UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Viorel Micula, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Civil No. 1:14-cv-00600 (APM) ) The Government of Romania, ) ) Respondent. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION Petitioner Viorel Micula has asked this court to confirm an arb itration award entered in his favor against the Government of Romania under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. Confirm ing, or recognizing, that arbitration award would render it an enforceable judgment of this court. M icula contends that the court should confirm the award ex parte —that is, without serving the G overnment of Romania—under 22 U. S.C. § 1650a, which provides: “The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the awa rd were a final judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of th e several States.” The questi on before the court is whether a statute that empowers federal courts to “enforce” an international arbi tration award as if it were a final state court judgment permits a federal court, as a precursor to enfor cement, to recognize or confirm such an arbitration award on an ex parte basis. The court concludes that section 1650a does not permit use of s uch an ex parte procedure and therefore denies Micula’s petition. If Micula wishes to ha ve his arbitration award recognized2 and enforced in a United States federal court, he must file a p lenary action, with proper service on the Government of Romania under the Foreign Sovereign Immunitie s Act of 1976.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Convention on the Settlemen t of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States The Convention on the Settlement o f Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“Convention” or “ICSID Convention”) established t he International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 28, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The Convention entered into effect on October 14, 1966, after it had been ratified by 20 countries, including the United States. 1 Id. art. 68; ICSID, Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention , at 1-6, ICSID Doc. ICSID/8-A (Sept. 2014). The Convention’s purpose was to promote economic development an d private international investment by providing a legal framework and procedural mechan ism that could be used to resolve (primarily economic) disputes between private investors and gov ernments. Id. at Preamble;
S EN . E XEC

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. 2, at 1 (1966). “ICSID has jurisdiction over a dispute where t wo requirements are met. First, there must be an investment-related legal disp ute between a state party to the Convention and a national of another state that is also a party to the treaty. Second, the parties to the dispute must consent to ICSID’s jurisdiction.” Mobile Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela , __ F. Supp. 3d __, No. 14 Civ. 8163, 2015 WL 631409, at *3 (S .D.N.Y. Feb. 13,

1 As of September 2014, 150 countries had become Contracting Sta tes to the Convention. ICSID, Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention , at 1, ICSID Doc. ICSID/8-A (Sept. 2014).3 2015). Where ICSID has jurisdict ion, its decision s are final a nd are subject to re view only within ICSID itself. Id. at *4. The Convention, however, did not confer upon ICSID the power to enforce its awards. It left that function to its contracting states. Article 54(1) of the Convention provides: Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursua nt to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imp osed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a cour t in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through its federal courts and may provide that such courts sha ll treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent stat e. ICSID Convention art. 54(1). The ICSID Convention was not self-executing. See Medellin v. Texas , 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (explaining when a treaty obligation requires legislatio n to become domestic law). It thus required its Contracting States to “take such legislative or ot her measures as may be necessary for making the provisions of this Convention effective in its terri tories.” ICSID Convention art 69. Congress gave the ICSID Convention domestic effect in the Unite d States by passing the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 1966 (“Investment Disputes Act”).
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Act of 196 6, Pub. Law 89-532, 80 Stat. 334 (1966) (codified a t 22 U.S.C. §§ 1650 and 1650a). Section 3 of the Investment Disputes Act, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1650a, addresses the enforcement of ICS ID arbitration awards in the United States. It provides in full: (a) Treaty rights; enforcement; full faith and credit; nonapplicati on of Federal Arbitration Act An award of an arbitral tribunal rendered pursuant to chapter I V of the convention shall create a right a rising under a treaty of the U nited States. The pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforce d and shall be given the same full faith and credit as if the award were a fin al judgment of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States. Th e Federal4 Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) shall not apply to enforce ment of awards rendered pursuant to the convention. (b) Jurisdiction; amount in controversy The district courts of the United States (including the courts enumerated in section 460 of Title 28) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions and proceedings under subsection (a) of this section, regardless of the amount in controversy. 22 U.S.C. § 1650a.
B. Micula v. Romania Proceedings Before the ICSID Tribunal Petitioner Viorel Micula, along with four co-petitioners 2 (collectively, “Claimants”), submitted an arbitration request to ICSID on August 2, 2005. Micula v. Romania , ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, ¶ 10 (Dec. 11, 20 13), ECF No. 1-4. The ICSID tribunal proceedings began on November 10, 2006. Id. at ¶ 16. Claimants asserted that they had made investments in certain regions of Romania in reliance on economic incentives institute d by the Romanian government. See, e.g. , id . at ¶ 131; see also Statement of P. & A. in Supp. of Pet. to Confirm ICSID Arbitra tion Award and Enter J., ECF No. 1-1 at 3 [hereinafter Pet’r’s P. & A.]. When Romania later revoked those incentives, Claimants alleged that they experienced signi ficant financial losses. See, e.g. , Micula at ¶¶ 131, 262

