COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Agee 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

JEFFREY SCOTT KIBLER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0165-02-4 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE 

 DECEMBER 3, 2002 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PAGE COUNTY 

John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 

 David A. Downes for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 On January 22, 1996, Jeffrey Scott Kibler (Kibler) was 

convicted in the Page County Circuit Court of two counts of 

forgery, two counts of uttering, one count of attempted uttering, 

and one count of petit larceny by false pretenses. For these 

crimes Kibler received sentences totaling 15 years and 12 months 

incarceration with 12 years and 12 months suspended so long as 

certain conditions were met and he "keep the peace and be of good 

behavior, including obeying the usual rules and regulations of the 

places of his confinement." 

 On October 23, 2000, the court revoked two years of the 

suspended sentences for various violations. The remainder of the 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.
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suspended sentences continued the "good behavior" requirement in 

addition to other standard stipulations. On January 9, 2002, the 

circuit court conducted a revocation proceeding on the 

Commonwealth's petition to revoke the remainder of Kibler's 

suspended sentences. At the conclusion of that proceeding the 

trial court revoked five years of Kibler's suspended sentences 

based on three instances of violating the "good behavior" 

provision: 

 (1) the possession of a pencil sharpener containing a razor 

blade in violation of the rules of the Page County jail, 

 (2) a statement to a corrections officer that upon release he 

would rape and molest young children and that hopefully some of 

them would die, and 

 (3) an admission to correctional officers that he sent family 

members envelopes through the mail containing a white powder.1

 Kibler asserts that the court abused its discretion in 

revoking the suspended sentences because the evidence was 

insufficient to show substantial misconduct. We disagree and 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

1

 As the parties are fully conversant with the record in 

this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no 

precedential value, only those facts necessary to a disposition 

of this appeal are recited. 
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 

in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all 

reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See

Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 

537 (1975). Moreover, the General Assembly has granted trial 

courts wide authority to revoke a suspended sentence. 

In any case in which the court has suspended 

the execution or imposition of sentence, the 

court may revoke the suspension of sentence 

for any cause the court deems sufficient that 

occurred at any time within the probation 

period, or within the period of suspension 

fixed by the court. 

Code § 19.2-306. 

 The Virginia Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed the 

breadth of this discretion lodged with the trial court. "[A] 

revocation of a suspended sentence lies in the discretion of the 

trial court and that . . . discretion is quite broad." Hamilton 

v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976) 

(citing Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 38 S.E.2d 479 

(1946)). "[T]he issue on review of a revocation 'is simply 

whether there has been an abuse of discretion.'" Connelly v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 888, 890, 420 S.E.2d 244, 245 (1992) 

(quoting Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 221, 116 S.E.2d 

270, 274 (1960)). 
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 While the trial court's discretion in revocation proceedings 

is quite broad, it is not unfettered. 

The cause deemed by the court to be 

sufficient for revoking a suspension must be 

a reasonable cause. . . . "[The court's] 

finding of fact and judgment thereon are 

reversible only upon a clear showing of 

abuse of such discretion." The discretion 

required is a judicial discretion, the 

exercise of which "implies conscientious 

judgment, not arbitrary action." 

Marshall, 202 Va. at 220, 116 S.E.2d at 274 (quoting Slayton, 

185 Va. at 367, 38 S.E.2d at 484) (emphasis added); see also

Duff v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 293, 297, 429 S.E.2d 465, 467 

(1993). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 The trial court clearly found from the evidence that: (1) 

Kibler possessed a sharp object – either a detached razor blade 

or a prohibited pencil sharpener, (2) told a corrections officer 

that he planned to rape, molest and kill little children upon 

his release, and (3) sent envelopes containing white powder to 

various family members which he admitted to corrections 

officials during the nationwide concern about anthrax-laced 

letters in 2001. 

 Kibler argued the mailing of the powdered letters should 

not be considered because he testified this occurred before the 

anthrax scare began. However, Kibler also told corrections 

officers he thought a federal detainer was in place against him 

because of the mailings. The trial court was entitled to 
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disbelieve Kibler's testimony and assume he was lying to cover 

his guilt. "[T]he fact finder is not required to believe all 

aspects of a defendant's statement or testimony; the judge or 

jury may reject that which it finds implausible, but accept 

other parts which it finds to be believable." Pugliese v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 (1993) 

(quoting Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 

603, 606 (1973)). The trial court was further entitled to give 

the incident such weight as it deemed proper. See Walton v. 

Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 426, 497 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1998) 

("Great deference must be given to the factfinder who, having 

seen and heard the witnesses, assesses their credibility and 

weighs their testimony."). 

 Kibler contended for the first time at oral argument that 

even if the revocation was justified, based on the other 

incidents, the matter should be remanded for re-sentencing due 

to the unknown weight given the letter incident in determining 

the total revocation period. This concept was never argued to 

the trial court or made in Kibler's brief. We therefore do not 

consider this argument under the provisions of Rule 5A:18. "The 

Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which 

was not presented to the trial court." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). No argument 

was advanced for application of the "ends of justice" exception, 

and we see none. 
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 While a trial court may revoke a suspended sentence "for any 

cause the court deems sufficient" under Code § 19.2-306, the 

Supreme Court of Virginia has interpreted this language to mean a 

"reasonable cause." Slayton, 185 Va. at 367, 38 S.E.2d at 484. 

Although the court's basis for revocation must be reasonable, 

this Court has held that a defendant's actions need not be 

criminal conduct, but must be substantial misconduct. See

Holden v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 38, 43-44, 497 S.E.2d 492, 

494-95 (1998). 

 Possession of a sharp instrument, threats to children and 

improper use of the mail are alike in all not being acts of good 

behavior. Each of the three incidents cited by the trial court, 

standing alone, would arguably be sufficient to be deemed by a 

trial court substantial misconduct sufficient to revoke Kibler's 

suspended sentences. When considered as a whole, Kibler's 

collective conduct satisfies any reasonable definition of 

substantial misconduct sufficient to revoke a suspended 

sentence. 

 It is apparent on the record that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in revoking Kibler's suspended sentences. 

The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. 

Affirmed.