Richard Michael 

DonohooAppellee

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 24, 2015

No. 04-15-00291-CR

The State of Texas,

Appellant

v.

Richard Michael Donohoo,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 8, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 453259

The Honorable Celeste Brown, Judge Presiding

ORDER

This appeal was submitted on October 7, 2015. For the reasons that follow, the appeal is 

withdrawn from submission.

Richard Michael Donohoo moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a 

warrantless arrest and as a result of “custodial interrogation without proper Miranda warnings.” 

Donohoo’s motion alleged that he was immediately arrested after he exited his apartment. 

Donohoo further alleged that “[t]hereafter followed custodial interrogation without proper 

Miranda warnings, field sobriety testing, transport to the Magistrate’s Office for intoxilyzer

testing, and follow-up booking procedures.” The trial court’s order granted Donohoo’s motion 

“in all respects.”

The trial court made oral findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether 

Donohoo’s warrantless arrest was authorized by article 14.03(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.03(a)(1) (West 2015).

However, the trial court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding 

when Donohoo was arrested and whether Donohoo made voluntary statements to police officers 

and participated in field sobriety tests “during custodial interrogation without proper Miranda 

warnings.”

The trial court is required to make written findings of fact “in all cases concerning 

voluntariness.” Vasquez v. State, 411 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6). This includes cases involving an alleged violation of 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See Vasquez, 411 S.W.3d at 919. The trial court is also 
obligated “to make findings and conclusions that were adequate and complete, covering every 

potentially dispositive issue that might reasonably be said to have arisen in the course of the 

suppression proceedings.” State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This 

court may not imply findings in support of the trial court’s suppression order. See id.; State v. 

Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (court of appeals must abate for additional 

findings when trial court’s findings regarding the circumstances of interrogation are 

insufficiently specific or detailed from which to reach a legal conclusion on the question of 

custody).

We therefore withdraw the appeal from submission, abate the appeal, and remand the 

case to the trial court to make the following determinations. With respect to each, we direct the 

trial court to state its conclusion and the specific findings of fact upon which the conclusion is 

based. 

a. When was Donohoo arrested? 

b. If the trial court concludes Donohoo was arrested after officers obtained evidence that 

Donohoo moved to suppress, was Donohoo detained and, if so, when was Donohoo 

detained and was there reasonable suspicion to support Donohoo’s detention?

c. Was Donohoo in custody before officers obtained evidence that Donohoo moved to 

suppress? The specific findings of fact should include—but are not limited to—the 

following:

i. Did the focus of the officers’ investigation center on Donohoo? If so, when?

ii. Did the officers reasonably believe that Donohoo had committed a criminal 

offense? If so, when?

iii. Did any officer tell Donohoo that he was not free to leave? If so, when?

iv. Did any officer physically deprive Donohoo of his freedom of action in any 

significant way? If so, when?

v. Did any officer create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe 

that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted? If so, when? 

vi. Was Donohoo given Miranda warnings? If so, when?

d. For purposes of section 6 of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 

were Donohoo’s statements voluntarily made and made under voluntary conditions? 

We further order the trial court to specifically identify the evidence that was suppressed. 

We order the findings of fact be filed in a supplemental clerk’s record by December 28, 2015.

It is so ORDERED on November 24, 2015.

_________________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 24th day of November, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court