Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

) 

JOHN K. BOTSON, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,

Respondent. 

) Supreme Court No. S-15671 

Court of Appeals No. A-11192 

District Court No. 3AN-10-11042 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7077 – January 15, 2016 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

 ) 

) 

) 

) 

Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals of the State of 

Alaska, on appeal from the District Court of the State of 

Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Brian K. Clark, 

Judge. 

Appearances: Brent R. Cole, Law Office of Brent R. Cole, 

P.C., Anchorage, for Petitioner. Seneca A. Theno, Municipal 

Prosecutor, and Dennis A. Wheeler, Municipal Attorney, 

Anchorage, for Respondent. 

Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and 

Bolger, Justices. 

BOLGER, Justice.
 

FABE, Chief Justice, dissenting.
 

I. INTRODUCTION 

John Botson was arrested for driving under the influence. According to a 

breath test, his blood alcohol level was .141. The police officer informed Botson of his 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

constitutional right to an independent chemical test, which Botson declined. But 

unbeknownst to Botson and the police officer administering the test, the breath test 

device had produced an error code related to one of its quality assurance mechanisms. 

Botson argues that his breath test result was inadmissible under the 

Anchorage Municipal Code, which requires breath tests to be conducted in compliance 

with methods approved by the Alaska Department of Public Safety. He also argues that 

suppression was required under the Due Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution 

because his ignorance of the error code prevented him from knowingly and intelligently 

waiving his constitutional right to an independent chemical test. But although the 

administration of Botson’s breath test may not have strictly complied with approved 

methods, Botson does not contest the district court’s finding that the error code had no 

bearing on the accuracy of the test. Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s and 

the court of appeals’ conclusion that the breath test result was admissible under our 

“substantial compliance” doctrine. We also agree that Botson validly waived his right 

to an independent chemical test because he had a basic understanding of that right before 

declining the test. We therefore affirm. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

A. John Botson’s Arrest And Breath Test 

John Botson was arrested for driving under the influence and submitted to 

breath testing of his blood alcohol concentration. The Anchorage police officer who 

administered the test explained to Botson that once the breath test device was prepared 

it would “go through a bunch of self checks [to] make sure it’s functioning properly.” 

Following a 15-minute observation period, the officer took Botson’s breath sample and 

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the breath test device produced a reading of .141,1 significantly higher than the legal limit 

of .08.2 

After informing Botson of the result and reading formnotices regarding the 

revocation of Botson’s driver’s license and seizure of his vehicle, the officer read Botson 

a notice of his right to an independent chemical test. The officer told Botson: 

You are under arrest for the offense of driving under the 

influence. In addition to a chemical test of your breath, you 

have a right to an independent chemical test of your level of 

intoxication. . . . 

You may obtain an independent test one of the 

following ways. If you wish to have an independent 

chemical test at municipal expense, we will make 

arrangements for a sample of your blood to be drawn by 

qualified personnel at no expense to you. . . . Two, if you 

wish to have an independent chemical test of your own 

choosing, you must make your own arrangements for one to 

be administered within the immediate Anchorage area by a 

qualified person and you must pay for it yourself. . . . 

. . . It is possible that evidence from the independent 

chemical test sample may be obtained by the municipality 

through legal processes and used against you. 

I cannot give you any other legal or medical advice. 

If you have any questions, you should ask your legal and 

health advisors. At this time you must decide whether or not 

you want to take an independent chemical test. 

Botson responded, “No, I guess not.” 

1 Botson took two breath tests, but the first produced an invalid sample. 

After the first test, the officer gave Botson further instruction on how to breathe into the 

machine and administered the second breath test. 

2 See Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 09.28.020(B) (2010). 

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At the time neither Botson nor the officer was aware that the breath test 

device had produced an error code related to one of its quality assurance measures, the 

“external standard” test. That test involves a canister of compressed ethanol gas, or “alco 

bottle,” connected to the device’s testing chamber. Each canister is labeled with a target 

value that the administering officer enters into the device prior to testing, and the device 

has a regulator that controls the flow of gas into the chamber.3 

Thebreath test deviceautomatically conducts anexternal standard test both 

before and after taking a subject’s breath sample.4 The device first adjusts the target 

value according to barometric pressure. The device’s regulator then turns on and a 

known quantity of ethanol gas from the canister is pulled into the chamber.5 The device 

produces a numerical result based on the amount of alcohol detected, and if that result 

falls within a given range of the target value, the “external standard” test is satisfied. If 

the result falls outside of this range, the machine will produce an error message reading 

“standard out of range.”6 

In Botson’s case the target value adjusted for barometric pressure was .079 

and the pre-sample external standard test produced a result of .080, well within the 

acceptable range.7 But the next external standard test, run after Botson’s breath sample 

3 ALASKA SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION LAB., BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING 

P R O G R A M M A N U A L 2 6 - 2 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t 

http://www.dps.alaska.gov/crimelab/docs/DMT/Breath_Alcohol_Program_Testing_ 

Manual_DMT.pdf 

4 Id. 

5 Id. 

6 Id. at 35, 37. 

7 According to the Municipality’s expert witness, the acceptable range at this 

(continued...) 

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was taken, resulted in a value of only .018, far below the expected value. The breath test 

device therefore produced an error message reading “standard out of range.” This error 

message appeared on the device’s screen as well as a printout that the officer initialed 

and dated. But according to the officer, the error message nonetheless went unnoticed. 

The Municipality of Anchorage subsequently charged Botson with driving 

under the influence, noting that his breath test revealed a blood alcohol level of .141. 

B. The Trial Court Proceedings 

Botson filed two suppression motions before the district court, both 

highlighting the failure of the final external standard test and the resulting error code. 

Botson’s first motion was based primarily on AMC 09.28.023(E), which 

states, “To be considered valid under the provisions of this section, the chemical analysis 

of the person’s breath or blood shall have been performed according to methods 

approved by the state department of public safety.” The district court held a two-day 

evidentiary hearing at which the officer and two expert witnesses testified. The officer 

explained that at the end of the test sequence, a prompt appears on the breath test 

device’s screen asking the operator if the external testing canister (the alco bottle) has 

been turned off, and the operator must input “yes” before the test results can be printed. 

According to the officer, he “[got] ahead of [himself]” during Botson’s test and turned 

off the alco bottle too early “so [he] could just push the yes button.” After listening to 

an audio recording of Botson’s breath test, the officer identified the “clunking” sound of 

the alco bottle being turned off before the final external standard test was completed. 

The Municipality’s expert witness, Colleen O’Bryant, confirmed this 

interpretation of the audio recording and testified that turning off the alco bottle 

(...continued) 

barometric pressure would have been .069 to .089. 

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prematurely would have caused the final external standard test to produce a result out of 

range. She further explained that the calibration of the breath test device had been 

verified on September 14 and October 7, 2010, and that the device would have been 

“working properly” on September 30, when Botson was arrested. 

Botson presented expert testimony froma retired Anchoragepoliceofficer, 

Donald Mann. Much of Mann’s testimony was unrelated to the external standard test,8 

but Mann confirmed based on the audio recording of Botson’s breath test that the officer 

likely shut off the alco bottle prematurely. Mann further opined that this could have 

caused the alco reading to fall significantly below the target value. Reaching a different 

conclusion from the Municipality’s expert, however, Mann testified that regardless of 

what caused the final external standard test to fail, this error precluded the required 

assurance of accuracy. 

The district court denied Botson’s suppression motion, concluding that for 

purposes of AMC 09.28.023(E), “methods approved by the state department of public 

safety” referred only to those which the Department had codified, rather than “any 

[statewide] procedure or method that the [Department] instituted or taught.” Because 

neither state statute nor regulation requires external standard testing, the court reasoned, 

the failure of the final external standard test did not render the test result inadmissible. 

In the alternative, the court concluded that even if external standard testing had been 

required, the Municipality had substantially complied with applicable protocol. 

Specifically, the court found that the officer prematurely turned off the alco bottle, that 

8 Specifically, Mann analyzed the audio tone produced by the breath test 

device during both of Botson’s breath tests. Based on his analysis of the audio 

recording, Mann speculated that the thermistor — which measures air flow into the 

device’s chamber — may not have been functioning correctly. But critically, Mann 

testified that this air flow issue “ha[d] absolutely nothing to do with the accuracy of the 

analysis of what[] [was] in the sample chamber.” 

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this caused the final external standard test to fail, and that in light of this “simple” 

explanation for the error code, the reliability of Botson’s test results was not in doubt. 

Accordingly, the court concluded that the Municipality had proved substantial 

compliance and that Botson’s test result was therefore admissible. 

Botson then filed a second suppression motion alleging that the officer’s 

failure to disclose the “standard out of range” error had deprived Botson of his due 

process right to an independent chemical test, because his waiver of this right was not 

“knowingly and intelligently made.”9 Botson supported this claim with an affidavit 

stating that he would have taken a blood test had he known about the undisclosed error. 

Botson also noted that as a rheumatologist he “[relies] extensively on laboratory testing 

andinstrumentation”andis “familiar with thepurposeand need for insuring theaccuracy 

of instruments and machines.” He further attested that based on the officer’s mention of 

the breath test device’s self-tests, he “assumed . . . [the officer] would tell [him] if the 

[device] was not functioning correctly.” 

The district court denied this second suppression motion. Citing Zemljich 

v. Municipality of Anchorage, 

10 the court stated: 

[F]or a knowing waiver to occur, it is generally sufficient that 

defendant is notified of his right to an independent chemical 

test, is aware that he has been arrested for operating under the 

influence, and understands that the purpose of the 

9 See Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 676-77 

(Alaska 1990) (“Since a defendant must provide the state with potentially incriminating 

evidence at the risk of criminal penalties, we hold that due process requires that the 

defendant be given an opportunity to challenge the reliability of that evidence in the 

simplest and most effective way possible, that is, an independent test. . . . A defendant’s 

waiver of this due process right essential to a fair trial is valid only if it is knowingly and 

intelligently made.”). 

10 151 P.3d 471, 476-78 (Alaska App. 2006). 

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independent chemical test is to obtain evidence of his blood 

alcohol level. 

The court reasoned that Botson knowingly and intelligently waived his right to an 

independent chemical test under that “basic outline of the law.” The district court 

concluded that as a matter of law, “[t]here is nothing requiring the police to inform a 

defendant of any particular problems with the [breath test device] prior to obtaining a 

waiver of an independent chemical test.” And even if such disclosure were required, the 

court found as a factual matter that this “would not have changed a reasonable person’s 

analysis of whether or not to obtain an independent chemical test.” 

Thedistrict court held anon-jurytrial, at which theMunicipalityintroduced 

evidence of Botson’s breath test sample.11 Based on this sample and stipulated facts, 

Botson was convicted of driving under the influence. 

C. The Court Of Appeals’ Decision 

Botson appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed Botson’s conviction.12 

The court first noted that the government is not required to “show absolute compliance 

with breath test procedures” to introduce a breath test result; rather, “substantial 

compliance is sufficient.”13 In determining whether the government has shown 

substantial compliance, the court defined the relevant inquiry as “whether the 

government’s departure from normal procedures affected the reliability of the breath 

test.”14 Based on the district court’s finding of reliability — which Botson did not 

11 Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage, A-11192, 2014 WL 4050588, at *1 

(Alaska App. Aug. 13, 2014). 

12 Id. at *5-6. 

13 Id. at *2. 

14 Id. 

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challenge — the court of appeals upheld the district court’s conclusion “that the error in 

the administration of the second [external standard] test did not invalidate Botson’s 

breath test result.”15 

In addressing Botson’s constitutional claim, the court of appeals first 

summarized its pastdecisions on knowingand intelligent waiver, statingthat“an arrestee 

cannot knowingly and intelligently waive the right to an independent test if he does not 

have a ‘basic understanding’ of the right to an independent test.”16 The court further 

noted that 

[a]n arrestee acquires a “basic understanding” of that right if 

he is “notified of the right to an independent test, is aware 

that he or she was arrested for driving under the influence, 

andgenerally understands thatthepurposeoftheindependent 

test is to obtain evidence of his or her blood alcohol level.”[17] 

The court concluded that Botson had acquired this “basic understanding” of his right to 

an independent chemical test.18 

ChiefJudgeMannheimer dissented,concluding that Botson couldnotmake 

an informed decision about whether to exercise his constitutional right to an independent 

test absent knowledge of the error message.19 He noted that the majority’s position may 

be consistent with Crim v. Municipality of Anchorage, where the court of appeals held 

15 Id. 

16 Id. at *4 (quoting Crim v. Municipality of Anchorage, 903 P.2d 586, 588 

(Alaska App. 1995)). 

17 Id. (quoting Zemljich v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 471, 475 

(Alaska App. 2006)). 

18 Id. 

19 Id. at *6-11 (Mannheimer, C.J., dissenting). 

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that an arrestee could validly waive the right to an independent test absent knowledge of 

his actual breath test result.20 But Chief Judge Mannheimer concluded that Crim had 

been wrongly decided, reasoningthat“[f]or an arresteeto be able to meaningfully choose 

whether to assert their right to an independent blood test, the arrestee must know more 

than the general purpose of the breath test and the general purpose of the independent 

blood test.”21 Characterizing the officer’s failure to discover the error message as 

negligent, Chief Judge Mannheimer concluded that Botson was “deprived — by 

government action — of a fair opportunity to decide whether to exercise his right to an 

independent test.”22 

Botson filed a petition for hearing, which we granted. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When we review an appellate decision of the court of appeals, we 

independently review the underlying judgment of the trial court.23 

“We review a denial of a motion to suppress evidence in the light most 

favorable to upholding the trial court’s ruling.”24 Although “[t]he trial court’s findings 

of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous[,] [w]e independently 

determine whether the trial court’s factual findings support its legal conclusions.”25 

20 Id. at *7-8 (citing Crim, 903 P.2d at 588).
 

21 Id. at *11.
 

22 Id.
 

23 State v. Hodari, 996 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Alaska 2000). 

24 State v. Miller, 207 P.3d 541, 543 (Alaska 2009). 

25 Id. (citation omitted). 

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“[T]he interpretation of . . . controlling statutes and regulations is a legal 

question which we review de novo.”26 “When deciding [constitutional] due process 

claims, we apply our independent judgment, adopting the rule of law that is most 

persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”27 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 The District Court Was Not Required To Suppress Botson’s Breath 

Test Result Under AMC 09.28.023(E). 

Anchorage Municipal Code 09.28.023(E) provides: 

To be considered valid . . . , the chemical analysis of the 

person’s breath or blood shallhavebeenperformedaccording 

to methods approved by the state department of public safety. 

If it is established at trial that a chemical analysis of breath or 

blood was performed according to approved methods by a 

person trained according to techniques, methods and 

standards of training approved by the state department of 

public safety, there is a presumption that the test results are 

valid and further foundation for introduction of the evidence 

is unnecessary. 

Botson argues that because the breath test device produced a “standard out of range” 

error code during the final external standard test, the Municipality failed to comply with 

“methods approved by the state department of public safety.” 

1.	 The Municipality did not strictly comply with “methods 

approved by the state department of public safety.” 

The quality assurance measure at issue in this case — external standard 

testing — is not mentioned in any regulations adopted by the Department of Public 

26 Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge, 339 P.3d 636, 638 (Alaska 2014). 

27 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 145 P.3d 

561, 564 (Alaska 2006) (citation omitted). 

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Safety (the Department),28 and the Municipality argues that compliance with 

Department-approved methods for purposes of AMC 09.28.023(E) should be measured 

only against codified protocol. 

As an initial matter, we disagree with the Municipality’s assertion that this 

issue is “settled” under our current caselaw. The Municipality points to three of our 

cases involving deviations from the Department’s breath testing protocol: Wester v. 

State,29 Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage,30 and Keel v. State. 

31 It is true that each 

of these cases addressed an alleged omission with respect to an expressly codified 

requirement.32 But we have never held that for purposes of AMC 09.28.023(E) or the 

nearly identical language in AS 28.35.030(d), “methods approved by the [Department]” 

are restricted to those methods outlined in the administrative code. And for the reasons 

below, we decline to do so here. 

TheDepartment’sregulationsprovideguidanceon severalaspects ofbreath 

alcohol testing, including the approval of new breath testing equipment,33 certification 

28 See 13 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 63.005-.900 (2010). 

29 528 P.2d 1179 (Alaska 1974). 

30 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978). 

31 609 P.2d 555 (Alaska 1980). 

32 See Keel, 609 P.2d at 558 (evaluating alleged non-compliance with a prior 

version of 13 AAC 63.100); Oveson, 574 P.2d at 803-04 (evaluating alleged noncompliance with a prior regulation requiring the completion of a “Breathalyzer 

Operational Checklist”); Wester, 528 P.2d at 1184 (evaluating alleged non-compliance 

with a prior version of 13 AAC 63.040(a)(1)). 

33 13 AAC 63.030. 

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of breath test operators,34 and verification of a test instrument’s calibration.35 But as 

Botsoncorrectlypointsout, the only guidance “[w]ith respect to thebreath test procedure 

itself” is 13 AAC 63.040, entitled “Procedure for breath test analysis.” This section 

requires that an officer conduct a 15-minuteobservationprior to breath testing; enter data 

when prompted by the breath test instrument; and “instruct the [subject] to blow into the 

mouthpiece until the visual display indicates that a satisfactory sample has been 

obtained.”36 But the regulations contain no further detail about the operation of the 

breath test instrument such as quality assurance measures or appropriate responses to 

error codes.37 

Instead it appears that the Department has reserved these details for the 

Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory’s Breath Alcohol Program Testing Manual (the 

Manual). The Manual outlines several troubleshooting steps to be taken in response to 

a “standard out of range” error code and advises the breath test operator to contact the 

crime lab if the error message persists. The Manual also describes the external standard 

testing process, explaining that the test “delivers a known quantity of ethanol to the 

[breath test device] both before and after the subject sample. The purpose is to ensure 

the [device] is accurately recognizing and quantitating ethanol concentrations.”38 

34 13 AAC 63.050(a). 

35 13 AAC 63.100(a)-(c). 

36 13 AAC 63.040(a). 

37 See 13 AAC 63.005-.900. 

38 ALASKA SCIENTIFIC CRIME DETECTION LAB., BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING 

P R O G R A M M A N U A L 2 6 ( 2 0 1 5 ) , a v a i l a b l e a t 

http://www.dps.alaska.gov/crimelab/docs/DMT/Breath_Alcohol_Program_Testing_ 

Manual_DMT.pdf. 

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Testimony at the suppression hearing similarly shed light on the 

Department’s approved protocol. In particular, the officer testified that he should have 

waited for the breath test device’s prompting before turning off the alco bottle (which 

contains the ethanol gas used in the external standard test) and responded to the 

subsequent error code by checking the alco bottle or using another machine. The 

Municipality’s expert witness similarly described the appropriate response to the error 

message produced during Botson’s test. But because the officer failed to note the error 

message on the device’s screen and printout, no remedial measure was taken. We 

therefore conclude that the Municipality failed to strictly comply with Departmentapproved methods in administering Botson’s breath test. 

2.	 The Municipality substantially complied with “methods 

approved by the state department of public safety” in 

administering Botson’s breath test. 

As noted above, AMC 09.28.023(E) requires that a breath test be 

“performed according to methods approved by the state department of public safety.” But 

in applying the analogous provision in state statute,39 we have held that “where the 

record demonstrates that the test was properly performed,” substantial compliance with 

approved methods is sufficient to establish admissibility.40 

In Wester v. State we applied this rule to a requirement that the breath tester 

“observe the subject to be tested for at least 15 minutes immediately prior to testing.”41 

We held that although the tester may not have personally observed the subject for the 

entire 15-minute period, observation by the arresting officer constituted substantial 

39 See AS 28.35.033(d). 

40 Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1978). 

41 528 P.2d 1179, 1183-85 & n.21 (Alaska 1974) (quoting former 7 AAC 

30.020(2) (1974)).
 

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compliance and that “a rigid standard of proof [as to that] foundational fact is 

unnecessary.”42 

We reached a similar result in Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, which 

involved the omission of a checkmark on a “Breathalyzer Operational Checklist” 

required under prior regulations.43 In that case “[t]here was uncontroverted testimony 

that the step in question was performed despite the failure to check off the box 

representing that step.”44 As we explained, the omission rendered the usual presumption 

of the test’s validity inapplicable but did not automatically render the test results 

inadmissible.45 We held that “where there has been substantial compliance with the 

[checklist provision], and . . . where the record demonstrates that the test was properly 

performed, the test results are admissible.”46 

In Keel v. State we reached the opposite result in considering a former 

regulatory requirement that a breath test instrument be calibrated by a qualified 

“instructor.”47 There the state had shown that the breath test device had been calibrated 

within the requisite time period by a police lieutenant, but had not “inquire[d] further into 

42 Id. at 1184-85. 

43 574 P.2d at 803-04 (citing former 7 AAC 30.020 (1976)). 

44 Id. at 805. 

45 Id. at 804. 

46 Id. at 805. 

47 609 P.2d 555, 557-59 (Alaska 1980) (citing former 7 AAC 30.050(b) 

(1980)). A similar regulation now requires periodic calibration by the “scientific 

director” or a “qualified person designated by the scientific director.” 13 AAC 

63.100(b). 

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where, when[,] or by whom [the lieutenant] had been ‘certified.’ ”48 We held that “[t]he 

state’s failure to show that [the lieutenant] was properly qualified, therefore, casts doubt 

on the accuracy of the calibration and hence on the reliability of the [breath test] 

result[].”49 

Here the district court found that despite the deviation from protocol, the 

accuracy of Botson’s test result was not in doubt, and Botson did not challenge the 

district court’s factual findings in either his appeal50 or his petition for hearing. Even if 

he had, we could not say that the district court’s finding of reliability was clearly 

erroneous.51 The district court appropriately considered the following evidence: 1) the 

officer’s confirmation after listening to an audio recording of the testing process, that he 

had turned off the alco bottle prematurely; 2) calibration verification reports from both 

before and after Botson’s arrest; 3) O’Bryant’s expert testimony after listening to the 

audio recording that she could hear the alco bottle being turned off and that this would 

have caused the error code in question; and 4) the absence of any compelling testimony 

from Botson’s expert witness suggesting that the breath test device was unreliable. 

Botson’s position would require us to disregard this evidence. He appears 

to argue that if a deviation from testing protocol could theoretically have impacted the 

accuracy of a breath test result, this precludes the consideration of a “post hoc theory” 

as to how the test may nonetheless have been accurate. And he argues that the court of 

48 Keel, 609 P.2d at 558. 

49 Id. 

50 Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage, A-11192, 2014 WL 4050588, at *2 

(Alaska App. Aug. 13, 2014). 

51 See State v. Miller, 207 P.3d 541, 543 (Alaska 2009) (“The trial court’s 

findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” (citing State v. 

Joubert, 20 P.3d 1115, 1118 (Alaska 2001))). 

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appeals mischaracterized the relevant precedent when it stated that “the crucial issue in 

determining whether there has been substantial compliance is whether the government’s 

departure from normal procedures affected the reliability of the breath test.”52 

But we view the trial court’s substantial compliance analysis as consistent 

with the relevant caselaw, where we have expressly considered the state’s evidence in 

determining whether the deviation from codified protocol undermined the reliability of 

a breath test. In Wester for instance, we concluded that the minor deviation from 

protocol in the administration of the 15-minute observation period had no impact on the 

reliability of the test result, in light of testimony that the subject was under continuous 

observation for the requisite time period.53 Similarly in Oveson, we looked to the state’s 

“uncontroverted” testimony that although the officer had failed to mark one of the boxes 

on the “Breathalyzer Operational Checklist,” he indeed performed the actions described 

therein.54 In contrast the government failed to provide such evidence in Keel: although 

it presented testimony alleging that its calibrating officer met the requirements for a duly 

certified “instructor,” we noted that stronger evidence was required to establish this 

foundational fact.55 In summary, we have never considered the admissibility of a breath 

test result in a factual vacuum. 

Botson attempts to distinguish his case from Oveson’s application of the 

substantial compliance doctrine by characterizing the officer’s failure to complete the 

final external standard check as jeopardizing the “substantive purpose of the [breath test 

device’s] self-check” process. But the purpose of the self-check process here, like the 

52 See Botson, 2014 WL 4050588, at *2. 

53 528 P.2d 1179, 1183-85 & n.27 (Alaska 1974). 

54 574 P.2d 801, 804-05 (Alaska 1978). 

55 609 P.2d 555, 558-59 (Alaska 1980). 

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purpose of the checklist requirement in Oveson, was to ensure that the breath test was 

accurate.56 And here as in Oveson, the State provided persuasive evidence to show that 

the breath test device was functioning normally and providing accurate readings despite 

the police officer’s failure to strictly comply with statutorily approved methods.57 

Finally Botson argues that under the relevant caselaw, police officers must 

“ ‘substantially comply’ with each substantive part of the State-approved breath test 

protocol.” But we have never held that “substantial compliance” is required at a 

particular level of granularity,58 and we decline to do so now. Imposing such a 

requirement would likely lead to less accurate breath testing because it would provide 

the Department of Public Safety and local municipalities with the incentive to reduce the 

number of individual safeguards in their testing protocols. 

Accordingly, we disagree with Botson’s attempt to distinguish his case 

from Oveson and Wester based on the significance of the police officer’s deviation from 

protocol. The district court did not err in denying Botson’s first motion to suppress. 

B.	 Botson Knowingly And Intelligently Waived His Constitutional Right 

To An Independent Chemical Test. 

This court has long recognized an individual’s due process right to 

challenge the results of a breath alcohol test.59 In Gundersen v. Municipality of 

56 See Oveson, 574 P.2d at 804-05. 

57 Cf. id. at 805. 

58 See, e.g., id. at 803, 805 (finding substantial compliance despite testing 

officer’s failure to mark the checkbox indicating he had “[g]auge[d] [the] test ampul and 

insert[ed] [it] in left-hand holder”). 

59 See Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376, 381 (Alaska 1976) (“A denial of the 

right to [analyze a breathalyzer’s components], that is to say, to ‘cross-examine’ the 

results of the test, would be reversible error without any need for a showing of 

(continued...) 

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Anchorage we explained that “[s]ince a defendant must provide the state with potentially 

incriminating evidence at the risk of criminal penalties, . . . due process requires that the 

defendant be given an opportunity to challenge the reliability of that evidence in the 

simplest and most effective way possible, that is, an independent test.”60 We further 

noted that “if the police choose not to preserve a breath sample, due process requires that 

they give clear and express notice of a defendant’s right to an independent test and offer 

assistance in obtaining one in order to introduce police-administered test results at 

trial.”61 

“A defendant’s waiver of this due process right essential to a fair trial is 

valid only if it is knowingly and intelligently made.”62 “We have held that a defendant’s 

waiver of his due process rights is effective despite his intoxication so long as he knew 

what he was doing.”63 But we have not further addressed what constitutes effective 

waiver of the right to an independent chemical test. The court of appeals has addressed 

this issue more directly, stating that effective waiver requires 

“a basic understanding of the right to an independent test,” 

which is satisfied if the driver is notified of the right to an 

independent test, is aware that he or she was arrested for 

driving under the influence, and generally understands that 

59 (...continued)
 

prejudice.” (citing R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 44 (Alaska 1971))).
 

60 792 P.2d 673, 676 (Alaska 1990). 

61 Id. at 677. 

62 Id. 

63 Id. (quoting Thessen v. State, 454 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska 1969)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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the purpose of the independent test is to obtain evidence of 

his or her blood alcohol level.[64] 

The court of appeals also has noted that effective waiver “does not require that the driver 

be able to ‘assess[] the potential advantages and disadvantages of availing himself of the 

right to an independent test.’ ”65 

Of the court of appeals’ decisions addressing the right to an independent 

chemical test, only one has held an arrestee’s waiver ineffective. That case, 

Ahtuangaruak v. State, involved a defendant with limited English abilities who could 

not understand the police officer’s “lengthy attempt to explain the blood test option.”66 

The court of appeals held that because this language barrier prevented the arrestee from 

gaining a “basic understanding” of his constitutional right to an independent test, due 

process required suppression of the arrestee’s breath test result.67 

Echoing this characterization of waiver as requiring only “a basic 

understanding of the right to an independent test,”68 the court of appeals has upheld a 

defendant’s waiver as valid in every subsequent case.69 Crim v. Municipality of 

64 Zemljich v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 471, 475 (Alaska App. 

2006) (quoting Ahtuangaruak v. State, 820 P.2d 310, 311 (Alaska App. 1991)). 

65 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Crimv. Municipality of Anchorage, 903 

P.2d 586, 588 (Alaska App. 1995)). 

66 820 P.2d at 311. 

67 Id. at 311-12. 

68 See id. at 311. 

69 See, e.g., Wing v. State, 268 P.3d 1105, 1108 (Alaska App. 2012) (holding 

waiver effective despite arrestee’s argument that she didn’t know whether it would be 

strategic to have an independent chemical test); Zemljich, 151 P.3d at 474-78 (holding 

waiver effective where arrestee declined to make a decision whether or not to invoke the 

(continued...) 

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Anchorage70 is most directly on point. There the court held that a defendant could 

“knowingly and intelligently” waive his right to an independent chemical test without 

knowing the results of his breath test in advance.71 Looking to the “totality of the 

circumstances,” the court noted that the arrestee “appeared to understand the gravity of 

his situation, that he had been arrested for driving while intoxicated, that the police had 

taken a sample of his breath for a reading of his alcohol level, and the significance of an 

opportunity to have an independent test of his alcohol level.”72 

We agree with the conclusion of both the district court and the court of 

appeals that Botson acquired a “basic understanding” of his right to an independent 

chemical test, as defined in the caselaw outlined above. And on the facts of this case, we 

find that this “basic understanding” standard satisfies due process requirements. The 

circumstances required for a “basic understanding” were all present in the instant case: 

1) the officer read Botson a form notice of his right; 2) the intake transcript suggests that 

Botson understood he had been arrested for driving under the influence; and 3) as the 

court of appeals correctly observed, “Botson does not dispute that he understood the 

significance of the breath test and the importance of the opportunity to have an 

independent test of his blood alcohol level.”73 

69 (...continued) 

right); Moses v. State, 32 P.3d 1079, 1084 (Alaska App. 2001) (holding waiver effective 

despite arrestee’s argument that he was unable to understand whether the independent 

test would work in his favor). 

70 903 P.2d 586. 

71 Id. at 588-89. 

72 Id. 

73 Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage, A-11192, 2014 WL 4050588, at *4 

(continued...) 

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Botson does not appear to argue that suppression was required under 

existing precedent. Instead he asks us to adopt the position taken by Chief Judge 

Mannheimer in his dissenting opinion. Chief Judge Mannheimer opined that Crim was 

wrongly decided and proposed the following rule: “In order to give an arrestee a fair 

opportunity to decide whether to exercise the right to an independent blood test, the 

government must be required to apprise the arrestee of the circumstances that would 

reasonably bear on the arrestee’s decision whether to exercise this right.”74 For the 

reasons below, we decline to overrule Crim in favor of this alternative framework. 

First, we agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that “[t]he [rule] 

Botson proposes, carried to its logical conclusion, would require the government to show 

strict compliance rather than substantial compliance with any breath test procedures that 

govern the actual administration of the breath test”75 — a result that would be 

inconsistent with existing precedent that substantial compliance with Departmentapproved protocol may be sufficient to establish foundation.76 As the court of appeals 

reasoned,suppression would berequired under ChiefJudgeMannheimer’sproposedrule 

73 (...continued) 

(Alaska App. Aug. 13, 2014). 

74 Id. at *9 (Mannheimer, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 

75 Id. at *5. 

76 See Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1978) 

(“[W]here there has been substantial compliance with the ‘Breathalyzer Operational 

Checklist’ provision [in then-existing code] and . . . the record demonstrates that the test 

was properly performed, the testresults are admissibleunder AS 28.35.033(d).”); Wester 

v. State, 528 P.2d 1179, 1184 (Alaska 1974) (“[W]here substantial compliance with the 

15-minute provision is established on the record, . . . a prima facie showing of the 

foundational fact necessary to establish admissibility is satisfied.”). 

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even where substantial compliance was present and where the deviation from protocol 

had no impact on the accuracy of the test.77 

Botson echoes Chief Judge Mannheimer’s contrary conclusion that “a 

decision in Botson’s favor [would not] mean the end of the substantial compliance 

doctrine.”78 We first note that the rule Botson proposes appears limited to “observable 

irregularit[ies] in the breath testing process,”79 which would indeed preserve the 

substantial compliance doctrine in the context of more latent errors, such as deviations 

from the prescribed process for verifying breath test instruments’ proper calibration.80 

But we have never drawn a distinction between observable and latent errors in evaluating 

the admissibility of breath test results, and decline to do so here.81 If anything, adherence 

to protocol may be of heightened importance in the context of errors that are not 

immediately apparent, such as a calibration issue that could cast doubt not only on an 

individual breath test result, but on a more systemic basis.82 

In a related vein, Chief Judge Mannheimer suggests that the substantial 

compliance doctrine would still apply to “flaws which, even if detected and 

communicated to the arrestee, would not have materially affected the arrestee’s decision 

77 Botson, 2014 WL 4050588, at *5. 

78 Id. at *11 (Mannheimer, C.J., dissenting). 

79 Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 

80 See 13 AAC 63.100(a)-(c). 

81 In Wester, for instance, we applied the substantial compliance doctrine to 

the testing officer’sfailure to personally observe the subject for themandatory 15-minute 

period — an omission that was immediately apparent from the testing process itself. 

528 P.2d at 1184-85. 

82 See Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555, 558 (Alaska 1980) (noting that “proper 

calibration of the breathalyzer is essential to guarantee accurate readings”). 

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concerning whether to demand an independent blood test.”83 But deciding in Botson’s 

favor would mean that even a flaw not impacting the accuracy of an arrestee’s breath test 

could be deemed to “materially affect[] the arrestee’s decision” whether to invoke the 

right. Chief Judge Mannheimer maintains that “the issue in Botson’s case is not the 

ultimate reliability of the breath test result,”84 but we fail to see how else an error in the 

testing process would be relevant to a reasonable person’s decision whether to take an 

independent chemical test. 

Botson argues that knowledge of an error that is later proven “harmless” 

could impact this decision, and Chief Judge Mannheimer correctly points out that 

“[a]rrestees must make their decision about the independent test on the spot.”85 Botson 

contends that the solution is simple: “require officers to inform arrestees of machine 

error messages, even if an officer is of the opinion — and a court may later agree — that 

the error had no effect on accuracy.” But this is not a case where an officer intentionally 

withheld information about a potential inaccuracy; rather, the officer failed to realize his 

mistake or notice the resulting error code. If the mere specter of unreliability is sufficient 

to render a breath test result invalid on constitutional grounds, the effect would be to 

require strict as opposed to substantial compliance whenever an officer’s mistake was 

only later discovered. 

In addition Chief Judge Mannheimer surmises that under Crim, “Botson’s 

waiver [would be] valid regardless of whether the officer’s failure to inform Botson of 

83 Botson, 2014 WL 4050588, at *11 (Mannheimer, C.J., dissenting). 

84 Id. 

85 Id. at *10. 

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the error message was willful or only negligent.”86 Similarly Botson argues that a more 

protective constitutional rule would “provide . . . incentive for officers to pay attention 

to error messages and appropriately respond to them.” But evidentiary requirements in 

the Anchorage Municipal Code87 and its state analogue88 already operate to prevent the 

admission of a breath test where an officer’s conduct — whether willful or merely 

negligent — impacts a test’s reliability. These requirements also encourage law 

enforcement’s adherence to Department-approved protocol in the administration of 

breath tests: such adherence gives the test a presumption of validity,89 whereas deviation 

from established protocol requires the prosecution to present additional evidence of a 

breath test’s accuracy.90 An arrestee’s constitutional right to an independent chemical 

test is not the only assurance of reliability; evidentiary requirements directly serve this 

function. 

Finally, we address Botson’s argument analogizing the right to an 

independent chemical test to the right to cross-examination. In Lauderdale v. State we 

analogized an arrestee’s “opportunity to test the reliability or credibility” of a breath test 

86 Id. 

87 AMC 09.28.023(E). 

88 AS 28.35.033(d). 

89 AMC 09.28.023(E) (“If it is established at trial that a chemical analysis of 

breath or blood was performed according to approved methods . . . , there is a 

presumption that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 

evidence is unnecessary.”). 

90 See, e.g., Wester v. State, 528 P.2d 1179, 1184-85 & n.27 (Alaska 1974) 

(noting testimony that arrestee had been observed for the requisite 15-minute period, 

even if not by the testing officer); Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801, 

805 (Alaska 1978) (noting “uncontroverted testimony” that the step omitted from the 

prescribed checklist had been performed). 

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with a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examine a witness who testifies 

against him.91 In his dissent here, Chief Judge Mannheimer noted this analogy, stating: 

When a court decides whether the government’s 

failure to make pre-trial discovery [disclosures] adversely 

affected a defendant’s choices regarding the right of crossexamination . . . , we do not simply ask whether the defendant 

understood (1) that the government’s general purpose in 

presenting the witness’s testimony was to secure the 

defendant’s conviction, and (2) that the general purpose of 

cross-examination is to test the credibility and accuracy of a 

witness’s testimony. 

Instead,weexaminetheundisclosed information to see 

whether it likely would have affected the defendant’s 

assessment of whether to exercise the right of crossexamination.[92] 

Undisclosed information can impact any number of a criminal defendant’s 

strategic decisions, including but not limited to whether and how to cross-examine an 

adverse witness.93 For this reason, we have indeed held that a failure to make required 

pre-trial disclosures under Alaska Criminal Rule 16(a) is presumptively prejudicial.94 

91 548 P.2d 376, 381 (Alaska 1976); see U.S. Const. amend. VI. 

92 See Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage, A-11192, 2014 WL 4050588, 

at *9 (Alaska App. Aug. 13, 2014) (Mannheimer, C.J., dissenting). 

93 See Alaska R. Crim. P. 16(a) (“In order to provide adequate information for 

informed pleas, expedite trial, minimize surprise, afford opportunity for effective crossexamination, and meet the requirements of due process, discovery prior to trial should 

be as full and free as possible consistent with protection of persons, effective law 

enforcement, and the adversary system.”). 

94 Bostic v. State, 805 P.2d 344, 349 (Alaska 1991) (“[W]e conclude that a 

defendant is presumptively prejudiced when confronted with a Criminal Rule16(b)(1)(i) 

violation.”). 

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And when evaluating whether a non-disclosure is prejudicial, we sometimes inquire into 

whether the withheld information would have affected a party’s strategic decisions.95 

But the test for prejudicial error is not identical to the test for whether a 

waiver of a constitutional right is knowing and intelligent. In our view, Botson appears 

to argue that, to make an “intelligent” waiver, the arrestee must be apprised of any 

information that would promote a strategic decision on whether to take the independent 

test. But this requirement conflicts with how a waiver is reviewed in other contexts. For 

example, a waiver of the right to remain silent may be knowing and intelligent “in the 

sense that there was awareness of the right . . . and a decision to forego that right, but yet 

not knowing and intelligent in the sense that the tactical error of that decision was not 

perceived.”96 Similarly here an arrested driver’s waiver of the right to an independent 

chemical test may be effective even if the driver does not understand the full tactical 

significance of that decision. The constitution does not necessarily entitle a criminal 

defendant to all information that could conceivably affect his decision to waive his right 

to an independent chemical test. And we decline to adopt such an expansive rule on the 

facts of this case. 

Wealso recognizethat Botson could havearguedamoremoderateposition: 

that an arrestee should be provided with any information that would directly bear on the 

95 See, e.g., id. at 348 (noting government’s non-disclosure led defendant to 

“commit[] himself to a theory of the case without being put on notice not only that his 

theory would be rebutted by expert testimony, but that it would be rebutted by someone 

with whom he had a privileged relationship”). 

96 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, ORIN S. KERR, 

CRIMINALPROCEDURE§ 6.9(b) (3d ed. 2007) (footnotes omitted); see also Blank v. State, 

3 P.3d 359, 364 (Alaska App. 2000) (concluding driver’s confession was voluntary even 

though interviewing trooper did not reveal accident victim had been killed) rev’d on 

other grounds, 90 P.3d 156 (Alaska 2004). 

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likelihood that the breath test was inaccurate or unreliable.97 In this case, however, the 

district court concluded that the error message did not raise any such concerns: 

Complete and accurate knowledge of the event in question 

. . . would have been that the officer improperly turned the 

Alco bottle off prior to the last self-test being conducted. The 

error result from this mistake had no implications regarding 

the accuracy of the DataMaster test result itself. Objectively 

speaking, this would not change a defendant’s analysis of 

whether or not to challenge the DataMaster result. 

We agree with the district court’s conclusion on this issue. Accordingly, we need not 

wade into how such information, erroneously or willfully withheld, might bear on 

whether an arrestee knowingly and intelligently waived his right to an independent test. 

V. CONCLUSION 

We therefore AFFIRM the court of appeals’ decision affirming Botson’s 

conviction. 

97 See Gunderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 675 (stating 

that “due process requires that the defendant be given an opportunity to challenge the 

reliability” of the breath test evidence by requesting an independent test). 

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FABE, Chief Justice, dissenting. 

I disagree with the court’s conclusion that John Botson knowingly and 

intelligently waived his right to an independent chemical test. I do agree with the court’s 

rejection of a rule that would require arrestees to “be apprised of any information that 

would promote a strategic decision on whether to take the independent test.”1 Such an 

expansive rule is not constitutionally required. But I depart from the court’s analysis 

when it declines to consider how information about the error message in the 

administration of the breath test may have borne on Botson’s ability to knowingly and 

intelligently waive his right to an independent test. 

Having rejected the broader rule discussed above, the court acknowledges 

that a“moremoderateposition”would require the government to provide arrestees “with 

any information that would directly bear on the likelihood that the breath test was 

inaccurate or unreliable.”2 But the court declines to reach the question whether this 

alternative approach to Crim’s “basic understanding”test isnecessaryto ensure effective 

waiver because it concludes that the error message in this case did not raise any concerns 

about the accuracy of the test.3 Because the court concludes that “[o]bjectively 

speaking,” knowledge of the error message “would not change a defendant’s analysis” 

of whether to exercise the right to an independent test, it does not “wade into” a 

discussion of how knowledge of the error message might have influenced Botson’s 

1 Op. at 27. 

2 Op. at 27-28. 

3 Op. at 28; see Crim v. Municipality of Anchorage, 903 P.2d 586, 588 

(Alaska App. 1995). 

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decision not to obtain an independent test.4 I disagree that information about the error 

message would have been irrelevant to Botson’s decision at the time of his arrest. 

The threshold question in this case is whether knowledge of the error 

message would have been relevant to Botson’s decision-making process had it been 

available to him at the time of his arrest. The court answers this question in the negative 

on the ground that “[c]omplete and accurate” information would have assured Botson 

that the error message did not suggest inaccuracy.5 But if the officer who administered 

the breath test had noticed the error message, it is unclear from the record whether he 

would have known the source of the message and would have been able to guarantee 

Botson that it did not signify inaccuracy. 

We now have the benefit of 20-20 hindsight to conclude that the error 

message did not necessarily indicate that the test result was inaccurate. But our inquiry 

does not turn on the correctness of the ultimate determination that the breath test was 

reliable: It turns on whether Botson’s waiver was knowing and whether he had all 

information directly bearing on the accuracy of the test result before he made his 

decision. The fact that more complete information relating to the source and effect of the 

error message was obtained later is not relevant to Botson’s knowledge at the time he 

waived his constitutional right. Only the knowledge and information available to the 

defendant at the time of his purported waiver are relevant in determining whether his 

waiver was knowing and voluntary.6 And the very fact that the police officer made an 

4 Op. at 28. 

5 Op. at 28. 

6 See United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 

in the analogous waiver of Fifth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, “[t]he 

question . . . is not . . . what the record reveals about [a defendant’s] understanding . . . 

(continued...) 

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error while administering the test would surely have been relevant to Botson’s decision. 

Knowledge that the police officer had already committed one error, regardless of its 

ultimate effect on the accuracy of the test, would likely have played a role in Botson’s 

decision whether to request an independent test. 

Because I disagree that information about the error message would have 

been irrelevant to Botson’s decision-making process, I would reach the question whether 

the “basic understanding” test articulated in Crim passes constitutional muster. I do not 

believe that it does. 

The requirements for a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver have 

been discussed extensively by federal and state courts in the context of other 

constitutional rights, including the right to Miranda warnings and the right to counsel. 

In the context of guilty pleas, we have explained that “waivers of constitutional rights . . . 

not only must be voluntary but [also] must be knowing, intelligent acts done with 

sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”7 

6 (...continued) 

throughout the different stages of the proceedings . . . but specifically what the defendant 

understood at the particular stage of the proceedings at which he purportedly waived his 

right.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 

1973) (noting that in the context of the right to counsel, the “keystone determination” in 

the waiver inquiry is the “state of mind of the accused or information at hand upon which 

he at that time intelligently waived his constitutional right.” (emphasis added)). 

7 Wilson v. MacDonald, 168 P.3d 887, 889 n.10 (Alaska 2007) (quoting 

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted); 

see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (“It is reasonably clear . . . that 

waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and 

intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which 

depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that 

case . . . .’ ” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))); Johnson, 304 U.S. 

at 464 (“The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to 

(continued...) 

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I agree with the court that an appropriately protective rule in the context of 

the right to obtain an independent test would “not necessarily entitle a criminal defendant 

to all information that could conceivably affect his [or her] decision.”8 But it would 

require defendants to be informed of “relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”9 

So while an effective waiver can occur without access to all information that would help 

with strategy, arrestees must be informed of information they would need in order to 

knowingly and intelligently waive their right. Because the right to an independent 

chemical test is meant to protect defendants from having erroneous results admitted 

against them at trial,10 any information regarding the reliability of the test must qualify 

7 (...continued) 

counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances 

surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the 

accused.”). 

8 Op. at 27. In Crim, the court of appeals correctly held a waiver effective 

when Crim complained that “without knowing the result of his . . . breath test, he could 

not have assessed the potential advantages and disadvantages of availing himself of the 

right to an independent test.” 903 P.2d 586, 588 (Alaska App. 1995). Similarly, in 

Moses v. State, the court of appeals held a waiver effective when an arrestee claimed his 

waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made because he did not understand whether 

the independent test would work in his favor. 32 P.3d 1079, 1083-84 (Alaska App. 

2001). Holding otherwise would have contradicted existing precedent and allowed 

defendants to have evidence suppressed merely because they were unable to predict 

whether an independent test would work in their favor or to their detriment. 

9 Wilson, 168 P.3d at 889 n.10. 

10 As the court recognizes, “due process requires that the defendant be given 

an opportunity to challenge the reliability of that evidence . . . [by taking] an independent 

test.” Op. at 19. See also John P. Ludington, LL.B., Drunk Driving: Motorist’s Right to 

Private Sobriety Test, 45 A.L.R. 4th 11, § 2(a) (1986) (“The rationale [behind the right 

to an independent test] is that denial of such an opportunity amounts to suppression of 

evidence or at least interference with amotorist’s right to obtain exculpatory evidence.”). 

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as “relevant circumstances.” At the very least, “relevant circumstances” include those 

that, at the time of arrest, appear to directly bear on the likelihood of the test’s accuracy 

or inaccuracy.11 

Here, the fact that the machine issued an error message would have been 

an important — if not the most important — factor in Botson’s assessment of the 

reliability of the test. There is no question that if the arresting officer had seen the error 

message but deliberately concealed this fact from Botson, we could not have concluded 

that Botson knowingly waived his right to an independent test. And the fact that in this 

case the officer negligently rather than intentionally withheld the information from 

Botson does not alter this analysis. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the decision that 

Botson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to an independent test. 

11 In State v. Sanchez, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered a case in 

which the breath test in question was subsequently determined to be inaccurate. 967 

P.2d 129, 130-31 (Ariz. App. 1998). The court held that “[t]here was no knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary waiver of [the arrestee’s] right to obtain an independent test” 

because “[t]he blood test was obviously declined because he believed that he was being 

offered the opportunity to take another equally valid test.” Id. at 132. While the test in 

this case was subsequently determined to be accurate, the relevant question is whether 

Botson had sufficient information to assess the likelihood of its accuracy. 

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