regulations," the subject parcel was a "remainder parcel" that was 

entitled to partial tax abatement. The Nevada Tax Commission (NTC) 

referred the case to a Chief Administrative Law Judge (AU. 

The AU J held a hearing, at which Hughes submitted 

approximately 20 exhibits demonstrating other instances in which the 

Assessor retroactively applied the remainder regulations, and as a result, 

either treated the "smaller" newly created parcel as the remainder parcel 

or allowed for all newly created parcels to be categorized as the remainder 

parcel. In response, the Assessor explained that it attempted to effectuate 

the legislative purpose behind NRS 361.4722 by trying to determine the 

property owner's intent; and in this case, because another newly created 

parcel was, at a size of 16.62 acres, much larger than the subject parcel, it 

appeared that the owner's intent was for the subject parcel to be a "new 

parcel for development" (NPD). In sum, the primary issue was whether 

the Assessor should evaluate only whether the parcel's use has changed, 

as provided in NAC 361.61034(3), or whether the Assessor should evaluate 

the relative size of the new parcels along with other circumstantial 

'The so-called "remainder regulations" were promulgated by the 

Nevada Tax Commission—effective March 23, 2007—to provide a 

methodology to evaluate whether a newly created parcel is eligible for a 

partial abatement of property taxes. NAC 361.61032. Specifically, NAC 

361.61034(1) states that all new parcels "must be separately evaluated to 

determine whether there has been any change in the use of the property." 

The remainder regulations require this evaluation because NAC 

361.61034(3) provides that if a newly created parcel's use has changed, 

then the parcel is a "new parcel for development," and may not receive a 

tax abatement, whereas if the use has not changed, then it is a remainder 

parcel, which may receive a tax abatement. NAC 361.61034(3). 

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considerations to determine if any parcels "remained" after the owner 

partitioned the NPDs. 

The AU J submitted his proposed findings of fact, conclusions 

of law, and decision (AU J proposed decision) to the NTC, finding that the 

subject parcel should be treated as a remainder parcel, and therefore 

subject to the tax abatement. The AU J found that treating the subject 

parcel as a remainder parcel was "in accordance with NRS 361.4722, and 

NAC 361.61002 to 361.61038." The AU J also recommended that the 

amount of the abatement should be determined using the apportionment 

formula set forth in NAC 361.61036. The NTC did not initially adopt the 

AU J proposed decision, finding instead that the Assessor's original 

interpretation of the statutes was appropriate (the first NTC decision). 

After two separate petitions for judicial review, the district 

court voided the NTC's decision. The district court found that the AUJ 

decision was logical and well written, and that the Assessor's methodology 

applied different standards to different properties, equating to a nonuniform taxation in violation of Article X, Section 1, of the Nevada 

Constitution. Following two district court remands, the NTC ultimately 

reversed course and adopted the AL's proposed decision in its entirety 

(the third NTC decision). 

The district court affirmed the third NTC decision, concluding 

that the Assessor had not met its burden of demonstrating that the 

decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or was arbitrary or 

capricious. Specifically, the district court found that the NTC did not 

retroactively apply the remainder regulations. Instead, it found that the 

NTC "applied the same standard as the remainder regulation[s], not 

because the standard had been codified, but because it was a reasonable 

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standard for determining whether the [slubject [p]arcel was a[n] [NPD]." 

(internal quotations omitted). As a result, the district court ruled that "in 

the absence of development activity [the subject parcel] should be treated 

as a remainder parcel." The Assessor now appeals. 

Standard of review 

"On appeal from orders deciding petitions for judicial review, 

this court reviews the administrative decision in the same manner as the 

district court," and without deference to the district court's decision. 

Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physicians' Bd., 130 Nev. , , 327 P.3d 487, 

489 (2014); Kay v. Nunez, 122 Nev. 1100, 1105, 146 P.3d 801, 805 (2006) 

("[T]his court affords no deference to the district court's ruling in judicial 

review matters."). 

"We review the factual determinations of administrative 

agencies for clear error 'in view of the reliable, probative and substantial 

evidence on the whole record' or for an 'abuse of discretion." Nassiri, 122 

Nev. at , 146 P.3d at 489 (quoting NRS 233B.135(3)(e), (0). "Thus, 

factual findings will only be overturned if they are not supported by 

substantial evidence, which, we have explained, is evidence that a 

reasonable mind could accept as adequately supporting the agency's 

conclusions." Id. 

We review questions of law de novo. City of N. Las Vegas v. 

Warburton, 127 Nev. , 262 P.3d 715, 718 (2011). However, 

"[a]lthough statutory construction is generally a question of law reviewed 

de novo, this court `defer[s] to an agency's interpretation of its governing 

statutes or regulations if the interpretation is within the language of the 

statute." Taylor v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 129 Nev. , 

314 P.3d 949, 951 (2013) (quoting Dutchess Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Nev. State 

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Bd. of Pharmacy, 124 Nev. 701, 709, 191 P.3d 1159, 1165 (2008) 

(alteration in original)). "[This] court may remand or affirm [a] final 

decision or set it aside in whole or in part if substantial rights of the 

petitioner have been prejudiced because the final decision of the agency is 

. . . [i]n violation of. . statutory provisions." NRS 233B.135(3)(a). When 

interpreting an unambiguous statute we "impart it with [its] ordinary 

meaning and [do] not go beyond that meaning." Star Ins. Co. v. Neighbors, 

122 Nev. 773, 776, 138 P.3d 507, 510 (2006). 

The NTC erred when it adopted the AM proposed decision because the AUJ 

proposed decision misapplied NRS 361.4722(6) 

The Assessor argues that the AU J proposed decision and, 

subsequently, the third NTC decision, misinterpreted NRS 361.4722(6). 

The Assessor alleges that NRS 361.4722(6) requires a two prong analysis 

and that the aforementioned decisions ignored the first prong and 

mistakenly determined only the second prong. We agree. 2 

NRS 361.4722(6) defines a remainder parcel as: 

[A] parcel of real property which remains after the 

creation of new parcels of real property for 

2Another key point of contention in this case is whether or not the 

remainder regulations were applied retroactively. See Cnty. of Clark ix LB 

Props., Inc., 129 Nev. „ 315 P.3d 294, 296 (2013) (explaining that 

legislative regulations generally may not be applied retroactively). We 

conclude, however, that whether or not the remainder regulations were 

applied retroactively is inconsequential at this point. As explained in this 

order, NRS 361.4722(6) requires a two prong analysis. The ALJ proposed 

decision ignored the first prong. Because we are reversing the district 

court order due to the AL's misapplication of NRS 361.4722(6), the issue 

of whether the AU J retroactively applied the remainder regulations is 

moot. 

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development from one or more existing parcels of 

real property, if the use of that remaining parcel 

has not changed from the immediately preceding 

fiscal year. 

Under this definition, a remainder parcel cannot exist without the 

formation of an NPD. And a parcel cannot be a remainder parcel if it 

underwent a change in use. Thus, the statute creates a two prong test for 

determining whether a parcel of land is a remainder parcel. 

Under the first prong, upon the division of a larger parcel, the 

Assessor must determine if one of the subdivided parcels is an NPD. The 

Assessor must first identify if there is an NPD, because under NRS 

361.4722(6), there cannot be a remainder parcel unless one of the other 

subdivided parcels is an NPD. For example, if fictional parcel A was 

completely divided into parcels B and C, both B and C cannot be 

remainder parcels because one must be an NPD. In other words, for B to 

be a remainder parcel, C would have to be an NPD, and vice versa. To 

determine whether a parcel is an NPD, the Assessor applies a multifactor 

approach. See Cnty. of Clark, 129 Nev. at 315 P.3d at 296-97 

(approving of the Assessor's multifactor approach in determining taxable 

value). The multifactor approach includes consideration of the size of the 

parcel, the money spent separating the parcel, how the parcel aligns with 

developed parcels in that area, and the zoning of the parcel. Upon 

completion of this analysis, after the Assessor determines which of the 

subdivided parcels is an NPD, the Assessor may proceed to NRS 

361.4722(6)'s second prong with regard to the non-NPD parcels. 

Under the second prong, once another parcel has been 

classified as an NPD, the Assessor examines whether the use of the 

subject parcel has changed, in order to determine if it is indeed a 

remainder parcel. See NRS 361.4722(6) (explaining that "if the use of that 

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remaining parcel has not changed from the immediately preceding fiscal 

year" then it is a remainder parcel (emphasis added)). If the parcel's use 

has changed, the parcel cannot be a remainder parcel. 

In the present case, when the 46.59 acre master parcel was 

split, the Assessor applied the multi-prong approach and determined that 

the 3.62 acre subject parcel was an NPD and, thus, was not a remainder 

parcel. The AU J proposed decision, however, which the NTC adopted and 

the district court affirmed, found that the subject parcel's use did not 

change and it, therefore, was a remainder parcel under NRS 361.4722. 

We conclude that the reasoning applied by the AU J proposed 

decision, which was subsequently adopted in the third NTC decision, is at 

odds with NRS 361.4722(6) because it merely takes into consideration the 

second prong, use change, and not the first prong, whether an NPD was 

created by the partition. Specifically, prior to determining that the subject 

parcel was a remainder parcel, the AU J proposed decision did not 

determine whether another parcel partitioned from the master parcel was 

an NPD. Instead, the AI, proposed decision concluded that the subject 

parcel was a remainder parcel simply because its use did not change. This 

one-sided analysis violated NRS 361.4722(6). 3 See NRS 233B.135(3)(a). 

3Hughes argues that "there is no evidence in the record regarding 

whether the other seven parcels that were created at the same time as the 

subject parcel were considered remainder parcels or [NPDs]." Therefore, 

Hughes contends that the Assessor's argument that the KA proposed 

decision failed to comply with NRS 361.4722(6)'s two prong analysis is not 

justiciable because the argument is based on hypothetical facts, 

specifically that the other seven sub-divided parcels from the master 

parcel were designated as remainder parcels as well, thus requiring that 

the subject parcel be designated as an NPD. Hughes' justiciability 

continued on next page . . . 

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Therefore, we conclude that the AU I proposed decision, which the NTC 

adopted and the district court affirmed, was decided in err and prejudiced 

substantial rights of the Assessor. 4Accordingly we, 

ORDER the third NTC decision, which the district court 

affirmed, REVERSED AND REMAND this matter for proceedings 

consistent with this order. 

Douglas 

kvzi,e 

Cherr 

ibbonh 

Pickering 

. . . continued 

argument, however, does not affect our conclusion because we are not 

basing our decision on how the other seven parcels were designated. We 

are simply concluding that the AU I proposed decision misinterpreted NRS 

361.4722(6) by failing to apply its first prong. That said, it is likely that on 

remand the administrative law judge will have to determine how the other 

seven parcels were classified in order to assess the first prong of NRS 

361.4722(6). Day v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 121 Nev. 387, 389, 116 P.3d 

68, 69 (2005) ("[T]his court has the inherent authority to remand 

administrative agency cases for factual determinations." (internal 

quotations omitted)). 

4We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude 

that it is unnecessary for us to reach their merits. 

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(0) I ,!474 
cc: Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge 

Clark County District Attorney/Civil Division 

Fennemore Craig, P.C./Reno 

Attorney General/Las Vegas 

Carson City Clerk 

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SAITTA, J., with whom HARDESTY, C.J., and PARRAGUIRRE, J., agree, 

dissenting: 

This case began over seven years ago. Prior to arriving at this 

court, this case was before an administrative law judge, the NTC multiple 

times, and various district court judges. Throughout this entire process, 

the primary issues have been: (1) how to assess "use change" in order to 

determine whether the subject parcel was a remainder parcel or an NPD, 

and (2) how to best calculate a tax abatement, if necessary. Now the 

majority chooses to shift the focus to whether or not one of the other seven 

sub-divided parcels of the master parcel was ever classified as an NPD, a 

fact not currently contained in the record. In analyzing this narrow issue, 

the majority fails to give the AU J proposed decision proper deference, 

which led the majority to mistakenly reverse and remand. Instead, in my 

view, the third NTC decision should be affirmed because the AU J proposed 

decision properly determined that the subject parcel was a remainder 

parcel and set forth the best methodology for calculating the requisite tax 

abatement. 

The majority improperly reversed and remanded this case 

because it failed to afford proper deference to the AL's interpretation of 

NRS 361.4722(6). See Taylor v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 129 Nev. 

„ 314 P.3d 949, 951 (2013) ("[T]his court defer[s] to an agency's 

interpretation of its governing statutes or regulations if the interpretation 

is within the language of the statute." (alteration in original) (internal 

quotations omitted)). Assuming that the majority's plain language 

reading of NRS 361.4722(6) is correct and that a two prong analysis is 

required, the AU J proposed decision only satisfied the second prong 

because those were the only facts made available to it. The ALJ could not 

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decide whether any of the other seven sub-divided parcels split from the 

master parcel were ever classified as an NPD because the Assessor did not 

submit the requisite evidence for making that decision. Although perhaps 

not as complete as the majority would prefer, the AL's interpretation of 

NRS 361.4722(6) was within the language of NRS 361.4722(6). 

Consequently, once afforded the proper level of deference, the AL's 

interpretation of NRS 361.4722(6) was satisfactory and reversal and 

remand was unnecessary. 

The AU J proposed decision properly decided both primary 

issues and should have been affirmed. First, the AU J utilized a proper 

methodology for assessing "use change." The AU, making it clear that he 

was using the remainder regulations as guidance and not precedent, 

implemented a more objective approach than the approach proposed by 

the Assessor, because he considered construction activity on the property. 

Then, in accordance with his methodology, the AU J properly classified the 

subject parcel as a remainder parcel. Further, the subject parcel's 

classification as a remainder parcel conformed with the consistency, 

uniformity, and predictability requirements of NRS 360.291. Second, the 

AL's decision to implement the apportionment formula codified in the 

remainder regulations is preferable to the Assessor's comparable sales 

approach. Once again the AU J acted properly because he simply used the 

remainder regulations as guidance.' Therefore, the AM proposed decision 

properly decided the primary issues and should have been affirmed. 

'The AL's handling of both issues was proper because he did not 

apply the remainder regulations retroactively in either instance. See 

Cnty. of Clark v. LB Props., Inc., 129 Nev. , 315 P.3d 294, 296 

continued on next page . . . 

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J. 

Parraguirre 

In sum, today's reversal and remand essentially starts this 

seven year litigation anew with no clarity as to the primary issues. The 

majority's failure to show the MA proposed decision the proper deference 

has created a scenario where this court will likely face the exact same 

questions once again after this case goes through another round of 

administrative hearings and district court proceedings. Therefore, I 

dissent. 

Saitta 

We concur: 

4_41,1 C.J. 

Hardesty 

. . continued 

(2013) (explaining that a regulation may only be applied prospectively 

unless an intent to apply it retroactively was clearly manifested or the 

regulation does not establish a substantive rule that creates a standard of 

conduct and imposes new rights or duties). 

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