No. 3--00--0677

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2001

In re B.L.S.,	                	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

a Minor						)	of the 14th Judicial Circuit,

							)	Henry County, Illinois

(The People of the State of		)

Illinois,						)

							)

	Petitioner-Appellee,		)	

							)

	v.						)	No. 00--JD--16

							)	

B.L.S.,						)	Honorable

                                )	Clarke C. Barnes

	Respondent-Appellant).		)	Judge, Presiding

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   PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER delivered the opinion of the court:

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	In this appeal, B.L.S. claims: (1) he should not have been committed to the Department of Corrections (DOC) without the

judge considering a social investigation report, and (2) he

should receive credit against his commitment for the time he

spent in predisposition detention.  We order the credit and

otherwise affirm.

B	ACKGROUND

	B.L.S., a minor, committed an aggravated battery and was

held in predisposition detention before being adjudicated an

habitual juvenile offender under section 5--815(f) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/5--815(f)

(West 2000)).  After the adjudication, he was committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division (DOC), until his

twenty-first birthday, as section 5--815(f) requires.  Section 5-

-705(1) of the Act calls for preparation of a social

investigation report before a minor is committed to the DOC.  705

ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000).  However, the judge did not order

such a report before sentencing B.L.S. to the commitment required

in section 5--815(f).

ANALYSIS

		I. Commitment Under Section 5--815(f) Without A

	Social Investigation Report

	Respondent contends that the trial court's failure to order

a social investigation report prior to committing him to the DOC

requires that the commitment order be vacated and entitles him to

a new dispositional hearing.  We disagree.  

	Section 5--705(1) of the Act, which pertains to juvenile

offenders in general, provides:

"No order of commitment to the Department of

Corrections, Juvenile Division, shall be entered

against a minor before a written report of social

investigation, which has been completed within the

previous 60 days, is presented to and considered by the

court."  705 ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000).

	Section 5--815(f) of the Act, a special provision pertaining solely to habitual offenders, provides:

"If the court finds that the prerequisites established in subsection (a) of this Section have been proven, it

shall adjudicate the minor an Habitual Juvenile

Offender and commit him to the Department of

Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his twenty-first

birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or

non-emergency authorized absence."  705 ILCS 405/5--

815(f) (West 2000).

	Respondent bases his claim on the mandatory language of

section 5--705(1) requiring the court to consider a social

investigation report before committing a minor to the DOC. 

However, our review of the relevant provisions of the Act leads

us to conclude that section 5--705(1) does not apply in this

case.  Section 5--705(1) is part of a comprehensive statutory

scheme specifying, inter alia, the circumstances under which a trial judge shall determine whether to make the minor a ward of

the court.  If the minor is made a ward of the court, section 5--

705(1) directs the judge to determine the disposition best suited

to the interests of the minor and the public.  The statute

further provides that the judge may rely on "[a]ll evidence

helpful in determining these questions, including oral and

written reports."  705 ILCS 405/5--705(1) (West 2000).  The

social investigation report is one such written report.

	Accordingly, the report is generally necessary to guide a

court in determining (1) whether to make the minor a ward of the

court, and (2) an appropriate disposition for the minor if he is

adjudged a ward of the court.  In the instant case, however, the court never faced these determinations because B.L.S.’s habitual

juvenile offender status invoked section 5--815(f), which

automatically required a disposition of commitment to the DOC. 

The mandatory nature of the disposition naturally also required

that B.L.S. be made a ward of the court.  See In re S.P., 297 Ill. App. 3d 234, 696 N.E.2d 739 (1998) (noting that a

disposition cannot be made without an underlying adjudication of

wardship).  Because B.L.S. had been adjudicated an habitual

juvenile offender, the court was required to commit him to the

DOC until his twenty-first birthday.  Thus, any construction of the statute whichthat would require the court to consider a social

investigation report prior to disposition would render such

consideration meaningless.

	Respondent contests this conclusion in his brief by

asserting:

"Even where a minor has been initially found in an

adjudicatory hearing to be an habitual offender, the

trial judge who conducts the dispositional hearing is

required to determine whether the best interests of the

minor and the public require that he be made a ward of

the court."

	This assertion flatly contravenes the language in section 5-

-815(f) requiring commitment of habitual juvenile offenders to

the DOC.  B.L.S. cites In re S.P. to support his position.  However, a close reading of that case shows that the language he quotes1 does not pertain to proceedings conducted under the special habitual offender provisions of the Act.  Rather, the quoted

language pertains to proceedings conducted in theseparate the cases that

rppreceded before a minor commits anthe offense invoking section 5--815(f). Accordinglym,,

B.L.S.’s above-quoted assertion is unfounded.

