M ot her pl ann ed t o l i ve wi t h h er mo t her i n St

. Loui s , M i s s our i an d at t end c ol l ege
. 1

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -2 -3 0 5 (b )( 1 )( C ) p e rm its a m a n c la im ing to b e a c h ild ’s f a the r to fi le a c o m p la int to 2

es t abl i s h par ent age
. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs F eb ru ar y 23, 200 4
JAM IE ED WAR D H INES v. TE RR ELL L YN N S IMMS Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01D-2055 M uriel Robins on, Jud ge

No. M2003- 01459-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 24, 2004

This appea l involves a custody dispute trig g ere d by a paternity action. The trial court fa shioned a perma nent par enting plan which na med Father the primary residential pa rent during the school y ear and Mother the primary

residential pa

rent during summ er vacation. Mother appe als. We aff irm the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined.
Cla rk L e e Sha w, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Te rr e ll Ly nn Simm s.
Th oma s K . B ow e rs , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , Jam ie Ed wa rdHi ne s.
OP IN ION
J amie Hines ( “F ather ”) and Terr ell Simm s (“Mother ”) a re thepare nts of a minor child, a son, born Aug ust 2, 1999. The parties never marrie d but lived toge ther with their son unti l Mother
a nn ou nc e d inAu g us t 20 01 that sh e wa s le a vin g F a the r andre turnin g to h e r h ome in M iss ou ri wi th the ir so n. F a the r pe tit ion e d the tr ia l c ou rt to e sta bli sh pate rn ity , e njo in M oth e r f ro m r e mov ing the ir 1 2
so n f ro m th e ir ho me , s e t c hil d s up po rt , a ndc re a te a te mpo ra ry pa re nti ng plan p e nd ing tr ia l.C h a n c e l l o r C a r o l M c C o y g r a n t e d t h e TR O. 3

M o t her al so sought at t o rney ’ s fees and o n ap p eal argues t hat t he t ri al co urt ab used i t s d i scr et i o n i n not award i ng 4 h e r fe e s u n d e r T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -2 -3 1 1 (a )( 1 4 ) a n d T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -5 -1 0 3 (c ).

C i rcui t Jud ge C arol So l o m an sat by i nt erchange fo r Cir cui t Jud ge M uri el R o b i nson. 5

T he t r i al cour t found a do wnwa r d dev i at i on f r om t he C hi l d Supp ort G ui del i nes was appropri at e g i ven t he t r ave l 6 exp enses Father wo ul d i ncur making f o ur r o und

- t ri p s p er mo nt h f rom N ashvi l l e t o M i ss o uri fo r vi si t at i o n w i t h hi s son.

In ad d i t i o n, annual ho l i d ays were t o al t ernat e b et ween t he p arent s. In t he event M o t her d i d no t m o ve to 7 M i ss o uri , t he o rder p rovided fo r t he chi l d t o res i d e wi t h Father t hree da y s each we ek and wi t h M o t her t he rema i ni ng fo ur d ays.

T he exc han ges became s o cont ent i ous wi t h e i t her M ot her not s howi ng up or cl ai mi ng Fat her ha d not s hown

8 up t hat Fat he r testi fi ed at t r i al t hat he al way s pur cha s ed ga s i n t he vi ci ni t y of t he exc han ge i n or der t o produce g as rec eip t s t o p ro ve t he p l ac e, t i m e a nd d ate o f his att em p t ed visi t s.

