SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3008-15T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARKITA A. NORRIS, a/k/a MARKITA

ANITA NORRIS and MAKITA A. 

NORRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

Submitted February 27, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino, Nugent and Haas.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-

07-0774.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Rochelle Watson, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Cynthia L. Ritter, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

May 15, 2017
2 A-3008-15T5

Defendant Markita A. Norris appeals from her judgment of 

conviction on resentencing for murder and attempted murder. We 

previously affirmed defendant's convictions, State v. Markita A. 

Norris, No. A-1561-12 (App. Div. Nov. 30, 2015), certif. denied, 

226 N.J. 213 (2016), but remanded for resentencing. Id. (slip op. 

at 2). 

On remand, after finding one less aggravating factor on the 

murder count, and two fewer aggravating factors on the attempted 

murder count, the court imposed the same consecutive sentences it 

had previously imposed.1 The court did not explain why, on remand,

the elimination of the most serious aggravating factors it had 

considered in its original sentence did not affect the resentence. 

For this and the reasons that follow, we are constrained to remand 

again for further sentencing proceedings. In doing so, we reject 

 

1 The aggravating factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), 

relevant to this appeal, include: (1) The nature and circumstances 

of the offense, and the role of the actor therein, including 

whether or not it was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, 

or depraved manner; (2) The gravity and seriousness of harm 

inflicted on the victim, including whether or not the defendant 

knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense 

was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance due to 

advanced age, ill-health, or extreme youth, or was for any other 

reason substantially incapable of exercising normal physical or 

mental power of resistance; (3) The risk that the defendant will 

commit another offense; (6) The extent of the defendant's prior 

criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses of which he 

has been convicted; and, (9) The need for deterring the defendant 

and others from violating the law.
3 A-3008-15T5

defendant's suggestion that the sentencing was a product of the 

sentencing court's intransigence.

The facts underlying defendant's conviction are detailed in 

our previous opinion and need not be repeated in their entirety.

Rather, we recount the facts relevant to defendant's sentence.

The State established at trial that following a fundraiser at the 

Black United Fund in Plainfield, defendant and her uncle instigated 

a verbal altercation with the surviving victim and the decedent. 

Id. (slip op. at 3-4). During the verbal altercation, defendant's 

uncle punched the surviving victim, and a fight ensued. Id. (slip 

op. at 4). Although the trial witnesses were not entirely 

consistent as to the sequence of events, their testimony, 

considered collectively, established that while defendant's uncle 

fought with the surviving victim, defendant stabbed the surviving 

victim twice in the left arm and once in the back. The surviving 

victim suffered a collapsed lung and other injuries. Id. (slip 

op. at 4-5, 8). 

The testimony of witnesses also established that defendant 

fought with and stabbed the decedent, who collapsed on the 

sidewalk. Defendant walked away but returned and kicked the 

victim, once or repeatedly, according to differing witness 

accounts. Id. (slip op. at 5-8). After stabbing the decedent and 

then attacking him a second time, defendant danced in the middle 
4 A-3008-15T5

of the street before she and her uncle drove away in his car. Id.

(slip op. at 5). The autopsy revealed the cause of decedent's 

death to be multiple stab wounds to the chest, abdomen, and right 

arm. Id. (slip op. at 8).

When the trial court sentenced defendant the first time, the 

court did not distinguish between the aggravated assault and murder 

counts when it considered aggravating and mitigating factors. The 

court explained the basis for finding aggravating factors one and 

two:

In this matter, supporting those factors, by 

the facts on this case, the [c]ourt finds the 

cruel manner in the attack as this person 

attacked two individuals, both separately, two 

separate victims with a knife, one of which 

she was having a dispute, and then when 

finishing with one, turned her attentions to 

the other, stabbing one from the back.

Next, the excessive force. There were 

multiple stab wounds involved in this case.

Next supporting factor, the brutal and 

senseless nature. The victims were attacked 

in this matter after a fund raiser dance. This 

was at a place in Plainfield called the BUF. 

It was there for a youth sports night. This 

whole incident appeared to occur due to a bump 

on the dance floor, it spilled over to the 

streets outside, after people were leaving. 

Brutal and senseless.

Overall, the nature of this case is horrific, 

the acts depraved, and the dancing over the 

victim uncalled for, showing this [c]ourt a 

lack of remorse, and in a review of the papers, 
5 A-3008-15T5

the [c]ourt believes demonstrates lack of 

remorse in this case.

[Id. (slip op. at 27-28).]

In our opinion affirming defendant's convictions, we remanded 

for resentencing, explaining:

There are several problems with the trial 

court's finding of factors one and two. 

First, the trial court's opinion does not 

include for each factor "a distinct analysis 

of the offense for which the court sentences 

the defendant." State v. Lawless, 214 N.J.

594, 600 (2013).

Second, the trial court referred to the 

"cruel" manner of the attack on the victims 

without any discussion or finding as to 

whether defendant inflicted pain or suffering 

gratuitously, as an end in itself, rather than 

merely as a means of committing the crimes. 

[State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 217-18

(1989)]. If the trial court intended to make 

this distinction, it did not explain the facts 

upon which it relied.

Third, the trial court's emphasis on two 

crimes and two attacks was central to its 

determination to impose consecutive sentences 

under Yarbough. Thus, it appears the court 

considered the same factors in sentencing 

defendant to consecutive sentences and in 

sentencing defendant to upward ranges of the 

consecutive sentences.

We have other concerns as well. For example, 

the court cites the use of "excessive force," 

but does not explain how the force used in 

this case is different from any other firstdegree murder or first-degree aggravated 

assault committed with a knife. In fact, it 

appears the excessive force — multiple stab 

wounds — caused decedent's death, thereby 
6 A-3008-15T5

subjecting defendant to a sentence for murder.

And though the court found the attacks to be 

brutal and senseless, the question is whether 

there is something about what occurred here 

that is more brutal and senseless than any 

other first-degree murder or first-degree 

aggravated assault.

In short, it appears from this record that the 

court double-counted aggravating factors one 

and two. Accordingly, we vacate defendant's 

sentence and remand for resentencing. In view 

of this disposition, we need not address 

whether the eighty-year aggregate sentence of 

the twenty-one-year-old defendant — in effect, 

a sentence to life imprisonment without any 

likelihood of parole — shocks the judicial 

conscience.

[Id. (slip op. at 28-29.]

When the remand hearing commenced, the court stated that it 

would not consider aggravating factors one and two in resentencing 

defendant. During the course of oral argument, however, the court 

was apparently persuaded by the State's contention that, though 

aggravating factor two was without "a solid justification,"

aggravating factor one was at least applicable as to the decedent.

Before imposing sentence, the court confirmed defendant's 

eligibility for a discretionary extended term under N.J.S.A.

2C:44-3(a), the persistent offender statute. Defendant, age 

twenty-one when she committed the murder and attempted murder, had 

been convicted of four previous adult offenses: third-degree 

resisting arrest and fourth-degree criminal trespass, both 
7 A-3008-15T5

committed when she was eighteen years old; and third-degree 

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and third-degree 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance, both committed 

when she was nineteen years old. Defendant thus qualified as a 

persistent offender. She had "been convicted of a crime of the 

first, second or third degree [when] [twenty-one] years of age or 

over, [and had] been previously convicted on at least two separate 

occasions of two crimes, committed at different times, when [she] 

was at least eighteen years of age, . . . within [ten] years of 

the date of the crime for which [she was] being sentenced." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). 

Next, as to the crime of murder, the court found aggravating 

factor one, the nature and circumstances of the offense. The 

court found that defendant left the decedent lying face down on 

the sidewalk after she stabbed him, and "returned . . . to attack 

him about the face, head and chest." 

The court also found aggravating factor number three, the 

risk of re-offense. The court based its determination on 

defendant's record, including her "lack of success" on probation 

and parole. She served two probationary terms resulting in two 

violations of probation. The court pointed out "[s]he had four 

New Jersey State Prison terms and four parole violations[.]" The 

court also noted defendant's juvenile record.
8 A-3008-15T5

The court found aggravating factor six, defendant's prior 

criminal record. The court explicitly stated it was considering 

factor six only insofar as it was a consideration as to the 

extended-term sentence. 

Lastly, the court found aggravating factor number nine based 

on defendant's criminal record, the need to protect the public,

and the need to deter others by sending a message that such conduct 

will not be tolerated. The court added that defendant demonstrated 

a lack of remorse by dancing in the street after stabbing the 

victims. The court found no mitigating factors. 

After explaining the reasons for imposing consecutive 

sentences, the court made clear it was applying aggravating factors 

three and nine to defendant's sentence for attempted murder, and 

aggravating factors one, three and nine to her sentence for murder. 

In both instances, the court found that the aggravating factors 

substantially outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors.

In summary, when the court first sentenced defendant, it 

appeared to find aggravating factors one, two, three and nine on 

both counts, giving great weight to aggravating factors one and 

two. In contrast, on resentencing, the court found only 

aggravating factors one, three and nine on the murder count, and 

only three and nine on the remaining count. Yet, notwithstanding 
9 A-3008-15T5

this significant quantitative and qualitative difference in 

aggravating factors, the court imposed the same sentence. 

The court imposed its original sentence of fifty-years on the 

murder count. Applying NERA, the court determined defendant must 

serve forty-two years, six months and two days before becoming 

eligible for parole. As to the attempted murder count, the court 

again imposed the same sentence, thirty years subject to NERA. 

Thus, on the attempted murder count, defendant must serve twentyfive years, six months and two days before becoming eligible for 

parole. The court imposed the sentences consecutively, resulting 

in an aggregate eighty year term with sixty-eight years of parole 

ineligibility. Defendant will become eligible for parole when she

is eighty-nine years old. In effect, the court imposed a life 

sentence on the twenty-one-year-old defendant.

On the resulting judgment of conviction, under a printed 

directive to include all aggravating and mitigating factors, the 

judgment states: "The [c]ourt finds that aggravating factors 1, 

2, 3 and 9 substantially outweigh the non-existent mitigating 

factors as originally noted." Defendant appealed from the judgment 

of conviction entered after resentencing. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
10 A-3008-15T5

POINT I

THE 80 YEAR SENTENCE IMPOSED AT THE 

RESENTENCING – THE SAME AS THAT PREVIOUSLY 

IMPOSED – IS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE.

A. Because The Court Reimposed The Same 

Sentence As Previously Imposed 

After Eliminating Significant 

Aggravating Factors, The Case 

Should Be Remanded For Sentencing.

B. The Sentencing Court Erred In 

Finding That Aggravating Factor One 

Applied To The Murder Conviction, 

After The Appellate Division 

Remanded For Resentencing For 

Impermissible Double-Counting.

C. Defendant's Aggregate Sentence Of 

80 Years Subject To NERA, Which Will 

Make Her Eligible For Parole When 

She Is 89 Years Old, Shocks The 

Judicial Conscience.

We agree that the trial court, having eliminated significant 

aggravating factors, should not have imposed the same sentence, 

at least in the absence of a compelling explanation — something 

we cannot discern from the record.

Our review of a trial court's sentencing determination is 

deferential. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). Reviewing 

courts must not substitute their judgment for that of the 

sentencing court. O'Donnell, supra, 117 N.J. at 215. Nonetheless, 

"[a]ppellate courts are 'expected to exercise a vigorous and close 

review for abuses of discretion by the trial courts.'" Lawless,
11 A-3008-15T5

supra, 214 N.J. at 606 (citations omitted). Thus, for example, 

when a trial court fails to provide a qualitative analysis of the 

relevant sentencing factors on the record, or considers an 

aggravating factor that is inappropriate to a particular defendant 

or to the defense at issue, an appellate court may remand for 

resentencing. Fuentes, supra, 217 N.J. at 70. 

Moreover, "[a] clear explanation 'of the balancing of 

aggravating and mitigating factors with regard to imposition of 

sentences and periods of parole ineligibility is particularly 

important.'" Id. at 73 (quoting State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 

565-66 (1989)). "That explanation should thoroughly address the 

factors at issue." Ibid. 

In short, "a trial court should identify the relevant 

aggravating and mitigating factors, determine which factors are 

supported by a preponderance of evidence, balance the relevant 

factors, and explain how it arrives at the appropriate sentence." 

O'Donnell, supra, 117 N.J. at 215. In cases such as the one before 

us, where on remand the sentencing court has substantially 

eliminated the most serious aggravating factors underlying the 

original sentence, the sentencing court must explain its rationale 

for nonetheless imposing an identical sentence. Imposing the 

identical sentence after eliminating the most serious aggravating 

factors, without explaining how eliminating those factors has had 
12 A-3008-15T5

no impact on the sentence, raises the specter of capriciousness 

and does not instill confidence that the sentence has been imposed 

only after careful consideration of the relevant criteria in the 

New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice.

Here, although the sentencing court on remand initially 

announced it would not consider aggravating factors one or two, 

it went on to consider aggravating factor one nonetheless. That 

aggravating factor is supported by the record. After stabbing the 

decedent and walking away, defendant returned and gratuitously 

inflicted additional pain, either by kicking the dying decedent 

once or kicking him repeatedly. The sentencing court eliminated, 

however, aggravating factor two. 

Of greater significance is the sentencing court imposing on 

the attempted murder count the identical sentence despite 

eliminating aggravating factors one and two, which appeared to 

have driven the lengthy extended term the court originally imposed. 

These circumstances raise concerns about the propriety of the 

resentence imposed on the attempted murder count. 

We note the sentencing court had already exercised its 

discretion to impose both an extended term and a consecutive 

sentence on the attempted murder count. As our Supreme Court has 

noted, "the decision whether sentences for different counts of 

conviction should run consecutively or concurrently often drives 
13 A-3008-15T5

the real-time outcome at sentencing." State v. Zuber, 227 N.J.

422, 449 (2017). We also note the United States Supreme Court's 

recognition of "the mitigating qualities of youth" and the need 

for courts to consider at sentencing a youthful offender's "failure 

to appreciate risks and consequences" as well as other factors 

often peculiar to young offenders. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.

460, 476-77, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467-68, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 422-23 

(2012). Our Supreme Court noted "that the same concerns apply to 

sentences that are the practical equivalent of life without 

parole[.]" Zuber, supra, 227 N.J. at 429.

That is not to say that defendant in the case before us, who 

was twenty-one-years old when she committed murder and attempted 

murder, should be given the same consideration as a juvenile 

offender. But certainly the real life consequences of a 

consecutive, extended-term sentence should be considered, 

particularly under circumstances such as these, where on the 

attempted murder charge the most serious aggravating factors had 

been eliminated and the two that remained were somewhat ubiquitous.

For the foregoing reasons, we again remand this matter for 

resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.