This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 THE BANK OF NEW YORK 2 MELLON, F/K/A THE BANK OF 3 NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR 4 THE HOLDERS OF THE CERTIFICATES, 5 FIRST HORIZON PASS-THROUGH 6 CERTIFICATES SERIES FHAMS 7 2006-AA6, BY FIRST HORIZON HOME 8 LOANS, A DIVISION OF FIRST 9 TENNESSEE BANK NATIONAL 10 ASSOCIATION MASTER SERVICER, 11 IN ITS CAPACITY AS AGENT FOR 12 THE TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING 13 AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, 14
Plaintiff-Appellee, 15
vs. No. 33,208 16
FLORIANA VENETICO, 17 Defendant-Appellant. 18

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 19 Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge 20 Cavin & Ingram, P.A. 212 Stephen D. Ingram 1 Albuquerque, NM 2 for Appellee 3 Richard S. Mackenzie 4 Santa Fe, NM 5 for Appellant 6 MEMORANDUM OPINION 7 HANISEE, Judge. 8
{1} Defendant appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff 9 in this foreclosure case. We issued a second notice of proposed disposition proposing 10 to affirm, and Defendantresponded with a memorandum in opposition. We have 11 carefully considered the arguments raisedin that memorandum. However, for the 12 reasons stated below, we continue to belie ve the first and second notices of proposed 13 disposition correctly analyzed the issues and should be followed. We therefore affirm 14 the judgment entered by the district court in this case, for the reasons stated below as 15 well as those discussed in the notices. 16
{2} In the second notice of proposed disposition we relied heavily on our 17 assumption that the original lender, Firs t Horizon Home Loan Corporation (FHHLC), 18 is also the Plaintiff in this case, denominated as “First Horizon Home Loans, a 19 division of First Tennessee Bank, N.A.” Wedid not view the absence of the word 203 “Corporation” from Plaintiff’s title as signifi cant or as altering in any way Plaintiff’s 1 right to enforce the note. In response, Defendant does not ar gue that FHHLC and 2 Plaintiff are in fact different legal entities; instead, she argues only that “the record of 3 this case is devoid” of any evidence or facts supporting that proposition. [2d MIO 2-8] 4
{3} Defendant did not raise this specific ar gument in the district court. She did 5 mention in passing, in an affidavit, that “[i]n 2005 a promissory note was filed by a 6 company (First Horizon Home Loan Corporation) which does not appear as a party 7 in this action.” [RP 168] However, she did so only to support her argument that 8 Plaintiff had not shown that the note it was attempting to enforce was the same note 9 that Defendant signed in 2005. [RP 163] Defendant did not argue, as she does now, 10 that Plaintiff had no standing because it had not established that it had the right to 11 enforce the note at the time it f iled this action. Thus, she did not alert Plaintiff to the 12 necessity of providing proof of its legal status vis a visFHHLC during the proceedings 13 below, and Plaintiff therefore had no occasi on to do so. In similar circumstances, we 14 have held that if the record on appeal allo ws a reasonable inferen ce that an entity has 15 standing to maintain an action, and there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court can 16 presume that the entity did in f act have the requisite standing. Los Vigiles Land Grant 17 v. Rebar Haygood Ranch, LLC, 2014-NMCA-017, ¶¶ 10, 20, 317 P.3d 842. Given the 18 close similarity in names between FHHLC and Plaintiff, and the lack of any evidence 191 We presume counsel for Defendant simp ly failed to research the question of 14 FHHLC’s identity as it relates to Plaintiffs . Otherwise, given the undisputed facts we 15 discuss below, we would have to conclude that counsel acted in a highly 16 unprofessional manner in falsely suggesting to this Court that Plaintiff is a separate 17 legal entity from FHHLC such that it does not have the right to enforce promissory 18 notes made payable to FHHLC. If counseldid know the facts we discuss, it was 19 disingenuous to repeatedly st ate that the record is devoid of evidence of the 20 connection between Plaintiff and FHHLC, all the while knowing the true situation. 21 See, e.g., Rule 16-303(A) NMRA (discussing an attorney’s duty of candor toward a 22 tribunal). We prefer to believe counsel’s erro r was one of omission rather than an 23 affirmative attempt to mislead. 24 4 to the contrary in the recordbelow, we may presume Plaintiff has the same legal rights 1 as FHHLC to enforce the promissory note in question here. 2
