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2 , 0 0 Conn. App. 1

New London v. Speer

CITY OF NEW LONDON v. SHERI SPEER

(AC 45742)

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, the city of New London, sought to recover a balance due for

water and sewer services provided to the defendant’s property. The

defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that she was a debtor in a pending

bankruptcy action at the time the underlying action was commenced,

and sought damages for the plaintiff’s alleged violation of the automatic

stay imposed by the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362).

The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim,

finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action.

On the defendant’s appeal to this court, held that the trial court improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction: considering the express statutory language in 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 (k) creating a right to damages for individuals injured by violations

of the automatic stay, and consistent with federal precedent construing

the same, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) authorized an independent cause of action

for damages that survived the disposition of the underlying bankruptcy

case; moreover, this court concluded, consistent with the majority of

federal appellate courts, that the plain language of the federal statute

(28 U.S.C. § 1334) governing bankruptcy cases and proceedings grants

federal district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy petition only, and that a claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 (k) was not a bankruptcy petition and did not fall under the

exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts; furthermore, the

clear statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) distinguishing between

the exclusive and ‘‘not exclusive’’ jurisdiction of the federal district

courts reinforced the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction

over the federal claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) and

compelled the conclusion that an action for damages pursuant to 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k) is a civil proceeding arising under title 11 and, thus, is

within the original but not exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district

courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b).

Argued February 1—officially released August 13, 2024

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for failure to pay for water

and sewer services, and for other relief, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New London,

where the defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter,
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New London v. Speer

the court, O’Hanlan, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion

to dismiss the counterclaim and rendered judgment

thereon, from which the defendant appealed to this

court. Reversed; further proceedings.

Sheri Speer, self-represented, the appellant (defendant).

Brian K. Estep, with whom was Eric J. Garofano,

for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The self-represented defendant, Sheri

Speer, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction her

counterclaim against the plaintiff, the city of New London, in which the defendant sought damages for the

plaintiff’s alleged violation of the automatic stay

imposed by the United States Bankruptcy Code. See 11

U.S.C. § 362 (a) (2012). On appeal, the defendant claims

that the court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate her counterclaim seeking damages

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k). We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the

trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. In July, 2017, the plaintiff initiated

the underlying action against the defendant to recover

a balance due for water and sewer services for the

defendant’s property in New London. See General Statutes §§ 7-239 and 7-254. The plaintiff alleged that the

defendant’s outstanding debt was $1100.87 as of June

28, 2017, and sought interest and attorney’s fees. The

defendant filed her appearance on November 21, 2017,

and a notice of bankruptcy on January 2, 2018, stating,

in relevant part, that ‘‘the above named debtor filed a

petition for relief on May 20, 2014, under 11 U.S.C.

§§ 301, 302 or 303.’’ Also on January 2, 2018, the trial
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New London v. Speer

court clerk granted the plaintiff’s motion for default for

failure to plead, as the defendant had failed to file a

responsive pleading. The defendant filed a motion to

open the default on January 19, 2018, which presently

remains pending in the trial court.

The case remained dormant for several years until

January, 2022, when the court notified the parties that

the case would be dismissed for the plaintiff’s failure

to prosecute the action with reasonable diligence pursuant to Practice Book § 14-3 (a), unless the pleadings

were closed on or before February 25, 2022. The plaintiff

filed a certificate of closed pleadings and a claim for

trial list on February 16, 2022, and the defendant filed

an answer with a special defense and a counterclaim

on March 8, 2022. In her counterclaim, the defendant

alleged that she was a debtor in In re Speer, United

States Bankruptcy Court, Docket No. 14-21007 (AMN)

(D. Conn.), which was pending at the time the underlying action was commenced. On July 16, 2021, the Bankruptcy Court issued a final decree closing the defendant’s involuntary chapter 7 case. The defendant alleged

that the plaintiff, ‘‘[k]nowing [that the defendant] was

a debtor in a bankruptcy,’’ initiated and litigated the

underlying action in violation of the automatic stay

provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362. The

defendant sought actual damages, including costs and

attorney’s fees, as well as punitive damages for each

of the plaintiff’s alleged violations of the automatic stay

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) (1).

After obtaining extensions of time to plead as to the

counterclaim,1 the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss

1 The plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time to plead as to the

counterclaim on April 7, 2022, asking for thirty days to respond to the

defendant’s counterclaim. The trial court granted that request on April 28,

2022, extending the deadline to May 9, 2022. On May 5, 2022, the plaintiff

filed a second motion for extension of time to plead, asking for an additional

thirty days, which was granted on May 23, 2022. On May 18, 2022, the

defendant filed a motion for default for the plaintiff’s failure to plead as to

her counterclaim, arguing that the plaintiff’s deadline passed on May 9, 2022.
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New London v. Speer

the counterclaim on June 2, 2022. In support of its

motion, the plaintiff argued that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s counterclaim because her bankruptcy related claims are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code in accordance with

our Supreme Court’s decision in Metcalf v. Fitzgerald,

333 Conn. 1, 214 A.3d 361 (2019), cert. denied, U.S.

, 140 S. Ct. 854, 205 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2020). The plaintiff

contended that ‘‘[t]he proper jurisdiction for any

claimed violation is in the Bankruptcy Court, [and] not

the Superior Court . . . .’’ The defendant filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss,

arguing that Metcalf did not apply to her counterclaim

because ‘‘Metcalf was a review of the applicability of

state vexatious litigation and [Connecticut Unfair Trade

Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et

seq.] claims [arising from] violations of the Bankruptcy

Code, not whether one can bring a purely bankruptcy

based claim in the Superior Court.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

After hearing argument on the motion to dismiss on

August 4, 2022,2 the trial court, O’Hanlan, J., issued a

written order granting the motion to dismiss the following day. The court’s order stated in relevant part: ‘‘This

matter alleges that the [plaintiff] violated the stay

imposed by law while [the defendant] was subject to

the jurisdiction of the [United States] Bankruptcy Court;

see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); and seeks damages for such

violation. [Our] Supreme Court has made clear that

actions such as these are preempted by federal bankruptcy law, and that the Superior Court does not have

The trial court, Jacobs, J., denied the defendant’s motion for default on

June 22, 2022. 2 After filing this appeal, the defendant filed a statement that no transcript

was deemed necessary to prosecute her appeal pursuant to Practice Book

§ 63-4 (a) (3).
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New London v. Speer

jurisdiction to hear them. See Metcalf v. Fitzgerald,

[supra, 333 Conn. 13].’’ This appeal followed.3

As a preliminary matter, we first note the applicable

standard of review and legal principles regarding the

automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code. ‘‘A motion

to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the

record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur

review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and

resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will

be de novo.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Ahrens v. Hartford Florists’ Supply, Inc., 198 Conn.

App. 24, 29, 232 A.3d 1129 (2020).

‘‘Under the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition has certain immediate consequences.

For one thing, a petition creates an estate that, with

some exceptions, comprises all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement

of the case. . . . A second automatic consequence of

the filing of a bankruptcy petition is that, with certain

exceptions, the petition operates as a stay, applicable

to all entities, of efforts to collect from the debtor outside of the bankruptcy forum. [See 11 U.S.C.] § 362

(a). The automatic stay serves the debtor’s interests by

protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also

benefits creditors as a group by preventing individual

creditors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of the others. Under the [Bankruptcy] Code, an

individual injured by any willful violation of the stay

shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may

recover punitive damages. [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (k) (1).’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

3 After filing this appeal, the defendant filed a motion for articulation in

the trial court, asking the court to articulate the legal and factual basis for

its decision. The court denied the motion, and the defendant filed a motion

for review with this court. We granted the motion for review but denied

the relief requested therein.
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New London v. Speer

Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. 154, 156–57, 141 S. Ct. 585,

208 L. Ed. 2d 384 (2021).

‘‘[A]lthough state courts have jurisdiction to interpret

the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and orders of

the bankruptcy court to determine whether, under their

plain terms, the automatic stay provision applies to a

state court proceeding—which interpretations are subject to correction by the bankruptcy court—state courts

do not have jurisdiction to change the status quo by

modifying the reach of the automatic stay provision

either by extending the stay to proceedings to which

it does not automatically apply or by granting relief from

the stay in proceedings to which it does automatically

apply. Rather, any modification of the stay must be

sought in bankruptcy court.’’ U.S. Bank National Assn.

v. Crawford, 333 Conn. 731, 756–57, 219 A.3d 744 (2019).

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate her counterclaim seeking damages pursuant to 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k). She argues that Metcalf v. Fitzgerald,

supra, 333 Conn. 13, does not require dismissal of her

counterclaim because ‘‘[t]he logic behind Metcalf was

not that the Superior Court could not hear federal

claims. . . . Metcalf was a review of the applicability

of state vexatious litigation and CUTPA claims as a

consequence of violations of the Bankruptcy Code, not

whether one can bring a purely bankruptcy based

claim in Superior Court.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

Accordingly, she asserts that the Superior Court is in

as good a position as a federal court to adjudicate her

counterclaim based on the Bankruptcy Code itself. The

plaintiff responds that, in Metcalf, our Supreme Court

‘‘established that causes of action in Connecticut state

courts seeking damages under the . . . Bankruptcy

Code are preempted by the United States Bankruptcy

Court.’’ The plaintiff maintains that ‘‘the penalties
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New London v. Speer

afforded by the Bankruptcy Code are solely the authority of the United States Bankruptcy Court, not the courts

of individual states.’’ We agree with the defendant that

Metcalf does not control in the present case, and we

conclude that the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the defendant’s counterclaim.

In Metcalf v. Fitzgerald, supra, 333 Conn. 3, our

Supreme Court considered ‘‘whether the United States

Bankruptcy Code provisions permitting bankruptcy

courts to assess penalties and sanctions preempt state

law claims for vexatious litigation and violation of

[CUTPA].’’ The court held ‘‘that the Bankruptcy Code

impliedly preempts . . . state law CUTPA and vexatious litigation claims for two main reasons: (1) Congress legislated so comprehensively as to occupy the

entire field of penalties and sanctions for abuse of the

bankruptcy process, leaving no room for state law to

supplement; and (2) the federal interest in uniformity

is so dominant that we assume it precludes enforcement

of state laws that threaten the uniformity and finality

of the bankruptcy process for debtors and creditors

alike.’’ Id., 12–13. In the present case, however, the

defendant has not asserted a state law cause of action

in her counterclaim. Instead, she seeks relief pursuant

to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus,

application of the holding in Metcalf that the Bankruptcy Code preempts state law causes of action does

not resolve the question presented in this appeal—

whether state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate a

claim expressly authorized by the United States Bankruptcy Code.

We note that the parties’ appellate briefs focused

primarily on the import of Metcalf rather than on the

federal statutes relevant to the jurisdictional issue.4

4 In her reply brief, the defendant claimed that 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (c) authorizes the trial court to adjudicate her counterclaim ‘‘because the original

proceeding brought by the [plaintiff] was to collect on water bills without

it having sought removal of the automatic stay.’’ Title 28 of the United States
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New London v. Speer

Accordingly, after oral argument before this court, we

ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs concerning that issue. See Blumberg Associates Worldwide,

Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn.

123, 161, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (‘‘reviewing court not only

can but must address an issue implicating subject matter jurisdiction whenever it arises, regardless of how

the issue comes to the court’s attention’’). Specifically,

we ordered the parties to address two issues: ‘‘(1)

whether 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) provides an independent

cause of action for damages that survives the disposition of the underlying bankruptcy case; see, e.g., In re

Healthcare Real Estate Partners, LLC, 941 F.3d 64,

70–71 (3d Cir. 2019); Houck v. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 480–81 (4th Cir. 2015); and

(2) if such an action is viable, whether it is within the

‘original and exclusive jurisdiction’ of the federal courts

under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) or the ‘original but not exclusive jurisdiction’ of the federal courts under [28 U.S.C.]

§ 1334 (b). Compare Powell v. Washington Land Co.,

684 A.2d 769, 772–73 (D.C. App. 1996), with Halas v.

Platek, 239 B.R. 784, 788–94 (N.D. Ill. 1999).’’ The parties

thereafter filed supplemental briefs in accordance with

this court’s order.

I

As to the first issue, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k)

(1), ‘‘an individual injured by any willful violation of

a stay provided by this section shall recover actual

Code, § 1334 (c) (1), provides that, ‘‘[e]xcept with respect to a case under

chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in this section prevents a district court in the

interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect

for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising

under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.’’ The defendant

does not explain how 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (c) applies to her counterclaim, and,

given that there is no indication that the Bankruptcy Court considered the

defendant’s 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim and decided to abstain from hearing

it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (c), we are not persuaded that it applies in

the present case.
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New London v. Speer

damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in

appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.’’ The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit has explained that, ‘‘[b]efore 1984, when Congress enacted [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (k) (designated [11

U.S.C.] § 362 (h) when enacted),5 the automatic stay

appeared to be merely proscriptive. Section 362 (a) [of

title 11 of the United States Code] provided that the

filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay, without prescribing any sanction for its violation. . . . The

Bankruptcy Code simply gave the bankruptcy court

authority to administer the proscription. . . . Thus,

courts had held that the [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (a) automatic

stay provision did not provide a party with an independent right of action for damages but rather with a procedural mechanism to be regulated and enforced by the

bankruptcy court. . . .

‘‘In 1984, however, with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered

sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.), Congress created a private

cause of action for the willful violation of a stay, authorizing an individual injured by any such violation to

recover damages.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Houck v. Substitute Trustee Services, Inc., supra, 791 F.3d 481; see also In re Healthcare

Real Estate Partners, LLC, supra, 941 F.3d 71 (‘‘while

the institution of a bankruptcy proceeding at some point

is necessary for the institution of [an 11 U.S.C.] § 362

(k) action, the institution of a new or the continuation

of an existing [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (k) action does not

depend on the continued existence of that proceeding’’); Internal Revenue Service v. Murphy, 892 F.3d

5 We note that the redesignation of what had been subsection (h) of 11

U.S.C. § 362 to subsection (k) occurred in 2005. See Pub. L. 109-8, § 305 (1)

(B), 119 Stat. 23, 79 (2005). For convenience, we refer to subsection (k)

when discussing case law that referred to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (h) prior to its

redesignation.
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New London v. Speer

29, 36 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting that 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k)

provides ‘‘a private cause of action to ‘[a]n individual

injured by any willful violation of a stay’ ’’); Garfield v.

Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 811 F.3d 86, 91–92 (2d

Cir. 2016) (noting that ‘‘the Bankruptcy Code provision

concerning the discharge injunction . . . does not

explicitly create a cause of action for its violation,

whereas the automatic stay provision provides such a

remedy’’ (citation omitted)); Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d

829, 830–31 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 362

(k) ‘‘creates a cause of action that can be enforced after

bankruptcy proceedings have terminated’’).

Considering the express statutory language in 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k) creating a right to damages for individuals injured by violations of the automatic stay, and consistent with federal precedent construing the same, we

conclude, and the parties agree, that 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k)

authorizes an independent cause of action for damages

that survives the disposition of the underlying bankruptcy case.

II

The second issue we must address is whether federal

courts have exclusive jurisdiction over an action for

damages brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k). Our

analysis of that issue is guided by the following relevant

legal principles.

‘‘Federal law is enforceable in state courts not

because Congress has determined that federal courts

would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might

provide a more convenient forum—although both might

well be true—but because the Constitution and laws

passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the [s]tates

as laws passed by the state legislature. The [s]upremacy

[c]lause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the

Land,’ and charges state courts with a coordinate

responsibility to enforce that law according to their
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New London v. Speer

regular modes of procedure.’’ Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S.

356, 367, 110 S. Ct. 2430, 110 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1990).

It is well settled that ‘‘the [s]tates possess sovereignty

concurrent with that of the [f]ederal [g]overnment, subject only to limitations imposed by the [s]upremacy

[c]lause. Under this system of dual sovereignty, we have

consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate

claims arising under the laws of the United States. . . .

‘‘This deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction is, of course, rebutted if

Congress affirmatively ousts the state courts of jurisdiction over a particular federal claim.’’ (Citations omitted.) Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59, 110 S. Ct.

792, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1990).

‘‘Only an explicit statutory directive, an unmistakable

implication from legislative history, or a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests can displace this presumption.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian,

590 U.S. 1, 15, 140 S. Ct. 1335, 206 L. Ed. 2d 516 (2020);

accord O’Toole v. Eyelets for Industry, Inc., 148 Conn.

App. 367, 372–73, 86 A.3d 475 (2014); see also Lewis v.

Lewis, 35 Conn. App. 622, 625–26, 646 A.2d 273 (1994)

(‘‘[s]tate courts of general jurisdiction have the power

to decide cases involving federal . . . rights where

. . . neither the [United States] [c]onstitution nor statute withdraws such jurisdiction’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

Accordingly, to determine whether Congress

defeated this presumption of state court jurisdiction

‘‘by expressly or impliedly creating exclusive federal

jurisdiction’’ of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claims; O’Toole v.

Eyelets for Industry, Inc., supra, 148 Conn. App. 373;

we consider the relevant federal statutes establishing

jurisdiction of bankruptcy proceedings. See id.
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New London v. Speer

In construing and applying federal statutes, ‘‘principles of comity and consistency require us to follow

the plain meaning rule for the interpretation of federal

statutes because that is the rule of construction utilized

by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit. . . . If the meaning of the text is not plain,

however, we must look to the statute as a whole and

construct an interpretation that comports with its primary purpose and does not lead to anomalous or unreasonable results.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Highland Street Associates v. Commissioner of Transportation, 213 Conn. App. 426, 432, 278 A.3d 30, cert.

denied, 345 Conn. 917, 284 A.3d 628 (2022); see also

Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC, 331

Conn. 53, 117–18, 202 A.3d 262, cert. denied sub nom.

Remington Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S.

Ct. 513, 205 L. Ed. 2d 317 (2019).

The Bankruptcy Code provides that ‘‘[t]he ability of

any district judge or other officer or employee of a

district court to exercise any of the authority or responsibilities conferred upon the court under this title shall

be determined by reference to the provisions relating

to such judge, officer, or employee set forth in title 28.

. . .’’ 11 U.S.C. § 105 (c) (2012). Title 28 of the United

States Code, § 1334, ‘‘grants bankruptcy jurisdiction to

the district courts in the first instance, and those courts

may refe[r] such jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts

under prescribed circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco, LLC, 598 U.S. 288, 300 n.5, 143 S. Ct. 927,

215 L. Ed. 2d 262 (2023); see also 28 U.S.C. § 157 (a)

and (b).6

6 Title 28 of the United States Code, § 157, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)

Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any

or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case

under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.

‘‘(b) (1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title

11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case

under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter
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New London v. Speer

Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 provides in relevant

part: ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.

‘‘(b) Except as provided in subsection (e) (2), and

notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the

district courts, the district courts shall have original

but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings

arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases

under title 11. . . .

‘‘(e) The district court in which a case under title

11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive

jurisdiction—(1) of all the property, wherever located,

of the debtor as of the commencement of such case,

and of property of the estate; and (2) over all claims

or causes of action that involve construction of section

327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to

disclosure requirements under section 327.’’

Accordingly, federal district courts have exclusive

jurisdiction over ‘‘all cases under title 11’’; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 (a) (2012); and the district court where the bankruptcy case is commenced or pending has exclusive

jurisdiction over the property of the debtor and the

estate; 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (e) (1) (2012); and over any

appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of

this title. . . .’’

Section 157 of title 28 of the United States Code divides ‘‘all matters that

may be referred to the bankruptcy court into two categories: core and noncore proceedings. . . . Put simply: If a matter is core, the statute empowers

the bankruptcy judge to enter final judgment on the claim, subject to appellate review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and the parties have

not consented to final adjudication by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy

judge must propose findings of fact and conclusions of law. Then, the

district court must review the proceeding de novo and enter final judgment.’’

(Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 573 U.S. 25, 33–34, 134 S. Ct.

2165, 189 L. Ed. 2d 83 (2014).
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New London v. Speer

claim involving the construction of 11 U.S.C. § 327. 28

U.S.C. § 1334 (e) (2) (2012). Significantly, however, as

to ‘‘all civil proceedings’’ that merely arise under, arise

in, or are otherwise related to a bankruptcy case, the

district court has ‘‘original but not exclusive jurisdiction . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b)

(2012).

Subsection (a) grants federal district courts ‘‘original

and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.’’ 28

U.S.C. § 1334 (a) (2012). A majority of federal appellate

courts have held that the phrase ‘‘all cases under title

11’’ refers to the bankruptcy petition itself.7 See Matter

of Chesapeake Energy Corp., 70 F.4th 273, 281 (5th Cir.

2023) (‘‘[t]he first category refers to the bankruptcy

petition itself’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));

Rohe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 988 F.3d 1256, 1262

n.8 (11th Cir. 2021) (‘‘[28 U.S.C.] § 1334 only concerns

jurisdiction over ‘cases under title 11’ ’’); In re HNRC

Dissolution Co., 761 Fed. Appx. 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2019)

(district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction

‘‘ ‘of all cases under title 11,’ ’’ which refers to the bankruptcy petition itself); Gupta v. Quincy Medical Center,

858 F.3d 657, 661–62 (1st Cir. 2017) (‘‘ ‘[c]ases under

title 11’ refers only to the bankruptcy petition itself,

and it is the umbrella under which all of the proceedings

that follow the filing of a bankruptcy petition take

place’’ (footnote omitted)); In re Skyline Woods Country Club, 636 F.3d 467, 471 (8th Cir. 2011) (‘‘[f]ederal

district courts, and their bankruptcy courts by delegation, have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title

11 . . . but that provision is limited to the [d]ebtor’s

[bankruptcy] petition and the proceedings that follow

the filing of a bankruptcy petition’’ (citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted)); Stoe v. Flaherty,

7 In the absence of binding precedent on this issue, we consider cases

from other jurisdictions in which courts have considered the application of

28 U.S.C. § 1334.
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436 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2006) (‘‘The category of cases

under title 11 refers merely to the bankruptcy petition

itself. . . . A case arises under title 11 if it invokes a

substantive right provided by title 11.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)); Gonzales v.

Parks, 830 F.2d 1033, 1035 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 distinguishes between ‘‘ ‘cases under title 11,’ ’’

which are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal

courts, and ‘‘ ‘civil proceedings arising under title 11,

or arising in or related to cases under title 11,’ ’’ which

are within the original but not exclusive jurisdiction of

federal courts); but see Eastern Equipment & Services

Corp. v. Factory Point National Bank, 236 F.3d 117,

121 (2d Cir. 2001) (claim for damages pursuant to 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k) ‘‘must be brought in the bankruptcy

court, rather than in the district court, which only has

appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases’’ (emphasis in original)); Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal

Savings & Loan Assn., 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir. 1989)

(‘‘[s]ection 1334 (a) of the Judicial Code vests original

and exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under

[t]itle 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) in the federal district

courts, and a case under [11 U.S. C. § 362 (k)] is such

a case’’).

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit previously held that the Bankruptcy

Court has exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought

under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) for violations of the automatic

stay; see Eastern Equipment & Services Corp. v. Factory Point National Bank, supra, 236 F.3d 121; it

recently has cast doubt on that holding, explaining that

the court had ‘‘failed to address the contradiction

between [its] holding and the plain language of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 (a) . . . . Thus, [its] holding has been criticized

by many of [its] sister circuits.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

Inn World Report, Inc. v. MB Financial Bank NA,

Docket No. 21-2911-cv, 2022 WL 17841529, *2 (2d Cir.
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December 20, 2022); see also Stern v. Marshall, 564

U.S. 462, 480, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2011)

(noting that allocation of authority between bankruptcy

court and district court ‘‘does not implicate questions

of subject matter jurisdiction’’).

Further undermining the precedential value of Eastern Equipment & Services Corp. is the Second Circuit’s

decision of MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d

104, 110 (2d Cir. 2006), in which the court stated that

a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) ‘‘is not a matter within

the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.’’

In that case, the former chapter 7 debtor initiated an

adversary proceeding seeking damages for a creditor’s

violation of the automatic stay. Id., 106. The creditor

‘‘moved to dismiss or stay the proceeding in favor of

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, claiming

that an account agreement . . . mandated arbitration

of the claims.’’ Id. The Bankruptcy Court denied the

creditor’s motion, and the creditor appealed to the

United States District Court for the Northern District

of New York, which held ‘‘that the bankruptcy court

did not abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss or

stay the adversary proceeding in favor of arbitration

of the [11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim because] permitting

arbitration of the alleged automatic stay violation would

seriously jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy

Code.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 107. The

creditor appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed

the judgment of the District Court. Id., 110–11.

In reversing the judgment, the Second Circuit

explained that arbitration of the 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k)

claim ‘‘would not jeopardize the important purposes

that the automatic stay serves: providing debtors with

a fresh start, protecting the assets of the estate, and

allowing the bankruptcy court to centralize disputes
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concerning the estate.’’ Id., 109. It also was ‘‘not persuaded that a stay, which arises by operation of statutory law and not by any affirmative order of the bankruptcy court, is so closely related to an injunction that

the bankruptcy court is uniquely able to interpret and

enforce its provisions. An arbitrator of [an 11 U.S.C.]

§ 362 ([k]) claim would be asked to interpret and

enforce a statute, not an order of the bankruptcy court.

Arbitration is presumptively an appropriate and competent forum for federal statutory claims. . . . Congress

has authorized the litigation of automatic stay claims

in district courts as well as in the bankruptcy court

presiding over the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, so this

is not a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

bankruptcy courts. . . . While the automatic stay is

surely an important provision of the Bankruptcy Code,

there is no indication from the statute that any dispute

relating to an automatic stay should categorically be

exempt from resolution by arbitration.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 110. Accordingly, although not stated expressly,

it appears that the Second Circuit has overruled, sub

silencio, its holding that the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over an 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim. See

In re Walker, 551 B.R. 679, 691 n.23 (Bank. M.D. Ga.

2016) (noting that ‘‘[t]he Second Circuit’s statement [in

MBNA America Bank, N.A., that an 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k)

claim is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

bankruptcy courts] appears inconsistent with its own

precedent’’).8

8 We also do not find Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal Savings &

Loan Assn., supra, 892 F.2d 577, persuasive as to the construction of 28

U.S.C. § 1334 (a), given that the court in that case incorrectly stated that

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) ‘‘vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases

arising under [t]itle 11 . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) As previously noted in

this opinion, subsection (a) vests ‘‘original and exclusive jurisdiction of all

cases under title 11’’ in the federal district courts; 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) (2012);

whereas subsection (b) vests ‘‘original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all

civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases

under title 11.’’ (Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) (2012).
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We conclude, consistent with the majority of federal

appellate courts, that the plain language of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 (a) grants federal district courts original and

exclusive jurisdiction over the bankruptcy petition

only.9 The Bankruptcy Code’s internal definition of petition is consistent with this construction. Specifically,

11 U.S.C. § 101 (42) provides that ‘‘[t]he term ‘petition’

means petition filed under section 301, 302, 303 and

1504 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a

case under this title.’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, because

a ‘‘petition filed under section 301, 302, 303 and 1504

of [title 11]’’ commences ‘‘a case under [title 11]’’; 11

U.S.C. § 101 (42) (2012); it follows that ‘‘cases under

title 11’’ as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a) refers to the

bankruptcy petition itself. A claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k), however, is not a bankruptcy

petition and, therefore, does not fall under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the federal district courts pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1334 (a).

9 We also note that several state appellate courts have reached the same

conclusion. See, e.g., Triem v. Kake Tribal Corp., 513 P.3d 994, 997 n.10

(Alaska 2022) (‘‘Alaska’s superior courts are trial courts of general jurisdiction and thus may exercise jurisdiction over cases ‘arising in or related to’

title 11 of the United States Code provided the issues are not within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts’’); 366-386 Geary Street, L.P. v.

Superior Court, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1186, 1196, 268 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1990) (‘‘the

federal district courts, and the bankruptcy courts to which they refer matters,

have exclusive jurisdiction only over ‘cases under title 11,’ i.e., the bankruptcy proceeding itself’’); Calderin v. Quartz Hill Mining, LLC, 317 So.

3d 243, 246 (Fla. App. 2021) (‘‘ ‘[c]ases under title 11,’ as provided in subsection (a) [of 28 U.S.C. § 1334], ‘refers merely to the bankruptcy petition itself,

over which federal district courts (and their bankruptcy units) have original

and exclusive jurisdiction’ ’’); Stevenson v. Prairie Power Co-operative, Inc.,

118 Idaho 52, 57, 794 P.2d 641 (App. 1989) (‘‘Idaho state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to adjudicate proceedings falling under

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b)’’), aff’d, 118 Idaho 31, 794 P.2d 620 (1990); Pilkington

v. Pilkington, 71 N.E.3d 865, 868 (Ind. App.) (‘‘The district courts and their

bankruptcy units have exclusive jurisdiction only over ‘the bankruptcy petition itself.’ . . . In other matters ‘arising in’ or ‘related to’ title 11 cases,

unless the [B]ankruptcy [C]ode provides otherwise, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.’’ (Citation omitted.)), aff’d, 80 N.E.3d 886 (Ind. 2017).
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Section 1334 (e) (1) of title 28 of the United States

Code, which provides that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, wherever located,

of the debtor as of the commencement of such case,

and of property of the estate, also does not apply to

the defendant’s counterclaim in the present case. The

defendant’s 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim arose after the

commencement of her involuntary chapter 7 bankruptcy case, and that case was closed by the time she

asserted her counterclaim in the present case. Accordingly, her counterclaim against the defendant is not

‘‘property of the estate,’’ which includes ‘‘all legal or

equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the

commencement of the case.’’ (Emphasis added.) 11

U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1) (2012). See MBNA America Bank,

N.A. v. Hill, supra, 436 F.3d 110 (‘‘Because this was a

liquidating [c]hapter 7 case, there was no reorganization

and [the former debtor’s] bankruptcy estate included

only property in which she had an interest as of the

commencement of her bankruptcy case. . . . Consequently, any damages that might be awarded on the [11

U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) claim would be [the former debtor’s]

personal property and would not be part of her bankruptcy estate.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.));

see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Labuzan,

579 F.3d 533, 545 (5th Cir. 2009) (‘‘[The] plain language

of [11 U.S.C.] § 541 (a) (1) implies that [an 11 U.S.C.]

§ 362 (k) claim can never be brought as of commencement of the case, because, by definition, an automaticstay violation occurs post-filing. . . . Accordingly, we

conclude that [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (k) automatic-stay-violation claims are not property of the estate as defined in

[11 U.S.C.] § 541 . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis

altered.)). Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (e) (2) is inapplicable in the present case, as the defendant’s 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 (k) claim does not involve construction of 11

U.S.C. § 327, which concerns a bankruptcy trustee’s
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employment of professional persons to ‘‘assist the

trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties under’’ the

Bankruptcy Code.

Consequently, the defendant’s claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) is not within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the federal district courts pursuant to

either subsection (a) or subsection (e). It follows, therefore, that such a claim falls under the broad category

of ‘‘all civil proceedings arising under or related to cases

under title 11,’’ over which the ‘‘the [federal] district

courts . . . have original but not exclusive jurisdiction

. . . .’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) (2012). Indeed, 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 (k) authorizes an independent cause of action for

damages, which constitutes a civil proceeding ‘‘arising

under title 11.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) (2012). Thus, there

is no ‘‘explicit statutory directive,’’ and we discern no

‘‘clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction

and federal interests,’’ that would displace the presumption of state court jurisdiction over a claim pursuant to

11 U.S.C. § 362 (k).10 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, supra, 590 U.S. 15.

To the contrary, the express statutory language limits

the exclusive jurisdiction of federal district courts to

the narrow class of ‘‘cases under title 11’’; 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 (a) (2012); and establishes that federal courts

have ‘‘original but not exclusive jurisdiction’’ over the

broader class of ‘‘civil proceedings arising under title

11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.’’

(Emphasis added.) 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) (2012). Simply

put, the clear statutory language in 28 U.S.C. § 1334

distinguishing between the exclusive and ‘‘not exclusive’’ jurisdiction of the federal district courts reinforces

10 Given our conclusion regarding the plain text of the relevant statutes,

we do not search for ‘‘an unmistakable implication from legislative history

. . . [to] displace [the] presumption’’ of concurrent state court jurisdiction

over the federal claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Atlantic Richfield

Co. v. Christian, supra, 590 U.S. 15.
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the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction

over the federal claim.

Our research has revealed a handful of cases concerning whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b), state

courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal

district courts to adjudicate a claim for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k). Although some courts have

decided this jurisdictional issue in cursory fashion without considering the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1334,11 in our

supplemental briefing order, we directed the parties to

consider two decisions in which the courts analyzed

the relevant statutes and reached opposite conclusions

regarding the jurisdictional issue. See Halas v. Platek,

supra, 239 B.R. 792 (holding that bankruptcy court has

exclusive jurisdiction over 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim);

Powell v. Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d 773

(holding that Superior Court in District of Columbia

has concurrent jurisdiction with federal district courts

to adjudicate 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim).

11 For example, in an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals of Michigan stated, without any analysis, that ‘‘the determination of whether a party

violated 11 U.S.C. [§] 362 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal

courts.’’ Society Bank, Michigan v. Rogers, Docket No. 195078, 1997 WL

33330949, *1 (Mich. App. December 30, 1997). The Court of Appeals of

Kansas also considered the jurisdictional issue in an unpublished opinion

and resolved it without considering the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1334. See

First National Bank v. Cunningham, Docket No. 108,380, 2013 WL 4730264,

*7 (Kan. App. August 30, 2013). Specifically, the court explained that the

‘‘dispositive issue [was] whether [it] should exercise jurisdiction over an

alleged violation of a bankruptcy stay.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., *6. Although

the court noted that the parties in that case had cited various federal cases

in support of their respective positions as to state court jurisdiction over

an 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim, it simply stated, without analysis, that ‘‘[w]e

decline to accept jurisdiction to address a possible violation of the bankruptcy stay and dismiss this issue finding the best course of action is for

that issue to be resolved by the bankruptcy court.’’ Id., *7. Similarly, in

Hawthorne v. Hameed, 836 P.2d 683, 685–86 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989), the

Oklahoma Court of Appeals held, without considering the text of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334, that a debtor’s claim for damages arising from violations of the

automatic stay ‘‘was the exclusive province of the bankruptcy court.’’
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In Powell v. Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d

769, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

entered a default judgment against the plaintiff-tenant

(tenant) and granted the defendant-landlord (landlord)

possession of the property. Shortly after the landlord

filed a writ of execution to evict the tenant pursuant to

the judgment, the tenant filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy

petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

District of Columbia. Id., 769–70. ‘‘[T]hree days after

the bankruptcy filing, agents of the [landlord] . . .

attempted to evict the [tenant],’’ although the record

did not reveal ‘‘[t]he extent of the eviction . . . .’’ Id.,

770. After her bankruptcy case was involuntarily dismissed, the tenant filed an action in the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia in three counts sounding in

wrongful eviction (count I), violation of the automatic

stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) (count II), and

conversion (count III). Id. The Superior Court granted

the landlord’s motion to dismiss, concluding that,

because all the counts were based on the landlord’s

alleged violation of the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.

§ 362, ‘‘it was a case arising under the Bankruptcy Code,

and, thus, that original and exclusive jurisdiction was

vested in the [United States] District Court and the

[United States] Bankruptcy Court.’’ Id.

The tenant appealed, and the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals considered whether the tenant’s complaint was ‘‘a ‘case under title 11’ over which the [federal] District Court (or bankruptcy court) has exclusive

jurisdiction.’’ Id., 772. The court began its analysis by

noting that ‘‘[a] case ‘under title 11’ is the bankruptcy

case per se, ‘the case upon which all of the proceedings

which follow the filing of a petition are predicated.’

. . . [Thus], the case that was ‘under title 11,’ and

within exclusive federal court jurisdiction, was the

bankruptcy petition filed by’’ the tenant, which case

was dismissed before the tenant filed her action in the
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Superior Court. (Citation omitted.) Id. After concluding

that counts I and III did not constitute a case under

title 11 because they arose under the laws of the District

of Columbia; id., 772–73;12 the court addressed count

II, observing that, ‘‘unlike counts I and III, [count II

was] based on a violation of the [B]ankruptcy [Code]

itself.’’ Id., 773. The court reasoned that, although ‘‘[11

U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) proceedings are not specifically

defined as core proceedings in [28 U.S.C. § 157 (b) (2)

(G)], they have been held to be core proceedings. . . .

This conclusion is based, in part, on the notion that

core proceedings involve matters concerning the

administration of the bankruptcy estate, and bankruptcy estate matters traditionally fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court; that motions to punish

creditors for violating automatic stays are similar to

motions to be released from the stay, which are core

proceedings, and that contempt proceedings claiming

a violation of the automatic stay are also core proceedings. . . . In addition, the automatic stay provision of

the Bankruptcy Code is a creature peculiar to federal

bankruptcy law and plays a fundamental role in the

administration of the Bankruptcy Code. . . .

‘‘A core proceeding . . . is one arising under or arising in a case under title 11, but it is not a case under

title 11. It is only the latter type of case over which

the district court has exclusive jurisdiction under [28

12 The court reasoned that, because the wrongful eviction and conversion

counts arose under the laws of the District of Columbia, they ‘‘do not

constitute a case ‘under title 11’ and therefore do not fall within the federal

court’s exclusive jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1334 (a).’’ Powell v. Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d 772. The court further explained that it

‘‘need not decide whether [those claims] ‘arise under’ or ‘in’ title 11 or are

‘related to’ cases under title 11, placing them within the federal court’s

original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1334 (b). . . .

[E]ven if the [tenant’s] claims did fall within subsection (b), this would not

deprive the Superior Court of jurisdiction, because subsection (b) provides

that the district courts have jurisdiction, but do not preclude jurisdiction

in local courts.’’ Id., 773.
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U.S.C.] § 1334 (a). Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction

to hear count II of [the tenant’s] complaint’’ seeking

damages pursuant to [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (k). (Citations

omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

In a footnote at the end of the opinion, the court

explained that ‘‘[t]here may be some concern that local

courts are not the best fora to determine questions

that so directly affect the operations of the Bankruptcy

Code. In light of the clear statutory scheme that preserves and, indeed, appears to defer to state court jurisdiction except with regard to cases ‘under’ title 11 . . .

we are not free to resolve that concern, however, by

reference to exclusive federal jurisdiction. The fact that

the trial court has jurisdiction over the complaint does

not preclude a party from seeking to remove the case

to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (1994). We note

also that if the complaint had been filed during the

pendency of the bankruptcy petition, it could be argued

that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to

entertain these claims as involving the ‘property of the

estate.’ . . . We need not address this argument

because any ‘property’ interest that may have been created by the claims could not have been ‘of the estate’

once the bankruptcy case had been dismissed . . . .’’

(Citations omitted.) Id., 773 n.12.13

13 In a concurring opinion in Powell, Judge Schwelb noted that ‘‘[t]he

doctrine that a court order is to be enforced by the court which issued it,

and only by that court, has been applied in cases very similar to [Powell].

In Hawthorne v. Hameed, 836 P.2d 683 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989), a debtor

who had filed for bankruptcy protection sued his creditor in a local district

court for wrongful garnishment, alleging that the garnishment was in violation of the bankruptcy court’s automatic stay. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the debtor, but the appellate court reversed,

holding that the bankruptcy court had the sole responsibility to determine

the effects of its own stay, and that in Oklahoma the power of a state court

to punish for contempt lies exclusively in the court whose order is violated.

. . . The court [in Hawthorne] went on to explain that claims for relief

from the creditor’s acts prohibited solely by the automatic stay should be

brought only in bankruptcy court. . . . The decision in Hawthorne was
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In Halas v. Platek, supra, 239 B.R. 784, however,

the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

exercising de novo review of the Bankruptcy Court’s

ruling; see footnote 6 of this opinion; reached the opposite conclusion regarding jurisdiction over an 11 U.S.C.

§ 362 (k) claim. In that case, eight days after Attorney

Regan D. Ebert filed a tort action against James Halas,

Halas filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. Id., 786.

Ebert, unaware of the bankruptcy petition, obtained a

default judgment against Halas, who then notified Ebert

of his pending bankruptcy case. Id. Halas’ bankruptcy

case subsequently was dismissed, and Ebert transferred

her file to a different attorney, David F. Platek, who

enforced the judgment by garnishing Halas’ wages. Id.

In response, Halas filed a motion to vacate the state

court judgment. In that motion, Halas argued that the

judgment was void because it was entered in violation

of the automatic stay and requested ‘‘a return of all

monies collected pursuant to the default judgment, a

stay of any further collection, and any other relief the

state court might deem just and equitable.’’ Id. The state

court granted Halas’ motion to vacate but denied his

requests for additional relief. Id.

Halas then filed in the Bankruptcy Court a request

for sanctions against Ebert and Platek for violating the

automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k). Id., 786.

The Bankruptcy Court, after reopening the bankruptcy

case and holding a hearing on the request for sanctions,

followed in Ramdharry v. Gurer, [Docket No. CV-89-42620, 1995 WL 41353

(Conn. Super. January 25, 1995)]. The courts in Hawthorne and Ramdharry,

however, did not address or even mention the relevant provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1334 (a) and (b) . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Powell v. Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d 774 (Schwelb,

J., concurring). Judge Schwelb also emphasized in his concurring opinion

that the ‘‘undisputed and unassailable determination that [the tenant’s] case

‘arises under’ the Bankruptcy Code [compelled] the conclusion that,

according to the terms of [28 U.S.C. §] 1334 (b), the bankruptcy court had

original but not exclusive jurisdiction . . . .’’ Id., 775.
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found that Platek wilfully violated the automatic stay

but nonetheless concluded that res judicata precluded

Halas’ request for sanctions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362

(k) because ‘‘the state court had concurrent jurisdiction

to impose [11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) sanctions’’ and declined

to do so when it adjudicated Halas’ motion to vacate.

Id., 786–87. In a motion for rehearing, Halas argued that

‘‘violations of an automatic stay fall within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.’’ Id., 787. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, explaining ‘‘that under

28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b), the state court had concurrent

jurisdiction to impose an [11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) sanction

and [finding] that Halas had litigated a similar motion

for sanctions at the state level.’’ (Footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Halas appealed to the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that the

Bankruptcy Court improperly concluded that res judicata barred his 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim. Id. The District

Court restated the issue as ‘‘whether [an 11 U.S.C.] § 362

([k]) motion for sanctions falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court pursuant to [28 U.S.C.]

§ 1334 (a) or under the non-exclusive jurisdictional provision of [28 U.S.C.] § 1334 (b).’’ Id., 788. In resolving

that issue, the court noted that, although it had found

no ‘‘federal case directly addressing the jurisdictional

issue [of] whether a state court has jurisdiction to

impose [11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) sanctions’’; id., 789; it had

found ‘‘one state case, Hawthorne v. Hameed, 836 P.2d

683 [(Okla. Civ. App. 1989)],14 and one case from the

District of Columbia, Powell v. Washington Land Co.,

[supra, 684 A.2d 769], that’’ had addressed the jurisdictional issue. (Footnote added.) Id., 790.

After reviewing the decisions in Powell and Hawthorne, the court concluded ‘‘that [an 11 U.S.C.] § 362

14 See footnotes 11 and 13 of this opinion.
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([k]) request for sanctions is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court under [28 U.S.C.] § 1334

(a).’’ Halas v. Platek, supra, 239 B.R. 792. The court

reasoned that, although ‘‘the decision in Powell is wellreasoned, the court finds the holding in Hawthorne to

be more consistent with the aims of the Bankruptcy

Code. In short, allowing state courts to impose [11

U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) sanctions, a penalty so closely intertwined with the bankruptcy case itself, would undermine Congress’ intent to have one uniform bankruptcy

system. . . . The court reaches this conclusion despite

[28 U.S.C.] § 1334 (b)’s language, a fair reading of which

does suggest that state courts have jurisdiction over

[11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) requests. That is, [11 U.S.C.] § 362

([k]) has been construed as creating a cause of action

. . . and when a cause of action is one which is created

by title 11, then that civil proceeding is one arising

under title 11. . . . Further, that [an 11 U.S.C.] § 362

([k]) action is considered a core proceeding . . . and

hence, within the ambit of [28 U.S.C.] § 1334 (b), does

not alter the court’s conclusion. Section 1334 (b) [of

title 11 of the United States Code]is primarily an expansion of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction rather than an

avenue for state courts to address issues traditionally

within the realm of the bankruptcy courts. In other

words, the focus of [28 U.S.C.] § 1334 (b) is on the

scope of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction rather than

the state court’s. . . .

‘‘For these reasons, the court concludes that state

courts do not have jurisdiction to impose sanctions

under [11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]). . . . Because the state

court did not have jurisdiction, Halas could not have

sought [11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k]) sanctions in that forum.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 792–93.

In their supplemental briefs in the present case, the

parties’ respective positions on Powell and Halas are
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unsurprising. The defendant endorses the reasoning set

forth in Powell and reiterates that the trial court has

jurisdiction to adjudicate her counterclaim for damages

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k). The plaintiff, in turn,

argues that ‘‘[t]his court should follow the reasoning in

Halas [rather than] Powell when considering grounds

of exclusive jurisdiction’’ because the defendant’s 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim is ‘‘under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a).’’

Given the express statutory language in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334, we find the court’s reasoning in Powell, which

comports with our reading of federal statutes, more

persuasive.

The court in Halas v. Platek, supra, 239 B.R. 792–93,

acknowledged that ‘‘a fair reading of [28 U.S.C. § 1334

(b)] does suggest that state courts have jurisdiction’’

to award damages pursuant to [11 U.S.C.] § 362 (k)

because the statute authorizes a cause of action for

damages, which would constitute a civil proceeding

‘‘arising under title 11’’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1334

(b). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court in

Halas nonetheless dismisses the significance of this

plain reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b) because that subsection ‘‘is primarily an expansion of bankruptcy courts’

jurisdiction rather than’’ the jurisdiction of state courts.

Id., 793. This reasoning is particularly unpersuasive

given the well settled presumption of concurrent state

court jurisdiction over federal claims, which presumption the court neither acknowledged nor discussed in

Halas. We decline to ignore the express statutory language distinguishing between federal jurisdiction of

bankruptcy proceedings that is exclusive and that

which is ‘‘not exclusive’’; (emphasis added) 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334 (a) and (b) (2012); when such distinction reinforces the well settled presumption of concurrent state

court jurisdiction over federal claims.
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New London v. Speer

We also find unavailing the court’s reasoning that

‘‘allowing state courts to impose [11 U.S.C.] § 362 ([k])

sanctions, a penalty so closely intertwined with the

bankruptcy case itself, would undermine Congress’

intent to have one uniform bankruptcy system.’’ Halas

v. Platek, supra, 239 B.R. 792. Much like the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals, we are ‘‘not persuaded that

a stay, which arises by operation of statutory law and

not by any affirmative order of the bankruptcy court,

is so closely related to an injunction that the bankruptcy

court is uniquely able to interpret and enforce its provisions.’’ (Emphasis added.) MBNA America Bank, N.A.

v. Hill, supra, 436 F.3d 110. Indeed, the Second Circuit’s

reasoning with respect to the arbitrability of an 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k) claim in that case applies with equal

force in the present case. That is, like arbitration, a state

court ‘‘is presumptively an appropriate and competent

forum for federal statutory claims,’’ and state court

judges, much like arbitrators, ‘‘would be asked to interpret and enforce a statute, not an order of the bankruptcy court.’’15 See id.; see also, e.g., Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133–34, 913 A.2d 415 (2007) (‘‘State

courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought

15 We note that the standard for determining damages pursuant to 11

U.S.C. § 362 (k) is neither complex nor unique to bankruptcy law. As the

Second Circuit has explained: ‘‘any deliberate act taken in violation of a

stay, which the violator knows to be in existence, justifies an award of

actual damages. An additional finding of maliciousness or bad faith on the

part of the offending creditor warrants the further imposition of punitive

damages . . . . This standard encourages would-be violators to obtain

declaratory judgments before seeking to vindicate their interests in violation

of an automatic stay, and thereby protects debtors’ estates from incurring

potentially unnecessary legal expenses in prosecuting stay violations.’’ In

re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 902 F.2d 1098, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990); see also

In re Parker, 634 Fed. Appx. 770, 773 (11th Cir. 2015) (‘‘Punitive sanctions

are appropriate when a party acts with reckless or callous disregard for the

law or rights of others. . . . [P]unitive damages [are] appropriate to serve

the dual purposes of punishing [a violator’s] indifference to the law . . .

and to deter . . . future similar misconduct.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.)).
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under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983. . . . The elements of, and the

defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by

federal law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.)).16 Accordingly, we decline to follow

the court’s reasoning in Halas, which ignores the plain

text of 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.

Instead, much like the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals, we find that the plain language of the relevant

statutes compels our conclusion that an action for damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k) is a civil proceeding

arising under title 11 and, thus, is within the original but

not exclusive jurisdiction of the federal district courts

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (b). Consequently, the trial

court improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.17

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

16 Like 11 U.S.C. § 362 (k), ‘‘[t]itle 42 of the United States Code, § 1983

permits an award of compensatory damages . . . and an award of punitive

damages in a proper case.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) West Haven v. Hartford Ins. Co., 221 Conn. 149, 160, 602 A.2d

988 (1992). 17 We nevertheless note, as the court in Powell did, that ‘‘[t]he fact that

the trial court has jurisdiction over the [counterclaim] does not preclude a

party from seeking to remove the case to federal court . . . .’’ Powell v.

Washington Land Co., supra, 684 A.2d 773 n.12.