14-1373 

Ilyas v. Lynch 

BIA 

A077 340 247 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR 

AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

28th 4 day of July, two thousand fifteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

8 GERARD E. LYNCH, 

9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 ALI ILYAS, AKA NAJAM SHARIFF 

14 ILYAS, 

15 Petitioner, 

16 

17 v. 14-1373 

18 NAC 

19 

20 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

21 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

22 Respondent. 

23 _____________________________________ 

24 

25 FOR PETITIONER: Ali Ilyas, pro se, Bronx, New York. 

26 

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant 

28 Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, 

29 Assistant Director; Janice K. 
2 

1 Redfern, Senior Litigation Counsel, 

2 Office of Immigration Litigation, 

3 U.S. Department of Justice, 

4 Washington, D.C. 

5 

6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

9 DENIED. 

10 Petitioner Ali Ilyas, a native and citizen of Pakistan, 

11 seeks review of the BIA’s April 10, 2014, decision denying his 

12 motion to reopen. In re Ali Ilyas, No. A077 340 247 (B.I.A. 

13 Apr. 10, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

14 underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

15 We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of 

16 discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). 

17 When the agency considers relevant evidence of country 

18 conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the 

19 agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence 

20 standard. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 

21 2008). 

22 An applicant may file one motion to reopen within 90 days 

23 of the date on which a final administrative decision was 
3 

1 rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. 

2 § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is 

3 undisputed that Ilyas’s motion to reopen was untimely and 

4 number-barred because it was his second motion and he filed it 

5 almost 10 years after his order of removal became final. 

6 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). 

7 However, the limitations do not apply where a motion is “based 

8 on changed country conditions arising in the country of 

9 nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,if 

10 such evidence is material and was not available and would not 

11 have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 

12 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 

13 It was not error for the agency to conclude that Ilyas 

14 failed to show a material change in country conditions between 

15 his asylum hearing and when he filed his motion to reopen. The 

16 evidence showed that pervasive sectarian violence in Pakistan 

17 existed in the years preceding Ilyas’s 2003 asylum hearing and 

18 continued at the time of his 2014 motion to reopen. See Norani 

19 v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006)(establishing 

20 date of hearing as baseline for assessing whether evidence 

21 establishes changed conditions). Although the news articles 
4 

1 and reports submitted by Ilyas suggested that violence may have 

2 increased over the years, it was not error to conclude that the 

3 recent evidence—even if it showed a marginal increase—was 

4 insufficient to constitute a material change in country 

5 conditions excusing the applicable procedural limitations. 

6 See 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 

7 see also In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 257 (B.I.A. 2007) 

8 (“Change that is incremental or incidental does not meet the 

9 regulatory requirements” for motions to reopen based on changed 

10 country conditions). 

11 Moreover, as the BIA observed, evidence of generalized 

12 sectarian violence in Pakistan was insufficient to show that 

13 Ilyas’s fears differed from the population as a whole. See 

14 Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 314 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999) 

15 (“General violence in [a country] does not constitute 

16 persecution, nor can it form a basis for petitioner’s 

17 well-founded fear of persecution.”). And the BIA was not 

18 required to find that Ilyas would be targeted for converting 

19 two people to Shia Islam because this assertion was found not 

20 credible in his underlying merits proceedings. See Kaur v. 

21 BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005). 
5 

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 

3 for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. 

4 FOR THE COURT: 

5 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 

6 

7