IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1701

Filed October 28, 2015

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANGELA J. RETTERATH

AND CHAD M. RETTERATH

Upon the Petition of

ANGELA J. RETTERATH, n/k/a ANGELA J. NEUMAN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning

CHAD M. RETTERATH,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Christopher C. 

Foy, Judge.

A mother appeals from a district court’s modification of a dissolution 

decree. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Richard N. Tompkins Jr. of Tompkins Law Office, Mason City, for 

appellant.

Judith M. O'Donohoe of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Braun, & White, L.L.P., 

Charles City, for appellee.

Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

Angela Neuman appeals a district court order modifying a dissolution 

decree to place physical care of the children with her ex-husband, Chad 

Retterath.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Angela and Chad married in 2003, had two children, and divorced in 2010. 

Under the dissolution decree, Angela received physical care of the children,

subject to liberal visitation with Chad.

In the ensuing years, Angela repeatedly alleged that Chad and others 

sexually abused the children. The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance action

in juvenile court. Chad subsequently filed a petition to modify physical care in the 

district court.

The juvenile court adjudicated the children in need of assistance (CINA)

and transferred their custody to the Department of Human Services for 

placement in foster care. Meanwhile, the department investigated the allegations 

of abuse. No founded reports of child abuse were issued against Chad.1

The juvenile court later determined one of the children’s “recollections” of 

sexual abuse were “a result [of] what he . . . interpreted as what his mother told 

him happened to him” and he had “yet to relay one single detail of abuse that he 

actually remember[ed].” The court further states, “every treatment professional 

involved in this case agrees that the boys do not exhibit the behaviors one would 

expect to see in abuse victims.” The court ordered the department to transition 

 

1 The department issued one founded report, with the perpetrator designated as 

“unknown.”
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the children to Chad’s home and granted the district court concurrent jurisdiction 

to address Chad’s modification petition. In a subsequent permanency order, the 

court transferred “sole custody” of the children to Chad, ordered visits with 

Angela to be supervised, and granted the department discretion to determine the 

“time, place, frequency, circumstances, nature and duration of visits.”

In time, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Chad’s 

modification petition. Following the hearing, the court made the following 

pertinent findings:

Like any parent, Chad is far from perfect. However, Chad has 

made a sincere effort to improve his parenting over the course of 

the CINA proceedings and has shown he can provide a safe, 

nurturing home for the boys. In contrast, Angela is unwilling to 

acknowledge her responsibility for the behavioral and emotional 

issues that her sons face. . . . The social workers who have 

assisted the family uniformly believe that it is in the best interests of

the boys to transfer physical care to Chad.

The court found Chad’s testimony “more credible,” reasoning that Angela’s 

willingness to “pursue her fantastical and ‘over-the-top’ accusations of sexual 

abuse against Chad . . . undermine[d] her general credibility.” The court 

transferred physical care of the children from Angela to Chad, required all 

visitation between Angela and the children to be supervised, and vested 

discretion with Chad to determine the parameters of visitation.

Angela filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Progedure 1.904(2)

for enlarged findings and conclusions, challenging the delegation to Chad of 

discretion to conduct visits. The district court denied the motion. This appeal 

followed.
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II. Analysis

A. Modification of Physical Care

A party requesting modification must prove (1) a substantial and material 

change in circumstances that is more or less permanent and affects the 

children's welfare and (2) an ability to provide superior care. In re Marriage of 

Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). On our de novo review, we are 

convinced Chad satisfied this heavy burden.

Angela leveled horrific allegations of sexual abuse against Chad and 

others, some bordering on the absurd. The department and law enforcement 

authorities investigated the allegations and found scant support for them. While 

Angela maintains she simply conveyed what the children reported, the older child 

called this assertion into question when he told his therapist and foster parents 

that Angela prompted him to “disclose” the abuse and made him “lie.” See, e.g.,

In re Marriage of McCord, No. 03-0497, 2003 WL 23219961, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Nov. 26, 2003) (stating mother was correct in giving credence to initial statement 

of daughter but mother’s credibility was adversely affected by the fact the child 

later gave inconsistent statements and said mother told her to say the father was 

the perpetrator).

The children’s reactions to their father also raised doubts about Angela’s 

veracity. Visitation supervisors reported the boys were happy to see and interact 

with him during supervised visits. The boys’ therapist testified their behaviors 

around their father were not typical of sexually abused children. 
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Angela continued to malign Chad even after the sex abuse allegations 

failed to gain traction. For example, she accused him of drug abuse, an 

accusation which was quickly refuted.

Angela’s allegations harmed the children. As a result of the allegations, 

the children were moved in and out of three foster homes, including a relative’s 

home. The second set of foster parents asked to have the placement curtailed 

because they feared Angela would make unsubstantiated allegations of abuse 

against them that would jeopardize their foster care license. 

In addition to the instability generated by the repeated moves, the 

children’s behaviors changed. The older child evinced “serious perception and 

thinking” issues; the younger child sometimes had “lengthy tantrums” in Angela’s 

presence. See In re Marriage of Winnike, 497 N.W.2d 170, 173-74 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1992) (noting mother was “strongly committed to pursuing her allegations of 

sexual abuse. However, she seem[ed] oblivious to any harm her public 

campaign against [the father] may have on her daughter”); see also, e.g., 

McCord, 2003 WL 23219961, at *8 (noting child “suffered serious emotional 

damage as a result of her mother’s posturing”).

Meanwhile, Chad did his best to address the allegations and nurture the 

children. He cooperated with the multiple investigations, preserved the children’s 

relationship with Angela’s family members despite Angela’s estrangement from 

them, and engaged appropriately with the children during visits and after the 

juvenile court granted him sole custody. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gooley, No. 

05-0551, 2008 WL 5412287, at *3 (noting father cooperated with investigations, 
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interacted well with his daughter and provided a suitable and stable home for his 

daughter).

We conclude Angela’s sustained attacks against Chad and her 

involvement of the children in those attacks constituted a material and substantial 

change of circumstances affecting the welfare of the children. See Winnike, 497 

N.W.2d at 174 (“In determining custody we can give great weight to a parent's 

attempt to alienate a child from her other parent if evidence establishes the 

actions will adversely affect a minor child.”); see also, e.g., Gooley, 2008 WL 

5412287, at *3 (affirming modification of physical care where mother 

“systematically attempted to destroy the relationship between father and 

daughter” by making “numerous allegations of abuse to the DHS,” subjecting 

child “to at least four genital examinations . . . with none finding there was 

conclusive evidence of sexual abuse,” and taking other actions against the best 

interests of the child). We further conclude Chad showed himself to be the 

superior caretaker notwithstanding Angela’s historic role as primary caretaker. 

We affirm the district court’s modification of the physical care provision in the

dissolution decree.

B. Visitation

The district court entered a visitation order as follows:

So long as the CINA cases involving [the children] remain open, the 

Department of Human Services shall have sole discretion to 

establish the time, place, frequency, circumstances, nature, and 

duration of any communication or visitation between [Angela] and 

the children. If the parties are unable to agree on the specifics of 

visitation once the CINA cases involving [the children] are closed, 

then [Chad] shall have sole discretion to establish the time, place, 
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frequency, circumstances, nature, and duration of any 

communication or visitation between [Angela] and the children.[2] 

Angela argues the court (1) should not have required the visits to be 

supervised and (2) should not have granted Chad discretion to control visitation. 

On the first point—the requirement of supervision—we agree with and find 

evidentiary support for the following analysis by the district court:

In this case, the Court is satisfied that the imposition of certain 

restrictions on the right of Angela to visitation with her children is 

necessary to ensure their safety and welfare. During supervised 

interactions with H over the past two years, Angela has confronted 

her son many times about what she perceived as his lack of 

honesty. She continued to pursue these confrontations, even after 

being told many times previously to avoid arguing with H about his 

honesty due to the negative effect these arguments have on him. 

Given the poor judgment exhibited by Angela in supervised 

settings, the Court does not believe that she could maintain 

appropriate boundaries in dealing with the boys if her visitation was 

not supervised. The Court also believes allowing Angela 

unrestricted visitation at the present time would soon lead to 

additional false accusations against Chad.

We affirm the district court’s visitation order to the extent it required visits 

between Angela and the children to be supervised.

On the second point—delegation of supervision authority to Chad—

Chad’s attorney conceded error at oral arguments. See In re Marriage of 

Stephens, 810 N.W.2d 523, 530 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012); see also, e.g., Schleis v. 

Keiner, No. 14-1258, 2015 WL 2089690, at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 6, 2015); 

In re Marriage of Schmidt, No. 13-0675, 2014 WL 2432549, at *7-8 (Iowa Ct. 

 

2 Our record does not reveal whether and when the CINA case closed. For purposes of 

this opinion, we will assume the CINA is closed and we will address that portion of the 

visitation order addressing post-closure visitation. See A.B. v. M.B., 569 N.W.2d 103, 

104-05 (Iowa 1997) (stating “[c]ustody or visitation orders entered by a court granted 

‘concurrent jurisdiction’ . . . are only determinative of the rights of the parents inter se if 

and when the juvenile court’s placement of the children during their CINA status has 

been rendered of no further effect by orders of the juvenile court”).
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App. May 29, 2014); In re Marriage of Vidal, No. 09-1608, 2010 WL 3324939, at 

*7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2010). As Chad’s attorney correctly pointed out, a 

district court may not delegate its authority to determine the parameters of 

visitation to a third party. See Stephens, 810 N.W.2d at 530 (“It is well 

established that the district court is the only entity that can modify a custody or 

visitation order, subject to the review of the appellate courts. This obligation to 

modify a decree cannot be delegated to any person or entity because that person 

or entity has no jurisdiction to render such a decision.” (citations omitted)).

Delegation of visitation parameters to the opposing party is of particular concern. 

As the Iowa Supreme Court stated, a district court should not 

make the right of visitation contingent upon an invitation from the 

party having the custody of the child, or require the consent of one 

parent for the other to visit the child, . . . thereby leaving the 

privilege of visitation entirely to the discretion of the party having 

the child in custody.

Smith v. Smith, 142 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Iowa 1966) (citation omitted).

In light of this authority, we reverse the portion of the district court’s 

visitation order delegating supervisory and other authority over visitation to Chad 

and remand for entry of an order by the district court assigning a visitation 

supervisor other than one denominated by Chad and defining the parameters of 

visitation.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees

Angela requests appellate attorney’s fees. An award rests in our 

discretion. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa 2005). 

Because Angela did not prevail on the physical care issue, we decline her 

request.
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Costs on appeal are taxed equally to the parties.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.