IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 17, 2003

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERESA GAIL PRESSON

 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County

No. CR3686 Robert E. Burch, Judge

No. M2002-03090-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 20, 2003

The defendant, Teresa Gail Presson, appeals from the Dickson County Circuit Court’s order

revoking her probation that she received upon her guilty plea to theft of property valued more than

$10,000 but less than $60,000. The defendant contends that although she violated her probation, the

trial court erred by ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID G. HAYES and JOHN

EVERETT WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.

William B. Lockert,III,District Public Defender; Chris L. Young, Assistant District Public Defender

(on appeal); and Mitchell B. Dugan, Dickson, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Teresa Gail

Presson.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; J. Ross Dyer, Assistant Attorney General; Dan

Mitchum Alsobrooks, District Attorney General; and Kim G. Menke, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

The record reflects that on January 1, 1998, the defendant pled guilty to theft of property

valued more than $10,000 but less than $60,000, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced her to

five years in the Department of Correction to be served on supervised probation and ordered that she

pay $22,021.84 in restitution. Subsequently, the defendant’s probation supervisor filed a probation

violation warrant, alleging that the defendant had violated her probation by failing to meet with the

supervisor and failing to pay her restitution.

At the revocation hearing, Catherine Stringfield, the defendant’s probation supervisor,

testified that she began supervising the defendant in July 2001. She said she filed a probation
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violation warrant against the defendant because the defendant had missed ten appointments with her

from December 2001 to August 2002. She said the defendant’s excuse for missing the appointments

was that the defendant had to work two jobs. She said that sometimes the defendant telephoned and

rescheduled the missed appointments but that the defendant also missed some of the rescheduled

appointments. She said that the defendant also had failed to pay her restitution and that the

defendant claimed she could not afford to pay the restitution because the defendant was no longer

married and “just making ends meet.” On cross-examination, Ms. Stringfield testified that the

defendant’s probation contract had ten rules and that the defendant had violated only two of them.

She acknowledged that the defendant had two children and that the defendant told her the defendant

has hepatitis C. She said the defendant had paid $9,477 toward restitution but that the defendant still

owed over $10,000 and had not made any restitution payments since March 4, 2002.

The defendant testified thatshe had hepatitis C and missed appointments with Ms. Stringfield

in March and April 2002 because she was in the hospital. She said she missed appointments in

August 2002 because of car trouble. She said she telephoned and rescheduled some of the

appointments but that her car broke down again as she was driving to some of them. She said that

she and her husband separated in December 2001 and that “everything went downhill from then.”

She said that she had to work two jobs in order to support her two children, that she currently worked

at Thunder Alley and made about $480 every two weeks, and that she could no longer afford to make

her restitution payments. She said that she had been approved for food stamps and public housing

recently and that she was supposed to start nursing school in April 2003. She said that she would

receive a $4,000 or $5,000 income tax refund, that she would pay it toward her restitution, and that

she never meant to violate her probation. Upon being questioned by the trial court, the defendant

acknowledged that the court had warned her at the guilty plea hearing about missing appointments

with her probation supervisor.

Given the change in the defendant’s financial situation, the trial court chose not to hold the

defendant in violation of her probation for failing to make restitution payments. However, the trial

court ruled that the defendant had violated the terms of her probation by failing to report to her

probation supervisor. The trial court noted that it had told the defendant at her guilty plea hearing

never to miss appointments with her supervisor. It determined that the defendant had missed

appointments and that the defendant sometimes had chosen to go to work instead of keeping the

appointments. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve the

remainder of her sentence in confinement.

Although the defendant admits that she violated her probation, she contends that the trial

court’s disposition of the case was improper. She argues that given her personal circumstances, a

less harsh punishment such as split confinement would have been appropriate. The state contends

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that the defendant serve her sentence in

confinement. We agree with the state.

The decision to revoke probation is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Grear,

568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978). Upon revoking probation, the trial court has the discretion to
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order the original sentence to be served. See T.C.A. § 40-35-310, -311(d). An abuse of discretion

may be found only if the record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial

court. See State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991).

The defendant admitted missing appointments with her probation supervisor and missing

some of the appointments that she had rescheduled. She also acknowledged that the trial court had

warned her at her guilty plea hearing not to miss the appointments. The record reflects that the

defendant repeatedly failed to comply with the reasonable requirements of her probation. We

conclude that the trial court had a material basis for requiring her to serve the remainder of her

sentence in confinement. 

Based upon the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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JOSEPH M. TIPTON, JUDGE