__________________________________________________________________

12-15-00166-CR

_______________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

________________________________________________________________

SAMUEL LANCASTER IV

v.

The State of Texas

APPEAL FROM THE 217th DISTRICT COURT

OF ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS

Cause No. 2014-0496

ANDERS BRIEF OF APPELLANT

SAMUEL LANCASTER IV

__________________________________________________________________

Respectfully, Submitted:

/S/ John D. Reeves

JOHN D. REEVES

Attorney at Law

1007 Grant Ave.

Lufkin, Texas 75901

Phone: (936) 632-1609

Fax: (936) 632-1640

SBOT # 16723000

Email: tessabellus@yahoo.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED

ACCEPTED

12-15-00166-CR

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

11/2/2015 4:47:33 PM

Pam Estes

CLERK

 RECEIVED IN 12th COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS 11/2/2015 4:47:33 PM PAM ESTES Clerk
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Parties:

Appellant in Trial Court:

Samuel Lancaster IV

TDCJ# 2004508

2350 Atascocita Rd.

Humble, Texas 77396

Appellee in Trial Court:

The State of Texas

Trial and Appellate Counsel:

Appellant: 

JOHN D. REEVES Trial William Agnew

Attorney at Law Attorney at Law

1007 Grant Ave P.O. Box 2507

Lufkin, Texas 75901 Lufkin, Texas 75901

Phone: (936) 632-1609 Phone: 936/637-1200

Fax: (936) 632-1640 SBOT: 00796105

SBOT # 16723000

Appellee: 

April Ayers- Perez Trial Sandra Martin

Asst. Angelina County District Atty. Asst. Angelina County District Atty. 

P.O. Box 908 P.O. Box 908 

Lufkin, Texas 75901 Lufkin, Texas 75901

Phone: 936-632-5090 Phone: 936/ 632-5090

SBOT# 24090975 SBOT# 24081674

ii.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Page:

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL.......................................... .ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................ iv-v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................................................1-2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.....................................................2

ISSUE PRESENTED.............................................................................................2-4

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................3-9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................9-10

ARGUMENT...........................................................................11-20

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER.........................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE....................................................21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...........................................................21

iii.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

 

Page:

U.S. Supreme Court Cases 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, (1967) ..........................................................1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984) ..............................................18-19

Fifth Circuit

Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, (5th Cir. 1979) ...............................................21

Texas Cases

Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)....................................15

Euler v. State, 158 S.W. 3d 88, (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................................18

Gonzalez v. State, 337 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex. App.-Houston [1 Dist.] 2011).12, 13 

Harris v. State, 656 S.W. 2d 481, (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).....................................17

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ..................................12

Jackson v. State, 877 S.W. 2d 768, (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).......................12, 13, 19

Jordan v. State, 495 S.W. 2d 949, (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).....................................17

Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)............................................18

McFarland v. State, 928 S.W. 2d 482, (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) .............................18

iv.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, (Tex. Crim. App.1990)............................16

Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)..................................17

Rodriguez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 837, (Tex. Crim. App.2006).................................16

Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) .............................12

Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ....................12,13

RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Const. Amend. VIII ................................................................................17

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.................................................................................17

Tex. Health & Safety Code Sec. 481.121....................................................11-12

Texas Penal Code Ann. Section 38.04.............................................................11

Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33.1...............................................17

v.
___________________________________________________________

12-15-00166-CR

_______________________________________________________________

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

________________________________________________________________

Samuel Lancaster IV

v.

The State of Texas

APPEAL FROM THE 217th DISTRICT COURT

OF ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS

Cause No. 2014-0496

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Samuel Lancaster IV

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS;

COMES NOW, John D. Reeves, court appointed attorney on appeal for 

Samuel Lancaster, IV Appellant, and pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967). Johnson v. State, 885 S.W. 2d 641 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994), and 

Stafford v. State 813 S.W. 2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), files this Anders Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was indicted by a grand jury in cause 2014-0496 the 

July/September term for evading arrest or detention- one or more prior. (CR Vol. 
1 p. 17) Additionally, appellant was indicted by a grand Jury in the July/September 

term in cause 2014-0634 on October 3, 2014 for the offense of possession of 

marijuana in an amount of five pounds or less but more than four ounces. (CR Vol. 

2 p. 11) The two matters were consolidated by agreement on November 3, 2014 

into cause 2014-0496. (CR Vol. 1 p. 34) On August 15, 2014. Appellant waived 

arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. (CR Vol. 1 p. 27) A jury was waived 

in both cases on January 29th, 2015. (CR Vol. 1 p. 35) A non-jury trial occurred on 

May 15, 2015. (RR Vol. 2) Appellant was found guilty on counts and sentenced to 

eight years in the ID-TDJC on the evading arrest and two years in the State Jail 

Division for the possession of marijuana charge. (RR Vol. 2 p. 62-64) Notice of 

Appeal was filed on June 10, 2015. (CR Vol. 1 p. 52) John Reeves was appointed 

to represent Appellant on July 14, 2015. (CR Vol. 1 p. 56) 

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellate counsel did not find a Trial Court Certification in Volume I or 

Volume II of the Clerk’s Records. The Clerk has been notified and certification 

has been sent to the client for signature so the record can be supplemented. 

ANDERS ISSUES PRESENTED

Anders Issue 1

Is the evidence is legally sufficient to support proof of the two indictments 

2.
of evading arrest and possession of marijuana?

Anders Issue 2

Is there error regarding the admission into evidence of States’ Exhibit one 

through twenty five including any error regarding trial objections?

Anders Issue 3

 Is the sentence of the trial court disproportionate in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

Anders Issue 4

Did trial counsel provide ineffective assistance concerning appellant’s 

sentencing hearing? 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The case was called for trial upon an indictment charging appellant with 

possession of marijuana in an amount greater than four ounces yet less than five 

pounds and evading arrest or detention with a vehicle wherein the appellant 

entered a plea of not guilty to each count. (RR Vol. 2, p. 5-6) The prosecutor 

requested, and the Court agreed, that the Court take Judicial Notice of the State’s 

intent to seek a deadly weapon finding, previously filed with the Court, and the 

State’s notice of filing of the certificate of analysis that both the State and defense 

counsel stipulate is accurate and admissible as to the substance being marijuana 

and the amount. (RR Vol. 2, p. 8) The testimony considered by the judge on 

guilt/innocence consisted of three witnesses by the state and two witnesses for the 

defense, beginning with the testimony of Sergeant Michael Ray of the Sabine 

3.
County Sheriff’s Department (SCSD). (RR Vol. 2, p. 9-28)

Sergeant Ray testified that he had been a peace officer for eleven years, and 

had been employed with the Hemphill Police Department at the time of this 

incident. (RR Vol. 2, p. 9) On May 19th, 2014, the witness stated he was a patrol

officer, patrolling the streets and answering calls for service. Sergeant Ray stated

that he had been advised by dispatch that the Louisiana State Police was in pursuit 

of a black Chrysler. At the Milam four-way intersection, at Highway 103 and 87, 

he observed the car come to a complete stop. He verified the license plate number. 

Once Sergeant Ray pulled out, the vehicle, travelling westbound, picked up speed, 

and passed an 18-wheeler in a no passing zone. Sergeant Ray testified that as the 

car was passing the 18-wheeler, another 18-wheeler that was traveling east, had to 

run off the road to avoid an accident. The witness then activated his lights and 

siren, the car sped up to over 100 miles per hour, and advised his dispatcher that he 

was in pursuit of the vehicle. Sergeant Ray stated that during most of the pursuit, 

the driver would turn his headlights off and travel into oncoming traffic lanes at 

speeds between 100 and 120 miles per hour. The witness testified that he gave the 

car space to avoid any potential collision. In the Sergeant’s opinion, the driver was 

driving in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. 

During the pursuit, Sergeant Ray advised his dispatcher of his location, lost contact 

via radio at the county line, but kept in contact using his cell phone. When he 

reached the San Augustine County and Nacogdoches County lines, he requested 

that his dispatch advise each of the county authorities that he was entering their 

county and request support. As he approached Angelina County, he was told 

Angelina County was going to set up spike strips around the Highway 103 bridge,

4.
but he did not see any officers until he reached the Lufkin city limits. (RR Vol. 2, 

p. 10-12) Sergeant Ray observed that the vehicle hit the spike strips while traveling 

about 90 miles an hour. An Angelina County deputy followed the car with 

Sergeant Ray ensuing. The car swerved then proceeded in the middle of the lane

until it reached the loop, he tried to turn left, and the car finally stopped. (RR Vol. 

2, p. 13) 

State’s Exhibit 1, Sergeant Ray’s in-car dash camera video and audio of the 

incident, starting at approximately 2:30 a.m., was admitted. (RR Vol. 2, p. 14) The 

Sergeant did not arrest the driver, but recalled he observed a large amount of 

marijuana in the vehicle. He left the scene when the driver was ready to transport 

to jail. (RR Vol. 2, p. 15) State’s Exhibit 1 was published and Sergeant Ray 

narrated. At the Milam intersection, the appellant appeared to driving in an orderly 

way, but based on the information he had received from Louisiana the Sergeant 

followed the vehicle to verify the license plate. Sergeant Ray was not aware of the 

reason Louisiana authorities were pursuing the vehicle. (RR Vol. 2, p. 16) The 

video showed that the Sergeant’s lights and siren were on. He stated that the 

appellant turned off his lights, but when he would travel down a hill or steep curve, 

he would turn them on, and would turn his lights back off again. (RR Vol. 2, p. 17-

18) Once stopped, Sergeant Ray stated that an Angelina County deputy was trying 

to knock the window out since the doors were locked. (RR Vol. 2, p. 21) There 

was one occupant in the vehicle that was told to exit, but did not comply, 

remaining on the floorboard in a fetal position. (RR Vol. 2, p. 22) 

On recross examination, Sergeant Ray stated that he had kept a distance of 

approximately a football field away from the vehicle. (RR Vol. 2, p. 26) The 

Sergeant did not speak to the appellant once removed from the vehicle. The 

witness admitted that the appellant was probably scared when the deputy broke the

5.
window. (RR Vol. 2, p. 27)

Officer Mark McLin, an Angelina County Sheriff’s office patrol lieutenant 

since 2004 observed the defendant on May 19, 2014. (RR Vol. 2, p. 28-45) State’s 

Exhibit 2, his Angelina County Sheriff’s office patrol car video of that morning 

was admitted. (RR Vol. 2, p. 29-30) The video begins at the patrol station where 

the Sheriff’s office received information that Louisiana State Patrol had been in 

pursuit of a vehicles and another officer from a neighboring county within Texas 

was in pursuit heading towards Angelina County. (RR Vol. 2, p. 31) Spike strips 

were set prior to the Officer’s vehicle. The vehicle hit the spike strips and as the 

vehicle passed the Officer, the Officer turned on his lights, began following the 

appellant, while the appellant was swerving “all over the road”. Officer McLin 

“bumped” the appellant and the appellant stopped. In the Officer’s opinion, the 

appellant’s driving was “extremely erratic and dangerous”. (RR Vol. 2, p. 34-35) 

State’s Exhibits 3 through 7, snapshots of Officer McLin’s patrol car video, were 

admitted. The snapshots depicted a passing 18-wheeler and other vehicles, the 

appellant’s vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed without lights on, and the 

appellant traveling in multiple lanes. State’s Exhibits 8 through 22, photographs of 

the scene when the vehicle was stopped and when the vehicle was processed at the 

Sheriff’s office, were admitted. (RR Vol. 2, p. 37) Officer McLin discovered 

marijuana in a backpack and paraphernalia, including a digital scale, empty clear 

capsules, a marijuana grinder, and papers when he processed the vehicle. (RR Vol. 

2, p. 38) When he removed the paraphernalia out of the car, he packaged it and 

placed it into a secured locker at the sheriff’s office. Later, an evidence technician 

would take the evidence from the locker and place it in a locked evidence room.

6.
(RR Vol. 2, p. 39) State’s Exhibit 24, the marijuana and the digital scale, was

admitted. State’s Exhibit 25, the backpack that the marijuana was in and now 

contained just the paraphernalia, was admitted. (RR Vol. 2, p. 40-42) The amount 

of marijuana was approximately one pound, definitely less than five pounds but 

more than four ounces. (RR Vol. 2, p. 43) 

On cross-examination, Officer McLin stated that when the appellant was 

removed from the vehicle, he appeared completely withdrawn, and would not 

listen to any of their demands. (RR Vol. 2, p. 44) On redirect examination, the 

Officer stated that they demanded several times that the appellant exit the vehicle, 

and he never opened the door. (RR Vol. 2, p. 44)

Stewart Kendall, a deputy with the Angelina County Sheriff’s Department 

for two years, was on patrol on May 19, 2014. (RR Vol. 2, p. 45-49) While Deputy 

Kendall was located in a parking lot off of Highway 103, he observed the appellant 

drive through the turning lane, or median, into opposing lanes towards his vehicle, 

putting him in fear of serious bodily injury. (RR Vol. 2, p. 47) Deputy Kendall 

observed the vehicle being stopped and the appellant being pulled from the vehicle. 

He took custody of the appellant and transported him to the jail. When the 

appellant was removed from the vehicle, he was not very responsive to anything, 

but during transport requested to see medical staff for glass in his eye. Deputy 

Kendall transported the defendant to Memorial Medical Center where a doctor 

looked at his eye, and the Deputy was relieved. The State rested. (RR Vol. 2, p. 48-

49) Regina Lancaster, the appellant’s mother, was called as a witness by the 

defense. (RR Vol. 2, p. 49-52) Ms. Lancaster testified that the appellant had been 

to a mental institution a couple of times for nervous breakdowns that started when 

he was about 16 years old. She did not recall the diagnosis. The appellant’s prior 

7.
attorney had filed a motion for a mental exam to determine competency. (RR Vol. 

2, p. 50) The witness stated that when the appellant is confronted with stressful 

situations, he shuts down or makes bad decisions. He had not been prescribed any 

medication. (RR Vol. 2, p. 51)

On cross-examination, Ms. Lancaster stated that the defendant is 22 years 

old, and had been prescribed medication in the past, but marijuana was not 

prescribed. (RR Vol. 2, p. 52)

Mr. Lancaster, the appellant testified. (RR Vol. 2, p. 52-62) The appellant 

testified that he was coming from Natchitoches, Louisiana after dropping off a 

cousin. He was aware that the police were following him, and was driving fast 

because he was afraid since he was in an unfamiliar area. He had come from and 

noticed police were following him after he crossed the state line into Texas. The 

appellant stated that he did not want anyone to get hurt, but was scared and wanted 

to get away from the area and get home. (RR Vol. 2, p. 53-54) He stated that 

marijuana was in his vehicle, and he was trying to get to his home located in 

Houston. He stated that he had been incarcerated for one year and did not feel that 

a sentence of eight years was fair. The defendant stated that no one was hurt, and 

the evading arrest was a Class A misdemeanor raised to a third degree felony and 

that the State is seeking a finding of a deadly weapon which he did not possess. 

(RR Vol. 2, p. 55) He stated that he is a hard-working man, had been raising his 

son, and made a mistake. Prior to this, he had only one misdemeanor on his record 

and would like a second chance. (RR Vol. 2, p. 56-57) 

On cross examination, the appellant stated that he was not sure how it 

appeared to other people how he handled stressful situations, but agreed that he

8.
shuts down in such situations. The State mentioned allegations, but not 

convictions, of acts on his criminal history, including assault in 2014, robbery in 

Bexar County, taking a weapon from an officer, and assault of a public servant. 

The appellant’s responses were unclear, responding “Okay” or “I’m not sure.” The 

Court directed the State to move on. The State asked whether the appellant was 

scared while he was in Louisiana and why. The defendant stated he was scared 

because he was under arrest. He did not recall driving without lights, and did not 

give the officers his name when removed from the vehicle because he was 

exercising his right to remain silent, although he was not sure whether he was 

under arrest or recall if he was handcuffed. (RR Vol. 2, p. 58-62)

The State and defense rested and closed. (RR Vol. 2, p. 62)

The appellant waived presentence investigation. (RR Vol. 2, p. 63-64)

The judge returned a verdict of guilty on evading arrest with a vehicle, with 

a finding of a deadly weapon, to wit, a motor vehicle, and guilty of possession of 

marijuana in an amount greater than four ounces yet less than five pounds. The 

trial court sentenced appellant to eight years confinement in the Texas Department 

of Criminal Justice Institutional Division on the charge of evading arrest with a 

vehicle with a finding of a deadly weapon, and two years confinement in a state 

jail facility for the charge of possession of marijuana in an amount greater than 

four ounces yet less than five pounds. The sentences were to run concurrently. (RR 

Vol. 2, p 64)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Four issues are presented as a basis for appeal, which is stated in Anders Issue

9.
considered. First is considered sufficiency of the evidence, The State’s 

witnesses testimony was not controverted and included video and photo evidence. 

The appellant admitted to the crime in punishment. Appeal counsel considers 

admissibility of the State’s twenty-five exhibits and any error regarding trial 

objections. Counsel finds all exhibits were admitted without objection. The one 

objection not ruled upon in favor of the defense was not pursued by the defense as 

the State changed its manner of questioning. Thirdly, counsel considers whether 

the sentence rendered by the trial court was disproportionate in violation of the 

U.S. Constitution. There was no objection made in the trial court as to the sentence 

rendered and each was in the range of punishment by statute. Lastly, appeal 

counsel considers whether trial counsel was ineffective. The record reveals trial 

counsel presented evidence through the appellant and cross-examined the 

witnesses and there is no basis on the record to support ineffective assistance of 

counsel. 

10.
ARGUMENT

Anders Issue 1

Is the evidence is legally sufficient to support proof of the offenses of 

evading arrest and possession of marihuana as alleged in the indictments?

Appellant counsel finds that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 

finding of guilt for evading arrest and possession of marihuana as the convictions 

are supported by the evidence. The State’s indictment is pursuant to 

Texas Penal Code Sec. 38.04: Evading Arrest or Detention

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he knows 

is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or 

detain him.

(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the 

offense is: An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the 

offense is:

(1) a state jail felony if the actor has been previously convicted under this 

section;

(2) a felony of the third degree if:

(A) the actor uses a vehicle while the actor is in flight;

Tex. Health & Safety Code Sec. 481.121. Offense: Possession of Marihuana

(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, a person commits an offense if the person 

knowingly or intentionally possesses a usable quantity of marihuana.

(b) An offense under Subsection (a) is:

11.
(3) a state jail felony if the amount of marihuana possessed is five pounds or 

less but more than four ounces;

Appellant is aware that in a legal sufficiency review, this Honorable Court 

will examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine 

whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). Appellant recognizes the fact finder is the sole judge of the credibility and 

weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses. Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 

4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Appellant 

understands this court will give full deference to the jury's responsibility to fairly 

resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007).

 Appellant counsel finds that the evidence in the instant matter is sufficient 

because the record contains a mere modicum of evidence probative of an element 

of the offense. Gonzalez v. State, 337 S.W.3d 473, 479 (Tex. App.-Houston [1

12.
Dist.] 2011) Appellant believes that the evidence presented supports a conclusion 

that the defendant committed; the criminal offenses of evading arrest and

possession of marijuana.

In the instant matter there was testimony from two peace officers who 

witnessed the incident, video and photography evidence of the appellant’s evasion, 

and testimony from the appellant admitting to the offenses.(RR Vol. 2, p.10-12, 

14-15, 22, 29-30, 34-35, 38,40-43,53-54, 56-57) Each of these will be considered.

The issue here is whether there the evidence is legally sufficient to prove the 

offenses of evading arrest and possession of marihuana as alleged in the 

indictments.

Appellant argues there was not a lack of evidence as recognized by the 

Judge in counts 1 and 2. Appellant argues a rational trier of fact could determine a 

consistent set of facts of which could be believed beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Thus, pursuant to Williams v. State, Gonzalez v. State and Jackson v. Virginia, 

supra, appellant argues there is more than a “mere modicum” of evidence probative 

of the element of the direction of the discharge as well hereinafter be addressed. 

Appellant argues the Judge could as a rational fact finder have found the 

elements of the offense as alleged in the indictment to have been shown beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The testimony of the two peace officers is sufficient to support

13.
the elements charged. Both officers testified they activated their lights and 

sirens in an attempt to stop the appellant. The officers then pursued the appellant as 

he drove, refused to bring his vehicle to a stop, and proceeded to drive away from 

the officers as they tried to detain the appellant lawfully. Additionally, Officer 

McLin testified that he discovered marijuana, later determined to weigh a pound,

in a backpack and paraphernalia, including a digital scale, empty clear capsules, a 

marijuana grinder, and papers when he processed the vehicle.

Appellant argues the video and photographic evidence of the peace officers

support the elements of the offense of evasion as alleged in the indictment. The 

state introduced without objection State’s Exhibit 1, Sergeant Ray’s in-car dash 

camera video and audio of the incident, State’s Exhibit 2, Officer McLin’s patrol 

car video, and State’s Exhibits 3 through 7, snapshots of Officer McLin’s patrol car 

video. (RR Vol. 2, p. 14, 29-30, 37) These visuals depicted a passing 18-wheeler 

and other vehicles, the appellant’s vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed without 

lights on, and the appellant traveling in multiple lanes followed by the peace 

officers. (RR Vol. 2, p.10-13, 29-30, 34-35, 47)

Appellant counsel finds the Judge could as a rational fact finder have found 

the elements of the offenses as alleged in the indictment to have been shown 

14.
beyond a reasonable doubt from the testimony of appellant. Mr. Lancaster, the 

appellant testified that he was aware the police were following him, and was 

driving fast because he was afraid since he was in an unfamiliar area. (RR Vol. 2, 

p. 52-54) He had come from and noticed police were following him after he 

crossed the state line into Texas.( RR Vol. 2, p. 53-54) The appellant also stated 

that marijuana was in his vehicle, and he was trying to get to his home located in 

Houston and stated that he made a mistake. (RR Vol. 2, p. P56-57) Appellant 

counsel cannot reasonably argue that the evidence was insufficient as there was no 

controverting evidence. 

Anders Issue 2.

Is there error in the admission of State’s exhibit one through twenty five

including any error regarding trial objections?

Only twenty-five exhibits were offered at the plea and sentencing hearing. 

No objections were made to any of the exhibits offered by the State. (RR Vol. 2, p. 

p. 14, 30, 36, 37, 41, 42) Appellant counsel found no other instances of objection 

in the record. Generally it is held that a timely objection must be made in order to 

preserve an error in the admission of evidence. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330,

15.
355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) In viewing the trial court’s decision to admit or 

exclude evidence and whether there was an abuse of discretion it is generally been 

determined that the trial court is in the best position to decide questions of

admissibility, and will be upheld if a trial court's decision to admit or exclude 

evidence is "within the zone of reasonable disagreement when reviewed under an 

abuse of discretion standard. See Rodriguez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Tex. 

Crim. App.2006); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390-91 (Tex. Crim. 

App.1990). Appeal counsel believes there was no preserved error regarding any of 

the exhibits or the objections by defense counsel. As such appeal counsel finds no

harm in relation to the record to subvert the substantial right of the appellant to 

require a reversal of the trial courts sentence.

Anders Issue 3

Was the trial court’s sentences of eight years confinement in TDCJ-ID and 

two years confinement in State Jail disproportionate sentence in violation of 

16.
the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution? (U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.)

The sentence of eight years confinement in ID-TDCJ and two years State 

Jail was within the penalty range of two to ten years, for a third degree felony and 

six months to two year State Jail in the State of Texas. In this matter there was no 

objection to the trial court concerning the sentence. There was no allegation or 

complaint that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and 

unusual punishment, and as such the error if any was not preserved for review. 

