14-1478 

Ware v. Brennan

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO 

A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S 

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH 

THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED 

BY COUNSEL. 

 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 9th day of June, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT D. SACK,

PETER W. HALL, 

SUSAN L. CARNEY,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

Polean K. Ware, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 14-1478 

Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Polean K. Ware, pro se, Enfield, CT. 
2 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Deirdre M. Daly, United States 

Attorney, District of Connecticut, Anne 

F. Thidemann, David C. Nelson, 

Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United 

States Attorneys, New Haven, CT. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 

(Squatrito, J.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Appellant Polean K. Ware, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court=s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of the Postmaster General with respect to Ware’s claims of discrimination and 

retaliation under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. We assume the 

parties= familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on 

appeal. 

We review de novo orders granting summary judgment and focus on whether the district 

court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving 

party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 

292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in 

favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 

(2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not 

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
3 

On careful review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude that the district court 

properly granted summary judgment to the Postmaster General. We affirm for substantially the 

same reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough memorandum and order. We have 

considered all of Ware’s remaining arguments, and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, 

we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk