Rel: August 23, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 

Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 

300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 

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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0683

_________________________

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC 

v. 

Bondy's Ford, Inc.

Appeal from Henry Circuit Court

(CV-17-1)

BRYAN, Justice.

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve, LLC ("Radiance"), appeals 

from a judgment entered by the Henry Circuit Court ("the trial court") in 

favor of Bondy's Ford, Inc. ("Bondy's"). Radiance had garnished the 
SC-2023-0683

2

wages of David Sherrill, who had worked for Bondy's. Bondy's stopped 

paying on the garnishment, claiming that Sherrill had left its 

employment. Bondy's, however, continued to pay funds for Sherrill's

ongoing services to a company created by Sherrill's wife. Radiance 

claimed that Bondy's was still required to comply with the garnishment 

by withdrawing the funds owed for Sherrill's ongoing services. As 

explained below, Radiance and Bondy's each presented evidence in 

support of what we conclude were cross-motions for a summary 

judgment. The trial court entered a judgment granting Bondy's motion.

Radiance appealed. Because genuine issues of material fact exist, we 

reverse the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings. 

Procedural History

On January 23, 2017, SE Property Holdings, LLC, filed a "Notice of 

Filing of Foreign Judgment" in the trial court. SE Property Holdings had 

obtained a judgment from a Florida court against Sherrill. At the time 

of the filing of the notice, Sherrill owed approximately $265,780 under

the foreign judgment. SE Property Holdings thereafter sought 

garnishment from various entities as part of its efforts to collect the debt. 
SC-2023-0683

3

On July 16, 2018, SE Property Holdings obtained process of 

garnishment, issued to Bondy's as a garnishee. See § 6-6-393, Ala. Code 

1975. In its answer, Bondy's averred that Sherrill was its employee, that

it would withhold funds from his compensation, and that it would pay 

those funds to the circuit clerk as required. See § 6-6-450, Ala. Code 1975.

In August 2018, Sherrill moved to stop the wage garnishment. SE 

Property Holdings objected, arguing that Sherrill was not a resident of 

Alabama and thus was not entitled to withholding exemptions under 

Alabama law. The trial court denied Sherrill's "objection to 

garnishment."

In January 2019, Radiance was substituted for SE Property 

Holdings as the plaintiff, according to the terms of a sale and transfer of 

SE Property Holdings' rights under the original foreign judgment. Upon 

a motion filed by Radiance, the trial court entered a judgment on January 

23, 2019, stating: "The Motion of Radiance ... to condemn and disburse 

any and all funds received from ... Bondy's ... is hereby GRANTED. The 

Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to condemn and disburse all funds 

received from said Garnishee, and any future funds received, to the 

Plaintiff ...." (Capitalization in original.) See § 6-6-454, Ala. Code 1975 
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4

("If the garnishee answers and admits indebtedness to the defendant, 

judgment thereon must be entered against him, after judgment against 

the defendant, for the amount so admitted, if less than the amount of the 

judgment against the defendant, or, if more or equal thereto, for the 

amount thereof; and if the debtor demand is not then payable, execution 

must be suspended until its maturity.").

In September 2019, an August 29, 2019, letter written on Bondy's 

letterhead was filed with the circuit clerk, stating that Sherrill had left 

Bondy's employment on June 24, 2019. The letter provided no indication

that it was sent to Radiance. The circuit clerk marked the letter

"received" on September 6, 2019. Bondy's did not make any further 

payments on the garnishment.

On October 26, 2022, Radiance filed a "Motion for Judgment 

Against Garnishee," i.e., Bondy's. In its motion, Radiance characterized 

Bondy's August 29, 2019, letter as "an unsworn amended answer." 

Radiance submitted evidence in support of its motion, arguing that 

Sherrill had continued providing services to Bondy's and had merely 

diverted his pay to a company owned by his wife. Based largely on the 

Court of Civil Appeals' decision in Devan Lowe, Inc. v. Stephens, 842 So. 
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5

2d 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002), Radiance asked the trial court to find that 

the company was a "sham" and to enforce the garnishment against 

Bondy's for funds it had paid, and was continuing to pay, for Sherrill's 

services. 

