NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 23-1956

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOSEPH M. GREENE,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00124-001)

Chief District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on February 2, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

(Filed: February 14, 2024)

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OPINION*

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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 

precedent.
2

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Greene violated the conditions of his supervised release and was sentenced 

to 24 months’ imprisonment, followed by two additional years of supervision. Having

appealed the validity of this sentence, Greene’s counsel has moved to withdraw under

Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule (L.A.R.) 109.2 and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), asserting that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. The

Government agrees, and Greene, for his part, declined to submit a pro se brief. Because 

we agree there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal with regard to Greene’s sentence,

we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

I. DISCUSSION1

When defense counsel files an Anders motion, we first evaluate the adequacy of 

counsel’s briefing and then conduct a full examination of the proceedings to determine 

whether an appeal would be wholly frivolous. United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564, 

568 (3d Cir. 2022). Counsel’s briefing is adequate if it satisfies L.A.R. 109.2(a), which 

requires counsel to “(1) demonstrate[] to this Court that [he] has thoroughly examined the 

record in search of appealable issues, and (2) explain[] why those issues are frivolous.” 

Id. at 569. Counsel need not “raise every possible appealable issue to meet this 

standard,” but she must “adequately attempt to uncover the best arguments” and explain 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583(e). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. We review the District 

Court’s sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 

(3d Cir. 2014). 
3

their faults. Id. at 569–70 (citations omitted). We next conduct our own review of the 

record, and if we are satisfied there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, we will grant 

counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm. Id. at 568. We discuss both steps below. 

A. Defense Counsel’s Anders Brief

In the circumstances of this case, defense counsel’s filing, on the whole, is 

sufficient to satisfy L.A.R. 109.2(a). 

In the text of his Anders brief, counsel argues that there are no non-frivolous 

issues for appeal because the District Court’s sentence was procedurally correct. 

Specifically, counsel notes the District Court properly considered the sentencing factors 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), explained its reasoning, and informed Greene of his appellate 

rights and the conditions of his sentence. Counsel also notes that the sentence was

“properly imposed and calculated under the [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines].”2 Anders Br. 

3.

In addition, counsel submitted a detailed “Anders Checklist” that includes his 

analysis of approximately thirteen potential sentencing defects. This reflects that counsel 

reviewed the entire record to ensure that the District Court satisfied all procedural 

requirements. Finally, the Government conducted its own review confirming there are no 

non-frivolous issues for appeal. 

2 While counsel “need not raise every frivolous issue,” United States v. Langley, 

52 F.4th 564, 566 (3d Cir. 2022), we note that counsel’s brief here is unusually short and 

cites little caselaw. Given the review reflected by the checklist and the fact that the 

record is straightforward, however, we find that counsel has satisfied L.A.R. 109.2(a).
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B. Greene’s Sentence

Our independent review of the proceedings also demonstrates that Greene’s 

sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. We must first “ensure that the 

district court committed no significant procedural error” when reviewing a sentencing 

challenge. Langley, 52 F.4th at 576 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007)). If there is no such error, we next determine whether the sentence was 

substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Here, the District Court did not commit any procedural errors at sentencing. The 

parties agreed prior to Greene’s hearing that the applicable Guidelines range was 18–24 

months’ imprisonment, and, even in the absence of such agreement, that range was 

correct.3 The Court discussed the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), analyzing 

Greene’s criminal history and behavior, the serious nature of the violation at issue, the 

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and whether the sentence was 

“sufficient and not greater than necessary” to curb Greene’s recidivism. App. 38-42; 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). It also considered Greene’s motion for a downward departure, 

permitted Greene to speak at length, and explained why it selected the given sentence. 

3 Greene committed a Grade A violation of supervised release because he engaged 

in conduct constituting a state or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment 

exceeding one year that involved possession of a firearm. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines 

Manual § 7B1.1(a)(1) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023). Greene’s underlying convictions 

were Class B felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 1014. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2). And at the 

time Greene was originally sentenced to supervision, the District Court determined he 

had a criminal history category of III. As such, the Guidelines range of 18–24 months 

was the appropriate range for revocation of release, see U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 

7B1.4, and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) authorized an additional term of supervised release after 

he served his revocation sentence. 
5

The Court even went so far as to ask the parties whether there were any “procedural 

irregularities” that needed to be addressed and whether “there [was] an adequate 

discussion based on the 3553(a) factors to justify the extent of the sentence.” App. 46. 

None were identified by the parties. 

Greene’s sentence of 24 additional months of imprisonment and two years of 

supervised release was also substantively reasonable. A sentence is substantively 

reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 

sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United 

States v. Shah, 43 F.4th 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 

F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)). Greene’s sentence was imposed for his second violation 

of the conditions of his supervised release, and it was a serious violation: Greene fired a 

weapon in a public square, resulting in six separate charges. Notably, his conduct 

violated multiple terms of supervised release that were running concurrently, for which 

the District Court could have imposed multiple, consecutive revocation sentences, United 

States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 851–52 (3d Cir. 2006), but the District Court declined to do 

so, and the sentence it did impose fell within the Guidelines range. See United States v. 

Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that sentences within the 

correct Guidelines range are more likely to be reasonable than those outside the range). 

In addition, the District Court was permitted to impose up to 30 months’ additional 

supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1), (h), but it opted to impose only 24 

months. Accordingly, it was reasonable—if not lenient—for the District Court to 

sentence Greene as it did.
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II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

affirm the District Court’s judgment.

4

 

4

In accordance with L.A.R. 109.2(b) we state that the issues presented here lack 

legal merit, and so Greene’s counsel is not required to file a petition for writ of certiorari 

with the Supreme Court.