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[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 235 (Friday, December 6, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 96986-96996]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-28738]

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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 212 3035]

Gravy Analytics, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid 
Public Comment

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Proposed consent agreement; request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged 
violations of Federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices. The attached Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid 
Public Comment describes both the allegations in the complaint and the 
terms of the consent order--embodied in the consent agreement--that 
would settle these allegations.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before January 6, 2025.

[[Page 96987]]

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file comments online or on paper by 
following the instructions in the Request for Comment part of the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. Please write ``Gravy 
Analytics; File No. 212 3035'' on your comment and file your comment 
online at https://www.regulations.gov by following the instructions on 
the web-based form. If you prefer to file your comment on paper, please 
mail your comment to the following address: Federal Trade Commission, 
Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Stop H-144 
(Annex G), Washington, DC 20580.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer Rimm (202-326-2277), 
Attorney, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue 
NW, Washington, DC 20580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 6(f) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule Sec.  2.34, 16 CFR 
2.34, notice is hereby given that the above-captioned consent agreement 
containing a consent order to cease and desist, having been filed with 
and accepted, subject to final approval, by the Commission, has been 
placed on the public record for a period of 30 days. The following 
Analysis to Aid Public Comment describes the terms of the consent 
agreement and the allegations in the complaint. An electronic copy of 
the full text of the consent agreement package can be obtained at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/commission-actions.
    You can file a comment online or on paper. For the Commission to 
consider your comment, we must receive it on or before January 6, 2025. 
Write ``Gravy Analytics; File No. 212 3035'' on your comment. Your 
comment--including your name and your State--will be placed on the 
public record of this proceeding, including, to the extent practicable, 
on the https://www.regulations.gov website.
    Because of heightened security screening, postal mail addressed to 
the Commission will be subject to delay. We strongly encourage you to 
submit your comments online through the https://www.regulations.gov 
website. If you prefer to file your comment on paper, write ``Gravy 
Analytics; File No. 212 3035'' on your comment and on the envelope, and 
mail your comment to the following address: Federal Trade Commission, 
Office of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Stop H-144 
(Annex G), Washington, DC 20580.
    Because your comment will be placed on the publicly accessible 
website at https://www.regulations.gov, you are solely responsible for 
making sure your comment does not include any sensitive or confidential 
information. In particular, your comment should not include sensitive 
personal information, such as your or anyone else's Social Security 
number; date of birth; driver's license number or other State 
identification number, or foreign country equivalent; passport number; 
financial account number; or credit or debit card number. You are also 
solely responsible for making sure your comment does not include 
sensitive health information, such as medical records or other 
individually identifiable health information. In addition, your comment 
should not include any ``trade secret or any commercial or financial 
information which . . . is privileged or confidential''--as provided by 
section 6(f) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule Sec.  
4.10(a)(2), 16 CFR 4.10(a)(2)--including competitively sensitive 
information such as costs, sales statistics, inventories, formulas, 
patterns, devices, manufacturing processes, or customer names.
    Comments containing material for which confidential treatment is 
requested must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled 
``Confidential,'' and must comply with FTC Rule Sec.  4.9(c). In 
particular, the written request for confidential treatment that 
accompanies the comment must include the factual and legal basis for 
the request and must identify the specific portions of the comment to 
be withheld from the public record. See FTC Rule Sec.  4.9(c). Your 
comment will be kept confidential only if the General Counsel grants 
your request in accordance with the law and the public interest. Once 
your comment has been posted on the https://www.regulations.gov 
website--as legally required by FTC Rule Sec.  4.9(b)--we cannot redact 
or remove your comment from that website, unless you submit a 
confidentiality request that meets the requirements for such treatment 
under FTC Rule Sec.  4.9(c), and the General Counsel grants that 
request.
    Visit the FTC website at https://www.ftc.gov to read this document 
and the news release describing the proposed settlement. The FTC Act 
and other laws the Commission administers permit the collection of 
public comments to consider and use in this proceeding, as appropriate. 
The Commission will consider all timely and responsive public comments 
it receives on or before January 6, 2025. For information on the 
Commission's privacy policy, including routine uses permitted by the 
Privacy Act, see https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacy-policy.

Analysis of Proposed Consent Order To Aid Public Comment

    The Federal Trade Commission (``Commission'') has accepted, subject 
to final approval, an agreement containing a consent order from Gravy 
Analytics, Inc. (``Gravy Analytics'') and Venntel, Inc. (``Venntel,'' 
and collectively with Gravy Analytics, ``Respondents''). The proposed 
consent order (``Proposed Order'') has been placed on the public record 
for 30 days for receipt of public comments from interested persons. 
Comments received during this period will become part of the public 
record. After 30 days, the Commission will again review the agreement, 
along with the comments received, and will decide whether it should 
make final the Proposed Order or withdraw from the agreement and take 
appropriate action.
    Gravy Analytics and Venntel are Delaware corporations with their 
headquarters in Virginia. Respondent Venntel is a subsidiary of Gravy 
Analytics. Gravy Analytics and Venntel are data brokers that collect 
and sell precise geolocation data about consumers' mobile devices.
    Gravy Analytics does not collect data directly from consumers. 
Rather, it purchases precise geolocation data and other personal data 
for its products from other data suppliers, including other data 
aggregators. Gravy Analytics offers several data products to its 
customers. These products include transfers of batch location data, 
consisting of a unique persistent identifier for the mobile device 
called a Mobile Advertiser ID (``MAID'') and timestamped latitude and 
longitude coordinates; audience segments, which are groupings of MAIDs 
that purportedly share similar traits based on the locations or events 
the mobile devices and MAIDs have visited; and an online application 
programming interface that, among other things, enables Gravy 
Analytics' customers to geofence locations. Gravy Analytics makes its 
data products available to commercial customers, such as marketers, 
other data brokers, stores, and other commercial entities.
    Venntel obtains mobile location data from Gravy Analytics 
exclusively. Venntel offers batch transfers of location data and allows 
customers to geofence specific locations. Venntel also offers its 
customers access to an online application programming interface through 
which its customers may search for devices that visited specific

[[Page 96988]]

locations, obtain device information about a particular mobile phone, 
or obtain location data for individual devices. Venntel sells its data 
products only to public sector customers, such as government 
contractors.
    The Commission's proposed three-count complaint alleges Respondents 
violated section 5(a) of the FTC Act by (1) unfairly selling sensitive 
location data and (2) unfairly collecting, using, and transferring 
consumer location data without consent verification; and that Gravy 
Analytics violated section 5 of the FTC Act by (3) unfairly selling 
inferences about consumers' sensitive characteristics derived from 
location data.
    With respect to the first count, the proposed complaint alleges 
Respondents sold location data associated with persistent identifiers, 
such as MAIDs, that could be used to track consumers to sensitive 
locations, such as medical facilities, places of religious worship, 
places that may be used to infer an LGBTQ+ identification, domestic 
abuse shelters, and welfare and homeless shelters. For example, by 
plotting timestamped latitude and longitude coordinates associated with 
mobile devices using publicly available map programs, it is possible to 
identify which consumers' mobile devices visited medical facilities and 
when.
    With respect to the second count, the proposed complaint alleges 
Respondents failed to verify that their data suppliers obtained 
informed consent from consumers to have the consumers' location data 
collected, used, and sold. Respondents' primary mechanism for ensuring 
that consumers have provided appropriate consent is through contractual 
requirements with their suppliers. However, contractual provisions, 
without additional safeguards, are insufficient to protect consumers' 
privacy.
    With respect to the third count, the proposed complaint alleges it 
was an unfair practice for Gravy Analytics to sell inferences about 
consumers' sensitive characteristics derived from their location data. 
Gravy Analytics created custom audience segments for customers based, 
for example, on consumers' attendance at a cancer charity run and based 
on consumers' church attendance, and has also offered standard audience 
segments based on medical decisions and political activities.
    The proposed complaint alleges that Respondents could have 
addressed each of these failures by implementing certain safeguards at 
a reasonable cost and expenditure of resources. The proposed complaint 
alleges Respondents' practices caused, or are likely to cause, 
substantial injury to consumers that is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition and is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves. Such practices constitute 
unfair acts or practices under section 5 of the FTC Act.
    The Proposed Order contains injunctive relief designed to prevent 
Respondents from engaging in the same or similar acts or practices in 
the future. Part I prohibits Respondents from misrepresenting the 
extent to which: (1) Respondents review data suppliers' compliance and 
consent frameworks, consumer disclosures, sample notices, and opt in 
controls; (2) Respondents collect, maintain, use, disclose, or delete 
any covered information, and (3) the location data that Respondents 
collect, use, maintain, or disclose is deidentified.
    Part II prohibits Respondents from selling, licensing, 
transferring, sharing, disclosing, or using sensitive location data in 
any products or services. Sensitive locations are defined as those 
locations in the United States associated with (1) medical facilities 
(e.g., family planning centers, general medical and surgical hospitals, 
offices of physicians, offices of mental health physicians and 
practitioners, residential mental health and substance abuse 
facilities, outpatient mental health and substance abuse centers, 
outpatient care centers, psychiatric and substance abuse hospitals, and 
specialty hospitals); (2) religious organizations; (3) correctional 
facilities; (4) labor union offices; (5) locations of entities held out 
to the public as predominantly providing education or childcare 
services to minors; (6) associations held out to the public as 
predominantly providing services based on racial or ethnic origin; (7) 
locations held out to the public as providing temporary shelter or 
social services to homeless, survivors of domestic violence, refugees, 
or immigrants; or (8) military installations, offices, or buildings. 
This prohibition does not apply to sensitive location data used to 
respond to or prevent data security incidents, for national security 
purposes conducted by Federal agencies or other Federal entities, or 
for response by a Federal law enforcement agency to an imminent risk of 
death or serious bodily harm to a person. Part III requires that 
Respondents implement and maintain a sensitive location data program to 
develop a comprehensive list of sensitive locations and to prevent the 
use, sale, license, transfer, sharing, or disclosure of sensitive 
location data.
    Part IV requires that Respondents establish and implement policies, 
procedures, and technical measures designed to prevent recipients of 
Respondents' location data from associating consumers with locations 
predominantly providing services to LGBTQ+ individuals, locations of 
public gatherings of individuals during social demonstrations, marches, 
or protests, or using location data to determine the identity or 
location of an individual's home. Part V requires that Respondents 
notify the Commission any time Respondents determine that a third party 
shared Respondents' location data, in violation of a contractual 
requirement between Respondents and the third party.
    Part VI requires that Respondents must not collect, use, maintain, 
and disclose location data: (1) when consumers have opted-out, or 
otherwise declined targeted advertising and (2) without a record 
documenting the consumer's consent obtained prior to the collection of 
location data. Part VII requires that Respondents implement a supplier 
assessment program designed to ensure that consumers have provided 
consent for the collection and use of all data obtained by Respondents 
that may reveal a consumer's precise location. Under this program, 
Respondents must conduct initial assessments of all their data 
suppliers within 30 days of entering into a data sharing agreement, or 
within 30 days of the initial date of data collection. The program also 
requires that Respondents confirm that consumers provided consent and 
create and maintain records of suppliers' assessment responses. 
Finally, Respondents must cease from using, selling, or disclosing 
location data for which consumers have not provided consent.
    Part VIII requires that Respondents provide a clear and conspicuous 
means for consumers to request the identity of any entity, business, or 
individual to whom Respondents know their location data has been sold, 
transferred, licensed, or otherwise disclosed or a method to delete the 
consumers' location data from the databases of Respondents' customers. 
Respondents must also provide written confirmation to consumers that 
the deletion requests have been sent to Respondents' customers.
    Part IX requires that Respondents provide a simple, easily-located 
means for consumers to withdraw any consent provided and Part X 
requires that Respondents cease collecting location data within 15 days 
after Respondents receive notice that the consumer withdraws their 
consent. Part XI also

[[Page 96989]]

requires that Respondents provide a simple, easily-located means for 
consumers to request that Respondents delete location data that 
Respondents previously collected and to delete the location data within 
30 days of receipt of such request unless a shorter period for deletion 
is required by law.
    Part XII requires that Respondents: (1) document and adhere to a 
retention schedule for the covered information they collect from 
consumers, including the purposes for which they collect such 
information, the specific business needs, and an established timeframe 
for its deletion, and (2) prior to collecting or using any new type of 
information related to consumers that was not previously collected, and 
is not described in its retention schedule, Respondents must update 
their retention schedules. Part XIII requires that Respondents delete 
or destroy all historic location data and all data products developed 
using this data. Respondents have the option to retain historic 
location data if they have records showing they obtained consent or if 
they ensure that the historic location data is deidentified or rendered 
non-sensitive. Respondents must inform all customers that received 
location data from Respondents within 3 years prior to the issuance 
date of this Order of the Commission's position that such data should 
be deleted, deidentified, or rendered non-sensitive. Part XIV requires 
Respondents to establish and implement, and thereafter maintain, a 
comprehensive privacy program that protects the privacy of consumers' 
personal information.
    Parts XV-XVIII are reporting and compliance provisions, which 
include recordkeeping requirements and provisions requiring Respondents 
to provide information or documents necessary for the Commission to 
monitor compliance. Part XIX states that the Proposed Order will remain 
in effect for 20 years, with certain exceptions.
    The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the 
Proposed Order, and it is not intended to constitute an official 
interpretation of the complaint or Proposed Order, or to modify the 
Proposed Order's terms in any way.

    By direction of the Commission, Commissioner Ferguson 
dissenting.
April J. Tabor,
Secretary.

Statement of Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya Joined by Chair Lina M. Khan 
and Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter in Full and Commissioner 
Melissa Holyoak in Part I

I. The Porous Line Between Government and Private Surveillance

    Any first-year constitutional law student will tell you that the 
distinction between a government agent and private actor is paramount: 
the Fourth Amendment corrals the former but not the latter. For the 
people being watched, that line is porous if not irrelevant.
    Governments have long relied on private citizens for work that 
would be impractical or illegal for law enforcement. Elizabeth I prided 
herself on seeing and hearing all in her realm, famously sitting for 
one of her final portraits in a gown embroidered with human eyes and 
ears.\1\ Her ministers achieved that surveillance through a much-feared 
system of agents and spies,\2\ as well as a quieter network of local 
clergy who tracked the weekly church attendance of converted Catholics 
and the Separatist Puritans we now know as Pilgrims.\3\ Her successor, 
James I, went further, offering bounties to any of his subjects who 
reported practicing Catholics.\4\
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    \1\ See generally Daniel Fischlin, Political Allegory, 
Absolutist Ideology, and the ``Rainbow Portrait'' of Queen Elizabeth 
I, 50 Renaissance Q. 170, 175-83 (1997) (reflecting the view that 
the portrait was intended to convey that ``[t]he Queen watches and 
listens vigilantly, seeing in all perspectives, hearing in all 
directions'').
    \2\ See generally John Coffey, Persecution and Toleration in 
Protestant England, 1558-1689 (2000). See also id at 95-96 
(describing government agents loitering in St. Paul's courtyard 
``pretending to be
    sympathetic'' to the Puritans' cause); Stephen Budiansky, Sir 
Francis Walsingham, Brittanica, available at https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francis-Walsingham (last accessed Nov. 
29, 2024).
    \3\ See Act of Uniformity, 1 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1559) (instituting a 
12 shilling fine for absences, ``to be levied by the churchwardens 
of the parish where such offence shall be done''); An Act to retain 
the Queen's Majesty's Subjects in their due Obedience, 23 Eliz. 1, 
c. 1 (1580) (raising the fine to 20 pounds); Act Against Puritans, 
35 Eliz. 1, c. 1 (1593) (instituting penalties for Puritans who 
profess allegiance to the Church of England, only to subsequently 
fail to attend church services).
    \4\ See An Act to Prevent and Avoid Dangers which Grow by Popish 
Recusants, 3 Jas. 1, c. 5 (1605) (immunizing informants and 
providing them one-third of the money seized from the offending 
individual).
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    The governor of Plymouth Colony, William Bradford, would later 
recount what forced him and his fellow migrants to travel, first to the 
Netherlands and then to the New World. They were ``hunted & persecuted 
on every side,'' he wrote. While ``some were taken & clapt up in 
prison, others had their houses besett & watctht night and day[.]'' \5\
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    \5\ See William Bradford, Of Plymouth Plantation 6 (c. 1630-
1651). Professor Coffey explains that, while Catholics were the 
focus of government surveillance efforts at the time, Separatist 
Puritans were also targeted. See Coffey, supra note 2, at 103 (``The 
harsh repression of the Separatists in the 1580s and 90s was. . . 
out of all proportion to their threat. [. . .] Separatist 
congregations were hunted down and incarcerated, their ringleaders 
put to death.'').
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    Four-hundred years later, those loose networks of citizen-
informants have been succeeded by a digitized, automated, and highly 
profitable industry of commercial data brokers that ``artfully dodge[ ] 
privacy laws.'' \6\ In 2001, the Electronic Privacy Information Center 
used the Freedom of Information Act to survey Federal law enforcement 
agencies' reliance on those firms.\7\ They determined that this network 
of data brokers allows law enforcement to easily and warrantlessly 
``download comprehensive dossiers on almost any adult.'' \8\ They 
warned that ``[i]f we are ever unfortunate enough to have George 
Orwell's Big Brother in the United States, it will be made possible by 
the private sector.'' \9\
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    \6\ See Chris J. Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How 
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package 
Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. Int'l L. 595, 595 (2003).
    \7\ Id. at 597.
    \8\ Id. at 595.
    \9\ Id. at 633.
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    This complaint and proposed settlement concern two contemporary 
peers of those data brokers, Gravy Analytics, Inc. and its subsidiary, 
Venntel, Inc. (``Respondents''). The Commission alleges these companies 
collect, aggregate, and sell precise geolocation data from roughly one 
billion mobile devices.\10\ According to public reporting, Venntel's 
customers have included American law enforcement.\11\
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    \10\ Complaint, FTC v. Gravy Analytics, Inc. & Venntel, Inc., 
(Dec. 2, 2024), [hereinafter Complaint] at 2.
    \11\ See, e.g., Byron Tau and Michelle Hackman, Federal Agencies 
Use Cellphone Location Data for Immigration Enforcement, Wall Street 
Journal, (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-agencies-use-cellphone-location-data-for-immigration-enforcement-11581078600; Joseph Cox, The DEA Abruptly Cut Off Its App Location 
Data Contract, Vice, (Dec. 7, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/dea-venntel-location-data/; Lee Fang, FBI Expands Ability to 
Collect Cellphone Location Data, Monitor Social Media, Recent 
Contracts Show, The Intercept, (Jun. 24, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/24/fbi-surveillance-social-media-cellphone-dataminr-venntel/; Byron Tau, IRS Used Cellphone Location Data to 
Try to Find Suspects, Wall Street Journal, (Jun. 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-used-cellphone-location-data-to-try-to-find-suspects-11592587815.

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[[Page 96990]]

II. The Respondents' Privacy Invasions Clearly Violate Section 5 of the 
FTC Act

    You may not know anything about Gravy Analytics, but Gravy 
Analytics may know quite a bit about you.
    Do you eat breakfast at McDonald's? Do you buy CBD oil? Did you 
recently buy lingerie? Are you pregnant? Are you a stay-at-home parent? 
Are you a Republican? A Democrat? Are you in the pews every Sunday in 
Charlotte? Or Atlanta? Have you recently attended an event for breast 
cancer? Are you a blue-collar Gen X parent and golf-lover who has 
recently been looking into Medicare?
    These are just a few of the 1,100 labels that the Commission 
alleges that Gravy Analytics appended to individual consumers so as to 
sell their bundled data to private companies for targeted advertising--
or to better understand the ``persona'' of any given individual whose 
data a company has requested.\12\ According to our complaint, 
Respondents actively encouraged their customers to identify individual 
people using the data they sold.\13\
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    \12\ See Complaint, supra note 10, at 9-10.
    \13\ Id. at 5.
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    In the complaint, the Commission alleges that the Respondents' 1) 
sale of data tying consumers to sensitive locations, (2) collection and 
use of geolocation data without verifying that it was obtained with 
consumers' informed consent, and (3) the sale of sensitive inferences 
about those consumers' ``medical conditions, political activities, and 
religious beliefs,'' among other things, constitute unfair trade 
practices prohibited by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
    I agree with my colleague Commissioner Holyoak that the specific 
practices alleged in the complaint meet the threshold for ``substantial 
injury'' under section 5.\14\ More than a decade ago, the Commission 
issued a final report offering guidance to businesses on protecting the 
privacy of American consumers.\15\ That report classified ``precise 
geolocation'' as a type of ``sensitive information,'' and urged 
companies to obtain people's affirmative express consent before 
collecting it.\16\ As the District Court of Idaho affirmed last year, 
collection and disclosure of precise geolocation is a violation of 
privacy--itself an injury.\17\ It can further lead to stigma, 
harassment, and even physical danger.\18\
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    \14\ Statement of Commissioner Melissa Holyoak, In the Matter of 
Gravy Analytics, Inc. & Venntel, Inc. (Dec. 2, 2024).
    \15\ Fed. Trade Comm'n, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of 
Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers, 
(2012).
    \16\ Id. at 58.
    \17\ See Order on Motion to Dismiss, FTC v. Kochava, Inc., 2:22-
cv-00377-BLW, (D. Idaho May 4, 2023) at 8-10, (``an invasion of 
privacy may constitute an injury that gives rise to liability under 
Section 5(a)'') https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/71-OpiniononMTD.pdf.
    \18\ Id. at 8-9.
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    This is the fourth recent Commission action and third settlement 
brought to stop the nonconsensual collection and sale of geolocation 
data.\19\ In my view, the illegality of this conduct is more than 
clear.
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    \19\ Complaint, FTC v. Kochava, Inc., 2:22-cv-00377-BLW, (D. 
Idaho Jul. 15, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/1.%20Complaint.pdf; Complaint, FTC v. X-Mode Social, Inc., Docket 
No. 212-3038, (Jan. 9, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/X-Mode-Complaint.pdf; Complaint, FTC v. InMarket Media, 
LLC, Docket No. 202-3088, (Jan. 18, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Complaint-InMarketMediaLLC.pdf.
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III. Venntel's Sales of Location Data Undermine Established Fourth 
Amendment Protections

    According to our complaint, Respondent Venntel ``markets to its 
public sector customers that the location data and these enhanced tools 
can be used for government purposes.'' \20\ Public reporting suggests 
that these government clients have included Federal law enforcement 
agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).\21\ This poses an 
important question: Can a collection of precise geolocation data that 
otherwise violates section 5 be cured by a potential future law 
enforcement use of that data?
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    \20\ Complaint, supra note 10.
    \21\ See supra note 11.
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    I think the answer is ``no.'' Section 5 makes no mention of such a 
circumstance, but it does expressly call on the Commission to consider 
``countervailing benefits to consumers'' from the practice in question, 
and further permits the Commission to weigh ``established public 
policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence'' when 
declaring a practice unfair.\22\
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    \22\ 15 U.S.C. 45(n). To be clear, I do not believe that an 
appeal to public policy is necessary to support this matter. Still, 
I believe it is useful exercise here, especially when considering 
the Commission's actions relative to other policy priorities.
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    In 1928, Justice Louis Brandeis, one of the architects of this 
Commission, warned against formalistic interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment. ``Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against 
specific abuses of power must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a 
changing world,'' he wrote.\23\ For the last 60 years, since the Katz 
court's declaration that the Fourth Amendment ``protects people, not 
places,'' the Supreme Court has more or less heeded that call.\24\
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    \23\ Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). The Olmstead majority held that a prolonged wiretap did 
not constitute a search or seizure for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment because the interception occurred along public phone lines 
leading to the home in question--``[t]here was no entry of the 
houses or offices of the defendants.'' Id. at 464.
    \24\ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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    In Kyllo, the Court found that a thermal imaging device that 
allowed law enforcement to track activities inside a home constituted a 
search under the Fourth Amendment--even though it involved no trespass 
into the home.\25\ In Riley, the Court refused to equate the search of 
someone's cellphone with searches of their purse or wallet or any other 
physical items people carry.\26\ Most relevantly, in Carpenter, the 
Court held that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
extended cell-site location records of their movements, irrespective of 
the fact that the data accessed by the government was disclosed to and 
held by a commercial third party, and further held that the government 
must generally obtain a warrant before acquiring such records.\27\
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    \25\ Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 67 (2001).
    \26\ Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
    \27\ See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 306-321 
(2018).
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    Look at the cell-site location data in Carpenter; look at the data 
in question here. It's basically the same data. In some ways, the 
Respondents' data is more invasive.
    The cell-site records in Carpenter could place an individual 
``within a wedge-shaped sector ranging from one-eighth to four square 
miles''; \28\ Respondents' data locates people down to a meter.\29\ 
Cellphone carriers maintain location records for five years, and 
Federal agents obtained a total of 129 days of geolocation data--
although the Court held that accessing just seven days of data 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.\30\ The Respondents can draw on 
three years of data, and Venntel offers its clients the ability to 
``continuously'' track a person's phone for 90 days.\31\ The Carpenter 
court warned that cell-site geolocation records

[[Page 96991]]

can reveal a person's ``familial, political, professional, and sexual 
associations''--a phrase that might as well be Respondents' marketing 
slogan.\32\
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    \28\ See Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 312.
    \29\ Complaint, supra note 10, at 2.
    \30\ See Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 302 (129 days) & 310 n. 3 (seven 
days constitutes a Fourth Amendment search).
    \31\ Complaint, supra note 10, at 3-4.
    \32\ See Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 311 (citing United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
Furthermore, while it may be easier to refrain from using an app 
than to stop using a smartphone altogether, the complaint makes 
clear that the customers whose geolocation information has been 
collected by Venntel have in no way voluntarily ``assume[d] the 
risk'' of disclosing their geolocation information in this manner. 
See id. at 315; Complaint, supra note 10, at 5-9. In sum, it is easy 
to agree with my colleague Commissioner Holyoak, who wrote that our 
enforcement actions protecting precise geolocation ``[correlate] 
with judicial recognition, in other contexts, of how significant 
such information is.'' See Concurring Statement of Comm'r Melissa 
Holyoak, Kochava, Inc., FTC Matter No. X230009, at 2 (July 15, 2024) 
(``The Commission's effort to protect the privacy of consumers' 
precise geolocation data in this case correlates to judicial 
recognition, in other contexts, of how significant such information 
is.''), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2024-7-15-Commissioner-Holyoak-Statement-re-Kochava-final.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To make this plain: Carpenter said that to get this data, you need 
a warrant; Venntel lets them get it without a warrant. I cannot see how 
this is a ``countervailing benefit to consumers.'' It certainly 
contravenes ``established public policy.''
    Looking beyond Carpenter, a panoply of statutes sets out a range of 
safeguards against the government's untrammeled collection of 
Americans' sensitive data. The Wiretap Act requires warrants to 
authorize wiretapping and interception of communications.\33\ The 
Stored Communications Act protects the privacy of subscribers' 
information held by internet service providers and established 
procedures for government access by warrant, subpoena, court order, or 
written consent.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ 18 U.S.C. 2510 through 2522.
    \34\ 18 U.S.C. 2703(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Both of those laws concern oral or written communications; one may 
assume that Congress would want to protect this data. Consider that if 
law enforcement wants YouTube to disclose the name of a single video 
that I have watched online, Federal statute requires that they get a 
warrant, grand jury subpoena, or a court order.\35\ Similarly, the 
Cable Act provides that cable subscribers' personally identifiable 
information, such as their viewing habits, cannot be disclosed without 
their consent, except in the case of a court order.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Id. 2710(b)(2)(C). Separately, while it cannot yet 
constitute ``an established public policy,'' I would be remiss if I 
did not note that The Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act, which 
would extend these Fourth Amendment protections to geolocation data 
held by data brokers, recently passed the House of Representatives. 
See H.R. 4639, 118th Cong. (2023).
    \36\ 47 U.S.C. 551(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Admittedly, there is active debate around whether these statutes 
impose the correct degree of protection in light of the Fourth 
Amendment. That said, the correct degree is clearly not zero.

IV. The Proposed Order

    Speaking generally, the proposed order prohibits Respondents from 
disclosing sensitive location data in any of its products or 
services.\37\ Sensitive location data includes, inter alia, medical 
facilities, religious buildings, schools and daycares, domestic 
violence shelters, and military facilities.\38\ The order also directs 
Respondents to ensure that their clients do not use their data to track 
people to political protects, or to locate someone's home.\39\ The 
order requires that Respondents not collect any data from consumers 
that have opted out of targeted advertising via their operating system, 
and will block them from collecting, using, or disclosing geolocation 
data without proof that people have agreed to that.\40\
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    \37\ See Order, Gravy Analytics, Inc. & Venntel, Inc., FTC 
Docket No. 2123035 at 5 (``II. Prohibitions on the Use, Sale, or 
Disclosure of Sensitive Location Data'').
    \38\ See id. at 4-5.
    \39\ See id. at 7-8 (``IV. Other Location Data Obligations'').
    \40\ See id. at 9 (''VI. Limitations on Collection, Use, 
Maintenance, and Disclosure of Location Data''). These are just a 
few parts of the order, which includes various other provisions and 
exceptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like the Court in Carpenter, the proposed order recognizes that not 
all government uses of geolocation data are alike.\41\ It has 
exceptions for the disclosure of geolocation data for certain bona fide 
national security and data security purposes, including countering 
espionage and disrupting cyber threats from foreign ``nation states, 
terrorists, or their agents or proxies.'' \42\ It also has exceptions 
for Federal law enforcement agencies responding ``to an imminent risk 
of death or serious bodily harm to a person.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 319.
    \42\ Order, supra note 37.
    \43\ See id. at 4. These should not be understood as 
``exceptions'' to section 5, but rather a recognition that in this 
specific instance, these order provisions are appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unless one of these special exceptions applies, agencies like DHS, 
DEA, FBI, and IRS will not be able to use Venntel to warrantlessly 
track people to church, to the doctor, to school, to protests, or to 
their homes. And Venntel will soon not be able to trade in any 
geolocation data without the consent of the people being tracked.

Concurring Statement of Commissioner Melissa Holyoak Joined in Part by 
Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya (Section I Only)

    I support today's settlement with two location data broker 
companies--Respondents Gravy Analytics, Inc. (``Gravy'') and its 
subsidiary, Venntel, Inc. (``Venntel'')--to resolve allegations that 
Respondents: packaged and sold consumers' precise geolocation data to 
third parties, revealing consumers' visits to places of worship, 
medical facilities, and political gatherings (Count I); failed to 
employ reasonable procedures to verify that geolocation data obtained 
from third parties had been collected with appropriate consumer consent 
(Count II); and created and sold ``audience segments'' based on 
consumers' religious beliefs, political leanings, and medical 
conditions that had been derived from precise geolocation data (Count 
III).\1\ Staff are to be commended for their efforts and hard work in 
resolving this matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Compl. ]] 76-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    My statement proceeds in two parts: Section I discusses 
Respondents' collection and sale of consumers' precise geolocation data 
to third parties and the alleged direct and cognizable harms resulting 
from that conduct. Section II outlines my views on the necessity, 
efficacy, and scope of the Proposed Order's injunctive provisions and 
my interpretation of Count III of the Complaint.

I. The Alleged Harms From Respondents' Conduct

    I start by recounting Respondents' alleged conduct here. The 
Complaint alleges that Respondents collected and purchased vast amounts 
of consumers' precise geolocation information from third-party data 
suppliers and mobile applications.\2\ Through these various suppliers 
and applications, Respondents claimed to collect, process, and curate 
over 17 billion signals from approximately a billion mobile devices on 
a daily basis.\3\ Respondents allegedly packaged and sold this 
geolocation data--in both raw and enriched formats--along with other 
persistent identifiers to different commercial entities and government 
clients.\4\ The Complaint also alleges that Gravy separately offered 
commercial entities curated ``audience segments'' for targeted 
advertising, sometimes based on consumers' perceived religious beliefs, 
political leanings, and medical

[[Page 96992]]

conditions derived from insights about their geolocation data.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Id. ]] 7-9.
    \3\ Id. ] 9.
    \4\ Id. ]] 7, 13-22.
    \5\ Id. ]] 44-45, 50-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I am gravely concerned about the potential harms stemming from the 
sale of consumers' geolocation data,\6\ and in certain instances, these 
harms may constitute a ``substantial injury'' under section 5 of the 
FTC Act.\7\ Here, the Complaint alleges that Respondents' sale of 
consumers' precise geolocation data in certain circumstances enabled 
their third-party clients to directly track individual consumers' 
movements at sensitive ``geo-fenced'' locations, such as places of 
worship, medical facilities, and political events, with no guardrails 
or oversight.\8\ The Complaint further alleges that this practice 
directly revealed consumers' political, religious, and medical 
activities, and thus, constitutes a ``substantial injury'' under 
section 5.\9\ I agree. As I explained in the Kochava action, selling 
``precise geolocation information revealing political, medical, or 
religious activities, without consumers' consent to willing purchasers, 
. . . breaches [consumers'] trust and jeopardizes Americans' 
freedoms.'' \10\ Thus, under these circumstances, the alleged sale of 
consumers' precise geolocation information--data obtained from third-
party suppliers without consumers' knowledge and appropriate consent--
meets the threshold for alleging ``substantial injury'' under section 
5.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See, e.g., Dhruv Mehrotra & Dell Cameron, Anyone Can Buy 
Data Tracking US Soldiers and Spies to Nuclear Vaults and Brothels 
in Germany, Wired (Nov. 19, 2024) (``Experts caution that foreign 
governments could use [geolocation] data to identify individuals 
with access to sensitive areas; terrorists or criminals could 
decipher when [U.S.] nuclear weapons are least guarded; or spies or 
nefarious actors could leverage embarrassing information for 
blackmail.''), https://www.wired.com/story/phone-data-us-soldiers-spies-nuclear-germany/.
    \7\ See Concurring Statement of Comm'r Melissa Holyoak, Kochava, 
Inc., FTC Matter No. X230009, at 2 (July 15, 2024) (``I agree that 
the complaint adequately alleges a likelihood of substantial injury, 
in the revelation of sensitive locations implicating political, 
medical, and religious activities. The Commission's effort to 
protect the privacy of consumers' precise geolocation data in this 
case correlates to judicial recognition, in other contexts, of how 
significant such information is.''), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2024-7-15-Commissioner-Holyoak-Statement-re-Kochava-final.pdf.
    \8\ Compl. ]] 11-12, 16, 18-22, 25-26.
    \9\ Id. ]] 48, 50-53, 56-57, 59.
    \10\ Holyoak Concurring Statement, supra note 7, at 3.
    \11\ The Complaint alleges several secondary (and indirect) 
harms that may arise from Respondents' conduct, including ``stigma, 
discrimination, physical violence, emotional distress, and other 
harms.'' See Compl. ]] 60-69. I have concerns about whether certain 
secondary harms are legally cognizable, and whether we could meet 
our burden of proof--at summary judgment or trial--that Respondents' 
practices raised a ``significant risk of concrete harm'' to 
consumers. Cf. FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 
2010) (``An act or practice can cause `substantial injury' by doing 
a `small harm to a large number of people, or if it raises a 
significant risk of concrete harm.' '' (citation omitted)); In re 
Soc. Media Adolescent Addiction/Pers. Inj. Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 
4:23-CV-05448-YGR, 2024 WL 4532937, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024) 
(concluding that the States plausibly alleged a ``substantial 
injury'' for Meta's alleged unfair conduct because: (1) ``body image 
and eating disorders'' are real medical conditions, (2) ``knowingly 
developing tools that encourage youth addiction `cannot fairly be 
classified as either trivial or speculative,' '' and (3) the States' 
allegations present a ``substantial risk of imposing at least a 
`small harm to a large number of people,' . . . , given these 
practices are allegedly targeted at all minor users of Facebook and 
Instagram'') (internal citations omitted)). I await guidance from 
future court decisions, including in the Commission's ongoing 
Kochava litigation, about these harms.
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    In addition, consumers' precise geolocation data can be easily 
misused by law enforcement to impinge on basic freedoms under the 
United States Constitution, including Americans' Fourth Amendment 
rights against wrongful government surveillance.\12\ I share 
Commissioner Bedoya's concerns about this practice and the harms it 
poses to Americans.\13\ The continued misuse of geolocation data by law 
enforcement is an ongoing and extant threat to Americans' civil 
liberties.\14\ Moreover, foreign actors can readily purchase precise 
geolocation data about Americans, including our active-duty military 
personnel, with no oversight or guardrails, which can pose serious 
national security and counterintelligence risks.\15\
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    \12\ Holyoak Concurring Statement, supra note 7, at 2-3 
(describing how ``government officials can purchase precise 
geolocation data from commercial data brokers in ways that may 
circumvent Fourth Amendment protections,'' and how ``[t]here are 
examples of public-private collaboration in other settings, too, 
suggesting that government and private-sector entities increasingly 
work together to leverage consumers' private information without 
compulsory or formal process, such as a warrant'') (citations 
omitted); see also id. at 3 n.12 (citing Lee Fang, FBI Expands 
Ability to Collect Cellphone Location Data, Monitor Social Media, 
Recent Contracts Show, The Intercept (June 24, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/06/24/fbi-surveillance-social-mediacellphone-dataminr-venntel/).
    \13\ See Concurring Statement of Comm'r Alvaro Bedoya, In re 
Gravy Analytics, Inc., FTC Matter No. 2123035, at Sec.  III (Dec. 3, 
2024).
    \14\ See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 118-459, pt. 1, at 2 (Apr. 15, 
2024) (``H.R. 4639, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale Act . . . 
closes the legal loophole that allows data brokers to sell 
Americans' personal information to law enforcement, intelligence 
agencies, and other government agencies without the agency first 
acquiring a warrant. If the agency were to gather this information 
itself, it would be required to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or other 
legal order. By closing this loophole, the bill prevents government 
agencies from conducting an end-run around the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment.'').
    \15\ Supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although I firmly believe that a comprehensive solution for the 
sale and disclosure of consumers' geolocation information requires 
Congressional action,\16\ the Commission should not shy away from using 
all available enforcement tools in the interim to address the evolving 
practices in the location data broker industry. The Commission should 
also investigate how location data brokers share geolocation data about 
Americans with foreign or malign actors. And where the facts warrant 
it, the Commission should consider stronger injunctive remedies in 
those cases, including restrictions that prevent or impede the sale of 
geolocation data about Americans, especially our servicemembers and 
their families, to bad actors overseas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ See generally H.R. 4639, Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale 
Act, Sec.  2 (``A law enforcement agency of a governmental entity 
and an element of the intelligence community may not obtain from a 
third party in exchange for anything of value a covered customer or 
subscriber record or any illegitimately obtained information.''); 
H.R. 815, Public Law 118-50, Division I, Protecting Americans' Data 
from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024, Sec.  2 (``It shall be 
unlawful for a data broker to sell, license, rent, trade, transfer, 
release, disclose, provide access to, or otherwise make available 
personally identifiable sensitive data of a United States individual 
to--(1) any foreign adversary country; or (2) any entity that is 
controlled by a foreign adversary.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. The Proposed Order and Count III of the Complaint

    I also write separately today to share my views on the Proposed 
Order's injunctive provisions and my interpretation of Count III of the 
Complaint (Unfair Sale of Sensitive Inferences Derived from Consumers' 
Location Data). To begin with, let me be clear: my vote for today's 
settlement should not be read as a full-throated endorsement of the 
Proposed Order in its entirety or every allegation in the Complaint. I 
have serious concerns about whether the Commission could obtain many of 
the Proposed Order's injunctive provisions in a contested 
litigation.\17\ Indeed, while the Federal district court in the Kochava 
litigation may address the propriety of various types of injunctive 
relief from the Proposed Order in the coming months, I will continue to 
reserve judgment here. I also have questions about the necessity and 
efficacy of the injunctive provisions found in Sections VI, VII, and 
IX,\18\

[[Page 96993]]

which first appeared in the X-Mode Social matter before my arrival at 
the Commission.\19\ As we turn the page on the last four years, the 
Commission should comprehensively examine the utility of the type of 
injunctive relief found in today's Proposed Order in the future and 
implement changes where warranted.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See, e.g., Dissenting Statement of Comm'r Melissa Holyoak, 
Joined by Comm'r Andrew N. Ferguson, In re Rytr, LLC, FTC Matter No. 
2323052, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2024) (``As I have suggested recently in 
other contexts, the Commission should steer clear of using 
settlements to advance claims or obtain orders that a court is 
highly unlikely to credit or grant in litigation.''), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/holyoak-rytr-statement.pdf.
    \18\ For example, these injunctive provisions collectively 
require Respondents to ensure that consumers have affirmatively 
consented to all upstream uses of their location data, such as for 
targeted advertising, and provide opt-out mechanisms for consumers 
to withdraw consent directly with Respondents, even though 
Respondents ``do not collect mobile location data directly from 
consumers'' and consumers ``have no interactions with Respondents 
and have no idea that Respondents have obtained their location 
data.'' Compl. ] 8; see generally Proposed Decision and Order 
Sec. Sec.  VI (Limitations on Collection, Use, Maintenance, and 
Disclosure of Location Data), VII (Supplier Assessment Program), and 
IX (Withdrawing Consent). I question the efficacy of these 
provisions given their focus on Respondents, which are upstream from 
the initial collection of this data from consumers. While ensuring 
appropriate consent for all upstream uses of consumers' data is 
laudable goal, the Commission may be better served by focusing 
injunctive relief on the companies that collect this data in the 
first instance, not upstream data aggregators like Respondents.
    \19\ Compare Proposed Decision and Order Sec. Sec.  VI 
(Limitations on Collection, Use, Maintenance, and Disclosure of 
Location Data), VII (Supplier Assessment Program), and IX 
(Withdrawing Consent) with In re X-Mode Social, Inc. and Outlogic, 
LLC, FTC Matter No. 212-3038, Proposed Decision and Order Sec. Sec.  
VI-VII, IX (Jan. 9, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/X-Mode-D%26O.pdf.
    \20\ During the first Trump administration, the Commission held 
several public hearings on Competition and Consumer Protection in 
the 21st Century, including to solicit public and industry feedback 
on improvements to the Commission's data security orders. See 
Hearings on Competition & Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, 
Fed. Trade Comm'n (2018-19), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement-policy/hearings-competition-consumer-protection. Following these public 
hearings, the Commission updated its data security orders, and FTC 
staff explained the key changes in public-facing guidance. See 
Andrew Smith, Former Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
New and Improved FTC Data Security Orders: Better Guidance for 
Companies, Better Protection for Consumers, FTC Business Blog (Jan. 
6, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2020/01/new-and-improved-ftc-data-security-orders-better-guidance-companies-better-protection-consumers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Proposed Order
    While today's settlement is not perfect by any measure, several 
provisions in the Proposed Order will mitigate the harms resulting from 
Respondents' allegedly unlawful practices--i.e., the disclosure of 
consumers' political, religious, and medical activities. Critically, 
the Proposed Order will prohibit the unauthorized sale or disclosure of 
``Sensitive Location Data''--geolocation data associated with military 
installations and buildings, medical facilities, religious 
organizations, childcare and education services, and many others--to 
third parties.\21\ It also requires Respondents to implement a 
``Sensitive Data Location'' program, as well as prophylactically avoid 
associating consumers' precise geolocation data with (1) political 
demonstrations, marches, and protests and (2) residences for individual 
consumers.\22\ The Proposed Order further requires Respondents to offer 
individual consumers the ability to request deletion of their 
geolocation data in Respondents' datasets.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Proposed Decision and Order Sec.  II; see also id. at 2 
(Definitions).
    \22\ See id. Sec. Sec.  III-IV. Indeed, I believe the Proposed 
Order's terms will prevent some of the unfortunate public-private 
partnerships we have seen recently in the context of political 
activity. See, e.g., Holyoak Concurring Statement, supra note 7, at 
3 n.13.
    \23\ Proposed Decision and Order Sec.  XI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I support Sections II, III, IV, and XI of the Proposed Order since 
they are directly tied to Respondents' alleged conduct, help mitigate 
the specific harms from disclosing consumers' political, religious, and 
medical activities, and properly balance the costs and benefits, as 
required by section 5 of the FTC Act. But today's settlement also has 
important limits, particularly with the sale and use of ``Sensitive 
Location Data''. In my view, the Proposed Order strikes the proper 
balance under our unfairness authority. Permitting the use and 
disclosure of precise geolocation information to third parties for 
national security or data security purposes,\24\ or to prevent imminent 
risk of death or serious bodily harm,\25\ presents tangible benefits 
that appropriately fall within the confines of the Proposed Order's 
carefully negotiated definitions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See Proposed Decision and Order at 4 (defining ``National 
Security'' to mean ``the national defense, foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence, international and internal security, and 
foreign relations[,]'' which ``includes countering terrorism; 
combating espionage and economic espionage conducted for the benefit 
of any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign 
agent; enforcing export controls and sanctions; and disrupting cyber 
threats that are perpetrated by nation states, terrorists, or their 
agents or proxies'').
    \25\ Id. at 4 (defining ``Location Data'' to exclude data used 
for ``National Security'' purposes, ``Security Purposes,'' and 
``response by a federal law enforcement agency to an imminent risk 
of death or serious bodily harm to a person'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the same time, the Proposed Order's restrictions on further 
disclosure of consumers' geolocation data help protect American 
citizens' constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment rights should not be for 
sale, under any circumstance. I agree with Commissioner Bedoya on this 
issue and the importance of the Proposed Order's restrictions here.\26\ 
Constitutionally appropriate process, such as warrants or subpoenas, 
exists for law enforcement to obtain information it needs, without 
resorting to purchasing consumers' precise geolocation data from 
unscrupulous location data brokers to circumvent judicial 
oversight.\27\ Nor does the Proposed Order have a deleterious impact on 
law enforcement efforts. Law enforcement personnel can always avail 
themselves of the appropriate legal process to obtain such data in a 
manner that comports with Fourth Amendment requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ Bedoya Concurring Statement, supra note 13, at Sec.  IV.
    \27\ Holyoak Concurring Statement, supra note 7, at 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Count III (Unfair Sale of Sensitive Inferences)

    The Complaint alleges that Gravy created and sold custom ``audience 
segments'' based on consumers' religious beliefs, political leanings, 
and medical conditions by geo-fencing sensitive locations, such as 
breast cancer events, specific churches, and ``Republican focused 
political events.'' \28\ The sale of ``audience segments'' tied to 
consumers' religious beliefs, political leanings, and medical 
conditions qualifies as an unfair practice: it ``causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury'' by revealing consumers' political, 
religious, and medical activities (as discussed supra in Section I), 
consumers cannot reasonably avoid the harm (they are not aware of 
Respondent and did not consent to the use), and it is not outweighed by 
any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.\29\ For these 
reasons, I support Count III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Compl. ]] 50-53.
    \29\ Id. ]] 56-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, my vote today does not entail broader support for the 
Majority's continued effort to deem targeted advertising an unfair 
practice under section 5. Nor should my vote be construed as endorsing 
the Complaint's theory about secondary harm to consumers.\30\ As I have 
explained before, we must ``tease out the complexity of the privacy 
debate'' and ``press for more empirical research'' to ground our 
unfairness analysis.\31\ Our complaints cannot simply rely on 
politically charged buzzwords. For example, the Complaint here 
expresses concerns with Gravy's practice of creating general ``audience 
segments''

[[Page 96994]]

for targeted advertising--e.g., ``Sports Betting Enthusiast[s],'' 
``Early Risers,'' ``Healthy Dads,'' ``New Parents'', or ``Parents with 
Young Kids'' \32\ But the Complaint fails to confront how these 
audience segments create a ``significant risk of concrete harm'' and 
ignores the potential benefits to consumers and competition. 
Behaviorally targeted advertising may produce more relevant ads to 
consumers, reducing their search costs and allowing small businesses 
and new market entrants to connect with a broader consumer base.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Id. ]] 60-69.
    \31\ Melissa Holyoak, Remarks at National Advertising Division, 
A Path Forward on Privacy, Advertising, and AI, at 7 (Sept. 17, 
2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Holyoak-NAD-Speech-09-17-2024.pdf.
    \32\ Compl. ]] 47-49.
    \33\ See, e.g., Commissioner Holyoak Remarks, supra note 31, at 
6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, my vote should not be construed as support for deeming 
the use of sensitive data or the categorization of sensitive data as 
unlawful in every circumstance. Consumers may be deceived or harmed 
where their sensitive data is used without their knowledge or consent, 
contrary to their reasonable expectations. But context matters. For 
example, if a consumer searches online for nearby pediatricians close 
to their home, then serving ads in other contexts for pediatrician 
offices and groups based on the consumer's location may be both 
reasonable and desirable. If a consumer subscribes to a podcast on a 
certain type of politics, advertisements for other political podcasts 
may be of interest to that consumer.
    We also need to disentangle any objections to the content of an 
advertisement from the practices of categorization and targeting 
generally. Take, for example, the practice of categorizing consumers 
into the ad segment ``women over 50 suffering from breast cancer.'' An 
advertiser may use that segment to target ads for well-validated 
treatments, potentially connecting women with life-saving care. Or an 
advertiser could use that segment to target ads for bogus treatments. 
We should not conflate our concern about deceptive advertising (the 
bogus treatment) with the lawful act of categorizing and targeting 
based on sensitive data, lest we undermine the ability to connect women 
with life-saving care. This is just one example of the potentially 
beneficial or harmful content served to audience segments. Certain 
types of categorization and targeting may offer similar benefits to 
consumers and competition, if used properly and in a lawful manner.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See generally Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Comm'r 
Melissa Holyoak, Social Media and Video Streaming Services Staff 
Report, Matter No. P205402, at 15-18 (Sept. 19, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/commissioner-holyoak-statement-social-media-6b.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As we consider these types of difficult privacy questions in the 
future, it is of paramount importance that we challenge only unfair or 
deceptive conduct, supported by specific facts and empirical research, 
rather than demonizing the entire digital advertising industry.\35\ And 
until Congress acts to address privacy directly through legislation, it 
is vital we recognize and abide by the limited remit of the 
Commission's statutory authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Commissioner Holyoak Remarks, supra note 31, at 5-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew N. Ferguson

    Today the Commission approves complaints against, and proposed 
consent orders with, Gravy Analytics \1\ (``Gravy'') \2\ and 
Mobilewalla \3\ for various practices concerning the collection and 
dissemination of precise location data allegedly constituting unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in violation of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act.\4\ Gravy and Mobilewalla are data brokers that 
aggregate and sell consumer data, including location data.\5\ Gravy and 
Mobilewalla do not collect the data from consumers.\6\ Those data are 
collected from applications that consumers use on their smartphones, 
and Gravy and Mobilewalla purchase or otherwise acquire those data 
after they are collected.\7\ Gravy and Mobilewalla then sell those data 
to private firms for advertising, analytics, and other purposes, as 
well as to the government.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Also named is Venntel, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Gravy Analytics.
    \2\ Complaint, In re Gravy Analytics (``Gravy Complaint'').
    \3\ Complaint, In re Mobilewalla (``Mobilewalla Complaint'').
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 45.
    \5\ Gravy Complaint ] 7; Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 3, 18.
    \6\ Gravy Complaint ] 8; Mobilewalla Complaint ] 4.
    \7\ Gravy Complaint ]] 9-10; Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 4, 5.
    \8\ Gravy Complaint ]] 13-21; Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 6, 19, 
36. As my colleagues' statements make clear, the sale of data to the 
government for law-enforcement, national-security, and immigration-
enforcement purposes implicates different constitutional and 
statutory questions than the sale of those same data to private 
firms. I take no firm position on those questions except to say that 
I believe that the restrictions on sale to the government in the 
Gravy order are lawful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Part I

    I concur entirely in two of the counts the Commission brings 
against both firms, and one that we bring against Mobilewalla alone. 
These counts are sufficient to justify my vote in favor of submitting 
the complaints and proposed consent orders for public comment. First, 
the Commission alleges that Gravy and Mobilewalla sell consumers' 
precise location data without taking sufficient measures to anonymize 
the information or filter out sensitive locations.\9\ This type of 
data--records of a person's precise physical locations--is inherently 
intrusive and revealing of people's most private affairs. The sale of 
such revealing information that can be linked directly to an individual 
consumer poses an obvious risk of substantial injury to that 
consumer.\10\ The theft or accidental dissemination of those data would 
be catastrophic to the consumer. The consumer cannot avoid the injury. 
Unless the consumer has consented to the sale of intimate data linked 
directly to him, the sale of the data happens entirely without his 
knowledge.\11\ Finally, given that the anonymized data remain valuable 
to firms for advertising and analytics, the injury that the consumer 
suffers is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits for the 
consumer.\12\ The sale of non-anonymized, precise location data without 
first obtaining the meaningfully informed consent of the consumer is 
therefore an unfair act or practice in violation of section 5.
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    \9\ Gravy Complaint ]] 73-75; Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 66-67.
    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 45(n); see FTC v. Kochava, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 3d 
1319, 1323-24 (D. Idaho 2024).
    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 45(n).
    \12\ Ibid.
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    Second, the Commission accuses both companies of collecting, using, 
and selling precise location information without sufficiently verifying 
that the consumers who generated the data consented to the collection 
of those data by the applications that collected it.\13\ Given that the 
failure to obtain meaningful consent to the collection of precise 
location data is widespread, data brokers that purchase sensitive 
information cannot avoid liability by turning a blind eye to the strong 
possibility that consumers did not consent to its collection and sale. 
The sale of precise location data collected without the consumer's 
consent poses a similarly unavoidable and substantial risk of injury to 
the consumer as does the sale of the non-anonymized data. I therefore 
concur in these counts against Gravy and Mobilewalla.\14\
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    \13\ Gravy Complaint ]] 76-78; Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 71-72.
    \14\ Section 5 does not impose strict liability for the purchase 
of precise location data collected without the consumer's consent, 
nor do I understand the complaints and orders as interpreting 
section 5 hold data brokers strictly liable for every purchase of 
precise location data that was collected without the consumer's 
consent. Data brokers need only take reasonable steps to ensure that 
the data they are acquiring were originally collected with the 
consumer's consent. Gravy Complaint ] 76 (faulting Gravy for not 
taking ``reasonable steps to verify that consumers provide informed 
consent to Respondents' collection, use, or sale of the data for 
commercial and government purposes.''); Mobilewalla Complaint ] 71 
(similar).

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[[Page 96995]]

    I further concur in one additional count charged against 
Mobilewalla alone. The Commission accuses it of having committed an 
unfair act or practice for its conduct on real-time bidding exchanges 
(RTBs).\15\ An RTB is a marketplace where advertisers bid in real time 
on the opportunity to show an advertisement to a user as the user is 
visiting a website or using an application.\16\ The auctions take place 
in the blink of an eye, and the listings on which advertisers bid 
include information such as the user's mobile advertising ID (MAIDs) 
and current precise location.\17\ Advertisers crave these data because 
it allows them to maximize the value of each ad impression by 
displaying the ads only to the users most likely to find the 
advertisement useful. The Commission accuses Mobilewalla of sitting on 
the RTBs, submitting bids, collecting the MAIDs and location data for 
the bids, retaining those data even when it did not win the auction, 
and combining those data with data acquired from other sources to 
identify the user represented by the MAID.\18\ It aggregated and sold 
this combined identity and location information to its clients.\19\ 
This alleged practice violated Mobilewalla's legal contracts with the 
exchanges.\20\
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    \15\ Mobilewalla Complaint ] 70.
    \16\ Id. ] 9.
    \17\ Ibid.
    \18\ Id. ]] 12-15.
    \19\ Id. ] 18.
    \20\ Mobilewalla Complaint ] 10.
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    The violation of a private contract alone is not enough to 
establish a violation of section 5.\21\ But these agreements protected 
more than just Mobilewalla's contractual counterparties. They also 
protected large numbers of consumers from the risk of having their 
private data aggregated, linked to their identity, and sold without 
their consent, as Mobilewalla did. Mobilewalla's breach of its 
contractual obligations therefore exposed consumers to the same 
substantial risk of injury as collection of their data without consent, 
was not reasonably avoidable by consumers (as this conduct was far 
removed from their knowledge and control), and was not outweighed by 
any countervailing benefits to consumers. It is therefore in the public 
interest to hold Mobilewalla liable for this conduct under section 5, 
as it would be even if no contract governed Mobilewalla's obligations 
regarding the unconsented collection and retention of these precise 
location data.\22\
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    \21\ See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929) (Section 5's 
requirement that enforcement ``would be to the interest of the 
public'' is not satisfied in the case of a purely private dispute, 
as ``the mere fact that it is to the interest of the community that 
private rights shall be respected is not enough to support a finding 
of public interest.'').
    \22\ See id. at 27-28 (explaining that protection of private 
rights can be incident to the public interest, and that such cases 
might include those where the conduct threatens the existence of 
competition, involves the ``flagrant oppression of the weak by the 
strong,'' or where the aggregate loss is sufficient to make the 
matter one of public consequence but incapable of vindication by 
individual private suits).
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Part II

    I dissent from the Commission's counts against both firms accusing 
them of unfairly categorizing consumers based on sensitive 
characteristics, and of selling those categorizations to third 
parties.\23\ The FTC Act prohibits the collection and subsequent sale 
of precise location data for which the consumer has not consented to 
the collection or sale. It further requires data brokers to take 
reasonable steps to ensure that consumers originally consented to the 
collection of the data that the data brokers subsequently use and sell. 
If a company aggregates and categorizes data that were collected 
without the consumer's consent, and subsequently sells those 
categorizations, it violates section 5. But it does so only because the 
data were collected without consent for such use, not because the 
categories into which it divided the data might be on an indeterminate 
naughty categories list. The FTC Act imposes consent requirements in 
certain circumstances. It does not limit how someone who lawfully 
acquired those data might choose to analyze those data, or the 
conclusions that one might draw from them.\24\
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    \23\ Gravy Complaint ]] 79-81; Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 68-69.
    \24\ Of course, other laws might prohibit particular uses of 
data that were collected consistently with the requirements of 
section 5. Using lawfully obtained data to draw conclusions about a 
consumer's race alone would not violate section 5, but using those 
conclusions to make an employment or housing decision, for example, 
might violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 
or the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. But merely drawing a 
conclusion from lawfully obtained data does not violate section 5.
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    Consider an analogous context: the collection of data by private 
investigators. Private investigators do not violate the law if they 
follow someone on the public streets to his place of employment, 
observe him entering a church, observe him attending the meeting of a 
political party, or watch him enter a hospital. These are all public 
acts that people carry out in the sight of their fellow citizens every 
day. Nor do private investigators violate the law by concluding from 
their lawful observations that the person works for that company, 
practices that religion, belongs to that political party, or suffers 
from an illness. Nor would the law prohibit the private investigator 
from selling his conclusions to a client. But the law would forbid 
private investigators from trespassing on the employer's property; from 
surreptitiously planting cameras inside the church sanctuary to observe 
the rites; from recording the proceedings of the political meeting 
without consent; or from extorting hospital staff for information about 
the person's condition. The law prohibits collecting data in unlawful 
ways; it does not prohibit drawing whatever conclusions one wants, or 
selling those conclusions to someone else, so long as the data from 
which the conclusions were drawn were lawfully obtained.
    The same principle should apply to section 5. The added wrinkle is 
that in the information economy, private data are usually collected in 
the context of a commercial relationship between the user and the 
developer of an application or website. Just as we expect a merchant to 
disclose the material terms of a transaction before collecting payment, 
we expect that the user of an app or website be informed of how their 
private information--part, and often all, of the consideration they 
give in exchange for use of the app or website--will be collected and 
used, and given a chance to decline the transaction. Commercial 
fairness might also require more than vague hidden disclosures, 
especially when the loss of privacy is substantial, as is the case with 
collection of precise location data and its sale to third parties.
    Rather than faulting these companies for disclosing data about 
users without adequate consent, these counts in the complaints focus 
instead on the inherent impropriety of categorizing users according to 
so-called ``sensitive characteristics.'' Perhaps my colleagues are 
worried that advertisements targeted on the basis of these categories 
can cause emotional distress--the theory they advanced in the 
Commission's Social Media 6(b) Report earlier this year.\25\ But as I 
argued then, it is folly

[[Page 96996]]

to try to identify which characteristics are sensitive and which are 
not. ``[T]he list of things that can trigger each unique individual's 
trauma is endless and would cover every imaginable'' advertisement 
based on every possible categorization, so whatever lines we end up 
drawing will be ``either arbitrary or highly politicized.'' \26\
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    \25\ FTC, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining the Data 
Practices of Social Media and Video Streaming Services, An FTC Staff 
Report, at 44 (Sept. 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Social-Media-6b-Report-9-11-2024.pdf.
    \26\ Concurring and Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Andrew 
N. Ferguson, A Look Behind the Screens: Examining the Data Practices 
of Social Media and Video Streaming Services, at 5 (Sept. 19, 2024), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/ferguson-statement-social-media-6b.pdf.
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    We can already see this dysfunction in these complaints, which 
mention as sensitive characteristics race, ethnicity, gender, gender 
identity, sexual orientation, pregnancy, parenthood, health conditions, 
religion, and attendance of a political protest, among others.\27\ 
While some of these characteristics often entail private facts, others 
are not usually considered private information. Attending a political 
protest, for example, is a public act. The public expression of 
dissatisfaction or support is the point of a protest. Treating 
attendance at a political protest as uniquely private and sensitive is 
an oxymoron. Moreover, there are no objective criteria on which to base 
this list.\28\ The statute provides no guidance. The list is therefore 
a purely subjective creation of Commission bureaucrats. And it excludes 
categories that many would consider deeply private and sensitive.\29\ 
And if we did a full accounting of characteristics that someone, 
somewhere might consider sensitive, no useful categorizations would 
remain. If what we are worried about is that the generation and sale of 
these categorizations will be a substitute for the sale of the user 
data from which they are derived, the correct approach is to treat 
conclusions derived from user data as no different than the underlying 
data. In either case, adequate consent is required for their 
collection, use, and sale.
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    \27\ Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 27-32.
    \28\ See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-39 (2001) 
(rejecting a Fourth Amendment rule that limited thermal-imaging data 
collection to only ``intimate details'' because of the impossibility 
of developing a principled distinction between intimate and 
nonintimate information).
    \29\ Gun ownership is an example. In many States, citizens are 
free to own guns without registering them. There is therefore no 
public record that a person owns a gun. And in constitutional-carry 
States, a citizen may carry his handgun in concealment without the 
government's permission, which means that bearing a firearm outside 
the home remains a private act. I expect many Americans would be 
horrified if their sensitive location data were used to place them 
in a ``gun owner'' category, and that category were then sold to 
other firms or to the government--particularly banks have gotten in 
the habit of ejecting customers who engaged in disfavored 
activities. Yet gun ownership does not make the Commission's list. 
But political protests do. It is hard to see this list as anything 
other than the product of arbitrary or political decision making.
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    Finally, I have doubts about the viability of a final charge levied 
against Mobilewalla for indefinitely retaining consumer location 
information.\30\ It is a truism that data stored indefinitely is at a 
greater risk of compromise than data stored for a short period of time. 
But nothing in section 5 forms the basis of standards for data 
retention. The difficulty is illustrated perfectly by the proposed 
order we approve today. Rather than impose any particular retention 
schedule, it merely requires that Mobilewalla:
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    \30\ Mobilewalla Complaint ]] 73-74.

. . . document, adhere to, and make publicly available . . . a 
retention schedule . . . setting forth: (1) the purpose or purposes 
for which each type of Covered Information is collected or used; (2) 
the specific business needs for retaining each type of Covered 
Information; and (3) an established timeframe for deletion of each 
type of Covered Information limited to the time reasonably necessary 
to fulfill the purpose for which the Covered Information was 
collected, and in no instance providing for the indefinite retention 
of any Covered Information . . .\31\
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    \31\ Decision and Order, In re Mobilewalla, Inc., at 13.

    Given that Mobilewalla is in the business of selling user 
information, and that the marginal cost of data storage is low, the 
``specific business need'' can be nothing more than the possible 
existence in the future of some buyer willing to pay more than the low 
cost of storage to acquire the data. I see no reason why Mobilewalla 
could not set a retention period of many decades based on this 
reasoning. In fact, while two-year-old location data is intuitively 
less valuable than one-year-old location data, it is quite plausible 
that twenty- or thirty-year-old location data is more valuable than 
location data that is only a few years old, as it may allow advertisers 
to tap into nostalgic sentiments.
    The trouble with both the sensitive-categories count and the data-
retention count is that the text of section 5 cannot bear the 
tremendous weight my colleagues place on it. My colleagues want the FTC 
Act to be a comprehensive privacy law. But it is not. Comprehensive 
privacy regulation involves difficult choices and expensive tradeoffs. 
Congress alone can make those choices and tradeoffs. It did not do so 
when it adopted the general prohibitions of section 5 nearly nine 
decades ago. And it has not adopted comprehensive privacy legislation 
since then. We must respect that choice.
    Until Congress acts, we should vigorously protect Americans' 
privacy by enforcing the laws Congress has actually passed. But we must 
not stray from the bounds of the law. If we do, we will sow uncertainty 
among legitimate businesses, potentially disrupt the ongoing 
negotiations in Congress on privacy legislation, and risk damaging 
losses for the Commission in court.

[FR Doc. 2024-28738 Filed 12-5-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-P
```