Filed 10/3/16 Marriage of Csupo CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of GABOR and BRET

CSUPO.

 B263058

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD489643)

GABOR CSUPO,

Respondent,

v.

BRET CSUPO,

Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Robert E. Willett, Judge. Affirmed.

Stephen Temko and Dennis Temko for Appellant.

Young, Spiegel & Lee, Lance S. Spiegel and Hyunu Lee for Respondent.

_____________________________________
2

Bret Crain (formerly Bret Csupo) appeals from postdissolution orders that 

interpreted an agreement for spousal and child support. She seeks arrears in support 

payments that she claims are due because her ex-husband, Gabor Csupo, did not include 

capital gains he received from the sale of real property as “income” for purposes of 

calculating the agreed-upon support payments. After properly considering extrinsic 

evidence concerning the meaning of the parties’ agreement, the trial court found that the 

parties did not intend to include the proceeds of real estate sales as “income” for purposes 

of child and spousal support. The trial court’s conclusion is supported by substantial 

evidence, and we therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

Bret and Gabor married in 1999 and separated in 2008.1 They have three children, 

who were all minors at the time the marriage was dissolved in September 2010.

The parties executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) on August 6, 2010,

following a mediation. The MSA was incorporated into a judgment of dissolution filed 

September 16, 2010. The MSA specified the division of marital property, including real 

property, and established procedures for calculating spousal support and child support. 

Both the spousal support and the child support provisions set a base monthly amount of 

support payments subject to increase if Gabor’s monthly “income” exceeded a threshold 

amount ($54,050) over the prior quarter.2 The base amount of monthly child support was 

$9,216 and the base amount of monthly spousal support was $12,789. Under the terms of 

the MSA, the spousal support obligation expired in November 2011.

1 Because the parties formerly shared their last name, for the sake of clarity we 

refer to them by their first names in this opinion.

2 Gabor characterizes this mechanism as an “Ostler-Smith” provision. The term 

refers to In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33, in which the court 

ordered support based on a fixed amount plus a percentage of the husband’s bonus. Bret 

objected below to characterizing the support calculation mechanisms in the MSA as 

“Ostler-Smith” provisions on the ground that the MSA does not use that term. We 

therefore refer to the support calculation mechanisms as the “Excess Income Provisions.”
3

Prior to the dissolution, Gabor made a good living as a writer, producer and 

director and as a co-owner of an animation business. According to Gabor, his fortunes 

began to decline in 2003 when he and his business partner lost a contract with 

Nickelodeon, but he continued to obtain some directing jobs and received residuals from 

past projects. At the time the MSA was executed, the primary source of his income was 

from residuals.

Gabor testified that the purpose of the Excess Income Provisions in the MSA was 

to calculate increased support payments in the event that he obtained additional 

employment income, such as from directing jobs or from extra residuals. He also 

testified that he had a real estate portfolio for investment purposes. However, the record 

did not show any capital gains realized during the marriage.

The MSA attached a “DissoMaster”3 printout as an exhibit, which provided a 

breakdown of the inputs used to calculate Gabor’s monthly support payments. The only 

income listed in the DissoMaster summary was from “Wages + salary.” It is undisputed 

that the DissoMaster calculation did not include any amounts from capital gains.

One of the items of real property assigned to Gabor in the MSA was a building on 

Highland Avenue in Los Angeles. Gabor sold that building in January 2011 for a 

substantial profit. He used proceeds from that sale to acquire and improve another 

property on Louise Avenue in Encino. He sold the Louise property in 2012 and also 

realized gains on that sale.

On December 23, 2013, Bret filed a request for modification of child support. On 

March 4, 2014, she filed a request for an order awarding alleged arrearages for both 

spousal and child support. Bret sought alleged arrearages of $223,452 for child support 

3 “The DissoMaster is a privately developed computer program used to calculate 

guideline child support under the algebraic formula required by [Family Code] section 

4055.” (In re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227, fn. 5.) 

Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
4

and $355,561 for spousal support. The claims were largely based upon alleged capital 

gains from Gabor’s sales of the Highland and Louise properties.4

The trial court combined Bret’s two requests for trial, which occurred on 

August 25 and August 29, 2014, followed by argument and further briefing. The court 

provided oral tentative findings at a hearing on September 5, 2014, followed by a written 

tentative ruling on September 30, 2014. Based upon the extrinsic evidence and 

examination of the MSA as a whole, the trial court concluded that the parties “did not 

intend to include capital gains within the meaning of income” even though it was not in 

the best interests of the children to exclude such money.

The court issued a final order on February 2, 2015. The court found that, except 

for amounts attributable to the fourth quarter of 2013 (amounting to $14,749, which 

Gabor had already paid), Bret “has failed to carry her burden of proving that there are 

support arrearages due from [Gabor].” However, the court modified Gabor’s child 

support obligation. The modification reduced Gabor’s monthly child support base 

payment, but included an Ostler-Smith excess income adjustment that is based on

Gabor’s “total annual income from all sources.” In calculating Gabor’s income for 

purposes of the new support payment, the trial court included an amount equivalent to an 

assumed rate of return on Gabor’s realized capital gains from the sale of the Highland 

and Louise properties.

Bret filed her notice of appeal on March 30, 2015. 

DISCUSSION

1. The Trial Court’s Interpretation of the Parties’ Marital Settlement 

Agreement Was Supported by Substantial Evidence

Bret’s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in interpreting the 

term “income” in the MSA’s Excess Income Provisions. She first argues that the term 

was clear on its face and the trial court therefore erroneously considered extrinsic 

4 On appeal, Bret claims that the arrearages total $155,671 for child support and 

$254,303 for spousal support.
5

evidence of its meaning. Alternatively, she claims that, even if the court properly 

considered such evidence, it erred in concluding that the intent of the parties was to limit 

“income” in the Excess Income Provisions only to income from Gabor’s earnings and not 

to include capital gains from the sale of the Highland and Louise real properties. We 

reject both arguments.

The rules governing the interpretation of written agreements are well established. 

A contract “must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties 

as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.” 

(Civ. Code, § 1636.) If possible, intent should be determined from the language of the 

agreement. However, if a contract is ambiguous on its face, or if parol evidence shows 

that it is reasonably susceptible to two or more interpretations, extrinsic evidence may be 

considered. (Bill Signs Trucking, LLC v. Signs Family Limited Partnership (2007) 

157 Cal.App.4th 1515, 1521 (Bill Signs Trucking).) Extrinsic evidence is admissible if it 

is “relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably 

susceptible.” (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 

37.) Marital settlement agreements that are incorporated into a dissolution judgment

“ ‘are construed using the same statutory rules governing the interpretation of contracts 

generally.’ ” (In re Marriage of Simundza (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1518; In re 

Marriage of Trearse (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1189, 1192 (Marriage of Trearse).)

The trial court’s threshold finding of ambiguity is a question of law that is subject 

to independent review on appeal. (Bill Signs Trucking, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1521.) If the extrinsic evidence is not in conflict, the trial court’s interpretation of the 

contract is also subject to independent review. (Ibid.) However, if the extrinsic evidence 

conflicts, we must uphold any reasonable construction that is supported by substantial 

evidence. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 746–747.) In 

reviewing for substantial evidence, we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor 

of Gabor as the prevailing party and make all legitimate and reasonable inferences from 

the evidence to uphold the trial court’s findings if possible. (In re Marriage of Bonds
6

(2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 31, superseded by statute on another point, as stated in In re 

Marriage of Cadwell-Faso & Faso (2011) 191 Cal.App. 4th 945, 958.)

a. The term “income” in the MSA’s Excess Income Provisions is

ambiguous

The MSA does not define “income.” In the abstract, the term could include any 

number of monetary sources, including salary, business earnings, and profits from sales. 

In the absence of a precise definition, the scope of the term is unclear.

Consideration of the MSA as a whole does not settle the question. While the term 

“income” could be interpreted broadly, the operation of the Excess Income Provisions

suggests a definition that does not include the proceeds of real property sales. The 

provisions established a calculation that mandated increased support payments if Gabor’s 

income exceeded a certain amount per month.

5 The use of a monthly income amount to 

calculate increased payments seems more consistent with an intent to address fluctuations 

in monthly earnings than with a desire to capture gains from one-time sales of real 

property. In addition, the monthly base amount that the Excess Income Provisions

established for child support payments was computed using DissoMaster inputs that 

included only “wages and salary,” not income from other sources.

In light of the various possible meanings, the trial court was not limited to 

interpreting the MSA from the four corners of the agreement. As discussed above, “[i]n 

California a party is entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence in support of his 

interpretation of language in an agreement embodied in a writing, provided the evidence 

is offered to support a meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible.” 

(Marriage of Trearse, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1192.)

Gabor testified that the intent of the Excess Income Provisions was to capture 

extra income from his sporadic employment and residuals from past work. The evidence 

showed that his earnings varied due to the nature of his work in the entertainment 

5 Although the provision for excess child support omitted the term “per month,” 

Bret stipulated that was a mistake by the mediator.
7

industry. Gabor’s expert also testified that such provisions are typically used to account 

for variations in employment earnings. This evidence supported the possible 

interpretation of income in the Excess Income Provisions as income from earnings rather 

than capital gains. The language of the MSA was susceptible to that interpretation.

Other evidence also supported a reasonable interpretation of “income” as earnings. 

The MSA divided the marital property—including real property—and specified each 

party’s separate interest. The MSA assigned the Highland property to Gabor. Bret also 

received separate interests in various real property, including 50 percent of a property in 

Hawaii and a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the family’s former residence. The 

evidence showed that Bret in fact received proceeds from the sale of several properties 

after the MSA was signed, including a 40 percent interest in the proceeds from the sale of 

the former residence, which she used to help support herself and her children over five 

years. On the whole, the evidence was consistent with an agreement for the division of 

property in the MSA that allowed the parties to exclude the value of that property from 

support calculations.

Arguments that Bret made below also indirectly support this interpretation. In the 

trial court, Bret argued that capital gains were not included in the DissoMaster calculation 

attached to the MSA because “at the time of the MSA, any capital gains by the parties 

would have been viewed as a community asset and divided. It wouldn’t have been 

viewed as income attributed to [Gabor] for income available for support. So there would 

not have been a reason for capital gains to be included in the DissoMaster.” If the 

proceeds from the sale of real property divided under the MSA would not have been 

included in assessing the parties’ respective income for purposes of calculating support 

prior to the dissolution, it is reasonable to conclude that the parties did not intend to 

include such property in a support calculation after the dissolution.

Bret argues that the term “income” in the MSA was unambiguous because the law 

is clear that income can include capital gains for purposes of calculating child support 

payments. Bret cites section 4058 along with various cases interpreting that statute,
8

which she characterizes as creating a “right” to use capital gains for the calculation of 

child support. The argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.

First, it assumes that the parties intended to import the legal meaning of “income” 

from child support cases into the Excess Income Provisions. The undefined term 

“income” in the Excess Income Provisions is certainly susceptible to that interpretation,

depending upon other evidence of intent. But it is by no means certain.

Several general propositions bear upon this assumption. “ ‘The words of a 

contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to 

their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a 

special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.’ ” 

(Biancalana v. Fleming (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 698, 702, citing Civ. Code, § 1644.) Bret 

cites Estate of Heard (1957) 49 Cal.2d 514 for the principle that courts should assume 

that the drafters of a written instrument did not intend to “pursue a course contrary” to 

law. (Id. at p. 522.) Heard also instructs that “words in a private instrument should 

ordinarily, in the absence of a showing of a contrary intent, be given the effect given 

them by the statutory or case law.” (Id. at p. 521.) However, the case that Heard cites 

for that proposition, Weinreich E. Co. v. A.J. Johnston Co. (1915) 28 Cal.App. 144, states 

more specifically that “legal terms are to be given their legal meaning unless obviously 

used in a different sense.” (Id. at p. 146, italics added.)

None of these principles dictates an interpretation here. The MSA does not 

indicate whether the parties intended to use the common term “income” in a particular 

legal sense. There is also no reason to believe that the parties perceived a need to include 

capital gains in the definition of income because the law required them to do so. 

Moreover, as discussed above, the operation of the Excess Income Provisions suggests 

that the parties did not intend to include nonrecurring capital gains events.

Second, the legal authorities that Bret cites in support of her definition of income 

concern the financial resources to be considered for calculating child support payments. 

Spousal support is governed by sections 4300–4360, not section 4058. (In re Marriage of

Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 302 (Cheriton).) Courts have broad discretion in 
9

determining spousal support in light of the factors identified in section 4320. (Cheriton,

at pp. 302–304.) The statutes governing spousal support do not contain any definition of 

income.

Bret and Gabor used the same excess income mechanisms to calculate child 

support and spousal support, albeit applying different percentages, using the same 

undefined term “income.” There is no indication that they intended that term to be 

interpreted differently in the two provisions. Bret’s argument that the court should 

presume that the parties drafted the Excess Income Provisions to incorporate the 

applicable law has even less force when it is not clear what law would govern.

Third, Bret’s claim that she did not waive her “right” to include Gabor’s capital 

gains in the child support calculation is based on a faulty premise. There is no “right” to 

receive a portion of capital gains as child support. If there had been no agreement, the 

court would have had the discretion to include Gabor’s realized capital gains in a child 

support calculation, but it was not required to do so. In re Marriage of Pearlstein (2006) 

137 Cal.App.4th 1361 (Pearlstein), the primary case on which Bret relies, refers 

repeatedly to the trial court’s “discretion” to include the proceeds from stock sales in a 

child support calculation if those proceeds were not reinvested in other income producing 

assets. (See id. at pp. 1376–1377.) It did not hold that the trial court had an obligation to 

do so.6 The statutory child support scheme does not create an enforceable “right” to a 

portion of capital gains that must be expressly waived.

Bret also argues that Gabor conceded in the trial court that capital gains were 

“income” when he stipulated that “capital gains is income within the meaning of Family 

Code section 4058.” But this stipulation was, at most, simply a legal admission

6 Even amounts included in the statutory guidelines for the calculation of child 

support under section 4055 are not mandatory. Courts can use their discretion to depart 

from those guidelines under the circumstances identified in section 4057, which include 

the parties’ stipulation to a different amount, subject to section 4065, subdivision (a). In 

any event, Bret does not argue that including capital gains from Gabor’s real property 

sales in the child support calculation was necessary to comply with the guideline formula 

in section 4055.
10

concerning the scope of section 4058. Contrary to Bret’s contention, it did not include 

any factual concession about the intent of the parties in using the term “income” in the 

Excess Income Provisions.

Thus, the term “income” in the Excess Income Provisions was ambiguous, and the 

trial court correctly considered extrinsic evidence to interpret its meaning.

b. The trial court’s interpretation was reasonable in light of the extrinsic 

evidence and the language of the agreement

The trial court weighed conflicting evidence about the meaning of the Excess 

Income Provisions. Gabor testified that the provision was intended to include only 

earnings; Bret testified that it was not so limited. An important part of Bret’s argument 

below was that the parties expected that real estate sales would be included in the excess 

income calculation because of Gabor’s history of real estate dealings during the marriage. 

The court rejected that argument based on the evidence, concluding that “[i]f there were 

capital gains realized during the marriage, they were not identified in any way that is 

persuasive to the court and they were not within several years before the MSA was 

executed.”7 Because the trial court reached its decision based upon disputed extrinsic 

evidence, we employ the substantial evidence standard to review its interpretation of the 

MSA. (Bill Signs Trucking, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1521; Roddenberry v. 

Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)

Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s interpretation. The court 

concluded that, if the parties had intended to include capital gains within the meaning of 

income, they would have made some provision for treatment of those amounts in the 

MSA. The court also concluded that “the requirement for quarterly payments on account 

7 The trial court explained this conclusion orally on September 5, 2014, before 

permitting further briefing and offering a written tentative ruling on September 30. 

Because no statement of decision was requested, there is no record of the final and 

complete factual findings underlying the court’s final order on February 2, 2015. In the 

absence of such a statement of decision, “all intendments will favor the trial court’s 

ruling and it will be presumed on appeal that the trial court found all facts necessary to 

support the judgment.” (In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 648–649.)
11

of ‘excess’ income is more consistent with wage and salary income” than with capital 

gains income. Both conclusions were reasonable based upon the evidence.

The court’s conclusion that the quarterly payment scheme in the Excess Income

Provisions was more consistent with wage and salary income than with real estate sales is 

supported by the testimony of Gabor’s expert that the provisions are typical of “OstlerSmith” mechanisms often used by entertainment executives whose income fluctuates 

depending upon the availability and success of projects. The evidence showed that 

Gabor’s income from work and residuals was subject to such fluctuation.

The trial court also reasonably concluded that, if the parties had intended to treat 

proceeds of real estate sales as income, they would have included some explanation of 

how such income should be assessed. As discussed above (and as the trial court 

recognized), Pearlstein and the cases that it cites hold that capital gains that are 

reinvested in other income producing assets are not appropriately included in child 

support calculations. (See Pearlstein, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1375–1377.) 

Moreover, as the trial court also correctly recognized, income from capital gains is taxed 

differently from earnings, which would affect the calculation of the posttax income 

available for child support. If the parties had intended to calculate child support based 

upon future real estate sales, one would expect them to have addressed such complexities 

in the agreement.8

The absence of any mention of future real estate sales in the Excess Income

Provisions is even more telling in view of the detailed apportionment in the MSA of Bret 

and Gabor’s separate interests in their real property. In particular, the MSA expressly 

8 As an example of such a specific agreement, the parties in Kohn v. Kohn (1950) 

95 Cal.App.2d 708 expressly agreed that “income” for purposes of a marital settlement 

entitling the wife to a portion of the husband’s yearly income should be calculated 

“ ‘without the addition or inclusion of capital gains and profits, unless such capital gains 

and profits be reduced to cash or other liquid form, in which latter event, any profit 

realized by capital sales or conversions, or otherwise, shall constitute income.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 711.)
12

identified the Highland property as Gabor’s separate property, but did not include any 

explanation of how to calculate “income” in the event it was sold.

Testimony supported the conclusion that the parties would likely have addressed 

the real property interests divided in the MSA if they had intended to include the 

proceeds from sales of that property in the excess income calculation. On crossexamination by Bret’s counsel, Gabor’s expert testified that he did not include real 

property capital gains in his analysis of income available for support because “I don’t 

believe the normal intent of people in writing excess income formulas is to include gains 

from the sale of assets, in this case, assets that were literally part of the marital settlement 

agreement that were sold shortly thereafter.” From the evidence, the trial court could 

reasonably infer that the absence of any mention of real property proceeds or other capital 

gains in the Excess Income Provisions meant that the parties did not mean to include 

them.

The trial court also heard other evidence from which it could have assessed Bret’s 

credibility negatively. For example, on cross-examination Bret admitted that she had not 

included the proceeds of the sale of her condominium in the “income” that she reported 

on her income and expense declaration dated the same day as the MSA (August 6, 2014).

In considering another issue (i.e., the parties’ testimony about the respective time that 

they spent with the children), the trial court noted Bret’s “tendency to exaggerate” which 

“diminishes her credibility on this issue as it does on other issues.”

There is abundant evidence to support the trial court’s understanding of the 

parties’ intent in using the term “income” in the Excess Income Provisions. We therefore 

affirm the trial court’s interpretation.

2. Bret’s Public Policy Argument Provides No Basis to Award Arrearages

Bret claims that, if capital gains are not included in “income” for purposes of the 

Excess Income Provisions, then the parties improperly “contracted away the children’s 

right to child support” and the Excess Income Provisions were void as against public 

policy. We conclude that the Excess Income Provisions did not violate public policy, as 
13

the parties expressly agreed that the child support obligation could be modified by the 

court.

The MSA provides that “[i]t is understood that the child support specified under 

this Section 4 is modifiable by a court of competent jurisdiction, if warranted by changed 

circumstances.” Thus, the parties did not purport to bind the court to the agreed-upon 

child support obligation in the event the court concluded that it was not in the children’s 

best interest in light of circumstances existing at the time.

In that critical respect the MSA is different from the agreements in the cases on 

which Bret relies. In Cheriton, the agreement that the court held unenforceable purported 

to limit the court in setting an appropriate child support amount. (See Cheriton, supra, 

92 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.) The agreement stated that “ ‘the Court may not consider a 

monthly housing cost of over $3,000’ ” in calculating child support, regardless of the 

actual needs of the children. (Ibid.) In In re Marriage of Ayo (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 

442, the parties entered into a “hold-harmless” agreement that purported to relieve the 

father from his obligation to pay any child support that the court ordered. (Ayo, at 

p. 450.) The court concluded that the agreement was an invalid attempt “to completely 

obviate the clear and strong policy of this state that a parent must support his children.” 

(Ayo, at p. 451.)

In contrast, the child support provision in the MSA left the court free to modify the 

child support award in the children’s best interest. The trial court did in fact modify 

Gabor’s child support obligation. In calculating the new child support payment, the court 

took capital gains into account. It specifically included an amount of income that it 

attributed to the return that Gabor could receive on the realized capital gains from his sale 

of the Highland and Louise properties after the MSA was executed. Bret does not 

challenge that modification on appeal.

Under section 4065, subdivision (a), parties are permitted to stipulate to a child 

support amount subject to court approval. The child support provision in the MSA 

provided a substantial fixed sum for child support ($9,216 per month) based upon 

historical income figures, included a mechanism for increasing that amount when 
14

Gabor’s income was higher than predicted, and permitted court modification if 

circumstances changed. We decline to hold that a child support stipulation with such 

provisions violates public policy.

3. Bret Acquiesced to the Trial Court’s Order Concerning the Payment of Taxes 

on Residuals and Her Request to Modify that Order Is Therefore Waived

Bret asks this Court to modify the trial court’s order that Gabor pay taxes on all 

residuals he receives before remitting to Bret her share of those residuals pursuant to the 

MSA. However, it appears that the trial court ordered this procedure in response to 

Bret’s request. At a minimum, she did not object to the order below and therefore cannot 

raise an objection on appeal.

The MSA stated that each party “shall pay their own taxes related to the receipt of 

residual income.” However, a practice developed in which Gabor paid the taxes due on 

all residuals and then gave Bret her portion after deducting her share of the taxes. In a 

joint statement that the trial court ordered prior to issuing its final order, Bret requested 

an “order clarifying taxes on residuals.” She stated that, “[i]f [Gabor] is indeed paying 

[Bret’s] share of the taxes owed on her portion of the residuals and if the taxes are being 

attributed to [Bret] as nontaxable income in the attached dissomaster, then [Bret] seeks an 

order clarifying and confirming that [Gabor] shall pay taxes on all residuals whether paid 

to [Gabor] or [Bret].” Bret did not register any objection to Gabor paying the taxes and 

remitting to Bret her remaining nontaxable portion.

The court apparently interpreted Bret’s statement as a request that Gabor pay all 

the taxes due for both parties’ share of the residuals. In its final order, the court 

confirmed that, “pursuant to the terms of the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement,” 

Gabor should pay the income taxes on all residuals and pay Bret “a net after tax sum for 

her share of the residuals.” The court also ordered that Bret’s “request for an order that 

[Gabor] shall pay taxes on all residuals whether paid to [Gabor] or [Bret] is denied.”

On appeal, Bret claims that she asked the trial court to “clarify the MSA so 

[Gabor] would understand that he was not supposed to pay [Bret’s] taxes.” The actual 

language in the joint statement appears to request precisely the opposite. In any event, 
15

Bret never objected to the trial court’s order, and never tried to clarify the request on

which the order was based, either in writing or at the hearing on November 18, 2014,

more than two months before the final order, when the court orally announced its 

findings. Bret cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal. (Children’s Hospital &

Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 776.)

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

LUI, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

JOHNSON, J.