If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

VINCENT BOWDEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 4, 2023

v No. 360485

Wayne Circuit Court

BRODERSEN MANAGEMENT CORP, and, 

BRODERSEN ENTERPRISES OF MICHIGAN, 

LLC,

LC No. 20-004122-NO

Defendants-Appellees,

and

BRODERSEN PROPERTIES, LLC, and POPEYES,

 Defendants.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and SWARTZLE and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Although plaintiff raises multiple arguments that are a variation on a theme, this case is 

resolved by addressing only one: whether this Court’s order in a prior interlocutory appeal had 

the effect of dismissing all defendants from this lawsuit. We conclude that it did and affirm the 

trial court.

Because this case may be resolved on procedural grounds, only a brief recitation of the 

underlying facts of the case is necessary. Plaintiff alleges that in 2017 he purchased a two-piece 

chicken meal at a Popeye’s restaurant in Detroit. According to plaintiff, he immediately became 

ill after biting into a piece of chicken. He claims that the chicken had a “foul smell” and an “awful 

taste.” Plaintiff claims that what he bit into was not chicken, but in fact a fried mouse. According 

to plaintiff, after interacting with restaurant staff, he went to the hospital where he was treated and 

released. 
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Plaintiff filed this action three years later, in March of 2020, just a few days before the 

period of limitations expired. The complaint alleged product liability claims under both negligence 

and strict liability theories, as well as a claim for breach of implied warranty. Plaintiff named three 

defendants: Brodersen Management Corp, Brodersen Properties, LLC, and Popeyes. Brodersen

Management is the parent company with subsidiaries named Brodersen Properties and Brodersen 

Enterprises of Michigan, LLC. Brodersen Properties owns the real estate of the restaurant, while 

Brodersen Enterprises actually operates the restaurant. 

Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition in February 2021. Defendants sought 

summary disposition under both MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and MCR 

2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Defendants presented several arguments in 

support of that motion. Their arguments essentially break down into two categories. First, that 

plaintiff has not come forth with sufficient evidence to establish any of the defendants’ liability. 

And, second, that plaintiff did not actually name as a defendant the one entity that could potentially 

be liable: Brodersen Enterprises, the operator of the restaurants.1 The trial court granted the motion 

in part and denied the motion in part. It granted the motion as to Brodersen Properties and Popeyes 

being improper parties. And, having determined that Brodersen Enterprises rather than Brodersen 

Management was the proper party, it granted substitution of Brodersen Enterprises in place of 

Brodersen Management under the misnomer doctrine. It further directed that all references to 

Brodersen Management in the caption and complaint be struck. Finally, it denied defendants’ 

motion in all other respects. 

Brodersen Management and Brodersen Enterprises then filed an application for leave to 

appeal to this Court. The application raised three issues. The first issue challenged allowing the 

substitution of Brodersen Enterprises in place of Brodersen Management and the other two issues 

related to the trial court’s denial of summary disposition on the substantive grounds raised below. 

This Court, in lieu of granting leave, reversed the trial court in part:

Pursuant to MCR 7.205(E)(2), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Wayne 

Circuit Court’s October 12, 2021 order is REVERSED, but only to the extent that 

the trial court held that plaintiff was entitled to substitute a new party defendant in 

this action under the “misnomer doctrine,” and this case is REMANDED to the trial 

court for further proceedings consistent with this order. Because the appellant 

business organizations are two separate legal entities, neither the relation-back 

doctrine nor the misnomer doctrine are applicable here. See Miller v Chapman 

Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 106-108; 730 NW2d 462 (2007); Salem Springs, LLC 

v Salem Twp, 312 Mich App 210, 222-224; 880 NW2d 793 (2015). 

In light of the foregoing, the motion for stay pending appeal is DENIED as 

moot. 

 

1 The other Brodersen entities did not operate the restaurant and Popeyes is a brand, not a legal 

entity. 
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On remand, plaintiff filed a “Motion to Rescind the Substitution of Brodersen Enterprises 

of Michigan, LLC and Reinstate Brodersen Management Corporation as a Defendant.” Plaintiff 

argued that, because this Court reversed the decision to substitute Brodersen Enterprises for 

Brodersen Management, the trial court should reinstate Brodersen Management as a defendant. 

Plaintiff argued that defendants had not originally requested in their motion for summary 

disposition that Brodersen Management be removed as an improper party and that the trial court 

had not granted summary disposition in favor of Brodersen Management. 

