Wilfredo Rosales v. State of Maryland, No. 6, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, 

J.

APPEAL AND ERROR—EFFECT OF DELAY OR FAILURE TO TAKE 

PROCEEDINGS

Maryland Rule 8-202, which requires that a notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty 

days after entry of the final judgment is a claim-processing rule, not jurisdictional. 

Therefore, the ground for dismissal of an untimely appeal is not jurisdictional, but is for 

failure to comply with the Maryland Rules. The Rule is also subject to waiver and 

forfeiture. 

EVIDENCE—IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION—PRIOR CRIMES, 

WRONGS OR ACTS

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-609, a witness’ prior convictions under Violent Crimes in 

Aid of Racketeering Activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 are admissible for witness impeachment. 

VICAR convictions involve criminal acts that are relevant to a witness’ credibility. 

Therefore, the convictions are admissible for purposes of witness impeachment. 
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County

Case No. CT121814X

Argued: September 7, 2018

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 6

September Term, 2018

WILFREDO ROSALES

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Barbera, C.J.

Greene,

*Adkins,

McDonald,

Watts,

Hotten,

Getty,

JJ.

Opinion by Getty, J.

Filed: April 17, 2019

*Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the 

hearing and conference of this case while an 

active member of this Court; after being recalled 

pursuant to the MD. Constitution, Article IV, 

Section 3A, she also participated in the decision 

and adoption of this opinion. 
In this case we are asked to determine whether a witness’ prior convictions for 

committing a violent crime in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (“VICAR 

offenses”) are admissible for witness impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-609. 

Specifically, the Defendant sought to impeach the State’s witness with the witness’ 

conviction of conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering 

and threatening to commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering. We hold that a 

witness’ prior convictions for VICAR offenses are admissible for witness impeachment. 

Convictions for VICAR offenses cross the conceptual dividing line between crimes 

involving the basic level of dishonesty required to commit any crime and those 

characterized by inherent deceitfulness, furtive conduct, and disregard for societal 

cohesiveness. Individuals who choose to involve themselves with an enterprise engaged 

in racketeering activity and who choose to commit or conspire to commit violent acts with 

the express purpose of aiding such an enterprise are also likely willing to lie under oath, as 

judged by our standard outlined in State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205 (1994). 

The trial court erred in excluding the witness’ prior convictions for impeachment 

purposes at trial. However, we hold further that the exclusion of these convictions was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals’ affirmation 

of the trial court’s exclusion of the convictions is reversed, but Mr. Rosales is not granted 

a new trial. 

After we granted certiorari, the State raised for the first time the issue of jurisdiction 

and contended that this Court did not have jurisdiction to reach the merits. As a result, we

also address this Court’s jurisdiction and review our prior classification of Maryland Rule 
2

8-202 as a “jurisdictional” rule that required immediate dismissal of an appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

For the following reasons, we determine that this Court has jurisdiction to reach the 

merits. Although in the past this Court has considered the thirty-day time limitation for 

noticing an appeal within Maryland Rule 8-202 as “jurisdictional,” that deadline is based

on a rule and not on a statute. Therefore, the basis for dismissal for failure to file a notice 

of an appeal within thirty days is not lack of jurisdiction, but failure to comply with the 

Maryland Rules. Furthermore, appellate courts must also consider waiver and forfeiture

before dismissing an appeal. As explained in detail below, jurisdiction in this case is 

consistent with Maryland Rule 8-202. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Underlying Facts

This case involves an encounter between a former member of the Mara Salvatrucha 

(“MS-13”) gang, Hector Hernandez-Melendez (“Mr. Hernandez-Melendez”), a.k.a.

“Scrappy,” and a group of current MS-13 members. Mr. Hernandez-Melendez was 

walking to his girlfriend’s home on September 26, 2012 at about 7:00 p.m. through the 

Langley Hampshire Neighborhood Park in Langley Park, Prince George’s County, 

Maryland. While Mr. Hernandez-Melendez was resting on a swing, Wilfredo Rosales

(“Mr. Rosales”) and six other men approached Mr. Hernandez-Melendez and asked if he 

was Scrappy. Mr. Hernandez-Melendez said no. The group then asked Mr. HernandezMelendez to lift his shirt. When Mr. Hernandez-Melendez refused, he was thrown to the 

ground and stabbed by someone in the group. 
3

An ambulance transported Mr. Hernandez-Melendez to Washington Hospital 

Center. After Mr. Hernandez-Melendez received care for his injuries, detectives arrived

and questioned him. He told the detectives that he did not recognize any of his attackers 

except for Mr. Rosales. He knew Mr. Rosales did not stab him but he believed that Mr. 

Rosales removed $150 from his wallet. He also believed Mr. Rosales was the instigator of

the attack because Mr. Rosales was the only one in the group who would have recognized

Mr. Hernandez-Melendez.

According to Mr. Hernandez-Melendez, he “walk[ed] through” Mr. Rosales in 

2006.

1 However, after that encounter and prior to the incident in the park, Mr. HernandezMelendez had not had any contact with Mr. Rosales since 2006. Mr. Hernandez-Melendez

confirmed the identity of Mr. Rosales through photo identification. Based upon this 

identification, Mr. Rosales was arrested. 

B. The Trial 

The State charged Mr. Rosales with nine counts related to the assault of Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez. On May 30, 2013, a jury trial began in the Circuit Court for Prince 

 

1

“Walking through” is the description Mr. Hernandez-Melendez gave to the process of 

entering MS-13. During the “walking through” period, an individual is not yet a full 

member of MS-13. An individual is inducted as a full MS-13 member after they are 

“jumped in.” Mr. Hernandez-Melendez testified that Mr. Rosales was “walking through”

for a period of approximately four months before they lost contact. Mr. HernandezMelendez was not in contact with Mr. Rosales when Mr. Rosales allegedly “jumped in,” 

gaining full membership into MS-13. Sergeant Norris, who was accepted as an expert at 

trial to testify about MS-13 stated the following pertaining to “jumping in”: “A jump-in is 

basically you’re beaten. It’s called a 13 or you’re beaten for 13 seconds. And when they 

do this, thirteen seconds isn’t by a stopwatch. It’s whoever’s counting. We’ve timed them 

going up to over a minute and a half to become a member.” 
4

George’s County and Mr. Hernandez-Melendez testified in the State’s case. During direct 

examination, Mr. Hernandez-Melendez testified about his prior experience as a member of 

MS-13. He stated that in his opinion, he was attacked as retaliation for testifying as a 

government witness against three MS-13 members in a federal homicide trial in 

Washington, D.C. in 2009. 

Prior to Mr. Rosales’ cross-examination of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez, the trial court 

heard argument on the State’s motion in limine to preclude Mr. Rosales from questioning 

Mr. Hernandez-Melendez about his 2011 conviction in the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon in aid 

of racketeering and threatening to commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering in 

violation of the federalstatute, Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (“VICAR”), 

18 U.S.C. § 1959. The State asked the trial court to prohibit admission of the convictions 

under Maryland Rule 5-609. The State argued that these were convictions that could not 

be used to impeach his credibility, contending that these crimes were neither infamous 

crimes nor crimes relevant to credibility. Mr. Rosales argued that these offenses were

impeachable because they were relevant to credibility and were different from other crimes 

of violence. The trial court granted the State’s motion and ruled, “we are going to exclude 

any reference to his conviction, and we are going to exclude any questions as to what he 

was in jail for.” 

After the conclusion of the trial, the jury deliberated and found Mr. Rosales guilty 

of two of the nine counts—retaliation against a witness and participation in a criminal gang. 

On June 26, 2013, the trial court sentenced Mr. Rosales to twelve years of imprisonment
5

with six years suspended on the conviction for retaliation against a witness and a 

consecutive sentence of ten years with five years suspended on the conviction for 

participation in a criminal gang.

C. Post-Trial Proceedings

Mr. Rosales filed an initial notice of appeal on October 16, 2013 and a motion to 

permit a notice of appeal past the filing date. The circuit court granted the motion. The 

initial appeal was docketed in the Court of Special Appeals as No. 1835, September Term 

2013. Mr. Rosales voluntarily dismissed this appeal in October 2014.

On September 27, 2016, Mr. Rosales filed a Petition for Postconviction Relief. 

Among other allegations, Mr. Rosales alleged ineffective assistance of his trial counsel 

because he had requested that trial counsel file an appeal and trial counsel did not timely 

file the appeal. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for February 1, 2017. Prior to the 

start of the hearing, the State agreed that Mr. Rosales was entitled to file a belated appeal. 

During the hearing, the State and Mr. Rosales briefly went on the record to inform the 

postconviction court that they had reached an agreement. Specifically, the State said: 

Your Honor, in this case, trial counsel filed a notice of appeal past the filing 

date, and then tried to get it recognized. . . which he wasn’t able to do. We 

are willing to—I think it’s the right thing to grant a belated appeal, and to 

hold the rest of the post-conviction issues in abeyance for Mr. Rosales. 

The postconviction court agreed to sign the proposed consent order, and the order was 

docketed. The consent order authorized a belated notice of appeal and ordered that the 

postconviction petition be withdrawn without prejudice. In the consent order, Mr. Rosales 

was permitted to re-file a petition “after the appellate process is concluded, provided the 
6

filing occurs within ten (10) years from [the] original sentencing date.” Mr. Rosales 

subsequently filed the belated appeal. 

In an unreported opinion filed on December 11, 2017, the Court of Special Appeals 

affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court properly concluded that 

Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s prior convictions involved violent crimes that were not 

relevant to credibility and were non-impeachable crimes under Maryland Rule 5-609. 

Rosales v. State, No. 2659, Sept. Term, 2016, 2017 WL 6312861, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. 

App. Dec. 11, 2017). Regarding jurisdiction, the Court of Special Appeals noted in a 

footnote that Mr. Rosales was given a belated opportunity to file a notice of appeal through 

postconviction relief. Id. at *1. The footnote stated, “[a]ppellant’s initial appeal was 

voluntarily dismissed as untimely filed. Appellant subsequently filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief based on his counsel’s failure to note a timely appeal, and he was given 

the right to file a belated notice of appeal.” Id. at *n.1. Neither party had raised any issue 

about jurisdiction before the Court of Special Appeals. Mr. Rosales petitioned this Court 

for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on March 6, 2018. 

Mr. Rosales presents one question for our review: 

1. Were the complainant’s prior convictions for committing violent crimes 

in aid of racketeering activity, i.e., for conspiracy to commit assault with 

a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering activity and threatening to 

commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering activity, admissible for 

purposes of impeachment under Maryland Rule 5-609? 

As explained more fully below, we answer yes. 

On August 28, 2018, after briefing this Court on the merits, the State raised for the 

first time a lack of appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Special Appeals and this Court and 
7

filed a Motion to Vacate and Remand with Instructions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. 

The State argued dismissal of this matter was mandatory and that the Court of Special 

Appeals should have never addressed the merits of this case. Mr. Rosales filed a response 

on September 4, 2018, arguing that the State waived any claim for lack of jurisdiction in 

this matter. Accordingly, we will also address the jurisdiction issue below. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The standard of appellate review of an evidentiary ruling turns on whether the trial 

judge’s ruling was based on a pure question of law, on a finding of fact, or on an evaluation 

of the admissibility of relevant evidence.” Brooks v. State, 439 Md. 698, 708 (2014). 

Whether or not a crime bears upon credibility or is an infamous crime under Maryland Rule 

5-609 is a question of law. State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 213 (1994). Questions of law 

are reviewed under the de novo standard. Brooks, 439 Md. at 708–09. Accordingly, we 

will review the trial court’s ruling on the evidence without any deference. 

