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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EUGENE LAMONT DAVIS

Appellant No. 1440 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order April 13, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009685-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J., 

STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017

Appellant, Eugene Lamont Davis, appeals from the order entered April 

13, 2015, denying his motion to dismiss which asserted a violation of 

Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. We affirm.

We derive the following statement of facts and procedural background 

of this case from the trial court’s opinion and the record. See Trial Ct. Op. 

8/19/2015, at 1-2. 

[In March 2014], Philadelphia[1]Police Officers [], in a 

marked patrol vehicle, observed [Appellant] driving a vehicle 

with tinted windows at a high rate of speed and disregarding a 

stop sign. The officers attempted to stop [Appellant’s] vehicle 

by operating their lights and sirens. [Appellant] allegedly failed 

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1

Philadelphia is the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

901(a).
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to pull over for several blocks. During the pursuit, [Appellant] 

allegedly sped through two steady red lights and two additional 

stop signs, causing another vehicle to swerve out of the way. 

[Appellant] was arrested and was charged with driving under the 

influence [(“DUI”)] (75 Pa.C.S. § 3802) fleeing and eluding 

police (18 Pa.C.S. § 3733), and recklessly endangering another 

person [(“REAP”)] (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). Appellant was also 

issued traffic citations under the [] Vehicle Code.2

[In May 2014], [Appellant] was found guilty in absentia on 

all four traffic offenses [] [in] the [Philadelphia] Municipal Court -

Traffic Division. The DUI charge was listed in the [General] 

Division of the Municipal Court for disposition. A preliminary 

hearing was held[], and [Appellant] was bound over for trial [in 

the Court of Common Pleas] on all charges. [] [In February 

2015, Appellant argued a motion to dismiss the remaining 

charges before the court, asserting that subsection (1)(ii) of 18 

Pa.C.S. § 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, barred his 

subsequent prosecution. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 

2/19/2015, at 4. Appellant argued that dismissal was 

appropriate because the multiple charges filed against him arose 

from the same criminal episode, occurred within the same 

judicial district, and the Commonwealth was aware of the

charges when it prosecuted him for the summary offenses. Id. 

at 4-11.] [In April 2015], this court denied [Appellant’s] motion 

to dismiss. [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal[3][in May 2015. 

No 1925(b) statement was ordered.]

Id. at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization and some footnotes omitted).

The trial court filed an opinion in August 2015. In June 2016, this 

Court issued a memorandum opinion affirming the trial court. Appellant 

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2

[Appellant] received [] citations for driving without a license [], reckless 

driving [], disregarding a red signal [], and illegal sunscreen []. [75 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 1501(a), 3736(a), 311(a)(3)(i), and 4524(e)(1), respectively.]

3 As Section 110 “embodies the same basic purposes as those underlying the 

double jeopardy clauses, the interlocutory appealability of double jeopardy 

claims has been applied to claims based on Section 110.” Commonwealth 

v. Bracaielly, 658 A.2d 755, 759-760 (Pa. 1995).
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petitioned this Court for en banc reconsideration, which was granted in 

August 2016.

Appellant raises the following claim for our review:

1. Did not the lower court err in denying [A]ppellant’s motion to 

dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 in that: (i) [Appellant] 

was found guilty in Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Traffic 

Division on four traffic citations; (ii) the Traffic Division 

prosecutions were based upon the same criminal conduct 

and/or [a]rose from the same criminal episode as the instant 

criminal charges; (iii) the Commonwealth was aware of the 

instant charges before the commencement of the trial on the 

former charges; and, (iv) these instant charges occurred 

within the same judicial district as the former prosecutions in 

the Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Traffic Division? 

Substituted Brief for Appellant, at 3.

This Court addressed the compulsory joinder rule in our recent 

decision, Commonwealth v. Perfetto, --- A.3d --- (Pa. Super. 2017) (en 

banc).4 The Perfetto Court held that jurisdiction is no longer an express 

element of the four-prong compulsory joinder test; rather, a court must 

consider whether all charges occurred within the same judicial district. 

Perfetto, --- A.3d ---, *21 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). The Perfetto

Court also held that jurisdiction is implicit in any compulsory joinder 

analysis, and in judicial districts with an open traffic court, summary traffic 

offenses may be disposed of in a single proceeding in the traffic court, which 

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4 A claim regarding compulsory joinder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 raises a 

question of law reviewed under a de novo standard of review and a plenary 

scope of review. See Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71 n.4 (Pa. 

2008).
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has exclusive jurisdiction to hear it, without violating the compulsory joinder 

rule. Id. at *12-14. Further, the Court observed that in the unique context 

of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has allocated disposition 

of summary traffic offenses solely to the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic 

Division. Id. at *16-21. As such, the court concluded that Title 75 

summary offense must be disposed of in a proceeding in the Philadelphia 

Municipal Court Traffic Division and that a separate proceeding must be held 

for the remaining, higher offenses. Id. at *18.

Applying the Perfetto holding to the case sub judice, Appellant’s 

subsequent prosecution is not subject to dismissal under compulsory joinder, 

as Appellant’s prior summary traffic offenses were adjudicated in the 

Municipal Court Traffic Division. The trial court’s denial was proper. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

P.J.E. Bender, and Judges Bowes, Panella, Ott, and Stabile

join the memorandum.

Judges Lazarus, Dubow, and Moulton concur in the result. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2017