* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion s h ould not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 96-40306

_______________________

ROGER LEE PUGH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAMES A COLLINS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Walls Unit; Nurses, Male and Female, Skyview Unit; CORRECTIONS OFFICERS, Skyview Unit,; PSYCHIATRIC DOCTORS, Skyview Unit,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

(6:95-CV-497)

_________________________________________________________________ November 21, 1996 Before WISDOM, JONES, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Roger Lee Pugh appeals the February 27, 1996 order of

Judith K. Guthrie, United States Magistrate Judge, dismissing his

42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against former director Collins and

unidentified doctors and nurses at the Skyview unit as frivolous.

Finding no error, we affirm.2 Appellant’s one page brief, if most liberally construed,

raises two issues: appointment of counsel and the legality of his

treatment with psychotropic drugs.

Appella nt writes in his brief that he is unable to

understand the concepts in his complaint and needs the assistance

of counsel. There is no general right to appointment of counsel in

a civil case. Salmon v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist.

, 911

F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir. 1990). The court may appoint counsel if

necessary to advance the proper administration of justice. 28

U.S.C. §1915(e)(1). Appointment of counsel should be reserved for

“exceptional circumstances.” Ulmer v. Chancellor

, 691 F.2d 209, 212

(5th Cir. 1982). There is no showing of exceptional circumstances

in this case. Appellant’s request for appointment of counsel is

denied.

Appellant also challenges the magistrate judge’s

conclusion that his treatment with psychotropic drugs was not in

viol ation of the constitution. The magistrate judge found that

appellant did not manifest a lack of consent to medication by

injection, thus the due pro cess requirements for involuntary

medication were not triggered. Appellant refused to take his

medication orally and signed a refusal of treatment form. However,

appellant gave no indication of lack of consent to medication by

injection and did not sign a refusal of treatment form for

injections. The magistrate judge also found that the officials

were prepared to comply with the procedural requirements of3

Washington v. Harper
, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), if appellant had refused

treatment by injection.

There is no basis to dispute the co nclusions of the

magistrate judge. Pugh never refused to take medication by

injection or notified prison officials that he would not

voluntarily do so; on the contrary, after executing written refusal

to take medication orally, he continued to take the injections

w ithout objection. Absent such a refusal or objection, duly

commu nicated to prison officials, there is no involuntary

medication claim, and the Due Process protections of Washington v.

Harper were not implicated. Consequently, Pugh’s involuntary

medication claim under § 1983 was wholly without merit, and the

district court did n ot abuse its discretion in dismissing the

involuntary medication claim as f rivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).

The judgment of the court is, therefore,

AFFIRMED

.