DISCUSSION

A. Appellate Jurisdiction of this Court

In the State’s Motion to Vacate and Remand with Instructions to Dismiss for Lack 

of Jurisdiction, the State argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the 

consent order did not make the prerequisite findings that would warrant a court granting a 

belated opportunity to appeal as postconviction relief. Second, under Maryland Rule 4-

407, the consent order is not a final judgment. Mr. Rosales argues that the State waived 

any jurisdictional claim because the State did not raise the jurisdictional issue earlier and 

that the postconviction proceeding was sufficient under the Maryland Rules. For the 
8

following reasons, this Court concludes it has jurisdiction to reach the merits of this case 

and declines to vacate and remand this matter with instructions to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

“In Maryland, appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally created, is statutorily 

granted.” Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC, 412 Md. 555, 565 (2010)

(citing Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546 (2002); Kant v. Montgomery Cty., 365 Md. 

269, 273 (2001)). “[M]atters of jurisdiction are always before this [C]ourt and are 

exceptions to the general rule that we will consider only such questions as have been raised 

and decided below.” Carrier v. Crestar Bank, N.A., 316 Md. 700, 722 (1989) (quoting 

Webb v. Oxley, 226 Md. 339, 343 (1961)). Appellate jurisdiction is codified in § 12-301 

of the Courts and Judicial Proceeding Article (“Cts. & Jud. Proc.”) of the Maryland Code, 

which states in its entirety:

Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a 

final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right 

of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of 

original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the 

right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant 

may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been 

suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may 

cross-appeal from the final judgment. 

The statute contains no time provision for entry of an appeal. Cf. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-

401(e) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an appeal shall be taken 

by filing an order for appeal with the clerk of the District Court within 30 days from the 

date of the final judgment from which appealed.”) (illustrating a statutory time limitation

in the context of an appeal from a district court to a circuit court). 
9

Currently, no statute sets forth a time limitation for an appeal from a final judgment 

of a circuit court in a criminal matter such as this one. Instead, the time limitation is 

governed by the Maryland Rules. Maryland Rule 8-202(a) details the time limitation for a 

party to file an appeal from a final judgment in the circuit court. Specifically, the Rule 

states, in pertinent part, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice 

of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the 

appeal is taken.” Md. R. 8-202(a). 

This current scheme did not always exist. Until the adoption of the 1957 Maryland 

Code, there was a time limitation for appeals set forth in both statute and rules.

Specifically, the predecessor statute to the current appellate jurisdiction statute contained 

a time limitation to notice an appeal. Additionally, the Maryland Rules also contained 

different time provisions within the Rules for noticing an appeal based on the type of action, 

such as a criminal or a civil action, that was appealed. 

With the adoption of the 1957 Code, the thirty-day time limitation for appeals from 

a circuit court to an appellate court was eliminated from the statute. Compare Md. Code 

(1951), Art. 5 § 6 (“All appeals, or writs of errors, allowed from any judgment or 

determination of a court of law, to the Court of Appeals2 of this State, other than from 

decisions on questions arising under the insolvent law, shall be taken within thirty days 

from the date of such judgment or determination. . . .”) with Md. Code (1957), Art. 5 § 6 

(“Any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final decree, or order in the nature 

 

2 Maryland’s intermediate appellate court, the Court of Special Appeals, was established 

in 1966 and thus is not referenced in the statutes of the 1950s. 
10

of a final decree, entered by a court of equity.”). It is significant that from the 1957 Code

to present, no statute has set forth a time limit for an appeal in a case such as this one.

Thus, the General Assembly removed the time limitation for appeals in the 1957 

code and this Court exclusively adopted the time limitation as a part of Maryland Rule 

812.3 In a committee note to Maryland Rule 812, the Court’s Standing Committee on Rules 

of Practice and Procedure stated:

The committee invited attention to the fact that by this Rule the time for 

taking an appeal is uniformly made thirty days in all cases, civil as well as 

criminal. Since the adoption of this Rule a great many procedural provisions 

in statutes providing different times for appeal have been repealed. 

Thus far, this Court has failed to acknowledge this change in the statutory scheme.

4

We have continued to refer to the requirement of Maryland Rule 8-202(a) and its 

predecessors as “jurisdictional.” Therefore, if an appellant failed to comply with the thirtyday filing requirement, we would, in dismissing the appeal for that reason, frequently refer 

to a lack of “jurisdiction.”

Our prior case law evidences this reliance on statutory jurisdiction. In 1858, in 

Porter v. Timanus, this Court reviewed several orders and decrees from the Orphans Court 

for Howard County. 12 Md. 283 (1858). At the onset of the opinion, this Court declared 

two of the orders “not open for review” and dismissed them from the appeal “on the 

ground[s] that [the appeal of the orders] was not taken in thirty days, as required by the act 

 

3 This Rule is now Maryland Rule 8-202(a). 

4 We thank the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure for recently 

bringing this inconsistency to our attention. See Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & 

Procedure, No. 195, Notice of Proposed Rules Changes (2018). 
11

of 1818, ch. 204, sec. 1.” Id. In Porter, the thirty-day requirement was set forth in the 

statute. Therefore, a failure to comply with the statute divested this Court of authority to 

reach the merits of the appeal. 

Error arose when this Court began characterizing the thirty-day requirement as 

“jurisdictional” after the adoption of the 1957 Code. This language occurred in Houghton 

v. Cty. Com’rs. of Kent Cty., when this Court referred to the dismissal of an appeal under 

the Maryland Rule 1012, now Rule 8-202(a), as a “jurisdictional” rule.5 305 Md. 407, 413 

(1986) (“Consequently, the present appeal was taken more than thirty days from the final 

judgment of the circuit court. The requirement of Rule [8-202] and its predecessors, that 

an order of appeal be filed within thirty days of a final judgment, is jurisdictional; if the 

requirement is not met, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must be 

dismissed.”), superseded by Rule on other grounds as stated in Hiob v. Progressive Am. 

Ins. Co., 440 Md. 466 (2014). In Houghton, this Court used a string citation of the

“jurisdictional” precedent as far back as Porter to support the incorrect proposition that the 

thirty-day requirement in the Rules at that time was a “jurisdictional” rule. The use of the 

string citation failed to distinguish the cases from those that were decided after the statutory 

change. 

 

5 We note that prior to our decision in Houghton, this Court at times applied the Rule as a 

jurisdictional bar even though the specific term “jurisdiction” was not used. See e.g., 

Clinton Petroleum Servs., Inc. v. Norris, 271 Md. 665 (1974) (“This [Rule] is mandatory. 

Thus, we have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal. . . .”). 
12

Reliance on Houghton has continued. See, e.g., Griffin v. Lindsey, 444 Md. 278, 

285–86 (2015) (“The 30-day requirement for notices of appeal ‘is jurisdictional; if [it] is 

not met, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.’”)

(citing Houghton, 305 Md. at 413); Keys v. State, 195 Md. App. 19, 27–28 (2010) (citing 

Houghton, 305 Md. at 413) (“With respect to a notice of appeal, the requirement that it ‘be 

filed within thirty days of a final judgment is jurisdictional; if the requirement is not met, 

the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.’”). We now 

recognize that this interpretation of Maryland Rule 8-202(a) and its predecessors is 

incorrect in that we have failed to account for the 1957 Code adoption that removed the 

thirty-day requirement from the statute.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently clarified an interpretation of an

analogous federal statute in Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13

(2017). In Hamer, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined 

that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of an appeal because the appeal was untimely 

filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C), which limited the time

for filing an appeal in certain circumstances. Id. at 18. The Seventh Circuit stated the 

untimely filing mandated dismissal of the appeal. Id.

After a review of the issue, the Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s 

dismissal stating, “a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule. . . is not jurisdictional;

it is, instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not properly raised 

by the appellee.” Id. at 16. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the time limitation for 

an extension of time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule Appellate Procedure
13

4(a)(5)(C) was a claim-processing rule, subject to waiver or forfeiture, and not a 

jurisdictional statute requiring immediate dismissal. Id. at 22. 

The Supreme Court reasoned that only Congress may determine a federal court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 17. Therefore, a time limit in a court rule only qualifies 

as jurisdictional if Congress sets forth the limitation in statute. Id. “A time limit not 

prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory claim-processing rule, serving ‘to promote 

the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps 

at certain specified times.’” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)). 

The Court further explained: 

This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this 

distinction, “mischaracterize[ing] claim-processing rules or elements of a 

cause of action as jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that 

characterization was not central to the case, and thus did not require close 

analysis.” But prevailing precedent makes the distinction critical. Failure to 

comply with a jurisdictional time prescription, we have maintained, deprives 

a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal—a 

“drastic” result. The jurisdictional defect is not subject to waiver or forfeiture 

and may be raised at any time in the court of first instance and on direct 

appeal. In contrast to the ordinary operation of our adversarial system, courts 

are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their own 

initiative.

Id. (citations omitted). The mandatory claim-processing rules that the Courts promulgate 

on the other hand are less rigid. Id.

As explained above, some opinions of this Court have referred to the thirty-day time 

limitation in the Maryland Rules as “jurisdictional,” failing to recognize that the thirty-day 

requirement no longer appears in the statute. We now recognize that Maryland Rule 8-

202(a) is a claim-processing rule, and not a jurisdictional limitation on this Court. Despite 
14

this recognition, Maryland Rule 8-202(a) remains a binding rule on appellants, and this 

Court will continue to enforce the Rule. We are not concluding that it is inappropriate for a 

court to dismiss an untimely appeal. Rather, we are stating that the appropriate grounds for

dismissal of an untimely appeal is to dismiss for a failure to comply with the Maryland Rules, 

instead of for lack of jurisdiction. Further, as the Rule is not jurisdictional, a reviewing court must 

examine whether waiver or forfeiture applies to a belated challenge to an untimely appeal.

Proper characterization of Maryland Rule 8-202(a) as a claim-processing rule 

permits us to consider the basis for review of Mr. Rosales’ belated appeal. This Court has 

consistently recognized that a belated appeal can be granted as a postconviction remedy

for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Garrison v. State, 350 Md. 

128, 142–43 (1998) (“[W]hen an accused can show that appellate review of his conviction 

has been frustrated by his trial or appellate attorney’s inaction in failing to file timely an 

appeal that an accused has promptly and diligently requested be filed, or when, through no 

fault of his own, an accused’s desired appeal is not timely filed on his behalf, a belated 

appeal may be a proper remedy under post conviction procedures.”). 

Postconviction proceedings commence upon the filing of a petition for 

postconviction relief in the circuit court in which the defendant was convicted. Md. R. 4-

401(a). A hearing is promptly held on the petition “unless the parties stipulate that the facts 

stated in the petition are true and that the facts and applicable law justify the granting of 

relief.” Md. R. 4-406(a). Upon the conclusion of the hearing, “[t]he judge shall prepare 

and file or dictate into the record a statement setting forth separately each ground upon 

which the petition is based, the federal and state rights involved, the court’s ruling with 
15

respect to each ground, and the reasons for the action taken thereon.” Md. R. 4-407(a). 

Additionally, the judge shall issue “an order either granting or denying relief.” Md. R. 4-

407(b). “The statement and order constitute a final judgment when entered by the clerk.” 

Md. R. 4-407(d). 

In this case, the postconviction court did not follow the appropriate postconviction 

procedures. Mr. Rosales and the State entered into a consent agreement signed by the 

postconviction court to permit a belated appeal. A hearing was not held on the merits of 

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the postconviction court did not issue a

statement of reasons or order. Further, the consent order reserved Mr. Rosales’ right to 

refile a postconviction petition upon the conclusion of these appellate proceedings. 

Ordinarily, we would dismiss Mr. Rosales’ appeal for failure to comply with the 

Rule’s thirty-day deadline and the absence of the postconviction court’s proper findings 

under the Postconviction Act to grant a belated appeal. However, this Court believes it is 

evident from the record of the postconviction hearing that the State was conceding 

ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the failure of Mr. Rosales’ counsel to file 

a timely appeal. The record indicates that Mr. Rosales, the State, and the postconviction

court agreed that a belated appeal was a proper remedy. 

Further, this issue has proceeded through the appellate system without the State 

filing a motion under Maryland Rule 4-408 or objecting to a review on the merits by the

Court of Special Appeals. “[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is 

waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.” See Hobby v. 

State, 436 Md. 526, 542 (2014) (quoting State v. Jones, 138 Md. App. 178, 230 (2001), 
16

aff’d 379 Md. 704 (2004)). Where the State has failed to object to the entry of the consent 

order during the postconviction proceedings and has failed to raise this issue before the 

Court of Special Appeals, the State has effectively waived any objection to the inadequate 

postconviction proceedings. Finally, Maryland Rule 1-201(a) states, “[t]hese rules shall 

be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and elimination 

of unjustifiable expense and delay.”

For the reasons stated above, given the unique history of these proceedings and the 

apparent consent of all parties, this case presents a narrow circumstance in which we will 

consider the merits without the filing of a timely appeal or without the postconviction court 

following the appropriate postconviction process. Otherwise, a remand would inevitably 

result in the postconviction court making the appropriate findings under the Postconviction 

Act to permit Mr. Rosales to file a belated appeal, the appeal working its way up the 

appellate ladder, and this Court addressing the exact issue that was already briefed and 

argued before this Court. Therefore, we will reach the merits of this matter. We can take 

this step because, considering our above reconsideration of how the 30-day filing 

requirement relates to appellate jurisdiction, there is no jurisdictional impediment for us to 

do so. This is an exceptional circumstance, and this Court urges the circuit courts in the 

future to comply with the postconviction procedures outlined in Maryland Rule 4-401 et 

seq. 

B. Witness Impeachment pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-609

Maryland Rule 5-609 governs the admissibility of a witness’ prior conviction of a 

crime for impeachment purposes. The Rule states: 
17

(a) Generally. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, 

evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 

elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination

of the witness, but only if (1) the crime was an infamous crime or other crime 

relevant to the witness’s credibility and (2) the court determines that the 

probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of unfair 

prejudice to the witness or the objecting party. 

(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this Rule 

if a period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction, 

except as to a conviction for perjury for which no time limit applies.

(c) Other Limitations. Evidence of a conviction otherwise admissible under 

section (a) of this Rule shall be excluded if: 

(1) the conviction has been reversed or vacated; 

(2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon; or 

(3) an appeal or application for leave to appeal from the judgment of 

conviction is pending, or the time for noting an appeal or filing an 

application for leave to appeal has not expired. 

(d) Effect of Plea of Nolo Contendere. For purposes of this Rule, 

“conviction” includes a plea of nolo contendere followed by a sentence, 

whether or not the sentence is suspended. 

Rule 5-609 requires a three-part analysis before a court determines whether a witness’ prior 

conviction is admissible. 

First, the court must determine whether the crime is an “infamous crime or other 

crime relevant to the witness’ credibility.” Md. R. 5-609. “If a crime does not fall within 

one of the two categories, then it is inadmissible and the analysis ends.” Cure v. State, 421 

Md. 300, 324 (2011) (quoting State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 477–78 (1994)). “Infamous 

crimes include treason, common law felonies, and other offenses classified generally as 

crimen falsi.” State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 213 (1994). Crimen falsi includes crimes 

that have an element of deceitfulness, untruthfulness, or falsification and so bear directly 

on the witness’ propensity to testify truthfully, such as perjury, false statement, criminal 

fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense. Id. at 213 n.5. The common law felonies include 
18

“murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, burglary, larceny, arson, sodomy, and mayhem.” 

Cure, 421 Md. at 324 (quoting Robinson v. State, 4 Md. App. 515, 523 n.3 (1968)). 

Statutory felonies are not infamous crimes. State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 476 (2008)

(quoting Prout v. State, 311 Md. 348, 363 (1988)) (“[C]rimes, other than those that are 

infamous, whether misdemeanors or statutory felonies, fall into the class of lesser crimes 

and may or may not reflect one’s tendency to be truthful.”). 

As to credibility: 

To fall into the category of “other crimes relevant to credibility,” the crime 

itself, by its elements, must clearly identify the prior conduct of the witness 

that tends to show that he is unworthy of belief. Moreover, a crime tends to 

show that the offender is unworthy of belief, if the perpetrator “lives a life of 

secrecy” and engages in “dissembling in the course of [the crime], being 

prepared to say whatever is required by the demands of the moment, whether 

the truth or a lie.”

Anderson v. State, 227 Md. App. 329, 339 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 464 (2008)) (citing Washington v. State, 191 Md. App. 48, 82 

(2010)). 

After the classification of the conviction, the court determines whether the 

conviction is more than fifteen years old. Cure, 421 Md. at 324. Finally, the court balances 

the probative value of the conviction against its potential for unfair prejudice. Id. at 325. 

If the conviction is admissible, “the name of the conviction, the date of the conviction, and 

the sentence imposed” is introduced. Giddens, 335 Md. at 222. 

In this matter, the trial court excluded the convictions based on the initial step,

finding that the underlying substantive offense of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s prior 

convictions were general crimes of violence that were inadmissible for impeachment
19

purposes. Mr. Hernandez-Melendez was convicted in the Federal District Court in the 

District of Columbia of (1) conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon in aid 

of racketeering, and (2) threatening to commit a crime of violence in aid of racketeering in 

violation of Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959. Crimes 

committed under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 are commonly classified as “VICAR” crimes. See, e.g., 

United States v. Candelario-Santana, 834 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. 

Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 993 (10th Cir. 2014).

Neither party contends Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions fall under the scope 

of “infamous crimes” under Maryland Rule 5-609. Rather, Mr. Rosales argues that Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions are admissible as relevant to credibility for witness 

impeachment. 

This is not the first case in which we have been asked to clarify the limits of other 

crimes relevant to the witnesses’ credibility. State v. Giddens is the seminal Maryland case 

on this topic. 335 Md. 205 (1994). In Giddens, we resolved “whether a three-year old 

conviction for distribution of cocaine may be used to impeach a witness’ credibility under 

[Maryland Rule 5-609].” Id. at 207. In that case, the issue before the jury was “purely one 

of credibility.” Id. at 208. The State sought to introduce evidence of a prior conviction for 

distribution of cocaine to undercut his credibility. 

We concluded that convictions for drug manufacturing, distribution, or possession 

with intent to distribute involved:

A person who has committed crimes that posed grave danger to the fabric of 

society, that only could have been carried on furtively, and that required him 
20

to take great pains to conceal his conduct, would probably not be adverse to 

concealing the truth if it is to his advantage to do so.

 

Id. at 217 (quoting Carter v. State, 80 Md. App. 686, 694 (1989)). The Court used this 

reasoning to distinguish the narcotics trafficker from the mere possessor. We determined 

that “an individual convicted of cocaine distribution would be willing to lie under oath.” 

Id. 

We reached our conclusion by parsing the motivations of one who uses drugs 

recreationally and one who surreptitiously profits from their distribution and use by others. 

We determined a drug dealer “lives a life of secrecy and dissembling in the course of [his] 

activity . . . .” Id. (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 (2d Cir. 1977)). The 

dealer’s profession, by nature, necessitates being “prepared to say whatever is required by 

the demands of the moment” to evade detection and maintain his criminal enterprise. Id. 

Thus, we held that a prior conviction for distribution of cocaine is admissible to impeach a 

witness’ credibility. Id. 

Giddens draws the boundary line between the dishonesty inherent in “all violations 

of the law” and the extraordinary dishonesty that is a crucial characteristic of those 

engaging in particular offenses. Id. at 215. The latter is demarcated by those acts which 

“pose[] grave danger to the fabric of society”; 

“only could have been carried on furtively”; required “great pains to conceal”; necessitate 

“a life of secrecy and dissembling”; and involve being “prepared to say whatever is 

required by the demands of the moment.” Id. at 217. 
21

As a matter of first impression, we are asked to determine whether one who 

“murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, [or] commits assault 

resulting in serious bodily injury,” or threatens, attempts, or conspires to do so, in order to 

gain entrance to or increase standing in an enterprise he or she knows to be engaged in 

racketeering activity is an impeachable offense.6 Mr. Rosales urges us to reach the same 

conclusion about individuals who commit VICAR offenses as we did in Giddens of those 

individuals who distribute narcotics. He argues that like narcotics distribution, all 

individuals involved in RICO enterprises would also be prepared to say whatever is 

required of the moment, whether a truth or a lie. The State argues a VICAR conviction 

does not have any bearing on a witness’ credibility simply because the violent act was 

performed in relation to racketeering activity. The State contends “racketeering activity” 

is a RICO predicate act and RICO predicate acts run the gamut from murder to making 

unlawful payments or loans to labor organizations. Given the wide net of conduct captured 

 

6

In In re Gary T., the Court of Special Appeals examined whether a prior conviction for 

conspiracy to distribute marijuana could be admissible for impeachment. 222 Md. App. 

374, 377 (2015). In Gary T, the defendant sought to impeach the victim witness by 

showing the victim had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Id. The trial 

court excluded the evidence, concluding the evidence was not an impeachable offense and 

that the probative value would not outweigh any prejudice to the witness. Id. at 386. The 

Court of Special Appeals held that a prior conviction for conspiracy to distribute a 

controlled dangerous substance may be used as impeachment evidence. Id. In reaching 

this conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals determined, “[i]f, for purposes of Rule 5-609, 

the crime that the witness had agreed to commit is an infamous one or one that is relevant 

to the witness’ credibility and thus would qualify as an impeachable offense, the conspiracy 

to commit that crime should as well.” Id. at 385. We agree. In re Gary T. instructs us to 

examines the underlying offense of the conspiracy to determine whether the conspiracy 

conviction is admissible. Therefore, the fact that Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s convictions 

were for conspiracy do not alter our analysis. 
22

in the term racketeering activity, the actual conduct of the witness is unknown if presented 

to a jury. 

We agree with Mr. Rosales. In reaching this conclusion, it is important to review 

the purpose behind 18 U.S.C. § 1959 and the elements that must be established to be 

convicted of such an offense. In 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed the Comprehensive 

Crime Control Act into law. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 

98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). Among other changes, the law amended the Interstate Travel 

in Aid of Racketeering statute to include the VICAR language, now codified at 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1959. At that time, the Senate asserted that “the need for Federal jurisdiction [was] clear, 

in view of the Federal Government’s strong interest . . . in suppressing the activities of 

organized criminal enterprises . . .” S. Rep. No. 98-255, at 305 (1983). Most pertinent were 

such enterprises as “organized crime ‘families’” (i.e., the Mafia) and “legitimate business 

organizations” engaged in activities such as mail fraud and illegal distribution of controlled 

substances. Id. at 307. 

The elements of Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959 

(2017) provide, in relevant part, as follows: 

(a) Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a 

promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise 

engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or 

maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in racketeering 

activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, 

commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or threatens to 

commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of 

any State or the United States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be 

punished[:]
23

(4) for threatening to commit a crime of violence, by imprisonment for not 

more than five years or a fine under this title, or both;

(6) for attempting or conspiring to commit a crime involving maiming, 

assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 

by imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine. . .under this title, or 

both. 

“Racketeering activity” is defined as set forth in § 1961, The Racketeer Influenced and 

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1) (2017). Specifically, 

“racketeering activity” is: 

(A) [A]ny act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, 

robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a 

controlled substance or listed chemical . . . which is chargeable under State 

law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; and (B)

[through G] any act which is indictable under [several provisions of title 18, 

including, but not limited to, crimes related to bribery, counterfeiting, 

embezzlement from pension and welfare funds, fraud, tampering with a 

witness, and forgery]. 

 

18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2017). These are commonly referred to as RICO “predicate acts.” See 

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 497 n.2 (2000). “Enterprise” is defined as “any partnership, 

corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 

associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which 

affect, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2) (2017).

The government must prove elements concerning both the enterprise and the 

defendant beyond a reasonable doubt to successfully prosecute an individual under § 1959. 

First, regarding the enterprise, the government must show: (a) the existence of an 

enterprise; (b) that the enterprise engaged in, or affected, interstate or foreign commerce; 

and (c) that the enterprise engaged in racketeering activity. Next, regarding the defendant, 
24

the government must first prove that he or she committed—or threatened, attempted, or 

conspired to commit—a predicate offense. Further, the defendant must have committed 

the predicate offense either: (i) as consideration for the receipt of anything of pecuniary 

value, or (ii) for the purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or increasing the position 

in, the charged enterprise. The charged individual must also act with the mens rea 

necessary for a conviction under § 1959. Specifically, the individual must act with the 

purpose of receiving something of pecuniary value from the enterprise or with the purpose 

of joining, increasing, or maintaining his standing, or that of another in the racketeering 

enterprise. 

Upon a review of the elements, VICAR offenses strike at the heart of what it means 

to “live[] a life of secrecy and dissembling[,] . . . being prepared to say whatever is required 

by the demands of the moment, whether the truth or a lie.” State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 

217 (1994). The criminal enterprises central to any VICAR offense are specifically formed 

to subvert and replace societal norms, reshape existing power structures to be under the 

control of criminal bodies, and engage in furtive criminal activity that, in turn, destabilizes 

the very communities in which they operate. 

Paralleling Giddens, this Court must parse the difference between one who commits 

simple assault and one who commits assault with express purpose of aiding an enterprise 

engaged in racketeering. Typically, this Court has held that a conviction for an act of 

violence is not relevant to a witness’ credibility and may not be used to impeach a witness. 

See State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 512 (1986) (holding battery was non-impeachable 

because battery “is so vague that the misconduct cannot be readily ascertained”), 
25

superseded by Statute on other grounds as stated in Watts v. State, 457 Md. 419 (2018); 

Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701 (1981) (holding indecent exposure was not relevant to 

credibility); State v. Jones, 217 Md. App. 676 (2014) (holding conviction for attempted 

second-degree murder is a non-impeachable offense). Convictions for acts of violence are 

non-impeachable under Rule 5-609 because acts of violence “generally have little or no 

direct bearing on honesty and veracity.” State v. Duckett, 306 Md. 503, 512 (1986) (citing 

Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 343, 347 (1967), cert denied 390 U.S. 1029 

(1968)). Rather, acts of violence typically “result from a short temper, a combative nature, 

extreme provocation, or other causes.” Id. (quoting Gordon, 127 U.S. App. D.C. at 347). 

In considering VICAR offenses, the requisite mens rea is unlike that of typical acts 

of violence. As previously stated, an individual convicted of a VICAR offense must act in 

consideration for something of pecuniary value or with the purpose of gaining entrance 

into, maintaining a position in, or increasing position in the enterprise to be convicted under 

§ 1959. VICAR offenses are different from other acts of violence which we have 

previously held are not impeachable. Typically, one who aids a racketeering enterprise 

will be living “a life of secrecy and dissembling,” “being prepared to say whatever is 

required by the demands of the moment,” and “pos[ing] [a] grave danger to the fabric of 

society . . . .” Giddens, 335 Md. at 217. 

“At the very heart of our determination. . . is the kinds of conduct which give rise 

to this offense.” State v. Westpoint, 404 Md. 455, 480 (2008). The association with others 

in the enterprise in a concerted effort to advance or cover up racketeering activity, not the 

predicate offense, that makes VICAR crimes inherently deceitful. The criminal conduct at 
26

issue is measured, planned, and entered into, not out of haste, but as a critical element of a 

person’s membership in a racketeering enterprise. Further, much of this conduct requires 

secrecy and tears at the fabric of society.7 Therefore, we conclude that, pursuant to the 

standard enumerated in Giddens, VICAR offenses are within the “eligible universe” of 

offenses which may be used to impeach a witness’ credibility. 

While some racketeering activity under § 1961 may not qualify as an infamous 

crime or be otherwise relevant to a witness’ credibility, on balance, the great majority of 

enumerated offenses meet these criteria. Many of the predicate and racketeering offenses 

engaged in are admissible under either the “other crimes relevant to credibility” or 

“infamous crimes.”8 Further, gang and drug distribution activity account for over 60% of 

the racketeering activity in criminal RICO cases. See Pamela Bucy Pierson, RICO Trends: 

From Gangsters to Class Actions, 65 S.C.L. Rev. 213, 221 (2013). On balance, 

 

7 For example, see United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 620 (4th Cir. 2015) (enterprise 

was the Latin Kings gang which was involved in attempted murder, armed robbery, and 

bank fraud); United States v. Basciano, 599 F.3d 184, 194–95 (2d Cir. 2010) (enterprise 

was the Bonanno crime family, which was engaged in the solicitation of murder and drug 

distribution, among other things); United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 992 (8th Cir. 

2004) (enterprise was a gang known as the “Rolling 60’s Crips” associated for the common 

purpose of selling cocaine); United States v. Phillips, 239 F.3d 829, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(enterprise was a street gang known as “Dawg Life” that engaged in drug trafficking); 

United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 772–73 (4th Cir. 1998) (enterprise was a drug 

distribution ring involved in murder and the sale of heroin); United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 

997, 1003–04 (4th Cir. 1994) (enterprise was the Fates Northern Virginia chapter of a 

motorcycle gang engaged in drug distribution); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 

375 (2d Cir. 1992) (enterprise was a “wholesale and retail narcotics organization known as 

the ‘Unknown Organization’”); United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981) 

(enterprise was the Office of Senator in the South Carolina legislature engaged in bribery).

8 For example, murder, under the infamous crimes prong is admissible. 
27

Hernandez-Melendez’s VICAR conviction is certainly within the “eligible universe” of 

those convictions admissible to impeach a witness’ credibility, especially when viewed 

with an eye toward the racketeering activity most frequently engaged in by criminal 

enterprises. We see no principled rationale to distinguish this case from Giddens. Thus, 

Giddens should control here. 

Moving on to the second and third steps of the Maryland Rule 5-609 analysis, the 

second step requires that we ensure that the conviction is less than fifteen years old, has 

not been reversed or vacated, was not the subject of a pardon, and no appeal from the 

judgment is pending. See Md. R. 5-609(b)-(c). In this case, the conviction occurred in 

2011 and was therefore less than fifteen years old. None of the other potential issues are 

applicable here. 

Under the third step, the Court must ensure that the probative value of the conviction 

outweighs its prejudicial impact. Md. R. 5-609(a)(2). The trial court never conducted this 

balancing test because it concluded that the conviction failed the first step and was not 

probative of credibility. The five factors relevant to assessing whether probative value 

outweighs prejudicial impact include: “(1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) 

the point in time of the conviction and the [witness’] subsequent history; (3) the similarity 

between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the [witness’] 

testimony; and (5) the centrality of the [witness’] credibility.” Burnside v. State, 459 Md. 

657, 675 n.8 (2018) (quoting Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 717 (1995)). 

Regarding the first factor, because VICAR convictions substantially impact the 

witness’ credibility, explained in detail above, such a conviction has significant 
28

impeachment value. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of admission. Factor two and three, 

are not particularly relevant here as Mr. Hernandez-Melendez was the victim, not the 

defendant. Factors four and five weigh heavily in favor of admitting the conviction. “[T]he 

potential for unfair prejudice is less . . . where the witness to be impeached with evidence 

of a prior conviction is not the defendant.” King v. State, 407 Md. 682, 704 (2009). Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez was the victim of the attack and the only witness, and he only 

recognized Mr. Rosales as one of his attackers because of their previous interaction in the 

MS-13 gang. His credibility was central to the prosecution. Therefore, we conclude the 

factors weigh in favor of admission. 

The final issue we must address is whether failing to allow impeachment with the 

criminal convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Rosales argues that the 

case turned heavily on Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s credibility. He asserts that the 

exclusion of any evidence bearing on Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s credibility was harmful 

error. The State disagrees, noting that during the trial on numerous occasions, Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez stated that he was in prison and described instances of his conduct 

relating to his involvement with MS-13. The only thing the jury would have learned from 

the admission of the convictions, the State argues, is the name of crimes for which Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez was convicted. 

Typically, to determine whether the error committed by the trial court was harmless, 

we apply the following test: 

[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing 

court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a 

belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the 
29

verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. 

Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is not a reasonable 

possibility that the evidence complained of—whether erroneously admitted 

or excluded—may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict. 

Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976). Moreover, this Court has recognized that “where 

credibility is an issue and, thus, the jury’s assessment of who is telling the truth is critical, 

an error affecting the jury’s ability to assess a witness’ credibility is not harmless error.” 

Dionas v. State, 436 Md. 97, 110 (2013). 

In Devincentz v. State, we reviewed what we termed “he said she said” cases, turning 

“entirely on the relative credibility of the defendant and the accuser.” 460 Md. 518, 561–

62 (2018). There, the jury was prevented from considering testimony from the victim’s 

step-brother that the victim told her alleged abuser that she could do things “that would get 

him in trouble.” Id. at 553. Ultimately, we decided that excluding this evidence was not 

harmless “because [the] errors affected the jury’s ability to assess [the victim’s] credibility. 

Id. at 562. Rosales’ jury, on the other hand, had ample opportunity to learn of Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez’s suspect credibility. 

In the present case, the defense counsel referred to Mr. Hernandez-Melendez as “a 

convicted felon” in his opening state and as a “gangster” throughout the case. Mr. 

Hernandez-Melendez testified and admitted on numerous occasions to his membership in 

the MS-13 gang. Further, he admitted to engaging in criminal activity with the gang. 

Specifically, he stated that he would “attack other gangs.” Mr. Hernandez-Melendez also 

told the jury that he had been “in jail for about four years” which he served pursuant to the 
30

VICAR convictions. He also stated that he was on probation both at the time of the attack 

and during his current testimony. 

The rationale in favor of admitting the VICAR convictions, as stated above, is that 

criminal activity in aid of racketeering enterprise is probative of credibility. If the jury 

already knew that Mr. Hernandez-Melendez was involved with an enterprise engaged in 

racketeering—the MS-13 gang—and that he was incarcerated for this association, knowing 

the name, date, and sentence imposed would add little value to the jury’s consideration of 

the witness’ credibility. 

For these reasons, the jury had the benefit of sufficient information to evaluate and 

determine the victim’s credibility. While erroneous, there is not a reasonable possibility 

that excluding impeachment evidence in the form of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez’s VICAR 

convictions contributed to the guilty verdict against Rosales. We conclude the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

CONCLUSION

Maryland Rule 8-202 requires an appellant to file a notice of appeal within thirty 

days of entry of a judgment. This is not a limit on an appellate court’s jurisdiction but is 

more properly classified as a claim processing rule. Properly understood, we are not barred

from reaching the merits of this case. As to the merits, we hold that Mr. HernandezMelendez’s prior VICAR convictions for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous 

weapon in aid of racketeering, and threatening to commit a crime of violence in aid of 

racketeering are admissible for impeachment purposes under Maryland Rule 5-609. The

trial court erred in excluding the witness’ prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The 
31

trial court should not have restricted cross-examination of Mr. Hernandez-Melendez. 

However, we hold further that the exclusion of these convictions was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Therefore, Mr. Rosales is not granted a new trial. 

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF

SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY

PETITIONER.