* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 1/7/97 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SONIC RESTAURANTS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MANFRED KRUGER; CHRISTINA KRUGER, Defendants-Appellants. No. 96-6193 (D.C. No. CIV-95-796) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, BALDOCK, and HENRY, Circuit Judges

.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Defendants Manfred and Christina Kruger appeal fromthe entry of summary judgment holding them in breach of the part ies’ “Termination of Independent Contractor Services and Release of Clai ms” (termination agreement), awarding plaintiff Sonic Restaurants, Inc. (Sonic) compensatory damages, and enjoining future violations of the termination agre ement. The district court relied on a lengthy list of undisputed facts to uphold the validity of the termination agreement, determine defendants’ breach thereof, an d grant appropriate relief. Upon de novo review, Kaul v. Stephan , 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996), we affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s orders of March 22 and May 29, 1996. Most of the objections broadly stated in defendants ’ appellate brief “lack even rudimentary substantiation in factual argumentand legal authority.” Washington v. Department of Transp. , 84 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th Cir. 1996). We shall therefore limit our discussion to the “discer nible questions” raised regarding lack of consideration, execution of the agreement u nder duress, and procedural error on summary judgment. See id. Defendants contend they were entitled to keep $15,0 00 in advances made before the parties severed their relationship and, hence, plaintiff’s “forgiveness” of this outstanding “debt” in the termination agree ment did not constitute valid consideration. This argument rests on an insupport able premise. The $15,000-3-

had been a matter of dispute between the parties--adispute acknowledged and settled by the very agreement defendants now attackby reassuming their adversarial pre-agreement position. Countenancing such a challenge, by which defendants seek to nullify a negotiated compromise essentially by reneging on it, would effectively destabilize any agreement intende d to settle disputed obligations. Further, and in any event, defendants do not adequately support their underlying position regarding the $15,000 with evid ence, argument, and legal authority. Defendants also attack the termination agreement on the ground that Manfred Kruger was under extreme duress at the time of its execution. However, defendants fail to cite any evidence in the record to substantiate this conclusory claim. Their reference to an affidavit executed mo nths after the district court’s decision is patently improper, see Aero-Medical, Inc. v. United States , 23 F.3d 328, 329 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994); Boone v. Carlsbad Ba ncorporation, Inc. , 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992), and we will not si ft through the record searching for other, competent evidence to bolster their unsupported assertions of error, see Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. , 82 F.3d 1533, 1540 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 297 (1996). Finally, defendants contend that the district courtimproperly adopted plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts. However , all we are told is that the-4-

seventeen facts in question “are contradicted by th e Defendants’ evidence filed in motions and 180 exhibits of evidence, like W-2's an d payroll check stubs; statements of witnesses and other documents relatin g to the employee status of Manfred Kruger; relating to the circumstances of th e signing of the Termination Agreement of May 2, 199[5]; and the overall decepti on of [Sonic] with this Termination Agreement and in this Termination Agree ment of May 2, 1995.” Appellants’ Opening Brief at 11. This catch-all re cord reference is plainly inadequate from a procedural/evidentiary standpoint , see S.E.C. v. Thomas , 965 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1992), and, more fundament ally, fails to provide this court with specific, reasoned challenges to the var ious material facts relied on by the district court. The only particular fact impli cated by the reference concerns Manfred Kruger’s employment status, which actually was never determined in--indeed, was irrelevant to--the district court’s disposition. Rather, the court merely recited the undeniable facts that defendants (1) conceded Mr. Kruger’s status as an independent contractor in the terminat ion agreement, and (2) later took action contrary to this concession. To the extent defendants seek to attack the termination agreement by recanting this concess ion and resurrecting the employment-status dispute, they run afoul of the sa me principle discussed above in connection with the advances. One may not nulli fy an otherwise proper settlement by rearguing the merits of claims expres sly resolved therein.-5-

We have considered all of defendants’ arguments and , whether explicitly addressed or tacitly rejected, each has been found to lack merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for th e Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. Defendants’ motion to supplement the record is denied. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge