[Cite as Pfeifer Farms, Inc. v. Hill, 2024-Ohio-3057.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

MARION COUNTY

PFEIFER FARMS, INC., ET AL.,

 PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, CASE NO. 9-23-79

 v.

MASON HILL, ET AL.,

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES, O P I N I O N

[KONRAD KUCZAK - APPELLANT]

Appeal from Municipal Court of Marion County

Trial Court No. 22 CVH 314

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: August 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Konrad Kuczak, Appellant

Todd A. Anderson for Appellees, Pfeifer Farms, Inc. and Upper 

Holdings, LLC
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WALDICK, J.

{¶1} Attorney-appellant, Konrad Kuczak (“Kuczak”), brings this appeal 

from the November 17, 2023 judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court.

On appeal, Kuczak argues that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to 

plaintiff-appellee, Pfeifer Farms (“Pfeifer”), for Kuczak’s violation of R.C. 2323.51 

and Civ.R. 11. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} Mason Hill and Kiersta Weis (collectively, “Defendants”) leased a 

residence in Marion from Pfeifer. The rental term was for one year beginning April 

1, 2020, converting to a month-to-month tenancy beginning April 1, 2021. The 

rental amount was $1,200 per month and the security deposit was $800.

{¶3} On November 17, 2021, Defendants were served a notice of termination 

of their tenancy effective December 31, 2021. Defendants did not pay rent for 

December of 2021, but they did move out of the residence in December of 2021.

Defendants also did not provide a forwarding address upon the termination of their 

tenancy.

{¶4} On January 18, 2022, Defendants were provided written notice that 

their security deposit would be retained along with documentation and a demand for 
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money damages totaling $27,837.67. It was alleged, inter alia, that Defendants 

caused significant damage to the property, far beyond normal wear and tear.1

{¶5} After Defendants did not respond to the claim for damages, Pfeifer filed 

a complaint against Defendants in the Marion County Municipal Court seeking 

money damages in the amount of $15,000 for unpaid rent, late fees, pet violation 

fees, oil tank refilling fees, and property damage.2

{¶6} Defendants retained attorney Kuczak to represent them. Kuczak then 

filed an answer and counterclaim to Pfeifer’s complaint. The counterclaim alleged, 

inter alia, that Pfeifer had required a security deposit greater than one-month’s rent 

in contravention of R.C. 5321.16, and that Pfeifer had committed an “abuse of 

process.” Defendants indicated that their attorney did not tell them about filing 

counterclaims, and that they did not understand the allegations.

{¶7} Both parties filed motions for summary judgment; however, Kuczak 

ultimately dismissed Defendants’ counterclaims that were made under R.C. 

5321.16. Subsequently, Defendants’ summary judgment motion was denied, and 

1 As a result of the damages, Pfeifer had to

refill the oil tanks, remove trash/debris from inside and outside the property, including outbuildings, completely remove the carpet throughout the house, repair the cabinets/drawers 

in the kitchen, replace broken window screens, replace broken ceiling tiles, plaster holes, 

replace wallpaper throughout the house, fix door trims, replace a missing stair spindle, 

replace water softener, and deep clean the entire property.

2 Pfeifer testified that they chose to limit the recovery amount to $15,000 even though the damages far 

exceeded this amount.
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Pfeifer’s was granted in part, which disposed of Defendants’ only remaining 

counterclaims.

{¶8} A trial was held before a magistrate on November 30, 2022.3 Kuczak 

told one of the Defendants, Mason Hill, that he did not have to be present for the 

trial because he was not subpoenaed by Pfeifer. 

{¶9} Kiersta Weis testified at the hearing and she admitted that Defendants 

had caused many of the alleged damages to the subject property, despite having 

denied causing the damage previously. Testimony and exhibits were presented 

establishing the condition of the property both before and after Defendants were on 

the property. After reviewing the evidence, the magistrate recommended that 

judgment be granted in favor of Pfeifer in the amount of $15,000 plus statutory 

interest. Defendants objected to the magistrate’s decision, but the objections were 

overruled. The magistrate’s recommendation was adopted as the order of the trial 

court. 

{¶10} Following the trial, Pfeifer filed a motion for attorney’s fees and 

sanctions against Defendants and against their attorney, Kuczak, with request for an 

oral hearing. Kuczak withdrew as counsel for Defendants and Kuczak retained 

counsel. A hearing was held on Pfeifer’s motion for attorney’s fees and sanctions 

3 No transcript from this trial was filed on appeal. Kuczak specifically did not request the transcript.
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on August 28, 2023. The hearing could readily be described as “combative,” 

particularly during Kuczak’s testimony.

{¶11} On November 6, 2023, the trial court issued a written decision

determining that Kuczak had engaged in frivolous conduct in violation of R.C. 

2323.51, and that he had violated his duties under Civ.R. 11. In reaching the 

conclusion that Kuczak engaged in frivolous conduct, the trial court conducted the 

following analysis:

The evidence presented at the oral hearing shows frivolous conduct 

occurred based on a series of events throughout this case. The Court 

will not describe each and every event leading to the finding that 

frivolous conduct occurred but will briefly discuss a few examples 

that led to this finding.

Following continual photographic evidence and a list of damages 

provided by Plaintiffs, Defendants (Weis and Hill) through their 

Attorney (Kuczak) continued to deny the damage. They denied the 

damages in their answers to Plaintiffs’ Request for Admissions and 

during depositions, which led to a full day of trial with increased time 

and attorney’s fees. However, at the trial, Defendant Weis admitted to 

knowledge of most of the damage Plaintiffs alleged occurred in their 

original complaint and throughout the entire process.

Attorney Kuczak engaged in frivolous conduct specifically designed 

to harass Plaintiffs leading to an unnecessary delay in the proceedings 

by filing counterclaims with a lack of any legal or factual basis and 

without knowledge of his own clients. Hill and Weis both testified 

they had no knowledge of the counterclaims filed by their attorney. 

Based on the letter provided by Plaintiffs following the end of their 

tenancy, no reasonable attorney could argue the counterclaims filed 

have merit. Attorney Kuczak defended the baseless counterclaims 

until Motions for Summary Judgment were filed. At which point, 

Attorney Kuczak dismissed two claims, regarding the rental deposit, 

but continued with the claims for quiet enjoyment and abuse of 

process. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment 
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on those final two counterclaims. However, Attorney Kuczak showed 

up at trial believing the claims were still pending.

The evidence showed Attorney Kuczak advised both Defendants to 

continue to deny the property damage in their answers to Plaintiffs’ 

Requests for Admissions. * * * Both Hill and Weis testified they 

relied on Attorney Kuczak to answer the discovery requests and were 

advised to say “none”, regardless of if it was an inaccurate statement. 

Hill and Weis further testified they admitted to some of the damages 

listed throughout Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions, but that they 

were told to deny the damages by Attorney Kuczak. * * * Both Hill 

and Weis testified they relied fully on the advice from Attorney 

Kuczak throughout the case because they had no understanding of the 

legal basis of the claims or of the process itself.

Attorney Kuczak provided the answers “exhibits will be identified and 

exchanged at a time designated by the court” in Defendants’ answers 

to Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production. Hill and Weis both admitted 

they had no documents to provide at the time and would not have any 

to supplement. However, Attorney Kuczak testified he answered this 

way because the Court issued a scheduling order, with a discovery 

requests deadline, that controls over the Ohio Rules of Civil 

Procedure.

Evidence also showed Attorney Kuczak had informed Hill he “was 

not subpoenaed by Plaintiffs to appear at the trial, even though he was 

a party to the case, therefore he did not need to appear.” Hill testified 

he would have been at the trial if Attorney Kuczak did not tell him not 

to attend. Hill also testified Attorney Kuczak failed to explain that 

Hill’s failure to appear at the trial could lead to a default judgment 

being made against him. Attorney Kuczak denied telling Hill not to 

appear, but admitted to telling Hill he was “unnecessary.” 

Furthermore, Attorney Kuczak presented no evidence or witness 

testimony at trial to defend the claims or evidence presented by 

Plaintiffs. Defendant Weis was called by Plaintiffs’ counsel on cross 

examination but was not recalled for further explanation or 

examination by Attorney Kuczak on direct examination.

Evidence was also presented that, prior to the trial, Attorney Anderson 

reached out to Attorney Kuczak for stipulations on certain evidence 

and to discuss possible settlement. Evidence presented at the sanctions 
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hearing revealed Attorney Kuczak told Attorney Anderson he had “no 

intention of entering stipulations because he wasted his time with 

depositions.” Attorney Kuczak also admitted to not submitting to any 

negotiations during the case and further admitted to telling Attorney 

Anderson his job was to “throw sand in your gears” at the trial. Hill 

testified Attorney Kuczak never brought any offer of settlement to 

him or Weis during the pendency of the case.

It is clear from the evidence presented at the oral hearing frivolous 

conduct occurred and due to that conduct, the case was prolonged, 

leading to additional expenses and Attorney’s fees incurred by 

Plaintiffs. Defendants, Hill and Weis, relied solely on the advice of 

Konrad Kuczak throughout their case, without understanding the 

possible consequences of their actions or disactions. Therefore an 

award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under R.C 2323.51 against 

Konrad Kuczak only.

(Doc. No. 76).

{¶12} The trial court also determined that Kuczak violated Civ.R. 11 by 

filing counterclaims on behalf of defendants without their knowledge or approval. 

The trial court found this particularly egregious because prior to filing the 

counterclaims Kuczak knew or should have known that the counterclaims had no 

basis or support.

{¶13} Based on testimony at the final hearing, the trail court determined that 

Pfeifer should be awarded the attorney’s fees incurred due to Kuczak’s violations 

of R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. Testimony and evidence established that Pfeifer 

incurred $12,545 in attorney’s fees and expenses due to Kuczak’s actions. On 

November 17, 2023, the trial court issued a final judgment for Pfeifer against 
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Kuczak in that amount. It is from this judgment that Kuczak now appeals, asserting 

the following assignments of error for our review.
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First Assignment of Error

The trial court committed prejudicial error in imposing sanctions 

pursuant to Civ.R. 11.

Second Assignment of Error

The trial court committed prejudicial error by concluding that 

Kuczak’s acts or omissions were frivolous as a matter of law.

Third Assignment of Error

The trial court committed prejudicial error in issuing its award 

of sanctions contrary to 2323.51(B)(2)(a).

{¶14} Before we reach the assignments of error, we must address a 

procedural issue in this matter. Kuczak did not request or produce a transcript of the 

November 30, 2022 hearing. Given that the trial court imposed sanctions under 

Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 for Kuczak’s conduct throughout this case, and given 

that Kuczak’s conduct was exemplified through some of the statements and 

testimony at the November 30, 2022 hearing, the lack of a transcript from the 

hearing hinders our review to a degree. App.R. 9(B)(3); Irvin v. Tate, 2022-Ohio2553, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). 

{¶15} Simply put, “appellant bears the burden of showing error by reference 

to matters in the record.” Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 

(1980). “Without a transcript, a reviewing court must presume the regularity of the 

proceedings under such circumstances.” Irvin at ¶ 10.
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{¶16} Here, we have a transcript from the sanctions hearing, so we can still 

conduct a review of the matter; however, to any extent actions or statements at the 

original final hearing were made, such as Weis admitting issues she had previously 

denied claiming that Kuczak had told her to deny them, we must presume regularity 

and accept the trial court’s findings from the earlier hearing.

First Assignment of Error

{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Kuczak argues that the trial court 

committed prejudicial error by imposing sanctions against him under Civ.R. 11.

Standard of Review

{¶18} Civil Rule 11 governs the signing of pleadings, motions, and other 

documents and provides, in pertinent part:

The signature of an attorney or pro se party constitutes a certificate by 

the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read the document; 

that to the best of the attorney’s or party’s knowledge, information, 

and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not 

interposed for delay. If a document is not signed or is signed with 

intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and 

false and the action may proceed as though the document had not been 

served. For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney or pro se party, 

upon motion of a party or upon the court’s own motion, may be 

subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing 

party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing 

any motion under this rule.

{¶19} In ruling on a motion for sanctions made pursuant to Civ.R. 11, a court 

“must consider whether the attorney signing the document (1) has read the pleading, 

(2) harbors good grounds to support it to the best of his or her knowledge, 
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information, and belief, and (3) did not file it for purposes of delay.” Ceol v. Zion 

Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 290 (9th Dist.1992); ABN AMRO Mtge, supra,

2013–Ohio–1557, ¶ 17. The standard of review to be applied to a trial court’s 

decision on a request for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 is an abuse of discretion. Feagan 

v. Bethesda N. Hosp., 2024-Ohio-166, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.). However, purely legal 

questions, such as whether good legal grounds exist to support a complaint, are 

reviewed de novo. Id.; Reddy v. Singh, 2015-Ohio-1180, ¶ 74 (3d Dist.).

Analysis

{¶20} Kuczak first argues that the trial court “did not find that anything 

Kuczak did was willful,” thus the trial court could not impose sanctions under 

Civ.R. 11. However, Kuczak’s argument ignores the clear language of the trial 

court’s decision. In the trial court’s discussion of Civ.R. 11, the trial court set forth 

the applicable legal authority indicating that an attorney has to willfully violate 

Civ.R. 11 before the trial court could sanction the attorney. Only two sentences later,

the trial court determined that Kuczak violated his duty provided under Civ.R. 11.

{¶21} Kuczak seems to take issue with the fact that the trial court did not 

specifically use the word “willful” when it determined that he violated Civ.R. 11. In 

order to find that the trial court failed to make a finding that his conduct was willful, 

we would have to ignore the legal authority the trial court cited just two sentences 

prior and presume that the trial court did not follow that legal authority. This is an 

illogical interpretation of the trial court’s decision, and we reject it.
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{¶22} Kuczak next argues that he did not cause a delay in this case and that 

the trial court did not find that he signed or filed documents “for the purpose of 

delay” as Civ.R. 11 requires. Again, Kuczak ignores the fact that the trial court cited 

the exact language of Civ.R. 11 related to “delay,” then indicated that Kuczak 

knowingly encouraged both defendants to provide false or misleading answers on 

Pfeifer’s “Request for Admissions,” which led to unnecessary time and expenses 

throughout the case. 

{¶23} It is important to focus on Kuczak advising Defendants to deny issues 

in discovery responses even when the Defendants did not deny that they had caused 

certain damages. Defendants testified that they did not understand the Requests for 

Admissions and they relied on Kuczak telling them to deny the salient issues. 

Defendant Weis specifically testified that she did not believe her answers to the 

interrogatories were true when she signed them. (Tr. at 70). Then, as the matter 

proceeded to trial, defendant Weis readily admitted to many of the damages caused. 

Defendant Hill testified that because of the answers submitted in discovery there 

were more “headaches,” resulting in a longer trial and more attorney’s fees. (Aug. 

28, 2023, Tr. at 29).

{¶24} Moreover, both Defendants testified that interrogatories asked what 

portion of the lease they believed to be invalid and Kuczak instructed them to state 

the “entire lease,” but the Defendants did not even believe that. (Id. at 40). Pfeifer 

testified that if interrogatories and admissions had been answered honestly they 
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would not have had to take depositions. These actions alone would be sufficient to 

justify sanctions under Civ.R. 11. 

{¶25} Further, in imposing sanctions under Civ.R. 11, the trial court 

determined that Kuczak filed counterclaims without the knowledge or approval of 

his clients. In addition, the trial court determined that Kuczak filed counterclaims

that he knew had no basis or support when they were filed. For example, Kuczak 

testified that his “quiet enjoyment” claim was based on language required by the 

“Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority” even though this case was based in 

Marion. (Id. at 79). In addition, Kuczak filed a counterclaim alleging that Pfeifer 

was in violation of R.C. 5321.16 for requiring a security deposit in excess of a 

month’s rent. However, he had no actual evidence to support this claim—just a mere 

supposition that Pfeifer’s document tilted “Notice of Security Deposits Disposition” 

must mean that multiple security deposits were required and that they must have 

been in excess of a month’s rent in violation of R.C. 5321.16. Notably, there was 

only ever one security deposit and it was less than a month’s rent. To the extent that 

Kuczak claimed evidence to the contrary, defendant Hill specifically testified that 

Kuczak’s testimony was “[n]ot true at all.” (Tr. at 246).

{¶26} These are all issues that caused delay in this case, and they are all 

reasons supporting the trial court’s determination that he willfully violated Civ.R. 

11. In fact, it is relatively inconceivable that Kuczak would arrive on the day of trial 

having told one of the Defendants he did not need to be present, while being unaware 
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that his counterclaims were no longer pending due to summary judgment being 

granted in favor of Pfeifer.

{¶27} Finally, we emphasize that while Kuczak essentially attacks every 

single one of the trial court’s findings related to sanctions in this matter, even if we 

agreed with him on some of the points, it would not create reversible error here as 

the record clearly reflects he engaged in sanctionable conduct under Civ.R. 11. For 

all of these reasons, Kuczak’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error

{¶28} In his second assignment of error, Kuczak argues that the trial court 

committed prejudicial error by concluding that his acts or omissions were frivolous 

as a matter of law.

Standard of Review

{¶29} “ ‘[N]o single standard of review applies in R.C. 2323.51 cases.’ ”

Namenyi v. Tomasello, 2014–Ohio–4509, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), quoting Wiltberger v. 

Davis, 110 Ohio App.3d 46, 51 (10th Dist.1996). When the question regarding what 

constitutes frivolous conduct calls for a legal determination, such as whether a claim 

is warranted under existing law, an appellate court is to review the frivolous conduct 

determination de novo, without deference to the trial court’s decision. Natl. Check 

Bur. v. Patel, 2005–Ohio–6679, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). 

{¶30} “In contrast, if there is no disputed issue of law and the question is 

factual, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Riverview Health Inst., 
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L.L.C. v. Kral, 2012–Ohio–3502, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.). Likewise, if the trial court 

determines that a violation under R.C. 2323.51 or Civ.R. 11 exists, the trial court’s 

imposition of sanctions for said violation will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 

discretion. Gallagher v. AMVETS Post 17, 2009–Ohio–6348, ¶ 32 (6th Dist.), citing 

State ex rel. Fant v. Sykes, 29 Ohio St.3d 65 (1987). An abuse of discretion occurs 

when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Worrell 

v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 2006–Ohio–6513, ¶ 10.

{¶31} Frivolous conduct is governed by R.C. 2323.51(A)(2), which reads, in 

pertinent part,

(2) “Frivolous conduct” means either of the following:

(a) Conduct of an inmate or other party to a civil action, of an inmate 

who has filed an appeal of the type described in division (A)(1)(b) of 

this section, or of the inmate's or other party's counsel of record that 

satisfies any of the following:

(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another 

party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose, 

including, but not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless 

increase in the cost of litigation.

(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a 

good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 

existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the 

establishment of new law.

(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions 

that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are 

not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity 

for further investigation or discovery.
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(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not 

warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not 

reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

{¶32} In determining whether a claim itself is frivolous under the statute, the 

test is whether no reasonable lawyer would have brought the action in light of the 

existing law. Orbit Elecs., Inc. v. Helm Instrument Co., 2006–Ohio–2317, ¶ 49 (8th 

Dist.).

Analysis

{¶33} Under his second assignment of error, Kuczak lists seven findings of 

the trial court that he believes are not supported. Further, he claims that even if the 

findings were supported, the findings did not legally meet the threshold to impose 

sanctions.

{¶34} Kuczak specifically argues that the trial court improperly determined 

that he engaged in frivolous conduct by: advising defendant Hill that he did not have 

to appear for trial unless subpoenaed; presenting no evidence at trial; failing to 

engage with opposing counsel in an attempt to enter stipulations to limit the issues 

at trial; refusing to enter into settlement negotiations; filing counterclaims without

the approval of Defendants; telling opposing counsel that it was his job to throw 

“sand” in Pfeifer’s “gears”; and formulating a response to interrogatories that 

exhibits would be identified and exchanged at a later time designated by the trial 

court.
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{¶35} In evaluating Kuczak’s arguments, it is important to emphasize that 

the trial court determined that Kuczak engaged in frivolous conduct “based on a 

series of events throughout this case.” (Doc. No. 75). In fact, the trial court stated it 

would not discuss each and every event leading to the finding, focusing on a few 

examples. Kuczak seemingly attempts to attack all of the examples provided by the 

trial court. However, as stated in the prior assignment of error, even if we 

determined any single argument had some merit, others do not.

{¶36} Simply put, Pfeifer filed an action against Defendants seeking 

damages the Defendants had caused to Pfeifer’s property. Despite the fact that 

Defendants ultimately admitted that they caused much of the damage, this case 

proceeded through depositions, summary judgment motions, and a trial. Kuczak’s 

actions delayed the case and needlessly increased the cost of the litigation for both 

parties. 

{¶37} After reviewing the record, we find no error with the trial court’s 

determination that Kuczak engaged in frivolous conduct. Therefore his second 

assignment of error is overruled.

Third Assignment of Error

{¶38} In his third assignment of error, Kuczak argues that the trial court erred 

by issuing its award of sanctions in this matter.
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Analysis4

{¶39} In its entry, the trial court made the following findings with regard to 

the “Amount of Attorney’s Fees” awarded:

If frivolous conduct is found and the Court awards attorney’s fees, 

“the amount of an award of attorney’s fees shall not exceed, and may 

be equal to or less than, the attorney’s fees that were reasonabl[y] 

incurred by a party.” R.C. 2323.51(B)(3-4) [italics removed]. For 

awards under Civ.R. ... 11, “the court may award the reasonable value 

of the services performed by the attorney, whether or not the party 

represented by that attorney actually paid or is obligated to pay the 

attorney for such services performed. Civ.R. 54 [italics removed].

Plaintiffs provided itemized lists of work completed by Attorney 

Anderson, as well as the testimony from Attorney Jon Jenson. 

Attorney Jenson testified based on his review of the invoices, he 

believed the attorneys [sic] fees charged were reasonable with the 

work that was completed. Plaintiff Dennis Pfeiffer testified to the 

amount of fees and expenses he has incurred throughout the case and 

what he would also be incurring for the oral hearing on the motion for 

sanctions.

The testimony and evidence provided establish an amount of $10,350 

in attorney’s fees and $395.00 in expenses related to frivolous and 

sanctionable conduct prior to the hearing on the pending motion. 

Plaintiffs requested an additional $225.00 per hour in attorney’s fees 

for the oral hearing on the pending motion. This Court heard eight (8) 

hours of testimony and evidence on Plaintiffs’ motion, totaling an 

additional amount of $1,800.00 in attorney’s fees.

Having reviewed the testimony and evidence presented, this Court 

finds the amount of attorney’s fees and expenses Plaintiffs’ have 

incurred based on the frivolous conduct and sanctionable conduct 

under Civ.R. 11 in the amount of $12,545.00 to be reasonable based 

on the circumstances of the case and the conduct that occurred 

throughout.

4 The standards of review referenced in the previous assignments of error remain relevant here.
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(Doc. No. 76).

{¶40} Kuczak makes numerous arguments in an attempt to undermine the 

trial court’s award. First he contends that the trial court did not find that Pfeifer was 

adversely affected by Kuczak’s conduct, so the trial court improperly awarded 

sanctions. However, the trial court explicitly determined that Pfeifer incurred 

attorney’s fees and expenses “related to frivolous and sanctionable conduct.” (Id.) 

Kuczak’s argument is thus inaccurate and it is not well-taken.

{¶41} Kuczak next argues that the record does not have reliable probative 

evidence of the cost of Kuczak’s conduct. However, the record contains the 

testimony of an independent attorney who indicated that he could not find any 

grounds to support Kuczak’s counterclaims. The independent attorney also testified 

regarding the fees and expenses related to the frivolous conduct and he found them 

to be reasonable and necessary. Further, he testified that the hourly rate charged by 

Pfeifer’s attorney was reasonable.

{¶42} Kuczak argues that the independent attorney’s testimony was “of no 

probative value,” but we disagree. In a bench trial, the trial court acts as the 

factfinder and determines both the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence. State v. Schenck, 2022-Ohio-430, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.); DiPasquale v. Costas, 

2010-Ohio-832, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.). The trial court could readily find the independent 

attorney’s testimony credible and we will not second-guess that credibility 

determination.
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{¶43} Finally, Kuczak argues that “the case had to be tried in any event.” 

More specifically, he argues, “For Pfeiffer to have accomplished his slam dunk, he 

would have had to put the ball through the hoop by proving damages with reasonable 

certainty.” (Appt.’s Br. at 23). This argument ignores the increase in litigation costs 

that was necessitated by Kuczak’s actions in a case where Defendants ultimately 

admitted to much of the conduct and Pfeifer had damages well in excess of $15,000.

{¶44} In sum, after reviewing the record before us, we find no reversible 

error with the trial court’s factual and legal conclusions in this matter. Therefore, 

Kuczak’s third assignment of error is overruled.5

Conclusion

{¶45} Having found no error prejudicial to Kuczak in the particulars 

assigned and argued, his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the 

Marion Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

/jlm

5 Although we have not sustained any of Kuczak’s assignments of error, we find that he had good grounds to 

appeal the trial court’s determination. Therefore we deny Pfeifer’s request for attorney’s fees and costs of the 

appeal under App.R. 23.