I 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 5370 

To provide for restrictions related to nuclear cooperation with the People’s 

Republic of China, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 26, 2016 

Mr. SHERMAN (for himself and Mr. FORTENBERRY) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period to be 

subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration 

of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To provide for restrictions related to nuclear cooperation 

with the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘U.S.-China Nuclear 

5 Cooperation and Nonproliferation Act of 2016’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) A report issued in 2001 by the Department 

2 of Defense found that ‘‘China supplied Pakistan 

3 with nuclear material and expertise and has provided 

4 critical assistance in the production of Pakistan’s 

5 nuclear facilities’’. China is also alleged to have pro6 vided Pakistan with 50 kilograms of highly enriched 

7 uranium, and designs for a nuclear weapon. 

8 (2) An unclassified report submitted to Con9 gress in 2011 by the Director of National Intel10 ligence found that Chinese entities ‘‘continue to sup11 ply a variety of missile-related items to multiple cus12 tomers, including Iran and Pakistan’’. Previous re13 ports by the Director of National Intelligence have 

14 confirmed that Chinese entities have provided sup15 port for the missile program of North Korea. 

16 (3) China has failed to bring to justice Li 

17 Fangwei, also known as Karl Lee, who has been in18 dicted in the United States on charges of providing 

19 sensitive missile technology to Iran. According to a 

20 report from the Congressional Research Service, 

21 ‘‘concerns persist about Chinese willingness as well 

22 as ability to detect and prevent illicit transfers’’ of 

23 dual-use and sensitive nuclear and missile items. 

24 (4) At a May 12, 2015, hearing, members of 

25 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 


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1 raised concerns that China may have diverted to its 

2 nuclear submarine program reactor cooling pumps 

3 produced by the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, thereby 

4 bolstering the stealth of its submarines, and vio5 lating the Previous Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 

6 (as that term is defined in section 3(4)). 

7 (5) Similarly, at a July 16, 2015, hearing be8 fore two subcommittees of the Committee on For9 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, wit10 nesses testified that China had likely diverted tech11 nology from its civilian nuclear program to its mili12 tary programs, and had failed to undertake suffi13 cient efforts to prevent the transfer of sensitive dual 

14 use and other controlled items. 

15 (6) China has announced plans to provide Paki16 stan with nuclear reactors, in addition to those 

17 China had already agreed to construct prior to 2004, 

18 in violation of its 2004 commitments to the Nuclear 

19 Suppliers Group (NSG). 

20 (7) Five members of the Chinese People’s Lib21 eration Army have been indicted in the United 

22 States on charges of hacking into the computer net23 works of Westinghouse and stealing United States 

24 intellectual property, including the design of nuclear 

25 power plants. 


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1 (8) China has announced plans to export nu2 clear power plants based on technology acquired le3 gally from Westinghouse, one of China’s primary 

4 commercial partners under its current and previous 

5 nuclear cooperation agreements with the United 

6 States. While China has committed not to export 

7 United States-origin technology without a marketing 

8 license from Westinghouse, there is no definition of 

9 ‘‘United States-origin technology’’ in statute or reg10 ulation, thereby complicating efforts by the United 

11 States to control the transfer of United States-origin 

12 nuclear technology. 

13 (9) China General Nuclear Power Company, a 

14 state-owned nuclear power provider, has been in15 dicted in the United States on charges of unlawfully 

16 producing special nuclear material outside the 

17 United States without the authorization of the De18 partment of Energy. 

19 (10) China’s plans to reprocess United States20 origin spent nuclear fuel raises the risk that China 

21 could divert plutonium to military purposes, thereby 

22 enabling it to produce additional nuclear weapons 

23 that threaten the United States and its allies. 

24 (11) Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz told the 

25 Wall Street Journal, in Beijing on March 17, 2016, 


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1 that the United States does not ‘‘support large-scale 

2 reprocessing’’, and China’s plan to proceed with a 

3 commercial-scale reprocessing facility ‘‘certainly isn’t 

4 a positive in terms of nonproliferation’’. 

5 (12) China’s pursuit of commercial plutonium 

6 reprocessing will increase the likelihood that Japan 

7 expands its own commercial reprocessing program, 

8 and that South Korea will increase efforts to initiate 

9 such a program of its own. Growing stockpiles of 

10 plutonium in East Asia increase the chances of mili11 tary diversion and theft, thereby raising the risk of 

12 nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and inter13 state nuclear conflict. It is in the interest of the 

14 United States to prevent the stockpiling of pluto15 nium in East Asia. 

16 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

17 In this Act: 

18 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT19 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com20 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Relations 

21 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

22 of the House of Representatives. 

23 (2) CHINA.—The term ‘‘China’’ means the Peo24 ple’s Republic of China. 


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1 (3) CHINESE PERSON.—The term ‘‘Chinese 

2 person’’ means— 

3 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na4 tional of China; and 

5 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

6 China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of 

7 the Government of China. 

8 (4) PREVIOUS NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREE9 MENT.—The term ‘‘Previous Nuclear Cooperation 

10 Agreement’’ means the Agreement for Cooperation 

11 Between the Government of the United States of 

12 America and the Government of the People’s Repub13 lic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear 

14 Energy, concluded July 23, 1985. 

15 (5) UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘United 

16 States’’ means the several States, the District of Co17 lumbia, and any territory or possession of the 

18 United States. 

19 (6) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

20 ‘‘United States person’’ means any United States 

21 citizen, any alien lawfully admitted to the United 

22 States for permanent residence, any entity organized 

23 under the laws of the United States or any jurisdic24 tion within the United States, and any person in the 

25 United States. 


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1 (7) UNITED STATES-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERA2 TION AGREEMENT.—The term ‘‘United States-China 

3 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement’’ means the Agree4 ment for Cooperation Between the United States 

5 and the Government of the People’s Republic of 

6 China that was submitted to the appropriate con7 gressional committees under section 123 of the 

8 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) on 

9 April 21, 2015, and which entered into force on Oc10 tober 29, 2015. 

11 SEC. 4. NOTICE REGARDING TRANSFERS OF NUCLEAR 

12 TECHNOLOGY TO CHINA. 

13 The Secretary of Energy shall, not later than 5 days 

14 after receiving an application for the proposed transfer of 

15 nuclear technology to China under section 57b. of the 

16 Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), includ17 ing an application for specific authorization to be provided 

18 for in a subsequent arrangement under section 131 of that 

19 Act (42 U.S.C. 2160), notify the appropriate congres20 sional committees of the receipt of such application. The 

21 notice shall describe with particularity the items contained 

22 in the proposed transfer of nuclear technology. 


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1 SEC. 5. APPROVAL FOR TRANSFER OF UNITED STATES-ORI2 GIN TECHNOLOGY WHEREVER LOCATED. 

3 (a) APPROVAL.—Section 57b. of the Atomic Energy 

4 Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)) is amended— 

5 (1) by striking ‘‘b. It shall be unlawful’’ and in6 serting ‘‘b.(1) It shall be unlawful’’; 

7 (2) by striking ‘‘(1) as specifically’’ and insert8 ing ‘‘(A) as specifically’’; 

9 (3) by striking ‘‘(2) upon authorization’’ and 

10 inserting ‘‘(B) upon authorization’’; and 

11 (4) by adding at the end the following new 

12 paragraph: 

13 ‘‘(2) The requirements for authorization under para14 graph (1) shall apply to any United States-origin tech15 nology that may be used in the development or production 

16 of special nuclear material, and items derived from such 

17 United States-origin technology, regardless of the nation18 ality of the ownership of such technology or the location 

19 of the technology outside the United States.’’. 

20 (b) DEFINITION OF UNITED STATES-ORIGIN TECH21 NOLOGY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the 

22 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall issue, 

23 as part of the regulations issued pursuant to section 57b. 

24 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), 

25 a definition of items covered by the term ‘‘United States26 origin technology’’ in paragraph (2) of such section, inVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:34 Jun 01, 2016 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H5370.IH H5370

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1 cluding items derived from such technology. The term 

2 shall include items developed by United States persons or 

3 persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 

4 and items developed with the participation of the United 

5 States Government, including large, passive light water re6 actors. 

7 SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT FOR APPROVAL OF RE8 TRANSFERS OF UNITED STATES-ORIGIN 

9 TECHNOLOGY. 

10 In addition to the requirements applicable to trans11 fers of items under section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act 

12 of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)), any request for authoriza13 tion to transfer United States-origin technology (as de14 fined pursuant to section 5(b) of this Act) from China, 

15 or with the significant participation of Chinese persons not 

16 located in the United States, to a country other than the 

17 United States or China, shall be denied unless the appli18 cant can demonstrate— 

19 (1) significant ongoing participation by United 

20 States persons in the transfer; 

21 (2) in the case of nuclear reactors and reactor 

22 components, significant United States content in23 volved in, or attendant to, the proposed transfer; 

24 and 


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1 (3) in the case of the transfer of technology de2 veloped with the participation of the United States 

3 Government, timely and adequate reimbursement of 

4 the United States Government for any grants or 

5 loans provided by the United States Government to 

6 entities involved in the development of the tech7 nology. 

8 SEC. 7. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CHINA-PAKISTAN NU9 CLEAR COOPERATION. 

10 It is the policy of the United States— 

11 (1) to oppose the provision by China of assist12 ance in the construction of any nuclear reactor in 

13 Pakistan other than the first 2 reactors constructed 

14 at Chasma, which were consistent with the condi15 tions concerning China’s participation in the Nuclear 

16 Suppliers Group; and 

17 (2) to assist Pakistan with the acquisition and 

18 development of sufficient electrical power to meet its 

19 domestic requirements for electrical power through 

20 means other than nuclear power. 

21 SEC. 8. ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. 

22 (a) NOTIFICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINA23 TION.— 

24 (1) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days 

25 after the President makes a determination described 


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1 in paragraph (2), the President shall notify the ap2 propriate congressional committees of that deter3 mination. 

4 (2) DETERMINATION.—A determination de5 scribed in this paragraph is a determination that the 

6 Government of China, persons acting on behalf of 

7 the Government of China, or Chinese persons have, 

8 since the entry into force of the United States China 

9 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement— 

10 (A) retransferred any United States nu11 clear items to a third country without the per12 mission of the United States Government; 

13 (B) diverted or attempted to divert United 

14 States nuclear items to military use; 

15 (C) stolen or attempted to steal United 

16 States nuclear items; 

17 (D) failed to undertake measures necessary 

18 to prevent transfers of goods, services, and 

19 technology described in section 2(a) of the Iran, 

20 North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 

21 (Public Law 106–178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), or 

22 to make substantial progress in efforts to pre23 vent such transfers; 

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1 tions Security Council Resolution 2270, adopted 

2 on March 2, 2016, and previous resolutions 

3 concerning North Korea; 

4 (F) refused to adhere to the Nuclear Sup5 plier Group guidelines regarding the export of 

6 any new civilian nuclear reactors, regardless of 

7 any prior or future contract obligations; or 

8 (G) otherwise violated the terms and condi9 tions of the United States-China Nuclear Co10 operation Agreement, or any authorization 

11 issued by the United States Government con12 cerning transfers of United States nuclear 

13 items. 

14 (b) PLAN OF CORRECTIVE ACTION.—Not later than 

15 60 days after the President makes a determination de16 scribed in subsection (a), the President shall provide to 

17 the appropriate congressional committees a plan of correc18 tive action to— 

19 (1) address the activity described in subsection 

20 (a) that was the subject of the determination; 

21 (2) mitigate any damage to the national secu22 rity of the United States because of such activity; 

23 and 

24 (3) prevent further such activity. 


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1 (c) MEASURES AUTHORIZED.—At any time the 

2 President may, if the President determines it is necessary 

3 to address activity described in subsection (a) that was 

4 the subject of a determination under that subsection, im5 pose any measures authorized by law, including— 

6 (1) measures authorized by the International 

7 Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.); 

8 and 

9 (2) suspension of cooperation with China under 

10 the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agree11 ment. 

12 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘United 

13 States nuclear items’’ means any items that are trans14 ferred to China under— 

15 (1) the United States-China Nuclear Coopera16 tion Agreement; 

17 (2) section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 

18 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)); or 

19 (3) part 110 of title 10, Code of Federal Regu20 lations. 

21 SEC. 9. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED MINUTE. 

22 The President may not bring into effect the proce23 dures described in the section of the Agreed Minute to 

24 the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 

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1 tion Exchanges’’ unless the President, at least 60 days 

2 of continuous session of Congress before those procedures 

3 become effective— 

4 (1) provides to the appropriate congressional 

5 committees the details concerning the implementa6 tion of those provisions; and 

7 (2) certifies to the appropriate congressional 

8 committees that those procedures protect the na9 tional security of the United States to an extent that 

10 is equal to or greater than those procedures provided 

11 for under parts 110 and 810 of title 10, Code of 

12 Federal Regulations. 

13 SEC. 10. REPROCESSING UNDER THE UNITED STATES14 CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREE15 MENT. 

16 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con17 gress that the United States should encourage countries 

18 in East Asia to forgo the commencement of spent nuclear 

19 fuel reprocessing activities, as part of a mutual effort to 

20 prevent the spread of separated plutonium in the region. 

21 (b) IMPLEMENTATION OF REPROCESSING CONSENT

22 RIGHTS UNDER AGREEMENT.—The President shall not 

23 agree to the reprocessing, recycling, or other alteration in 

24 form or content of nuclear material, as described in Article 

25 6.2 of the United States-China Nuclear Cooperation 


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1 Agreement, at any facility to which the International 

2 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not ap3 plied, unless, for each proposed facility at which such ac4 tivity will take place, the President certifies to the appro5 priate congressional committees that— 

6 (1) the President has made a formal request to 

7 the IAEA to apply safeguards to the facility; 

8 (2) the IAEA has refused the request described 

9 in paragraph (1); and 

10 (3) the arrangements and procedures under 

11 which such reprocessing, recycling, or other alter12 ation in form or content will occur— 

13 (A) include a requirement that nuclear ma14 terial transferred pursuant to the United 

15 States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 

16 and nuclear material used in or produced 

17 through the use of such material— 

18 (i) not be commingled with any other 

19 nuclear material; 

20 (ii) be clearly marked as United 

21 States-obligated nuclear material; 

22 (iii) be stored in separate facilities 

23 from any other nuclear material; and 

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1 quest by the IAEA or either party to the 

2 Agreement; and 

3 (B) are sufficient to detect in a timely 

4 manner— 

5 (i) the diversion for military purposes 

6 of nuclear material transferred pursuant to 

7 the United States-China Nuclear Coopera8 tion Agreement and nuclear material used 

9 in or produced through the use of such 

10 material; and 

11 (ii) the transfer to facilities or loca12 tions not agreed to by the United States of 

13 nuclear material transferred pursuant to 

14 the United States-China Nuclear Coopera15 tion Agreement and nuclear material used 

16 in or produced through the use of such 

17 material. 

18 (c) NOTIFICATION REQUIRED.—If the President 

19 issues a certification described in subsection (b), the Presi20 dent shall include with that certification a detailed descrip21 tion of— 

22 (1) the facility at which the reprocessing, recy23 cling, or other alteration in form and content will 

24 take place; 

25 (2) the safeguards applied to the facility; 


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1 (3) the measures that will be undertaken to se2 cure and prevent the theft or diversion to military 

3 purposes of any separated plutonium that will result 

4 from the activities at the facility; 

5 (4) the amounts of materials to be processed at 

6 the facility; 

7 (5) the amount of processed fissile material 

8 that may be stockpiled as a result of the activities 

9 at the facility, and the estimated period of time that 

10 it may be stockpiled prior to its civilian use in a nu11 clear reactor; and 

12 (6) the risks to the national security of the 

13 United States that are posed by the potential diver14 sion of nuclear material at the facility. 

15 SEC. 11. REPORTS. 

16 (a) INITIAL REPORT.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after 

18 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 

19 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com20 mittees a report on China’s history of compliance 

21 with the peaceful use and nonproliferation provisions 

22 of the Previous Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. 

23 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

24 paragraph (1) shall include— 


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1 (A) a detailed examination of every sus2 pected or alleged violation of the Previous 

3 Agreement; 

4 (B) the response by China to any inquiries 

5 by the United States regarding any such sus6 pected or alleged violation of the Previous 

7 Agreement; 

8 (C) an assessment of the likelihood of fu9 ture violations under the terms of the United 

10 States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; 

11 and 

12 (D) an assessment of the potential advan13 tages that a large civil nuclear infrastructure or 

14 program may provide to China as it seeks to 

15 meet its future nuclear weapons requirements. 

16 (b) ANNUAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 15, 

18 2017, and annually thereafter, the President shall 

19 submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

20 a report on the status of the United States-China 

21 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and compliance by 

22 China with the Agreement. 

23 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under 

24 paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum— 


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1 (A) a detailed examination of every sus2 pected or alleged violation of the Agreement by 

3 China that may have occurred during the pre4 ceding calendar year; 

5 (B) the response by China to any inquiries 

6 by the United States regarding any such sus7 pected or alleged violation; 

8 (C) an accounting of the specific roles 

9 played in the civil and military nuclear pro10 grams of China by all Chinese persons visiting 

11 United States nuclear labs and facilities; 

12 (D) an assessment of whether China or 

13 any entity acting on its behalf has targeted any 

14 United States nuclear-related private-sector or 

15 governmental entities, enterprises, or assets for 

16 any form of cyber trespass, theft, or attack, or 

17 has taken specific actions pursuant to such tar18 geting by any entity; 

19 (E) an assessment of the risks of diversion 

20 of special nuclear material transferred pursuant 

21 to the Agreement, the likely consequences of 

22 such diversion, and steps taken to avert any po23 tential diversion; 

24 (F) an assessment of the potential military 

25 utility of diverted civil nuclear technology; 


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1 (G) an assessment of any civil or criminal 

2 law enforcement actions taken by China against 

3 any entities or individuals within its govern4 ment or its jurisdiction that have— 

5 (i) violated nonproliferation or peace6 ful use requirements of the Agreement or 

7 any other bilateral or multilateral nuclear 

8 agreement to which China is a party; 

9 (ii) committed any cyber trespass, 

10 theft, or attack on any United States nu11 clear-related private sector or govern12 mental entities, enterprises, or assets; or 

13 (iii) conducted any cyber trespass or 

14 cyber exploitation against any private sec15 tor nuclear entities, enterprises, or assets 

16 for commercial gain; and 

17 (H) a description of the extent to which 

18 the Government of China has honored requests 

19 by the United States for enforcement of legal 

20 action against any entities or individuals de21 scribed in subparagraph (G), including requests 

22 by the United States for extradition. 

23 (c) FORM.—The reports required under subsections 

24 (a) and (b) may be submitted in classified form, but shall 


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1 also contain an unclassified executive summary and may 

2 contain an unclassified annex. 

3 (d) ANNUAL EXPORTS REPORT.—Not later than 

4 April 15, 2017, and annually thereafter, the President 

5 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

6 a report that— 

7 (1) identifies all export licenses issued in the 

8 preceding calendar year pursuant to the United 

9 States-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, in10 cluding, at a minimum for each license, the license 

11 applicant, the items licensed and their value, the 

12 proposed end user of the items, and the term of the 

13 license; and 

14 (2) assesses China’s progress in strengthening, 

15 implementing, and enforcing laws to ensure that re16 stricted dual-use technology is not transferred to 

17 countries of proliferation concern. 

Æ 


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