1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49511

VERON ICA ARREOLA,

Claimant

- Appellant,

v. SCENTSY, INC., Employer; and GRANITE STATE INSURA NCE CO., Surety,

Defendants

- Respondents.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Boise, December 2022 Term
Opinion Filed: June 23, 2023
Melanie Gagnepain, Cl erk

Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission.

The order of the Commission is vacated
, and the case is remanded with instructions for fu rther proceedings

. Goicoechea Law Offices, C htd., Boise
, for Appellant. Justin Aylsworth argued.
Bowen & Bailey, LLP, Boise , for Respondent s

. Rachael O’ Bar argued.

BRODY, Justice. This appeal arises ou t of the Idaho Industrial Commission’s order denying Veronica
Arreo la’s petition for a declara tory ruling and motion for reinstatement of compensation

. Arreola
bro ught her petition and motion against the Granite State Insurance Co. (“ the Surety”) , when the Surety , without an order from the Commission

— as permitted by our i nterpretation of Idaho
Code section 72

- 434 in Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab , 138 Idaho 859
, 71 P.3d 458 (2003)

— invoked section 72

- 434 to suspend Arreola’s compensation payments

. I n the Surety’s
unilateral and private determination, suspending Arre ola ’s compensation payments was appropriate because the Surety had purportedly scheduled Arreola’s Independent Medical Exam (“IME”) with its physician at a “reasonable” tim e, I.C. § 72

- 433(1), and Arreola had “unreasonably” failed to s ubmit to or had obstructed the scheduled IME by not appearing , I.C. §
72

- 434

. Arreola’s petition and motion disputed these private conclusions by the Surety . Arreola2 also maintained t hat only the Commission has the authority to adjudicate the underlying medical

exam dispute and determin e whether there is a factual basis to execute the enforcem ent mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72

- 434. The Commission denied the petition and motion
, i n str ucti ng Arreola to instead proceed through a compla int for relief

. For the reasons discussed below
, we conclude that our de cision in Brewer interpreting
Idaho C ode se ction 72

- 434 was manifestly wrong

. O nly the Commission has the authority to adjudicate med ical exam disputes
, and to enforce that adjudication through the enforcement
mechanisms in section 72

- 434 by ordering the s uspension of both the injured employee ’ s

c ompensation payments a nd “ right to take or prosecute any pro cee dings” under the Worker’s
Com pensation Law (“the Law”) until the failure or obstruction by the injured employee related
to the reques ted medical exam c ease s

. In light of this, Arreola’s conc ern that the Suret y’s unilateral execution of the
enforc eme nt mechanisms in section 72

- 434 al so suspended her right to file a “complaint” to seek
relief is now abated. With Brewer overruled and the authority of the C ommission clarified , there
is no legal i mpediment to filing a “ complaint ” below , as initially pref erred by the Commission

. Neverthele s s , we do not affirm

. G iv en the shift in the legal landsc ape with Brewer overruled
, we vacate the Commiss ion ’ s order denyin g the petition and motion , and remand with ins tructions
that the Commission : (1) order payment of prospective compensation pay ment s t hat might be

ow ed until such time as the Commission determines that payments are not required under secti on 72

- 434 ; (2) rec ons ider the appropriate procedural m echanism for adjud icating the underlying
factual dispute ; and (3) instruct the Sure ty what procedural mechanism it must use to obtain an
order authorizing it to lawfully suspend compensation payments

. I. FACTUAL AND PROCE DURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2021, Arreola experienced an i ndustrial accident, and injured her right shoulder while using a mallet in the course of her employment with Scentsy, Inc. Arreola ti mel y made a

w orker ’ s c ompensation claim for benefit s

. Two weeks later
, h er claim was “ accepted ” as

“ compensable ” by the Surety and bene fits later commenced. A few weeks after that
, Arreola
underwent an MRI and
, one week later
, visited a treating orthop edi c physician

. After reviewing the MRI and examining A rreola, the treati ng physician diagnosed Arreola with a “trauma tic” right rotator cuff tear , recommended that her injury “requires surgical intervention[,] ” and
thereafter sought authorization fr om the Surety to perform surgery on Arreola’s shoulder

. The3 p hysician also note d that Arreola had “ an acute rotator cuff tear [that] needs to be repaired

sooner [rather ] than la ter , ” and emp hasized that “ time is of the essenc e

. ” The Surety did not immediately authorize surgery ; i nstead, it placed the request from th e treating physici an “under review[.]” Three weeks into review
, the Surety sent Arreola a n otice instructing her to submit to an IM E w ith Dr. Jeffrey Hessing twenty days after the notice date. The Surety had apparently scheduled the IME without coor dinat in g with Arreola. Si x days before the scheduled IME, Arreola’s attorney responded to the noti ce, and informed the Surety
that Arreola co uld not attend the IME at the scheduled time because it was in “direct conflict” with Arreola’s “long

- standing” obl igati on s to care for a re lative. Arreola’s attorney also requested that the Surety coordinate the scheduling of all IMEs with his office.
Fi ve days after Arreola’s attorney responded
, the Surety sent another notice, instructing
Arreola to submit to an IME with D r. Hessing at a re scheduled date and time. Apparently , t he Surety had again unilateral ly scheduled the IME. Four days after th e s econd notice was sent , Arreola’s attorney responded and informed the Surety that Arreola could not attend the
resch edule d IME for the same reason as before: Arreola had a prior, “unavoidable obligation” during the re scheduled day and time to care for he r r elative. Arreola’s attorney again requested
that the Surety coordinate the scheduling of all IMEs with his offic e. One d ay before the

re sch eduled IME, the Surety responded to Arreola’s attorney that the IME would not be
rescheduled a second time : “I hav e g iven your client ample opportunity to attend an IME. If she
fails to attend the IME tomorrow her time loss benef its will be stopped.”
Arre ola di d not attend the rescheduled IME. Three days later, the Surety issue d a “Notice of Claim Status” to Arreola, an d explained that due to Arreola’s “failure to attend the medical
examination [,] [the Surety was ] suspending [ Arreol a’s ] temporary total dis abilit y benefits under Idaho Code [section] 72

- 434.” The Surety added that Arreola’s benefits “will be suspen ded until [ Arreola ] attend[s] an independent medical examination with Dr. Hessing’s office.” In the meantime, Arreola’s tre ating physician still ha d not received authorization from the Surety to perform the recommend ed surgery. Subsequently, Arreola sought in tervention from the Commission . Instead of filing a complaint with a m otion for an emergency hearing , Arreola filed a mo tion for reinstatement o f

comp ensation , or in the alternative, a petition for a declaratory r uling from the Commission to
reinstate h er compen sation based on the Surety’s unlawful execution of section 72

- 434 . Arreo la4 also sought “sanctions” and attorney fe es against the Surety fo r its “punitive” use of section 72

- 434 to arbitrarily “penalize” Arre ola for missing the IME that the Surety had unilaterally
scheduled , and allegedly knew Arreola could not attend due to a preexisting conflict

. T he Commission did not reach the merits of Arreol a’s request for relief

. Instead, the
Commission denied Arreola ’ s motion and petition as procedurally im pro per and declined to hold a hearing on the underlying factual dispute or to issue a declaratory ruling reinstating

compen sation payment

. The Comm ission explained that because Arreola had not yet filed a complaint
, Arreola’s motion was not properly before th e Commission . Thus, it could not be ruled

upon . As for Arreola’s petition for a declaratory ruling, the Commission decli ned to use this proced u ral mec hanism to resolve the underlying d i spute even though the Commission ’ s Judicial
Rules of Practice and Procedure specifically auth orize it to issue a declaratory ruling . Instead, the
Commission instructed Arreola that the preferred procedural path was for he r to pursue relief throug h administrative litigation, by filing a complaint and a motion for an emergency hearing
befo re an assigned referee. Arreola timely a pp e aled from the denial of her petition for a declaratory ruling and
motion for reinstateme nt of b enefits

. II. STANDARD OF REVI EW “In reviewing a decision of the Commission, this Court exercises free review over the
Comm ission ’ s legal conclusions. ” Clark v. Sh ar i ’ s Mgmt. Corp. , 155 Idaho 576, 579, 314 P.3d 631, 634 (2013)

. “The interpretation of a s tatute is a question of law over w hich this Court
exercises de novo review.” Kelly v. TRC Fabrication, LLC , 168 Idaho 788, 79 1, 487 P.3d 723, 726 (2021) (quoting Rob i so n v. Bateman

- Hall, Inc. , 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003) )

. “When doing so, t his Cou rt ‘must liberally constr ue the provisions of the worker’s compensation law in favor of the employee, in order to serv e the humane purposes for which the
law wa s promulgated.’ ” Clark , 155 Idaho at 579, 314 P.3d at 634 (quoting Jensen v. City of
Poc atello, 135 Idaho 406, 413, 18 P .3 d 211, 218 (2000))

. III. ANALYSIS On appeal, Arreola first focuses on the underlying factual di spute

. Arreola alleges that the Surety refused to coordinate with Arreola in scheduling the IME on the dates and times she was
avai lable. Thus, acc ording to Arreola, the re is no factual basis to exec ute Idaho Code section 72

- 434 and suspend her compensation payments because the S ur e ty did not schedule an IME for a5 “reasonable” time
, see I.C. § 72

- 433(1), and Arreola did not “unreasona bly” fa il to sub mit to or
otherwise obstruct the IME
, see I.C. § 72

- 434. However, we do no t reach this underl ying factual dispute that the Commission n e ver addressed in denying Arreola’s petition and motion below

. Instead, Arreola’s appeal turns on questio ns of l aw raised b y Arreola related to the proper interpretation and o peration of Idaho Code section 72

- 434.
C iting to case law from this Court interp re t ing the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Law, along with Idaho Code section 72

- 707 , Arreola maintains that only th e Commissio n can adjudicate disputes related to employer

- dire cted medical examinations arising under Ida ho Code
sections 72

- 433 (1) and 72

- 434 (l i ke the one here); and then through the enforcement
mechanisms in section 72

- 434 for such adjudication s , only th e Commissio n can suspend an injured employee ’ s payment o f compensation and “ right to take or prosecute a ny proceeding s ”
under the Law for t h e time “such failure or obstruction” by the injured employee “continues.”
Based on this , Arreola contends the Surety here acted unlawfully when it unilaterally
executed th e enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 7 2

- 434 without first obtainin g a n order from the Commission . Part of this execution included suspending payment of Arreola’s compensation benefits
, and Ar reola maint ains that this execution also necessarily suspended her “right to take or prosecute any proce eding s ” under the Law becaus e t he dual mechanisms in
section 72

- 434 are both conjoined by “and”

— and made mandatory by the use of “shall” in the

s tatute

. In other w ords, Arreola argues that the Surety’s unilateral executio n of section 72

- 434

creates a “Catc h

- 22” because it simultaneou sl y suspends both her compensa tion payments and
her ability to challenge that suspension and obtain reinstatement thr ough th e procedura l
mechanism the Commission insisted on below: the filing of a complaint.
On this no te, Arreo la essentially asks this Court to r ev i sit our interpretation of Idaho
Code section 72

- 434 in Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab , 138 Idaho 859, 8 64, 71 P.3d 458,
4 63 (2003) , and conclude that Brewer was manifestly wrong when it held that private employers
and sureties could unilaterally en fo r ce and execute section 72

- 434 (as the Surety did here) without first obtaining authority to do so through a n order from the C ommission

. In the alternative, A rreola argues that if Brewer ’s interpretation of sec tion 72

- 4 34 is correct , then the

statute is un c onstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine and due process. Under her nondelegation argument, Arreola a rgue s th at if Idah o Code section 72

- 434 unilaterally allows a private surety to suspend both payment o f compens ation
, and the6 employee ’ s “right to t a ke or prosecute any proceedings” under the Law to challenge the surety’s
action

— then the Idaho Legislature has, thr ough secti on 72

- 434, unconstitutionally delegated power to private sureties ( who are adverse t o injured employees ) to make the sureties th e “ judge, jury, and executioner” of medical exam disputes arising under section s 72

- 433 (1) and 72

- 434. In

supp ort of h er argumen t, Arreola points to, among other things, the United States Supreme Court
decision i n Carter v. Carter Coal Co. , 298 U.S. 238, 3 10

– 12 (1936) , where the Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated power to private producers a nd miner s to fix t he
maximum hours of labor

— instead of a disinterested governmental agency

. Under her due proce ss argument, Arreola argues that if I d aho Code section 72

- 434 permits a private surety to unilatera lly suspend an injured employee ’ s com pensation payment s without notice and before a meaningful hearing is held in front of a neutral decisi on

- maker (i.e.,

t he Commission)

— particularly when en ti t lement to (i.e., liability for ) compensation is undisputed (as it is here)

— then Idaho Code section 72

- 434 vi olate s t he Due Pr ocess Clauses of
both the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitut ion . According to Arreola, those
clauses require a pretermination hearing in these circumstances unde r both constitutions

. C onsistent with the doctrine of constitu tional a voidance, we do not reach Arreola’s alternative constitutional arguments under the no ndelegation doctr ine and due process. See
Miller v. Id a ho State Patrol , 150 Idaho 856, 864, 252 P.3d 1274, 1282 (2011) (“The general rule
of constitutional avoidan ce encou rages cou rts to interpret statutes so as to avoid unnecessary constitutional question s.”). Idaho Code section 72

- 434 can be interpreted c on s istently with the Worker’s Compensation Law to avoid these constitutional questions , and in doing so, it is clear
th at our in terpretation of section 72

- 434 in Brewer was manifestly wrong.
A. O nly the Comm ission has the au thority to adjudicate medical exam disputes under Id ah o Code sections 72

- 433 (1) and 72

- 434 , and order the implementation of the enforcement mechanisms in secti on 72

- 434.

“ When t here is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law ‘the rule
of stare decisis dictates t hat we follow i t, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has prov en over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to v indicate plain, ob vious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.’ ” Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of
Idaho
, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2006) (quot in g Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (199 0)). In Brewer v. La Crosse Health & Rehab
,7 we held that an employer or s urety could unilaterally execute Idaho Code section 7 2

- 434 and suspend payment of compensation to an inju re d employee without first obtaining an order from
the Commission because noth ing “expressly nor implicitly” required the employer or surety to “obtain an order of the Commission prior to s uspending benef its for obstruction of an IME.” 138
Idaho 859, 864, 71 P.3d 458, 463 (2003)

. T his interpretation of Idaho Code section 72

- 434 in
B rewer , effectively reading section 72

- 434 as delegating adjudicatory and enforcement authority

to emplo yers and sureties o ver i njured employees
, was manifestly wrong

. The fu nd a mental misstep in Brewer was to read the language of Idaho Code section 72

- 434 in isolati on instead of in context of the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Law as a whole

. This approach is required here because unlike Idaho Code section 72

- 435 which ex pressly authorize s the Commission to suspend or reduce compensation of an injured emp loyee who persi sts in certain injurious practices

— Idaho Code section 72

- 434 is completely silent on who is a uthorized
to in voke and execute its enforcement mechanisms for a medical exam dispute

. See Arneson v. Robinson , 59 Idaho 223, 239 , 82 P.2d 249, 255 (1938 ) (explain ing that the Workm en ’ s Compensation Act of 1917 must be “construed and considered as a whole” to answer a partic ular question the statutory scheme is s ilent on where the scheme was passed as a complete act ) ; 1971 Idaho Sess. Laws 422, 422

– 85 (rec odifying
, as a complete act, the Workmen’s Compe nsation Act of 1917 into the Worker’s Compensation L aw , I.C. §§ 72

- 101 to 72

- 805 (1971) )

. W hen the relevant provisions under the Law are read in context as a whole, it plainly does not empo wer or author ize a n employer or surety to unilaterally invoke and execute the
enforcem ent mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72

- 434 w i thout first obtaining an order from the
Commissio n. Accordingly, Brewer ’s interpretation of section 72

- 434 was “ manife stly wrong, [and] s tare decisis does not require that we continue an incorrect readi ng of [th at] statute.” Greenough , 142 Idaho at 592

– 9 3 , 13 0 P.3d at 1130

– 31

. We begin where we did not in Brewer , by applying our well

- settled approach to statutory interpretation that forbid s read ing provisions in isolat ion: Statutory interpr etation begins with the literal language of th e sta tute. Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document

. The statute should be considered as a wh ole, and words should be give n their plain , usual, a nd ordinary meanings. It should be noted th at the C ourt must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is unam biguous, the8 clearly exp ressed intent of the le gislative body must be given effect, and th e C ourt need not consider rules of statutory construction. Nelson v. Evans , 166 Idaho 815, 820, 464 P.3d 301, 306 (2020) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Th e fou r relevant statutes under the Worker’s Com pens ation Law to interpreting the plain meaning of Idaho Code sectio n 72

- 434 are s ections 72

- 707, 72

- 712, 72

- 433 (1) , and 72

- 434: All questions arising under this law , if not settled b y agreement or stipulation of t he interested parties with the approval of the commission, exc ept as otherwise herein provided, shall be det ermined by the commissio n

. I.C. § 72

- 70 7 ( emphasis added ). Upon application of any party to the proceeding, or when ordered by the commission o r a m ember thereof or a hearing officer, referee or examin er , and when issues in a case cannot be resolved by pre

- hearing conferences o r otherwise , a hearing shall be held for the purpose of determining the issues

. I.C. § 72

- 712 (emphasis added).
After an injur y or contraction of an occupational disease and during the period of disability the employee, if requested by the employer or ordered by the commission, shall submit himself for ex ami nation at reasonable tim es and places to a duly qualified physician or su rgeon

.

. . . . I.C. § 72

- 433(1) (emphasis ad ded). If an injured employee unreasonably fails to submit to or in any way obstr ucts an exami nation by a physician or surgeon designated by the commission o r the employer, the injured employee’s right to tak e or prosecute any proceedings under this law sha ll be suspended until such failure or obstruction ceases, and no compensation sh all be payabl e for the period during which such failure or obstruction conti nues. I.C. § 72

- 434 (emphasis added). When consider ed as a whole
, Idaho Code sections 72

- 707, 72

- 712, 72

- 433 (1) , and 72

- 434 plainly operate in at least two ways. Contrary to Brewer , n either way delegates author ity to an employer or surety to unilaterally adjudicate a dispute, and thereafter execute the enf orcement mech anisms in Idaho Code section 72

- 434. Fi rst, Idaho Code sectio n 72

- 707 prevents an emplo yer or surety and an injured employee from settl ing “ by agre ement or stipulation ” a medical exam dispute witho ut obtaining a stamp of “approval” from the Co mmission

. Thi s is
because there is nothing “ otherwise herein pro vided ” in the Worker’s Compensation Law that
allow s private settlement

. See I.C. § § 72

- 101 to 72

- 929 ; see als o I.C. § 72

- 404 (allowing9 parties to , in c ert ain circumstances , com promise and sett le “ claims ” f or comp ensation
without Com mission approval

— but not disputes under section s 72

- 433(1) and 72

- 434)

. Second, if the employer or surety and the injured employee ha ve a medical exam dispute that
arises unde r s ections 72

- 433 (1) and 72

- 434

— and canno t settle it w ith the Commission’s stamp of approval through , for example, an inf ormal pre

- hearing conference

— the n the dispute “ shall be determined by the [C] ommission.” See I. C. § § 72

- 707 , 72

- 712

. Accordingly, when there is su ch an unresolved dispute, befo re any “suspe n[sion s ] ” pursuant to Idaho Code section 72

- 434 can be executed
, t he Commission must adjudicate th e dispute through a hearing

. See I.C. § 72

- 712 (explaining th at the Commission “shall” hold a

“ hearing ” to deter mine issues “in a case that canno t be resolved by pre

- hearing conferences or otherwise”) ; see also Curr v. Curr , 124 Idaho 686, 690, 864 P.2d 13 2, 136 (1993). Only after the Commission has adjudicated the d ispute
, and made findings of fact, can the Co mmission
determine whe ther it “shall” execute the d ual enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section
72

- 434 and simulta neously suspend both the injured employee’s : (1 ) payment of compensation ; and (2) “ right to t ake or prosecute any proceeding s ” under th e L aw

— “ until such failure or obstruction ” by the injur ed employee related to the medical exam requested by the employer or surety “ ceases

. ” See I.C. §§ 72

- 434, 72

- 433 (1) , 72

- 707 , 72

- 7 12

. Th at said, i f an employer or surety desires to have the enforcement mechanisms in

se ction 72

- 434 operate a gai nst an injured employee
, the employer or surety must request an order
from the Commission

. N othing in the Idaho Worker’s Compensation Law authorizes the employer or surety to privately and un ilaterally dete rmine its scheduling of an exam was reasonable whi le the employee ’ s condu ct was u nreasonable
, and then execute the dual
enforcement mechanisms in se ction 72

- 434 by suspending an injured employee ’ s benefits until

s uch time as the employer or surety determines , in its discretion
, th at the employee’s “failur e or obstruction” has a dequately “cease[d].” P ursuant to the pl ain language of Idaho Cod e section 72

- 707, this authority rests solely with the Commission

. If the Commission orders the injured employee’s compensation and “right to take or prosecute any proc eeding s ” under the Law suspended after adjudicating a medical exam dispute
, th en the Commission’s order is what gives
the surety or employer the authority to suspend payment of compen sation

. With this clarified, we turn to Arreola’s press ing concern that t he Surety’s unilateral
execution of Idaho Code section 72

- 434 also sus pen ded her “right to take or prosecute any10 proceedings” under the Law before the Commission ; i.e., it suspended her ability to file a complaint to challenge the Surety’s a ctions at all

. For the reasons below, it did not.
T he provision s in section 72

- 434 that su spend an employee ’s “r ight to take or prosecute any proceedings ” under the Law if the employee “unreasonably” fails to submit to
, or otherwise
obstruct s a requested medical ex am ha ve been part of Idaho’s worker ’ s compensation schem e i n substantially th e same form since its original enactment in 1917 : Sec. 29. After an injury and during the period of disability, the workman, if so requested by his employer , or ordered by the Board shall submit himself to examination, at reasona ble times and places
, to a duly qualified phys ician or surgeon designated and paid by the employer

. . . . If a workman refuses to submit hi mself to or in any way obstructs such examination, his right to take o r prosecute any proceed ings under this Act shal l b e suspended until such refusal or obstructi on ceases, and no compensation shall be payable for the period during which such refusal or o bstruction continues

. 19 17 Idaho Sess. Laws 252, 267

– 68 (emphasis adde d) ; 1971 Idaho Sess . L a ws 422 , 461 ; I.C. § §
72

- 43 3 (1) , 72

- 434 (2023). To give effect to all the words in section 72

- 434 and render none superfluous
, Nelson
, 166 Idaho at 820, 464 P.3d a t 306 , the phrase “to take or prosecute any proceedings” must be
interpreted in two parts . T h e meaning of “ to

. . . prosecute ” any proceeding is relatively straigh tforward: to “prosecute” is “[t]o follow up” or “to carry on an action or other judicial

pro c eeding” that has already commenced. See Prosecute , Black’s Law Diction ary (2 nd e d. 1910).
On the other hand, th e meaning of “to take ” any proceeding is not so stra ightforward.
B etween 1911 and 1917, when worker ’ s compensation schemes were first enacted in the
Unit ed States , many states

— including Idaho

— borrowed from the Engli sh Workmen’s Compen sat i on Act of 1897 (“A ct of 1897”)
, and the English Workmen’s Compensation Act of
1906 (“Act of 1906”)
, which amended the Act of 1897

. See McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber C o. , 34 I daho 773, 781 , 203 P. 1068, 1071 (1921); Skelly , 62 Idaho at 1 98 , 109 P.2d at 624 ; M c Cormick v. Cent. C oal & Coke Co. , 232 P. 1071, 1074 (Kan. 1925) ; Jerem iah Smith, Sequel

to Workmen ’ s Compensation Acts , 27 H ARV

. L. R EV

. 235, 247 (1914). However, state s d id not borrow uniformly, and not all borrow ed the “ take” langu age in the analogou s p r ovision of their

w orker ’ s compensation scheme

. See, e.g. , 1911 Mass. A cts 998, 1003 ( “ If he refuses to submit himself for the examination, or in any way obstructs the same , his right to compensation shall be suspended, and his compen sation during the p eri o d of suspension ma y be forfeited.”).11 Relevant here, u nder the English Act s of 1897 and 1906 , t o “take” a proceeding for compensation was equivalent to “ commencing ” a proce eding t o bring or enforce a claim of compensation against a n e mployer

. See Act of 18 9 7, 60 & 61 Vict. c h . 37 § 1 (2) (b) (explaining that a workman may eithe r commence proceedings under the Act or “take” proceedings under
the common law against a thi rd party , but not both)
, reprinted in M. Robert

- Jones, Handbook on
the Workmen’s Compensa tio n Act 1897 , at 12 ( London, Cardiff: Western Mail, Ltd.
, 5 th
ed. 1898), https://archive.org/details/handbookonworkme00robe/page/12/mode/2up (last visited June 12, 20 23) ; Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7 c h . 58 § 1 (2) (b) (using the term “take” in the same manner) , r epr i nted in V. R. Aron son, The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906
, at 71 ( Lon don,
T. F. Unwin 1909), https://archive.org/details/workmenscompens00britgoog/page/ 71 /mode/2u p (last visited June 12, 2023) ; Act of 1897, 60 & 61 Vict. c h . 37 § 1 ( 4) ( “ If, within the ti m e hereinafter in t his Act limited for taking proceedings

. . . . ” ); Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7 c h . 58 § 1 ( 4 ) (using the term “taking proceedings” in the same manner); se e also Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7 . c h . 58 § 6 ( explaining a workman ’s r ight to claim compensat ion versus his right t o “take” proceedings
at common law for damages again st a third party ) ; see, e.g. , Clatworthy v. R. & H. Green, Ltd.
, 86 L. T. 702 (June 4, 1902) (explaining that a widow of a workman was “entitled to take

procee ding s under the Act [of 18 9 7] to enforce her claim” of compensation ) , reprinted in 4
R. M. Minton

- Senhouse, A Digest of Workmen’s Compensation Cases , at 153 ( London, Butterworth & Co., 2 d ed . 19 04 ) , https://archive.org/details/workmenscompe ns00coltgoog/ page/n1 64/mode/2up (last v isi t ed June
12 , 2023)

. Importantly, except for a few terms, the relevant pr ovision in Idaho’s Act of 1917

— now recodified in a substantially similar fo rm in Idaho Code s ections 72

- 433(1) and 72

- 434

— borrow ed directly from the analogous pro visions in the E nglish Wor kme n’s Compensation A ct of 1906 : (4) Where a workman has given notic e of an accident, he shall
, if so required by the employer
, submit himself for examination by a duly qualified medical practitioner provided and paid by the emplo yer, and, if he refuses to
su bmit himself to su ch examination, or in any way obstructs the sam e , his right to compensation, and to take or prosecute any proceedings under this Act in rela tion to compensation, shall be suspended until such examination has t aken place

.

. . . .12 (14 ) A ny workman receiving weekly payments under this Act shall, if so req uired by the employer, from time to time submit himself for examination by a duly qualified m edical practitioner provided and paid by the employer. If the workman refuses to su bmit hims elf to such examination, or in any way obstructs the same, his right to such weekly payments shall be suspended until such examination has taken place. (15)

. . . . If a workman, on being required so to do, refuses to submit himself for examinat ion by a me dic al referee to whom th e matter has been so referred as aforesaid, or in any way obstructs the same, his right to compensation and to take or prosecute any proceed ing under this Act in relation to compensation, or, in the case of a workman in r eceipt of a we ekl y payment, his rig ht to that weekly payment, shall be suspended u ntil such examination has taken place

.

. . . . (20) Where under this schedule a right to com pensation is suspended no compensation shall be payable in respect of the perio d of suspensi on. Ac t 1906, 6 Edw. 7 c h . 58, s ched. I, para s

. 4, 14, 15 , 20 (emphasis added)
, reprinted in V

. R

. Aronson, The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1906
, at 212

– 3 2 ( London, T. F. Unwin 1909 ) , https://archive.org/details/workmenscompens00britg oog/page/ 222/mode/2up ( las t v isited June 12, 2 0 23)

. Notably, the rules enacted and adopted und er the English Act of 1906

— no different than
the analogous provision in Idaho Code section 72

- 434 today

— did not allow employers to
unilateral ly suspend either the injur ed employee’ s pay men t of compensation or the right “to take or prosecut e” any proceedings when an injured employee allegedly refused to submit to or
obstructed a me dical exam requested by an employer

. See Workmen’s Compensation Rules 1907, 6 Edw. 7 c h . 58 , Ru le 55 , re pri nt ed in V. R. Aronson, The Workmen’s Compensation
Act 19 06
, app. A , at 307 ( London, T. F. Unwin 1909 )

. Instead, if a dispute arose, employers were re quired to first “apply” to the relevant committee, arbitrator , or jud ge to request

— thr ough notice and a meani ngful hearing

— that the injured employee’s right s to co mpensation and “to take or prosecute” any pr oce edings be suspended. See id . The English Act o f 1906, through its adopted rules
, even provided a standard
form for an e mployer to gi ve notice to the employ ee that the employer “intend[ed] to apply ” to a judge at a future hearing “for an order suspending” the em plo yee’s “right to compensation

. . . and to take or prosecute any proceedings under [the Act of 1906] in relation to
comp ensat ion

. . . on the ground that [the employee] refuse[s] to submit [themselves] to medical13 examination as required by [the employer] ,” in accordance with paragraph s 4 , 14, o r 1 5 of the
“first schedule” to the Act of 1906. S ee id

. Form 52, app. B, at 399 , http s://archive.org/details /workmenscompens00britgoog/page/3 99 /mode/2up (last vi s ited June 13, 2023) ; see id. Rule 84, app. A, at 326 (a dopting standard forms under the Act o f 1906)

. Accordingly , the term “to take” in section 72

- 434, as it has existed since Id aho’s original
Act of 1 917 when it was first borrowed from the English Acts of 1897 and 1906, is synonymous with “ commencing ” a proceeding to claim or enforce a claim of compensation

. Under the modern Worker’s Compensation Law in Idaho, a n injured employee does this by filing “a n

a ppl ication requesting a hearing” with the Commissi on, I.C. § 72

- 706, o r as the Commission has

seen to put it, by filing a “complaint” with the Commission. See Judicial Rule of Practice and Procedure (“ J.R.P. ”) 3(A)(1) (2023) (chan ging the term “applicat ion ” i n I.C. § 72

- 706 to “complaint”). In light of t his, it was reasonable for Arreola to maintain that
, under Brewer , the Surety’s
unilateral inv ocation of section 72

- 434 simultaneously suspended both her payment of compensation an d right “ to take or pr os ecut e any proceedings ” under the Worker ’ s Compensatio n Law to then bar the filing of a complaint

. However, with Brewer ’s interpretation
of section 72

- 434 overrul ed and our clarificatio n of the Commission ’ s authority , Arreola’s

conce r n of this “C atch

- 22” flowing from Brewer is now abated

. A s ex plained above, o nly the
Commission has the authority to

— a fter a hearing adjudicating a medical exam dispute

— order
that the dual enforcement mechanisms in Idaho Code section 72

- 434 be enforce d a n d executed against an injured e mployee

. Thus, an order suspend ing the “ri ght to take or prosecute any proceeding s ” unde r the Law necessarily cannot exist until after a proceeding with the Commission has already c ommenced , the issue is adjudicated, and the C ommission orders
that the dual enforcement mech anisms in section 7 2

- 434 be executed.
In the instant case , the Sure ty unil aterally and privately determine d, without an adjudication by the Commission, that the Su rety had scheduled the IME at a “reasonable” time and place, I.C. § 72

- 433(1) , and that Arreola had “unreasonab ly fail [ ed] to submit to ” or had
otherwise “ob struct[ ed]” the IME scheduled by the Su rety, I.C. § 72

- 434

. From this, and
under Brewer , the Surety unilaterally execut e d Idaho Code section 72

- 434 w ithout the authority
of an order from the Co mmission. Part of this execution in cluded suspending payment of
Ar reola’s compensation. However, i n light of the clarifications regarding section 72

- 43414 announced today
, the Surety had no authority to eithe r unil aterally adjudicate the und erlying dispute or execute the dua l enforcement mech anism s in section 72

- 434. Moreover, because no proceeding before the Commission has adjudicated the underlying factual dispute, Arreola’s “right to take or prosecute any p roceed in gs” under the Law is necessarily not s uspended.
This bri ngs u s to the proc edural challenge Arreola raises on appeal : W h ether the
Commission acted in excess of its powers whe n it denied Arreola ’ s petition for a declaratory ruling and motion for r einsta te men t of be nefits and instead require d that she proceed thro ugh a complai nt and a motion for an emergenc y he aring to obtain any relief

. Given our overruling of
Brewer , and the resulting change i n the legal l andscape it brings
, a decision by this Cou rt at this juncture would be premature

. On the one ha n d , with Brewe r overruled, there is no longer a procedural impedimen t to Ar reola filing a complaint to pursue a nd receive relief as i nit ially
instructed and proc edurally preferred by the Commission

. On t he oth er hand
, with Brewer
overruled
, a s urety or emp loyer must hav e a procedural mechanism to adjudicate medical exam
di sputes. Accordingly
, it is now necessary for the Commission to re consider the appropriate

pro cedural m echanism , under its adopted Ju dic ial Ru les of Practice and Procedure
, for securing a

“ just , speedy, and eco nomical determi nati on ” of the underlying medica l exam dispute

— a nd
similar dispute s between the parties moving f orward

. See J.R.P. 1(A)

. Curre ntly , t he Commission ’ s Judicial Rules of Pract ice and Procedure provide at least

two procedu ral pathways : ( 1) f iling a compl ain t and a motion

— to then apply for a hearing , or for an emergency hearing (J.R.P. 3, 8 ) ; or (2) filing a petition for a declarato ry ruling (J.R.P. 15). In light of Brewer being over rul ed today
, w hether one of these pathway s will provide a n employee

“ sure and certain ” relief when their compen sation payments are unl awfully suspended , I.C. § 72

- 2 01

— or provide a surety or employer a “ ju st, speedy, and economical ” procedur e for lawful ly

s usp end ing payments when a n employee refuses to submit to
, or obstructs, a req uested medical

exam , J.R.P. 1(A)

— i s an issue the Com mission must consider in the first instance
, in cl uding in
the circumstances of this case. Pursuant to Idaho Code sect ion s 7 2

- 50 8, 72

- 707, and 72

- 708, the
Commission may even determine a n ew procedure shou ld be ado pted and used to resolve such
d isputes , particular ly where the y arise before a complaint is ever file d (like in this c ase).
For these reasons, we vacate the C ommiss ion ’ s d ecision denying Arreola ’s mo tion for
reinstatement of ben efits and petitio n for a declaratory ruling

. Becaus e our overruling of Brewer applies only prospectively
, w e re man d with instructions th at the Commission :15 (1) enter an ord er di recting the S ur ety to reinstate any prospective ly owed compensation that Arreola mi ght be entitled to , if any
, pe nding the resolution of the u nd er lying dispute regarding Arreola ’ s past compensat ion payments ; (2) d etermine the procedural process governing medical exam disp utes u nder Idaho Code sections 72

- 43 3(1) and 72

- 434 ; and (3) determine whe ther adjudi cating the und erlying dispute over pa st compensa tion should proceed by the filing of a complaint , a petition for declaratory ruling , or some o ther procedure

. Fi nally
, b ec ause no fac tual findings were made below, we do not reach Arreola’s

argu me n t , based on the underlying factual dispute, that it is per se unreason able for an employer

or surety to

— as the Surety allegedly did here

— unilaterally schedule a requested medical
examina tio n f or an injured employee under Idaho Code section 72

- 433 (1)

. Inste ad, t ha t issue

must b e addressed on remand once the Commi ssion determines th e appropriate procedural
mechanism as instructe d a bove

. B. Costs and Attorney Fee s Arreola and the Surety both re quest costs a nd attorney fees on a ppeal

. Arreola also requests attorne y fees f or the proceedings below. Cost s on appeal are awar ded as a matter of course to the prevailing party, unless otherwis e o rdered by this Court. I.A.R. 40(a). Arreola is the prevaili ng par ty on ap peal ; thus, she is en titled to costs

. As for attorney f ees , Arreola is not entitled to fees on appeal , and will o nly be entitled to fees for the proceedings below if she prevails in the underlying di spute over past compensation
ben efits and shows that the Surety had no reason able basis in fact to discontinue p ayments

. A rreola requested fees on appeal , and for the pr oceedings below , u nder Idaho Code
section 72

- 804. There are three cir cumstances in which fees may be awarded under that statute:
If th e commis sion or any court bef ore whom any proceedings are brough t under this law determines that [1] the employer or his s urety contested a claim for compensation made by an inj ured employ ee or dependent of a deceased employee without reasonable grou nd , or that a n employer or his

sur ety [2] neglected or refused within a reasonable tim e after receipt of a written claim for co mpensation to pay to the injured employee or his depend ents the co mpe nsation provided by law, or [3] without reasonable grounds discon tinued p ayment of compensatio n as provided by law justly due and owing to the emp loyee or his dependents, the employer sha ll pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the comp ensation pr ovi ded by this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys em ployed by inju red employees or thei r dependents shall be fixed by the commission.16 I.C. § 72

- 804 ( emphasis added)

. Typically, “ [t ] he decision that grounds exist for awa rding a claimant attorney f ees [under I.C. § 72

- 804] is a factual determination which res ts wit h the Co mmission.” Page v. Mc Cain Foods, Inc. , 155 Idaho 755, 76 0 , 316 P.3d 671, 676 (2014) (quoting Poss v. Meeker
Mach. Shop , 109 Idaho 920, 92 6 , 712 P.2d 621, 627 (1985) ( second alterat ion in original )). However, a ttorney fees are also awarded und er sec tion 72

- 804 if an employer or surety contests a claim for compen sation “ without reasonable ground” through an appeal that is “frivolous[.]” See
Baker v. La. Pac. Corp. , 123 Idaho 799, 803, 85 3 P.2d 544, 548 (1993) (awarding fees on appeal
when the em ployer ’s argume nts simply asked the Court to re

- weigh the evidence). A ccordingly
, whether Arreola is entitled to fees on appeal or below because the Surety acted with out a
“reaso nable groun [d] ” in discontinuing Arreola’s payments implicates a basis for fee s in e ither
fac t or law under Idaho Code section 72

- 804

. See Pag e , 155 Idaho at 760, 316 P.3d at 676 ; Baker , 123 Idaho at 803, 8 53 P.2d at 548

. As for the legal basis, t he Surety did not discont inu e compensation payments “without reasonable ground” in law becaus e at the time it discontinued Arreola’s payments, it lawfully
di d so in reliance on and pursuant to Brewer ’s interpretatio n of Idaho Code section 72

- 434. Although we overrule Brewer and clarify the Commission ’ s au thority today
, t he Surety acted

pursu ant to settled law at th e t ime, def ended settled law on appeal, and de fended the decision of
the Comm ission instructing Arreola to seek relief through a “compl aint” and a motion for an

emergency hearing. See Deon v. H & J, Inc. , 157 Idaho 665, 672, 339 P.3 d 550, 557 (2014) ( denyi ng fees und er section 72

- 804 where it w as reas onable to request that the Cour t affirm the
Commission’s d ecision below in favor of the emplo yer and surety). Thus, there is no legal basis
to award Arreola fees under Idaho Code section 72

- 80 4 , for the instan t di s pute , o n appeal or during the pro ceedings on remand related to this Court ’ s o verruling of Brewer

. A s for the factual basis, w hether the Surety “ discontinued payment of compensation ” without “reasonable grounds” in fact was neit her re solved below, nor by this app eal

. It remains
to be determined wh ether the Surety scheduled the IME for a “reasonable time [ ,] ” I.C. § 72

- 433 (1) , and whether Arreola “unreasonably” failed to submit to or obstructed the scheduled IME, I.C. § 72

- 434. Acc ording ly
, this factual b asi s for fe es cannot be used to award fees to Arreola for
this appeal

. Neverthele ss , because this case i s remanded to resolve th e underlying dispute over past compensation , t he Commis sion may revisit whether to award fees to Arreola for t he entire17 proceedi ngs below
, excluding this appeal
, and awa rd fe es to Arreola if the Surety discont inued
Arreola ’ s past co mpensation payments without a re asonable basis in fact. Finally, the Surety’s request for attorney fees on appeal is denied. Th e only legal basis for
f

ees cited b y the Surety was for fees through s an ctions against Arreola under Idah o Appellate Rule 11.2(a ). Under Rule 11.2(a), “ [a] ttorney fees can be awarded as sanctions when a party or attorney violates either (a) the frivolous f ilings clause or (b) the im proper p urpose clause.”
Andrews v. State In du s. Special Indem. Fund , 162 Idaho 156, 160, 395 P.3d 375 , 379 (2017)

. Here, t he test for sanctions has plainly not b een met. Arreola’s appeal, which brought to this
Court’s attention i ts man ifestly wrong decision i n B rewer an d the apparent pro cedural bar flowing from it, was neither frivolous n or filed for an imprope r purpose. Arreola br ought a “good faith argument” to reverse existing law

— and has achieved it. See I.A.R. 11.2(a).
IV. CONCLU SION
F or the reasons stated ab ove , the Co mmission ’ s order is vacated
, and this case is
remanded for further pro ceedings with instructi ons to the Commission

. Costs are awarded to Arreola on appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 40

. Arreola and the Surety are de nied a ttorney fees on appeal

. How ever, o n remand , the Commission may r evisit whether to award Arreola attorney fees under Idaho Code s ection 72

- 804, for the entire proceedings below

. C hief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.