[Cite as State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof , 126 Ohio St.3d 47, 2010-Ohio-2516.]

T HE S TATE EX REL . M OSIER , A PPELLANT , v. F ORNOF , M AGISTRATE , ET AL ., A PPELLEES . [Cite as State ex rel. Mosier v. Fornof , 126 Ohio St.3d 47, 2010-Ohio-2516.]
Prohibition — Mandamus — Juvenile cour t and juvenile-court magistrate do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to proceed on child-custody matter — Adequate remedy at law by appeal — Judgment affirmed and
writs denied. (No. 2009-2175

— Submitted May 26, 2010

— Decided June 10, 2010.)
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-09-1192, 2009-Ohio-5618.

__________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the c ourt of appeals denying the request of appellant, Tonya Mosier, for writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent appellees, Magistrate Judith Fornof and the judges of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, from determining child-custody issues concerning Mosier’s daughter and to vacate the entries and orders relating to child custody in the underlying proceeding. {¶ 2} “Neither mandamus nor prohibition will issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Dzina v. Celebrezze , 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 N.E.2d 1202, ¶ 12. “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can de termine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Plant v. Cosgrove , 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 {¶ 3} For the following reasons, the juvenile court judges and magistrate do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to decide child-custody matters in the underlying proceeding. {¶ 4} First, they have specific statutory jurisdiction to do so. See R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) (juvenile court has exclusive or iginal jurisdiction “to determine the custody of any child not a ward of anot her court of this state”); R.C. 3109.042 (“An unmarried female who gives birth to a child is the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the child until a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order designating another person as the residentia l parent and legal custodian”). Mosier is an unmarried female who gave birth to the child, and there is no allegation or
evidence in the record that the child is a ward of another state court. {¶ 5} Second, Mosier erroneously claims that R.C. 3109.12 divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction to determine her child’s custody because she had not filed a proper complaint. That statutory provision relates to the procedure that a father of a child born to an unmarried woman must use when requesting reasonable parenting time rather than le gal custody. See R.C. 3109.12(A) (“If a
child is born to an unmarried woman and if the father of the child has acknowledged the child and that acknowledg ement has become final * * * or has been determined in an action under Chapte r 3111. Of the Revised Code to be the father of the child, the father may file a complaint requesting that the court of appropriate jurisdiction of the county in which the child resides grant him reasonable parenting time rights with the child * * *” [emphasis added]). {¶ 6} “ ‘Custody’ refers to the right to ultimate legal and physical control over a child, while ‘parenting time rights’ grant a parent the power of temporary physical control for the purpose of visitation.” Williamson v. Cooke , Franklin App. No. 09AP-222, 2009-Ohio-6842, ¶ 22, citing Braatz v. Braatz (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 706 N.E.2d 1218 (“ ‘Visita tion’ and ‘custody’ are related but distinct legal concepts. ‘Custody’ resides in the party or parties who have theJanuary Term, 2010

3 right to ultimate legal and physical control of a child. ‘Visitation’ resides in a noncustodial party and encompasses that party’s right to visit the child”). Through his counterclaim and motion in th e underlying juvenile court proceeding, the child’s father had sought custody of the child, not increased parenting time or
visitation. {¶ 7} Therefore, Mosier’s claim alleges, at best, an error in the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction rather than a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Jimison v. Wilson , 106 Ohio St.3d 342, 2005-Ohio-5143, 835 N.E.2d 34, ¶ 11. Because the juvenile court judges a nd magistrate do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to dete rmine child-custody matters in the underlying case, Mosier has an adequate remedy by appeal to raise her claims, and the court of appeals properly dismisse d her action for extraordinary relief in prohibition and mandamus. Judgment affirmed.
B ROWN , C.J., and P FEIFER , L UNDBERG S TRATTON , O’C ONNOR , O’D ONNELL , L ANZINGER , and C UPP , JJ., concur.

__________________ Lydy & Moan, Ltd., Daniel T. Ellis, and Frederick E. Kalmbach, for appellant. Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and John A. Borell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees.

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