This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8 v. No. 30,382 9 EDGAR DOMINGUEZ-MERAZ, 10 Defendant-Appellee. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 12 Jacqueline D. Flores, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 17 Adrianne R. Turner, Assistant Appellate Defender 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 for Appellee 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 SUTIN, Judge. 22 The State appeals from th e district court’s order dismissing one count of 23 automobile burglary. See NMSA 1978, § 30-16-3(B) (1971). This Court issued a 242 calendar notice proposing to reverse. Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition 1 to this Court’s notice of proposed summary disposition. After due consideration of 2 Defendant’s arguments, we reverse. 3 The charge of automobile burglary at i ssue in this appeal arose from allegations 4 that Defendant was in the process of removing the front wheels of a vehicle when 5 apprehended by law enforcement officers. The district court dismissed the single 6 count of automobile burglary, following Defendant’s argument that his actions did not 7 constitute an automobile burglary because he never physically entered the vehicle. 8 [RP 44] In this Court’s cal endar notice, we relied on a recent opinion of this Court, 9 State v. Muqqddin , No. 28,474, slip op. (N.M . Ct. App. May 5, 2010), cert. granted, 10 __-NMCERT-__, __ N.M. __, __ P.3d __ (No. 32,430, Aug. 2, 2010), to propose 11 summary reversal of the district court’s decision. We noted that, in Muqqddin , this 12 Court considered whether puncturing the gas tank of a vehicle and draining out the gas 13 constituted automobile burglary, holding that it did. Id. ¶ 1. There, we stated that “[a] 14 fuel tank—attached as it is, to a vehicle—is unquestionably a part of that vehicle and 15 absolutely necessary for its primary func tion as a mode of transportation. Any 16 penetration of a vehicle’s perimeter is thus a penetration of the vehicle itself.” Id. 17 ¶ 11. 183 Moreover, we noted in our notice of proposed disposition that to the extent 1 Defendant and the district court relied on Florida’s interpretation of its statute to 2 support dismissal, in Muqqddin we considered the applicability of Drew v. State , 773 3 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2000) (holding that removi ng hubcaps and tires from a vehicle does 4 not constitute automobile burglary, but at mo st the offense of larceny), and concluded 5 that Florida’s interpretation of its burglary statute was unpersuasive. Muqqddin , No. 6 28,474, slip op. at ¶¶ 12-13. Specifically, in Muqqddin , we stated that it is apparent 7 “that Florida’s burglary statute contempl ates only vehicle compartments which can 8 be entered either wholly or partiallyby a person; e.g., engine and passenger 9 compartments, trunks, etc.,” but that in New Mexico “a slight entry by use of an 10 instrument is sufficient.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 11 Thus, based on this Court’s analysis in Muqqddin , we proposed to conclude that 12 removal of a vehicle’s wheels is sufficient to constitute burglary in violation of 13 Section 30-16-3(B). 14 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant argues that this Court’s 15 interpretation of the New Mexico burglary statute in Muqqddinwas incorrect and 16 continues to direct this Court to Florida’s interpretation of its burglary statute for 17 support. To the extent Defendant asks this Court to revisit its determination in 18 Muqqddin , we decline to do so. Defendant points out that Muqqddinis currently 194 before our Supreme Court on a writ of certio rari. However, to the extent Defendant 1 invites this Court to hold his case in abeyance pending a decision by our Supreme 2 Court or to certify this matter to the S upreme Court pursuant to Rule 12-606 NMRA, 3 we again decline to do so. Muqqddinis the latest pronouncement from this Court on 4 this issue, and although certiorari has b een granted, the S upreme Court has not 5 reversed or overruled this Court’s decision in Muqqddin . Until the Supreme Court 6 does so, Muqqddinremains controlling precedent on which our courts are entitled to 7 rely. See Arco Materials, Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 118 N.M. 12, 14, 8 878 P.2d 330, 332 (Ct. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds by Blaze Constr. Co. v. 9 Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 118 N.M. 647, 884 P.2d 803 (1994). 10 For the reasons stated in this opinion and in our notice of proposed disposition, 11

we reverse. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13

__________________________________ 14 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 15 WE CONCUR: 16

_________________________________ 17 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 18

_________________________________ 195 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 1