NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 180477-U

Order filed December 22, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

DWIGHT E. MUSSON, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Will County, Illinois, 

Appeal Nos. 3-18-0477 and 3-18-0478 

Circuit Nos. 13-CF-1435 and 

 13-CF-2252 

Honorable 

David Martin Carlson, 

Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Schmidt and Wright concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: (1) The record was insufficient to review defendant’s claim that the State 

presented misleading evidence to the grand juries, and defendant’s claim that the 

evidence presented to the grand juries was insufficient to support a finding of 

probable cause was improper. (2) The evidence was sufficient to prove defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance 

and drug-induced homicide. (3) Any error in the court’s admission of othercrimes evidence was harmless. 

¶ 2 Defendant, Dwight E. Musson, appeals his convictions for unlawful delivery of a 

controlled substance and drug-induced homicide. Defendant argues that (1) the Will County 
2 

circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the bills of indictment, (2) the evidence was 

insufficient to prove him guilty of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, and (3) the court 

abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On June 28, 2013, defendant was charged by indictment with unlawful delivery of a 

controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 2012)) in that he “knowingly and 

unlawfully delivered a substance containing heroin, a controlled substance, other than as 

authorized in the [Illinois] Controlled Substances Act [(Act) (id. § 100 et seq.)].” Defendant was 

also charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (id. § 402(c)), but this charge 

was dismissed prior to trial. The charges were filed in Will County case No. 13-CF-1435. 

¶ 5 On October 17, 2013, defendant was charged by indictment with drug-induced homicide 

(720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 2012)) in that he “knowingly and unlawfully deliver[ed] heroin, a 

controlled substance, to Rebecca Sova, and Rebecca Sova thereafter ingested a portion of said 

heroin into her body, and said ingestion of heroin caused the death of Rebecca Sova.” This 

charge was filed in Will County case No. 13-CF-2252. 

¶ 6 A. Motion to Dismiss the Bills of Indictment

¶ 7 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss both bills of indictment. Defendant alleged that at 

both grand jury proceedings, Officer Jason Barten gave misleading testimony, and, as a result, 

the bills of indictment violated defendant’s right to due process. Specifically, defendant alleged 

that Barten “allow[ed] the members of the Grand Jury to falsely believe that the Defendant went 

alone and purchase[d] the drugs,” which caused the grand juries to return the bills of indictment. 

Defendant also argued that the testimony presented to the grand juries did not provide probable 
3 

cause to believe that the charged offenses had been committed. Defendant purported to quote 

from the transcript of the grand jury proceedings in his motion. 

¶ 8 Several hearings were held on defendant’s motion to dismiss the bills of indictment. Over 

the course of the hearings, the court admitted into evidence a video recording of defendant’s 

interview with Detective Shawn Filipiak, a video recording of defendant’s interview with Barten, 

transcripts of each interview, and transcripts of the grand jury proceedings. Neither the recording 

of defendant’s interview with Barten nor the transcripts of the grand jury proceedings are 

contained in the record on appeal. 

¶ 9 At one of the hearings on defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments, Barten testified 

that he was one of the primary investigators on this case. Barten acknowledged that he testified 

before the first grand jury that defendant had stated that he gave the heroin to Sova after he 

purchased it. Barten testified that he believed that defendant said this during one of his 

videotaped statements. If such statements were not in the videos, they would not be anywhere 

else. Barten also testified that he received a forensic report of defendant’s cell phone on July 9, 

2013, which contained records of text messages. He was aware of the content of these text 

messages when he testified before the second grand jury, but he was not aware of it at the time 

he testified before the first grand jury. 

¶ 10 Defense counsel argued that Barten’s testimony before both grand juries was inaccurate 

and misleading because nothing in defendant’s interview with the police indicated that he 

purchased the heroin and then gave it to Sova. Defense counsel asserted that defendant stated in 

his interviews that he and Sova purchased the heroin together. Defense counsel argued that even 

the text messages did not support Barten’s representations to the second grand jury that 

defendant purchased the heroin and gave it to Sova. 
4 

¶ 11 The court denied the motion to dismiss as it related to the bill of indictment for druginduced homicide, which was returned by the second grand jury. The court took the matter under 

advisement as it related to the bill of indictment for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.

The matter was continued to August 31, 2015. A docket entry indicates that the motion to 

dismiss was denied at that time. However, the record does not contain a written order or the

transcript of the proceedings on August 31.1

¶ 12 B. Pretrial Motions Concerning Other-Crimes Evidence

¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence that he had used or sold illegal 

drugs on prior occasions. Defendant argued that this evidence was inadmissible to show his 

propensity to commit a crime and that the probative value of the evidence would be substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

¶ 14 The State filed a motion to admit evidence of other crimes. The motion stated that the 

State planned to introduce evidence that defendant regularly sold heroin to Barry Burd, his 

coworker. The State indicated that this evidence would be introduced to show defendant’s intent 

to deliver heroin to Sova. 

¶ 15 The court ultimately ruled that it would allow Burd to testify regarding prior heroin 

transactions with defendant. The court reasoned that “if it goes to one of the elements the State 

has to prove, they are allowed to get into it.” 

¶ 16 C. Trial

1

In his reply brief, defendant contends that the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was 

contained in the transcripts he provided. However, defendant cited to a portion of the transcript in which 

the court denied his motion to dismiss based on his argument that the State failed to give the applicable 

law to the grand jury. Defendant does not reassert this argument on appeal. The record does not contain a 

transcript of the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with 

unlawful delivery of a controlled substance on the basis that Barten provided inaccurate testimony before 

the grand jury.
5 

¶ 17 The matter proceeded to a bench trial. Sandra Kovalcik, Sova’s mother, testified that she 

saw Sova on June 27, 2013. She saw Sova at the hospital the next day after receiving a call from 

defendant. Defendant said that he was Sova’s friend and that Sova had overdosed on heroin. 

Sova died on July 2, 2013. 

¶ 18 Detective Filipiak interviewed defendant on June 29, 2013, after defendant had agreed to 

accompany several detectives to the police station. Filipiak knew Sova’s father, a retired police 

officer, before working on the case. An audio and video recording of Filipiak’s interview with 

defendant was admitted into evidence and played in open court. In the recording, defendant 

stated that he had been in a sexual relationship with Sova for approximately a month and a half. 

On June 27, 2013, defendant and Sova met at a gas station between 8 and 9 p.m. They went to 

some friends’ houses. They then went to defendant’s residence and used heroin together. 

¶ 19 Sova’s money was used to purchase the heroin, and defendant had the connection. The 

detectives asked defendant: “How many grams did you buy? How much money’s worth?” 

Defendant replied, “One hundred dollars’ worth.” Filipiak asked: “You purchased it and then 

you guys got high together and do you believe that is about right? Is that all correct?” Defendant 

replied, “Yeah.” Filipiak asked, “Did [Sova] go with you when you purchased it? Did she drive 

and you were the passenger?” Defendant replied, “Yeah.” Filipiak asked defendant if Sova 

handed him money to purchase the heroin, and defendant nodded his head. Filipiak asked: 

“Okay. And then you went up and purchased it from your source?” Defendant nodded his head. 

Filipiak asked, “A hundred dollars’ worth of heroin?” Defendant nodded his head.2 Filipiak 

2

A transcript of the interview prepared by the defense, which was introduced at trial as a 

demonstrative exhibit, does not indicate that defendant nodded his head when Filipiak asked defendant if 

he went up and purchased the heroin from his source and whether it was one-hundred dollars’ worth of 

heroin. However, the video recording shows that defendant nodded his head, indicating “yes,” after each 

of these questions was asked.
6 

asked, “Is it one bag or multiple bags?” Defendant replied, “Multiple bags.” Defendant said that 

there were a total of six bags. They went to a friend’s house and then went to defendant’s 

residence. They started using the heroin when they got to defendant’s residence. 

¶ 20 Defendant went to sleep at approximately 6:30 a.m. Sova lay down next to him. 

Defendant woke up at 7:40 a.m. Sova was still sleeping. She was lying on defendant, and he 

rolled her off of him. She made a gurgling noise. Defendant went to work. Defendant called 

Sova multiple times, but she did not answer. Defendant remembered the gurgling noise and 

became concerned that something was wrong. Defendant checked on Sova during his lunch 

break. She was still lying on the same spot on the bed. Her lips were blue. She was breathing and 

gurgling a little bit. Defendant drove Sova to the hospital. He stayed at the hospital for 

approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour. Defendant called Sova’s mother and left. 

¶ 21 Burd testified that he had been granted immunity from prosecution for the offenses of 

possession of controlled substances and delivery of controlled substances from 2013 if he 

testified truthfully and consistently with his prior statements to the police. Burd previously 

worked with defendant at a bar. In June 2013, Burd was using heroin. He purchased heroin from 

defendant approximately every two to three days. Sometimes defendant brought the heroin to 

work. Other times, Burd picked it up from his house or across the street from the Jiffy Lube 

where defendant also worked. 

¶ 22 On June 28, 2013, at approximately 9 to 10 a.m., defendant called Burd and asked him to 

go to his house to check on Sova. Defendant told Burd that Sova was not awake when he left the 

house, and she was not answering her phone. Defendant said that they had been “up partying all 

night.” Burd got dressed, used heroin, and went to defendant’s residence. He arrived 

approximately 30 minutes later. Burd found Sova lying in a bed. She would not wake up. Burd 
7 

lifted her arm, and she seemed stiff and cold. He put his finger on her neck to check for a pulse, 

but he could not find one. Sova was cold to the touch and had blue lips. Burd told defendant that 

he could not find a pulse and that he would call 911. Defendant said he would take care of it. 

Burd did not call 911 because he was afraid. He left the residence.

¶ 23 Barten testified concerning security camera footage from the hospital. The footage 

showed defendant pull up to the hospital in his father’s pickup truck. Sova was taken out of the 

passenger seat and placed in a wheelchair. The security camera footage was played in court. A 

video recording of defendant’s interview at the Shorewood Police Department was also played.3

Neither the security camera footage nor the recording of the interview is included in the record 

on appeal. 

¶ 24 Officer Daniel Tischina testified that he recovered a video from the gas station where 

defendant and Sova met on June 27, 2013, at approximately 9:25 p.m. Tischina testified that in 

the video, Sova could be seen by her vehicle at the gasoline pump. She then drove the vehicle to 

an area with no security cameras. A white truck with a decal on it, which appeared similar to the 

truck defendant drove to the hospital, pulled up to the gas station. The white truck exited the gas 

station parking lot, and Sova’s vehicle followed it. The security camera footage was admitted 

into evidence, but it is not contained in the record on appeal. 

¶ 25 Pursuant to stipulation, an ATM receipt showing a withdrawal of $100 on June 27, 2013, 

at 10:20 p.m. was admitted into evidence. Sova’s father gave the receipt to the police, and it was 

presumed to be Sova’s ATM receipt.

3

Only Barten’s testimony on redirect examination and recross-examination appear in the record. 

This testimony occurred during the afternoon session on October 4, 2017. It appears that there was a 

morning session of the trial on October 4, but no transcript for this session appears in the record.
8 

¶ 26 Dr. Peter Stockmal testified as an expert witness in the field of emergency medicine. 

Stockmal testified that he treated Sova in the ER on June 28, 2013. Sova was unconscious and 

not breathing well. The providers in the ER gave her Narcan, which would revive someone who 

had recently overdosed on narcotics. Sova did not respond to the Narcan. Stockmal said that by 

the time Sova was brought to the hospital, the initial effect of the heroin may have worn off and 

she may have been suffering from encephalopathy from not breathing. In that situation, Narcan 

would not have had much effect. 

¶ 27 Stockmal testified that his notes indicated the male who brought Sova to the ER reported 

that she had been snorting heroin at 6 a.m. that morning. Sova’s urine was tested for the presence 

of drugs. It was positive for opiates, barbiturates, and cocaine. Her blood was tested for aspirin, 

Tylenol, and alcohol. All the blood tests were negative. Sova’s pupils were dilated symmetrically 

and were reactive to light. In the event of a fresh heroin overdose, a patient’s pupils would be 

constricted. However, there were several hours between Sova’s ingestion of heroin and her 

treatment in the ER, which could have allowed for the pupils to no longer be constricted. 

¶ 28 Sova was transferred to the intensive care unit (ICU), where her treatment was managed 

by other doctors. At the time Sova was transferred to the ICU, Stockmal had diagnosed her with 

heroin overdose, respiratory failure, question early rhabdomyolysis with renal insufficiency, mild 

hyperkalemia, and toxic/anoxic encephalopathy. Stockmal testified that rhabdomyolysis was a 

muscle injury. He stated that Sova’s creatine kinase (CK) was elevated, which can be caused by 

a muscle injury or being in a still position without moving. Stockmal testified that the 

encephalopathy diagnosis meant that Sova’s brain was not functioning. Stockmal acknowledged 

that Sova was positive for cocaine as well as heroin.
9 

¶ 29 Officer Daniel Koopman testified that he and three other officers executed a search 

warrant on the residence where defendant indicated that he and Sova had used heroin prior to her 

hospital admission. Koopman searched a bedroom at the residence. Koopman saw a white 

powdery substance and a business card with a similar white powdery substance on it on top of a 

dresser. Koopman also observed a similar white powder on a blanket. Koopman also saw a 

“corner cut baggy.” Pursuant to stipulation, the white powder on the blanket was tested and 

found to contain cocaine. None of the other items were tested. 

¶ 30 Larry Shelton, a forensic scientist at the crime laboratory, was accepted as an expert 

witness in forensic science in the field of toxicology.4 Shelton testified that he received samples 

of blood and urine in connection with the instant case to be tested for drugs. The testing began on 

July 23, 2013. The testing was “geared toward the cocaine and the opiates” because of the 

limited sample that was available. A preliminary test showed positive results for barbiturates, 

opiates, and cocaine. A confirmatory test on the urine showed the presence of 6-

Monoacetylmorphine (6-MAM), codeine, morphine, and naloxone. Shelton testified that 6-

MAM was a metabolite of heroin. Shelton then performed quantitative testing on the blood. The 

testing did not detect cocaine, but it detected benzoylecgonine, the major metabolite of cocaine, 

at a level of 630 micrograms per liter. Codeine was detected at a level of less than 10 

micrograms per liter, and morphine was detected at a level of less than 50 micrograms per liter.

¶ 31 For the morphine test, the samples were diluted. Three tests were run on three different 

levels of dilution. Each test returned a result of approximately 30 micrograms per liter. Because 

the response that the testing instrument gave for all the dilutions was below the lowest calibrator 

4

Shelton referred to his place of employment as the “Illinois State Police Forensic Sciences 

Command.” However, for the sake of consistency, we refer to it as the “crime laboratory” throughout this 

order. 
10 

used in the calibration curve, the tester could not be as sure about the accuracy of the result. 

Accordingly, the results were reported as less than 50 micrograms per liter rather than the 

specific numbers. Thirty to fifty micrograms per liter was a therapeutic level of morphine.

¶ 32 Daniel Isenschmid, a forensic toxicologist at NMS Laboratories, testified as an expert 

witness in the field of toxicology. In January 2017, NMS Laboratories received two vials of 

Sova’s blood. The blood had been drawn on June 28, 2013, and it had been stored at room 

temperature. Isenschmid said that there were a lot of limitations to using such a sample, as 

“things are going to start breaking down.” Isenschmid also noted that some drugs were less 

stable than other drugs, “[s]o there may be some loss.”

¶ 33 Before testing the sample, Isenschmid indicated to the police that the sample “quite 

possibly could be goopy” due to its age. “Goopy” meant a “very thick, mucousy sample.” Such a 

sample may not be testable. When the sample of Sova’s blood arrived at NMS Laboratories, 

employees determined that it could still be tested but the quantitative numbers were likely 

unreliable. Isenschmid stated that he did not describe the sample he actually received as “goop.” 

¶ 34 NMS Laboratories ran an “expanded postmortem drug screen,” which tested for 

approximately 230 therapeutic drugs. The testing revealed positive findings for morphine, 

codeine, diphenhydramine (or Benadryl), caffeine, cotinine (a nicotine metabolite), MEGX (a 

lidocaine metabolite), and naloxone. 

¶ 35 NMS Laboratories also ran a second confirmatory test for morphine, codeine, 

diphenhydramine, and barbiturates. The confirmatory test revealed morphine at 97 nanograms 

per milliliter, codeine at less than 5 nanograms per milliliter, and diphenhydramine at 55 

nanograms per milliliter. Isenschmid testified that nanograms per milliliter was the “same thing”

as micrograms per liter. Isenschmid stated that the morphine concentration and the small amount 
11 

of codeine in Sova’s blood indicated that the morphine probably came from the ingestion of 

heroin. Diphenhydramine was frequently used as a cutting agent with heroin. The confirmatory 

test revealed a very small amount of butalbital, a barbiturate, but it was below the reporting 

limits. Isenschmid stated that the positive result for MEGX was an incidental finding and was not 

quantitated. MEGX came from lidocaine, which was frequently used in hospitals. Lidocaine was 

also a cutting agent of cocaine, heroin, and other drugs. 

¶ 36 Isenschmid indicated that the positive findings of the testing were accurate, but he 

“wouldn’t put too much weight on the actual number[s]” due to the age of the sample and its 

storage conditions. Isenschmid stated that the testing done at the crime laboratory was more 

reliable. Isenschmid also stated that there may have been other drugs in the blood that had 

broken down over time and could not be detected by NMS Laboratories. Isenschmid noted that 

benzoylecgonine, a breakdown product of cocaine, was found by the crime laboratory when it 

previously tested the blood. NMS Laboratories was not able to detect benzoylecgonine, and this 

was likely due to the age of the sample. 

¶ 37 Defense counsel asked Isenschmid what level of morphine was toxic. Isenschmid replied:

“That’s going to vary very, very much in different individuals. It’s a drug when 

given by itself as morphine produces a fair amount of tolerance. So somebody 

that’s been on it for a long time, like for cancer, could tolerate very high amounts; 

versus somebody who has not used it before, a toxic amount could be as low as 

20, 30, 40 nanograms per milliliter. It depends.” 

¶ 38 Dr. Michel Humilier testified as an expert witness in the field of forensic pathology. 

Humilier performed an autopsy on Sova on July 2, 2013. Sova’s lungs revealed edema, which 

was consistent with having been on a respirator for several days. It could also be caused by 
12 

heroin or opiate use. Sova’s heart was slightly heavy. Her liver, spleen, and kidneys were 

congested, which were normal findings with the heart stopping. Sova’s brain showed edema, or 

excess fluid, which can occur with a lack of oxygen to the brain. The brain also showed diffuse 

softening, which was consistent with Sova having been on artificial respiration for several days. 

The use of opiates was also a possible cause for cerebral edema.

¶ 39 Humilier testified that the crime laboratory reported that urine collected from Sova at the 

hospital was positive for 6-MAM, the first metabolite of heroin. After heroin was converted to 6-

MAM, it then converted to morphine. The presence of 6-MAM conclusively indicated that 

heroin was present in Sova’s system. According to the report from NMS Laboratories, the blood 

collected from Sova at the hospital was positive for morphine in the concentration of 97 

nanograms per milliliter. The prior report from the crime laboratory indicated that there was

morphine in Sova’s blood in the concentration of less than 50 micrograms per liter. That level of 

morphine would be very low in a hospital setting. However, the morphine level in Sova was 

caused by an illicit drug and was not administered under the supervision of a physician. 

Accordingly, “any amount is considered a problem.” 

¶ 40 The crime laboratory reported that benzoylecgonine, the first metabolite of cocaine, was 

present in Sova’s blood at the concentration of 630 micrograms per liter. Humilier could not 

determine from the autopsy whether Sova had consumed heroin or cocaine last.

¶ 41 Humilier’s initial opinion was that Sova had died of anoxic encephalopathy due to 

“combined drug intoxication.” Humilier explained that the crime laboratory had only tested for 

cocaine and opiates, so he said that Sova died from combined drug intoxication to “cover 

anything else that may have been missed,” like alcohol or fentanyl. Humilier had asked the chief 
13 

deputy coroner if there were any other specimens available for testing, and the chief deputy 

coroner said that, to his knowledge, there were not. 

¶ 42 In January 2017, Humilier learned through conversations with the prosecutors that there 

were additional specimens. These specimens were sent to NMS Laboratories, and an expanded 

panel, which tested for much more than just cocaine and opiates, was performed. The specimens 

had not been stored properly, and the earlier testing was likely more reliable. However, the 

testing at NMS Laboratories “ruled out the presence of other substances to the extent that it could

with the date of the sample so that we could focus the cause of death as being strictly heroin and 

cocaine intoxication.” Humilier’s amended opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical and 

scientific certainty, was that Sova’s cause of death was anoxic encephalopathy due to heroin and 

cocaine intoxication.

¶ 43 On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and 

Humilier:

“Q. All right. And so then is it fair to say that you—originally your 

opinion was a combination of cocaine and heroin? 

 A. Yes.

 Q. Okay. Based upon those two results? 

 A. That’s correct.

 Q. The—what you got from the crime lab, less than 50 MCGLL for the 

morphine and the 630 MCG over L for the cocaine?

 A. And the 6-MAM.”
14 

¶ 44 Humilier could not say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the effect of 

the heroin, by itself, caused Sova’s death. The following exchange occurred between Humilier 

and defense counsel:

 “Q. So you cannot say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 

death would not have occurred in the absence of the heroin? 

 A. That’s correct.

 Q. And you cannot say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 

heroin was a but[-]for cause of death? 

 A. I don’t understand what that means. 

 Q. That she wouldn’t have died had it not been for the heroin. 

A. That’s correct.

 Q. So your opinion is, if I rephrase it, that the heroin and the cocaine 

contributed to [Sova’s] death? The both, the heroin and the cocaine— 

 A. Yes, that’s correct.

Q:—contributed? 

A: That’s correct.”

¶ 45 On redirect examination, the following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and 

Humilier:

“Q. Okay. So in your opinion *** the cause of death of Rebecca Sova was 

the anoxic encephalopathy due to heroin and cocaine intoxication; is that correct? 

 A. That’s correct.
15 

 Q. So maybe this was a game of semantics, sir, but when you were asked 

by counsel *** whether the cocaine and heroin contributed to the death, are you 

assuming that contributing and cause is one in the same or can you elaborate on 

that for us, please?

 A. I mean that the cause of death is due to the combination of her having 

heroin and cocaine in her system.” 

¶ 46 Records of text messages exchanged by defendant and Sova were also introduced into 

evidence. The records showed that defendant sent Sova a text message at approximately 7:30 

p.m. on June 27, 2013, asking if she wanted to “hang out” at a friend’s house later and saying 

that he was doing lines of “H” by himself. Sova asked why defendant was not sharing, and 

defendant said he had no one to share with. At approximately 7:44 p.m., Sova said: “Save some 

for me I just got off work.” At approximately 8 p.m., defendant said that he had no money, and 

he was going to hang out with his friends because he did not want to just sit at home. Sova said 

that she had money. At approximately 8:11 p.m., defendant said: “Come on I’m drinking and 

driving and have dope in the truck.” They arranged to meet at a gas station. At approximately 

8:28 p.m., Sova indicated that she had arrived at the gas station. 

¶ 47 Records of text messages that defendant exchanged with someone named Sarah on June 

29, 2013, were also admitted into evidence. Defendant asked Sarah if he could come to her house 

because the police were looking for him. Defendant told Sarah he was facing a possible 

manslaughter charge because he was with someone who overdosed. Sarah asked, “How is it your 

fault though?” Defendant replied, “Cause I was the one who got it for her.” Defendant then 

stated, “It’s in our last text messages.” Sarah asked, “And can[’]t you say you refused to get her 
16 

the drugs and she got them somewhere else?” Defendant replied, “And I’ve been telling the cops 

and her parents that she brought it over that I didn’t get it for her but the text say [sic] different.”

¶ 48 The State rested.

¶ 49 Dr. Gregory S. Retzinger, a clinical pathologist, testified as an expert witness for the 

defense. Retzinger was hired by defense counsel to review medical records and render opinions. 

Retzinger reviewed hospital records, including laboratory reports and patient reports, concerning 

Sova. He also reviewed records from the crime laboratory and NMS Laboratories, as well as the 

testimony of Dr. Stockmal, Dr. Humilier, Shelton, and Isenschmid. 

¶ 50 Retzinger testified that he reviewed the records on certain test levels of troponin and 

“CK-MB.” The results indicated that Sova had suffered a “heart-related event” between 6 and 8 

a.m. on June 28, 2013. Retzinger stated that significant cardiac events occur frequently when 

people take high doses of cocaine. The heart does not pump appropriately, blood does not get to 

the organs, tissues downstream die, and “[s]tuff backs up.” A high dose of opioids would not 

cause such a condition. Sova’s autopsy revealed that her heart was slightly enlarged, which could 

have been caused by a cardiac event or from fluid being retained in the heart tissue. Retzinger 

noted that no microscopic examination of the heart was performed at the autopsy. 

¶ 51 The crime laboratory results showed that Sova had an elevated level of benzoylecgonine, 

a cocaine metabolite. Based on Retzinger’s knowledge of the half-life of cocaine, how the body 

deals with cocaine, and the stability of the sample once the blood is drawn, Retzinger opined that 

Sova’s cocaine level would have been as least 3000 micrograms per liter at 7 a.m. on June 28, 

2013. This would have been a lethal amount of cocaine. 

¶ 52 The crime laboratory results showed that Sova had less than 50 nanograms per milliliter 

of morphine in her blood. In an otherwise ambulatory patient, a therapeutic level of morphine is 
17 

up to 100 nanograms per milliliter. Given the age of the sample when it was tested, the level of 

morphine presumably derived from heroin would not have exceeded the therapeutic range for an 

otherwise ambulatory patient at 7:40 a.m. on June 28, 2013. Retzinger testified that the literature 

said “something to the effect of greater than 200 nanogram[s] per mill[iliter]” of heroin is a lethal 

amount. The amount of heroin required to kill an individual varied depending on other potential 

comorbidities. Also, a person who had been using heroin for an extended period of time might 

have a greater tolerance. Retzinger had no information about how often Sova used heroin. 

¶ 53 Retzinger opined that Sova’s anoxic encephalopathy was caused by a cardiopulmonary 

event due to her ingestion of cocaine. Retzinger opined, within a reasonable degree of medical or 

scientific certainty, that the heroin or morphine in Sova’s system had nothing to do with her 

death. Retzinger stated that Sova’s pupils were dilated and reactive when she was admitted to the 

hospital, which was consistent with cocaine intoxication. A person on heroin would have 

constricted pupils that did not react well to light. Even if several hours had passed after Sova 

ingested heroin, Retzinger would still expect her pupils to be constricted. Sova’s heart rate was 

slightly elevated, which was also consistent with cocaine intoxication.

¶ 54 The defense rested.

¶ 55 The State called Dr. Stockmal as a rebuttal witness. Stockmal testified that he did not 

believe that Sova presented with a myocardial infarction. The results of Sova’s echocardiogram 

were normal. Sova had a mild elevation of troponin, but she had no electrocardiogram (ECG) 

findings of an acute heart attack. The troponin elevation could have been from a hyperdynamic 

state or stress. Sova’s CK levels were “markedly elevated,” but “the majority of that was due to 

rhabdomyolysis.” Sova’s relative CK index, which was considered when diagnosing a heart 
18 

attack, was extremely low. A CK index above 2.5 would indicate that a myocardial infarction 

had occurred, but Sova’s CK index was never that high.5

¶ 56 Dr. Humilier testified that he disagreed with Retzinger’s conclusion that heroin played no 

role in causing Sova’s anoxic encephalopathy. If Sova had a myocardial infarction four days 

prior to the autopsy, Humilier would have expected her heart to have a mottled look. Humilier’s 

observations of Sova’s heart were not consistent with someone who had suffered from a 

myocardial infarction, and there were no findings in the ER records that were consistent with a 

myocardial infarction. Humilier did not perform a microscopic examination on Sova’s heart 

because he did not believe it was necessary. The myocardial tissue looked completely normal. 

Sova’s troponin levels were indicative of a minor injury to the heart, but not a myocardial 

infarction. Humilier stated that “the troponin was indicative of the heart’s injury from the 

cocaine and heroin intoxication along with the brain injury along with the kidney failure.” 

¶ 57 Humilier did not believe that Retzinger adequately considered the presence of the heroin 

or the 6-MAM in Sova’s system. Humilier stated that “though the value of the morphine is 

subtherapeutic in a clinical context where you have a physician taking care of a patient, with it 

being from heroin and not under the administration of a physician, that is a fatal death causing 

finding.” The prosecutor asked Humilier, “And any amount of heroin is enough that can kill a 

person; is that correct?” Humilier replied, “In that context, yes.” Humilier stated that the level of 

benzoylecgonine in Sova’s blood at the time it was tested at the crime laboratory was relatively 

low.

5

Defendant asserts in his reply brief that the record shows that Sova’s CK index was 3.9 on June 

29, 2013, at 5 a.m. However, defendant cites to a portion of the transcript where Stockmal was discussing 

Sova’s troponin levels, not her CK index.
19 

¶ 58 Humilier testified that the fact that Sova’s pupils were dilated did not present a problem 

for his opinion that she died of a heroin and cocaine overdose. Humilier stated that there were no 

studies to indicate whether cocaine or heroin would have a dominant effect on the pupils. Sova’s 

brain swelling could have also changed the pupillary response. 

¶ 59 Humilier stated that he was asked to discuss the case with the defense attorneys, but he 

refused. Humilier explained: “[I]n my experience, once the defense counsel has hired an expert 

their purpose is just to discredit anything I have to say, and I would just be helping them in doing 

that by giving them ammunition. So I don’t do that.” 

¶ 60 The defense called Dr. Retzinger as a surrebuttal witness. Retzinger stated that 

“myocardial infarction” was not the terminology he would use for Sova’s heart injury. The terms 

myocardial injury, event, or lesion would be more appropriate. An individual could have a 

significant heart-related event and a normal ECG. An ECG performed on Sova on June 28, 2013, 

showed abnormalities, namely, tachycardia and “[n]onspecific ST abnormality.” Tachycardia 

meant that Sova had a fast heart rate. Nonspecific ST abnormality meant that there was damage 

to the back wall of Sova’s heart. 

¶ 61 Retzinger testified that troponin was a better indicator of heart injury than CK levels 

because troponin was only elevated if there was damage to the heart. Retzinger acknowledged 

that Sova had rhabdomyolysis, but her troponin levels indicated that a large part of her “CKMB” was coming from the heart. Retzinger opined that it was possible for the heart to appear 

normal when there is a myocardial insult.

¶ 62 Retzinger disagreed with Humilier’s testimony that any amount of heroin could kill a 

person. Retzinger noted that heroin was a prescription medication in several countries—

including Canada, Ireland, and Portugal—and that it was a legalized recreational drug in the 
20 

Netherlands. Retzinger stated that no government would “knowingly allow [its] citizenry to take 

a drug that will end up in certain death.” Retzinger noted that many people used heroin, and they 

did not all die. Retzinger stated: “To say that anybody that takes any amount of heroin is going to 

suffer certain death is ridiculous.” 

¶ 63 Retzinger did not agree with Humilier’s testimony that Sova’s level of benzoylecgonine, 

the major metabolite of cocaine, was relatively low. Sova’s level of benzoylecgonine was 630 

micrograms per liter, and a toxic level would be above 1000 micrograms per liter. However, the 

sample was 30 days old at the time it was tested and had not been preserved, so the levels of 

benzoylecgonine were going down over time. If the blood had been tested when it was first 

collected, it would have been above the toxic level. 

¶ 64 Retzinger opined that the fact that Sova’s pupils were dilated indicated that cocaine 

intoxication was dominant. Sova’s initial presentation at the ER was not consistent with heroin 

overdosage because her pupils were dilated and reactive to light, she did not respond to Narcan, 

she had a fast heart rate, and she had no pulmonary edema. 

¶ 65 After hearing arguments, the court found defendant guilty of unlawful delivery of a 

controlled substance and drug induced homicide. The court reasoned: 

“As it relates to the delivery count, [defendant], I think your statements arguably 

there were three different versions of how the delivery occurred in this Court’s 

mind and that in and of itself supported with the presence of the controlled 

substance of the heroin I believe satisfies all the prongs of the case law. So it is 

not simply an admission. It is not simply a confession. It is more than that.” 
21 

¶ 66 The court imposed concurrent sentences of 24 years’ imprisonment for drug-induced 

homicide and 11 years’ imprisonment for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant 

appeals.

¶ 67 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 68 A. Motion to Dismiss Indictments

¶ 69 We first address defendant’s argument that the court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss the indictments. Defendant argues that (1) the State presented deceptive and inaccurate 

evidence during the grand jury proceedings, and (2) even if Barten’s testimony was not 

misleading, “the indictments did not satisfy the elements required by the applicable statutes.” We 

address each argument in turn.

¶ 70 1. Inaccurate Evidence

¶ 71 We first address defendant’s argument that the State presented deceptive or inaccurate 

evidence to the grand juries. “The due process rights of a defendant may be violated if the 

prosecutor deliberately or intentionally misleads the grand jury, uses known perjured or false 

testimony, or presents other deceptive or inaccurate evidence.” People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 

239, 257 (1998). 

¶ 72 As a threshold matter, the State argues that the record on appeal is insufficient to address 

defendant’s argument that the State presented misleading evidence to the grand juries. We agree.

Defendant failed to include the grand jury transcripts in the record, though the record indicates 

that they were introduced as exhibits at one of the hearings on the motion to dismiss the 

indictments. Without the grand jury transcripts, it is impossible to determine exactly what 

Officer Barten testified to in each proceeding and to compare these statements against the 

evidence that Barten was aware of at the time of the grand jury proceedings. Stated another way, 
22 

without the transcripts, it is impossible to determine whether Barten’s statements to the grand 

juries were inaccurate.

¶ 73 We acknowledge that Barten indicated during his testimony at one of the hearings on the 

motion to dismiss that he testified before the first grand jury that defendant had stated that he 

gave the heroin to Sova after he purchased it. However, without the transcripts of the grand jury 

proceedings it is impossible to determine the actual wording that Barten used and compare it 

against defendant’s statements during his interviews with the police. We also acknowledge that 

defendant purported to quote from the grand jury transcripts in his motion to dismiss the 

indictments, and both parties referenced certain excerpts from the grand jury proceedings during 

their arguments on defendant’s motion. However, without the actual grand jury transcripts, it is 

impossible to determine whether the parties’ representations concerning the grand jury 

proceedings were accurate or to put the excerpts in context of the entire proceedings.

¶ 74 “An appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings 

below to support a claim of error.” People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000). “Any doubts 

which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” 

Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). Because we cannot adequately review 

defendant’s claim that the evidence presented to the grand jury was inaccurate or misleading 

without the actual grand jury transcripts, we assume that the circuit court’s order denying the 

motion to dismiss the indictments was proper. See Fair, 193 Ill. 2d at 264 (“In the absence of a 

complete record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the circuit court was in 

conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.”).

¶ 75 2. Failure of Indictment to Satisfy Applicable Law
23 

¶ 76 We now address the second part of defendant’s argument—that even if Barten’s

testimony was not misleading, “the indictments did not satisfy the elements required by the 

applicable statutes.” Under section 114-1(a)(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 

ILCS 5/114-1(a)(8) (West 2012)), an indictment may be dismissed if “[t]he charge does not state 

an offense.” 

¶ 77 However, defendant’s argument is not that the allegations in the bills of indictment do not 

adequately set forth the elements of the offenses of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance 

and drug-induced homicide. Such an argument would fail. The bill of indictment charging 

defendant with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance set forth all the elements of the 

offense—namely, that defendant delivered a controlled substance other than as authorized by the 

Act. See 720 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 2012). Similarly, the bill of indictment charging 

defendant with drug induced homicide set forth all the elements of that offense—that defendant 

“unlawfully deliver[ed] a controlled substance to another, and any person’s death [was] caused 

by the *** ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance.” 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 

2012). 

¶ 78 Instead, the substance of defendant’s argument is that the evidence presented at the grand 

jury proceedings did not support findings of probable cause that defendant committed the 

charged offenses. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence presented to the grand juries 

merely showed that he and Sova jointly and simultaneously acquired the heroin, not that 

defendant delivered the heroin to Sova. However, “[a] defendant may not seek to challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence considered by a grand jury if some evidence was presented.”

DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 255. Moreover, “an indictment that is valid on its face may not be 

dismissed on the ground that the evidence supporting it is inadequate.” People v. Oliver, 368 Ill. 
24 

App. 3d 690, 699 (2006). The indictments in this case were facially valid because they 

adequately set forth all the elements of the charged offenses. It is undisputed that there was some 

evidence presented to the grand jury—namely, Barten’s testimony. Thus, defendant may not 

seek dismissal of the indictments by attacking the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the 

grand jury. 

¶ 79 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

¶ 80 Defendant next argues that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to prove 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance or druginduced homicide. To prove that defendant committed the offense of unlawful delivery of a 

controlled substance, the State was required to show that defendant knowingly delivered heroin 

to Sova. See 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2012). To prove that defendant committed the offense of 

drug-induced homicide, the State was required to show that defendant (1) unlawfully and 

knowingly delivered heroin to Sova, and (2) Sova’s death was “caused by” the injection, 

inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of the heroin. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3 (West 

2012). Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that (1) he delivered heroin 

to Sova, or (2) Sova’s death was caused by the ingestion of heroin. 

¶ 81 When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original). People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) 

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “This standard of review ‘gives full 

play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh 

the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” People v. 
25 

Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Determinations made by the 

trier of fact on issues concerning the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, 

while not conclusive, are entitled to deference. Id. The reviewing court “must allow all 

reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Cunningham, 212 

Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so 

improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Collins, 

106 Ill. 2d at 261. 

¶ 82 1. Delivery 

¶ 83 We first address defendant’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

knowingly delivered heroin to Sova. “ ‘Deliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual, constructive or 

attempted transfer of possession of a controlled substance, with or without consideration, 

whether or not there is an agency relationship.” 720 ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2012). 

¶ 84 Citing People v. Coots, 2012 IL App (2d) 100592, defendant argues that he never 

delivered heroin to Sova. Defendant contends that he merely jointly possessed the heroin with 

Sova because the purchase of the heroin was a copurchase by truly equal partners.

¶ 85 In Coots, the victim wanted to procure heroin, and he provided money to pay for heroin. 

Id. ¶ 40. The defendant made calls, located a supplier, and ordered the heroin. Id. Both the 

defendant and the victim were present when the heroin was delivered to their hotel room, but the 

supplier gave the heroin to the defendant. Id. The victim ingested one bag of heroin, and the 

defendant also ingested some of the heroin. Id. ¶ 10. The defendant had several more bags in her 

pocket. Id. The victim told the defendant that he was not high, and he begged her for a second 

bag of heroin. Id. The defendant indicated to detectives that she initially intended not to give the 

victim a second bag. Id. ¶ 11. However, the victim continued to beg, and she gave him another 
26 

bag. Id. The defendant explained that the victim had paid for the heroin with his own money. Id. 

The victim eventually died of an overdose. Id. ¶ 5. 

¶ 86 The Coots court discussed the decision in United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d 

Cir. 1977) and related authority from federal courts and the courts of other states. Coots, 2012 IL 

App (2d) 100592, ¶¶ 19-34. The court then concluded that the case law it had discussed 

addressed “two paradigmatic situations.” Id. ¶ 36. In the first paradigmatic situation, “the 

defendant and the co-user ‘simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a drug for their own 

use, intending only to share it together.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Swiderski, 548 

F.2d at 450). In such a situation, the defendant is guilty of possession but not delivery. This is 

because “the co-purchasers are, from the outset, in ‘joint possession’ (in the criminal-law sense) 

with no intention of distributing the illicit substance to a third party.” Id.

¶ 87 In the second paradigmatic situation, “the defendant separately procures the drug in the 

absence of the co-user (and perhaps co-purchaser), then physically transfers possession to the couser, with no intent to convey any to a third party.” Id. ¶ 37. In such a situation, the defendant is 

guilty of delivery. Id. The Coots court reasoned that “when one person acquires the drug himself, 

then physically transfers possession to another, he has ‘operated as [a] link between the person 

with whom he intended to share the [drug] and the drug itself.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Wright, 593 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1979)). In that situation, the co-users are not equal partners 

because the user who acquired the drug has taken a more active role in the transaction. Id.

¶ 88 The Coots court found that the facts of that case did not fall neatly into either 

paradigmatic situation and that “the evidence allowed a reasonable jury either to convict or to 

acquit defendant.” Id. ¶ 41. The court reasoned that “the resolution of the trial depended on 

debatable inferences going to the interrelated questions of ‘practical control’ and joint 
27 

possession—and thus to the ultimate issue of whether any physical transfer of heroin from 

defendant to [the victim] was a delivery.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. The Coots court reversed 

and remanded for a new trial on the basis that defense counsel should have requested, and the 

circuit court should have given, two pattern jury instructions that would have clarified the 

meaning of the term “deliver.” Id. ¶¶ 54-56. 

¶ 89 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the instant case falls into 

the second paradigmatic situation discussed in Coots. See id. ¶ 37. During defendant’s interview 

with Filipiak, defendant indicated that he and Sova rode in her vehicle to purchase heroin from 

his source, she drove the vehicle, and she provided the money. However, defendant’s statements 

during his interview supported an inference that he alone exited the vehicle and purchased the 

heroin from his source. He nodded his head, indicating “yes,” both when Filipiak asked him if 

Sova handed him the money and when Filipiak asked if he then “went up” and purchased the 

heroin from his source. It would have made little sense for Sova to hand defendant money to 

purchase the heroin if she was with him during the actual purchase. Also, defendant admitted in a 

text message to Sarah that he “got it” for Sova. Like Coots, this was a close case. However, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could 

conclude that defendant and Sova did not jointly and simultaneously acquire possession of the 

heroin, despite the fact that Sova was a co-user and a co-purchaser. 

¶ 90 The trial evidence also supported an inference that after defendant obtained the heroin, he 

transferred possession of some of the heroin to Sova. Defendant told Filipiak that he and Sova 

both used the heroin at his residence. The next day, defendant found Sova unresponsive, and he 

took her to the hospital. Subsequent testing on Sova’s urine showed the presence of 6-MAM. Dr. 
28 

Humilier testified that the presence of 6-MAM conclusively showed that there was heroin in 

Sova’s system. 

¶ 91 We reject defendant’s argument that his conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled 

substance violated the corpus delicti rule. Generally, the corpus delicti, or the commission of a 

crime, cannot be proven solely by a defendant’s admission, confession, or out-of-court statement. 

People v. Lara, 2012 IL 112370, ¶ 17. The State must also present independent corroborating 

evidence. Id. 

“[T]he corpus delicti rule requires only that the corroborating evidence 

correspond with the circumstances recited in the confession and tend to connect 

the defendant with the crime. The independent evidence need not precisely align 

with the details of the confession on each element of the charged offense, or 

indeed to any particular element of the charged offense.” Id. ¶ 51. 

¶ 92 Here, there was sufficient corroborating evidence corresponding with the circumstances 

of defendant’s statements to the police and tending to connect him with the crime. Surveillance 

footage from the gas station showed that defendant met Sova there, as he told the police. An 

ATM receipt also showed that Sova withdrew $100 that evening, which corroborated 

defendant’s statements that he purchased one hundred dollars’ worth of heroin with money 

provided by Sova. Burd’s testimony corroborated defendant’s statement that Sova was 

unresponsive in his residence the next day. Testing on Sova’s blood and urine showed that she 

had ingested heroin, which corroborated defendant’s statement that they had used heroin together 

earlier that morning. 

¶ 93 2. Causation 
29 

¶ 94 Defendant next argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Sova’s death was caused by the ingestion of heroin, which was one of the essential elements of 

the offense of drug-induced homicide. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3 (West 2012). 

¶ 95 In People v. Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 42, our supreme court held that the term “caused 

by” in the drug-induced homicide statute referred to a contributing cause standard, which is the 

usual standard of causation in Illinois homicide cases. Under the contributing cause standard, 

“[t]he defendant’s act *** need not be the sole or immediate cause of death; rather, it is sufficient 

if the defendant’s act contributed to cause the death.” People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 152 

(1996). In a drug-induced homicide case, the State is required to prove that the ingestion of the 

controlled substance that the defendant delivered to the victim was a contributing cause of the 

victim’s death. See Nere, 2018 IL 122566, ¶ 71. 

¶ 96 Here, the trial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that the 

ingestion of heroin was a contributing cause of Sova’s death. Dr. Humilier testified that Sova’s 

death was caused by heroin and cocaine intoxication. Humilier stated that both the heroin and 

cocaine contributed to Sova’s death and that the presence of both the heroin and cocaine caused 

Sova’s death. In reaching his conclusion, Humilier acknowledged that there was a therapeutic 

level of morphine in Sova’s blood. Though Humilier could not say that heroin alone caused 

Sova’s death, he opined that any amount of heroin could be “a problem” or even lethal. Humilier 

noted that heroin was not administered under the supervision of physicians. Based on Humilier’s 

expert opinion, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that heroin intoxication was a 

contributing cause of Sova’s death. 

¶ 97 We acknowledge that Dr. Retzinger opined that Sova’s death was solely due to cocaine 

intoxication and that heroin intoxication had nothing to do with her death. However, Retzinger’s 
30 

testimony that Sova had suffered a heart-related event due to cocaine intoxication was partially

contradicted by the testimony of Humilier and Dr. Stockmal. Neither Humilier nor Stockmal 

agreed with Retzinger that Sova’s dilated pupils necessarily meant she was suffering from 

cocaine intoxication. Also, Stockmal testified that Sova’s ECG results were normal, the mild 

elevation of her troponin levels could have been due to a hyperdynamic state or stress, and her 

CK index was low. Humilier testified that Sova’s heart did not have a mottled look, her 

myocardial tissue appeared normal, and her troponin levels were not indicative of a myocardial 

infarction. 

¶ 98 Contrary to Retzinger’s testimony that the level of benzoylecgonine in Sova’s blood 

indicated that she would have had a lethal amount of cocaine her system on the morning of June 

28, 2013, Humilier testified that the level of benzoylecgonine in Sova’s blood was relatively low. 

Humilier disagreed with Retzinger’s opinion that the level of morphine in Sova’s system was so 

low that the ingestion of heroin could not have contributed to her death. Humilier noted that 

unlike morphine administered in a hospital, heroin was not administered under the supervision of 

a physician and any amount could be lethal. Humilier’s testimony on this point was partially 

corroborated by Isenschmid’s testimony that, for some individuals, a toxic amount of morphine 

could be as low as 20 nanograms per milliliter. 

¶ 99 The varying opinions of Stockmal, Humilier, and Retzinger presented the circuit court 

with conflicting evidence. It was the province of the circuit court to weigh the credibility of these 

witnesses and to resolve conflicts in their testimony. See People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 

(2001). It was not unreasonable for the court to accept the testimony of Humilier and Stockmal 

over that of Retzinger, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on 

these matters. See id.
31 

¶ 100 We reject defendant’s argument that the circuit court erred in finding Humilier’s 

testimony to be credible. Defendant extensively argues that Humilier’s conclusion that heroin 

intoxication contributed to Sova’s death came only after the testing at NMS Laboratories, which 

defendant claims was unreliable. Specifically, defendant argues:

“It should have been suspicious, if not obvious, that Dr. Humilier originally could 

not conclude that heroin was a contributing cause of Sova’s death, but just when 

the trial was about to begin years later and test results of ‘goop’ represented a 

significantly higher level of morphine was in Sova’s body, he amended his 

opinion.” 

¶ 101 Defendant’s argument is unavailing, and it misrepresents the record. First, there was no 

evidence that the blood tested by NMS Laboratories was “goop.” Isenschmid testified that he 

expressed concerns that such an old sample could be “goopy,” but stated that he was not 

describing the sample he actually received as “goop.” Moreover, nothing in Humilier’s testimony 

supports defendant’s assertion that Humilier only concluded that heroin contributed to Sova’s 

death after the results from NMS Laboratories revealed a higher concentration of morphine than 

the initial testing. In fact, Humilier explicitly stated on cross-examination that his initial opinion 

based on the testing at the crime laboratory was that Sova’s cause of death was heroin and 

cocaine intoxication. Humilier explained that the initial testing was only for cocaine and opiates, 

so he used the term “combined drug intoxication” in order to “cover anything else that may have 

been missed by that testing.” The purpose of the testing at NMS Laboratories was to determine if 

other substances may have also contributed to Sova’s death. 

¶ 102 Defendant notes that the testing performed by NMS Laboratories detected additional 

drugs in Sova’s system. Defendant argues that it is “curious” that Humilier claimed to have 
32 

ordered testing from NMS Laboratories to determine whether more drugs were present in Sova’s 

system but failed to explain what effect the additional drugs had on the basis of his amended 

conclusion. Humilier was not asked directly about the presence of the additional drugs. However, 

Humilier indicated that the testing at NMS Laboratories “ruled out the presence of other 

substances to the extent that it could with the date of the sample so that we could focus the cause 

of death as being strictly heroin and cocaine intoxication.” Thus, the trier of fact could 

reasonably infer that Humilier did not believe that the additional drugs that were detected 

contributed to Sova’s death. 

¶ 103 Notably, the only additional drugs found by NMS Laboratories were diphenhydramine 

(or Benadryl), caffeine, cotinine (a nicotine metabolite), and MEGX. Isenschmid testified that 

MEGX came from lidocaine, which was used in hospitals and as a cutting agent with cocaine, 

heroin, and other drugs. The MEGX finding was an incidental finding. Isenschmid also testified 

that a very small amount of butalbital was detected, but it was below the reporting limits. It is not 

apparent that any of these substances would have contributed to Sova’s death. 

¶ 104 We also reject defendant’s argument that Humilier was not credible because he offered 

contradictory testimony. Specifically, defendant argues that Humilier initially testified that he 

could not say that heroin was a “but-for” cause of Sova’s death, but later testified, in defendant’s 

characterization, “that any amount of heroin is lethal, establishing heroin as a ‘but-for’ cause.” 

However, Humilier’s actual testimony was that any amount of heroin can kill a person; he did 

not testify that any amount of heroin was necessarily lethal. This was not contradictory with his 

testimony that he could not say in this particular instance that Sova would not have died had it 

not been for the heroin. We note that after Humilier testified that he could not say that heroin 
33 

was a “but-for” cause of Sova’s death, he clarified that Sova’s death was caused by both the 

heroin and cocaine in her system. 

¶ 105 We disagree with defendant’s assertion that Humilier’s testimony that he relied on the 

representations of the chief deputy coroner that there were no other specimens available for 

testing was unbelievable. In his brief, defendant asserts: “Common sense dictates that any 

hospital in America would draw more than one vial of blood/urine, especially with the possibility 

that the cause of death was from overdose. An experienced coroner, Dr. Humilier would have 

known this.” Defendant’s assertion is completely speculative. Humilier’s reliance on the chief 

deputy coroner’s representations that no other specimens were available did not render his 

testimony incredible.

¶ 106 We also reject defendant’s argument that Humilier was not a credible witness because he 

refused to discuss his findings with the defense. Humilier explained that he did not want to talk 

to the defense because he believed, based on experience, that the defense expert would attempt to 

discredit everything that he said. This did not render his testimony unworthy of belief. 

¶ 107 C. Admission of Burd’s Testimony Concerning Other Crimes 

¶ 108 Defendant argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting Burd to testify 

that defendant had delivered heroin to him in the past. Defendant argues that “[u]nder the unique 

facts of this case, it appears the court considered Burd’s testimony regarding the prior bad acts to 

establish Defendant’s propensity to commit crime.” Defendant notes that the State argued that 

the other-crimes evidence was relevant to show intent and absence of mistake due to defendant’s 

familiarity with heroin. Defendant argues that these matters were not at issue and that the othercrimes evidence should not have been admitted for these purposes. Defendant also argues that, 
34 

even assuming the evidence was admissible, its probative value was substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice. 

¶ 109 Other-crimes evidence is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than the 

defendant’s propensity to commit crimes. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135 (2005). 

Examples of proper purposes for the admission of other-crimes evidence include showing modus 

operandi, intent, identity, motive, or absence of mistake. Id. at 136. The circuit court’s decision 

to admit other-crimes evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.

¶ 110 Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that the court improperly considered Burd’s 

testimony concerning defendant’s prior deliveries of heroin as evidence of defendant’s 

propensity to commit crimes. This testimony was admitted to show defendant’s intent to deliver 

heroin, and nothing in the record indicates that the circuit court considered it for any other 

purpose. Accordingly, we presume that the court only considered this evidence for the limited 

purpose for which it was introduced. See People v. Deenadayalu, 331 Ill. App. 3d 442, 450 

(2002). 

¶ 111 Even if we were to accept defendant’s argument that the court abused its discretion in 

admitting the other-crimes evidence for the purpose of showing defendant’s intent to deliver 

heroin on the basis that this was not at issue, we agree with the State that any error was harmless. 

“[T]he improper introduction of other-crimes evidence is harmless error when a defendant is 

neither prejudiced nor denied a fair trial based upon its admission.” People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 

513, 530 (2000). “Although the erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence ordinarily calls for 

reversal, the evidence must have been a material factor in the defendant’s conviction such that, 

without the evidence, the verdict likely would have been different. If it is unlikely that the error 

influenced the jury, reversal is not warranted.” People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 339 (2000). 
35 

Unlike Hall, this case involved a bench trial rather than a jury trial, and the court set forth its 

reasoning for the verdict on the record. Accordingly, we have even more information than in a 

jury trial concerning what evidence influenced the court’s verdict.

¶ 112 Here, evidence that defendant delivered heroin to Sova was introduced through 

defendant’s statement to the police that he “went up” and purchased heroin from his source with 

Sova’s money and that they later used the heroin together. The fact that heroin was found in 

Sova’s blood and urine was circumstantial evidence that defendant transferred possession of 

some of the heroin to her at some point. Defendant’s text messages to Sarah, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the State, also supported an inference that he transferred possession of the 

heroin to Sova. The circuit court expressly indicated that it had found that the State had proven 

delivery based on defendant’s statements and the presence of the heroin in Sova’s system. The 

court did not indicate that Burd’s testimony affected its determination as to delivery. Under these 

circumstances, it is unlikely that the admission of Burd’s testimony influenced the circuit court’s 

verdict. See Hall, 194 Ill. 2d at 339. 

¶ 113 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 114 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed. 

¶ 115 Affirmed.