. Further, Claimants argued that Romania’s actions violated its bilateral investment treaty with Sweden. See, e.g. , id. ¶ 131; see also Pet’r’s P. & A. at 3-4. In December 2013, the ICSID tribunal ruled for the Claimants, awarding them monetary damages of 376,433,229 Romanian Leu (RON)—the equiva lent of 116,317,868 U.S. Dollars—p lus interest at the rate of the three-month Romanian Interbank Offer Rate, plus 5%, compounded on a quarterly basis with respect to certain amounts and periods (“the Award”). Micula at ¶ 1329; Pet’r’s P. & A. at 4;

2 These co-petitioners were Viorel Micula’s brother Ioan Micula and three companies that they controlled, S.C. European Food S.A., S.C. Starmill S.R.L., and S.C. Multipack S. R.L. Micula v. Romania , ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, ¶ 2-7 (Dec. 11, 2013), ECF No. 1-4.5 Updated Statement of P. & A. in Supp. of Pet. to Confirm ICSID Arbitration Award and Enter J., ECF No. 7-1 at 6 [hereinafter Updated Pet’r’s P. & A.].
C. Procedural History in this Court Five months later, on April 11, 2014, Micula filed a petition w ith this court under 22 U.S.C. § 1650a seeking confirmation of the Award on an ex parte basis (“Petition”). 3 Pet. to Confirm ICSID Arbitration Award and Enter J., ECF No. 1 at 1-4. Micula argued that, because section 1650a is purportedly silent as to the proper procedure for conf irming an ICSID award, the court should “look to the most analogous state law in crafting the pr ocedural mechanism to confirm such judgments”—here, the District of Columbia Uniform Enforcement o f Foreign Judgments Act, D.C. Code § 15-352. Pet’r’s P. & A. at 8. Under that statute, the Superior Court fo r the District of Columbia is permitted to confirm foreign judgments on an ex parte basis. See id. (citing Nader v. Serody , 43 A.3d 327, 333 (D.C. 2012)). Micula also cited a series of cases from the Southern District of New York in which the courts borrowed New York stat e procedural rules and confirmed ICSID awards ex parte

. See id. (citing cases). Shortly before Petitioner filed in this court, Romania moved be fore ICSID to annul the Award. Updated Pet’r’s P. & A. at 5. ICSID’s Secretary-Genera l granted Romania an initial stay of enforcement. Id . After ICSID constituted an ad hoc Committee to consider the annulment request, Romania sought an extension of the stay pending the de cision on annulment. Id

. The ad
hoc Committee granted the stay re quest on August 7, 2014, but made it contingent upon on Romania’s filing of a written assurance that it would make unco nditional, full payment of the Award

3 The other Claimaints—Ioan Micul a and the Micula brothers’ comp anies—did not formally join in the Petition before this court—at least they were not identified in the case captio n or in the body of the Petition as “Petitioners.” However, counsel for Micula stated during a telephonic hearing in this m atter that “we do not seek the award to be confirmed only as to our petitioner. We seek it to be confirmed as to all cla imants.” Draft Tr. of Telephone Conference at 10, Micula v. Gov’t of Romania , No. 14-600 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2015) [hereinafter “Draft Tr.”].6 if the request for annulment was denied. Id . When Romania did not file the written assurance, the
ad hoc Committee revoked the stay as of September 7, 2014. Id. As a result, Petitioner Micula filed an updated petition, which again requested confirmation o f the award on an ex parte basis, as well as entry of judgment of the award after its conversion int o US dollars. Id . at 9-10. On February 9, 2015, this court, newly assigned to this matter, entered a minute order seeking an update from Micula as to his “efforts to serve the g overnment of Romania.” Min. Order, Micula v. Gov’t of Romania , No. 14-600 (D.D.C. Feb 9, 2015). In his response to the cour t’s order, Micula argued that “[a]wards issu ed by [ICSID] should be confir med ex parte pursuant to the ICSID Convention and applicable U.S. law.” Status Report, ECF No. 9 at 1. Relying again on decisions from the Southern District of New York, Micula asserted that, “ [i]n keeping with the policy goals of the ICSID Convention and its enabling statute, federal court s have routinely confirmed ICSID awards on an ex parte basis.” Id. at 2 (citing cases). Although not served with the Petition, Romania informally appea red in this matter on March 17, 2015, when a Romanian government official sent an email to the court which detailed the ongoing ICSID annulment proceedings, noted Romania’s efforts to secure a U.S. lawyer, and requested an extension of time in which to file a defense. Ema il from Darius-Bogdan Vâlcov, Minister of Public Finance, to the Honorable Judge P. Amit Meht a, United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Mar. 17, 2015), ECF. No 10-1 at 1. N o lawyer, however, entered an appearance on Romania’s behalf, and the court never received a formal response to either Micula’s original or updated Petition. Notwithstanding the lack of a formal response from Romania, thi s court has closely studied the question whether a federal district court has the authority to confirm an ICSID award on an ex parte basis under section 1650a. The court’s scrutiny stems from the Supreme Court’s admonition7 that “[s]ervice of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant,” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing,
Inc. , 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999), as well as the rule that, absent pr oper service, “federal courts lack the power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant,” Mann v. Castiel , 681 F.3d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The court also found it unusual that, in lig ht of international comity concerns, Congress would have granted fed eral courts the authority to con firm substantial arbitration awards against a foreign government w ithout providing notice through f ormal service of process. On April 16, 2015, during a telephoni c conference in which Roma nia participated, the court delivered its opinion orally that section 1650a does not permit ex parte confirmation of an ICSID award and denied the Petition. Order, ECF No. 12; Draft Tr. at 12-22. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the legal analysis supporting the court’s decision.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Interpretation of Section 1650a To determine whether an ICS ID award can be confirmed ex parte under section 1650a, the court begins, as it must, with the statute’s text. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa , 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (stating that the “starting point” for statutory analysi s “is the statutory text”). Courts are to presume that the “words used” in a statute should be given thei r “ordinary meaning.” Moskal v.
United States , 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990). When “the words of the statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete.” Desert Palace , 539 U.S. at 98 (internal citations omitted). But if the statutory language is not clear, a court may use contextual ana lysis to determine the meaning of a statute. “Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statuto ry scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meani ng clear, or because only one of the8 permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is comp atible with the rest of the law.” United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. , 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (internal citations omitted). Section 1650a provides minimal guidance on how a federal court should convert an ICSID arbitration award into a federal court judgment. Courts are di rected to “enforce” and “give[] the same full faith and credit” to an ICSID award “as if the award were a final judgmen t of a court of general jurisdiction of one of the several States.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a. But the statute does not address precisely how a court s hould go about “enforcing” and “ giving full faith and credit” to an ICSID award—whether by complaint, motion, registration, or othe rwise. See Mobile Cerro Negro , 2015 WL 631409, at *5 (“The brief text of the enabling statute thus does not specify the procedural mechanism by which an arbitral award is to be converted into a federal judgment.”); see also id., at *5 n.9. Federal district courts are split on how to interpret the limit ed text of section 1650a; no appellate court has addressed the issue. Trial courts in th e Southern District of New York have routinely recognized ICSID awards on an ex parte basis. See, e.g. , id.; Grenada v. Grynberg , No. 11 Misc. 45 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011); Siag v. Arab Republic of Egypt , No. M-82 (PKC), 2009 WL 1834562 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009); Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic , No. M-82 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic , No. M-82 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007). The court in Mobile Cerro Negro provided the most comprehensive explanation for this approach. Remarking that “ICSID awards . . . can and are expected to be recognized and enforced in national courts,” Mobile Cerro Negro , 2015 WL 631409, at *4, the court observed that section 1650a was “silent as to the anteced ent process by which the award is converted into an enforceable U.S. federal court judgment,” id. at *7. Relying on a variety of9 sources—previous ICSID enforcement cases; the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652; 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(1); 5 and other areas of law which contain gaps in the federal statu tory scheme—the court concluded that “there is compelling authority supporting filling this statutory gap by looking . . . to the law of the forum state.” Id. at *7. Because New York state law permits
ex parte recognition of a foreign judgment , the court invoked that proce dure to recognize the ICSID award. Id . at *1, 11. 6 By contrast, the court in Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic , 893 F. Supp. 2d 747 (E.D. Va. 2012), in the context of addressing a question of venue transfer, rejected any distinction between recognition or confirmation of an ICSID awa rd, on the one hand, and enforcement, on the other, id. at 752. The court read section 1650a to provide “only for the enforcement of ICSID awards.” Id. Focusing on the statutory text that federal courts should “enforce” an ICSID award as they would a final state court judg ment, the court observed that “[t]here is no mechanism for the recognition or confirmation by a federal court of a state court judgment. Unlike state courts that have domestication procedur es, federal courts have no procedure for the recognition or confirmation of state court judgments.” Id. at 753. Because federal courts do not recognize or confirm state court judgments, the court re asoned, “Congress in implementing

4 The Rules of Decision Act provides: “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” 28 U.S.C. § 1652. 5 Rule 69(a)(1) states that: “A money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution, unless th e court directs otherwise. The procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment o r execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” F ED

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. P. 69(a)(1). 6 In a recent decision, Judge Rudol ph Contreras of this court co ncluded that ex parte recognition of an ICSID award was appropriate under the ICSID Convention and 22 U.S.C. § 1650 a. Miminco, LLC v. Democratic Republic of the Congo , No. 14-01987 (RC), 2015 WL 1061555 (Feb. 9, 2015). The reaso ning behind Judge Contreras’ opinion, however, was different from that invoked in Mobile Cerro Negro . Judge Contreras found that recognition of an ICSID award should not involve forum state law because “ state-law rules governing reco gnition of foreign judgments have no place in an ICSID enforcement action commencing in federal court.” Id. at *2 n.3. Instead, Judge Contreras reasoned that an ex parte proceeding involving a certified copy of an ICSID award was con sistent with the terms and purposes of the ICSID Convention, as well as the previous decisions of o ther courts. Id. at *2.10 the ICSID Convention provided a system for enforcement of award s, not for the recognition or confirmation of awards.” Id. at 754-55. Thus, the court concluded that the only available m ethod for converting an ICSID award into a domestic judgment was thro ugh the same method by which a state court judgment could be enforced in federal court—“a su it on the judgment a s a debt,” or in other words, a plenary proceeding, which would require service on the foreign government. Id. at 754. This court has considered the competing interpretations of sect ion 1650a and concludes that the court’s reading of the statute in Continental Casualty Co. is more consistent with its text and structure. The text of section 1650a expressly requires federa l courts to treat ICSID awards in the same manner as “state court judg ments.” 22 U.S.C. § 1650a. No tably, the statute uses only the verb “enforce” as it relates to state court judgments; it does not use the verbs “confirm” or “recognize.” That word choice is consistent with the procedura l rule that “the proper treatment of a state court judgment by a federal court is not recognition, o r registration, but enforcement.”
Cont’l Cas. Co. , 893 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (“In the federal courts, ‘a j udgment of a stat e court may b e sued on as a cause of action in a federal court having jurisdic tion.’”) (quoting 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 1364 (2012)). Further, there is no federal statutory mechanism akin to the Un iform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act that enables a federal court to register, recognize or confirm a state court judgment. See Atkinson v. Kestell , 954 F. Supp. 14, 15 (D.D.C. 1997) (“State court judgments cannot be registered in this court”; limiting the federal regis tration statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1963, to registration only of fed eral court judgments); Marbury Law Group, PLLC v. Carl , 729 F. Supp. 2d 78, 83 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that the court lacked subject mat ter jurisdiction to enforce a state court judgment because 28 U.S.C. § 1963 permits registration of only federal court judgments);11 but see GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., Inc. , 718 F.3d 615, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing with Marbury Law Group and permitting confirmation of state court awards under 28 U.S. C. § 1963 if other jurisdictional requirements are satisfied)

. Instead, as Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper have written: “The most direct consequence of applying the full fai th and credit statute is that a federal court must enforce a state court judgment when an action is brought for that purpose.” 18B
C HARLES A. W RIGHT , A RTHUR R. M ILLER & E DWARD H. C OOPER , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE §4469, at 79 (2d ed. 2002) (emphasis added). Because the plai n language of the ICSID enabling statute requires arbitral awards and state court judgm ents to be treated in a parallel manner, it follows that ICSID awards were intended to be enforced by plenary actions

. This reading is consistent with o ther parts of section 1650a. For instance, in subsection (a) of the statute, Congress expressly stated that the “Federal Arb itration Act (9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.) [FAA] shall not apply to enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to t he convention.” 22 U.S.C. 1650a(a). Section 9 of the FAA, which Congress enacted before 22 U.S.C. 1650a, 7 is entitled “Award of arbitrators; confirmation ; jurisdiction; procedure” and permits a prevailing party to “confirm” an arbitration award in federal court. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added). Thus, when enacting the ICSID Convention’s enabling statute, Congress was keenly aware that domestic arbitration awards could be c onfirmed, but elected not to use t hat procedure for ICSID awards. Requiring an ICSID awardee to file a plenary action also is con sistent with subsection (b) of section 1650a. That subsection provides that federal courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions and proceedings under subsection (a) of this secti on, regardless of the amount in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1650a(b). The use of the words “act ions” and “proceedings” strongly connotes a congressional intent to domesticate ICSID awards thr ough a plenary action, rather than

7 9 U.S.C. § 9 entered into law on July 30, 1947.12 ex parte confirmation or recognition. The Federal Rules of Civil Proced ure provide support for this reading of the statute. Rule 1, in effect when section 1650a w as enacted, provides that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81.” F ED

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. P. 1 (emphasis added). Rule 2 st ates that “[t]here is one form of action—the civil action.” F ED

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. P. 2. And, under Rules 3 and 4, “civil actions are required to commence by the filing of a complaint, followed by the issuance and service of a
summons.” SEC v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. , 842 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325 ( D.D.C. 2012). “Congress can expressly provide by statute ‘to allow proceedings more sum mary than the full court trial at common law.’” Id. (quoting N.H. Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon , 362 U.S. 404, 407 (1960)). However, by expressly using th e words “actions” and “proceedings” in sec tion 1650a, Congress chose not to allow a summary, ex parte process to domesticate an ICSID arbitration award. Compare id. at 326 (finding that Congress intended summary proceedings when it pro vided that the SEC “may apply” for an order of relief). Although the court finds that the text and structure of section 1650a compel the result here, the enabling statute’s legislative history lends additional sup port to the court’s conclusion. Both the House and Senate Reports state that “[i]f an action is brought in a U.S. district court to enforce the final judgment of a State court, it is, of course, given fu ll faith and credit in the Federal court. Section 3(a) [8] would give the same status t o an arbitral award.” H.R. R EP

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. 1741, at 3-4 (1966) (emphasis added); S EN

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. 1374, App. at 4 (1966) (emphasis added). Further, both reports refer to Section 3(b) [9] as providing a “uniform procedure for enforcement of awards rendered pursuant to the [C]onvention.” H.R. R EP

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. 1741, at 4 (1966) (emphasis added); S EN

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. 1374, App. at 4 (1966). Nowhere does either report refer to ex parte proceedings or the need for

8 “Section 3(a)” refers to 22 U.S.C. 1650a(a), which was origina lly published as Pub. L. No. 89-532, § 3(a). 9 “Section 3(b)” refers to 22 U.S.C. 1650a(b), which was original ly published as Pub. L. No. 89-532, § 3(b).13 confirmation or recognition as a precursor to enforcement, even though Congress knew that such mechanism was possible under the FAA. As with the text of the statute itself, Congress’ use of the term “action” in the legislative history, without reference to a process of recognition or confirmation, indicates an intent to use a plenary proceeding t o domesticate an ICSID award. Finally, the court finds later-enacted legislation to be instru ctive and to further support the court’s reading of section 1650a. See Ginsburg, Feldman & Bress v. Fed. Energy Admin. , 591 F.2d 717, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is a well established principl e that courts may look to subsequent legislation as an aid in the interpretation of prior legislatio n dealing with the same or similar subject matter.”). In 1970, only four years after it enacted enabling legislation for the ICSID Convention, Congress passed an enabling statute for another international d ispute resolution convention, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitr al Awards (“Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention”). 10 See Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No . 91-368, 84 Stat. 693. Regard ing such arbitral awards, Congress provided that “any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 207 (emphasis added). The For eign Arbitral Awards Convention enabling statute clearly demonstrates that when Congress wants to permit ex parte confirmation of a foreign arbitration award it knows how to do so. That only f our year earlier Congress chose not to include such a process in the ICSID enabling statute is stro ng evidence that Congress did not intend for parties who had won ICSID awards to confirm such awards. Accordingly, the court concludes that Petitioner Micula must file a plenary action und er section 1650a to convert his ICSID award into an enforceable j udgment in this court.

10 In delivering its oral ruling, the court mistakenly said that the Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention was enacted before the ICSID Convention’s enabling st atute. Draft Tr. at 18. Thi s written opinion corrects that error.14 B. No Conflict with the United Stat es’ Obligations Under the ICSID Convention The court’s interpretation of section 1650a does not conflict w ith, or abrogate in any way, the United States’ obligations under the ICSID Convention. See Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. , 724 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts prefer to avoid such conflicts” “between statutes and treaties”; “Thus , we presume that newly enacted statutes do not automatically abrogate existing treaties.”). T o be certain, Article 54 of the ICSID Convention obligates the United States to both “recognize” and “enforce” an ICSID award “as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.” ICSID Convent ion art. 54. But the Convention does not obligate its contracting states to adopt any specific metho d for fulfilling those obligations. See generally id. § 6, arts. 53-55 (articles concerning “Recognition and Enforcem ent of the Award”). Rather, Article 54(3) contemplates that “the award sh all be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in force in the State in whose territories such execution is sought.” Id. art. 54(3). And, in the case of “[a] Contracting State with a federal constitution,” Article 54(1) specifies that an award may be enforced “through its federal courts” and that the Contracting State “may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituent state.” Id. art. 54(2). The ICSID Convention anticipates that a Contracting State with a feder al constitution, such as the Unit ed States, can elect to treat an ICSID award as a final judgment of a constituent state court. That i s precisely what section 1650a does. Thus, requiring an ICSID award w inner to file a plenary action to recognize and enforce the award does not in any way conflict with the United States’ obligation s under Article 54 of the Convention.
IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that Petitioner must file a plenary action, subject to the ordinary requirements of process under the Forei gn Service Immunities Act, to15 convert its ICSID award against Romania into an enforceable dom estic judgment. Therefore, Petitioner’s ex parte Motion to Confirm the ICSID Award is denied without prejudice. A separate order accompanying this Memorandum Opinion was filed on April 1 6, 2015. Order, ECF No. 12.

Dated: May 18, 2015 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge