NO. PD-1597-14 

COURT OF APPEALS NO. 02-13-00016-CR 

IN THE 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

OF TEXAS 

JOSEY WALES PARKS, 

Appellant 

vs. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

Appellee. 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 

OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS 

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9 

of Tarrant County, Texas in Cause No. 1263051 

Hon. Brent Carr, Presiding 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 

L. PATRICK DAVIS 

SBN 00795775 

115 N. Henderson Street 

Fort Worth, Texas 76102 

(817)870-1544 

(817)870-1589 fax 

ATTORNEY FOR 

APPELLANT/PRO BONO 

PD-1597-14

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

Transmitted 1/2/2015 2:28:03 PM

Accepted 1/12/2015 5:19:06 PM

ABEL ACOSTA

CLERK
LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 

Josey Wales Parks 

Represented by: 

Trial/ Appeal: 

Hon. L. Patrick Davis 

SBN 00795775 

115 N. Henderson Street 

Fort Worth, Texas 76102 

(81 7)870-1544 

(817)870-1589 fax 

COMPLAINANT 

The State ofTexas 

i 

Represented by: Trial/ Appeal 

Hon. Joe Shannon, Jr. 

Tarrant County District Attorney 

401 W. Belknap Street 

Fort Worth, Texas 76196 

(817)884-1400 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

List of Interested Parties .................................. i 

Table of Contents .......................................... ii 

Index of Authorities ...................................... iii 

Statement Regarding Oral Argument .......................... vi 

Statement of the Case ....................................... 1 

Procedural History .......................................... 1 

Grounds for Review .......................................... 2 

(1) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this 

Court's opinion in State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002)? 

(2) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this 

Court's opinion in Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011)? 

Argument .................................................... 2 

Ground for Review No. 1 ..................................... 3 

Ground for Review No. 2 ..................................... 9 

Prayer ..................................................... 15 

Certificate of Service ..................................... 16 

Certificate of Compliance .................................. 16 

Appendix: 

Memorandum Opinion .......................................... A 

ii 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

State Cases 

Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3' 9 

Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .......... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) .......... . 

........................................................ 2,8,12,13 

Curry v. State, 808 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ........... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6' 8 

Davis v. State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.· Crim. App. 1992) ........... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) .......... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ......... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •· ..................................... 9 

Garza v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 147, 48 S.W.2d 625 (1930) ......... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .......... . 

....... .............................................. ....... 12,13 

Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ........... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 9 

Horton v. State, 986 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet.) ... 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

Jones v. State, 579 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ........... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) .......... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

iii 
McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. 

denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997) ................................... 10 

Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ........ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

Perez v. State, 818 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 

19 91, no pet. ) .................................................. 3 

Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ........... . 

. . . . . . . • . . • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . • . . • • • . . • • . . • . . • . . • . . • . . . . • . . . . . . 4 

Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ........ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 

State v. Davila, 169 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) 

............................................................... 12 

State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ............. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (TeK. Crim. App. 2002) ......... . 

................ .. ................................ ........ 2,6,7,9 

Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ...... . 

............ ......... .............................. ... .... 9,11,12 

Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ........ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ............ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 

Texas Constitution 

TEX. CONST. art. I, §9 .................................. 4,8,10,13 

Texas Codes, Statutes, and Rules 

TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b)(Vernon2012) ........... . 

• . . • . . . • . . • . • • . . . . • • . • . . . . . • . . . • • . • • • • . . • • . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01 (Vernon 2012) ............. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2012) ............. . 

................ ... .................................... 4,8,13,14 

United States Constitution 

U.S. CONST. amend IV .................................... 4,8,10,13 

iv 
Federal Cases 

Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1968) ...................... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . • • . • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) .......................... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ............................... . 

. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ................................ . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 

Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) ......................... . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

v 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

Appellant does not believe oral argument would aid this 

Honorable Court in reaching a decision as this case rests on sound 

case law from this Court. The grounds raised in this petition have 

already been plowed by this Court. 

vi 
TO THE JUDGES OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS: 

NOW COMES JOSEY WALES PARKS, Appellant herein, and files this his 

Petition for Discretionary Review of the judgment of the Second 

Court of Appeals for the State of Texas. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

On October 19, 2012, Appellant was sentenced to six (6) months 

deferred adjudication probation in the County Criminal Court No. 9 

of Tarrant County, Texas, in cause number 1263051 for the offense 

of Possession of Marijuana, under 2 ounces and assessed a fine of 

$150.00 as a result of a plea of guilty. (C.R., Vol. 1, p. 24). On 

August 2, 2012, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to 

suppress after an evidentiary hearing was conducted and provided 

its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record. (R.R., 

Vol. 2, pp. 82-84). The trial court gave its permission to appeal. 

Appellant timely gave his Notice of Appeal specifically complaining 

of the denial of his suppression motion. (C. R. , Vol. 1, p. 31) . 

--FACTUAL STATEMENT--

The memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals adequately sets 

out the disputed, factual background between the parties. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 

judgment and delivered a memorandum opinion on September 18, 2014. 

Appellant's timely filed motion for rehearing was denied on October 

23, 2014. Appellant's timely filed motion for extension of time to 

1 
file his petition for discretionary review was granted on December 

5, 2014. Appellant's petition for discretionary review is timely 

if filed on or before December 29, 2014. 

GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 

(1) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's 

opinion in State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)? 

(2) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's 

opinion in Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)? 

Ground I and Ground II will be argued separately. 

ARGUMENT 

On September 18, 2014, the Fort Worth Court affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court in a memorandum opinion holding, inter 

alia, that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining 

that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant and that 

the evidence seized subsequent to Appellant's illegal detention had 

no bearing on the procurement of the search warrant and the items 

seized thereafter. The Fort Worth Court's opinion conflicts and 

ignores this Court's decisions in both Steelman and Crider. See 

Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Judge 

Cochran, writing for the majority, assumed the day began at 12:00 

am as well when the affidavit/record recited no time); State v. 

Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding the 

mere odor of marijuana, standing alone, emitting from a residence 

does not give officers probable cause to believe Appellant was in 

2 
possession of marijuana in their presence). The Fort Worth Court 

does not have the luxury of disagreeing with the decisions of the 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Horton v. State, 986 S.W.2d 

297, 300 (Tex. App. -Waco 1997, no pet.) (intermediate appellate 

courts are duty bound to apply the law as interpreted by the Court 

of Criminal Appeals) (opinion of Davis, C. J.) . Accordingly, 

Appellant seeks discretionary review from this Court. 

GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. 1 

(1) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's 

opinion in State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)? 

GENERAL APPLICABLE STANDARDS 

The trial court is the sole judge of credibility of the 

witnesses ln a suppression hearing and, absent an abuse of 

discretion, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. Perez 

v. State, 818 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, 

no pet.); see also Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997) . Such findings are reviewed on an abuse of discretion 

standard and "will not be disturbed on appeal unless no reasonable 

review of the facts shown in the appellate record could support the 

trial court's ruling." Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 497-98 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Cantu v. State, 817 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991). 

3 
When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of 

a Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the burden of 

proof. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 

Once the defendant establishes that a ( 1) search or seizure has 

occurred and that (2) no warrant was obtained, the burden of proof 

shifts to the State. Id. If the State is unable to produce 

evidence of a warrant, then it must prove the reasonableness of the 

search or seizure. Id. 

In the case at bar, Appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of his 

detention because they were obtained as a result of an 

unconstitutional detention. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); 

see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 2012); TEX. 

CONST. art. I, §9; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. It is undisputed that 

Littlejohn did not have a warrant to either detain Appellant or to 

arrest him. Thus, the State had the burden to affirmatively 

establish that Appellant had committed an offense or was about to 

commit an offense before Littlejohn made the detention. Henry v. 

United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); 

see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 2012). 

For government officials to be able to conduct investigative 

detentions, they must have reasonable suspicion based on specific, 

4 
articulable facts which, when combined with rational inferences 

from those facts, would lead the officer to conclude that a 

particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in 

criminal activity. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007). Articulable facts must amount to "more than a mere 

inarticulable hunch, suspicion, or good faith suspicion that a 

crime was in progress." Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1981). 

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS 

Littlejohn testified that he conducted a "knock and talk" of 

Appellant's residence on September 20~ 2011. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 30). 

Littlejohn was unclear what time the "knock and talk" occurred. 

(R.R., Vol. 2, p. 32). At the time of the "knock and talk," 

Littlejohn smelled the odor of marijuana emitting from Appellant's 

house. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 18). After the short conversation, 

Littlejohn left Appellant's residence and went back to the Crowley 

Police Department. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 20). Littlejohn was then 

instructed by Wallace to go back to the residence, set up 

surveillance and make sure no one left the home so that Wallace 

could obtain a search warrant for the residence. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 

21). Littlejohn went back to the house and observed Appellant ride 

his bike and walk his dog. Id. Littlejohn then initiated a second 

conversation with Appellant and detained him, at the direction of 

Wallace, by placing him in the back of his patrol car. (R.R., Vol. 

5 
2, pp. 22-23). Littlejohn testified that his primary objective in 

detaining Appellant was the odor of the marijuana. (R.R., Vol. 2, 

pp. 33-34). A search warrant was later signed by a magistrate for 

Appellant's residence at 11:34 am the same day. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 

40,46; Vol. 3, SX-1). The warrant was executed at approximately 

12:00 pm and the search took approximately two (2) hours. (R.R., 

Vol. 2, 53) . 

The question for this Court to decide is simply whether the 

initial arrest of Appellant could be legally made without a warrant 

or did the prolonged detention become an arrest. This Court has 

already held that the mere odor of marijuana, standing alone, 

emitting from a residence does not give officers probable cause to 

believe Appellant was ln possession of marijuana in their presence. 

Steelman, 93 S.W.3d at 108. Secondly, the mere tip, standing 

alone, provided by Valerio's mother that Appellant was selling 

marijuana to her son does not constitute probable cause. Id. The 

tip was never substantiated and Appellant was never charged with 

dealing drugs. Id. 

Finally, "a detention that is not temporary and reasonably 

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 

interference, is unreasonable and, thus, violative of the Fourth 

Amendment." Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). Both Littlejohn and Wallace erroneously thought Appellant 

was in possession of marijuana based on the mere smell of marijuana 

6 
emitting from Appellant's residence. (R.R., Vol. 2, pp. 33-34, 54). 

Wallace even stated that fact in his affidavit for the search 

warrant which the trial court adopted in its findings 1 of fact and 

again stated it in his testimony as well: " ... Was he in possession 

of it? I say yes, he was because it was in his residence." (R.R., 

Vol. 3, SX-l(p. 1 of 5); (R.R., Vol. 2, pp. 46,82). But no one 

could remember neither the time of day the "knock and talk" 

occurred, nor when the subsequent detention of Appellant occurred, 

nor when the discovery of marijuana in Appellant's home occurred: 

Q. [DEFENSE]: Again, I guess the timing here -- You don't 

recall what time you did the knock and talk that day? 

A. [LITTLEJOHN]: Not o££hand, no, sir. 

(R.R., Vol. 2, p. 32) (emphasis added). 

Without the time, one can only assume from the record that the 

day began at 12:00 am on September 20, 2011, and Appellant was in 

the back of the patrol car until at least two (2) hours after 11:34 

am when the magistrate signed the search warrant as Wallace stated 

the search of the residence took nearly two ( 2) hours after he 

Wallace admitted at the hearing that although he states 

Appellant committed the offense of possession of marijuana on 

September 19, 2011, in his affidavit for the search warrant, the 

date was actually September 20, 2011. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 46; Vol. 3, 

SX-1 (p. 1 of 5). The trial court judge incorporated said clerical 

error in his findings of fact. (R.R., Vol. 2, p. 82). Wallace did, 

however, get the date correct in his affidavit on when Littlejohn 

smelled the odor of marijuana at the residence. (R.R., Vol. 3, SX-1 

(p. 2 of 5) . 

7 
arrived with the signed warrant at noon. (R.R., Vol. 2, pp. 52-53). 

That's nearly fourteen (14) hours that Appellant is sitting in the 

back of the patrol car. Accord Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710 (Judge 

Cochran, writing for the majority, assumed the day began at 12:00 

am as well when the affidavit/record recited no time); see Davis, 

947 S.W.2d at 243. Did Littlejohn smell it at 12:01 am, 1:00 am, 

2:00am, 3:00am, 4:00am, 5:00am, 6:00am, 7:00am, 8:00am, 9:00 

am, 10:00 am, 11:00 am??? 

Thus, the longer the time gap between those events, the more 

likely the detention evolved into an arrest based on the record 

before this Honorable Court. Regardless o£ the time e~ement, the 

continued detention of Appellant was based upon the officers' 

conclusion that Appellant was in possession of marijuana based on 

the smell of marijuana which Steelman has already held, as a matter 

of law, is an erroneous belief and conclusion. Littlejohn, 

following the orders of Wallace, exceeded the scope of any alleged 

Terry detention in believing the odor of marijuana emitting from 

one's residence equals possession of marijuana. It does not. 

Thus, Appellant's warrantless detention, under these circumstances, 

was an unlawful seizure of his person which led to the procurement 

of a search warrant for his residence where marijuana was 

subsequently discovered. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. 

I, §9; accord Davis, 947 S.W.2 at 243-44. Accordingly, all 

evidence seized after said illegal arrest must be suppressed. TEX. 

8 
CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a)(Vernon2012). 

GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. 2 

(2) Does the Court of Appeals' decision conflict with this Court's 

opinion in Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)? 

GENERAL APPLICABLE STANDARDS 

The trial court is the sole judge of credibility of the 

witnesses in a suppression hearing and, absent an abuse of 

discretion, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed. State 

v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also 

Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 85. Such findings are reviewed on an abuse 

of discretion standard and "will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

no reasonable review of the facts shown in the appellate record 

could support the trial court's ruling." Montanez v. State, 195 

S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cantu, 817 S.W.2d at 77. 

But when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility 

and demeanor of the witnesses, this Honorable Court reviews de novo 

a trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact. Estrada 

v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

When reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, 

this Honorable Court applies a highly differential standard in 

keeping with the constitutional preference for a warrant. 

Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 819-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

Under this standard, this Court will uphold the magistrate's 

9 
probable cause determination "so long as the magistrate had a 

'substantial basis for .... conclud[ing]'uthat probable cause 

existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); Swearingen, 

143 S.W.3d at 810. A request for a warrant must be supported by a 

sworn affidavit that sets out facts sufficient to support a finding 

of probable cause. TEX. CONST. art. I, §9; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (c) (Vernon 2012). In 

determining whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, a 

magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit and 

must interpret the affidavit in a common sense and realistic 

manner. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W .. 2d 482, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119 (1997). 

Under the Fourth Amendment, an affidavit is sufficient if, 

from the totality of the circumstances reflected in the affidavit, 

the magistrate was provided with a substantial basis for concluding 

that probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39; U.S. CONST. 

amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, §9. Statements made during a motion 

to suppress hearing do not factor into the probable cause 

determination; rather, appellate courts examine only the four 

corners of the affidavit to determine whether probable cause 

exists. Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1996) . 

10 
APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS 

In support of probable cause for issuance of the search 

warrant in the case at bar, the affidavit of Wallace stated the 

date that Littlejohn detected the smell of marijuana emitting from 

Appellant's residence, but he failed to state the time said event 

took place. 

Said affidavit is, therefore, fatally defective. First, there 

is nothing in the affidavit telling the magistrate at what time the 

alleged incident took place. Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604, 608 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710. An affidavit is 

inadequate if it fails to disclose ~acts which would enable the 

magistrate to ascertain the event upon which probable cause was 

founded was not so remote as to render it ineffective. Jones v. 

State, 579 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), citing, Garza v. 

State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 147, 48 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1930). Here, the 

affidavit is defective because the facts stated therein are not 

shown to be closely related to the time of the issuance of the 

warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause to search 

Appellant's residence for marijuana. The record shows the search 

warrant was issued by the magistrate at 11:34 am on September 20, 

2011. Without knowing what time on September 20, 2011, Littlejohn 

made contact with Appellant and smelled the marijuana, the issuing 

magistrate was simply left to guess. Accord Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d 

812-13 (Cochran, J., dissenting). 

11 
In failing to inform the magistrate as to when Littlejohn 

arrived at "876 Oarlock Drive, Crowley, Tarrant County, Texas" and 

smelled marijuana at Appellant's residence, the magistrate had no 

information as to whether any evidence of marijuana could still be 

found at Appellant's residence. Logically, the longer the time gap 

between the initial detention and the eventual signing of the 

search warrant, the less likely marijuana will be found in 

Appellant's home. Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710. 

there is a gap of nearly twelve (12) hours. 

In the case at bar, 

The affidavit in the case at bar does not state probable cause 

to issue a search warrant for App~llant' s residence. Because 

September 20, 2011, started at 12:00 am, the question as to when 

Littlejohn detected the smell of marijuana remains unanswered. Did 

he smell it at 12:01 am, 1:00 am, 2:00 am, 3:00 am, 4:00 am, 5:00 

am, 6 : 0 0 am, 7 : 0 0 am, 8 : 0 0 am, 9 : 0 0 am, 1 0 : 0 0 am, 11 : 0 0 am? ? ? 

Without the time stated in the affidavit, the search warrant could 

not issue. Crider, 352 S.W.3d at 710; accord State v. Davila, 169 

S.W.3d 735, 739-40 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet.); see Davis v. 

State, 831 S.W.2d 426, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Gordon v. State, 

801 S.W.2d 899, 914-15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Thus, the seizure 

of Appellant's residence under these circumstances was an unlawful 

search and seizure. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, §9. 

Therefore, the evidence seized by virtue of the invalid warrant is 

subject to suppression under Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of 

12 
Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a)(Vernon 

2012) . 

TCCP Article 38.23 

However, it is an exception to the provisions of TCCP Article 

38.23(a) if the evidence was obtained by a police officer acting in 

good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate 

based upon probable cause. Id. art. 38.23(b). In the 

distinguishable case at bar, however, the good-faith exception 

should not be applied because as stated above, there was no finding 

of probable cause by the magistrate in the instant case as required 

under the specific language of TCCP .Article 38.23 (b). Id. It is 

well founded that an affidavit under "Art. 38.2 3 (b) requires a 

finding o£ probab~e cause, while [the federal good-faith exception 

is] more flexible in allowing [an] officer's belief in probable 

cause [to be] reasonable. Thus, we must direct our attention to 

the validity of the warrant and affidavit without recourse to any 

'good faith' exception to the warrant requirement." Curry v. State, 

808 S.W.2d 481, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (alteration in 

original) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

The search warrant for Appellant's residence was wholly 

lacking of any information to support an independent judgment that 

probable cause existed for the issuance of same. Gordon, 801 S.W.2d 

at 915-16, quoting, Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 

( 1971) ("The decisions of this Court concerning Fourth Amendment 

13 
probable-cause requirements before a warrant for either arrest or 

search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a 

warrant be supplied with su:f:ficient in:formation to support an 

independent judgment that probable cause exists for the 

warrant") (emphasis added); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (b) 

(Vernon 2012) . Therefore, the good-faith exception is not 

applicable in the case at bar. Id. 

CONCLUSION 

Littlejohn's own testimony supports a finding of no probable 

cause to justify the arrest of Appellant for possession of 

marijuana and the subsequent procurement of a search warrant for 

Appellant's residence where marijuana was later discovered. In the 

alternative, if the initial detention was based on reasonable 

suspicion, said detention exceeded its scope and became a full 

blown arrest based on the totality of the circumstances and the 

record before this Honorable Court. Therefore, the evidence 

obtained subsequent to said illegal arrest must be suppressed. 

An affidavit in support of a search warrant is inadequate if 

it fails to disclose facts which would enable the magistrate to 

ascertain that the event upon which probable cause was founded was 

closely related to the time of the issuance of the search warrant 

to justify a finding of probable cause for same. Because the 

officer's affidavit failed to provide the time of day necessary for 

the issuance of a search warrant for Appellant's residence relating 

14 
to the offense of Possession of Marijuana under 2 ounces, the 

evidence obtained subsequent to said illegal search must be 

suppressed. 

PRAYER 

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays this Honorable 

Court grant this Petition for Discretionary Review and after a full 

review hereon reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand 

said case for entry of an Order suppressing all illegally obtained 

tangible evidence after the illegal detention of Appellant for the 

reasons stated herein and in accordance with the Fourth Amendment 

of the United States Constitution, Article I, section 9 of the 

Texas Constitution and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure and for any other relief Appellant may be justly 

entitled. 

15 

RESPECT FULL 

L .-r 

L. PATRICK 

SBN 00795775 

115 N. Henderson Street 

Fort Worth, Texas 76102 

(817)870-1544 

(817)870-1589 fax 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT /PRO BONO 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document was hand-delivered to Hon. Joe Shannon, Jr., Tarrant 

County District Attorney, 401 W. Belknap Street, Fort Worth, Texas 

76196, and sent via certified mail to Hon. Matthew Paul, State 

Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, Texas 78711 on 

December 29, 2014. 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

Pursuant to Rule 9. 4 ( i) ( 3) of ;the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, I, L. Patrick Davis, hereby state that this document 

contains approximately 3,548 words exclusive of that contained in 

the Appendix and those sections inapplicable to said Rule. 

16 
A 
JOSEY WALES PARKS 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-13-00016-CR 

V. 

APPELLANT 

STATE 

FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 9 OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 1263051 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1 

I. Introduction 

Crowley police officers detained Appellant Josey Wales Parks while they 

sought a search warrant for his home, where they subsequently discovered 

marijuana. Parks pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana, two ounces or less, 

in exchange for six months of deferred adjudication community supervision, a 

1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 
fine, and court costs after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. Parks 

appeals the denial of his motion to suppress in two points pertaining to the 

search warrant affidavit and his detention. We affirm. 

II. Motion to Suppress 

When the trial court determines probable cause to support the issuance of 

a search warrant, there are no credibility determinations. State v. McLain, 337 

S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011 ). Instead, the trial court is constrained to 

the four corners of the affidavit. /d. Accordingly, when reviewing a magistrate's 

probable cause determination, we apply the deferential standard of review 

articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 

103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004 ). Under that standard, we uphold the probable cause determination 

"so long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a 

search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. 

Ct. at 2331 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 

736 (1960), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 

83, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980)); see Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 811; see also 

McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271; Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). 

Further, we may not analyze the affidavit in a hyper-technical manner; 

rather, we must interpret the affidavit "in a commonsensical and realistic manner, 

recognizing that the magistrate may draw reasonable inferences. When in doubt, 

2 
we defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made." 

McClain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. Probable cause exists when, under the totality of 

the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime will be found at the specified location. /d. at 272. "The focus is not on 

what other facts could or should have been included in the affidavit; the focus is 

on the combined logical force of facts that are in the affidavit." State v. Duarte, 

389 S.W.3d 349, 354-55 (Tex. Grim. App. 2012). As long as the magistrate had 

a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, the magistrate's 

probable cause determination will be upheld. McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. 

We have summarized the following pertinent information from Investigator 

Wallace's search warrant affidavit, which he signed on September 20, 2011: 

• In the two months prior to the search warrant application on September 20, 

2011, the Crowley Police Department received up to twenty reports of 

burglary and thefts in Parks's neighborhood. 

• "On or about September 19, 2011, ... Parks ... did then and there commit 

the offense of Possession of Marijuana . . . in that he did then and there 

possess marijuana inside his residence .... " 

• On September 19, 2011, Lachelle Henton advised Crowley Police Officer 

McCurtain that her juvenile son T.V. had been stealing property from 

residences in their neighborhood and trading the stolen property with Parks, 

who lived across the street from them, in exchange for marijuana. 

• On September 19, 2011, Henton went to Parks's house to confront Parks 

about providing T.V. with marijuana. He admitted to her that he provided 

marijuana to T.V. in exchange for property, and she admonished Parks to stay 

away from her son and to stop providing him with marijuana. 

• On September 20, 2011, Officer McCurtain told Investigator Wallace what 

Henton had told him about stolen property possibly being located at Parks's 

residence. 

3 
• On September 20, 2011, Officers McCurtain and Littlejohn went to Parks's 

residence and conducted a "knock and talk" with Parks. Parks told them 

about his friendship with T.V. but denied providing T.V. with marijuana or 

receiving any property from him. 

• Officer McCurtain, who was previously employed as a narcotics interdiction 

officer and due to his training and experience had become familiar with the 

odor of fresh marijuana, and Officer Littlejohn reported that they detected the 

overwhelming odor of fresh marijuana coming from inside Parks's residence 

while they talked with Parks in the open doorway of his residence. 

• Officer Littlejohn began surveillance of Parks's residence, saw an unidentified 

female enter the residence with a key, and saw Parks transport several boxes 

with unknown contents from a truck parked in the driveway into the residence. 

"It was determined at that point to detain ... Parks and the female in the 

residence in order to protect any evidence from destruction." 

• Officer Littlejohn approached Parks outside the residence, detained him, 

secured him in the back of his patrol unit, and gave him his Miranda warnings. 

Parks then waived his rights and agreed to answer questions. 

• Officer Littlejohn knocked on the door, detained the female who answered it, 

and placed her in the back of Officer McCurtain's patrol unit. She waived her 

rights, agreed to answer questions, and told Officer McCurtain that she had 

an amount of marijuana in a green bag that was located just inside the 

residence by the doorway. 

• Officer Harold Cussnick with the Fort Worth Police Department K-9 Unit was 

asked to come to the residence; his K-9 partner Kelev had a positive alert to 

the presence of narcotics at the residence's front door. 

The face of the warrant reflects that the magistrate signed it at 11:33 a.m. on 

September 20, 2011. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Littlejohn testified that he and Officer 

McCurtain decided to conduct a "knock and talk" with Parks after receiving T.V.'s 

mother's credible tip regarding her son's crime spree and his exchanging the 

4 
stolen goods for marijuana with Parks, a neighbor across the street. 2 They went 

to Parks's home at some point in the morning between 8:00 a.m. and "before 

lunch" and spoke with Parks for around five minutes. Both officers detected a 

strong odor of marijuana coming from inside the house when Parks opened the 

front door. Parks told them that he did not want to speak with them and that "he 

knew the kid but, you know, he wasn't doing any of the buying" of the stolen 

property. 

After conversing with Parks, the officers returned to the police station and 

talked with Investigator Wallace. Officer Littlejohn said that Investigator Wallace 

told them to return to Parks's house and make sure nobody left while he 

procured a search warrant for the house. After returning to Parks's house, the 

officers saw Parks leave the house to ride his bike and walk his dog. Officer 

Littlejohn relayed this information to Investigator Wallace, who told him to detain 

Parks. Officer Littlejohn testified that he approached Parks, took Parks's cell 

phone, and placed him in the back of his patrol car3 and that Parks was detained 

from concern that he might otherwise destroy the evidence. While Parks was 

detained, a Fort Worth K-9 unit arrived and alerted outside the home to the 

2

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (stating that a 

police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock 

because that is no more than any private citizen might do). 

3

0fficer Littlejohn further testified that he did not activate the lights on his 

patrol car and that he did not handcuff Parks before placing him in the patrol car. 

5 
presence of drugs. 4 Officer Littlejohn testified that Parks was detained for thirty 

minutes to an hour before the search warrant was executed and that police 

recovered a stolen Wii game console and a small amount of marijuana from 

Parks's residence. 

Investigator Wallace testified that he had sent Officers Littlejohn and 

McCurtain back to the residence to prevent Parks from removing or destroying 

the evidence and that he asked for a K-9 unit to be sent out. Investigator 

Wallace said that he waited to hear the results from the K-9 unit before he started 

drafting the search warrant and that it usually took him thirty to forty-five minutes 

to "bang out a warrant like this." 

On cross-examination, Investigator Wallace stated that the search warrant 

affidavit contained a typographical error in that the first statement in the affidavit 

recited that Parks had committed possession of marijuana on or about 

September 19, 2011. Investigator Wallace testified that he had intended for that 

date to read September 20, 2011, 5 and that he had based the affidavit on the 

September 20, 2011 events-the "knock and talk" at Parks's residence, the 

4

Cf. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18 ("The government's use of trained 

police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 'search' 

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). Parks does not argue that 

Jardines retroactively applies to the K-9's alert; he does not address the alert at 

all. 

5

0fficer Littlejohn stated that he thought the police had arrested Parks for 

possession on September 19, but he also agreed that the conversation with 

T.V.'s mother had occurred on September 19 before the September 20 "knock 

and talk" and the arrest. 

6 
marijuana odor smelled by the officers, and the K-9 unit's alert. Investigator 

Wallace further testified that he arrived at the residence around noon to conduct 

the search. 

The trial court recited into the record that the two references to September 

19 in the affidavit were typographical errors; 6 that all of the events occurred on 

September 20, 2011; and that based on the smell of marijuana that the officer 

recognized based on his training and experience, there was sufficient probable 

cause to believe that there were potential controlled substances in the house. 

The trial court adopted the affidavit's factual recitation as the chronology of 

events that led to the search warrant and expressly stated that the detention did 

not lead to recovery of any evidence that was sought to be used against Parks. 

And it concluded that the search warrant led to the recovery of the evidence at 

issue and that the search warrant was valid on its face because, despite the 

typographical errors, it was supported by probable cause. 

In his second point, Parks complains that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to suppress because the affidavit failed to state what time Officer 

6

As set out above in our summary of the affidavit's contents, there were 

actually three references to September 19; only one of them-the allegation that 

Parks committed possession of marijuana "on or about September 19, 2011 "-

appears to be incorrect in light of the record. We must uphold the trial court's 

ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law 

applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. 

State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. 

State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 

(2004). 

7 
Littlejohn smelled the marijuana odor coming from his house, leaving the 

magistrate to guess whether drugs could still be found there. 

The affidavit reflects that Henton, a named informant, spoke directly to 

Parks, who admitted to her that he had supplied her son with marijuana. See 

Matamoros v. State, 901 S.W.2d 470, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (upholding the 

validity of a search warrant affidavit when it specified a named informant who 

supplied the information upon which probable cause was based and was 

sufficiently detailed to suggest direct knowledge on the informant's part). 

Further, Henton's information was corroborated by the fact that the officers then 

went to Parks's residence and smelled an "overwhelming odor of fresh 

marijuana" coming from inside the house. The affidavit also reveals that through 

his training and experience as a narcotics interdiction officer, Officer McCurtain 

was familiar with the odor of fresh marijuana. Finally, the affidavit indicates that a 

female inside the residence told the officers that there was marijuana inside 

Parks's residence. 

The record reflects that the search warrant was issued and executed at 

11:34 a.m. on September 20, 2011-the same day on which the officers detected 

the odor of fresh marijuana coming from inside Parks's residence. Further, the 

affidavit stated that the Crowley Police Department had received "up to twenty 

reports of burglary" in Parks's neighborhood during the previous two months. In 

conjunction with Henton's tip that her son had been stealing from his neighbors' 

homes and trading the stolen goods to Parks in exchange for marijuana, the 

8 
magistrate could have reasonably inferred that Parks had been engaging in 

continuous drug transactions during the two months leading up to the search of 

his residence. See Jones v. State, 364 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Grim. App. 2012) 

("We have suggested that time is a less important consideration when an affidavit 

recites observations that are consistent with ongoing drug activity at a 

defendant's residence."), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 370 (2012); Thibault v. State, 

No. 02-06-00449-CR, 2008 WL 45757, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 3, 

2008, pet. refd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that when the 

affidavit recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature 

such as a course of conduct, the passage of time between the occurrence of 

events set out in the affidavit and the time the search warrant was issued 

becomes less significant). 

We defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have 

made, and here, the magistrate could have determined that the information was 

still sufficiently fresh to issue the search warrant without the specific time that the 

officers smelled the marijuana pinpointed in the affidavit. See McLain, 337 

S.W.3d at 272; cf. Crider v. State, 352 S.W.3d 704, 708-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011) (requiring a specific time in a DWI search-warrant affidavit for blood 

evidence due to alcohol's dissipation from bloodstream). Therefore, we conclude 

that the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that sufficient 

probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. See Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 

354-55; McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271. We overrule Parks's second point. 

9 
In his first point, Parks argues that his detention was an arrest without 

probable cause that led to the search warrant's procurement. Parks sought 

suppression of all tangible evidence seized from his residence and any of his 

statements. The record reflects that his statements, if any, were not offered or 

admitted into evidence, and it supports the trial court's conclusion that the other 

evidence was recovered pursuant to the search warrant, which we have already 

concluded was properly supported by probable cause. 7 Therefore, even 

assuming that the seizure itself was unlawful, because there was no evidence 

resulting from the detention for the trial court to suppress, we overrule Parks's 

first point. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a) (West 2005). 

Ill. Conclusion 

Having overruled both of Parks's points, we affirm the trial court's 

judgment. 

PER CURIAM 

PANEL: MCCOY, DAUPHINOT, and WALKER, JJ. 

DO NOT PUBLISH 

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 

DELIVERED: September 18, 2014 

7

Parks does not explain how the detention could have led to the search 

warrant's procurement when, as set out above, the search warrant application 

was based primarily on the tip from T.V.'s mother, the fresh marijuana odor, and 

other circumstances that led to Parks's detention while the police pursued the 

warrant. 

10