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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 17-1406

U NI T E D S TAT E S OF A M E RI C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

B YR O N J. H OL TO N

, Defendant-Appellant.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the

S o uthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s

. No . 3 :1 5 -cr-3 0 0 1 6 -S M Y-1 — Sta ci M. Ya ndle , Judg e.

A RGU E D O C T OB E R 4, 2017

— D E C I D E D O C T OB E R 13, 2017

Befor e B AU E R

, E A S T E R

B R O O K , and M AN I O N

, Circuit Judges

. P E R C URI AM

. Byr on Holton p l e a d e d gui l ty to r obbing a gr ocer y stor e in souther n Illin oi s whi le car r yi n g and usin g a fi r ear m, a nd a j u r y f ound hi m gui lty of c onspi r ing to c ommi t Hobbs Act r obber y (a r obber y affecting in ter state commer ce). I n s e n t e n c in g H o lton on the conspi racy count, the di str i ct j udge i mposed a pr i son ter m r oughly four y ear s abo v e the recom-2 No. 17-1406
mended Gui d elines s e n t e nce. The j udge based the sentence

on other r obber i es that Holton commi tted, and that w er e
r elev a nt to hi s conspi r acy conv i cti on, but for whi ch h e w a s not char ged. He contends that th e d is t r i ct judge abused her d is c r eti on by r elyi ng on unchar ged conduct as the basi s for i mposin g a n abov e-Gui delines sentence. Because the Supr eme Cour t has held that a di str i ct j udge may consi der ev i dence of conduct that i s r elev a nt to the offense of conv i c ti on, ev en i f that conduct i s unchar ged, w e affi r m the j udgment.
W e begin wi th some backgr ound. H olton lost hi s factor y j ob a nd, in need of money , agr eed wi th tw o fr i ends to r ob dr ug dealer s. After the gr oup successfully r obbed sev er a l dr ug dealer s, i t r edi r ected i ts effor ts to tar get gr oc e r y s tor es, includin g a S hop ‘n S av e. Once Holton knocked off thi s stor e, law enfor cement agents tr acked hi m down, and he confessed dur ing questio n i n g to p ar ti ci pati ng in r obbing the S hop ‘n S av e. In a second super seding indi c t m ent, the gov er nment char ged Holton wi th sev en counts: one count f or conspi r in g to commi t H obbs Act r o bber y in v i olati on of 18 U.S .C. § 1951; thr ee counts of Hobbs Act r obber y for hi ts on the S hop ‘n S av e and tw o ot h e r stor es, Q-Mar t a nd Alps G r ocer y S tor e, in
v i olati on of 18 U.S .C. § 1951; and thr ee c ounts of usin g a fi r ear m d u r in g each of these gr ocer y stor e r obber i es—all

cr i mes of v i olence—in v i olati on of 18 U.S .C. § 924(c)(1)(A). He

w as not char ged wi th r obbin g the dr ug dealer s. Holton pleaded gui l ty to tw o counts—Hobbs Act r obber y of the S hop ‘n S av e a nd the § 924(c) char ge of doi ng s o w h il e u sing a fi r ea r m

— but he w ent to tr i al on the other char ges. A j ur yNo. 17-1406 3
found hi m g u i lty of conspi r a cy b ut a cqui tted hi m of the

r emainin g char ges. The par ti es d i d not contest the j udge’s calculati on s o f the Gui delines r anges for Holton’s c r i m es. For the § 924(c) offense for whi ch Holton had pleaded gui lty , the j udg e d e ter mined that i t car r ie d at least a sev en-y ear sentence, to be s er v ed consecutiv ely to any other sentence i mposed. As t o the

c o nv i cti ons for conspi r acy and r obbing the S hop ‘n S av e , gr ouped together for Gui delines pur p oses, see U.S

. S .G. § 3D1.2(a), the j u dge declar ed that the adv i sor y Gui delin es
r a n ge w a s 41-51 months based on H olton’s offense lev el of 20 and cr i minal hi stor y categor y of III. Holton r equested a pr i son ter m that fell “ at the low end” of the Gui delin es r ange, but f ocused hi s sentencing ar gument

on why he should not r ecei v e a ter m abo v e the Gui delin es
r a n ge. H e a r g ued that i t w ould v i olate hi s Fi fth and S i xth Amendment r i ghts i f the cour t deci ded that acqui tted conduct (the Q-Mar t and Alps Gr ocer y S tor e r obber i es) and unchar ged conduct (the dr ug-dealer r obber i es) j usti fi ed hi m recei v ing an abov e-Gui delines sentence. He contended that i f the j ud ge consi der ed thi s c o n d u c t r elev ant, s he w ould r epudi ate the j ur y’s v er di ct and unconsti tuti onally p uni sh h i m for cr i mes for whi ch he w a s not conv i cted. The gov er nment ar gued that, in consi der in g the factor s under 18 U.S .C. § 3 5 53(a), the c our t should i mpose a sentence of 2 5 y ear s ’ i mpr i sonment because H olton w as “ one o f the most v i olent and d a n g e r ous cr i m inals in our soci ety .” The gov er nment focused on the expansi v e natur e and cir cums t ances of the conspi r acy

. The gov er nment asser ted that a4 No. 17-1406

p r e p onder ance of the ev i dence show ed that Holton ha d

r obbed at gunpoint v ar i ous dr ug dealer s and the Q-Mar t and Alps Gr ocer y S tor e b efor e the conspi r acy led hi m to c ommi t the S hop ‘n S av e r obber y
. The gov er nment also contended that

a n abov e-Gui delines sentence w as n eeded “to reflect t he danger of bodi l y h a r m Holton cr eated” dur ing the robber i es and to pr otect the publi c by “incapaci tat[i ng]” hi m

. The di s tr i c t j udge i mposed pr i son ter ms o f 96 months for the conspi racy offense and 5 1 months for the r obber y conv i cti on, to be ser v ed concur r ently , a nd 84 months for the § 924(c) offense, a s w el l a s fi v e y ear s’ super v i sed r elease. The j udge acknowledged that she h a d th e d i s c r e ti on to consi der acqui tted

co n d u ct but declined to do so because, she sai d , that w ould “totally d eni gr ate[ ] the S i xth Amendment and w ould [] be ta n t amount to j ur y nulli fi cati on.” But the j udge also thought

a sentence w i thi n the Gui delines r a ng e for the conspi r acy offense w ould not appr opr i a tely r e f l ect the s er i ousness or natur e of thi s cr i me. S h e explai ned that based on the tr i al

ev i dence, t h e conspi r acy began wi th “r obbing dr ug dealer s” and “ev olv ed” into r obbing other businesses, including the S hop ‘n Sav e. Because the dr ug-dealer r obber ie s w e r e “connected in a substanti al w ay t o the conspi r a cy char ge and

conv i ct ion,” they w er e “si gni fi cantly r elev ant” to the “natur e and c i r cumstances of that conspi r acy” as “unchar ged conduct whi ch I hav e author i ty to consi der .” The j udge ulti mately deci ded that the dr ug-dealer r obber i es w ar ranted a h ar sher sentence. On appeal, Holton ar gues that the di str i c t j u dge i mposed

a s ub s t ant iv ely u nr easonable s entence b y r e l y in g o n u n ch a r g e d conduct (the dr ug-dealer r obber i es) as the basi s f o r i m posingNo. 17-1406 5

an abov e-Gui d elines sentence on the conspi racy count. He fi r st contends tha t t he judge wr ongly supplanted the j ur y’s factfinding r ole and i mpr oper ly used a pr eponder ance-of-theev i dence standar d (instead of b e y ond a r easonable doubt) when deter mining that he r obbed dr ug dealer s. In suppor t of thi s ar gument, h e quotes Justi ce S cali a, who, in a di s s ent fr om
a deni al of c er ti or a r i, di sappr ov ed of j udges f in ding facts a t sentencin g about unchar ged or acqui tted conduct. Accor ding to Justi c e S cali a, “any fact necessar y to pr ev ent a s entence fr om being substantiv ely unr easonable—ther eby exposing the defendant to the longer sentence—i s an element that must be ei ther a dmi tted by the defendant or f oun d b y the jur y .” Jones

v

. United States , 135 S

. Ct. 8, 8 ( 2 014) (S c ali a, J., di ssenting fr om the deni a l of cer ti or ar i ). In the alter nati v e, Holton asser ts that the di str i ct j udge wr ongly a s s u m ed that “i f Appellant w as
conv i cted on the conspi r a cy c ount, i t w as pr ov en be y ond a
r easonable doubt that Appella nt w a s inv olv ed wi th the unchar ged conduct ... .”
Nei ther ar gument i s av ai ling. The S u pr eme Cour t has long author i zed judges to consi der a t sentencing cr i minal conduct that i s relev ant to the offense of conv i cti on, ev en i f t h e defendant w a s not w a s conv i cted fo r that c onduct, “so long as that conduct has been pr ov ed by a pr eponder ance of the ev i dence.” Unit e d S ta t e s v

. W

atts , 519 U.S

. 148, 157 (1997). See a lso United States v

. Heckel , 5 70 F .3d 791, 797 (7th Ci r

. 2009). Exer ci sin g thi s di scr eti on does not v i olate a defendant’s consti tuti onal r i ghts because as the Cour t explai ned, “sentencing enhancements do not p u n i s h a d efendant for cr i mes of whi ch he w as not conv i cted, but rather incr ease hi s s entence because of the manner in whi ch he commi tted the c r i me of conv i cti on.” W atts , 5 19 U.S

.6 No. 17-1406

at 1 54. The di ssent in Jones does not under min e W atts as contr olli n g author i ty

. In thi s case, the j udge’s sentencing of Hol t o n for the conspi r acy conv i cti on compli ed w i th W atts. Although she di d

n o t state expli ci tly that Holton mor e li kely than n ot r obbed dr ug dealer s , s h e s ai d enough to s how that s he r eached thi s conclusi on and ther efor e di d not er r

. When a j udge does not f ind expli ci tly that a defendant commi tted unchar ged conduct by a p r eponder ance of the ev i dence, the sentence wi ll be upheld i f “i t i s clear fr om the r ecor d” that the j udge d eter

mined that the d e f e n d a nt i s r esponsi ble for i t. United States v

. White, 737 F .3d 1121, 1141 (7 t h Ci r

. 2013) (inter n al quotati on
mar ks and ci tati on omi tted). At sentencing, the j u dge explain e d t hat the dr ug-dealer r obber i es “r epr esent[ed] unchar ged conduct whi ch I hav e author i ty to consi der

. ” The tr i al

ev i dence, she obser v e d , s how ed that the robber y conspi r acy had “ ev olv ed” fr om r obbin g dr ug dealer s to r obbin g the S hop ‘n S av e

. The ear li er r obber i es ther efor e w er e “si gni fi c antly

r elev a nt” to h er c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f “ th e n atur e and ci r cumstances of that conspi racy offense.” These statements a l s o r ebut Holton’s alte r n ati v e ar gument that the judge incor r ectly assumed that the c onspi r acy c onv i cti on meant that the gov er nment had pr ov en the dr ug-dealer r obber i es bey ond a r easonable doubt. The j udge mer ely deci ded that the ear li er robber i es
w er e r elev ant to sentencing Holton for the conspi r acy offense and that she w as sati sfi ed fr om the tr i al ev i dence that the conduct had occur r ed. The j udgment of the di str i c t cour t i s AFFIRMED.