16-904 

Guzman-Alvarez v. Sessions 

BIA 

Nelson, IJ 

A206 638 444 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

27th day of October, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

RICHARD C. WESLEY, 

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

JACQUELINE LISSETTE GUZMAN-ALVAREZ, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 16-904 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Kathryn E. Cimone, Jadeja & Cimone, 

LLP, Hempstead, N.Y. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Jessica A. 

Dawgert, Senior Litigation Counsel; 
2

Tracey N. McDonald, Trial Attorney, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

DENIED. 

 Petitioner Jacqueline Lissette Guzman-Alvarez, a native 

and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a February 23, 2016 

decision of the BIA affirming an August 18, 2015 decision of 

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Guzman-Alvarez’s 

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jacqueline 

Lissette Guzman-Alvarez, No. A206 638 444 (B.I.A. Feb. 23, 

2016), aff’g No. A206 638 444 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 18, 

2015). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 

IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the grounds 

that the BIA did not reach. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We therefore 

review only the agency’s conclusion that Guzman-Alvarez failed 

to establish her membership in a cognizable particular social 
3

group. We review factual findings under the substantial 

evidence standard and questions of law—including the question 

whether a group constitutes a particular social group—de novo. 

Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). 

“The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that 

the applicant is a refugee,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), and 

“the applicant [must] satisf[y] the trier of fact that the 

applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers 

to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant 

is a refugee,” id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). One way that an 

applicant can demonstrate eligibility for asylum and 

withholding of removal is to show that she was persecuted on 

account of her membership in a particular social group. Id.

§§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); 1231(b)(3)(A). To be cognizable, a 

particular social group must satisfy all three of the following 

requirements. Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195-96. First, it must be 

composed of members who “share a common immutable 

characteristic.” Id. at 195 (quoting In re Acosta, 19 I & N 

Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985)). An immutable characteristic is one 

that members of the group “either cannot change, or should not 

be required to change because it is fundamental to their 

individual identities or consciences.” Id. (quoting In re 
4

Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. at 233). Second, the particular social 

group must be defined with particularity, meaning that the group 

must be “discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not be 

amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.” Id. at 196 

(quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014)). 

Third, the particular social group must be “socially distinct 

within the society in question,” meaning that it is “perceived 

as a group by society.” Id. (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 

I & N Dec. at 237, 240). 

The BIA has determined that women who have fled domestic 

violence may qualify for asylum as members of a particular 

social group when, based on their circumstances and 

circumstances in the country from which they have fled, each 

of those requirements is met. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. 

388, 390 (BIA 2014) (concluding that a proposed group of 

“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 

relationship” satisfied the three requirements for a particular 

social group). The BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G- offers 

guidance for this case-specific inquiry. We conclude that, in 

light of the principles expressed in Matter of A-R-C-G- and the 

insufficient and vague evidence presented below, the agency did 

not err in concluding that Guzman-Alvarez failed to carry her 
5

burden of establishing membership in a cognizable particular 

social group. Specifically, Guzman-Alvarez did not present 

sufficient evidence to fulfill the “immutable characteristic” 

and “defined-with-particularity” requirements. 

First, as to the “immutable characteristic” requirement, 

gender is an immutable characteristic and the BIA has determined 

that “marital status can be an immutable characteristic where 

the individual is unable to leave the relationship.” Id. at 

392-93. When considering whether a characteristic is 

immutable, “adjudicators must consider a respondent’s own 

experiences, as well as more objective evidence, such as 

background country information.” Id. at 393. Here, based on 

the evidence put forward by Guzman-Alvarez, the agency did not 

err in concluding that Guzman-Alvarez was ineligible for 

relief. 

The standards set forth in the Matter of A-R-C-G- refer to 

“marital status” and the importance of a fact-specific, 

case-by-case inquiry in assessing whether “dissolution of a 

marriage could be contrary to religious or other deeply held 

moral beliefs” or whether “dissolution is possible when viewed 

in light of religious, cultural, or legal constraints” and the 

applicant’s “own experiences.” Id. at 392-93. In Matter of 
6

A-R-C-G-, the applicant “suffered repugnant abuse by her 

husband,” including “weekly beatings,” a broken nose, rape, and 

an incident in which her husband threw paint thinner on the 

applicant, burning her breast. Id. at 389. The applicant 

“contacted the police several times but was told that they would 

not interfere in a marital relationship. On one occasion, the 

police came to her home after her husband hit her on the head, 

but he was not arrested.” Id. The BIA in Matter of A-R-C-Gfound that “it [wa]s significant that the [applicant] sought 

protection from her spouse’s abuse and that the police refused 

to assist her because they would not interfere in a marital 

relationship.” Id. at 393. Additionally, the applicant in 

Matter of A-R-C-G- “repeatedly tried to leave the relationship 

by staying with her father, but her husband found her and 

threatened to kill her if she did not return to him.” Id. at 

389. 

Here, in contrast, although Guzman-Alvarez and Santos had 

three children and lived together as a family for approximately 

14 years, they never married. In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the 

applicant was unable to leave her husband because he followed 

her and threatened her with death if she did not return. 

However, Guzman-Alvarez testified that, since April 2014, she 
7

had lost communication with Santos (although a female cousin 

reported that Santos had sent the cousin a Facebook message 

stating that he was looking for her). Additionally, unlike the 

applicant in Matter of A-R-C-G-, Guzman-Alvarez never 

complained to the police. Finally, in the proceedings below, 

the agency focused on evidence showing that Guzman-Alvarez was 

able to run errands and escape to the United States, which was 

rebutted only by vague and undetailed testimony, to support its 

finding that the applicant had not shown an inability to leave 

her relationship. Based on our review of the record, we find 

no error in the conclusion that Guzman-Alvarez failed to meet 

the “immutable characteristic” requirement. 

Substantial evidence similarly supports the agency’s 

determination that Guzman-Alvarez failed to satisfy the 

“defined-with-particularity” requirement. A social group is 

“defined with particularity” when there is a “clear benchmark 

for determining who falls within the group.” Paloka, 762 F.3d 

at 196 (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I & N Dec. at 239); see

Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I & N Dec. at 393 (looking to the police 

department’s refusal to protect the applicant when determining 

that the applicant satisfied the particularity requirement). 

Here, the agency concluded that Guzman-Alvarez’s social group 
8

was too broad. This conclusion is amply supported by the record 

which shows that Guzman-Alvarez was not married to her abuser, 

never complained to the police, and otherwise offered only vague 

testimony in arguing that her particular social group was 

defined with particularity. Taking the record as a whole, we 

again find no error in the conclusion that Guzman-Alvarez failed 

to meet the “defined-with-particularity” requirement. 

 We have considered Guzman-Alvarez’s remaining claims and 

conclude that they, too, are without merit. For the foregoing 

reasons, we DENY the petition for review. Any pending request 

for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second 

Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk