### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-09-00226- CV

Terr ence Ste wart, Appellan t

v. Texas Health and Human Servic es Com m ission , Appellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F TRAVIS CO UNTY, 200 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. D-1 -GN-0 8-0 0312 0, H ONO RAB LE JO HN K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Pro s e a p pellant Terr ence Stewart filed suit ag ainst appellee Texas Hea lth and H u ma n Service s Commi ssion (“H HSC”), alleg ing that HHSC was “coe rcing labor without pay . . . by denial of food-stamps” and asking the court to require HHSC to “provide rea l job training , ” re t u rn nine months of food stamps, and void a denial of food-stamp benef its that occur

red when HHSC “fa iled to provide promised transporta tion to an [HHSC ] require d meeting .” HHSC answe red and filed a 1 plea to the jurisdiction asser ting that Stewart had not stated a cognizable claim or met the statutory

Stewart has filed two documents he has titled “Appe l l an t ’s Br ief.” These very brief 1 documents do not comply with the rules of appellate proce dure and prese nt very littl e in the way of argument or explanation of his complaints. See Tex. R. App. P . 38.1. Although pr o se appe llants are held to the same standard as parties repr esente d by counsel to avoid g iving unrepr esente d parties an advanta g e over repr esente d parties, see Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W .2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978), we will addre ss Stewart’s complaints as best we can, rathe r than striking his brief and dismiss ing the cause . See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a) (1); Rivera v. Co u n t r yw i de Ho me Loans, Inc. , 262 S.W .3d 834, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pe t.).prer equisites to suit, that his purported claims wer e not ripe, and that HHSC was protec ted by

sovere ign immunit y . After a hear ing on HHSC’s plea, the trial court g rante d the plea and dismiss ed Stewart’s claims for lack ofjurisdiction. Stewart appea ls, arguing that HHSC require d rec ipients of food stamps submit to thirty hours per week of “unpaid involuntary servitude to a g overnme nt

o r ch u rc h ” and that HHSC’s rules violated fede ral regulations on food stamps. We aff irm t h e trial court’ s order

.

HHSC attache d to its plea to the jurisdiction docu m en t s showing that Stewart ap p ea l ed from a denial of an application for food stamps. A hear ing was held, and the hea ri n g office r found that Stewart missed a schedule d employ ment and training session and did not contac t the Texas Workforce Commi ssion (TWC) to explain his absenc e. When TWC hear d nothing from Stewar t fo r t en day s, it asked HHSC to sanction S tewar t. HHSC notified Stewart that the m issed appointment was at least his third instance o f n o n compl iance with the employ ment and training prog ram a

nd that his food stamps would be denied f or six months. The hear ing of fice r conc luded that HHSC’s sanction was in acc ordanc e with Texas rules and that requiring food-stamp rec ipients to pe rfor m voluntee r work or comply with employ ment and training activities was not involuntar y servitude. The hear ing office r upheld HHSC’s penalty , as d i d an administrative revie w of the hear ing office r’s decision. On May 22, Stewart was notified that he had thirty day s to seek judicial revie w in the district court. Stewart filed his pe tition i n the trial cour t on August 28, 2008. 2

See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.176 (West 2008) (pe rson may seek judicia l reviewby 2 filing petition within thir t y day s of date complained- of decision is final and appea lable); 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 357.703 (2010) (Tex as He al t h & Human S ervs. Com m’n, Hea ring s) (person may appea l adver se decision by filing petition in district court within t h i rt y d ay s of notice of final decision). 2At the hear ing on HHSC’s plea to the jurisdiction, Stewart, who was participating via

t el ep h o n e, i n sisted that the August 28 petition was his second petition. He said he sent his firs t petition in mid-J une and rec eived a letter from the trial court that prompted him to send the August 28 petition. He said, “I sent in the form, waited for a response . When I g ot a response , I did what the response asked of me.” He asked how he could have g otten the court’s indige nce form if the court had not mailed it to him. Be y ond insisti ng that his August petition was not his first filing, Stewart did not provide any proof that he had mailed an ear lier petit ion for judicial revie w, s o the trial court r

uled that it lacked jur isdiction over the matter

. About two wee ks afte r the trial court’s decision, Stewart filed a document stating that he was appea ling the dismiss al and asser ting that he had filed a

petition for judicial re view within thirty day s of the May

22 final administrative de cision. Stewart attac hed a letter he rec eived f rom the trial cour

t clerk that was date d August 5, 2008, and wa s appar ently sent in ref

ere nce to a

letter from Stewart dated J une 17, 2008. The cler k’s letter states th at the cler k’s office had “re ceive d paper work from y ou indicating that y ou will be repr esenting y ourself in a civil suit to be filed with this off ice.” The letter informed Stewart that the cler k’s office had “not rec eived y our petition. In order to beg in y our lawsuit, you must file a petition.” The letter also told Stewart that he had to pay

a filing fee or submit an aff idavit of indige nce. Stewart points to this letter as proof that he filed his first petition on or about J une 17.

Although we are sy

mpathetic to the difficulties fa ced by pro se litiga

nts, the courts

are require d to hold such litigants to the same leg al standards as parties repr esente d by counsel, even

as we liberally construe a pro se party ’s arguments and filings. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn ,

3573 S.W .2d 181, 184-85 (Tex. 1978); Chambers v. State , 261 S.W .3d 755, 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2008, p et
. d en i ed ). Once HHSC prese nted evidenc e showing that Stewart had not filed a timely p et i t ion for judicial revie w, Stewart had the burden of producing evidenc e to show he had tim el y soug ht revie w. Stewart produce d no evidenc e in response to HHSC’s plea to the jurisdiction. After the trial court’s decision, he prese nted th e cl er k ’s office ’s letter that shows only that Stewart sent something indicating he intended to seek judicial revie w. Howeve r, the letter specific ally states that the cler k’s office had not rec eived a petition to initiate a suit for judicial revie w. There fore , the trial court did not err in concluding that Stewart did not seek j u d i ci al re view within the thirty -day deadline and that the court lacke d j u ri sdiction over the suit. See HCA Healthcare Corp. v. Texas Dep’ t of Ins. , 303 S.W .3d 345, 352 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (“B eca use the Hospitals failed to file their petitions for judicial revie w . . . within the require d 30-day time frame, the district court was without jurisdiction to consider them.”)

.

The trial court had proper g rounds for dismiss al and did not err i n dismiss ing Stewart’s suit for la ck of jurisdiction. We aff irm the trial cour

t’s order

.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: De cembe r 9, 2010

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