NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JUAN F., Appellant,

v.

ERICA C., N.C., M.F., Appellee.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0064 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300AD202000053

The Honorable Elaine Fridlund-Horne, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Coconino County Public Defender’s Office, Flagstaff

By Rhys Campbell

Counsel for Appellant

Christiansen Law, PLLC, Flagstaff

By Christopher L. Christiansen

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 8-19-2021
JUAN F. v. ERICA C., et al. 

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Juan Figueroa (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to N.C. and M.F. (collectively “children”). 

For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Erica Campos (“Mother”) and Father married in 2013 and 

share the two minor children. In February 2015, Father pled no contest, in 

California, to two counts of lewd or lascivious acts with a child, for 

molesting his nine-year-old niece. The California court sentenced Father to 

10 years’ imprisonment with 526 days of pre-incarceration credit.

¶3 Mother and Father divorced in February 2016, and the 

superior court awarded Mother sole legal decision-making and primary 

care of the children. The divorce decree required Father to buy a phone and 

minutes, and then provide that phone to Mother, who would facilitate 

telephone contact between the children and Father. Father gave Mother an 

iPad and she set up a phone plan for it. Mother then provided the iPad’s 

phone number to Father through her attorney. 

¶4 In January 2020, Father petitioned to enforce his parenting

time. Father requested that Mother give his letters to the children, allow the 

children to talk to him, and inform him of the children’s health, schooling, 

and milestones. 

¶5 The day after the March 2020 hearing on Father’s petition to 

enforce, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights as to both 

children. Mother alleged two grounds: that Father’s felony convictions 

proved his unfitness to parent the children, and that the length of Father’s 

sentence deprived the children of a normal home for a period of years. 

¶6 The juvenile court held a termination hearing on November 

6, 2020. Mother testified Father has not spoken to the children while in 
JUAN F. v. ERICA C., et al. 

Decision of the Court

3

prison, including no attempts to call via the iPad. Mother also testified that 

because the children have not seen their father in eight years, receiving his 

gifts and letters made them uncomfortable. And she stated the children 

consider Father a stranger. Mother is the children’s main provider and can 

support the children without Father’s help. 

¶7 Father testified he had a good relationship with the children 

before his incarceration. He described taking them on trips to the beach, the 

Colorado River, Lake Havasu, and museums. And he testified to taking the 

children to school. But he also acknowledged his inability to carry out 

common parental tasks since being incarcerated. Father claimed he tried 

calling the children more than 100 times and sent more than 50 letters over 

the past five years. But he also admitted that he has not spoken to either 

child during his incarceration.

¶8 The juvenile court severed Father’s parental rights on the 

length of sentence ground, finding his incarceration precludes him from 

providing the children with a normal home. Father timely appealed, and 

we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶9 We review the severance of parental rights for an abuse of 

discretion. Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 15 (App. 

2018). We will uphold the juvenile court’s findings of fact “if supported by 

adequate evidence in the record.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 

Ariz. 445, 452, ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (quoting State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 247 

(1979)). “The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, 

is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

I. Statutory Ground

¶10 To sever the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court must 

find parental unfitness based on at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B), by clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 

279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). “[S]uch a standard adequately conveys to the 

factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions 

necessary to satisfy due process.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 

(1982). On appeal, due process requires us to assess whether a reasonable 

factfinder could conclude based on the record that the petitioning party has 

met its clear and convincing evidentiary burden to sustain the termination 

of parental rights. See id. at 747–48, 769.
JUAN F. v. ERICA C., et al. 

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¶11 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if “the 

parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony . . . [and] 

the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived 

of a normal home for a period of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Michael J. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. sets forth non-exclusive factors the court must 

consider when determining whether the length of a felony sentence 

sufficiently deprives a child of “a normal home for a period of years.” 196 

Ariz. 246, 251–52, ¶ 29 (2000). The court must consider: 

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child 

relationship existing when incarceration begins, 

(2) the degree to which the parent-child 

relationship can be continued and nurtured 

during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child 

and the relationship between the child's age and 

the likelihood that incarceration will deprive 

the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the 

sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to 

provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of 

the deprivation of a parental presence on the 

child at issue.

Id. The court should also consider all other relevant factors as part of the 

termination inquiry. See Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 450, ¶ 15. But the court is 

not required to list its factual findings as to each factor on the record. Id. at 

451–52, ¶ 19. 

¶12 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

juvenile court’s findings on the length of sentence ground. The children 

were young when Father began serving his ten-year sentence in California. 

Mother testified the children never visited Father in-person. The parties 

presented conflicting evidence about other forms of contact. Mother 

claimed Father never tried to call the children and Father claimed he called 

them often, but never spoke to either of them. Neither party introduced 

evidence, such as phone records or the iPad device, to substantiate their 

claim. While Mother admitted receiving Father’s letters, she claimed that 

reading the letters made the children uncomfortable because they 

considered him “a stranger.”

¶13 Father argues the juvenile court erred in assessing the Michael 

J. factors because it did not consider that Mother denied him access to the 

children. But the juvenile court expressly found “Mother may have 

interfered with Father’s relationship, but only as to phone contact.” And 
JUAN F. v. ERICA C., et al. 

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record evidence does not support Father’s assertion that the superior court 

held Mother in contempt of court for failing to facilitate visitation. In any 

event, Mother’s alleged interference only affects one Michael J. factor: the 

parent-child relationship during Father’s incarceration. 

¶14 Father does generally dispute the juvenile court’s findings on 

the other factors but does not point to a legal deficiency. Rather, he asks us 

to reweigh the evidence and reach a new conclusion, which we will not do. 

See Joelle M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 525, 528, ¶ 18 (App. 2018). 

Father thus failed to establish that the juvenile court abused its discretion 

in finding Mother met her evidentiary burden on the length of sentence 

ground.

II. Best Interests

¶15 The juvenile court must also find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that termination would be in the best interests of the children. 

Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). Once a court 

has found at least one statutory ground to terminate, it may “presume that 

the interests of the parent and child diverge.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35. 

We thus focus our inquiry at the best interest stage on “the interests of the 

child as distinct from those of the parent.” Id. at 285, ¶ 31. The “child’s 

interest in stability and security” is the touchstone of our inquiry. Id. at 286, 

¶ 34 (citation omitted). Termination of parental rights is in the child’s best 

interests “if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child 

will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. The 

court “must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time 

of the severance determination.” Id. at 150–51, ¶ 13.

¶16 Father argues the juvenile court erred in its best interests’

analysis because it “only considered that Father was a stranger to the 

children.” But the court’s termination order included factual findings based 

on Mother’s testimony that the children will benefit from termination 

because they will be “at ease to know a stranger will not be contacting 

them.” Father offers no legal basis for us to conclude that this finding is 

insufficient to support a best interests conclusion. The court thus did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that termination was in the children’s best 

interests.
JUAN F. v. ERICA C., et al. 

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.