PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

OMERO CORDOVA, a/k/a 

Omar L. Cordova, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

 No. 14-6039

 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:13-CR-00137-HE-1)

 

 

J. Lance Hopkins, Tahlequah, Oklahoma for Appellant. 

David McCrary, Assistant United States Attorney (Sanford C. Coats, United States 

Attorney, and Edward J. Kumiega, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the 

brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

________________________________ 

MORITZ, Circuit Judge 

________________________________ 

While executing a search warrant at Omero Cordova’s home, law enforcement 

found marijuana, firearms, and drug paraphernalia, and Cordova admitted ownership of 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

July 6, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

the items. Charged with various offenses, Cordova sought to suppress the evidence 

against him. Although the district court agreed the affidavit failed to provide probable 

cause, it denied Cordova’s motion to suppress under the good faith exception to the 

warrant requirement. The court also rejected Cordova’s separate motion to suppress his 

statements, concluding his confession was voluntary. A jury subsequently convicted 

Cordova of all six charges against him. Cordova appeals, challenging the district court’s 

denial of his motions to suppress the evidence and his statements. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse. We conclude the 

affidavit contained so few facts implicating either Cordova or his current home that a 

reasonable officer could not have relied on the warrant in good faith. Because the 

government conceded at oral argument that if the good faith exception doesn’t apply then 

Cordova’s statements must also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, we need not 

address Cordova’s second issue and we remand for further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2012, Chris Gabeau—an Oklahoma City police detective assigned 

to a Federal Bureau of Investigation task force—sought a search warrant for Omero 

Cordova’s home at 2412 S.W. 78th Street, Oklahoma City. 

The first three pages of Detective Gabeau’s affidavit contain general information 

about Gabeau, his qualifications and experience, and his conclusions regarding the traits 

and habits of drug dealers. The substantive portion of the affidavit begins on page four 

and is entitled “Details of Investigation.” The first six paragraphs of those details contain 

information from an unidentified confidential source interviewed in October 2011, a year 
3 

before the warrant’s execution. The confidential source self-identified as a member of the 

Juarito gang, which is “heavily involved in narcotics trafficking” in the Oklahoma City 

area. The unnamed informant detailed specific sales of methamphetamine between the 

gang and “one of [its] main suppliers,” Christopher Billingsley, within the previous two 

months. Oklahoma County Search Warrant Aff., Doc. 25-2, at 4. Notably, Cordova’s 

name does not appear in the first six paragraphs of the substantive portion of the affidavit 

and the affidavit does not identify him as a member of the Juarito gang or as a participant 

in any of the sales the informant described. 

The affidavit then switches gears and discusses an event that occurred some 21 

months before the warrant’s execution. According to the affidavit, state troopers 

discovered 70 pounds of marijuana in a vehicle bound for Oklahoma City in January 

2011. The affidavit does not indicate who was driving the vehicle at the time of the traffic 

stop but states that law enforcement learned the marijuana “was supposed to be delivered 

to 8008 S Youngs Blvd to a subject in a black [C]orvette.” Aff. at 4 (emphasis added). 

According to the affidavit, Cordova had listed 8008 S. Youngs Boulevard in Oklahoma 

City as his address on an October 2011 police form on which he reported a burglary. The 

affidavit concludes this paragraph by indicating that on an unspecified date, officers 

observed a black Corvette registered to Christopher Billingsley parked outside the 

Youngs Boulevard address. 

Turning to somewhat more recent events, the affidavit detailed that in January 

2012, approximately nine months before the warrant’s execution, Cordova purchased a 

residence at 2412 S.W. 78th Street, “using Cordova’s mother . . . to actual [sic] purchase 
4 

the home.” Aff. at 4-5. The affidavit also indicated Cordova’s mother purchased the 

home from a member of a family known by law enforcement to be involved in selling 

methamphetamine, cocaine HCL, and marijuana. The affiant further advised that “it is 

not uncommon” for drug traffickers to conceal vehicle, cell phone, and home purchases 

by using family members as straw buyers to avoid law enforcement detection. 

But the affiant provided no specific information regarding whether or when the 

individual who sold the home had been involved in drug trafficking, except to say that the 

affiant had reviewed “several documents from other agencies including but not limited to: 

Oklahoma City Police Department, Drug Enforcement Agency and so forth stating 

numerous surveillance hours, wire interceptions, [and] Confidential Informants 

purchasing controlled substance from the [] family DTO.” Aff. at 5. 

The affidavit also noted that law enforcement sporadically surveilled 2412 S.W. 

78th Street during the summer and fall of 2012. Most notably, the affidavit indicated that 

approximately four months earlier, during the week of June 4, 2012, law enforcement 

officers watched as Billingsley drove up to the home in his black Corvette followed by a 

white Nissan Titan registered to Cordova. According to the affidavit, Billingsley got out 

of the car, opened the garage door, and then drove into the garage, shutting the door 

behind him. While the affidavit indicates that the Titan’s “driver” left in a third car while 

Billingsley remained, it doesn’t identify the driver of the Titan. Nor does it indicate 

whether anyone else was at the residence or how long Billingsley remained there. 

Additionally, the affidavit identified five other dates in the three preceding 

months—July 26, July 30, September 21, September 24, and October 15—on which 
5 

officers surveilled the 78th Street property. Those officers noted only that vehicles 

registered to Cordova sometimes parked at the residence and that, on two occasions, a 

vehicle not registered to him parked at the house. Finally, the affidavit noted Billingsley 

had three non-drug convictions, two in 1993 and one in 1995. The affidavit identified one 

prior conviction for Cordova—an undated conviction for possessing a controlled 

substance. 

Based on this information, on October 16, 2012, an Oklahoma state court judge 

found probable cause to issue a search warrant for Cordova’s 78th Street home. State and 

federal law enforcement officers executing the warrant the following day discovered four 

firearms; more than $12,000 in cash; 123.7 grams of marijuana; and various items 

associated with distribution, including a box of plastic bags, a heat sealer, a digital scale, 

and a ledger. 

Officers triggered Cordova’s security system as they entered the residence, 

prompting the monitoring company to contact Cordova, who returned home. Officers 

immediately detained Cordova and a detective advised him that officers wanted to speak 

to him about guns and marijuana they had discovered in the search of his home. The 

detective also asked Cordova to contact his wife and request that she return home so 

officers could “determine [her] involvement.” Jackson v. Denno Hr’g Tr., Doc. 116, at 

13. Cordova responded that “[e]verything in the house [was his]”—a statement he 

reiterated after receiving his Miranda rights and signing a waiver. Id. at 13, 19, 23-24. 

The United States indicted Cordova for distributing marijuana, possessing more 

than 130 grams of marijuana with intent to distribute, possessing firearms in furtherance 
6 

of a drug trafficking crime, maintaining a place for using and distributing marijuana, 

making a false statement to an Internal Revenue Service Agent, and money laundering. 

Cordova moved to suppress the physical evidence and his incriminating statements, 

arguing the affidavit did not provide probable cause for the warrant. The district court 

agreed but concluded the good faith exception applied and declined to suppress the 

evidence. The district court also denied Cordova’s motion to suppress his confession after 

rejecting Cordova’s argument that officers coerced his confession by impliedly tying his 

wife’s liberty to Cordova’s cooperation. 

After a jury convicted Cordova as charged, the district court sentenced him to 156 

months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

Cordova argues Gabeau’s affidavit contained so little indicia of probable cause 

that no reasonable officer would have relied on it and that the district court erred in ruling 

otherwise. Cordova further contends police coerced his confession and that the district 

court should have suppressed his statements. Because the government did not crossappeal the district court’s determination that the warrant lacked probable cause, we 

initially consider whether the officers could have reasonably relied on the warrant in 

good faith—a question of law we review de novo. See United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 

1292, 1299 (10th Cir. 2001). 

Although a search conducted pursuant to a warrant not supported by probable 

cause violates the Fourth Amendment, evidence discovered during such a search need not 

be suppressed so long as “‘an officer acting with objective good faith obtain[ed] a search 
7 

warrant from a detached and neutral magistrate and the executing officers act[ed] within 

its scope.’” See id. at 1298-99 (quoting United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1184 

(10th Cir. 1999)). But this good faith exception doesn’t apply if the affidavit was “so 

lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable.” See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) (internal 

quotations and citations removed). An officer can’t rely in good faith on an affidavit that 

is “bare bones” or “devoid” of factual support. United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 

927, 934 (10th Cir. 1990). 

In arguing the affidavit in this case lacked any indicia of probable cause, Cordova 

focuses on the staleness of the information contained in the affidavit, particularly the 

information that 21 months before the affidavit’s execution, officers learned that 70 

pounds of marijuana was slated to be delivered to “a subject in a black [C]orvette” parked 

in front of Cordova’s former residence. He also challenges the affidavit’s failure to 

supply a nexus between criminal activity and the place to be searched—his current 

residence at the time the warrant was executed. 

The government concedes that the information supporting the warrant was dated, 

but argues it was refreshed by more recent information implicating Cordova’s current 

residence in an ongoing and continuous drug trafficking enterprise. Similarly, the 

government maintains that even though the marijuana was destined for a vehicle that 

Cordova did not own, which was to be parked in front of a house where Cordova no 

longer lived, the affidavit provided a nexus with his current residence because of 

Cordova’s “ongoing relationship” with Billingsley and the fact that Cordova used a straw 
8 

purchaser to buy his current home from someone involved in drug trafficking. Aplee. Br. 

at 15-16. 

But the parties’ specific disputes obfuscate a more significant problem: while the 

affidavit may have provided some indication of Billingsley’s involvement in an on-going 

drug enterprise and some weak information regarding Cordova’s association with 

Billingsley, it was devoid of any facts supporting the inference that Cordova or his home 

were involved with Billingsley’s—or anyone else’s—ongoing drug enterprise. 

In arguing for the good faith exception, the government relies primarily on a 21-

month-old transaction involving a drug delivery that not only never occurred, but that 

even if it had occurred, was to involve delivery to an unnamed subject in a vehicle

registered to Billingsley, parked in front of Cordova’s former home. The affidavit 

contained no information indicating the delivery was to be made to Cordova or to 

Cordova’s current address. Nor did it indicate that Cordova assisted in arranging the twoyear-old transaction, knew the transaction was set to occur, or was even at his former 

home at the slated delivery time. 

While dated information of an ongoing criminal enterprise may be relevant to a 

probable cause analysis, see United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir. 1986), 

the isolated fact of an attempted drug delivery to a car parked in front of Cordova’s 

former house 21 months before the warrant was issued provides neither evidence of 

Cordova’s participation in such an ongoing enterprise nor evidence that his former home 

was being used in such an enterprise. In short, the nearly two-year-old information 

implicating Billingsley—but not Cordova or his home—is of little assistance to the 
9 

government even under the deferential good faith analysis. See United States v. 

Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1233 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that although affidavit 

contained some dated information, officers did not unreasonably rely on warrant because 

affidavit recounted defendant’s gang-related activity and criminal activity spanning nine 

years); United States v. Craig, 861 F.2d 818, 822-23 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding sufficient 

indicia of probable cause for reasonable reliance when affidavit provided evidence that 

defendant sporadically engaged in criminal activity over a thirteen-year period); see also

United States v. Mathis, 357 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding affidavit’s 

information was not stale when evidence demonstrated defendant’s ongoing criminal 

activity from 1999 to 2001). 

As one of our sister circuits has explained, the use of a residence in a drug 

enterprise “is not inherently ongoing,” but rather exists on a continuum from a single use 

of the home in dealing drugs to the use of the home as a “drug den.” See United States v. 

Hython, 443 F.3d 480, 485-86 (6th Cir. 2006). At best, the affidavit here provided 

evidence of a single failed transaction slated to occur in front of Cordova’s former home 

21 months before law enforcement sought a warrant for Cordova’s current home. 

Because this stale information cannot support a conclusion that Cordova’s current home 

was an operation base for ongoing criminal activity, we conclude a reasonable officer 

would have accorded the warrant’s keystone piece of information little to no weight. 

The government also relies heavily on what it characterizes as Billingsley’s “free 

access” to Cordova’s current home. But this characterization considerably overstates the 

affidavit’s assertions. The single connection the affidavit makes between Billingsley and 
10 

Cordova’s current home involves an event that occurred four months prior to the 

affidavit’s execution. Specifically, in June 2012, law enforcement officers observed 

Billingsley drive up to Cordova’s current home followed by an individual in a vehicle 

registered to Cordova. The affidavit indicates that Billingsley opened the garage, drove 

inside the garage, and shut the door. Nothing in the affidavit indicates Billingsley had 

unfettered access to the interior of the home. Further, even coupled with the dated 

information of Billingsley’s attempted drug transaction in front of Cordova’s former 

home, this single observation falls short of supporting even an inference that Billingsley 

was using Cordova’s current residence as a drug den for ongoing trafficking activities. 

Put simply, the government’s argument relies largely on two pieces of 

information. One is not only dated but fails to implicate either Cordova or Cordova’s 

former residence, let alone the place for which the warrant was sought. The other, while 

at least involving the place for which the warrant was sought, is an isolated incident that 

fails to show Cordova allowed Billingsley to use his home for purposes of Billingsley’s 

drug enterprise. These two isolated incidents not only fail to provide probable cause but, 

even when considered with the information discussed below, they fail to provide any 

indicia of probable cause. 

What remains of the government’s argument rests on the affidavit’s suggestion 

that Cordova used his mother as a “straw purchaser” for his home to avoid discovery of 

his drug dealings. While we defer to law enforcement’s expertise on whether innocent 

facts might indicate criminal activity, that deference is not without its limits. The 

affidavit indicates that it is common for drug traffickers to use family members to conceal 
11 

large purchases, and then simply states that Cordova’s mother purchased his current 

home. Thus, the affidavit implies without concluding that Cordova used his mother as a 

straw purchaser to conceal the purchase. But without other information implicating 

Cordova or his home in criminal activity, the officer’s suggestion that Cordova engaged 

in an activity sometimes associated with criminals is sheer speculation and of minuscule 

value. 

Finally, the government tacitly acknowledges that the affidavit’s remaining 

information doesn’t substantially further its cause. While the affidavit identifies 

Billingsley’s prior criminal history, that history is quite dated—occurring in the mid90s—and was unrelated to drug activity. Even more to the point, the affidavit identified 

only a single prior conviction for Cordova—an undated conviction for mere possession, 

not distribution. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting 

that the value of a “mere isolated violation” diminishes quickly whereas evidence of a 

course of conduct does not); see also United States v. Potts, 586 F.3d 823, 830 (10th Cir. 

2009) (stating that information about possessing child pornography was not stale because 

such material is likely to be “hoard[ed]”). Similarly, the government doesn’t even suggest 

there is any significance to the affidavit’s only real reference to what the district court 

termed “more recent matters”—namely, law enforcement’s surveillance of Cordova’s 

current residence on approximately seven days over a five-month period. As the district 

court pointed out, that surveillance was less than enlightening, revealing only officers’ 

“verif[ication] Mr. Cordova’s car was parked in his own driveway.” 

While the good-faith exception is broad, it is not boundless. Boiled down, the 
12 

affidavit at issue here indicated nothing more than that a high-volume drug delivery was 

set to be made to a vehicle parked in front of Cordova’s former home nearly two years 

before officers sought a warrant for his current home and that one party to that drug deal 

was present at Cordova’s current residence on one occasion four months before the 

warrant was executed. Not only does this information fail to provide probable cause, it is 

so removed from implicating Cordova or his current residence that it amounts to nothing 

more than a hunch. See United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 2004) 

(pointing out that while a court must look at the totality of the circumstances rather than 

engage in a “divide-and-conquer” analysis, it may not “arrive at probable cause simply by 

piling hunch upon hunch” (internal citation and quotation removed)). 

CONCLUSION

Given the sparse connection between Cordova’s current home and ongoing or 

recent criminal activity, we conclude officers acted unreasonably in relying on the 

affidavit and we reverse the district court’s ruling. And because the government conceded 

at oral argument that if we concluded officers did not rely on the affidavit in good faith 

then Cordova’s subsequent statements were fruit of the poisonous tree, we also reverse 

the district court’s decision denying Cordova’s motion to suppress his statements.