FILED 

April 5, 2016 

In the Office of the Clerk of Court 

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DIVISION THREE 

JOSE ANTONIO ALVARADO, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF WASHING TON 

DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, 

Respondent. 

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No. 33130-0-111 

PUBLISHED OPINION 

PENNELL, J. - This case turns on what type of evidence the Department of 

Licensing (DOL) must produce at a contested hearing in order to disqualify a commercial 

driver's license (CDL) based on a positive drug test. Jose Alvarado argues that principles 

of statutory interpretation and the constitutional right of due process require the DOL 

disclose the laboratory data used to generate a test result instead of merely the test's 

conclusions. Finding no such requirement under either standard, we affirm Mr. 

Alvarado's CDL disqualification. 

FACTS 

Jose Alvarado applied to work as a commercial driver for the city of Sunnyside, an 

employer subject to the federal workplace drug and alcohol program, 49 C.F .R. pt. 40. 
No. 33130-0-III 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

As part of the federal program, Mr. Alvarado submitted a preemployment drug test. The 

DOL subsequently received a report from a medical review officer stating Mr. Alvarado 

had tested positive for cocaine. 

Upon receiving the medical review officer's report, the DOL notified Mr. 

Alvarado it would disqualify his CDL. Mr. Alvarado requested a hearing to challenge the 

proposed disqualification. At the administrative hearing, Mr. Alvarado did not testify, 

present witness testimony, or submit evidence to demonstrate the result was a false 

positive. Rather, he argued the matter should be dismissed because RCW 46.25 .125( 4) 

requires the DOL to produce a copy of the full laboratory report specifying the 

quantitative values of his drug test, not merely a report documenting a positive test result. 

The hearing officer disagreed and upheld the DOL's disqualification. Mr. Alvarado 

appealed to the superior court. At this hearing, Mr. Alvarado reargued his position but 

again did not present evidence. The superior court affirmed the disqualification. Mr. 

Alvarado filed this timely appeal. 

ANALYSIS 

A. RCW 46.25.125 

Mr. Alvarado argues the DOL violated RCW 46.25.125 when it failed to produce a 

copy of the laboratory data report at his disqualification hearing. According to Mr. 

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No. 33130-0-III 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

Alvarado, it was not sufficient for the medical review officer to sign a report stating that 

Mr. Alvarado had tested positive for cocaine. Instead, he argues the plain language of the 

Washington statute requires disclosure of the quantitative data utilized by the drug 

laboratory to justify the positive test result. 

Issues of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed de novo. State v. 

Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 191, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). In construing a statute, the court's 

fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. Lake v. 

Woodcreek Homeowners Ass 'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). "Statutory 

interpretation begins with the statute's plain meaning," which is "discerned from the 

ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that 

provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A court's inquiry ends if the statute is unambiguous after 

reviewing its plain meaning. Id. 

The statute at issue here outlines the hearing rights of a CDL holder who has 

received a notice of disqualification based on a positive drug or alcohol test. It provides 

as follows: 

For the purposes of this section, or for the purpose of a hearing de novo in 

an appeal to superior court, the hearing must be limited to the following 

issues: (a) Whether the driver is the person who is the subject of the report; 

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No. 33130-0-III 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

(b) whether the motor carrier, employer, or consortium has a program that is 

subject to the federal requirements under 49 C.F .R. 40; and ( c) whether the 

medical review officer or breath alcohol technician making the report 

accurately followed the protocols established to verify or confirm the 

results, or if the driver refused a test, whether the circumstances constitute 

the refusal of a test under 49 C.F.R. 40. Evidence may be presented to 

demonstrate that the test results are a false positive. For the purpose of a 

hearing under this section, a copy of a positive test result with a declaration 

by the tester or medical review officer or breath alcohol technician stating 

the accuracy of the laboratory protocols followed to arrive at the test result 

is primafacie evidence: 

(i) Of a verified positive drug test or positive alcohol confirmation 

test result; 

(ii) That the motor carrier, employer, or consortium has a program 

that is subject to the federal requirements under 49 C.F .R. 40; and 

(iii) That the medical review officer or breath alcohol technician 

making the report accurately followed the protocols for testing established 

to verify or confirm the results. 

RCW 46.25.125(4) (emphasis added). 

The crux of the parties' dispute pertains to what is meant by "a copy of a positive 

test result." Mr. Alvarado argues this language refers to the quantitative data relied on to 

reach a positive test result. Focusing on the statute's use of the word "result," we 

disagree. A "result" is defined as "something obtained, achieved, or brought about by 

calculation, investigation, or similar activity (as an answer to a problem or knowledge 

gained by scientific inquiry)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 

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No. 33130-0-III 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

1937 (1993). In other words, a result is the conclusion drawn from data analysis. It is not 

the analysis itself. Because the statute only requires a copy of the test "result," it does not 

contemplate disclosure of the quantitative data or information utilized to reach a positive 

test result. 

The context of the applicable statute solidifies this interpretation. As the parties 

agree, chapter 46.25 RCW was written to comply with the federal Commercial Motor 

Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (CMVSA), Pub. L. No. 99-570, title XII. 1 Indeed, the statute 

at issue, RCW 49.25.125, references 49 C.F.R. 40, the federal regulations governing the 

CMVSA. Looking at these regulations, the medical review officer responsible for 

reporting a drug test is specifically instructed to report the "[r]esult of the test" as 

"positive, negative, dilute, refusal to test, [or] test cancelled." 49 C.F.R. § 40.163(c)(6).2 

Again, it is the conclusion that must be reported, not the data used to generate the 

conclusion. This is consistent with federal regulations which strictly limit the medical 

review officer's authority to disclose the quantitative values used to arrive at a test result. 

49 C.F.R. § 40.163(g). 

I There are no currently effective sections of the CMVSA. The relevant law is 

now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31306. 

2 The federal regulations refer to the medical review officer by the abbreviation 

MRO. 

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No. 33130-0-III 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

Mr. Alvarado correctly points out that, under 49 C.F.R. § 40.87, the medical 

review officer cannot report a positive test result unless the amount of drugs in a test 

sample meets specified cutoff concentrations. However, the fact that the medical review 

officer's conclusions must be consistent with certain guidelines does not mean the 

officer's report must explain how those guidelines were met in a given case. 

B. Due Process 

Apart from his statutory argument, Mr. Alvarado contends due process requires the 

DOL to produce a copy of the full laboratory report at a CDL disqualification hearing. 

Constitutional challenges are questions of law subject to de novo review. Evans, 177 

Wn.2d at 191. 

The State must provide due process when it deprives an individual of life, liberty, 

or property. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Driver's licenses, 

including CDLs, are property interests protected by procedural due process principles. 

Amunrudv. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216, 143 P.3d 571 (2006). The fundamental 

components of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. Watkins v. Dep 't of 

Licensing, 187 Wn. App. 591, 602, 349 P.3d 946 (2015). These are not mere formalities. 

Due process must be "meaningful and appropriate to the nature of the case." Svendgard 

v. Dep'tofLicensing, 122 Wn. App. 670, 681, 95 P.3d 364 (2004). 

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No. 33130-0-III 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

We consider three factors when analyzing whether the State provided due process: 

(1) the private interest that will be affected by the government action, (2) the risk of 

erroneously depriving a person of that interest through the procedures used, and the 

probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the State's interest, 

including the function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens the additional 

requirements would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 

L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). 

Mr. Alvarado's challenge goes to the second Mathews factor. According to Mr. 

Alvarado, without disclosure of a full laboratory report, the hearing rights afforded by 

statute are reduced to nothing more than a rubber stamp of a medical review officer's 

report. We disagree. For one thing, the medical review officer's report is not a 

meaningless piece of paper. In Mr. Alvarado's case, it was signed under penalty of 

perjury by a medical doctor, verifying that federal protocols were met in reaching a 

positive test result. In addition, Mr. Alvarado was afforded ample ability to contest the 

accuracy of the report. He was entitled to demand a copy of his full laboratory report, 

including quantitative data, prior to the disqualification hearing. 49 C.F .R. § 40.329 

(copies must be disclosed within 10 business days of request). At the hearing, Mr. 

Alvarado had the right to testify, present testimony from witnesses, and submit exhibits. 

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No. 33130-0-111 

Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing 

RCW 46.20.332, .334. These safeguards were sufficient to protect Mr. Alvarado from an 

erroneous deprivation of his CDL, as required by due process. 

Because the State afforded Mr. Alvarado a meaningful procedure for contesting 

the disqualification of his CDL, his due process claim necessarily fails. Although Mr. 

Alvarado has an important property interest in his CDL, the weight of this interest is 

tempered by the fact that a CDL holder's disqualification is stayed during the pendency of 

the hearing process. RCW 46.25.125(6); see City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 

670-71, 91 P.3d 875 (2004). Furthermore, the State has a significant interest in 

maintaining safety on the public roadways. The purpose of chapter 46.25 RCW is to be 

"liberally construed to promote the public health, safety, and welfare." RCW 46.25.005. 

This strong interest weighs against requiring production of evidence that is not required 

by statute and is easily accessed by the CDL holder. 

The decision of the superior court is affirmed. 

WE CONCUR: 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

j 

(~ c~~JOPennell, J. 

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Fearing~' 

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