* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 1/7/97

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SONIC RESTAURANTS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MANFRED KRUGER; CHRISTINA

KRUGER,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 96-6193

(D.C. No. CIV-95-796)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before PORFILIO, BALDOCK, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Defendants Manfred and Christina Kruger appeal from the entry of

summary judgment holding them in breach of the parties’ “Termination of

Independent Contractor Services and Release of Claims” (termination agreement),

awarding plaintiff Sonic Restaurants, Inc. (Sonic) compensatory damages, and

enjoining future violations of the termination agreement. The district court relied

on a lengthy list of undisputed facts to uphold the validity of the termination

agreement, determine defendants’ breach thereof, and grant appropriate relief. 

Upon de novo review, Kaul v. Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996), we

affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s orders of March

22 and May 29, 1996. 

Most of the objections broadly stated in defendants’ appellate brief “lack

even rudimentary substantiation in factual argument and legal authority.” 

Washington v. Department of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th Cir. 1996). We

shall therefore limit our discussion to the “discernible questions” raised regarding

lack of consideration, execution of the agreement under duress, and procedural

error on summary judgment. See id.

Defendants contend they were entitled to keep $15,000 in advances made

before the parties severed their relationship and, hence, plaintiff’s “forgiveness”

of this outstanding “debt” in the termination agreement did not constitute valid

consideration. This argument rests on an insupportable premise. The $15,000
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had been a matter of dispute between the parties--a dispute acknowledged and

settled by the very agreement defendants now attack by reassuming their

adversarial pre-agreement position. Countenancing such a challenge, by which

defendants seek to nullify a negotiated compromise essentially by reneging on it,

would effectively destabilize any agreement intended to settle disputed

obligations. Further, and in any event, defendants do not adequately support their

underlying position regarding the $15,000 with evidence, argument, and legal

authority. 

Defendants also attack the termination agreement on the ground that

Manfred Kruger was under extreme duress at the time of its execution. However,

defendants fail to cite any evidence in the record to substantiate this conclusory

claim. Their reference to an affidavit executed months after the district court’s

decision is patently improper, see Aero-Medical, Inc. v. United States, 23 F.3d

328, 329 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994); Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d

1545, 1549 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992), and we will not sift through the record searching

for other, competent evidence to bolster their unsupported assertions of error, see

Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1540 n.3 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 297 (1996).

Finally, defendants contend that the district court improperly adopted

plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts. However, all we are told is that the
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seventeen facts in question “are contradicted by the Defendants’ evidence filed in

motions and 180 exhibits of evidence, like W-2's and payroll check stubs;

statements of witnesses and other documents relating to the employee status of

Manfred Kruger; relating to the circumstances of the signing of the Termination

Agreement of May 2, 199[5]; and the overall deception of [Sonic] with this

Termination Agreement and in this Termination Agreement of May 2, 1995.” 

Appellants’ Opening Brief at 11. This catch-all record reference is plainly

inadequate from a procedural/evidentiary standpoint, see S.E.C. v. Thomas, 965

F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1992), and, more fundamentally, fails to provide this

court with specific, reasoned challenges to the various material facts relied on by

the district court. The only particular fact implicated by the reference concerns

Manfred Kruger’s employment status, which actually was never determined

in--indeed, was irrelevant to--the district court’s disposition. Rather, the court

merely recited the undeniable facts that defendants (1) conceded Mr. Kruger’s

status as an independent contractor in the termination agreement, and (2) later

took action contrary to this concession. To the extent defendants seek to attack

the termination agreement by recanting this concession and resurrecting the

employment-status dispute, they run afoul of the same principle discussed above

in connection with the advances. One may not nullify an otherwise proper

settlement by rearguing the merits of claims expressly resolved therein. 
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We have considered all of defendants’ arguments and, whether explicitly

addressed or tacitly rejected, each has been found to lack merit. Accordingly, the

judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma

is AFFIRMED. Defendants’ motion to supplement the record is denied. The

mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio 

Circuit Judge