IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17-0148

Filed April 5, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF C.L., H.L., M.S., and M.S.,

Minor children,

E.L., Mother,

Appellant,

R.S., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Gregg R. 

Rosenbladt, Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Dylan J. Thomas, Mason City, for appellant mother.

Michael J. Moeller of Sorensen & Moeller Law Office, Clear Lake, for 

appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David M. Van Compernolle, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee State.

David A. Grooters of Pappajohn, Shriver, Eide & Nielsen, P.C., Mason 

City, guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
2

VOGEL, Judge. 

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental 

rights to their children. Finding the State proved the grounds for termination by 

clear and convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best 

interest, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

C.L., born September 2000; H.L., born January 2004; M.E.S., born November 

2001; and M.J.S.1, born October 2005, came to the attention of the Iowa 

Department of Human Services (DHS) in 2007, upon allegations of physical 

abuse and domestic violence. Over the course of the next few years, many 

services were offered, specifically targeting the mental health and substance 

abuse of the parents along with efforts to keep the children safe. The children 

were removed from the home at different times, but in September 2014, H.L., 

M.E.S., and M.J.S. were returned to the mother’s care, and their child-in-need-ofassistance cases were closed in January 2015 due to progress demonstrated by 

the mother. C.L. was returned to the mother’s care in May 2015. 

However, it was not long before the mother became resistant to services, 

including refusing to let the child protective worker enter parts of her home and 

garage. In August 2015, the DHS became aware the mother’s paramour and 

another man were living in the mother’s home and there were allegations the 

mother was smoking marijuana with her paramour. The mother denied use but 

refused to participate in a drug screen requested by the DHS. Meanwhile, there 

 

1 The father in this appeal is the biological parent of M.E.S. and M.J.S. The parental 

rights of the fathers of C.L. and H.L. were also terminated; they do not appeal. 
3

were reports the children were being exposed to pornography and were 

engaging in sexual activity with one another. 

On August 31, 2015, the children were removed from the home and placed in 

foster care. The mother was ordered to cooperate with the DHS. In September 

2015, the mother tested positive for methamphetamine; she admitted to using but 

stated that her paramour was no longer living with her, and she refused to reengage in mental-health counseling. In October 2015, the child protective worker 

observed signs of drug use in the mother and noted her paramour was still living 

in the home. In January 2016, the mother began participating in family 

preservation court. Through March 2016, she provided several drug screens that 

were positive for methamphetamine and/or marijuana. She began inpatient 

substance-abuse treatment and was discharged unsuccessfully multiple times 

before ultimately completing inpatient treatment in May 2016. She transitioned to 

outpatient services and resumed her relationship with her paramour. 

The mother continued to provide positive drug screens through July 2016, 

while denying use. Also in July 2016, her paramour was arrested for domestic 

abuse assault. The mother reported her paramour had attempted to strangle her 

and threw a pocket knife at her. In addition, throughout the pendency of the 

case, the mother’s employment has been sporadic and her housing situation 

unreliable. 

The father’s participation in services has been inconsistent, and he has 

been resistant to substance-abuse and mental-health treatment. The father has 

had intermittent periods of supervised visitations with M.J.S. but has not 
4

consistently participated in services since the DHS became involved in 2007 

based on abuse allegations against him. 

On July 7, 2016, after several years of offered services, the State filed a 

petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to all the children and the 

father’s parental rights to his two children—M.E.S. and M.J.S. The matter first 

came on for hearing on October 28 and concluded on October 31. On December 

16, the district court ordered both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights 

terminated under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (2016). Following the 

mother’s and father’s motions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), the 

court enlarged its original termination order and found the DHS had made 

reasonable efforts to reunify the parents with their respective children. Both the 

mother and father appeal. 

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, we apply a de novo 

review, giving weight to the factual findings of the district court, while not being 

bound by them. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).

III. Statutory Grounds for Termination

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) permits termination if:

The court finds that all of the following have occurred:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of 

assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of 

the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or 

for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home 

has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the 

present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the 

child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.
5

Both the father and the mother argue the State failed to prove the statutory 

grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and the DHS failed to 

make reasonable efforts towards reunification.2 The father also asserts the 

district court should have granted him an additional six months to work towards 

reunification. The mother also argues termination was not in the best interests of 

the children and that a bond exists between her and the children that should 

militate against termination. The State urges us to affirm the termination. 

“When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one 

statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the 

sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Because the mother does not contest the statutory 

elements under section 232.116(1)(f) on appeal, we affirm the termination of her 

parental rights under that code section. Nonetheless, we include information 

about the mother’s situation to show why the district court found the children 

could not be returned to her care. In its final written report to the court prior to 

the termination hearing, the DHS recommended termination, stating:

The children have been victimized on several occasions by [the 

mother]’s husbands or paramours over the life of the case. They 

have been physically, emotionally, and sexually abused by persons 

they thought they could trust as well as by one another. They will 

continue to require mental health services to address their trauma 

issues.

 

2 The father alleges a vague due process violation with no specific argument, citation,

nor showing that such an argument was made before the district court. As such, we do 

not address the issue. See Iowa. R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in 

support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.”); see also Meier v. Senecaut, 

641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that 

issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will 

decide them on appeal.”). 
6

[The mother] has engaged in relationships with men that 

have significantly and viciously abused her children. She has 

repeatedly defended the men, including [the stepfather] and [her 

paramour], and has been unable or unwilling to keep her children 

safe from further abuse at their hands. [The mother] has told the 

children she didn’t believe their trauma disclosures, has said that 

the perpetrator is a good person and would never hurt her children, 

and lied about maintaining those relationships when ordered not to. 

[C.L.] was able to recognize this pattern several years ago and told 

this worker and his mother that the children should not reside with 

her if she had a boyfriend. It is an unfortunate pattern of behavior 

that led to her children repeatedly being abused.

At this time, the children have been removed from their 

mother’s care for fourteen consecutive months. The three younger 

children were previously out of her care for approximately nineteen 

months while [C.L]’s mental health and behavioral needs resulted in 

his removal for twenty-one consecutive months and another twelve 

months. No trial home visits have occurred since their 8/31/15 

removal nor have visits progressed from supervised.

In regards to the father, the report stated: 

[The father] has [not] demonstrated any consistent service 

participation nor [has he] assumed an active parental role in the 

children’s lives. [The father] does not have a permanent home. He 

enjoys having visits with M.J.S. His past victimization of M.E.S. 

resulted in the district court not allowing him to have any contact 

with her. [The father] has not engaged in mental health services.

At the termination hearing, the child protective worker articulated concerns 

about the children being placed back in the mother’s care:

[T[hese children have been traumatized repeatedly over the years, 

and in my—my understanding from just conversations I’ve had with 

[one of the social workers], you know, all of the kids are continuing 

to suffer effects from what they have been through, and the last 

thing they need is to be placed back into an environment where 

there will be concerns for supervision, concerns for drug use, 

concerns for choosing inappropriate partners to be around, you 

know, around the children.

The social worker assigned to the case recommended termination for both the 

mother and the father:
7

These children have endured more chaos and instability and harm 

and unhappiness than I think almost any other kids I’ve ever 

worked with have endured. And they have seen things. They have 

experienced things. They have done things to each other that I 

don’t know that most people would ever understand. And it’s not 

fair to them, and it’s not fair to—to their futures. It’s not fair to their 

future children for them to continue to be abused and for them to 

not learn how to grow up to be safe, healthy, happy, young people, 

young adults, parents, employees, all of those things. They won’t 

be able to function if this kind of abuse continues to happen to 

them. That’s what’s happening right now with M.E.S. At least 

that’s my fear. They can’t—[t]hey just can’t continue it.

In its order terminating parental rights, the district court found:

[B]ased on the history of this case and the vast number of services 

provided, that insufficient progress has been made to allow for 

return of the children to the parental home of their mother or 

father[. . .] at this time. [The mother] herself admits that some of 

the children are not ready to come home and she is not ready to 

have them home, but resists termination of her parental rights.

We agree with the district court that the record reveals grave concerns about 

returning the children to the custody of either the mother or the father. The 

mother has a long history of exposing her children to physical and emotional 

abuse. Despite her progress in the initial stages of this case, the reports from the 

last time the children were in her care are deeply troubling and include evidence 

of the mother’s drug use, a relationship with a violent paramour, exposing the 

children to inappropriate things, and failure to supervise the safety of the 

children. Over the latter stages of this case, her participation in services has 

been sporadic, and she has not made enough progress to allow the children to 

be returned safely to her care. Regarding the father, the only participation he 

has had over the last several years has been sporadic supervised visits with one 

of his children. He has consistently failed to participate in services, fulfill any sort 

of caretaker role, or provide a home that his children could be safely returned to. 
8

His request for an additional six months thus rings hollow after he has failed to 

engage in offered services for years. Thus, we affirm the termination of both the 

mother’s and the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).3 

IV. Best Interest and Impediments to Termination

In accordance with Iowa Code sections 232.116(2) and (3), the district 

court considered “whether proceeding with termination is in the best interest of 

the child[ren]” and whether any exceptions existed that prevented termination. 

The court stated:

The termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the 

children because there is a lack of closeness in the parent-child 

relationship. None of the children over age [ten] objects to the 

termination. The Court needs to give primary consideration to the 

children’s safety, to the best placement for furthering their long-term 

nurturing and growth, and to the physical, mental, and emotional 

condition and needs of the children. 

As demonstrated in the facts set forth above, the children’s 

safety, and the best opportunity for furthering the children’s longterm nurturing and growth, as well as the physical, mental, and 

emotional condition and needs of the children support termination 

of parental rights. Further, taking into account all of the facts and 

possible exceptions to termination, there is no reason to believe the 

children will be disadvantaged by the termination.

We agree termination was in the best interest of the children and nothing 

militated against termination.

V. Conclusion 

We agree the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the mother’s 

parental rights to C.L., H.L., M.E.S., and M.J.S. and the father’s parental rights to 

M.E.S. and M.J.S. should be terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f). 

 

3 Both the mother and the father appeal claiming the DHS failed to make efforts to 

reunite them with their children. Our review of the record confirms the DHS offered a 

variety of services over an extended period of time in an effort to help the mother and 

the father reunite with their children. Thus, we reject both of these claims. 
9

We also agree with the district court that termination was in the children’s best 

interest. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.