Filed 12/1/23 Ranjbari v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ROYA RANJBARI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

LIBERTY MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B321595

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 19STCV35158)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County 

of Los Angeles, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.

Heidari Law Group, Saman Ryan Heidari and Giorgio 

Cassandra, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Colman Perkins Law Group, James J. Perkins and Chloe P. 

Graham, for Defendant and Respondent.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roya Ranjbari appeals from the trial court’s denial 

of her petition to vacate an arbitration award in favor of 

defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. She contends the 

arbitrator committed misconduct warranting vacatur under Code 

of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5)1 when he 

excluded expert testimony, refused to postpone the hearing to 

resolve critical evidentiary issues, and denied her right to a court 

reporter. We affirm.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Uninsured Motorist Claim Investigation

Plaintiff was insured under an auto insurance policy issued 

by defendant that included uninsured motorist coverage with a 

$100,000 limit and an arbitration agreement.

On February 2, 2019, plaintiff made a letter demand on 

defendant on a claim arising from an auto collision that she 

stated occurred on August 7, 2018. According to plaintiff, as she 

entered the 101 freeway, attempting to merge into the westbound 

lanes at 20 to 30 miles per hour, a white vehicle traveling 60 

miles per hour struck her 2018 Kia on the left side.2 The impact 

1 All further references are to the Code of Civil Procedure 

unless otherwise indicated.

2 The facts of the accident and plaintiff’s injuries are taken 

from the independent medical examination (IME) report by 

Dr. Richard C. Rosenberg dated November 7, 2020, and the 
3

propelled plaintiff’s car into the guardrail on the right. Plaintiff 

did not hit any other vehicles. The white vehicle did not stop.

Plaintiff did not call for medical assistance at the scene or 

report the accident, but instead drove home and sought medical 

treatment at an emergency room the next day. That visit was 

followed by various medical examinations, chiropractic therapy, 

and pain management services.

On March 4, 2019, defendant’s counsel responded to the 

demand by scheduling plaintiff for an examination under oath 

before a certified shorthand court reporter pursuant to the terms 

of her policy. Counsel also requested that plaintiff produce 

certain documents and bring her car to the examination so that 

defendant’s expert could download its event data recorder (EDR).

On May 8, 2019, defendant sent plaintiff a copy of “the 

EDR download” obtained from plaintiff’s car by defendant’s 

expert.

On May 15, 2019, plaintiff acknowledged that she received 

and executed the transcript of her examination under oath.

B. Arbitration Proceedings

Pursuant to the arbitration agreement in plaintiff’s policy, 

the parties submitted her uninsured motorist claim to binding 

arbitration administered by Judicate West, a dispute resolution 

provider.

arbitrator’s July 22, 2021, findings and award. Plaintiff provided 

varying versions of the accident to insurance investigators, 

healthcare providers, and at the arbitration. The arbitrator 

ultimately found her testimony about the event not credible.
4

On October 2, 2020, plaintiff appeared for an IME at the 

office of Dr. Rosenberg. On November 5, 2020, Dr. Rosenberg 

forwarded his report on the IME to defendant’s counsel, who in 

turn forwarded a copy to plaintiff’s counsel.

On March 4, 2021, Judicate West served notice that the 

arbitration hearing would take place on July 12 and 13, 2021, 

before retired Superior Court Judge Christopher J. Warner.

On May 26, 2021, defendant served a deposition subpoena 

on one of plaintiff’s health care providers seeking production of 

her medical records.

On June 18, 2021, plaintiff served a demand to exchange 

expert information pursuant to section 2034 requesting a 

response by June 25, 2021. No other expert demands were 

served by either party.

On June 22, 2021, defendant served an amended notice of 

intent to introduce documents at the arbitration hearing 

pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.823,

3 including the 

IME report of Dr. Rosenberg and the EDR download report for 

plaintiff’s car.

On Friday morning, July 9, 2021, the arbitrator held a 

conference with the parties in advance of the hearings set to 

begin the following Monday. Following the conference, plaintiff 

e-mailed a letter to the arbitrator raising certain evidentiary 

issues and requesting a hearing on those matters.4 Defendant 

3 All further rules references are to the California Rules of 

Court.

4 In addition to her July 9, 2021, letter, plaintiff served and 

lodged with the arbitrator that day an exhibit list with copies of 

the listed exhibits.
5

responded by e-mail on July 11, 2021, suggesting, among other 

things, that certain of the evidentiary matters could be handled 

during the course of the scheduled hearings.

The arbitration began on the morning of July 12, 2021, and 

concluded on the evening of July 13, 2021. Plaintiff testified for 

two hours and submitted photographs of her car and repair 

estimates. Her treating physicians and chiropractor also testified 

on her behalf, opining on her injuries. One of her witnesses, Dr. 

Larry Miller, testified that his opinions about plaintiff’s injuries 

were based on plaintiff’s statements about the accident, including 

her reporting of an impact that caused her car’s airbags to deploy.

Defendant submitted exhibits including the transcript of 

plaintiff’s examination under oath and Dr. Rosenberg’s IME 

report. Defendant also called two forensic experts. Timothy 

Staab testified about his examination of the EDR, the mechanism 

that activates a vehicle’s airbag. The EDR, which activates when 

there is a rapid change in velocity of five miles per hour or more, 

did not record an event on the day of the purported accident or 

any other time. Based on his examination of the EDR, Staab 

opined that if there was an impact to plaintiff’s vehicle, it did not 

cause plaintiff’s car to change velocity five miles per hour or 

more. Donald Miller testified about the nature of the damages to 

plaintiff’s car and his opinions about plaintiff’s body movements 

within the car, assuming that an accident occurred.

On July 22, 2021, the arbitrator issued his findings and 

award. He noted that plaintiff’s testimony was “quite vague” 

regarding various aspects of the accident and that she “was 

impeached several times regarding the alleged accident with 

testimony from [her] Examination Under Oath taken 

April 10, 2019.” The arbitrator found that: “The testimony of 
6

[plaintiff’s own witness] Dr. Miller was devastating to [plaintiff’s]

credibility . . . . Airbag deployment and a collision with the sound 

wall simply did not happen, assuming arguendo that a collision 

occurred at all. [¶] Setting aside [plaintiff’s] lack of credibility, 

[defendant’s] forensic evidence preponderates. The EDR data 

and photographs disprove this claim. [¶] AWARD: [¶] 

[Plaintiff] is to take nothing. Each [p]arty bears their own costs, 

fees and expenses.”

C. Petition to Vacate Award

On November 12, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition to vacate 

the award. According to plaintiff, her rights were prejudiced by 

the arbitrator’s misconduct in (1) denying plaintiff the right to a 

court reporter; (2) “permitting [defendant] greater leeway with 

evidentiary issues relative” to plaintiff; (3) refusing to postpone 

the arbitration hearing pending a determination of evidentiary 

issues raised at the pre-arbitration conference; (4) and refusing to 

allow plaintiff to submit evidence and testimony. Plaintiff 

supported her petition with the declarations of her counsel and

her two proposed rebuttal witnesses, as well as copies of the 

arbitration agreement and her July 9, 2021, letter to the 

arbitrator.

On November 22, 2021, defendant filed its opposition to the 

petition. The opposition was supported by the declaration of 

defendant’s counsel describing, among other things, the 

July 9, 2021, pre-arbitration conference and the circumstances 

surrounding the exclusion of the two rebuttal witnesses, as well 

as 11 exhibits, including Dr. Rosenberg’s IME report and 

counsel’s letter transmitting the EDR download taken by Staab.
7

Plaintiff did not file a reply brief or any other papers in 

support of her petition.

On May 10, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on 

plaintiff’s petition. Following the hearing, the court took the 

matter under submission and subsequently issued an order 

denying the petition.

On plaintiff’s claim that the arbitrator prevented her from 

submitting evidence on a material issue in violation of section 

1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), the trial court found that “[t]he 

evidence presented to the court makes clear that [p]laintiff is 

actually seeking to vacate the arbitration award based on the 

alleged erroneous sustaining of [d]efendant’s objections to her 

rebuttal witnesses. . . . [¶] The court declines to review the 

arbitrator’s decision based on an allegedly erroneous evidentiary 

ruling.”

On her assertion that the arbitrator failed to postpone the 

hearing to resolve certain issues raised in her July 9, 2021, letter, 

the trial court found that “[t]here is evidence that some 

evidentiary concerns were resolved at the final hearing on 

July 9, 2021, and defense counsel also indicates that the 

arbitrator made other evidentiary rulings at the hearing.”

And, on the arbitrator’s refusal to allow a court reporter to 

transcribe the hearings, the trial court concluded that “[p]laintiff 

has not shown that her rights were substantial[ly] prejudiced [by] 

that ruling. Moreover, that the arbitrator recorded the 

proceedings himself does not appear to be improper,” citing rule 

3.824, subdivision (b)(1).
8

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Arbitration awards are generally not subject to judicial 

review. (Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 11 

(Moncharsh).) “[B]ecause it vindicates the intentions of the 

parties that the award be final, and because an arbitrator is not 

ordinarily constrained to decide according to the rule of law, it is 

the general rule that, ‘The merits of the controversy between the 

parties are not subject to judicial review.’ [Citations.] More 

specifically, courts will not review the validity of the arbitrator’s 

reasoning. [Citations.] Further, a court may not review the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting an arbitrator’s award. 

[Citations.] [¶] Thus, it is the general rule that, with narrow 

exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot be reviewed for errors 

of fact or law.” (Id. at p. 11.)

We subject a trial court’s ruling on a petition to vacate an 

arbitration award “to a different standard of review than the 

underlying arbitration award. [Citation.] We apply the 

substantial evidence test to the trial court’s determination of 

disputed factual issues. [Citation.] ‘Issues of statutory 

interpretation and the application of that interpretation to a set 

of undisputed facts are questions of law subject to independent 

review by this court. [Citation.]’” (Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. 

(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1087.)
9

B. Exclusion of Rebuttal Witnesses

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

vacate the arbitration award pursuant to section 1286.2, 

subdivision (a)(5), based upon the arbitrator’s refusal to hear 

testimony from her proffered rebuttal witnesses.

1. Background

Near the close of the arbitration hearing, after plaintiff had 

rested her case and defendant’s forensic experts had testified, 

plaintiff’s attorney stated that he wanted to call two witnesses on 

rebuttal, Robert A. Kilroy and David J. King. Neither had 

testified during plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Defendant objected and 

requested an offer of proof. Plaintiff proffered “that [Kilroy and 

King] had different opinions than those of [defendant’s] experts.” 

The arbitrator sustained defendant’s objection and did not allow 

Kilroy and King to testify.

In support of her petition to vacate, plaintiff submitted 

Kilroy’s declaration, in which he explained that he was a licensed 

chiropractor who was a percipient witness to the examination of 

plaintiff by Dr. Rosenberg. Kilroy stated that he had been 

prepared to testify during the arbitration as a rebuttal witness 

about “the specific things [he] observed regarding what took place 

. . . .” Kilroy did not, however, state that he disagreed with any 

part of Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony or opinion.

Plaintiff also submitted King’s declaration in which he 

explained that he was a registered mechanical engineer who had 

been prepared to testify at the arbitration as “a rebuttal witness 

to the testimony proffered by other experts . . . regarding accident 
10

reconstruction, [EDR] accuracy, and the location and function of 

the entire [EDR] and [a]irbag systems in as installed in 

[plaintiff’s] vehicle.” King, however, did not explain the 

substance of his proffered testimony, did not provide his opinion 

about the accident, and did not state that he disagreed with any 

portions of the testimony of defendant’s experts.

2. Legal Principles

“[V]acation of an award for ‘refusal . . . to hear evidence 

material to the controversy’ (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(5)) must rest on 

more than a simple error in applying the rules of evidence. . . . 

[S]ection 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), ‘if not properly limited, could 

swallow the rule that arbitration awards are generally not 

reviewable on the merits.’ The provision is not ‘a back door to

Moncharsh[, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1] through which parties may 

routinely test the validity of legal theories of arbitrators.’ 

[Citation.] Instead, it was designed as a ‘safety valve in private 

arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an arbitrator 

has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’ [Citation.] 

It comes into play, for example, when an arbitrator, without 

justification, permits only one side to present evidence on a 

disputed material issue. [Citation.] The Arbitration Act codifies 

‘the fundamental principle that “[a]rbitration should give both 

parties an opportunity to be heard.” [Citation.] . . . [T]he 

opportunity to be heard must be extended to all parties 

equitably.’ [Citation.] To conduct an arbitration without abiding 

by that principle evinces bias, constituting misconduct.” 

(Heimlich v. Shivji (2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 368–369.)
11

3. Analysis

The record does not support plaintiff’s assertion of 

misconduct under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5). Plaintiff’s 

evidence in the trial court consisted of declarations from the two 

excluded witnesses, stating only that they were prepared to 

testify in rebuttal at the arbitration hearings and generally 

describing the topics of their proposed testimony. Further, the 

record of the arbitration proceedings demonstrated that, even 

though plaintiff was well aware of the EDR data and the identity 

of the expert who downloaded it, she did not conduct any expert 

discovery on the issue. Nor did she call an accident 

reconstruction expert during her case-in-chief, choosing instead 

to rely on her own testimony about the accident, photographs of 

her car, and repair estimates. Accordingly, and contrary to

plaintiff’s assertion, the evidence did not demonstrate that the 

arbitrator prevented her from presenting crucial accident 

reconstruction evidence. Instead, it described, at best, a disputed 

evidentiary issue concerning the proper scope of expert rebuttal 

testimony, the resolution of which was within the sound 

discretion of the arbitrator as the trier of fact. (See Diamond 

Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors (1971)16 

Cal.App.3d 581, 604 [trial court has discretionary authority over 

the scope of rebuttal testimony].)

C. Denial of Postponement

Plaintiff next contends that she was substantially 

prejudiced by the arbitrator’s purported refusal to postpone the 

arbitration to address her evidentiary concerns. According to 
12

plaintiff, she established sufficient cause for a continuance of the 

arbitration hearings and therefore was entitled to an order 

vacating the arbitration award pursuant to section 1286.2, 

subdivision (a)(5).

1. Background

As noted, following the July 9, 2021, pre-arbitration

conference, plaintiff’s counsel e-mailed a letter to the arbitrator 

expressing “concerns” and seeking “guidance and clarification . . . 

in order to be able to fairly present [plaintiff’s] claim at time of 

arbitration.” Specifically, counsel queried why defendant was 

being allowed to call “two undisclosed forensic experts (who ha[d]

not so much as had their specialty identified)” and “one 

undisclosed medical expert (who similarly ha[d] not been 

identified in any capacity).” Counsel noted that defendant had 

not responded to plaintiff’s request for exchange of expert 

information and argued that defendant should not be permitted 

to introduce its experts without plaintiff “having had an 

opportunity to depose the same.” Counsel also requested a 

hearing to determine the admissibility of the EDR data report 

from her car, claiming that she had no opportunity to conduct 

discovery concerning the report and arguing that it was therefore 

subject to exclusion.

Plaintiff’s counsel concluded the letter by requesting that 

the arbitrator “hold a hearing as to the admissibility of any 

documentary evidence . . . [and] to determine the appropriateness 

of [defendant’s] undisclosed witnesses . . . .” Plaintiff did not, 

however, request a continuance or postponement of the hearings 
13

set for July 12 and 13, 2021, or otherwise suggest that she was 

unable to proceed on the scheduled dates.

Defendant’s counsel responded to plaintiff’s letter in a 

July 11, 2021, e-mail arguing, among other things, that (1) the 

arbitrator ruled that “issues surrounding the EDR evidence 

would be resolved during the hearing itself;” (2) plaintiff’s 

demand for exchange of expert information was untimely and 

there was no agreement concerning the exchange of expert 

information; and (3) plaintiff was well aware of the identity of 

two of defendant’s expert’s, namely, Dr. Rosenberg and Staab,

and the identity of its third expert, Miller, had not been disclosed 

because plaintiff had refused to disclose at the pre-arbitration 

conference the witnesses she intended to call.

The arbitration hearing went forward as scheduled on 

July 12, 2021, and the record contains no further information 

concerning the evidentiary issues raised by plaintiff on 

July 9, 2021.

2. Legal Principles

“[S]ection 1286.2 . . . , subdivision (a), which sets forth 

grounds for vacating an arbitration award, is an exception to the 

general rule precluding judicial review. Section 1286.2, 

subdivision (a)(5) requires a court to vacate an arbitration award 

when a postponement request supported by sufficient cause is 

refused and the moving party suffers substantial prejudice. 

Section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), states, ‘[T]he court shall vacate 

the award if the court determines any of the following: [¶] . . .

[¶] . . . The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by 

the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon 
14

sufficient cause being shown therefor . . . .’ The Courts of Appeal 

have held, ‘[Section 1268.2, subdivision (a)(5), is] a safety valve in 

private arbitration that permits a court to intercede when an 

arbitrator has prevented a party from fairly presenting its case.’ 

[Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶]

“[T]he decision whether to grant a continuance lies in the 

first instance with the arbitrator. . . . [S]ection 1282.2 provides, 

‘Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides, or unless 

the parties to the arbitration otherwise provide by an agreement 

which is not contrary to the arbitration agreement as made or as 

modified by all the parties thereto: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) The neutral 

arbitrator may adjourn the hearing from time to time as 

necessary. On request of a party to the arbitration for good 

cause, or upon his own determination, the neutral arbitrator may

postpone the hearing to a time not later than the date fixed by 

the agreement for making the award, or to a later date if the 

parties to the arbitration consent thereto.’ (Italics added.) The 

word ‘may’ is permissive rather than mandatory. [Citations.]” 

(SWAB Financial, LLC v. E*Trade Securities, LLC (2007)

150 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1196–1197.)

3. Analysis

Plaintiff’s contention that she demonstrated sufficient 

cause for a postponement of the hearings is unsupported by the 

record. As she concedes, “the [trial] court was limited in its 

ability to evaluate [the sufficient cause] issues . . . .” Although 

she attributes the problems with the evidentiary record to the 

lack of a reporter, she ignores that her own evidence suggests 

that she did not request a postponement of the hearings 
15

scheduled to commence on July12, 2021. Instead, in plaintiff’s 

letter, she requested “guidance” and a “preliminary hearing” on 

evidentiary issues initially raised at the July 9 pre-arbitration 

conference. She did not state or imply that she was not prepared 

to proceed on July 12, or otherwise request a postponement of the 

proceedings pending the outcome of the requested evidentiary 

hearing. And, as the trial court found, the arbitrator ruled on 

some, if not all, of her issues, either at the pre-arbitration 

conference or during the hearings. That he may have ruled 

against her on some issues, such as the exclusion of defendant’s 

forensic experts and the introduction of the EDR data, was not 

sufficient cause to continue the hearings.

Moreover, to the extent her July 9, 2021, letter could be 

construed as a request for a continuance to take the depositions 

of plaintiff’s experts and conduct other accident reconstruction 

discovery,

5 she failed to explain why the need for such 

depositions and other discovery had not been addressed earlier in 

the proceedings. As defendant’s evidence showed, plaintiff 

received the EDR report in May 2019, and she was thus aware of 

Staab’s identity since at least that time. Similarly, she received 

Dr. Rosenberg’s IME report in November 2020 and therefore had 

adequate time prior to the July hearing dates to conduct 

discovery on any issues raised by the facts or conclusions stated 

in his report. And, it was undisputed that her request to 

5 In her letter, plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing on 

the admissibility of the EDR data and stated that “[the] report 

was generated by a person, and cannot be used in lieu of that 

person, if at all qualified, to testify to the same. This is especially 

true if [plaintiff] ha[d] no opportunity to depose such person with 

sufficient time for the presentation of her [a]rbitration claim.”
16

exchange expert information was sent less than a month prior to 

the scheduled hearing dates, making it untimely under section 

2034. Yet she provided no explanation for the tardiness of her 

request, much less one that would have excused her failure to 

discover the defense experts’ identities earlier.

The trial court therefore did not err in concluding that the 

arbitrator had adequately addressed plaintiff’s evidentiary 

concerns.

D. Denial of Court Reporter

Plaintiff contends, as a preliminary matter, that the 

arbitrator erred by relying on rule 3.824 in support of his refusal 

to allow a court reporter, as that rule applies only in judicially 

mandated arbitrations. She also contends that she had a right to 

a reporter under section 1282.5 and that the arbitrator’s denial of 

that right “reflected [his] failure to conduct a fair and impartial 

hearing” in violation of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5).

1. Background

At the outset of the arbitration hearings,6 the arbitrator 

denied plaintiff’s request to have a certified shorthand reporter 

transcribe the proceedings and “ordered that no recordings be 

6 Plaintiff asserts, without citation to evidence, that the 

arbitrator’s decision to deny her a court reporter was made at the 

July 9, 2021, pre-arbitration conference. Her letter to the 

arbitrator that day, however, fails to mention any request for a 

court reporter or ruling on the issue.
17

made other than by him at his option[,] . . . cit[ing] . . . rule 

3.284(b)(3) as support.”