See, Tex .R. App. P. 33.1(a); Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 119-20 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1996). (RR Vol. 2, p. 64) Here, after the trial court announced its 

sentence at the punishment hearing, appellant made no objection to the trial court 

about the punishment assessed and did not assert her claim under the Eighth 

Amendment and the Texas Constitution in the trial court. (RR Vol. 2 p. 64) As 

such, the punishment of eight years confinement in ID-TDCJ and two years State 

Jail falls within the range set forth by the Texas Legislature. Therefore, the 

punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. Harris v. State, 

656 S.W. 2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 S.W. 2d 949, 

952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) Appeal counsel believes appellant has waived his

17.
cruel and unusual punishment complaint. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 564 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) There is no evidence that the appellant‘s sentencing 

process did not provide fundamental fairness. U.S. Const., Amend XIV. Euler v. 

State, 158 S.W. 3d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) Fundamental fairness requires 

that an accused receive a fair trial. In the instant matter, the appellant’s testified to 

what he believed to explain his actions. (RR Vol. 2 p. 54-55) Further, the appellant 

waived his right to a PSI report. (RR Vol. 2 p. 64)

Anders Issue 4

Was trial counsel’s representation ineffective?

The standard promulgated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. 

22. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984) requires a two-step analysis. First it requires a 

demonstration that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. To satisfy this requirement 

appellant must identify the acts or omissions of counsel alleged to be ineffective 

assistance and affirmatively prove that they fell below the professional norm of 

reasonableness. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W. 2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 

18.
This Honorable court then will judge a claim of ineffectiveness based on the 

totality of the representation. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 695-96, 104 S. Ct. at 

2069. The presumption is that trial counsel was effective. See, Jackson v. State, 

877 S.W.2d 768,771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Trial counsel did present evidence 

through the appellant’s testimony. (RR V2, P 52-62) Trial counsel cross-examined 

witnesses in detail. (RR Vol. 2 p. 23, 26, 44, -51, 55-57, 77-87) The appellant was 

able to present his reasoning for his behavior. (RR Vol. 2 p. 54-55) Appeal counsel 

finds no basis to determine trial counsel’s strategy or to ascertain of what value it 

might have been to call or not to call other witnesses. The appellant’s testimony as 

set out previously supports the facts of the indictment. Appeal counsel does not 

find support from the record to argue “but for” trial counsels decisions in the 

sentencing hearing there would have been a different result. Especially, 

considering the appellant’s testimony regarding offense. (RR Vol.2 p. 53-61) In 

reviewing the totality of trial counsel’s representation and presentation of evidence 

as considered above- the record does not present evidence of trial counsel falling 

below the objective standard of reasonableness and professional norms. Strickland,

supra. Further, appellant counsel does not find a single egregious error or omission

19.
that will constitute ineffective assistance. Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 

994 (5th Cir. 1979) 

As such appellate counsel offers this Anders Brief.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant’s counsel respectfully 

requests, as relief, that he be allowed to withdraw as this appeal is frivolous and so 

advise Appellant so that she may pursue a pro se brief if she so desires, or 

alternatively to appoint other counsel for Appellant in the prosecution of this 

appeal. 

Respectfully, Submitted:

/S/ John D. Reeves

JOHN D. REEVES

Attorney at Law

1007 Grant Ave.

Lufkin, Texas 75901

Phone: (936) 632-1609

Fax: (936) 632-1640

SBOT # 16723000

Email: tessabellus@yahoo.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

20.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I, John D. Reeves Counsel for appellant hereby certify that this brief exclusive of 

the rule provisions that do not provide counting contains 4,333 words.

/S/ John D. Reeves

John D. Reeves

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s 

Brief on this 2nd day of November has been forwarded to the State’s Counsel, 

April-Ayers-Perez, Assistant District Attorney of Angelina County, by Efiling 

service.

/S/ John D. Reeves

John D. Reeves

21.