1 IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

Joseph Kolby Willis, ) Dock et No.: 2014-05-0005 Employee, ) v. ) State File No.: 57982-2014 All Staff, ) Employer, ) Date of Injury: July 30, 2014 And ) Riverport Insurance Co ., ) Judge: Baker Insurance Carrier. ) )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER IN A BIFURCATED PROCEEDING

THIS CAUSE came before the undersigned Workers’ Compensation Judge on July 20, 2015, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2014) for a Compensation Hearing. The employee, Joseph Willis, seeks a determination regarding whether the employer, All Staff, is obligated to provide temporary disability and medical benefits. Considering the parties’ positions, the applicable law, Mr. Willis’ testimony, and all the evidence submitted, this Court fi nds that Mr. Willis sustained a compensable injury and is entitled to temporary disability and medical benefits. As these proceedings have been bifurcated, the Court reserves the issue of permanency pending further litigation.

ANALYSIS

Issues

1. Whether Mr. Willis suffered an injury arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment for All Staff.

2. If so, whether All Staff mu st provide him temporar y disability and medical

benefits. 1

1 The Court bifurcated the pr oceedings in this case because Mr. Willis received limited medical treatment for his injury and he had not reached maximum medical improvement. Thus, if Mr. Willis prevailed at this proceeding by proving his injury compensable, the Co urt would consider the amount of any pe rmanent disability benefits due at a2 Evidence Submitted

The Court admitted into eviden ce the exhibits below:

1. Curriculum vitae of Dr. David Moore;

2. Office notes of Dr. Moore;

3. October 28, 2013 letter of Dr. Moore;

4. Treatise on the lower limb;

5. Medical records of Dr. David Moore;

6. August 14, 2014 workplace restri ctions provided by Dr. Moore;

7. August 8, 2014 radiology report;

8. May 22, 2015 transcript of Dr. Moore deposition; 2

9. August 21, 2014 D r. Moore letter; and

10. Medical bills.

The Court designated the followi ng as the technical record:

 Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD), filed August 13, 2014;

 Dispute Certification Notice (D CN), filed September 18, 2014;

 Joint Pre-Compensation Hearing Statement;

 All Staff’s Motion in Limine;

 Mr. Willis’s response to All Staff’s Motion in Limine;

 Deposition Notice for Mr. W illis, filed April 28, 2015;

 Deposition Notice for Mr. Willis , filed May 6, 2015; and

 Deposition Notice for Dr. David Moore, filed April 28, 2015.

The Court did not consider attachments to the above f ilings unless admitted into evidence during the Co mpensation Hearing. The Court co nsidered factual statements in the above filings or any atta chments to them as allegati ons unless established by the

evidence.

The parties stipulated to the following:

 Mr. Willis is a twenty-three-year-old re sident of Lewis County, Tennessee.

 Mr. Willis suffered an inju ry on July 30, 2014.

 Mr. Willis worked for All Staff at the time the injury occurred.

 Mr. Willis has a high-school diploma.

subsequent hearing upon his attainment of maximum medical improvement.

2 There was some confusion about numbering the exhibits at trial. To ensure that all exhibits were properly admitted, the exhibits attached to the deposition were admitted with the deposition, even though the Court admitted duplicate copies of some of the exhibits separately.3  Following the injury , Mr. Willis did not return to work for All Staff earning the same or greater wages.

 Mr. Willis earned an average weekly wage of $428.87 at the time of the injury, resulting in a compen sation rate of $285.93.

At the Compensation Hearing, Mr. Willis provided in-person te stimony. No other

witnesses testified.

History of Claim

Procedural History

Mr. Willis filed a PBD on August 13, 20 14. The parties did not resolve the disputed issues through mediation, and the Mediation Specialist filed the DCN on September 18, 2014. Mr. Willis filed a Request for Expedite d Hearing seeking temporary disability and medical benefits. M r. Willis requested a re cord review but did not include an affidavit, deposition or any sw orn testimony with his request. This Court entered an order denying Mr. Willis’ Request for Expedited Hearing on November 10, 2014, and deemed the claim non- compensable. The parties then proceeded to discovery and this compensation hearing.

Factual Background and Testimonial Evidence

Mr. Willis worked for All Staff, a sta ffing company, as a “line helper” at the Milliken/Kasbar textile plant (K asbar) in Columbia, Tennessee. His job duties included loading the “hoppers” with material to keep the assembly line moving and loading

finished rolls of textile into trucks. Alt hough the factory had not licensed Mr. Willis to drive a forklift, his supervisor allowed him to drive a forklift to move materials.

Mr. Willis’ job required him to recycle scrap material. To perform his recycling duties, Mr. Willis used the fork lift to transfer the scrap a distance of approximately fifty feet from the scrap pile to a baling machin e, a device similar to an industrial trash compactor. After filling the lo ading area of the baler comp letely, Mr. Willis flipped a

switch on the back of th e machine to turn the machine off. He then proceeded b ack to the front of the machine, where he placed pieces of baling wire into the ma chine, so that they

traversed the machine on the in side and the ends of the wi re pieces protruded from the back. Thereafter, he walked behind the machine and tied th e ends of the baling wire together at several points to secure the scra p into a bale. Mr. Willis had to “squat down” in order to reach the tie-points on the mach ine with the bottommost tie-point being about one foot off the ground. Additionally, M r. Willis had limited space behind the baling machine—at trial, he described an area of a pproximately two and one-half to three feet in width between the back of the baling mach ine and a nearby gua rdrail—to maneuver while tying the baling wire. After tying the baling wire at each tie-point, a process which4 took several minutes, Mr. Willis turned the power back on, pushed the start button and

the machine formed the material into a large bale of scrap material. Mr. Willis then used a forklift to transport, weig h, and store the bale.

About two weeks before he suffered the workplace injury, Mr. Willis’ supervisor told him that he could no longer drive the fo rklift to move materials. Without access to the forklift, Mr. Willis resort ed to “rolling” or pulling th e scrap material across the factory floor to the baling machine. Mr. W illis testified that he had little trouble rolling the small rolls, which weighed between ei ghty and 120 pounds. The larger rolls, however, proved more difficult.

On July 30, 2014, Mr. Willis suffered an injury to his left knee while working the

third shift at Kasbar. Mr. Willis’ shift started at 11:00 p.m. Over the course of the shift, he carried scrap to the baling machine and produc ed two or three bales of scrap. At that time, Mr. Willis testified, the area around his upper left thigh, right above his knee, had

hurt for about a week. He further testified that he had sharp pain s, and an occasional burning pain, in the area around his left knee. Mr. Willis di d not know the cause of the pain, and testified that he had no trouble with his knee followin g a prior surgery to correct his left knee after his kneecap popp ed out of place several years earlier.

Mr. Willis’ supervisor expected him to pr oduce four bales of scrap per shift. Around 3:00 a.m., Mr. Willis fi nished loading the baler and mo ved to the backside of the machine to tie the baling wire in order to produce another bale. He finished tying the

bottommost tie and moved to rise from a squatting position. Mr. Willis demonstrated twisting as he rose from the squatting position, and testified that he intended to use his left arm to power up the balin g machine. By using his left arm, Mr. Willis had to reach across his body. When he attempted to rise, but before coming up from the squatting position completely, he “felt a sharp, quick pain in my knee and I immediately fell down to the ground grabbing my leg. I looked down; I saw my kneecap was out of place.”

Mr. Willis testified that his left kneecap shif ted completely to th e right so that it was located on the inside of his left leg. He “popped” his knee back into place and then

“scooted” on his back from be hind the machine and signaled coworkers to come to his

aid. The coworkers he lped Mr. Willis outside to the park ing lot, and his supervisor drove him to the Maury Regional Medical Center emergency room (Maury Regional).

Providers at Maury Regional x-rayed Mr. Willis’ left kne e and confirmed that his kneecap had popped out of place. (Ex. 7.) The providers at Maury Regional prescribed pain medication and a knee immob ilizer and released Mr. Willis that same day. After his release from the hospital, Mr. Willis testified that All Staff reprimanded him for failing to report his injury immediately.

After his release from the hospital, Mr. Willis saw Dr. David Moore, who5 performed an arthroscopic patellar realignmen t and chondroplasty on Mr. Willis’ knees in

2005 and 2006. (Exs. 2, 3, 5.) 3 Dr. Moore also examined Mr. Willis on Au gust 29, 2013, when Mr. Willis sought medical clearance to jo in the United States Na vy. (Ex. 2.) Mr. Willis did not express having any problems with his knees during the appointment, and the examination revealed “normal alignmen t, normal motion, and normal stability” in

both knees. Id . Dr. Moore cleared Mr. Willis for mili tary service. (Exs. 3, 5.)

In August 2014, Dr. Moore ordered an MRI, which revealed that Mr. Willis dislocated his kneecap and “tore the remai nder of his previously repaired medial patellofemoral ligament.” (Ex. 8 at 16.) On August 14, 2014, Dr. Moore cleared Mr.

Willis to return to work bu t imposed workplace restricti ons that prohibited him from squatting, stooping, be nding and working at unprotected heights. (Ex. 6.) Dr. Moore recommended additional therapy, but Mr. Willis could not attend because he did not have

health insurance. He scheduled Mr. Willis for a follow-up appoint ment on September 18,

2014. Id

.

With respect to medical bills, Mr. Willis test ified that he paid half of the MRI bill, which was “around $250,” and half of the bill for the office visits with Dr. Moore, which was “around $150,” but he did not know the exact amount. Dr. Moore billed a total of $2,910 to Mr. Willis for care provided for the left-knee injury. (Ex. 10.)

Mr. Willis provided the restrictions to All Staff, but A ll Staff could not

accommodate his restrictions. He testified th at he looked for work thereafter, but his “knee was getting in the way of it,” and he was unable to fi nd a job until May 2015, when he began working for Tanner Coating Pipeline Services. His new job required him to do heavy work, including kneelin g, bending, and squatting.

Concerning the current condition of hi s knee, Mr. Willis testified that his knee was “fine,” and it was “where he could work on it, where he could walk around on it.” However, he still experienced ra ndom, sharp pains in his knee one or twice a week and a little instability. The pain bega n both during work and after work wh en he lay down to

rest. Mr. Willis wished to return to Dr. Moore for treatment.

On cross-examination, Mr. Willis admitted that he was not lifting anything at the time the injury occurred, and that the floor behind the baling machine was level and free of hazards. Additionally, Mr. Willis admitte d that he di d not indicate on a recent employment application that he previously su ffered an injury that impaired his lifting capacity. When asked why he did not include the information on his application, he stated, “They just basically to ld me, they said, can you lift heavy stuff, I said yeah, they

3 At trial, Mr. Willis testified that he had no problems with his knees, other than occas ional soreness, following the surgery and was able to run, work out and play sports without difficulty.6 said well you’re fine, you don’t have to put that.” 4

Mr. Willis took Dr. Moore’s deposition on May 22, 2015. During the deposition, the following exchange occu rred between Dr. Moore and Mr. Willis’ attorney, Gene

Hallworth:

Q: Did you get a case history?

A: I did. I took his history at that time.

Q: And what was that history?

A: He did tell me that at time that [sic] he had actually been doing quite

well until he sustained an injury while at work. And he was basically coming out of a squa tting position. It sounds as if he were twisting when he came up and he felt that his kneecap came out of place.

Q: Okay. And assume, if you woul d, that he was working, pulling material on a – on a floor that weighe d anywhere betwee n 100 pounds and 3 or 400 pounds or more and that his knee was fatigued at the time of this injury. Would that have an effect on this injury?

A: If someone had done a significant amount of exertion in their quadriceps, in particular work fatigue, that’s what controls your kneecap, so you would have less control of your kn eecap. So, yes, that is possible.

Q: Well, is it more likely – if the hi story is true, would it be more likely than not – or cause – I mean, a contributing factor?

A: I would say it’s a contributing fact or. I guess I would have to know

how much he lifted. How tired he was. I mean, there are a lot of different permutations. But it is certainly possibl e that if he did have significantly fatigued quadriceps that that would have given him le ss control over his kneecap.

Q: Okay. So it’s fair to say that if he does a lot of exertion on his knee immediately prior to this injury that that physical exertion, more likely than not, did contribute to this injury? Is that fair?

A: If he was significantly fatigued, I would say that, yes, that would have helped contribute to his injury.

4 The Court understands “they” to mean Mr. Willis’ potential employer.7 Q: Okay. And assume that he wa s in a squatting position behind a

machine that’s one or two feet from a wall behind; and then there is a rail behind that safety rail between him; ma king it a fairly tight place for him to be squatting, and he would be in an awkward position with his knees. Would that be a contributing factor or could it be a contributing factor?

A: Certainly, the position of his – when people tend to dislocate or sublux, meaning having the patella come part way out and go back in, or dislocate and come all the way out of place, it’s usually the position of their knee. So it’s usually flexed, meaning si gnificantly bent. And then there’s a significant valgus force, meaning that their knee is turned relative to their ankle. So anything that would put him in that pos ition would certainly lead to an increased risk of a patella dislocation.

(Ex. 8 at 8-10.)

On cross-examination, All Staff’s a ttorney, Duane Willis, asked Dr. Moore

whether Mr. Willis coul d have suffered the same injury if he performed a similar

movement outside the work environment. D r. Moore stated, “I guess that is a fair statement. I mean, I think it is his – if he would have performed that same maneuver in another location, not at work, could it have co me out of place? The answer to that would be yes.” (Ex. 8 at 24.) On re-direct, ne ar the conclusion of the deposition, Mr. Willis’ attorney and Dr. Moore stated the following:

Q: All right. And then the fact that he was in a tight area between the wall and the bailing [sic] ma chine, which is a fairly large machine, that being in an awkward position turni ng his leg would be a contributing

factor?

A: Being in a tight space, squatting down, I think would actually make you more prone to having to rotate your body as you go from a squatting position. So if that were the case that is also a possible contributing factor.

Q: Well, I don’t like the word “possi ble,” Doctor, because anything is possible. So would it be more likely – assuming those are the facts, would it be more likely that not? And then if he is reac hing over his head to a button to try to turn a mach ine on or off, would that –

Mr. Willis: Objection.

A: Again, that is really hard for me to actually answer correctly not knowing exactly what it looks like and ho w big the space is relative to his8 body. I mean, if he were in a cram ped space where he had to contort and rotate as he is ge tting up, could that lead to an increased risk for his patella to come out of place? It could.

(Ex. 8 at 26-27.)

Mr. Willis’ Contentions

Mr. Willis argues that he suffered a comp ensable knee injury on July 30, 2014. He argues that the size of the area behind the baling machine, coupled with the unusual position in which he had to maneuver his body to tie ba ling wire and operate the machine, constituted a hazard of employment that contributed more than fifty percent in causing his injury. He requests that the clai m be deemed compensable and that All Staff be ordered to provi de him temporary disability and medical benefits.

All Staff’s Contentions

All Staff argues that the work did not cont ribute more than fifty percent in causing Mr. Willis’ injury. M r. Willis did not testify that a sp ecial hazard contributed to the injury, or that he lifted material. Dr. Moore stated that Mr. Willis could have suffered the same injury at any other location. In s hort, simple body mechanics and Mr. Willis’ preexisting knee condition resulted in the injury. All Staff argue s that the Court deemed the injury non-compensabl e in its order denying Mr. Willis’ re quest for relief on an expedited

basis and should not reverse course now. It asks that the Court find the claim noncompensable.

Findings of Fact an d Conclusions of Law

Standard Applied

The Workers’ Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in favor of either party but shall be construe d fairly, impartially a nd in accordance with basic principles of statutory construc tion favoring neither the employee nor employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014 ). In a workers’ compensation action, Employee shall bear th e burden of proving each and every element of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 50-6-239(c )(6) (2014). Employee

must show that the injury arose primarily out of an d in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code An n. § 50-6-102(13) (2014).

Factual Findings

Mr. Willis had surgery to repair both of his kneecaps due to instability, which previously caused dislocations . He underwent surgery in 2005 and 2006, and had no9 problems with his knees since the surgeries, other than oc casional pain. On July 29, 2014, Mr. Willis started his sh ift at Kasbar at 11:00 p.m. He moved rolls of scrap material, weighing at least eighty to 120 po unds, from the line to th e baling machine over

the course of the next five h ours and produced two or three rolls of scrap material. The baling machine was situated in such a manner that Mr. W illis had only two and one-half to three feet of space behind it to maneuver while tying the balin g wire pieces into knots. The small amount of space re quired Mr. Willis to position hi s body awkwardly. At approximately 3:00 a.m., Mr. Willis squatted down , in an awkward positi on, to tie the last baling wire at the tie point lo cated approximately one foot a bove the factory floor. When Mr. Willis moved to rise, he twisted his body, and his left kneecap dislocated. Dr. Moore

determined that the dislocation tore the previously repaired medial patellofemoral ligament in Mr. Willis’ le ft knee. Dr. Moore re commended therapy, knee immobilization, and surgery if the therap y and immobilization did not stabilize Mr.

Willis’ knee.

Application of Law to Facts

I. All Staff’s Motion In Limine

All Staff asks the Court to bar the intr oduction of Dr. Moor e’s deposition as an exhibit at trial. In the alternative, All St aff asks that the Court prohibit introduction of Dr. Moore’s testimony concer ning temporary to tal disability, permanent partial and permanent total disability, maxi mum medical improvement and past medical expenses. As grounds for the motion, All Staff argues th at Mr. Willis prejudiced its client by failing to update its discovery responses in a timely manner. Specifically, All Staff claims that Mr. Willis did not provide it a complete copy of Dr. Moore’ s treatment records until the day of the deposition. All Staff argues that Mr. Willis’s failure to prov ide the records

violated Rule 26.05 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Proc edure, and inhib ited its ability to take an effective deposition.

Mr. Willis opposes the motion arguing, esse ntially, that All Staff prejudiced itself by scheduling the deposition with out having reviewed all the me dical records. The Court

agrees.

The file shows that All Staff noticed D r. Moore’s deposition for May 22, 2015.

The Court finds that All Staff noticed the de position with the suspic ion that it likely did not have all the medical records and, in fact , admitted this suspic ion in its motion. Furthermore, counsel for Mr. Willis denies that All Staff asked for updated records and thought that All Staff had already acquired th em. All Staff had the option to reschedule the deposition if it needed more time to revi ew the records and could have mitigated the alleged prejudice by rescheduling. Instead, All Staff chose to go forward with the deposition. For that reason, the Court finds that Mr. Willis’ alleged failure to update his discovery responses was harmless, or All Staff could have mitigated th e alleged harm. In10 any event, the Court holds that the a lleged failure does not warrant barring the introduction of any portion of Dr. Moore’s deposition. The Cour t denies All Staff’s

motion in limine.

II. Compensability

In order for an injury to be compensable, it must have been accidental. Under the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law, an injury is accident al “only if the injury is caused by a specific incident, or set of incident s, arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employmen t, and is identifiable by time a nd place of occurre nce[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014). “An inju ry ‘arises primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment’ only if it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the injury, considering all causes [.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50 -6-102(13)(B) (2014). The statutory requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of the employment are not synonymous “although both elements exist to ensure a work conn ection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits.” Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance , 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005). 5

An injury occurs in the course of empl oyment if it takes plac e while the employee performs a duty he or she is employed to perform. Fink v. Caudle , 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn. 1993). Thus, the “course of employmen t” requirement focuses on the time, place, and circumstances of the injury. Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc. , 181 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2005).

Mr. Willis’ injury constituted an injury by accident an d undoubtedly occurred in the course of his employment fo r All Staff. Mr. Willis’ left kne ecap dislocated during his shift at Kasbar at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 30, 2015, when he turned to rise after tying baling wire to secure the scrap bale produced by the baling machine. His job required him to perform this action. The main point of contention, however, is whether Mr. Willis’ injury arose primar ily out of his employment.

“Arising out of employment” refers to causation. Reeser v. Yellow Freight Sys.

, 938 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. 1997). An injury arises out of employment when there is a

causal connection between the resulting injury and the conditions under which the work is required to be performed. Fritts v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. , 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005). Stated another way, an inju ry arises out of employment when it “has a

5 The Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board allo ws reliance on precedent from the Tennessee Supreme Court “unless it is evident that the Supreme Court’s decisi on or rationale relied on a remedial interpretation of preJuly 1, 2014 statutes, that it relied on specific statutory language no longer contained in the Workers’ Compensation Law, and/or that it relied on an analysis that has since been addressed by the general assembly through statutory

amendments.” McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing , No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, *13 n.4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015).11 rational, causal connection to the work.” Braden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 833 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. 1992)

. “The mere presence of an employee at the place of injury because of his [or her] employmen t will not alone result in the injury being considered as arising out of the employment.” Jordan v. United Methodist Urban Ministries, Inc., 740 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tenn. 1987). Instead, the in jury must result from a danger or hazard peculiar to the work or be caused by a risk inherent in the nature of the work. Thornton
v. RCA Serv. Co., 221 S.W.2d 954, 9 55 (Tenn. 1949).

Here, Mr. Willis’ job required him to tie baling wires on the back of the baling

machine. Mr. Willis testified that the floor behind the machine was even, and there were no standing puddles of water or other substances that cons tituted a special hazard. All Staff argued extensively that the absence of a special hazard renders this claim noncompensable. The Court previously denied Mr. Willis’ request for temporary disability and medical benefits upon a finding of noncompensability. The key difference between

the circumstances under which the Court rend ered the Expedited Hearing Order and the circumstances as they stand at the Compen sation Hearing is the addition of Mr. Willis’ credible, detailed testimony. When the Cour t entered the Expedite d Hearing Order, it did

so without the benefit of a ny sworn testimony. Mr. Willis did not provide an affidavit and, at Mr. Willis’ request, the Court rendered its decision based on a review of the file without convening an evidentiary hearing. Essentially, the Court had no reliable factual basis to support an award of benefits at th at time and had no choice but to deny his benefits request.

At the Compensation Hearing, Mr. Willis cr edibly testified that his job required him to work in a confined space that limited his movement. He also physically demonstrated how he performed these activities. Due to the size of the space, Mr. Willis had to contort his body into an odd position to perform his employment activities. Based on his testimony, the Court finds that th e work environment constituted a special employment hazard. His duty to complete th e job as assigned and in the space provided gave rise to the special hazard and constitu ted a causal connection between work and the injury.

Furthermore, the workplace activities were the sole cause of hi s injury. While Mr. Willis previously suffered from knee problems , the prior knee problems resolved after surgery and he had no other pr oblems for nine years until th e current injury, except for occasional pain. Accordingly, the Court finds that the work conditions contributed more than fifty percent in causing his injury considering all causes.

Having determined that Mr. Willis’ j ob duties presented a special hazard that contributed to his injury, the Co urt now turns to the issue of medical causation. Except in “the most obvious, simple and routine case s,” a workers’ compensation claimant must establish by expert medical tes timony that he or she is injured and that there exists a causal relationship between the injury a nd the claimant's employment activity. Wheetley12 v. State , No. M2013-01707-W C-R3-WC, 2014 Tenn. LEXI S 476 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel June 25, 2014) (citing Excel Polymers, LLC v. Broyles , 302 S.W.3d 268, 274 (Tenn. 2009); Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co. , 274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn. 2008)).

Both attorneys questioned Dr. Moore extens ively concerning medical causation. Much of the testimony is recounted in this order. The Court finds, however, that Mr. Willis does not need expert medi cal evidence to establish cau sation in this case because he suffered an “obvious” injury on July 30, 2014. Mr. Willis testified that he moved to rise from the squatting position be hind the baling mach ine when he “fe lt a sharp, quick pain in my knee and I immediately fell down to the ground grabbing my leg. I looked down; I saw my kneecap was out of place.” He further st ated that the kneecap had shifted completely to the right, so that it was located on the inside of his left leg. The Court finds the injury akin to a severely broken bone and was so obvious that the undersigned does not need expert medical te stimony to establish medical causation. Furthermore, although Dr. Moore’s opinions se emed to fluctuate over the course of the deposition, the Court alternatively finds that his opinion satisfied the medical causation standard. ( See Ex. 8 at 8-10.)

The Court further finds that the injury contributed more than 50% in his current

need for medical treatment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102 (13)(C) (2014). Dr. Moore recommended that Mr. Willis undergo thera py, and possibly undergo surgery if the therapy does not stabilize his knee. Ruling out the pre-existing condition as the cause of his injury, which the Court ha s, leaves only the workplace accident as the cause of his dislocation, which resulted in hi s need for medical treatment.

Mr. Willis established that he suffered an injury that arose pr imarily within the course and scope of hi s employment for All Staff. Accord ingly, the Court holds that Mr. Willis suffered a compensable injury to his left kneec ap on July 30, 2014.

III. Medical and Temporary Disability Benefits

The Workers’ Compensation La w provides that the employe r shall furnish, free of charge to the employee, such medical treatment made re asonably necessary by the accident. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)(A) (2014). The Cour t, therefore, finds that All Staff shall be required to provide Mr. Willis further trea tment for his knee with Dr. Moore. In addition, All Staff shall pay the past medical bills for, and any other medical bills related to, Mr. Willis’ tr eatment with Dr. Moore for the July 30, 2014 left-knee injury.

Further, All Staff shall pay for any add itional reasonable, necessary, and related medical care provided by Dr. Moor e, whom the Court appoints as the authorized treating physician. The Court finds the appointment appropriate, considering the length of time

since the accident and All Staff’s failure to provide a panel of ph ysicians for follow-up13 care after the emergency room released Mr. W illis’ with a diagnosis of a dislocated left kneecap.

Finally, Mr. Willis has request ed temporary disability be nefits. An employee is entitled to receive temporary total disab ility benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-207(1) whenever the empl oyee suffers a compensable, work-related injury that renders the employee unable to work. See Simpson v. Satterfield, 564 S.W.2d 953 (Tenn. 1978); Tenn. Code Ann § 50-6-2 07(1) (2014). In order to establish a prima facie case for temporary total disability benefits, the worker must show that (1) he or she is totally disabled and unable to work due to a co mpensable injury, (2 ) the work injury and inability to work are causally connecte d, and (3) the duratio n of the disability. Gray v. Cullom Machine, Tool & Die, Inc. , 152 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Te nn. 2004). Entitlement to temporary total disability benefits ends whenever an employee is able to return to work. Cleek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 19 S.W.3d 770, 77 6 (Tenn. 2000). Temporary partial disability refers to the time, if any, during which the injure d employee is able to resume some gainful employment but has not reached maximum recovery. Williams v. Saturn Corp. , No. M2004-01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn . LEXIS 1032, 7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Nov. 15, 2005).

Dr. Moore cleared Mr. Willis to resu me working but imposed workplace restrictions. According to Mr. Willis’ testim ony, All Staff could not accommodate his

restrictions. Mr. Willis also testified that he looked for other work, but his knee injury hindered his ability to find a j ob. Under these circumstances, the Court finds an award of temporary partial disability benefits appropriate.

Dr. Moore imposed Mr. Willis’ restricti ons on August 14, 2014, and scheduled a return visit for September 18, 2014. Dr. Moore may have lessened the severity of the restrictions at the return visit, but that information is not befo re the Court. As of the time of the Compensation Hearing, Dr. Moore had not lessened the restrictions. Mr. Willis, however, returned to work ar ound the beginning of May 2015 , ending his entitlement to temporary disability benefits, ab sent proof that he earned less money at his new job. Mr. Willis provided no evid ence on this issue. Without a specific date or post-injury wage information, the Court will set th e date of return as May 1, 2015, and find that Mr. Willis earned the same or a greater rate of pay at his new job. Accordingly, All Staff must provide Mr. Willis temporary pa rtial disability benefits for the period from August 14, 2014, to May 1, 2015. This is a period of thirty-seven weeks and one day at a compensation rate of $285.93 for a total of $10,620.26.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. All Staff or its workers’ compensation ca rrier shall pay all outstanding medical

bills for treatment of Mr. Willis’ Ju ly 30, 2014 left-knee injury.14 2. All Staff or its workers’ compensation carri er shall provide continued medical care for Mr. Willis’ left-knee injury with the authorized treating ph ysician, Dr. David Moore, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 (2014).

Medical bills shall be furnished to All St aff or its workers’ compensation carrier by Mr. Willis or Dr. Moore.

3. The amount of temporary pa rtial disability benefits is $285.93 per week. Payment of past-due benefits in the amount of $ 10,620.26 shall be made for the period from August 14, 2014, to May 1, 2015.

4. This matter is set for a status conferen ce on Monday, November 16, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. (CDT), at which time the Court and the parties will discuss scheduling the

second half of this bifurc ated proceeding to address permanency. The Court will convene the status conference telephoni cally. The parties must call (615) 741- 2113 to participate.

5. This order shall not constitu te a final judgment under Ru le 58 of the Tennessee

Rules of Civil Procedure.

6. The Insurer or Self-Insured Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the necessary confir mation within the period of compliance may result in a penalty asse ssment for non-compliance.

ENTERED this the 25th day of August, 2015.

___________________ __________________ Joshua Davis Baker, Judge

Court of Workers’ Co mpensation Claims15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order was sent to the following recipients by the fo llowing methods of service on this the 25th day of August, 2015.

Name Certified

Mail First

Class

Mail Via

Fax Fax

Number Via

Email Email Address

Gene Hallworth X hallworthg@aol.com

Duane Willis X dwillis@morganakins.com

Richard Clark X rclark@morganakins.com

___________________ __________________ Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

Court of Workers’ Co mpensation Claims WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov