COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

MARGARET L. SHARP 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0990-98-2 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 10, 1998 

ROLAND M. WOODARD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

John F. Daffron, Jr., Judge 

 (Augustus S. Hydrick, Jr., on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (Mary P. Usry; Hairfield, Morton & Allen, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Margaret L. Sharp (mother) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court modifying the child support paid by Roland M. 

Woodard (father). Mother contends that the trial court erred in 

(1) deviating from the presumptively correct amount of child 

support payable under the statutory guidelines; and (2) failing 

to award her attorney's fees and costs. Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Deviation from Guidelines

 The facts are not in dispute. As set out in the written 

statement of facts, mother moved to reinstate this case and 

sought a change in custody and in child support. By agreement of 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the parties, mother was awarded sole custody of the parties' two 

minor children. The trial court calculated the amount of child 

support which would be presumptively correct under the statutory 

guidelines based upon the parties' joint income. See Code 

§§ 20-108.1(B) and 20-108.2(B). The court then determined that 

mother's receipt of approximately $100,000 as her share of the 

proceeds from the sale of an inherited beach house made 

application of the guidelines unjust or inappropriate. The court 

reduced the amount of support payable to mother by father from 

$958 to $750. 

 Mother contends that the trial court erred in deviating from 

the statutory guidelines on the basis of the sale proceeds. We 

find no error. 

 "[I]n determining child support, there is a 

rebuttable presumption that the amount 

determined in accordance with the statutory 

guidelines, Code § 20-108.2, is the correct 

award." Should the trial judge conclude that 

"application of [such] guidelines would be 

unjust or inappropriate in a particular case 

as determined by relevant evidence pertaining 

to the factors set out in §§ 20-107.2 and 

20-108.1," the court may depart from the 

statutory schedule, provided the attendant 

order adequately explains the deviation. 

Cooke v. Cooke, 23 Va. App. 60, 63, 474 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1996) 

(citations omitted). See Richardson v. Richardson, 12 Va. App. 

18, 401 S.E.2d 894 (1991). Here, the trial court first 

determined the parties' gross income pursuant to the statutory 

guidelines, then found that application of the guidelines would 

be unjust or inappropriate under the circumstances. The trial 
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court did not attempt to include the proceeds of the sale of the 

beach house in mother's gross income. Therefore, the extent to 

which mother realized any capital gains was irrelevant. Based 

upon this record, we do not find that the trial court's decision 

to deviate from the guidelines was an abuse of discretion. See

id. at 21, 401 S.E.2d at 896. 

Attorney's Fees and Costs

 An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the 

sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal 

only for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. 

App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper 

award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the 

circumstances. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 

338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). The trial court found that mother 

had realized an "extraordinary gain" as a result of the sale of 

her family's beach house. We cannot say that the trial court 

abused its discretion in refusing to award mother her attorney's 

fees and costs. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.