Opinion issued April 30, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00633-CV

———————————

ELI SASSON, ON BEHALF OF 78 ACRES, LP AND 

INWOOD PARTNERS, LP, Appellant

V.

ANDREW SCHATTE, MICHAEL SURFACE, TOWN & COUNTRY 

VENTURES, LLC, TOWN & COUNTRY VENTURES II, INC., THE 

KEYSTONE GROUP F/K/A TOWN & COUNTRY VENTURES, INC., HC 

5815, LLC, DAVID BLUMHARDT, AND GERALD EVERSOLE, Appellees

On Appeal from the 189th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2010-08868

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Eli Sasson, on behalf of 78 Acres, LP and Inwood Partners, LP, appeals a 

summary judgment in favor of Andrew Schatte, Michael Surface, Town & Country 
2

Ventures, LLC, Town & Country Ventures II, Inc., The Keystone Group f/k/a 

Town & Country Ventures, Inc., HC 5815, LLC, David Blumhardt, and Gerald 

Eversole. Sasson sued appellees for fraud, tortious interference, and conspiracy, 

alleging that Eversole, a Harris County commissioner, was improperly influenced 

by the remaining appellees to ensure that appellee Surface, instead of Sasson, 

received an office space contract from Harris County. Appellees moved for 

summary judgment on all of Sasson’s claims, and the trial court granted the 

motions. We affirm.

Background

The bid process

In March 2005, Harris County issued a request for proposal (“RFP”) for the 

purchase or lease of property to house its Juvenile Probation office, Public Health 

and Environmental Services Clinic, and Women and Infant Care Clinic. 

According to Sasson’s deposition testimony, which was submitted as summaryjudgment evidence, he was contacted by Pat Pollan of Yancey Hausman & 

Associates, Inc., an independent broker, on behalf of Harris County. Pollan

requested that Sasson submit a proposal for Sasson’s property on Antoine Drive. 

Sasson testified that he bought the property next door to his original property in 

order to submit the proposal because the RFP required more square footage than he 

originally owned. 
3

Proposals were due by 3:00 p.m. on April 4, 2005. Sasson testified that he 

arrived at Yancey Hausman’s office on time, but that the receptionist waited to 

stamp his proposal until after 3:00. Sasson averred in his affidavit in opposition to 

summary judgment that his proposal was rejected for being submitted late, but that 

after he complained, Harris County restarted the bid process. Two proposals were 

submitted in response to the first RFP–Sasson’s, and a proposal from HC 5815, 

LLC, an entity from which Surface was entitled to receive all profits. According to 

Sasson, he did not know that Surface was involved in the competing proposal 

because his name did not appear on any of the proposal documents. 

Sasson averred that he felt that Pollan had not given him a fair chance and 

asked for and received assurances that Pollan would not be involved in the second 

RFP. Harris County issued a second RFP, with a proposal deadline of October 24, 

2005, to be run by the Harris County Purchasing Department instead of Yancey 

Hausman. Once again, two proposals were submitted–one from Sasson and one 

from HC 5815. The Purchasing Department appointed an Evaluation Committee 

to review the proposals, and the committee recommended to the Facilities and 

Property Management Department (“FPM”) that HC 5815’s proposal be accepted. 

FPM in turn recommended to the Harris County Purchasing Department that 

Harris County accept HC 5815’s proposal, and the Purchasing Department 
4

recommended to the Harris County Commissioners Court that it award the contract 

to HC 5815. The Commissioners Court voted to award the contract to HC 5815. 

Sasson averred that he was suspicious about improper influence in the 

bidding process because he believed his proposal was superior. He inquired about

the process with the Harris County Attorney’s Office and the District Attorney’s 

Office. He averred that both offices told him that no improprieties were found. 

The lawsuit

Sasson averred that in March 2008, he was contacted by a news reporter 

investigating claims that Surface had improperly influenced Harris County 

officials, including Eversole, in order to obtain Harris County contracts. The 

reporter told Sasson that the bid process in which he participated was part of the 

investigation, and Sasson ultimately met with the FBI to discuss the bid process. 

Eversole and Surface were indicted on charges that Surface bribed Eversole to 

obtain Harris County contracts, including the contract that is the subject of this 

case, but the charges were later dismissed. Eversole and Surface each pleaded 

guilty to a charge of lying to a federal official, and Surface pleaded guilty to 

falsifying a tax return for improperly deducting an expense associated with 

Eversole as a business expense. 
5

In February 2010, Sasson sued Surface and most of the other appellees for 

fraud, tortious interference with a prospective business relationship, and 

conspiracy. A year later, Sasson added Eversole as a defendant.

Eversole moved for summary judgment, arguing among other things that 

Sasson’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that he was entitled to 

immunity. The appellees also filed two joint motions for no-evidence summary 

judgment. The trial court granted the appellees’ motions.

Discussion

In his first, third, and fourth issues, Sasson contends that the trial court erred 

in granting summary judgment because (1) he raised a fact issue regarding the 

applicability of the statute of limitations, (2) he presented more than a scintilla of 

evidence of each challenged element of his causes of action, and (3) he raised more 

than a scintilla of evidence of causation. Sasson also contends that the trial court 

erred in granting summary judgment in Eversole’s favor because Eversole is not 

entitled to immunity. We address Sasson’s third issue regarding causation first, 

because it is dispositive.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. 

Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). If a trial court grants summary 

judgment without specifying the grounds for granting the motion, we must uphold 
6

the trial court’s judgment if any of the grounds are meritorious. Beverick v. Koch 

Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. 

denied). When a party has filed both a traditional and no-evidence summary 

judgment motion, we typically first review the propriety of the summary judgment 

under the no-evidence standard. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Ford Motor Co. v. 

Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). If the no-evidence summary 

judgment was properly granted, we need not reach arguments under the traditional 

motion for summary judgment. Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d at 600. When 

reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the 

nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in 

the nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 

(Tex. 2005).

To prevail on a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the movant 

must establish that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the 

nonmovant’s claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at 

trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 523–24 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). The burden then shifts to the 

nonmovant to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to each 

of the elements specified in the motion. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 

572, 582 (Tex. 2006); Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 524.
7

B. Applicable Law and Analysis

Appellees asserted in their summary-judgment motion that Sasson’s claims 

could not survive summary judgment because there was no evidence that any

alleged improper conduct attributable to Eversole was the cause in fact of Sasson’s 

damages. Among other things, the appellees argued that there was no evidence 

that the alleged bribery of Eversole, who had only one of five votes, caused the 

other members of the Commissioners Court to vote to award the contract to HC 

5815.1

 

Both tortious interference with prospective business relationships and fraud 

require the plaintiff to demonstrate cause in fact. S & I Mgmt., Inc. v. Choi, 331 

S.W.3d 849, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); COC Servs., Ltd. 

v. CompUSA, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 654, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). 

To prevail on a tortious interference with prospective business relationships claim, 

the plaintiff must prove that the alleged tortious conduct constitutes a cause in fact 

that prevented the prospective business relationship from occurring. COC Servs., 

150 S.W.3d at 679. Likewise, to prevail on a fraud claim, the plaintiff must prove 

that the fraud was the proximate cause of his injury, and the components of 

proximate causation are cause in fact and foreseeability. S & I Mgmt., 331 S.W.3d 

at 856. 

 1 The four commissioners voted in favor of the proposal and the county judge voted 

against it. 
8

“[C]ause-in-fact . . . is satisfied by proof that (1) the act was a substantial 

factor in bringing about the harm at issue, and (2) absent the act (‘but for’ the act), 

the harm would not have occurred.” HMC Hotel Props. II Ltd. P’ship v. KeystoneTexas Prop. Holding Corp., 439 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Tex. 2014) (citing Akin, Gump, 

Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat’l Dev. and Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 

122 (Tex. 2009)). “These elements cannot be established by mere conjecture, 

guess, or speculation.” Id. (citing Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 

S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)). “If the defendant’s negligence merely furnished a 

condition that made the injuries possible, there can be no cause in fact.” W. Invs., 

Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005). 

Thus, Sasson bore the burden to adduce evidence raising a genuine issue of 

material fact as to causation with respect to his fraud and tortious interference 

claims. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582; Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 524. The 

parties agree that only the Commissioners Court could award the contract. Sasson 

contends that he raised a fact issue on causation by adducing evidence that 

Surface’s property was in Eversole’s precinct and that Eversole testified that he 

would defer to the other commissioners regarding the county’s purchase or lease of 

property in their respective precincts. Thus, Sasson argued in his response to the 

no-evidence motion, and argues on appeal, that he was entitled to an inference that 

the other commissioners similarly deferred to Eversole and voted to approve the 
9

award of the contract to HC 5815 because the property was in Eversole’s precinct 

and Eversole approved it. 

But evidence regarding how Eversole would vote in a hypothetical scenario, 

without more, is no evidence that the other commissioners awarded the contract to

HC 5815 out of deference to Eversole because the property subject to the contract 

was located in his precinct. Sasson correctly argues that he is entitled to all 

reasonable inferences, see Valence Operating Co., 164 S.W.3d at 661, but here, he 

is urging us to hold that he may raise a fact issue by stacking one inference upon 

another. See HMC Hotel, 439 S.W.3d at 913 (cause in fact may not be established 

by conjecture, guess, or speculation). 

Sasson adduced no evidence that the three other commissioners who voted 

to award the contract to HC 5815 did so out of deference to Eversole because the 

property was located in his precinct and he wanted it awarded to HC 5815. See 

Ford Motor Co., 135 S.W.3d at 601 (“Evidence that is so slight as to make any 

inference a guess is in legal effect no evidence.”). Thus, taking all of Sasson’s 

evidence as true and assuming, as Sasson alleges, that Surface bribed Eversole to 

win the contract, Sasson adduced no evidence raising a fact issue regarding 

whether the three other commissioners who also voted to award the contract to HC 

5815 were improperly influenced by the alleged bribe or anything else. See id. 

The votes of the three other commissioners were sufficient to award the contract to 
10

HC 5815, regardless of Eversole’s vote. Accordingly, Sasson failed to raise a fact 

issue on causation. See Mack Trucks, Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582; Hahn, 321 S.W.3d 

at 524.

Because Sasson failed to raise a fact issue on an essential element of his 

fraud and tortious interference claims, his civil conspiracy claim must also fail. 

Civil conspiracy is a derivative tort; that is, a defendant’s liability for conspiracy is 

dependent on his participation in an underlying tort for which the plaintiff seeks to 

hold at least one of the named defendants liable. Preston Gate, LP v. Bukaty, 248 

S.W.3d 892, 898 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Thus, if summary judgment 

is proper on the underlying tort claims—here, fraud and tortious interference—then 

it is also proper on Sasson’s conspiracy claim. See id.; see also Grant Thornton 

LLP v. Prospect High Income Fund, 314 S.W.3d 913, 930–31 (Tex. 2010). 

We overrule Sasson’s third issue. Because we have concluded that the trial 

court properly could have granted summary judgment on all of Sasson’s claims 

based on causation, we do not reach Sasson’s remaining issues.
11

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Rebeca Huddle

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.