This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8 vs. No. 31,074 9 Consolidated with 31,077 10 JORDAN S., 11 Child-Appellant. 12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 13 John M. Paternoster, District Judge 14 Gary King, Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Jacqueline L. Cooper, Ac ting Chief Public Defender 18 Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 VIGIL, Judge. 23 Child appeals from two judgments of the district court; one judgment 24 adjudicated him as a delinquent child fo r having committed the act of aggravated 252 assault with a deadly weapon (as an acce ssory) by admission, and the other judgment 1 adjudicated him as a youthful offender for having committed the act of assault by a 2 prisoner causing great bodily harm (as anaccessory) and aggravated assault upon a 3 peace officer causing great bodily harm (as anaccessory). We issued two notices of 4 proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm each judgment of the district 5 court. Child filed a motion to consolidate the appeals, which we granted under Case 6 No. 31,074. After the consolidation, Ch ild filed a single memorandum in opposition 7 in response to our notices. We have considered Child’s response and remain 8 unpersuaded that Child has demonstratederror. Therefore, we affirm. 9 Accessory Liability 10 On appeal, Child argues that the districtcourt erred by ruling that his offenses 11 were among those enumerated in NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-3(J) (2009), because those 12 offenses were not listed as having been committed by an accessory. Child argues that, 13 as a result, he should not have been punish ed as a youthful offender or, alternatively, 14 the rule of lenity should resolve the ambi guity in the Children’s Code in his favor. 15 [MIO 5-9] 16 We are not persuaded that accessory liability has lesser consequences than 17 principal liability. In State v. Perez , 2002-NMCA-040, ¶¶ 18, 23, 132 N.M. 84, 44 18 P.3d 530, we addressed this question and held that a child adjudicated as a youthful 193 offender for having been an accessory to oneof the enumerated offenses is to be 1 punished in the same way as a juvenile ad judicated to have committed the offense as 2 a principal. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is considered one of the 3 offenses enumerated as Section 32A-2-3(J)(1 )(b), assault with the intent to commit a 4 violent felony. [DS 3] Also, assault by a prisoner causing great bodily harm and 5 aggravated battery on a peace officer cau sing great bodily harm are considered 6 offenses enumerated respectively as Secti on 32A-2-3(J)(1)(f). As a result, we are not 7 persuaded that the district court erred by punishing Child as a youthful offender or that 8 the rule of lenity should apply. 9 Extended Commitment 10 Child argues that the district court erred by imposing the extended commitment 11 in the care of CYFD until he reaches the ag e of twenty-one because (1) it was based 12 on the court’s erroneous belief that it did not have discretion to do otherwise, (2) Child 13 was only liable as an accessory, and (3) the court should have considered Child’s 14 psychological evaluation as mitigating eviden ce. [MIO 9-15] Weare not persuaded. 15 Child represents that the district court did not believe that it had discretion to 16 impose less than the extended commitment. [MIO 9-12] To support this 17 representation, Child notes that the districtcourt judge asked trial counsel if he was 18 “inviting the court to summarily alter the available sanctions as provided in the 194 Children’s Code because [the case involved] accessory liability rather than principal 1 liability.” [MIO 10] Also, before issuing its final decision, the court stated that it 2 would “not change the law from the benc h” and imposed the extended commitment. 3 [Id.] Child contends that th ese statements indicate that the court did not believe that 4 a lesser punishment was possible. [I d.] We are not convinced by Child’s 5 characterization of the court’s comments. It appears to us that the court was referring 6 to its lack of discretion as to Child’s status as a youthful offender for having been 7 adjudicated for an enumeratedoffense as an accessory, not its lack of discretion as to 8 the extent of the punishment for his accessory liability. 9 We also note that the district c ourt’s decision to impose the extended 10 commitment is not contrary to law. As we stated above, Child committed acts 11 enumerated in the statute, the State did not seek to sentence Child as an adult, and the 12 district court found that a juvenile dispos ition was appropriate; thus, Child could have 13 been “subject[ed] to extended commitment inthe care of the department until the age 14 of twenty-one.” NMSA 1978, § 32A-2- 20(F) (2009) (using permissive language to 15 allow the district court to subject a youthful offender to the extended commitment 16 where a juvenile disposition is appropriate). [RP 52] The district court had discretion 17 within the limits of the Delinquency Ac t to impose the extended commitment and, 18 therefore, had discretion to consider wh ether the psychologicalevaluation rendered 195 another consequence more appropriate. Cf. State v. Jones , 2010-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 35- 1 38, 41, 45, 148 N.M. 1, 229 P.3d 474 (describing the purpose of an amenability 2 hearing and the discretion of the districtcourt under the Delinque ncy Act). We will 3 not hold that the district court abused th at discretion only because it did not impose 4 the consequences Child would have preferred. [MIO 13-15] 5 Amenability Hearing 6 Lastly, Child argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 7 conduct a hearing on Child’s amenability to treatment. [MIO 15-16] Child now 8 pursues this argument under the demands of State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 127, 129, 428 9 P.2d 982, 984 (1967); and State v. Boyer , 103 N.M. 655, 658-60, 712 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Ct. 10 App. 1985). [MIO 15] As we stated in our notices, we hold that Child was not entitled 11 to amenability-to-treatment hearing because the State did notgive notice of its intent 12 to invoke an adult sentence and because Child was not subject to sentencing as an 13 adult. See § 32A-2-20(B)(1); Jones , 2010-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 36-38 (observing that a 14 child’s “commitment to a facility for the care and rehabilitation of adjudicated 15 delinquent children for a period of up to two years” is a possible consequence after an 16 amenability hearing where the child may f ace an adult sentence (internal quotation 17 marks and citation omitted)). 186 For the reasons stated in our notices and in this opinion, we affirm the 1 judgments and dispositions of the district court. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

_______________________________ 4 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 5

WE CONCUR: 6

_________________________________ 7 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 8

_________________________________ 9 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 10