IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Harrisburg Area Community College, :

Petitioner :

: No. 654 C.D. 2019

v. :

: Argued: May 11, 2020

Pennsylvania Human Relations :

Commission, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: October 29, 2020

Harrisburg Area Community College (HACC) petitions for review from 

the March 26, 2019 interlocutory order of the Pennsylvania Human Relations 

Commission (PHRC), which denied HACC’s motion to dismiss Holly Swope’s

(Swope) PHRC complaint for legal insufficiency.1

1 After the PHRC issued its interlocutory order, HACC sought permission to appeal to this 

Court, pursuant to section 702(b) of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §702(b), and Rule 

1311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1311. On September 11, 2019, 

we granted HACC’s petition for permission to appeal the PHRC’s interlocutory order. Thereafter, 

HACC filed an application to amend the PHRC’s order to authorize immediate appellate review in 

accordance with section 702(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §702(b). Although the PHRC granted 

HACC’s application in a supplemental order issued on May 7, 2019, as we concluded in our 

September 11, 2019 order granting HACC’s permissive appeal, because the PHRC issued the 

supplemental order more than 30 days after the application had been filed, the application was deemed 

denied pursuant to Rule 1311(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 

1311(b). “Where the administrative agency . . . refuses to amend its order to include the prescribed 

statement, a petition for review under Chapter 15 of the unappealable order of denial is the proper 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

Background

HACC operates a nursing program that provides students the opportunity 

to earn an associate degree and become eligible to take the Pennsylvania State Board 

of Nursing’s registered nurse licensing examination. Once admitted to the program, 

students must successfully complete a series of nursing courses that feature both class 

work and clinical training. HACC requires all candidates in the nursing program, on 

an annual basis, to submit to a urine screening test for the presence of drugs, and if they 

test positive, they will be removed from the nursing program. (Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 197a.)

On October 25, 2018, Swope filed a discrimination complaint with the 

PHRC. As alleged in the complaint, Swope has a disability due to suffering from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder and Irritable Bowel Syndrome. According to the complaint, 

Swope is able to complete the essential components of HACC’s nursing program as 

long as she is granted the reasonable accommodation of being permitted to take her 

legally prescribed medical marijuana medication. (PHRC Complaint ¶¶ 6-8, R.R. at 

197a.) 

Also according to the complaint, in July 2018, Swope informed Jill Lott

(Lott), HACC’s Director of Nursing, of her medical condition and requested that she 

be permitted to use the medical marijuana she had been prescribed by her physician as 

an accommodation for her disability. Swope alleged in the complaint that Lott 

informed her that she must comply with HACC’s drug policy to continue in the nursing 

program, as her request would violate HACC’s contracts with various clinics. Lott 

mode of determining whether the case is so egregious as to justify prerogative appellate correction of 

the exercise of discretion by the lower tribunal.” Pa.R.A.P. 1311, Note. Subsequent to the filing of 

the petition for permission to appeal, Rule 1311 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

was amended to provide that a permissive appeal may only be sought by petition for permission to 

appeal and not by a petition for review under the Note to Rule 1311.
3

advised Swope that she would be required to undergo a drug test in 90 days. (PHRC 

Complaint ¶¶ 9-13, R.R. at 197a.) Swope alleged that HACC violated section 4(a)(3)

of the Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act (PFEOA)2and requested all 

available and appropriate remedies under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 

(PHRA).3 (PHRC Complaint ¶¶ 14-15, R.R. at 197a-98a.)

On January 18, 2019, HACC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 

arguing that it was legally insufficient because Swope had failed to allege actionable 

violations of either PHRA or PFEOA. In particular, HACC contended that the 

definitions of disability in PHRA and PFEOA exclude from coverage current users of 

controlled substances, that marijuana is considered a controlled substance under federal 

law and, therefore, that neither PHRA nor PFEOA require accommodation of 

marijuana use, even if such use is permitted under the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana 

Act (MMA).4 For similar reasons, HACC also argued that the PHRC lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to investigate Swope’s allegations. (R.R. at 3a-7a.)

On March 26, 2019, the PHRC issued an interlocutory order denying

HACC’s motion to dismiss. The PHRC noted that the definition of disability under 

section 4(p.1)(3) of PHRA, 43 P.S. §954(p.1)(3), excludes current, illegal users of 

controlled substances, but argued that under section 303(a) of the MMA, 35 P.S. 

2 Act of July 17, 1961, P.L. 776, as amended, 24 P.S. §5004(a)(3). Section 4(a)(3) of the 

PFEOA provides that “it shall be an unfair educational practice for an educational institution . . . [t]o 

expel, suspend, punish, deny facilities or otherwise discriminate against any students because of race, 

religion, color, ancestry, national origin, sex, handicap or disability.” Id. The PHRC is vested with 

the authority to administer the PFEOA. Section 5 of the PFEOA, 24 P.S. §5005. 

3 Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§951-963.

4 Act of April 17, 2016, P.L. 84, 35 P.S. §§10231.101-10231.2110.
4

§10231.303(a), marijuana is lawful in Pennsylvania if prescribed as medication by a 

physician. (PHRC Order, March 26, 2019, R.R. at 58a.) The PHRC determined that

so long as the use of the marijuana is consistent with the 

parameters of the [MMA], the [Pennsylvania] Legislature 

declares it is not illegal. To be excluded from the coverage 

of [s]ection 4(p.1)(3) [of PHRA], the use has to be “illegal.” 

Here, it is alleged that [Swope’s] use was legal.

(PHRC Order, March 26, 2019, R.R. at 58a.) The PHRC reasoned that Swope’s “use 

of marijuana to mitigate her suffering [made] the present claim viable under the 

[MMA] in combination with PHRA and PFEOA” and, therefore, denied HACC’s 

motion to dismiss. Id.

Discussion

A. The Parties’ Arguments

As stated in our September 11, 2019 order granting HACC’s permissive 

appeal, the sole issue on appeal is whether the anti-discrimination provisions of PHRA 

and PFEOA require accommodation of Swope’s lawful use of medical marijuana under 

the MMA. HACC argues that both PHRA and PFEOA exclude marijuana users from 

disability discrimination protections. While HACC acknowledges that PHRA and 

PFEOA require it to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified disabled 

students, it contends that individuals who currently and illegally use controlled 

substances, including marijuana, are exempted from disability definitions under both 

statutes. HACC maintains that both PHRA and PFEOA incorporate the definition of 

controlled substances in the federal Controlled Substances Act (Federal CSA),

5 which 

defines marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance, meaning it has no medically 

acceptable use under federal law. Thus, according to HACC, because marijuana use 

5 21 U.S.C. §§801-971.
5

is considered illegal under the Federal CSA, individuals who use marijuana are 

excluded from both PHRA’s and PFEOA’s disability definitions, regardless of whether 

such use is considered medicinal and/or lawful under Pennsylvania law.

HACC also asserts that although the MMA legalized the use of marijuana 

for certain medicinal purposes, the MMA did not amend either PHRA’s or PFEOA’s 

definitions for illegal use of controlled substances, with both statutes continuing to rely 

on the federal definition of controlled substances. First, HACC notes that although the 

MMA explicitly amended The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act

(Pennsylvania Drug Act),

6

the MMA makes no mention of either PHRA or PFEOA. 

Second, HACC argues that the MMA only prohibits employers from taking adverse 

actions against employees due to their status as certified users of medical marijuana, 

but, the MMA’s “employment discrimination prohibition mentions nothing about 

expanding the [PHRC’s] jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute employers for failing 

to accommodate medical marijuana use.” (HACC’s Br. at 13-14.) Nor does the MMA

contain any similar protections for post-secondary students. HACC maintains that an 

earlier version of the MMA contained protections for students, but that the final enacted 

version did not contain any such protections. HACC further contends that implied 

repeals of prior laws are disfavored and that, because the MMA is not irreconcilable 

with the definitions of illegal drug use under PHRA and PFEOA, we should not imply 

a repeal of the latter statutes.

Finally, HACC argues that our courts have held that PHRA and the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)7should be interpreted co-extensively. HACC 

observes that PHRA’s disability exclusions for illegal drug users mirror those of the 

ADA and that adopting the PHRC’s interpretation of the exclusion would place the two 

6 Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§780-101 to 780-144.

7 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213.
6

statutes in conflict. However, according to HACC, adopting its preferred interpretation 

of the PHRC would be consistent with the statutory language of the ADA. 

In contrast, the PHRC contends that PHRA and PFEOA only exclude from 

their disability definitions current, illegal users of controlled substances, which it 

asserts does not encompass certified users of medical marijuana. The PHRC notes that 

section 303(a) of the MMA sets forth the general rule that “[n]otwithstanding any 

provision of law to the contrary, use or possession of medical marijuana as set forth in 

this act is lawful within this Commonwealth.” 35 P.S. §10231.303(a). Therefore, the 

PHRC asserts that “so long as the use of marijuana is consistent with the parameters of 

the MMA, it is not illegal in Pennsylvania” and that “in order not to require an 

accommodation of the use of medical marijuana, the use of marijuana would have to 

be illegal.” (PHRC’s Br. at 10.) 

The PHRC further maintains that both section 12(a) of PHRA, 43 P.S. 

§962(a), and case law interpreting PHRA mandate that PHRA be construed liberally to 

accomplish its purpose of safeguarding individuals’ right to be free from illegal 

discrimination. The PHRC contends that under a liberal construction of PHRA, an 

individual who uses medical marijuana must be accommodated because medical 

marijuana is legal in Pennsylvania. Additionally, the PHRC asserts that, while PHRA

and the ADA have similarities, PHRA is not limited in scope by the ADA and, in many 

areas, actually provides greater protections than its federal counterpart. Finally, the 

PHRC asserts that we should afford deference to its interpretation of PHRA because it 

is the administrative agency tasked with enforcing PHRA.

B. Relevant Statutory Law

As a preliminary matter, we note that among the number of provisions in 

the MMA, most apply to the licensing and regulation of growers, manufacturers, 

researchers, and dispensaries. Minimal attention is given to employees, and even less 
7

is given to students. In fact, section 2104 of the MMA, while not providing any 

guidance as to how, where or whether pre-school, primary, or secondary students were 

permitted to use medical marijuana on school premises, did require the Department of 

Education to develop regulations pursuant to that section. 35 P.S. §10231.2104. 

However, we could find no regulations to date.

Moreover, the MMA provides that it is “the intention of the General

Assembly that any Commonwealth-based program to provide access to medical 

marijuana serve as a temporary measure, pending Federal approval of and access to 

medical marijuana through traditional medical and pharmaceutical avenues.” 

Section 102(4) of the MMA, 35 P.S. §10231.102(4) (emphasis added).

We now look at the applicable statutes in this case. Under section 5(i)(1) 

of PHRA, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any owner, lessee, proprietor, 

manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any public accommodation to 

“[r]efuse, withhold from, or deny to any person because of his . . . handicap or disability

. . . any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of such public 

accommodation.” 43 P.S. §955(i)(1). Pursuant to section 4(a)(3) of PFEOA, it is an 

“unfair educational practice for an educational institution . . . [t]o expel, suspend, 

punish, deny facilities or otherwise discriminate against any student because of . . . 

handicap or disability.” 24 P.S. §5004(a)(3). The definition of “public 

accommodation” under PHRA includes, inter alia, “primary and secondary schools, 

high schools, academies, colleges and universities, extension courses and all 

educational institutions under the supervision of this Commonwealth.” Section 4(l) of 

PHRA, 43 P.S. §954(l). Under the PHRC’s regulations, 

[i]f a handicapped or disabled person, with reasonable 

accommodation, meets the essential eligibility requirements 

for and is similarly situated with able-bodied persons in 

terms of need and desire to use, enjoy or benefit from a public 

accommodation, then reasonable accommodations shall be 
8

made to assure the person opportunity substantially 

equivalent to that of able-bodied persons to use, enjoy and 

benefit from the public accommodation in an integrated 

setting.

16 Pa. Code §44.21.

The PHRA defines “‘handicap or disability,’ with respect to a person,” 

as follows:

(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially 

limits one or more of such person’s major life activities;

(2) a record of having such an impairment; or

(3) being regarded as having such an impairment, but such 

term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction 

to a controlled substance, as defined in section 102 of the 

[Federal CSA] (Public Law 91-513, 21 U.S.C. §802).

Section 4(p.1) of PHRA, 43 P.S. §954(p.1) (second emphasis added). The definition 

of “handicap or disability” in PFEOA is nearly identical to that in PHRA, providing 

the following:

“Handicap or disability,” with respect to a person, means—

(i) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits 

one or more of the person’s major life activities;

(ii) a record of having such an impairment; or

(iii) being regarded as having such an impairment, but does 

not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a 

controlled substance, as defined in section 102 of the 

[Federal CSA] (Public Law 91-513, [21 U.S.C. §802]).

Section 3(7) of PFEOA, 24 P.S. §5003(7) (second emphasis added).

The Federal CSA defines a “controlled substance” as a “drug or other 

substance . . . included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B” of the Federal CSA. 
9

Section 102(6) of the Federal CSA, 21 U.S.C. §802(6). By the statute’s own terms, 

marijuana is listed as a Schedule I controlled substance, section 202(c) of the

Federal CSA, 21 U.S.C. §812(c), and the Federal CSA states that a Schedule I 

controlled substance is delineated as such when 

(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for 

abuse;

(B) The drug or other substance has no currently 

accepted medical use in treatment in the United States; 

[and]

(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or 

other substance under medical supervision.

Section 202(b)(1) of the Federal CSA, 21 U.S.C. §812(b)(1) (emphasis added). 

 The Federal CSA is expressly referenced in PHRA and PFEOA, and both 

statutes incorporate its provisions and prohibitions. The Federal CSA expressly 

includes marijuana on the list of drugs which are described as having no accepted 

medical use. In other words, Schedule I drugs are scheduled as such because Congress 

has determined that the drug has (1) a high potential for abuse, (2) no currently 

accepted medical use, and (3) a lack of accepted safety for the use of the drug under 

medical supervision. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005) (citing 21 U.S.C. 

§812(b)(1)) (“Schedule I drugs are categorized as such because of their high potential 

for abuse, lack of any accepted medical use, and absence of any accepted safety for use 

in medically supervised treatment.”)).

 Significantly, Congress also has delineated those controlled substances 

which it does recognize as having a currently accepted medical use in the United States. 

These are listed in Schedules II-V. Marijuana is not listed in Schedules II-V. In other 

words, Congress has determined that not only is marijuana listed as a prohibited 

Schedule I drug, it also chose not to include it on the list of those substances that it 

recognizes as having any accepted medical use.
10

Turning to Pennsylvania law, section 303(a) of the MMA provides 

generally that the use or possession of medical marijuana is lawful and states that 

“[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, use or possession of 

medical marijuana as set forth in [the MMA] is lawful within this 

Commonwealth.” 35 P.S. §10231.303(a) (emphasis added). Section 2101 of the 

MMA provides that the “possession and consumption of medical marijuana permitted 

under [the MMA] shall not be deemed to be a violation of the [Pennsylvania Drug Act]. 

If a provision of the [Pennsylvania Drug Act] relating to marijuana conflicts with a 

provision of [the MMA], this act shall take precedence.” 35 P.S. §10231.2101. 

However, section 304(a) of the MMA also provides an exclusion rendering the use of 

medical marijuana unlawful as follows: “[e]xcept as provided in section 303, section 

704, Chapter 19 or Chapter 20 [of the MMA], the use of medical marijuana is 

unlawful and shall, in addition to any other penalty provided by law, be deemed a 

violation of the [Pennsylvania Drug Act].” 35 P.S. §10231.304(a) (emphasis added).

As noted above, the MMA provides that employees cannot be 

discriminated against due to their status as certified users of medical marijuana, but 

does not require that an employer provide an accommodation therefor. Moreover, 

the MMA does not limit the employer’s right to discipline an employee for being under 

the influence of medical marijuana in the workplace or for conduct falling below 

standards of normal care while under the influence of medical marijuana. Section 

2103(b) of the MMA, provides, in full: 

(b) Employment.--

(1) No employer may discharge, threaten, refuse to hire or 

otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee

regarding an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, 

location or privileges solely on the basis of such employee’s 

status as an individual who is certified to use medical 

marijuana.
11

(2) Nothing in this act shall require an employer to make 

any accommodation of the use of medical marijuana on 

the property or premises of any place of employment. This 

act shall in no way limit an employer’s ability to discipline 

an employee for being under the influence of medical 

marijuana in the workplace or for working while under the 

influence of medical marijuana when the employee’s 

conduct falls below the standard of care normally 

accepted for that position.

(3) Nothing in this act shall require an employer to commit 

any act that would put the employer or any person acting on 

its behalf in violation of Federal law.

35 P.S. §10231.2103(b) (emphasis added). Thus, while an employer cannot 

discriminate on the basis of an employee’s status as a certified medical marijuana user, 

35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(1), an employer is not required “to make any 

accommodation for the use of medical marijuana on [its] property or [the] 

premises of any place of employment,” 35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(2), or commit any 

act that would put itself, or any one acting on its behalf, in violation of federal law. 

35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(3) (emphasis added).

 While there is a limited general provision in the MMA prohibiting 

discrimination against an employee due to his or her status as a certified user, there is 

no similar mention in the MMA regarding post-secondary students. The MMA only 

references the use of medical marijuana by pre-school, primary, and secondary students 

under section 2104 of the MMA to note that the Department of Education is to 

promulgate regulations therefor. Section 2104 of the MMA provides, in full, as 

follows:

The Department of Education shall promulgate regulations 

within 18 months of the effective date of this section 

regarding the following:
12

(1) Possession and use of medical marijuana by a 

student on the grounds of a preschool, primary 

school and a secondary school.

(2) Possession and use of medical marijuana by an 

employee of a preschool, primary school and a 

secondary school on the grounds of such school.

35 P.S. §10231.2104 (emphasis added). As can be seen by the above, section 2104 of 

the MMA only references pre-school, primary, and secondary students, but it does 

not contain a statement as to whether or not the use of medical marijuana is 

permitted by these students. Instead, the MMA required the Department of 

Education to promulgate regulations with respect to these students. As noted, our

research did not uncover any regulations which cite to 35 P.S. §10231.2104 or 

explicitly address the treatment of medical marijuana on school premises. Moreover, 

there is absolutely no reference to post-secondary students in the MMA whatsoever. 

Swope is a post-secondary student. While the legislature could have included language 

relating to post-secondary students in the MMA, it chose not to do so.

C. Analysis

We now assess whether HACC was required to provide a reasonable 

accommodation for Swope’s medical marijuana use. To determine whether the 

language in PHRA and PFEOA is overridden by the MMA, so as to require an 

exemption, we apply laws of statutory construction.

The purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the 

General Assembly’s intent and give it effect. 1 Pa.C.S. 

§1921(a). In discerning that intent, the court first resorts to 

the language of the statute itself. If the language of the 

statute clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative 

intent, it is the duty of the court to apply that intent to the 

case at hand and not look beyond the statutory language to 

ascertain its meaning. See 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(b) (“When the 

words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the 
13

letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of 

pursuing its spirit.”).

Mohamed v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 40 A.3d 1186, 

1193 (Pa. 2012). 

i. The Use of Medical Marijuana under the MMA

The PHRC’s argument that the legalization of medical marijuana in 

Pennsylvania via the MMA requires an accommodation for the use of medical 

marijuana under section 5(i)(1) of PHRA and section 4(a)(3) of PFEOA is unpersuasive 

for two reasons.8 First, even as to employers/employees, which is not the case at hand, 

8

Initially, we address HACC’s central contention that PHRA and PFEOA categorically 

preclude an individual who uses a controlled substance from having a “handicap or disability.” 

(HACC’s Br. at 9 (“[B]oth statutes explicitly exempt from their definitions of the term ‘disability’ 

any individual who is engaged in the ‘current, illegal use of . . . a controlled substance . . . .’”) 

(emphasis added)). However, the question as phrased by this Court in our September 11, 2019 order 

was as follows:

Whether the anti-discrimination provisions under Section 5(i)(1) of the 

[PHRA], as amended, 43 P.S. §955(i)(1) (prohibiting places of public 

accommodation from unlawfully discriminating against an individual 

because of a “disability”), and Section 4(a)(3) of the [PFEOA], as 

amended, 24 P.S. §5004(a)(3) (prohibiting institutions of higher learning 

from discriminating against “any student because of . . . [a] disability”), 

require accommodation of [Swope’s] lawful use of medical 

marijuana under [the MMA], in light of federal law prescribing that 

the use of marijuana is illegal.

(09/11/19 Order) (emphasis added). HACC’s statement of the issue conflates the question before us. 

The question is not whether Swope has a disability, it is clear that she does, Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder and Irritable Bowel Syndrome. The question is whether HACC must accommodate the 

disability by allowing the use of medical marijuana. The operative language defines the term 

“handicap or disability,” and specifies that the defined term “does not include current, illegal use of 

or addiction to a controlled substance,” as defined by the Federal CSA. Section 4(p.1) of PHRA, 43 

P.S. §954(p.1); Section 3(7) of the PFEOA, 24 P.S. §5003(7). Through this caveat, the General 

Assembly specified that the use of or addiction to a controlled substance does not constitute a 

handicap or disability, even if such use or addiction otherwise would fall within the definition. 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
14

the MMA only prohibits discrimination against an employee because of his or her

status as a certified user under section 2103(b)(1), 35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(1). While

employers are prohibited from discriminating or retaliating against individuals based 

on their status as certified users of medical marijuana, section 2103(b)(2) of the MMA

provides that employers are not required to provide an accommodation to employees

on their premises, nor are employers prohibited from disciplining employees who are 

under the influence of medical marijuana on work premises:

(2) Nothing in this act shall require an employer to make 

any accommodation of the use of medical marijuana on 

the property or premises of any place of employment. 

This act shall in no way limit an employer’s ability to 

discipline an employee for being under the influence of 

medical marijuana in the workplace or for working while 

under the influence of medical marijuana when the 

employee’s conduct falls below the standard of care 

normally accepted for that position.

35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(2) (emphasis added). Furthermore, section 2103(b)(3) of the 

MMA also provides that “[n]othing in this act shall require an employer to commit any 

act that would put the employer or any person acting on its behalf in violation of Federal 

law.” 35 P.S. §10231.2103(b)(3) (emphasis added). 

Furthermore, section 510(4) of the MMA notes that users of medical 

marijuana “may be prohibited by an employer from performing any duty which could 

result in a public health or safety risk while under the influence of medical marijuana” 

and such a “prohibition shall not be deemed an adverse employment decision even if 

the prohibition results in financial harm for the [medical marijuana] patient.” 35 P.S. 

§10231.510(4) (emphasis added). This provision would clearly apply to intensive care 

Consequently, an individual cannot, for instance, claim that a drug addiction constitutes a disability 

that requires accommodation.
15

unit nurses or other nurses who are under the influence of medical marijuana while on 

the job or in training. Here, Swope is not even an employee, but a student at a postsecondary institution. Even if she was an employee, HACC would apparently not be

required to provide an accommodation under these circumstances, as Swope is training 

to be a nurse, which implicates a potential public health or safety risk. 

Second, the MMA neither references PHRA nor PFEOA, nor provides 

any language that directly addresses the usage of medical marijuana by students. The 

MMA only instructs the Department of Education to promulgate regulations, which it 

did not do. See 35 P.S. §10231.2104. Where, as here, the General Assembly “expressly 

mentions one thing in a statute, we must assume that it intended to exclude all things 

omitted.” Bickerton v. Insurance Commissioner, 808 A.2d 971, 976 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2002). The legislature could have amended the language of PHRA and PFEOA to 

require accommodation of medical marijuana use, but chose not to do so. The 

legislature also could have included an anti-discrimination statement for postsecondary students within the MMA along the lines that it provided for employees, but 

it chose not to do so. “[U]nder the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 

the express mention of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of others not 

mentioned.” West Penn Allegheny Health System v. Medical Care Availability and

Reduction of Error Fund, 11 A.3d 598, 605-06 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). 

Ultimately, the above choices reflect policy judgments that belong to the 

legislature, not the courts. When the language of a statute is clear, we apply the words 

of the statute as written. Failing to do so would result in this Court wrongfully 

obtruding upon the province of the General Assembly to draft statutes according to 

whatever policies it deems important. Again, the MMA provides no protections for 
16

post-secondary students.

9

 Moreover, the General Assembly did not amend or 

otherwise alter PHRA and PFEOA provisions that exclude users of medical marijuana

from their definitions of disability.

10

 Hence, we are unable to do so.

9

In fact, an earlier version of the MMA prohibited schools from refusing to enroll or otherwise 

penalize a medical marijuana patient solely for having a medical marijuana access card or using 

medical marijuana in accordance with the MMA. See S.B. 3, 199 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2015-

2016 (Pa. 2015), available at https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txt

Type=PDF&sessYr=2015&sessInd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billNbr=0003&pn=0840 (last 

visited October 28, 2020). However, these student protections were not included in the version of the 

MMA that was enacted into law.

10 HACC also argues that PHRA and the ADA should be interpreted in a co-extensive manner 

and that adopting the PHRC’s interpretation of the disability exclusion for illegal drug users would 

place the two statutes in conflict. Generally, PHRA and the ADA are interpreted in a co-extensive 

manner because both laws deal with similar subject matter and are grounded on similar legislative 

goals. Imler v. Hollidaysburg American Legion Ambulance Service, 731 A.2d 169, 173-74 (Pa. 

Super. 1999); see also Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). However, in 

interpreting PHRA, Pennsylvania courts are not bound by federal court decisions interpreting the 

ADA. Canteen Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 814 A.2d 805, 811-12 n.5 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2003); Imler, 731 A.2d at 174. Yet, in a case of first impression, it may be appropriate to 

look to federal decisions involving similar federal statutes for guidance. Canteen Corp., 814 A.2d at 

812 n.5.

Like PHRA, section 511 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §12210, excludes illegal drug users from the 

term “individual with a disability” when “the covered entity acts on the basis of such use,” and defines 

“illegal use of drugs” as the “use of drugs which is unlawful under the [CSA.]” Id. PHRA uses 

different language, but accomplishes similar ends. See 43 P.S. §954(p.1) (excluding “current, illegal 

use of or addiction to a controlled substance” from the definition of “handicap or disability”). As

pointed out by HACC, in James v. City of Costa Mesa, 700 F.3d 394 (9th Cir. 2012), the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that medical marijuana use, which was permitted under 

the law of Washington State but prohibited by federal law, qualified as an illegal use of drugs for 

purposes of the ADA and, therefore, that the plaintiff’s use of medical marijuana brought him within 

the ADA’s illegal drug exclusion. Id. at 405. However, HACC has not cited to any United States 

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decisions, or any other federal court decisions, which 

interpreted the Pennsylvania MMA as it relates to the ADA. Moreover, unlike the federal ADA, 

PHRA is a Pennsylvania law, which the General Assembly has the authority to amend. Thus, 

although we ultimately find in HACC’s favor and conclude that the MMA did not amend PHRA,

because we are not bound by federal decisions interpreting the ADA, there are no federal decisions 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
17

ii. The MMA Does Not Amend PHRA or PFEOA

Notwithstanding the absence of any statutory provision requiring 

accommodation of students’ use of medical marijuana, the PHRC contends that the 

MMA modified both PHRA and PFEOA to require that educational institutions 

accommodate medical marijuana use. In particular, the PHRC argues that medical 

marijuana use is no longer considered illegal drug use under either PHRA or PFEOA 

because section 303(a) of the MMA expressly provides that “[n]otwithstanding any 

provision of law to the contrary, use or possession of medical marijuana as set forth in 

this act is lawful,” 35 P.S. §10231.303(a). However, this argument is not persuasive 

as it is contrary to basic statutory construction precepts.

First, neither section 303 of the MMA, nor any other provision in that law, 

mention PHRA or PFEOA. Except when a statute purports to be a revision of all 

statutes upon a particular subject or to establish a uniform and mandatory system 

covering a class of subjects, “a later statute shall not be construed to supply or repeal 

an earlier statute unless the two statutes are irreconcilable.” Section 1971 of the 

Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §1971. Thus, “there is a very strong 

presumption that a statute does not impliedly repeal another statute.” Borough of 

Emmaus v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 156 A.3d 384, 398 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2017); see also In re Delinquent Tax Sale, 477 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) 

(noting that “implied repeals are not favored by the law”); City of Pittsburgh v. 

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 284 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971) 

(concluding “there is a presumption against implied repeal”). “The question of whether 

a statute has been impliedly repealed by a later statute is exclusively a question of 

interpreting the MMA, and the General Assembly possesses the authority to amend or repeal the 

disability exclusions for marijuana users present in PHRA, we place little to no weight on either the 

language of the ADA, or federal cases interpreting it, in our overall analysis of this matter. 
18

legislative intent.” HSP Gaming, L.P. v. City of Philadelphia, 954 A.2d 1156, 1175 

(Pa. 2008). Because repeals by implication are not favored, they “will not be implied 

unless there be an irreconcilable conflict between statutes embracing the same subject 

matter.” Id. Moreover, since implied repeals are not favored, “legislative intent to 

repeal a statute by enacting another must be clearly shown.” Id.

Here, because the MMA is not irreconcilable with any provision of PHRA

or PFEOA, we decline to conclude that the MMA impliedly repealed any portion of 

those statutes. Although the MMA provides that medical marijuana use is lawful in 

Pennsylvania, given the silence in the MMA with respect to PHRA and PFEOA and 

the absence of any specific protection for students, there is no reason to infer that the 

General Assembly intended to require educational institutions to accommodate a 

student’s use of medical marijuana. Moreover, the MMA is not irreconcilable with 

either PHRA or PFEOA due to the different objectives of the statutes. The purpose of 

PHRA and PFEOA is to remedy various types of discrimination, as opposed to the 

MMA, which legalized medical marijuana. The absence of a statutory provision 

requiring post-secondary educational institutions to accommodate medical marijuana 

usage, however, does not negate or frustrate the MMA’s overall intent of making 

medical marijuana lawful in Pennsylvania.

In Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 

2008), the California Supreme Court reached a similar result. Prior to legalizing 

recreational marijuana, California voters approved a 1996 initiative that gave users of 

medical marijuana a defense to certain state criminal charges involving the drug. Id. 

at 202. After the plaintiff was discharged by his employer for medical marijuana use, 

he brought a lawsuit against his employer under California’s anti-disability 

discrimination law. Id. Like PHRA, California’s anti-discrimination law did not 

require employers to accommodate the use of illegal drugs. Id. at 204-05. The 

California Supreme Court determined that although California voters had decided to 
19

legalize medical marijuana for certain uses, there was nothing in California’s medical 

marijuana law to suggest that California voters intended the law to require employers 

to accommodate employees’ medical marijuana use under California’s antidiscrimination law. Id. at 205-07. The absence of any statutory provision requiring 

accommodation of medical marijuana usage by students renders the circumstance 

analogous to that at issue in Ross. That is, there is nothing in the MMA suggesting that 

the General Assembly intended to require educational institutions to accommodate 

students’ usage of medical marijuana under PHRA or PFEOA.

Our conclusion is bolstered by the MMA’s reference to other statutes. The 

MMA references the Pennsylvania Drug Act in section 304(a), and section 2101, 35 

P.S. §§10231.304(a), 10231.2101. The fact that the MMA explicitly amended the 

Pennsylvania Drug Act, but did not specifically amend either PHRA or PFEOA, can 

only be interpreted as meaning the General Assembly did not intend to amend either 

PHRA or PFEOA. Moreover, the MMA explains that it is “the intention of the General 

Assembly that any Commonwealth-based program to provide access to medical 

marijuana serve as a temporary measure, pending Federal approval of and access 

to medical marijuana through traditional medical and pharmaceutical avenues.” 

35 P.S. §10231.102(4) (emphasis added). Because the General Assembly intended that 

the program be temporary pending Federal approval, it is clear that the legislature 

recognized the Federal CSA, and any other federal prohibition against the use of 

medical marijuana. Importantly, “it is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a 

statute, a requirement which the legislature did not see fit to include.” Commonwealth 

v. Rieck Investment Corp., 213 A.2d 277, 282 (Pa. 1965). The General Assembly could 

have explicitly amended PHRA and PFEOA, but it did not, and we are unable to 

presume that it intended to amend those laws by implication.
20

iii. The PHRC’s Interpretation of PHRA is Not 

Entitled to Deference.

The PHRC also argues that because PHRA mandates that the act should 

be construed liberally, we should adopt the PHRC’s interpretation with respect to the 

accommodation of medical marijuana use. We note that section 12 of PHRA states 

that the provisions of PHRA “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of 

purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent with any provisions hereof shall not apply.” 

43 P.S. §962; see Chestnut Hill College v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,

158 A.3d 251, 258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (observing that PHRA should be construed 

liberally to accomplish its purposes). However, as our Supreme Court has held, the 

liberal construction mandate of PHRA only requires that we “adopt a construction 

which, without doing violence to the language of the statute, best promotes the goal of 

equal employment.” Winn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 484 A.2d 392, 398 (Pa. 1984)

(emphasis added). Moreover, it is not PHRA or any particular interpretation thereof 

that commands our conclusion here. Rather, it is the MMA, or, more specifically, the 

absence of any provision in the MMA providing the sort of mandate that the PHRC

seeks, that drives our holding. As stated above, our conclusion is based firmly on the 

ground that the MMA does not require the accommodation of medical marijuana on an 

employer’s premises, nor does the same provision of the MMA apply to or even 

mention post-secondary students. Further, the legislature included a specific provision 

that addressed discrimination due to the use of medical marijuana and stated that an 

employer does not have to accommodate its use or possession on the premises or where 

public safety would be risked. See 35 P.S. §§10231.2103(b), 10231.510(4). As a 

result, HACC cannot be required under the MMA to accommodate the use of a drug 

that is proscribed by PHRA and PFEOA, via adoption of the Federal CSA, to treat a 

disability. Therefore, although PHRA should be construed liberally, because the 

PHRC’s proposed, liberal construction of PHRA would require us to effectively rewrite 
21

the MMA to include protections and provisions that the General Assembly did not see 

fit to include, we are unable to adopt the PHRC’s preferred interpretation of the 

statutory scheme. 

Additionally, the PHRC argues that we should defer to its interpretation 

of PHRA and PFEOA because it is the administrative agency tasked with enforcing

those statutes. In general, “[w]hen considering an agency’s interpretation of a statute 

that it is charged with implementing and enforcing, we afford substantial deference to 

that interpretation.” Office of Administration v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 

916 A.2d 541, 550 n.11 (Pa. 2007); see Winslow-Quattlebaum v. Maryland Insurance

Group, 752 A.2d 878, 881 (Pa. 2000) (“It is well settled that when the courts of this 

Commonwealth are faced with interpreting statutory language, they afford great 

deference to the interpretation rendered by the administrative agency overseeing the 

implementation of such legislation.”). 

However, “[w]hen an administrative agency’s interpretation . . . is 

inconsistent with the statute itself, or when the statute’s meaning is unambiguous, such 

an administrative interpretation carries little weight.” Office of Administration, 916 

A.2d at 550 n.11. Consequently, “[w]e must give deference to the interpretation of the 

legislative intent of a statute made by an administrative agency only where the language 

of that statute is not explicit or ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous or unclear if its 

language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations.” Bethenergy Mines Inc. 

v. Department of Environmental Protection, 676 A.2d 711, 715 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)

(citation omitted); see also Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 

Pa.C.S. §1921 (providing that “[w]hen the words of [a] statute are not explicit, the 

intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other 

matters[,] . . . administrative interpretations of such statute” (emphasis added)); 

Velocity Express v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 853 A.2d 1182, 1185 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (holding that courts “need not give deference to any agency when 
22

its construction frustrates legislative intent” and, therefore, although “courts often defer 

to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes it administers, where . . . the meaning of a 

statute is a question of law for the court” and when the court is “convinced that the 

agency’s interpretation is unwise or erroneous, that deference is unwarranted”).

First, we observe that although the PHRC’s interpretation of PHRA and 

PFEOA may be entitled to deference where those statutes are ambiguous, because the

PHRC is responsible for implementing and enforcing them, we note that PHRA and 

PFEOA are not ambiguous and moreover, the PHRC is not responsible for 

implementing or enforcing the MMA; thus, its interpretation of that statute should not 

be afforded any weight. Second, even if the statutes were otherwise determined to be 

ambiguous, to the extent that the PHRC is entitled to deference, we note that both 

statutes exclude disability discrimination protections for current users of illegal 

controlled substances with regard to their use of illegal substances. This is in accord 

with the legislature’s decision to look to the definition of controlled substances as 

defined by the Federal CSA, which deems marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance 

without any accepted medical use. See Section 4(p.1) of PHRA, 43 P.S. §954(p.1); 

Section 3(7) of PFEOA, 24 P.S. §5003(7). Moreover, as discussed previously, based 

on its plain language and structure, the MMA did not amend or repeal the disability 

exclusions of section 4(p.1) of PHRA or section 3(7) of PFEOA. Hence, even if PHRA

or PFEOA were ambiguous, we would afford the PHRC no deference because its 

construction of the statute frustrates legislative intent. As we have explained in detail

above, the legislature, in the face of the MMA, chose not to amend PHRA or PFEOA. 

This abstention on behalf of the legislature evinces its intent that current users of illegal 

drugs not be subject to protection with regard to their illegal use of drugs. Of course, 

“[t]he cardinal rule of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 

of the Legislature.” O’Rourke v. Department of Corrections, 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa. 

2001).
23

Finally, we address our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Gass v. 52nd 

Judicial District, Lebanon County, 232 A.3d 706 (Pa. 2020), in which a local judicial 

district implemented a probation policy that prohibited individuals under court 

supervision from using medical marijuana. Id. at 707. Specifically, the policy 

prohibited “the active use of medical marijuana, regardless of whether the defendant 

has a medical marijuana card, while the defendant is under supervision by the [local 

probation department.]” Id. at 708. The policy stated that “[s]ince medical marijuana 

use (medical or recreational) is . . . illegal under [f]ederal law, and the [local judicial 

district] and the [local probation department] should not knowingly allow violations of 

law to occur, the prohibition against such use is required.” Id. at 708-09. In other words, 

in contravention of the MMA, the local judicial district incorporated the Federal CSA 

despite that the General Assembly had not done so.

 The Court framed the question before it as “whether the [p]olicy violates 

the immunity provision of the MMA.” Gass, 232 A.3d at 711. The immunity provision 

of the MMA provides that an individual 

shall [not] be subject to arrest, prosecution or penalty in 

any manner, or denied any right or privilege, including 

civil penalty or disciplinary action by a Commonwealth 

licensing board or commission, solely for lawful use of 

medical marijuana or manufacture or sale or dispensing 

of medical marijuana, or for any other action taken in 

accordance with this act . . . .

35 P.S. §10231.2103(a) (emphasis added). See Gass, 232 A.3d at 708. The Court in 

Gass ultimately concluded that a local policy cannot usurp a state law simply by 

reference to a federal law. 

The Supreme Court concluded that while the local policy pointed to the 

Federal CSA, “the core principle of federalism recognizing dual sovereignty between 

the tiers of government . . . [and that in] enacting the MMA, the Pennsylvania 

Legislature proceeded pursuant to its independent power to define state criminal law 
24

and promote the health and welfare of the citizenry.” Gass, 232 A.3d at 714. 

Furthermore, the Court explained that 

[w]hile the circumstances are certainly uneasy – since 

possession and use of medical marijuana remains a 

federal crime – we find that the [local judicial district] 

cannot require state-level adherence to the federal 

prohibition, where the General Assembly has specifically 

undertaken to legalize the use of medical marijuana for 

enumerated therapeutic purposes.

Id. (emphasis added). “Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the 

principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty 

the other is bound to respect.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012).

 The instant matter is distinguishable because the General Assembly chose 

not to require employers to accommodate an employee’s, let alone a post-secondary 

student’s, usage of medical marijuana under the MMA, PHRA, or PFEOA, which are 

state legislative enactments. This is because the General Assembly specifically 

incorporated the Federal CSA into PHRA and PFEOA. Specifically, “(3) being 

regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does not include current, illegal 

use of or addiction to a controlled substance, as defined in section 102 of the [Federal 

CSA] (Public Law 91-513, 21 U.S.C. §802),” 43 P.S. §954(p.1), and “(iii) being 

regarded as having such an impairment, but does not include current, illegal use of or 

addiction to a controlled substance, as defined in section 102 of the [Federal CSA] 

(Public Law 91-513, [21 U.S.C. §802]).” 24 P.S. §5003(7). Contrary to the Gass case, 

here the General Assembly exercised its law making authority to include a provision 

in PHRA and PFEOA to require compliance with the Federal CSA. After enacting the 

MMA, the legislature chose not to remove those restrictions from PHRA or PFEOA. 

The General Assembly has clearly spoken and the language in PHRA and PFEOA 

reflect the General Assembly’s intent.
25

Conclusion

The MMA does not provide any requirements for accommodations of postsecondary students who use medical marijuana for a disability. Moreover, the General 

Assembly chose not to amend PHRA or PFEOA after passage of the MMA to otherwise 

remove the applicability of the Federal CSA, which prohibits the use of Schedule I 

drugs, including medical marijuana. For these reasons, HACC, an educational 

institution, was not required to provide Swope a reasonable accommodation for her use 

of medical marijuana. Thus, we must conclude that Swope’s claim was legally 

insufficient and the PHRC erred in denying HACC’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, 

we reverse the PHRC’s interlocutory order and remand the instant matter to the PHRC 

to grant HACC’s motion to dismiss consistent with this opinion. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Harrisburg Area Community College, :

Petitioner :

: No. 654 C.D. 2019

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Human Relations :

Commission, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 29th day of October, 2020, the March 26, 2019 

interlocutory order of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) is 

REVERSED, and the instant matter is REMANDED to the PHRC to GRANT 

Harrisburg Area Community College’s motion to dismiss consistent with this 

opinion. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Harrisburg Area Community College, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Human Relations :

Commission, : No. 654 C.D. 2019

Respondent : Argued: May 11, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

CONCURRING OPINION

BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: October 29, 2020 

While I agree with the Majority that we are bound by statute to reverse 

the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s interlocutory order, I write 

separately to urge the General Assembly to amend the Pennsylvania Human 

Relations Act (PHRA)1and the Pennsylvania Fair Educational Opportunities Act

(PFEOA)2so the benefits the General Assembly created in the Pennsylvania Medical 

Marijuana Act (MMA)3for the citizens of this Commonwealth are not illusory or 

applicable in only limited circumstances; thereby, creating an egregious result as is 

demonstrated in the instant case. 

When the General Assembly enacted the MMA, it declared in Section 

102 thereof:

(1) Scientific evidence suggests that medical marijuana is 

one potential therapy that may mitigate suffering in some 

patients and also enhance quality of life.

1 Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.

2 Act of July 17, 1961, P.L. 776, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 5001-5010.

3 Act of April 17, 2016, P.L. 84, 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110.
AEC - 2

(2) The Commonwealth is committed to patient safety. 

Carefully regulating the program which allows access to 

medical marijuana will enhance patient safety while 

research into its effectiveness continues.

(3) It is the intent of the General Assembly to:

(i) Provide a program of access to medical marijuana

which balances the need of patients to have access to the 

latest treatments with the need to promote patient safety.

(ii) Provide a safe and effective method of delivery of 

medical marijuana to patients.

(iii) Promote high quality research into the effectiveness 

and utility of medical marijuana.

35 P.S. § 10231.102 (emphasis added).

As a co-equal branch of government, this Court has no authority to fulfill

the General Assembly’s intent as set forth in the MMA of providing access to 

medical marijuana to those individuals whose physicians have prescribed it, while 

simultaneously enforcing the protections and rights the General Assembly created in 

the PHRA and the PFEOA. Due to the General Assembly’s failure to revise the 

PHRA and the PFEOA to reflect the MMA’s intent, an individual otherwise granted 

access to medical marijuana under the MMA loses all protections and rights of the 

PHRA and the PFEOA. In order for Pennsylvania citizens to have access to medical 

marijuana while receiving the protections and rights of the PHRA and the PFEOA, 

the General Assembly must amend the PHRA and the PFEOA to remove the “as 

defined in Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (Public Law 91-513, 21 

U.S.C. § 802)” restriction from its description of illegal use of a controlled substance. 

See Section 4(p.1) of the PHRA, 43 P.S. § 954(p.1); Section 3(7) of the PFEOA, 24 

P.S. § 5003(7). 

The conflict among these statutes has created an absurd result in 

requiring Pennsylvania citizens to choose the benefits of medical marijuana or the 
AEC - 3

protections of the PHRA and the PFEOA. This quagmire for individuals whose 

physicians have prescribed medical marijuana for their use as authorized by the 

MMA, but who are then precluded from using the same because of the risk to their 

employment and education since such use is still illegal under the PHRA and the 

PFEOA, and other Pennsylvania law, is an untenable position. “Nevertheless, 

‘[w]here the language of the governing statute is clear (or clear enough), . . . the 

solution is legislative – and not judicial – adjustment.’” Gass v. 52nd Judicial 

District, Lebanon County, 232 A.3d 706, 715 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Williams v. City of 

Phila., 188 A.3d 421, 436 (Pa. 2018)).

For these reasons, the General Assembly is, therefore, strongly 

encouraged to revise all affected areas of the law to accurately reflect its declaration 

of intent set forth in the MMA to permit Pennsylvania citizens access to medical 

marijuana to mitigate suffering and enhance their quality of life.

__________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge