Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10915

Summary Calendar

MARTY WAYNE BELL

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:05-CV-272

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioner-appellant Marty Wayne Bell, Texas prisoner # 1112384, was

found guilty of murder and was sentenced to 65 years in prison. He has filed a

28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging this conviction, arguing in relevant part

that the trial court denied him due process by not protecting Bell’s right to

testify and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 3, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10915

2

calling Bell to testify. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,

federal courts will not grant habeas relief on any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in state court proceedings unless the state court’s ruling was the

result of “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States,” or if the state court decision “was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding. § 2254(d). “[A] federal habeas court making the

‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask whether the state court’s

application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).

On appeal, Bell contends that the district court erred in applying the

harmless error standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993),

to his claim of trial court error; he maintains that deprivation of the right to

testify should constitute a structural error. The district court’s application of the

harmless error standard is not contrary to and does not constitute an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-82 (1993). Bell also contends that he is entitled to

relief under the harmless error standard because the evidence presented against

him was slight and because his proposed trial testimony would have established

his innocence. He has not established that the district court’s error in not

preserving his right to testify had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

Bell also asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to call him to testify. He has not demonstrated that any error by counsel

was so serious as to “render[] the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding

fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

Consequently, the judgment of the district court denying Bell habeas relief is

AFFIRMED.