[PUBLISH] 

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

 ________________________ 

No. 12-15602 

 ________________________ 

 D. C. Docket No. 8:12-cr-00169-EAK-MAP-1 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 versus 

LAZARO RAMIREZ-FLORES, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 ________________________ 

 Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Middle District of Florida 

 _________________________ 

Before MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and FULLER,* District Judge. 

____________ 

*Honorable Mark E. Fuller, United States District Judge for the Middle District of 

Alabama sitting by designation. 

 

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PER CURIAM: 

 The petition for rehearing is DENIED, and no judge in regular active service 

on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 

35, Fed.R.App.P.), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. 

 We reject Ramirez-Flores’ argument that United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 

1334 (11th Cir. 2014), published two days before the publication of this decision, 

indicates that the South Carolina statute at issue in this case is indivisible under 

Descamps v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). The Howard 

court addressed the issue pursuant to a preserved Descamps challenge, and held that 

the Alabama statute at issue there was indivisible under the de novo standard of 

review. 742 F.3d at 1340–41, 1349. By contrast, Ramirez-Flores did not preserve a 

Descamps challenge, and this panel held that it was not “plain or obvious that the 

[South Carolina] statute is indivisible.” United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 

816, 823 (11th Cir. 2014). Rather, we held that one reasonable interpretation of the 

South Carolina statute was to criminalize “entry without consent and with criminal 

intent into either a structure in which someone sleeps or a shed or other structure 

appurtenant thereto and within 200 yards thereof.” Id. at 822. Our holding is 

entirely consistent with Howard’s key to determining divisibility. 742 F.3d at 1348 

(“The key to determining divisibility, according to Descamps, is whether the 

‘statute sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative – for 

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example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automobile’” 

(quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281)). 

Our holding is also entirely consistent with the application of the divisibility 

analysis in Howard, because the language of the statutes in the two cases is very 

different. In Howard, the statute’s language clearly created a non-exhaustive list of 

illustrative examples of structures which could form the basis of a burglary 

conviction. See id. at 1348–49. By contrast, the statute we considered in RamirezFlores’ appeal created an exhaustive list of such structures. See S.C. Code §§ 16-

11-10, 16-11-310(2), 16-11-312(A). As a result, Howard does not provide a reason 

to treat the statute under which Ramirez-Flores was convicted as indivisible under 

the plain error standard of review. See United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845, 846 

n.1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“For a plain error to have occurred, the error must be one that 

is obvious or clear under current law.”). 

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