	In sum, we hold that the requirement of a social

investigation report in section 5--705(1) applies only in

juvenile proceedings where the judge has dispositional

discretion.  When a minor is adjudicated an habitual offender

under section 5--815(f), a social investigation report is not

required.

	II. Credit Against Commitment for Time Spent

	in Predisposition Detention

	Following the trial court's adjudication of respondent as an

habitual juvenile offender, he was made a ward of the court and 

committed to the DOC until his twenty-first birthday.  The parties agree that respondent is entitled to day-for-day good

time credit pursuant to section 5--815(f) of the Act.  705 ILCS

405/5--815(f) (West 2000).  The parties disagree, however, as to

whether respondent is entitled to credit for his predispositional

confinement.  

	The record shows that B.L.S. was held in a detention home

before being committed as an habitual juvenile offender.  The

trial court did not award any credit for the period of

predispositional confinement.  Respondent argues that the

commitment order should be modified to allow credit for the time

he spent in custody prior to his dispositional hearing.  The

State disagrees, arguing that any right to presentence credit is

statutory and that unlike provisions in the Unified Code of

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1--1--1 et seq., (West 2000)), no such right has been provided by the Act.  We agree with respondent on

this issue.  It is true, as the State maintains, that the Act

does not expressly provide for a credit against commitment for

the time a minor spends in predisposition detention.  However,

the Act does provide that "minors shall have all the procedural

rights of adults in criminal proceedings, unless specifically

precluded by laws that enhance the protection of such minors." 

705 ILCS 405/5--101(3) (West 2000).  Adults receive pre-sentencepresentence

custody credit against determinate sentences (730 ILCS 5/5--8--

7(b) (West 2000)), and nothing in the Act specifically precludes

minors from receiving similar credit against the determinate

commitment mandated in section 5--815(f).

	The Act also provides that "[i]n no event shall a guilty

minor be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile

Division for a period of time in excess of that period for which

an adult could be committed for the same act."  705 ILCS 405/5--

710(7) (West 2000)).  In our view, denying minors credit for predisposition detention contravenes the spirit, if not the

letter, of this provision.  We also note that minors are clearly

entitled to such credit when their dispositions involve a

"sentencing order of detention."  705 ILCS 405/5--710(1)(a)(v)

(West 2000).

	These considerations led the Appellate Court, Fourth

District, to conclude that a minor is entitled to credit for

predisposition custody against an indeterminate commitment to the

DOC.  In re E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 696 N.E.2d 846 (1998).  The Appellate Court, Second District, reached the opposite

conclusion in In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 701 N.E.2d 1170 (1998).  The holding in J.J.M. was based on the differences between juvenile proceedings for minors and criminal proceedings

for adults.  However, subsequent amendments to the Act have

brought juvenile proceedings more in line with criminal

proceedings.

	For instance, the court in J.J.M. stated: "While the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act are protective and

rehabilitative, by contrast, the purpose and policy of the

Unified Code [of Corrections] are designed to be punitive as well

as rehabilitative."  J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 331-32, 701 N.E.2d at 1173.  Yet our supreme court recently stated that

subsequent amendments to the Act "represent[] a fundamental shift

from the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the

overriding concerns of protecting the public and holding juvenile

offenders accountable for violations of the law."  In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317, 746 N.E.2d 732, 735 (2001).

	Additionally, the court in J.J.M. noted that juveniles receive only indeterminate commitments to the DOC with

"continuous opportunity to seek early release."  J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 701 N.E.2d at 1173.  That observation does not

apply to minors like B.L.S. who are adjudicated habitual juvenile

offenders.  This factor provides additional reason to grant

minors who are committed under section 5--815(f) the pre-sentencepresentence

custody credit that adults receive.

	We decline to follow J.J.M. for these reasons.  We agree with the holding in E.C. and conclude that its reasoning applies equally to determinate dispositions under section 5--815(f).

	The record does not reflect how much time B.L.S. spent in

predisposition detention.  We thus remand with directions for the

circuit court to determine the appropriate credit.

	CONCLUSION

	The judgment of the Henry County circuit court adjudicating

B.L.S. an habitual juvenile offender and committing him to the

DOC is affirmed.  The cause is remanded for calculation of his

predisposition detention credit.

	Affirmed and remanded with directions.

	HoOlLdDrRudgiIdDgGeE and SlLaAtTeErR, JJ., concur.