RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2735-15T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.S., 

Defendant-Appellant,

and

F.S.,

Defendant.

_________________________________

In the Matter of J.S., 

a Minor.

__________________________________

Submitted October 17, 2017 – Decided 

Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FN-09-0188-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Ryan T. Clark, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 26, 2017
2 A-2735-15T3

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arriel 

Rubinstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (Cory H. Cassar, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

J.S. (the mother) appeals from an April 2, 2015 order finding 

that she abused and neglected her child, J.S. (the child),

1 who 

was born in March 2013, by inadequately supervising him and failing 

to properly care for him while he was hospitalized. The mother 

argues that although she may have failed to supervise the child, 

her failure amounted to simple negligence. She contends therefore 

that the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) 

produced insufficient evidence at the fact-finding hearing. We 

disagree and affirm. 

In August 2014, the Division learned from a referral that the 

child suffered a skull fracture and subdural hematoma from falling 

down a set of concrete stairs at an outdoor barbeque. He remained 

in the hospital for more than a month due to surgery and a related 

infection. The Division investigated the circumstances of the 

fall and obtained additional information during the 

 

1 The mother and child share the same initials.
3 A-2735-15T3

hospitalization as to the mother's interaction with the child. 

The Division then substantiated the abuse and neglect allegations,

and conducted an emergency Dodd2 removal after the hospital 

discharged the child. 

The judge held a fact-finding hearing over three days. The 

Division produced testimony from three witnesses: caseworkers, 

Madeline Liriano and Zoe Casanova; and Dr. Madesa Espana, a 

pediatrician and the chief of child protection and safety center 

at St. Joseph's hospital. The mother did not testify. The judge 

found the Division's witnesses to be credible, rendered a thorough 

oral opinion, and issued the order under review. 

The scope of our review of an order finding abuse or neglect 

is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.D., 207 N.J.

88, 112 (2011). We must uphold "factual findings undergirding the 

trial court's decision if they are supported by 'adequate, 

substantial and credible evidence' on the record." N.J. Div. of 

Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting 

In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 

1993)). Even where there are alleged errors in the judge's 

evaluation of underlying facts, we "will accord deference unless 

 

2 A "Dodd removal" refers to the emergency removal of a child 

from the home without a court order, as authorized by N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.29 of the Dodd Act, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82.
4 A-2735-15T3

the trial court's findings went so wide of the mark that a mistake 

must have been made." Ibid. (citation omitted). 

An "abused or neglected child," is defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4), as a child who is less than eighteen years of age and

whose physical, mental, or emotional condition 

has been impaired or is in imminent danger of 

becoming impaired as the result of the failure 

of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a 

minimum degree of care (a) in supplying the 

child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, 

education, medical or surgical care though 

financially able to do so or though offered 

financial or other reasonable means to do so, 

or (b) in providing the child with proper 

supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably 

inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, 

or substantial risk thereof[;] . . . or by any 

other acts of a similarly serious nature 

requiring the aid of the court.

"'Whether a parent or guardian has failed to exercise a 

minimum degree of care' in protecting a child is determined on a 

case-by-case basis and 'analyzed in light of the dangers and risks 

associated with the situation.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 593, 614 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting 

G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 181-82 (1999)). 

"'[M]inimum degree of care' refers to conduct that is grossly or 

wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional." G.S., 

supra, 157 N.J. at 178. "[A] guardian [or parent] fails to 

exercise a minimum degree of care when he or she is aware of the 

dangers inherent in a situation and fails adequately to supervise 
5 A-2735-15T3

the child or recklessly creates a risk of serious injury to that 

child." Id. at 181. 

This standard "implies that a person has acted with reckless 

disregard for the safety of others." Id. at 179. Moreover, a 

parent may be found to have abused or neglected a child when the 

parent creates a substantial risk of harm, since a court "need not 

wait to act until a child is actually irreparably impaired by 

parental inattention or neglect." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 

161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999). Courts have recognized that a parent's 

inaction or unintentional conduct may amount to a finding of abuse 

or neglect, if there is evidence that the child was injured. G.S., 

supra, 157 N.J. at 175-77. 

The mother admitted to Ms. Liriano that prior to the incident 

the child "was always running around or getting into something and 

she had to always watch him." According to Ms. Liriano, the child 

was hyperactive. The mother told Ms. Liriano that she was not 

directly supervising the child immediately before the fall. The 

judge determined that the mother should have known of the danger 

associated with the steps from which the child had fallen. As the 

judge stated "knowing that a child is as hyper as [the child] is, 

a reasonable person would understand the danger surrounding the 

concrete steps." The judge explained that the mother failed to 

adequately supervise the child. 
6 A-2735-15T3

The judge also found that the mother's actions during the 

child's hospitalization fell below the required degree of minimum 

care. Ms. Liriano visited the child in the hospital multiple 

times, but the mother was not present. Ms. Casanova testified 

that when the mother was present in the hospital with the child, 

the mother failed to properly bathe and feed her son. The judge 

further found that the mother failed to provide timely 

authorization for medical procedures. The judge explained

Dr. Espana . . . saw [the child in the 

hospital] and there were no family members 

that were present. That during the course of 

[the child's] . . . hospitalization, there 

were times [when the mother] was there[,] but 

. . . did not soothe him when [he] had cried. 

Dr. Espana testified that it is comforting for 

a child to see [his or her] mother after coming 

out [of] surgery and it prevents the elevation 

of the child's blood pressure. 

She testified that it is standard to get the 

patient's history from the parent. However, 

[the mother] was not available in person to 

provide these details. She testified that it 

is common that parents are at their child's 

bedside [twenty-four] hours a day to care for 

their child's needs and also to provide 

consent for any additional procedures the 

child may need. 

Dr. Espana testified that [the child's] 

transfer to another facility was impeded when 

[the mother] was not present to sign the 

consent forms. It was delayed. She testified 

she was able to get a hold of [the mother] on 

the phone . . . to discuss [his] medical 

history and the incident that brought [him] 

to the hospital. She testified that, although 
7 A-2735-15T3

[the mother] answered all of her questions, 

[the mother] seemed detached and showed no 

rapport with [the child]. 

We conclude therefore that there is sufficient credible 

evidence to support the judge's findings that the mother abused 

and neglected the child by providing inadequate supervision during 

the time of the fall and by her interactions with him during his 

hospitalization.

Affirmed.