100898 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

prior to the connection of a VRS CA to 

the video conference. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27479 Filed 12–12–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 25 

[IB Docket No. 21–456; FCC 24–117; FR ID 

265639] 

Spectrum Sharing Rules for NGSO 

Fixed-Satellite Service Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final rule; denial of 

reconsideration. 

SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal 

Communications Commission (FCC or 

Commission) clarifies the methodology 

to be used in compatibility analyses by 

non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) 

fixed-satellite service (FSS) system 

licensees. The Second Report and Order 

adopts specific degraded throughput 

methodology criteria that NGSO FSS 

systems licensed in a later processing 

round must include in compatibility 

analyses, in absence of a coordination 

agreement, to demonstrate that they can 

operate compatibly with and protect 

NGSO FSS systems authorized in earlier 

processing rounds. The Second Report 

and Order clarifies these methodologies 

to promote market entry, regulatory 

certainty, and spectrum efficiency 

through good-faith coordination. The 

Commission also adopts an Order on 

Reconsideration dismissing in part and, 

on alternative and independent 

grounds, denying a petition for 

reconsideration. 

DATES: Effective on January 13, 2025. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

additional information on this 

proceeding, contact Carolyn Mahoney, 

Satellite Programs and Policy Division, 

Space Bureau, at (202) 418–7168 or 

carolyn.mahoney@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Second 

Report and Order and Order on 

Reconsideration, in IB Docket No. 21– 

456, FCC 24–117, adopted on November 

5, 2024 and released on November 15, 

2024. The full text of this document is 

available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 

attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf. 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 

1980, as amended (RFA), requires that 

an agency prepare a regulatory 

flexibility analysis for notice and 

comment rulemakings, unless the 

agency certifies that ‘‘the rule will not, 

if promulgated, have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities.’’ Accordingly, 

the Commission has prepared a Final 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) 

concerning the potential impact of the 

rule changes contained in the Second 

Report and Order and Order on 

Reconsideration. The FRFA is set forth 

in the appendix of the document 

available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ 

attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf and a 

summary is included in the Procedural 

Matters section below. 

Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis 

The Second Report and Order 

contains modified information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(PRA), Public Law 104–13. It will be 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) for review under 

Section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, other 

Federal agencies, and the general public 

will be invited to comment on the 

modified information collection 

requirements contained in this 

document. 

The Commission assessed the effects 

of requiring later-round NGSO FSS 

grantees to submit compatibility 

showings with respect to earlier-round 

grantees with whom coordination has 

not yet been reached. The Commission 

finds that doing so will serve the public 

interest and is unlikely to directly affect 

businesses with fewer than 25 

employees. 

Congressional Review Act 

The Commission has determined, and 

the Administrator of the Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget, 

concurs that this rule is non-major 

under the Congressional Review Act, 

5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will 

send a copy of the Second Report and 

Order and Order on Reconsideration to 

Congress and the Government 

Accountability Office pursuant to the 

Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 

801(a)(1)(A). 

Synposis 

I. Introduction 

In the Second Report and Order, the 

Commission continues to refine the 

Commission’s rules governing spectrum 

sharing among a new generation of 

broadband satellite constellations to 

promote market entry, regulatory 

certainty, and spectrum efficiency 

through good-faith coordination. 

Specifically, the Commission clarifies 

certain details of the degraded 

throughput methodology that, in the 

absence of a coordination agreement, 

must be used in compatibility analyses 

by non-geostationary satellite orbit, 

fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS) 

system licensees authorized through 

later processing rounds to show they 

can operate compatibly with, and 

protect, NGSO FSS systems authorized 

through earlier processing rounds. The 

Commission adopts a 3 percent timeweighted average throughput 

degradation as a long-term interference 

protection criterion, a 0.4 percent 

absolute increase in link unavailability 

as a short-term interference protection 

criterion, and declines to adopt 

additional protection metrics or to adopt 

an aggregate limit on interference from 

later-round NGSO FSS systems into 

earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. In an 

accompanying Order on 

Reconsideration, the Commission 

denies a Petition for Reconsideration (88 

FR 58540, August 28, 2023) of the 

Report and Order (88 FR 39783, June 30, 

2023). These actions continue the 

Commission’s efforts to promote 

development and competition in 

broadband NGSO satellite services. 

II. Background 

The Commission is committed to 

updating and refining its rules 

governing NGSO FSS systems, at a time 

when these systems are being deployed 

at unprecedented scale. NGSO FSS 

satellites traveling in low- and mediumEarth orbit provide broadband services 

to industry, enterprise, and residential 

customers with lower latency and wider 

coverage than previously available by 

satellite. 

Processing Round Procedure 

Overview. Applications for NGSO FSS 

system licenses and petitions for 

declaratory ruling seeking U.S. market 

access for non-U.S.-licensed NGSO FSS 

systems are considered in groups based 

on filing date, under a processing round 

procedure. Pursuant to the 

Commission’s rules, a license 

application for ‘‘NGSO-like’’ satellite 

operation, including operation of an 

NGSO FSS system, that satisfies the 

acceptability for filing requirements is 

reviewed to determine whether it is a 

‘‘competing application’’ or a ‘‘lead 

application.’’ A competing application 

is one filed in response to a public 

notice initiating a processing round. 

Any other application is a lead 

application. The public notice for a lead 

application initiates a processing round 

and establishes a cut-off date for 

competing NGSO-like satellite system 

applications. After the close of the 

processing round, the Commission 

grants all the applications for which the 


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Commission finds that the applicant is 

legally, technically, and otherwise 

qualified, that the proposed facilities 

and operations comply with all 

applicable rules, regulations, and 

policies, and that grant of the 

application will serve the public 

interest, convenience and necessity. 

NGSO FSS System Spectrum Sharing 

Overview. The Commission has adopted 

rules for spectrum sharing among NGSO 

FSS systems. NGSO FSS space station 

license applications granted with a 

condition to abide by these sharing rules 

are exempt from frequency band 

segmentation procedures that otherwise 

apply to applications for NGSO-like 

satellite operation. Instead, NGSO FSS 

operators must coordinate with one 

another in good faith the use of 

commonly authorized frequencies. If 

two or more NGSO FSS satellite systems 

fail to complete coordination, a default 

spectrum-splitting procedure using a 

DT/T of 6 percent threshold applies, 

pursuant to § 25.261(c) of the 

Commission’s rules. In the NGSO FSS 

Report and Order (82 FR 59972, 

December 18, 2017), the Commission 

stated that it would ‘‘initially limit’’ 

sharing under the DT/T of 6 percent 

threshold to qualified applicants in a 

processing round. The Commission 

explained that treatment of applicants 

after a processing round would be on a 

case-by-case basis and would consider 

both the need to protect existing 

expectations and investments and the 

benefits of additional entry, as well as 

any comments filed by incumbent 

operators and reasoning presented by 

the new applicant. 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The 

NPRM (88 FR 39783, June 30, 2023) in 

this proceeding sought comment on 

potential rule changes to clarify the 

relative obligations between NGSO FSS 

systems approved in different 

processing rounds. Specifically, the 

Commission proposed to limit the 

existing NGSO FSS spectrum-splitting 

procedure in § 25.261(c) to those 

systems approved in the same 

processing round, and to require 

systems approved in a later processing 

round to coordinate with, or 

demonstrate they will protect, earlierround systems. The Commission invited 

comment on how to quantify interround protection and whether it should 

sunset after a period of time. The 

Commission also proposed to require all 

NGSO FSS grantees, regardless of their 

processing round status, to coordinate 

with each other in good faith, and 

sought comment on specific information 

sharing obligations that could facilitate 

operator-to-operator coordination. 

Report and Order. In response to the 

record developed through the NPRM, 

the Report and Order adopted rule 

changes designed to promote market 

entry, regulatory certainty, and 

spectrum efficiency of NGSO FSS 

systems. The Commission, for the first 

time, limited the default spectrumsplitting procedure in § 25.261(c) to 

NGSO FSS systems approved in the 

same processing round and required 

NGSO FSS systems approved in a later 

processing round to coordinate with, or 

demonstrate they will protect, earlierround systems, subject to a sunsetting 

provision. The Commission also 

required all NGSO FSS grantees to 

coordinate with each other in good 

faith. Regarding the technical 

demonstrations of compatibility of laterround NGSO FSS systems with earlierround systems, the Commission 

concluded that an interference analysis 

based on a degraded throughput 

methodology offered the most 

technically promising path for NGSO 

FSS inter-round sharing and required 

later-round systems to use such a 

methodology. In adopting a sunsetting 

provision for the inter-round protection 

requirement, the Commission 

concluded that protection of earlierround NGSO FSS systems must ensure 

a stable environment for continued 

service and investment but should not 

hinder later-round systems indefinitely. 

The Commission decided that NGSO 

FSS systems will be entitled to 

protection from systems approved in a 

subsequent processing round until ten 

years after the first authorization or 

market access grant in that subsequent 

processing round. After that date, all 

systems in both processing rounds will 

be treated on an equal basis with respect 

to spectrum sharing in the absence of a 

coordination agreement, and the default 

spectrum-splitting procedure in 

§ 25.261(c) will also apply between 

systems in the two rounds. In sum, prior 

to commencing operations, an NGSO 

FSS licensee or market access recipient 

must either certify it has completed a 

coordination agreement with any 

operational NGSO FSS system licensed 

or granted U.S. market access in an 

earlier processing round, or submit a 

showing for Commission approval that 

it will not cause harmful interference to 

any such system with which 

coordination has not been completed 

using a degraded throughput 

methodology. 

Further Notice. In conjunction with 

the decision in the Report and Order to 

adopt an inter-round protection 

requirement described above, the 

Commission adopted the Further Notice 

(88 FR 40142, June 21, 2023) to finalize 

the details of the degraded throughput 

methodology. The Commission invited 

specific comment on the appropriate 

values and assumptions to be used in 

this requirement, as well as on whether 

the Commission should adopt a rule 

limiting aggregate interference from 

later-round NGSO FSS systems into 

earlier-round systems. Ten comments, 

eight reply comments, and several ex 

parte presentations were filed in 

response to the Further Notice. 

Petition. On July 20, 2023, OneWeb 

filed a Petition for Partial 

Reconsideration of the Report and Order 

concerning the sunset period adopted 

with the new inter-round protection 

requirement. Kuiper opposed the 

OneWeb Petition, SpaceX commented 

on it, and OneWeb replied to Kuiper’s 

opposition. 

III. Discussion 

1. Second Report and Order 

In this Second Report and Order, after 

review of the record, the Commission 

clarifies certain details of the degraded 

throughput methodology that, in the 

absence of a coordination agreement, 

must be used in compatibility analyses 

by NGSO FSS system grantees, 

authorized through later processing 

rounds, to show they can operate 

compatibly with, and protect, NGSO 

FSS systems, authorized through earlier 

processing rounds. Specifically, the 

Commission adopts a 3 percent timeweighted average throughput 

degradation as a long-term interference 

protection criterion and a 0.4 percent 

absolute increase in link unavailability 

as a short-term interference protection 

criterion. The Commission declines to 

adopt additional protection metrics or to 

adopt an aggregate limit on interference 

from later-round NGSO FSS systems 

into earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. 

The Commission’s decisions in the 

Second Report and Order rely on its 

predictive judgment in the highly 

complex and dynamic area of spectrum 

sharing among a new generation of 

innovative NGSO FSS systems. The 

Commission’s decisions strive to 

balance its competing goals of providing 

regulatory certainty for, and adequate 

protection of, earlier round systems visa-via later entrants while encouraging 

new entry and coordination among 

NGSO FSS operators. 

1. Long-Term Interference Metric 

Further Notice. In the Further Notice, 

the Commission outlined its expected 

steps in a degraded throughput analysis 

and sought comment on the proposed 

process. Specifically, noting that 3 


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percent had been suggested as an 

appropriate value for several aspects of 

the degraded throughput analysis, 

including a long-term interference limit 

based on reduction in time-weighted 

average throughput, the Commission 

invited comment on the appropriate 

values for such a limit, including 

technical justification. 

Comments. Four out of the five 

commenters proposing a specific 

threshold value for degraded throughput 

support using the 3 percent value noted 

in the Further Notice. Kuiper, for 

example, observes that a 3 percent 

throughput-degradation threshold has 

been adopted internationally to protect 

V-band GSO networks from NGSO FSS 

systems and argues that it provides a 

conservative measure of protection for 

incumbent systems due, in part, to 

conservatism in the methodology a new 

entrant must use to estimate 

interference. Viasat agrees that use of 

the 3 percent threshold should 

adequately safeguard systems from 

adverse performance degradation 

experienced over an extended period of 

time. Telesat, while initially arguing 

that ‘‘[t]he long-term criterion is 

sufficiently stable and there is a 

sufficient record, including through 

recent ITU studies, to support adopting 

a 3 percent degradation limit,’’ more 

recently concludes that specific 

degraded throughput criteria should be 

left to coordination discussions among 

satellite operators to determine. Telesat 

now believes that the record is 

sufficiently complete to allow the 

Commission to adopt rules, endorsing 

the 3 percent degraded throughput 

value for the long-term protection 

criterion proposed by SpaceX. Intelsat 

initially indicated that further study 

would be required before concluding 

upon a degraded throughput value, but 

now supports the 3 percent value as 

well. TechFreedom argues it is 

premature to adopt protection criteria. 

Public Knowledge and New America 

Open Technology Institute also support 

adopting a 3 percent degraded 

throughput threshold. 

SpaceX, which initially commented 

that a 3 percent degraded throughput 

value required further study, 

subsequently submitted its own 

spectrum sharing study evaluating the 3 

percent limit. Using publicly available 

information and reference standard 

antenna patterns, SpaceX performed 123 

dynamic (Monte Carlo) simulations of 

interference from various 2020 

processing-round NGSO systems into 

various 2016 processing-round NGSO 

systems. In 112 of the 123 studied cases, 

degradation was below 3.12 percent, 

which SpaceX argues empirically 

supports the Commission adopting a 3.0 

percent degradation of average spectral 

efficiency as a single-entry long-term 

interference criterion for compatibility 

determinations. 

Only OneWeb proposes a long-term 

interference metric other than 3 percent, 

arguing that a 3 percent time-weighted 

average degraded throughput limit will 

substantially harm NGSO FSS operators 

and disincentivize coordination. 

OneWeb asserts that an aggregate 

interference and rain fade criterion of no 

more than 10 percent degradation in 

average throughput is appropriate for an 

NGSO FSS system, that apportionment 

of this allowed percentage of 

interference to other NGSO systems 

should be no more than 2.5 to 3.85 

percent, and that when accounting for 

the existence of multiple co-frequency 

NGSO systems, the single-entry average 

degraded throughput should be less 

than 1 percent for each individual 

NGSO system. OneWeb further claims 

that if a 3 percent limit were adopted 

per system and six NGSO FSS systems 

were operating co-frequency, then a 15 

percent degradation in average 

throughput would occur from the 5 

interfering systems to the victim system. 

No other commenter supports OneWeb’s 

proposal; SpaceX, Kuiper, and Telesat 

raise numerous technical concerns with 

it; and commenters suggest alternative 

explanations for the results of OneWeb’s 

analysis. 

OneWeb also argues that SpaceX’s 

study purporting to affirm the 3 percent 

metric relies on flawed assumptions that 

undermine its conclusions. Specifically, 

OneWeb contends that the study fails to 

accurately model system-specific details 

that could impact whether a previousround system may experience harmful 

interference. OneWeb’s analysis 

incorporating its revised assumptions 

argues that the 3 percent metric results 

in substantially higher levels of 

interference than projected by both 

SpaceX and Kuiper, which could exceed 

5 percent when taking into account a 

small deployment of Kuiper customer 

terminals without adding any 

contribution from the Viasat system. 

Thus, OneWeb concludes that SpaceX’s 

study fails to adequately predict the 

interference levels prior-round NGSO 

systems would receive. OneWeb further 

highlighted its support for a 1 percent 

or less average degraded throughput as 

the long-term criterion that should be 

adopted. 

Decision. The Commission adopts a 3 

percent time-weighted average degraded 

throughput threshold as the long-term 

interference metric that must be 

complied with in any inter-round 

compatibility showing submitted by a 

later-round NGSO FSS grantee. The 3 

percent time-weighted average degraded 

throughput is calculated on a per link 

basis. The Commission concludes that 

adopting this value best furthers its 

goals of providing regulatory certainty 

for, and adequate protection of, earlierround NGSO FSS systems while 

allowing for new entry and coordination 

among NGSO FSS operators. First, this 

value has been developed and adopted 

internationally as sufficient for the 

protection of GSO satellite networks 

using adaptive coding and modulation 

techniques, which are also used by 

NGSO FSS systems. Second, the 3 

percent throughput-degradation 

threshold limits the interference 

allowed at any location, not the 

expected average of interference across 

all locations. Since the worst-case 

locations will likely drive the 

discussion of appropriate system 

parameters and any mitigation 

measures, actual interference should be 

less than 3 percent in many 

circumstances. Third, the Commission’s 

technical review of the SpaceX study on 

the record indicates that the study 

reliably supports the conclusion that a 

3 percent threshold is achievable by 

later-round systems, and therefore 

encourages competitive new entry, by 

demonstrating that the simulated 

degradation was near or below 3 percent 

in 112 of the 123 studied cases of laterround systems protecting earlier-round 

systems. 

The Commission disagrees with 

OneWeb that a 3 percent degraded 

throughput threshold would 

disincentivize coordination, for three 

reasons. First, not all links considered 

in the SpaceX study meet this degraded 

throughput threshold. Additional links 

or different assumed parameters might 

also not meet the threshold, and 

therefore the 3 percent degraded 

throughput threshold would incentivize 

coordination or require mitigation. 

Second, this protection requirement is 

unilateral, and later-round systems will 

have an incentive to coordinate to 

receive some accommodation, or 

protection from interference, from 

earlier-round systems. And third, the 

10-year sunset period ensures that 

earlier-round systems and later-round 

systems will be treated on an equal basis 

after the sunset, and any compatibility 

analyses will no longer permit the laterround system to operate in cases where 

it would exceed the default spectrumsplitting mechanism in § 25.261(c). 

In contrast, a criterion of 1 percent or 

lower has not been demonstrated to 

allow for competitive new entry by any 

study. The Commission also finds the 

technical basis for this criterion to be 


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flawed. The Commission agrees with 

Telesat that OneWeb is incorrect in 

claiming that Note 3 of 

Recommendation ITU–R S. 2131–1 

provides a 10 percent limit on timeweighted average degraded throughput 

for an FSS link employing adaptive 

coding and modulation (ACM). In 

addition, the single-entry interference 

criterion proposed by OneWeb is based 

on an isolated scenario that does not 

represent the broad variation of 

throughput degradation that can occur 

due to rain fade. Further, the singleentry throughput degradation values 

suggested by OneWeb are based on 

arbitrary assumptions. And the idea 

conveyed by OneWeb that the allowable 

degradation from one interference 

source should simply be computed by 

considering the degradation allowance 

from all interference sources and then 

dividing by the number of interference 

sources is simply incorrect, because it 

does not take into account the manner 

in which ACM is implemented in 

modern satellite links. 

On the other hand, declining to adopt 

any specific long-term interference 

protection criterion could invite 

unnecessary and lengthy debates among 

later-round operators submitting 

compatibility analyses and earlier-round 

operators subject to those analyses with 

whom a coordination agreement has not 

yet been reached. Instead, the 

Commission concludes that establishing 

a specific long-term interference 

protection metric, as technically 

supported on the record, will provide a 

clear benchmark for new entrants, 

around which parties may tailor any 

alternative long-term protections 

mutually agreed in coordination. 

2. Short-Term Interference Metric 

i. Relative vs. Absolute Increase in 

Unavailability 

Further Notice. In addition to seeking 

comment on defining a long-term 

interference metric in the degraded 

throughput analysis, the Further Notice 

sought comment on setting a short-term 

interference metric expressed as a 

change in the earlier-round system’s 

link unavailability time percentage. The 

Commission invited comment on the 

appropriate value for this limit, 

including technical justification. 

Comments. On the issue of defining a 

short-term interference metric, 

commenters differed on whether to use 

a relative change in link unavailability, 

an absolute change in link 

unavailability, or both. Ultimately, 

commenters on this issue support the 

use of an absolute metric; no commenter 

opposes use of an absolute metric or 

only supports use of a relative metric. 

SpaceX, for example, explains that 

because next-generation satellite 

systems are designed to be resilient to 

signal degradation, these systems 

frequently maintain a high degree of 

link availability—typically in excess of 

99 percent—despite varying 

environmental effects and interference 

from other NGSO systems. This equates 

to a typical baseline unavailability of 

less than 1 percent, but with such levels 

of unavailability as the baseline, SpaceX 

states that very small changes in link 

performance can trigger ‘‘wild swings’’ 

in a relative unavailability metric, even 

if the absolute level of link availability 

remains close to its baseline value. O3b 

and Intelsat each propose a formula to 

determine an absolute allowed increase 

in unavailability that changes with the 

baseline availability, reflecting concerns 

that a single value for increase in 

unavailability may not adequately 

protect high availability links. OneWeb 

supports an absolute increase in 

unavailability and supports O3b’s 

proposal for a variable absolute increase 

in unavailability based on the service 

requirements of the link to cover a 

wider range of use cases. 

Decision. The Commission agrees 

with the general consensus among 

commenters on this issue. The 

Commission concludes that the use of 

an absolute increase in link 

unavailability as the short-term 

interference metric provides a more 

reliable measure of short-term 

interference that is not as susceptible to 

significant fluctuations as a relative 

increase metric would be. The 

Commission therefore adopts an 

absolute increase in link unavailability 

as the sole short-term interference 

metric required in an inter-round 

compatibility showing submitted by a 

later-round grantee. As discussed in 

greater detail below, the Commission 

declines to adopt proposals for a 

formulaic approach for a variable 

absolute increase in unavailability in 

establishing a short-term interference 

metric. 

ii. Value 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

also invited specific comment on the 

appropriate value for the short-term 

interference metric, with accompanying 

technical justification. 

Comments. Commenters are divided 

on the appropriate value for the shortterm protection criterion. OneWeb 

asserts that if the Commission adopts an 

absolute change in link unavailability as 

the short-term metric, the single-entry 

limit should be ‘‘substantially lower 

than’’ 0.01 percent to account for uses 

which may necessitate higher levels of 

availability, such as links designed to 

meet a 99.99 percent unavailability 

requirement. Viasat claims that a 0.05 

percent tolerable packet loss rate from 

all sources ‘‘is the minimum necessary 

requirement’’ and states that a smaller 

value, such as 0.01 percent, would 

provide a margin to allow for other 

sources of short-term packet loss. 

Intelsat initially argued that further 

study would be required before 

determining protection criteria values, 

although now supports an absolute 

metric based on a sliding-scale formula, 

similar to O3b’s, for the short-term 

protection criterion. Similarly, Telesat 

had also initially argued that no single 

short-term metric is appropriate for all 

links in all coordinations based on its 

own study, but now agrees that the 

SpaceX proposal strikes the right 

balance in protecting incumbent NGSO 

systems while supporting the entry of 

new NGSO systems and supports the 0.4 

percent metric. 

SpaceX argues that its study of several 

2016 processing-round and 2020 

processing-round systems using 123 

dynamic (Monte Carlo) simulations 

establishes an ‘‘empirical zone of 

reasonableness’’ for the values of the 

absolute change in link availability. The 

values in the SpaceX study range from 

0 to 0.382 percent at a carrier-to-noise 

(C/N) threshold of 0 dB, and SpaceX 

states that the upper end of this range 

is appropriate for both uplink and 

downlink. SpaceX therefore contends 

that its study provides empirical 

support for short-term interference up to 

approximately 0.4 percent absolute 

change in link availability at a C/N 

threshold of 0 dB. SpaceX further argues 

that its conservative use of a C/N 

threshold of 0 dB to assess changes in 

link availability further supports 

allowing short-term interference up to 

0.4 percent absolute change. SpaceX 

suggests that setting such a value will 

incentivize a later-round system to try to 

limit inline events to an earlier-round 

system toward achieving this level of 

short-term interference or if it cannot, to 

coordinate with the earlier-round 

system to more efficiently use the 

shared spectrum. Telesat supports the 

proposed SpaceX approach, noting that 

it is the only approach that encourages 

coordination amongst operators by 

establishing a backstop value to protect 

incumbent operators while also 

supporting good faith coordination and 

promoting competition. 

Kuiper supports the proposed SpaceX 

0.4 percent absolute increase in 

unavailability metric as well. Kuiper 

initially proposed the Commission 

adopt a 0.1 percent absolute increase in 


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link unavailability as a threshold for 

short-term interference, which Kuiper 

argued would offer sufficient room for 

new entrants to bring their systems into 

operation, even in drier climates, while 

being highly protective to incumbents. 

Kuiper now urges the Commission to 

adopt an absolute threshold in the range 

of 0.1 to 0.4 percent for short-term 

protection as proposed by Kuiper and 

SpaceX, respectively, arguing that this 

would incentivize both new entrants 

and incumbents to negotiate in good 

faith while minimizing impacts on 

vulnerable links and operations in both 

systems. Kuiper also explains that 

arguments claiming that a short-term 

threshold in this range would 

discourage coordination between 

incumbents and new entrants ignore the 

realities of coordination, which occurs 

when both parties are incentivized to 

negotiate a more mutually beneficial 

outcome than an alternative 

compatibility showing scenario. Kuiper 

notes that even with interference 

thresholds tilted in favor of new 

entrants, rather than with a more 

balanced approach as proposed by 

Kuiper and SpaceX, new entrants would 

retain these incentives and continue to 

coordinate with incumbents. Regarding 

incumbents, Kuiper argues that while 

incumbents have incentives to minimize 

potential impacts of new entrants, an 

overly protective short-term threshold, 

like the O3b proposed formula, would 

incentivize incumbents to make 

unreasonable coordination demands 

and leverage those protections against 

new competition. 

O3b proposes the Commission use a 

formula, rather than a fixed percentage 

value, to determine the allowed increase 

in unavailability of an earlier-round 

system link. O3b proposes that the 

permitted increase in unavailability = 

¥0.12 * baseline availability + 12.02. 

O3b argues that its formula 

appropriately adjusts protection levels 

to service requirements and reflects a 

broad range of technical characteristics 

and protection requirements. OneWeb 

agrees and argues the SpaceX proposal 

would eliminate later round systems’ 

incentive to coordinate, unacceptably 

undermine established operators’ 

service quality, render it impossible for 

operators to guarantee a defined quality 

of service to their customers, and 

subvert the purpose of the processing 

round framework. OneWeb further 

asserts that a 0.4 percent absolute 

increase is ‘‘overly-relaxed’’ and risks 

undermining U.S. credibility as a stable 

investment environment and deterring 

international coordination with U.S. 

systems. Intelsat supports O3b’s 

proposed formula approach and 

proposes the Commission adopt a 

slightly modified version of the formula, 

increasing the minimum unavailability 

degradation value. Intelsat proposes that 

the permitted increase in unavailability 

= ¥0.12 * baseline availability + 12.05, 

modifying the minimum unavailability 

degradation factor from 12.02 to 12.05 

which Intelsat argues allows for 

flexibility regarding the percent of link 

unavailability for high availability links. 

OneWeb also supports adopting O3b’s 

proposed formula, should the 

Commission decline to issue a further 

notice and comment. SpaceX and 

Kuiper oppose this approach, arguing 

that O3b’s formula is overly protective 

of earlier-round systems and would 

incentivize those incumbents to 

leverage strict limitations on later-round 

systems, thus discouraging market entry 

and innovation and leading to 

inefficient spectrum sharing. Telesat 

also raises concerns, flagging that the 

O3b formula has not been previously 

considered by the Commission or 

‘‘related forums such as the ITU’’ and 

involves granular details that are better 

addressed in coordination between 

parties than by the Commission. 

In the alternative, O3b and OneWeb 

suggest the Commission seek further 

comment on an appropriate short-term 

interference criterion and each of the 

corresponding proposals through a 

second further notice of proposed 

rulemaking. O3b argues that the SpaceX 

and Kuiper proposals are both untimely 

and warrant additional inquiry. SpaceX 

and Kuiper argue that the record is 

complete with detailed analyses, and 

demonstrates that parties have moved 

toward a consensus on values and 

methodology, and encourage the 

Commission to move forward with a 

final order. Telesat agrees, finding that 

the record is sufficiently complete to 

allow the Commission to finalize the 

rules for spectrum sharing and arguing 

that further delay will not lead to better 

rules, but rather, foster lingering 

uncertainty as to the framework in 

which NGSO operators coordinate their 

activities. Telesat additionally notes that 

the record demonstrates that there may 

never be a perfect formula that 

optimally addresses all possible NGSO 

system interactions which all parties 

agree upon, given the nature of the 

complex analyses and systems involved 

in developing specific metrics, and thus 

the Commission is justified in moving 

forward with a final order. 

Decision. After review of the record, 

the Commission adopts a 0.4 percent 

absolute increase in link unavailability 

at a C/N threshold of 0 dB as the shortterm interference metric to be used in 

inter-round compatibility analyses. For 

the reasons discussed below, the 

Commission concludes that this 0.4 

percent value, more so than the 0.1 

percent value, 0.01 percent or less 

values, or the formulas proposed by O3b 

or Intelsat on the record, most closely 

aligns with the Commission’s goals of 

providing regulatory certainty for and 

ensuring adequate protection of earlierround incumbents while offering the 

best opportunities for later-round new 

entrants and competition and 

encouraging coordination. 

First, the Commission finds that this 

criterion will adequately protect earlierround NGSO FSS systems. Like the 

long-term interference metric adopted 

above, this short-term interference 

metric will limit the increase in link 

unavailability at any analyzed location. 

Since the worst-case locations will 

likely drive operators’ determinations of 

appropriate system parameters and any 

mitigation measures, the actual increase 

in unavailability will be less than 0.4 

percent in many circumstances. In 

addition, the use of a C/N threshold of 

0 dB to assess changes in link 

availability is at the upper end of the 

¥3 dB to 0 dB range for C/N thresholds 

supported on the record for 

compatibility analyses, and renders the 

0.4 percent value more conservative. 

Because the C/N threshold is intended 

to reflect the minimum carrier received 

signal, relative to noise, necessary to 

maintain a link, real values for the C/N 

threshold may be closer to ¥2 dB or ¥3 

dB. At these lower C/N thresholds, the 

absolute change in link availability is 

typically lower than at the 0 dB 

threshold. Thus, using a 0 dB C/N 

threshold may overestimate the 

interference from a later-round system 

to an earlier-round system’s link whose 

actual C/N threshold is lower. The 

Commission further concludes this 

value will be sufficiently protective of 

earlier-round systems because of the 

decisions below to use simplifying 

assumptions in the analysis—such as 

modeling 50 percent or 100 percent 

deployment of an incumbent system 

even if it has not yet deployed in those 

numbers, or using an assumed satellite 

selection strategy when the actual 

satellite selection strategy is not 

provided by the incumbent—that may 

also tend to overestimate the actual 

interference caused to an incumbent 

system by the later round system. These 

simplifying assumptions in the analysis 

itself tend to offer incumbents more 

protection. Therefore, the Commission 

considers the totality of the analysis 

when deciding upon the likely realworld interference caused by a laterVerDate Sep<11>2014 16:42 Dec 12, 2024 Jkt 265001 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\13DER1.SGM 13DER1

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round system satisfying the 0.4 percent 

absolute increase in link unavailability 

metric at a C/N threshold of 0 dB. 

