14-1373 Ilyas v. Lynch BIA A077 340 247 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF**  **APPELLATE PROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND**  **THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL**  **RULE 32.1.1. WHEN**  **CITING A**  **SUMMARY ORDER**  **IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN**  **ELECTRONIC DATABASE**  **(WITH THE**  **NOTATION “SUMMARY**  **ORDER”). A PARTY**  **CITING TO**  **A SUMMARY**  **ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **28 th**  **day of July, two thousand fifteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOSÉ A. CABRANES** , 7 **GERARD E. LYNCH,** 8 **CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **ALI ILYAS, AKA NAJAM SHARIFF** 13 **ILYAS,** 14 Petitioner **,** 15 16 **v. 14-1373** 17 **NAC** 18 19 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 20 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 21 Respondent **.** 22

**_____________________________________** 23 24 **FOR PETITIONER:** Ali Ilyas, pro se, Bronx, New York. 25 26 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant 27 Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, 28 Assistant Director; Janice K. 292 Redfern, Senior Litigation Counsel, 1 Office of Immigration Litigation, 2 U.S. Department of Justice, 3 Washington, D.C. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 8

DENIED. 9 Petitioner Ali Ilyas, a native and citizen of Pakistan, 10 seeks review of the BIA’s April 10, 2014, decision denying his 11 motion to reopen. In re Ali Ilyas , No. A077 340 247 (B.I.A. 12 Apr. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 13 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 14 We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 15 discretion. Ali v. Gonzales , 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). 16 When the agency considers relevant evidence of country 17 conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the 18 agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence 19 standard. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 20 2008). 21 An applicant may file one motion to reopen within 90 days 22 of the date on which a final administrative decision was 233 rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. 1 § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is 2 undisputed that Ilyas’s motion to reopen was untimely and 3 number-barred because it was his second motion and he filed it 4 almost 10 years after his order of removal became final. 5 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 6 However, the limitations do not apply where a motion is “based 7 on changed country conditions arising in the country of 8 nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,if 9 such evidence is material and was not available and would not 10 have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 11 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 12 It was not error for the agency to conclude that Ilyas 13 failed to show a material change in country conditions between 14 his asylum hearing and when he filed his motion to reopen. The 15 evidence showed that pervasive sectarian violence in Pakistan 16 existed in the years preceding Ilyas’s 2003 asylum hearing and 17 continued at the time of his 2014 motion to reopen. See Norani 18 v. Gonzales , 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006)(establishing 19 date of hearing as baseline for assessing whether evidence 20 establishes changed conditions). Although the news articles 214 and reports submitted by Ilyas suggested that violence may have 1 increased over the years, it was not error to conclude that the 2 recent evidence—even if it showed a marginal increase—was 3 insufficient to constitute a material change in country 4 conditions excusing the applicable procedural limitations. 5
See 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 6

s ee also In re S-Y-G- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (B.I.A. 2007) 7 (“Change that is incremental or incidental does not meet the 8 regulatory requirements” for motions to reopen based on changed 9 country conditions). 10 Moreover, as the BIA observed, evidence of generalized 11 sectarian violence in Pakistan was insufficient to show that 12 Ilyas’s fears differed from the population as a whole. See 13 Melgar de Torres v. Reno , 191 F.3d 307, 314 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) 14 (“General violence in [a country] does not constitute 15 persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s 16 well-founded fear of persecution.”). And the BIA was not 17 required to find that Ilyas would be targeted for converting 18 two people to Shia Islam because this assertion was found not 19 credible in his underlying merits proceedings. See Kaur v. 20

BIA , 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005). 215 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 1 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 2 for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. 3
FOR THE COURT: 4 Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 5 6 7