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DA 21-0348

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2022 MT 222N

ROBERT STINCHFIELD,

 Plaintiff, Appellant,

 and Cross-Appellee,

 v.

CITY OF SIDNEY,

 Defendant, Appellee,

 and Cross-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,

In and For the County of Richland, Cause No. DV-20-11

Honorable Kaydee Snipes Ruiz, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

William A. D’Alton, D’Alton Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana

For Appellee:

Gerry P. Fagan, Afton E. Ball, Moulton Bellingham PC, Billings, 

Montana

Submitted on Briefs: September 21, 2022

 Decided: November 1, 2022

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

11/01/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0348
2

Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating 

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not 

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this 

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana 

Reports. 

¶2 Robert Stinchfield (Stinchfield) appeals from two Seventh Judicial District Court 

decisions denying his motions for partial summary judgment and judgment as a matter of 

law in his wrongful discharge from employment action. We affirm.

¶3 Following ongoing concerns regarding unsafe behavior, the chief of the Sidney 

Police Department (the Department) recommended Stinchfield’s termination from the 

Department. The mayor of Sidney accepted the recommendation and terminated 

Stinchfield from his position as an officer on November 5, 2018. Stinchfield brought a suit 

for wrongful discharge against the City of Sidney (the City). On motion for summary 

judgment, and again on motion for judgment as a matter of law, Stinchfield argued that the 

City had not followed its own personnel policies when it terminated Stinchfield, in 

violation of § 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA. The City also filed its own motion for summary 

judgment. The District Court denied the motions and, following a four-day trial, the jury 

found in favor of the City. Stinchfield appeals the denial of his motions for summary 

judgment and judgment as a matter of law, while the City cross-appeals the denial of its 

motion for summary judgment.
3

¶4 This Court reviews a district court’s decision on motions for summary judgment or 

judgment as a matter of law de novo for correctness. Johnson v. Costco Wholesale, 2007 

MT 43, ¶ 18, 336 Mont. 105, 152 P.3d 727; Krajacich v. Great Falls Clinic, LLP, 2012 

MT 82, ¶ 13, 364 Mont. 455, 276 P.3d 922. Summary judgment is only appropriate where 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Krajacich, ¶ 13; M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Judgment as a matter of law is 

properly granted only when there is a complete absence of any evidence which would 

justify submitting an issue to a jury and all such evidence and any legitimate inferences 

that might be drawn from the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to 

the party opposing the motion. Johnson, ¶ 11; M. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). 

¶5 A discharge is wrongful if the “employer materially violated an express provision 

of its own written personnel policy prior to the discharge, and the violation deprived the 

employee of a fair and reasonable opportunity to remain in a position of employment with 

the employer.” Section 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA. Stinchfield argues that the City violated 

Policy 2.14 of the City of Sidney Employee Policy Manual (Policy Manual), which requires 

a supervisor to contemporaneously notify an employee and conduct an investigation into 

alleged policy violations upon learning of them.1 However, the “Exemptions” section of 

the Policy manual states: 

The disciplinary procedures outlined in this manual do not apply to 

the police department. In addition, certain police personnel polic[i]es or 

policies related to safety sensitive functions may differ from this manual. 

1 Trial testimony indicated that Stinchfield’s supervisors had repeatedly verbally informed 

Stinchfield of his deficiencies and had considered at length how to address these shortcomings, 

eventually putting him in remedial placements in hopes of improving his skills.
4

The City of Sidney recognizes that sworn members of the Police Department 

are governed by a set of rules, regulations, polic[i]es, procedures, directives, 

and disciplinary guidelines, some of which may be statutorily provided for. 

Therefore, it is intended that the polic[i]es contained in this manual shall act 

in conjunction with those Department rules, regulations, policies, 

procedures, directives and disciplinary guidelines as established and shall 

apply to any areas of employment by the City of Sidney, not specifically 

covered by Department rules, regulations, policies, procedures, directives, 

and disciplinary guidelines.

All such personnel should contact their supervisor for copies [of] the 

applicable personnel and disciplinary policies.

(Emphasis added.)

¶6 The procedures outlined in Policy 2.14—which commences with the statement that 

“City employees are subject to disciplinary action”—are clearly “disciplinary” in nature, 

and therefore subject to the Policy Manual’s language exempting police department 

personnel. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the exemption section clearly indicates that Policy 

2.14 is not applicable to City police officers such as Stinchfield. 

¶7 Stinchfield’s primary contention is that the mayor, by attaching Policy 2.16, titled 

Employee Grievance, of the Policy manual to Stinchfield’s termination letter, conceded 

that the Policy Manual applies to police officers like Stinchfield. However, even if the act 

of attaching a grievance policy to a termination letter could somehow preclude the effect 

of the plain language of the Policy Manual’s exemption section for purposes of 

§ 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA, the mayor’s act was not, in any event, inconsistent with the 

language clearly stating that only “disciplinary procedures,” not grievance policies, are 

exempted. 

¶8 The remainder of Stinchfield’s legal arguments are difficult to discern. He quotes 

numerous pages from the trial transcript and disputes various items of testimony by City 
5

witnesses regarding whether the Department had or applied disciplinary or termination 

procedures of its own, and whether the Department in fact “investigat[ed]” (rather than 

merely “evaluat[ed]” or remediated) Stinchfield’s alleged performance deficiencies. 

However, police officers such as Stinchfield are clearly exempted from applicability of 

Policy 2.14 and Stinchfield himself asserts that there was no other termination policy 

promulgated by either the City or the Department that was applicable to him. Contrary to 

Stinchfield’s argument, the Department’s alleged lack of its own termination policy did not 

override the plain meaning of the opening sentence of the Policy Manual’s Exemption 

Section.2 Stinchfield fails to point to an applicable personnel policy and therefore cannot 

show that the undisputed facts or evidence demonstrate that the City violated its own 

policies under § 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA. The District Court did not err in denying 

Stinchfield’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law.

¶9 Because the District Court did not err in denying Stinchfield’s motions and we 

therefore uphold the jury verdict in favor of the City, we need not reach the issue raised by 

the City’s cross-appeal regarding whether the District Court erred in denying the City’s 

motion for summary judgment.

2

In his Reply Brief, Stinchfield asserts that Department policies do not afford sufficient 

pre-termination due process to officers such as Stinchfield. A reply brief must be confined to new 

matter raised in the brief of the appellee. M. R. App. P. 12(3). The City does not make due-process 

arguments in its Response Brief and, moreover, Stinchfield did not raise a constitutional due 

process claim in his Opening Brief, nor does he show on appeal where this argument was preserved 

below. 

Also in his Reply Brief, Stinchfield brings up allegations of poor conduct and performance 

by his then-supervisors at the Department. He fails to show how such allegations are relevant to 

the question of whether he demonstrated an absence of disputed fact material to, or evidence 

justifying submission to a jury regarding, the question of whether the City had violated an express 

provision of its policy pursuant to § 39-2-904(1)(c), MCA.
6

¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the 

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of 

applicable standards of review. 

¶11 Affirmed.

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

We Concur: 

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

/S/ BETH BAKER

/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR