SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1338 

CA 13-01028 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, CARNI, AND VALENTINO, JJ. 

 

NED W. GOULD, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E.E. AUSTIN & SON, INC. AND CATTARAUGUS-LITTLE 

VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

 

MAXWELL MURPHY, LLC, BUFFALO (ALAN D. VOOS OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.

LIPPMAN O’CONNOR, BUFFALO (THOMAS D. SEAMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Cattaraugus County

(Michael L. Nenno, A.J.), entered January 7, 2013. The order, inter

alia, denied the motion of plaintiff for partial summary judgment on

the issue of liability with respect to the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this Labor Law and common-law

negligence action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained

while performing masonry work at the Cattaraugus-Little Valley Central

School District High School. Defendant Cattaraugus-Little Valley

Central School District hired defendant E.E. Austin & Son, Inc. as the

general contractor on the project, and that defendant hired Casler

Masonry, which employed plaintiff, to perform certain masonry work on

the project. According to plaintiff, he was working on a ladder

leading up to scaffolding erected in the auditorium when an unsecured

tub of mortar that was located in an elevated position on a forklift

fell and struck him on the head, shoulder, back and leg, thereby

injuring him. Supreme Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion for

partial summary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to the

Labor Law § 240 (1) claim. 

It is well settled that, “[t]o be entitled to a judgment on

liability for a violation of section 240 (1) of the Labor Law, [a]

plaintiff [is] required to prove, as a matter of law, not only a

violation of the section, but also that the violation was a proximate

cause of his [or her] injuries” (Rossi v Main-South Hotel Assoc., 168

AD2d 964, 964; see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1

NY3d 280, 287, citing Duda v Rouse Constr. Corp., 32 NY2d 405, 410;
-2- 1338 

CA 13-01028 

Danielewicz v Klewin Bldg. Co., Inc., 39 AD3d 1194, 1194-1195), and it

is further well settled that “an accident alone does not establish a

[section] 240 (1) violation or causation” (Blake, 1 NY3d at 289). We

note at the outset that the court properly determined that plaintiff

established a violation of section 240 (1) (see Williams v Town of

Pittstown, 100 AD3d 1250, 1251; Minchala v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,

67 AD3d 978, 978). We conclude that, by submitting the affidavit of a

coworker with personal knowledge of the facts (see Vetrano v J.

Kokolakis Contr., Inc., 100 AD3d 984, 986), and “relying on [his own]

deposition testimony, [plaintiff] established, prima facie, that

[section] 240 (1) was violated and that the violation was a proximate

cause of [his] injuries” (Lopez-Dones v 601 W. Assoc., LLC, 98 AD3d

476, 479; see generally Kirbis v LPCiminelli, Inc., 90 AD3d 1581,

1582).

We further conclude, however, that the court properly denied

plaintiff’s motion because defendants raised a triable issue of fact

whether plaintiff’s alleged injuries were caused by the falling mortar

tub (see Jones v West 56th St. Assoc., 33 AD3d 551, 551-552; see

generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Defendants

submitted evidence establishing that plaintiff told his supervisor

immediately after the incident that he was not injured, continued to

work for the remainder of the regular workday, worked full days over

the following week, and never complained of any alleged injuries

associated with the mortar tub falling on him. Indeed, the evidence

in the record, including plaintiff’s certified medical records and an

independent medical examination (IME) report, which was prepared by a

physician who examined plaintiff and was submitted by defendants in

opposition to the motion, demonstrates that plaintiff sought medical

treatment and stopped working only after suffering an abdominal injury

while lifting buckets of mortar one week after the mortar tub struck

him. Even then, plaintiff did not mention to any medical professional

that a mortar tub had struck him, and did not report any injuries

attributable thereto, until 21⁄2 months after the incident (see Jones,

33 AD3d at 551-552). Moreover, the physician who conducted the IME of

plaintiff concluded, based on his examination of plaintiff, that the

injuries of which plaintiff complained were degenerative in nature,

and that plaintiff did not sustain any injuries when the mortar tub

struck him.

Entered: February 7, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court