2 A t e mpo ra

ry re str a ini ng or de r wa s iss ue d e njo ini ng Mo the r f ro m mo vin g wi th the c hil d to Missouri. Mother answ ere d the paternity petition, counter sued for child support, moved to dissolve

3 the TRO and moved to re strain Father fr om forcing her f rom their home. A re straining order was 4 issued ag ainst Father re strain i n g him both from forcing Mother to move fr om their home and
re mov ing the c hil d f

ro m Mo the r’ s te mpo ra

ry ph y sic a l po sse ssi on pe nd ing tr ia l. Following a hearing in October 2001, the t rial court enter ed an or der f inding that Mr. H ines 5 was the child’s natura l fathe r and fashioned a tempora ry pare nting plan w hich re quired F ather to pay $475 per month in child support

. The TRO a g ainst Mother wa s dissolved, and she wa s g rante d 6 permission to move to Missouri wit h the parties’ son. The tria l court further fo u nd that aff ording Father pa renting time was in the best intere st of the chil d , an d ac co rdi ng ly named F ather

the
re s i d en t i al par ent for two f ive day periods out of e ach month, with Mother be ing the residential pa re nt the re ma ind e r o f the mon th. Spe c if ic a lly the or de r pr ov ide d that the “ c hil d sh a ll re sid e wi th 7 the Father e very

first and third Sunday

from 7 : 0 0 p
. m
. t o t he following Friday at 7:00 p.m. The parties will meet at a desig nated location an equal distance from the parties’ re sidence s, which is the ‘Waffle Hut’ in Metropolis, I llinois .”
Un fo rtun a te ly , fo llo wi ng Mo the r’ s mov e to Mis so uri wi th the c hil d, the pa rt ie s’ re la tio ns hip fu rthe r d e te ri orat ed, a ndthe sc he du le d b imo nth ly vis itatio n e xch a ng e s o ft e n b ro ke do wn int o shouting matc hes that on occ asion nec essitated the police being involved. 8

I n Jun e of 20 02 , a c on te mpt pe tit ionwa s f

ile d b y Mo the r a lle g ing that Fathe r wa s lat e in c hil d support payments and had not exercised visitation. A show ca use hea ring on the contempt wa s set fo r August

. I n the m e a nti me , F a the r ans we re d a ndde nie d th e a lle g a tio ns a ndob ta ine d a TRO ag ainst Mother enjoining her f rom assaulting Father. F ollowing the show cause hearing, the trial
c ou rt dis mis se d b othc on te mpt pe tit ion s a ndor de re d th a t th e te mpor ary pare nti ng plan r e ma in i nC ouns el for M ot her , R al ph Fra zi er , was permi t t ed by t he t r i al cour t t o wi t hdr aw. Fr om t hat poi nt i n D ece mb er 9 2 0 0 2 , M o the r re p re se n te d he rs e lf p ro se in the trial c o u rt. 3 e ff e c t. On c e a g a in, in Ja nu ary of 20 03 , M oth e r f

ile d a c on te mpt pe tit ion , a nd F a the r f

oll ow e d s uit 9 in Febr uary of 2003 with his own contempt petition ag ainst Mother. B oth petitions allege d visitation violations.
I n Marc h 2003, the trial to establish the permanent parenting plan was held. Father testified that h e s h o u ld be his son’s primary car e g iver since he wa s a tea cher and conside red e ducation extremel y i m p o rt ant for his son. He also detailed nume rous incidents both befor e and a fter the parties’ separ ation wher e Mother was abusive both verba lly and phy sically

to him. Father

further te sti fi e d th a t Mo the r w ou ld t ake out he r f ru str a tio n w ithhim

on the ir so n d uring the e xch a ng e s. Father’s mother , Fe licia Hines, testified to times she ha d witnessed Mother be ing a busive to her son b o t h b e f o r e t h e i r s e p ar a t i o n a n d a ts o m e o f t h e v i s i t a t i o n e x c h a n g e s
. In a d d i t i o n , B r i t t a n y H a z l e y, a friend of F ather , also testified that she had observed Mot her’ s and her male friend’s misbehavior at visitation ex chang es.
I n co n tra s t , M o t h er , ac t i n g pro s e , testified that she loved he r son and ha d alway s been the primary car eg iver for

him. W hen questioned briefly by the t ri al court, Mother

explained she left Father be cause she fe lt she was having to do too much of the parenting by herse lf. Mother’s mother , Rita Rivers, testified that her daug hter wa s a loving , caring mother ; t h at s h e an d her husba nd had helped Mother

and F ather

when the c hild was born; but that she di d not want to interfe re too much. I n contra st, Ms. Ri vers e x plained that F ather’s mother, Ms. Hines, wa s too involved with the situation and that she believe d it was Ms. Hines, not Father, who w as behind F ather ’s re quest for
c us tod y . Sh e fu rthe r te sti fi e d tha t Fathe r ha d ha d some tr ou ble ke e pin g job s. Mo the r’ s f ina l w itn e ss was he r aunt, Tina B ry cen, w ho testified that Mother wa s a wonderful mot her and that the child was
a “ mom my ’s bo y ” sin c e he a lw a y s h a d to be wi th M oth e r w he n s he wa s n ot i n s c ho ol. Following the proof and prior to announcing its decision, the trial court a dmonished Mother reg arding her f

uture c onduct. The c ourt stated:
F ir st o ff , f ro m w hat I ’m

he ari ng , M s. Simm s, y ou ’r e try ing y ou r b e st t o d e fe a t th is man’s re lationship with his c hild. This Court will not allow y ou to do that, and if y ou continue to do it, then obviously y ou’re not g oing to be any form of c ustodian here

. You ar e both fit pare nts for this child. The problem is y ou don’t respe ct ea ch other

. Th e p r o o f s h o w s t h a t y o u h a v e b e e n v o l a t i l e d u r i n g t h e s e v i s i t a t i o n s
. Y o u c u rs e in front of y o u r child. You do things that are not appropriate for a pare nt. That evidenc e is overw helming in this rec ord. So, I ’m g oing to do what I think is i n the best interest a nd welfa

re of this child at this t ime. You p i cked this gentlema n to be the father of y our child, and y ou’re g oing to ha ve to d e a l w ithit un til y ou r c hil d ha s re a c he d ma jority wh ic h is 18 a ndg ra du a te s w ith his re g ula

r s e nio r c la ss. So, y ou a ll n eed to g e t in a moo d to pa

re nt this c hil dT he cour t al s o advi s ed M ot her t hat s he nee ded t o s t op “ r ant i ng and r avi ng ” and t hat t he part i es nee ded t o get 10 al o ng. T he co urt s t at ed that , a s f ar as t he f ut ure was co ncerned , t he co urt was wi p i ng t he sl at e cl ean wi t h regard t o any p re v io u s b a d c o n d u c t. 4 appropriately , and have respe ct for e ach othe r. I f y ou continue in y our vain, y ou’re g oing to lose a ll rights to this child. I find it to be in the best interest and w elfa re of this child that joi nt custody be the or der of

The Court. . . . 10
Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi na l or de r f ou ndthat:
1. B othpa

rt ie s a re fi t to be pa

re nts

. 2. Mother has attempted to defe at the F ather ’s re lationship with parties’ minor child. 3. Neither

party respe cts the other. 4. Mo the r c ur se s in fr on t of the min or c hil d a nd c on du c ts he rs e lf in a ma nn e r n ot i n th e be st interests and w elfa

re of the minor child. . . . [T] he parties need to re spect one another and in the event the Mothe r continues he r inappropriate conduc t in the presenc e of the child, she may lose any form of c ustodial rig hts to the child. . . . The pa rties ar e her eby

awa rded joint custody of t he mi nor child

. . . . Until the minor chi ld i s e nr oll e d inkin de rg art e n, Mo the r s ha ll b e c us tod ia n f ro m July 1 un til st Dec ember

31 . Father will be the c ustodian from January 1 until J une 30

. . . . st st th
Once the minor child is e nrolled in kinde rg arte n, the Father shall be custodian of the minor child during the school y ear , from two day s befor e the beg inning of s ch o ol
un til the en d of May . O nc e the c hil d is e nr oll e d inkin de rg art e n a ndla te r y e ars , Mo the r s hall b e c us tod ia n of the min or c hil d fo r the mon ths of June , July a ndAu g us t until two day s befor e school starts in August. . . .
Mother shall have visitation of t he mi nor child during Father’s c ustodial periods for one we ekend pe r month from 6:00 p.m. on the first Friday of ea ch month until 6:00 p.m. on the next S unday

and for one optional weekend upon 48 hours notice to the F a the r. F a the r s ha ll h a ve the sa me vis itatio n d uring the Mo the r’ s c us tod ia l pe ri od s.

. . . Mother is here by

restrained and enjoined from harassing , verba lly abusing , or ca lling the F a the r o r h is f

a mil y me mbe rs a ny

vil e or ug ly na me s.
Th e pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan wa s att a c he d to th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi na l or de r. Mo the r a pp e a ls the tr ia l c o u r t’ s p lan b e c au s e it ma k e s F a th e r

th e p r im ar y

r e s id e n ti a l p ar e n t f

o r th e ir s o n o n c e he enter s kinderg arte n.5 A N A L Y SIS
I. R ESI D ENTIAL P ARE NT I NG P L AN
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404 requires every final custody order to incorporate a pe rmane nt pare n t i n g p l an for

any minor children the subje ct of a divorce , leg al sepa

ration, annulment or separ ate maintenance a ction. A par enting plan is defined in Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 402(3) a s “a wr itten plan for the pare nting a nd best interests of the child, including the allocation of par enting responsibilities and the establishment of a r esidential sche dule, as we ll as an aw ard of child support consistent with titl e 36,
c ha pte r 5 .” Ac c or din g to T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 4, a pe rm a ne nt p are nti ng plan s ha ll: (a) (1) Provide f

or the c hild’s chang ing needs a s the child g rows and matures, in a way that minimi zes the need f or further modifica t i o n s to the permane nt pare nting plan; (2) Establish the authority an d responsibi lities of eac h pare nt with respec t to the
c hil d, c on sis te nt w iththe c ri te ri a in this pa rt ; (3 ) M ini mize the c hil d’ s e xpos ur e to h arm fu l pa re nta l c on fl ic t; (4) Provide f

or a pr ocess f

or dispute re solution, before court action, unless prec luded or limited by

§ 36-6-406; . . . (5) Allocate decision-making authority to one (1) or both parties re g arding the child’s education , health ca

re, e x trac urricula

r ac tiviti es, and r elig ious upbringing . The pa rt ie s may inc or po rate a n a g re e me nt re la te d to the c are a nd g ro wth o f the c hil d in the se sp e c if

ie d a re a s, or in oth e r are a s, int o the ir plan, c on sis te nt w iththe c ri te ri a in this part. Reg ardle ss of t he allocation of decision making in the pa renting plan, the par t i es m ay

ag ree that either pa

rent may make e merg ency

decisions af

fec ting the he a lthor sa fe ty of the c hil d; (6) Provide that eac h pare nt may make the day -to-day

decisions r ega rd i ng the ca re of the c hil d w hil e the c hil d is re sid ing wi th that pa re nt; (7) Provide that when mutual decision m aking is desig nated but cannot be achie ved, the pa rt ie s sh a ll make a g oo d faith e ff ort to re so lve the iss ue thr ou g h th e app ro pria te dispute resolution proce ss, subje ct to the exception set forth in subdivision (a)(4) (F );
Under the leg islation, the court is to determine a residential schedule , which desig nates the p r i m ar y r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n ta n d d e s i g n a t e s i n w h i c h p ar e n t ’ s h o m e t h e c h i l d w i l l r e s i d e o n g i v e n d a ys du ri ng the y e ar. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6- 40 2( 5) . A re sid e nti a l sc he du le is d e fi ne d a s:

. . . the sc he du le of wh e n the c hil d is in e a c h pa re nt’ s ph y sic a l care, and it sh a ll desig nate the primary

residential pa

rent [t he pare nt w ith whom the child re sides more than 50% of t he ti me]; in addition, the residential schedule shall desig nate in which pare nt’s home ea ch minor child sha l l reside on g iven day s of the y ear , including provisions f

or holiday s, birthday s of family members, vacations, a nd other s p ec ialT e n n
. C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -6 -4 0 6 instr u c ts a c o u rt to li m it the re sid e n tial tim e fo r a p a re n t t h a t ha s e n g a g e d in 11

cer t ai n s peci f

i ed conduct or exh i bi t s ce r t ai n t r ai t s , i ncl udi ng , but not l i mi t ed t o: (1) wi l l f ul aban do nment ; ( 2) phy s i cal
or s exu al ab us e; (3) emo t i onal ab us e; (4) neg l ect o r nonperf ormanc e o f

p ar ent al d ut i es ; or ( 5) a n e mo t i onal or phy s i cal i m p ai rme nt whi ch i nt erf eres wi t h pa rent al res p o nsi b i l i t i es. N ei t her part y herei n argues t hat the t ri al co urt s ho ul d have
u til iz e d T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -6 -4 0 6 to li m it re sid e n tial tim e w ith e ithe r p a re n t.

6 occa sions, consistent with the criteria of this part; provided, that nothing c ontained here in shall be construe d to modify any provision of § 36-6-108; . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-402( 5). When fashioning the residential schedule , the court is inst ructe d to take into acc ount the fac tors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 404(b):
. . . the court shall make re sidential provision s for e ach c hild, consistent with the
c hil d’ s d e ve lop me nta l le ve l a ndthe famil y ’s so c ia l and eco no mic c ir c ums ta nc e s, wh ic h e nc ou ra g e e a c h p are nt t o maint a in a lov ing , s ta

ble , a ndnu rturing re la tio ns hip
w i t h t h e c h i l d

. T h e c h i l d ’ s r e s i d e n t i a l s c h e d u l e s h a l l b e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p ar t

. If the limitations of § 36-6- 406 are not disposit ive of the c hild’s residential sche dule, 11 the c ou rt sh a ll c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s: (1) The pare nt’s ability to instruc t, inspire, and enc ourag e the c hild to prepare for a life of service, and t o compete succe ssfully in the society

which the c hild face s as an a du lt; (2) The relative streng th, nature, and stabilityof the c hild’s relationship with eac h pare nt, including whe ther a pare nt has taken g reater re sponsibili ty for pe rf o rm ing pare nting r esponsibiliti es re lating to the daily needs of the child; (3) The wi l l ingne ss and ability of ea ch of the pare nts to facilitate and e ncoura g e a c los e a ndc on tin uin g pa

re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip be tw e e n the c hil d a nd the oth e r p are nt, consistent with the best interests of the child; (4) Willful refusal to attend a court-or d er ed parent educ ation seminar may be
c on sid e re d by the c ou rt a s e vid e nc e of that pa re nt’ s la c k of g oo d fait h i n the se pr oc e e din g s; (5) The dispositi on of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, me dical
car e, educ ation, and other nece ssary

car e; (6) The deg ree to which a pare nt has been the prim ary car eg iver, de fined a s the pare nt wh o h a s ta

ke n th e g re a te r r e sp on sib ili ty fo r p e rf ormin g pa

re nta l r e sp on sib ili tie s; (7 ) T h e lo v e , a f

f e c ti o n , a n d e mo ti o n a l ti e s e xis ti n g b e tw e e n e a c h p ar e n t a n d the child; (8) The emotional needs and developmenta l level of the c hild; (9 ) T he c ha

ra c te r andph y sic a l an d e mot ion a l f itn e ss o f e a c h p are nt a s it re la te s to eac h pare nt’s ability

to pare nt or the we lfare of the c hild;7

(10) The child’s intera ction and interr elationships with sibl ings and with significant a du lts , a s w e ll a s th e c hil d’ s in vo lve me nt w iththe c hil d’ s p hy sic a l su rroun din g s, sc ho ol, or oth e r s ig nif

ic a nt a c tiv iti e s; (1 1) Th e imp orta nc e of c on tin uity in the c hil d’ s life a nd the le ng th of tim e the c hil d ha s li ve d ina

sta ble , s a tis fa c tory

e nv ir on me nt; (1 2) Ev ide nc e of

ph y sic a l or

e mot ion al abu se to the c hil d, to the oth e r p are nt o r t o any other pe rson; (13) The char acte r and be havior of any other pe rson who re sides in or fre quents the home of a pare nt and such pe rson’s intera ctions with the child; (14) The rea sonable pre fer ence of the c hild if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or older. . . . (15) Ea ch par ent’s employment schedule , and the c ourt may make a ccommodations consistent with those schedules; a nd (16) Any other fa ctors dee med re levant by the court.
These f actor s incorporate those set out in T en n
. C o d e Ann. § 36-6-106, the statute whic h g uid e d the tr ia l cou rt in c us tod y de te rm inatio ns prior

to the pa re nti ng plan le g isl a tio n. Th a t st a tut e has not bee n repealed. The fac tors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 106 are still rele vant as a re fac tors established by

the courts. The primary conce rn in determin at i o n s of a c hild’s residential place ment rema ins the best interests of the c hild, and consideration of the fac tors under Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6-404( b) still necessitates a compar ative ana ly sis.
T h u s , b y s t at ute as we ll as case law, the we lfare and best intere sts of the children a re the paramount c oncern in c ustody and residential place ment determinations, a nd the g oal of any such decision is to place the child in an environme nt that will best serve his or he r nee ds. P a rker v

. Parker , 986 S.W .2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1999) ; Le ntzv . Le ntz , 7 17 S.W. 2d 87 6, 87 7 (T e nn . 1 98 6) ; Luke v. Luke , 6 51 S.W. 2d21 9, 22 1 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) . T he Ge ne ra l A ssem bl y has fo un d th a t “ [t]he be st interests of the c hild are se rved by a parenting arr ang ement that best maintains a child’s e motional g rowth, hea lth a n d stability , and phy sical ca re.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-401(a ). The aim of a custodial o r

residential a

rra ng ement is to promote the child’s we lfare by cre ating an envir onment that pr omo te s a

nu rturing re la tio ns hip wi th e a c h p are nt. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 6-404(b ); Aaby v

. Strange , 924 S.W .2d 623, 629 (Tenn. 1996)

. Tria l c ou rt s mu st e xer c ise br oa d dis c re tio n in c hil d c us tod y matte rs
. Parker , 986 S.W .2d at 56 3. L ike a c us tod y de c isi on , a de te rm inatio n of the be st r e sid e nti a l pl a c e me nt p la n f or a c hil d mu st turn on the particula

r fac ts of eac h case
. Such decisions often hing e on the tria l court’s a ssessment of the de meanor

and cr edibilityof the pa

rents and other witnesses. Adelsperge r , 970 S.W .2d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) . The trial court is in a far better position t han this court to observe the demea nor of the wit nesses and resolve the issues in the case that are based on the cre dibilit y of the witnesses. McCaleb v. Saturn Corp. , 91 0 S.W. 2d 41 2, 41 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; W hitacker v . W

hitacker , 957 S.W .2d 834, 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Be cause of the discr etion g iven trial courts in this ar ea and beca use of the f

act spe cific nature of such de cisions, appellate c ourts are reluc tant to second-g uess a tria l court’s determination8

reg arding custody

and visitation. Nelson v. Nelson , 66 S.W .3d 896, 901 (T enn. C t. App. 2001); Ru the rfo rd

v . R uth e rfo rd , 9 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d 9 5 5 , 9 5 6 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 6 2 6 , 6 3 1 (T enn. Ct. App. 1996)). A ccor dingly , this court will decline to disturb the pare nting plan fashioned by the t rial court here in unless that decision i s based on a material err or of law or the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst it. Nic ho ls vNic ho ls , 792 S.W .2d 713, 716 (Tenn. 1990) ; Adelsperge r , 970 S.W .2d at 485.
Her e, thetr

ia l c o u r t d etermined that the Father should be the primary residential pa

rent during the s chool y ear and Mother the residential pa rent during summer vac ation. Be cause the par ents live in differ ent states, continuing the six -month residential plac ement split would n ece ssarily preve nt the child from attending the same school for an entire sc hool y ear . Such a situation is ge nera lly not in the child’s best interest, and the court prope rly divided residential time base d on the school y ear
. Mother’s re al complaint is that Father, not she, wa s made re sidential pare nt for the sc hool y ear . Mother asserts that the t rial court was “not happy with [her] going to Missouri for the support of her family ” and punishe d her f or re locating

. We h a ve c are fu lly re vie we d the tr ia l tra ns c ri pt an d fin d noth ing to sup po rt Mo the r’ s c la im that the trial wa s d i s p l ea s ed with her move to Missouri. It is clear f rom the trial court’s rema rks during the hea

ring and in her

final orde r that the c ourt was displea sed with Moth er ’s “volatile” conduct. Spec ifically

the trial court found that Mother ha d intentionally preve nted the child fr om seeing his father , had ins isted on arg uing with Father in front of the child, and had made der og atory rema rks about F ather

to the child.
B othpa rt ie s p re se nte d te sti mon y

a ndma dearg ume nts a

bo ut the oth e r’ s f

a ili ng s. No pu rp os e is s e rv e d b y

ou r f urthe r r e c ou nti ng the de ta ils of tho se arg umen ts h e re in. We h a ve c are fu lly revie wed the r ecor d here in as well as the trial court’s r uling in lig ht of specific arg uments raised by Mother. We find there is no basis to conclude that the trial court did not f ully consider a ll factors rele vant t o the custody or parenting plan for the parties’ son. The fact that Father is a teac her and testified that he hig hly

valued e ducation appe are d to impress the trial court that it would be in the child’s best intere st to li ve with F at h er during the school y ear . I n addition, the court found that Mo the r had no t a c te d inthe c hil d’ s in te re st b y he r b e ha vio r. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t a ny

of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fa c tua l fi nd ing s. We fi nd the tr ia l c ou rt a do pte d a

plan d e sig ne d to
se rv e the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re sts

. Ac c or din g ly , we a ff ir m the pa re nti ng plan a do pte d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt

. II. A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES
Tenne ssee f

ollows the American Rule requiring “litiga n t s t o p ay their own attorney ’s fe es in the absence of a statute or c ontrac tual provision otherwise.” State v. Brown & W illiamson Tobacco Corp. , 1 8 S. W. 1 86 , 1 94 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; John Kohl & Co. v. Dearborn & Ewing , 9 7 7 S. W. 528, 534 (Tenn. 1998) . I n custody disputes, the question of whethe r to awa rd attorney ’s fee s and the amount of any

such fe es is larg ely in the di scre tion of t he trial court, and the appe llate court will not9

interfe re except upon a cle ar showing of abuse of that discre tion.” Deas v . Deas , 774 S.W .2d 167, 170 (Tenn. 1989)

. Mo the r c omplai ns that

the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d inno t a wa

rd ing he r atto rn e y ’s fe e s p ur su a nt t o Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 2-311(a )(14) and § 36-5- 103(c) . Even if Mother wer e elig ible for f

ees unde r e ith e r s ta tut e , w e fi ndthetr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n inde nying he r r e qu e st f or fe e s.
I n his brief, F ather

complains that Mother’s a ppeal is frivolous and that he is e ntitled to an awa rd of attorney ’s fe es. It is true that Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 1-122 permits t his court to decla re an appea l frivolous and aw ard attorney ’s fees. An appeal i s frivolous if it is devoid of merit or it is has
no rea sonable c hanc e o f s u ccess. W ake fie ld v . Lo ng mi re , 54 S.W .3d 300, 304 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). De spite the standard of revie w for custody determinations, such determinations ar e very fac t depende nt. We cannot ag ree with Father that Mother’s appeal is frivolous and, theref ore, w e deny his re qu e st f

or a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.
C ONCL US I ON
We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nt in a ll re sp e c ts. Cos ts are ta xedto the app e lla nt, Te rr e ll Ly nn Simm s.

___________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE