IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52278-1-II

Respondent.

vs. PUBLISHED OPINION

LLEWELLYN ANDREW ROY,

Appellant.

MAXA, C.J. – Llewellyn Roy appeals his conviction of second degree animal cruelty. 

Under RCW 16.52.207(2)(a)1, a person is guilty of second degree animal cruelty for “fail[ing] to 

provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention” and 

causing unnecessary pain as a result.

Roy argues that RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) provides five alternative means of committing the 

offense. Because the jury was instructed on all five means and was not instructed that jurors had 

to be unanimous regarding one of the means, he claims that the State was required to present 

sufficient evidence to support each means to sustain the conviction.

We hold that RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) provides only a single means of committing the 

crime of second degree animal cruelty, and the five listed terms are merely different ways of 

 

1 RCW 16.52.207 was amended in 2019. Because those amendments do not materially affect the 

language relied on by this court, we cite to the current version of the statute. 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

April 7, 2020
No. 52278-1-II

2

committing that single means. And we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove 

one of the ways, failing to provide necessary medical treatment and thereby causing unnecessary 

or unjustifiable physical pain to his animals. Accordingly, we affirm Roy’s conviction.

FACTS

On the evening of July 15, 2017, Roy was arrested on his way to the store and placed in 

jail. At the time, he owned two mastiffs named Fausto and Azura, a bulldog named Mike, and 

four parrots.

On July 19, Roy’s neighbor, Lisa Wesen, was concerned because she heard barking day 

and night and noticed that Roy’s car had not been home for several days. After knocking on the 

front door and finding no one home, she went to the back fence and saw the three dogs in the 

backyard. Fausto was in a kennel on the back porch that was compacted with feces, and the dog 

had nowhere to stand or lie down. Mike was on the back porch staring at the door and Azura 

was by the fence barking. The mastiffs looked skinny, had red and goopy eyes, and did not look 

healthy. Wesen and her husband brought food and water to the dogs and a neighbor shoveled out 

the kennel. Wesen contacted Jennifer Krueger, an animal control officer for the City of 

Centralia.

Krueger went to the jail and spoke with Roy and Roy asked her to contact his mother to 

take care of the animals. When Roy’s mother declined to help, Krueger contacted Roy again and 

he provided Krueger with a key to his home. Krueger also asked him to release the animals to an 

animal shelter so they could get regular care.

Krueger went to Roy’s home with Kyle Stockdale, another animal control officer. Roy’s 

home was very warm and smelled of urine and feces. The parrots had shredded newspaper that 
No. 52278-1-II

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was strewn about the living room. One of the parrots had died. The cages were filthy and the 

parrots had no food or water.

They found the dogs in the backyard. Krueger described the mastiffs: 

They were very, very skinny. You could see every knob on their spine. They had 

big sores on their elbows where they lay down. Their eyes were -- their eyelids 

were very swollen with a condition called cherry eye. The female couldn’t even 

hardly see out of her eyes, because the top and bottom lids were so swollen it was 

just a little slit for her to see.

 

1 Report of Proceedings at 113. She described the mastiffs as being in bad shape and in pain. 

Stockdale provided similar testimony. Both mastiffs eventually received medical treatment for 

their cherry eye as well as for ear and skin infections.

The State charged Roy with first degree and second degree animal cruelty. At trial, the 

State explained that the first degree charge pertained to the deceased parrot and the second 

degree charge pertained to the mastiffs.

The to-convict instruction for second degree animal cruelty, tracking the language of 

RCW 16.52.207(2)(a), required the State to prove that Roy “knowingly, recklessly, or with 

criminal negligence failed to provide an animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or 

medical attention.” Clerk’s Papers at 25. The trial court instructed the jury that it had to be 

unanimous as to one act of second degree animal cruelty. The court did not instruct the jury that 

it had to be unanimous regarding the particular ways of committing the crime listed in the toconvict instruction.

The jury could not reach a verdict on first degree animal cruelty pertaining to the parrot 

and found Roy guilty of second degree animal cruelty pertaining to the mastiffs. Roy appeals his 

conviction.
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ANALYSIS

A. SECOND DEGREE ANIMAL CRUELTY AND ALTERNATIVE MEANS

Roy argues that RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) provides five alternative means of committing

second degree animal cruelty and that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove each 

means. We disagree.

1. Statutory Language

RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) provides:

 An owner of an animal is guilty of animal cruelty in the second degree if, under 

circumstances not amounting to first degree animal cruelty, the owner knowingly, 

recklessly, or with criminal negligence: 

 (a) Fails to provide the animal with necessary shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or 

medical attention and the animal suffers unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain 

as a result of the failure.

RCW 16.52.207(2)(a). RCW 16.52.207 identifies three other means of committing second degree 

animal cruelty: knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence inflicting unnecessary suffering 

or pain on an animal, RCW 16.52.207(1)(a); abandoning an animal, RCW 16.52.207(2)(b); and 

abandoning an animal when the animal suffers bodily harm or the abandonment creates a risk that 

the animal will suffer substantial bodily harm, RCW 16.52.207(2)(c).

Roy claims that RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) identifies five alternative means for committing 

the crime under that subsection: knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence failing to 

provide (1) shelter, (2) rest, (3) sanitation, (4) space, or (5) medical attention. The State argues

that subsection (2)(a) identifies only one means of committing animal cruelty, and that the 

subsection merely provides five ways of committing that single means.

2. Alternative Means Doctrine

An alternative means crime is one where the applicable statute provides that the 

proscribed criminal conduct can be proved in multiple ways. State v. Barboza-Cortes, 194 
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Wn.2d 639, 643, 451 P.3d 707 (2019). As a general rule, the statute identifies a single crime and 

states that the crime can be committed by more than one means. State v. Smith, 159 Wn.2d 778, 

784, 154 P.3d 873 (2007). Determining whether a statute provides alternative means of 

committing a crime is a matter of judicial interpretation. Barboza-Cortes, 194 Wn.2d at 643.

The alternative means determination relates to jury unanimity required under article I, 

section 21 of the Washington Constitution. State v. Owens, 180 Wn.2d 90, 95, 323 P.3d 1030 

(2014). For an alternative means crime, a defendant is entitled to a unanimous jury 

determination as to the particular means by which he or she committed the crime. Id. If there is 

no express statement of jury unanimity, the State must present sufficient evidence to support 

each of the alternative means. Id. But if the statute identifies a single means of committing a 

crime, unanimity is not required even if there are different ways of establishing that means. See

Barboza-Cortes, 194 Wn.2d at 643.

The alternative means analysis focuses on whether the statute describes the crime in 

terms of separate, distinct acts (alternative means) or in terms of closely related acts that are 

aspects of one type of conduct (not alternative means). State v. Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d 726, 734. 

364 P.3d 87 (2015).

The more varied the criminal conduct, the more likely the statute describes 

alternative means. But when the statute describes minor nuances inhering in the 

same act, the more likely the various “alternatives” are merely facets of the same 

criminal conduct.

Id.

Two other principles are relevant here. First, the use of a disjunctive “or” in a list of 

ways of committing the crime does not necessarily mean that those ways are alternative means. 

Owens, 180 Wn.2d at 96. For example, in Owens the Supreme Court held that seven terms 
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stated in the disjunctive, read together, constituted a single means rather than seven alternative 

means for trafficking in stolen property. Id. at 98.

Second, a statute that provides a means within a means does not identify an alternative 

means crime. Smith, 159 Wn.2d at 783. “[W]here a disputed instruction involves alternatives 

that may be characterized as a ‘means within [a] means,’ the constitutional right to a unanimous 

jury verdict is not implicated and the alternative means doctrine does not apply.” Id. 

3. Analysis

In Barboza-Cortes, the court addressed RCW 9.41.040(2)(a), which states that a person is 

guilty of second degree possession of a firearm if the person “owns, has in his or her possession, 

or has in his or her control any firearm” after having been previously convicted of certain 

felonies. 194 Wn.2d at 646. The court held that this statute did not establish an alternative 

means crime. Id. The court stated, “While there may be subtle distinctions in aspects of 

ownership, possession, and control that may be material in other contexts, in the present 

circumstances that all describe ways of accessing guns.” Id. Therefore, the terms were merely 

“nuances inhering in” accessing guns and “facets of the same criminal conduct.” Id. (quoting 

Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d at 734).

In Owens, the court addressed RCW 9A.82.050(1), which prohibits trafficking in stolen 

property. 180 Wn.2d at 92. The statute provided that a person is guilty of trafficking if he or she 

“ ‘knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises the theft of 

property for sale to others.’ ” Id. at 96 (quoting RCW 9A.82.050(1)). The court held that this 

group of terms together identified a single category of criminal conduct – facilitating or 

participating in the theft of stolen property. Id. at 98-99.
No. 52278-1-II

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Here, shelter, rest, sanitation, space, and medical attention represent different aspects of 

the basic necessities for an animal’s comfortable life. They are not independent, essential 

elements of the crime. Instead, they are “minor nuances inhering in the same act” and “facets of 

the same criminal conduct.” Sandholm, 184 Wn.2d at 734. Read together, the listed terms 

criminalize failing to provide an animal with basic necessities.

We conclude that RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) identifies a single means of committing second 

degree animal cruelty: failing to provide an animal with the basic necessities of life and thereby 

causing unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain. RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) does not describe five 

alternative means of committing that crime.

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Roy argues that his due process rights were violated because the State did not present 

sufficient evidence to prove all of the means listed in RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) beyond a reasonable 

doubt. But we have held above that RCW 16.52.207(2)(a) provides a single means of 

committing second degree animal cruelty, not five alternative means. As noted above, if the 

statute identifies a single means of committing a crime, unanimity is not required even if there 

are different ways of establishing that means. See Barboza-Cortes, 194 Wn.2d at 643. 

Therefore, the State had to prove only that Roy failed to provide both mastiffs with necessary 

shelter, rest, sanitation, space, or medical attention.

Here, the State presented evidence that Roy failed to provide both mastiffs with medical 

attention. Both dogs were emaciated, had sores on their elbows, and had cherry eye. Both 

also exhibited pain when they moved. Both were later treated for the cherry eye as well as ear 

and skin infections. And there was evidence that the mastiffs suffered unnecessary or 

unjustifiable physical pain as a result of the failure to provide medical attention.
No. 52278-1-II

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We hold that the State provided sufficient evidence that Roy’s conduct amounted to second 

degree animal cruelty under RCW 16.52.207(2)(a).

CONCLUSION

We affirm Roy’s conviction of second degree animal cruelty.

MAXA, C.J.

We concur:

SUTTON, J.

GLASGOW, J.