46868 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 149 / Wednesday, August 4, 2010 / Proposed Rules 

Management and Budget (OMB) has 

approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(m) Refer to MCAI EASA Airworthiness 

Directive 2006–0198, dated July 11, 2006; 

Shorts Service Bulletins SD330–28–37, 

SD360–28–23, SD360 SHERPA–28–3, and 

SD3 SHERPA–28–2, all dated June 2004; and 

the service information listed in Tables 1, 2, 

and 3 of this AD; for related information. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 26, 

2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–19172 Filed 8–3–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0402; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–165–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Model 747 Airplanes and 

Model 767 Airplanes Equipped With 

General Electric Model CF6–80C2 or 

CF6–80A Series Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM); 

reopening of comment period. 

SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier 

proposed airworthiness directive (AD) 

for certain Model 747 airplanes and 

Model 767 airplanes. The original 

NPRM would have required revising the 

airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise 

the flightcrew to use certain procedures 

during descent in certain icing 

conditions. The original NPRM resulted 

from reports of several in-flight engine 

flameouts, including multiple dual 

engine flameout events and one total 

power loss event, in ice-crystal icing 

conditions. This action revises the 

original NPRM by revising the text of 

the proposed AFM revision. We are 

proposing this supplemental NPRM to 

ensure that the flightcrew has the proper 

procedures to follow in certain icing 

conditions. These certain icing 

conditions could cause a multiple 

engine flameout during flight with the 

potential inability to restart the engines, 

and consequent forced landing of the 

airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this supplemental NPRM by August 30, 

2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

You may review copies of the 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Office 

(telephone 800–647–5527) is in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Margaret Langsted, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6500; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2008–0402; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–165–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) (the ‘‘original 

NPRM’’) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to 

include an airworthiness directive (AD) 

that would apply to certain Model 747 

airplanes and Model 767 airplanes. That 

original NPRM was published in the 

Federal Register on April 7, 2008 (73 FR 

18721). That original NPRM proposed to 

require revising the airplane flight 

manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew 

to use certain procedures during descent 

in certain icing conditions. 

Actions Since Original NPRM Was 

Issued 

Since we issued the original NPRM, 

we have received a report of another 

significant flameout event on a Model 

747 airplane. As a result of this latest 

event, Boeing has revised the AFM 

instructions to include the activation of 

wing anti-ice for those altitudes where 

wing anti-ice can be used while still 

ensuring that other systems that use 

bleed air are adequately supplied with 

bleed air. Therefore, we have revised the 

AFM text specified in paragraph (g) of 

this supplemental NPRM to include this 

new text. 

Other Relevant Rulemaking 

Related NPRM, Docket FAA–2008– 

0403, Directorate Identifier 2007–NM– 

166–AD (73 FR 18719, April 7, 2008), 

proposed to require similar actions for 

Model MD–11 and MD–11F airplanes, 

certified in any category, equipped with 

General Electric (GE) CF6–80C2 series 

engines. These airplanes have been 

determined to be subject to the 

identified unsafe condition addressed in 

this supplemental NPRM. 

Support for the Original NPRM 

The Air Line Pilots Association, 

International supports the intent and 

language of the original NPRM. The 

National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB), based on the success of similar 

AFM requirements to address this 

unsafe condition on Hawker Beechcraft 

Corporation Model 400, 400A, and 400T 

series airplanes, and Model MU–300 

airplanes, supports the adoption of the 

proposed requirements. 


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Request for FAA To Actively Pursue 

Research to Develop a Permanent 

Solution 

The NTSB notes that the original 

NPRM is intended as interim action, 

and points out that it has issued Safety 

Recommendation A–06–59, dated 

August 25, 2006. In this safety 

recommendation the NTSB asked the 

FAA to ‘‘* * * work with engine and 

airplane manufacturers and other 

industry personnel as well as 

appropriate international authorities to 

actively pursue research to develop an 

ice detector that would alert pilots to 

internal engine icing and require that it 

be installed on new production turbojet 

engines, as well as retrofitted to existing 

turbojet engines.’’ Therefore, the NTSB 

hopes the FAA pursues research in 

concert with the multi-national Aircraft 

Icing Research Alliance that might 

develop an ice detector to alert 

flightcrews to the accretion of ice 

crystals on internal engine surfaces, so 

that flightcrews can take the appropriate 

actions. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter’s request. We agree that the 

GE CF6–80C2 series engine needs to be 

modified to mitigate the risk of 

flameouts caused by ice crystal 

accretion. However, at this time, we do 

not agree to pursue research to develop 

an ice detector that would alert 

flightcrews to the internal engine icing, 

or with requiring manufacturers to 

install ice detectors internal to the 

engines. In addition, no such designs 

have been proposed to the FAA. Instead, 

for future designs, we are developing 

rulemaking to show acceptable engine 

operation in an ice crystal environment. 

For engines that currently demonstrate 

a susceptibility to ice crystals, we are 

working with manufacturers to develop 

engine design changes to make engines 

more robust during ice crystal 

accumulation and shedding encounters. 

We will continue to provide feedback to 

the NTSB through the established 

process for addressing safety 

recommendations. For this AD, if 

different methods to address the unsafe 

condition are developed, under the 

provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, 

we will consider requests for approval 

of an AMOC if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the 

method would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. No change to the 

supplemental NPRM is necessary in this 

regard. 

Request to Require Demonstration of 

Non-Susceptibility in Future Designs 

The NTSB states that it hopes the 

FAA will require future engine designs 

to demonstrate that they will not be 

susceptible to the accretion of ice 

crystals on internal surfaces. The NTSB 

points out that this request is in keeping 

with information provided to the NTSB 

by the FAA’s icing expert during a 

briefing with the NTSB. 

From these statements, we infer that 

the NTSB is requesting that we revise 

the original NPRM to include a 

statement of our intent to require 

manufacturers to demonstrate that 

future engine designs are not 

susceptible to the accretion of ice 

crystals. We partially agree. We agree 

that current FAA regulations addressing 

engine and airplane icing do not apply 

to the ice crystal environment; therefore, 

we are working with the aviation 

industry to develop appropriate 

regulations that address operation in an 

ice crystal environment. As we 

determine the necessary requirements to 

address this issue, we will consider 

additional rulemaking. We do not agree 

to revise this AD to include a statement 

regarding future regulations that have 

not yet been determined. No change to 

the supplemental NPRM is necessary in 

this regard. 

Request to Withdraw the Original 

NPRM 

GE acknowledges that a small number 

of inclement weather or significant 

weather system encounters have 

resulted in short-duration multiple 

engine power loss. GE points out that 

these few events occurred out of 14 

million flights over 20 years of total 

service experience on the Model CF6– 

80C2 series engine. GE states that a 

forced landing resulting from one of 

these in-flight ice-crystal icing events is 

extremely improbable (including 

demonstrated relight performance). 

Therefore, GE asserts that the proposed 

condition does not meet the definition 

of ‘‘unsafe condition,’’ as defined by 

FAA Advisory Circular 39–8, 

‘‘Continued Airworthiness Assessments 

of Powerplant and Auxiliary Power Unit 

Installations of Transport Category 

Airplanes,’’ dated September 8, 2003. 

From these statements, we infer that 

GE requests that we withdraw the 

original NPRM. We do not agree. We 

have evaluated the unsafe condition and 

find that sufficient data exist to 

demonstrate that the environment that 

causes the engine flameout would likely 

cause engine damage that potentially 

would prevent an engine from 

relighting. The condition could exist on 

all of an airplane’s engines, resulting in 

a forced landing. The advisory circular 

referenced by the commenter merely 

provides guidance. We have determined 

that an unsafe condition exists, and the 

appropriate vehicle for correcting an 

unsafe condition is an AD. We have not 

changed the supplemental NPRM 

regarding this issue. 

Request to Delay Issuance of AD Until 

New Software Modification Is 

Implemented 

Lufthansa Technik (Lufthansa) 

suggests that the AD be postponed until 

a new electronic control unit (ECU) 

software modification has been 

implemented, and GE can present data 

to operators to show the need to 

mandate the proposed procedures. 

Lufthansa asserts that GE did not 

provide data to the airlines on how 

many flameout events have occurred. 

Consequently, Lufthansa states that its 

flightcrews have not used the procedure 

specified in the original NPRM. 

Lufthansa points out that it is usually 

common sense to use the proposed 

procedure; therefore, it is hard to 

understand why the proposed 

procedure will now be mandatory. 

We do not agree to delay issuance of 

this action. We do not consider that 

delaying this action until after the 

release of a possible software revision is 

warranted. As Lufthansa points out, 

while the proposed procedure might be 

common sense to some, most 

flightcrews are not using the proposed 

procedure; therefore, as stated 

previously, we have found that ECU 

software logic alone does not provide an 

acceptable level of safety. We have 

determined that the in-flight anti-ice 

activation procedures in combination 

with the electronic engine control (EEC) 

software are necessary to mitigate the 

unsafe condition. However, under the 

provisions of paragraph (i) of the 

supplemental NPRM, we will consider 

requests for approval of an AMOC if 

sufficient data are submitted to 

substantiate that the change would 

provide an acceptable level of safety. 

We find that delaying this action would 

be inappropriate in light of the 

identified unsafe condition, and have 

made no change to this supplemental 

NPRM in this regard. 

Request to Revise Related AD To 

Reduce Compliance Time 

Global Supply Systems (Global) 

requests that we revise AD 2007–12–07, 

Amendment 39–15085 (72 FR 31174, 

June 6, 2007), to require a much earlier 

compliance time for the software update 

required by that AD. That AD applies to 

GE Model CF6–80C2B series turbofan 

engines with ECUs installed on Model 

747 and 767 airplanes. Global explains 

that GE has two engine software 

revisions to the EEC bleed scheduling, 

which, while not preventing flameouts 


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from occurring, do appear to mitigate 

the effect. Global notes that the later 

software revision is subject to AD 2007– 

12–07, which requires compliance by 

July 10, 2012. Global reasons that 

software upgrades are required only on 

workshop visits for unserviceability or 

engine change, and with current 

serviceability levels, the mandatory 

upgrading of current equipment is 

extremely slow, leading to substantial 

levels of unmodified software installed 

on airplanes. Global asserts that, while 

this problem increases pressure to 

introduce procedures to alleviate the 

problem, it does not adequately address 

the improvement in safety that would be 

incumbent on bringing the compliance 

date of AD 2007–12–07 forward to 

require use of a programmed upgrade of 

the EEC software. 

We do not agree to change the 

compliance time for the actions required 

by AD 2007–12–07. In developing an 

appropriate compliance time for the 

requirements of that AD, we considered 

the safety implications, parts 

availability, and normal maintenance 

schedules for timely accomplishment of 

the requirements of that AD. In 

consideration of all of these factors, we 

determined that the compliance time 

required by that AD represents an 

appropriate interval in which the 

software can be updated in a timely 

manner within the fleet, while still 

maintaining an adequate level of safety. 

However, operators are always 

permitted to accomplish the 

requirements of an AD at a time earlier 

than the specified compliance time; 

therefore, an operator may choose to 

update the software, as required by that 

AD, before the required compliance date 

specified in that AD. If additional data 

are presented that would justify a 

shorter compliance time, we might 

consider further rulemaking on this 

issue. We have made no change to this 

supplemental NPRM in this regard. 

Request to Remove GE Model CF6–80A 

Series Engines 

GE Aviation (GE) suggests removing 

all references to GE Model CF6–80A 

series engines from the original NPRM. 

GE states that it is not aware of any 

confirmed engine flameout events 

related to GE Model CF6–80A series 

engines due to ice-crystal icing 

conditions. GE explains that this might 

be due to several factors: 

• A significantly different type-design 

booster from that of the GE Model CF6– 

80C2 series engines (GE Model CF6– 

80A series engines have fewer rotor and 

booster stages, with 30 percent fewer 

airfoils, resulting in significantly 

reduced potential accretion sites than 

the GE Model CF6–80C2 series engines); 

• A significantly different variable 

bleed valve system (especially the exit 

path); and 

• A purely hydro-mechanical (power 

management control with mechanical 

engine control) fuel control system, 

where as GE Model CF6–80C2 series 

engines have predominantly FADEC 

control with different fueling schedules 

and response characteristics. 

From these statements, we infer that 

GE is requesting that we remove 

airplanes equipped with GE Model 

CF6–80A series engines from the 

applicability of this supplemental 

NPRM. We do not agree. Although there 

have been no recorded flameout events 

related to GE Model CF6–80A series 

engines, flightcrews are not required to 

determine which model of engine is 

installed on the airplane. Therefore, it is 

possible that the flightcrew would not 

perform the necessary AFM procedure 

because the flightcrew is unaware of the 

engine model that is installed on the 

airplane they are flying. However, under 

the provisions of paragraph (i) of this 

supplemental NPRM, we will consider 

requests for approval of an AMOC for 

airplanes equipped with GE Model 

CF6–80A series airplanes if sufficient 

data are submitted to substantiate an 

acceptable level of safety. We have 

made no change to this supplemental 

NPRM in this regard. 

Request to Acknowledge No Flameout 

Events on GE Model CF6–80A Series 

Engines 

Boeing states that the FAA should 

revise the Discussion section of the 

original NPRM to acknowledge that 

there have been no flameout events 

recorded on GE Model CF6–80A series 

engines. While this engine has a similar 

compressor design, Boeing believes it 

has certain design features (including 

the VBV door geometry and schedule), 

which might explain why it does not 

have flameout events. Boeing asserts 

that operators of airplanes equipped 

with GE Model CF6–80A series engines 

might desire to ask for an AMOC with 

this AD for those airplanes. 

We partially agree. We agree that 

there have been no recorded flameout 

events to date on GE Model CF6–80A 

series engines during ice-crystal icing 

conditions. However, as previously 

noted, the Discussion section in the 

original NPRM is not restated in this 

supplemental NPRM; therefore, there is 

no need to revise the supplemental 

NPRM in this regard. 

Request to Revise Wording in the 

Discussion Section of the Original 

NPRM 

GE suggests that we revise the 

wording of the Discussion section of the 

original NPRM to remove the word 

‘‘core,’’ or, if that is not acceptable, to 

change ‘‘core flow path’’ to ‘‘booster and 

core flow path.’’ GE points out that the 

term ‘‘core’’ can be interpreted to mean 

just the high-pressure spool portion of a 

turbofan. 

We partially agree. We do not agree 

with GE’s suggestion to remove the 

word ‘‘core’’ from the Discussion 

section. We do agree that the phrase 

‘‘booster and core flow path’’ is more 

accurate; however, because the 

Discussion section of the original NPRM 

is not restated in this supplemental 

NPRM, there is no need to revise the 

supplemental NPRM in this regard. 

GE also suggests that we revise the 

Discussion section of the NPRM to 

remove the following sentence: ‘‘The GE 

CF6–80C2 and CF6–80A series engines 

models have similar compressor 

designs.’’ GE suggests removing this 

sentence for the same reasons it requests 

that we remove GE Model CF6–80A 

series engines from the applicability of 

the original NPRM. Or, if we do not 

agree to remove that sentence, GE 

proposes that we revise that sentence to 

clarify the statement of similarity of 

compressor designs of the GE Model 

CF6–80A and CF6–80C2 series engines. 

GE proposes changing the sentence to 

read, ‘‘The GE CF6–80C2 and CF6–80A 

series engines models have different 

booster and VBV system designs, but 

similar compressor designs.’’ 

We partially agree. We do not agree 

with GE’s suggestion to remove the 

subject sentence from the Discussion 

section. We do agree that the revised 

wording suggested by GE is more 

accurate; however, as previously noted, 

the Discussion section in the original 

NPRM is not restated in this 

supplemental NPRM, therefore, there is 

no need to revise the supplemental 

NPRM in this regard. 

GE also believes that, in the 

Discussion section of the original 

NPRM, the reference to ‘‘¥40 °C’’ in the 

explanation of conditions for activating 

engine anti-ice on airplanes equipped 

with a primary in-flight ice detection 

system should be changed to ‘‘SAT 

¥40 °C.’’ 

From this statement, we infer that GE 

is requesting that we revise the 

Discussion section of the original NPRM 

to clarify the referenced temperature. 

We partially agree. We agree that the 

temperature should be ‘‘SAT ¥40 °C.’’ 

However, as previously noted, the 


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Discussion section in the original NPRM 

is not restated in this supplemental 

NPRM, there is no need to revise the 

supplemental NPRM in this regard. 

Request to Revise the Costs of 

Compliance Section of the NPRM 

GE suggests that there should be an 

operational cost of compliance included 

in the proposed Costs of Compliance 

provided in the original NPRM. GE 

states that, while increasing engine offtake or bleed does provide additional 

margin against flameout, doing so 

requires somewhat increased fuel burn. 

GE believes the proposed procedure 

would be required on a significant 

percentage of flights, and estimates that 

the incremental fuel required is around 

100 pounds of fuel per flight for Model 

747 airplanes, but less for Model 767 

airplanes. 

We do not agree to include an 

operational cost. The cost information 

in AD actions describes only the direct 

costs of the specific actions required by 

the AD: an AFM revision in this case. 

The estimated cost of this action 

represents the time necessary to perform 

only the actions actually required by 

this supplemental NPRM. We recognize 

that, in doing the actions required by an 

AD, operators might incur operational 

costs in addition to the direct costs. The 

cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions, 

however, typically does not include 

incidental or operational costs such as 

the time required for planning or other 

administrative actions, and, in this case, 

possible additional fuel costs. Those 

costs, which might vary significantly 

among operators, are almost impossible 

to calculate. Additionally, we have 

determined that the additional fuel burn 

necessitated by the AFM procedure 

would be insignificant. We have not 

changed the supplemental NPRM in this 

regard. 

Request to Remove Nacelle Anti-Ice 

Requirement in Certain Icing 

Conditions 

Global requests that we revise the 

original NPRM to remove the proposed 

requirement to select manual nacelle 

anti-ice in visible moisture below a total 

air temperature (TAT) of 10 °Celsius (C) 

during descent at lower altitudes (e.g., 

Flight Level (FL) 100). Global states that 

its primary area of operation includes a 

high proportion of flights in regions that 

have been particularly affected by ice 

crystal accretion incidents, so it is 

concerned about the risks involved with 

the identified unsafe condition. 

However, although Global understands 

and supports measures to reduce the 

risks associated with ice-crystal icing, it 

considers forcing use of manual nacelle 

anti-ice during descent in visible 

moisture to be too prescriptive and 

deleterious to safety. 

First, Global points out that the 

proposed procedure is required 

irrespective of altitude, and that nacelle 

anti-ice will frequently be unnecessarily 

required to be selected ‘‘ON,’’ 

particularly at lower altitudes where ice 

crystal ingestion and subsequent 

flameout have not been experienced. 

Second, Global explains that its 

flightcrews have become accustomed to 

using automatic ice detection and are 

therefore less familiar with the detection 

of conditions requiring the manual 

selection of nacelle anti-ice. For this 

reason, Global asserts that there will be 

an increase in the flightcrew’s workload 

during descent as the external ambient 

conditions are assessed more frequently, 

especially at lower altitudes where air 

traffic control and approach procedures 

generate a higher workload. 

Third, Global states that increase in 

idle thrust level dependant on engine 

anti-ice increases the required descent 

distance. Global declares that the use of 

the flight management computer’s 

(FMC’s) descent predictions is essential 

for environmental and economic 

reasons to minimize fuel usage. Because 

descent is predicated on not using the 

nacelle anti-ice, requiring use of the 

nacelle anti-ice will negate this 

prediction. Although the FMC can be 

programmed to account for the effect of 

using nacelle anti-ice below an entered 

altitude, this method is not efficient and 

would either cause the airplane to 

become high and fast because of 

inadequate distance for descent, or, 

conversely, cause the airplane to 

descend too early, increasing fuel usage 

and noise disturbance. 

Fourth, Global states that it is aware 

of a similar process requiring manual 

activation of nacelle anti-ice on a 

different airplane/engine combination, 

which also suffers from ice crystal 

accretion. Global points out that process 

allows reversion to auto nacelle anti-ice 

below 10,000 feet. 

We do not agree to remove the 

proposed requirement to select manual 

nacelle anti-ice in visible moisture 

below a TAT of 10 °C during descent at 

lower altitudes (e.g., 10,000 feet). 

Contrary to Global’s assertion that 

flameout caused by ice-crystal icing has 

not been experienced at lower altitudes, 

flameouts at altitudes lower than 10,000 

feet have occurred as a result of icecrystal icing. 

We recognize that the descent phase 

of flight requires a higher level of 

workload for the flightcrew; however, 

icing can occur at any altitude at any 

time, and is most common in descents 

as the airplane passes through visible 

moisture. As we explained in the 

original NPRM, ice-crystal icing does 

not appear on radar due to its low 

reflectivity, and the airplane ice detector 

does not detect the presence of these 

specific icing conditions. Therefore, icecrystal icing is often undetected by the 

flightcrew. Although these specific icing 

conditions are difficult to detect, all 

pilots should know what visible 

moisture is and how to recognize it 

without significant impact to flightcrew 

workload. In fact, all pilots need be 

cognizant of the conditions they are 

flying in and be capable of reacting to 

those conditions, regardless of the phase 

of flight. 

The requirement to activate the 

engine anti-ice prior to descent in 

visible moisture with TAT less than 

10 °C and greater than saturated air 

temperature (SAT) ¥40 °C already 

exists for airplanes that are not 

equipped with a primary in-flight ice 

detection system, which is designed to 

automatically activate wing anti-ice and 

engine anti-ice when the airplane is in 

icing conditions. However, the primary 

in-flight ice detection system does not 

detect ice-crystal icing; therefore, the 

engine anti-ice would not be activated 

during these icing encounters. There is 

no requirement to activate engine antiice at temperatures below SAT ¥40 °C, 

and this proposed AD would require 

activation of engine anti-ice at 

temperatures below SAT ¥40 °C. 

Activating the engine anti-ice increases 

the flameout margin and reduces the 

potential for multiple engine flameouts 

by increasing bleed flow and idle speed. 

As far as Global’s assertion that use of 

manual nacelle anti-ice will increase 

fuel usage, we have confirmed that any 

increase in fuel usage caused by use of 

manual nacelle anti-ice would be 

insignificant. Engine anti-ice also assists 

with relighting the engines by turning 

on the igniters on airplanes that are not 

equipped with autorelight. We have 

determined that FMC software logic 

alone does not provide an adequate 

level of safety in lieu of manual anti-ice 

activation in ice-crystal icing 

conditions. 

For the reasons discussed previously, 

we have concluded that requiring 

selection of manual nacelle anti-ice in 

visible moisture below a TAT of 10 °C 

during descent at lower altitudes does 

increase safety and does not impose 

undue burdens on operators. We have 

made no change to the supplemental 

NPRM in this regard. 


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FAA’s Determination and Proposed 

Requirements of the Supplemental 

NPRM 

We are proposing this supplemental 

NPRM because we evaluated all 

pertinent information and determined 

an unsafe condition exists and is likely 

to exist or develop on other products of 

these same type designs. Certain 

changes described above expand the 

scope of the original NPRM. As a result, 

we have determined that it is necessary 

to reopen the comment period to 

provide additional opportunity for the 

public to comment on this supplemental 

NPRM. 

Interim Action 

We consider this proposed AD 

interim action. If final action is later 

identified, we might consider further 

rulemaking then. 

Explanation of Additional Paragraph in 

the Supplemental NPRM 

We have added a new paragraph (d) 

to this supplemental NPRM to provide 

the Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America subject code 30: Ice and rain 

protection. This code is added to make 

this supplemental NPRM parallel with 

other new AD actions. We have 

reidentified subsequent paragraphs 

accordingly. 

Explanation of Change Made to the 

Supplemental NPRM 

We have revised this supplemental 

NPRM to identify the legal name of the 

manufacturer as published in the most 

recent type certificate data sheet for the 

affected airplane models. 

Explanation of Change to Costs of 

Compliance 

Since issuance of the original NPRM, 

we have increased the labor rate used in 

the Costs of Compliance from $80 per 

work-hour to $85 per work-hour. The 

Costs of Compliance information, 

below, reflects this increase in the 

specified hourly labor rate. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 1,064 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs for U.S. operators to 

comply with this proposed AD. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Parts Cost per airplane 

Number of 

U.S.-registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

AFM revision ............................................ 1 $85 $0 $85 340 $28,900 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA– 

2008–0402; Directorate Identifier 2007– 

NM–165–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) We must receive comments by August 

30, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to The Boeing 

Company Model 747 airplanes and Model 

767 airplanes, certified in any category, 

equipped with General Electric Model CF6– 

80C2 or CF6–80A series engines. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 30: Ice and rain protection. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD results from reports of several 

in-flight engine flameouts, including 

multiple dual engine flameout events and 

one total power loss event, in ice-crystal 

icing conditions. We are issuing this AD to 

ensure that the flightcrew has the proper 

procedures to follow in certain icing 

conditions. These certain icing conditions 

could cause a multiple engine flameout 

during flight with the potential inability to 

restart the engines, and consequent forced 

landing of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Revision 

(g) Within 14 days after the effective date 

of this AD, revise the Limitations Section of 

the Boeing 747 or 767 AFM, as applicable, to 

include the following statement. This may be 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 149 / Wednesday, August 4, 2010 / Proposed Rules 46873 

done by inserting a copy of this AD into the 

AFM. 

‘‘Prior to descent in visible moisture and 

TAT less than 10 °C, including SAT less than 

¥40 °C, nacelle anti-ice switch must be in 

the ON position. At or below 22,000 ft, wing 

anti-ice selector must be in the ON position.’’ 

Note 1: When a statement identical to that 

in paragraph (g) of this AD has been included 

in the general revisions of the AFM, the 

general revisions may be inserted into the 

AFM, and the copy of this AD may be 

removed from the AFM. 

Special Flight Permits 

(h) Special flight permits, as described in 

Section 21.197 and Section 21.199 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 

and 21.199), may be issued to operate the 

airplane to a location where the requirements 

of this AD can be accomplished provided the 

operational requirements defined in the 

Limitations Section of the AFM are used if 

icing is encountered. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(i)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. Send information to Attn: 

Margaret Langsted, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; telephone (425) 917–6500; fax (425) 

917–6590. Information may be e-mailed to: 9- 

ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 27, 

2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–19154 Filed 8–3–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0670; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–339–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A318–111 and A318–112 Airplanes and 

Model A319, A320, and A321 Series 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM); 

reopening of comment period. 

SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier 

NPRM for the products listed above. 

This action revises the earlier NPRM by 

expanding the scope. This proposed AD 

results from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Damage to the lower lateral fittings of the 

80VU rack, typically elongated holes, 

migrated bushes [bushings], and/or missing 

bolts have been reported in-service. In 

addition damage to the lower central support 

fitting (including cracking) has been 

reported. 

In the worst case scenario a complete 

failure of the 80VU fittings in combination 

with a high load factor or strong vibration 

could lead to failure of the rack structure 

and/or computers or rupture/disconnection 

of the cable harnesses to one or more 

computers located in the 80VU. This rack 

contains computers for Flight Controls, 

Communication and Radio-navigation. These 

functions are duplicated across other racks 

but during critical phases of flight the 

multiple system failures/re-configuration 

may constitute an unsafe condition. 

* * * * * 

The proposed AD would require actions 

that are intended to address the unsafe 

condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by August 30, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Airbus, 

Airworthiness Office—EAS, 1 Rond 

Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac 

Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 

96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; e-mail: 

account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may review copies of the referenced 

service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. 

For information on the availability of 

this material at the FAA, call 425–227– 

1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Dulin, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 227–2141; fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2008–0670; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–339–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 


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