{4} Furthermore, unlike Defendant, we have researched this question and have 3 discovered that Plaintiff does indeed have the legal right to enforce promissory notes 4 arising out of loans made by FHHLC. 1 Plaintiff is a division of First Tennessee Bank, 5 N.A., and a successor in interest by merger to FHHLC, a fact that has been pointed out 6 by many courts. See, e.g., In re Weisband , BAP Nos. AZ-10-1239, AZ-10-1267- 7 PaJuMk, 2011 WL 3303453, at *1 n. 3 (BAP 9th Cir. June 13, 2011) (noting that First 8 Horizon Home Loans, a division of First Tennessee Bank National Association, is the 9 successor by merger to FHHLC as a result of a merger occurring in 2007); Barlee v. 10 First Horizon Nat’l Corp. , No. 12-3045, 2013 WL 1389747, at*1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. April 11 15, 2013); Diaz v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp. , No. 12-178 ML, 2012 WL 12 4855202, at *1 n.1 (D. R.I. Oct. 12, 2012); First Horizon Bank v. Moriarity-Gentile , 135 No. 10-CV-0289 (KAM) (RER), 2012 WL 4481509, at *1 n.1 (E.D. N.Y. Aug. 17, 1 2012). The fact that Plaintiff is now a di vision of First Tennessee Bank, rather than 2 a subsidiary corporation as it was previ ously, has no impact on Plaintiff’s ability to 3 enforce the promissory note and mortgage. See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Romero , 4 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 17, 320 P.3d 1 (recognizing that a successor in interest to a party 5 to a contract has standing to maintain su it on that contract). Therefore, Defendant’s 6 objections to our reliance on Plaintiff’s status as the original lender and original holder 7 of the note and mortgage are without merit and provide no grounds for departing from 8 the analysis contained in the second notice of proposed disposition. Given Plaintiff’s 9 legal status in this case, we reject De fendant’s arguments concerning real-party-in10 interest and standing, for the reasons stated in the second notice of proposed summary 11 disposition. 12
{5} The other major argument contained in Defendant’s second memorandum in 13 opposition is a renewed attack on the ad missibility of Tiera Thune’s affidavit, 14 including a claim that the affi davit is insufficient to auth enticate the promissory note, 15 mortgage, and mortgage assignment that are central to this case. The district court 16 rejected Defendant’s challenge to the affi davit, [RP 188] and we have twice proposed 17 to do the same. In response to our last proposal, Defendant again raises a number of 18 objections to the sufficiency of the affidavit, without citing a single case in support of 196 any of those objections. [2d MIO 10-13] Where no authority is cited, this Court may 1 presume no such authority exists. City of Eunice v. State of N.M. Taxation & Revenue 2 Dep’t , 2014-NMCA-085, ¶ 17, 331 P.3d 986, cert. denied , 2014-NMCERT-007, 331 3 P.3d 923, and cert. granted , 2014-NMCERT-008, 334 P.3d 425. Furthermore, it is not 4 this Court’s duty to attempt to discern the legal basis for Defendant’s arguments. See 5 Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 6 1076 (holding that this Court has no duty to re view an argument that is not adequately 7 developed). We therefore affirm on the que stion of the admissibility and sufficiency 8 of the Thune affidavit, for the reasons stated in the first and second notices of 9 proposed disposition. 10
{6} Defendant raises another argument that is not supported by any cited authority: 11 a claim that the original 2005 mortgage cont ained no legal description of the property, 12 and that this somehow legally prevented Pl aintiff from having the ability to foreclose 13 on the mortgage, because Plaintiff subsequently re-recorded a mortgage that contained 14 the originally-missing legal description. [2d MIO 8-9] Once again, where no authority 15 is cited in support of an argument, we presume there is no such authority, and we 16 affirm on that basis. See City of Eunice , 2014-NMCA-085, ¶ 17. Also, we note that 17 the district court found there were no disputedfacts regarding this issue— the original 18 mortgage omitted the legal description of the property (although it did contain the 197 physical address of the property [RP 9]), and the mortgage was subsequently re1 recorded to add the legal description. [RP 188] Defendant has never presented any 2 evidence or legal authority indicating that either the original mortgage or the re3 recorded mortgage do not secure the promisso ry note she entered in to in exchange for 4 the mortgage loan she received. Plain tiff was therefore properly granted summary 5 judgment on this issue. 6
{7} Without any citation to the record or tolegal authority, Defendant also makes 7 a cursory argument to the effect that no evid ence was presented to show that Plaintiff 8 owned the mortgage at the time this lawsu it was initiated; she maintains this is a 9 “glaring jurisdictional defect.” [2d MIO 9] Again, we decline to develop Defendant’s 10 argument for her. See Headley , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15. We do note that Plaintiff was 11 the original mortgagee on the mortgage, and the record also contains an assignment 12 of the mortgage to Plaintiff dated Janu ary 11, 2010, nine days before the first 13 complaint was filed in this case. [RP 30] We therefore reject this argument. 14
{8} Based on the foregoing discussion as well as the analyses set out in the first and 15 second notices of proposed disposition, we hol d that Plaintiff had standing to enforce 16 both the promissory note and the mortgage at issue in this case at the time this lawsuit 17 was initiated. We also hold the district court properly granted summary judgment to 18 Plaintiff, and therefore affirm the district court’s decision. 198 {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

_____________________________ 2 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 3

WE CONCUR: 4

__________________________________ 5 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 6

__________________________________ 7 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 8