The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion. As the trial court stated on the record:

Here, the Court does agree with defendant's arguments. At the hearing for 

the MSD, this Court specifically considered whether Brodersen Management

Company was proper party defendant. It is included on the record and, based on 

the briefs and the oral argument, this Court ruled that the Brodersen Management 

Corporation should be substituted in place of Brodersen Enterprises of Michigan, 

LLC, the franchise owner and proper party. This substitution was argued by the

plaintiff. The Court entered an order, removing all references of Brodersen 

Management Corp and left the new defendant, Brodersen Enterprise of Michigan,

LLC. The Court of Appeals reversed this Court's order, to the extent that the trial 

Court held that plaintiff was entitled to substitute a new party defendant in the 

action under this misnomer doctrine and found the relation back doctrine, nor the 

misnomer doctrine were not applicable. The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial 

Court for further proceedings consistent with their order. They didn’t—the Court 

of Appeals did not reinstate Brodersen Management Corp into this case. The Court 

of Appeals found Bro—Brodersen Enterprises could not be added. The Court of 

Appeals threw out the only viable defendant, leaving no defendants. Thus, this 

supports the reason why the remaining arguments that were brought on the

application for stay pending leave for appeal was [sic] moot, because there was 

nothing left to rule on, given there were no more defendants. So, wherefore in light

of the Court of Appeals[’] decision and the record, the Court agrees with the 

defendant, that the case is over and a judgment dismissal is proper and counsel 

should submit an order to that effect. 

At this point, two things are clear. First, that the effect of the trial court’s October 12, 2021 

order granting partial summary disposition included a dismissal of Brodersen Management, which 

was the basis for allowing a substitution of Brodersen Enterprises, rather than merely allowing the 

addition of Brodersen Enterprises. Second, in the January 31, 2022 order denying leave to appeal, 

this Court left intact that part of the trial court’s order. And, while this Court could have directed 

that Brodersen Management be reinstated when it reversed the order of substitution for Brodersen 

Enterprises, no reinstatement was ordered.

This arguably renders the issue unreviewable under the law of the case doctrine. As 

explained in Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001):

The law of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a particular 

issue binds the appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to that issue. 

Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App. 558, 565; 575 N.W.2d 31 (1997). 
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Thus, a question of law decided by an appellate court will not be decided differently 

on remand or in a subsequent appeal in the same case. Id. The primary purpose of 

the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once 

decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.

Interestingly, plaintiff, in his brief in the trial court, cites Ashker and argues that the law of the case 

doctrine actually supports his position. Specifically, plaintiff argued that because this Court 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order, that must mean that we must have 

concluded that the case would continue on, thus precluding Brodersen Management from pursuing 

the issue that it should be dismissed from the lawsuit. Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced for a 

number of reasons. 

First, as discussed above, the trial court had dismissed Brodersen Management from the 

case. Therefore, it is plaintiff’s burden to establish that Brodersen Management should be 

reinstated. Second, plaintiff places too much significance on the phrase “remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this order.” That phrase, or some variation of it, is typically used by 

this Court in orders and opinions whenever a case is remanded to the trial court especially if there 

are no specific directions which limit the scope of the remand. It could be, in fact, that the case 

will continue following remand. For example, if, following the reversal of summary disposition,

there remained a viable party defendant then the further proceedings might involve going to trial, 

a different motion for summary disposition being filed and considered, or a myriad of other 

possibilities. On the other hand, the further proceedings might be nothing more than the trial court 

entering the order closing the case. In this case, it was the latter that the trial court found necessary 

and we agree with the trial court.

More to the point, any application of the law of the case doctrine would be in Brodersen 

Management’s favor. The effect of the trial court’s earlier order was to dismiss Brodersen 

Management from the case and allow Brodersen Enterprises to be substituted in its place. This 

Court only held that the substitution was improper while not concluding that that had any effect 

on the dismissal of Brodersen Management. Thus, we are estopped from revisiting whether 

Brodersen Management should not have been dismissed.

But, assuming that consideration of that issue is not precluded by the law of the case 

doctrine, we would nevertheless affirm the trial court. Plaintiff’s motion to reinstate is, in 

substance, a motion for the trial court to reconsider the dismissal of Brodersen Management. The 

trial court denied the motion. Therefore, the only question properly before us is whether Brodersen 

Management should have been dismissed as not being a proper party. This would require plaintiff 

to persuasively argue that Brodersen Management is a proper party. This plaintiff fails to do.

First, looking to plaintiff’s motion in the trial court, it does not offer any argument that 

Brodersen Management is a proper party defendant. Rather, plaintiff’s argument rested on its 

theory that this Court’s reversal of the substitution also of necessity reinstated Brodersen 

Management as a defendant, an argument that we have already rejected.

Second, turning to plaintiff’s brief on appeal, it too fails to make an argument as to why 

Brodersen Management is a proper party defendant. Plaintiff’s primary argument on appeal 

regarding whether Brodersen Management should have been dismissed as an improper party 
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focuses on the procedural posture in the trial court. Specifically, plaintiff argues that Brodersen 

Management did not properly raise the issue in its trial court motion, that plaintiff was caught off 

guard at the motion hearing, and plaintiff did not get a fair opportunity to address the issue. It is 

certainly true that defendant’s motion for summary disposition could have been more explicit on 

this issue with respect to Brodersen Management. But to say that plaintiff was caught completely 

off guard is not entirely accurate.

First of all, one of defendants’ affirmative defenses listed in its answer to the complaint

was that Brodersen Management did not “operate the franchise restaurant” at issue. Second, in 

defendants’ initial disclosures, they specifically point out that “Plaintiff has named parties that do 

not operate the franchise restaurant and therefore, have no duty or liability.” Third, in their 

summary disposition motion and brief, defendants specifically stated that the actual entity 

operating the restaurant is Brodersen Enterprises, which was owned by Brodersen Management. 

Fourth, in its response to the motion for summary disposition, plaintiff raised the possibility of 

using the misnomer doctrine to substitute in Brodersen Enterprises. Finally, this issue was clearly 

discussed by the parties because, at the October 2, 2021, hearing on the motion for summary 

disposition, plaintiff’s counsel specifically stated that “I asked numerous times if we can do a 

stipulated order to correct any misnomer to get the correct party involved . . . .” 

Moreover, if plaintiff were truly caught off guard at the hearing when Brodersen 

Management was included in the discussion regarding proper party defendants, plaintiff could 

have raised the issue with the trial court and requested additional time to brief and argue that 

specific point. Plaintiff certainly had the opportunity to raise the issue in its motion to reinstate 

Brodersen Management and argue why Brodersen Management is a proper party to the litigation, 

but plaintiff failed to do so.

The only argument plaintiff presents in the current appeal is that Brodersen Management 

is a proper party defendant is an undeveloped argument about piercing the corporate veil. Citing 

Wells v Firestone Tire and Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 650-651; 364 NW2d 670 (1984), plaintiff 

states that “our courts have allowed a party to pierce the corporate veil and hold a parent 

corporation liable for the tortious conduct of its wholly owned subsidiary where the parent 

corporation dominates the subsidiary and if recognizing the separate entities would aid in the 

perpetration of a wrong.” 

Wells is hardly on point. First, it was, as it described itself, a “reverse piercing” case. 

Wells, 421 Mich at 650. This was a workers’ compensation case where the employee was 

attempting to separate the corporate owner, Firestone, from the local Firestone store which was a 

wholly-owned subsidiary of the national company. Second, the case involved workers’ 

compensation principles and whether an employee of the subsidiary should be considered an 

employee of the parent, thus precluding a lawsuit against the parent under the exclusive remedy 

doctrine. Therefore, it is of little benefit to this case.

Somewhat more relevant is plaintiff’s reliance on Acton Pluming & Heating Co v Jared 

Guilders, Inc, 368 Mich 626; 118 NW2d 956 (1962). But Acton points out that piercing the 

corporate veil is reserved for extreme cases. Indeed, in that case, the trial court concluded that 

“the corporations were mere shams and that the record indicated not one of the corporations was 

operated as a legitimate corporation.” Acton, 368 Mich at 628. Clearly, while these cases set 
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forth the basic principles for piercing the corporate veil, plaintiff does nothing to apply those 

principles to the case before us. 

Plaintiff also argues that Brodersen Management should be estopped from denying that it 

is a proper party defendant because it misrepresented that Brodersen Management was a proper 

party. But the only evidence that plaintiff offers in his brief is the same evidence that he referred 

to at the hearing on the motion for summary disposition in the trial court: that plaintiff’s counsel 

received letters from the insurance company that the insured was Brodersen Management. But the 

fact that the insurance company insured Brodersen Management does not make Brodersen 

Management a proper party defendant, nor does it even constitute a representation by Brodersen 

Management that it is the proper party to be sued. This is particularly true in light of, as discussed 

above, the numerous instances where defendants pointed out that Brodersen Enterprises operated 

the restaurant. 

Plaintiff also argues that this Court’s prior order reversing the substitution of parties had 

the effect of reinstating Brodersen Management as a defendant. This is inconsistent with the trial 

court’s conclusion at the motion hearing that it had, in fact, dismissed Brodersen Management as 

not being a proper defendant and allowed Brodersen Enterprises to be substituted in as the proper 

defendant. Even if plaintiff’s argument regarding the effect of our prior order is technically correct 

as a procedural matter, the fact remains that the trial court determined that Brodersen Management 

is not a proper defendant and plaintiff has failed to put forth a viable argument to the contrary. 

In sum, plaintiff was on notice from the beginning of the lawsuit that defendants’ position 

was that Brodersen Enterprises was the only proper party defendant. And plaintiff consistently 

failed to make a persuasive argument why Brodersen Management was a proper party defendant.2

For these reasons, we conclude that our prior order dismissed the only remaining, viable 

defendant from this lawsuit. Thus, the only option available to the trial court on remand was to 

dismiss the case. Moreover, even if it were appropriate in light of our prior order to revisit the 

issue whether Brodersen Management was a proper party defendant, plaintiff has not presented a 

viable argument as to why the trial court erred in concluding that Brodersen Management is not a 

proper defendant.

Affirmed. Defendants may tax costs. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle 

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney 

 

2 Plaintiff’s final argument is merely a rebuttable to an anticipated argument by defendants 

that an alternative ground for affirming the trial court is that there is not genuine issue of material 

fact regarding whether there was a breach of duty that caused plaintiff’s illness. While plaintiff 

did correctly anticipate that this argument would be raised, we need not address it in light of our 

rejection of plaintiff’s argument on appeal.