1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SARA JAHANGIRI,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,

Defendants.

 Civil Action No. 23-3029 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(July 15, 2024)

On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff Sara Jahangiri filed a [1] Complaint seeking a judgment 

compelling the Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the United States Department of State 

(together, “Defendants”), to render a decision on her K-1 nonimmigrant visa application, 

pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) bar on “unreasonabl[e] delay.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(1). Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ [6] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Upon review of the 

briefing,1the relevant legal authority, and the record as a whole, the Court shall GRANT

Defendants’ [6] Motion to Dismiss and DISMISS Plaintiff’s [1] Complaint in its entirety. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Sara Jahangiri is a citizen of Iran who is engaged to a United States citizen. 

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following:

• Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1;

• Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 6;

• Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s

Opp’n”), ECF No. 10; and

• Defendants’ Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 11.
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Compl. ¶ 8. In June 2021, her fiancé filed an I-129F, Petition for Alien Fiancé(e), with the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services, which was approved in September 2022. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. 

In December 2022, Plaintiff submitted a K-1 nonimmigrant visa application. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff 

appeared for an interview on January 19, 2023 at the United States Embassy in Ankara, 

Turkey. Id. ¶ 13. After the interview, Plaintiff received a notice informing her that her application 

had been refused for administrative processing and that Defendants would notify her by email 

when processing had been completed. Id. ¶ 14. On January 20, 2023, Defendants sent Plaintiff 

an email requesting that Plaintiff complete and submit form DS-5535 with supplemental questions, 

which she did on January 24, 2023. Id. ¶ 15. Since then, both Plaintiff and her fiancé have 

inquired as to the status of her application on numerous occasions, and her application has 

remained in administrative processing. Id. ¶¶ 16–18. 

B. Procedural History

In May 2023, Plaintiff filed an action seeking a judgment compelling a decision on her visa 

application pursuant to the APA. See Jahangiri v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 23-1487 (CKK), 2023 

WL 5174305, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2023). Plaintiff alleged that the delay in adjudicating her 

application “has caused her and her fiancé... to suffer significant, ongoing harm in that they remain 

in legal limbo as to whether they are able to start their lives together as a couple in the United 

States,” and she argued that Defendants’ delay in adjudication was unreasonable under the APA. 

Id. at *1. The Court sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint on August 11, 2023. Id. at *5. 

In October 2023, Plaintiff filed the current action alleging the same harm as in her previous 

lawsuit. Compl. ¶ 19. Plaintiff added that she is now pregnant, that it is devastating for her fiancé 

to be separated from his child, and also she does not wish to give birth to her U.S. citizen child in 

Iran. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. Her fiancé may not travel to Iran to visit his child, once born, nor may he move 
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to Iran because “his life is established [in the U.S.], and there is No Travel Advisory for US citizen 

traveling to Iran.” Id. ¶ 42. As she did previously, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ delay in 

adjudication is unreasonable under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. ¶ 34 (citing 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706(1)). Through this action, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendants to adjudicate her visa 

application. See generally Compl. 

Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure 

to state a claim. Defs.’ Mot. at 1. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 91–92 (D.D.C. 2020) 

(JDB); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). In determining whether 

there is jurisdiction, the court may “‘consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts 

evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's 

resolution of disputed facts.’” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 

(D.C. Cir. 1992)). Courts must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construe 

the complaint liberally, granting the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be drawn from 

the facts alleged. See Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

However, the “‘factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving 

a 12(b)(1) motion’ than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Grand Lodge 

of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.D.C. 2001) (RMU) (citation 
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omitted). A court need not accept as true “‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’” or 

an inference “‘unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’” Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 

456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on grounds that it 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint 

is not sufficient if it “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 

(2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the

factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff.” 

Nat’l Postal Prof’l Nurses v. U.S. Postal Serv., 461 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27 (D.D.C. 2006) (PLF).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may consider “the facts alleged in the 

complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint,” or 

“documents upon which the plaintiff's complaint necessarily relies even if the document is 

produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.” Ward 

v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Gustave–Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002) 

(RBW); Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 624 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2009)). The court may also 

consider documents in the public record of which the court may take judicial notice. Abhe & 
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Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants present various arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, they 

argue that certain Defendants are improperly named as Defendants. Second, they argue that 

consular nonreviewability precludes judicial review. Defendants then argue that Plaintiff’s claim 

fails because she cannot identify a discrete agency action that a consular officer is required to 

take. Finally, they argue that even if those grounds do not foreclose relief, Plaintiff’s mandamus 

claim fails on the merits and therefore should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court 

now addresses these arguments in turn.

A. Improper Defendants

Defendants argue that the Department of State and Secretary of State should be dismissed 

as those parties cannot adjudicate a visa application. Defs.’ Mot. at 5. In support, Defendants rely 

on the proposition that “consular officers [have] ‘exclusive authority to review applications for 

visas, precluding even the Secretary of State from controlling their determinations.’” Id. (citing

Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Saavedra Bruno 

v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1999))). However, Ms. Jahangiri is not challenging a 

consular officer’s adjudication of her visa application; she is challenging the alleged delay of her 

application’s adjudication. Filazapovich v. Dep’t of State, 560 F. Supp. 3d 203, 233 (D.D.C. 2021) 

(APM); see also Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 10 (“Control over a consular officer’s 

visa determination ... is not the same as control over the timing by which the consular officer 

considers the applications presented to her.”) (emphasis in original). Courts in this jurisdiction 

reject the same argument that Defendants have raised here. See, e.g., id.; Ramirez v. Blinken, 594 

F. Supp. 3d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2022) (RC). Therefore, the Court finds that the Secretary of State and 
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the Department of State are properly named defendants.

B. Doctrine of Consular Non-Reviewability

Defendants next argue that Ms. Jahangiri’s claims fail under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability. Defs.’ Mot. at 6–10. This doctrine provides that “a consular official’s decision to 

issue or withhold a visa is not subject to judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” 

Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159. The doctrine of consular non-reviewability derives from “the 

political nature of visa determinations and... the lack of any statute expressly authorizing judicial 

review of consular officers’ actions.” Id. The scope of the doctrine also aligns with Congress’s 

decision to commit the adjudication of visa applications exclusively to consular officers. 

See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) & (g); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1361.

For nearly a century, courts in this jurisdiction have applied the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and “refused to review visa decisions of consular officials.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 

F.3d at 1159–60 (collecting cases). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit recently reaffirmed that the doctrine of “[c]onsular non-reviewability shields a 

consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from judicial review.” Baan Rao Thai Rest., 

985 F.3d at 1024. However, courts of this jurisdiction have held that the doctrine does not apply 

where “plaintiffs ‘do not seek judicial review of a consular decision, but instead seek a final 

decision on their applications.’” Didban v. Pompeo, 435 F. Supp. 3d 168, 174 (D.D.C. 2020) 

(CRC) (quoting Afghan & Iraqi Allies Under Serious Threat Because of Their Faithful Serv. to the 

U.S. v. Pompeo, No. 18-01388 (TSC), 2019 WL 367841, at *10 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2019)). This 

includes where a visa application remains in administrative processing. See, e.g., id. at 172, 174; 

Vulupala v. Barr, 438 F. Supp. 3d 93, 98–99 (D.D.C. 2020) (ABJ) (refusing to apply the consular 

non-reviewability doctrine where the “visa application remains in administrative processing” 
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where the government actively seeks additional information from the applicant); Nine Iraqi Allies, 

168 F. Supp. 3d at 290 (holding that the consular non-reviewability doctrine does not apply where 

the applicant’s tracker status remains in administrative processing); Al-Gharawy v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 617 F. Supp. 3d at 11–17 (collecting cases and holding the same).

Here, the doctrine of consular non-reviewability does not preclude the Court from 

reviewing the adjudication of Ms. Jahangiri’s visa application, as it remains in administrative 

processing. On January 19, 2023, the consular officer who reviewed Ms. Jahangiri’s documents 

alerted her that her application was “refused under section 221(g) of the U.S. Immigration and 

Nationality Act” because it was “undergoing administrative processing.” Compl. Ex. F at 1, ECF 

No. 1-2. After Ms. Jahangiri submitted additional personal information on January 24, 2023 per 

the Embassy’s request, the Embassy informed her that her “[c]ase is currently in administrative 

processing.” Compl. Ex. G at 3, ECF No. 1-2. Further, in response to the inquiry for a status 

update from Ms. Jahangiri’s fiancé, the Embassy indicated that the case was “still pending 

necessary administrative processing.” Compl. Ex. H at 1, ECF No. 1-2. As in other cases where 

courts have deemed the consular non-reviewability doctrine to not apply, Ms. Jahangiri’s 

application clearly remains in administrative processing per the express language of the consular 

officials. Accordingly, the Court holds that the consular non-reviewability doctrine does not bar 

judicial review of Ms. Jahangiri’s claims.

C. Non-discretionary Duty

Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim fails because there is no discrete agency 

action that a consular officer is required to take. Defs.’ Mot. at 10. 

As the Supreme Court has held, “a claim [for unreasonable delay] under § 706(1) can 

proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it 
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is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) (emphasis in 

original). As other courts have held, “[g]ranting or refusing a visa to an applicant who has been 

interviewed is clearly a discrete agency action.” Khazaei v. Blinken, No. 23-1419 (JEB), 2023

WL 6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023). Furthermore, taking such an action is required by 

both the APA and the Department’s own regulation, and is to be done within a reasonable time. 

See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (noting that 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) “imposes a general but nondiscretionary duty upon an 

administrative agency to pass upon a matter presented to it ‘within a reasonable 

time’”); Vulupala, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 100 (concluding that “[g]ranting or refusing a final visa 

application is a mandatory agency action” under 22 C.F.R. § 41.106).

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants’ arguments again fail.

D. Unreasonable Delay

Finally, Defendants argue that even if the grounds argued above do not foreclose relief, 

Plaintiff’s mandamus claim fails on the merits and therefore should be dismissed for failure to state 

a claim. Defs.’ Mot. at 18. Ms. Jahangiri argues, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 14, that Defendants have not 

adjudicated her application “within a reasonable time” as required by the Administrative Procedure 

Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and that the Court must “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 

unreasonably delayed,” id. § 706(1). Although a court may order an agency “to perform a 

[mandatory] act, [i.e.,] to take action upon a matter,” a court may not decide “how [the agency] 

shall act.” Norton, 542 U.S. at 62.

To determine whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that agency action has been 

“unreasonably delayed,” courts apply the familiar “TRAC” factors laid out in Telecommunications 

Research & Action Center v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984):
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(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule 

of reason; 

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the 

speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling 

statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of 

reason; 

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation 

are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; 

(4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on 

agency activities of a higher or competing priority; 

(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the 

interests prejudiced by delay; and 

(6) the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency 

lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting TRAC, 

750 F.2d at 80) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 

152 (D.D.C. 2017) (RJL) (applying TRAC factors to claim for mandamus relief). Plaintiff points 

to case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the idea that “this 

Court need not assess the TRAC factors.” Compl. ¶ 36. However, as the Court informed Plaintiff 

in its earlier opinion, see Jahangiri, 2023 WL 5174305, at *2, this Ninth Circuit case is not binding 

precedent, and it is the law of this Court to apply TRAC. Whether a delay is unreasonable “cannot 

be decided in the abstract, by reference to some number of months or years beyond which agency 

inaction is presumed to be unlawful, but will depend in large part... upon the complexity of the 

task at hand, the significance (and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the 

agency.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1102. The Court now considers 

the various factors in turn. The Court notes that most of the below discussion mirrors the analysis 

presented in its opinion addressing Plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit, see generally Jahangiri, 2023 WL 

5174305, as the only material changes are that Plaintiff is now pregnant, additional time has 
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elapsed while her application remains in administrative processing, and Plaintiff has presented 

additional argumentation in response to a dispositive motion, whereas the earlier opinion dismissed 

her case sua sponte.

