IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52535-6-II

Respondent,

v.

BRUCE L. BENNETT, JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

CRUSER, J. — Bruce L. Bennett Jr. appeals his judgment and sentence for second degree 

murder and second degree robbery following the superior court’s amendment to his judgment and 

sentence adding a “community placement” provision. Bennett argues that the court erred when it 

failed to consider youth as a mitigating factor for crimes that he committed when he was 23 years 

old. Bennett makes additional claims of error in a statement of additional grounds (SAG). Because 

the superior court did not possess the authority to entertain Bennett’s request to reconsider every 

aspect of his sentence, which had become final before the amendment at issue in this case, we hold 

that the court correctly rejected Bennett’s arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

February 11, 2020
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FACTS

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1994, Bennett was convicted of second degree murder and second degree robbery. The 

superior court calculated Bennett’s offender score using Bennett’s five prior Oregon convictions. 

In 1991, Bennett was convicted of three counts of first degree burglary and two counts of first 

degree kidnapping in Oregon. The court counted Bennett’s three prior first degree burglary 

convictions as one point, but counted his two first degree kidnapping convictions separately. The 

court sentenced Bennett within the standard range to 397 months of confinement. 

Bennett has twice sought review of his sentence. Bennett previously appealed his judgment 

and sentence, arguing that the superior court erred in calculating his offender score by counting 

his prior Oregon convictions as separate offenses. State v. Bennett, noted at 84 Wn. App. 1115, 

1997 WL 87092, at *5. We disagreed and affirmed Bennett’s judgment and sentence. Id. at *6.

Then, in May 2015, Bennett filed a personal restraint petition (PRP), claiming that his 

judgment and sentence was facially invalid because the superior court improperly calculated his 

offender score. We disagreed and dismissed his petition as time-barred. 

Related to the current appeal, on August 10, 2017, the superior court entered a “Stipulated 

Order Amending Judgment and Sentence,” which modified Bennett’s judgment and sentence to 

clarify that his sentence included 24 months of community placement following his release. This 

order was signed by the court, the prosecuting attorney, and Vern McCray as “Attorney for 

Defendant.” Clerk’s Papers at 13. For reasons not germane to this appeal, the superior court later 

vacated this order and set a hearing on the State’s request to amend the judgment and sentence. 

Bennett appeared and represented himself at this hearing, which occurred on August 17, 2018. 
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At the hearing, Bennett argued that he was entitled to a full resentencing concerning every 

aspect of his judgment and sentence. The State opposed Bennett’s request for a full resentencing, 

arguing that the sole issue before the superior court was the State’s motion to amend the 

community placement provision. The State further argued that Bennett’s attempt to have his entire 

sentence reconsidered was not timely because his sentence was final. The court ruled that it “is 

treating this matter as a resentencing on this case for purposes of whether or not the imposition of 

the community placement is appropriate.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 23 (emphasis 

added). Despite this ruling, the superior court nevertheless allowed Bennett to argue for a full 

reconsideration of his sentence and said it would address Bennett’s arguments.1 

After hearing lengthy argument from Bennett that his age at the time he committed his 

crimes (age 23) should warrant a lesser sentence than the one the court previously imposed, as well 

as his argument regarding same criminal conduct as it related to his prior Oregon convictions, the 

court announced that it would adhere to the 397-month sentence it originally imposed. The court 

reasoned that when Bennett committed the crimes he was 23 years old, had two children, an 

employment history, and a significant other. The court further concluded that the prior sentencing 

court did not err when it calculated Bennett’s offender score. 

The court entered an amended judgment and sentence that imposed 24 months of 

community placement but did not impose discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). The 

 

1 Despite the superior court indicating that it would address all of Bennett’s arguments, the court 

fully considered only Bennett’s argument regarding youth as a mitigating factor to Bennett’s 

sentence. 
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superior court reimposed all other aspects of Bennett’s 1994 judgment and sentence with credit for 

time served. 

Bennett appeals the amended judgment and sentence. 

DISCUSSION

I. BENNETT’S REQUEST FOR RESENTENCING

Bennett contends that the superior court erred when it refused to reduce the prison term of 

his judgment and sentence. Bennett’s claim fails because the superior court lacked the authority 

to reconsider Bennett’s sentence in full. The matter before the superior court, as the court correctly 

noted at the outset of the August 17, 2018 hearing, was to determine whether the imposition of 

community placement was appropriate. The superior court’s decision to entertain Bennett’s 

request that it reconsider the entirety of his sentence was not rooted in any recognizable legal 

authority.

There are three means by which a criminal sentence may be challenged or attacked: a 

motion for relief from judgment or order pursuant to CrR 7.8, a direct appeal, or a PRP. State v. 

Basra, 10 Wn. App. 2d 279, 287, 448 P.3d 107 (2019), review denied, 455 P.3d 133 (2020). Any 

petition or motion for collateral attack on a sentence must be filed within one year after the 

sentence becomes final, unless the sentence is invalid. Id. A judgment becomes final when any 

of the requirements of RCW 10.73.090(3) are met. In re Pers. Restraint of Skylstad, 160 Wn.2d 

944, 948, 162 P.3d 413 (2007). Under RCW 10.73.090(3), a judgment becomes final on the last 

of the following dates:

(a) The date it is filed with the clerk of the trial court;

(b) The date that an appellate court issues its mandate disposing of a timely 

direct appeal from the conviction; or
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(c) The date that the United States Supreme Court denies a timely petition 

for certiorari to review a decision affirming the conviction on direct appeal. The 

filing of a motion to reconsider denial of certiorari does not prevent a judgment 

from becoming final.

Bennett, as noted above, challenged his sentence both through a direct appeal in 1997 and 

by a PRP in 2015. His 397-month sentence was final at the time he asked the superior court to 

reconsider it at the August 17, 2018 hearing.2

Simply asking the superior court, many years after a criminal sentence has become final, 

to reconsider the sentence is not a legitimate manner in which to challenge or attack a sentence. 

In appealing the court’s decision to adhere to Bennett’s previously imposed sentence, Bennett 

overlooks that the superior court lacked the authority to grant the relief he sought. 

We hold that the superior court did not err when it refused to reduce the prison term of 

Bennett’s judgment and sentence. 

II. SAG

Bennett argues that the superior court erred in computing his offender score by counting 

his prior Oregon convictions as separate offenses because his Oregon judgment and sentence 

identifies the convictions as part of a “single criminal episode,” and, therefore, his prior 

convictions encompass the same criminal conduct under Washington law. SAG at 2 (capitalization 

omitted). Bennett also argues that the statutory factors set forth in former RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a) 

(1990)3upon which his sentence was based are unconstitutionally vague. 

 

2 Moreover, Bennett did not move for relief from his full judgment and sentence pursuant to CrR 

7.8. Bennett moved for relief pursuant to CrR 7.8 solely on the basis that the amendment adding 

community placement to his judgment and sentence and the imposition of LFOs were 

unauthorized. 

3 RCW 9.94A.400 was recodified as RCW 9.94A.589. LAWS OF 2001, ch. 10, § 6.
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Again, as we note above, Bennett was not entitled to full reconsideration of his sentence. 

Bennett’s sentence was final, and the original offender score calculation was not relevant to the 

State’s motion to amend his judgment and sentence to add the community placement provision. 

Thus, the court did not err in declining to revisit the question of same criminal conduct as it related 

to Bennett’s prior Oregon convictions.

Likewise, Bennett’s constitutional challenge to former RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a) fails. In 

addition to the superior court’s lack of authority to reconsider Bennett’s sentence in full, the 

vagueness doctrine is not applicable in the context of sentencing guidelines. For these reasons, 

Bennett’s arguments fail. 

CONCLUSION

The amended judgment and sentence is affirmed. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

CRUSER, J.

We concur:

WORSWICK, P.J.

SUTTON, J.