PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 600 U. S. Part 1 

Pages 447–476 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

June 29, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022 447 

Syllabus 

GROFF v. DeJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the third circuit 

No. 22–174. Argued April 18, 2023—Decided June 29, 2023 

Petitioner Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest. In 

2012, Groff took a mail delivery job with the United States Postal Service. Groff's position generally did not involve Sunday work, but that 

changed after USPS agreed to begin facilitating Sunday deliveries for 

Amazon. To avoid the requirement to work Sundays on a rotating 

basis, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station that did not make Sunday deliveries. After Amazon deliveries began at that station as well, 

Groff remained unwilling to work Sundays, and USPS redistributed 

Groff's Sunday deliveries to other USPS staff. Groff received “progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays, and he eventually 

resigned. 

Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting 

that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice 

“without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS's] business.” 42 

U. S. C. § 2000e(j). The District Court granted summary judgment to 

USPS. The Third Circuit affrmed based on this Court's decision in 

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, which it construed 

to mean “that requiring an employer `to bear more than a de minimis 

cost' to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.” 35 

F. 4th 162, 174, n. 18 (quoting 432 U. S., at 84). The Third Circuit found 

the de minimis cost standard met here, concluding that exempting Groff 

from Sunday work had “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workfow, and diminished employee morale.” 35 F. 4th, at 

175. 

Held: Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result 

in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular 

business. Pp. 456–473. 

(a) This case presents the Court's frst opportunity in nearly 50 years 

to explain the contours of Hardison. The background of that decision 

helps to explain the Court's disposition of this case. Pp. 456–467. 

(1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for 

covered employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 

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448 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Syllabus 

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, 

because of such individual's . . . religion.” § 2000e–2(a)(1). As originally enacted, Title VII did not spell out what it meant by discrimination “because of . . . religion.” Subsequent regulations issued by the 

EEOC obligated employers “to make reasonable accommodations to the 

religious needs of employees” whenever doing so would not create 

“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 29 CFR 

§ 1605.1 (1968). In 1970, however, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII 

did not require an employer “to accede to or accommodate” a Sabbath 

religious practice because to do so “would raise grave” Establishment 

Clause questions. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324, 334. 

This Court affrmed Dewey by an evenly divided vote. See 402 U. S. 

689. Congress responded by amending Title VII in 1972 to track the 

EEOC's regulatory language and to clarify that employers must “reasonably accommodate . . . an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice” unless the employer is “unable” to do so 

“without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 

§ 2000e(j). Pp. 456–458. 

(2) Hardison concerned an employment dispute that arose prior to 

the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In 1967, Trans World Airlines hired 

Larry Hardison to work in a department that operated “24 hours per 

day, 365 days per year” and played an “essential role” for TWA by providing parts needed to repair and maintain aircraft. Hardison, 432 

U. S., at 66. Hardison later underwent a religious conversion and began 

missing work to observe the Sabbath. Initial conficts with Hardison's 

work schedule were resolved, but conficts resurfaced when he transferred to another position in which he lacked the seniority to avoid work 

during his Sabbath. Attempts at accommodation failed, and TWA discharged Hardison for insubordination. 

Hardison sued TWA and his union, and the Eighth Circuit sided with 

Hardison. The Eighth Circuit found that reasonable accommodations 

were available to TWA, and rejected the defendants' Establishment 

Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F. 2d 

33, 42–44. This Court granted certiorari. TWA's petition for certiorari asked this Court to decide whether the 1972 amendment of Title 

VII violated the Establishment Clause as applied by the Eighth Circuit, 

particularly insofar as that decision had approved an accommodation 

that allegedly overrode seniority rights granted by the relevant collective bargaining agreement. At the time, some thought that the Court's 

now-abrogated decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602—which 

adopted a test under which any law whose “principal or primary effect” 

“was to advance religion” was unconstitutional, id., at 612–613—posed 

a serious problem for the 1972 amendment of Title VII. Ultimately, 
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Syllabus 

however, constitutional concerns played no on-stage role in the Court's 

decision in Hardison. Instead, the Court's opinion stated that “the 

principal issue on which TWA and the union came to this Court” was 

whether Title VII “require[s] an employer and a union who have agreed 

on a seniority system to deprive senior employees of their seniority 

rights in order to accommodate a junior employee's religious practices.” Hardison, 432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title 

VII imposed no such requirement. Ibid. This conclusion, the Court 

found, was “supported by the fact that seniority systems are afforded 

special treatment under Title VII itself.” Id., at 81. Applying this 

interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit's 

evaluation of the factual record, the Court identifed no way in which 

TWA, without violating seniority rights, could have feasibly accommodated Hardison's request for an exemption from work on his 

Sabbath. 

The parties had not focused on determining when increased costs 

amount to “undue hardship” under Title VII separately from the seniority issue. But the Court's opinion in Hardison contained this oftquoted sentence: “To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost 

in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” Although many lower courts later viewed this line as the authoritative 

interpretation of the statutory term “undue hardship,” the context renders that reading doubtful. In responding to Justice Marshall's dissent, 

the Court described the governing standard quite differently, stating 

three times that an accommodation is not required when it entails “substantial” “costs” or “expenditures.” Id., at 83, n. 14. Pp. 459–465. 

(3) Even though Hardison's reference to “de minimis” was undercut by conficting language and was feeting in comparison to its discussion of the “principal issue” of seniority rights, lower courts have 

latched on to “de minimis” as the governing standard. To be sure, 

many courts have understood that the protection for religious adherents 

is greater than “more than . . . de minimis” might suggest when read 

in isolation. But diverse religious groups tell the Court that the “de 

minimis” standard has been used to deny even minor accommodations. 

The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as prescribing a “more than a 

de minimis cost” test, 29 CFR § 1605.2(e)(1), though it has tried to 

soften its impact, cautioning against extending the phrase to cover such 

things as the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules, 

the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages for a substitute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps” when they are not contrary to a “bona fde seniority system.” §§ 1605.2(e)(1), (2). Yet some 

courts have rejected even the EEOC's gloss on “de minimis,” rejecting 

accommodations the EEOC's guidelines consider to be ordinarily re-
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450 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Syllabus 

quired. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that Hardison 

does not compel courts to read the “more than de minimis” standard 

“literally” or in a manner that undermines Hardison's references to 

“substantial” cost. Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. Pp. 465–467. 

(b) The Court holds that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as 

that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffce to establish 

“undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that 

one phrase. In describing an employer's “undue hardship” defense, 

Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better explains the decision. The Court understands Hardison 

to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in 

the overall context of an employer's business. This fact-specifc inquiry 

comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in 

ordinary speech. Pp. 468–473. 

(1) To determine what an employer must prove to defend a denial 

of a religious accommodation under Title VII, the Court begins with 

Title VII's text. The statutory term, “hardship,” refers to, at a minimum, “something hard to bear” and suggests something more severe 

than a mere burden. If Title VII said only that an employer need not 

be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability 

simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of 

additional costs. Adding the modifer “undue” means that the requisite 

burden or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifable” level. 

Understood in this way, “undue hardship” means something very different from a burden that is merely more than de minimis, i. e., “very 

small or trifing.” The ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” thus 

points toward a standard closer to Hardison's references to “substantial 

additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. 

Further, the Court's reading of the statutory term comports with pre1972 EEOC decisions, so nothing in that history plausibly suggests that 

“undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean anything less than 

its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v. McDonough, 596 U. S. 

–––, –––. And no support exists in other factors discussed by the parties for reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line. 

Pp. 468–470. 

(2) The parties agree that the “de minimis” test is not right, but 

they differ in the alternative language they propose. The Court thinks 

it is enough to say that what an employer must show is that the burden 

of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased 

costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Hardison, 

432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. Courts must apply the test to take into account 

all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accom-
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 451 

Syllabus 

modations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size, 

and operating cost of an employer. P. 470–471. 

(3) The Court declines to adopt the elaborations of the applicable 

standard that the parties suggest, either to incorporate Americans with 

Disabilities Act case law or opine that the EEOC's construction of Hardison has been basically correct. A good deal of the EEOC's guidance 

in this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected by the 

Court's clarifying decision. But it would not be prudent to ratify in 

toto a body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the beneft of the 

clarifcation the Court adopts today. What is most important is that 

“undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and courts should 

resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context of an 

employer's business in the commonsense manner that it would use in 

applying any such test. P. 471. 

(4) The Court also clarifes several recurring issues. First, as the 

parties agree, Title VII requires an assessment of a possible accommodation's effect on “the conduct of the employer's business.” § 2000e(j). 

Impacts on co-workers are relevant only to the extent those impacts go 

on to affect the conduct of the business. A court must analyze whether 

that further logical step is shown. Further, a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice, cannot 

be considered “undue.” Bias or hostility to a religious practice or accommodation cannot supply a defense. 

Second, Title VII requires that an employer “reasonably accommodate” an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess the 

reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommodations. Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, an employer 

must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other options would also be necessary. Pp. 471–473. 

(c) Having clarifed the Title VII undue-hardship standard, the Court 

leaves the context-specifc application of that clarifed standard in this 

case to the lower courts in the frst instance. P. 473. 

35 F. 4th 162, vacated and remanded. 

Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor, J., 

fled a concurring opinion, in which Jackson, J., joined, post, p. 474. 

Aaron M. Streett argued the cause for petitioner. With 

him on the briefs were J. Mark Little, Christopher E. Tutunjian, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S. 

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452 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Counsel 

Sasser III, David J. Hacker, Stephanie N. Taub, Alan J. 

Reinach, Jonathon Cherne, Randall Luke Wenger, and 

Jeremy L. Samek. 

Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General 

Fletcher, Aimee W. Brown, and Charles W. Scarborough.* 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West 

Virginia et al. by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia, 

Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Michael R. Williams, Senior Deputy 

Solicitor General, and Grant A. Newman, Assistant Solicitor General, and 

by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: 

Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkansas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Raúl Labrador of 

Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of 

Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin 

Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella 

of New Hampshire, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, 

Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken 

Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Jason Miyares of Virginia; 

for Airline Employees for Health Freedom by John C. Sullivan and Kristina M. Williams; for the Alabama Center for Law and Liberty et al. by 

Matthew J. Clark; for the American Constitutional Rights Union by John 

J. Park, Jr.; for the American Hindu Coalition by Matthew T. Martens; for 

Americans for Fair Treatment by David Osborne; for the Becket Fund for 

Religious Liberty by Mark L. Rienzi; for the CatholicVote.org Education 

Fund by Antony B. Kolenc; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by 

Thomas C. Berg and Kimberlee Wood Colby; for the Church of Jesus 

Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. by Alexander Dushku and R. Shawn 

Gunnarson; for Citizens United et al. by Gary M. Lawkowski, Michael 

Boos, and Daniel H. Jorjani; for the Council on American-Islamic Relations by John S. Friend, Lena F. Masri, and Justin Sadowsky; for Former 

EEOC General Counsel et al. by Rachel N. Morrison; for the General 

Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Gene C. Schaerr, H. Christopher 

Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, Todd R. McFarland, and Christopher E. Mills; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver, 

Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gannam; for the Louis D. 

Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law by Thomas R. McCarthy, 

Kenneth L. Marcus, Alyza D. Lewin, L. Rachel Lerman, and Arthur 

Traldi; for the Muslim Public Affairs Council by Joshua C. McDaniel; for 

the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLA) et al. 

by Nathan Lewin and Dennis Rapps; for Religious Liberty Scholars et al. 
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Opinion of the Court 

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to accommodate the religious practice of their employees 

by John A. Meiser and Douglas Laycock; for the Seventh-day Adventist 

Church in Canada et al. by Nicholas R. Reaves; for the Sikh Coalition 

et al. by Jonathan Z. Morris, Scott P. Dixler, and Jeremy B. Rosen; for 

the Thomas More Society et al. by Thomas Brejcha, Stephen M. Crampton, Howard Slugh, and B. Tyler Brooks; for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America by Eric Rassbach and Nathan J. Diament; 

for U. S. Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by Sarah E. Child; for Joseph B. Holland, 

Jr., by Robert P. George, Kent J. George, and Jeffrey A. Kimble; for John 

Kluge by John J. Bursch, Rory T. Gray, and Michael J. Cork; for Robert 

P. Roesser by Bruce N. Cameron and Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.; for 

Asma T. Uddin et al. by Steven T. Collis, pro se; and for 400 Physicians 

et al. by Erin Elizabeth Mersino and Richard Thompson. 

