[Cite as State v. Carroll, 2024-Ohio-628.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

CRAWFORD COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 3-23-33

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

TERESA CARROLL, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. 22-CR-0368

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: February 20, 2024

APPEARANCES:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

Daniel J. Stanley for Appellee
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MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Teresa Carroll (“Carroll”), brings this appeal 

from the July 14, 2023, judgment of the Crawford County Common Pleas Court

convicting her of obstructing justice in violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(3). On appeal, 

Carroll argues there was insufficient evidence presented to convict her and that her 

conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} On November 15, 2022, Carroll was indicted for obstructing justice in 

violation of R.C. 2921.32(A)(3)/(C)(3), a felony of the fifth degree. She pled not 

guilty to the charge and proceeded to a jury trial on July 13, 2023. After the evidence 

was presented, the jury found Carroll guilty of obstructing justice as charged.

Carroll was then sentenced to serve nine months in prison. A judgment entry 

memorializing her conviction and sentence was filed July 14, 2023. It is from this 

judgment that Carroll appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our 

review.

Assignment of Error

The Defendant/Appellant’s conviction for obstructing justice is 

not supported by sufficient evidence and it is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence both in respect to the degree of the offense 

claimed to have been committed by the parties that the 

Defendant/Appellant was aiding and as to the evidence generally 
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requiring the vacating of the sentence and the matter must be 

reversed and remanded to the trial court.

{¶3} On appeal, Carroll argues that there was insufficient evidence presented 

to convict her, and that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Although argued together in Carroll’s brief, sufficiency and manifest 

weight are distinct legal concepts, so we will address them separately after setting 

forth the applicable standards of review and a summary of the evidence presented 

at trial. 

Standards of Review

{¶4} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a 

question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); State v. Groce, 

163 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 6. Therefore, our review is de novo. In re 

J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by constitutional 

amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 

(1997), fn. 4) following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). 

“In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386.
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{¶5} By contrast, in reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines 

the conflicting testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio52. In doing so, this court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 

of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine 

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. 

{¶6} Nevertheless, a reviewing court must allow the trier-of-fact appropriate 

discretion on matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 

Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly 

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ 

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d 

Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio 

St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

Controlling Statute

{¶7} In this case, Carroll was convicted of obstructing justice in violation of 

R.C. 2921.32(A)(3)/(C)(3), which reads:

(A) No person, with purpose to hinder the discovery, apprehension, 

prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for crime or to 

assist another to benefit from the commission of a crime * * * shall 

do any of the following:
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* * *

(3) Warn the other person or child of impending discovery or 

apprehension;

* * *

(C)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of obstructing justice.

* * *

(3) * * * [I]f the crime committed by the person aided is a felony * * 

* obstructing justice is a felony of the fifth degree.

Evidence Presented by the State

{¶8} Detective Tyler Winkleman of the Crawford County Sheriff’s Office 

testified that he received information that Carroll’s daughter, Jessica, and a man 

named Jalil, also known as “Thug,” were selling and using drugs in Carroll’s home 

in Galion on the weekends. Detective Winkleman testified that two controlled drug 

buys of cocaine were made from Jalil at Carroll’s residence.

{¶9} On November 3, 2022, following the controlled buys, the police kept 

the residence under surveillance while Detective Winkleman left to procure a search 

warrant. During the detective’s absence, Jalil left the residence multiple times and 

walked to a house on the corner and then came back. When Jalil was outside the 

residence, he was arrested. By 8:26 p.m., Jalil was in custody.

{¶10} Carroll was at work approximately 30 minutes away during Jalil’s 

arrest, but her daughter Jessica was at Carroll’s home. After Jalil was arrested, 
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officers knocked on the doors and windows of the residence but Jessica would not 

come outside. Jessica had two active warrants for her arrest. 

{¶11} Meanwhile, Carroll learned that the police were outside her residence. 

She called the Galion Police and the Crawford County Sherriff’s Office and was 

able to confirm that the police were at her residence but she could not find out why.

Carroll called her daughter Jessica and spoke with Jessica on the phone at 8:39 p.m.

for approximately 4 minutes. Then, at 9:01 p.m., Carroll sent a text message to 

Jessica stating “They got thug.” (State’s Ex. C5). Fifteen seconds later Carroll sent 

a second text message to Jessica that read: “Erase your phone.” (Id.)

{¶12} Jessica eventually came out of the house willingly, leaving her cell 

phone on her bed. Carroll’s home was searched and officers located digital scales 

in Carroll’s bedroom. They also located a “sandwich bag that had some white 

residue that looked like it was attempted to get poured down the sink” in a bathroom 

“parallel to Jessica’s room[.]” (Tr. at 139).

{¶13} In the course of the investigation, Jessica and Jalil’s phones were 

searched. From this search, it was learned that the conversations between Jessica 

and Jalil had been deleted from Jessica’s phone.

{¶14} On November 9, 2022, Jessica called Carroll from jail and that call 

was recorded. On the call, Jessica told Carroll to use Google to see if law 

enforcement could find deleted text messages on a cell phone. Jessica then said to 
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Carroll, “remember what you told me to do that night?” After searching, Carroll told

Jessica that law enforcement could get deleted text messages. Jessica then asked

Carroll to speak with the phone’s owner to see if he could do anything.

{¶15} The same day of the jailhouse call, Carroll sent a text message to the 

owner of the phone, Michael, asking if he could get into the “Spectrum app” and 

“report the phone lost or stolen and wipe it out and delete it so that none of the 

information on that phone can be retrieved[.]” (Tr. at 133).

{¶16} Once Detective Winkleman learned that Carroll had instructed Jessica 

to delete text messages, he brought Carroll in for an interview. During the interview, 

Carroll stated that she initially told Jessica to hide in the basement. Carroll stated 

that once she learned Jessica was going to go outside anyway, she urged her to go 

out before the police broke down her door. Carroll claimed the only reason she told 

Jessica to delete the text messages was so officers would not see that Carroll told 

Jessica to hide from the police.

Evidence Presented by the Defense

{¶17} Carroll testified in her own defense, emphasizing that her daughter 

Jessica had serious drug issues. Carroll testified that Jessica had overdosed multiple 

times. Carroll testified that Jessica had only recently moved into Carroll’s residence. 

{¶18} As to the text messages, Carroll claimed she told Jessica to delete the 

text messages so Michael would not see them. Michael apparently paid for the 
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phone and various other things in Jessica’s life, and Carroll was afraid Michael 

would find out about Jalil.

{¶19} Carroll acknowledged she had a prior felony conviction for illegal 

conveyance in 2009. She claimed to have been law-abiding since then. However, 

when confronted with three misdemeanor theft convictions in the past several years, 

Carroll claimed she could not remember them. Carroll testified that Jessica was now 

in prison for a felony drug conviction based on what had occurred.

Sufficiency Analysis

{¶20} Carroll contends the State presented insufficient evidence to convict 

her of obstructing justice. She focuses her argument on the enhancing element 

contained in R.C. 2921.32(C)(3), which indicates that if the State proves beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the crime committed by the person aided is a felony, then 

obstructing justice is a felony of the fifth degree. Carroll argues the State presented 

no evidence whatsoever regarding the underlying offense, thus, at most, she could 

only be convicted of a misdemeanor under R.C. 2921.32(C)(2).

{¶21} Contrary to Carroll’s argument, the State presented evidence that 

Jessica and Jalil were involved in trafficking cocaine, with two controlled buys 

occurring at Carroll’s residence. Detective Winkleman specifically testified that 

trafficking drugs other than marijuana was a felony in the following segment:

[Defense Counsel]. And understand we are not talking about selling 

of marijuana, we’re talking about the selling of other drugs?
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A. Both illegal, but, yes.

Q. One’s a misdemeanor, one’s a felony?

A. Both illegal, but, yes.

(Tr. at 151). We note that contrary to defense counsel’s question, trafficking/selling 

“marihuana” is a felony, so the premise of defense counsel’s question was actually 

incorrect. Only gifting marihuana constitutes a misdemeanor in certain 

circumstances. R.C. 2925.03(C)(3)(h). Regardless, there was testimony presented 

that the crime committed by the person aided was a felony.

{¶22} Carroll next argues she did not obstruct justice at all because there was 

no indication she was trying to prevent Jessica from being discovered or 

apprehended. Carroll also claims she did nothing to interfere with her daughter’s 

arrest.

{¶23} However, once Carroll learned the police were at her residence, 

Carroll sent Jessica a text message informing her that “Thug” had been arrested and 

Jessica should delete her phone conversations with him. Carroll also told law 

enforcement officers she instructed Jessica to hide from the police either on the 

phone or via text message. (State’s Ex. A; B). Importantly, R.C. 2921.32(A)(3) 

“merely requires that [the defendant] warn [another] of impending discovery or 

apprehension; it does not require any particular response to the warning[.]” State v. 

Seijo, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0011, 2012-Ohio-645, ¶ 47, citing State v. 
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Mercado, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84559, 2005–Ohio–3429, ¶ 20. A reasonable 

factfinder could determine that Carroll’s text messages and the phone call 

constituted a warning.

{¶24} Moreover, a reasonable factfinder could determine the various 

communications Carroll had with Jessica were intended to warn Jessica to prevent 

her discovery. Furthermore, separate from the first instance, Carroll sent a message 

to the owner of Jessica’s phone to delete all the history and report it stolen well after 

Jessica was arrested. When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State, a reasonable factfinder could determine that Carroll was acting with purpose 

to hinder her daughter’s prosecution for a crime.

{¶25} We note that Carroll cites State v. Pelfrey, 112 Ohio St.3d 422, 2007-

Ohio-256, as support for her argument; however, Pelfrey dealt with deficient verdict 

forms where the verdict form did not contain the element enhancing the offense to 

one of a greater degree. Here, however, the verdict form specifically required the 

jury to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime committed by the aided 

person WAS a felony.” (Doc. No. 21). Therefore, Pelfrey is entirely inapplicable to 

this case. Further, the verdict forms establish that the jury clearly found the crime 

committed by the person aided was a felony.

{¶26} In sum, given all the evidence that was presented, and when looking 

at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State as we are directed, we do not 
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find there was insufficient evidence presented to convict Carroll of obstructing 

justice as a felony of the fifth degree.

Manifest Weight Analysis

{¶27} Carroll contends that even if there was sufficient evidence presented 

to convict her of obstructing justice, her conviction was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. Carroll argues that the State did not present evidence that Jessica 

or Jalil was convicted of a trafficking crime. In support, she cites State v. Bronaugh, 

69 Ohio App.2d 24, 25, 429 N.E.2d 1084, 1086 (1st Dist.1980), which held, “The 

crime of obstructing justice cannot be committed without the commission of an 

underlying crime by another, here the crime of trafficking in drugs.” Bronaugh is 

readily distinguishable, however, because Carroll herself testified that Jessica had 

been convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison as a result of what occurred in 

this case. Further, the detective testified that trafficking in cocaine was a felony.

{¶28} Finally, we emphasize that the jury was able to see and hear the 

testimony of Carroll, and evaluate her story both at trial and in the video of her 

interview. The jury was free to disbelieve Carroll’s minimizing statements. State v. 

Smith, 2023-Ohio-3015, 223 N.E.3d 919, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.). Simply put, this is not one 

of the rare cases where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. 

Therefore, Carroll’s assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion

{¶29} Having found no error prejudicial to Carroll in the particulars 

assigned and argued, her assignment of error is overruled and the judgment and 

sentence of the Crawford County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.

/hls