1

09-0331-c v Molinari v. Bloomber g 1 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS 2 F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T 3 4

_______________ 5 6 August Term, 2008 7 8 (Argued: Marc h 27, 2009 L ast Suppl. Brief s Filed: April 10, 2009 De cided: Apr il 28, 2009) 9 10 11 Docke t No. 09-0331-c v 12 13

_______________ 14 15 G UY M O LI N A RI , 16 17 Plain tif f , 18 19 W I L L AM C. T HOMPS ON J R ., I NDI VI DUA L L Y AND I N HI S OF F I CI AL CAPACI TY AS THE N EW Y O RK 20 C I TY C OM PTROL L ER , B ETS Y G OTB AUM , I NDI VI DUAL L Y AND I N HE R OF F I C I AL C AP AC I TY AS 21 P U BL I C A DVO CATE F OR THE C I T Y O F N EW Y O RK , B I L L DE B LA SIO , IN D IV ID U A LL Y A N D IN H IS 22 OF F I C I AL C AP AC I TY AS A M EMBER OF THE N EW Y O RK C I TY C O U N C IL , L ETI TI A J AM ES , 23 I NDI VI DUAL L Y AND I N HE R OF F I C I AL C AP AC I TY AS A M EMBER OF THE N EW Y O RK C I TY C O U N C IL , 24 C H A RLES B AR R ON , I NDI VI DUAL L Y AND I N HI S OF F I C I AL C AP AC I TY AS A M EMBER OF THE N EW 25 Y O RK C I TY C I TY C O U N C IL , R OS AL I E C AL I EN DO , P HI L L I P D E P A O LO , P HI L I P F O G LIA , KEN T 26 L EBSOCK , ANDR EA R I CH , M I KE L ONG , T OM L ONG , S AR AH L YONS , I DA S A N O FF , G L OR I A S MI TH , 27 E RI C S NYD ER , KEN NE TH J. B AER , KEN NE TH A. D I AMONDS TONE , P ET ER G L EA S ON , M A RK 28 W I NS TON G R I F F I TH , A R I H OF F NUNG , A L F ONS O Q UI R OZ , Y D A N I S R ODRI GUEZ , J O ANNE S I MON , 29 N EW Y O RK P U BL I C I NT E R E S T R ES EA R C H G R OUP , I NC ., U. S. T E R M L I MI TS , LUVE NI A S UBER , 30 S TANL EY K A LAT H A RA , AND R ES PONSI BL E N EW Y O RK , 31 32 33 Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , 34 35 v. 36 37 M I CH A EL R. B LOO M BERG , I N H I S O FFI CI A L CA PA CI T Y A S M AYO R OF THE C I T Y O F N EW Y O RK , 38 C HRI S TI NE Q UI NN , I N H ER O FFI CI A L CA PA CI T Y A S S PEAKE R OF THE N EW Y O RK C I TY C O U N C IL , 39 N EW Y O RK C I TY C O U N C IL , C I T Y O F N EW Y O RK , 402 1 De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es, 2 3 J A M ES J. S AM PEL , I N H I S O FFI CI A L CA PA CI T Y A S P RE SI D EN T O F C O M M I SSI O N ER S O F E L EC TI ONS 4 F OR THE B O A RD O F E L EC TI ONS I N TH E C I T Y O F N EW Y O RK , AND B O A RD O F E L EC TI ONS I N THE 5 C I T Y O F N EW Y O RK , 6 7 De fe nd an ts

. 8 9

_______________ 10 11 B e f o r e : 12 S TR AUB , P OOLE R , RAGGI , Circuit Judges

. 13 14

_______________ 15 16 On appe al from a judgme nt of the United States District Court for the Easter n District of 17 New Y ork (Char les P. Si fton, Judge ), g rantingdefe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt and 18 dis mis sin gpla int if fs ’ Ame nd e d Co mpl a int . In O c tob e r 2 00 8, the Ne w Y or k Ci ty Counc il 19 enac ted L ocal L aw 51, whic h Mayor B loombergsigne d into law on November 3, 2008. L ocal 20 L aw 5 1 ame nd e d p re vio us ly e xistin gte rm

lim its le g isl atio n b y

e xten din gthe numbe r o f e lig ibl e 21 terms from two c onsecutive te rms to three f or the Mayor, Council Members, Public Advoc ate, 22 Comptroller and B oroug h Presidents. L ocal L aw 51 amends term limits l eg islation that was 23 e na c te d in

19 93 by re fe re nd um, and wi ll a llo w c e rt a in o ff

ic ia ls t o r un fo r t hir d te rm s in 24 No ve mbe r 2 00 9. B e c a us e we ho ld t

hat L oc a l L aw 5 1 d oe s n ot v iol ate pla int if fs ’ F ir st 25 Am e ndme nt r ig hts , s ub sta nti ve du e pr oc e ss r ig hts , N e w Y or k St ate re fe re nd

um l aw a nd the City 26 of Ne w York’ s conflict of inter est law, we aff irm. 27

_______________ 28 29 RANDY M. M A STRO , Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher L L P, New Yor

k, NY (N orman Sieg el, New York, 30 NY, on the br ief), for Plainti ffs-Appellants W

illam C. T

hompson Jr., Be tsy Gotbaum, Bill de 31 Blasio, Letit ia James, Charles Barron, Rosalie Caliendo, Phillip DePaolo, Philip Fogli a, Kent 32 Le bs oc k

, A nd re a R ic h, Mik

e Long, Tom Long, Sa ra h Ly on s, Id a S an off , G lor ia S mi th, Er ic 33 Sn

y de r, Ke nn e th J

. B ae r, Ke nn e th A . D iam on ds ton e, P e te r G le as on , M ar k W ins ton Gr iff

ith , A ri 34 Ho

ffn ung, Al fon so Qu iroz, Y

da nis Ro dr igu e

z, J o A nn e Sim on , U

.S . Te rm Lim its , Lu v e nia Su be r, 35 Sta nle

yKalath ara, an d R esp on sib leNe w York

. 36 37 (Pieter Va

n Tol, Andrew

Be hrman, L ovells L L P, New Yor k, NY, for Plaintif

f-Appellant New 38 Y ork Public Inte rest Researc h Group, Inc. ) 39 40 A L AN G. KR AMS , Assistant Corporation Counsel (Michae l A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of 41 the City

of Ne w York, on the brief ), Ne w York, N Y, for Defendants-Appe llees

. 42 43 Har

ry Kre sky , New Y ork, NY, for Lenora B. Fulani and the New Y ork City Organizations of the3 1 Ne w York

In de pe nd e nc e Pa rty

as amici cur iae in s up

po rt o f P lai nti ffs

- Ap pe lla nts

. 2 3 Robert D. Joffe, Cravath, Swaine & Moore L L P, New Yor k, NY, for the Partnership for N ew 4 Y ork City, Inc. as amicus cur iae in support of Defendants-Appellee s . 5

_______________ 6 7 S TR AUB , Circuit Judge : 8 Plaintiffs-Appellants appe al from the judg ment of the United States District Court for the 9 Easter

n District of Ne w York ( Charles P. Sifton, Judge ), g rantingdefe ndants’ motion for 10 summa

ry jud g me nt a

nd dis mis sin gpla int if

fs ’ Ame nd e d Co mpl a int . A t is su e in t his lit ig atio n is 11 an ame ndment to the Charter of the City

of Ne w York, e ntitled L ocal L aw 51, whic h was pa ssed 12 by

the City Council and signe d into law by Mayor Michae l R. Bloombergon November 3, 2008. 13 I t provides that Member s of the City Council, the Mayor, Public Advocate, Comptroller and 1 4 B o r o u g hP r e s i d e n t s ar e e l i g i b l e t o s e r v e a m a x i mumo f

th r e e c o n s e c u t i v e t e r

m s i no f f i c e . It 15 amends sec tions 1337 and 1338 of the City Charter , which pre viously provided for

a maximum 16 of

tw o c on se c uti ve te rm s f

or the se of fi c ia ls a nd wh ic h w e re e na c te d b y

a c ity -w ide re fe re nd

um i n 17 1993. 18 The individual plaintiffs include the c urre nt Compt roller a nd Public Advocate of

New 19 York City , sever al cur rent membe rs of the N ew Yor k City Council who voted ag ainst the 20 le g isl atio n at is su e in t his c a se , s e ve ra l in div idu a ls who are a lle g e d to “ have de ve lop e d c on c re te 21 plans” to run f

or City Council seats in the Novembe r 2009 ele ction, sever al individuals who are 22 a lle g e d to have e xpe nd e d ti me and mon e y in f avo r o f t he tw o p ub lic re fe re nd a

on te rm lim its 23 which ar e also at issue in this case , and “vote rs from a ll walks of life – a nd all five boroughs of 24 thi s g re at Cit

y – who

. . . v ote d to imp os e te rm lim its ” in t

he se tw o r e fe re nd a . T he pla int if fs a lso 25 inc lud e thr e e or g anizatio ns – N e w Y or k Pu bli c Inte re st R e se arc h G ro up , Inc ., U. S. T e rm L imi ts4 1 and Responsible Ne w York – which wer e re fer red to by the District Court as “g ood-g overnme nt 2 g roups.” 3 The individual defe ndants are the cur rent Mayor of Ne w York City , the Speake r of the 4 City

Council and the cur

rent he ad of the New Y ork City Boa rd of Ele ctions. The instituti onal 5 defe ndants are the New York City

Council, the Boa

rd of Ele ctions and the City of Ne w York 6 itself. 7 Th e g ra

vame n o f p la int if

fs ’ Ame nd e d Co mpl a int

is t ha t de fe nd ants vio late d f

e de ra l, S tate 8 and City

law by amendingexis ting ter

m limi t leg islation enacte d by ref ere ndum, thereby 9 extending themselve s the opportunity to run for a

n additional term in offic e. Plaintiffs asser t 10 se ve ra l c a

us e s o f a c tio n, inc lud ingvio latio ns of the Un ite d St ate s a

nd Ne w Y or k St ate 11 Constit utions, the New Yor k Municipal Home Rule L aw a nd the City

Charter ’s conf

lict of 12 int e re st p ro vis ion s. Th e Di str ic t Co ur t di smi sse d p la int if

fs ’ Ame nd e d Co mpl a int

in i ts e nti re ty 13 on

summa ry jud g me nt. 14 On

a pp e a l, a pp e lla nts a dv anc e fo ur

pr inc ipa l argume nts . F ir st, the y argue that de fe nd ants 15 vio late d th e ir

F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts be c a us e City vo te rs wi ll n owbe le ss l ike ly to p art ic ipate in 16 the re fer endum proc ess, and thus eng ag e in less Fir st Amendment speec h, if laws ena cted by 17 re fe re nd a

c an b e ame nd e d b y

City Counc il l e g isl atio n. Se c on d, the y argue that de fe nd ants 18 violated their substantive due proce ss rig hts gua rante ed by

the Four teenth Amendme nt of the 19 Un ite d St ate s Co ns tit uti on be c a us e the so le purp os e of

L oc a l L aw 5 1 is to e xten d d e fe nd ants ’ 20 own political car eer s by entre nchingincumbents. Third, they argue that def

endants violated N ew 21 York Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b) , which they contend r equire s a mandatory 22 ref

ere ndum to enact the pr ovisions of L ocal L aw 51. F inally , they argue that def

endants violatedThere is one exception at issue here , which will be discussed in Part I I Iof this Opinion, 1 namely , New Y ork Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23, whic h sets forth ce rtain ty pes of loca l laws that are “subjec t to mandatory ref ere ndum,” N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 23 , in c lud ingtho se that “cha ng e[] the member ship . . . of the leg islative body ,” see id. § 23(2)( b). 5 1 the City

Charter ’s conf

lict of interest provisions by enac ting leg islation confer ringupon 2 themselves a political be nefit. B eca use we hold that the enac tment of L ocal L aw 51 did not run 3 afoul of a

ny of these pr ovisions, we aff irm the District Court’s judg ment. 4 BACK GR OUND 5 I . Ne w Yo rkS ta te ’s Re f er en d u m S ch eme 6 As a

g e ne ra l matte r, thi s c a se tou c he s u po n th e City

Counc il’ s a

nd Ma y or ’s a uth or ity to 7 enac t local laws amendingthe City Charter . Citi es in the State of Ne w York a re g iven broa d 8 po we r t o e na c t lo c a l la ws , in c lud ingtho se ame nd inga c ity c ha rt e r, a s lo nga s th e y

“ re lat[e ] to i ts 9 proper

ty , aff airs or g overnme nt” and a re “ not inconsistent with the provisions of th[ e] [ state] 10 constitution or any g ener al law.” N.Y. C O N ST ., A RT . IX, § 2; se e als o N.Y. M UN . H OM E R U LE 11 L AW § 1 0( 1) (i )- (i i) . T his inc lud e s lo c a l la ws re latin gto “ [t]he po we rs , d uti e s, qu a lif

ic atio ns , 12 number, mode of selec tion and remova l, terms of off ice, c ompensation, hours of wor k, 13 protec tion, welfar e and sa fety of its office rs and e mploy ees.” N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 14 10(1)( ii). 15 A city

may enac t such laws by

a majority

vote of its leg islative body and the a pproval of 16 its ma

y or , a nd , in the c a se of

a may or ’s ve to, the le g isl ativ e bo dy may ov e rr ide the may or ’s ve to 17 with a two-thirds vote. See id. §§ 20-21. Moreove r, sec tions 36 and 37 of the Ne w York 1 18 Municipal Home Rule L aw a llow voters to enac t such laws dire ctly by means of a

ref ere ndum. 19 See id. at §§ 36 , 3 7. Suc h a re fe re nd um m ay be ini tiate d d ir e c tly

by vo te rs thr ou g h a

pr oc e ss6 1 commonly

ref err ed to as a

voter initiative. See id. § 3 7. Ge ne ra lly , if qu a lif ie d v ote rs fi le wi th 2 the City

Clerk a pe tition containing a c erta in number of sig nature s reque sting that a proposed 3 local law a

mendingthe City

Charter be put to ref

ere ndum, the proposed loca l law will appea r on 4 the ballot at the next ge nera l election. Se e id . A re fer endum proposinga loca l law amendingthe 5 City

Charter may also be initiated by

a cha rter c ommissi on. See id. § 36. A cha rter c ommissi on 6 may

be cr eate d by

a voter s’ petition, the City Council or the Mayor. See id. § 36(2)- (4). 7 Notwithstanding the se provisions, the New York Court of Appe als has made clea r that 8 “[d] irec t leg islation in citi es must alway s rest on some constitutional or statutory g rant of pow er. 9 Gover

nment by repr esentation is st ill the rule. Direc t action by the people is the e x ception.” 10 Mc Cab e v . V

oo rh is , 243 N.Y. 401, 413 (1926)

. 11 II. 19 93 Vo te r Init iat ive and 1 99 6 R e fer e ndum 12 In November 1993, City

voters put a r efe rendum on the ba llot by voter initiative 13 proposingterm limits for cer tain elec ted City

officia ls, which was ultimately adopted by

a vote of 14 more than 59% . I t provided: 15 CHAPTER 50 16 TERM L I MI TS 17 18 § 1 13 7. Pub lic Pol ic y . It is he re by de c lare d to be the pu

bli c 19 policy of the c ity

of Ne w York to limit to notmore than e ight 20 consec utive y ear s the time elec ted offic ials can se rve a s mayor, 21 pu bli c a dv oc ate , c omp tr oll e r, bo ro ugh p re sid e nt a nd c ounc il 22 me mbe r s o th at e le c te d r e pr e se ntativ e s a re “ c iti zen

re pr e se ntativ e s” 23 who ar e re sponsive to the needs of the people a

nd are not car eer 24 politicians. 25 26 § 1138. Term L imits . Notwithstanding a ny provision to the 27 contra ry contained in this cha

rter, no pe rson shall be e ligible to be 28 elec ted to or ser ve in the off

ice of mayor, public advoc ate, 29 comptroller, bor oug h president or council member

if that personPlaintiffs point t o a New Y ork Times article , which re ports that the Mayor’s “ unofficia l 2 emissaries” “beg an appr oaching ” ter m-limit s proponent and “ [b] illionaire” Ronald L auder two 7 1 had pre viously held such off

ice f or two or more full consec utive 2 terms (includingin the case of counc il member at lea st one 3 four- y ear term), unless one full term or more has ela psed since that 4 person last he ld such offic e; provided, how ever , that in calculating 5 the numbe r o f c on se c uti ve te rm s a pe rs on ha s se rv e d, on ly

te rm s 6 commencingon or af ter January

1, 1994 shall be counte d. 7 8 N.Y. City

Charter §§ 1137-38 (N.Y . L eg al Publ’gCorp. 2001) (r epea led Nov. 3, 2008) 9 (her einaf

ter, the “ 1993 Voter Initiative”). 10 In 1996, the City Council put a ref

ere ndum on the ballot seekingto increa se the ter m 11 limit s applicable to Council Members from two to thre e conse cutive ter ms (“1996 Refe rendum” ). 12 City

voters re jected the 1996 Refer endum by a mar g in of approximately 54% to 46%. 13 III . 20 08 Te r m Lim it s A m e ndm e nt 14 More than a deca de later , on October

2, 2008, Mayor B loombergannounce d that he 15 intended to work w ith the Speaker of the City

Council, Christi ne C. Quinn, to introduce 16 leg islation to ex tend the City ’s term limits set forth in sections 1137 and 1138 of the City Charter 17 from two conse cutive ter ms to three and the n seek r e-e lection. The Ma y or empha siz ed that the 18 chang e in law would a llow voters to elec t experience d leade rship in a time of unpre cede nted 19 fi sc a l c ri sis . T hu s, on Oc tob e r 7 , 2 00 8, City

Counc il M e mbe rs , at th e Ma y or ’s re qu e st, 20 introduced bill No. 845-A, which, if sig ned into law, would ame nd sections 1137 and 1138 of the 21 City

Charter to chang e the ter

m limi ts from no more than two c onsecutive te rms to no more than 22 three such terms. 23 Pla int if

fs c la im that th e May or

wa s a wa re of his int e nti on s to a sk

the City Counc il t o p a ss 24 leg islation ex tendingterm limits as early as 2007, but delayed his announc ement until October

2y e ars a g o “ to p e rs ua de him no t to fi g ht a

on e -t ime e xten sio n o f t e rm lim its .” Sam Ro be rt s & Eric Konig sberg , Enigmatic Billionair e Is Drawn Bac k to the Term Limits Fray , N.Y. T I MES , Oct. 9, 2008, at A1 ( available at J .A. 281-83). They also cite a Ne w York

Po st repor t indicating that the Mayor’s staf

f conduc ted polling no late r than the be g inning of J une 2008 to explore wh e the r v ote rs wo uld

su pp or t a c ha ng e to t he City ’s te rm

lim its , whic h s ho we d “ little se nti me nt” amongvoters for

such a c hang e. Da

vid Seifman, Mike ’s Poll Sizing Up “3r d Term” , N.Y. P O ST , J une 4, 2008, at 11 ( available at J .A. 790). 8 1 2008 so that voters could not put the issue of ter m limi ts on the ballot through a voter initiative 2 pr ior

to t he No ve mbe r 2 00 9 e le c tio n. Un de r s e c tio n 3 7 o f N e w Y or k M un ic ipa l H ome Rul e 3 L aw, if

qu a lif ie d v ote rs we re to h ave fi le d a pe tit ion fo llo wi ngthe int

ro du c tio n o f t

he bil l in 4 October

2008 putting the ter

m limi ts issue to a ref

ere ndum, it would appear on the Novembe r 5 2009 elec tion ballot at the ear liest. See N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 3 7( 6) -( 7) . E ve n if 6 su c c e ssf

ul, su c h a vo te r i nit iativ e wo uld

no t a ff e c t th os e ma de e lig ibl e fo r r e e le c tio n in 7 November

2009 as a r esult of the Mayor’s propose d amendment. 8 In a dd iti on , p la int if fs e mph a size the re po rt e d d isc us sio ns be tw e e n th e Ma y or and Ron a ld 9 L auder . Specifica lly , The New Y ork Times re po rt e d th at Mr . L a ud e r i nit ia lly

vo we d to 10 “vig orously

oppose” the plan outlined by Mayor B loomberg , but he “ba cked down” af ter the 11 May or

pr omi se d h im a

se at on a c ha rt e r c omm iss ion

that th e Ma

y or a g re e d to c onve ne in 2 01 0 to 12 put th e te rm

lim its iss ue ba c k o n th e ba llo t f or re fe re nd um. Mic ha e l B arb aro & Ka re e m F ahim , 13 Lau de r O

pp os es M ay or on Pe rm an e nt C

ha ngeto T

e rm Lim its , N.Y. T I MES , Oct. 6, 2008, at A21 14 (ava ilable at J.A. 353-54). Plaintiffs claim that this ag ree ment is refle cted in the f ollowing 15 pr ov isi on

of the bil l: 16 Th is l oc a l la w s ha ll t ake e ff

e c t imme diate ly

and sh a ll a pp ly 17 to elections held on or a fter the date of its enactment, provide d that 18 this local law shall be de emed r epea led upon the ef fec tive date of

a 19 lawful a nd valid proposal to amend the char ter to set ter

m limi ts at 20 tw o, rathe r t ha n thre e , f ull c on se c uti ve te rm s, a s su c h te rm s w e re inPlaintiffs make many alleg ations about the propose d apostasy of Ronald L auder ’s 3 support for L ocal L aw 51 in lig ht of his former support for ter

m limi ts in New York City , which took the form of la

rg e ca sh contributions to the pro-term limits posit ion in the 1993 and 1996 ref ere nda. Mr. L auder

is said to have “struc k a dea l” with Mayor B loombergpursuant to which he cha ng ed his position in return for the Ma y or’s promise to name him to the city commission which would see k to place the term limits i ssue on the ballot in 2010. But we think it i mportant to note that Mr. L auder

is a private c itiz en who is fr ee to c hang e his political positions as he wi sh e s. Th e re is n o a lle g atio n th at he pe rf or me d a ny ill e g a l a c t and

he is n ot a

pa rt y to t his action. 9 1 forc e and e ffe ct prior to the e nactment of this local law, whe re suc h 2 proposal has be en submitted for the a pproval of the qualified 3 elec tors of the c ity and appr oved by

a majority

of such e lectors 4 voting ther eon. 5 6 See S.A. 67-68. Plaintiffs argue that “[t]hi s alteration of the Ter m-L imits Bill made c lear that the 7 B ill ’s tr

ue purp os e wa s to a ff

or d a thi rd te rm in o ff ic e to c ur re ntl y te rm -l imi te d Ci ty

of fi c ia ls 8 only ; after

war d, the voters would de cide the te rm limit s applicable to subsequent g ener ations of 9 City

officia ls.” See Br ief for

Plaintiffs-Appellants Will iam C. Thompson, J r., et al. (“B rief f or 10 Appellants”) at 11. Plaintiffs invoke a New Y ork Times blog post re portingthat Mr. L auder 11 state d, “ ‘I

be lie ve ve ry

str on g ly that th e may or

sh ou ld g e t th e e xtra

te rm and the City Counc il 12 sh ou ld g e t a

thi rd te rm . T hat is pa

rt of the de a l. B ut I

ne ve r s po ke a

bo ut t he fi rs t- te rm

c ounc il 13 members.’ ” Michae l Ba rbar o, Lau de r P uts Ne w H ur dlein M ay or ’s Pa th , N.Y. T I M ES C I TY 3 14 R OOM , Oct. 21, 2008, 15 http:// city

room.blog s.ny

times.com/2008/10/21/ lauder -puts-a- new- hurdle-in- mayors-path/ 16 (ava ilable at J.A. 360-61). 17 When the bill was introduced into the City Council, Publ ic Advocate B etsy Gotbaum and 18 City

Cou nc il M e mbe rs B ill de B la sio and L e tit ia Jame s, wh o a

re pla int if fs and a pp e lla nts in t his 19 action, re quested the City ’s Conflicts of Intere st Boar d to issue an advisory opinion as to whether10 1 Council Members would violate the City Charter ’s conf

lict of interest provisions by voting on 2 the bil l. T he B oa

rd ru le d th at no vio latio n w ou ld o c c ur . It r e a so ne d th at th e c on fl ic t of int e re st 3 provisions prohibit Members from votingon proposed leg islation that would confer a per sonal 4 be ne fi t, b ut t

hat an e xten sio n o f t e rm

lim its wa s a

pu bli c be ne fi t r e latin gto t

he ir ro le s a s p ub lic 5 officia ls. 6 Counc il M e mbe rs de B la sio and Jame s su bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d a pe tit ion in N e w Y or

k St ate 7 Supreme Court, Ne w York County (Jacqueline W. Sil berma nn, J ustice), se ekinga tempora ry 8 re str a ini ngor de r e njo ini ngCounc il M e mbe rs fr om v oti ngon the bil l on

the g ro un d th at it

wo uld 9 violate the City

Charter ’s conf

lict of interest provisions. The c ourt denied the petition, holding 10 that no irrepa

rable harm would oc cur to pe titioners beca use they could, inte r a lia , abstain fr om 11 voting on the bill and that “ g rantingthe TRO would be a n undue interf

ere nce by one bra nch of 12 g overnme nt with another at this st ag e of the leg islative proce ss, and, thus, the matter is not now 13 justiciable.” De

Blas io v . Co nfl ic ts o

f I nte re st B oa rd of t heCity of N e w York, No. 1141289/08 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 22, 2008) (T RO Hea ring ). 15 On Octobe r 23, 2008, the City Council voted 29 to 22 to enact L ocal L aw 51, amending 16 the City ’s term limits law to three c onsecutive te rms. Of the f ifty -one sitting Me mbers who 17 voted on the B ill, thi rty -five w ould have be en prohibited fr om runningfor r eele ction under the 18 term limits enacted in 1993. Of those thirty -five Me mbers, twenty -three voted to enac t L ocal 19 L aw 51. 20 May or

B loo mbe rgsigne d th e bil l into l aw o n N ov e mbe r 3 , 2 00 8. L oc a l L aw 5 1 p ro vid e s, 21 in r e le va

nt p art : 22 § 1137. Public policy . I t is hereby decla red to be the11 1 public policy of the c ity

of Ne w York to limit the tim e ele cted 2 o ff i ci al s ca ns erv e a s m ay o r, p u b l i c a dv o ca t e, co mp tro l l er , b o ro u gh 3 president a nd council member

so that elec ted re prese ntatives are 4 “citizen repr esentatives” who a re r esponsive to the nee ds of the 5 people a nd are not car eer

politicians. It

is f ur the r d e c lare d th at t

his 6 policy is most appropriately serve d by limiting the time such 7 officials can serve to not more than threefull consecutiveterms

. 8 9 § 1 13 8. Te rm lim its

. Notwithstanding a ny provision to the 10 contra ry contained in this cha

rter, no pe rson shall be e ligible to be 11 elec ted to or ser ve in the off

ice of mayor, public advoc ate, 12 comptroller, bor oug h president or council member

if that person 13 had pre viously held such off

ice f or three or more f

ull consecutive 14 terms, unless one f ull term or more ha s elapsed sinc e that per son 15 last held such off ice; provide d, howeve r, that in ca lculatingthe 16 numbe r o f c on se c uti ve te rm s a pe rs on ha s se rv e d, on ly

te rm s 17 commencingon or af ter January

1, 1994 shall be counte d. 18 19 L ocal L aw No. 51 ( Nov. 3, 2008). Immediately prior to sig ning the bill, May or B loomberg 20 expressed his commitment to convene a char ter c ommissi on in 2010 to put the term limi ts issue 21 ba c k o n th e ba llo t f or re fe re nd um. 22 IV. Thi s Litigation 23 Plaintiffs commence d this action on November 10, 2008 and filed a

n Amended 24 Com

pla int on No ve mbe r 1 7, 20 08 . T he ir Am e nd e d Co mpl a int

a lle g e s th at de fe nd ants vio late d: 25 (1 ) p la int if

fs ’ F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts by ame nd ingthe 19 93 Vo te r I nit iativ e thr ou g h Ci ty 26 Counc il l e g isl atio n, the re by dis c oura g ingvo te rs fr om p art ic ipatin gin t he re fe re nd

um p ro c e ss i n 27 the future ; (2) plaintiffs’ substantive due proce ss rig hts gua rante ed by

the Four teenth Amendme nt 28 by

passingleg islation with t he sole purpose of extending the ir own political ca ree rs and 29 entre nchingincumbents; (3) State a nd City law mandating a

ref ere ndum to enact leg islation 30 reg ardingterm limits; and (4) the City Charter ’s conf

lict of interest provisions by enac ting 31 leg islation that enabled c erta in Members of the City Council and the Mayor to run for ree lectionPlaintiffs also asserte d claims under the provision of the Ne w York State Constitution 4 that is analog ous to the First Amendme nt. The District Court held that these c laims failed for the same re asons that plaintiffs’ F irst Amendment claims we re subjec t to summ ary judgme nt. Although a

ppellants do not appea

r to have made a

direc t statement that they have a bandoned their state c onstitut ional claims on this appeal, we agree with the appellee s that they have in f act done so. The a

rgument will therefor e be tr eate d by this Court as having be en wa ived. On J anuar

y 16, 2009, the City

filed its reque st for administrative pre -cle ara nce pur suant 5 to section 5 of the VotingRights Act with the De partment of Justice (“D OJ ”). See42 U.S.C. § 1973c; 28 C.F.R. § 51.1 et seq. On Marc h 17, 2009, the DOJ iss ued its pre- clea ranc e letter , stating that it “does not interpose a ny objection to the spec ified cha ng es [in L ocal L aw 51,]” but its failure to objec t “does not bar subsequent litigation to enjoin the enforc ement of the chang es.” Be cause the District Court’s judg ment was e ntere d prior to the DOJ’s pre- clea ranc e letter , it was without jurisdiction t o do so. See, e .g. , McD aniel v. Sanche z , 4 52 U. S. 1 30 , 1 53 (1 98 1) ; se e als o Bran c h v . S

mi th , 538 U.S. 254, 283-84 (2003) ( Kenne dy , J ., plurality concur ringopinion) (“To be consistent with the statutory scheme , the district courts should not enterta in constituti onal challeng es to nonprec lear ed votingchang es and in this way anticipate a

rulingnot y et made by the Exe c uti ve .” ). Ac c or din g ly , w e re mand e d to the Di str ic t Co ur t on Ma rc h 3 0, 20 09 fo r i t to aff irm in full its prior judg ment, which it did on April 7, 2009. The par ties subsequently

filed supplemental brief

s on April 8, 2009, indicatingthat they rea ssert their identica l pleading s and arguments previously

filed in this appeal. This ac tion is, t here fore , ripe for our re view. 12 1 and re tain positions of seniority , thus confer ringpersona l benef

its at public ex pense. 4 2 On Dec ember 12, 2008, defe ndants moved to dismiss t he Amende d Complaint and the 3 parties c ross-moved f or summary

judgme nt. On J anuar

y 5, 2009, the District Court hear d oral 4 argument. On J anuar y 13, 2009, the District Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary 5 judgme nt and g rante d summary judgme nt to defenda

nts, enteringjudgme nt shortly there afte r. 6 On J anuar

y 22, 2009, appellants timely filed a notice of appe al from the D istrict Court’s 7 Memorandum a

nd Orde r. 5 8 DI SCU SSIO N 9 “ We r e vie w a n a wa rd of summa ry jud g me nt de novo , and we will uphold the judgment 10 only

if the evide nce, vie wed in the lig ht most favorable to the party ag ainst whom it is entered, 11 demonstrates that there a re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that the judg ment was13 1 war

rante d as a matter of law .” Barfield v. N.Y . City Health &Hosp. Corp. , 537 F.3d 132, 140 2 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ) ( c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 3 (1 98 6) ; Rubens v. M ason , 527 F.3d 252, 254 ( 2d Cir. 2008)). 4 I. The F ir stAm e ndm e nt 5 In th e ir

Am e nd e d Co mpl a int , p la int if fs a lle g e that de fe nd ants vio late d th e ir F ir st 6 Amendment rig hts by enac ting L ocal L aw 51. The y claim that they

as we ll as other voter s in the 7 City

wi ll b e le ss l ike ly

to p art ic ipate in t

he re fe re nd

um p ro c e ss i n th e futur e , a nd thu s e ng a g e in 8 le ss F ir st A me ndme nt s pe e c h, if laws e na c te d b y

re fe re nd a c an b e ame nd e d o r r e pe a le d b y City 9 Council leg islation. Apply ing the First Amendme nt balancingtest first set forth in Anderson v. 10 Ce le br e

zze , 460 U.S. 780 (1983), the District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ cla im. See M olinari v. 11 Bloo mb e rg , 596 F. Supp. 2d 546, 565-67 (E .D.N.Y. 2009) . I t held, “On ba lance , no rational fa ct 12 fi nd e r c ou ld c on c lud e that th e c la ime d inte rf e re nc e wi th p la int if

fs ’ [F ir st A me ndme nt] r ig hts 13 outweig hs the rig ht of the City Council to let people choose the best ca ndidates to dea l with the 14 curr ent ec onomic situation.” Id. at 567. 15 Her e, appe llants claim that the District Court used the cor rec t analy tical fra mework but 16 misapplied it. They emphasize that the re cord c ontains evidenc e showingthat those who 17 pa

rt ic ipate d in

the 19 93 and

19 96 re fe re nd a

pr oc e ss h ave no int e nti on of do ingso in t

he futur e if 18 the law u lti mate ly e na c te d a nd ma int a ine d th e re by

c an s imp ly

be ame nd e d b y

City Counc il 19 le g isl atio n. In e sse nc e , th e y argue that L oc a l L aw 5 1 “ de c re a se s [th e ir sp e e c h’ s] e ff

e c tiv e ne ss” 20 and, as a

result, their spee ch is chilled. SeeBr ief for Appellants at 22. The y

contend, more over, 21 that th e “ tim ing[of L oc a l L aw 5 1] e xac e rb ate d th e se a lr e a dy -s ig nif ic ant b ur de ns by

dir e c tly 22 frustrating the timely exercise of

New Y ork City

voters’ a cknowledg ed right to put the termThe Mayor and the City Council eac h has authority to cre ate a

char ter c ommissi on, 6 wh ic h c ou ld t

he or e tic a lly

put an is su e on

the ba llo t f

or re fe re nd um at a sp e c ia l e le c tio n a s e arl y as six ty day s after

the proposed le g islation is fil ed with the city cler k. See N.Y. M UN . H OME R UL E L AW § 36(2), ( 4), (5) (b). 14 1 limit s issue to a third city wide vote pr ior to this November’s e lection.” See id. at2 5

. T h ey al l ege 2 that th e so le purp os e of L oc a l L aw 5 1 w a s to “ e ntr e nc h” inc umb e nts and , a s su c h, the ir F ir st 3 Amendment intere sts outweigh the interests of the City

. See id. at 26 -3 1. Ap pe lle e s, fo r t he ir 4 pa rt , c la im that th e ob

je c tiv e of L oc a l L aw 5 1 w a s to pr ov ide the City ’s c iti zen s th e op po rt un ity 5 to vote for e x perie nced public of ficials in a time of f

inancial c risis. Appellants contend, 6 howeve r, that L ocal L aw 51 wa s not nece ssary to achieve this objective bec ause the Mayor or the 7 City

Council could have timely put the issue of term limits to a refe rendum prior to the 8 November

2009 elec tion. See ge nerally N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 36. 6 9 We ag ree , howeve r, with appe llees’ f urther a rgument that L ocal L aw 51 doe s not 10 implicate plaintiffs’ F irst Amendment rig hts and, there fore , we ne ed not dec ide whethe r the 11 Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d in de te rm ini ngthat th e City ’s int e re sts outw e ig he d p la int if fs ’ F ir st 12 Am e ndme nt i nte re sts . N o b a lanc ingis n e c e ssa ry be c a us e pla int if

fs do no t ha

ve a via ble F ir st 13 Amendment cla im in the first place. 14 A. P laintif fs H ave NotIdentif

ied a Bu rden on Th eir F irst Am endm ent Rights 15 The log ical startingpoint is t o identify prec isely what plaintiffs a

re c laiming it is that 16 violates their F irst Amendment rig ht to free speec h. There is no doubt that New York la w 17 permits the City

Council to amend a lawpreviously enac ted by

ref ere ndum, as the Ne w York 18 Court of Appea ls has so held. S e e C a r u s o v . Ci t

yo f N

. Y. , 517 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1987) 19 (B ly

n, J. ), aff’d on op. of Blyn, J. , 533 N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. Div. 1st Dep’ t 1988), aff’d on op. ofAp pe lla nts a pp e ar t o a rgue in a fo otn ote that Caruso is d ist inguis ha ble be c a us e it d id 7 no t a dd re ss “ wh e the r t

hat po we r a llo ws a

wh oll y se lf -i nte re ste d le g isl atur e to c omp le te ly evisce rate a re fer endum that was e x plicitly intended to constra in that body ’s own powe r.” See B ri e f f or Ap pe lla nts at 48 -4 9 n .1 5. Th is i s si mpl y a re c a st o f p la int if

fs ’ c on fl ic t of

int e re st argume nt, wh ic h w e a dd

re ss inf ra , Pa rt I V. Ap pe lla

nts a lso a pp e ar t o a rgue that Carus o is inapposite bec ause the term limits l aw e nacte d by the 1993 Voter

Initiative expressly

stated that it was the “public policy” of N ew Yor k City not to permit an elec ted offic ial to serve mor e than eig ht consec utive y ear s. We fail to see how Carus o is lim ited to those laws that do not aff ect the City ’s “ pu

bli c po lic y .” I t is c le ar t

hat th at th e Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls d id n ot i nte nd

to l imi t the import of Carus o in this respect: the issue pre sented wa s “whe ther the Council may amend or re peal a

local law e nacte d by

voter initiative.” Se e Carus o , 5 17 N. Y. S.2 d at 89 9. Th is question was answ ere d in the aff irmative. See id. at 899-901.

15 1 Blyn, J. , 547 N.E.2d 92 (N.Y . 1989), cert. de nied , 493 U.S. 1077 (1990). B y adoptingthe lower 2 court’s opinion, the Ne w York Court of A ppeals stated: 3 [T] he laws pr oposed and e nacte d by the people unde r an initiative 4 provision are subject to the same c onstitut ional, statutory and 5 char ter limitations as those passed by the L eg islature and a

re 6 entitled to no gr eate r sanc tity or dig nity . Inasmuch a s a leg islative 7 bo dy may mod if y or a bo lis h it s p re de c e sso r’ s a c ts s ub je c t on ly to 8 its own discretion, it likewise should be able, in the a bsence of an 9 express regulation or restric tion, to amend or re peal a n enac tment 10 by the elec torate, its co- ordinate unit, and v ic e v e rsa . 11 12 Id. at 900 (interna l citations omit ted). 7 13 Although w e ar e cle arly bound to follow Carus o as a matter of Ne w York State la w, see 14 Van Buskirk v . N.Y . Times Co. , 325 F.3d 87, 89 ( 2d Cir. 2003), plaintiffs, at bottom, contend that 15 thi s sc he me vio late s th e F ir st A me ndme nt b e c a us e it d isc oura g e s c iti zen s f ro m pa rt ic ipatin gin 16 the re fer endum proc ess. 17 The F irst Amendment provides that “ Congr ess shall make no la w . . . abr idgingthe 18 fre edom of spee ch, or of the pre ss; or the rig ht of people pe ace ably to assemble, and to pe tition 19 the Gover

nment for a

redr ess of grieva

nces.” U.S. C O N ST ., ame nd I . T he F ourt e e nth 20 Amendment make s that prohibition applicable to the State and City of Ne w York. Se e Tho rn hil l16 1 v. Alabama , 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). It is ax iomatic that “[t] he F irst Amendment ‘wa s fashioned 2 to assure unf

ettere d intercha

ng e of ide as for

the bring ing a

bout of political and social c hang es 3 desired by

the people.’ ” Mey er v. Grant , 4 8 6 U. S

. 4 1 4 , 4 2 1 (1 9 8 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Roth v. United 4 States , 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 5 Although it is self-e vident that the re fer endum ca n serve “[a]s a basic instrument of 6 democr atic g overnme nt,” City of Eastl ake v . Forest City Enters., Inc. , 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976), 7 the rig ht to pass leg islation through a ref ere ndum is a state-c reated rig ht not gua rante ed by

the 8 U.S. Consti tution, see Sav e Palisade FruitLands v. Todd , 279 F.3d 1204, 1210- 11 (10th Cir.) 9 (“ [N]ot

hin gin t he langua g e of

the Con sti tut ion

c omm and s d ir e c t de moc ra c y , a nd [the c ourt

is] 10 awa

re of no [contrary] authority .”), cert. de nied , 537 U.S. 814 (2002). See also Marijuana 11 Policy Projec t v. United States , 3 04 F .3 d 8 2, 85 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 2) ; Sto nev . Ci ty of Pre sc ott , 173 12 F.3d 1172, 1174- 76 (9th Cir.), cert. de nied , 5 28 U. S. 8 70 (1 99 9) ; Taxpayers United for 13 As se

ssm e nt C uts v . A us tin , 994 F.2d 291, 295 ( 6th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Const itution does not 14 re qu ir e a

state to c re ate an in iti ativ e pr oc e dure .” ); Pony LakeSch. Dist. 30 v. State Comm. for 15 Re or

ga niz ati on of S

c h. Di sts

. , 710 N.W.2d 609, 623 (Neb.) ( “B eca use the rights of initiative or 16 ref

ere ndum are a mea

ns of direc t democra cy , fede ral c ourts have c oncluded that the pa rtial 17 rese rvation or total abse nce of the rig ht of initiative or ref ere ndum in a state constitution does not 18 violate a f

undamental r ight to vote.” ), cert. de nied, 5 47 U. S. 1 13 0 ( 20 06 ); c f. Hunter v. Eric kson , 19 39 3 U .S. 38 5, 39 2 ( 19 69 ) ( imp lyingthe same ); Mey er , 486 U.S. at 421-25 (same). 20 Nonethele ss, as the Supreme Court ha s rec og nized, if a state choose s to confer the rig ht of 21 ref

ere ndum to its citizens, itis “obligated to do so in a manner consistent with the Constit ution.” 22 Mey er , 48 6 U .S. at 42 0; Tax pa y e rs U nite d fo r A sse

ssm e nt C uts , 994 F.2d at 295 (“[W] e conc lude17 1 that a lth ou g h th e Con sti tut ion do e s n ot r e qu ir e a

state to c re ate an in iti ativ e pr oc e dure , if it 2 cre ates such a

proce dure, the state ca

nnot place r estrictions on its use that violate the fe dera l 3 Constit ution.”). Thus, courts have decide d whether particula r re gulations of voter initiative or 4 ref

ere ndum schemes ha

ve run a foul of the U.S. Constituti on. See, e .g. , Cipriano v. Ci ty of 5 Houma , 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (holdingunconstitutional under the Equa l Protection Clause the 6 re str ic tio n o f t

he ri g ht t o v ote in a

re ve nu e bo nd

re fe re nd um t o o nly

tho se wh o p ay

pr op e rt y 7 taxes) ; W

irz bu rge r v . G alv in , 4 12 F .3 d 2 71 (1 st C ir . 2 00 5) (r e je c tin ga F re e Exe rc ise c ha lle ng e to 8 pr ov isi on s o f t

he Ma ssa c hu se tts Con sti tut ion pr oh ibi tin gvo te r i nit iativ e s to ame nd the state 9 constitution t o allow public financ ial support of private , relig iously aff iliated schools), c e rt. 10 denied, 546 U.S. 1150 (2006). 11 The Supreme Court, in Mey er v. G rant and Buck ley v . American Constitutional L aw 12 Foundation, Inc ., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), addr essed the F irst Amendment re strictions on such 13 g overnme ntal regulation of voter initiatives. In Mey er , the Supreme Court he ld that Colorado’s 14 prohibition ag ainst paying c irculators of voter initiative petitions violated the First Amendme nt. 15 See 4 8 6 U

. S

. at4 1 5

- 1 6 , 4 2 2

- 2 3

. T h e C o urtm a d e c l e ar “ th atth e p o w e r

t o b ani n i t i at i v e s e n t i r e l y” 16 does not allow a state “to limit di scussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions.” Id. at 17 42 5. Th e Court

e xpla ine d: 18 Th e c ir c ulatio n o f a n in iti ativ e pe tit ion

of ne c e ssi ty 19 involves both the expression of a desire for political cha ng e and a 20 discussion of the merits of the pr oposed cha ng e. Althoug h a 21 petition circulator ma y not have to per suade pote ntial signatories 22 that a pa rt ic ula r p ro po sa l sh ou ld p re va il t o c a ptu re the ir signatur e s, 23 he or she will at least have to persuade them that the matter is one 24 de se rv ingof the pu bli c sc rutiny

and de bate that w ou ld atte nd its 25 consideration by the whole e lectorate. This will in almostever y 26 case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and whyAs to the forme r, the Court conc luded that it was “a dequate ly protec ted by

the 8 require ment that no initiative proposal may be plac ed on the ba llot unless the required numbe r of signatures has be en obtained.” Mey er , 486 U.S. at 425-26. As to the latter , the Court explored the var ious other “pr ovisions of the Colorado statute” that “ deal e x pressly with the potential dang er that circulators might be te mpted to pad their pe titions with false sig nature s” and f ound them to be suffic ient to achieve the State’s objec tive. Id. at 427. 18 1 its advocate s support it. Thus, the circulation of a petition involves 2 th e t y p e o f i n t er ac t i v e c o m mun i ca t i o nco n ce rn i n g p o l i t i ca l ch an ge 3 that is appropriately descr ibed as “ core political speec h.” 4 5 Id. 421-22 (inter

nal footnote omitted). 6 The Court we nt on to say that the re fusal to per

mit the plaintiffs to pay

petition circulators 7 re str ic te d p ro te c te d s pe e c h in tw o w ay s: 8 F ir st, it l imi ts the numbe r o f v oic e s who wi ll c onve y a pp e lle e s’ 9 me s s a g e an d th e h o ur s th e y

c ans p e ak

an d , th e r e f

o r e , li mi ts th e s iz e 10 of the a udience they

can r eac h. Second, it makes it less likely that 11 appellee s will ga rner the number of

signatures nec essar

y to place 12 the matter on the ballot, thus li miting their a bility to make the 13 matter the f ocus of state wide discussion. 14 15 Id. at 422-23 (inter nal footnote omitted). The Court rejec ted “the State’ s arguments that the 16 pr oh ibi tio n is jus tif ie d b y its int e re st i n ma

kin gsure that an in iti ativ e ha s su ff ic ie nt gra ss r oo ts 17 support to be place d on the ballot, or by its int ere st in protectingthe integ rity of the initiative 18 proce ss.” Id. at 425. The Court c oncluded, ther efor e, that the State f ailed to justify

the burde n 8 19 on political expression and held the law unc onstitut ional. See id. at 428. 20 In Buck

ley , the Supreme Court he ld unconstituti onal under the Fir st Amendment ea ch of 21 the followingthree conditions that Colorado place d on the ballot-initiative proce ss: “(1) the 22 require ment that initiative-petition circulators be reg istered voter s; (2) the re quirement that they 23 wea

r an ide ntification badg e bea ringthe[ir] . . . name; and ( 3) the re quirement that propone nts of 24 an initiative repor t the names a

nd addre sses of all paid c irculators a nd the amount paid to ea ch19 1 circ ulator.” 525 U.S. at 186 (citations omitted). The Supre me Court conclude d that all three of 2 Colorado’s re quirements dra stically reduc ed the number

of per sons, both volunteer and pa id, 3 available to circulate petitions. Id. at 193-205. It went on to conclude that the State’s dominant 4 justification – to police lawbre aker s amongpetition circulators – w as “se rved by the re quirement 5 . . . that eac h circ ulator submit an aff idavit setting out, amongsever al par ticulars, the ‘ addre ss at 6 which he or

she re sides, including the street name and number , the city or town, and the county .’” 7 Id. at 196 (bra ckets omitted). It held, there fore , that the re quirements we re unc onstitut ional, as 8 they

“cut[] down the number of messag e ca rrier s in the ballot-acc ess ar ena w ithout im pelling 9 cause .” Id. at 197. 10 Both Mey er and Buck ley “involved an unc onstitut ional regulation of speec h that 11 happene d to occur in the context of an . . . initiative scheme.” Save Palisade FruitL ands , 279 12 F.3d at 1212

. The c halleng ed laws “ specific ally regulated the pr ocess of

advoca cy itself: the 13 laws dictate d who could speak (only volunteer c irculators a

nd reg istered voter s) or howt o go 14 about speaking ( with name badg es and subse quent re ports).” Initiative &Refere ndum Inst. v. 15 W

alker , 450 F.3d 1082, 1099 ( 10th Cir. 2006) ( en banc ), cert. de nied , 549 U.S. 1245 (2007). 16 Tog ether , Me

y e r and Buck

ley make c lear

that the Fir st Amendment protec ts polit ical spee ch fr om 17 undue g overnme nt interfer ence in the context of refe rendum pe titioni ng . 18 Howeve r, Me y e r and Buck

ley do not gua

rante e a r ight to leg islate by ref ere ndum, much 19 less a right protectinga law e nacte d by ref ere ndum from amendme nt or repe al by a leg islative 20 bo dy . A s e xpla ine d b y the Te nth

Cir c uit en banc : 21 Although the First Amendme nt protects political spee ch 22 inc ide nt t o a n in iti ativ e c ampa ig n, it d oe s n ot p ro te c t th e ri g ht t o 23 make law, by ini tiativ e or

oth e rw ise

. . . . Th e dis tin c tio n isI t would be re miss not t o mention the fac t that the 1993 Voter I nitiative imposed the 9 previous ter

m limi ts on electe d officia ls in New York City for ove r fifte en year s – even withstanding the 1996 Refer endum – there by undersc oringthe sig nificant e ffe ct that City voters have ha d on the elec toral proc ess. 20 1 betwee n laws that re gulate or r estrict the c ommunicative conduc t 2 of per sons advocating a position i n a re fer endum, which wa rra nt 3 strict scrutiny , and laws that determine the proce ss by which 4 leg islation is enacted, whic h do not. 5 6 Id. at 10 99 -1 10 0 ( c itatio n o mitte d) ; see also Biddulph v. Mortham , 8 9 F .3 d 1 49 1, 14 98 n. 7 ( 11 th 7 Cir. 1996) (explaining that in Mey er , “the Court esta blished an explicit di stinction between a 8 s t at e’ s p o we r t o re gu l at e t h e i n i t i at i v e p ro ce s s i ngen er al an d th e p o we r t o re gu l at e t h e e x ch an ge 9 of idea s about political chang es soug ht throug h the proc ess. The Court only addre ssed the 10 constitutionalit y

of the latter .”). 11 He re , p la int if fs are no t in

any wa y re str ic te d f

ro m e ng a g ingin F ir st A me ndme nt a c tiv ity 12 as the re fer enda pr oponents wer e in Mey er and Buck ley . In fac t, plaintiffs emphasize that they 13 wer e fr ee to e x erc ise their F irst Amendment rig hts in connection with the 1993 and 1996 14 ref

ere nda in an attempt to highlight the time a nd cost they

expended on those ef

forts. Plaintiffs 15 re ma in f

re e to d o s o in

c onne c tio n w ithre fe re nd a or oth e rw ise no w a

nd in t he futur e . Pl a int if

fs ’ 16 c la im i s si mpl y

that th e ir F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts are vio late d b y L oc a l L aw 5 1 b e c a

us e City 17 voters will be less likely in the future to e ng ag e in the re fer endum proc ess if a la w ena cted by

that 18 proce ss can be amende d or re peale d throug h City Council leg islation. This claim implicates no 9 19 First Amendme nt rig ht. Cf. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Employe es , 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 20 (1979) ( per c uriam) ( “The First Amendme nt rig ht to associate a nd to advocate ‘provide s no 2 1 gu ar an t ee th ata s p ee ch wi l l p er s u ad e o r t h atad v o ca cy wi l l b e e ff

ec t i v e. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Hanove r 22 Townshi

p Fed’n of Teac hers v. Hanov er Cmty. Sch. Corp. , 457 F.2d 456, 461 ( 7th Cir. 1972));21 1 Ukrainian-Am. Bar Ass’n, Inc. v . Bake r , 8 93 F .2 d 1 37 4, 13 79 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 0) (“ Th e ri g ht t o 2 sp e ak p ro te c te d b y the fi rs t ame ndme nt i s n ot, ho we ve r, a ri g ht t o b e he e de d. ” ). At bo tto m, 3 “ther e is a c rucia l differ ence betwee n a law that has the ‘inevitable eff ect’ of re ducingspeec h 4 beca

use it restricts or r egulates spee ch, [as in Me y e r and Buck

ley, ] and a law that ha s the 5 ‘inevitable e ffe ct’ of r educingspeec h beca use it makes par

ticular spee ch less likely

to succe ed.” 6 In iti ati v e &Re

fe re nd um In st. , 450 F.3d at 1100. The for mer implicates the F irst Amendment and 7 the latter doe s not. See ge nerally id. 8 We f

ind ins tr uc tiv e the Te nth

Cir c uit ’s en banc decision in In iti ati v e &Re fe re nd um In st. 9 I t addre ssed whethe r an a mendment to the Utah Constitution authoriz ing r efe renda violated the 10 First Amendme nt by singlingout initi atives re g ardingwildlife manag ement by requiringa super 11 majority

for their adoption. See id. at 1086. The pla intiffs, including six wildl ife a nd animal 12 advoca cy

g roups, ar gued that by

raisingthe bar

for wildlife initiatives, this provision im posed a 13 “ c hil lin ge ff

e c t” on the e xer c ise of

the ir F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts be c a us e it m a de it m or e dif

fi c ult 14 to pass such initiatives. See id. T h e T en thC i rc u i tre j ec t edth ei r a rgu m en t , wr i t i n g: 15 Under the Plaintiffs’ theory , ever y structura l feature of 16 g overnme nt that makes some political outcomes less likely than 17 oth e rs – a nd the re by dis c oura g e s so me sp e ake rs fr om e ng a g ingin 18 protec ted spee ch – violates the F irst Amendment. Constitut ions 19 and rule s of proc edure routinely make leg islation, and thus 2 0 ad v o ca cy , o nce rt ai ns u b j ec t s m o re d i ff

i cu l tb y re qu i ri n g a 21 supermajor ity vote to enac t bills on cer tain subjects. . . . [citing 22 e xamp le s] Th e se pr ov isi on s p re suma bly have the “ ine vit a

ble 23 eff ect” of re ducingthe total “quantum of spe ech” by discourag ing 24 advocates of nucle ar pow er pla nts, ge nera l bankinglaws, or 25 unauthorized state fla g s from botheringto seek leg islation or 26 ini tiativ e s e mbo dyingthe ir vie ws . Y e t if

it v iol ate s th e F ir st 27 Amendment to re move ce rtain issues from the vic issitudes of 28 ordinary democr atic politics, constitutions themselves ar e 29 unconstitutional. I ndeed, the Plaintiffs’ theory would have the22 1 ironic ef fec t of rende ringthe re lief they seek in this litigation 2 un c on sti tut ion a l un de r t he F ir st A me ndme nt: if

it i s 3 unconstitutional to amend the Utah c onstitut ion to require a 4 supermajor ity to approve a wildlife initiative, those who fa vor such 5 an ame ndme nt w ou ld b e le ss l ike ly to e ng a g e in a dv oc a c y

in i ts 6 favor

. 7 8 No doubt the Plaintiffs are sincere in their many sworn 9 statements that they find the heightened thre shold for wildlife 10 initiatives dispi riting, a nd fee l “marg inalized” or “silenc ed” in the 11 wake of Proposition 5. Their constitutional claim beg ins, however , 12 from a ba sic misunderstanding . The F irst Amendment ensure s that 13 all points of view may be hea rd; it does not ensure that all points of 14 vie w a re e qu a lly lik e ly to p re va il. 15 16 Id. at 1100-01 (inter nal citations omitted). 17 We b e lie ve that th e Te nth Cir c uit ’s ana ly sis is s ound and e qu a lly a pp lic a ble he re . T hat is , 18 while the plaintiffs in Initiative &Refere ndum Inst. c la ime d th at th e ir F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts 19 wer e chilled be cause Utah’s supe r-major ity require ment made it more diff icult to pass wildlife 20 ref

ere nda, plaintiffs he re c laim that their First Ame ndment rig hts are c hilled beca use Ne w York 21 State law p uts re fe re nd a and City Counc il l e g isl atio n o n e qu a l f oo tin g , p e rm itt ingthe latte r t o 22 superse de the f

ormer ( and v ic e v e rsa ). As such, like in In iti ati v e &Re fe re nd um In st. , there is no 23 restric tion on plaintiffs’ speec h. 24 Other c ourts have a ddresse d analog ous circumstanc es and c ome to simil ar c onclusions 25 that reinfor ce our holding that no F irst Amendment rig ht is im plicated in this case . For example, 26 Po ny

Lak e Sc ho ol D ist

ric t 30 v . S tate Com mi tte e for

Re or ga niz ati on of S

c ho ol D ist

ric ts , 710 27 N.W.2d 609, 624-25 (Neb.) , cert. de nied , 547 U.S. 1130 (2006), held that Ne braska ’s 28 ref

ere ndum proce ss did not viol ate the F irst Amendment by requiringa heightened amount of 29 petition signature s to temporarily suspend the oper ation of a la w that was e nacte d by

a leg islative23 1 body

pendinga re fer endum appr oving it. The court re asoned: 2 Although pla intiffs primarily rely on Mey er

and Buck ley to 3 support their position, neither ca se is applicable to initi ative or 4 ref ere ndum proce sses that do not restrict political communication 5 or assoc iation. Neither do the y apply to leg islation which is not 6 intended to re gulate these proce dures. 7 8 [The act] does not impose any restric tions or conditions on 9 plaintiffs’ rig ht to communicate with voters a bout the political 10 chang e they seek. N or does [the ac t] attempt to regulate the 11 c ir c ulatio n o f i nit iativ e or re fe re nd um p e tit ion s. Rathe r, pla int if fs ’ 12 a sse rt ion that th e ir ri g ht t o f re e sp e e c h h a s b e e n d imi nis he d is 13 based e ntirely upon their cla im that unless [ the ac t] is suspended 14 until the re fe re nd um v ote , th e a

bil ity of tho se op po se d to [it] to 15 pe rs ua de vo te rs to r e je c t it wi ll b e mor e dif

fi c ult . Pl a int if

fs ’ c la im 16 is n ot b a se d u po n a ny a c tua l r e str ic tio ns on

the ir ri g ht t o 17 communicate w ith voters. 18 19 Given the c onditions t he people of Ne braska have imposed 20 on their powe r to suspend an a ct’s oper ation pendinga re fer endum 21 elec tion, the “difficulty ,” as de scribed by plaintiffs, ca

n be avoide d 22 only by this court’s expanding the scope of the re fer endum power 23 itself. As discussed, the U.S. Constituti on does not guara ntee a 24 rig ht of ref ere ndum, and to expand this right would be to ig nore the 25 c le ar a nd un ambi guo us pr oc e dure se t out by the pe op le in a

rt ic le 26 I I I , § 3, of the state Constitution. This we shall not do. 27 28 Id. (i nte rn a l c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also Marijuana Policy Proje ct v. United States , 304 F.3d 82, 29 84, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (r ejec ting a First Amendme nt challeng e to a law denying the District of 30 Columbi a author ity to “ena ct . . . any

law” r educingpenalties a ssociated with possession, use, or 31 distribution of marijuana, bec ause the leg islation “restricts no spee ch; to the contra ry , medical 32 mari

jua na a dv oc ate s r e ma in f

re e to l ob by , p e tit ion , o r e ng a g e in o the r F ir st 33 Am e ndme nt- pr ote c te d a c tiv iti e s to re du c e mari jua na pe na lti e s. ” ); Sto nev . Ci ty of Pre sc ott , 173 34 F.3d 1172, 1775 ( 9th Cir.) (holding that an Arizona ordinanc e deny ing its citizens the 35 opportunity

to petition for a city -wide r efe rendum with re spect to laws pa ssed under an24 1 emer g ency

decla ration did not fall within the orbit of Mey er and Buck ley , as the lawat issue was 2 “not a r estriction, condition, or re quirement that impermissibly burdens the e x erc ise of the 3 re fe re nd

um p ow e r, the re by

inv ok ingthe pr ote c tio n o f t he F ir st A me ndme nt. Ins te a d, it i s a 4 deleg ation to the leg islature by the people of

a par t of their re serve d power

of re fer endum.”) , c e rt. 5 denied, 5 28 U. S. 8 70 (1 99 9) ; Tax pa y e rs U nite d fo r A sse

ssm e nt C uts v . A us tin , 994 F.2d 291, 297 6 (6th Cir. 1993) (“ Unlike the cha lleng ed provisions in Mey er , Michig an’s initiative sy stem does 7 no t r e str ic t th e me ans that th e pla int if fs c an u se to a dv oc ate the ir pr op os a l. .

. . Our r e su lt w ou ld 8 be diffe rent if, a s in Mey er , th e pla int if fs we re c ha lle ng inga

re str ic tio n o n th e ir

a bil ity to 9 communicate w ith other voters a bout proposed leg islation, or if they alleg ed they

wer e being 10 tr e ate d d if

fe re ntl y tha n o the r gro up s se e kin gto i nit iate le g isl atio n. ” ); W ellwood v. Johnson , 172 11 F.3d 1007, 1009 ( 8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a n Arka nsas law that r equire d the sig nature s of 15 12 perc ent of the r eg istered voter s in a political subdivisi on to put on the ballot a local initiative 13 reg ardingwhether a county is “wet” or “dr

y” bec ause the require ment “in no way burden[s] t he 14 ability

of supporter s of local- option elections to make their vie ws hea rd”)

. 15 As our S ist e r C ir c uit s ( and the Ne br a sk a

Sup re me Court ) h ave re c ognize d, pla int if fs ’ 16 F ir st A me nd

me nt r ig hts are no t im

pli c ate d b y

re fe re nd um s c he me s pe r se(and c erta inly not by 17 the City

Council’s amendment of a law pre viously

enac ted by

a re fer endum), but by

the 18 regulation of advoc acy within the refe renda

proce ss, i.e. , p e tit ion

c ir c ulatin g , d isc ours e and a ll 19 other prote cted f

orms of advoc acy . Even if plaintiffs a re c orre ct that the ena ctment of L ocal L aw 20 51 will make it more diffic ult for plaintiffs to org anize voter initiatives and re fer enda in the 21 future, “ the difficulty of the proc ess alone is insuffic ient to impli cate the Fir st Amendment, as 22 long a s the communication of idea s associate d with the [refer endum proc ess] is notaff ecte d.”25 1 Do brov oln

yv . M oo re , 126 F.3d 1111, 1113 ( 8th Cir. 1997), cert. de nied , 523 U.S. 1005 (1998). 2 He re , n o s uc h e ff e c t e xists . N oth ingis p re ve nti ngpla int if fs fr om e ng a g ingin F ir st 3 Am e ndme nt s pe e c h r e g ard ingte rm lim its , whe the r w ith in t

he re fe re nd

um c onte xt or

no t. Wh ile 4 we a

pp re c iate the pr a c tic a l r e a lity that Cit y vo te rs wi ll n ot b e a

ble to s top c e rt a in e le c te d o ff ic ia ls 5 fr om s e e kin ga

thi rd te rm in o ff ic e thr ou g h a

vo te r i nit iativ e be c a

us e the pr oc e ss w ou ld t ake until 6 at least the N ovember 2009 elec tion, se e su

pra [pp. 7-8] , this temporal fac t does not amount to a 7 First Amendme nt violation. See, e .g. , Save Palisade FruitL ands v. Todd , 279 F.3d 1204, 1210- 8 11 (1 0th

Cir .) (h old ingthat th e Un ite d St ate s Co ns tit uti on do e s n ot gua

ra nte e the ri g ht t o p a ss 9 leg islation by

means of a

ref ere ndum), cert. de nied , 537 U.S. 814 (2002). 10 B. Balan cing Under Ande rso n v . Celebre zze is Unn ece ssary 11 Appellants ar gue, howe ver, that L ocal L aw 51 is entitled to First Ame ndment scrutiny 12 under An de rso n v . Ce le br e zze , 460 U.S. 780 (1983). The y state, bec ause “ [a] ll election laws 13 invariably

impose some burden upon individual voters,” Gr e e n Par ty of N .Y. Statev . N. Y

. S tate 14 Bd. of Elections , 389 F.3d 411, 419 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (interna l quotation marks omitted), L ocal L aw 15 51 is subject to First Amendment ba lancing . Their a rgument beg ins from a fa ulty premise. 16 Anderson and its prog eny deal with ele ction and votingrig hts laws that restric t speec h or ballot 17 acc ess. L ocal L aw 51 doe s neither. 18 To c lari fy thi s p oint, i t is ne c e ssa

ry to b ri e fl y dis c us s Anderson , its proge ny and the c ases 19 cited by

appellants in their br iefs. I n Anderson , th e Sup re me Court a dd re sse d th e F ir st 20 Amendment validity of Ohio’s e arly

filing de adline, which r equire d an indepe ndent ca ndidate for 21 the President of the United States to file his or her paper work by Marc h 20 in order to be on the 22 g ener al elec tion ballot for November 1980. See460 U.S. at 782-83. As the Supre me Court26 1 po int e d o ut, by

Marc h o f a

n e le c tio n ye ar, “ de ve lop me nts in c ampa ig ns fo r t he ma jor -p art y 2 no min atio ns have on ly be gun , a nd the ma jor pa rt ie s w ill no t a do pt t

he ir no min e e s a

nd platf or ms 3 for a

nother five months.” Id. at 790-91. The Supreme Court wrote : 4 Constit utional challeng es to specif ic provisions of a State’ s 5 elec tion laws . . . cannot be resolved by any “litmus-paper

test” that 6 wi ll s e pa rate va lid fr om i nv a lid

re str ic tio ns . Ins te a d, a

c ourt mus t 7 re so lve su c h a c ha lle ng e by

an a na ly tic a l pr oc e ss t

hat pa ra lle ls i ts 8 work in ordinar y litigation. It must first consider the cha rac ter a nd 9 ma g nit ud e of the a sse rt e d in

jur y to t he ri g hts pr ote c te d b y

the F ir st 1 0 an d F o urt e e n thA m e n dm e n t s th atth e p l a i n t i f f s e e k s t o v i n d i c at e . It 11 then must identify and eva luate the pr ecise interests put forw ard by 1 2 th e S t at e a s j u s t i f i c at i o n s f o r th e b ur d e ni mp o s e d

b y i t s r u l e . In 13 passingjudgme nt, the Court must notonly deter mine the 14 le g iti ma c y and str e ng th o f e a c h o f t

ho se int e re sts , it

a lso mus t 15 c on sid e r t he e xtent to wh ic h th os e int e re sts make it n e c e ssa ry to 16 burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only afte r we ighingall these fa ctors 17 is the review ing c ourt in a position to decide whe ther the 18 challeng ed provision is unconstitutional. 19 20 Id. at 78 9. Th e Sup re me Court c on c lud e d th at th e e arl y

fi lin gde a dli ne ha d th e e ff e c t of “ tot a lly 21 exclud[ ing] any

candidate who make s the dec ision to run for President as a n independe nt after 22 the Marc h deadline.” Id. at 79 2. I t r e a ff ir me d th at “ it i s e sp e c ia lly

dif fi c ult fo r t he State to 23 jus tif

y a re str ic tio n th at li mit s p oli tic a l pa rt ic ipatio n b y

an id e nti fi a

ble po lit ic a l g ro up wh os e 24 members sha

re a particula r viewpoint, assoc iational pref ere nce, or economic status.” Id. at 793. 25 Th e Court

wr ote : 26 A burde n that falls unequa lly on new or

small polit ical 27 parties or on independe nt candidate s impinges, by its very nature , 2 8 o na s s o c i at i o n a l c h o i c e s p r o t e c t e d b y th e F i r s tA m e n dm e n t

. It 29 discriminates ag ainst those candidates and – of pa rticular 30 imp or tanc e – a g a ins t th os e vo te rs wh os e po lit ic a l pr e fe re nc e s li e 31 outside the exist ing political pa rties. B y limit ing the opportunities 32 of ind e pe nd e nt- min de d v ote rs to a sso c iate in t he e le c tor a l are na

to 33 enhanc e their political e ffe ctiveness a s a g roup, such r estrictions 34 threaten to reduc e diver sity and compe tition i n the marke tplace of27 1 ideas. Historica lly political fig ures outside the two ma jor parties 2 have be en fe rtile source s of new ide as and ne w programs; many of 3 the ir c ha lle ng e s to the status qu o h ave in t ime ma de the ir wa y int o 4 the political mainstream. In short, the primary values prote cted by 5 the Fir st Amendment – “a profound national commitment to t he 6 pr inc ipl e that de bate on pu bli c iss ue s sh ou ld b e un inh ibi te d, ro bu st, 7 and wide- open”– a re se rved when ele ction campa igns a re not 8 monopoliz ed by the exist ing political pa

rties. . . . The O hio filing 9 deadline c halleng ed in this case doe s more than bur den the 10 associational r ights of inde pendent voter s and ca ndidates. It places 11 a sig nificant state- imposed restriction on a nationwide elec toral 12 pr oc e ss. 13 14 Id. at 79 4- 95 (i nte rn a l c itatio ns a nd fo otn ote omi tte d) . T he Court pr oc e e de d to ho ld t

he statut e 15 un c on sti tut ion a l, c on c lud ingthat th e se burd e ns outw e ig he d th e State ’s min ima l inte re sts in 16 imposing a Ma

rch de adline. See id. at 796-806. 17 We rec ently had occ asion to apply

the Anderson balanc ing te st in Pr ic e v . Ne w York Sta te 18 Board of Elections , 5 40 F .3 d 1 01 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ), up on wh ic h a pp e lla nts re ly he avil y in t he ir 19 brief. I

n Price , we a ddresse d the Fir st Amendment constitutionality of Ne w York’ s prohibition 20 on voting by

absente e ballot in elec tions for political party county committees. See id. at 103-04. 21 We r e ite rate d th e Sup re me Court ’s state me nt t hat “ [a]ll ‘[e ]le c tio n la

ws wi ll i nv ari a

bly imp os e 22 some burden upon individual voter s.’” Id. at 107 (quotingBurdick v . Takushi , 504 U.S. 428, 433 23 (1992)) (sec ond alteration in original). We e mphasized that, in determining whether to apply the 24 First Amendme nt balancingtest, “it is important only that there is at least some burde n on the 25 voter-pla intiffs’ rig hts.” Id. at 10 9. We h e ld t hat th e pla int if

fs “ have an a sso c iatio na l r ig ht t o 26 vo te in p oli tic a l pa rt y e le c tio ns , a

nd that r ig ht i s b ur de ne d whe n th e state make s it mor e dif fi c ult 27 for these voters to ca st ballots.” Id. at 108 (interna l citations omit ted). In addition, we held that 28 “ca

ndidates’ a ssociational rig hts are a ffe cted, in at lea st some manner, when bar riers a re pla cedSee, e .g. , Crawf ord v. Marion County Elec tion Bd. , 128 S. Ct . 1610 (2008) ( applying 10 Anderson ’s ba lanc ingte st a nd up ho ldi nga

Vo te r ID l aw) ; Ra nd

all v . S orre ll , 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ( plurality

opinion) (striking down, in the fac e of a First Amendme nt challeng e, Ve rmont’s campa ign f

inance statute limit ing both the a mounts that candidates f

or state of fice could spend on the ir c ampa ig ns and

the amou nts that in div idu a ls, or g anizatio ns , a nd po lit ic a l pa

rt ie s c ou ld contribute to those ca

mpaig ns); Clingman v. Beave r , 5 4 4 U. S

. 5 8 1 (2 0 0 5 ) ( ap p l yi n g Anderson ’s balanc ing te st and reje ctingthe L ibertar ian Party ’s cha lleng e to Oklahoma’ s semi-closed pr imary allowinga par

ty to invite its own member s and those re g istered a s Independe nts to vote in the pa rt y ’s pr ima ry , b ut n ot m e mbe rs of

oth e r p art ie s) ; Burdick, 5 0 4 U. S

. 4 2 8 (ap p l yi n g Anderson ’s ba lanc ingte st a

nd up ho ldi ngHa

wa ii’ s b an o n wri te -i n v oti ng ); Ru tan v . R e pu bli c an Pa rty

of I ll. , 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (holdingthat the Fir st Amendment prohibits gove rnment off icials from discharg ing or

threateningto discharg e public employees solely for not supportingthe political pa rt y in p ow e r) ; Eu v. San Franc isco County Democ ratic Cent. Comm. , 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (holdingthat California violated the First Amendme nt by , inte r a lia , banningprimary e nd or se me nts by

po lit ic a l pa

rt ie s) ; Bullock v . Carter , 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (upholdingan Equa l Pr ote c tio n c ha lle ng e to a

Te xas l aw r e qu ir inga

c and idate to p ay

a fi lin gfe e a s a

c on dit ion

to havin ghis name pla c e d o n th e ba llo t in a pr ima ry e le c tio n) ; W

illiams v. Rhodes , 393 U.S. 23, 24 (1968) ( invalidating O hio’s elec tion laws that made “ it virtually impossibl e for

a new political party , even though it has hundreds of thousa nds of member s, or an old par ty , which has a

very sma ll n umb e r o f m e mbe rs , to be pla c e d o n th e state ba llo t to c ho os e e le c tor s p le dg e d to pa rt ic ula r c and idate s f

or the Pr e sid e nc y

and Vi c e Pr e sid e nc y

of the Un ite d St ate s” ); Libertarian Pa rty of O hio v . B lac k

we ll , 462 F.3d 579 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (invalidatingan Ohio ele ction law requiringall minor parties to file a petition no later than 120 da y s prior to the date of the primar y 28 1 befor e the voter s that would elec t these ca ndidates to party

positions.” Id. (c i t i n g Anderson , 460 2 U.S. at 786). We conc luded: “B eca use there is some burden on the pla intiffs’ associational 3 rig hts, we must apply the fra mework a rticulated in Burdick .” Id. (c i t i n g Burdick, 504 U.S. at 4 433-34). On ba lance , we c oncluded that the State’ s interests wer e of “ infinitesimal weig ht” and 5 thus could not outweig h the plaintiff’s F irst Amendment intere sts. See id. at 110-12. 6 In an attempt to convince us to apply the Anderson balanc ing te st to L ocal L aw 51, 7 a pp e lla nts se ize on

our r e c e nt r e a ff

ir matio n th at “ [a]ll e le c tio n la ws wi ll i nv ari a

bly imp os e so me 8 burden upon individual voters.” Price , 5 4 0 F. 3 d at1 0 7 (qu o t i n g Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433) 9 (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s and a lte ratio n o mitte d) . B ut Anderson , Burdick and their pr og eny

(as 10 we ll a s a ll the oth e r c a se s c ite d b y a pp e lla nts ) a re c omp le te ly

ina pp os ite

. Th e se c a se s a ll

10e le c tio n) ; Gree n Party of N.Y . State v. N.Y

. State Bd. of Elections , 389 F.3d 411 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (applying the Anderson balanc ing te st and invalidating New Y ork’s voter enrollment sche me, which did not keep da

ta on enr ollment in poli tical par ties that failed to re ceive 50,000 votes for the ir gub e rn ator ia l c and idate s in the pr e vio us e le c tio n) ; Unity Party v. W allace , 707 F.2d 59 ( 2d Cir. 1983) (re

jectinga F irst Amendment and Equa l Protection challeng e to New York’s require ment that minor party candidates ac cept the nomination of the party by a ce rtain date prior to the elec tion). 29 1 involve direc t restrictions on spee ch or a cce ss to the ballot. Pl aintiffs fa ce no suc h restric tions by 2 vir tue of L oc a l L aw 5 1. Rathe r, pla int if fs argue that th e y

and oth e r v ote rs wi ll b e le ss l ike ly to 3 eng ag e in spee ch and that their speec h will potentially become less eff

ective if law passe d by 4 ref

ere nda ca n be ame nded or r epea led by City Council leg islation. For the r easons e x plained, 5 this does not amount to a First Amendment violation. 6 Finally , in footnote five of their B rief a

nd throug hout their Reply Br ief, a ppellants argue 7 that th e ir

F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts are vio late d b e c a us e the e xten sio n o f t e rm lim its “ burd e ns bo th 8 voters in their a

bility to effe ctively

support would-be c halleng ers to entr enche d incumbents and 9 c ha lle ng e rs in t

he ir a bil ity to m ount e ff

e c tiv e c ampa ig ns .” B ri e f f or Ap pe lla nts at 24 n. 5. Thus , 10 in order to trig g er F irst Amendment scrutiny , appellants a rgue that L ocal L aw 51 a ffe cts the 11 “elig ibilit y

of ca ndidates.” Reply

Br ief for Plaintiffs-Appellants Will iam C. Thompson, J r., e t al

. 1 2 (“ R ep l y

Br i ef fo r A p p el l an t s ”) at5 (c i t i n g Anderson , 4 60 U. S. a t 78 8 ( “ Ea c h p ro vis ion

of the se 13 sc he me s, wh e the r i t g ov e rn s th e re g istratio n a nd qu a lif ic atio ns of

vo te rs , the selec tion and 14 eligibilit

y of candidates , or the votingproce ss itself, inevitably aff ects – at least to some deg ree – 15 the ind ivi du a l’ s r ig ht t o v ote and his ri g ht t o a sso c iate wi th o the rs fo r p oli tic a l e nd s. ” ) ( e mph a sis 16 added) ). 17 No tw ith sta nd inga pp e lla nts ’ p ro te statio ns to t

he c ontr ary , th is a

rgume nt n e c e ssa

ri ly 18 focuse s on the substantive impact that the e x tension of term limits has on the politi cal landsc ape.30 1 See Reply

Br ief for Appellants at 5 (“ As a matter of law, the Term- L imits Amendment, by 2 regulating e ligibility require ments for off

ice, ne cessa

rily burdens F irst Amendment ac tivity to at 3 le a st s ome de g re e .” ). B ut t he y ult imate ly

c on c e de , a

nd the law i s c le ar, that th e y have no F ir st 4 Amendment rig ht to term limi ts. See id. at 5. Cf. U.S. Term Limit s, Inc. v . Thorton , 5 14 U. S. 5 779, 837 (1995) ( explaining that the issue of te rm limit s at the state a nd local leve l does not 6 imp lic ate the U. S. Co ns tit uti on ). Mo re ov e r, the ir

Am e nd e d Co mpl a int , in

its e ig hty-s ix pa g e s, 7 make s n o a lle g atio n th at pl a int if fs ’ F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts are so me ho w b ur de ne d, e ve n if on ly 8 in t

he sli g hte st w ay , b y

L oc a l L aw 5 1’ s su

bs tanti ve c ha

ng e to t e rm

lim its

. 9 Fa ced w ith these insurmountable problems, a ppellants quickly

switch g ear s and ar gue that 10 the F ir st A me ndme nt “ burd e ns [do n ot] f low [] fr om t

he su bs tanc e of

the Te rm -L imi ts 11 Amendment itself. Rather , they are all the direc t result of the proc ess by which that law w as 12 enac ted and, more specific ally , of [defenda nts’] calculated disre g ard f or the voice of City

voters.” 13 See Reply

Br ief for Appellants at 7. In particula r, they argue, def

endants’ “ eleve nth-hour 14 un do ingof

the 19 93 and

19 96 Re fe re nd a

ha s d isc ou

ra g e d r e fe re nd a -r e late d s pe e c h, imp a ir e d it s 15 futur e e ff

e c tiv e ne ss, and

dir e c tly fr us tr ate d th e pr e se nt e xer c ise of Ne w Y or k Ci ty vo te rs ’ 16 acknow ledg ed right to put the term-limits issue to a third city wide vote.” Id. Thus , a

pp e lla nts 17 tr ans fo rm

the ve ry e sse nc e of

the ir c la im a s th e y

arr ive at di ff

e re nt j un c tur e s o f t

he F ir st 18 Amendment ana ly sis. 19 We are not persuade d by these e ffor

ts. At bottom , plaintiffs cha lleng e Ne w York’ s equal 20 treatment of law e nacte d by ref ere ndum and law e nacte d by a leg islative body . Such a sche me,Al tho ug h p la int if fs in f a c t c ri tic ize the City ’s pr oc e dure s f or ho ldi ngre fe re nd a

be c a us e 11

“ [c]it ize ns se e kin ga

vo te by re fe re nd um . . . fa c e an a

rd uo us ta sk to m e re ly

a pp e ar o n th e ba llo t, le t a lon e to p e rs ua de fe llo w v ote rs of the de sir a

bil ity of the ir po sit ion ,” J.A. 54 (P ls. Am

. Complt . ¶ 65), they

make no leg al cha lleng e to that proc ess in the instant suit. Appellants do not appe ar to a rgue that laws e nacte d by ref ere nda ca nnot be 12 su bs e qu e ntl y

ame nd e d o r r e pe a le d b y

a le g isl ativ e bo dy

wi tho ut c ontr ave nin gthe Du e Pr oc e ss 31 1 ho we ve r, do e s n ot r un a fo ul o f t he F ir st A me ndme nt. Any c hil lin gof

pla int if fs ’ F ir st 11 2 Amendment ac tivity is self-imposed and thus “inc idental[] and constitutionally insignifica

nt.” 3 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. , 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991). 4 II. Subst ant ive Due P r oc e ss 5 Ap pe lla

nts argue ne xt that L oc a l L aw 5 1 v iol ate s th e ir su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss r ig hts 6 guara

nteed by the Four teenth Amendme nt of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically , they argue that 7 beca

use the purpose of L ocal L aw 51 wa s an “inc umbency re- employ

ment prog ram” to allow 8 “those in powe r to have the opportunity to remain in powe r,” r ational-ba sis review is not 9 applicable

. SeeBr ief for Appellants at 36, 38, 40. 10 The lawin this C ircuit is clear that “[w]here, as he re, a

statute neither inter fer es with a 11 fundame ntal rig ht nor single s out a suspect c lassification, ‘we will invalidate [t hat statute] on 12 substantive due proc ess g rounds only when a plaintiff ca

n demonstrate that there is no rational 13 relationship between the le g islation and a leg itimate leg islative purpose.’” Maloney v. Cuomo , 1 4 5 5 4 F. 3 d

5 6 , 5 9 -6 0 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( p er

cu ri am ) ( qu o t i n g B e a t i e v . Ci t yo f N

. Y. , 123 F.3d 707, 711 15 (2d Cir. 1997)). A ppellants identify

neither a fundame ntal rig ht nor a suspec t classification that 16 is at issue here . As for a fundame ntal rig ht, appellants appe ar to a rgue that L ocal L aw 51 17 imp lic ate s a

ri g ht t o te rm

lim its or a ri g ht t o b e fr e e fr om l aw e na c te d b y le g isl ator s a c tin gin 18 their own political self- interest. The Due Process Clause guara ntees ne ither. As for a

suspect 12 13Clause of the F ourtee nth Amendment. Assuming, arguendo , that they do raise suc h an argument, it mustbe re

jected be cause there is no fundamental r ight to pass law by ref ere ndum at all. Se e su

pra [p. 16]

. Cf. U.S. Term Limit

s, Inc. v . Thorton , 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995) (r eg ardingterm limits); 13 Vieth v. J ubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plura lity opinion) (with respe ct to politicallyselfinterested le g islation, holdi ngthat political ge rry mander ing r aises a non-

justiciable question beca use, inte r a lia , in c umb e nts pa ss r e dis tr ic tin gle g isl atio n w ithan inte nt, at le a st i n p art , to g ain “political adva

ntag e,” a nd deter mining whe n the motive of “political a dvantag e” r eac hes an intolerable le vel is impractica ble). 32 1 class, cle arly

plaintiffs are not so situated, nor do they sug g est otherwise

. 2 To avoid rationality revie w, appe llants argue that it “is dee ply inappropriate for 3 leg islation that threatens to distort or manipulate r egular de mocratic proce sses, such as ‘ when 4 [i ncumbent] state leg islators are passinglaws dea ling with their own re- elec tion prospects.’” See 5 Br ief for

Appellants at 36 (a lteration in orig inal). F or this proposition, they rely on a dissenting 6 o p i n i o nfr o mth e F o urt hC i rc u i t ’s d en i al o f ap et i t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g en banc , see M iller v. 7 Cunningham , 512 F.3d 98, 99 ( 4th Cir. 2007) (Wilki nson, J ., dissenting) , and the F irst Circuit’s 8 decision in Bo na s v . To wn o f No rth Sm ith

fie ld , 265 F.3d 69 ( 1st Cir. 2001). Neither stands f or 9 this propositi on, and both ar e entire ly inapposite. 10 Although w e nee d not heed a dissent from the F ourth Circuit’s denial of a petition for 1 1 re h ea ri n g en banc , w e have satis fi e d o ur se lve s th at it is i rr e le va

nt t o th is a

pp e a l. I n h is d iss e nt, 12 Judg e Wilk ins on a dd re sse s a Vi rg ini a e le c tio n la

w e nti tli ngan in c umb e nt s tate le g isl ator to 13 selec t the method of nomination for his own seat, to which he wa s himself elig ible to seek 14 ree lection. See M iller , 512 F.3d at 99-100 (Wilkins on, J ., dissenting) . J udg e Wilkins on appea rs 15 to opine that it violates the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating in f

avor of incumbents, as 16 well as the F irst Amendment rig hts of political parties to fre e assoc iation. See id. at 104-05.33 1 Although a

ppellants che rry

pick statements fr om his diss ent that appe ar to support their position, 2 the dissent, taken a s a whole, dire ctly contra dicts their ar gument. Indeed, it explicitly rec og nizes 3 that the issue of ter m limi ts, even if the la ck ther eof te nds to favor inc umbents, is not one of 4 constitutional dim ension. See id. at 10 4. Mo re ov e r, Judg e Wilk ins on no te s: 5 [T]he re is c e rt a inl y no thi ngun c on sti tut ion a l per se about 6 inc umb e nts sh a pin gthe e le c tor a l pr oc e ss t o th e ir a dv anta g e . T his 7 is m e re ly a fe atur e of

Am e ri c an p oli tic s. Th e F ra me rs we re sure ly 8 awa re of the de sir e of

tho se wh o h old

e le c tiv e of

fi c e to r e ta in 9 elec tive office , y et they wer e cle arly

comforta ble g iving 10 incumbents the authority to write ele ction law. Judi cial 11 intervention into the elec toral proc ess, mere ly for the pur

pose of 1 2 r o o ti n go u t s e lf

- inte r e s te d

p o li ti c a l b e h av io r , w o u ld th e r e f o r e b e a [] 13 “substantial” incur sion into t extually and tra ditionally

leg islative 14 prer og atives. 15 16 Id. at 102. 17 The F irst Circuit opinion i n Bonas is equally unhelpful to plaintiffs, as it involves nothing 18 more than the interpre tation of state ele ction law. In Bonas , the voters of North Smithfield, 19 Rho de I sla

nd pa sse d a 19 98 re fe re nd

um s wi tc hin gmun ic ipa l e le c tio ns fr om o dd -n umb e re d to 20 even- numbere d y ear s startingin the y ear 2002. See 265 F.3d at 71-73. Thre e school c ommitt ee 21 members we re e lected in 1997, e ach to se rve a four- y ear term in ac corda

nce w ith the election law 22 at that time. See id. The c ommitt ee me mbers asse rted that the 1998 r efe rendum “ era ses any 23 need f

or an e lection in 2001.” See id. at 71 . T he re fe re nd um, ho we ve r, did

no t e xplic itl y 24 mention any

chang es in the ele ction schedule leadingup to 2002, nor was a ny officia l action eve r 25 taken a imed at leng theningthe terms for these off ices. See id. at 72 . T he de fe nd ants , 26 never

theless, dec ided not to hold a municipal elec tion in 2001. See id. at 73. The pla intiffs sued, 27 seekingto compel the ele ction in November 2001 for those whose terms e x pired that year . The34 1 court wr ote: 2 Her e, our e valuation of whe ther such w idesprea d 3 disenfra nchisement ha s occur

red star ts – and ends – with a 4 question of state law : Do state and loc al rules manda te an e lection 5 in North Smit hfield for the offic es of town c ouncil and school 6 committee in the fa ll of 2001? [I f] such an ele ction is require d . . . 7 the To wn ’s re fu sa l to ho ld i t w ou ld w or k a tot a l and c omp le te 8 dis e nf ra nc his e me nt o f t

he e le c tor ate , a

nd the re fo re wo uld 9 co n s t i tu t e av i o l at i o no f du e p ro ce s s (i nad d i t i o nt o b ei n g a 10 violation of state law)

. 11 12 Id. at 75. The c ourt ultimately conclude d that “the languag e of the ref ere ndum require s that the 13 odd-y ear

elec tion cy cle c ontinue undisturbed until the y ear 2002.” Id. at 77. Thus, Bonas holds 14 on ly

that in c umb e nts c ann ot su a s po ntedo awa

y with an elec tion when state lawmandates it. 15 This has nothing to do with the issues pre sented on this appea l. 16 L et us be c lear . I t is indi sputable that, as a result of L ocal L aw 51, se vera l Members of 17 the City

Council who voted for it and w ere ineligible to r un for r eele ction under the previous 18 term limits l aw will now be a ble to seek r eele ction in the City ’s Novembe r 2009 ele ction. Some, 19 perha

ps even ma

ny , of these inc umbents may be ele cted to a third te rm. Neve rtheless, L ocal L aw 20 51 neither inter fer es with a funda mental rig ht nor single s out a suspect c lassification. 21 Acc ording ly , it is subj ect to rationality revie w. 22 He re , th e City ’s purp or te d r e a so n f

or e na c tin gL oc a l L aw 5 1 is to p ro vid e the vo te rs wi th 23 an opportunity

to elect e x perie nced public of ficials in a time of f

inancial c risis. I t is bey ond 24 dis pute that e xten din gNe w Y or k Ci ty ’s te rm

lim its to t

hr e e c on se c uti ve te rm s is ra tio na lly 25 related to that leg itimate objective. The fac t that defe ndants also may have be en motivated by 26 political rea sons – the desire to r emain in offic e and in positions of seniority – is inconsequential 27 under our

substantive due proc ess ana ly sis. See Be ati e , 123 F.3d at 712 (“To uphold the35 1 le g isl ativ e c ho ic e , a c ourt ne e d o nly

fi nd so me ‘r e a so na

bly c on c e iva ble state of

fa c ts that c ou ld 2 p ro v i d e ara t i o n al b as i s ’ f o r t h e l egi s l at i v e a ct i o n . ”) (qu o t i n g Heller v . Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 320 3 (1 99 3) ). We n ote on ly that th is c on sid e ratio n ma y we ll p lay a pa rt in t he vo te rs ’ d e c isi on

to v ote 4 them back into off ice ( or not). 5 Finally , plaintiffs make muc h of the fa ct that the Mayor and va rious Council Members 6 have stated that they intend to put the issue of term limits t o ref ere ndum after

the next election 7 cycle in an e ffor

t to return the law

to a maxim um of two consec utive terms. Plaintiffs state that 8 this “one time only deal” violates due proc ess. Howe ver, L ocal L aw 51 doe s not contain a sunset 9 pr ov isi on ; r athe r, it s tate s th at it : 10 shall be dee med re peale d upon the ef fec tive date of

a lawf ul and 11 valid proposal to amend the char ter to set ter

m limi ts at two, rather 12 than three , full consec utive terms, as such limits were in force and 13 eff ect pr ior to the ena ctment of this local law, where such proposa l 14 has bee n submitt ed for the appr oval of the qua lified elec tors of the 15 city and appr oved by

the majority

of such e lectors votingthere on. 16 17 See S.A. 67-68. Of c ourse, the f act that this law may

be re peale d by

a re fer endum makes it no 18 differ ent than any other lawamendingthe City Charter . We fully

ag ree with the District Court’s 19 statement that termingL ocal L aw 51 a “one- time only ” mea sure “ does not cha ng e [the Due 20 Process] analy sis.” Mo lin ar i v . B loo mb e rg , 596 F. Supp. 2d 546, 571 (E.D.N .Y. 2009). 21 In c on c lus ion , L oc a l L aw 5 1 d oe s n ot v iol ate pla int if fs ’ s ub sta nti ve du e pr oc e ss r ig hts 22 guara

nteed by the Four teenth Amendme nt. 23 III. New York State Re ferendum Law 24 Plaintiffs argued bef ore the District Court that under Municipal Home Rule L aw § 25 23 (2 )(b) , ( e ) a

nd (f ), the su bs tanc e of

L oc a l L aw 5 1 c ou ld b e e na c te d o nly by re fe re nd um. Th e seNew Y ork City Charter § 38 provides, in re levant par t, that a re fer endum is require d for 14 th e p a s s a g e o f

a lo c a l l awth at: “ Ab o li s h e s o r c h an g e s th e f

o r m o r c o mp o s it io no f

th e c o un c il [, ] . . . chang es the ter

m of an e lective of

fice r, or [a]bolis hes, transf ers or curta ils any

power of an elec tive office r.” N .Y. City Charter § 38 (N.Y. L eg al Publ’gCorp. 2001). They make no a

rgument in their openingbrief w ith respec t to subdivi sions (e) or (f) of 15 section 23(2) of the Ne w York Municipa l Home Rule L aw or New Y ork City

Charter § 38, except for notingin a footnote that if we wer e to ce rtify the question reg ardingsection 23(2) (b) to the New Y ork Court of Appe als, we should ce rtify the questions reg ardingthe forme r provisions as well. SeeB ri e f f or Ap pe lla nts at 48 n. 15 . M or e ov e r, a pp e lla nts of fe r n o r e sp on se in their Reply

Br ief to appe llees’ a

rgument that their cla ims under subdivisions (e) and ( f) a nd New Y ork City

Charter § 38 are abandone d. Appellants mere ly rea ssert their r equest for cer tification. See Reply

Br ief for Appellants at 20-21. I

n short, they

make no a

rgument whatsoeve r re g ardingtheir cla ims under subdivisions (e) or ( f) or New Y ork City

Charter § 38. Acc ording ly , such cla ims are de emed a bandoned. See, e .g. , United States v. Re strepo , 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir.), cert. de nied , 510 U.S. 843 (1993). 36 1 su bs e c tio ns pr ov ide , in

re le va nt p art : 2 Exc e pt a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d b y or un de r a uth or ity of a state 3 statut e , a loc a l la w s ha ll b e su

bje c t to mand ator

y re fe re nd um i f i t: 4

. . . 5 b. In the ca se of a city , town or villag e, changes themembe rship or 6 composition of the legislative body or incre ases or decr ease s the 7 numbe r o f v ote s w hic h a ny me mbe r i s e nti tle d to c a st. 8

. . . 9 e. Abolishes an e lective of fice , or cha

ng es the method of 10 nominating, e lectingor re moving a n elec tive office r, or changes 11 the term of an ele ctive office , or re duces the salary of an e lective 12 office r duringhis term of off ice. 13 14 f. Abolishes, transf ers or curtails any power of an electiveofficer

. . 15

. . 16 17 N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 23(2) ( emphasis adde d). Plaintiffs advanc ed this challeng e under 18 the pa

ra lle l pr ov isi on s o f t

he Ne w Y or

k Ci ty Cha rt e r a s w e ll. 14 19 On

a pp e a l, h ow e ve r, a

pp e lla nts have a ba nd on e d th e ir

argume nts wi th r e sp e c t to 20 subdivisions (e) and (f ), as we ll as New Y ork City Charter § 38, and ar gue her e only that L ocal 15 21 L aw 51 “ chang es the membe rship . . . of the leg islative body ,” as pr ovided under MunicipalBy pursuingonly

a cla im under Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b) , appellants have 16 nece ssarily

abandone d their ar gument that extending ter m limi ts for the Mayor, Comptroller and Bor oug h Presidents requir es a r efe rendum unde r state law beca use sec tion 23(2)(b) doe s not apply to executive officia ls. See N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 2 3( 2) (b ) ( a

pp lyingon ly

to t ho se laws that “c hang e[] the member ship or composition of the legislative body

. . . . ” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . A c c or din g ly , a

pp e lla nts ’ a rgume nt r e late s o nly

to C ity Counc il M e mbe rs and

the Pub lic Advocate. See N.Y. City Charter §§ 21-22 (“ There shall be a c ouncil which shall be the leg islative body

of the c ity . . . . The c ouncil shall consist of the public advoc ate a nd of fifty -one other membe rs terme d council member s.”). 37 1 Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b)

. As noted at the outset, the N ew Yor k Court of Appea ls has made 16 2 clea

r that loca l gove rnments have broad pow er to e nact loca l laws, and dire ct democr acy in New 3 York is the exception, not the rule. Se e Mc Cab e v . V oo rh is , 243 N.Y. 401, 413 (1926) . Section 4 10 of

the Munic ipa l H ome Rul e L aw p ro vid e s th at c ity g ov e rnme nts sh a ll h ave the po we r t o 5 adopt and a

mend local law s relatingto “[t] he powe rs, duties, qualifications, number, mode of 6 selec tion and remova l, terms of off ice, c ompensation, hours of wor k, protec tion, welfar e and 7 safe ty

of its office rs and e mploy ees.” N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 10(1)( a)( 1). Indeed, the 8 Second De partment in Go lde n v . Ne w York City Cou nc il , 762 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App. Div. 2d 9 Dep’ t), appeal denied, 7 93 N. E. 2d 41 1 (N. Y. 20 03 ) h e ld t

hat a re fe re nd um w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to 10 e na c t L oc a l L aw 2 7 ( 20 02 ), wh ic h ame nd e d te rm lim its and

ha d th e e ff

e c t of a llo wi ngc e rt a in 11 City

Council Members to see k ree lection who we re ine ligible unde r the pre vious term limitlaw 12 and, in some instance s, to serve two more consec utive y ear s than previously allowed. The parties 13 in t

hat c a se did

no t, h ow e ve r, inv ok e su

bs e c tio n 2 3( 2) (b ) o f t

he Ne w Y or

k M un ic ipa l H ome Rul e 14 L aw. Thus , w e are no w f a c e d w iththe qu e sti on

of wh e the r p la int if

fs ’ i nv oc atio n o f t

his 15 subsection commands a differ ent re sult than as in Golden

. 16 Ap pe lla

nts argue that L oc a l L aw 5 1 “ c ha ng e s th e me mbe rs hip of

” the City Counc il 17 beca

use it will inevitably

result in the re elec tion of many incumbents in November 2009 who38 1 we re ine lig ibl e to s e e k r e e le c tio n und e r t he pr e vio us te rm

lim it l aw. Th e pa

rt ie s d o n ot d isp ute 2 that the incumbent re elec tion rate in Ne w York City is approxim ately

98%. Appe llees off

er two 3 response s to this arg ument. First, they contend that the phr ase “ membership” r efe rs to structura l 4 chang es in the leg islative body , not chang es in the identity of the individuals who constitute it. 5 F or

e xamp le , th e y

c la im that an in c re a se or

de c re a se in t

he numbe r o f s e ats i n th e City Counc il 6 would constitute a “c hang e[] ” in “membe rship.” Second, the y argue that the law

in question 7 must directly

cause the “c hang e[] in membership” to trig g er se ction 23(2)( b). They contend that 8 L ocal L aw 51 mer ely permits cer

tain incumbents to run for r eele ction who wer e ter m limi ted 9 under the previous law, but it is the voters who w ill cause the “ chang e[] ” in “membe rship” by 10 voting f

or par ticular c andidates in the N ovember 2009 elec tion. New Yor k State’s jurisprudenc e 11 in t

his are a make s c le ar t

hat a pp e lle e s a re c or re c t in bo th r e sp e c ts. 12 Th e re is n o c a se law i nte rp re tin gMunic ipa l H ome Rul e L aw § 23 (2 )( b) , whic h w e nt i nto 13 e ff

e c t on Janu ary 1, 19 64 . T he re is c a se law, ho we ve r, int e rp re tin gits pr e de c e sso r, City Ho me 14 Rule L aw § 15( 1), which pr ovided, in rele vant par t, “Except as otherw ise provided by or under 15 authority

of an a ct of the le g islature, a loc al law sha ll be subject to mandatory ref ere ndum if it . . . 16 [c] hang es the form or composition of the loca l leg islative body . . . .” N.Y. C I TY H OM E R U LE 17 L AW § 1 5( 1) (r e pe a le d Jan . 1 , 1 96 4) (M c Ki nn e y ’s 19 52 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he on ly no ta ble 18 differ ence betwee n City Home Rule L aw § 15 a

nd Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b) is that 19 the forme r uses the w ord “f orm” whe re the latter uses “ membership.” 20 I t is clear, how ever , that the New York State L eg islature did not intend to make a 21 substantive chang e in the mea ning of the provision by

virtue of this revision. The pa ssag e of 22 New Y ork Municipal Home Rule L aw in 1964 consolidate d sever al sepa rate statutes that define d39 1 the po we rs of

dif fe re nt t y pe s o f m un ic ipa lit ie s. Spe c if

ic a lly , it re pla c e d “ the City

Ho me Rul e 2 L aw, the V illage Home Rule L aw, a rticles 6 and 6Aof the County L aw ( containingg ener al 3 g rants of loc al law powe rs to counties) a nd §§ 51-a though 51-f of the Town L aw ( containing 4 g ener al g rants of loc al law powe rs to suburban towns).” N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 58 5 (note). T he Ne w York O ffice for L ocal Gove rnment wa s assig ned the task of draf ting the 6 Munic ipa l H ome Rul e L aw. I ts s tate d p ur po se in d ra ft ingthe law w a s to “ a ssu re un if or mity ” in 7 g overna

nce a mong the various ty

pes of municipalities and to make it “easie r to eff ectuate” 8 “future amendments a nd revisions of law . . . sinc e only one law w ould have to be a mended 9 rathe r than four .” See Purpose and Scope of Mun. Home Rule L aw, Me morandum of N.Y

. 10 Offic e for

L ocal Gov’ t, re

pr inte d in 3 5 C M c K i n n e y ’ s C o n s o l

. Law s o f N

. Y

. , atX I, X III

- X IV 11 (1 99 4) ; see also Analy sis of the Mun. Home Rule L aw, Me morandum of N.Y . Offic e for L ocal 12 Gov’t (e nacte d by L . 1963, c. 843), re

pr inte d in 35C McKinney ’s Consol. L aws of N Y, at XV13 XXI I I(1994). 14 Fur

thermore , the Municipal Home Rule L aw state s that it was not intended: 15 to abolish or curta il any rig hts, privilege s, powers or jurisdiction 16 here tofore c onfer red upon or

deleg ated to any

local g overnme nt or 17 to a ny bo ard , b od

y or of fi c e r t he re of , unle ss a c ontr ary int e nti on is 18 clea rly manifest fr om the express provisions of this chapter or by 19 nece ssary intendment there from, or to re strict the power s of the 2 0 l e g i s l atur e t o p a s s l aw s r e gu l at i n gm at t e r s o th e r th anth e p r o p e rty, 21 aff airs or g overnme nt of local g overnme nts as distinguished fr om 22 matters re lating to their proper ty , aff airs or g overnme nt. 23 24 N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 50(3). 25 Wit h particula r re spect to sec tion 23 of the Municipal Home Rule L aw, Ne w York’ s 26 Offic e for

L ocal Gove rnment stated:40 1 Se c tio n 2 3 is ba se d o n Ci ty Ho me Rul e L aw, se c tio n 1 5, wi th s ome 2 clar ification in the first subdivision. . . . W ith respec t to matters 3 su

bje c t to mand ator

y re fe re nd um, the su

bje c ts a re a s th e y a pp e ar i n 4 the City Home Rule L aw pr ovision, ex cept that c hang es ar e made 5 to a dju st the se c tio n to the fa c t th at it a lso a pp lie s to c ounti e s, 6 towns and vil la g e s. 7 8 An a ly sis of

the Mun. Ho me Rul e L aw, 35 C Mc Ki nn e y ’s Con so l. L aws of N. Y. , at X XI ; se e als o 9 Home Rule Ha

ndbook, N.Y. Of

fice for L ocal Gov’ t, Memorandum, Constit utional Amendment 10 Re Hom e Rule and Re lated Legislati on , May 1963, at J .A. 813-15 (“ The proc edure for a doption 11 of loca l laws, the spec ification of ty pes of loca l laws subject to re fer enda ( mandatory or 12 permissive), the r estriction and pr ohibitions ag ainst the adoption of loca l laws would be 13 substantially

as they now ar e in the City

Home Rule L aw.” ). 14 We conclude, the ref ore, that the New Y ork State L eg islature did not intend a substantive 15 c ha

ng e by re pla c ingthe wo rd

“ fo rm ” a s u se d in

se c tio n 1 5 o f t

he City Ho me Rul e L aw w ith 16 “member ship” as used in sec tion 23(2)(b) of the Municipal Home Rule L aw. See, e .g. , In re 17 Estate of Horchler , 322 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (App. Div. 2d De p’t 1971) (“ [N] o g ener al or mate rial 18 chang e in the existi nglaw is intended by a re vision, unless the leg islative desig n to acc omplish a 19 chang e is evident.” ) (inter nal citations omitted), aff’d on op. of App. Div. , 283 N.E.2d 768 (N.Y

. 20 1972). 21 I t nece ssarily follows that case law interpr etingthe forme r is persua sive as to the prope r 22 interpre tation of the latter. T hese c ases de monstrate that a la w that has the e ffe ct of c hang ing 23 who c o n s ti tute s a le g is lati v e b o dy , a s p la inti f f s a ll e g e L o c a l L aw5 1 w il l d o , d o e s n o t “ c h an g e [] 24 the form or

composition of the leg islative body .” In Ne ils v . Ci ty of Yon k e rs , 237 N.Y.S.2d 245 25 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court addr essed whe ther the c hang ing of war d boundary

lines constituted “a41 1 c ha

ng e in t he fo rm or c omp os iti on ” of

the loc a l le g isl ativ e bo dy un de r s e c tio n 1 5( 1) of

the City 2 Home Rule L aw. See id. at 250-51. Eve n though the chang ing of boundary lines would appea

r 3 to affe ct who would be e lected to of fice , the cour

t held that it did not come within section 15(1) 4 of the City

Home Rule L aw a

nd so did not require a

ref ere ndum. See id. at 251. 5 In Me hie l v . Co un ty Bo ar d o f Le gis lator s , 571 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App. Div. 2d De p’t), 6 appeal denied, 578 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y . 1991), Ne w York’ s Appellate D ivision addressed whe ther 7 a loca l law passed by the Westchester

County L eg islature providingfor the r eappor tionment of 8 its legislative districts re quired a ref ere ndum under Ne w York Municipa l Home Rule L aw § 9 34 (4 ), wh ic h d e a ls w ithpe rm iss ive re fe re nd a in c ounti e s. L ike se c tio n 1 5 o f t he City Ho me Rul e 10 L aw, se ction 34(4) r equire s a re fer endum to enac t any local law that “cha

ng es the for

m or 11 composition of the board of supervisors of suc h county .” See id. at 809. The c ourt held that 12 “[t] he re districting plan unde r consider ation mere ly chang es the bounda

ry lines of the leg islative 13 districts in W estche ster County and does not c onstitut e a c hang e in the ‘f orm or composition’ of 14 the Westchester

County L eg islature.” Id. (interna l citations omit ted). 15 We find Ne ils and Mehie l espec ially

instructive bec ause r edistrictinghas as much 16 potential to chang e the individual member s of a leg islative body as does a chang e in term limits. 17 Neve rtheless, both cour ts decided that redistrictingdoes not “c hang e[] the form or composition” 18 of the re levant body . This case law lea ds us to conclude that Municipa l Home Rule L aw § 19 23(2)( b) re fer s to structural cha ng es, and not c hang es in the identity of the individual members 20 who comprise the leg islative body

. 21 We also find persua sive the District Court’s discussion of the ter m “member ship” as used 22 in t

he Op tio na l Co unty

Go ve rnme nt L aw, a

Ne w Y or k St ate statut e e na c te d a

ro un d th e same tim e42 1 a s th e Munic ipa l H ome Rul e L aw. Th is s tatut e , e na c te d in 19 61 but si nc e re pe a le d, pr ov ide d in 2 re le va

nt p art : 3 I f s uc h c ity e le c ts t o w ith dr aw f

ro m th e jur isd ic tio n o f i ts c ivi l 4 service commission and adopt the county civil service 5 administration, the mem bership of the county c ivil service 6 c om mi ssi on sh all , on the date on which such c hang e of f orm of 7 administration by the city become s eff

ective, be incre ased to five 8 me mb e rs , all of whom shall be a ppointed by

the county

manag er, 9 and not more tha n three of whom shall at the same time be 1 0 a dh e r e nt s o f th e s am e p o l i t i c a l p arty. 11 12 Chapter 565 ( the Optional County Gover nment L aw § 1008) (1961), re pr inte d in L A WS O F N.Y., 13 18 4th

Se ssi on , 1 96 1, Vo l. 2 , at 17 87 (e mph a sis a dd e d) . A s a ptl y no te d b y the Di str ic t Co ur

t: 14 I t is unli kely that the leg islature ra dically revised its under standing 15 of the ter m “member ship” betwe en 1961 and 1963. H ence , the 16 1963 leg islature, which pa ssed the Municipal Home Rule L aw, 17 conce ived of the te rm “membe rship” as r efe rringto structural 18 char acte ristics, including the number of pe rsons in the leg islative 1 9 b o dy. 20 21 Mo lin ar i v . B loo mb e rg , 596 F. Supp. 2d 546, 572 (E.D.N .Y. 2009). 22 We a lso fi nd pe rs ua siv e the re lativ e ly

re c e nt N e w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls d e c isi on

in 23 Ma

y or of City of N e w York v . Co un c il o

f Cit yof N e w York, 8 7 4 N

. E

. 2 d

7 0 6 (N

. Y

. 2 0 0 7 )

. In 24 2001, the City

Council, over then- Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s veto, enac ted L ocal L aws 18 a nd 25 19. Prior to the enac tment of these loca l laws, the Mayor wa s require d to eng ag e in collec tive 26 ba

rg a ini ngwi th C ity

e mpl oye e s thro ugh o ne c e rt if ie d e mpl oye e or g anizatio n r e g ard ingc e rt a in 27 matters. The re w as one e x ception: the Mayor had to ba rg ain direc tly

with unions repre senting 28 “uniforme d” employees, e.g. , uniformed police , fire, sa nitation and corr ection ser vices. The 29 2001 local laws, how ever , expanded the def inition of “uniformed” employ ees to include fire 30 alar

m dispatchers a

nd emer g ency

medical tec hnicians. Se e id . at 707-09. The Mayor cha lleng ed43 1 the local law s on the g round that it was subjec t to a mandatory ref ere ndum under Municipal 2 Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(f ), which pr ovides: “Except as otherw ise provided by or under 3 authority

of a state statute, a loca l law shall be subjec t to mandatory ref ere ndum if it . . . 4 [a] bolishes, transfe rs or c urtails any power of an e lective of

fice r.” Se e id . at 710. 5 T h e C o urtre j ec t edth e M ay o r’ s ch al l en ge, re as o n i n g: 6 The re quirement of a ref ere ndum for leg islation that 7 “cur tails any power of an e lective of

fice r” must be r ead a s applying 8 only to leg islation that im pairs a pow er c onfer red on the office r as 9 part of the fra mework of

local g overnme nt. For e x ample, a loc al 10 law limiting the powe r of Ne w York City ’s Mayor to appoint 11 c omm iss ion e rs , o r t o p re pa re a bu dg e t, o r t o c re ate or

a bo lis h 12 positions wit hin his ex ecutive of fice would require a re fer endum 13 (see N.Y. City Charter §§ 6, 8 [f] ; § 225 [ a]). But, a s a g ener al 14 ru le , a law that me re ly

re gulate s th e op e ratio ns of c ity g ov e rnme nt, 15 in collective ba rg ainingor in some other a rea , is not a curtailment 16 of an of fice r’s powe r. . . . 17 18 So he re , th e Ma y or ’s po we r in theNe w York City 19 governm ental structure is unimpaired. A local law prescribing a 20 procedural rule for collec tive bargaining is not an encroachme nt 21 on the May or’s role in City governme nt. Thelim ita tio n o n h is 22 freedom to ac t is merely a c onsequenc e of legislative 23 po lic y ma k ing. B yc on tra st, thec as es th e Ma y or re lie s o n a ll 24 inv olv e d li mi tat ion s o n a n e le c te d o ffi c e r’ s st ru c tural a uth or ity

. 25 26 Id. at 711 (interna l citations omit ted) (e mphasis added) . Thus, the New York Court of Appe al’s 27 analy sis clear ly

emphasizes Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)’s c oncer n with structural c hang es 28 made by

law, as oppose d to an incidental c onsequenc e of a law. 29 Ba sed on these a uthorities, we agree with appellee s that the term “me mbership” a s used 30 in Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b) ref ers to the struc tural cha

rac teristics of the leg islative 31 bo dy . Astr

uc tur a l c ha

ng e to t he “ me mbe rs hip ” might o c c ur , f or e xamp le , whe re a

law d ir e c tlyWe note that City Charter § 22 provides that “the siz e of the council . . . may be 17 incre ased by

local law w ithout approval” by the elec tors in a re fer endum. See N.Y. City Charter §§ 22, 38 (N.Y. L eg al Publ’gCorp. 2001). On its fac e, this seems to conflict with sec tion 2 3 ( 2 ) ( b ) , th o u g ha

p p e ll an ts d o n o t r a is e th is ar gume n t. We n e e d n o t r e s o lv e th is c o n f

li c t. We note, howeve r, by

its ex press ter

ms section 22 is subject to state law. See N.Y. City Charter § 22 (“ Consist ent with stat e law , the size of the counc il and the number of districts from which council member s are elec ted may be incr ease d by

local law w ithout approval pursua nt to section thi rt y -e ig ht. ” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o id. § 28 (“The council in addition to all enumerated power s shall have powe r to adopt loca l laws which it dee ms appropriate, which are not inconsistent wit h the provisions of this charter or with the constitution or laws of the United States or thi

s st ate , f or the g oo d r

ule and g ov e rnme nt o f t

he c ity ;” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o N.Y. M UN . H OM E R UL E L AW § 10 (enume ratingpower s and limits of local g overnme nt). Moreove r, the Ne w York Court of A ppeals ha s long he ld that a city char ter c annot be “inconsistent with [t he] laws of the State.” Pe op lev . Le wis , 6 4 N .E .2 d 7 02 , 7 03 (N .Y . 1 94 5) ; see also Fossella v. Dinkins , 485 N.E.2d 1017, 1018-19 (N.Y. 1985) (per c uriam). Thus, a ny analy sis of section 22 of the City Charter would in turn impli cate state law, inc luding Ne w York Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23. 44 1 incre ases or

decr ease s the number of

seats in the leg islative body

. L ocal L aw 51, howe ver, 17 2 aff

ects only an incumbent’ s elig ibilit y to seek re elec tion. 3 Even a ssuming, arguendo , that the term “ membership” a s used in the statute re fer s to the 4 specific individuals constitut ing a leg islative body , as appe llants sugg est, L ocal L aw 51 doe s not 5 trig g er Municipa l Home Rule L aw § 22( 2)(b) beca use it does not direc tly

chang e the 6 membership; rather, the e lection re sults in November 2009 will cause this chang e. See Lane v

. 7 Johnson , 28 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y . 1940). 8 In Lane , th e Vi lla g e of Pe e ks kil l, whic h w a s p art of the To wn

of Cor tla ndt, d e c ide d to 9 form its own city , the City of Peekskill. I t drafte d a cha rter w ith that effe ct, which pr ovided, 10 inte r a lia , for the e lection of two super visors who wer e def

ined there under a s “City

office rs.” 11 See id. at 710-11. Unde r Ne w York la w at the time, “[t]he supervisors of the c ities . . . in each 12 county , when law fully convene d, [were a lso] the boar d of super visors of the county .” See id. at 13 711 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Thus, when the two supe rvisors wer e ele cted a s45 1 P e e k s k i l l “ C i ty o f

f i c e r s , ” th e y a l s o b e c am e m e mb e r s o f th e B o ar d

o f S u p e r v i s o r s o f th e c o un ty, 2 there by

incre asingthe number of supervisors on the c ounty Boa rd. See id. The plaintiffs a rgued 3 that the Peekskill char ter violated N ew Yor

k law prohibitingany

law “which . . . cha

ng es the 4 form or c ompositi on of the e lective body of such c ounty

. . . without adoption by the elec tors of 5 such county

. . . .” Se eid

. T h e C o urto f A p p ea l s re j ec t edth e a rgu m en t , wr i t i n g: 6 [The Cit y of Peeskill] has not by

the spec ial or loca l law . . . 7 chang ed in any manner any provision of law whic h fix es the for m 8 of county g overnme nt of Westchester or the form or

composition 9 of

any e le c tiv e bo dy . It ha s me re ly e xer c ise d it s p ow e r t o 10 incorpora te a c ity [; ] and by

forc e of the provisions of the g ener al 11 law which de termines the f orm or composition of the B oard of 12 Supervisors, city office rs bec ome member s of the B oard of 13 Supervisors and thus the number of member s of the B oard of 14 Supervisors is increa sed. 15 16 Id. at 712. 17 As in Lane , L oc a l L aw 5 1 is no t w hat w or ks the c ha ng e in t he me mbe rs hip of

the City 18 Counc il. Rathe r, any e ff e c t c a us e d b y L oc a l L aw 5 1, a lth ou g h r e a l, i s in dir e c t. T he c ha ng e wi ll 19 be c a

us e d b y the No ve mbe r 2 00 9 e le c tio n r e su lts . L oc a l L aw 5 1 a ff e c ts o nly c e rt a in c and idate s’ 20 e lig ibi lity

to s e e k r e e le c tio n. I t is of no mom e nt t

hat a numbe r o f f

or me rl y te rm -l imi te d Co un c il 21 me mbe rs wi ll l ike ly – in de e d, a lmo st c e rt a inl y – w in r e e le c tio n b e c a

us e of the op po rt

un ity 22 aff

orded the m by

L ocal L aw 51. The City ’s ar gument in this reg ard a ppear s to us to be 23 unassailable: “ I f mere ly chang ing the likelihood that particular individuals will serve in the 24 future c onstitut es ‘c hang ing’ the Council’s membership or c ompositi on, then a host of other 25 le g isl atio n w ithsim ila r s pil lov e r e ff

e c ts – c ampa ig n f

ina nc e c ha ng e s, fo r o ne e xamp le – w ou ld 26 also nee d voter a pproval.” Br ief for

Def endants-A

ppellees Micha el R. Bloomber g , et al . at 4. 27 This conclusion is consistent not only with Lane but also with the redistrictingdecisions in Nie ls46 1 and Mehie l . Clearly redistrictingis likely

to have the ultimate e ffe ct of c hang ing who will run 2 and

sit in a le g isl ativ e bo dy , b ut N e w Y or k c ourt s h ave he ld i t do e s n ot r e qu ir e a re fe re nd um. 3 For

all the re asons discussed, we hold that section 23(2)( b) of Ne w York Municipa l 4 Ho me Rul e L aw d oe s n ot r e qu ir e a re fe re nd um t o e na c t L oc a l L aw 5 1. We d e c lin e a pp e lla nts ’ 5 invitation to certify the interpre tation of this provision to t he Ne w York Court of A ppeals. 6 “De spite our discre tionary authority to cer tify , cer tification is an exceptional proc edure , to which 7 we r esort only

in appropriate circ umstances.” McG rath v. Toys “R” Us, Inc. . 356 F.3d 246, 250 8 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Krohn v. N.Y . City Police Dep’ t , 3 4 1 F

. 3 d 1 7 7 , 1 8 0 ( 2 d

C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) )

. “ In 9 the pa st, we have c e rt if ie d q ue sti on s to the Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls o nly

wh e re the re is a 10 split of authority

on the issue, wher e the statute’ s plain languag e does not indicate the answ er, or 11 when pr esente d with a complex question of New Yor k common law for

which no Ne w York 12 authority

can be found.” Riordan v. Nationwi de Mut. Fire I ns. Co. , 977 F.2d 47, 51 ( 2d Cir. 13 1992). 14 These c ircumstance are not present he re. We a re c onfident as to how the N ew Yor k 15 Court of Appea ls would rule on this issue in li g ht of the pre sumption of repre sentative 16 de moc ra c y

in N e w Y or

k, the pla in m e anin gof

the statut e , it s le g isl ativ e his tor y , th e ho ldi ng s in 17 Nie ls and Mehie l , th e me anin gof the te rm “ me mbe rs hip ” a s u se d in the Op tio na l Co unty 18 Gover

nment L aw § 1008 a

nd the New

York Court of Appe als dec isions in Mayor of City of New 19 Y or k v . Co un c il o

f Cit yof N e w York and Lane v. Johnson . Co nv e rs e ly , th e re is a c omp le te 20 absenc e of a

uthority sug g estingthat the New

York Court of Appe als would hold that sectionAppellants re ly exclusively

on Forti v. New Y

ork State Ethics Commission , 554 N.E.2d 18 876 (N.Y. 1990) , in which the Ne w York Court of A ppeals a ddresse d the constitutionality of the Ethic s in Go ve rnme nt A c t, t o a

rgue that L oc a l L aw 5 1 im pli c ate s “ me mbe rs hip ” a s u se d in section 23(2) (b). In Fo rti , the plaintiffs cla imed, inte r a lia , that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause bec ause its “r evolvingdoor” r ules treated forme r executive e mploy ees more stringe ntly

than forme r leg islative employ ees. See id. at 878-79. The New Y ork Court of Appea ls rejec ted this argument, explaining, inte r a lia , that the disparate treatment could be justified by

“the f act[] t hat ea ch leg islator is personally acc ountable to his or her constituency

and that the Legislat ure itself is reconstituted eve ry two years with an atte nd an t c ha nge in membe rship, polit ical orientation and prior ities .” Id. at 883 (e mphasis added) . Honingin on this langua g e, appe llants argue that “c hang e[] in [ ] m ember ship” must mean a c hang e in the individual members. Howe ver, the mere happensta nce that the New Y ork Court of Appe als used the word “ membership” in the latter conte x t to mean cha ng e in the leg islature’s individual members c arr ies littl e, if a ny , weig ht with respec t to the proper inter pretation of New Y ork Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b) , which wa s not even re motely at issue in Fo rti . Moreove r, even a ssuming that a c hang e in “membe rship” enc ompasses a me re c hang e in the individual members, Fo rtire inf

or c e s o ur c on c lus ion

that th e No ve mbe r 2 00 9 e le c tio n, no t L oc a l L aw 5 1, is what will aff

ect that c hang e. Se e Fo rti , 5 54 N. E. 2d at 88 3 ( re fe rr ingto a

c ha ng e in m e mbe rs hip ever y two y ear s as a r esult of elec tions). 47 1 23 (2 )(b) is tri g g e re d b y L oc a l L aw 5 1. Ac c or din g ly , w e pe rc e ive no be ne fi t f ro m c e rt if yingthi s 18 2 qu e sti on

to t he Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls b e c a

us e we are in a

po sit ion to c on c lud e wi th 3 sufficie nt cer

tainty what it would hold. That is, New Yor k Municipal Home Rule L aw § 23( 2)(b) 4 does not requir e a r efe rendum to ena ct L ocal L aw 51. 5 IV . Co nflic t o f Int e r e st 6 Finally , plaintiffs alleg e that def endants violated the conflicts of inter est provisions set 7 forth in Chapter 68 of the City Charter , § 2604(b)( 2), (3) , as we ll as Conflicts Boar d Rule 1-13(d) 8 (“Rule 1- 13(d)” ). 9 Th e pr ov isi on s p ro vid e , in re le va nt p art : 10 2. No public serva nt shall eng ag e in any

business, transac tion or 11 pr ivate e mpl oy me nt, or have any fi na nc ia l or oth e r p ri vate int e re st, 12 direc t or indirect, whic h is in conflict with the proper discharg e of 13 his or he r o ff ic ia l dutie s. 1448 1 3. No public serva nt shall use or attempt to use his or her position 2 as a public se rvant to obtain any financ ial g ain, contra ct, license , 3 pr ivi le g e or oth e r p ri vate or

pe rs on a l a dv anta g e , d ir e c t or ind ir e c t, 4 for the public se rvant or a ny person or firm associated with the 5 pu

bli c se rv ant. 6 7 Ci ty

Ch arte r § 2 6 0 4 ( b ) ( 2 )

- ( 3 ) (N

. Y

. L e g a l P u b l’ gCo r p . 2 0 0 1 )

. Ru le 1

- 1 3 ( d ) p r o v id e s th at “ [i ]t 8 shall be a violation of City Charter § 2604(b)( 2) for

a public ser

vant to intentionally

or 9 knowing ly [] . . . aid, induce or cause another

public serva

nt to eng ag e in conduc t that violates any 10 provision of City Charter § 2604.” N.Y. B oard of

Conflicts Rule 1-13(d), available at 11 http:// www.nyc.g ov/html/ conflicts/downloads/pdf3/Rules%20Ame ndments%20by%20Rule%20 12 Number/1_13.pdf. 13 Pr ior

to v oti ngon

L oc a l L aw 5 1, Counc il M e mbe rs de B la sio and Jame s a nd Pub lic 14 Advocate Gotbaum filed a n inquiry with the City

of Ne w York Conflicts of Intere st Boar d (the 15 “ B oa

rd ” ), re qu e sti ngan a dv iso ry op ini on a s to wh e the r C ounc il M e mbe rs and the Pub lic 16 Advocate would violate these provisions by voting on the bill. On Oc tober 15, 2008, the B oard 17 iss ue d A dv iso ry

Op ini on No . 2 00 8- 3 ( “ Ad

vis or y Op ini on ” ), ho ldi ngthat Me mbe rs of the City 18 Counc il w ou ld n ot v iol ate the c on fl ic t r ule s b y vo tin gon

L oc a l L aw 5 1. Spe c if

ic a lly , it he ld: 19 [I ]t is t he B oa rd ’s vie w t

hat th e ir of fi c ia l a c tio ns in p art ic ipatin gin 20 a leg islative proce ss that might yield them this arguable be nefit [of 21 an extra term] would not confe r upon them any

“private or 22 persona l advantag e” w ithin the meaningof Charte r Section 23 2604(b)( 3), nor would it constitute a “ private inter est” in conf lict 24 with the proper discharg e of the ir offic ial duties in violation of 25 Charter Section 2604(b)( 2). 26 27 Id. at7 7 3

. T h e B o ar d c o n c l u d e d

th at“ i ti s s qu ar e l y with in the pr op e r d isc ha rg e of Counc il 28 Me mbe rs ’ o ff

ic ia l dutie s a s le g isl ator s ( and , in Ms. Go tba

um’ s c a se , a s a

n e le c te d o ff

ic ia l w ho se 29 duties include pre siding ove r the Council) for them to vote upon, and other wise par ticipate in the49 1 leg islative proce ss reg arding , a bill lawfully pendingbefor e the Council.” Id. I t w ro te , “ wh ile 2 term-limited elec ted offic ials may have a persona l politi cal inter est in the Bill’s outcome, that 3 interest does not fa ll within t he ‘de finable a nd cruc ial subset’ of Chapte r 68 that would disqualify 4 them from par

ticipating in c onsideration and possible e nactment of the proposed le g islation.” Id. 5 The B oard a lso cited Go lde n v . Ne w York City Cou nc il , 762 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App. Div. 2d De p’t), 6 appeal denied, 7 93 N. E. 2d 41 1 (N. Y. 20 03 ), in whic h th e Ap pe llate Di vis ion he ld t hat th e City 7 Council had authority to enac t laws reg ardingterm limits. See id. at 77 5. Th e B oa rd c on c lud e d: 8 “ Gi ve n th is j ud ic ia l a uth or ity , to ho ld t

hat a ll M e mbe rs of

the Counc il who wo uld

argua bly 9 benef

it by beingenable d to run for a nother ter m are disqualified by

Chapter 68 f

rom voting on 10 such a la

w would deny

to the people’ s elec ted re prese ntatives one of the power s aff orded the m 11 by

State and loca l law.” Id. Th e B oa rd c omm e nte d th at, i f p la int if fs ’ p os iti on

we re c or re c t, “ it 12 [would] follow that they could not vote on an

yme as ur e aff

ectingthe terms and c onditions of 13 their public ser

vice a s Council Members.” Id. at 776-77. B ut this i s not the case , the B oard 14 explained, as Council Members c an vote on pa y raises, c ampaig n contribution limi ts, ethics rules 15 reg ardinglobbyists, etc. See id. at 77 7. Othe rw ise , it op ine d, “ de moc ratic g ov e rnme nt” wo uld 16 come “ to a halt.” Id. 17 Di sp le a se d w iththe B oa rd ’s c on c lus ion s, pla int if

fs a sse rt thr e e c a us e s o f a c tio n in

the ir 18 Amended Complaint seekinga dec laratory judgme nt that defe ndants violated City Charter § 19 2604(b)( 2) and( 3) and Rule 1- 13(d) by proposingand/or votingupon L ocal L aw 51, a nd that the 20 L aw is there fore invalid. They alleg e that def

endants violated the conflict provisions by voting 21 on

le g isl atio n th at r e su lte d in pe c un iary

be ne fi ts, inc lud ingsix- fi gur e sa lari e s, su bs tanti a l be ne fi ts 22 pa c ka g e and

a dd iti on a l annua l f

ina nc ia l a llo wa

nc e s. Th e y

a lso a lle g e that de fe nd ants wi ll g a in50 1 an “inc rea se in the political ca che wroug ht by additional y ear s spent in the public eye, which 2 un qu e sti on a

bly se rv e s to inc re a se futur e po lit ic a l and e mpl oy me nt p ro sp e c ts f

or the se pu bli c 3 serva

nts.” See id. at 111, 112 (Pls. Am. Compl t. ¶¶ 317, 322). With respec t to May or 4 Bloomber g , plaintiffs alleg e that “[t]he May or’s political dea lings to guara ntee the pa ssag e and 5 e na c tme nt o f t

he Te rm -L imi ts A me ndme nt, inc lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to , h is d e a l w ithRon a ld 6 L auder

and City Council Speaker Christine Quinn, a lso involved the use of his position to confer 7 upon himself other dire ct and indire ct forms of ‘ financ ial g ain’ a nd ‘private or per sonal 8 advanta g e.’” Id. at 112 (Pls. Am. Compl t. ¶ 323). 9 The District Court held that a private r ight of

action existed under Chapter 68 of the 10 Cha

rt e r, but di smi sse d p la int if fs ’ c la ims e sse nti a lly

fo r t he re a so ns state d b y

the B oa rd in i ts 11 Advisory

Opinion. Se e Mo lin ar i v . B loo mb e rg , 596 F. Supp. 2d 546, 577-82 (E .D.N.Y. 2009)

. 12 In doing so, the court g ave c onsiderable weig ht to the conclusions of the B oard. See id. at 579- 13 80. Appellee s argue that the District Court wa s corr ect on the me rits but contend that we ne ed 14 no t r e a c h th e se qu e sti on s b e c a us e no pr ivate ri g ht o f a c tio n e xists un de r C ha pte r 6 8 o f t

he City 15 Charter

. 16 Assuming, without dec iding, that a private r ight of

action exists under Chapter 68 of the 17 City

Cha rt e r, we ho ld t

hat th e Di str ic t Co ur

t pr op e rl y dis mis se d p la int if

fs ’ c la ims un de r C ity 18 Cha

rt e r § 26 04 (b )( 2) and (3 ) a nd Rul e 1- 13 (d ). F ir st, we no te that th e Di str ic t Co ur t pr op e rl y 19 defe rre d to the Boa rd’s c onclusions. See D iLucia v. Mandelk er , 493 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (App. 20 Div. 1st Dep’t 1985) ( noting that the B oard’ s “opinions should be g iven consider able we ight by 21 the cour

ts. . . . [ T]he conclusion is plain that absent a c lear showingto the contra

ry , advisory 22 opinions of such ag encie s should be g iven g reat defe renc e and va lidity .”), aff’d for reasons statedSee B aker v . Marley , 170 N.E.2d 900 (N.Y . 1960) (f inding violation wher e mayor 19 participated in meeting s of villag e boar d, which adopte d resolutions leadingto the condemnation of va ri ou s p arc e ls o f r e a l pr op e rt y , in c lud ingon e owne d b y the may or

fr om whic h h e sto od

to g a in f ina nc ia lly ); Zagor e os v . Co nk

lin , 491 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363-64 (App. D iv. 2d Dep’t 1985) (findingviolation where deter minative votes on construc tion-relate d applications to town and zoning boar ds were cast by board me mbers who we re e mploy ees of the construc tion company ); Tuxedo Conservation &Taxpayers Ass’n v . Town Bd. of T own of T uxedo , 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 2d De p’t 1979) (f inding violation wher e town-boa rd member

voted on a multi-milli on do lla r c on str uc tio n p ro

je c t f ro m w hic h h is a dv e rt isi ngc omp any sto od to g a in f ina nc ia lly ); In re Sa nd e rs, J r. , CO I B Ca se No . 2 00 5- 44 2 ( Ma y 31 , 2 00 7) (f

ind ingvio latio n whe re Ne w Y or k Ci ty Council Member, having ma rried his Chief of

Staff, continued to e mploy her in that c apac ity , as his su bo rd inate , in

dir e c t vi olatio n o f t

he City ’s c on fl ic t of

int e re st p ro vis ion ); In reSa ss , C O IB Case No. 98- 190 (June 29, 1999) (findingviolation where Direc tor of Administration of the Manhattan B oroug h President’s Of fice used her

position t o authorize the hiringof her own pr ivate c omp any

to c le an th e B or ou g h Pr e sid e nt’ s o ff ic e s) ; In reRo ss , COI B Case No. 97-76 (De c. 22, 1997) ( findingviolation where Assistant District Attorney issued a fa lse g rand jury summons to a police office r to interfe re w ith his scheduled testimony ag ainst the Assistant’s husband in traf

fic c ourt on the same da

y ); Advisory

Opinion 94-17 (Jul y

11, 1994) (a dvising that member of

City commission shoul d not vote on an application submi tted by a private company fo r a pr oje c t th at a

no t- fo r- pr of

it c or po ra tio n w ithwh ic h h e ha d a

fi na nc ia l r e latio ns hip pu

bli c ly supported); Advisory

Opinion 93-21 (Jul y

12, 1993) (a dvising that a Council Member wa s not pe rm itt e d to no min ate a

fa mil y me mbe r f

or a pp ointme nt t o a

c omm un ity bo ard be c a us e it c ou ld cre ate a n appea ranc e that the Council Member was sec uringa private adva ntag e for someone with whom he or she w as assoc iated); Advisory Opinion 90-04 (Apr il 16, 1990) (advisingthenMay or of the City of Ne w Y or k to re c us e him se lf

fr om m atte rs be fo re the B oa rd of Es tim ate conce rningthe re newa l of two Manhattan c able f ranc hises in which Time Warner , Inc. had a n int e re st b e c a

us e the May or

ha d a n in dir e c t f

ina nc ia l inte re st i n T ime War ne r) ; c f. G e or gev . Ci ty of Cocoa, Fla. , 78 F.3d 494, 498 ( 11th Cir. 1996) (holding that city council member

in Florida did not have conf

lict barringhim from voting on a redistrictingplan bec ause of his polit ical interests as a

n incumbent planningto run for r eele ction in one of the ne w sing le member districts, reasoning , inte r a lia , that ever y one of the incumbent city council member s had such a n interest and it would be “ absurd” to interpret F lorida’s votingconflicts statute in such a way that would disqualify

all members of

leg islative bodies from par ticipating in leg islative redistricting 51 1 below , 501 N.E.2d 32 (N.Y . 1986). He re, pla intiffs have f ailed to make a

“cle ar showing ” that 2 the B oard w as incorr ect. 3 The c ases a nd Boa rd opinions cited by

appellants make this clear. I n eac h one, the 4 interest ser

ved by the public serva

nt’s officia l actions resultingin a conf lict was a pe rso na l, 5 pr iv ateinterest, not an inter est in the terms and c onditions of his or her public off ice. 19decisions). 52 1 Ap pe lla

nts re ly he avil y up on Ad vis or y Op ini on , 9 5- 24 (O c t. 3 0, 19 95 ), but th at op ini on is 2 ina

pp os ite . It a dv ise s o nly

that Co un c il M e mbe rs may us e City e mpl oye e s a

nd re so ur c e s in 3 c on du c tin gno n- pa rt isa n v ote r r e g istratio n d

ri ve s, a s lo nga s n o p art isa n p oli tic a l a c tiv ity

is 4 conducte d duringthe drives whic h would promote the intere sts of a par ticular Council Member , 5 elec ted offic ial or ca ndidate for

elec tive office . The B oard opine d that “if the vote r re g istration 6 dr ive s w e re to b e us e d to pr omo te the po lit ic a l c ampa ig n o f C ounc il M e mbe rs or oth e rs , it wo uld 7 constitute a conf

lict of interest for

the Council Members to ask the ir aides to par ticipate in such 8 drives . . . . ” J.A. 619. 9 Appellants cite this opinion for the pr oposition t hat City Council Members ca

n violate the 10 City

Cha rt e r’ s c on fl ic t of

int e re st p ro vis ion s whe n e ng a g ingin p ur e ly po lit ic a l a c tiv ity . A s is 11 c le ar, thi s o pin ion re late s to the us e of

pu bli c mon ie s f

or pr ivate c ampa ig ns and

ha s n oth ingat a ll 12 to do with the present c ase. 13 Pla int if

fs str e ss t hat L oc a l L aw 5 1 is pa

rt ic ula rl y e g re g iou s b e c a

us e it p ro vid e s a

on e -t ime 14 benef

it to thos e who voted f

or it. Howeve r, as noted su pra , L ocal L aw 51 doe s not contain a 15 sunset provision; it m ere ly states that it can be repe aled by a subseque nt refe rendum. 16 Finally , plaintiffs reha sh their alleg ations reg ardingMayor B loomberg ’s communications 17 with Mr. L auder . Howeve r, as the D istrict Court stated, even if the se alleg ations were true, they 18 would not establish a violation of Chapter 68. “ The Mayor’s a lleg ed ‘be nefit’ wa s a for mer 19 op po ne nt’ s su

pp or t f or a pie c e of le g isl atio n, no t a

pe rs on a l or

fi na nc ia l r e wa

rd in h is p ri vate 20 capa city .” Mo lin ar i , 596 F. Supp. 2d at 580. We agree . 21 Acc ording ly , the District Court proper ly dismiss ed plaintiffs’ c laims under City law53 1 alleg ing that defe ndants had a conflict of inter est in violation of sections 2604(b)( 2) and ( 3) of 2 the City

Charter and Rule 1-13( d). 3 CO NC LU SION 4 L ocal L aw 51 ha s no doubt stirred controve rsy . Some fee l that it dis reg ards the w ill of 5 the people a s expressed by the 1993 Voter

Initiative and 1996 Refe rendum. That may be a 6 ju s ti f

ia b le r e a c ti o n . B u t i t i s n o t t h e r o le o f th is Co urt t o inte r

je c t i ts e lf into c it y p o li ti c s . We 7 shall only

adjudicate the constitutional and leg al claims prope rly befor e us, which w e have 8 analy

zed exhausti vely

. 9 For

the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM the District Court’s judgment granting 10 defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt and dismissi ngplaintiffs’ Amende d Complaint.