[Cite as State v. Walker, 2021-Ohio-235.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ADAMS COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 19CA1102 

 : 

 v. : 

 : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

ERNEST A. WALKER, : ENTRY 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Timothy P. Young, Ohio State Public Defender, Katheryn R. Ross-Kinzie, 

Assistant Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. 

David Kelley, Adams County Prosecutor, West Union, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

 

Smith, P.J. 

{¶1} Ernest A. Walker appeals the judgment entry of the Adams 

County Court, entered September 19, 2019. Subsequent to a bench trial, 

Walker was convicted of misdemeanor traffic charges. On appeal, Walker 

asserts three assignment of errors: (1) that the trial court unconstitutionally 

shifted the State’s burden of proof; (2) that Walker’s convictions are against 

the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it denied Walker’s request for a jury trial. Upon review of 

the record, we find merit to Appellant’s third assignment of error. Thus, we 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 2

reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

{¶2} After law enforcement officers confronted Ernest A. Walker, 

“Appellant,” outside the United Dairy Farmers in West Union on June 28, 

2019, Appellant was cited for operating a vehicle under the influence of 

alcohol or a drug of abuse, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(A); OVI refusal, R.C. 

4511.19(A)(2); failure to control a motor vehicle, R.C. 4511.202; and failure 

to stop after an accident, R.C. 4549.03. Appellant was arraigned at the 

Adams County Court on July 1, 2019. He was brought with other inmates 

from the Adams County Jail.1

{¶3} Appellant did not have the benefit of legal counsel with him at 

the arraignment. The arraignment transcript reflects that the trial court 

inquired as to whether Appellant was able to hear the “general statement” as 

to the “arraignment consequences,” and Appellant replied, “Yes.” Appellant 

pled not guilty to all four offenses. After entering his plea, the trial court 

informed, “We will set the matter for a pretrial and a trial.” 

{¶4} Appellant informed the court he could not afford an attorney so 

the court advised that it would appoint legal counsel. The matter was also 

 

1

 Appellant was held in the jail pending arraignment due to a prior outstanding warrant for failing to appear 

in that court. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 3

scheduled for a trial on July 22, 2019. A “Notice of Trial Pretrial, Etc.” 

dated July 2, 2019 contains Appellant’s signature. This notice indicates 

“court trial.” 

{¶5} On July 8, 2019, Appellant’s counsel filed a notice of 

representation, request for discovery, and bill of particulars. A transcript of 

that same date, entitled “Transcript of Final Pretrial,” indicates that 

Appellant’s counsel appeared in court on that date but Appellant did not. 

However, Appellant was still lodged in the jail. The only significance of this 

brief transcript is that it indicates that Appellant would be brought over from 

the jail. The transcript does not contain any discussion with Appellant or 

any indication that Appellant was in fact brought into the courtroom. 

 {¶6} The record also contains a transcript of “court trial” held July 22, 

2019. The transcript reflects that another attorney was substituting for 

Appellant’s appointed counsel, who was not feeling well that day. The 

transcript is actually unclear as to whether the trial court or the assistant 

prosecutor stated as follows: 

At the. [sic] Discovery was complete and we were actually 

going to do a Court Trial today before Ms. Drinnon came up ill. 

So, this would be whether we want to continue the Court trial 

for another time. 

{¶7} At this point, Appellant’s substitute attorney indicated that 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 4

Appellant had some concerns about his charges, i.e. whether he was 

being charged with a second or third offense OVI. Everyone agreed 

that Appellant needed to talk to his own attorney, the one familiar 

with his case. The trial court stated a six-week continuance would be 

appropriate. On July 22, 2019, a journal entry indicates Appellant’s 

case was reassigned for court trial on September 6, 2019. 

 {¶8} On September 6, 2019, the proceedings began with 

another discussion about the level of Appellant’s OVI offense. 

However, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel advised the court 

Appellant had another concern. The trial transcript contains the 

following discussion of Appellant’s request for a jury trial. 

Appellant: We will leave it to a jury trial. 

Atty. Drinnon: Is the fact that my client has stated he believes he’s 

not going to receive a fair trial. 

Appellant: Yeah. 

Court: I think he’s under a little bit of a misconception 

because he keeps saying move it to a jury trial, so 

it goes upstairs. I keep telling him that that [sic.] 

doesn’t mean it goes upstairs. I would still be 

down here, but at this point and time I don’t know 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 5

what the court would want or wish. I do have to 

do I think, um, you know, ethically. 

*** 

Prosecutor: I would oppose that just to because it’s within the

seven days. 

Court: Um it’s absolutely in the seven days. And if there 

were, if you had wanted a jury trial that was part of 

the arraignment when I went through the 

arraignment actually with you probably twice I 

talked to you about that. 

Appellant: Yeah, you see my lawyer the 28th of last month so, 

how am I going to get anything done within seven 

days? 

Court: So, we, uh, you were here for an arraignment and 

at the arraignment I always discuss very clearly 

about how the demand for jury trial is done. That 

time has come and gone if we’re otherwise ready 

for trial. We’ve got our witnesses here were going 

to go [inaudible]. 

Appellant: Well let’s do it then. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 6

 *** 

Court: On behalf of your client who brought those things 

up both in regard to the question about the second 

OVI charge and also in regard to a jury trial which 

would be overruled. We are going to go forward 

with trial today. 

{¶9} Appellant was found guilty of all charges. The trial court 

ordered a pre-sentence investigation and report. The matter was 

deferred for sentencing on September 19, 2019. 

{¶10} At sentencing, the trial court merged the two OVI convictions. 

The trial court sentenced Appellant on the second offense OVI charge to 180 

days in the Adams County Jail, 150 days suspended, a $525 fine and court 

costs. The court further ordered two years probation and one-year license 

suspension. As part of probation, Appellant was to obtain a drug and 

alcohol assessment. Appellant was also ordered to pay fines and costs on 

the failure to control and failure to stop after an accident charges. 

{¶11} This timely appeal followed. Appellant’s sentence was stayed 

pending appeal. Where pertinent, additional facts are set forth below. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 7

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

“I. THE TRIAL COURT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 

SHIFTED THE STATE’S BURDEN TO PROVE ALL 

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE BEYOND A 

REASONABLE DOUBT TO THE DEFENDANT, 

ERNEST WALKER, IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT 

TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED STATES 

AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTIONS. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ERNEST 

WALKER’S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A 

FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF 

CONVICTION FOR OPERATING A VEHICLE 

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AGAINST 

THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

WHEN IT DENIED ERNEST WALKER’S REQUEST 

FOR A JURY TRIAL.” 

{¶12} For ease of analysis, we begin with Appellant’s third 

assignment of error. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶13} As a general rule, the United States Supreme Court has 

always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional 

rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.1461 

(1938), (“Trial courts must indulge every reasonable presumption 

against waiver.”); State v. Tackett, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 04CA12, 

2005-Ohio-1437, at ¶ 19. Because of the fundamental importance of 

the right to a jury trial, the trial court must not lightly infer a waiver of 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 8

the right to a jury trial. Id. See State v. Scott, 123 Ohio App.3d 331, 

704 N.E.2d 265, (2d. Dist. 1997), citing Tallmadge v. DeGraft-Biney,

39 Ohio St.3d 300, 301-302, 530 N.E.2d 1310 (1988). 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶14} An accused charged with a first-degree misdemeanor is entitled 

to a trial by jury. See R.C. 2945.17; Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution. 

See also State v. Wilson, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1084, 2019-Ohio-2965, 

at ¶ 10. However, in misdemeanor cases, the state does not violate a 

defendant's constitutional rights when it conditions the right upon the filing 

of a written demand for a jury trial. See Tackett, supra, at ¶ 19, citing, 

Mentor v. Giordano, 9 Ohio St.2d 140, 224 N.E.2d 343 (1967), at paragraph 

one of the syllabus. Crim.R. 23 governs the procedure for obtaining or 

waiving a trial by jury. See Tackett, supra, at ¶ 20. Crim.R. 23 provides, in 

relevant part: 

In petty offense cases, where there is a right of jury trial, the 

defendant shall be tried by the court unless he demands a jury 

trial. Such demand must be in writing and filed with the clerk

of court not less than ten days prior to the date set for trial, or 

on or before the third day following receipt of notice of the date 

set for trial, whichever is later. Failure to demand a jury trial as 

provided in this subdivision is a complete waiver of the right 

thereto. 

{¶15} “The purpose behind Crim.R. 23(A) is to ensure that criminal 

defendants do not wait until they have reached the courthouse steps on the 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 9

day of trial to demand a jury. This would result in undue delay and expense 

and possibly prejudice the state.” Tackett, supra, at ¶ 21, quoting State v. 

Burton, 39 Ohio App.3d 151, 151, 530 N.E.2d 955 (6th Dist. 1988). 

However, “[w]here a request for jury trial is made sufficiently in advance of 

the actual trial as not to interfere with the orderly administration of the 

business of the court and will not result in any unnecessary delay or 

inconvenience to witnesses or prejudice to the state, it may well be an abuse 

of discretion for the trial court to deny a jury trial.” Tackett, supra, quoting 

State v. Edwards, 4 Ohio App.2d 261, 266, 208 N.E.2d 758 (4th Dist. 1965), 

(internal citations omitted.). 

{¶16} We begin our analysis by reiterating that Appellant was 

unrepresented at arraignment. He was brought from the jail with other 

inmates. It appears that the July 8th pretrial was conducted without 

his presence, but the record also indicates he was allowed to sign a 

recognizance bond on that date. Appellant presented to the court on 

July 22nd, but another attorney substituted for his counsel. 

Appellant’s chief concern appeared to be his confusion regarding the 

level of his OVI offense. The matter was rescheduled for court trial 

on September 6th. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 10

 {¶17} In his brief, Appellant summarizes these facts, arguing that they 

culminated in his failure to timely make a written demand for jury trial due 

to a lack of access to his appointed counsel. The State of Ohio’s brief does 

not address these pretrial facts but focuses solely on Appellant’s untimely 

verbal request for a jury trial on the morning of his September 6th trial. 

Appellant emphasizes that September 6th was the first time that he and his 

court-appointed counsel ever appeared in court together. 

 {¶18} The record reveals that the second pleading in the court’s 

record appears to be a court entry describing the arraignment process, 

Appellant’s not guilty plea, his updated address, the terms of bond, the name 

of his appointed counsel, and upcoming dates. This entry also contains this 

language: “Defendant having been fully informed of his rights pursuant to 

Criminal Rule 5....” Pursuant to Crim.R. 5(A)(5), a court must inform an 

accused of his right to a jury trial during the accused’s initial court 

appearance. It is mandatory that the court comply with this rule. See

Wilson, supra, at ¶ 10; (internal citations omitted.) Crim.R. 5(A) applies to 

criminal charges. For traffic offenses, the corresponding Traffic Rules 

apply. Traf.R. 8, “Arraignment,” contains elements from Crim.R. 5 as well. 

See State v. Donkers, 170 Ohio App.3d 509, 2007-Ohio-1557, 867 N.E.2d 

903, at ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). See also 1975 Staff Note 1 and 5 to Traf.R. 8. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 11

Similar to the Criminal Rules, the Traffic Rules also require an explanation 

of rights at the arraignment stage. Traf. R 8(D). “Specifically, before 

calling the defendant to plea, the judge shall cause him to be informed and 

shall determine that defendant knows and understands...that he has, where 

such right exists, a right to jury trial which must be demanded in petty 

offenses.” Id. Donkers, supra, at ¶ 31. 

{¶19} This court most recently considered a defendant’s claim that he 

was unfairly denied a jury trial in a criminal case in State v. Wilson, supra.

After a bench trial, Wilson was convicted of violation of a protection order, 

a violation of R.C. 2919.27 and a misdemeanor of the first degree. On 

appeal, Wilson argued that the trial court erred when it did not inform him 

that he had a right to a jury trial and was required to make an affirmative 

demand for a jury if he wanted to exercise that right. 

 {¶20} In our decision, we recognized that the right to a trial by jury is 

one of the most important rights guaranteed in the United States 

Constitution. Our review of the transcript of Wilson’s arraignment 

demonstrated that the trial court did not comply with the Crim.5(A) 

requirements. Our research led us to an 11th District case, State v. Bates, 

11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2005-A-0078, 2006-Ohio-3777, which held under 

somewhat similar circumstances: 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 12

Pursuant to Crim.R. 5(A)(5) the trial court must inform a 

defendant of his or her right to a jury trial during the initial 

appearance. State v. Stewart 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 

01CA002, 2001 WL 1744692, (Nov. 28, 2001), at *2. This 

court stated that a trial court's failure to inform an accused of 

his or her rights as required by Crim.R. 5 constitutes prejudicial 

error. State v. Fonseca, 124 Ohio App.3d 231, 234, 705 N.E.2d 

1278, (11th Dist. 1997), citing State v. Orr, 26 Ohio App.3d 24, 

25, 498 N.E.2d 181 (11th Dist. 1985). A trial court's failure to 

comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 5 invalidates the entire 

proceeding. Mentor v. Carter, 11th Dist. Lake No. 93-L-104, 

1994 WL 102394, at 2, citing Cleveland v. Whipkey, 29 Ohio 

App.2d 79, 278 N.E.2d 374 (8th Dist. 1972); State v. Boerst, 45 

Ohio App.2d 240, 241, 343 N.E.2d 141 (9th Dist. 1973). 

Bates, supra, at ¶ 22. In Bates, a review of the arraignment transcript 

revealed that the trial court failed to inform Bates, unrepresented at the time, 

of her right to be tried by a jury, thus failing to comply with Crim.R. 5(A). 

In Wilson, the State conceded that Wilson was not properly advised at the

initial appearance regarding his right to a jury trial but argued that because 

Wilson was later represented, he should be deemed to have waived the issue. 

We disagreed with the State, concluding: 

 We readily acknowledge the arguable merit in the appellee's 

argument that appellant did, in fact, have the benefit of legal

representation during the trial court proceedings after his initial 

appearance and that one could assume that his counsel must 

have advised appellant of his constitutional right to a trial by 

jury. However, while this could arguably be a valid assumption

in most instances, the right to a trial by jury is one of the most 

important rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution. 

Thus, absent actual compliance with Crim.R. 5, or absent some 

later curative action undertaken by the trial court to 

affirmatively advise the appellant of his right to a trial by jury, 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 13

we are reluctant to simply assume that, sometime during the 

course of the trial court proceeding, appellant must have been 

made aware of this important constitutional right. Thus, based

upon the facts present in the case sub judice, we are reluctant to 

conclude that appellant waived this particular constitutional 

guarantee. 

Id. at ¶ 14. 

{¶21} In another case from this district, State v. Tackett, supra, 

Tackett was convicted of “domestic violence by menacing,” a violation of 

R.C. 2919.25(C). Tackett appealed, asserting as one of his assignments of 

error, that he did not waive his right to a jury trial. The record revealed at 

Tackett’s arraignment, the court played a videotape that briefly outlined a 

criminal defendant’s legal rights. The videotape explained the right to have 

a matter tried by a jury and the time requirements for a written demand. The 

tape concluded by suggesting if a defendant had questions concerning the 

nature of the charges or the rights at the hearing, the defendant should ask 

questions when he or she is seated at the counsel table. 