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of 

Washington et al. by Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washington, Noah G. Purcell, Solicitor General, Karl David Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, and Brian J. Baker and Nicholas Ulrich, Assistant Attorneys 

General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions 

as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Phil Weiser of Colorado, William 

Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Anne E. Lopez of 

Hawaii, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea 

Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, and Charity 

R. Clark of Vermont; for Airlines for America by Anton Metlitsky, Robert 

A. Siegel, and Patricia N. Vercelli; for the American Federation of Labor 

and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Harold C. Becker, Matthew 

Ginsburg, and Andrew Lyubarsky; for the American Postal Workers 

Union, AFL–CIO, by Michael T. Anderson; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. by Joshua Matz, Carmen Iguina González, Gregory R. Nevins, Alex J. Luchenitser, Bradley Girard, and Karen 

L. Loewy; for the Freedom from Religion Foundation by Elizabeth Cavell 

and Patrick Elliott; for the Local Government Legal Center et al. by F. Andrew Hessick, Richard A. Simpson, Amanda Karras, and Erich Eiselt; and 

for the National Rural Letter Carriers' Association et al. by Jacob Karabell, 

Michael Gan, Mark Gisler, Jean-Marc Favreau, and Keith E. Secular. 

Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Founders' First Freedom, Inc., 

by Walter E. Carson and Michael D. Peabody; for the National Lawyers 

Association by Michael L. Foreman; for the Robertson Center for Constitutional Law by Michael Francisco and Bradley J. Lingo; for the Zionist 

Organization of America by Susan B. Tuchman; and for Jeffrey Podell 

et al. by Clifford A. Rieders. 
454 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Opinion of the Court 

unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 

42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j). Based on a line in this Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 

84 (1977), many lower courts, including the Third Circuit 

below, have interpreted “undue hardship” to mean any effort 

or cost that is “more than . . . de minimis.” In this case, 

however, both parties—the plaintiff-petitioner, Gerald Groff, 

and the defendant-respondent, the Postmaster General, represented by the Solicitor General—agree that the de minimis reading of Hardison is a mistake. With the beneft of 

thorough briefng and oral argument, we today clarify what 

Title VII requires. 

I 

Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for 

religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship 

and rest, not “secular labor” and the “transport[ation]” of 

worldly “goods.” App. 294. In 2012, Groff began his employment with the United States Postal Service (USPS), 

which has more than 600,000 employees. He became a 

Rural Carrier Associate, a job that required him to assist 

regular carriers in the delivery of mail. When he took the 

position, it generally did not involve Sunday work. But 

within a few years, that changed. In 2013, USPS entered 

into an agreement with Amazon to begin facilitating Sunday 

deliveries, and in 2016, USPS signed a memorandum of understanding with the relevant union (the National Rural Letter Carriers' Association) that set out how Sunday and holiday parcel delivery would be handled. During a 2-month 

peak season, each post offce would use its own staff to deliver packages. At all other times, Sunday and holiday deliveries would be carried out by employees (including Rural 

Carrier Associates like Groff) working from a “regional 

hub.” For Quarryville, Pennsylvania, where Groff was originally stationed, the regional hub was the Lancaster Annex. 

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The memorandum specifes the order in which USPS employees are to be called on for Sunday work outside the peak 

season. First in line are each hub's “Assistant Rural Carriers”—part-time employees who are assigned to the hub and 

cover only Sundays and holidays. Second are any volunteers from the geographic area, who are assigned on a rotating basis. And third are all other carriers, who are compelled to do the work on a rotating basis. Groff fell into this 

third category, and after the memorandum of understanding 

was adopted, he was told that he would be required to work 

on Sunday. He then sought and received a transfer to Holtwood, a small rural USPS station that had only seven employees and that, at the time, did not make Sunday deliveries. But in March 2017, Amazon deliveries began there as 

well. 

With Groff unwilling to work on Sundays, USPS made 

other arrangements. During the peak season, Sunday deliveries that would have otherwise been performed by Groff 

were carried out by the rest of the Holtwood staff, including 

the postmaster, whose job ordinarily does not involve delivering mail. During other months, Groff's Sunday assignments were redistributed to other carriers assigned to the 

regional hub.1 Throughout this time, Groff continued to receive “progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays. 

35 F. 4th 162, 166 (CA3 2022). Finally, in January 2019, he 

resigned.2 

1 Other employees complained about the consequences of Groff's absences. While the parties dispute some of the details, it appears uncontested that at least one employee fled a grievance asserting a confict with 

his contractual rights. After disputing any confict with contract rights, 

USPS eventually settled that claim, with the settlement reaffrming 

USPS's commitment to the memorandum of understanding. App. 118, 

125–126. 2 Groff represents that his resignation was in light of expected termination, and the District Court found “a genuine issue of material fact” foreclosed summary judgment as to whether Groff suffered an adverse em-
456 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Opinion of the Court 

A few months later, Groff sued under Title VII, asserting 

that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath 

practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS's] 

business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j). The District Court 

granted summary judgment to USPS, 2021 WL 1264030 (ED 

Pa., Apr. 6, 2021), and the Third Circuit affrmed. The panel 

majority felt that it was “bound by [the] ruling” in Hardison, 

which it construed to mean “that requiring an employer `to 

bear more than a de minimis cost' to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.” 35 F. 4th, at 174, n. 18 

(quoting 432 U. S., at 84). Under Circuit precedent, the 

panel observed, this was “not a diffcult threshold to pass,” 

35 F. 4th, at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted), and it 

held that this low standard was met in this case. Exempting Groff from Sunday work, the panel found, had “imposed 

on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workfow, and 

diminished employee morale.” Id., at 175. Judge Hardiman dissented, concluding that adverse “effects on USPS 

employees in Lancaster or Holtwood” did not alone suffce to 

show the needed hardship “on the employer's business.” 

Id., at 177 (emphasis in original). 

We granted Groff's ensuing petition for a writ of certiorari. 

598 U. S. ––– (2023). 

II 

Because this case presents our frst opportunity in nearly 

50 years to explain the contours of Hardison, we begin by 

recounting the legal backdrop to that case, including the 

development of the Title VII provision barring religious 

discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission's (EEOC's) regulations and guidance regarding 

that prohibition. We then summarize how the Hardison 

case progressed to fnal decision, and fnally, we discuss 

ployment action. 2021 WL 1264030, *8 (ED Pa., Apr. 6, 2021). The 

Government does not dispute the point in this Court. 

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Opinion of the Court 

how courts and the EEOC have understood its signifcance. 

This background helps to explain the clarifcations we offer 

today. 

A 

Since its passage, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 

has made it unlawful for covered employers “to fail or refuse 

to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, because of such individual's . . . religion.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e– 

2(a)(1) (1964 ed.). As originally enacted, Title VII did not 

spell out what it meant by discrimination “because of . . . 

religion,” but shortly after the statute's passage, the EEOC 

interpreted that provision to mean that employers were 

sometimes required to “accommodate” the “reasonable religious needs of employees.” 29 CFR § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967). 

After some tinkering, the EEOC settled on a formulation 

that obligated employers “to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees” whenever that 

would not work an “undue hardship on the conduct of the 

employer's business.” 29 CFR § 1605.1 (1968). 

Between 1968 and 1972, the EEOC elaborated on its understanding of “undue hardship” in a “long line of decisions” 

addressing a variety of policies. Hardison, 432 U. S., at 85 

(Marshall, J., dissenting); see Brief for General Conference of 

Seventh-day Adventists as Amicus Curiae 10–22 (collecting 

decisions). Those decisions addressed many accommodation 

issues that still arise frequently today, including the wearing 

of religious garb3 and time off from work to attend to religious obligations.4 

3 See, e. g., EEOC Dec. No. 71–779, 1970 WL 3550, *2 (Dec. 21, 1970) (no 

undue hardship in permitting nurse to wear religious headscarf). 4 See EEOC Dec. No. 71–463, 1970 WL 3544, *1–*2 (Nov. 13, 1970) (no 

“undue hardship” or “unreasonable burde[n]” for employer to train coworker to cover 2-week religious absence); EEOC Dec. No. 70–580, 1970 

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Opinion of the Court 

EEOC decisions did not settle the question of undue hardship. In 1970, the Sixth Circuit held (in a Sabbath case) that 

Title VII as then written did not require an employer “to 

accede to or accommodate” religious practice because that 

“would raise grave” Establishment Clause questions. 

Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324, 334. This 

Court granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1008, but then affrmed 

by an evenly divided vote, 402 U. S. 689 (1971). 

Responding to Dewey and another decision rejecting any 

duty to accommodate an employee's observance of the Sabbath, Congress amended Title VII in 1972. Hardison, 432 

U. S., at 73–74; id., at 88–89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 

Tracking the EEOC's regulatory language, Congress provided that “[t]he term `religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 

employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the 

conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j) 

(1970 ed., Supp. II). 

WL 3513, *1–*2 (Mar. 2, 1970) (manufacturing employer asked to accommodate sundown-to-sundown Sabbath observance did not carry “burden . . . 

to demonstrate undue hardship” where it did not address “whether another employee could be trained to substitute for the Charging Party during Sabbath days, or whether already qualifed personnel ha[d] been invited to work a double shift”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–670, 1970 WL 3518, 

*2 (Mar. 30, 1970) (no “undue `hardship' ” in having other employees take 

on a few more on-call Saturdays per year); see also EEOC Dec. No. 70– 

110, 1969 WL 2908, *1–*2 (Aug. 27, 1969) (employer could not deny employee all Sunday “overtime opportunities” on basis of employee's religious inability to work Saturday, where others not working the full 

weekend had been accommodated, notwithstanding employer's claim of 

“considerable expense”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–99, 1969 WL 2905, *1 

(Aug. 27, 1969) (no obligation to accommodate seasonal employee unavailable for Saturday work, where employer showed both “no available pool 

of qualifed employees” to substitute and a “practical impossibility of 

obtaining and training an employee” to cover one day a week for six 

weeks). 

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B 

The Hardison case concerned a dispute that arose during 

the interval between the issuance of the EEOC's “undue 

hardship” regulation and the 1972 amendment to Title VII. 

In 1967, Larry Hardison was hired as a clerk at the Stores 

Department in the Kansas City base of Trans World Airlines 

(TWA). The Stores Department was responsible for providing parts needed to repair and maintain aircraft. Hardison 

v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 877, 889 (WD Mo. 

1974). It played an “essential role” and operated “24 hours 

per day, 365 days per year.” Hardison, 432 U. S., at 66. 

After taking this job, Hardison underwent a religious conversion. He began to observe the Sabbath by absenting 

himself from work from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday, and this conficted with his work schedule. The problem was solved for a time when Hardison, who worked in 

Building 1, switched to the night shift, but it resurfaced 

when he sought and obtained a transfer to the day shift in 

Building 2 so that he could spend evenings with his wife. 

375 F. Supp., at 889. In that new building, he did not have 

enough seniority to avoid work during his Sabbath. Attempts at accommodation failed, and he was eventually “discharged on grounds of insubordination.” 432 U. S., at 69. 

Hardison sued TWA and his union, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM).5 The 

Eighth Circuit found that reasonable accommodations were 

available, and it rejected the defendants' Establishment 

Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 

527 F. 2d 33, 42–44 (1975). 

Both TWA and IAM then fled petitions for certiorari, with 

TWA's lead petition asking this Court to decide whether the 

1972 amendment of Title VII violated the Establishment 

Clause as applied in the decision below, particularly insofar 

5 “Labor organization[s]” themselves were and are bound by Title VII's 

nondiscrimination rules. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(c) (1964 ed.). 

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as that decision had approved an accommodation that allegedly overrode seniority rights granted by the relevant collective bargaining agreement.6 The Court granted both petitions. 429 U. S. 958 (1976). 

When the Court took that action, all counsel had good reason to expect that the Establishment Clause would fgure 

prominently in the Court's analysis. As noted above, in 

June 1971, the Court, by an equally divided vote, had affrmed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey, which had heavily relied on Establishment Clause avoidance to reject the 

interpretation of Title VII set out in the EEOC's reasonableaccommodation guidelines. Just over three weeks later, the 

Court had handed down its (now abrogated) 7 decision in 

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which adopted a 

test under which any law whose “principal or primary effect” 

“was to advance religion” was unconstitutional. Id., at 612– 

613. Because it could be argued that granting a special accommodation to a religious practice had just such a purpose 

and effect, some thought that Lemon posed a serious problem for the 1972 amendment of Title VII. And shortly before review was granted in Hardison, the Court had announced that the Justices were evenly divided in a case that 

challenged the 1972 amendment as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U. S. 65 

(1976) (per curiam). 

Against this backdrop, both TWA and IAM challenged the 

constitutionality of requiring any accommodation for religious practice. The Summary of Argument in TWA's brief 

began with this categorical assertion: “The religious accommodation requirement of Title VII violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.” Brief for Petitioner 

TWA, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, p. 19. Applying the threepart Lemon test, TWA argued that any such accommodation 

6 See Pet. for Cert. in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, O. T. 

1975, No. 75–1126, pp. 2–3, 17–22. 7 See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 597 U. S. –––, ––– (2022). 

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has the primary purpose and effect of advancing religion and 

entails “pervasive” government “entanglement . . . in religious issues.” Brief for Petitioner TWA, No. 75–1126, at 20. 

The union's brief made a similar argument, Brief for Petitioner IAM, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, pp. 21–24, 50–72, but 

stressed the special status of seniority rights under Title 

VII, id., at 24–36. 

Despite the prominence of the Establishment Clause in the 

briefs submitted by the parties and their amici,

8 constitutional concerns played no on-stage role in the Court's opinion, which focused instead on seniority rights.9 The opinion 

8 See, e. g., Brief for Chrysler Corporation as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (arguing an Establishment Clause violation), and Brief for State of Michigan 

as Amicus Curiae 20–25 (arguing no confict with the Establishment 

Clause), in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, O. T. 1976, No. 75– 

1126 etc. 9 The background summarized above and the patent clash between the 

ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” and “more than . . . de minimis” led 

some to interpret the decision to rest on Establishment Clause concerns. 

Justice Marshall observed in his Hardison dissent that the majority opinion “ha[d] the singular advantage of making consideration of petitioners' 

constitutional challenge unnecessary.” 432 U. S., at 89. A few courts assumed that Hardison actually was an Establishment Clause decision. 

See, e. g., Gibson v. Missouri Pacifc R. Co., 620 F. Supp. 85, 88–89 (ED 

Ark. 1985) (concluding that requiring an employer to “incur greater than 

de minimis costs” related to accommodating a Sabbath “would therefore 

violate the establishment clause”); see also Massachusetts Bay Transp. 

Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 450 Mass. 327, 

340–341, and n. 15, 879 N. E. 2d 36, 46–48, and n. 15 (2008) (construing state 

law narrowly on premise that Hardison might state outer constitutional 

bounds). Some constitutional scholars also suggested that Hardison must 

have been based on constitutional avoidance. See, e. g., P. Karlan & G. 

Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 

46 Duke L. J. 1, 6–7 (1996); M. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An 

Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 704 

(1992); cf. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F. 3d 821, 829 (CA6 

2020) (Thapar, J., concurring). In doing so, some have pointed to Hardison's passing reference to a need to avoid “unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their religion.” 432 U. S., at 84. But the Court later 

clarifed that “Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to 
462 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Opinion of the Court 

stated that “the principal issue on which TWA and the union 

came to this Court” was whether Title VII “require[s] an 

employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system 

to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order 

to accommodate a junior employee's religious practices.” 

432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title VII 

imposed no such requirement. Ibid. This conclusion, the 

Court found, was “supported by the fact that seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself.” 

Id., at 81. It noted that Title VII expressly provides special 

protection for “ `bona fde seniority . . . system[s],' ” id., at 81– 

82 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(h)), and it cited precedent 

reading the statute “ `to make clear that the routine application of a bona fde seniority system [is] not . . . unlawful 

under Title VII,' ” 432 U. S., at 82 (quoting Teamsters v. 

United States, 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977)). Invoking these authorities, the Court found that the statute did not require 

an accommodation that involuntarily deprived employees of 

seniority rights. 432 U. S., at 80.10 

Applying this interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing 

with the Eighth Circuit's evaluation of the factual record, 

the Court identifed no way in which TWA, without violating 

seniority rights, could have feasibly accommodated Hardison's request for an exemption from work on his Sabbath. 

The Court found that not enough co-workers were willing to 

take Hardison's shift voluntarily, that compelling them to do 

so would have violated their seniority rights, and that leaving the Stores Department short-handed would have adversely affected its “essential” mission. Id., at 68, 80. 

religious practices” but instead “gives them favored treatment” in order 

to ensure religious persons' full participation in the workforce. EEOC v. 

Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U. S. 768, 775 (2015). 10 We do not understand Groff to challenge the continued vitality of Hardison's core holding on its “principal issue” (bracketing his disputes that 

the memorandum of understanding set forth a seniority system). 432 

U. S., at 83, and n. 14. 

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The Court also rejected two other options offered in Justice Marshall's dissent: (1) paying other workers overtime 

wages to induce them to work on Saturdays and making up 

for that increased cost by requiring Hardison to work overtime for regular wages at other times and (2) forcing TWA 

to pay overtime for Saturday work for three months, after 

which, the dissent thought, Hardison could transfer back to 

the night shift in Building 1. The Court dismissed both of 

these options as not “feasible,” id., at 83, n. 14, but it provided no explanation for its evaluation of the frst. In dissent, Justice Marshall suggested one possible reason: that 

the collective bargaining agreement might have disallowed 

Hardison's working overtime for regular wages. Id., at 95 

(dissenting opinion). But the majority did not embrace 

that explanation. 

As for the second, the Court disputed the dissent's conclusion that Hardison, if he moved back to Building 1, would 

have had enough seniority to choose to work the night shift. 

Id., at 83, n. 14. That latter disagreement was key. The 

dissent thought that Hardison could have resumed the night 

shift in Building 1 after just three months, and it therefore 

calculated what it would have cost TWA to pay other workers' overtime wages on Saturdays for that fnite period of 

time. According to that calculation, TWA's added expense 

for three months would have been $150 (about $1,250 in 2022 

dollars).11 Id., at 92, n. 6. But the Court doubted that Hardison could have regained the seniority rights he had enjoyed in Building 1 prior to his transfer, and if that were 

true, TWA would have been required to pay other workers 

overtime for Saturday work indefnitely. Even under Justice Marshall's math, that would have worked out to $600 per 

year at the time, or roughly $5,000 per year today. 

11 The dissent appears to have drawn its estimate from Hardison's daily 

rate at the time of termination ($3.37/hour) and deposition testimony on 

typical overtime rates and shift lengths. See App. in No. 75–1126 etc., 

pp. 40, 126. 
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In the briefs and at argument, little space was devoted to 

the question of determining when increased costs amount to 

an “undue hardship” under the statute, but a single, but oftquoted, sentence in the opinion of the Court, if taken literally, suggested that even a pittance might be too much for 

an employer to be forced to endure. The line read as follows: “To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost 

in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” Id., at 84. 

Although this line would later be viewed by many lower 

courts as the authoritative interpretation of the statutory 

term “undue hardship,” it is doubtful that it was meant to 

take on that large role. In responding to Justice Marshall's 

dissent, the Court described the governing standard quite 

differently, stating three times that an accommodation is not 

required when it entails “substantial” “costs” or “expenditures.” Id., at 83, n. 14. This formulation suggests that an 

employer may be required to bear costs and make expenditures that are not “substantial.” Of course, there is a big 

difference between costs and expenditures that are not “substantial” and those that are “de minimis,” which is to say, so 

“very small or trifing” that they are not even worth noticing. Black's Law Dictionary 388 (5th ed. 1979). 

The Court's response to Justice Marshall's estimate of the 

extra costs that TWA would have been required to foot is 

also telling. The majority did not argue that Justice Marshall's math produced considerably “more than a de minimis 

cost” (as it certainly did). Instead, the Court responded 

that Justice Marshall's calculation involved assumptions that 

were not “feasible under the circumstances” and would have 

produced a different confict with “the seniority rights of 

other employees.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14; see Brief for 

United States 29, n. 4 (noting that Hardison “specifcally rejected” the dissent's calculations and that it is “wrong to assert” that Hardison held that a $150 cost was an undue 

hardship). 

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Ultimately, then, it is not clear that any of the possible 

accommodations would have actually solved Hardison's problem without transgressing seniority rights. The Hardison 

Court was very clear that those rights were off-limits. Its 

guidance on “undue hardship” in situations not involving seniority rights is much less clear. 

C 

Even though Hardison's reference to “de minimis” was 

undercut by conficting language and was feeting in comparison to its discussion of the “principal issue” of seniority 

rights, lower courts have latched on to “de minimis” as the 

governing standard. 

To be sure, as the Solicitor General notes, some lower 

courts have understood that the protection for religious adherents is greater than “more than . . . de minimis” might 

suggest when read in isolation. But a bevy of diverse religious organizations has told this Court that the de minimis 

test has blessed the denial of even minor accommodation in 

many cases, making it harder for members of minority faiths 

to enter the job market. See, e. g., Brief for the Sikh Coalition et al. as Amici Curiae 15, 19–20 (“the de minimis standard eliminates any meaningful mandate to accommodate Sikh 

practices in the workplace” and “emboldens employers to 

deny reasonable accommodation requests”); Brief for Council 

on American-Islamic Relations as Amicus Curiae 3 (Muslim 

women wearing religiously mandated attire “have lost employment opportunities” and have been excluded from “critical public institutions like public schools, law enforcement 

agencies, and youth rehabilitation centers”); Brief for Union 

of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America as Amicus 

Curiae 14–15 (because the “de minimis cost” test “can be 

satisfed in nearly any circumstance,” “Orthodox Jews once 

again [are] left at the mercy of their employers' good 

graces”); Brief for Seventh-day Adventist Church in Canada 

et al. as Amici Curiae 8 (joint brief of Sabbatarian faiths 

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arguing that Sabbath accommodation under the de minimis 

standard is left to “ their employers' and coworkers' 

goodwill”). 

The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as prescribing a 

“ `more than a de minimis cost' ” test, 29 CFR § 1605.2(e)(1) 

(2022), but has tried in some ways to soften its impact. It 

has specifcally cautioned (as has the Solicitor General in this 

case) against extending the phrase to cover such things as 

the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules, 

the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages 

for a substitute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps” 

when they are not contrary to a “bona fde seniority system.” 

§§ 1605.2(e)(1), (2). 

Nevertheless, some courts have rejected even the EEOC's 

gloss on “de minimis.” 12 And in other cases, courts have 

rejected accommodations that the EEOC's guidelines consider to be ordinarily required, such as the relaxation of 

dress codes and coverage for occasional absences.13 

12 For example, two years ago, the Seventh Circuit told the EEOC that 

it would be an undue hardship on Wal-Mart (the Nation's largest private 

employer, with annual profts of over $11 billion) to be required to facilitate voluntary shift-trading to accommodate a prospective assistant manager's observance of the Sabbath. EEOC v. Walmart Stores East, L. P., 

992 F. 3d 656, 659–660 (2021). See Walmart Inc., Wall Street Journal 

Markets (June 4, 2023). 13 See, e. g., Wagner v. Saint Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc., 2022 

WL 905551, *4–*5 (SD Ga., Mar. 28, 2022) (Orthodox Jew fred for taking 

off for High Holy Days); Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 

1314, 1322, 1331–1332 (ND Ga., 2017) (Muslim woman who wore a hijab 

fred because the sight of her might harm the business in light of “negative 

stereotypes and perceptions about Muslims”); El-Amin v. First Transit, 

Inc., 2005 WL 1118175, *7–*8 (SD Ohio, May 11, 2005) (Muslim employee 

terminated where religious services conficted with “two hours” of training a week during a month of daily training); EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., 

Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (ND Ga., 1981) (hiring a Sikh man as a restaurant 

manager would be an undue hardship because his beard would have conficted with “customer preference”). 

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Members of this Court have warned that, if the de minimis rule represents the holding of Hardison, the decision 

might have to be reconsidered. Small v. Memphis Light, 

Gas & Water, 593 U. S. ––– (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting 

from denial of certiorari); Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 589 

U. S. ––– (2020) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 

Four years ago, the Solicitor General—joined on its brief by 

the EEOC—likewise took that view. Brief for United 

States as Amicus Curiae in Patterson v. Walgreen Co., O. T. 

2019, No. 18–349, p. 20 (“Contrary to Hardison, therefore, an 

`undue hardship' is not best interpreted to mean `more than 

a de minimis cost' ”). 

Today, the Solicitor General disavows its prior position 

that Hardison should be overruled—but only on the understanding that Hardison does not compel courts to read the 

“more than de minimis” standard “literally” or in a manner 

that undermines Hardison's references to “substantial” 

cost.14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. With the beneft of comprehensive briefng and oral argument, we agree.15 

14 At the certiorari stage, the Government argued against review by 

noting that Government employees receive “at least as much protection 

for religious-accommodation claims [under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)] as [under] any interpretation of Title VII.” Brief in 

Opposition 9. Courts have not always agreed on how RFRA's cause of 

action—which does not rely on employment status—interacts with Title 

VII's cause of action, and the Third Circuit has treated Title VII as exclusively governing at least some employment-related claims brought by Government employees. Compare Francis v. Mineta, 505 F. 3d 266, 271 (CA3 

2007), with Tagore v. United States, 735 F. 3d 324, 330–331 (CA5 2013) 

(federal employee's RFRA claim could proceed even though de minimis 

standard foreclosed Title VII claim). Because Groff did not bring a 

RFRA claim, we need not resolve today whether the Government is correct that RFRA claims arising out of federal employment are not displaced 

by Title VII. 15 In addition to suggesting that Hardison be revisited, some Justices 

have questioned whether Hardison (which addresses the pre-1972 EEOC 

Guidelines) binds courts interpreting the current version of Title VII. See 

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III 

We hold that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as 

that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffce to 

establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employer's “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly 

to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better explains the decision. We therefore, like the parties, understand Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown 

when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an 

employer's business. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62 (argument 

of Solicitor General). This fact-specifc inquiry comports 

with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in 

ordinary speech. 

A 

As we have explained, we do not write on a blank slate in 

determining what an employer must prove to defend a denial 

of a religious accommodation, but we think it reasonable to 

begin with Title VII's text. After all, as we have stressed 

over and over again in recent years, statutory interpretation 

must “begi[n] with,” and ultimately heed, what a statute actually says. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 74 (2023); 

Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. 

–––, ––– – –––, ––– (2020). Here, the key statutory term is 

“undue hardship.” In common parlance, a “hardship” is, at 

a minimum, “something hard to bear.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 646 (1966) (Random House). 

Other defnitions go further. See, e. g., Webster's Third 

Abercrombie, 575 U. S., at 787, n. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As explained below, because we—like the Solicitor General—construe Hardison as consistent with the ordinary meaning of 

“undue hardship,” we need not reconcile any divergence between Hardison and the statutory text. 

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New International Dictionary 1033 (1971) (Webster's Third) 

(“something that causes or entails suffering or privation”); 

American Heritage Dictionary 601 (1969) (American Heritage) (“[e]xtreme privation; adversity; suffering”); Black's 

Law Dictionary, at 646 (“privation, suffering, adversity”). 

But under any defnition, a hardship is more severe than a 

mere burden. So even if Title VII said only that an employer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer 

could not escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of additional costs. Those 

costs would have to rise to the level of hardship, and adding 

the modifer “undue” means that the requisite burden, privation, or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifable” level. Random House 1547; see, e. g., Webster's Third 

2492 (“inappropriate,” “unsuited,” or “exceeding or violating 

propriety or ftness”); American Heritage 1398 (“excessive”). 

The Government agrees, noting that “ `undue hardship 

means something greater than hardship.' ” Brief for United 

States 30; see id., at 39 (arguing that “accommodations 

should be assessed while `keep[ing] in mind both words in 

the key phrase of the actual statutory text: “undue” and 

“hardship” ' ” (quoting Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, 

LLC, 721 F. 3d 444, 456 (CA7 2013))). 

When “undue hardship” is understood in this way, it means 

something very different from a burden that is merely more 

than de minimis, i. e., something that is “very small or trifing.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 388. So considering ordinary meaning while taking Hardison as a given, we are 

pointed toward something closer to Hardison's references to 

“substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 

432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. 

Similarly, while we do not rely on the pre-1972 EEOC decisions described above to defne the term, we do observe that 

these decisions often found that accommodations that entailed substantial costs were required. See supra, at 457, 

nn. 3–4. Nothing in this history plausibly suggests that 

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“undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean anything less than its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v. 

McDonough, 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (a “robust regulatory 

backdrop” can “fl[l] in the details” of a statutory scheme's 

use of a specifc term). 

In short, no factor discussed by the parties—the ordinary 

meaning of “undue hardship,” the EEOC guidelines that 

Hardison concluded that the 1972 amendment “ `ratifed,' ” 

432 U. S., at 76, n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted), the 

use of that term by the EEOC prior to those amendments, 

and the common use of that term in other statutes—supports 

reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line. 

See Brief for United States 39 (arguing that “the Court could 

emphasize that Hardison's language does not displace the 

statutory standard”). 

B 

In this case, both parties agree that the “de minimis” test 

is not right, but they differ slightly in the alternative language they prefer. Groff likes the phrase “signifcant diffculty or expense.” Brief for Petitioner 15; Reply Brief 2. 

The Government, disavowing its prior position that Title 

VII's text requires overruling Hardison, points us to Hardison's repeated references to “substantial expenditures” or 

“substantial additional costs.” Brief for United States 28– 

29 (citing 432 U. S., at 83–84, and n. 14); see Brief for United 

States 39. We think it is enough to say that an employer 

must show that the burden of granting an accommodation 

would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the 

conduct of its particular business. Hardison, 432 U. S., at 

83, n. 14. 

What matters more than a favored synonym for “undue 

hardship” (which is the actual text) is that courts must apply 

the test in a manner that takes into account all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, 

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“size and operating cost of [an] employer.” Brief for United 

States 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

C 

The main difference between the parties lies in the further 

steps they would ask us to take in elaborating upon their 

standards. Groff would not simply borrow the phrase “signifcant diffculty or expense” from the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) but would have us instruct lower courts 

to “draw upon decades of ADA caselaw.” Reply Brief 13. 

The Government, on the other hand, requests that we opine 

that the EEOC's construction of Hardison has been basically 

correct. Brief for United States 39. 

Both of these suggestions go too far. We have no reservations in saying that a good deal of the EEOC's guidance in 

this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected 

by our clarifying decision today. After all, as a public advocate for employee rights, much of the EEOC's guidance has 

focused on what should be accommodated. Accordingly, today's clarifcation may prompt little, if any, change in the 

agency's guidance explaining why no undue hardship is imposed by temporary costs, voluntary shift swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs. See 29 CFR 

§ 1605.2(d). But it would not be prudent to ratify in toto a 

body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the beneft of 

the clarifcation we adopt today. What is most important is 

that “undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and 

courts should resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context of an employer's business in the commonsense manner that it would use in applying any such test. 

D 

The erroneous de minimis interpretation of Hardison may 

have had the effect of leading courts to pay insuffcient attention to what the actual text of Title VII means with regard 

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to several recurring issues. Since we are now brushing 

away that mistaken view of Hardison's holding, clarifcation 

of some of those issues—in line with the parties' agreement 

in this case—is in order. 

First, on the second question presented, both parties agree 

that the language of Title VII requires an assessment of a 

possible accommodation's effect on “the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j); see 35 F. 4th, at 

177–178 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). As the Solicitor General 

put it, not all “impacts on coworkers . . . are relevant,” but 

only “coworker impacts” that go on to “affec[t] the conduct 

of the business.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–104. So an accommodation's effect on co-workers may have ramifcations for 

the conduct of the employer's business, but a court cannot 

stop its analysis without examining whether that further logical step is shown in a particular case. 

On this point, the Solicitor General took pains to clarify 

that some evidence that occasionally is used to show 

“impacts” on co-workers is “off the table” for consideration. 

Id., at 102. Specifcally, a co-worker's dislike of “religious 

practice and expression in the workplace” or “the mere fact 

[of] an accommodation” is not “cognizable to factor into 

the undue hardship inquiry.” Id., at 89–90. To the extent 

that this was not previously clear, we agree. An employer 

who fails to provide an accommodation has a defense only 

if the hardship is “undue,” and a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion 

in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious 

practice cannot be considered “undue.” If bias or hostility to a religious practice or a religious accommodation provided a defense to a reasonable accommodation claim, Title 

VII would be at war with itself. See id., at 89 (argument 

of Solicitor General) (such an approach would be “giving 

effect to religious hostility”); contra, EEOC v. Sambo's 

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sidering as hardship “[a]dverse customer reaction” from “a 

simple aversion to, or discomfort in dealing with, bearded 

people”). 

Second, as the Solicitor General's authorities underscore, 

Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate 

an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess 

the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or 

accommodations. See Adeyeye, 721 F. 3d, at 455; see also 

Brief for United States 30, 33, 39. This distinction matters. 

Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, it would 

not be enough for an employer to conclude that forcing other 

employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift 

swapping, would also be necessary. 

IV 

Having clarifed the Title VII undue-hardship standard, 

we think it appropriate to leave the context-specifc application of that clarifed standard to the lower courts in the frst 

instance. The Third Circuit assumed that Hardison prescribed a “more than a de minimis cost” test, 35 F. 4th, at 

175, and this may have led the court to dismiss a number of 

possible accommodations, including those involving the cost 

of incentive pay, or the administrative costs of coordination 

with other nearby stations with a broader set of employees. 

Without foreclosing the possibility that USPS will prevail, 

we think it appropriate to leave it to the lower courts to 

apply our clarifed context-specifc standard, and to decide 

whether any further factual development is needed. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

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Sotomayor, J., concurring 

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Jackson joins, 

concurring. 

As both parties here agree, the phrase “more than a de 

minimis cost” from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 

432 U. S. 63, 84 (1977), was loose language. An employer 

violates Title VII if it fails “to reasonably accommodate” an 

employee's religious observance or practice, unless the employer demonstrates that accommodation would result in 

“undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 

42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j). The statutory standard is “undue 

hardship,” not trivial cost. 

Hardison, however, cannot be reduced to its “de minimis” 

language. Instead, that case must be understood in light of 

its facts and the Court's reasoning. The Hardison Court 

concluded that the plaintiff's proposed accommodation would 

have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business because the accommodation would have required the employer either to deprive other employees of 

their seniority rights under a collective-bargaining agreement, or to incur substantial additional costs in the form of 

lost effciency or higher wages. 432 U. S., at 79–81, 83–84, 

and n. 14. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has interpreted Title VII's undue-hardship standard in 

this way for seven consecutive Presidential administrations, 

from President Reagan to President Biden. See 29 CFR 

§ 1605.2(e) (2022) (citing Hardison, 432 U. S., at 80, 84). 

Petitioner Gerald Groff asks this Court to overrule Hardison and to replace it with a “signifcant diffculty or expense” 

standard. Brief for Petitioner 17–38. The Court does not 

do so. That is a wise choice because stare decisis has “enhanced force” in statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). Congress is free 

to revise this Court's statutory interpretations. The 

Court's respect for Congress's decision not to intervene promotes the separation of powers by requiring interested parties to resort to the legislative rather than the judicial procPage Proof Pending Publication
Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 475 

Sotomayor, J., concurring 

ess to achieve their policy goals. This justifcation for 

statutory stare decisis is especially strong here because 

“Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse 

[Hardison]—openings as frequent and clear as this Court 

ever sees.” Id., at 456–457.1 Moreover, in the decades 

since Hardison was decided, Congress has revised Title VII 

multiple times in response to other decisions of this Court,2 

yet never in response to Hardison. See Kimble, 576 U. S., 

at 457. 

Groff also asks the Court to decide that Title VII requires 

the United States Postal Service to show “undue hardship 

to [its] business,” not to Groff's co-workers. Brief for Petitioner 42 (emphasis added); see 35 F. 4th 162, 176 (CA3 2022) 

(Hardiman, J., dissenting). The Court, however, recognizes 

that Title VII requires “undue hardship on the conduct of 

the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j) (emphasis 

added). Because the “conduct of [a] business” plainly includes the management and performance of the business's 

employees, undue hardship on the conduct of a business may 

include undue hardship on the business's employees. See, 

e. g., Hardison, 432 U. S., at 79–81 (deprivation of employees' 

bargained-for seniority rights constitutes undue hardship). 

There is no basis in the text of the statute, let alone in eco1 See, e. g., H. R. 1440, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(4) (2021); H. R. 5331, 

116th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(4) (2019); S. 3686, 112th Cong., 2d Sess., 

§ 4(a)(3) (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(a)(3) (2010); S. 3628, 110th 

Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(1)(B) (2008); H. R. 1431, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., 

§ 2(a)(4) (2007); H. R. 1445, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2005); S. 677, 

109th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2005); S. 893, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., 

§ 2(a)(4) (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2002); H. R. 4237, 

106th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2000); S. 1668, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 

§ 2(a)(4) (1999); H. R. 2948, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1997); S. 1124, 

105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(3) 

(1997); H. R. 4117, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(3) (1996). 2 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 (overruling Wards Cove 

Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 

of 2009, 123 Stat. 5 (overruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 

550 U. S. 618 (2007)). 

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476 GROFF v. DeJOY 

Sotomayor, J., concurring 

nomics or common sense, to conclude otherwise. Indeed, for 

many businesses, labor is more important to the conduct of 

the business than any other factor. 

To be sure, some effects on co-workers will not constitute 

“undue hardship” under Title VII. For example, animus toward a protected group is not a cognizable “hardship” under 

any antidiscrimination statute. Cf. ante, at 472. In addition, some hardships, such as the labor costs of coordinating 

voluntary shift swaps, are not “undue” because they are too 

insubstantial. See 29 CFR §§ 1605.2(d)(1)(i), (e)(1). Nevertheless, if there is an undue hardship on “the conduct of the 

employer's business,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), then such hardship is suffcient, even if it consists of hardship on employees. 

With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

None