### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 15, 200 4 S es sio n

ROCKY GARNER v . PHIL BREEDEN a nd ASSO CIATE S, ET AL


### .

Ap pe a l f ro m th e Chanc e ry

Cou rt fo r D a vid so n Co un ty No. 99-1966-II

Carol McCoy , Chance llor

No. M2002-03103-COA- R3-CV - F iled Augu st 24, 2004

Appellant su ed Ap p el l ee for br eac h of contra ct or in the a lternative f or quantum meruit value of service s rende red. A t the conc l u s i o n of Plaintiff’s proof the trial court sustained a motion for a direc ted ver dict on b eh al f o f Defendant a s to the quantum meruit claim and f urther sustaine d that motion on a larg e portion of the contra ct claim. As to r emaining portions of the contra ct claim the
mot ion fo r a

dir e c te d v e rd ic t w a s o ve rr ule d, a ndPla int if

f v olu nta ri ly dis mis se d the re ma ini ng c la ims without prejudice. We hold that the trial court erre d in gr anting the motion for a dire cted ve rdict as to the contra ct ca se but corr ectly g rante d a directed verdict as to quantum m eruit. The judg ment of the tr ia l c ou rt

is a ff ir me d in pa

rt , r e ve rs e d inpa

rt a ndre ma nd e d f

or tr ia l onthe c on tr a c t is su e s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art, and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which P A T R IC IA J . C O T T RE LL and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

J ames D. R. Roberts a nd J anet L . L ay man, Nashville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Rocky

Garner.

J ohn E. Quinn and Douglas B. J anney , I I I
, Nashville, Tennessee, f or the a ppellee, Phil Br eede n and As so c ia te s, a

so le pr op ri e tor sh ip, a ndPhi l B re e de n, a n in div idu a l.

OP IN ION

Roc ky Ga rn e r i s an ins ur a nc e a dju ste r an d Phil B re e de n o wn s a so le -p ro prie tor sh ip p ub lic ins ur a nc e a dju ste r b us ine ss kno wn a s Phi l B re e de n a nd As so c ia te s. I n the su mme r o f 1 99 8, the se pa rt ie s ma de a

c on tr a c tua l arr a ng e me nt un de r wh ic h Ga rn e r wa s to pe rf

orm se rv ic e s f

or B re e de n in the pre paration and submissi on of loss claims to insurance companies. His work was to be done on a per centa g e of commissi on basis which commis sion would be pay able by the insuranc e compa ny up on app ro va l a nd pay men t of the c la im w ith the e nti re ins ur a nc e c omp a ny c omm iss ionc he c k to-2-

be paid to Phil B ree den and Associates. The first question to be answe red in the case is ex actly what the c on tr a c t be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s w a s.

Ga rn e r a lle g e s in his c omp la int :

5. Mr . G arn e r h a s w or ke d a s a n in su ranc e a dju ste r f or ov e r f if te e n y e ars

. He is a me mbe r o f theAm e ri c a n So c ie ty of Pr of e ssi on a l E sti ma tor s. 6. PBA is a public insura nce a djuster. PBA, t h ro u g h its insurance adjuster e m p l o y ee s , (1) locates entities which have sustained a loss cove red by insurance cover ag e, (2) enter s into c ontrac ts w ith suc h entities - - which ar e PBA ’s clients - - to a ssist t hose entities i n securing the best payment possible from the ins ur a nc e c ompan y reg ard ing the c lie nt’ s c ov e re d lo sse s, (3 ) n e g oti a te s th e be st pa y me nt po ssi ble fr om the ins ur a nc e c omp a ny re g ard ing the c lie nt’ s c ov e re d lo sse s,

a nd(4 ) rec e ive s a

c omm iss ion fr om i ts c lie nts wh ic h is pa id f ro m th e pa y me nts PB A’ s c lie nts re c e ive fr om t he ins ur a nc e c omp a nie s. PB A pa y s a c omm iss ionto i ts insurance adjuster who w orks on the spec ific client matter

. 7. PBA employ ed Mr. Garner a s an insuranc e adjuster in the summer of 1998 via a ve rbal e mploy ment ag ree ment (the “ Employ ment Ag ree ment”). 8. The orig inal compensation arra ng ement under the Employ m ent Ag re e me nt w a s f

or PB A t o p a y

Mr . G arner

fi ft e e n p e rc e nt ( 15 %) of the a mou nts

rec eived by

PBA re g arding the spec ific client matters on which Mr. Ga rner worke d. 9. I n November 1998, Mr. Bree den, on behalf of P BA
, and Mr. Garne r ag ree d that commencing in November 1998, PBA would pay Mr. Garner twe nty -five [percent] (25%) of

the amounts rec eived by PBA re g arding the spec ific client
contra cts on which Mr. G arne r worke d. 10. PBA terminated M r. Garner on Fe bruary 26, 1999, with commissions still owed to Mr. Garner by PBA reg arding various matters. Mr. Bree den sent Mr. Ga r ner alet terto effect th at t erm in ati on in whi ch M r. Bree den adm it ted th at P BA owed c ommissi ons to Mr. Garne r “ba s ed o n the useful a mount of work done on a

c lie nt f ile a ndthe de g re e of c omp le tio n su c h wo rk wo uldre pr e se nt. ” Th a t le tte r a lso reque sted ce rtain information which Mr. Garner pr ovid ed to PBA soon af ter the reque st was made. 11. Notwiths t an d i n g repe ated r equests madeby or on beha lf of Mr. Garner that PBA pay Mr. Garner the commissions amounts owed to him, P BAhas still not paid Mr. Garner the amounts owed to him under his Employ ment Ag ree ment with PBA which Mr . Br eede n has ac knowl ed ged an d admitted are owed to Mr. Garner. 12. Even thoug h PBA a g reed to increa se Mr. Ga rner ’s compensation effect iv e Nov emb er 19 98 to tw ent y -fi ve perc ent (25 %) o f am ou nt s re cei ved byP BA from client matter s on which Mr. Ga rner worke d, PBA c ontinuing to pay Mr. Garner

on lyfi f tee n p ercen t ( 15 %) regard in g certai n cl ien t p ay men ts recei ved byP BA betwee n November

1998 and F ebrua

ry 26, 1999.-3- 13. I n addition, PB A has not paid Mr

. Garner anything at all for m any client matters on wh i ch Mr. Garne r per formed the insurance adjuster wor k even though PBA has r ece ived payments from many such clients. Notwithstanding repe ated attempts made by or o n b eh al f o f Mr. Garner , PBA ha s still not paid the

c omm iss ion s o we d to Mr . G arn e r d ue to P B A’ s r e c e ipt of tho se pay me nts

.

The answe r filed by Phil B ree den and A ssociates is essentially a complete denial of c ontrac t

arr ang ements and a n assertion that Garne r was an employ ee at-will of B ree den and A ssociates. At the outset we must be c og nizant of certa in elementary rules of c ontrac t const ru ct ion which ar e controlling in this case.

The supre me court has rec ently held:

I f a c ontrac t is plain and unambiguous, t he mea ning the reof is a question of la w, a ndit is the Cou rt ’s fu nc tio n to int e rp re t th e c on tr a c t a s w ri tte n a c c or din g to i ts plain terms. Se e Ha mb le n Co un ty v . Ci ty of M or ris tow n , 656 S.W .2d 331, 335-36 (T e nn . 1 98 3) ; Petty v . Sloan , 1 97 Te nn . 6 30 , 2 77 S.W.2d35 5, 35 8 ( 19 55 ). Th is determination of the intention of the parties is g ener ally treated as a question of law beca use the wor ds of the contr ac t ar e def inite and undisputed, and in dec iding the leg al ef fe ct o f t he wor ds, there is no g enuine f actua l issue left for a

jury to decide. Pla n t er s Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & W arehouse Co. , 78 S.W .3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 20 02 ). Ho we ve r, wh e re the writi ng is not plain andun a mbi g uo us a ndis s uc h a s to require the aid of [parol] evidenc e and the [parol] evidenc e is conflicting or may lead to more than one conclusion, the doubtful parts may be submitted to the fac t-finder for resolution. Barker v . Freeland , 91 Te nn . 112 , 18 S.W. 6 0, 61 (1 89 2) ; Forde v. Fisk Univ. , 661 S.W .2d 883, 886 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983).

Bratton v. Bratton , 136 S.W . 3d, 595, 601-2 (Te nn. 2004).

The rules g overning case s such as the prese nt c ontrac t dispute wer e articu l at ed b yt he supreme c ourt in Hibernia Bank & Trust C o. v. Boy d , 48 S.W .2d 1084 (Tenn. 1932)

.

I t is a well-est ab l i s h ed rule that the pr oper c onstruction or interpr etation of

a writt e n in str

ume nt, us ua lly

a qu e sti on of

la w f or jud g e or c ha nc e llo r, ma y

be c ome a mix ed question of law and fa ct to be submitted to a jury . We quote from the opinion of Lurton, J ., in Barker v . Freeland , 91 Tenn. 112, 116, 18 S.W. 60, 61:

I t is a n in dis pu ta

ble pro po si ti on that w he n a c on tr a c t is in writing , and its’ m eaning is plain and unambig uous, its int erpr etation is matter of law for the c ourt; b u t wh en the writing is not plain and

un a m b i g u o u s , b u t i s s u c h a s r e q u i r e s t h e a i d o f e v i d e n c e , e i t h e r to identify the subject-matter, or in orde r to asce rtain the situation and

su rr ou nd ing c ir c ums ta nc e s, or the natur e a ndqu a lit y

of the su bje c tmatter, a nd the evidenc e be c onflicting , or such a s ad m i ts of more-4- than one c onclusion, it is not err or to submit the i nterpre tation of the d o u b t f u l p ar t s o f t h e i n s tru m e n t , u n d e r

p r o p e r i n s tru c t i o n s , t o t h e j u r y. Thomp. Trials, § 1081, and c ases ther e cited. Th e a u th o r it ie s e ls e w h e r e u n if o r ml y s u p p o r t th is h o ld in g o f

o u r c o u r t. Se e 23 Am

. & En g

. En c y

. L a w (2 d Ed .) 55 5, 55 6; 6 Rul ing Ca se L a w, 86 2 (C on tr act s, § 2 49 ); 13 Cor

pu s Jur is, 78 5, 78 6 ( Con tr a c ts, § 9 97 ); Keyser v . Kemper , 157 Md. 437, 146 A. 275, 65 A.L .R. 641, and annotation beg inning at pag e 648. The text of Ruli ng Case L aw, a bove cited, states the g ener al rule: “It may be said, there fore
, t h at wh er e a contr act is to be c onstrued by its terms alone, it is the duty of the c ourt to interpre t it; but wher e its meaning is obscure, and its construction depends upon othe r and e x trinsic fac ts in con n ection with what is written, the question of interpre tation should be submitt ed to the jury
, under proper instruc tions.” The text of Corpus J uris, supra, is in acc ord: “Where the terms of a contra ct

are ambig uous and t heir meaning is to be determined fr om ext rinsic evidenc e which is conflicting , a question is prese nted for the jury or, as it is often stated, a question of mix ed law and fac t a

rises wher e the construction of a written contra ct depends on extrinsi c fa cts as to which ther e is a dispute. I n such a c ase the fac ts may be found by a specia l ve rdict, and the court may then interpre t the writing in the light of suc h finding . But a ccor ding to the u s u al p rac tice it is considere d a prope r ca se for a hypothetical cha

rg e in which the jury

should be told what would be the true construction of the instrument on the differ ent states of f act whic h might be f

ound by them, an d they

are then bound to take the pa rticular c onstruction applicable to the state of f act whic h they

find.” I t is the usual prac tice in t his state t o submit to a jury in an equity case mix ed questions o f

la w a n d f

a c t, w ith p r o p e r

in s tr u c ti o n s f r o m th e c h a n c e ll o r

o n th e la w applicable t o hypothetical stateme nts of fac ts which the evide nce te nds to prove. Mc El y a v . H ill , 1 05 Te nn . 3 19 , 5 9 S. W. 1 02 5, a ndc a se s th e re in c ite d; Crisman v. McM urray , 107 Tenn. 469, 64 S.W. 711.

Boyd , 48 S.W .2d at 1086-1087.

I t would defy

rational imag ination to say that the contra ctual ar rang ements betwe en Ga

rner and B ree den ar e cle ar and unambig uous. The written part of the c ontrac t fi l ed as Ex hibit 1 in t he pr oo f c on sis ts o f h a ndwritt e n n ote s b y Phi l B reeden. Abo ut a ll that c a n b e de c iph e re d f ro m th is instrument without the assis tance of parol evidenc e is that as of the date the doc ument was written Ga rn e r w a s to re c e ive a

15 % s ha re of the g ro ss fe e s on c e rt a in a c tiv e fi le s o f B re e de n a ndAs so c ia te s, those being J ames B arry , Charlene J ones, John Reeve s, Dr. S pora, Patsy Stann, Stevens, and Ac uff, with Garne r’s total fe e on the Jones, Ba rry and Ree ves adjustments totaling $8,505.

Whatever the details of the c ontrac tual arr ang ement turn out to be as a matter of fa ct, we a re

certain that Garner was m ore than an at-will employ ee of Br eede n. Garner alleg ed in hi s complaint
a contr actua l ag ree ment with Mr. Br eede n. When Mr. Br ee d en wa s called a s the first witness for-5-

Plaintiff he conf

irmed the c ontrac tual ag ree ment and the ba sis upon which payment to Mr. Garner was to be ma de.

Q. No w, y ou r atto rn ey wri te s in thi s le tte r, “ Mr . B re e de n’ s p os iti on is that th e re is no thi ng ow e d to Mr . G arn e r u nti l a c la im i s f ina lly se ttl e d a ndthe n o nly to the extent that Mr. Garne r adde d value to the c laim.” A. Ye s. Q. Do y ou a g re e wi th that st a te me nt? A. Ye s. Q. On May

22nd, 1999, did y ou believe that, that Mr. Garner w as entitled to money only to the extent of the value of the claim that he f iled? A. Ye s. Q. Be tween Ma

rch 22nd and May

20th, did y ou pay

Mr. Garner any money at all on any

claim whatsoe ver? A. No. Q. Fr om May

20th, 1999 to this morning , have y ou ever paid Mr. Ga

rner

a ny mon e y a t a ll o n a ny

c la im? A. No. Q. Ha ve y ou e ve r s a t do wn a nd re vie we d all of tho se fi le s, the 22 fi le s, have y ou ever sat down and revie wed those f iles thoroug hly

to determine the work that Mr. Garner did for

y ou? A. Ye s. Q. Whe n d id y ou do that? A. F ro m F e br

ua ry 18 th, ‘9 9 th ro ug h th e pr e se nt, ma ny tim e s, nu me ro us tim e s. Q. Yo ur

te sti mon y

tod a y is i n a ll that, y ou ne ve r f

ou nd on e do lla

r’ s w orth of work that Mr. Garner is entitled to? A

. N o , t h a t ’ s n o tm y t e s t i m o n y. Q. I wa nt t o h e ar y ou te ll m e wh a t y ou r t e sti mon y is. A. We attempted to - - in the dismiss al meeting , it was my desire to ha ve

an o p e n me e ti n g w ith M r

. G ar n e r , r e v ie w th e f il e s , lo o k a t th e d o c u me n tati o n that

was at his hand that he produc ed.

Hi m a ndI

a g re e on wh a t it

is, a ssi g n a

pr or a ta po rt ion th at it wo uld be worth and when the file - - when the pay ment came in, pay him that proration - - pay him that ag ree d portion.

Fr om this poi nt on, the simple question was how m u ch B ree den and A ssociates owe d Mr. Garner f or his work prior

to his termination on Fe bruary 18, 1999. The difficult fac tual part of the

case involved the determination of exactly how Mr. Ga

rner was to be pa id for his work. B y the Garner a naly sis he was to be pa id the full perc entag e in all ca ses where his part of the work on the file had be en complete d. By the B ree den ana ly sis he was to be paid on the basis of “him and I ag ree on what it is, assign a

prorata portion that it would be worth and when the file - - when the pay ment

c a me in, pa y

him that pr or a tio n - - p a y

him that a g re e d p ortio n. ” Th e tr ou ble c ome s b e c a us e “ him and I ” neve r could a g ree as to what Mr. B ree den owe d Mr. Garner.-6-

Since it is clear that the exact contra ctual ar r ang ement is not disclosed by the documents, then it ca nn ot be sa id that we are de a lin g wi th a c on tr a c t th a t is plain andun a mbi g uo us thu s ma kin g its interpre tation a question of law f or the c ourt. We are fac ed in this case w ith questions of fact whic h

m ust be resolve d by

the jury under the rule, a s stated in Boyd. See H ibernia Bank & Trust C o. v. Boyd
, 4 8 S

. W.2d 1084, 1087 (Tenn. 1932). See also, Bratton v. Bratton , 136 S.W .3d 595, 601-2 (Tenn. 2004)

.

The trial c ourt clea

rly rec og nized from the beg inning that the ambiguous ch ar acte r of the
exact con t rac tual arr ang ements betwe en the pa rties mandate d that the contra ct ca se g o to the jury

un de r p ro pe r i ns truc tio ns

.

At the close of

Plaintiff’s proof the trial court direc ted a verdic t in f avor of Def endant on the quantum meruit claim and a lso all “claims re lated to any of def endant’ s claim fil es upon which Plaintiff worked that wer e not completed at the time Plaintiff’s employ ment with defe ndant ende d.” This order e ntere d Aug ust 15, 200 2 wa s l at er aug mented by the final orde r of the c ourt enter ed No ve mbe r 4 , 2 00 2 w hic h r e a ff ir me d the Au g us t 15
, 20 02 or de r. We fi ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt c or re c tly direc ted a ve rdict as to Plaintiff’s quantum mer uit claim but erre d in directing a ver dict as to any part of the c on tr a c t c la im.

A t ri a l c ou rt c on sid e rs a ndthi s a

pp e llate c ou rt

re vie ws a

mot ion fo r a

dir e c ted verd ic t in

a c c or d w ith c e rt a in w e ll s e ttl e d r ule s:

T h o s e ru le s r e q u ir e th a t th e tria l ju d g e s a n d th e ap p e ll a te c o u r ts ta ke the
str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e in fa vo r o f the pe tit ion e r, a llo w a ll

rea sonable infe renc es in his favor, discard all counter vailing evidenc e and de ny the
mot ion wh e re the re is a ny do ub t a s to the c on c lus ion s to be dr a wn from th e whol e evidenc e. A verdic t should be dire cted only wher e a r easona

ble mind could draw but

one conc lusion. Holmes v . W ilson , 551 S.W .2d 682 (Tenn. 1977)

.

Crossli n v. Alsup , 594 S.W .2d 379, 380 (Tenn. 1980)

.

Th e or de rs of the tr ia l c ou rt of fe r no e xpla natio n fo r the g rant o f a dir e c te d v e rd ic t a t th e c los e of Plaintiff’s proof

in what i s clea

rly a case of disputed materia l fac ts. Refer ence to the transc ript dis c l o s e s t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t a c t e d f o r t w o s e p ar a t e r e a s o n s i n g r a n t i n g t h e d i r e c t e d v e rd ic t a s to

a lmo st a ll i ssu e s in the c on tr a c t c la im.

1. On the ba sis that Mr . G arn e r i n h is i n- c ou rt te sti mon y

dir e c tly c on tr a dic te d h is pr e vio us de po sit ion te sti mon y a s to his e xpe c ta tio n u nd e r the c on tr a c t.

2. That his proof of

damag es wa s speculative.

We d isa g re e wi th the tr ia l c ou rt in the se fi nd ing s.-7-

I n sustaining the motion for a direc ted ver dict as t o the m ajor portion of t he contr act a ction the court stated:

THE COURT: Wit h reg ards to the Motion to Dismiss, the bre ach of
contra ct claim, which is the onl y surviving cause of action, there ’s a very important

m a t t e r t h a tyo u n e e d t o a d d r e s s a n d t h a ti s yo u r c l i e n t ’ s t e s t i m o n y. Your client testified in his deposition that he did not ex pect pay ment on claims not completed at the time of termination. That wa s his testim o ny under

oath. An ind ivi du a l c a nn ot c ome in andtake a n in c on sis te nt po si tion u nd e r o a th beca use it nullifies that testimonyand in the fa ct of that ther e is no brea ch prove n.

So, he is not entitl ed, if his tes t i m ony is to be believed that he

e xpe c te d p a y me nt o n c la ims no t c omp le te d at t he ti me of his te rm inatio n. Hi s te sti mon y on the wi tne ss s ta ndha s b e e n d if fe re nt. Ho w d o y ou ex plai n th a t a ndho w d o y ou su rv ive the Mo tio n to Di smi ss?

. . . .

Your c lient has neg ated his own sworn testimonyin his de position by taking a position that he does expect payment on claims that wer e not completed at the time of termination and to that extent the m otion for bre ach of contac t is granted. That mea ns that the only thing that survive s are those claims that wer e completed at the time of termination.

The rule relied upon by the trial court is of long standing in Tennesse e but is limi ted to case s in which the stateme nts of the witness ar e dire ctly contra dictory

and unexplained.

I t is a rule of law in this state that contra dictory statements of a witness in co n n ec t i o n with the same fa ct have the re sult of “cancelling eac h other out.” DeGrafen r eid v. Nash. Ry. & Lt. C o. , 16 2 T e nn . 5 58 , 3 9 S. W.2 d 2 74 (1 93 1) ; Johnson v. Cincinnati N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. , 1 46 Te nn . 1 35 , 2 40 S .W . 4 29 (1 92 2) ; Donaho v. Large
, 25 Te nn

. Ap p. 43 3, 15 8 S.W. 2d44 7 ( 19 41 ); So uth e rn Mo tor s, Inc. v . Morton , 2 5 T e nn . A pp . 2 04 , 1 54 S.W. 2d80 1 ( 19 41 ); Nas hv ill e & American Trust Co. v. Ae tna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 21 Tenn. App. 366, 110 S.W .2d 1041 (1937). The que stion here is not one of the credibility of a witness or of the we ig ht o f e vid e nc e ; bu t it is w he the r the re is a ny

e vid e nc e a t a ll to p ro ve thefa c t. I f t wo wi tne sse s c on tr a dic t e a c h o th er, the re is pr oo f on bo th s ide s, a ndit i s f or the jury to s a y wh e re the truthlie s; bu t if the pr oo f o f a

fa c t li e s w ho lly

wi th o ne wi tne ss, a ndhe bo th aff irms and denies it, and the re is no ex planation, it cannot stand otherwise tha n unproven. For his testimony to prove it is no stronge rT h e depos i t i on i s n ot i n e v i den ce bu t on l y e x ce r pt s t h er eof w er e r ea d i n t o t h e r ec or d. 1

-8- than his testimonyto disprove it, and it would be mere caprice in a j u r y u p o n s u c h e v i d e n c e t o d e c i d e i te i t h e r w a y. J oh ns on , s up ra , 146 Tenn. at 158, 240 S.W . at 436. As can be see n from the quoted para g raph, this rule of

“cancellation” is usually stated as a

pp ly ing only

when the inconsistency

in the witness’s testimony is unexplained and when neither ve rsion of his testimonyis corrobor ated by other e vidence

. Taylor v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co. , 573 S.W .2d 476, 482-483 (Te nn.Ct.App. 1978).

Un de r this ru le of

“ c a nc e llatio n” the e vid e nc e mus t be c on sid e re d inthe lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to Plainti ff a nd a ver dict cannot be direc ted ag ainst him if reasona ble minds might diffe r as to the question of an unequivoca l and irrec oncilable conflict. Ga mb ill v . Middle Te nn e sse e Me d. Ctr

. , 751 S.W .2d 145, 152 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1988).

The a ction of the trial c ourt was ba s ed upon a sing le statement at the end of the extensive

cross-e x amination of Mr. Ga rner :

Q. You wer e not expecting pay m ent on claims t hat wer e not finished when y ou wer e terminated, wer e y ou? A. I was e x pecting claims - - I was expecting c ommissi on payments on the work pr oduct that I

had produc ed that we re in those claims, y es. I expected to be pa id f or my se rv ic e s. Q. I f I could have y ou take a look at Pag e 85 of y our Novemb er , 2 0 00 deposition, line 22. Question: “Were y ou expecting pay ment on claims that wer en’t finished” - - Answe r - - A. “No.” Q

. Q u e s t i o n : - - “ w h e n y o u w e r e t e r m i n a t e d ?” A. “No, I

wasn’t.” MR. QUI NN: That’s a ll myquestions, Your Honor.

The last part of this stateme nt c annot be considere d in isolation of the fir st part when de aling wi th a mot ion fo r a dir e c te d ve rd ic t. Ea rl ie r in the in- c ou rt te sti mon y of Mr . G arn e r h e wa s c ro ssexamined by

use of other

excerpts from his deposition. 1

Q. Whil e y ou wer e wor king f or M r. B ree den, in orde r to g et y our pe rc e nta g e , y ou r c omm iss ion , w he the r i t w a s 15 perc ent or 25 pe rc e nt, y ou ha d to perf orm ce rtain tasks, didn’t y ou? A. Ye s. Q. Whil e y ou we re wo rking fo r M r. B re e de n, to g e t y ou r p e rc e nta g e , to g et y our appr oved commission, 15 perc ent, 2 5 p ercent, y ou had to provide the-9-

estimate docume nt, assess the damag es, di scuss those damag es wit h the adjust er or insurance company

repr esentative, and ag ree on a settlement, didn’t y ou? A. No t on e ve ry

c a se . It de pe nd e d o n th e c ir c ums ta nc e s. Q. Wil l y ou turn to pag e 87, plea se, line 16. QUESTI ON: “B ut it wa s y our understanding - - well, let me g o back. L e t me a sk it in y ou r wo rd s. Te ll m e y ou r u nd e rs ta nd ing a s f ar a s w he n y ou wo uld be entitled and under what circ umstances y ou would be entitl ed to y our 15 per cent

o r 2 5 p e r c e n t

. W h a t

d i d y o u h a v e t o d o t o g e t i t ?” ANSWER: “I

had to provide the estimate docume nt, an assessment of the da mag es, discuss those dama g es with the adjuster or insuranc e company repr esentative, and ag ree on a settlement. And upon the fi nal ag ree ment and the

rec eipt of the c heck, the n I would be paid my

commissions.” Is t h a tyo u r

t e s t i m o n y? A. Th a t’ s w hat it

sa y s h e re , y e s.

As to M r. Ga

rn e r’ s in -c ou rt

te sti mon y

a ndhis pr e vio us de po sit ion the re c or d f urthe r s ho ws : Q. So is i t y our testimony that if y ou had done an es timate and Mr. Br eede n fired y ou - - whic h he di d ; we’re not disputing that - - if y ou had done an estimate, and someone el s e had to take over thefile and f inish it up, do the neg otiations, settle the claim, in this lawsuit, y ou’re claiming y our per centa g e base d on y our estimate r eg ardle ss of wheth er that was a cce ptable - - y our estimate wa s

acc eptable to the insurance c ompany or not? I sn’t that the ca se? A. No, sir. Q. Could y ou turn to pag e 90, plea se, line 11. Q U E S T I O N : “ Y o u h a v e d o n e a n e s t i m a t e , b u tt h e n y o u g e tf i r e d ?” ANSWER: “Uh- huh.” QUESTI ON: “Mr. B ree den or someone else has to take that file and f i n i s h i tu p ?” ANSWER: “Uh- huh.”

QUESTI ON: “Are y ou claiming that y ou’re entitled to y our p e r c e n t a g e , w h a t e v e r

i tm a y h a v e b e e n , 1 5 o r

2 5
, b a s e d o n y o u r e s t i m a t e a m o u n t ?” ANSWER: “I

sure a m.” QUESTI ON: “Reg ardle ss of whether that wasn’t g oing to f ly with the i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y ?”

ANSWER: “Ye s, sir.” Is t h a tyo u r

t e s t i m o n y?

I t m a y w e ll b e th a t a

ju r y may a c c e p t th is s in g u la

r s tate me n t b y M r

. G ar n e r o u t o f th e c o n te xt of his other stateme nts made in the same de position and as trier of fac t cast him on such a basis, but the ve ry re stric te d s c op e of

the “ c a nc e llatio n” ru le c a nn ot b e app lie d to jus tif y a dir e c te d v e rd ic t.

As to the qu e sti on of

wh e the r o r n ot the pr oo f o f d a ma g e s o ff e re d by Mr . G arn e r i s sp e c ulativ e wi thi n th e me a nin g of the pr oh ibi tio n a g a ins t the a wa rd of sp e c ulativ e da ma g e s it mus t-10-

be observ ed t h at the re cord in this case cause s one to wonder just what the jury

is ex pecte d to do. The rule as to the aw ard of speculative damag es, howe ver, is limited in its application.

The c ourts will allow re covery even if it is i mpossible to prove the exact amount of dama g es fr om the brea ch of c ontrac t. Otherwise, in certa in instances, the

co u rt s would be powe rless to help some wr ong ed parties. “Exact justice is not alway s attained, and the law does not r equire exactness of computation in suits that involve questions of

damag es g rowing out of contra ct or tort.” Provident Life and Acc ident Ins. Co. v. Globe I ndemnity Co.
, 156 Tenn. 571, 576, 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1057 (1928). In Coverdell v. M id-South Farm Equipment Assoc., I nc. , 335 F.2d 9 ( 6th Cir. 1964), the court applied Te nnessee law to determine that an insuranc e compa ny ag ent who was inform ed by

trustees of the defe ndant cor poration that he ha d been hir ed under a persona l service contra ct t o org anize their group insurance, worked an entire

wee kend on the pr oject, and c ance lled an appointment in Texas w as damag ed whe n the trustees g ave the contra ct t o another ag ent. Unce rtain and spe culative da mag es

are prohibited only

when the e x istence of

damag e is uncertain, not when the a mount is u nc e rt a in. Whe n th e re is s ub stanti a l e vid e nc e in th e recor d a ndre a so na ble infere nces may be drawn fr om that evidence mathematical certainty is not required. Id. at 14.

Cum mi ns v . B ro die , 6 67 S.W. 2d75 9, 76 5 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 98 3) ; see also Moore Constr. v. Cla rk sv ill e De p’ t of El e c tri c ity , 707 S.W .2d 1, 15 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1985).

At prese nt in this case only Plaintiff’s proof is bef

ore the court, a nd based upon that proof the trier of

fac t could find a bre ach of contra ct by Br ee den and A ssociates in fa ilure to pay Mr. Garner in a ccor dance there with. W h en t h e ca s e is fully tried the trier

of fa ct may

determine that Ga rn e r’ s w or

k w a s w orthl e ss andthat B re e de n a ndAs so c ia te s ow e him no thi ng un de r the c on tr a c t. T h e tr i e r o f f a c tm a y a l s o f

i n dt h a th i s p r o o f

o f d a m a g e s i s i n a d e q u a t e t o j u s t i f y a r e c o v e r y. Howeve r, genuine issues of m aterial fac t as t o all of these matters exist as the re cord now stands, and the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in dir e c tin g a

ve rd ic t ona ny

of the c on tr a c t is su e s.
Appellant’s qua ntum merui t ac t i o n is intriguing . The only rea son this quasi-contrac tual

reme dy can e x ist in t he company of the brea ch of contra ct action is be cause Def endant, in his answe r to the complaint, denied the exis tence of a contra ct. I f in f act a contra ct does not e x i s t , q uantum meruit would provide a viable alternative under which Garner might rec over for the va lue of wor k pe rf orme d. Th e pr ob le m w ith the c lai m’ s con ti nu e d v ia bil ity in this c a se is that G arn e r a lle g e s a contra ct and testifies in support of the contra ct. Br eede n was called a s the first witness by Plaintiff and conf irms the exis tence of a c ontrac t. The parties are in dispute as t o the ex act provisions of the
contra ct and how the compensation of Mr. Garner w as to be de termined unde r the terms of the

c on tr a c t. Wi th the te sti mon y of B re e de n b e ing be fo re the c ou rt a s a pa rt of Pla int if f’ s p ro of a ndhis
te sti m o n y c o n f i r m i n g t h e e xi s t e n c e o f

a c o n tr a c ti ti s d i f

f i c u l tt o i m a g i n e h o w q u a n t u mm e ru it continues to be viable

.-11-

Reg ardle ss of which version of the contra ct a trie r of f act ultimately

acc epts, the existence of an a g ree ment is uncontradicte d following Br eede n’s testimony . Since a c ontrac t co v er i ng the

e nti re qu e sti on of

the du tie s o f M r. Ga

rn e r andthe ob lig a tio n o f M r. B re e de n to pay him fo r tho se

se rv ic e s in fa c t e xists , th e re is thu s n o r oo m f or qu a ntu m me ru it.

Pla int if f ne xt c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in d e nying plaint if f r e a l e state commissions on t he two sale s of the Roddy farm based o n a t h eory

of quantum

me ru it. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t pl a int if

f w a s n ot en tit le d to re c ov e r u nd e r this theory becaus e t h er e wa s an express contra ct or a g ree ment g overning both of the

sa le s in qu e sti on a ndthi s c ou rt a g re e s. I t is a g ener al rule of

law that an implied contr act or quasi-contr act will not be impo s ed i n circ umstances whe re an express contrac t or ag ree ment exis ts. 66 Am.J ur.2d Re sti tut ion an d I mp lie d Co ntr

ac ts § 6 (1 96 4) . In c on ne c tio n w ith the fi rs t sale of the Roddy

farm to The Dicke rson Company , a written contrac t was ente red into between H ay slope, Fle t ch er Realty and The Dicker son Company which expressly provided for

a commission. As there w as an e x press a g ree ment for the pa y me nt o f a c omm iss ion on the fi rs t sa le
, the re c a n be no c la im f or qu a ntu m me ru it based up on the first sale. Wit h re spect to the sec ond sale, the c orre spondence of April 3, 1984, and April 5, 1984, betwee n Mrs. Roddy and Mr. F letcher establishes that the re wa s an expr e ss ag re e me nt be tw e e n the pa rt ie s th a t no c omm iss ionwo uld be pa id t o F le tc he r b y

Hay slo pe on the sa le to S mith a ndSc hu be rt . Pl a int if f’ s c la im fo r a c omm iss ion on the se c on d s a le ba se d o n t he th eory of qu a ntu m me ru it i s pr e c lud e d b y

the e xpre ss a g re e me nt be tw e e n the pa rt ie s tha t no com mis sio n w ou ld be paid.

Fletche r Realty, Inc . v. Hay slope Properties , 7 12 S.W. 2d 47 8, 48 1- 48 2 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 98 6) ; see also Scandlyn v. M

cDill Columbus Corp. , 895 S.W .2d 342, 349 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994).

Whil e at this stag e of the case wher ein only the proof of Plaintiff has bee n hear d the denial by Def endant in his answe r of the e x istence of a contr act would leave the quantum meruit question viable in ordinary circ umstances, the fac t that D efe ndant has been called as a witness by Plaintiff and has admitted the e x istence of the contra ct neg ates his g ener al denial in his answe r as to the existence of a c on tr a c t. Al l partie s ar e thu s in ag re e me nt that the ir e nti re re la tio ns hip is c ov e re d b y a c on tr a c t. Th e ir d i s a g r e e m e n t i s a s t o e xa c t l y w h a t t h e i r c o n tr a c t i s , a n d t h i s i s t h e f i r s t q u e s t i on tha t mu st addre ss itself to the trier of f act. The trial court w as co rre ct in direc ting a verdic t on the quantum

me ru it c la im.

Much of the briefs and a

rg umen t s on appea l center around w hether

or not the g rant by

the
tr ia l c ou rt of Pla int if f’ s T .R. C.P. 41 mot ionfo r v olu nta ry dis mis sa l w ith ou t pr e

jud ic e of the c a se (couc hed in terms of a non-suit) was effe ctive as to all contra ct claims. The r ecor d shows that afte r the tr ia l c ou rt

ha d a nn ou nc e d th a t it was dir e c tin g a ve rd ic t on the qu a ntu m me ru it i ssu e a nda lso direc ting a verdic t on all contra ct matters not f ully completed at the time of his te rmination
, t he following exchang e occ urre d:-12- THE C O U RT : I

b e li e v e th a t w h a t h e s a idw a s h e w a s n ’ t e x pecting pay ment on claims not c ompleted. Now, y ou must a sk y our client what he mea nt by that. I ’v e a lr e a dy ru le d th a t a s to the br e a c h o f c on tr a c t, he ’s no t e nti tle d to

a ca use of a ction for a ny

claims not completed at the time of his termination. The files ha ve been s ubmitted to the insurance c ompany and payment

wa s p e nd ing , h e ha d e ve ry ri g ht to expe c t compe ns a tio n. I f he ha d wor k in pr og re ss - - it is 4:00. Mr. Roberts, I hope y ou’re g oing to listen to me very car efully . We’re g oing to r ece ss. We’re g oing to take about 15 minutes. I want y ou to come bac k and tell me whi ch ca s es pay ment was be ing e x pecte d upon these c laims at the time of termination. You should also be pre pare d to arg ue, in a cohere nt fashion, what y ou think the proof shows is the t otal amount of dama g es y our client is re questing based on the proof that’s in the rec ord. (4:00 p.m., a r ece ss was had until 4:18 p.m.)

MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor - - THE COURT: Yes, sir. MR. ROBERTS: - - I do not be lieve - - I do not be lieve that we c an g ive y ou a number

with rea sonable c erta inty as to the claims that wer e complete d and sent to the insuranc e compa ny and to the extent we’r e aw aiting pay ments. I do not believe I can g ive y ou a mea ningf ul number of that tone. Plaintiff would respe ctfully move t his Court for a non-suit or, i n the

a lte rn a tiv e , a

mot ion fo r a

ne w t ri a l. THE COURT: Has a

non-suit been take n befor e? MR. ROBERTS: Not that I ’m awa re of

. THE C OURT: You’re entitled to take a non-suit if that’s what y ou’re asking me. I s that what y ou’re asking me?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, Your Honor

. TH E CO UR T: Yo u’ ll b e e nti tle d to a ndI ’l l a dvise the jury of tho se circ umstances. I

would ask if y ou will just step out. I ’m g oing to c all the jury back in andta lk t o t hem for a

fe w m inu te s, e xpla in t o th e m w hat’ s h app e ne d a ndwe ’l l dismiss them and y ou can c ome bac k in and g et y our thing s. (Ther eupon the jury was called ba ck in outside the pre sence of the attorney s.)

THE COURT: Please be seate d. L adies a nd g en t lemen, as y ou can see, none of t he parties or t heir attorney s are prese nt and that is due to the Plaintiff’s

re qu e st f or a no n- su it. A Pla in t i f

f h a s a n u n f

e t t e r e d r i g h tt o a s k

t h a tt h e y b e a l l o w e d to withdraw the ir suit at anytime. They can do that one time w ithout prejudice, meaning that they can r efile it and br

ing the lawsuit ag ain. They cannot do it a second time. Second time bar s them from filing

a la ws uit a ndis c on sid e re d w ithpr e jud ic e . In th is i ns ta nc e , this is the fi rs t no n- su it so it is pos sible that this case mig ht be re filed.-13- That mea ns that this matter is conclude d as far as y ou are conce rned and as f ar as I am conce rned, I

hope. Now I ’m g oing to e x cuse the court re porter f or having faithfully

done his duties. (4:20 p.m., a re cess wa s had until 4:48 p.m.) MR. QUI NN: I

have one matter if I

might I ’d like to make, it’s an ora l
mot ion fo r c os ts.

THE COURT: Well, usually when ther e’s a non-suit the costs are assessed ag ainst the P laintiff and that’s what is refle cted in the Or der but I don’t think
y ou c a n ma

ke a mot ion a t th is p oin t. Once a non-suit is announce d, it’s completed a nd so I think the Rules alre ady speak to ha ving ta

ken a non-suit, the costs are assessed a g ainst the Plaintiff.

There afte r ea ch of t he parties submitt ed a pr oposed orde r to ref lect the a ction of the trial

c ou rt

.

On Au g us t 7, 20 02 , th e tr ia l c ou rt sig ne d an order

wh ic h w a s e nte re d o f r e c or d o n A ug us t 6
, 2 0 0 2
, p r o v id in g : “ T h is matt e r w a s b e f o r e th e c o u r t u p o n c o u n s e l’ s o r a l mo ti o n to n o n

- suit the above matter pursua nt t o T en n es s ee Rule of Civil Procedur e 41.01. The court finding that the plaintiff’s motion is well taken her eby order s that the matter be dismiss ed without prejudice .”

On Au g us t 9, 20 02, th e tr ia l c ou rt sig ne d a n o rd e r w hic h w a s e nte re d o f r e c or d o n A ug us t 1 5
, 2 0 0 2
, p ro v i d i n g:

This case was tried in this Court befor e a jury o n J une 17-19, 2002. A t the close of Plaintiff’ s proof at trial, the Court partially g rante d Def

endant’ s Motion for Di re c te d V e rd ic t. S pe c if ic a lly , th e Cou rt

dis mis se d Pl a int if

f’ s qu an tum me ru it claims and a ll claims related to a ny of Def endant’ s claim files upon which Plaintiff worke d that wer e not completed at the time Plainti ff’ s employ ment with Defe ndant

e nd e d. F oll ow ing the dis mis sa l of the se c la ims
, Pla int if f vo lun tari ly

dis mis se d h is

rema ining c laims pursuant to Tennesse e Rule of Ci vil Procedure 41.01. There fore
, the Cou rt

fi nd s th a t Plainti ff ’s c la ims that w e re no t di smi sse d p ur su a nt t o Def endant’ s Motion for Direc ted Ver dict ar e hereby dismiss ed without prejudice

. Acc ording ly , it is hereby OR D E R E D t h a t P l a i n t i f f ’ s c l a i m s t h a t w e r e n o t d i s m i s s e d p u r s u a nt t o Def endant’ s Motion for Direc ted Ver dict are here by dismiss ed without prejudice

.

There afte r in post-trial proc eeding s the trial court executed a f inal order on November

4, 2 0 0 2
, wh i ch wa s en t er ed o f r ec o rd o n No v em b er2 1
, 2 0 0 2
, p ro v i d i n g:

This matter came for hearing befor e the Honora ble Carol McCoy , Chance llor Part I I
, o n N o v e mb e r 1
, 2 0 0 2 o n ( 1 ) D e f e n d a n ts ’ M o ti o n f

o r Re li e f f

r o m O r d er of Nonsuit and (2) A mended Moti on to Alter or Ame nd Orde r Granting discr etionary Costs (filed by

Plaintiff, Rocky

Garner) . After

a review of D efe ndants’ Motion for Relief fr om Order

of Nonsuit, the supporting documentation attached to the motion, the Response to De fenda nts’ Motion for Relief fr om Orde r of Non- Suit, t he arg uments of counse l for both parties during the hearing, and a revie w of the entire-14-

rec ord in this caus e, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion is well taken and should be g rante d. I t appea rs to the Court that Plai n tiff tender ed to the Court an Orde r of Non- Suit on August 7, 2002 to memorialize the oral nonsuit take n at the trial of this case

. Plaintiff’s tender ed Order of Non-Suit was entered by the Court on Aug ust 16, 2002. I t further appea rs t o the Court that Def

endants disag ree d with the la ng ua g e c on ta ine d in Pla int if f’ s A ug us t 7, 20 02 Or de r o f N on -S uit . D e fe nd a nts tender ed an a lternative O rder of Nonsuit to the Court (in response to Plaintiff’s Aug ust 7, 2002 proposed Orde r) on A u gu s t 9
, 2 002 which wa s also signe d by the Court and enter ed on Aug ust 15, 2002. I t is the opinion of the Court that the Order of Non -S uit submi tted by Plaintiff and enter ed by

the Court on Aug ust 16, 2002 should be set aside. I t is the opinion of the Court that the Orde r of Nonsuit submitted by De fe nd a nts a nde nte re d b y the Cou rt on Au g us t 15
, 20 02 is the mor e app ro pria te Or de r f or the Cou rt

to e nte r u nd e r the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f this c a se . A s a re su lt, De fe nd a nts ’ O rd e r o f N on su it ( e nte re d o n A ug us t 15, 200 2) is the Or de r o f N on su it in this case. After a re view of the Amended M o t ion to Alter or Amend O rder Gra nting Discre tionary

Costs (filed by

Plaintiff), the ar g uments of counse l for both part ies during the motion hea

ring
, and a revie w of the entire rec ord in this cause , the Court is of the opinion that the Amended Motion is not well taken and should be denied. Acc ording ly , it is hereby ORDERED that the Or der of Non-Suit submit ted by

Plaintiff (enter ed by

the Cou rt on Au g us t 16, 200 2) sh ou ld be se t asi de a nd that De fe nd a nts ’ Or de r o f N on su it (ente red on Aug ust 15, 2002) is the Orde r of Nonsuit in this ca s e. I t i s further ORDERED that the Amend ed M o tion to Alter or Amend Or der G ranting Discre tionary

Costs filed by

Plaintiff is denied.

This state of af

fairs w ould present inter esting questions under T.R.C.P. 41 wer e it not for the fa c t th a t th e a c tio n o f this c ou rt in r e ve rs ing the dir e c te d v e rd ic t a s to a ny c on tr a c t is su e e sse nti a lly rende rs the proc edura l problem m oot. There is no question that the trial court had alre ady ruled on the quantum merui t claim prior to the attempted voluntary dismiss al and we have a ffirme d this action of the tr ia l c ou rt . O ur

re ve rs a l of

the dir e c te d v e rd ic t re la tiv e to the c on tr a c t a c tio n s e nd s th e bu lk of the bre ach c ontrac t claim back f or a ne w trial. The vo l u n t ary dismiss al without prejudice of

rema ining c ontrac t issues allows that part of the c ase to be ref iled by P l ai n t i ff s o that the contra ct iss ue s in the ir

e nti re ty ma y be tr ie d u po n r e ma nd . T he or de r allo wi ng discret ion ary c os ts t o De fe nd a nt i s r e ve rs e d a nd the iss ue of dis c re tio na

ry c os ts w ill a wa it t

ri a l of the c on tr a c t c a se on its

me ri ts.

Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l cou rt is ac c or din g ly a ff ir me d in part, re ve rs e d in pa rt , a ndthe c a se

re ma nd e d to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r the tr ia l of

the c on tr a c t is su e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.

Costs of the cause are assessed to Appe llee.-15- ____________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE