[Cite as In re C.A., 2016-Ohio-7349.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SHELBY COUNTY 

 

IN RE: CASE NO. 17-16-09 

 

 C.A. 

ADJUDGED ABUSED, NEGLECTED 

AND DEPENDENT CHILD. O P I N I O N 

 

[TIMOTHY ANDERSON - APPELLANT] 

 

Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court 

Juvenile Division 

Trial Court No. 2014-DEP-0011 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: October 17, 2016 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Jim R. Gudgel for Appellant 

Brandon W. Puckett for Appellee 

 
Case No. 17-16-09 

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WILLAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Father-appellant Tim Anderson (“Anderson”) brings this appeal from 

the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County, Juvenile Division, 

terminating the parental rights of Anderson. Anderson claims that the trial court’s 

decision as to the best interest of the child was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed. 

{¶2} C.A. was born to Anderson and Crystal Litton (“Litton”) on August 4, 

2014. Doc. 1. Upon her release from the hospital, C.A. was placed into the 

temporary custody of the Shelby County Department of Job and Family Services, 

Children Services Division (“the Agency”). Doc. 4. The basis for the removal was 

that C.A. was a dependent child because her six siblings had been removed from the 

home and no progress was being made on the case plan by Litton and Anderson. 

Doc. 3. C.A. was later adjudicated dependent and ordered to remain in the custody 

of the Agency. Doc. 29, 38, 43, and 51.1

 Anderson and Litton then began working 

on the goals set forth in the case plan and were noted to be making “some progress” 

at the January 26, 2015, case plan review. Doc. 53. The trial court continued the 

temporary custody of the Agency after the review hearing. Doc. 55. 

{¶3} On July 9, 2015, the Agency filed a motion to suspend Anderson’s 

visitation with C.A. due to his becoming “verbally abusive and threatening” towards 

 

1

 The initial adjudication and disposition applied to Litton only. The second adjudication and disposition 

applied to Anderson after paternity had been established. 
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the Agency’s representatives. Doc. 56. The motion was granted by the trial court 

temporarily that same day, but extended after a hearing. Doc. 57, 61. A second 

case plan review was conducted on July 13, 2015. Doc. 58. At that time, it was 

noted that Anderson was living in a hotel, Litton had been sent to prison, and 

Anderson had been terminated from counseling for being uncooperative. Id. at 3-4. 

His progress in regards to the case plan was noted to be “insufficient”. Id. at 4. 

{¶4} On October 26, 2015, the Agency filed a motion for permanent custody. 

Doc. 63. The motion alleged that C.A. had been in the custody of the Agency for 

more than twelve of the last twenty-two months and that it would be in her best 

interest to terminate the parental rights and grant permanent custody to the Agency. 

Id. A hearing was scheduled for the motion on February 19, 2016. Doc. 106. Prior 

to the start of the hearing, Litton indicated that she wished to voluntarily surrender 

her parental rights. Id. The trial court accepted the surrender and found it was in 

the best interest of C.A. Id. The trial court then continued the hearing after learning 

that Anderson had not been properly provided notice of the hearing. Doc. 107. The 

hearing was then held on March 10, 2016. Tr. 6. 

{¶5} At the hearing, Anderson admitted through his attorney that C.A. had 

been in the temporary custody of the Agency for twelve out of twenty-two months. 

Tr. 9. The Agency then began presenting the testimony of five witnesses. The first 

was Carmen Martin (“Martin”), who had been the home coach for Anderson at the 

beginning of C.A.’s case. Tr. 12. Martin was responsible for supervising his 
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visitation with C.A. and providing advice on parenting. Tr. 12. Martin worked with 

Anderson two times a week during the fall of 2014 before she left the Agency to 

take another job. Tr. 13,15. According to Martin, Anderson’s interaction with C.A. 

was fine. Tr. 15. During the visits, Martin also worked with Anderson on financial 

issues. Tr. 15. Martin testified that Anderson did not have stable employment 

during the time she worked with him. Tr. 16. Martin also testified that Anderson 

usually had an “uncooperative attitude and just kind of seemed angry a lot.” Tr. 17. 

Although she recalled that Anderson always seemed angry, she did not recall any 

specific incidents. Tr. 18. Anderson was just generally angry about the case and 

argumentative when she made suggestions. Tr. 19. 

{¶6} On cross-examination, Martin testified that Anderson was 

argumentative when they were talking about the case. Tr. 21. Anderson was 

frustrated with the system and the fact that C.A. was taken by the Agency. Tr. 21. 

There were no concerns about Anderson being angry with C.A. Tr. 22. When there 

was a visit by developmental intervention specialists, Anderson would roll his eyes 

and curse at them. Tr. 24, 28. Martin testified that she felt that there was a great 

deal of tension, so she tried to keep the situation from escalating. Tr. 26. Martin 

agreed that Anderson was angry about how he perceived he was being treated by 

the Agency. Tr. 31. 

{¶7} Amy Swaney (“Swaney”) testified that she was the home coach for the 

Counseling Center for Wellness. Tr. 36. Swaney worked as a home coach for 
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Anderson from December 2014 until July 2015, when his visits were suspended. 

Tr. 37-40. As the coach she worked with Anderson on obtaining housing, obtaining 

food, and financial concerns. Tr. 39. At no time did Anderson provide Swaney 

with pay stubs as she requested, but she did see proof of taxes filed, which indicated 

income. Tr. 40. Swaney testified that Anderson had no steady income during the 

time she worked with him. Tr. 40. Anderson told her he was employed, but she 

never saw any proof. Tr. 41. Swaney also worked with Anderson on controlling 

his anger. Tr. 42. According to Swaney, Anderson was angry at the visits because 

he believed “everyone was against [him].” Tr. 43. 

{¶8} When Swaney first started working with Anderson, the visits were 

going well and were moved to his residence. Tr. 44. When she started pushing the 

financial situation, she would arrive for the visits with C.A. in her arms only to find 

Anderson was not there. Tr. 44. The visits were then moved back to the Agency’s 

office. Tr. 44. The visits were returned to the office on February 24, 2015, and then 

Anderson’s progress “started to go downhill”. Tr. 44-45. Anderson would start to 

leave visits early, would miss some visits, and spent at least one visit with his back 

to C.A. and Litton, instead spending the entire time complaining about how 

“everybody was out to get him and it was a conspiracy.” Tr. 45-46. By April, 

Anderson was spending only twenty to thirty minutes of a two-hour visit interacting 

with C.A. and the remainder of the time talking about the alleged conspiracy. Tr. 

47. When asked whether she thought Anderson was able to parent C.A. at that time, 
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Swaney said no because she thought Anderson had “a lot of anger built up” that 

would affect C.A. Tr. 53. 

{¶9} On cross-examination, Swaney admitted that during the visit where 

Anderson sat with his back to Litton and C.A., C.A. had come to the visit with hives 

on her back and stomach. Tr. 54. Anderson was upset and wanted C.A. to be taken 

to the doctor. Tr. 55. Swaney did not feel that it was necessary for C.A. to go to 

the doctor, so had told Anderson no. Tr. 55-56. Swaney also admitted that 

Anderson had had previous children removed from his home, so may not have a 

positive opinion of the Agency. Tr. 56-58. At no time did Anderson make threats 

directly to Swaney. Tr. 58. At no time did Anderson injure or threaten either 

Swaney or C.A. Tr. 59. 

{¶10} Upon cross-examination by the Court Appointed Special Advocate 

(“CASA”), Swaney testified that at the end of a primary care team meeting, 

Anderson had aimed an expletive comment at her. Tr. 60. Swaney testified that she 

did feel a “little bit” threatened by his statement. Tr. 61. 

{¶11} Dale Agnew (“Agnew”) testified that he was a therapist at the 

Counseling Center for Wellness. Tr. 64. Agnew testified that he had worked with 

Anderson for approximately four years, but had not done so in six to seven months. 

Tr. 65-66. Counseling was terminated after Anderson made some vague threats 

about no one at the office being safe. Tr. 66. The statement was made after 
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Anderson’s visitation with C.A. was cancelled for failing to confirm it and Anderson 

was angrily storming out of the office. Tr. 67. 

{¶12} Agnew testified that Anderson was referred to him for cognitive 

behavioral/solution focused therapy. Tr. 75. Anderson came to him for substance 

abuse issues, antisocial personality issues, and depressive issues. Tr. 76. These 

issues appeared to stem from problems with primary supports, housing, finances, 

and employment. Tr. 76. Anderson’s attendance at therapy varied from consistent 

at times to sporadic at times. Tr. 76. According to Agnew, Anderson would make 

progress, then he would regress when things did not go his way. Tr. 77. The last 

session with Anderson was on March 26, 2015, and Anderson ended the therapy 

claiming that it did not matter because no matter what Anderson did, it would not 

be enough for the Agency. Tr. 78. Agnew testified that Anderson would get close 

to having his children returned, but at the first set back, he would give up. Tr. 79. 

Agnew had discussed Anderson seeing a psychiatrist to be prescribed 

antidepressants. Tr. 80. When Anderson was participating in therapy, he was 

“relatively stable.” Tr. 80. After Anderson terminated services with Agnew, he 

went to Shelby County Counseling, but Agnew was unaware of whether Anderson 

was still receiving services through that agency. Tr. 82. 

{¶13} On cross-examination, Agnew testified that Anderson’s anger was 

directed towards the Agency and Anderson did not take his anger out on Agnew. 

Tr. 83-84. Agnew testified that Anderson’s frustration and anger was reasonable 
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considering the circumstances. Tr. 85-86. All of the urine screens Anderson 

completed for Agnew tested negative for drug usage. Tr. 86. When Anderson made 

his vague threat, he was angry about not getting to see C.A. Tr. 87. Anderson on 

many occasions stated that he loved his children and wanted to have his children 

back in his home. Tr. 88. 

{¶14} Upon cross-examination by the CASA, Agnew testified that they 

always call the police anytime a threat is issued regardless of the content or who 

makes it as a safety precaution. Tr. 89. Agnew described Anderson’s focus on a 

conspiracy against him as “pathological”. Tr. 89. Although Agnew had tried to get 

Anderson to seek medication to help with the depression, Anderson refused because 

he believed it would be used against him by the Agency. Tr. 91. On re-direct, 

Agnew testified that Anderson’s anger is not only aimed at the Agency, but at any 

entity he feels has wronged him. Tr. 92-93. 

{¶15} Cathy Iwanski (“Iwanski”) testified that she is the CASA in this case. 

Tr. 95. As the CASA, she first met C.A. at the end of August or beginning of 

September in 2014. Tr. 96. Iwanski testified that she had observed Anderson at 

three visits with C.A., with the last one being when C.A. was approximately eight 

months old. Tr. 98. Iwanski does not believe that Anderson can care for C.A. 

because he lacks steady employment, is not emotionally or mentally mature, and 

has outbursts of anger. Tr. 99. According to Iwanski, Anderson always seems to 

be angry. Tr. 100. She testified that she did not feel comfortable going to his home 
Case No. 17-16-09 

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alone, because of his anger and his attitude. Tr. 101. Iwanski testified that Anderson 

was not financially able to provide for C.A. as he has not held a regular job. Tr. 

102. Additionally, Iwanski testified that in her opinion Anderson could not provide 

adequate housing, medical care, food, or clothing for C.A. without “handouts”. Tr. 

102-103. Iwanski also doubted that Anderson had the patience required to handle a 

two-year old. Tr. 103. At the time of the hearing, Anderson had not been involved 

with C.A. since his visits were cancelled due to his anger issues. Tr. 105. As to 

siblings, Iwanski testified that C.A. has not met her birth siblings, but is bonded to 

her foster sibling. Tr. 105-106. To Iwanski’s knowledge, C.A. has not met any 

member of her paternal biological family except Anderson. Tr. 106. 

{¶16} Iwanski testified that the foster family loves C.A. and provides her 

with a good home. Tr. 106. The foster family is meeting her physical and emotional 

needs. Tr. 106. Although C.A. has developmental delays, the foster family has 

been actively addressing those. Tr. 107. C.A. has only lived with the one family 

and knows her foster parents as her parents. Tr. 108. Iwanski testified that the best 

placement for C.A. would be adoption by her foster parents. Tr. 108. In her opinion, 

it would be in C.A.’s best interest to have custody granted to the Agency. Tr. 109. 

{¶17} On cross-examination, Iwanski testified that she had felt threatened by 

Anderson, but admitted that she had not contacted the police, instead just reporting 

it at the team meetings. Tr. 110-11. Iwanski also admitted that although she 

believed that C.A. was born with fetal alcohol syndrome, there is no diagnosis 
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supporting her opinion. Tr. 114. Even if C.A. were to have fetal alcohol syndrome, 

that would be the result of actions by Litton, not Anderson. Tr. 114. If C.A. were 

to be returned to Anderson, there are programs that would assist him in obtaining 

and maintaining housing and food and in meeting her medical needs. Tr. 115-116. 

Iwanski admitted that she could understand why Anderson would not like her since 

she had previously recommended that his parental rights of his three other children 

should have been terminated. Tr. 119. 

{¶18} The final witness for the Agency was Barbara Reindel (“Reindel”) 

who was the caseworker. Tr. 139-40. Reindel testified that C.A. was found to be a 

dependent child “based on the issues within the family that dealt with substance use 

and abuse, domestic violence, relationship issues, inappropriate care and discipline 

of the children and unstable housing and schooling for those children.” Tr. 141. 

C.A. was placed with the foster family soon after she was born. Tr. 141. At no time 

was C.A. returned to the custody of Anderson or Litton. Tr. 141. The case plan 

called for Anderson to establish and maintain a home, which he has not done. Tr. 

142. Reindel testified that to her knowledge, Anderson had been homeless since 

July of 2015. Tr. 143. Anderson had failed to consistently obtain and maintain 

employment, with most of his jobs lasting only from a couple days to a couple of 

weeks. Tr. 143. During the case plan, Anderson was uncooperative by failing to 

provide the requested information and having limited involvement with C.A. Tr. 

143-44. Since July 6, 2015, Anderson has had no contact with C.A. due to the visits 
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being suspended. Tr. 144. According to Reindel, Anderson did have good 

attendance with seeing Agnew as he made 17 out of 21 scheduled appointments. 

Tr. 144. However, the counseling was terminated because Anderson decided to stop 

attending in March of 2015. Tr. 145. Although Agnew had recommended 

psychiatric attention, Anderson had refused. Tr. 145. Reindel testified that she 

referred him to Shelby County Counseling for crisis intervention when she saw he 

was at an emotional crisis point in 2015. Tr. 145. Anderson went for the assessment 

on August 12, 2015, and one follow-up appointment on September 29, 2015, but 

then failed to attend. Tr. 145. Reindel also testified that there were not many drug 

tests performed because she could not locate Anderson many times and that he had 

refused drug screens a couple of times, with the last time being February 24, 2016. 

Tr. 146. Reindel testified that on October 13, 2015 and November 10, 2015, 

Anderson was arrested and charged with drug related activities. Tr. 146. 

Additionally, Anderson was awaiting sentencing on a theft conviction. Tr. 146. As 

of February 24, 2016, Anderson was refusing to sign releases. Tr. 146. 

{¶19} Reindel testified that Anderson felt persecuted and expressed that 

feeling through “threatening and intimidating actions and words.” Tr. 147. She also 

described Anderson as dishonest with the Agency and himself. Tr. 147. She 

indicated that the team meetings were non-productive due to “the attitude and the 

behaviors and the mindset presented by” Anderson. Tr. 147. Reindel testified that 

Anderson had not successfully completed one thing in the entire case plan in the 
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year and a half it was in effect. Tr. 147. Rather than improving over time, 

Anderson’s emotional condition had worsened. Tr. 148. At the February 24, 2016, 

meeting, Anderson refused every request. Tr. 148. When she asked him where he 

wanted his mail to go, he told her to keep it and threw it in the trash as he left. Tr. 

149. Prior to that meeting, Anderson had not come to the Agency since September 

of 2015. Tr. 151. 

{¶20} Reindel testified that C.A.’s current caregivers are excellent and are 

meeting all of her needs. Tr. 152. The foster parents have been working on C.A.’s 

developmental issues since they were identified. Tr. 153. They are interested in 

adopting C.A. if she were to become available for adoption. Tr. 153. Reindel 

recommended that C.A. be allowed to remain with her foster parents. Tr. 153. 

Reindel also indicated that family placement was not an option in this case for a 

variety of reasons. Tr. 154. Reindel testified that it was in C.A.’s best interest to 

be placed in the agency’s permanent custody. Tr. 155. 

{¶21} On cross-examination Reindel testified that C.A. was born healthy, but 

had been exposed to alcohol prior to birth due to Litton’s drinking. Tr. 157. C.A. 

was only ruled dependent due to what had occurred with the other children. Tr. 158. 

Reindel testified that she did not believe additional time would benefit Anderson 

because despite the agency offering numerous referrals, Anderson had “chosen not 

to participate, not to cooperate, not to make changes.” Tr. 161. 
Case No. 17-16-09 

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{¶22} After the Agency finished presenting its case, Anderson testified on 

his own behalf. Anderson testified that he felt like the Agency had already 

determined to remove C.A. from his custody before she was even born. Tr. 167. 

Anderson testified that C.A. was born with no toxins in her system, but the Agency 

took her anyway. Tr. 169. When C.A. was born, Anderson and Litton were living 

in a two-bedroom apartment and he was working. Tr. 170. Between Anderson and 

Litton, they had a monthly income between $2,500 and $3,000. Tr. 170. Anderson 

believed that the Agency was not assisting him with trying to reunite him with C.A. 

Tr. 172. At the beginning he tried to do everything the Agency asked. Tr. 174. 

However, he was told “in a roundabout way” that the decision had already been 

made to terminate his parental rights to C.A. Tr. 174. Based upon his experiences, 

Anderson felt that he was mistreated by the Agency and not given a chance to show 

he could parent C.A. Tr. 175. Anderson had not been able to see C.A. in eight 

months after the Agency terminated his visits. Tr. 176. 

{¶23} Anderson testified that the alleged threat that was placed on his 

mother’s answering machine, was not made against anyone else, but was a threat of 

suicide. Tr. 177. However, at the hearing, Anderson indicated that he no longer felt 

suicidal, but was focused on trying to “get [himself] back together, on [his] feet.” 

Tr. 177. Anderson indicated that if C.A. were to be returned to him, he would do 

anything he could to provide for her and to keep her safe. Tr. 177-78. Anderson 
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indicated that he quit working with the Agency because they had indicated he had 

no chance to get C.A. returned to him. Tr. 179. 

{¶24} On cross-examination by CASA, Anderson admitted that he last 

attended a team meeting in either April or July of 2015. Tr. 181. Anderson also 

admitted that he was living in a temporary residence at that time as he was 

unemployed. Tr. 183. Anderson became frustrated during the developmental 

testing because he “felt that it was being overdone.” Tr. 186. 

{¶25} When questioned by the Agency, Anderson admitted that he did not 

follow through on Agnew’s recommendation for medication. Tr. 190-91. Anderson 

also admitted that for the three to four months before the hearing, he had been 

staying at two different addresses with friends. Tr. 191-92. However, he indicated 

that if he had C.A., he would get his own place. Tr. 193. At a later point in his 

testimony, Anderson stated that he had lived in his car since April of 2015. Tr. 196. 

{¶26} On April 8, 2016, the trial court entered judgment terminating the 

parental rights of Anderson and granting permanent custody of C.A. to the Agency. 

Doc. 120. Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal from that judgment. Doc. 121. 

Anderson raises the following assignments of error on appeal. 

First Assignment of Error 

The [trial court’s] decision, when it found that it was in the best 

interest of the minor child to terminate [Anderson’s] parental 

rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
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Second Assignment of Error 

The [trial court] did not consider all of the statutory best interest 

requirements in arriving at its decision.

We will address the assignments of error out of order for the purpose of clarity. 

Best Interest of the Child 

{¶27} The right to parent one's own child is a basic and essential civil right. 

In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). “Parents have a 

‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management of their 

children.” In re Leveck, 3d Dist. Nos. 5–02–52, 5–02–53, 5–02–54, 2003–Ohio–

1269, ¶ 6. These rights may be terminated, however, under appropriate 

circumstances and when all due process safeguards have been followed. Id. When 

considering a motion to terminate parental rights, the trial court must comply with 

the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414. These requirements include, 

in pertinent part, as follows. 

(B)(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the 

court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the 

court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of 

this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best 

interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the 

agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any 

of the following apply: 

* * * 

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more 

public children services agencies or private child placing agencies 

for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month 

period * * *. 
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For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be 

considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency 

on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to [R.C. 

2151.28] or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child 

from home. 

* * * 

(C) In making the determination required by this section * * *, a 

court shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent 

custody to the agency would have upon any parent of the child. A 

written report of the guardian ad litem of the child shall be 

submitted to the court prior to or at the time of the hearing held 

pursuant to division (A) of this section * * * but shall not be 

submitted under oath. 

R.C. 2151.414. 

{¶28} The determination whether to grant a motion for permanent custody 

requires a two-step approach. In re G.B., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP–1024, 

2005–Ohio–3141, ¶ 13. The first step is to determine whether any of the factors set 

forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) apply. Id. If one of those circumstances applies, then 

the trial court must consider whether granting the motion is in the best interest of 

the child by considering the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). Id. 

{¶29} A review of the record in this case indicates that C.A. was removed 

from Anderson’s custody on August 6, 2014. Sixty days from that date would be 

October 5, 2014. C.A. was adjudicated to be dependent, as it pertains to Anderson, 

on December 29, 2014. Thus, pursuant to statute, the date to be used for the purpose 

of determining a twelve-month period out of a consecutive twenty-two-month 
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period would be October 5, 2014, as it is the earlier date. The motion for permanent 

custody was filed on October 26, 2015. This is over a year later. The fact that C.A. 

had been in the temporary custody of the Agency for more than twelve-months in a 

twenty-two-month period was admitted by Anderson at trial. Thus, the portion of 

the judgment entry finding that C.A. was subject to the provisions of R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(d) is supported by the record. 

{¶30} This then takes us to the second part of the analysis: the best interests 

of the children factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). These factors are 1) the 

interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings, relatives, foster 

parents, and anyone else who significantly affects the children; 2) the wishes of the 

children; 3) the custodial history of the children; 4) the children’s needs for 

permanency; and 5) any factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7-11). R.C. 

2151.414(D). In this case, the trial court specifically addressed the first four factors 

and indicated that it had considered all of the factors. Doc. 120 at 4-5. The trial 

court made specific findings as to the bond, or lack thereof, between Anderson and 

C.A., the wishes of C.A., as expressed through the CASA for C.A., the custodial 

history of C.A. and that she had only lived with one family since birth, and C.A.’s 

need for a legally secure placement along with Anderson’s inability to provide that 

for C.A. A review of the record indicates that although the trial court did not state 

that one of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7-11) was met, there was evidence to 

support such a finding. As regards R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), Anderson admitted that 
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he had previously had three prior children removed from his custody by the Agency. 

Tr. 202. The findings of the trial court were supported by competent, credible 

evidence in the record. The trial court did consider the statutory factors as to the 

best interest of C.A. and the second assignment of error is overruled. 

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶31} In the first assignment of error, Anderson claims that the trial court’s 

determination to terminate his parental rights is not supported by the evidence. 

There is no dispute that the first prong of the test, that C.A. had been in the custody 

of the Agency for more than twelve months in a twenty-two-month period, had been 

met. The only issue for review is whether the trial court’s findings as to C.A.’s best 

interest were supported by the record. Upon review of the interrelationships 

between C.A. and the people in her life, the trial court determined that Anderson 

and C.A. had no bond. The evidence presented was that starting in March of 2015, 

Anderson was sporadic in his visits, missing several consecutive visits in April and 

May. As of July 2015, Anderson’s visits were suspended due to his behavior. The 

testimony also showed that C.A. is very attached to her foster family and that they 

wished to adopt C.A. This testimony supports the findings of the trial court as to 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). 

{¶32} As to the second factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the trial 

court indicated that C.A. was too young to express an opinion. Since C.A. was less 

than 2 years of age at the time of the hearing, this finding is supported by the record. 
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The CASA for C.A. testified that in her opinion, Anderson could not parent C.A. 

and stated that the termination of Anderson’s parental rights was in the best interest 

of C.A. Thus, the findings s to this factor are supported by the record. 

{¶33} The third factor considers the placement history of the child. The 

testimony was that C.A. was born on August 4, 2014, and placed with her foster 

family on August 6, 2014. Since that time, she had not lived with any other family. 

The trial court’s findings as to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) are supported by the record. 

{¶34} The fourth factor specifically addressed by the trial court was C.A.’s 

need for a legally secure placement. The evidence presented at the hearing showed 

that Anderson lacked stable housing, either living in his car or staying with friends 

since April 2015. Before that, he was living in a hotel with Litton. Throughout the 

case, he worked sporadically and at the time of the hearing, was unemployed again. 

There were also issues regarding his mental health and his anger. The testimony, 

even that by Anderson himself, indicated that he did not want to work with the 

Agency or to do what they asked. The trial court compared that with the evidence 

that C.A. was in a good situation, that she had bonded with the foster family, and 

that they wished to adopt her. She had spent her entire life in the custody of the 

Agency. Anderson had showed that he was not, at the time of the hearing, providing 

a stable environment for himself. Given all this evidence, the trial court determined 

that C.A. needed a stable and legally secure environment. This was supported by 

the record. 
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{¶35} Although the trial court did not specifically discuss the fifth factor, 

there was evidence to support a finding pursuant to it as was discussed above. The 

trial court stated that it had considered that factor as well. The record provides 

competent and credible evidence in support of the trial court’s conclusion that the 

termination of parental rights would be in C.A.’s best interest. Viewing the 

evidence, this court finds that the Agency proved that the termination of Anderson’s 

parental rights and the grant of permanent custody of C.A. was supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. The first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶36} Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant, the judgment of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Shelby County, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

SHAW, P.J. and ROGERS, J., concur. 

/hls