1. TRAC Factors One and Two

The D.C. Circuit has explained that the first TRAC factor—the time agencies take to make 

decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”—is the “most important,” although it is generally 

reviewed with the second TRAC factor as well. In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). The inquiry centers on “whether the agency’s response time... is governed by 

an identifiable rationale.” Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest v. FDA, 74 F. Supp. 3d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 

2014) (JEB). Because Congress has provided no statutory timeframe indicating how quickly it

requires the State Department to adjudicate and re-adjudicate visa applications, TRAC factor two 

is inapplicable. “To the contrary, Congress has given the agencies wide discretion in the area of 

immigration processing.” Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 153–54 (noting that a two-year delay in 

processing an immigration visa “does not typically require judicial intervention”).

In general, courts in this jurisdiction have regularly found that the Government applies a 

“rule of reason” to the review of visa petitions by adjudicating applications in the order they were 

filed. See, e.g., Muvvala v. Wolf, No. 20-02423 (CJN), 2020 WL 5748104, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 

2020) (“Other federal courts have held that this first-in, first-out method of adjudication constitutes 

a ‘rule of reason’ and satisfies the first TRAC factor.”). Courts in this jurisdiction often look to 

the length of delay as a rough yardstick to determine whether that “first-in, first-out” rule is, in 

fact, being applied.

Plaintiff Jahangiri had her visa interview in January 2023 and, since then, her application 

has remained in administrative processing. Compl. ¶¶ 13–18. Plaintiff argues that this delay is 
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unreasonable: it was a delay of nine months at the time of the filing of her Complaint, id. ¶ 34, 

twelve months at the time Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, see Defs.’ Mot, and now 

eighteen months at the writing of this opinion. However, courts in this jurisdiction routinely find 

that delays of numerous years are not unreasonable. See, e.g., Zaman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec., No. 19-3592 (ABJ), 2021 WL 5356284, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2021) (finding that a delay 

of forty-two months was “insufficient to warrant emergency relief in this district”); Pourshakouri 

v. Pompeo, No. 20-0402 (RJL), 2021 WL 3552199, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2021) (finding delay 

of forty-four months not unreasonable); Varghese v. Blinken, No. 21-2597 (CRC), 2022 WL 

3016741, at *5 (D.D.C. July 29, 2022) (finding delay of “around four years” does “not warrant 

judicial intervention, standing alone”); Arab v. Blinken, No. 21-1852 (BAH), 2022 WL 1184551, 

at *8 (D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2022) (ruling that a thirty-month delay was not unreasonable); see also

Yavari v. Pompeo, No. 2:19-2524, 2019 WL 6720995, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2019) (“District 

courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven years are 

unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.”). The time 

period of now eighteen months for which Ms. Jahangiri’s application has been in administrative 

processing is well within the bounds of that which other courts have found reasonable. 

Plaintiff next argues that claims of unreasonable delay for administrative processing are 

different than other “‘immigration processing delay’ cases,” so the lengths of delay should not be 

compared between the two categories. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 16–18. Plaintiff implies that this factual 

divergence means that the delay in Plaintiff's case cannot be justified. However, the difference is 

of no import. There are also numerous cases in which courts consider lengthy delays of 

administrative processing after attending an interview to not be unreasonable. See, e.g., Sawahreh 

v. U.S. Dep't of State, 630 F. Supp. 3d 155 (D.D.C. 2022) (JEB).
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Plaintiff then argues that the delay shows Defendants’ failure to process applications in 

accordance with the first-in, first-out methodology. Pl.’s Opp’n at 18–19. Plaintiff argues that 

applications in administrative processing are not addressed in conformity with this rule of reason 

because such rule would require these applications to be “concluded before additional visas are 

adjudicated, prioritizing them at the front of a queue ahead of any newly considered applications.” 

