J-S49013-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v.

RASHEED JOHNSON, 

 Appellee No. 2800 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Order of September 5, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005637-2012 

BEFORE: OLSON, OTT and STABILE, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2014 

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from an order granting 

suppression in favor of Appellee, Rasheed Johnson, which was entered on 

September 5, 2013.1

 We reverse and remand. 

The factual background of this case is as follows: 

On [February 25,] 2012 the Pennsylvania [Society for the 

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“PSPCA”)] received a[n 

anonymous] complaint regarding t[wo] dogs in the rear of 

[Appellee’s residence.2] The complainant stated that there 

[were] two dogs in the rear yard with heavy chains, no food or 

water[,] and the yard is full of feces and urine. 

 

1

 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d), the 

Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal “that the order will terminate 

or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). 

2 The record is unclear as to Appellee’s relationship with the owner of the 

residence; however, there is no dispute that Appellee had a privacy interest 

in the residence. 
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On [February 25,] 2012, at approximately 9:15[ a.m. PSPCA 

Officer Darlene Sosa] conducted an investigation into the 

complaint at [Appellee’s residence]. In the rear yard of the 

property, [Officer Sosa] observed one medium sized pitbull mix 

breed dog tethered on a heavy chain in [the] corner of the yard. 

The collar on the dog appeared [to be] tight[] around the neck. 

The area where the dog was chained was covered with feces and 

urine. The dog did not have access to food or water, or to clean 

sanitary condition[s]. [Officer Sosa] observed another heavy 

chain going into another dog house but [Officer Sosa] couldn’t 

see the dog at that time. That area was also covered in feces. 

[Officer Sosa] took [a] photo of the yard [that showed] trash, 

debri[s,] and feces. 

[On February 25,] 2012 [Officer Sosa checked] the PSPCA

cruelty database [which revealed that] the owner of this 

property[,] Terrance Hayward[ (“Hayward”), had previously 

been] found guilty [of dog fighting in] February 2009. [As part 

of his sentence, he was prohibited from] owning animals for five 

years. 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/25/12, at 2. 

 Based upon the above affidavit of probable cause, Officer Sosa sought 

a search warrant for Appellee’s residence. A magistrate granted Officer 

Sosa’s application for a search warrant and Appellee’s residence was 

searched. Evidence of dog fighting and drug dealing was found in the 

residence. 

The procedural history of this case is as follows. Appellee was charged 

via criminal complaint with possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance,3

 possession of a controlled substance,4 possessing an animal for 

 

3

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). 

4

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). 
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fighting,5

 aiding animal fighting,6 knowingly permitting animal fighting,7 and 

possession of drug paraphernalia.8 On May 16, 2012, a criminal information 

charging those same offenses was filed. 

On June 29, 2012, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which 

included a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. A 

suppression hearing was held on August 12, 2013, at the conclusion of which 

the suppression court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress. On August 21, 

2013, the Commonwealth moved to reconsider the order suppressing the 

evidence. That same day, the suppression court vacated its suppression 

order. On September 5, 2013, the suppression court heard argument on the 

Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration. Following argument, the 

suppression court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration 

and re-instated the original suppression order. This timely appeal followed.9

The Commonwealth raises one issue for our review: 

Did the [suppression] court err by suppressing narcotics and 

evidence of dog fighting seized pursuant to a search warrant as 

 

5

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(h.1)(3). 

6

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(h.1)(14). 

7

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5511(h.1)(17). 

8

 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32). 

9

 On October 4, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

December 9, 2013, the suppression court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

The Commonwealth’s lone issue on appeal was included in its concise 

statement. 
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there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause under 

the totality of the circumstances? 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 3. 

“In addressing a challenge to a [suppression] court’s [suppression 

ruling] we are limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those 

facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), appeal denied, 79 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2013) (internal alterations 

and citation omitted). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to the factual 

findings and legal conclusions of the suppression court.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 

1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 

In this case, Appellee moved to suppress the evidence seized from his 

residence because, according to Appellee, the magistrate lacked probable 

cause to issue the search warrant. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 

203 provides, in relevant part, that: 

(B) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 

supported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing 

authority. . . . The issuing authority, in determining whether 

probable cause has been established, may not consider any 

evidence outside the affidavits. 

* * * 

(D) At any hearing on a motion for the [] suppression of 

evidence, or for suppression of the fruits of evidence, obtained 

pursuant to a search warrant, no evidence shall be admissible to 

establish probable cause other than the affidavits provided for in 

paragraph (B). 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 203. 
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 We have explained the probable cause requirement for issuance of a 

search warrant as follows: 

[T]he question of whether probable cause exists for the issuance 

of a search warrant must be answered according to the totality 

of the circumstances test articulated in Commonwealth v. 

Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1985), and its Pennsylvania progeny, 

which incorporates the reasoning of the United States Supreme 

Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). . . . The task of 

the magistrate acting as the issuing authority is to make a 

practical, common sense assessment of whether, given all the 

circumstances set forth in the affidavit, a fair probability exists 

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 

particular place. A search warrant is defective if the issuing 

authority has not been supplied with the necessary information. 

The chronology established by the affidavit of probable cause 

must be evaluated according to a common sense determination. 

Further, probable cause is based on a finding of the probability, 

not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity, and deference is 

to be accorded a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. We 

must limit our inquiry to the information within the four corners 

of the affidavit submitted in support of probable cause when 

determining whether the warrant was issued upon probable 

cause. 

Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 432 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 78 A.3d 1089 (Pa. 2013). 

In this case, the four corners of Officer Sosa’s affidavit presented 

substantial evidence upon which the issuing magistrate could have 

reasonably determined that probable cause existed to search Appellee’s 

residence. Officer Sosa, who had three years of experience investigating 

cruelty to animal cases, observed one (with evidence of a second) dog in 

unsanitary conditions. Specifically, Officer Sosa stated that the area was 

covered in feces, urine, trash, and debris. Officer Sosa further stated that 
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there was no food or water visible, that the one dog she saw was tethered 

with a tight chain around its neck, that the dog was a pitbull mix, and the 

owner of the residence had previously been convicted of dog fighting and 

was prohibited from owning animals. 

The suppression court erred by considering each of these factors 

independently instead of examining the totality of the circumstances. An 

affidavit based solely upon one of these facts might be insufficient for the 

magistrate to find probable cause. However, when considered together, the 

facts show a fair probability of ongoing criminal activity. For example, the 

suppression court stated as to the feces, urine, trash, and debris in the yard, 

such evidence “does not signify abuse without more.” Suppression Court 

Opinion, 12/9/13, at 4. However, there was more evidence. The 

suppression court did not consider the unsanitary conditions of the yard in 

combination with the fact that there was no food or water, the dogs were 

chained with heavy chains, the collar on the one dog appeared to be tight, 

the dog was covered with feces and urine, and the one dog was a pitbull mix 

(a breed frequently used in animal fighting). Most glaring was the fact that 

Hayward, the owner of the residence, had previously been convicted of 

animal fighting and was, at that time, prohibited from owning animals. The 

fact that a pitbull mix was present at Hayward’s residence, along with the 

other evidence summarized above, strongly supports a fair probability that 
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criminal activity was occurring inside the residence. Thus, Officer Sosa’s 

affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause. 

 The suppression court further erred by focusing on possible innocent 

explanations for the information included in the affidavit of probable cause. 

See United States v. Booker, 612 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The 

possibility of an innocent explanation does not vitiate properly established 

probable cause.”); see also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 

941 (Pa. 2009) (Castille, C.J. concurring) (citation omitted) (“an officer is 

not required to eliminate all innocent explanations for a suspicious set of 

facts to have probable cause”). For example, the suppression court focused 

on the fact that the dog may have been given water and food inside the 

house and thus did not require additional food and water outside the 

residence. See Suppression Court Opinion, 12/9/13, at 4; N.T., 8/12/13, at 

15. Although this is one possible innocent explanation, an equally plausible 

explanation is that the dog lacked proper food and water. The suppression 

court further surmised that the owner of the residence may have been 

planning on cleaning the yard that day. N.T., 8/12/13, at 15. Again, 

although this is one possible innocent explanation, an equally plausible 

explanation is that the yard was never cleaned and the dogs were required 

to live in filth. When all of the factors are considered together, it is evident 

that probable cause existed to believe that proof of a crime would be found 

in Appellee’s residence. 
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 The suppression court also erred by faulting Officer Sosa for not 

conducting a more thorough investigation. Cf. Suppression Court Opinion, 

12/9/13, at 4 (Officer Sosa “took little time to determine all the facts.”). 

Officer Sosa could not enter Appellee’s backyard and search the doghouse 

nor could she search Appellee’s residence without a search warrant. Thus, 

any additional investigative techniques she could have employed would have 

been time consuming and difficult, if not impossible, without a search 

warrant. Although Officer Sosa could have taken such steps, they were not 

necessary in order to obtain probable cause to search the residence. 

 Finally, the suppression court erred by considering the manner in 

which the search warrant was executed when making its four corners 

analysis. See N.T., 9/5/13, at 7 (“That breach of privacy against what is a 

very sparse warrant is really the reason that [the suppression court] decided 

on the [four] corners that they should have done a lot more before they 

stole privacy rights from the [Appellee].”). 

Appellee’s argument that “the absence of any suggestion in the 

affidavit of probable cause or in the testimony of [Officer Sosa] at the 

suppression hearing that she . . . found a need to [care for the dogs]” is 

without merit. Appellee’s Brief at 5. First, any testimony at the suppression 

hearing could not properly be considered by the suppression court in 

determining whether the affidavit of probable cause was sufficient for the 

magistrate to find probable cause to issue the search warrant. Instead, the 
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suppression court was limited to considering the four corners of the affidavit 

of probable cause. Second, Officer Sosa lacked authority to proceed onto 

Appellee’s land to care for the dogs without a search warrant. Instead, 

Officer Sosa immediately sought approval from a magistrate for a search 

warrant and was able to execute the search warrant that same day. 

In sum, the suppression court erred by conducting a de novo review of 

the magistrate’s finding of probable cause and by dissecting each piece of 

evidence offered to support that determination. Instead, the suppression 

court should have reviewed the totality of the circumstances established by 

Officer Sosa’s affidavit to determine whether they provided a substantial 

basis for the magistrate to determine that they demonstrated a fair 

probability that contraband or criminal activity would be discovered in 

Appellee’s residence. Under the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that 

the search warrant was valid. Accordingly, we reverse the suppression 

court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.10

 

 Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 

10 Appellee’s motion to suppress argued not only that the search warrant 

was defective but that the execution of the search warrant was 

constitutionally defective. As the suppression court did not conduct a full 

suppression hearing and rule on Appellee’s contention that the execution of 

the search warrant was defective, we decline to decide in the first instance 

whether the suppression motion should have been granted on those 

grounds. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/17/2014