Second, the Commission concludes 

that adopting a 0.4 percent absolute 

increase in unavailability metric will 

simultaneously support competitive 

new entry because it will accommodate 

several modeled second-round systems, 

both uplinks and downlinks, per the 

123 dynamic (Monte Carlo) simulations 

in the SpaceX study, which the 

Commission notes are a better 

representation of the dynamic nature of 

NGSO systems than a static analysis 

would reflect. Further, the Commission 

has reviewed the SpaceX study and find 

that the data, assumptions, and 

methodology employed are reasonable 

for purposes of adopting a 0.4 percent 

short-term interference metric to be 

used in inter-round compatibility 

analyses. To be sure, O3b argues that the 

study is too limited in the operating 

metrics considered and is accordingly 

not reflective of real-world parameters. 

Such individualized parameters will be 

considered in individual compatibility 

analyses. In the event that other system 

combinations, or the use of different 

assumed parameters, result in 

exceedances of this short-term limit, 

this will require mitigation measures to 

be applied by the later-round operator 

or coordination with earlier round 

operators. 

Third, the Commission concludes that 

adopting this short-term protection 

value will support competitive new 

entry while continuing to encourage 

good-faith coordination among both 

incumbents and new entrants, which 

offers the best avenue for efficient 

spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS 

systems. Unlike the requirement for 

later-round systems to protect earlierround systems under the inter-round 

protection requirement prior to the 

sunset period, incumbents have no 

corresponding requirement to protect 

new entrants during this period, and 

therefore an overly conservative 

protection requirement for the benefit of 

incumbents may discourage incumbents 

from negotiating more lenient limits for 

new entrants. On the other hand, 

permitting new entrants to operate with 

an overly lenient limit may discourage 

them from negotiating with incumbents 

for more restrictive protections for the 

benefit of incumbents. The short-term 

interference metric the Commission 

adopts here strikes the right balance to 

encourage coordination among earlier 

and later-round systems. The 

Commission disagrees with assertions 

that the 0.4 percent absolute increase 

will risk investment in U.S. systems by 

discouraging international systems from 

coordinating with U.S. systems. While it 

is unclear which specific circumstances 

are in reference, the Commission 

reminds both incumbents and new 

operators that coordination with the ITU 

is separate from coordination within the 

U.S. and is required of all international 

systems under the ITU Radio 

Regulations. The Commission’s rules 

require both parties to engage in good 

faith coordination. Providing an avenue 

for meaningful competition by both 

incumbents and new entrants will 

encourage both sides to agree upon any 

more specific, mutual protection 

measures during coordination. 

The Commission is not persuaded by 

alternative proposals. The Commission 

disagrees with the proposed 0.01 

percent or lower threshold advocated by 

Viasat. Unlike the 0.4 percent absolute 

increase in unavailability metric, which 

the SpaceX Monte Carlo study in the 

record indicates is achievable for several 

modeled second-round systems, there is 

no evidence in the record from 

proponents of a 0.01 percent or lower 

threshold showing that it is achievable 

and provides for competitive new entry. 

And while a 0.1 percent limit would 

accommodate most second-round 

system links analyzed in the SpaceX 

study, a 0.4 percent limit will provide 

greater opportunities for new entry 

while still providing adequate 

protection of incumbent systems due to 

the conservative assumptions 

incorporated into the standard and the 

calculation of increase in unavailability 

and at the same time providing 

incentives for good faith coordination. 

Stricter limits for particular links can, of 

course, be agreed in coordination. The 

SpaceX study indicates 0.4 percent to be 

the upper limit in the studied cases in 

both uplink and downlink, and 

accommodates user terminals and 

gateway earth stations. Indeed, the 

Commission notes that Kuiper’s initial 

study, which proposes the 0.1 percent 

limit, uses the SpaceX study as partial 

justification for its chosen interference 

limit and nonetheless acknowledges 

that ‘‘SpaceX’s justification for a higher 

[0.4 percent] threshold has merit.’’ 

Further, Kuiper has since advocated for 

the Commission to adopt a threshold 

within the 0.1 and 0.4 percent range as 

proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, 

respectively, noting that these proposals 

represent a reasonable range that 

balances competing interests and 

incentives. 

The Commission also does not agree 

with O3b and Intelsat that their 

proposals to create a variable, slidingscale metric for absolute increase in 

unavailability would better serve the 

Commission’s goals than the adoption of 

a 0.4 percent absolute increase in link 

unavailability metric at a C/N threshold 

of 0 dB. As an initial matter, both the 

O3b and Intelsat formulae appear to be 

based on the protection of only a narrow 

set of systems. In addition, the 

Commission disagrees with O3b’s claim 

that the proposed formula would not 

impose additional complications on 

operators compared to an established 

absolute threshold value. Incorporating 

a variable, sliding-scale short-term 

interference metric would be more 

burdensome for later round systems to 

implement considering that detailed 

information of the incumbent system, 

including the receiver characteristics, 

would be required in order to calculate 

the baseline availability required by the 

sliding-scale formula. Absent 

cooperation from the operator of the 

incumbent system, it would be difficult 

to obtain this information, particularly 

for new entrants. The Commission does 

not find the alleged benefits of this 

approach as compared to a non-variable 

metric outweigh these burdens. Given 

the conservative assumptions in the 

analysis itself, the Commission is also 

concerned that O3b and Intelsat’s more 

stringent formulae may unnecessarily 

restrict competitive new entry. O3b and 

Intelsat’s principal objection to the use 

of a single 0.4 percent absolute value is 

that it would create a more noticeable 

impact on customers served by higher 

availability links than on those served 

by lower availability links. However, it 

is precisely a concern about the 

overprotection of high availability links 

that has driven the general consensus on 

the record towards using an absolute 

metric of increase in unavailability, 

rather than a relative metric. 

Moreover, O3b’s assumed baseline 

availability rates of the incumbent 

system may be higher on paper than in 

reality, to the extent O3b excludes from 

the baseline the effects of other existing 

sources of interference, such as 

interference from GSO networks, other 

NGSO systems, and intra-system noise. 

Accordingly, the relative impact on high 

availability links may be overstated. In 

addition, while O3b argues that a 0.4 

percent absolute increase in 

unavailability metric would ‘‘make it 

impossible for operators to guarantee a 

defined quality of service to their 

customers’’ because of the additive 

effect of short-term interference from 

multiple later-round systems, the 

potential for aggregate interference is 

not limited to the use of this value and 

would exist under O3b’s formula as 

well. Further, just as the Commission 

expects the real-world impact of a laterround system complying with the 0.4 


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percent increase in unavailability limit 

to be less than 0.4 percent in many 

cases, given the conservative 

assumptions in the analysis noted 

above, the Commission similarly 

expects that any cumulative, real-world 

effects of two or more later-round 

systems will likely be less than a simple 

multiplication of the 0.4 percent limit 

by the number of later-round interferers 

that O3b assumes because it fails to 

account for mitigation techniques or 

other spectrum-sharing measures that 

may be applied by the NGSO FSS 

systems and reduce their overall 

aggregate impact. 

While O3b also argues that a 0.4 

percent increase in unavailability limit 

would ‘‘eliminate later round systems’ 

incentive to coordinate’’ because all 

links in the SpaceX study can be 

accommodated under this short-term 

limit, other links or parameters not 

included in the SpaceX study, some of 

which O3b points out, might exceed the 

0.4 percent short-term limit. In any 

event, O3b itself notes that not all links 

in the SpaceX study meet the 3 percent 

degraded throughput long-term limit the 

Commission adopts above. Cases where 

a later-round system cannot meet either 

the short-term or long-term limit will 

encourage the later-round operator to 

complete coordination with the 

incumbent operator. Later-round 

operators will also be incentivized to 

coordinate in order to potentially 

receive some protection, or 

accommodation, from earlier-round 

operators. Further, the 10-year sunset 

period the Commission adopted in the 

Report and Order ensures that earlierround systems and later-round systems 

will be treated on an equal basis after 

the sunset period, and any compatibility 

analyses will no longer permit the laterround system to operate in cases where 

it would exceed the default spectrumsplitting mechanism in § 25.261(c). 

Accordingly, later-round system 

operators will have several incentives to 

complete coordination with earlierround operators. Moreover, § 25.261(b) 

of the Commission’s rules requires 

NGSO FSS licensees and market access 

recipients to coordinate in good faith 

the use of commonly authorized 

frequencies regardless of their 

processing round status. 

To the extent an incumbent wishes to 

ensure the highest availability for 

particular use cases, such as when 

offering its services to government or 

enterprise customers, it may discuss 

such particular uses during 

coordination with new entrants and 

new entrants will have several 

incentives to complete the coordination. 

The Commission has expressly 

recognized that the physical realities of 

interference in spectrum-based services 

should guide both system design and 

reasonable expectations of operation. 

The likelihood of harmful interference 

should be assessed under a range of 

operating conditions. Further, the 

Commission has encouraged operators, 

and specifically NGSO FSS operators, to 

design systems for a shared and 

dynamic operating environment and 

plan to manage potential interference in 

such dynamic environments. Operators 

providing important communications 

with 99.5 percent or greater service 

availability require systems equipped 

with redundancy to compensate for 

potential short-term impacts caused by 

inline events. The Commission has 

detailed best practices for satellite 

operator emergency planning and 

preparedness with specific 

recommendations to determine system 

resiliency and redundancy. To the 

extent operators have concerns about 

protecting particular types of links 

operating in the non-federal FSS, such 

as those they may be offering to 

government or enterprise customers, 

such concerns are best addressed in 

coordination agreements rather than in 

a non-federal spectrum sharing 

framework. 

In addition, the Commission does not 

agree with O3b that a 0.4 percent value 

‘‘subvert[s] the purpose of the 

processing round framework’’ because it 

is higher than the spectrum-splitting 

trigger, which O3b calculates for its 

system would be between 0.01 and 0.04 

percent absolute increase in 

unavailability. Although it is possible 

for a very small number of links of the 

earlier-round systems in which the DT/ 

T of 6 percent (I/N of ¥12.2 dB) (the 

trigger for coordination among systems 

in the same processing round) may be 

exceeded, such exceedance would be 

limited in terms of the number of links 

affected and the length of time. The 

Commission is not convinced that such 

short-term impact would be significant 

on the earlier round systems. The shortterm protection criteria the Commission 

adopts here is a unilateral protection of 

earlier-round systems by later-round 

systems and does not require any 

reduction in spectrum usage or other 

operational changes by the earlier-round 

system. In contrast, exceeding the more 

sensitive trigger for spectrum-splitting 

in § 25.261(c) for systems approved in 

the same processing round creates a 

mutual obligation for both systems to 

split their commonly authorized 

frequencies for the duration of the 

potential interference event. 

Nevertheless, for links of an earlierround system in which the DT/T is 6 

percent or greater, later-round systems 

are required to coordinate with the 

earlier-round systems of these links 

prior to commencing operation. 

The Commission is further not 

persuaded by calls to seek comment on 

the short-term interference metric 

through a second further notice of 

proposed rulemaking. The Further 

Notice sought comment on setting a 

short-term interference metric. In 

response to the Further Notice, 

interested parties have had ample 

opportunity to comment on all 

proposals, as illustrated by their record 

submissions. Adopting a specific limit 

for increase in unavailability, rather 

than adopting no limit or deferring the 

issue to a later time as some 

commenters advocate, will result in a 

more complete set of required 

interference metrics applicable to an 

inter-round compatibility analysis and 

therefore will provide greater regulatory 

certainty to earlier-round operators and 

later-round operators. Conversely, not 

adopting any specific acceptable shortterm interference threshold or deferring 

the issue to a later time would deprive 

new entrants of the certainty that they 

can provide some level of service 

without the agreement of an earlierround operator. The SpaceX study 

indicates 0.4 percent to be the upper 

limit in the studied cases in both uplink 

and downlink, and accommodates user 

terminals and gateway earth stations. 

Stricter limits for particular links can, of 

course, be agreed in coordination. 

Therefore, the Commission concludes 

an absolute increase in unavailability 

value of 0.4 percent at a C/N threshold 

of 0 dB will appropriately balance the 

Commission’s goals of providing 

regulatory certainty for, and adequate 

protection of, incumbent systems while 

at the same time ensuring competitive 

new entry and encouraging coordination 

among NGSO FSS operators. 

3. Minimum Link Availability 

Further Notice and Comments. In 

conjunction with the Commission’s 

consideration of long-term and shortterm interference criteria, SpaceX, on 

the basis of its study of several 2016 

processing-round and 2020 processinground systems, proposes that the 

Commission adopt a 99.0 percent link 

availability without the interferer at a C/ 

N threshold of 0 dB as a minimum 

benchmark for an earlier-round system 

to show it merits the backstop levels of 

short-term and long-term interference 

protection from a later-round system 

that the Commission is considering. 

SpaceX states this minimum benchmark 

indicates a well-designed, efficient 


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earlier-round NGSO system with a 

robust signal-to-noise ratio and that all 

first-round links studied by SpaceX 

achieved this minimum benchmark, 

except one link at 98.7 percent. 

Requiring a minimum 99.0 percent link 

availability, SpaceX argues, would 

prevent an incumbent whose publiclyavailable information shows its link 

achieves a 99.9 percent link availability 

at a C/N threshold of 0 dB, for example, 

from claiming that it can actually 

achieve only a 90 percent link 

availability at that threshold. Such a 

claim would tend to exaggerate the 

extent to which the earlier round system 

is susceptible to interference from every 

second-round system. SpaceX also 

contends that a rule requiring a firstround system to show a 99.0 percent 

link availability without the interferer at 

a C/N threshold of 0 dB incentivizes 

efficient spectrum sharing through 

coordination, since ‘‘a first-round 

system that cannot achieve this 

minimum benchmark level of 

performance on a given link—indicating 

its inefficient use of spectrum—would 

have to coordinate with the secondround system to determine a more 

efficient spectrum sharing 

arrangement.’’ O3b, in proposing its 

increase in unavailability threshold 

formula, supports protection of links 

with baseline availabilities as low as 97 

percent, and argues the SpaceX proposal 

would unfairly provide no protection 

for links with lower baseline availability 

levels that meet the needs of customers 

with a higher interference tolerance. 

Decision. The Commission agrees 

with SpaceX that an inefficient 

incumbent system design should not 

unreasonably hamper future entry. 

Further, the Commission has reviewed 

the SpaceX study and finds that the 

data, assumptions, and methodology 

employed are reasonable and note that, 

although O3b has commented that the 

study could be expanded upon using 

different system parameters, no 

commenter objects to the data, 

assumptions, or methodology SpaceX 

used. While O3b’s formula shows 

protection of links with baseline 

availabilities as low as 97 percent, its 

formula inherently recognizes that 

lower performing links should receive 

less protection and does not specifically 

justify or technically support requiring 

protection of links below 99.0 percent 

availability. Rather, the Commission 

concurs with SpaceX that a 99.0 percent 

link availability without the interferer at 

a C/N threshold of 0 dB is a reasonable 

minimum benchmark to guard against 

the risk of low-performing incumbent 

links. The Commission therefore will 

require this benchmark as a minimum 

value to be incorporated into an interround compatibility showing to 

demonstrate compliance with the longterm and short-term interference metrics 

adopted above. 

4. Additional Interference Metrics 

i. Loss of Synchronization 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

also asked whether additional means are 

needed to protect earlier-round systems 

against loss of synchronization due to 

potentially high levels of short-term 

interference. 

Comments. Most commenters on this 

issue oppose including additional 

criteria to protect against loss of 

synchronization. Telesat argues that 

doing so is unnecessary because in 

modern satellite systems the concept of 

link unavailability also protects against 

the loss of synchronization as long as an 

appropriate C/N objective is chosen. 

Kuiper states that including such a 

protection criteria would undermine 

incentives for a resilient design of 

modems and receivers and result in a 

less efficient spectrum sharing 

framework. Kuiper additionally 

maintains that any issues an incumbent 

may have regarding synchronization 

loss is best addressed in good-faith 

coordination with new entrants. 

Commenters also note that information 

on the particular modems used by 

incumbents, which is required to 

determine a protection criteria 

necessary to prevent loss of 

synchronization for a particular system, 

is not typically disclosed in domestic or 

international filings. Kuiper suggests the 

appropriate way to address 

particularized interference concerns of a 

given incumbent is not through 

systematic changes to the methodology 

but instead through operator-to-operator 

coordination. 

Two commenters support requiring 

later-round operators to specifically 

protect against an incumbent’s loss of 

synchronization, arguing that 

consideration of loss of synchronization 

does not render analyses overly 

complex, and that when information has 

been shared pursuant to good-faith 

coordination, the consideration of these 

additional metrics is straightforward 

and can ensure protection of a variety of 

NGSO system designs and service 

characteristics. OneWeb also argues the 

Commission should account for shortterm degraded throughput events where 

an operator may experience high levels 

of degradation causing a modem to lose 

synchronization or suffer other critical 

errors. OneWeb argues that loss of 

synchronization should be a required 

metric in any compatibility showing to 

ensure that operators have a complete 

picture of the interference environment 

if operators cannot achieve a 

coordination agreement. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

mandate new entrants protect 

incumbent systems against loss of 

synchronization, or incorporate a shortterm degraded throughput metric, 

beyond the protections afforded by the 

long-term and short-term interference 

protection criteria the Commission 

adopts above. The Commission agrees 

with commenters who argue that doing 

so would risk incentivizing inefficient 

system designs, including the choices of 

modems and receivers that are not 

capable of quickly re-establishing 

synchronization in a shared spectrum 

environment. The Commission also 

agrees with Telesat that doing so is 

unnecessary because a limit on the 

increase in link unavailability also 

protects against the loss of 

synchronization. In addition, requiring 

new entrants to meet such protection 

criteria that are defined solely by 

incumbents, to address particular 

interference sensitivities of incumbent 

systems, outside of protections mutually 

agreed in coordination, would create 

uncertainty for new entrants and could 

unduly restrain new entry and 

competition. 

ii. Carrier-to-Noise Objectives 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

sought specific comment on whether an 

earlier-round operator should be able to 

specify two C/N objectives—one relative 

to the C/N level below which the victim 

modem would lose signal lock with the 

satellite and another relative to the C/N 

level below which the victim link 

would become unavailable because it is 

not able to offer the minimum wanted 

throughput. 

Comments. Several commenters on 

this issue support the Commission 

adopting a single minimum C/N 

objective relative to link unavailability, 

rather than include multiple C/N 

objectives such as one below which the 

victim modem would lose lock. SpaceX 

proposes the Commission adopt a 

reference C/N threshold between ¥3 dB 

and 0 dB, because this range accounts 

for both real modem performance and 

the modulation and coding rates of 

broadband satellite waveforms within a 

reasonable margin. O3b suggests the 

Commission specify 0 dB as the 

standard C/N level to account for the 

threshold performance that efficient 

modems should be capable of achieving. 

Noting that the commonly used 

adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) 

standard DVB–S2X can demodulate 


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signals with C/N levels as low as ¥3 

dB, Intelsat recommends the required 

minimum C/N value should align with 

ACM standards and should accurately 

reflect the earlier NGSO system’s 

requirements. 

Several commenters also oppose 

allowing an incumbent to specify an 

additional C/N level below which its 

modem would lose lock, because doing 

so could invite gamesmanship, or 

otherwise require information on all of 

the potential modems and receivers 

used by the incumbent system, details 

of which are not typically available 

through publicly available filings. 

Kuiper argues that accounting for this 

factor in interference analyses could 

undermine incentives for a resilient 

design of modems and receivers, 

whereas rejecting proposals to account 

for link loss will require operators that 

choose designs ill-suited for a sharedspectrum environment to ‘‘internalize 

the costs of their decisions.’’ 

O3b, however, argues the Commission 

should allow an earlier-round operator 

to justify a system-specific alternative 

minimum C/N threshold by identifying, 

subject to reasonable explanation and 

support, the required C/N level needed 

to maintain link usability. O3b argues 

these C/N values would typically be 

incorporated into coordination 

discussions, so later-round systems 

should be aware of the earlierauthorized operators’ protection 

requirements. 

Decision. The Commission agrees 

with the general consensus on the 

record that reference C/N threshold 

values of between ¥3 dB and 0 dB are 

appropriate to account for the 

performance of efficient, modern 

modems and receivers. The Commission 

will adopt a C/N value of 0 dB that must 

be used in a compatibility showing with 

an earlier-round system as proposed by 

O3b and within the ranges supported by 

SpaceX and Intelsat as it reflects a 

reasonable, upper-limit for modern 

NGSO systems. The Commission also 

concludes that allowing an incumbent 

to specify an additional C/N level below 

which the victim modem would lose 

lock, if it is more sensitive than this 

range, could reward inefficient system 

designs at the expense of more 

competitive new entry. The Commission 

therefore declines O3b’s proposal to 

require later-round grantees to 

demonstrate they will meet any 

alternative incumbent-specified C/N 

level needed to maintain lock. 

Nonetheless, operators in coordination 

will be free to discuss and agree upon 

the use of other C/N levels when 

concluding a coordination agreement 

that leaves both parties better off than 

would operating under any submitted 

compatibility showing. 

iii. Aggregate Interference 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

also noted concerns about aggregate 

interference from multiple NGSO 

systems. The Commission invited 

comment on whether to set a limit on 

permissible aggregate interference from 

later-round systems into earlier-round 

systems. The Commission also asked 

whether the Commission should expect 

that there will be a maximum number 

of NGSO FSS systems that can be 

accommodated in a given frequency 

band and if so, how that should affect 

any inter-round protection criteria and 

the opening of additional processing 

rounds. Finally, the Commission 

inquired as to how the degraded 

throughput methodology should 

accommodate multiple NGSO systems 

that span multiple processing rounds. 

Comments. Most commenters on the 

issue of aggregate interference limits 

oppose them as unworkable and 

unnecessary. Commenters argue that 

setting aggregate interference limits is 

unnecessary for several reasons. As an 

initial matter, Mangata argues that the 

primary concern with respect to 

interference between NGSO systems is 

the occurrence of inline interference 

events, and the probability of an inline 

event involving multiple NGSO 

systems, with all the varying 

constellation designs and the resulting 

look angles, is very low. As such, 

Mangata contends that per-system limits 

established in this proceeding will be 

sufficient to mitigate any such concerns. 

Second, commenters argue that both 

advances in technology and the use of 

increasingly higher-frequency bands 

should make it possible for more 

operators to coexist within a band than 

is otherwise possible today. Third, 

commenters argue that required 

coordination or spectrum-splitting 

among later-round operators should 

further reduce the expected aggregate 

interference. 

Commenters also argue there is no 

demonstrated need on the record to 

adopt aggregate interference threshold 

for now. Kuiper notes that, given the 

long deployment timelines of NGSO 

FSS systems, such aggregate 

interference would not manifest for 

years—giving the Commission ample 

time to address this issue should it 

actually arise. Some commenters 

therefore recommend the Commission 

defer consideration of aggregate 

interference levels for protecting earlier 

round systems until there is more realworld data that can be evaluated to 

determine the effect of aggregate 

interference on individual system 

operations. 

Commenters further state that 

numerous implementation questions 

remain unsettled which would also 

make it difficult to enforce aggregate 

interference criteria, and this 

uncertainty raises the question of 

whether and how the Commission 

would administer an aggregate 

framework for NGSO sharing when the 

number of potential systems is 

perpetually in flux. Indeed, commenters 

state there is currently no known basis 

for any later-round applicant even to 

measure aggregate interference that 

might result from the combined 

operations of multiple systems. 

Commenters also dispute that 

establishing aggregate interference 

limits is a prerequisite to establishing 

per-system limits, and further dispute 

that per-system limits should be derived 

by simply dividing the aggregate limit 

among the number of later-round 

systems, because doing so assumes that 

each system contributes equally to 

aggregate interference. They argue such 

an assumption ‘‘defies reality’’ and 

‘‘would significantly overstate actual 

interference’’ because ‘‘cumulative 

interference could only result where 

multiple satellites communicate with 

earth stations at the same location, with 

the same frequency, and at the same 

time.’’ Commenters further note that 

some authorized systems may not 

deploy. 

Commenters also raise concerns with 

adopting an aggregate interference limit 

in the context of the Commission’s 

licensing regime for NGSO FSS systems. 

SpaceX argues the Commission cannot 

adopt an aggregate interference cap 

under its current processing round 

framework because the number of 

NGSO systems that will deploy in a 

given processing round and spectrum 

band is uncertain and highly variable. 

Kuiper contends that, given the 

Commission has adopted a framework 

designed to promote coordination and 

efficient coexistence, it would be 

irrational to adopt an aggregate limit on 

the assumption that parties neither 

coordinate nor take measures to 

efficiently share spectrum. Kuiper also 

suggests that the same arguments raised 

in favor of an aggregate cap on 

interference could be made to cap the 

number of applicants in a single 

processing round, where more 

applicants in a processing round can 

mean reduced spectrum access for any 

given licensee required to share 

spectrum on equal terms with 

contemporaneously licensed systems. 

Intelsat warns that adopting an 

aggregate interference cap would be an 


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end-run around the purposes of the 

sunset framework the Commission just 

adopted, which are to promote 

competition and to encourage NGSO 

operators to innovate and use spectrum 

more efficiently. 

Importantly, SpaceX warns that ‘‘an 

aggregate cap on interference would 

involve arbitrary line-drawing that risks 

stifling new NGSO system entry,’’ and 

numerous other commenters make 

similar statements. Instead, these 

commenters argue that NGSO systems 

can account for the total interference 

environment within their private 

negotiations, and that the Commission 

has determined in other contexts that 

operators themselves could account for 

aggregate interference concerns as a part 

of good-faith coordination. 

A minority of commenters do express 

support for the adoption of aggregate 

interference limits. OneWeb argues the 

establishment of aggregate limits on 

interference into NGSO FSS systems is 

a prerequisite to establishing per-system 

limits, and that failing to adopt 

aggregate limits could result in more 

systems being authorized than can 

reasonably be accommodated. OneWeb 

suggests the Commission could accept 

operators in an initial processing round 

‘‘up to’’ the established aggregate limit 

and, once those systems deploy, or fail 

to do so, the Commission could 

determine the number of additional 

systems that can be supported in later 

processing rounds. Considering 

degradation due to rain fade and other 

sources of interference, OneWeb argues 

that an aggregate limit of 2.5 to 3.85 

percent time-weighted average degraded 

throughput should be given to all NGSO 

FSS systems. 

Viasat suggests the Commission 

develop aggregate interference limits by 

defining the total amount of interference 

that any individual NGSO system 

should be expected to tolerate, then 

allocating this amount between different 

NGSO FSS systems and processing 

rounds, while ensuring adequate 

opportunities for additional market 

entry. Viasat argues an acceptable 

aggregate interference limit, including 

all interference sources (NGSO, GSO, 

and terrestrial), would be less than 0.05 

percent. ViaSat notes that aggregate 

interference limits on NGSO FSS 

systems have been adopted to protect 

GSO networks, though there remains no 

mechanism for allocating the overall 

interference budget between different 

NGSO operators. 

ITIF suggests the Commission could 

apply an aggregate limit to later-round 

systems, which would be divided 

equally among the later-round systems 

that actually deploy. TechFreedom also 

argues the Commission should consider 

how many NGSO systems a given 

frequency band support, but states it is 

premature to do so based on the current 

record. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

adopt limits on aggregate interference 

into an NGSO FSS system. First, there 

has been no demonstration of a need for 

such limits at this time. No secondround system is required to deploy its 

full constellation until 2029 at the 

earliest. Indeed, some proposed systems 

may never deploy their authorized 

number of satellites, or deploy any 

satellites at all. Even if the Commission 

felt it appropriate to adopt aggregate 

interference limits from later-round 

systems at this time, the Commission 

agrees with Kuiper, among others, that 

unresolved questions remain as to the 

derivation of any aggregate limits. The 

Commission also disagrees with 

OneWeb that a simplistic, worst-case 

assumption of multiplying the singleentry limit by six operational NGSO FSS 

systems reflects a realistic assessment of 

the interference environment because it 

fails to account for mitigation 

techniques or other spectrum-sharing 

measures that may be applied by the 

NGSO FSS systems and reduce their 

overall aggregate impact. Nor does the 

Commission agree with OneWeb that 

the Commission should adopt aggregate 

interference limits to prevent ‘‘more 

operators being granted authorizations 

to operate in a given band than can 

reasonably be accommodated.’’ The 

Commission’s experience has shown 

that not all authorized systems deploy 

their fully planned constellations, if 

they deploy at all. The recent generation 

of NGSO FSS systems has shown to be 

iterative in nature, with companies 

filing for systems in the first and second 

processing rounds, and using 

techniques like adaptive coding and 

modulation to adapt to changing 

spectrum environments. Blocking new 

entry while the Commission waits to see 

which NGSO FSS systems will deploy, 

out of a fear of future aggregate 

interference that may never arise, would 

artificially and unreasonably inhibit 

competition to the benefit of some 

incumbents but contrary to the public 

interest. Should a demonstrated need 

arise in the future, the Commission may 

revisit the question of aggregate limits. 

And, of course, operators are free to 

discuss and agree upon ways to account 

for any aggregate interference effects 

during their good-faith coordination 

discussions. 

5. Other Sources of Interference in 

Baseline 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

invited specific comment on how to 

determine the appropriate baseline for 

the earlier-round system, and whether it 

should include existing sources of 

interference, such as interference from 

GSO networks or intra-system 

interference. The Commission also 

inquired whether a degraded 

throughput methodology should 

compare an incumbent’s baseline level 

of performance given only natural 

degradation to that same incumbent’s 

expected performance given only a 

single new entrant’s operations, or 

whether the comparison should include 

the operations of multiple new entrants. 

i. GSO Interference 

Comments. Most commenters on this 

issue oppose including GSO 

interference in the baseline calculation. 

Commenters argue that including 

additional degradations in the baseline 

from interference due to GSO networks 

could overly complicate the analysis 

because there is no standardized model 

for such interference and no clear way 

to impute such interference across all 

systems given the different approaches 

NGSO systems employ to address GSO 

interference. Commenters also note that 

the Commission has set aside certain 

portions of the Ka-band in which GSO 

networks must protect NGSO systems, 

and argue that ‘‘[e]xisting NGSO 

operators should not be penalized for 

being subject to interference from 

secondary GSO networks.’’ 

Intelsat, however, supports including 

GSO interference in the baseline 

calculation. Intelsat argues that failing 

to account for all noise sources that 

contribute to the overall noise an NGSO 

system experiences will ultimately lead 

to the overprotection of earlier-round 

systems and, as a result, artificially 

reduce competition among NGSO 

satellite services. Intelsat argues the 

specific level of existing noise to be 

accounted for in each frequency range 

should be as accurate as possible and 

based on services deployed in that 

frequency range, which will vary 

depending both on the Commission’s 

rules that apply in the bands and on the 

intensity with which the bands are 

used. While conceding that GSO noise 

still needs to be modeled and developed 

to ensure that it is accurately 

represented, Intelsat argues there are 

likely baseline metrics that can be used 

in all or most scenarios to simulate GSO 

interference for which NGSO operators 

must account. Intelsat suggests the 

Commission need not define the metric 


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for inter-system interference from 

existing GSO systems because the party 

conducting the analysis can determine 

whether to include this element and 

provide any necessary justification for 

that choice. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

incorporate GSO interference into the 

baseline. The Commission 

acknowledges that omitting existing 

sources of interference in the baseline, 

such as GSO interference, will tend to 

underestimate the interference 

experienced by an incumbent. However, 

the Commission disagrees with Intelsat 

that parties should be able to create and 

use their own metric for GSO 

interference affecting the incumbent’s 

baseline in order to ease their burden of 

demonstrating compliance with the 

required interference limits. The 

Commission is concerned that Intelsat’s 

proposal, in the absence of an agreed 

model or clear way to impute such 

interference across all NGSO FSS 

systems, and the need to carefully 

consider GSO deployments and 

regulatory frameworks in different 

frequency bands, would create 

unnecessary disputes that would be 

time-consuming for Commission staff to 

assess and strain the Commission’s 

limited resources. Accordingly, the 

Commission concludes that any alleged 

benefit of incorporating GSO 

interference into the baseline does not 

outweigh the burdens on parties and 

Commission staff in determining the 

appropriate way to incorporate such 

interference at this time. Parties are free 

to explore such interference effects 

during the detailed information sharing 

and discussions that accompany goodfaith coordination among NGSO FSS 

operators, and which, the Commission 

finds, ultimately lead to the most 

efficient use of spectrum by the 

concerned operators. 

ii. Intra-System Interference 

Comments. Most commenters on this 

issue also oppose including intra-system 

interference in the baseline. These 

commenters state that satellite operators 

do not routinely disclose how they 

mitigate intra-system interference 

because such mitigation techniques 

have little to no impact on the 

operations of other constellations, may 

be competitively sensitive, and change 

with user needs. Kuiper argues that 

requiring consideration of intra-system 

interference would either leave new 

entrants to guess how each incumbent 

addresses intra-system interference, 

inviting inaccuracy and dispute, or 

necessitate an unnecessary and 

potentially intrusive mandate to share 

such information. Kuiper suggests that 

an administrable degraded throughput 

methodology is likely to omit several 

existing noise sources, such as intrasystem interference and interference 

from other NGSO FSS operators, given 

the practical difficulties of faithfully 

incorporating such factors into the 

analysis. 

Intelsat, however, again argues that 

the earlier-round system’s performance 

baseline should consider all realistic 

sources of noise degradation, including 

intra-system degradations. Intelsat 

contends that intra-system interference 

and non-time-varying sources could be 

standardized to a single value, and notes 

that ITU Resolution 770 uses 1 dB of 

margin to account for these cases. 

Intelsat asserts that intra-system noise is 

a critical factor that should be included 

in compatibility analyses and argues 

there is no technical reason not to 

account for intra-system noise as a 

realistic assumption that would improve 

sharing among NGSOs. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

incorporate intra-system interference 

into the baseline. Given that information 

on intra-system interference changes 

with user needs, the Commission is 

concerned that incorporating such 

interference into the baseline would 

create additional disputes between 

parties, and burdens on the 

Commission’s limited staff resources in 

resolving those disputes, in the absence 

of a clear way to incorporate such 

interference into the baseline. Further, 

the record is not sufficiently developed 

to determine whether the 1 dB margin 

used to account for intra-system 

interference and non-time-varying 

sources with respect to interference into 

GSO networks in V-band under ITU 

Resolution 770 would be appropriate to 

systems in other frequency bands. 

Accordingly, the Commission concludes 

that any alleged benefit of incorporating 

intra-system interference into the 

baseline does not outweigh the burdens 

on parties and Commission staff in 

determining the appropriate way to 

incorporate such interference at this 

time. Parties in coordination are free to 

explore such interference effects during 

their detailed information sharing and 

discussions. 

iii. Interference From Other NGSO FSS 

Systems 

Comments. The only specific 

comments on this issue supported 

comparing an incumbent’s baseline 

against its expected performance given 

the operations of a single (rather than 

multiple) new entrant. In particular, 

Kuiper argues that, while accounting for 

the noise environment an incumbent 

faces because of other incumbent NGSO 

FSS operators may make the analysis 

more accurate, the burden of increased 

complexity outweighs any benefit of 

this accuracy. Rather, Kuiper argues the 

Commission should follow the path 

taken by satellite operators in 

coordination—to model only the 

incumbent and new entrant’s systems. 

Kuiper states that instead of ignoring 

interference from other NGSO FSS 

systems, the Commission can account 

for it when establishing an interference 

threshold and recognize that excluding 

this interference makes any threshold 

that it adopts more conservative and 

protective than it appears. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

require compatibility analyses to 

include effects of multiple NGSO FSS 

systems in the baseline interference of 

the incumbent system because doing so 

could create uncertainty and disputes, 

with accompanying strain on the 

Commission’s limited staff resources to 

assess those disputes, as to which 

additional NGSO FSS systems should be 

considered in a given analysis and how 

their effects should be incorporated in 

the analysis. Accordingly, the 

Commission conclude that any alleged 

benefit of incorporating interference 

from multiple NGSO FSS systems into 

the baseline does not outweigh the 

burdens on parties and Commission 

staff in determining the appropriate way 

to incorporate such interference at this 

time. Although including this 

interference is not common in operator’s 

own coordination discussions, parties in 

coordination are free to explore such 

interference effects during their detailed 

information sharing and discussions. 

6. Rain Attenuation 

Further Notice. The Commission also 

asked how rain fade conditions in 

different locations should be 

incorporated into the degraded 

throughput analysis, how many 

locations should be evaluated, and 

whether any locations should include 

sites outside the United States. 

Comments. Most commenters on this 

issue support using three geographically 

diverse locations within the United 

States for application of a rain 

attenuation standard, one for each of 

low, medium and high rain rates. These 

commenters assert that using three data 

points will provide sufficient scope for 

an interference assessment, while at the 

same time not demanding an analysis 

that could become unwieldly with an 

excessive number of data points. 

SpaceX contends that these locations 

should reflect the actual deployments of 

earlier-round systems and, where 

possible, rely on locations that operators 


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jointly establish in good-faith 

coordination. 

Intelsat argues that four to five sites 

located within the United States in 

representative geographic areas with 

different rain rates ‘‘should suffice.’’ 

O3b proposes that the Commission 

require parties to employ at least four 

different latitudes between 10 degrees 

and 70 degrees North Latitude as test 

points in the analysis and consider a 

range of rain conditions at each latitude. 

Additionally, several commenters 

recommend that the Commission 

require operators to use a common rainattenuation model that references 

attenuation characteristics from the 

latest versions of Recommendations 

ITU–R P.618 and P.676. 

SpaceX also argues that the 

Commission should standardize the rain 

fade conditions that represent the low, 

medium, and high rain attenuation 

conditions for NGSO system 

deployments, and proposes to define 

low rain areas as having ≤30 mm/hr, 

moderate rain areas as having 40–50 

mm/hr, and high rain areas as having 

≥80 mm/hr. O3b similarly suggests rain 

rates for 0.01 percent of an average year 

that vary between dry (20–30 

millimeters/hour) to wet (up to 80 

millimeters/hour). 

Finally, Intelsat argues that, to 

account for other link losses, the 

Commission should either calculate the 

non-precipitation impairment values 

using the methodology specified in 

Recommendation ITU–R P.618 or use a 

standardized approach to these 

additional degradations. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

mandate specific rain fade assumptions 

to be used in an inter-round 

compatibility analysis. Rather, the 

Commission will assess rain fade 

assumptions on a case-by-case basis as 

to whether they are reliable and 

representative. While the Commission 

concludes based upon review of the 

record that inter-round compatibility 

analyses with three geographically 

diverse locations at various latitudes 

within the United States may be 

sufficient in many cases for application 

of a rain attenuation standard (one for 

each of low, medium and high rain 

rates), the Commission will assess rain 

fade assumptions, including the number 

of locations, on a case-by-case basis to 

determine whether they are reliable and 

representative. 

The Commission agrees with the 

majority of commenters on this issue 

that three locations would typically 

provide sufficient scope for the analysis 

without overburdening it because three 

locations will allow for the selection of 

sites with each of low, medium, and 

high rain rates. But regardless of the 

number of locations assumed (whether 

three or more or less than three), the 

operator submitting an inter-round 

compatibility analysis must demonstrate 

that the number of locations assumed is 

reliable and representative given the 

assumed operations of the earlier-round 

system. For example, if an earlier-round 

system operated only in a 

geographically limited area, such as at 

high latitudes, then a later-round 

operator might reasonably use location 

and rain fade assumptions that reflect 

the actual service area of the earlierround system even if less than three 

locations. Similarly, to ensure the most 

accurate modeling, these locations can 

reflect the actual coverage of earlierround systems and, where possible, rely 

on locations that operators jointly 

establish in good-faith coordination 

discussions. 

The Commission will also assess the 

rain attenuation model used in an interround compatibility analysis on a caseby-case basis as to whether it is reliable 

and representative. As an illustrative 

example, a party preparing an interround protection showing may model 

rain attenuation as per the current 

versions of ITU–R Recommendations 

P.618–14 and P.676–13, as 

recommended by commenters, and 

specify the rain fade conditions that 

represent the low, medium, and high 

rain attenuation conditions for NGSO 

system deployments, with rain rates for 

0.01 percent of an average year in low 

rain areas as ≤30 mm/hr, in moderate 

rain areas as 40–50 mm/hr, and in high 

rain areas as ≥80 mm/hr. The 

Commission will assess such rain fade 

assumptions on a case-by-case basis as 

to whether they are reliable and 

representative. Finally, as an illustrative 

example, a party might use 

Recommendation ITU–R P.618 to 

account for other link losses and will 

assess its appropriateness on a case-bycase basis, considering how these other 

link losses are treated in coordination 

and similar contexts and their particular 

applicability to the cases studied. 

7. Standardized Parameters 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

inquired as to whether the Commission 

should use standardized antenna 

patterns and noise temperatures for the 

computation of C/(I+N) in a degraded 

throughput method. 

Comments. Commenters supporting 

standardized parameters argue that the 

Commission should allow later-round 

applicants to use certain default system 

parameters for earlier-round applicants 

that reflect a baseline of accepted 

system performance, below which the 

earlier-round applicant should not be 

entitled to protection. 

SpaceX argues that establishing 

default parameter values will ensure 

that compatibility showings uniformly 

implement the best practices of efficient 

NGSO systems when the parties and the 

Commission lack access to operational 

information. SpaceX also argues that 

default parameter values will give 

notice to operators that any sharing 

framework will not accommodate filings 

or system designs that are based on 

inefficiencies intended to block 

competition. 

Intelsat also argues the Commission 

should also adopt or clarify the nominal 

or standard earth station parameters that 

should be used where the information is 

not provided in the operator’s 

authorization and not already provided 

for in the Commission’s rules. 

Commenters propose specific 

operational assumptions the 

Commission could standardize, 

including: assuming earth stations from 

the victim and the interfering systems 

are collocated for both uplink and 

downlink cases; considering satellite 

beams of the selected satellites as 

pointing toward the earth station 

location in both uplink and downlink 

cases; for uplink cases, considering only 

one interferer location at each time step; 

and implementing one-second time step 

durations in the analysis. 

Intelsat further proposes that, absent 

information on an incumbent’s tracking 

strategy, later-round grantees should 

default to using random selection as the 

tracking strategy to determine the 

available satellites that meet other 

operational parameters such as 

minimum elevation angle, GSO 

exclusion angle, and Nco (the maximum 

number of beams which can be 

illuminated simultaneously in the 

polarization considered). 

SpaceX recommends reference 

parameters for downlinks and uplinks 

that operators should use when 

operational information is missing or 

incomplete. As standardized downlink 

parameters, SpaceX proposes an earth 

station receive noise temperature of 

200K and satellite antenna patterns 

contained in Recommendation ITU–R 

S.1528. As standardized uplink 

parameters, SpaceX proposes a satellite 

receive noise temperature of 500K, earth 

station antenna diameters of 2.4m 

(gateway) and 1.0m (user terminal), and 

earth station antenna patterns contained 

in the ITU Radio Regulations Appendix 

8, Annex 3. 

Intelsat also suggests the Commission 

should standardize the method and 

waveform used for the conversion from 

C/N values to spectral efficiency, and 


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suggests using the method defined in 

Section 2.3 of the Annex of 

Recommendation ITU–R S.2131–1, 

which considers a DVB–S2X waveform 

and is widely used in the satellite 

industry. 

OneWeb, however, opposes making 

use of standardized parameters, arguing 

that the parameters for NGSO FSS 

systems vary widely and default NGSO 

system or earth station parameters are 

unlikely to effectively protect 

incumbent operators. In particular, 

OneWeb disagrees with considering 

only collocated earth stations. OneWeb 

asserts that this is an oversimplification 

and that aggregate interference of 

multiple stations within the same 

interfering system also needs to be 

addressed. Additionally, OneWeb 

opposes a standardized practice of 

considering only one interferer location 

at each time step, claiming that the 

interference potential could be 

underestimated if multiple earth 

stations are not accounted for and that 

earth station deployment models can be 

addressed in detailed coordination. 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

mandate specific parameters and 

assumptions to be used in an interround compatibility analysis. Rather, 

the Commission will assess these 

parameters and assumptions on a caseby-case basis as to whether they are 

reliable and representative. To facilitate 

the work of new entrants in preparing 

the showings and Commission staff and 

incumbents in reviewing them, the 

Commission lists below illustrative 

examples of parameters and 

assumptions that operators might 

consider using in any necessary 

compatibility showings: 

(1) assume earth stations from the 

victim and the interfering systems are 

collocated for both uplink and downlink 

cases; 

(2) consider satellite beams of the 

selected satellites as pointing toward the 

earth station location in both uplink and 

downlink cases; 

(3) for uplink cases, consider only one 

interferer location at each time step; 

(4) implement one-second time step 

durations in the analysis; 

(5) use of the method and waveform 

for the conversion from C/N values to 

spectral efficiency method defined in 

Section 2.3 of the Annex of 

Recommendation ITU–R S.2131–1; 

(6) assume earth station antenna 

diameters of 2.4m (gateway) and 1.0m 

(user terminal); 

(7) use the earth station antenna 

patterns contained in the ITU Radio 

Regulations Appendix 8, Annex 3; 

(8) assume an earth station receive 

noise temperature of 200K; 

(9) use the satellite antenna patterns 

contained in Recommendation ITU–R 

S.1528; 

(10) assume a satellite receive noise 

temperature of 500K; and 

(11) assume random selection as the 

tracking strategy to determine the 

available satellites that meet other 

operational parameters such as 

minimum elevation angle, GSO 

exclusion angle, and Nco. 

The Commission concludes that 

providing these illustrative examples of 

parameters and methodological 

approaches could make the preparation 

and review of compatibility analyses 

less burdensome and could avert 

unnecessary disputes among operators. 

The Commission emphasizes, however, 

that the Commission will assess these 

parameters and assumptions on a caseby-case basis as to whether they are 

reliable and representative, including by 

considering any alternative publicly 

available information or information 

that the incumbent provides during 

operator-to-operator coordination and 

any justifications raised by the parties. 

For example, the Commission will 

assess on a case-by-case basis whether it 

is appropriate for parties to assume that 

earth stations are collocated and to 

consider only one interferer location at 

each time step, including as it may be 

necessary due to the absence of detailed 

earth station deployment models and 

satellite receiving beams layout. The 

Commission believes that a case-by-case 

approach, in combination with the list 

of illustrative example parameters above 

taken from the record, will provide 

parties appropriate flexibility in 

tailoring their analyses while facilitating 

the preparation of these analyses by new 

entrants. 

8. Use of Information Gained Through 

Coordination 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

sought comment on what other 

technical data is needed to 

appropriately evaluate degraded 

throughput effects, and how the 

Commission can ensure that any 

degraded throughput analysis 

appropriately protects the specific 

characteristics of an NGSO system’s 

operations, including what role 

Schedule S information should play in 

the analysis. 

Comments. Commenters agree that as 

part of the good faith coordination 

among NGSO FSS operators required by 

the Commission, operators share 

technical and operational information 

about their systems, which is a better 

reflection of their actual or planned 

operations than can be drawn solely 

from information in the public record. 

Commenters therefore support the 

Commission allowing later-round 

operators to use operational information 

gained during coordination to enhance 

the accuracy of their compatibility 

showings with an earlier-round system, 

and to submit such showings to the 

Commission on a confidential basis, 

allowing the earlier-round operator to 

review the showing to ensure the 

information exchanged in good-faith 

coordination is properly represented 

and analyzed while preventing 

competing operators from viewing 

potentially commercially sensitive 

operational data. 

Commenters disagree, however, on 

whether later-round operators should be 

required to use more realistic 

operational information gained during 

coordination in their compatibility 

showings whenever possible, or 

whether later-round operators should 

have the choice of using either public or 

private data on the earlier-round system. 

Both sides raise the prospect of 

gamesmanship—if there is a 

requirement to use private data, the 

earlier-round operator could selectively 

provide system details that make it 

appear more sensitive to interference 

while omitting details that could 

facilitate sharing; while if there is the 

option, but no requirement, a laterround could choose any combination of 

public or private information to ease its 

compatibility showing, even public 

information that, commenters agree, 

may not reflect actual operations. 

Kuiper argues that, if later-round 

systems are given the option of using 

public or private information, the 

earlier-round operator will still have the 

opportunity to review the showing and 

comment on the appropriateness of the 

parameters used. SpaceX also notes that 

later-round operators may need to 

disclose confidential parameters in any 

compatibility studies before the 

Commission to show compliance with 

backstop interference values, supporting 

the disclosure of parameters as needed 

to maximize efficient spectrum sharing. 

Decision. The Commission agrees 

with commenters that the use of 

operational information shared during 

coordination should enhance the 

accuracy of compatibility showings, and 

will allow later-round operators to base 

their analyses on such information to 

the extent it is available and permitted 

by the incumbent operator to be 

reflected in a compatibility analysis 

submitted to the Commission. Analyses 

based on operational information shared 

during coordination may be submitted 

on a confidential basis when satisfying 

the requirements of the Commission’s 

confidentiality rules (assuming the 


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incumbent operator has permitted this 

information to be reflected in a 

compatibility analysis). However, the 

Commission agrees with Kuiper that 

later-round operators should have the 

flexibility to use publicly available 

parameters of the earlier-round system, 

even if alternative parameters are 

provided in coordination, and to justify 

that decision when submitting a 

compatibility analysis. The Commission 

will assess the use of publicly available 

information in these instances on a caseby-case basis to determine if the 

analysis is adequately representative of 

the earlier-round system, considering as 

well any arguments that the later-round 

operator has selectively used publicly 

available information to its advantage to 

ease its protection showing. In addition, 

because the incumbent’s privately 

shared operational data may be used in 

a compatibility analysis submitted to 

the Commission only if it consents to 

such use, the Commission does not 

believe that allowing use of such data 

will disincentivize information sharing 

during coordination, especially where 

the incumbent‘s consent may be 

contingent upon sharing the information 

on a confidential basis. 

9. Incorporation of Deployment 

Milestones Into Compatibility Analyses 

Comments. Several commenters note 

that when the operator of a later-round 

NGSO FSS system is preparing a 

compatibility showing for an earlierround system, the earlier-round system 

may not yet be fully deployed and, 

indeed, may never fully deploy or 

deploy at all. Commenters argue that 

later-round operators should be given 

the flexibility to provide compatibility 

analyses based either on the number of 

satellites at the 50 or 100 percent 

deployment milestones of the earlierround system, whichever has yet to be 

achieved, or on the ‘‘number of satellites 

actually deployed’’ and operating. 

Commenters suggest that later-round 

operators should not be held to the 

parameters of such showings before the 

actual deployment of the earlier-round 

system, and that later-round operators 

should be able to update their showings 

to account for later deployments, if not 

accounted for in the initial analysis. 

SpaceX, for example, argues that 

accounting for milestone requirements 

in compatibility analyses would better 

reflect the operational realities of NGSO 

systems and better calibrate the need for 

regulatory certainty with opportunities 

for new entry. SpaceX also argues that 

accounting for deployment milestones 

in compatibility showings better 

accommodates the interference risk to 

earlier-round systems as they grow and 

change, given that NGSO operators 

frequently file modifications as they 

build out systems that differ from those 

initially authorized. SpaceX further 

asserts that by emphasizing the 

deployment milestone requirements, the 

Commission can encourage earlierround systems to share higher-fidelity 

information about their near-term 

deployment plans for new satellite 

launches to ensure protection for those 

satellites. 

Decision. The Commission agrees that 

later-round NGSO FSS operators should 

not be restrained by a requirement to 

protect not yet deployed earlier-round 

systems. At the same time, the 

Commission is cautious about 

permitting compatibility analyses 

considering solely the number of 

deployed satellites at a given time, 

which may need to be updated with 

each subsequent launch of an earlierround system and consume unnecessary 

resources for the earlier-round operator, 

and Commission staff to review. 

Therefore, the Commission will permit 

compatibility analyses to consider only 

the deployment configuration of the 

earlier-round system at the six-year, 50 

percent milestone if this milestone has 

not yet been met. If the 50 percent 

deployment milestone has been met, 

compatibility analyses must consider 

the fully deployed system. In the event 

the earlier-round system misses a 

milestone and its authorization is 

automatically reduced to the number of 

satellites deployed on the date of the 

missed milestone, compatibility 

analyses need only consider the number 

of actually deployed satellites. 

10. Mitigation Techniques 

Further Notice. The Further Notice 

also asked what mitigation techniques 

would be appropriate for a later-round 

system to implement in the event that 

any protection criteria were not 

otherwise satisfied in a compatibility 

showing. 

Comments. Commenters on this issue 

agree that the Commission should not 

limit the mitigation techniques available 

to a new entrant where its constellation 

would otherwise exceed the interference 

thresholds, though some commenters 

specifically note that, once an operator 

commits to using certain mitigation 

techniques, it should be held to that 

commitment through licensing 

conditions. 

Decision. The Commission concurs 

that elaborating a list of appropriate 

mitigation techniques could 

unnecessarily restrict operator 

flexibility and spectral efficiency, and 

therefore will not limit the potential 

mitigation techniques that can be 

employed. Further, the Commission 

agrees that, when mitigation techniques 

are used as a basis for demonstrating 

compatibility with an earlier-round 

system, the later-round system will be 

required to employ those mitigation 

techniques to the extent necessary to 

protect the earlier-round system’s actual 

operations. 

11. Timing of Acceptance of 

Compatibility Showings 

Comments. Some commenters argue 

that the Commission should refuse to 

accept a compatibility showing from a 

later-round operator until the operator 

makes a ‘‘valid prior coordination 

attempt’’ with the earlier-round 

operator, or until ‘‘after coordination 

has failed.’’ Mangata notes that the 

Commission’s rules already require 

good faith coordination among all 

NGSO FSS grantees and argues the 

Commission ‘‘need not exclude valid 

degraded throughput analyses to enforce 

coordination since engaging in such 

coordination efforts is already 

required.’’ 

Decision. The Commission declines to 

adopt any limit on when a later-round 

NGSO FSS grantee may submit an interround compatibility analysis based on 

the state of its coordination with an 

earlier-round operator. Later-round 

grantees are under an obligation to 

coordinate in good faith with other 

NGSO FSS operators, before and after 

submission of any compatibility 

showings. The Commission does not 

believe it would be productive to codify, 

and potentially adjudicate, a 

requirement that later-round operators 

coordinate ‘‘enough’’ before the 

Commission will review a 

demonstration that their operations will 

be compatible with an earlier-round 

operator. Rather, to the extent earlierround operators may be concerned that 

its operational data will not be used in 

the compatibility showing, they may 

affirmatively reach out to provide such 

information and, a later-round grantee 

may not refuse such an offer consistent 

with its obligation to coordinate in good 

faith. 

12. Post-Sunset Sharing Regime 

Further Notice. When adopting a 

sunset period to accompany the new 

inter-round protection requirement in 

the Report and Order, the Commission 

determined that, after sunset, new 

entrants will be subject to co-equal 

spectrum sharing with incumbents. In 

the absence of a coordination 

agreement, this is accomplished through 

spectrum-splitting when the DT/T of 6 

percent threshold is exceeded. 

Nonetheless, the Further Notice sought 


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additional comment on what criteria 

should be applied among NGSO systems 

after the sunset period. 

Comments. Most commenters on this 

issue support the Commission’s initial 

decision in the Report and Order to 

apply the default spectrum-splitting 

procedure between earlier and laterround systems after sunsetting occurs. 

They argue that placing parties on an 

equal footing under the Commission’s 

default spectrum-splitting rules 

represents the simplest and most 

reasonable approach to sunsetting, that 

alternatives to spectrum splitting do not 

have a similar ability to incentivize both 

sides to reach a coordination agreement, 

and that not applying the spectrumsplitting rules equally after sunset 

would perpetuate a stratified spectrumsharing regime that gives incumbents a 

permanent advantage over later-round 

grantees. 

SpaceX, which supports applying the 

Commission’s default spectrum-splitting 

procedure after the sunset date, 

nonetheless argues that the Commission 

should ensure that systems with 

deployment milestones after the sunset 

date do not avoid good-faith 

coordination simply because their 

deployment commitments extend into 

the post-sunset regime. While SpaceX 

supports applying the Commission’s 

default spectrum-splitting procedure 

after the sunset date, it proposes a 

revision to the procedure to reward the 

more efficient system with the first 

choice in a spectrum split, and to apply 

this backstop both to systems within the 

same processing round and to differentround systems after protections sunset. 

Telesat asks the Commission to defer 

consideration of any revisions of the 

current regime until a later date, when 

the Commission has gained more 

experience in understanding how NGSO 

systems can coexist. 

ViaSat, SpaceX, and OneWeb reiterate 

earlier arguments that the Commission 

should revise the default spectrumsplitting mechanism as it applies to 

systems authorized in the same 

processing round, but do not argue that 

a different sharing regime should apply 

between earlier and later-round systems 

following sunset. OneWeb also argues 

the Commission should lengthen the 

sunset period for later-round operators 

until they have deployed their full 

systems, and only after consider 

applying the same metrics between 

prior-round operators and later-round 

operators. 

Decision. The Commission reaffirms 

the decision in the Report and Order to 

place earlier and later-round operators 

on an equal footing after the sunset date 

by applying the default, spectrumsplitting mechanism to both sets of 

operators at that time. Doing so ensures 

that earlier-round advantages do not 

continue indefinitely, and simplifies the 

regulatory framework when systems 

authorized through multiple processing 

rounds may be operating. However, the 

Commission declines to adopt proposed 

changes to the default, spectrumsplitting mechanism itself, as applied to 

systems within a processing round, 

because such changes are beyond the 

scope of this proceeding. Further, the 

Commission notes that no commenter 

advocates different treatment of laterround operators post-sunset than among 

earlier-round operators. Indeed, the 

equality of treatment of later-round 

operators after the sunset date is a key 

component of the sunset provision. And 

while the proposal to lengthen the 

sunset period for certain operators is 

also beyond the scope of the Further 

Notice’s inquiry, the Commission 

retains the authority to enforce its goodfaith coordination requirement in cases 

where a later-round operator with 

deployment milestones after the sunset 

date is alleged to be avoiding good-faith 

coordination. The Commission expects 

any such cases to be rare, however, 

because operators receive benefits of 

reaching stable coordination agreements 

not only in operation but in securing the 

necessary funding for constellation 

deployments. 

13. Digital Equity and Inclusion 

The Commission, as part of its 

continuing effort to advance digital 

equity for all, including people of color, 

persons with disabilities, persons who 

live in rural or Tribal areas, and others 

who are or have been historically 

underserved, marginalized, or adversely 

affected by persistent poverty or 

inequality, invited comment on any 

equity-related considerations and 

benefits (if any) that may be associated 

with the proposals and issues discussed 

in the Further Notice. 

The Commission did not receive 

specific comment on this topic. 

Nonetheless, the Commission finds that 

the rule changes in the Second Report 

and Order will continue to encourage a 

more stable and competitive 

environment for the development of 

NGSO FSS systems well suited to 

reaching underserved areas with new 

broadband capacity, and therefore that 

this rulemaking will enhance digital 

equity and inclusion. 

A. Order on Reconsideration 

Petition. OneWeb petitions for 

reconsideration (OneWeb Petition) of 

the sunset period adopted with the 

inter-round protection requirement in 

the Report and Order. OneWeb 

specifically requests that the 

Commission partially reconsider the 

sunset period for first round operators 

because it believes that the Commission 

failed to consider the evidence in the 

record and applied an unjustifiable 

sunset period to them. In support of its 

petition, OneWeb makes three principal 

arguments. 

First, OneWeb argues that the 

Commission effectively reduced the 

sunset period for first-round operators 

‘‘by 30 percent’’ compared to operators 

in later processing rounds because the 

10-year sunset period began on the date 

of the first authorization in a subsequent 

processing round, which occurred in 

2020, leading to a sunset period ending 

in 2030, whereas the Report and Order 

that established the sunset date was not 

adopted and released until 2023. 

OneWeb states this creates an 

‘‘effectively seven-year sunset period for 

interference protections’’ for first-round 

operators. OneWeb argues that such 

treatment undermines the benefit firstround operators should receive for their 

pioneering efforts and that, given the 

time required to implement technical 

changes in constellation designs and 

operations, the sunset period impairs 

first-round operators’ ability to develop 

appropriate mechanisms to co-exist 

with later-arriving operators, potentially 

subjecting first-round operators to 

harmful interference. OneWeb further 

contends that, although the Commission 

stated in 2017 that it would consider 

NGSO FSS applications filed after the 

first processing round on a ‘‘case-bycase’’ basis, OneWeb had no prior 

reasonable expectation that all laterround operators would be entitled to 

operate on a co-equal basis with firstround systems eventually. OneWeb 

claims that the Commission’s decision 

here is contrary to past precedent, 

where it denied Kuiper’s waiver request 

to be treated on an equal basis with 

systems that filed applications within a 

previous processing round. OneWeb 

also argues that the Commission failed 

to consider relevant information in the 

record and failed to provide a sufficient 

explanation for its decision. 

Second, OneWeb argues that the 

consideration of several questions in the 

Further Notice on the technical rules 

surrounding interference protections 

that affect the sunset period ‘‘further 

cuts into the already shorter sunset 

period for First Round operators.’’ 

OneWeb states these questions include: 

what protection levels should be 

imposed during and after the sunset 

period; whether there is a maximum 

number of NGSO systems that can be 

accommodated in a given frequency 


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band; how the number of NGSO systems 

accommodated should affect interround protection criteria and the 

opening of different rounds; and what 

‘‘co-equal’’ means when established 

operators are to operate a co-equal basis 

with newer entrants. 

Finally, OneWeb notes that several 

second-round applications from the 

2020 processing round remain pending. 

If granted, the operators would have up 

to nine years to deploy their full 

constellations under the Commission’s 

milestone rules. Therefore, OneWeb 

argues, the sunset of the inter-round 

protection requirement in 2030 will 

mean that ‘‘first-round operators would 

be protected from interference for little 

or no time after second-round grantees 

are fully deployed,’’ ‘‘effectively placing 

the later-arriving operators in the first 

processing round in the context of 

interference protections’’ and 

‘‘remov[ing] any meaningful incentive 

for second-round operators to 

coordinate with First Round operators.’’ 

OneWeb now requests that the 

Commission specifically establish the 

sunset for first-round protections at ten 

years from adoption of the Report and 

Order consistent with the notice for 

subsequent rounds, or at ten years from 

final adoption of the spectrum sharing 

framework metrics under the Further 

Notice. 

Comments. Kuiper opposed the 

OneWeb Petition. Kuiper contends that 

it fails to identify any material error in 

the Report and Order warranting 

reconsideration, and otherwise relies on 

arguments that the Commission has 

fully considered and rejected or that 

OneWeb could have but did not present 

earlier in this proceeding. 

Kuiper argues the Commission 

specifically addressed the question of 

whether the sunset should apply to firstround operators and concluded that, as 

applied, it gave ‘‘incumbent NGSO FSS 

grantees sufficient time to evaluate and 

adapt to the eventual, equal sharing 

environment’’ and that not applying the 

sunset in this way ‘‘would substantially 

frustrate the purpose of sunsetting by 

locking in incumbent protections that 

are not assured under the current, caseby-case regime.’’ Kuiper also states that 

OneWeb has offered no evidence— 

either now or before the Report and 

Order was adopted—that a seven-year 

period would afford insufficient time to 

prepare for co-equal spectrum sharing 

with second-round systems, or evidence 

that the thirteen years OneWeb will 

have had between its market access 

grant in 2017 and the end of the sunset 

period in 2030 would be insufficient. 

Kuiper states that OneWeb appears to 

misread the Commission’s reason for 

discussing the full deployment 

milestone, stating that at no point does 

the Commission suggest that it is 

choosing that milestone as a means to 

protect incumbents—instead, the 

Commission chose it in recognition that 

once a new entrant has fully deployed 

its constellation, it should generally 

have the right to co-equal treatment. 

And Kuiper notes that, as the 

Commission explained in direct 

response to OneWeb’s argument, the 

fact that the full deployment milestone 

for some (or even many) later-round 

operators will not occur until after the 

2030 sunset is irrelevant because ‘‘ ‘the 

speed of deployment of the later-round 

systems would not affect the overall 

time that the incumbents will be 

protected by systems approved in the 

later processing round.’ ’’ 

Kuiper further states that the Report 

and Order did not premise the adoption 

of the sunset period on providing interround protections after second-round 

systems have fully deployed and are 

providing service, instead reasoning that 

first-round operators would need some 

‘‘period of time’’ after an application 

had been granted in a new processing 

round to plan for co-equal sharing, and 

that the ten-year period, which would 

run from the grant of the first license in 

the next processing round, 

‘‘appropriately balance[d] the need for 

stability for incumbent operations and 

the possibility for new entrants to 

compete on an equal footing once they 

have built out their systems.’’ 

Kuiper also argues that OneWeb 

incorrectly assumes that second-round 

operators will delay offering any service 

until they are fully deployed, but that 

even if later-licensed systems did delay 

offering service in this manner, such 

delay would have no impact on the time 

given to OneWeb to operate with special 

protections. 

Kuiper further asserts that OneWeb’s 

claim that the decision removes ‘‘any 

meaningful incentive for second-round 

operators to coordinate’’ ignores the 

Commission’s thorough treatment of 

such incentives and record evidence 

that a sunset is likely to enhance the 

incentives for all parties to coordinate. 

And Kuiper argues that OneWeb’s 

argument that it has invested ‘‘billions 

of dollars’’ and ‘‘made significant 

financial investments in their next 

generation satellites based on the 

Commission’s framework existing prior 

to the adoption of a sunset period’’ 

ignores the billions of dollars that 

second-round operators have invested 

in their own systems. 

Kuiper finally argues that none of the 

questions in the Further Notice 

implicate the length or application of 

the sunset period to first-round 

operators, and notes that OneWeb itself 

explicitly told the Commission that the 

‘‘proposed sunset schedule’’—that is, a 

2030 sunset for second-round 

operators—‘‘affords the Commission 

time to further consider these issues.’’ 

OneWeb replied to Kuiper’s 

opposition, arguing that the opposition 

fails to counter the issues raised in its 

petition and reiterating arguments in the 

petition. OneWeb maintains that neither 

the Report and Order nor Kuiper have 

addressed the disparate treatment of 

first-round operators who have 

insufficient time to prepare for co-equal 

spectrum sharing. OneWeb contends 

that Kuiper ignores that the outcome of 

the Further Notice further diminishes 

first-round operators’ time to prepare for 

the ‘‘fully defined regulatory 

framework’’ given that they will have to 

comply with the new rules. 

SpaceX also responded to the 

OneWeb Petition, arguing that the tenyear sunset period adopted by the 

Commission ‘‘strikes the appropriate 

balance’’ between incumbents and new 

entrants but stating that careful 

consideration should be given when 

incorporating deployment milestones 

for later-round systems to minimize any 

advantages for operators that refuse to 

coordinate. 

Decision. The Commission dismisses 

in part and, on alternative and 

independent grounds, deny the OneWeb 

Petition in full on the merits. Under 

§ 1.429(l)(3) of the Commission rules, 

the Commission may dismiss a petition 

for reconsideration that presents 

arguments previously considered and 

rejected. OneWeb previously raised the 

issue that the 10-year sunset period 

would effectively eliminate advantages 

of first-round operators because of the 

timing of second-round grants, since 

first-round operators would be protected 

from interference for little or no time 

after some second-round grantees are 

fully deployed. The Commission fully 

considered and rejected this argument 

in the Report and Order, finding that 

while the sunset may occur before some 

later-round systems have reached the 

full deployment milestone at nine years, 

contrary to OneWeb’s argument, this 

would not ‘‘effectively eliminate’’ 

advantages for first-round operators, 

since the speed of deployment of the 

later-round systems would not affect the 

overall time that the incumbents will be 

protected by systems approved in the 

later processing round. Accordingly, the 

Commission dismisses this part of the 

OneWeb Petition pursuant to 

§ 1.429(l)(3). 

On alternative and independent 

grounds, the Commission denies the 


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OneWeb Petition on the merits. The 

Report and Order for the first time 

adopted an inter-round protection 

requirement to replace the 

Commission’s explicit policy of case-bycase licensing of NGSO FSS systems 

after the cutoff date in an initial 

processing round. In doing so, the 

Commission considered numerous 

sunsetting proposals on the record, 

ranging from 6 years after the 

application cut-off date in a processing 

round to 15 years commencing from 

release of the Report and Order for the 

current Ku-/Ka-band processing rounds 

and 15 years from the first authorization 

or market access grant in a subsequent 

processing round for future processing 

rounds. 

First, the Report and Order ensured 

all NGSO FSS operators authorized 

through a processing round the same 10- 

year period of time, following the first 

authorization in a subsequent 

processing round, during which they are 

protected by systems approved in that 

subsequent processing round under the 

newly adopted inter-round protection 

requirement. The 10-year period, tied to 

the first authorization in a later round, 

balances the Commission’s goals to 

afford later-round systems equal 

spectrum sharing opportunities under 

the spectrum-splitting procedure once 

their full service constellations are 

operational, while providing earlierround systems time to adjust to the 

constellations ultimately deployed by 

later-round grantees, with simplicity 

and regulatory clarity. While it is true 

that first-round operators effectively had 

notice of seven years of protection from 

all second-round grantees under the 

new inter-round protection requirement, 

applying a 10-year sunset provision 

from the date of the release of the Report 

and Order would result in an effective 

13-year sunset period for the first 

system authorized in the second 

processing round, contrary to the 

Commission’s rationales for adopting 

the 10-year inter-round protection 

period and its goal of promoting new 

entry. 

Indeed, the basis for the adoption of 

a 10-year period was not because it was 

the minimum necessary period for 

earlier-round systems to adjust to new 

entrants. Rather, the Commission 

concentrated on the deployment 

timelines of later-round systems and 

reasoned that sunset period should 

‘‘relieve earlier-round grantees of the 

uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing 

with new entrants’’ while giving laterround systems an equal opportunity to 

operate with their full service 

constellations, which may be completed 

at the nine-year final deployment 

milestone. For OneWeb’s first-round 

system approved in 2017, and for other 

first-round systems, the Commission 

continues to find that a sunset date in 

2030 (ten years after the first grant in the 

subsequent processing round, which 

occurred in 2020) relieves them of the 

uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing 

with new entrants intended by the 

sunset period. The Report and Order 

further noted the iterative development 

of NGSO FSS systems and the fact that 

many earlier-round grantees, like 

OneWeb, have proposed updated, 

second-generation systems filed in a 

later processing round that will benefit 

from the sunsetting period applied to 

second-round systems. As Kuiper notes, 

OneWeb provided no specific evidence 

to support its assertion that the sunset 

period as adopted is in fact insufficient. 

The Report and Order also 

determined that sunsetting will not 

upset existing expectations of 

interference protection because, under 

Commission policy in effect prior to the 

Report and Order, later-round 

applicants were considered on a caseby-case basis as to whether they will be 

entitled to share spectrum on an equal 

basis with earlier-round systems—as 

such there was never a guarantee that 

earlier-round grantees would be entitled 

to protection from later-round systems. 

OneWeb’s citation to a grant condition 

in which a later-round licensee was 

required to protect NGSO FSS systems 

authorized through an earlier processing 

round does not create a reasonable 

expectation that OneWeb would be 

protected indefinitely from all laterround applicants. The Report and Order 

acknowledged the Commission’s thenexisting policy of case-by-case licensing 

of NGSO FSS systems filed after a 

processing round, including licensing 

conditions, and based on the record in 

the proceeding decided to adopt a 

generally applicable inter-round 

protection requirement with an 

accompanying sunset provision. While 

OneWeb argues the Commission 

‘‘provided no notice that all such laterround operators would be entitled to coequal operations,’’ the policy of case-bycase licensing meant that any future 

applicant—or all future applicants— 

could be afforded co-equal status with 

earlier-round systems. The sunset 

period also does not effectively create 

an open-ended processing round 

because the sunset guarantees a period 

of time of unequal protection for earlierround systems, during which earlierround systems are not required to 

protect later-round systems, while an 

open-ended processing round would 

immediately treat all NGSO FSS 

systems on an equal basis. 

Second, the Report and Order tied the 

10-year sunset date to the date of the 

first authorization in a later processing 

round. In doing so, the Commission 

acknowledged that ‘‘the sunset may 

occur before some later-round systems 

have reached the full deployment 

milestone at nine years’’ but reasoned, 

contrary to OneWeb’s argument, this 

would not ‘‘effectively eliminate’’ 

advantages for first-round operators, 

since the speed of deployment of the 

later-round systems would not affect the 

overall time that the incumbents will be 

protected by systems approved in the 

later processing round. Similarly, the 

Commission does not share OneWeb’s 

concern that some ‘‘second-round 

operators’ fully-deployed systems 

would never have to protect First Round 

operators, effectively placing the laterarriving operators in the first processing 

round,’’ ‘‘contrary to the Commission’s 

acknowledgement that First Round 

operators should have some benefits, 

and remov[ing] any meaningful 

incentive for second-round operators to 

coordinate with First Round operators.’’ 

The basis for the 10-year sunset period 

was not to lock in coordination 

advantages for earlier-round systems. 

Rather, the Commission determined that 

fully deployed later-round systems 

should be able to operate on an equal 

basis with earlier-round systems; not 

that they must protect earlier-round 

systems for a specific period of time 

after full deployment. Further, the 

benefit to earlier-round operators is that 

they are entitled to a 10-year period 

after the initial grant in a later 

processing round in which later-round 

systems must protect the earlier-round 

system while accepting any interference 

caused by the earlier-round system, 

unless a coordination agreement has 

been reached. And as explained in the 

Report and Order, the Commission does 

not expect the sunset period to 

introduce significant coordination 

delays because the period is long 

enough that a later-round grantee would 

not wish to operate for years without an 

agreement with earlier-round grantees. 

Finally, the Commission disagrees 

that the exploration of issues in the 

Further Notice, some of which OneWeb 

itself requested, justifies changing the 

sunset provision. Specifically, OneWeb 

argues that having as open issues ‘‘what 

protection levels should be imposed 

during and after the sunset period’’ and 

‘‘what ‘co-equal’ means when 

established operators are to operate a coequal basis with newer entrants’’ 

shortens the time period for it to prepare 

for new entrants at the end of the sunset 


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period. In the Second Report and Order 

above, the Commission reaffirms the 

decision in the Report and Order to 

apply the default, spectrum-splitting 

mechanism between earlier and laterround systems after sunset. Therefore, 

there is no change in the post-sunset 

regime from what was adopted in the 

Report and Order. In addition, the 

Second Report and Order declines to 

adopt any cap on the number of NGSO 

FSS systems that can operate in a given 

frequency band, negating OneWeb’s 

concern that doing so may render the 

sunset period superfluous. Similarly, 

the Second Report and Order does not 

place any restrictions on ‘‘the opening 

of different processing rounds,’’ nor 

limit ‘‘the number of NGSO systems 

accommodated.’’ The changes the 

Commission has adopted in the Second 

Report and Order to the inter-round 

protection requirement also do not 

‘‘shorten’’ the sunset period for firstround systems because, while they will 

apply immediately upon the effective 

date of the rule changes, they will not 

apply between first and second-round 

systems after the sunset period. 

IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis 

As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (IRFA) was incorporated in the 

Further Notice released in April 2023. 

The Commission sought written public 

comment on the proposals in the 

Further Notice, including comment on 

the IRFA. No comments were filed 

addressing the IRFA. The Final 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) 

conforms to the RFA. 

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Second Report and Order 

The Second Report and Order 

continues to facilitate the deployment of 

non-geostationary satellite orbit, fixedsatellite service (NGSO FSS) systems 

capable of providing broadband and 

other services on a global basis, by 

refining the Commission’s rules 

governing spectrum sharing among a 

new generation of broadband satellite 

constellations to promote market entry, 

regulatory certainty, and spectrum 

efficiency through good-faith 

coordination. The Commission amends 

its rules governing the treatment of 

NGSO FSS systems filed in different 

processing rounds clarifying certain 

details of the degraded throughput 

methodology that, in the absence of a 

coordination agreement, must be used 

in compatibility analyses by NGSO FSS 

system licensees authorized through 

later processing rounds to show they 

can operate compatibly with, and 

protect, NGSO FSS systems authorized 

through earlier processing rounds. 

Specifically, the Second Report and 

Order clarifies details regarding the 

implementation of a degraded 

throughput methodology by adopting a 

3 percent throughput degradation as a 

long-term interference protection 

criterion, a 0.4 percent absolute increase 

in link unavailability as a short-term 

interference protection criterion, and 

declining to adopt additional protection 

metrics or to adopt an aggregate limit on 

interference from later-round NGSO FSS 

systems into earlier-round NGSO FSS 

systems. It also affirms that the default, 

spectrum-splitting mechanism will be 

applied among NGSO systems in 

different processing rounds after the 

sunset period. The actions the 

Commission takes in this proceeding 

further its efforts to promote 

development, and competition among 

broadband NGSO FSS system 

proponents, including the market entry 

of new competitors. 

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised 

by Public Comments in Response to the 

IFRA 

There were no comments filed that 

specifically addressed the proposed 

rules and policies presented in the 

IRFA. 

C. Response to Comments by the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration 

Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs 

Act of 2010, which amended the RFA, 

the Commission is required to respond 

to any comments filed by the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration (SBA), and to 

provide a detailed statement of any 

change made to the proposed rules as a 

result of those comments. The Chief 

Counsel did not file any comments in 

response to the proposed rules. 

D. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities To Which the 

Rules Will Apply 

The RFA directs agencies to provide 

a description of, and where feasible, an 

estimate of the number of small entities 

that may be affected by the rules 

adopted herein. The RFA generally 

defines the term ‘‘small entity’’ as 

having the same meaning as the terms 

‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small organization,’’ 

and ‘‘small governmental jurisdiction.’’ 

In addition, the term ‘‘small business’’ 

has the same meaning as the term 

‘‘small business concern’’ under the 

Small Business Act. A ‘‘small business 

concern’’ is one which: (1) is 

independently owned and operated; (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation; 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. 

Satellite Telecommunications. This 

industry comprises firms ‘‘primarily 

engaged in providing 

telecommunications services to other 

establishments in the 

telecommunications and broadcasting 

industries by forwarding and receiving 

communications signals via a system of 

satellites or reselling satellite 

telecommunications.’’ Satellite 

telecommunications service providers 

include satellite and earth station 

operators. The SBA small business size 

standard for this industry classifies a 

business with $44 million or less in 

annual receipts as small. U.S. Census 

Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 

firms in this industry operated for the 

entire year. Of this number, 242 firms 

had revenue of less than $25 million. 

Consequently, using the SBA’s small 

business size standard most satellite 

telecommunications service providers 

can be considered small entities. The 

Commission notes however, that the 

SBA’s revenue small business size 

standard is applicable to a broad scope 

of satellite telecommunications 

providers included in the U.S. Census 

Bureau’s Satellite Telecommunications 

industry definition. Additionally, the 

Commission neither requests nor 

collects annual revenue information 

from satellite telecommunications 

providers, and is therefore unable to 

more accurately estimate the number of 

satellite telecommunications providers 

that would be classified as a small 

business under the SBA size standard. 

For purposes of this proceeding it is 

likely that there are very few entities 

meeting the SBA’s definition of small 

satellite telecommunications providers 

that are small satellite system operators 

involved in designing, manufacturing, 

and launching a satellite due to the 

generally a high fixed cost of these 

activities. 

All Other Telecommunications. This 

industry comprises firms ‘‘primarily 

engaged in providing specialized 

telecommunications services, such as 

satellite tracking, communications 

telemetry, and radar station operation. 

This industry also includes 

establishments primarily engaged in 

providing satellite terminal stations and 

associated facilities connected with one 

or more terrestrial systems and capable 

of transmitting telecommunications to, 

and receiving telecommunications from, 

satellite systems. Providers of internet 

services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or Voice 

over internet Protocol (VoIP) services, 

via client-supplied telecommunications 

connections are also included in this 


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industry. The SBA small business size 

standard for this industry classifies 

firms with annual receipts of $40 

million or less as small. U.S. Census 

Bureau data for 2017 show that there 

were 1,079 firms in this industry that 

operated for the entire year. Of those 

firms, 1,039 had revenue of less than 

$25 million. Based on this data, the 

Commission estimates that the majority 

of ‘‘All Other Telecommunications’’ 

firms can be considered small. 

E. Description of Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 

Requirements for Small Entities 

The Second Report and Order amends 

rules that are applicable to space station 

operators requesting a license or grant of 

U.S. market access from the 

Commission. Specifically, the Second 

Report and Order adopts changes to the 

spectrum sharing requirements among 

NGSO FSS satellite systems approved in 

different processing rounds, and 

specifies details of the technical 

demonstration that space station 

licensees and market access grantees 

that were authorized through a later 

processing round must submit to show 

that they will not cause harmful 

interference to space station licensees 

and market access grantees that were 

authorized through an earlier processing 

round, prior to the sunsetting period, if 

the later-round grantees have not 

certified that they have reached a 

coordination agreement with the earlierround grantees. The technical 

demonstration of compatibility between 

the later-round system and the earlierround system is based on a degraded 

throughput methodology and assessing 

absolute increase in link unavailability. 

The adopted metrics, values, and 

assumptions to finalize degraded 

throughput methodology will impact 

information later-round NGSO FSS 

system operators are required to report 

in compatibility analysis submissions. 

However, because of the costs involved 

in developing and deploying an NGSO 

FSS satellite constellation, the 

Commission anticipates that few NGSO 

FSS operators affected by this 

rulemaking would qualify under the 

SBA definition of ‘‘small entity,’’ and 

therefore small entities are not likely to 

have to hire professionals, or incur any 

compliance costs as a result of the 

Second Report and Order. 

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact on Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered 

The RFA requires an agency to 

provide, ‘‘a description of the steps the 

agency has taken to minimize the 

significant economic impact on small 

entities . . . including a statement of 

the factual, policy, and legal reasons for 

selecting the alternative adopted in the 

final rule and why each one of the other 

significant alternatives to the rule 

considered by the agency which affect 

the impact on small entities was 

rejected.’’ 

The Second Report and Order defines 

specific metrics for long-term 

interference and short-term interference 

that must be used in compatibility 

analyses demonstrating that a laterround NGSO FSS system will 

adequately protect an earlier-round 

system. Agreeing with the general 

consensus of commenters, the Second 

Report and Order adopts a 3 percent 

degraded throughput threshold as the 

long-term interference metric for interround compatibility analyses and a 0.4 

percent absolute increase in link 

unavailability as the short-term 

interference metric based on the 

technical record developed in this 

proceeding. The Commission concludes 

that establishing a specific long-term 

interference protection metric consistent 

with the technical evidence in the 

record provides the benefit of a clear 

standard for new entrants, and a 

benchmark that parties can use to 

negotiate any alternative long-term 

protections mutually agreed to in 

coordination. 

The Commission specifically 

considered, and declined, adopting 

additional protection metrics for loss of 

synchronization, multiple carrier-tonoise (C/N) objectives, or aggregate 

interference limits in part because of the 

additional complexities and costs that 

complying with such additional metrics 

could entail. Similarly, the Commission 

considered, and rejected, incorporating 

interference from additional sources in 

the baseline calculation, such as from 

GSO networks, other NGSO FSS 

systems, and intra-system noise, in part 

to simplify the analysis required of new 

entrants in the absence of a coordination 

agreement. Moreover, to lower burdens 

on later-round operators, the 

Commission provides illustrative 

examples of parameters that may be 

used when preparing compatibility 

analyses and which will be considered 

on a case-by-case basis as to whether 

they are reliable and representative. The 

Commission also considered and 

reaffirmed its decision from the Report 

and Order to apply the default, 

spectrum-splitting mechanism to earlier 

and later-round operators after the 

sunset date to place them on equal 

footing, noting that facilitating equal 

treatment of later-round operators after 

the sunset date was a key component of 

the sunset provision. Additionally, by 

reaffirming this decision the 

Commission ensures that earlier-round 

advantages do not continue indefinitely, 

and simplifies the regulatory framework 

when systems authorized through 

multiple processing rounds may be 

operating. 

G. Report to Congress 

The Commission will send a copy of 

the Second Report and Order, including 

this FRFA, in a report to be sent to 

Congress pursuant to the Congressional 

Review Act. In addition, the 

Commission will send a copy of the 

Second Report and Order, including 

this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for 

Advocacy of the SBA. 

V. Ordering Clauses 

Accordingly, it is ordered that, 

pursuant to sections 4(i), 7(a), 10, 303, 

308(b), and 316 of the Communications 

Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 

154(i), 157(a), 160, 303, 308(b), 316, that 

is the Second Report and Order and 

Order on Reconsideration is adopted, 

the policies, rules, and requirements 

discussed herein are adopted, and Part 

25 of the Commission’s rules is 

amended. 

It is further ordrered that, pursuant to 

sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), and 405 of the 

Communications Act of 1934, as 

amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 

405, and 47 CFR 1.429(b), (l)(3), that the 

petition for reconsideration filed by 

WorldVu Satellites Limited in IB Docket 

No. 21–456, is dismissed in part and, on 

alternative and independent grounds, 

denied. 

It is further ordered that the Second 

Report and Order and Order on 

Reconsideration shall be effective 30 

days after publication in the Federal 

Register, except that § 25.261(d), which 

may contain new or modified 

information collection requirements, 

will not become effective until the 

Office of Management and Budget 

completes review of any information 

collection requirements that the Space 

Bureau determines is required under the 

Paperwork Reduction Act. The 

Commission directs the Space Bureau to 

announce the effective date of 

§ 25.261(d) by subsequent Public Notice. 

It is further ordered that the 

Commission’s Office of Secretary shall 

send a copy of the Second Report and 

Order and Order on Reconsideration, 

including the Final Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration. 

It is further ordered that the 

Commission’s Office of the Managing 

Director, Performance Program 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 100917 

Management, shall send a copy of the 

Second Report and Order and Order on 

Reconsideration in a report to be sent to 

Congress and the Government 

Accountability Office pursuant to the 

Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 

801(a)(1)(A). 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 25 

Satellites. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary. 

Final Rules 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Communications 

Commission amends 47 CFR part 25 as 

follows: 

PART 25—SATELLITE 

COMMUNICATIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 25 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 

307, 309, 310, 319, 332, 605, and 721, unless 

otherwise noted. 

■ 2. Amend § 25.261 by revising 

paragraphs (d) and (e) to read as follows: 

§ 25.261 Sharing among NGSO FSS space 

stations. 

* * * * * 

(d) Protection of earlier-round 

systems. Prior to commencing 

operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or 

market access recipient must either 

certify that it has completed a 

coordination agreement with any 

operational NGSO FSS system licensed 

or granted U.S. market access in an 

earlier processing round, or submit for 

Commission approval a compatibility 

showing which demonstrates by use of 

a degraded throughput methodology 

that it will not cause harmful 

interference to any such system with 

which coordination has not been 

completed. If an earlier-round system 

becomes operational after a later-round 

system has commenced operations, the 

later-round licensee or market access 

recipient must submit a certification of 

coordination or a compatibility showing 

with respect to the earlier-round system 

no later than 60 days after the earlierround system commences operations as 

notified pursuant to § 25.121(b) or 

otherwise. 

(1) Compatibility showings must 

contain the following elements: 

(A) A demonstration that the laterround system will cause no more than 

3 percent time-weighted average 

degraded throughput of the link to the 

earlier-round system, for links with a 

baseline link availability of 99.0 percent 

or higher at a C/N threshold of 0 dB; 

(B) A demonstration that the laterround system will cause no more than 

0.4 percent absolute change in link 

availability to the earlier-round system 

using a C/N threshold value of 0 dB, for 

links with a baseline link availability of 

99.0 percent link availability or higher; 

and 

(C) With respect to an earlier-round 

system that has not yet satisfied its 50 

percent deployment milestone pursuant 

to § 25.164(b)(1), the compatibility 

showing may consider only 50 percent 

deployment of the earlier-round system; 

if the 50 percent deployment milestone 

has been satisfied, the showing must 

consider 100 percent deployment of the 

authorized system. 

(2) Compatibility showings will be 

placed on public notice pursuant to 

§ 25.151(a)(13). 

(3) While a compatibility showing 

remains pending before the 

Commission, the submitting NGSO FSS 

licensee or market access recipient may 

commence operations on an 

unprotected, non-interference basis with 

respect to the operations of the system 

that is the subject of the showing. 

(4) A later-round NGSO FSS system 

will be required to conform its 

operations to its compatibility showing 

submitted for the protection of an 

earlier-round system to the extent 

necessary to protect the actual number 

of deployed and operating space 

stations of the earlier-round system. 

(e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first 

authorization or grant of market access 

in a processing round, the systems 

approved in that processing round will 

no longer be required to protect earlierrounds systems under paragraph (d) of 

this section, and instead will be 

required to share spectrum with earlierround systems under paragraph (c) of 

this section. 

[FR Doc. 2024–28993 Filed 12–12–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 300 

[RTID 0648–XE447] 

Fraser River Sockeye Salmon 

Fisheries; In-Season Orders 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Temporary rule; in-season 

orders. 

SUMMARY: NMFS publishes in-season 

orders to regulate treaty tribal and nontribal (all citizen) commercial salmon 

fisheries in United States (U.S.) waters 

of the Fraser River Panel (Panel) Area. 

In 2024, a single order was issued by the 

Panel of the Pacific Salmon Commission 

(Commission) and approved and issued 

by NMFS for fisheries within the U.S. 

Panel Area. This order relinquished 

regulatory control of U.S. treaty tribal 

and all citizen commercial fisheries in 

U.S. Panel Area waters. 

DATES: The effective dates for the inseason order is set out in this document 

under the heading In-season Orders. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Anthony Siniscal at 971–322–8407, 

email: Anthony.siniscal@noaa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Treaty between the Government of the 

United States of America and the 

Government of Canada concerning 

Pacific salmon was signed at Ottawa on 

January 28, 1985, and subsequently was 

given effect in the United States by the 

Pacific Salmon Treaty Act (Act) at 16 

U.S.C. 3631–3644. 

Under authority of the Act, Federal 

regulations at 50 CFR part 300, subpart 

F, provide a framework for the 

implementation of certain regulations of 

the Commission and in-season orders of 

the Commission’s Panel for U.S. sockeye 

and pink salmon fisheries in the Fraser 

River Panel Area. 

The regulations close the U.S. portion 

of the Panel Area to U.S. sockeye and 

pink salmon tribal and non-tribal 

commercial fishing unless opened by 

Panel regulations that are given effect by 

in-season orders issued by NMFS (50 

CFR 300.94(a)(1)). During the fishing 

season, NMFS may issue in-season 

orders that establish fishing times and 

areas consistent with the Commission 

agreements and regulations of the Panel. 

Such orders must be consistent with 

domestic legal obligations and are 

issued by the Regional Administrator, 

West Coast Region, NMFS. Official 

notification of these in-season actions is 

provided by two telephone hotline 

numbers described at 50 CFR 

300.97(b)(1) and in 89 FR 44553 (May 

21, 2024). The in-season orders are 

published in the Federal Register as 

soon as practicable after they are issued. 

Due to the frequency with which inseason orders are generally issued, 

publication of orders during the fishing 

season is impracticable. 

In-Season Orders 

The Fraser Panel did not issue any 

orders opening fisheries on sockeye or 

pink salmon in 2024. NMFS issued the 

following in-season order for U.S. 


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