the Montgomery County Jail. On Count I, the court sentenced Graham 

to a consecutive term of one year in the Montgomery County jail. As for Count 

VII, the trial court sentenced Graham to a consecutive sentence of two and onehalf years in the Department of Correction. Graham’s aggregate sentence was 
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four and one-half years but the trial court suspended two and one-half years to 

years to probation.

[7] Graham now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION1

[8] Graham argues that the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing him 

because it overlooked two potential mitigating factors: his guilty plea and his 

mental health issues. We cannot agree.

[9] To show that a trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor, the 

defendant must establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and 

clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 493 (Ind.

2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). While a failure to find 

mitigating circumstances clearly supported by the record may imply that the 

sentencing court improperly overlooked them, the court is obligated neither to 

credit mitigating circumstances in the same manner as would the defendant, 

nor to explain why it has chosen not to find mitigating circumstances. Roush v. 

 

1 Pursuant to Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(2)(b) and Indiana Code section 35-38-1-13, the presentence 

investigation (PSI) report must be excluded from public access. However, in this case, the information 

contained in the PSI report “is essential to the resolution” of Graham’s claims on appeal. Ind. Admin. Rule 

9(G)(7)(a)(ii)(c). Accordingly, we have included confidential information in this decision only to the extent 

necessary to resolve the appeal.
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State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Our supreme court has noted 

that “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it 

has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has 

found that the factor does not exist.” Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 818, 822–23 

(Ind. 2002). 

[10] Turning to Graham’s first claim, we note that although a guilty plea may be a 

mitigating circumstance, it “does not rise to the level of significant mitigation 

where the defendant has received a substantial benefit from the plea or where 

the evidence against him is such that the decision to plead guilty is merely a 

pragmatic one.” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

Here, there was overwhelming evidence of Graham’s guilt such that the 

decision to plead guilty was merely pragmatic. Moreover, Graham received a 

substantial benefit in return for the guilty plea: the State dismissed three of the 

charges, half of his sentence was suspended, and the trial court ordered 

concurrent sentences for Counts IV and V. See McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 

584, 591 (Ind. 2007) (holding that receiving concurrent sentences was a 

substantial benefit). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it did not find that Graham’s guilty plea was a mitigating factor.

[11] Lastly, Graham challenges the trial court’s denial that his mental illness was a 

mitigating circumstance. This court has held that a defendant’s mental illness 

can be a mitigating factor in sentencing. Ousley v. State, 807 N.E.2d 758, 762 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004). But this does not mean that a defendant’s claim of mental 

illness is automatically to be given significant mitigating weight. Id. The 
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mitigating weight to be given to a defendant’s mental illness depends upon: (1) 

the extent of the defendant’s inability to control his or her behavior due to the 

disorder or impairment; (2) overall limitations on the defendant’s functioning; 

(3) the duration of the mental illness; and (4) the extent of any nexus between 

the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime. Id. 

[12] At the sentencing hearing, Graham stated that he suffered from depression, 

anxiety, post-traumatic stress, and paranoid schizophrenia. Graham also stated 

that he met weekly with his mental health providers at Wabash Valley to 

maintain and manage his mental health issues. The trial court recognized 

Graham’s mental issues but found that Graham’s self-serving statements 

regarding his mental illness were “somewhat questionable” when “taken in 

conjunction with other documents.” (Transcript p. 41). Also, Graham had not 

provided the trial court with any documentation substantiating his claim that 

his was seeing anyone for his mental health issues at Wabash Valley. 

Moreover, it was not clear how many sessions Graham had attended or if the 

sessions were regular. Additionally, the trial court found that Graham’s

lengthy substance abuse negatively affected his mental health. 

[13] In addition, when considering the four Ousley factors, Graham does not argue 

that his mental illness impaired his ability to control his behavior, that it 

impaired his ability to function, or that there was any nexus between his mental 

health and the commission of his crimes. The other factor is duration of the 

mental illness. Under these circumstance, we find that the trial court was not 

required to consider mental illness as a factor in sentencing Graham.
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CONCLUSION

[14] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by failing to consider Graham’s guilty plea and mental illness as mitigating 

factors in sentencing Graham.

[15] Affirmed.

[16] Friedlander, Sr. J. and Brown, J. concur