AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed February 22, 2021 

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In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00755-CV IN THE ESTATE OF RAFFAELE MARTINI PANDOZY On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PR-18-03717-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Garcia This is a probate case in which the court ruled that appellant Sulma Gonzalez lacked standing to participate in the proceeding. In five issue s, Gonzalez now argues the trial court erred by: (i) co ncluding that she was not the d ecedent’s common law spouse or a creditor of the decedent’s estate; (ii) affirming t he findings made in a previous order declaring heirship; (iii) awarding attorney’s fe es against her; and (iv) not admitting a document to probate that she claims is decedent ’s last will. Concluding Gonzalez’s arguments are without merit, we affirm th e trial court’s judgment.–2– I. B ACKGROUND Raffaele Martini Pandozy died int estate in 2018. He had three c hildren who survived him: Maximillian Carlo Martini, Christopher O’Bannon M artini, and Michelle Cornelia Marini (co llectively, the “Children”). 1 Maximillian filed an application to determine heirship in Colli n County, and later, an application for indepe ndent administration and letter s of administration. The court appointed an ad-litem to represent Pandozy’s unknown heir s. After an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a judgment decla ring heirship naming the Children Pandozy’s sole heirs. The court also issued an order granting Maximillian letters of inde pendent administration. Gonzalez filed a motion for new tr ial and to transfer the case to Dallas County. Gonzalez argued, among other thi ngs, that she was Pandozy’s com mon law spouse and venue was not proper in Collin County. The Collin County co urt set aside its orders and transferred th e case to Dallas County. Maximillian filed a “Motion for Standing Hearing” requesting th at the court determine Gozalez’s status as an interested person under the Es tates Code and award attorney’s fees. See T EX

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. C ODE ANN . § 22.018. Gonzalez responded and attached her affidavit, the affi davit of Wilfredo Romero, a nei ghbor, and the affidavit of Victoria Sujansky, a work acquaintance.

1 Because Pandozy’s children share a last name, we refer to them individually by first name.–3– The court conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine standin g. Both parties were represented by co unsel at that time. Gonzalez and Sujansky testified in Gozalez’s case-in-chief, and Gonzalez offered a single exhibit into evidence. That exhibit, a secretary of state f iling, showed Pandozy as the new registered agent for “Core Fitness System Inc” with a business address for that agen t at 2548 Delmac Drive in Dallas, Texas. Gonzalez claimed that she and Pandozy r esided at that address as husband and wife. When the hearing concluded, Max imillian’s counsel moved for a d irected verdict, arguing that Gonzalez f ailed to prove that she was Pan dozy’s common law spouse and that she otherwise l acked standing. The court grante d the motion. After the motion was granted, Gonzalez filed five additional re sponses to the standing motion, each of which attached additional documents th at were not referenced or introduced at the hearing. Gonzalez also requeste d findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court denied. Gonzalez subsequently filed a mo tion for new trial that Maximil lian opposed. Maximillian’s counsel also filed supplemental affidavits in sup port of his attorney’s fees request. The motion for new trial was set for hearing but Gonzalez did n ot appear. The court later signed an order awa rding Maximillian $5,107.49 in a ttorney’s fees. The court also ruled that Gonzalez l acked standing and dismissed he r claims with prejudice, reaffirmed the Collin County court’s findings that t he Children are–4– Pandozy’s sole heirs, and memorialized its oral pronouncement g ranting Maximillian’s motion for directed verdict. This appeal followed

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II. A NALYSIS We note at the outset that Gonzalez is pro se before this Court . We liberally construe pro se pleadings and briefs. Washington v. Bank of N.Y ., 362 S.W.3d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pe t.). Nonetheless, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn , 573 S.W.2d 181, 184– 85 (Tex.1978); Washington , 362 S.W.3d at 854. To do ot herwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant who is represen ted by counsel. Shull v.
United Parcel Serv ., 4 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied ሻ. The rules of appellate procedure require that an appellant’s br ief contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appro priate citations to authorities and to the record.” T EX

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. P. 38.1(h). Similarly, we cannot speculate as to the substance of the specific issues a party claims we mu st address. Strange v. Continental Cas. Co ., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App. —Dallas 2004, pet. denied). With these principles in mind, we have endeavored to identify a nd address the issues properly before us. To th e extent that Gonzalez intendedto raise any

2 Two additional appeals arising out of the same underlying proc eeding were consolidated with this appeal under this cause number.–5– additional issues or arguments, th ey may be waived for improper briefing. See T EX

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. P. 38.1. Standing as an Interested Person under the Estates Code Gonzalez argues the trial court erred in concluding that she is not an interested person under the Estates Code and therefore lacks standing. Gon zalez insists that she is an interested person because she was Pandozy’s common law wi fe and is a creditor of the estate. 3 These arguments are not persuasive. Standing “focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relations hip with the lawsuit so as to have a ‘justiciable interest’ in its outcome.” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc.
v. Lovato , 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). Because standing is a requir ement of subject-matter jurisdiction, we review a trial court’s standing determination de novo. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez , 315 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. 2010). The Estates Code defines an interested person “an heir, devise e, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right in or claim agai nst an estate being administered.” TEX. EST. CODE AN N. § 22.018(1). In a probate pr oceeding, the burden is on the person whose standing is challenged to prove t hat she is an “interested person.” In re Estate of Casares , 556 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tex. App.—El

3 For the first time in her reply brief, Gonzalez also argues th at she is an interested person “if the afteracquired title doctrine applies.” This argument was not raised in the court below. And even if we assume the argument was preserved, it is forfeited for inadequate brie fing. See T EX

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. P. 38.1.–6– Paso 2018, no pet.); In re Estate of Forister , 421 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Here, Maximillian moved for a directed verdict after Gonzalez r ested her case. The trial court granted a directed verdict, and Gonzales appeal s the granting of a directed verdict, arguing there was “a genuine issue of materia l fact” as to her status as Pandozy’s common law wife and as a creditor of the estate. 4 But when a party moves for a directed verdict in a bench trial, it is actually requesting that the trial court render judgment because there i s no jury to direct. Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist ., 856 S.W.2d 417, 422 n. 4 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., concurring). In such a case, we treat the improperly charac terized motion for directed verdict as a motion for judgment. Joplin v. Borusheski , 244 S.W.3d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); In re A.G ., 531 S.W.3d 329, 335 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 12, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). This distinction is significant because it implicates the correct standard of revie w. See U.S. Fidelity Guar. Co. v. Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc ., 369 S.W.3d 559, 564 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pe t.). Because the motion in this case was brought after Gonzalez rested in a benc h trial, we construe Maximillian ’s motion for a directed verdict as a motion for judgment. See Joplin , 244 S.W.3d at 610.

4 She also lists numerous other reasons why the directed verdict was allegedly improper, but none of these reasons are adequately briefed. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1.–7– The trial court, as the fact finder in a bench trial, may rule on the factual and legal issues at the close of the plaintiff’s case. Id . By entering judgment at the close of the plaintiff’s case in chief, the trial court is presumed t o have ruled on both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. See Qantel Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls
Co ., 761 S.W.2d 302, 303–04 (Tex. 1988). On appeal from the granting of a motion for judgment in a bench trial, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the ju dgment may be challenged as in any other non-jury case. Huang v. Don McGill Toyota, Inc ., 209 S.W.3d 674, 677 (Tex. App.—Houst on [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.). When we review legal sufficiency, we review the e vidence in a light that tends to support the finding of the disputed facts and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison , 70 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex. 2001). We must credit the favorable evidence if reasonab le jurors could and disregard the contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). When reviewing a finding for factual sufficiency, we consider all the evidence and will set aside the finding only if it is so contra ry to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain , 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986) (per curiam). Under this construct, we view Gonzalez’s first two issues as a challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the ju dgment and apply the appropriate standard s to our review.–8– A. Informal Marriage Gonzalez first challenges the tria l court’s determination that no informal marriage existed. As the proponen t of the marriage, Gonzalez bo re the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she and Pandozy w ere informally married. See In re J.G.S ., No. 05-18-00452-CV, 2019 WL 336543, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). Specifically, Gonzalez was required to prove: (1) she and Pandozy agreed to be married; (2 ) after the agreement, they lived together in Texas as spouses; and (3) and there repr esented to others that they were married. See T EX

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. § 2.401(a)(2); Russell v. Russell , 865 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex. 1993); In re Estate of Marek , No. 05-13-01008-CV, 2014 WL 3057479, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dall as July 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem . op.). The existence of a common law marriage is a question of fact to be resolved by the fact finder. Joplin , 244 S.W.3d at 611. To this end, Gonzalez testified that she met Pandozy in around 2003 and they became romantically involved in 2008. At that time, she lived w ith her mother in a house located at 2548 Delmar Drive and Pandozy had a studio on Al Lipscomb Way. Although Gonzalez claimed that Pandozy moved in with her in 200 9, he also maintained his studio on Al Lipscomb. At one point, Gonzalez sa id that Pandozy lived at the Al Lipscomb address, but she later claimed that he had an art studio rather than a dedicated residen ce at that address. Gonzalez sai d that she and Pandozy–9– discussed marriage in around 2009 in the context of having an “ exclusive” relationship. Gonzalez testified as follows: Q. So, at any point either before or after 2009, did you discus s getting married with [Pandozy]? A. Yes ma’am. Q. Do you remember the discussion? A. Yes, the discussion essentially was that because we were, be came exclusive, you know, and he was, I’m going to say, you know had a lot of personal demons he had d ealt with throughout his life. [brief clarification by Court] A. So, he wanted with us to be t ogether, but we needed to be ex clusive and that included, you know, as far as sex we had to be exclusi ve and that was part of it and that’s the reason we decided to get mar ried . . . . Later, Gonzalez’s counsel asked, “So, you were saying . . . tha t you were exclusive, and that yes, you agreed to be married? (Emphasis added). Gonzalez responded affirmatively. Gonzalez sold the Delmar property in 2017 and moved to Waco, bu t Pandozy remained in Dallas. When Gonzalez visited Pandozy in Dallas she would either stay with him at the Al Lipscomb a ddress or would stay with her cous in. Pandozy was diagnosed with colon cancer and later died in the h ospital. Gonzalez visited Pandozy in the hospital but was in Waco when h e died. Gonzalez’s discovery responses were admitted into evidence duri ng cross examination. Those responses state that she has no documents ev idencing joint safe-–10– deposit boxes, joint property in terests, joint title to any mot or vehicles, credit files and credit card receipts, loan a pplications, leases, membership s, or other contractual obligations in the parties’ names. Gonzalez did not refute thes e responses or attempt to adduce evidence of any of the se items at the hearing. Although Gonzalez claimed she h ad carried Pandozy on her car in surance, she did not identify when or for ho w long. And she admitted that sh e had not submitted any documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. Gonzalez further admitted that she and Pandozy ha d never filed a joint tax return and did not maintain a joint bank account. She also ackn owledged that Pandozy’s businesses would someti mes loan her money for which P andozy required that she sign promissory notes. The affidavit of one of Gonzal ez’s witnesses, Wilfredo Romero, was also admitted into evidence during cro ss-examination. Romero was a n eighbor who lived on Delmar Street. He refers to Pandozy as Gonzalez’s husband wi thout explaining the basis for that characterization and then recounts an uniden tified time when he visited Gonzalez’s home unexpect edly and Pandozy asked “what [h e] needed with his wife.” In addition to submitting an affida vit, Sujanksy also testified at trial. She initially said that she knew Gonzalez through work and visited Gonzalez at home a “couple of times.” But she later testified that she saw Gonzale z and Pandozy about–11– every fifteen days or once a month. Sujansky admitted, however, that she had not seen Pandozy since 2015. Sujansky testified generally tha t Pandozy was there “when she v isited” and Gonzalez introduced him as her husband. She also said she heard Pandozy refer to Gonzalez as his wife but failed to specify when or how often. I nstead, Sujanksy conclusively stated that she alw ays believed that Gonzalez and Pandozy were husband and wife. The evidence attached to Maximillian’s motion included a Dallas Police incident report describing a disturbance at the Al Lipscomb pro perty after Pandozy’s death. The Children were there looking for Pandozy’s will when Gonzalez showed up and claimed that some of her belongings were on the property . When the police arrived, she told the officer tha t she was a partner in one of Pandozy’s businesses. On cross-examination, Gonzalez admitted that she did not tell t he officer she was Pandozy’s wife. Maximillian also attached Vincent Walker’s affidavit to his mot ion. Walker stated that he had been acquain ted with Pandozy for over thirty years and flew from Miami to Dallas in 2016 to care for Pandozy when he was diagnos ed with cancer. He stayed with Pandozy for appr oximately a month and a half, an d Gonzalez did not live there. Walker was with Pandozy every day when he was in th e hospital, and said Gonzalez only visited him twice. On one of those occasions, Gon zalez drove–12– Pandozy to the hospital when his car would not start. She later requested payment for her service. Walker further stated that Gonzalez never made a social visit t o Pandozy’s home and did not eat dinner with him. On the few occasions that Gonzalez was present with Pandozy, Walker di d not see any indication of roma ntic or even casual affection. Walker had long and intimate c onversations with Pandozy. Pandoz y never demonstrated an intimate relationship with Gonzalez nor did he ever express that he had any relationship with h er beyond “casual helper.” Gladys Smith also provided an affidavit. Smith resided in one o f the apartments at the Al Lipscomb property from May 2017 until Dece mber 2017. Gonzalez did not reside there during that time. Smith saw Gonza lez visit approximately three times to ask Pandozy for money or legal adv ice or to store things on the premises. According to S mith, this made Pandozy “very up set.” Although Gonzalez alleged that s he and Pandozy discussed marria ge in around 2009, she offered no evidence that the discussion ever c ulminated in an agreement to be married. At mo st, Gonzalez’s testimony describe s an agreement to get married at some point in the future, not an agreement to be married. This distinction is significant. See Estate of Summers , No. 14-13-00816-CV, 2015 WL 124311, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 8, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.);
Kuester v. Green , No. 03-13-00704-CV, 2015 WL 4998171, at *4 (Tex. App.—–13– Austin Aug. 20, 2015, no pet.) (m em. op.). The agreement-to-be- married element requires proof of an intent to create an immediate and permanen t marital relationship and that the couple did in fact agree to be husband and wife. Winegardner v. Hughes , Nos. 07-18-00434-CV, 07-19-0028 3-CV, 2020 WL 1966283, at *3 (Te x. App.— Amarillo Apr. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). There is no such e vidence here. There is some evidence of cohabitation and limited representati ons to others that Pandozy and Gonzalez were married. While this proof may so metimes constitute circumstantial evidence of an agreement to be marrie d, it is difficult to infer an agreement to be married from cohabitation in modern so ciety. Russell , 865 S.W.2d at 933. 5 Thus, evidence of “holding out” must be particularly convincing to be probative of an agreement to be married. Assoun v. Gustafson , 493 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied). 6 Gonzalez relies on Sujansky and Romero’s conclusory testimony a bout isolated instances to establish that she and Pandozy represente d to others that they were married. But other than Romero’s vague testimony about a s ingle instance he

5 We do not in any way imply that the record conclusively establ ishes cohabitation here. But we need not discuss this element because the other elements for establi shing an informal marriage are not met. See Danna v. Danna , No. 05-00472-CV, 2006 WL 785621, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Marc h 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). 6 The statutory requirement of r epresenting marriage to others is synonymous with the judicial requirement of “holding out to the public.” In re Estate of Giessel , 734 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The couple’s reputation i n the community as being married is a significant factor in determining the holding out element. Fuller v. DeFranco, No. 05-19-01203-CV, 2020 WL 6778408, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas N ov. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).–14– recalled, Gonzalez adduced no evid ence of specific instances in which she and/or Pandozy held themselves out as hus band and wife and whether suc h instances were common; nor did she elicit any testimony from family members or friends that she and Pandozy had a reputation in the community for being married

. See, e.g ., Smith

v. Deneve , 285 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. App.—D allas 2009, no pet.) (evidenc e insufficient to show couple repres ented themselves as married t o others when woman accepted ring, certain contracts listed couple as husband and wife, and couple were introduced as husband and wife, but there was no ev idence whether such introductions were common or rare); Castillon v. Morgan , No. 05-13-00872- CV, 2015 WL 1650782, at *4 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas April 14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence that woman and man represented themselves as mar ried and insurance policies and homeowner informati on sheet listed them as husband and wife was insufficient to prove informal m arriage when there was no evide nce regarding frequency of representations or whether anyone in community saw policies or information sheet); Danna , 2006 WL 785621, at *1–2 (evidence of four occasions on which couple introduced themsel ves as husband and wife and A ARP enrollment form signed by man referring to woman as his wife was insuffici ent to raise fact issue on representation as married to others). In short, Gonzal ez did not demonstrate that she and Pandozy both consiste ntly conducted themselves as husband and wife in the public eye or that the co mmunity viewed them as married.–15– Although Gonzalez presented some evidence relevant to the eleme nts of an informal marriage, the evidence was contradicted and not suffic ient to conclusively prove as a matter of law all vital facts in support of the exis tence of an informal marriage. The evidence is, therefore, legally sufficient to sup port the trial court’s determination. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). The evidence is also factually s ufficient to support the judgme nt. The evidence presented was, at best, conflicting. “Where the eviden ce is conflicting about the existence of an informal marriage, the conflict must be resolved by the factfinder.” J.G.S ., 2019 WL 336543, at *3. The c ourt resolved the conflicting evidence by finding that there was no informal marriage. Viewin g all the evidence, we cannot conclude that the evidence is so weak or the trial co urt’s finding is “so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as t o be clearly wrong and unjust.” See Dow Chem. Co ., 46 S.W.3d at 242.
B. Creditor of the Estate Gonzalez also argues that she is an interested person because s he is a creditor of the estate. The record does not support this contention. Gonzalez’s affidavit appears to c laim an interest in certain mi neral rights owned by an entity called “Ideas for Sale, Inc.” Gonzalez claim ed, but did not prove, that Pandozy owned an interest in this entity.–16– Gonzalez claims that she sold mineral interests to this entity and attached a Quitclaim deed to her affidavit reflecting this sale. Despite t he Quitclaim’s recitation that the interests were sold for $400, Gonzalez claims she was not compensated. She further claims that she and Pandozy agreed that the entity woul d hold the mineral interests “for safekeeping purposes” and that title to the inte rests would “revert back” to her in the future. The deed , however, does not reference any remainder interests or future divestments in favor of Gonzalez, nor did she introdu ce any other evidence to substantiate her claim. The Estates Code does not define “creditor.” As our sister cour t has observed, however, in legal parlance, “cred itor” includes “[a] person or entity with a definite claim against another, especially a claim that is capable of ad justment and liquidation.” In re Davidson , 485 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009)). In the probate context, the legislature has defined “claim s” as including (1) liabilities o f a decedent that survive the decedent’s death, including ta xes, regardless of whether th e liabilities arise in contract or tort or otherwise; (2) funeral expenses; (3) the ex pense of a tombstone; (4) expenses of administration; (5) estate and inheritances tax es; and (6) debts due a decedent’s estate. TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 22.005. The evidence Gonzalez adduced does not establish that she has a claim. Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that Gonzalez is not a creditor of Pandozy’s esta te.–17– Because Gonzalez did not meet her burden to prove either an inf ormal marriage to Pandozy or that she is a creditor of his estate, th e trial court did not err in concluding that Gonzalez lacks standing as an interested per son under the Estates Code. We resolve Gonzalez’s fir st and second issues against her

. The Heirship Determination Gonzalez’s third issue argues th e trial court erred by adopting the Collin County court’s heirship finding s. Specifically, Gonzalez argues that: The trial court’s affirmation of the set aside order amounted t o affirming a “void” judgment subject to direct or collateral att ack. Yet, the Trial Court’s affirmation of the heirship determination of [Pandozy’s] estate was a final order . . . . Gonzalez then cites case law c oncerning a court’s plenary power , Texas motions for new trial, and F ED

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. 60(b), concluding that “a party affected by a void judicial action need not appeal.” This issue is waived f or inadequate briefing.
See T EX

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. P. 38.1. Moreover, to the extent that G onzalez seeks to challenge the tr ial court’s heirship determination, we have concluded that the trial court did not err in concluding that Gonzalez lacks standing to participate in the p robate proceeding. Gonzalez’s third issue is overruled. 7

7 While the order entered by the court states that it “affirms” the Collin county order, we treat this as an adoption of the order’s terms.–18– Attorney’s Fees Gonzalez argues the trial cour t erred by awarding Maximillian’s attorney’s fees because he is not the executo r or administrator of the est ate and failed to prove any other statutory basi s for recovering fees. Although the trial court did not specify a statutory or contrac tual basis on which it awarded attorney fees, see MBM Fin. Corp. v. The Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009) (“ Texas has long followed the ‘American Rule’ prohibiting [attorney’s] f ee awards unless specifically p rovided by contract or statute.”), and Maximillian’s pl eading was likewise nonspecific as to the authority, Gonzalez did not specially except or otherwise challenge the ba sis for the fee request. See Bullock v. Regular Veter ans Ass’n of U.S., Post No. 76 , 806 S.W.2d 311, 315 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ) (“general allegation” of entitlement to attorney fees is sufficient if opposing party fails to speciall y except to lack of specificity). Accordingly, Maxim illian may recover his fees on any available legal basis. See Granbury Hospitality, Inc. v. State Bank of Texas , No. 05-16-01509-CV, 2018 WL 3968498, at *7 (Tex. App.—D allas Aug. 20, 2018, pet. de nied) (mem. op.); see also Deneve , 285 S.W.3d at 916–17 (pleading sufficiently general to allow recipient to argue any legal bas is to support attorney’s fees). Maximillian’s motion requested that the court hold a hearing to determine Gonzalez’s status as an interest ed person under the Estates Cod e. No particular type of pleading is required to bring a case under the Declaratory J udgments Act. Robins–19– v. Wilder , No. 05-97-00547-CV, 2000 WL 19335 9, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas F eb. 18, 2000, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Canales v. Zapatero , 773 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 1989, no writ). B ecause the motion can be fai rly characterized as an action “to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other lega l relations,” we construe the substance of the motion as a request for relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act. See T EX

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. § 37.002(b); City of El Paso v. Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d 366, 370 (Tex. 2009). In a suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act, a trial court ma y award reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are just and equita ble. T EX

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. § 37.009. See Robins , 2000 WL 193559, at *4. T herefore, there is a statutory basis upon which the attorney’s fees award may b e properly predicated.
We resolve Gonzalez’s fourth issue against her. Probate of Purported Will Gonzalez’s fifth issue appears to argue that the trial court er red by not admitting one of the documents she attached to one of her post- hearing filings as Pandozy’s last will and testament. The document in question is from the Dallas Central Appraisal District entitled “Exemption Application for Charitable Organization for 2017.” The record does not reflect, however, that an application for p robate was ever filed, or that the requisite pr oof for probating a will was met

. See T EX

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. C ODE–20– A NN . §§ 256.051-.053, 256.151-.153. We therefore resolve Gonzalez’ s fifth issue against her.
III. C ONCLUSION Maximillian requests that we impos e sanctions on Gonzalez pursu ant to T EX

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. P. 45. We deny this request. Having resolved all of Gonzalez’s issues against her, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

190755F.P05 /Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE–21– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

IN THE ESTATE OF RAFFAELE MARTINI PANDOZY
No. 05-19-00755-CV On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. PR-18-03717- 1. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia. Justices Schenck and Smith participating.
In accordance with this Court’ s opinion of this date, the judg ment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. It is ORDERED that appellee recover his costs of thi s appeal from appellant Judgment entered February 22, 2021.