This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 30,541 9 JOSHUA GONZALES, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 12 Steven L. Bell, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellee 16 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 17 Kimberly Chavez Cook, Assistant Appellate Defender 18 Santa Fe, NM 19 for Appellant 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION 212 CASTILLO, Judge. 1 Defendant appeals his convi ction for involuntary manslaughter. In this Court’s 2 notice of proposed summary disposition, weproposed to affirm. Defendant has 3 responded with a memorandum in opposition and a motion to amend the docketing 4 statement to add additional cl aims of error. We deny Defendant’s motion to amend 5 because it seeks to raise issues that are notviable on direct appeal. Because we are 6 not persuaded by the arguments in Defendant’s memorandum regarding the two issues 7 originally raised in the docketing statement, we affirm. 8 Motion to Amend the Docketing Statement 9 This Court will grant a motion to ame nd only if certain requirements are met, 10 including that the issues sought to be raised must be viable. See State v. Sommer , 118 11 N.M. 58, 60, 878 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1994) (denying the defendant’s motion 12 to amend the docketing statement when the argument offered in support of amendment 13 was not viable). Defendant’s motion to ame nd seeks to add three claims of error for 14 consideration on appeal. The first raises a claim of fundamental error with respect to 15 a jury instruction that the Defendant hi mself requested over the State’s objection. 16 [MIO 2, 6-20; DS 7] However, fundamental error has no application where a 17 defendant invites an error. See State v. Handa , 120 N.M. 38, 46, 897 P.2d 225, 233 18 (Ct. App. 1995). Defendant’s second issue relates to a jury instruction on proximate 193 cause, which Defendant acknow ledges he never requested. [MIO 2, 28-31] But our 1 Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamental error when the district court fails 2 to give an instruction that merely provide s a further definition of or elaboration on an 3 element of an offense. See State v. Munoz , 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 47, 126 N.M. 535, 972 4 P.2d 847 (finding no fundamental error when the district court failed to give that 5 portion of the proximate cause instruction that permits a determination of culpability 6 even when there is evidence that more than one person may have contributed to a 7 victim’s death). Finally, Defendant seeks to add a claim that the district court erred 8 in omitting a statement in the judgment thatDefendant’s parole is to be served 9 concurrently with parole in another case. [MIO 2, 31-32] De fendant’s argument is 10 based on what he believes the district court actually intended to put in the judgment, 11 a matter that we will not consider on appeal . Defendant is free to seek amendment of 12 the judgment in the district court to the degree that he believe s the error was simply 13 a clerical erro r arising from an oversight or omission. See Rule 5-113(B) NMRA. 14 Because we conclude that none of these issu es is viable on direct appeal, we deny 15 Defendant’s motion to amend the docketing statement. 16 Officer Presence During Voir Dire 17 Defendant contends that the district court erred in permitting police officers 18 who were witnesses in the case to remain in the courtroom during voir dire. [DS 7-8] 194 In Defendant’s docketing statement he asserted that the district court’s ruling was in 1 violation of Rule 11-615 NMRA, as well as his right to due process. [RP 7-8] 2 Defendant now concedes that this did not constitute a violation of Rule 11-615. [MIO 3 27] In this Court’s notice of proposed su mmary disposition, we stated that Defendant 4 had provided no explanation of how the presen ce of the officers deprived him of a fair 5 trial and that he had provided no authority that would support this as a basis for 6 reversal of his convictions. We stated th at when a party cites no authority to support 7 a claim of error, we assumeno such authority exists. In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 8 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). In Defendant’s memorandum in opposition, 9 he states that the jurors “exhibited notablediscomfort in answering” questions about 10 their attitude toward drug use—including their own drug use—and that the jurors “did 11 not appear to be responding candidly.” [MIO 27] Defendant asserts that we should 12 therefore conclude that he was deprived of a right to an impartial jury because his 13 convictions must have been based on jurors’ assumptions about known drug users. 14 As we are unable to determine how we c ould know from the record that jurors were 15 in fact made uncomfortable by the police presence, rather than by the nature of the 16 questions themselves, in light of the fact th at they were being as ked in a court of law, 17 in front of a judge, attorneys, and other members of the public, we cannot conclude 18 that the officers’ presence had any impact at all on voir dire. Furthermore, we find no 195 reason to conclude that jurors’ general conclusions about the violent propensities of 1 drug users must have played a role in th eir determination that Defendant should have 2 known that he was putting the vic tim in danger. It would seem just as likely that the 3 determination was based on the particular ev idence in this case: that Defendant knew 4 that Chavella’s brother was angry with th e victim, that the victim was taking great 5 care to hide from Chavella’s brother and Little Frankie, and that the heated emotional 6 state of Chavella’s brother provided Chavella ’s brother with an interest in finding the 7 victim that was serious enough that hewas willing to pay Defendant to have 8 Defendant lure the victim out of hiding. 9 Sufficiency of the Evidence 10 Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his 11 conviction for involuntary manslaughter. [DS 8] “In reviewing the sufficiency of the 12 evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, 13 indulging all reasonable inferen ces and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor 14 of the verdict.” State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26, 128 N.M. 711, 998 15 P.2d 176. “The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 16 most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the 17 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation 18 marks and punctuation omitted). 196 Although Defendant contends that the instruction on involuntary manslaughter 1 that he himself proffered was erroneous, it is against this instruction that we evaluate 2 the sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Vasquez , 2010 -NMCA- 041, ¶ 15, 148 3 N.M. 202, 232 P.3d 438; see also State v. Rosaire , 1996-NMCA-115, ¶¶ 20, 21, 123 4 N.M. 250, 939 P.2d 597. In order to find Defendant guilty of involuntary 5 manslaughter, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 6 Defendant asked the victim to come out of the house, that Defendant should have 7 known of the danger involved in his actions, th at he acted with a willful disregard for 8 the safety of others, and that his act caused the death of the victim. [RP 82] 9 In our notice of proposed summary disposition, we stated that Defendant’s 10 docketing statement indicated that the fo llowing evidence was introduced at trial: 11 Defendant owed the victim money for drugs . Little Frankie, a fri end of Defendant’s, 12 told Defendant that the victim had a roman tic interest in a woman named Chavella and 13 that Chavella’s brother was angry at the vi ctim. Little Frankie and Chavella’s brother 14 said they were having a hard time finding the victim, whom they believed was hiding 15 from them. They said they thought Defendant would be able to get the victim to let 16 his guard down, and that theywould pay Defendant’s debt to the victim if Defendant 17 could get the victim to comeout of his hiding place. De fendant then made a number 18 of phone calls, trying to reach the victim. In the phone calls, Defendant stated that he 197 had the money he owed the victim and wanted to pay him. Defendant determined 1 where the victim was hiding, and the three men went to th at location. Defendant went 2 to the door, and asked for the victim. Th e victim came out of the house and began 3 following Defendant. He was then shot by either Little Frankie, Chavella’s brother, 4 or both. At trial, recordings of phone calls were played fo r the jury in which 5 Defendant made statements suggesting that he knew on the day of the shooting that 6 something bad would happen to the victim if he followed Defendant out of the house. 7 We proposed to hold that, viewing the evid ence in the light most favorable to the 8 verdict, a reasonable juror could havefound beyond a reasonable doubt all of the 9 elements of involuntary manslaughter as set forth in the jury instruction. 10 In Defendant’s memorandum in opposition, he asserts that there is a factual 11 dispute about some of the information heprovided to this Court in the docketing 12 statement. [MIO 24] In Defendant’s docke ting statement, he informed this Court that 13 certain taped statements that were playedfor the jury did “suggest [Defendant] knew 14 that nothing good was going to happen to [the victim] when and if he came out of the 15 house at Defendant’s reque st.” [DS 5-6] In his memorandum in opposition, 16 Defendant attempts to create an issue of fact by now telling the Court that this was a 17 mischaracterization. [MIO 24] Even if we were inclined to accept Defendant’s later 18 description as opposed to his initial one, wenevertheless would need not reverse on 198 this basis. Assuming that Defendant’s statement to the police was primarily about his 1 fear and disbelief about what had just occurred, the remaining evidence described 2 above provided a sufficient basis for a reas onable juror to conclude that Defendant 3 should have known of the danger to the victim. 4 Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion and in our notice of proposed 5 summary disposition, we affirm. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

________________________________ 8 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 9 WE CONCUR: 10

__________________________________ 11 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 12

__________________________________ 13 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 14