Id. at 18–19. Plaintiff does not provide any proof to support this argument. Moreover, even if 

Plaintiff did submit evidence in support of this argument, it ignores the fact that applications have 

different levels of complexity and present different challenges. A later filed visa application being 

adjudicated sooner than Plaintiff’s does not, without more, support the contention that Defendants 

are not adhering to the first-in, first-out rule, as different applications may require different 

resources and time. Cf. Khoshrou v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-2859 (CKK), 2023 WL 4930086, at *7

(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2023) (rejecting the argument that other visa applicants being interviewed after 

but adjudicated before the plaintiff meant that defendants were not adhering to the first-in, firstout rule). 

In sum, the Court finds that the first and second TRAC factors do not lend credence to 

Plaintiff's claims. The time period for which Ms. Jahangiri’s application has been in administrative 

processing is not unreasonable. As TRAC factor one is considered the “most important” factor, 

this finding weighs heavily in the Court's ultimate holding.

2. TRAC Factor Four

Next, TRAC factor four requires an assessment of “the effect of expediting delayed action 

on agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. 

Defendants contend that this factor weighs heavily in their favor, Defs.’ Mot. at 23, while 

Plaintiff argues the opposite, Pl.’s Opp’n at 22–24. 
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Granting Plaintiff the relief she seeks would merely “reorder a queue of applicants seeking 

adjudication.” Tate v. Pompeo, 513 F. Supp. 3d 132, 149 (D.D.C. 2021) (BAH). The D.C. Circuit 

has emphasized the importance of considering “competing priorities” in assessing the 

“reasonableness of an administrative delay,” even “refus[ing] to grant relief when all the other 

factors considered in TRAC favored it, where a judicial order putting the petitioner at the head of 

the queue [would] simply move[] all others back one space and produce[] no net gain.” Mashpee 

Wampanaoag Tribal Council, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1100 (quoting In re Barr, 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 

1991)); see also Ghadami v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-00397 (ABJ), 2020 WL 

1308376, at *9 (finding that “expediting review in [the plaintiff’s] case would merely direct 

government resources from the adjudication of other waiver applications”). Any such order would 

plainly interfere with the agency’s “unique––and authoritative––position to view its projects as a 

whole, estimate the prospects for each, and allocate its resources in the optimal way.” In re Barr, 

930 F.2d at 76.

Plaintiff argues that Defendants operate from the “assum[ption]... that the Plaintiff’s Visa 

Application is not already at the ‘front of the line’ or ‘completely ignored’ by the Defendants.” 

Pl.’s Opp’n at 23. If her application were at the front of the line, then Defendants would be 

adjudicating Plaintiff’s application next, and there is no need to compel them to do so. And there 

is no evidence that Defendants are ignoring Plaintiff’s application. Contrarily, Plaintiff attaches 

as an exhibit to her Complaint a message from the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey, which states 

the Embassy would notify her“as soon as this process is completed,” indicating that the process is 

ongoing. Compl. Ex. H at 1, ECF No. 1-2. Expediting review of Plaintiff’s application would 

merely redirect resources from other cases, which is inappropriate to compel. Akrayi v. Dep't of 

State, Civ. A. No. 22-1289 (CRC), 2023 WL 2424600, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2023) (collecting 
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cases). 

Courts in this jurisdiction, including this Court, routinely decline to grant relief that would 

place one prospective visa applicant ahead of others. See, e.g., Xiaobing Liu v. Blinken, 544 F. 

Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2021) (TJK) (“This factor not only favors Defendants, but ends up 

altogether dooming Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay.”); Verma v. USCIS, No. 20-3419 

(RDM), 2020 WL 7495286, at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2020); Dehghanighanatghestani v. Mesquita,

No. 22-2595 (CKK), 2022 WL 4379061, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2022); Pushkar v Blinken, No. 

21-2297 (CKK), 2021 WL 4318116, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2021); Desai v. USCIS, No. 20-1005 

(CKK), 2021 WL 1110737, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2021); Manzoor v. USCIS, No. 21-2126 (CKK), 

2022 WL 1316427, at *5–*6 (D.D.C. May 3, 2022). The Court will now do the same here, finding 

that the fourth TRAC factor weighs strongly against Plaintiff.

3. TRAC Factors Three & Five

The third and fifth TRAC factors are often considered together and require the Court to 

consider Plaintiff’s interests, health, and welfare. Ghadami v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 

19-00397 (ABJ), 2020 WL 1308376, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2020).

Plaintiff Jahangiri alleges that her “welfare is clearly at stake,” as “failure to adjudicate 

leaves [her] in administrative uncertainty, legal limbo and knowledge that eventual denial of her 

Application could result in her being unable to start a life with her fiancé(e) [sic] in the United 

States.” Compl. ¶ 35. She further alleges that she “will suffer irreparable harm if her 

Application is not promptly adjudicated,” particularly because she is pregnant and will have to 

give birth to her U.S. citizen child in Iran. Id. ¶¶ 27–28, 42. She continues that her fiancé might 

not travel to Iran to visit his child, once born, nor might he move to Iran because “his life is 

established [in the U.S.], and there is No Travel Advisory for US citizen traveling to Iran.” Id. 
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¶ 42. 

The Court is sympathetic to these concerns and reminds the Government that it must treat 

Plaintiff's case with “the sense of urgency one would expect when familial interests are at stake.” 

Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 154. The delay in adjudicating Plaintiff's K-1 visa has forced her “to 

endure a prolonged and indefinite separation” from her fiancé, which is “undeniably 

significant.” Didban v. Pompeo, 435 F. Supp. 3d 168, 177 (D.D.C. 2020) (CRC). At the same 

time, the Court must also be mindful that “many others face similarly difficult circumstances as 

they await adjudication of their visa applications.” Mohammed v. Blinken, No. 20-3696 (TNM), 

2021 WL 2866058, at *6 (D.D.C. July 8, 2021); see also Palakuru v. Renaud, 521 F. Supp. 3d 

46, 53 (D.D.C. 2021) (TNM) (“While the Court does not doubt that [plaintiff] has an interest in 

prompt adjudication, so too do many others facing similar circumstances”).

On balance, the Court does find that Plaintiff will face significant consequences without 

intervention, and TRAC factors three and five lean in her favor. See, e.g., Zandieh v. Pompeo, No. 

20-919 (JEB), 2020 WL 4346915, at *5 (D.D.C. July 29, 2020) (third and fifth factors favored 

plaintiffs due to harm from family separation); Ghadami, 2020 WL 1308376, at *9 (third and 

fifth TRAC factors favored visa applicant who alleged that he was “irrevocably harmed” by 

separation from his children and wife due to government’s delay in rendering a decision on 

whether he was entitled to waiver of immigration restrictions in Presidential Proclamation

9645); Penn v. Blinken, No. 21-1055 (TJK), 2022 WL 910525, at *6 (D.D.C. March 29, 2022).

4. TRAC Factor Six

Finally, the sixth TRAC factor states that a “[c]ourt need not find any impropriety lurking 

behind agency lassitude in order to hold the agency action is unreasonably delayed.” Ghadami, 

2020 WL 1308376, at *9. The Court “must determine whether the agency has acted in bad faith 
16

in delaying action.” Gona v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 20-3680 (RCL), 2021 WL

736810, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2021). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any bad faith on the part of Defendants. See 

generally Compl. As TRAC directs, however, the lack of plausible allegations of impropriety 

does not weigh against Plaintiff, and therefore does not alter the Court’s analysis. See Palakuru,

2021 WL 674162, at *6 (considering the sixth TRAC factor “neutral” even though the plaintiff 

alleged that the government had engaged in “purposeful delay” and “artificially inflate[d] []

processing times”).

* * *

Altogether the Court finds that, based on an analysis under the TRAC factors, Plaintiff 

Jahangiri cannot prevail on the facts alleged in her Complaint to make out a claim for 

unreasonable delay of her visa application. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's 

Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

IV.CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and 

DISMISS Plaintiff’s [1] Complaint in its entirety. An appropriate order accompanies this 

Memorandum Opinion.

 /s/

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge