COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

NATHAN LAMONT REED 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1231-97-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 JUNE 23, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 

David F. Berry, Judge Designate 

 David H. White for appellant. 

 Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Nathan Lamont Reed (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial 

of second degree murder and of use of a firearm in the commission 

of that murder. He contends that the evidence was insufficient 

to support the second degree murder conviction, and, therefore, 

was also insufficient to support the firearm conviction. We 

disagree and affirm. 

 I. 

 On the day of the murder, Roscoe Ellison "had words" with 

Tobias Reed, appellant's cousin. Thereafter, Ellison asked Gary 

Goodridge to obtain a gun. Goodridge found a gun and gave it to 

Ellison. Goodridge and Ellison walked into an alley and 

confronted appellant and Tobias Reed. Ellison and Tobias Reed 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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exchanged words. Appellant ran up the alley and shot Ellison 

five times. Appellant continued firing although Ellison's back 

was towards appellant and Ellison was running away. Ellison shot 

his gun once or twice before he died. Appellant ran back down 

the alley and left in a car with Tobias Reed. Tobias Reed asked 

appellant, "How many times do you think you . . . hit [him]?" 

Appellant replied, "I don't know. I just let it go. . . . He 

shouldn't had did what he did." 

 At trial, Tobias Reed testified that Ellison had robbed him 

the week before at gunpoint. On the day of the murder, Tobias 

Reed said he wanted to "leave it alone," but Ellison came down 

the alley and pulled out a gun. When appellant refused Ellison's 

command to "get out of the way," Tobias Reed claimed that Ellison 

shot at appellant twice. Thereafter, appellant began shooting at 

Ellison. Ellison ran until he fell in the alley. 

 Appellant testified that on the day of the murder, Ellison 

approached him and Tobias Reed and said, "I heard you was coming 

looking for me, and you was suppose to kill me. . . . Somebody 

gonna die tonight." Appellant said he was scared and thought 

Ellison was going to kill him. Appellant testified that he had 

his hands in his pockets when Ellison began to shoot. Appellant 

pulled out a gun from his pocket and pulled the trigger. 

Appellant held the trigger and the gun kept firing. Appellant 

let go of the trigger after Ellison fell. 

 II. 
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 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 

in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 353, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). The 

credibility of the witnesses, the weight accorded to testimony, 

and the inferences to be drawn from the proven facts are matters 

to be determined by the fact finder. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8 

Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989). 

 So viewed, the evidence showed that appellant and Ellison 

were armed when they confronted each other in the alley. 

Appellant was there with his cousin who had earlier argued with 

Ellison. As appellant's cousin and Ellison continued to argue, 

Ellison and appellant began shooting. Appellant fired his weapon 

five times at Ellison. Some of the bullets hit Ellison while 

Ellison was fleeing. According to appellant's own testimony, he 

fired several shots at Ellison while Ellison had his back turned 

and was running away. The fact finder believed the 

Commonwealth's evidence, and rejected portions of the testimony 

of appellant and Tobias Reed. 

 The fact finder rejected appellant's claim that he acted in 

self-defense. Moreover, the evidence was sufficient for the 

trier of fact to infer beyond a reasonable doubt the element of 

malice from the circumstances in which the gun was used. See

Henry v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 281, 289, 77 S.E.2d 863, 868 
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(1953). Thus, the Commonwealth's evidence was sufficient to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with malice 

and committed second degree murder and that he used a firearm in 

the commission of that murder. 

 Affirmed.