PRELIMINARY PRINT 

## Volume 600 U. S. Part 1 **Pages 447–476** 

# OFFICIAL REPORTS

**OF** 

# THE SUPREME COURT

**June 29, 2023**

**REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions** 

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.OCTOBER TERM, 2022 447 Syllabus
**GROFF** v . **DeJOY, POSTMASTER GENERAL**
**certiorari to the united states court of appeals for**  **the third circuit** No. 22–174. Argued April 18, 2023—Decided June 29, 2023 Petitioner Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for reli

gious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest. In 2012, Groff took a mail delivery job with the United States Postal Serv

ice. Groff's position generally did not involve Sunday work, but that changed after USPS agreed to begin facilitating Sunday deliveries for Amazon. To avoid the requirement to work Sundays on a rotating basis, Groff transferred to a rural USPS station that did not make Sun

day deliveries. After Amazon deliveries began at that station as well, Groff remained unwilling to work Sundays, and USPS redistributed Groff's Sunday deliveries to other USPS staff. Groff received “pro

gressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays, and he eventually resigned.

Groff sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS's] business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j). The District Court granted summary judgment to USPS. The Third Circuit affrmed based on this Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , 432 U. S. 63, which it construed to mean “that requiring an employer `to bear more than a de minimis cost' to provide a religious accommodation is an undue hardship.” 35 F. 4th 162, 174, n. 18 (quoting 432 U. S., at 84). The Third Circuit found the de minimis cost standard met here, concluding that exempting Groff from Sunday work had “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the work

place and workfow, and diminished employee morale.” 35 F. 4th, at 175. Held : Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommoda

tion to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Pp. 456–473.

(a) This case presents the Court's frst opportunity in nearly 50 years to explain the contours of Hardison . The background of that decision helps to explain the Court's disposition of this case. Pp. 456–467. (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for covered employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ

ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect448 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Syllabus to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, because of such individual's . . . religion.” § 2000e–2(a)(1). As origi

nally enacted, Title VII did not spell out what it meant by discrimina

tion “because of . . . religion.” Subsequent regulations issued by the EEOC obligated employers “to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees” whenever doing so would not create “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 29 CFR § 1605.1 (1968). In 1970, however, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII did not require an employer “to accede to or accommodate” a Sabbath religious practice because to do so “would raise grave” Establishment Clause questions. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. , 429 F. 2d 324, 334. This Court affrmed Dewey by an evenly divided vote. See 402 U. S. 689. Congress responded by amending Title VII in 1972 to track the EEOC's regulatory language and to clarify that employers must “rea

sonably accommodate . . . an employee's or prospective employee's reli

gious observance or practice” unless the employer is “unable” to do so “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” § 2000e(j). Pp. 456–458. (2) Hardison concerned an employment dispute that arose prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII. In 1967, Trans World Airlines hired Larry Hardison to work in a department that operated “24 hours per day, 365 days per year” and played an “essential role” for TWA by pro

viding parts needed to repair and maintain aircraft. Hardison , 432 U. S., at 66. Hardison later underwent a religious conversion and began missing work to observe the Sabbath. Initial conficts with Hardison's work schedule were resolved, but conficts resurfaced when he trans

ferred to another position in which he lacked the seniority to avoid work during his Sabbath. Attempts at accommodation failed, and TWA dis

charged Hardison for insubordination.

Hardison sued TWA and his union, and the Eighth Circuit sided with Hardison. The Eighth Circuit found that reasonable accommodations were available to TWA, and rejected the defendants' Establishment Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc ., 527 F. 2d 33, 42–44. This Court granted certiorari. TWA's petition for certio

rari asked this Court to decide whether the 1972 amendment of Title VII violated the Establishment Clause as applied by the Eighth Circuit, particularly insofar as that decision had approved an accommodation that allegedly overrode seniority rights granted by the relevant collec

tive bargaining agreement. At the time, some thought that the Court's now-abrogated decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U. S. 602—which adopted a test under which any law whose “principal or primary effect” “was to advance religion” was unconstitutional, id ., at 612–613—posed a serious problem for the 1972 amendment of Title VII. Ultimately,Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 449 Syllabus however, constitutional concerns played no on-stage role in the Court's decisi on in Hardison . Instead, the Court's opinion stated that “the principal issue on which TWA and the union came to this Court” was whether Title VII “require[s] an employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee's religious prac

tices.” Hardison , 432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title VII imposed no such requirement. Ibid. This conclusion, the Court found, was “supported by the fact that seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself.” Id ., at 81. Applying this interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit's evaluation of the factual record, the Court identifed no way in which TWA, without violating seniority rights, could have feasibly accom

modated Hardison's request for an exemption from work on his Sabbath.

The parties had not focused on determining when increased costs amount to “undue hardship” under Title VII separately from the senior

ity issue. But the Court's opinion in Hardison contained this oftquoted sentence: “To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.” Al

though many lower courts later viewed this line as the authoritative interpretation of the statutory term “undue hardship,” the context ren

ders that reading doubtful. In responding to Justice Marshall's dissent, the Court described the governing standard quite differently, stating three times that an accommodation is not required when it entails “sub

stantial” “costs” or “expenditures.” Id. , at 83, n. 14. Pp. 459–465. (3) Even though Hardison's reference to “de minimis ” was under

cut by conficting language and was feeting in comparison to its discus

sion of the “principal issue” of seniority rights, lower courts have latched on to “de minimis ” as the governing standard. To be sure, many courts have understood that the protection for religious adherents is greater than “more than . . . de minimis ” might suggest when read in isolation. But diverse religious groups tell the Court that the “de minimis ” standard has been used to deny even minor accommodations. The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as prescribing a “more than a de minimis cost” test, 29 CFR § 1605.2(e)(1), though it has tried to soften its impact, cautioning against extending the phrase to cover such things as the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules, the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages for a substi

tute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps” when they are not con

trary to a “bona fde seniority system.” §§ 1605.2(e)(1), (2). Yet some courts have rejected even the EEOC's gloss on “de minimis ,” rejecting accommodations the EEOC's guidelines consider to be ordinarily re

-450 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Syllabus quired. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that Hardison does not compel courts to read the “more than de minimis ” standard “literally” or in a manner that undermines Hardison's references to “substantial” cost. Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. Pp. 465–467.

(b) The Court holds that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffce to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison cannot be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employer's “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formu

lation better explains the decision. The Court understands Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer's business. This fact-specifc inquiry comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary speech. Pp. 468–473. (1) To determine what an employer must prove to defend a denial of a religious accommodation under Title VII, the Court begins with Title VII's text. The statutory term, “hardship,” refers to, at a mini

mum, “something hard to bear” and suggests something more severe than a mere burden. If Title VII said only that an employer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability simply by showing that an accommodation would impose some sort of additional costs. Adding the modifer “undue” means that the requisite burden or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustifable” level. Understood in this way, “undue hardship” means something very differ

ent from a burden that is merely more than de minimis , i. e., “very small or trifing.” The ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” thus points toward a standard closer to Hardison's references to “substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. Further, the Court's reading of the statutory term comports with pre

1972 EEOC decisions, so nothing in that history plausibly suggests that “undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean anything less than its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v. McDonough , 596 U. S. –––, –––. And no support exists in other factors discussed by the par

ties for reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line. Pp. 468–470. (2) The parties agree that the “de minimis ” test is not right, but they differ in the alternative language they propose. The Court thinks it is enough to say that what an employer must show is that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Hardison , 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. Courts must apply the test to take into account all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accom

-Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 451 Syllabus modations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size, and operating cost of an employer. P. 470–471. (3) The Court declines to adopt the elaborations of the applicable standard that the parties suggest, either to incorporate Americans with Disabilities Act case law or opine that the EEOC's construction of Har

dison has been basically correct. A good deal of the EEOC's guidance in this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected by the Court's clarifying decision. But it would not be prudent to ratify in toto a body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the beneft of the clarifcation the Court adopts today. What is most important is that “undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and courts should resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the context of an employer's business in the commonsense manner that it would use in applying any such test. P. 471. (4) The Court also clarifes several recurring issues. First, as the parties agree, Title VII requires an assessment of a possible accommo

dation's effect on “the conduct of the employer's business.” § 2000e(j). Impacts on co-workers are relevant only to the extent those impacts go on to affect the conduct of the business. A court must analyze whether that further logical step is shown. Further, a hardship that is attribut

able to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in gen

eral, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice, cannot be considered “undue.” Bias or hostility to a religious practice or ac

commodation cannot supply a defense.

Second, Title VII requires that an employer “reasonably accommo

date” an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommoda

tions. Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, an employer must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work over

time would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other op

tions would also be necessary. Pp. 471–473.

(c) Having clarifed the Title VII undue-hardship standard, the Court leaves the context-specifc application of that clarifed standard in this case to the lower courts in the frst instance. P. 473. 35 F. 4th 162, vacated and remanded.

**Alito** , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. **Sotomayor**, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which **Jackson** , J., joined, post , p. 474. Aaron M. Streett argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were J. Mark Little, Christopher E. Tutun

jian, Kelly J. Shackelford, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Hiram S.452 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Counsel Sasser III, David J. Hacker, Stephanie N. Taub, Alan J. Re inach, Jonathon Cherne, Randall Luke Wenger, and Jeremy L. Samek. Solicitor General Prelogar argued the cause for respond

ent. With her on the brief were Principal Deputy Assist

ant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Fletcher, Aimee W. Brown, and Charles W. Scarborough. *

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of West Virginia et al. by Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General of West Virginia, Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Michael R. Williams, Senior Deputy Solicitor General, and Grant A. Newman , Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Steve Marshall of Alabama, Treg Taylor of Alaska, Tim Griffn of Arkan

sas, Ashley Moody of Florida, Chris Carr of Georgia, Raúl Labrador of Idaho, Brenna Bird of Iowa, Kris Kobach of Kansas, Daniel Cameron of Kentucky, Jeff Landry of Louisiana, Lynn Fitch of Mississippi, Austin Knudsen of Montana, Michael T. Hilgers of Nebraska, John M. Formella of New Hampshire, Dave Yost of Ohio, Gentner Drummond of Oklahoma, Alan Wilson of South Carolina, Jonathan Skrmetti of Tennessee, Ken Paxton of Texas, Sean D. Reyes of Utah, and Jason Miyares of Virginia; for Airline Employees for Health Freedom by John C. Sullivan and Kris

tina M. Williams ; for the Alabama Center for Law and Liberty et al. by Matthew J. Clark ; for the American Constitutional Rights Union by John J. Park, Jr. ; for the American Hindu Coalition by Matthew T. Martens ; for Americans for Fair Treatment by David Osborne ; for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty by Mark L. Rienzi ; for the CatholicVote.org Education Fund by Antony B. Kolenc ; for the Christian Legal Society et al. by Thomas C. Berg and Kimberlee Wood Colby ; for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al. by Alexander Dushku and R. Shawn Gunnarson ; for Citizens United et al. by Gary M. Lawkowski, Michael Boos, and Daniel H. Jorjani ; for the Council on American-Islamic Rela

tions by John S. Friend, Lena F. Masri, and Justin Sadowsky ; for Former EEOC General Counsel et al. by Rachel N. Morrison ; for the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists by Gene C. Schaerr, H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Hannah C. Smith, Kathryn E. Tarbert, Todd R. McFar

land, and Christopher E. Mills ; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Roger K. Gannam ; for the Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law by Thomas R. McCarthy, Kenneth L. Marcus, Alyza D. Lewin, L. Rachel Lerman, and Arthur Traldi ; for the Muslim Public Affairs Council by Joshua C. McDaniel ; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLA) et al. by Nathan Lewin and Dennis Rapps ; for Religious Liberty Scholars et al.Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 453 Opinion of the Court **Justice Alito** delivered the opinion of the Court. T itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employ

ers to accommodate the religious practice of their employees by John A. Meiser and Douglas Laycock ; for the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Canada et al. by Nicholas R. Reaves ; for the Sikh Coalition et al. by Jonathan Z. Morris, Scott P. Dixler, and Jeremy B. Rosen ; for the Thomas More Society et al. by Thomas Brejcha, Stephen M. Crampton, Howard Slugh, and B. Tyler Brooks ; for the Union of Orthodox Jew

ish Congregations of America by Eric Rassbach and Nathan J. Diament ; for U. S. Sen. Ted Cruz et al. by Sarah E. Child ; for Joseph B. Holland, Jr., by Robert P. George, Kent J. George, and Jeffrey A. Kimble ; for John Kluge by John J. Bursch, Rory T. Gray, and Michael J. Cork ; for Robert P. Roesser by Bruce N. Cameron and Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr. ; for Asma T. Uddin et al. by Steven T. Collis, pro se ; and for 400 Physicians et al. by Erin Elizabeth Mersino and Richard Thompson.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for the State of Washington et al. by Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General of Washing

ton, Noah G. Purcell, Solicitor General, Karl David Smith , Deputy Solici

tor General, and Brian J. Baker and Nicholas Ulrich, Assistant Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Rob Bonta of California, Phil Weiser of Colorado, William Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Anne E. Lopez of Hawaii, Aaron M. Frey of Maine, Anthony G. Brown of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, and Charity R. Clark of Vermont; for Airlines for America by Anton Metlitsky, Robert A. Siegel, and Patricia N. Vercelli ; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Harold C. Becker, Matthew Ginsburg, and Andrew Lyubarsky ; for the American Postal Workers Union, AFL–CIO, by Michael T. Anderson ; for Americans United for Sep

aration of Church and State et al. by Joshua Matz, Carmen Iguina Gon

zález, Gregory R. Nevins, Alex J. Luchenitser, Bradley Girard, and Karen L. Loewy ; for the Freedom from Religion Foundation by Elizabeth Cavell and Patrick Elliott ; for the Local Government Legal Center et al. by F. An

drew Hessick, Richard A. Simpson, Amanda Karras, and Erich Eiselt ; and for the National Rural Letter Carriers' Association et al. by Jacob Karabell, Michael Gan, Mark Gisler, Jean-Marc Favreau, and Keith E. Secular

. Briefs of amici curiae were fled for Founders' First Freedom, Inc., by Walter E. Carson and Michael D. Peabody ; for the National Lawyers Association by Michael L. Foreman ; for the Robertson Center for Consti

tutional Law by Michael Francisco and Bradley J. Lingo ; for the Zionist Organization of America by Susan B. Tuchman ; and for Jeffrey Podell et al. by Clifford A. Rieders.454 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the con

duc t of the employer's business.” 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j). Based on a line in this Court's deci

sion in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , 432 U. S. 63, 84 (1977), many lower courts, including the Third Circuit below, have interpreted “undue hardship” to mean any effort or cost that is “more than . . . de minimis .” In this case, however, both parties—the plaintiff-petitioner, Gerald Groff, and the defendant-respondent, the Postmaster General, rep

resented by the Solicitor General—agree that the de minimis reading of Hardison is a mistake. With the beneft of thorough briefng and oral argument, we today clarify what Title VII requires. I Gerald Groff is an Evangelical Christian who believes for religious reasons that Sunday should be devoted to worship and rest, not “secular labor” and the “transport[ation]” of worldly “goods.” App. 294. In 2012, Groff began his em

ployment with the United States Postal Service (USPS), which has more than 600,000 employees. He became a Rural Carrier Associate, a job that required him to assist regular carriers in the delivery of mail. When he took the position, it generally did not involve Sunday work. But within a few years, that changed. In 2013, USPS entered into an agreement with Amazon to begin facilitating Sunday deliveries, and in 2016, USPS signed a memorandum of un

derstanding with the relevant union (the National Rural Let

ter Carriers' Association) that set out how Sunday and holi

day parcel delivery would be handled. During a 2-month peak season, each post offce would use its own staff to de

liver packages. At all other times, Sunday and holiday de

liveries would be carried out by employees (including Rural Carrier Associates like Groff) working from a “regional hub.” For Quarryville, Pennsylvania, where Groff was orig

inally stationed, the regional hub was the Lancaster Annex.Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 455 Opinion of the Court The memorandum specifes the order in which USPS em

ployees are to be called on for Sunday work outside the peak season. First in line are each hub's “Assistant Rural Carri

ers”—part-time employees who are assigned to the hub and cover only Sundays and holidays. Second are any volun

teers from the geographic area, who are assigned on a rotat

ing basis. And third are all other carriers, who are com

pelled to do the work on a rotating basis. Groff fell into this third category, and after the memorandum of understanding was adopted, he was told that he would be required to workon Sunday. He then sought and received a transfer to Holtwood, a small rural USPS station that had only seven em

ployees and that, at the time, did not make Sunday deliver

ies. But in March 2017, Amazon deliveries began there as well. With Groff unwilling to work on Sundays, USPS made other arrangements. During the peak season, Sunday deliv

eries that would have otherwise been performed by Groff were carried out by the rest of the Holtwood staff, including the postmaster, whose job ordinarily does not involve deliv

ering mail. During other months, Groff's Sunday assign

ments were redistributed to other carriers assigned to the regional hub. 1 Throughout this time, Groff continued to re

ceive “progressive discipline” for failing to work on Sundays. 35 F. 4th 162, 166 (CA3 2022). Finally, in January 2019, he resigned. 2

1 Other employees complained about the consequences of Groff's ab

sences. While the parties dispute some of the details, it appears uncon

tested that at least one employee fled a grievance asserting a confict with his contractual rights. After disputing any confict with contract rights, USPS eventually settled that claim, with the settlement reaffrming USPS's commitment to the memorandum of understanding. App. 118, 125–126.

2 Groff represents that his resignation was in light of expected termina

tion, and the District Court found “a genuine issue of material fact” fore

closed summary judgment as to whether Groff suffered an adverse em

-456 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court A few months later, Groff sued under Title VII, asserting that USPS could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of [USPS's] business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( j). The District Court granted summary judgment to USPS, 2021 WL 1264030 (ED Pa., Apr. 6, 2021), and the Third Circuit affrmed. The panel majority felt that it was “bound by [the] ruling” in Hardison , which it construed to mean “that requiring an employer `to bear more than a de minimis cost' to provide a religious ac

commodation is an undue hardship.” 35 F. 4th, at 174, n. 18 (quoting 432 U. S., at 84). Under Circuit precedent, the panel observed, this was “not a diffcult threshold to pass,” 35 F. 4th, at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted), and it held that this low standard was met in this case. Exempt

ing Groff from Sunday work, the panel found, had “imposed on his coworkers, disrupted the workplace and workfow, and diminished employee morale.” Id ., at 175. Judge Hardi

man dissented, concluding that adverse “effects on USPS employees in Lancaster or Holtwood” did not alone suffce to show the needed hardship “on the employer's business .” Id ., at 177 (emphasis in original). We granted Groff's ensuing petition for a writ of certiorari. 598 U. S. ––– (2023). II Because this case presents our frst opportunity in nearly 50 years to explain the contours of Hardison , we begin by recounting the legal backdrop to that case, including the development of the Title VII provision barring religious discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC's) regulations and guidance regarding that prohibition. We then summarize how the Hardison case progressed to fnal decision, and fnally, we discuss ployment action. 2021 WL 1264030, *8 (ED Pa., Apr. 6, 2021). The Government does not dispute the point in this Court.Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 457 Opinion of the Court how courts and the EEOC have understood its signifcance. Th is background helps to explain the clarifcations we offer today. A Since its passage, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has made it unlawful for covered employers “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis

criminate against any individual with respect to his compen

sation, terms, conditions, or privileges [of] employment, be

cause of such individual's . . . religion.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e– 2(a)(1) (1964 ed.). As originally enacted, Title VII did not spell out what it meant by discrimination “because of . . . religion,” but shortly after the statute's passage, the EEOC interpreted that provision to mean that employers were sometimes required to “accommodate” the “reasonable reli

gious needs of employees.” 29 CFR § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967). After some tinkering, the EEOC settled on a formulation that obligated employers “to make reasonable accommoda

tions to the religious needs of employees” whenever that would not work an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 29 CFR § 1605.1 (1968). Between 1968 and 1972, the EEOC elaborated on its un

derstanding of “undue hardship” in a “long line of decisions” addressing a variety of policies. Hardison , 432 U. S., at 85 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Brief for General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists as Amicus Curiae 10–22 (collecting decisions). Those decisions addressed many accommodation issues that still arise frequently today, including the wearing of religious garb 3 and time off from work to attend to reli

gious obligations. 4

3 See, e. g. , EEOC Dec. No. 71–779, 1970 WL 3550, *2 (Dec. 21, 1970) (no undue hardship in permitting nurse to wear religious headscarf).

4 See EEOC Dec. No. 71–463, 1970 WL 3544, *1–*2 (Nov. 13, 1970) (no “undue hardship” or “unreasonable burde[n]” for employer to train co

worker to cover 2-week religious absence); EEOC Dec. No. 70–580, 1970458 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court EEOC decisions did not settle the question of undue hard

sh ip. In 1970, the Sixth Circuit held (in a Sabbath case) that Title VII as then written did not require an employer “to accede to or accommodate” religious practice because that “would raise grave” Establishment Clause questions. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co ., 429 F. 2d 324, 334. This Court granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1008, but then affrmed by an evenly divided vote, 402 U. S. 689 (1971). Responding to Dewey and another decision rejecting any duty to accommodate an employee's observance of the Sab

bath, Congress amended Title VII in 1972. Hardison , 432 U. S., at 73–74; id. , at 88–89 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Tracking the EEOC's regulatory language, Congress pro

vided that “[t]he term `religion' includes all aspects of reli

gious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac

commodate to an employee's or prospective employee's reli

gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j) (1970 ed., Supp. II). WL 3513, *1–*2 (Mar. 2, 1970) (manufacturing employer asked to accommo

date sundown-to-sundown Sabbath observance did not carry “burden . . . to demonstrate undue hardship” where it did not address “whether an

other employee could be trained to substitute for the Charging Party dur

ing Sabbath days, or whether already qualifed personnel ha[d] been in

vited to work a double shift”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–670, 1970 WL 3518, *2 (Mar. 30, 1970) (no “undue `hardship' ” in having other employees take on a few more on-call Saturdays per year); see also EEOC Dec. No. 70– 110, 1969 WL 2908, *1–*2 (Aug. 27, 1969) (employer could not deny em

ployee all Sunday “overtime opportunities” on basis of employee's re

ligious inability to work Saturday, where others not working the full weekend had been accommodated, notwithstanding employer's claim of “considerable expense”); EEOC Dec. No. 70–99, 1969 WL 2905, *1 (Aug. 27, 1969) (no obligation to accommodate seasonal employee unavail

able for Saturday work, where employer showed both “no available pool of qualifed employees” to substitute and a “practical impossibility of obtaining and training an employee” to cover one day a week for six weeks).Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 459 Opinion of the Court B The Hardison case concerned a dispute that arose during the interval between the issuance of the EEOC's “undue hardship” regulation and the 1972 amendment to Title VII. In 1967, Larry Hardison was hired as a clerk at the Stores Department in the Kansas City base of Trans World Airlines (TWA). The Stores Department was responsible for provid

ing parts needed to repair and maintain aircraft. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines , 375 F. Supp. 877, 889 (WD Mo. 1974). It played an “essential role” and operated “24 hours per day, 365 days per year.” Hardison , 432 U. S., at 66. After taking this job, Hardison underwent a religious con

version. He began to observe the Sabbath by absenting himself from work from sunset on Friday to sunset on Satur

day, and this conficted with his work schedule. The prob

lem was solved for a time when Hardison, who worked in Building 1, switched to the night shift, but it resurfaced when he sought and obtained a transfer to the day shift in Building 2 so that he could spend evenings with his wife. 375 F. Supp., at 889. In that new building, he did not have enough seniority to avoid work during his Sabbath. At

tempts at accommodation failed, and he was eventually “dis

charged on grounds of insubordination.” 432 U. S., at 69. Hardison sued TWA and his union, the International Asso

ciation of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM). 5 The Eighth Circuit found that reasonable accommodations were available, and it rejected the defendants' Establishment Clause arguments. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc ., 527 F. 2d 33, 42–44 (1975). Both TWA and IAM then fled petitions for certiorari, with TWA's lead petition asking this Court to decide whether the 1972 amendment of Title VII violated the Establishment Clause as applied in the decision below, particularly insofar

5 “Labor organization[s]” themselves were and are bound by Title VII's nondiscrimination rules. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(c) (1964 ed.).460 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court as that decision had approved an accommodation that alleg

edly overrode seniority rights granted by the relevant collec

tive bargaining agreement. 6 The Court granted both peti

tions. 429 U. S. 958 (1976). When the Court took that action, all counsel had good rea

son to expect that the Establishment Clause would fgure prominently in the Court's analysis. As noted above, in June 1971, the Court, by an equally divided vote, had af

frmed the Sixth Circuit's decision in Dewey , which had heav

ily relied on Establishment Clause avoidance to reject theinterpretation of Title VII set out in the EEOC's reasonableaccommodation guidelines. Just over three weeks later, the Court had handed down its (now abrogated) 7 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U. S. 602 (1971), which adopted a test under which any law whose “principal or primary effect” “was to advance religion” was unconstitutional. Id. , at 612– 613. Because it could be argued that granting a special ac

commodation to a religious practice had just such a purpose and effect, some thought that Lemon posed a serious prob

lem for the 1972 amendment of Title VII. And shortly be

fore review was granted in Hardison , the Court had an

nounced that the Justices were evenly divided in a case that challenged the 1972 amendment as a violation of the Estab

lishment Clause . Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins , 429 U. S. 65 (1976) ( per curiam). Against this backdrop, both TWA and IAM challenged the constitutionality of requiring any accommodation for reli

gious practice. The Summary of Argument in TWA's brief began with this categorical assertion: “The religious accom

modation requirement of Title VII violates the Establish

ment Clause of the First Amendment.” Brief for PetitionerTWA, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, p. 19. Applying the threepart Lemon test, TWA argued that any such accommodation

6 See Pet. for Cert. in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , O. T. 1975, No. 75–1126, pp. 2–3, 17–22.

7 See Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist. , 597 U. S. –––, ––– (2022).Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 461 Opinion of the Court has the primary purpose and effect of advancing religion and ent ails “pervasive” government “entanglement . . . in reli

gious issues.” Brief for Petitioner TWA, No. 75–1126, at 20. The union's brief made a similar argument, Brief for Peti

tioner IAM, O. T. 1976, No. 75–1126, pp. 21–24, 50–72, but stressed the special status of seniority rights under Title VII, id. , at 24–36. Despite the prominence of the Establishment Clause in the briefs submitted by the parties and their amici , 8 constitu

tional concerns played no on-stage role in the Court's opin

ion, which focused instead on seniority rights. 9 The opinion

8 See, e. g. , Brief for Chrysler Corporation as Amicus Curiae 6–20 (ar

guing an Establishment Clause violation), and Brief for State of Michigan as Amicus Curiae 20–25 (arguing no confict with the Establishment Clause), in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , O. T. 1976, No. 75– 1126 etc.

9 The background summarized above and the patent clash between the ordinary meaning of “undue hardship” and “more than . . . de minimis” led some to interpret the decision to rest on Establishment Clause concerns. Justice Marshall observed in his Hardison dissent that the majority opin

ion “ha[d] the singular advantage of making consideration of petitioners' constitutional challenge unnecessary.” 432 U. S., at 89. A few courts as

sumed that Hardison actually was an Establishment Clause decision. See, e. g. , Gibson v. Missouri Pacifc R. Co ., 620 F. Supp. 85, 88–89 (ED Ark. 1985) (concluding that requiring an employer to “incur greater than de minimis costs” related to accommodating a Sabbath “would therefore violate the establishment clause”); see also Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination , 450 Mass. 327, 340–341, and n. 15, 879 N. E. 2d 36, 46–48, and n. 15 (2008) (construing state law narrowly on premise that Hardison might state outer constitutional bounds). Some constitutional scholars also suggested that Hardison must have been based on constitutional avoidance. See, e. g. , P. Karlan & G. Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 Duke L. J. 1, 6–7 (1996); M. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 704 (1992); cf. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 952 F. 3d 821, 829 (CA6 2020) (Thapar, J., concurring). In doing so, some have pointed to Hardi

son's passing reference to a need to avoid “unequal treatment of employ

ees on the basis of their religion.” 432 U. S., at 84. But the Court later clarifed that “Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to462 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court stated that “the principal issue on which TWA and the union came to this Court” was whether Title VII “require[s] an employer and a union who have agreed on a seniority system to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee's religious practices.” 432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14. The Court held that Title VII imposed no such requirement. Ibid . This conclusion, the Court found, was “supported by the fact that seniority sys

tems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself.” Id ., at 81. It noted that Title VII expressly provides special protection for “ `bona fde seniority . . . system[s],' ” id ., at 81– 82 (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(h)), and it cited precedent reading the statute “ `to make clear that the routine applica

tion of a bona fde seniority system [is] not . . . unlawful under Title VII,' ” 432 U. S., at 82 (quoting Teamsters v. United States , 431 U. S. 324, 352 (1977)). Invoking these au

thorities, the Court found that the statute did not require an accommodation that involuntarily deprived employees of seniority rights. 432 U. S., at 80. 10 Applying this interpretation of Title VII and disagreeing with the Eighth Circuit's evaluation of the factual record, the Court identifed no way in which TWA, without violating seniority rights, could have feasibly accommodated Hardi

son's request for an exemption from work on his Sabbath. The Court found that not enough co-workers were willing to take Hardison's shift voluntarily, that compelling them to do so would have violated their seniority rights, and that leav

ing the Stores Department short-handed would have ad

versely affected its “essential” mission. Id ., at 68, 80. religious practices” but instead “gives them favored treatment” in order to ensure religious persons' full participation in the workforce. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. , 575 U. S. 768, 775 (2015).

10 We do not understand Groff to challenge the continued vitality of Har

dison's core holding on its “principal issue” (bracketing his disputes that the memorandum of understanding set forth a seniority system). 432 U. S., at 83, and n. 14.Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 463 Opinion of the Court The Court also rejected two other options offered in Jus

tice Marshall's dissent: (1) paying other workers overtime wages to induce them to work on Saturdays and making up for that increased cost by requiring Hardison to work over

time for regular wages at other times and (2) forcing TWA to pay overtime for Saturday work for three months, after which, the dissent thought, Hardison could transfer back to the night shift in Building 1. The Court dismissed both of these options as not “feasible,” id. , at 83, n. 14, but it pro

vided no explanation for its evaluation of the frst. In dis

sent, Justice Marshall suggested one possible reason: that the collective bargaining agreement might have disallowed Hardison's working overtime for regular wages. Id. , at 95 (dissenting opinion). But the majority did not embrace that explanation. As for the second, the Court disputed the dissent's conclu

sion that Hardison, if he moved back to Building 1, would have had enough seniority to choose to work the night shift. Id. , at 83, n. 14. That latter disagreement was key. The dissent thought that Hardison could have resumed the night shift in Building 1 after just three months, and it therefore calculated what it would have cost TWA to pay other work

ers' overtime wages on Saturdays for that fnite period of time. According to that calculation, TWA's added expense for three months would have been $150 (about $1,250 in 2022 dollars). 11 Id ., at 92, n. 6. But the Court doubted that Har

dison could have regained the seniority rights he had en

joyed in Building 1 prior to his transfer, and if that were true, TWA would have been required to pay other workers overtime for Saturday work indefnitely. Even under Jus

tice Marshall's math, that would have worked out to $600 per year at the time, or roughly $5,000 per year today.

11 The dissent appears to have drawn its estimate from Hardison's daily rate at the time of termination ($3.37/hour) and deposition testimony on typical overtime rates and shift lengths. See App. in No. 75–1126 etc., pp. 40, 126.464 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court In the briefs and at argument, little space was devoted to the question of determining when increased costs amount toan “undue hardship” under the statute, but a single, but oftquoted, sentence in the opinion of the Court, if taken liter

ally, suggested that even a pittance might be too much for an employer to be forced to endure. The line read as fol

lows: “To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hard

ship.” Id ., at 84. Although this line would later be viewed by many lower courts as the authoritative interpretation of the statutory term “undue hardship,” it is doubtful that it was meant to take on that large role. In responding to Justice Marshall's dissent, the Court described the governing standard quite differently, stating three times that an accommodation is not required when it entails “substantial” “costs” or “expendi

tures.” Id. , at 83, n. 14. This formulation suggests that an employer may be required to bear costs and make expendi

tures that are not “substantial.” Of course, there is a big difference between costs and expenditures that are not “sub

stantial” and those that are “de minimis,” which is to say, so “very small or trifing” that they are not even worth notic

ing. Black's Law Dictionary 388 (5th ed. 1979). The Court's response to Justice Marshall's estimate of the extra costs that TWA would have been required to foot isalso telling. The majority did not argue that Justice Marshall's math produced considerably “more than a de minimis cost” (as it certainly did). Instead, the Court responded that Justice Marshall's calculation involved assumptions that were not “feasible under the circumstances” and would have produced a different confict with “the seniority rights of other employees.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14; see Brief for United States 29, n. 4 (noting that Hardison “specifcally re

jected” the dissent's calculations and that it is “wrong to as

sert” that Hardison held that a $150 cost was an undue hardship).Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 465 Opinion of the Court Ultimately, then, it is not clear that any of the possible accommodati ons would have actually solved Hardison's prob

lem without transgressing seniority rights. The Hardison Court was very clear that those rights were off-limits. Its guidance on “undue hardship” in situations not involving se

niority rights is much less clear. C Even though Hardison's reference to “de minimis ” was undercut by conficting language and was feeting in compari

son to its discussion of the “principal issue” of seniority rights, lower courts have latched on to “de minimis ” as the governing standard. To be sure, as the Solicitor General notes, some lower courts have understood that the protection for religious ad

herents is greater than “more than . . . de minimis ” might suggest when read in isolation. But a bevy of diverse reli

gious organizations has told this Court that the de minimis test has blessed the denial of even minor accommodation in many cases, making it harder for members of minority faiths to enter the job market. See, e. g. , Brief for the Sikh Coali

tion et al. as Amici Curiae 15, 19–20 (“the de minimis stand

ard eliminates any meaningful mandate to accommodate Sikh practices in the workplace” and “emboldens employers to deny reasonable accommodation requests”); Brief for Council on American-Islamic Relations as Amicus Curiae 3 (Muslim women wearing religiously mandated attire “have lost em

ployment opportunities” and have been excluded from “criti

cal public institutions like public schools, law enforcement agencies, and youth rehabilitation centers”); Brief for Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America as Amicus Curiae 14–15 (because the “de minimis cost” test “can be satisfed in nearly any circumstance,” “Orthodox Jews once again [are] left at the mercy of their employers' good graces”); Brief for Seventh-day Adventist Church in Canada et al. as Amici Curiae 8 (joint brief of Sabbatarian faiths466 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court arguing that Sabbath accommodation under the de minimis s tandard is left to “ their employers' and coworkers' goodwill”). The EEOC has also accepted Hardison as prescribing a “ `more than a de minimis cost' ” test, 29 CFR § 1605.2(e)(1) (2022), but has tried in some ways to soften its impact. It has specifcally cautioned (as has the Solicitor General in this case) against extending the phrase to cover such things as the “administrative costs” involved in reworking schedules, the “infrequent” or temporary “payment of premium wages for a substitute,” and “voluntary substitutes and swaps” when they are not contrary to a “bona fde seniority system.” §§ 1605.2(e)(1), (2). Nevertheless, some courts have rejected even the EEOC's gloss on “de minimis .” 12 And in other cases, courts have rejected accommodations that the EEOC's guidelines con

sider to be ordinarily required, such as the relaxation of dress codes and coverage for occasional absences. 13

12 For example, two years ago, the Seventh Circuit told the EEOC that it would be an undue hardship on Wal-Mart (the Nation's largest private employer, with annual profts of over $11 billion) to be required to facili

tate voluntary shift-trading to accommodate a prospective assistant man

ager's observance of the Sabbath. EEOC v. Walmart Stores East, L. P. , 992 F. 3d 656, 659–660 (2021). See Walmart Inc., Wall Street Journal Markets (June 4, 2023).

13 See, e. g. , Wagner v. Saint Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc. , 2022 WL 905551, *4–*5 (SD Ga., Mar. 28, 2022) (Orthodox Jew fred for taking off for High Holy Days); Camara v. Epps Air Serv., Inc. , 292 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1322, 1331–1332 (ND Ga., 2017) (Muslim woman who wore a hijab fred because the sight of her might harm the business in light of “negative stereotypes and perceptions about Muslims”); El-Amin v. First Transit, Inc. , 2005 WL 1118175, *7–*8 (SD Ohio, May 11, 2005) (Muslim employee terminated where religious services conficted with “two hours” of train

ing a week during a month of daily training); EEOC v. Sambo's of Ga., Inc. , 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (ND Ga., 1981) (hiring a Sikh man as a restaurant manager would be an undue hardship because his beard would have con

ficted with “customer preference”).Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 467 Opinion of the Court Members of this Court have warned that, if the de minimis rule represents the holding of Hardison , the decision might have to be reconsidered. Small v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water, 593 U. S. ––– (2021) ( **Gorsuch** , J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Patterson v. Walgreen Co. , 589 U. S. ––– (2020) ( **Alito**, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). Four years ago, the Solicitor General—joined on its brief by the EEOC—likewise took that view. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Patterson v. Walgreen Co. , O. T. 2019, No. 18–349, p. 20 (“Contrary to Hardison , therefore, an `undue hardship' is not best interpreted to mean `more than a de minimis cost' ”). Today, the Solicitor General disavows its prior position that Hardison should be overruled—but only on the under

standing that Hardison does not compel courts to read the “more than de minimis ” standard “literally” or in a manner that undermines Hardison's references to “substantial” cost. 14 Tr. of Oral Arg. 107. With the beneft of compre

hensive briefng and oral argument, we agree. 15

14 At the certiorari stage, the Government argued against review by noting that Government employees receive “at least as much protection for religious-accommodation claims [under the Religious Freedom Resto

ration Act (RFRA)] as [under] any interpretation of Title VII.” Brief in Opposition 9. Courts have not always agreed on how RFRA's cause of action—which does not rely on employment status—interacts with Title VII's cause of action, and the Third Circuit has treated Title VII as exclu

sively governing at least some employment-related claims brought by Gov

ernment employees. Compare Francis v. Mineta , 505 F. 3d 266, 271 (CA3 2007), with Tagore v. United States , 735 F. 3d 324, 330–331 (CA5 2013) (federal employee's RFRA claim could proceed even though de minimis standard foreclosed Title VII claim). Because Groff did not bring a RFRA claim, we need not resolve today whether the Government is cor

rect that RFRA claims arising out of federal employment are not displaced by Title VII.

15 In addition to suggesting that Hardison be revisited, some Justices have questioned whether Hardison (which addresses the pre-1972 EEOC Guidelines) binds courts interpreting the current version of Title VII. See468 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court III W e hold that showing “more than a de minimis cost,” as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffce to establish “undue hardship” under Title VII. Hardison can not be reduced to that one phrase. In describing an employer's “undue hardship” defense, Hardison referred repeatedly to “substantial” burdens, and that formulation better ex

plains the decision. We therefore, like the parties, under

stand Hardison to mean that “undue hardship” is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer's business. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62 (argument of Solicitor General). This fact-specifc inquiry comports with both Hardison and the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary speech. A As we have explained, we do not write on a blank slate in determining what an employer must prove to defend a denial of a religious accommodation, but we think it reasonable to begin with Title VII's text. After all, as we have stressed over and over again in recent years, statutory interpretation must “begi[n] with,” and ultimately heed, what a statute ac

tually says. National Assn. of Mfrs. v. Department of De

fense , 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bartenwerfer v. Buckley , 598 U. S. 69, 74 (2023); Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma , 589 U. S. –––, ––– – –––, ––– (2020). Here, the key statutory term is “undue hardship.” In common parlance, a “hardship” is, at a minimum, “something hard to bear.” Random House Dic

tionary of the English Language 646 (1966) (Random House). Other defnitions go further. See, e. g. , Webster's Third
Abercrombie , 575 U. S., at 787, n. (T**homas** , J., concurring in part and dis

senting in part). As explained below, because we—like the Solicitor General—construe Hardison as consistent with the ordinary meaning of “undue hardship,” we need not reconcile any divergence between Hardi

son and the statutory text.Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 469 Opinion of the Court New International Dictionary 1033 (1971) (Webster's Third) (“someth ing that causes or entails suffering or privation”); American Heritage Dictionary 601 (1969) (American Heri

tage) (“[e]xtreme privation; adversity; suffering”); Black's Law Dictionary, at 646 (“privation, suffering, adversity”). But under any defnition, a hardship is more severe than a mere burden. So even if Title VII said only that an em

ployer need not be made to suffer a “hardship,” an employer could not escape liability simply by showing that an accom

modation would impose some sort of additional costs. Those costs would have to rise to the level of hardship, and adding the modifer “undue” means that the requisite burden, priva

tion, or adversity must rise to an “excessive” or “unjustif

able” level. Random House 1547; see, e. g. , Webster's Third 2492 (“inappropriate,” “unsuited,” or “exceeding or violating propriety or ftness”); American Heritage 1398 (“excessive”). The Government agrees, noting that “ `undue hardship means something greater than hardship.' ” Brief for United States 30; see id. , at 39 (arguing that “accommodations should be assessed while `keep[ing] in mind both words in the key phrase of the actual statutory text: “undue” and “hardship” ' ” (quoting Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F. 3d 444, 456 (CA7 2013))). When “undue hardship” is understood in this way, it means something very different from a burden that is merely more than de minimis , i. e. , something that is “very small or tri

fing.” Black's Law Dictionary, at 388. So considering or

dinary meaning while taking Hardison as a given, we are pointed toward something closer to Hardison's references to “substantial additional costs” or “substantial expenditures.” 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. Similarly, while we do not rely on the pre-1972 EEOC deci

sions described above to defne the term, we do observe that these decisions often found that accommodations that en

tailed substantial costs were required. See supra , at 457, nn. 3–4. Nothing in this history plausibly suggests that470 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court “undue hardship” in Title VII should be read to mean any

th ing less than its meaning in ordinary use. Cf. George v. McDonough , 596 U. S. –––, ––– (2022) (a “robust regulatory backdrop” can “fl[l] in the details” of a statutory scheme's use of a specifc term). In short, no factor discussed by the parties—the ordinary meaning of “undue hardship,” the EEOC guidelines that Hardison concluded that the 1972 amendment “ `ratifed,' ” 432 U. S., at 76, n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted), the use of that term by the EEOC prior to those amendments, and the common use of that term in other statutes—supports reducing Hardison to its “more than a de minimis cost” line. See Brief for United States 39 (arguing that “the Court could emphasize that Hardison's language does not displace the statutory standard”). B In this case, both parties agree that the “de minimis ” test is not right, but they differ slightly in the alternative lan

guage they prefer. Groff likes the phrase “signifcant diff

culty or expense.” Brief for Petitioner 15; Reply Brief 2. The Government, disavowing its prior position that Title VII's text requires overruling Hardison , points us to Hardi

son's repeated references to “substantial expenditures” or “substantial additional costs.” Brief for United States 28– 29 (citing 432 U. S., at 83–84, and n. 14); see Brief for United States 39. We think it is enough to say that an employer must show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Hardison , 432 U. S., at 83, n. 14. What matters more than a favored synonym for “undue hardship” (which is the actual text) is that courts must apply the test in a manner that takes into account all relevant fac

tors in the case at hand, including the particular accommoda

tions at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature,Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 471 Opinion of the Court “size and operating cost of [an] employer.” Brief for United St ates 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). C The main difference between the parties lies in the further steps they would ask us to take in elaborating upon their standards. Groff would not simply borrow the phrase “sig

nifcant diffculty or expense” from the Americans with Disa

bilities Act (ADA) but would have us instruct lower courts to “draw upon decades of ADA caselaw.” Reply Brief 13. The Government, on the other hand, requests that we opine that the EEOC's construction of Hardison has been basically correct. Brief for United States 39. Both of these suggestions go too far. We have no reserva

tions in saying that a good deal of the EEOC's guidance in this area is sensible and will, in all likelihood, be unaffected by our clarifying decision today. After all, as a public advo

cate for employee rights, much of the EEOC's guidance has focused on what should be accommodated. Accordingly, to

day's clarifcation may prompt little, if any, change in the agency's guidance explaining why no undue hardship is im

posed by temporary costs, voluntary shift swapping, occa

sional shift swapping, or administrative costs. See 29 CFR § 1605.2(d). But it would not be prudent to ratify in toto a body of EEOC interpretation that has not had the beneft of the clarifcation we adopt today. What is most important is that “undue hardship” in Title VII means what it says, and courts should resolve whether a hardship would be substan

tial in the context of an employer's business in the common

sense manner that it would use in applying any such test. D The erroneous de minimis interpretation of Hardison may have had the effect of leading courts to pay insuffcient atten

tion to what the actual text of Title VII means with regard472 GROFF v. D **e**JOY Opinion of the Court to several recurring issues. Since we are now brushing away that mistaken view of Hardison's holding, clarifcation of some of those issues—in line with the parties' agreement in this case—is in order. First, on the second question presented, both parties agree that the language of Title VII requires an assessment of a possible accommodation's effect on “the conduct of the em

ployer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j); see 35 F. 4th, at 177–178 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). As the Solicitor General put it, not all “impacts on coworkers . . . are relevant,” but only “coworker impacts” that go on to “affec[t] the conduct of the business.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–104. So an accom

modation's effect on co-workers may have ramifcations for the conduct of the employer's business, but a court cannot stop its analysis without examining whether that further log

ical step is shown in a particular case. On this point, the Solicitor General took pains to clarify that some evidence that occasionally is used to show “impacts” on co-workers is “off the table” for consideration. Id. , at 102. Specifcally, a co-worker's dislike of “religious practice and expression in the workplace” or “the mere fact [of] an accommodation” is not “cognizable to factor into the undue hardship inquiry.” Id. , at 89–90. To the extent that this was not previously clear, we agree. An employer who fails to provide an accommodation has a defense only if the hardship is “undue,” and a hardship that is attributa

ble to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice cannot be considered “undue.” If bias or hostil

ity to a religious practice or a religious accommodation pro

vided a defense to a reasonable accommodation claim, Title VII would be at war with itself. See id. , at 89 (argument of Solicitor General) (such an approach would be “giving effect to religious hostility”); contra, EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc. , 530 F. Supp. 86, 89 (ND Ga. 1981) (con

Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 473 Opinion of the Court sidering as hardship “[a]dverse customer reaction” from “a si mple aversion to, or discomfort in dealing with, bearded people”). Second, as the Solicitor General's authorities underscore, Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommodations. See Adeyeye , 721 F. 3d, at 455; see also Brief for United States 30, 33, 39. This distinction matters. Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, it would not be enough for an employer to conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hard

ship. Consideration of other options, such as voluntary shift swapping, would also be necessary. IV Having clarifed the Title VII undue-hardship standard, we think it appropriate to leave the context-specifc applica

tion of that clarifed standard to the lower courts in the frst instance. The Third Circuit assumed that Hardison pre scribed a “more than a de minimis cost” test, 35 F. 4th, at 175, and this may have led the court to dismiss a number of possible accommodations, including those involving the cost of incentive pay, or the administrative costs of coordination with other nearby stations with a broader set of employees. Without foreclosing the possibility that USPS will prevail, we think it appropriate to leave it to the lower courts to apply our clarifed context-specifc standard, and to decide whether any further factual development is needed. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.474 GROFF v. D **e**JOY **Sotomayor, J.** , concurring **Justice Sotomayor**, with whom **Justice Jackson** joins, concurring. As both parties here agree, the phrase “more than a de minimis cost” from Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison , 432 U. S. 63, 84 (1977), was loose language. An employer violates Title VII if it fails “to reasonably accommodate” an employee's religious observance or practice, unless the em

ployer demonstrates that accommodation would result in “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j). The statutory standard is “undue hardship,” not trivial cost. Hardison , however, cannot be reduced to its “de minimis ” language. Instead, that case must be understood in light of its facts and the Court's reasoning. The Hardison Court concluded that the plaintiff's proposed accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct of the em

ployer's business because the accommodation would have re

quired the employer either to deprive other employees of their seniority rights under a collective-bargaining agree

ment, or to incur substantial additional costs in the form of lost effciency or higher wages. 432 U. S., at 79–81, 83–84, and n. 14. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis

sion has interpreted Title VII's undue-hardship standard in this way for seven consecutive Presidential administrations, from President Reagan to President Biden. See 29 CFR § 1605.2(e) (2022) (citing Hardison , 432 U. S., at 80, 84). Petitioner Gerald Groff asks this Court to overrule Hardi

son and to replace it with a “signifcant diffculty or expense” standard. Brief for Petitioner 17–38. The Court does not do so. That is a wise choice because stare decisis has “en

hanced force” in statutory cases. Kimble v. Marvel Enter

tainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). Congress is free to revise this Court's statutory interpretations. The Court's respect for Congress's decision not to intervene pro

motes the separation of powers by requiring interested par

ties to resort to the legislative rather than the judicial proc

Cite as: 600 U. S. 447 (2023) 475 **Sotomayor, J.** , concurring ess to achieve their policy goals. This justifcation for st atutory stare decisis is especially strong here because “Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse [ Hardison ]—openings as frequent and clear as this Court ever sees.” Id. , at 456–457. 1 Moreover, in the decades since Hardison was decided, Congress has revised Title VII multiple times in response to other decisions of this Court, 2 yet never in response to Hardison . See Kimble , 576 U. S., at 457. Groff also asks the Court to decide that Title VII requires the United States Postal Service to show “undue hardship to [its] business ,” not to Groff's co-workers. Brief for Peti

tioner 42 (emphasis added); see 35 F. 4th 162, 176 (CA3 2022) (Hardiman, J., dissenting). The Court, however, recognizes that Title VII requires “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j) (emphasis added). Because the “conduct of [a] business” plainly in

cludes the management and performance of the business's employees, undue hardship on the conduct of a business may include undue hardship on the business's employees. See, e. g. , Hardison , 432 U. S., at 79–81 (deprivation of employees' bargained-for seniority rights constitutes undue hardship). There is no basis in the text of the statute, let alone in eco

1 See, e. g. , H. R. 1440, 117th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(4) (2021); H. R. 5331, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(a)(4) (2019); S. 3686, 112th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(a)(3) (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4(a)(3) (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(1)(B) (2008); H. R. 1431, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2007); H. R. 1445, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2005); S. 677, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2005); S. 893, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2002); H. R. 4237, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(4) (2000); S. 1668, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1999); H. R. 2948, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(4) (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a)(3) (1997); H. R. 4117, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a)(3) (1996).

2 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 (overruling Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio , 490 U. S. 642 (1989)); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 5 (overruling Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 550 U. S. 618 (2007)).476 GROFF v. D **e**JOY **Sotomayor, J.** , concurring nomics or common sense, to conclude otherwise. Indeed, for many businesses, labor is more important to the conduct of the business than any other factor. To be sure, some effects on co-workers will not constitute “undue hardship” under Title VII. For example, animus to

ward a protected group is not a cognizable “hardship” under any antidiscrimination statute. Cf. ante , at 472. In addi

tion, some hardships, such as the labor costs of coordinating voluntary shift swaps, are not “undue” because they are too insubstantial. See 29 CFR §§ 1605.2(d)(1)(i), (e)(1). Never

theless, if there is an undue hardship on “the conduct of the employer's business,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), then such hard

ship is suffcient, even if it consists of hardship on employees. With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.**Reporter’s Note** The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made: None