2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 7-14-2003 

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/370* Honorable Jose ph E. Irena s, Seni or District J udge for the United States District

Court for t

he District of

New Jersey, sitting by

designation. NOT PRE CEDENT IAL THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

___________ No. 02-3984

___________ MARY A . MARSHALL

Ap pellan t,
v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISS IONE R OF SO CIA L SEC URI TY.

___________ ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT FO R T HE EA STE RN DIST RIC T O F PE NN SY LV AN IA

(D.C. Civi l No. 01-cv- 5031) Distri ct Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schill er

___________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

July11, 2003 BE FO RE : NY GA AR D a nd S M ITH , Circu it Judges and IRENAS, * Senior Distri ct Judge . (Fil ed July14, 2003)2 ___________ OPINI ON OF THE COURT

___________ IRE NA S, Senior Distri ct Judge .

Ap pellan t, Ma ry A. M arsha ll (“M arsha ll”), app eals fro m an orde r entere d in the Dist rict Court on August 28, 2002, affi rming the de cisi on of the Commissi oner of Social Sec urity ( “Commissioner” ) deny ing Marshall ’s appl ication for s upplemental security income (“S SI”) und er Title XV I of the So cial Security Act (“A ct”). The Distri ct Court exerc ised j urisdi ction pur suant t o 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) , and we have jurisdi ction on appeal pur suant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will rever se and remand the cause for f urther proceedings. We need not burden the record bysetting fort h a detai led rec itat

ion of the background for t

his appealand will t

herefore l imit

our disc ussion to resol ution of t he issues present ed. Marshallfile d her thi rd appli cati on for dis abili ty on April 18, 1996, alle ging dis abili ty since J anuary1, 1993, due to diabe tes, high blood pr essure, and chronic l ymphedema. Marshal l’s application was deni ed init iall y on May 29, 1996, and upon reconsi derati on on November 2, 1996. The appealto the Admini strative Law Judge (“AL J”) was h eard on Ju ne 2, 199 8, and on June 26 , 1998, the A LJ den ied M arshall’s request for benefi ts. On July 15, 1998, Marshallsought re view of the ALJ’s deci sion before the Appeals Council , which three y ears l ater, denied re view. Marshallthen fi led3

suit in the Dis tri ct Court, which affirmed the admini strative de nial and Marshall now appeals. M arsha ll alleges that the Co mm issione r com mitted seve ral error s in rejec ting her app licatio n. A ltho ugh we hav e ple nar y revie w o f all le gal is sue s, see Krysztof orski v . Chater , 55 F.3d 8 57, 858 (3 d Cir. 199 5), “our review of the A LJ’s decisio n is m ore d efere ntial as w e dete rmine wh ether th ere is su bstan tial evide nce to support t he decisi on of the Commissi oner.” Knepp v. Apfel , 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). “We willnot set the Commissione r’s dec isi on aside i f it i s support ed by substant ial e vidence, even if we would have deci ded the fact ual inquiry differe ntly .” Hartranft

v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). We have defi ned “subst antia l evidence” a s “such re levant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might ac cept as a dequate. ” Ven tura v . Shala la , 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed. 2d 842 (1971)). As we have explained on numerous occasi ons, “our decisi ons make clear

that de termination of t

he existence vel
non of substa ntialevidence i s not merel y a quant itat ive exer cise. A single pi ece of evide nce w ill not satisf y the sub stantiality test if th e [C om missio ner] ig nore s, or fails to resolv e, a co nflict cr eated by coun tervailin g evid ence . No r is evid ence subs tantial if it is overwhelmed by other evi dence--parti cularl y certain t ypes of evidence ( e.g. , that offere d by t reati ng physi cians) --or i f it reall y cons tit utes not evidence but

mere conclus ion.” Morales v. Apf

el , 225 F .3d 31 0, 317 (3d C ir. 2000 ). Des pite the defe rence due in4

disab ility benefit c ases w e retain a resp onsib ility to scrutinize the en tire reco rd an d to
revers e or remand i f the Commissi oner’s de cisi on is not supporte d by subs tanti al evid enc e. Id. A c laima nt, in ord er to qu alify for S SI, m ust de mo nstrate a n “ina bility to enga ge in a ny subs tantial ga inful a ctivity by reaso n of any me dically dete rmina ble physi cal or ment al impai rment which can be e xpected t o resul t in death or which has last ed or can be expected to la st for a conti nuous peri od of not le ss than 12 months.” 42 U.S .C. § 1 382 c(a)(3 )(A); Burns v. Barnhart , 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). The Comm issioner evaluat es each case according to a five-step sequentialevaluation process unt il a fin din g of “dis able d” o r “n ot d isab led” is m ade . See 20 C.F.R. § 416. 920. The process i s as fol lows: (1) if the clai mant is cur rentl y engagi ng in subst antia l gainf ul activity, the cla iman t will be fou nd n ot disab led an d his a pplica tion fo r disab ility benefits will be automati call y deni ed; (2) if the clai mant is not sufferi ng from a “sever e” impa irmen t or com binatio n of impa irmen ts the cla iman t will be fou nd n ot disab led; (3) if
a seve re i mpairment meet s or e qual s a l isted impa irme nt i n 20 C.F. R. pt . 404, subpt . P, app. 1, and has las ted or i s expecte d to las t conti nually for at l east twelve months, then the clai mant will be found disabl ed; (4) if the clai mant is not sufferi ng from an impairment that either meets or e quals a listed imp airment the C omm issioner conside rs the claimant’s residual func tional capacity (“RFC ”) to determine whe ther the claiman t can perfo rm w ork the cl aimant has done in the past des pite t he severe i mpairment. If the c laimant can5

perform his or her pas t work, t he clai mant will be found not di sabled; and (5) i f the clai mant cannot perform his or her past work, the Commissi oner willconsider the claim ant’s R FC , med ical imp airme nts, age , educ ation, an d pas t wo rk ex perien ce to determ ine w hethe r the cla iman t can p erfor m o ther job s existin g in sig nifica nt nu mb ers in the national e conomy. 20 C.F.R. § 416. 920; Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 19 99). T he C laima nt mu st prov e steps one th roug h fo ur. If the claim ant m eets this burden, t he burden of proof s hifts to the Commissi oner in s tep fi ve to show that the clai mant is capable of attaini ng substant ial gainful e mployment that e xist s in the nati onal
eco nom y. Id . In the instant case, the A LJ con cluded tha t Marsh all did not have a severe mental i mpairment, and although she cannot pe rform her pas t rel evant work, whic h requir es conti nuous standi ng and walking, other j obs exist in the nationaleconomy that she can perform consideri ng her RFC, age, educ ation, and work experie nce.

Marshall argues that

(1) the ALJ’s conclus ion that she does not

suffer fr om a severe i mpairment i s unsupport ed by s ubstantial e vidence; (2) the ALJ’s conclus ions regardi ng her RFC were not support ed by s ubstantial e vidence because no consul tati ve
exam ination wa s con ducte d; and (3) the AL J imp rope rly evalua ted he r credib ility in
conc luding that he r testimo ny regard ing the intensity, per sistenc e, and fun ctiona lly limiting effe cts of h er imp airme nts w as no t fully cred ible. Th e prim ary issue b efore this Court is whether the ALJ had a suffici ent basi s to concl ude that Marshall’ s RFC for the6

full r ange of medium work was limited onlyby partiallimi tati ons on prolonge d standi ng or walking. In the i nstant case, t he ALJ found that des pite he r borderline i ntell ectual functi oning, dy sthy mia, and di abetes Marshal l has no si gnific ant phy sicalor nonexerti onal li mitations such a s would li mit her oc cupati onal base. (ALJ’s Decisi on at 6, Tr. 16; App. Br. at

7-8). However, the ALJ erre d in applying the di agnosis of the
cons ulting p sycholo gist, D r. Sol B arenb aum , Ph.D ., who expla ined th at M arsha ll “is capable of carry ing out normal routi nes and activities and maywork at a consi stent , but slow , pace .” (AL J’s D ecision at 3, T r. 13; A pp. A m. R ep. B r. at 1). H ere the AL J clearly took the term “pace” out of context

in reac hing the c onclusi on that Marshal l has no significant l imitati ons with regard to the pace at which she may work. The A LJ also failed to give seriou s consideration to the observ ations draw n by several of M arshall’s doctors and the Soci al Securi ty interviewer, a ll of whom commented on the s low pace at which Ma rshall operates. In add ition, despite the AL J’s conclusion that Ma rshall’s ly mphedema was severe, t here is no evidence i n the rec ord of the c orrel ation be tween the med ical ev idenc e related to her lym phed ema and h er RF C. L astly, althoug h it is w ell settled that “[a] n ALJ must give serious consi derati on to a cl aimant’ s subjec tive complaint s of pain, even where those complaint s are not supporte d by obj ecti ve evidence, ” M ason v. Sha lala , 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993) (ci ting Ferguson v.7

Schweiker , 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1985)), the rec ord reveal s that there ha s been no seri ous evaluat

ion of Marshall ’s lymphedema or her claims of depres sion. Therefore, since t

he ALJ had no suffici ent basi s upon which to conclude that Marshal l’s RFC for the full range of medium work was li mited onl y byparti al limi tati ons on prolonge d standi ng or walking, we conclude that the ALJ’s deci sion i s not supported by substantial evidenc e. Acco rdingly, we w ill reverse the District Cou rt’s order and r emand the cause to the Dist rict Court with i nstruc tions to remand t o the Co mm issione r of S ocial S ecurity, for furthe r proc eedin gs no t incon sistent w ith this opinion.8

TO THE C LERK:

Please fi le the foregoing opi nion.

/s/ Joseph E. I renas

_______________ Senior Dist

rict Judge** Honorable Jose ph E. Irena s, Seni or District J udge for the United States District

Court for t

he District of

New Jersey, sitting by

designation. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

___________ No. 02-3984

___________ MARY A . MARSHALL

Ap pellan t,
v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISS IONE R OF SO CIA L SEC URI TY.

___________ ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT FO R T HE EA STE RN DIST RIC T O F PE NN SY LV AN IA

(D.C. Civi l No. 01-cv- 5031) Distri ct Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schill er

___________ Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

July11, 2003 BE FO RE : NY GA AR D a nd S M ITH , Circu it Judges and IRENAS, ** Senior Distri ct Judge .

___________ JUDGMENT

___________2 This cause c ame to be consi dered on the record fr om the United St ates Distric t Cou rt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania a nd w as sub mitted pursu ant to Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a) on July11, 2003.

On consideration whereof, it i s now here ORDE RED A ND A DJUD GED by this Court that

the order

of the sai d Distri ct Court e ntered on August 28, 2002, be
revers ed, and i s herebyremanded.

All o f the a bov e in ac cord ance with the op inion o f this C ourt.

ATTEST:

______________________________ Clerk Date: Jul y 14, 2003