2. Legal Principles

The arbitration proceeding here was commenced pursuant 

to the agreement of the parties. Such contract-based arbitrations 

are governed by the contractual arbitration law, section 1280 et 

seq. (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 

332, 342 (Mercury).) The right to a court reporter in those types 

of arbitrations is delineated in section 1282.5, which provides, in 

pertinent part: “(a) [¶] (1) A party to an arbitration has the 

right to have a certified shorthand reporter transcribe any 

deposition, proceeding, or hearing. The transcript shall be the 

official record of the deposition, proceeding, or hearing. [¶] 

(2) A party requesting a certified shorthand reporter shall make 

his or her request in or at either of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] 

(B) A pre-hearing scheduling conference at which a deposition, 

proceeding, or hearing is being calendared. [¶] (b) If an 

arbitration agreement does not provide for a certified shorthand 

reporter, the party requesting the transcript shall incur the 

expense of the certified shorthand reporter. . . . . [¶] (c) If an 

arbitrator refuses to allow a party to have a certified shorthand 

reporter transcribe any deposition, proceeding, or hearing 

pursuant to this section, the party may petition the court for an 

order to compel the arbitrator to grant the party’s request. The 

petition may include a request for an order to stay any 

deposition, proceeding, or hearing related to the arbitration 

pending the court’s determination of the petition. [¶] (d) This 

section does not add grounds for vacating an arbitration award 
18

pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1286.2 or for correcting an 

arbitration award pursuant to Section 1286.6.”

3. Analysis

To the extent the arbitrator relied on rule 3.824 as 

authority for his refusal to allow a court reporter to transcribe 

the proceedings, he erred as that rule applies only to judicial 

arbitrations.7 But such erroneous legal decisions by arbitrator’s 

are generally not reviewable on a petition to vacate. (Moncharsh, 

supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 11.)

Moreover, although the trial court mentioned rule 3.824 in 

denying the petition on the court reporter issue, it did not base its 

decision on that rule. Instead, it concluded that plaintiff had not 

demonstrated substantial prejudice from the arbitrator’s ruling; 

7 In judicial arbitrations—governed by section 1141.10 et 

seq., as implemented by rule 3.810 et seq. (see Mercury, supra, 19 

Cal.4th at p. 343)—the right to a court reporter is set forth in 

rule 3.824(b), which provides: “(b) Record of proceedings [¶] 

(1) Arbitrator’s record The arbitrator may, but is not required 

to, make a record of the proceedings. [¶] (2) Record not 

subject to discovery Any records of the proceedings made by 

or at the direction of the arbitrator are deemed the arbitrator’s 

personal notes and are not subject to discovery, and the 

arbitrator must not deliver them to any party to the case or to 

any other person, except to an employee using the records under 

the arbitrator’s supervision or pursuant to a subpoena issued in a 

criminal investigation or prosecution for perjury. [¶] 

(3) No other record No other record may be made, and the 

arbitrator must not permit the presence of a stenographer or 

court reporter or the use of any recording device at the hearing, 

except as expressly permitted by (1).”
19

it cited rule 3.824 on the separate issue of whether the arbitrator

committed misconduct by making an audio recording of the 

proceeding.

To the extent plaintiff maintains that the refusal to allow a 

court reporter demonstrated arbitrator bias sufficient to warrant 

vacatur under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(5), her challenge is 

unavailing. As explained in subdivision (d) of section 1282.5, an 

arbitrator’s violation of that section does not create an additional 

ground for vacating the award under section 1286.2. Instead, the 

remedy for an arbitrator’s refusal to allow a court reporter is the 

right to seek a court order under subdivision (d) staying the 

arbitration and compelling the arbitrator to grant the request, an 

order that plaintiff failed to seek here. Moreover, plaintiff did not 

submit any evidence in the trial court to suggest that the 

recitation of the arbitration proceedings in the award was 

inaccurate, one-sided, or otherwise deviated substantially from 

what actually transpired during those proceedings. Thus, the 

denial of a reporter did not, by itself, show bias sufficient to 

warrant vacating the award under section 1286.2, subdivision 

(a)(5).
20

IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition to vacate the arbitration 

award is affirmed. Defendant is awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

BAKER, J.