 {¶22} When Tackett was called, the court inquired as to whether 

Tackett understood his rights as outlined in the video. Tackett indicated he 

did. The court then informed Tackett of the range of punishment. Tackett 

pled not guilty and requested a court-appointed attorney. After some 

discussion, the court informed Tackett he did not qualify for a courtappointed defender. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 14

 {¶23} The court next explained that Tackett’s trial would occur within 

45 days if he did not waive speedy trial. Tackett asked, “Can it be a jury 

trial?” The court responded that there was a procedure to be followed, that 

the procedure was explained on the video, and that Tackett had already 

affirmed he understood his rights. Tackett replied: “But it didn’t say how 

you go about getting a Jury,” to which the court replied, “Oh, yes, it did Sir.” 

Tackett subsequently proceeded to a bench trial and was convicted. 

 {¶24} Upon review, this Court found that it was not disputed that 

Tackett did not file a written request for jury trial. However, the record also 

indicated Tackett did not fully understand this right and the action required 

to preserve it. The videotape specifically invited defendants to ask 

questions, and Tackett’s later question about a jury trial revealed that he was 

uncertain about how to obtain one. We observed that the trial court chose to 

sidestep Tackett’s questions rather than directly answer them. We 

commented that the court appeared to take Tackett’s understanding of the 

videotape to mean that he memorized it. 

{¶25} We found that the court’s actions did not further the purpose of 

Crim.R. 23(A). We further found: 

Because the right to a jury trial is a constitutional right and

Civ.R. 23(A) is a procedural rule, because the trial court 

ignored the indicators that Tackett did not fully understand his 

rights and the steps needed to preserve them, and because the 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 15

trial court did not afford Tackett any latitude with respect to the 

formal requirements for preserving his rights, we find that the

trial court abused its discretion in denying Tackett's request for 

a jury trial. 

Id. at ¶ 26. 

 {¶26} In Donkers, supra, the defendant was convicted of various 

criminal and traffic charges. Initially, she was arraigned in two municipal 

courts. On appeal, Donkers asserted that the trial courts erred by failing to 

follow the required procedure upon her initial appearances by not fully 

advising her of the charges against her and of her rights. At Donkers’ 

arraignments, the state played videos which contained recitations of her 

constitutional rights. 

{¶27} At the outset, the 11th district court acknowledged problems 

because they did not have a video or a transcript of its contents within the 

record on appeal. The state countered that providing a record of the 

arraignment was Donkers’ burden on appeal. The appellate court, quoting 

State v. Boerst, 45 Ohio App.2d 240, 241-242, 343 N.E.2d 141 (9th Dist. 

1973), noted: 

“ ‘* * * Here, the defendant requested and filed the transcripts, 

and the reviewing court can determine from such transcripts 

whether or not an error was committed. We must assume that 

those transcripts, as certified by the clerk and the trial judge, 

respectively, are complete and accurate.’ ” 

Id. at ¶ 39. The Donkers court further observed: 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 16

 In the case before us, appellant ordered the entire transcript of 

the proceedings in her case from the dates of the initial 

appearances. The court reporter certified the submitted 

transcripts as true and correct. The transcripts of the initial 

appearances make no reference to a video and do not allude to 

any previous explanation of rights. If the state insists that there 

is more content that the court reporter failed to include and that 

is crucial to their position, the state could have used App.R. 

9(E) to correct the record and to submit the video along with a

certification that it was played at appellant's initial appearance 

so that we could judge its contents. 

Id. at ¶ 40. 

 {¶28} The Donkers court found: 

[E]ven if a complying video was played on both dates and if 

appellant can be confirmed as being present and if the 

importance of watching it was explained in her presence, a 

video or other en masse description of rights is merely that―a 

description of the rights. It does not satisfy the requirement that 

directs the court to determine that the defendant “understands”

the rights listed in Crim.R. 10(C) or “understands and knows” 

the rights listed in Traf.R. 8(D). These provisions require an

individualized inquiry. (Emphasis sic.) 

Id. at ¶ 42. 

{¶29} In Appellant’s case, the arraignment hearing transcript 

reveals that when Mr. Walker’s case was called, the trial court inquired 

about his name and address and inquired as to whether he received a copy of 

the traffic ticket. The only possible reference to an explanation of 

Appellant’s constitutional rights pursuant to Traf. R. 8(D) is as follows: 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 17

Court: And were you able to hear my general statement that I 

made to everybody in regard to. [sic] 

Appellant: Yeah, I heard you. 

Court: The arraignment consequences? 

Appellant: Yes. 

{¶30} The trial court did not ask Appellant if he had any 

questions about the “general statement.” It is at this point that the trial court 

began to read through the nature of the four charges; explained the potential 

penalties; took Walker’s not guilty plea; discussed Walker’s request for a 

court-appointed attorney; and discussed the terms of his bond. At the end of 

all of this discussion, the trial court asked, “Mr. Walker do you have any 

questions about what has happened here”? 

 {¶31} While the record does not indicate Appellant herein was a firsttime visitor to the Adams County Court, we cannot conclude, based on these 

facts, that Appellant was properly advised as to his right to a jury trial and 

how to make a timely demand pursuant to Crim.R. 23. We assume that the 

“general statement of arraignment consequences” was the trial court’s 

explanation of Appellant’s constitutional rights but we cannot confirm that. 

The arraignment transcript simply does not provide this information. “While 

the defendant does have the burden of seeing that the record is complete, 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 18

under the appellate rules, he can do no more than request the clerk to prepare 

and forward the transcript of docket and journal entries, and the transcript of 

proceedings.” Boerst, supra, at 242. While a full explanation of the 

constitutional rights pursuant to Crim.R. 5(A) may well have occurred, the 

arraignment transcript does not contain this discussion. 

 {¶32} Based on our review of the record, we find Appellant was not 

fully apprised of his right to a jury trial and of the requirements, pursuant to 

Crim.R. 23(A), to timely demand one in writing. We acknowledge the 

record does contain a “Notice of Trial, Pretrial, Etc.,” dated July 2nd, with 

Appellant’s signature, and several documents indicate Appellant’s being 

scheduled for a “court trial.” However, we cannot simply assume Appellant 

understood “court trial” to mean “trial to the bench” or “trial to the judge.” 

 {¶33} Further, as in Wilson, we cannot simply assume because 

Appellant was later appointed a lawyer that he must have been fully 

informed of this important constitutional right, particularly in light of the 

lack of access to his lawyer which he claims and the record supports. 

Assuming Appellant was properly apprised pursuant to Crim.R. 5(A), it does 

not appear the trial court inquired as to whether Appellant had any questions 

about his constitutional right to trial. Under the circumstances of 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 19

Appellant’s case, we find the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Appellant’s request. We sustain the third assignment of error. 2

{¶34} In light of our disposition of Appellant’s third 

assignment of error, Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are 

rendered moot. Accordingly, the judgment of the Adams County Court is 

reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

JUDGMENT REVERSED. 

 

2

 We recognize that many courts in the 4th District utilize general statements and/or videos to inform 

multiple defendants of their constitutional rights at arraignment. Our decision here does not find that 

practice to be improper. In fact, this decision could very possibly have been resolved in favor of Appellee 

had we been supplied with a record of the trial court’s “general statement” of Defendant/Appellant’s rights 

at arraignment. 
Adams App. No. 19CA1102 20

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED and that the 

CAUSE IS REMANDED. Appellee shall pay the costs. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Adams County Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE 

UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 

COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to 

exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a 

continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio 

an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If 

a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the 

expiration of the sixty-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a 

notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal 

period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date 

of such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. and Hess, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court, 

 _______________________________ 

 Jason P. Smith 

 Presiding Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from 

the date of filing with the clerk.