The trial court allowed the parties time to conduct discovery. In 

July 2023, Bondy's filed a "Response and/or Motion to Dismiss Radiance 

Capital's Motion for Judgment Against Garnishee." Bondy's also 

submitted evidence in support of its motion. Based on Devan Lowe,

Bondy's argued that, because Sherrill did not perform functions that 

were the "essence" of Bondy's business, he had always been more like an 

independent contractor. Thus, according to Bondy's, any funds it paid for 

Sherrill's continued provision of services to Bondy's were not subject to 

garnishment. Radiance thereafter submitted additional evidence in 

response to Bondy's filings.

On August 7, 2023, the trial court entered its judgment, stating:

"Before the Court is [Radiance]'s Motion for Judgment 

Against Garnishee, Bondy's ...[,] and Bondy's Response 

and/or Motion to Dismiss Radiance['s] Motion for Judgment 

Against Garnishee.

"A hearing was held on July 18, 2023. Radiance['s] 

Motion for Judgment is denied. Bondy's Motion to Dismiss is 

granted. Bondy's ... is dismissed."
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6

Radiance appeals. 

Standard of Review

Before considering the pertinent evidence produced by the parties

and the merits of Radiance's arguments on appeal, we must first 

ascertain the appropriate standard of review. As noted above, the trial 

court entered a garnishment judgment pursuant to § 6-6-454 on January 

23, 2019. In September 2019, Bondy's asserted to the trial court via a 

letter that Sherrill had left Bondy's employment on June 24, 2019. In its 

responsive "Motion for Judgment Against Garnishee," Radiance 

characterized Bondy's August 29, 2019, letter as "an unsworn amended 

answer."

Title 6, Chapter 10, Article 1, of the Alabama Code provides for 

exemption from levy and sale under process. Section 6-10-7(a), Ala. Code 

1975, provides, in relevant part: 

"Should the employment of the defendant for any reason be 

terminated with the garnishee, then the garnishee shall not 

later than 15 days after the termination of employment, 

report the termination to the court and pay into court all sums 

withheld from the defendant's wages, salaries, or other 

compensation. If the plaintiff in garnishment contests the 

answer of the garnishee, as now provided by law in such cases, 

and proves to the court the deficiency or untruth of the 

garnishee's answer, the court shall enter judgment against 

the garnishee for such amount as would have been subject to 
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7

the order of condemnation had the sum not been released to 

the defendant."

Thus, § 6-10-7(a) directs that a garnishee's report to the trial court 

of the termination of the defendant's employment be treated as an 

answer that may be contested by the plaintiff, in accordance with the 

procedure for garnishment actions. Consistent with the provisions of §

6-10-7(a), Radiance treated Bondy's August 29, 2019, letter as "an 

unsworn amended answer" and contested Bondy's assertions set forth in 

the letter.1 Because Radiance included supporting evidentiary materials 

with its responsive "Motion for Judgment Against Garnishee," we 

conclude that that motion was in the nature of a summary-judgment

motion. See Sexton v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 405 So. 2d 18, 20 (Ala. 

1981)("Summary judgment is appropriate if after the court considers the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 

affidavits, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact."). Likewise, 

because Bondy's "Response and/or Motion to Dismiss Radiance Capital's 

Motion for Judgment Against Garnishee" included supporting 

1Neither Radiance nor Bondy's argues that the other did not 

adequately comply with the pertinent statutory provisions governing 

garnishment actions. 
SC-2023-0683

8

evidentiary material, we conclude that that motion was also in the nature 

of a summary-judgment motion. 

Therefore, the procedural posture upon which the trial court 

entered its August 7, 2023, judgment was the parties' submissions of 

cross-motions for a summary judgment regarding the issue whether 

funds held by Bondy's are subject to garnishment to satisfy the foreign

judgment against Sherrill. See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. Overton, 59 

So. 3d 1, 4 (Ala. 2010).

"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. 

Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d 72, 74 

(Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial 

court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the 

movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue 

of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue 

Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 

952-53 (Ala. 2004)."

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 2004).

"On motion for summary judgment the burden is upon 

the movant to show that no genuine triable issue of material 

fact exists. Board of Sewer and Water Commissioners of the 

City of Mobile v. Alabama Power Co., Ala., 363 So. 2d 304 

(1978). In the instant case this maxim's applicability is 

complicated because both parties moved for summary 

judgment .... However, we hold that where such crossmotions for summary judgment occur the burden remains on 

each movant to establish the propriety of the court entering 

summary judgment on its own motion. See 10 Wright & 
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Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2727 (1973). 

The fact that the first party fails to carry the burden on his 

motion does not necessarily mean that the other party has 

carried the burden under his own motion and should be 

granted summary judgment. See Rains v. Cascade 

Industries, Inc., 402 F.2d 241 (3rd Cir. 1968); Walling v. 

Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1946)[,]

cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870, 66 S. Ct. 1383, 90 L. Ed. 1640 

(1946); 10 Wright & Miller, supra § 2720 (1973)."

Amason v. First State Bank of Lineville, 369 So. 2d 547, 552 (Ala. 1979).

Summary-Judgment Evidence

Before turning to Radiance's substantive arguments on appeal, we 

will summarize the evidence produced in support of the parties' 

respective cross-motions for a summary judgment. However, as an initial 

matter, we address Bondy's argument -- asserted for the first time on 

appeal -- that the evidence submitted by Radiance in support of its 

summary-judgment motion was not properly authenticated. Radiance 

correctly responds that Bondy's has waived that argument because 

Bondy's did not object to the admissibility of Radiance's evidence in the 

trial court and did not move to strike the evidence on the ground that it 

was not authenticated. See Chatham v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 So. 2d 

341, 344 (Ala. 1993)("A party must move the trial court to strike any 

nonadmissible evidence that violates Rule 56(e)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.] Failure 
SC-2023-0683

10

to do so waives any objection on appeal and allows this Court to consider 

the defective evidence. Perry [v. Mobile Cnty., 533 So. 2d 602,] 604-05 

[(Ala. 1988)]."). Because Bondy's did not raise any objection in the trial 

court to the evidence submitted by Radiance or move to strike that

evidence, that evidence was properly before the trial court and may be 

considered by this Court in analyzing whether summary judgment was 

proper. The evidence produced in the trial court showed the following. 

Sherrill works as a private pilot. Bondy's operates an automobile

dealership in southeast Alabama. According to the affidavit of Bondy's

comptroller, Bondy's "is not a commercial airline and does not offer 

airplane rental to the general public." Regarding Sherrill, the 

comptroller's affidavit stated: "In 2014, David Sherrill became employed 

with Bondy's to provide an estimated 100 hours of piloting services. The 

anticipated hours were established by prior yearly flight history. Bondy's 

offered Sherrill an employment position so he could participate in the 

[c]ompany health insurance and retirement benefits." Sherrill's starting 

gross pay was $72,000 per year. An April 2018 note in Sherrill's

employment file states that his pay was increased to $73,000 per year, or 

$1,403.85 per week. 
SC-2023-0683

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Bondy's is owned by individuals identified in the record simply as 

"the Marshall family." According to Sherrill's affidavit, he performed 

work primarily for the Marshall family and not for Bondy's. He was paid 

through Bondy's only to allow him to receive retirement and healthinsurance benefits from that entity. He stated that, in 2014, 

"the Marshall family was looking for a part-time pilot for their 

aircraft. Based on usage during the previous years, we 

estimated the Marshall family flew approximately 100 hours 

per year. ... The Marshall[]s offered to pay me through their 

car dealership, Bondy's, so I could participate in the 

company's retirement and health insurance plans. ... The 

vast majority of the time I spent as a pilot under this 

arrangement was for the Marshall family individually and not 

for Bondy's."

This work arrangement was such that Sherrill did not keep regular 

business hours or perform work at any of Bondy's offices. He was never 

employed as a car salesman for Bondy's. 

Notably, Sherrill affirmed that he was "allowed to fly for other 

people and businesses if it did not conflict with the Marshall[s'] flight 

plans." Indeed, Sherrill stated in his affidavit that he has flown more for 

other individuals and businesses "than the 100 hours I contract for with 

the Marshalls." He estimated that, in 2019, his "work with Bondy's only 

comprised about 1/4 of [his] annual flight time." 
SC-2023-0683

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In 2012, before Sherrill made his arrangement with Bondy's, 

Radiance's predecessor, SE Property Holdings, had obtained a judgment

from a Florida court on a mortgage foreclosure against Sherrill and his 

then-wife, Michele. The original judgment of $907,249.31 had been 

reduced to $265,780.68; it bore interest at 4.75% per annum. The foreign 

judgment was properly filed in the trial court on January 23, 2017. 

On July 16, 2018, SE Property Holdings filed in the trial court 

process of garnishment against Bondy's. At the time, Sherrill's debt 

totaled $339,760.02, including interest and costs. The writ-ofgarnishment section of the process of garnishment advised Bondy's that

it must report a termination of Sherrill's employment to the trial court

within 15 days of the termination. Bondy's responded by filing a form 

answer on July 25, 2018, selecting the option stating: "The defendant is 

employed, and the garnishee will withhold from the salary, wages, or 

other compensation of the defendant, as required, and pay the amounts 

withheld to the Clerk of the above-named Court." 

In his August 2018 motions to stop the garnishment, Sherrill 

represented that he was employed by Bondy's and that his take-home pay 

after withholding funds for taxes and child support was approximately 
SC-2023-0683

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$351 per week, or only $18,252 per year. He did not identify any other 

employer or any other sources of income, despite the fact that -- according 

to his later affidavit -- the majority of his work was performed for other 

businesses and individuals.

Sherrill's 2018 filings also contain discrepancies regarding his place 

of residence. In those filings, he listed an address in Panama City Beach, 

Florida, a post-office box in Headland, Alabama, and averred: "I live in 

Henry County, Alabama." On employment forms that Sherrill had 

signed in 2014, he listed an address in Headland. SE Property Holdings, 

however, showed that, despite Sherrill's sworn 2018 statement that he 

lived in Alabama, he had already received homestead and other 

exemptions based on a residence in Florida. In December 2018, Sherrill, 

appearing pro se at the time, wrote a handwritten letter to the trial court 

asking for a continuance of a hearing. In that letter, he admitted: "I 'do' 

live in Florida, Panama City Beach, and is my perm. residence, but am 

employed by Bondy's here in Dothan, AL. My work responsibilities only 

require me to be up here a couple times a month[. M]y kids do[,] however, 

live in Headland, AL!" Nonetheless, in his June 2023 affidavit, Sherrill 

averred that he had "mov[ed] to the area in 2014."
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Between July 30, 2018, and July 1, 2019, Bondy's paid a total of 

$2,267.94 on the garnishment. It stopped payments after July 1, 2019.

On July 1, 2019, Sherrill's present wife, Kelly, a nurse, formed a company 

known as KDS Aero Services, LLC. She was the sole initial member. 

Sherrill's June 2023 affidavit stated: "My wife formed KDS Aero Services, 

LLC[,] which provides pilot services to numerous businesses and 

individuals in the Wiregrass Region. ... In 2019, I resigned from 

employment with Bondy's to work full-time for KDS Aero Services, LLC."

However, in October 2019, in response to an email inquiry from an 

attorney for Radiance regarding his employment with Bondy's, Sherrill 

stated: "Hey Gus, not employed there anymore, sorry, haven't been since 

summer. If ya want I can prolly send you around $100 a month good 

faith monies til I find something else, just let me know, I check my email 

periodically. Take care, David[.]" Sherrill's October 2019 email did not 

mention his "work full-time for KDS Aero Services," his continued 

provision of services to Bondy's, or his provision of services to any other 

individual or entity.

In July 2019, Bondy's stopped paying for Sherrill's healthinsurance and retirement benefits. The Bondy's comptroller denied that 
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Bondy's had had any involvement in Sherrill's decision to leave his 

employment or in the formation of KDS Aero Services, although Radiance 

produced evidence indicating that a law firm that had previously 

provided services to Bondy's in unrelated matters had also prepared the 

certificate of formation for KDS Aero Services. The comptroller stated 

that Sherrill "agreed to continue to provide the 100 anticipated hours of 

service for Bondy's through an entity called 'KDS Aero[] Services, LLC.'"

In response to a Radiance subpoena requesting Bondy's entire file 

regarding KDS Aero Services, Bondy's produced four pages showing 

Bondy's total payments to KDS Aero Services each year from 2019 to 

June 10, 2022 -- three 1099 tax forms and one computer screenshot. The

record includes no contract between Bondy's and KDS Aero Services, no 

invoices or bills from KDS Aero Services to Bondy's, no records showing

services provided to Bondy's by KDS Aero Services, and no instructions 

regarding how and to whom payments from Bondy's for any services 

provided by KDS Aero Services are to be made.

On September 6, 2019, Bondy's submitted its letter reporting the 

termination of Sherrill's employment to the circuit clerk and made no 

further payments on the garnishment. The letter was dated August 29, 
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2019, was written on Bondy's letterhead, and was signed by an employee 

whose position was not identified. The letter was addressed to the Henry 

Circuit Clerk and stated simply: "To whom it may concern: David Sherrill 

(case # CV-2017-000001.00) is no longer employed by us. He left our 

employment on 06/24/2019. If you need any other information, please 

don't hesitate to call us." The letter includes no indication that it was 

sent to Radiance. It was filed nearly two months after the time required 

for giving notice of termination of employment when an employee's wages 

are subject to garnishment. See § 6-10-7.

On February 14, 2022, Sherrill applied for loan from All In Federal 

Credit Union to finance his purchase of a vehicle. On the loan 

application, he identified Bondy's as his sole employer and stated that he 

had been employed by Bondy's for six years. He listed his position with 

Bondy's as "Chief Pilot." Sherrill did not mention KDS Aero Services in 

the loan application. He left the space for "Other Income" blank. Sherrill 

also stated that he received gross income of $6,167.18 per month and paid 

no child support. Combined, a gross monthly income of $6,167.18 

amounts to an annual gross income of $74,006.16. In tax records for 

2021, Bondy's had reported paying KDS Aero Services $74,006.18.
SC-2023-0683

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Analysis

Alabama law provides for garnishment under § 6-6-370 et seq., Ala. 

Code 1975. Garnishment is defined as "process to reach and subject 

money or effects of a defendant ... in the possession or under the control 

of a third person," and such a third person is called "the garnishee." § 6-

6-370, Ala. Code 1975. Section 6-6-371, Ala. Code 1975, directs that the 

provisions of § 6-6-143, Ala. Code 1975, are applicable to garnishments; 

therefore, like attachment law, garnishment law "must be liberally 

construed to advance the manifest intent of the law." § 6-6-143.

Radiance refers us to § 6-6-452, which provides: 

"If the garnishee admits the possession of money 

belonging to the defendant, he must pay the same or so much 

thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's demand 

and costs into court to await the order of the court; and, if he 

fails to make such payment, he is liable as if he had admitted 

an indebtedness for the amount of such money."

The question presented, then, is whether Bondy's has possession of 

money belonging to Sherrill. 

Both parties rely almost exclusively on the Court of Civil Appeals' 

decision in Devan Lowe, supra. Radiance argues that the facts of Devan 

Lowe were similar to those presented here and that the holding of that 

case supports a finding that KDS Aero Services is a "mere sham," that 
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Sherrill is actually an employee of Bondy's, and that Bondy's must 

continue paying on the garnishment. Bondy's, in return, argues that the 

facts of Devan Lowe are distinguishable and that that case supports the

conclusion that, because Sherrill does not perform a function related to 

the "essence" of Bondy's business, he is an independent contractor and, 

therefore, Bondy's has no obligation to continue payments on the 

garnishment.

In Devan Lowe, the defendant, Carl Hubbard, sold cars over the 

Internet for an automobile dealership, Devan Lowe, Inc. ("the 

dealership"). Hubbard had arranged for the commissions on his sales to 

be paid to his wife so that the payments would not interfere with 

disability benefits he received from the federal government. 

Uncomfortable with the situation, the dealership's manager encouraged 

Hubbard to make other arrangements regarding his compensation.

Hubbard thus created Dolphin Developers, L.L.C. ("the L.L.C."), and 

instructed the dealership's office manager to direct funds owed him to the 

L.L.C. The dealership had no written agreement or contract with the 

L.L.C. The dealership's office manager did not know if the L.L.C. had a 

business license, if it was registered to do business in Alabama, or who 
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the owners or officers were. The dealership received no invoices from the 

L.L.C. for Hubbard's services.

Under the new arrangement, Hubbard no longer received benefits 

under the dealership's health-insurance plan. The dealership reported

his income by means of a 1099 tax form. When the trial court in Devan 

Lowe received evidence ore tenus, the dealership's office manager 

testified that Hubbard was no longer an employee of the dealership but 

admitted that he "performed the same services ... he had performed in 

the past; he was simply compensated for those services through a 

different entity." 842 So. 2d at 706. Hubbard also continued to receive 

benefits usually reserved for employees, such as the use of a 

demonstrator vehicle and a cellular telephone. 

After receiving the evidence, the trial court in Devan Lowe entered 

a final judgment in favor of the garnishor, relying heavily on the fact that 

the dealership and the L.L.C. had no contract. The dealership appealed. 

The Court of Civil Appeals applied the ore tenus presumption of 

correctness to the trial court's factual conclusions and considered two 

questions: first, whether there was evidence to support the finding that 

Hubbard was an employee of the dealership and not the L.L.C., see id. at 
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706-07, and, second, whether there was evidence to support the finding 

that the L.L.C. was a "mere sham or subterfuge." Id. at 707. 

Considering the first question, the Court of Civil Appeals noted that 

Hubbard sold automobiles and that selling automobiles was "the essence 

of [the dealership's] business." Id. at 706. Thus, that court reasoned, he 

was not performing a service that lent itself to an independent-contractor 

payment arrangement. The Court of Civil Appeals then discussed the 

fact that "nothing significant changed about Hubbard's employment 

between August when he was employed by [the dealership], and 

September, when [the dealership] was paying Hubbard's commission to" 

the L.L.C. Id. He still received health-insurance benefits, albeit under 

the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 instead of 

self-paying through the company's family coverage, and he still had use 

of a dealership vehicle and a cellular telephone. Based on those facts, 

coupled with the lack of a contract between the dealership and the L.L.C., 

the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the trial court had "ample 

evidence to support the ... finding" that the dealership, not the L.L.C., 

was Hubbard's employer. Id. at 707.
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As to whether the L.L.C. was a "sham," the Court of Civil Appeals 

likewise found that the trial court's conclusion was supported by 

sufficient evidence. Specifically, it noted Hubbard's admission that he 

had originally "devised a compensation plan shifting the bulk of his 

income to his wife to defraud the federal government so that he could 

continue to receive his full disability benefits." Id. at 707. Moreover, 

Hubbard created the L.L.C. shortly after entry of the judgment 

establishing his debt to the garnishor, thus supporting an inference "that 

the impetus for the formation of the L.L.C. was to evade" the garnishor.

Id. Noting that attachment law must be liberally construed and was 

designed to avoid fraud, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the 

evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion

that Hubbard had created the L.L.C. to avoid collection on the debt and 

was, therefore, still employed by the dealership. 

The Court of Civil Appeals in Devan Lowe cited Walker v. Carolina 

Mills Lumber Co., 429 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983), which Radiance 

also relies on in the present appeal. In Walker, the Court of Civil Appeals 

reversed a trial court's judgment in a child-support action on the ground 

that proof of fraud on the part by the debtor alone, and not necessarily 
SC-2023-0683

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collusion by the debtor and the garnishee together, is sufficient to 

disregard a transfer in avoidance of a debt. In Walker, the debtor had 

his employer start paying his commissions to his current wife shortly 

after he had received notice of his former wife's application for a writ of 

garnishment. The fact that the debtor had intended to hinder collection 

efforts, the Court of Civil Appeals determined, supported a finding of 

fraud, and thus, the Court of Civil Appeals held, the trial court should 

have set aside the assignment of his commissions for purposes of the 

garnishment without requiring proof of collusion by the employer. Id.

Both parties in this case focus their arguments on a single question: 

whether Sherrill remained an employee of Bondy's after Bondy's started 

making payments for his work to KDS Aero Services. Bondy's 

particularly relies on the language in Devan Lowe regarding the 

"essence" of the business to argue that Sherrill was an independent 

contractor. But Sherrill's employment status is not the primary inquiry.

Devan Lowe does not stand for the proposition that an independent 

contractor not engaged in work related to the essence of the business may 

be free from a garnishment. The Court of Civil Appeals examined the 

issues raised in Devan Lowe to determine whether the dealership in that 
SC-2023-0683

23

case continued to owe funds to Hubbard, the debtor, despite his routing 

payments for his work to the L.L.C. That was the appropriate inquiry 

under the garnishment statutes.

The statutory scheme relating to garnishment provides a process to 

reach money of a debtor "in the possession or under the control of a third 

person." § 6-6-370. If that third person, the garnishee, "fails to make 

such payment, he is liable as if he had admitted an indebtedness for the 

amount of such money." § 6-6-452. The ultimate question before the trial 

court in this case on the parties' cross-motions for a summary judgment 

was not whether Sherrill remained an employee of Bondy's. It was 

whether Bondy's continued to owe money to Sherrill or whether it in fact 

owed money to KDS Aero Services instead.

As in Devan Lowe, the lack of a contract, invoices, or, indeed, any 

other records showing the existence of a legitimate relationship between 

Bondy's and KDS Aero Services is compelling. This apparent lack of a

relationship between the two entities certainly creates genuine issues of 

material fact regarding whether Bondy's payments to KDS Aero Services 

were in fact owed to Sherrill. This is especially true when the dealings 
SC-2023-0683

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between the two entities is considered together with the other 

inconsistencies in the record.

The evidence produced supports an inference that both Bondy's and 

Sherrill were willing to establish an employee relationship in apparent 

misuse of Bondy's corporate form so that Sherrill could receive benefits 

for services he provided not to Bondy's, but privately to the Marshall 

family. Separately, Sherrill represented on a 2022 loan application that 

he was employed directly by Bondy's and was continuing to receive pay 

directly from Bondy's, and not from KDS Aero Services. The income 

reported by Sherrill on the 2022 loan application matched almost to the 

penny the amount Bondy's had paid to KDS Aero Services in 2021. 

Affidavits from Bondy's comptroller and Sherrill emphasize that 

most of his work was done for others. However, Sherrill failed to disclose 

any other sources of income in his filings with the trial court, the loan 

application mentioned above, and his communications with Radiance.

Indeed, when Radiance asked about his employment with Bondy's, 

Sherrill stated that he could make token payments "til I find something," 

plainly representing that he had not found other employment. Sherrill's 

statement in this regard conflicts with his affidavit testimony that he had 
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left Bondy's precisely "to work full-time for KDS Aero Services." Further, 

the record includes Sherrill's conflicting representations to the trial court 

regarding his state of residence.

Sherrill did stop receiving retirement and health-insurance 

benefits from Bondy's. Nonetheless, the evidence of Sherrill's 

misrepresentations in efforts to avoid the debt, his misuse of Bondy's 

corporate form to receive benefits he seemingly was not entitled to, and

the lack of any apparent legitimate business relationship between 

Bondy's and KDS Aero Services, considered together, create genuine

issues of material fact regarding whether Sherrill was engaged in fraud

or misuse of KDS Aero Services' corporate form to hide funds owed to him 

by Bondy's. See Devan Lowe, supra. Even if Bondy's itself was not 

engaged in some deception, proof of fraud by the debtor alone would be

sufficient to set aside any wrongful transfer to KDS Aero Services. See

Walker, supra.

Thus, "[t]his instance furnishes an example of a case where neither 

party has carried its burden on their respective motions and accordingly 

the issue was not ripe for summary judgment. This follows because we 

find that the record presents evidence from which the trier of fact might 
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infer that" Sherrill was engaged in fraud or misuse of KDS Aero Services' 

corporate form to hide funds owed to him by Bondy's. See Amason, 369 

So. 2d at 552. Accordingly, the trial court's August 7, 2023, judgment is 

reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 

552-53.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.