Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed June 15, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D21-598

Lower Tribunal No. 20-19278

________________

Andre White,

Appellant,

vs.

AutoZone Investment Corporation, 

d/b/a AutoZone Auto Parts,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lourdes 

Simon, Judge.

Law Offices of Levy & Levy, P.A., and Chad E. Levy (Sunrise); Diane 

Perez, P.A., and Diane P. Perez, for appellant.

Jones Walker LLP, and Laurie M. Riley, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, HENDON and GORDO, JJ. 

GORDO, J. 
2

Andre White appeals a trial court’s order granting AutoZone 

Investment Corporation d/b/a AutoZone Auto Parts’ motion to dismiss with 

prejudice. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Because 

we find that section 11A-28(10) of the Miami-Dade County Code establishes 

a private cause of action, we reverse. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Andre White began working for AutoZone in 2015. While he was an 

employee, he alleges he was subjected to ongoing verbal abuse due to his 

sexual orientation. White made a complaint to the corporate office in May 

2019 and was placed on leave pending an investigation. White was 

terminated on June 4, 2019.

White subsequently filed a complaint of discrimination with the MiamiDade Commission on Human Rights. In August 2020, White received a 

notice of right-to-sue from the Commission indicating the investigation was 

being terminated for his failure to cooperate with the agency and that he 

could pursue his charge further pursuant to Chapter 11A, section 11A-28(10) 

of the Miami-Dade County Code within ninety days of receipt of the notice. 

On September 9, 2020, White filed a complaint against AutoZone for 

sexual orientation discrimination and retaliation in violation of Chapter 11A 

of the Miami-Dade County Code. In January 2021, AutoZone filed a motion 
3

to dismiss White’s complaint, arguing Chapter 11A does not provide a private 

cause of action for employment discrimination. White filed a response to the 

motion which asserted the plain language of section 11A-28(10) established 

a private cause of action. AutoZone filed a reply asserting section 11A28(10) does not create a private cause of action. The trial court heard 

argument on the motion and, on January 28, 2021, granted the motion to 

dismiss with prejudice finding section 11A-28(10) does not establish a 

private cause of action. This appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a trial court’s determination on a motion to dismiss 

de novo. Grove Isle Ass’n, Inc. v. Grove Isle Assocs., LLLP, 137 So. 3d 

1081, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). “The construction of a statute is an issue of 

law subject to de novo review.” Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. 

Easton, 894 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 2005). 

LEGAL ANALYSIS

White contends the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss 

because the plain and unambiguous language of section 11A-28(10)(b) 

establishes a private cause of action for employment discrimination. We 

agree. 
4

In 1997, the Miami-Dade County Commission enacted Chapter 11A to 

prevent discrimination in housing, credit and financing practices, public 

accommodations, employment, family leave and employment in Dade

County service.1 Article IV of the Chapter deals with employment 

discrimination.

2

 

Section 11A-28 provides procedures for employment discrimination 

complaints. Per the terms of the section, after a complaint is filed the director 

of the Dade County Equal Opportunity Board or his or her designee shall 

conduct an investigation and “prepare a finding related to probable cause 

consisting of a final investigative report and recommended order.” See §

11A-28(7)(b), Code of Miami-Dade County. The report would become final 

ten days after issuance, unless a hearing was requested pursuant to section 

11A-28(9), which provides:

(9) Hearing in front of Equal Opportunity Board.

(a) If within ten (10) days after receipt of the director’s 

finding related to probable cause the respondent or 

the complainant submits a written request for a 

hearing before the board, then such hearing shall be 

granted expeditiously. A written request for a hearing 

submitted more than ten (10) days after receipt of the 

1 The ordinance enacting Chapter 11A repealed a prior version of the Code. 2 Section 11A-25(2) defines Employer as “any person who in the regular 

course of business has five (5) or more employees in Dade County in each 

of four (4) or more calendar weeks in the current calendar year and any 

agent, acting manager, contractor or subcontractor of such person.” 
5

director’s finding may be granted only upon a 

showing of good cause. The director shall have the 

final authority in deciding whether good cause has 

been shown. No hearing may be had from the 

director’s decision that good cause has not been 

shown. No hearing may be had from the director’s 

finding of lack of jurisdiction.

. . . 

(e) Upon the conclusion of the hearing, an 

adjudicative final order shall be issued and served 

upon the parties.

(emphasis added). Unlike other provisions in Chapter 11A, this employment 

discrimination article did not provide any procedures for enforcement by 

private persons.

In 2006, the Miami-Dade County Commission amended section 11A28 to include:

(10) Enforcement by private persons. 

(a) If within one hundred eighty (180) days after a 

complaint is filed alleging discrimination, the Director 

[of the Commission on Human Rights] has been 

unable to obtain voluntary compliance with the 

provisions of this Article, the aggrieved person may 

demand a notice of right-to-sue from the Director, the 

issuance of which shall terminate the jurisdiction of 

the Director and the Board over such a complaint. 

Not later than ninety (90) days following receipt of 

the notice of right-to-sue, the aggrieved person 

may commence a civil action in a court of 

competent jurisdiction against the respondent

named in the complaint.

(b) If, in a private enforcement proceeding under 

this Article, the court finds that a discriminatory 
6

practice has occurred or is about to occur it may 

issue an order prohibiting the practice and providing 

affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, 

including temporary or permanent injunctive and 

other equitable relief, temporary restraining order, 

actual and punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s 

fees, interest, costs or other appropriate relief.

Section 11A-28(10) (emphasis added).

I. Interpretation of Section 11A-28(10)

“In construing a statute we must begin, and often should end as well, 

with the language of the statute itself.” U. S. v. Steele, 147 F. 3d 1316, 1318 

(11th Cir.1998); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) 

(“[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal 

canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must 

presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 

statute what it says there.”). “The same logic applies to a local ordinance.” 

Vaughn v. Segal, 707 So. 2d 951, 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). When the words 

of a statute are unambiguous, “judicial inquiry is complete.” Rubin v. United 

States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981). 

AutoZone argues nothing in section 11A-28(10) specifically states a 

complainant may pursue an employment discrimination claim under Chapter 

11A. “In ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to 

the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design 
7

of the statute as a whole.” K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 

(1988); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts § 6, at 167 (2012) (stating a “judicial interpreter 

[should] consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical 

and logical relation of its many parts,” when interpreting any particular part 

of the text). 

The plain language of the statute clearly creates a private cause of 

action. Section 11A-28(10)(a) provides an individual the right to obtain a 

“notice of right-to-sue” and once such notice has been obtained that 

individual may “commence a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction.” 

Section 11A-28(10)(b) explicitly states a court may issue orders or provide 

affirmative relief “in a private enforcement proceeding under this Article.” 

Read together, this expressly creates a guideline for private enforcement of 

the employment discrimination chapter of the ordinance.3 

3 It is well settled that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and 

unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion 

for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the 

statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” A.R. Douglass, Inc., 

v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931). That principle aside, even if the 

language contained in the section could be considered ambiguous, “the title 

of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s 

text.” I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 

(1991). Here, the title of the section resolves any purported ambiguity as to 

whether a private cause of action to enforce the Chapter exists because it 

clearly states “[e]nforcement by private persons.” Other articles of Chapter 
8

AutoZone compares section 11A-28(10) to the administrative scheme 

of section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, which provides that if the Commission 

on Human Rights determines there is reasonable cause to believe that a 

discriminatory practice has occurred “in violation of the Florida Civil Rights 

Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: (a) Bring a civil action against 

the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or

(b) Request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57.” 

Section 760.11(4), however, is not analogous because section 11A28(10)(a) provides enforcement by a private person may commence “[i]f . . . 

the Director has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with the 

provisions of this Article” and receipt of a right to sue, not after the 

Commission on Human Rights “determines there is reasonable cause to 

believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred.” § 760.11(4), Fla. Stat. 

There is no prerequisite for an employee to obtain a probable cause 

determination prior to commencing a civil action and the plain language 

clearly authorizes employees to litigate their claims pursuant to Chapter 11A. 

11A have similarly titled sections and subsections which have been found to 

create a private right of action. See Francois v. Caribbean Airmail, Inc., 2002 

WL 31465742, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2002) (“[T]he sections dealing with 

housing, public accommodations, and contract procurement do expressly 

provide for private relief.”)
9

Section 11A-28(10) follows an outline of the procedures to be 

conducted by the Commission on Human Rights after a complaint is filed. 

Based on this structure, and the fact the section specifically provides it 

applies where “the Director has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance 

with the provisions of this Article,” this section is not meant as an 

administrative relief scheme. Rather, the section is meant as a guideline for 

a private individual to seek to enforce the employment discrimination article 

of Chapter 11A after the Commission on Human Rights has failed to provide 

relief. 

II. Prior Precedent

AutoZone also argues the trial court’s finding that section 11A-28(10) 

does not create a private right of action should be affirmed because other 

courts, including this Court, have found this section only allows an employee 

to pursue a claim in court against their former employer upon receipt of a 

notice of right-to-sue, but cannot assert such a claim under Chapter 11A. 

No District Court of Appeal in Florida has explicitly addressed whether 

the ordinance creates a private cause of action after its amendment. Other 

circuit and federal courts have addressed this ordinance post-amendment 

and have cited to a per curiam decision of this Court based on a trial court 

order finding section 11A-28 did not create a private cause of action. See
10

Hernandez v. Life Alert Emergency Response, Inc., 124 So. 3d 931, 931

(Fla. 3d DCA 2013). We start by emphasizing a well-established rule of 

jurisprudence—an unelaborated per curiam affirmance has no precedential 

value in any other case. See Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 

5th Dist., 434 So. 2d 310, 313 (Fla. 1983) (“We reiterate that [a per curiam]

decision is not a precedent for a principle of law and should not be relied 

upon for anything other than res judicata.”); Berek v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 396 

So. 2d 756, 759 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“We do not regard a per curiam 

affirmance without opinion as having precedential significance for other 

cases, notwithstanding that such an affirmance may establish the law of the 

particular case.”); Goldberg v. Graser, 365 So. 2d 770, 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1978) (“A per curiam affirmance without opinion does not bind the appellate 

court in another case to accept the conclusion of law on which the decision 

of the lower court was based.”); Mobil Chem. Co., a Div. of Mobil Corp. v. 

Hawkins, 440 So. 2d 378, 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding a per curiam 

affirmance without written opinion has no precedential value, even in the 

deciding court). 

While the decision in Life Alert was affirmed by our Court, such action 

should not be considered approval of the analysis and conclusions of law on 

which the decision of the lower court was based. See Life Alert, 2012 WL 
11

12887229, at *1. Per curiam affirmances have no precedential value 

because “[t]he rationale and basis for the decision without opinion is always 

subject to speculation.” Legal Affairs, 434 So. 2d at 312. “[T]here is no limit 

to the grounds that may prompt a per curiam opinion.” Newmons v. Lake 

Worth Drainage Dist., for Use & Benefit of Martin, 87 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 

1956). “Such uncertainty in itself negates a basis for reliance on an unwritten 

decision for guidance or precedence.” Legal Affairs, 434 So. 2d at 313. As 

such, our unelaborated per curiam affirmance decision in Hernandez ought 

not be cited for the proposition that section 11A-28(10) does not establish a 

private cause of action. Hernandez, 124 So. 3d at 931.

We are cognizant of this Court’s finding in De La Campa v. Grifols Am., 

Inc., 819 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) that Chapter 11A does not 

create a private cause of action for employment discrimination. Id. De La 

Campa, however, was issued prior to the 2006 amendment by the 

Commission adding section 11A-28(10). Id. We must give proper

significance to the Commission’s subsequent amendment to the Code 

adding an unambiguous section titled “[e]nforcement by private persons.” § 

11A-28(10). In revising section 11A-28 to include (10)(a) and (10)(b), it is 

evident the Commission intended to include a mechanism affording a 
12

charging party the right to pursue a private cause of action for claims of 

employment discrimination arising under Chapter 11A. 

Other courts, however, have utilized De La Campa to find the amended 

version of section 11A-28 creates no private cause of action. These courts 

reason that section 11A-28(10) merely provides an administrative relief 

scheme relating to employment discrimination matters. State v. Life Alert 

Emergency Response, 2012 WL 12887229, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Miami-Dade 

Cnty. Oct. 19, 2019) (citing Id. at 942). When considering the amendment, 

the cases rationalize that section 11A-28(10)(a) only “provides for an 

administrative relief scheme relating to employment discrimination matters.” 

Life Alert, 2012 WL 12887229, at *1; see also Espinoza v. John Bean Techs. 

Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176425, at *3–*4 (S.D. Fla., Oct. 9, 2019). 

These cases find this section “does allow an aggrieved person to file a 

lawsuit independently, but only if the party wishes to pursue the matter 

outside of the provisions of the Code.” Life Alert, 2012 WL 12887229, at *1. 

We do not believe these cases can be reconciled with the 2006 

amendments to Chapter 11A. First, these cases would interpret Chapter

11A’s provisions for obtaining a “notice of right-to-sue” to “commence a civil 

action in a court of competent jurisdiction” as providing only the right to sue 

under unnamed federal and Florida laws, not under Chapter 11A. But the 
13

County has no legislative power to require a person to obtain a notice of 

right-to-sue from the County before a person can proceed with a cause of 

action under federal and Florida laws. If this Court were to utilize the 

reasoning in these cases, the requirement in section 11A-28(10)(a) that a 

party obtain a notice of right-to-sue prior to commencing a civil action would 

be rendered a nullity. 

Second, this analysis ignores section 11A-28(10)(b), which discusses 

a private enforcement proceeding under the Chapter. If this Court were to 

agree that section 11A-28(10)(a) gives a party a right to sue but only “outside 

the provisions of the Code,” it would render subsection (b) meaningless. § 

11A-28(10). “It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that courts should 

avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.” Forsythe v. 

Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 1992). 

“Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and 

construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.” Id. at

455. The plain and unambiguous language of section (10)(a) and (10)(b) 

makes clear that once an aggrieved party has obtained a notice of right-tosue it may commence a private enforcement proceeding under this Chapter.

We also note that the facts in Life Alert are distinguishable. The plaintiff 

there initially filed a complaint with the Miami-Dade County Commission on 
14

Human Relations. Life Alert, 2012 WL 12887229, at *1. Following an 

investigation, the director concluded there was probable cause a 

discriminatory employment practice had occurred. Id. This determination 

also included a list of recommended remedial actions against the former 

employer. Id. The Director’s determination was not timely appealed by the 

employer and the parties subsequently failed to reach a resolution through 

conciliation. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed suit with the circuit court. 

The plain language of section 11A-28(10)(a) states “[i]f . . . the Director 

has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with the provisions of this 

Article, the aggrieved person may demand a notice of right-to-sue from the 

Director” and “following receipt of the notice of right-to-sue, the aggrieved 

person may commence a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction 

against the respondent named in the complaint.” In Life Alert, there was no 

demonstrable non-compliance with the provisions of the Code, and it is 

unclear whether the plaintiff ever received a notice of right to sue. Id. Here, 

White received a notice of right to sue from the Commission on Human 

Rights after the director was “unable to obtain voluntary compliance.” As 

such, White timely commenced a civil action after receipt of a notice of right 

to sue. § 11A-28(10)(a). 

CONCLUSION
15

The plain language of section 11A-28(10)(a) and (b) clearly 

establishes an aggrieved individual may pursue a private cause of action 

under the Code. Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the complaint 

with prejudice and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

Reversed and remanded.