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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL A. CRIMI 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 481 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-19-CR-0000298-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: MAY 1, 2023

Michael Crimi appeals the judgment of sentence imposed by the 

Columbia County Court of Common Pleas after a jury convicted him of thirddegree murder and related offenses for beating his then-girlfriend’s threeyear-old daughter, I.B., to death. Crimi raises seven issues on appeal, 

including: a challenge to the trial court’s granting of one of his requested 

remedies for the Columbia County Clerk of Courts’ (“clerk of courts”) 

inadvertent disclosure of ex parte and sealed defense motions to the Columbia 

County District Attorney’s office (“DA”); challenges to the trial court’s 

discretion in declining to conduct individual voir dire of potential jurors as well 

as its discretion in admitting social media posts and testimony by the 

Commonwealth’s forensic pathologist into evidence; a sufficiency and a weight 

claim; and a discretionary aspect of sentencing claim based in part on the fact 
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that he was 19 years old when the offenses occurred. As Crimi’s issues are 

either waived or meritless, we affirm.

On November 25, 2017, I.B. was in the care of Crimi, when Crimi called 

911 because I.B. was unconscious. I.B. was taken to the hospital and later 

died from blunt head trauma. The death was ruled a homicide and Crimi was 

charged with the homicide, along with related offenses. The Commonwealth 

also filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.

Defense counsel filed several ex parte motions related to expert 

witnesses and investigative services, which were placed under seal. However, 

the clerk of courts inadvertently disclosed seven of those motions to the DA 

and posted them on the public docket. Crimi filed a motion to dismiss based 

on this disclosure, seeking to either have his charges dismissed or the death 

penalty notice revoked or, in the alternative, have the prosecution of his case 

transferred to the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”). See

Motion to Dismiss, 8/4/2020, at 7-8 (unpaginated). 

The court held a hearing on the motion on September 3, 2020. Following 

the submission of briefs, the court issued an order and opinion the following 

month. In the opinion, the court found that the title of the motions revealed 

defense strategy, and although the disclosure of the ex parte motions had 

been inadvertent, the court agreed that the circumstances mandated the 

appointment of another prosecutor. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/2022, at 3, 

7. The court transferred prosecution of the case to the OAG.
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Crimi filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied after 

holding a hearing on the motion on November 5, 2020. Two months later, on 

January 12, 2021, the court granted the OAG’s motion to withdraw the 

intention to seek the death penalty.

The court set a trial date. Prior to the start of jury selection, the court 

announced that because this was no longer a capital case, there would not be 

individual voir dire. Rather, the court would conduct the voir dire en masse, 

and when doing so, would reference the proposed voir dire questions 

submitted by the parties. See N.T., 9/24/2021, at 2. The court advised 

counsel they would be allowed to ask supplemental questions. See id. at 5. 

Jury selection was then conducted and completed on September 30, 2021.

Trial began a few days later, on October 4, 2021. I.B.’s mother, Sierra 

Brown, testified the following day. She recounted I.B. was born in 

Pennsylvania in 2014 when Brown was in ninth grade, and that I.B.’s father 

had never met I.B. See N.T., 10/5/2021, at 465-466. Brown stated she moved 

to Florida, and attended a high school for teenage mothers there. See id. at 

468, 471. Brown met Crimi while in Florida, and the two began dating in June 

2017. See id. at 472. 

Brown testified she and I.B. moved back to Pennsylvania in August 

2017. See id. at 474. The two of them moved into their own apartment the 

following month, in September 2017. See id. at 477. Crimi then moved to 
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Pennsylvania, and in with Brown and I.B., in October 2017. See id. at 478-

79.

Brown got a job working four days a week from 7 a.m. until 5:30 p.m. 

See id. at 480. Crimi watched I.B. on the days Brown went to work. See id. 

at 480. Brown recalled that she got several texts from Crimi about I.B. while 

she was in Crimi’s care, and the Commonwealth admitted the texts into 

evidence. Brown read several texts which indicated Crimi’s frustration with 

caring for I.B. For example, Brown testified that on October 25, 2017, Crimi 

sent a text to Brown while she was at work complaining I.B. “won’t stop crying

and I’m going to jump off the balcony.” Id. at 538. He then texted he was 

“literally about to go insane today.” Id. 

Brown testified she received a text from Crimi a few days later, on 

October 28, telling her I.B. had fallen in the tub and hit her head. See id. at 

488. When Brown returned home, she saw I.B. had a bruise around her right 

eye. See id. at 488-489. Brown testified I.B. also had a bruise on her left 

cheek at this time, which Crimi told Brown I.B. had gotten when she had fallen 

down the stairs. See id. at 492. Then, on October 29, Crimi sent a message 

to Brown telling her he was angry as he believed I.B. was lying to him. See 

id. at 542.

In early November 2017, Brown testified I.B. began losing her hair and 

vomiting. Brown eventually took I.B. to the emergency room on November 

10, where I.B. had a CT scan of her head. I.B. was ultimately diagnosed with 
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constipation and discharged, with Brown being advised to make follow-up 

appointments. See id. at 495-498. 

Brown testified that I.B.’s vomiting abated but that I.B. became more 

and more clingy to Brown, and was wetting her bed despite being pottytrained. See id. at 494, 497, 499. According to Brown, Crimi would get 

frustrated with I.B., and Brown had to tell Crimi not to spank I.B. after seeing 

him use that form of punishment on her. See id. at 500. 

Brown testified her relationship with Crimi deteriorated between 

November 10 and November 25, as the two were arguing more and more. 

See id. at 500-501. Brown testified Crimi grew increasingly clingy, see id. at 

493, and sent her texts professing his love for her while also relaying his 

insecurity about Brown’s feelings for him. See id. at 543-554. She recounted 

that she asked Crimi to move out multiple times, but he refused. See id. at 

507. 

Brown testified she got a call on November 22 from Crimi, who was 

watching I.B. Crimi told Brown that I.B. had once again fallen and hit her head 

on the bathtub faucet. See id. at 504. I.B. got a bruise around her right eye. 

See id. at 505. The following day was Thanksgiving, which Brown, I.B. and 

Crimi spent together. Brown testified she again asked Crimi to leave that day, 

but he did not. See id. at 505.

The following evening, November 24, Crimi went to work. While Brown 

was feeding I.B. dinner, I.B. fell from her booster seat and bumped her head, 
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leaving a bump on her right temple. See id. at 509, 511. According to Brown, 

the incident did not cause any behavior changes in I.B. and Brown was not 

concerned I.B. had sustained a concussion. See id. at 510. Brown gave I.B. 

a bath, did not notice any injuries other than around her eye and forehead, 

and put I.B. to bed. See id. at 508, 531-532; N.T., 10/6/2021, at 666-667. 

Brown went to bed before Crimi got home from work. See N.T., 10/5/2021, 

at 511.

The next morning, November 25, Brown testified she had to go to work 

and left at around 6:20 in the morning. See id. at 512. Before leaving for 

work, Brown stated she said goodbye to I.B., who was awake in her bed and 

told Brown goodbye and that she loved her. See id. at 512. According to 

Brown, she noticed I.B. still had the injury on her forehead from the boosterseat fall the night before, see id. at 513, but was “alive and well and in good 

health.” Id. at 515. Crimi was in the apartment when Brown left for work, and 

was the person responsible for caring for I.B. that day. See id. at 515.

Brown testified she was called to Human Resources at her work after 

lunch, where she was told to call Crimi. Crimi informed Brown that there was 

an emergency - I.B. was unresponsive and he had unsuccessfully tried to wake 

her by putting her in the tub. See id. at 517. He told Brown he had called 

911. See id.

Kristopher Harger, the EMT who responded to the 911 call, also testified 

at trial. According to Harger, he and his partner received the report of an 
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unresponsive child around 12:20 p.m. on November 25, and they arrived at 

the apartment approximately ten minutes later. Crimi was there. Harger tried 

to ascertain what had happened, and Crimi told Harger about various falls I.B. 

had recently taken which were not “very descriptive or specific” and “changed 

quite a few times.” N.T. 10/4/2021, at 45, 61-62. Crimi did, at one point, tell 

Harger he had tried to wake I.B. up at around 11 that morning and put her in 

the bathtub when he could not rouse her. See id. Throughout the encounter, 

Crimi was, according to Harger, agitated, anxious and jittery. See id. at 49, 

61, 95, 110.

Harger found I.B. on a mattress, where she was naked and 

unresponsive. See id. at 47. She had blood around her nose and mouth. See 

id. at 69. She also had bruising around her head, including “battle wounds” 

behind her right ear and her left ear. Id. at 47-48. After Harger carried I.B. 

to the ambulance, he noticed she had additional bruising around her ribs. See 

id. at 69-70. I.B. was taken to Berwick Hospital, although it was decided en 

route that she would be life-flighted to Geisinger Medical Center (“Geisinger”). 

She was life-flighted to Geisinger that same afternoon.

Dr. Paul Bellino was the inpatient consultant for the child abuse team at 

Geisinger and he examined I.B. once she arrived at the hospital. Dr. Bellino 

testified about his findings at trial, after being accepted as an expert in 

pediatric trauma and abuse. See N.T., 10/4/2021, at 209. Dr. Bellino reported 

that I.B. was intubated and comatose when she arrived at the hospital. See 
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id. at 210. She was in critical condition, with what Dr. Bellino described as a 

very poor prognosis for survival, and was “clearly visibly injured with a number 

of bruises.” Id. at 211, 212, 215. 

In fact, Dr. Bellino cataloged 40 discreet bruises on I.B. over “pretty 

much every body surface: Her head, her ears, face, her shoulders, armpits, 

upper arm, lower arm, legs, even her feet, her buttocks, her back.” Id. at 

219; see also id. at 222-231 (referring to photographs submitted as exhibits 

and describing specific bruises on I.B.’s body in those photographs). Dr. 

Bellino testified that “the sheer fact that [I.B.] had so many bruises and the 

location of those bruises gives me an understanding of what happened to her 

... And when I think about what happened to her as a whole, it becomes 

obvious that ... these bruises are indicative of a severe beating which is 

ultimately the cause of her death.” Id. at 232; 284 (reiterating that “I mean, 

I have no doubt [I.B. was] beaten to death.”). 

Dr. Bellino also referenced the CT scan of I.B.’s head that had been 

taken at the hospital. Dr. Bellino reported that the scan showed bleeding in 

I.B.’s head and swelling of her brain so severe that it was cutting off the flow 

of blood to the brain. See id. at 215-216. It was, according to Dr. Bellino, 

markedly different from the CT scan that had been performed on I.B. on 

November 10, which “was perfectly normal.” Id. at 217. In contrast, I.B.’s CT 

scan performed on November 25 showed bleeding “basically over both of the 

upper portions of the skull” and was “very concerning.” Id. at 217-218. 
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According to Dr. Bellino, the bleeding around I.B.’s brain was “caused when 

the brain move[d] inside the skull in a violent fashion.” Id. at 233. 

Dr. Bellino further testified that I.B. had a number of retinal 

hemorrhages in both eyes, which is “probably one of the most distinguishing 

features of abusive head trauma.” Id. at 240. Dr. Bellino concluded that I.B.’s 

injuries, in his opinion, were not accidentally inflicted but rather were from 

“severe forceful activity.” Id. at 240-241. He opined that I.B.’s injuries were 

so extensive that I.B. would not have had any real function after they were 

inflicted. See id. at 241-242. So, for example, I.B. would not have been able 

to tell her mother goodbye and that she loved her if the injuries had already 

been inflicted. See id. at 242. In the end, without medical intervention, Dr. 

Bellino testified he “wouldn’t have expected [I.B.] to be able to do anything, 

let alone live for more than a couple hours, after a beating like that.” Id. at 

281.

Brown testified she was told on November 28 that I.B. had been 

declared brain dead. See N.T., 10/5/2021, at 527. Brown decided to take I.B. 

off life support that same day, and I.B. died. See id. A memorial service was 

held for I.B., but Crimi did not attend the service because he had returned to 

Florida with his family. See id. at 530.

Crimi testified on his own behalf. He testified he was 19 when he moved 

in with Brown and I.B. See N.T., 10/7/2021, at 951. He agreed that he and 

Brown argued, but he maintained he wanted the relationship to work. As for 
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the time around I.B.’s death, Crimi testified he went to work on November 24 

and got home around midnight or 12:30 in the morning on November 25. See 

id. at 982-983. 

He testified he woke up the morning of November 25 when a truck 

arrived to deliver a TV to the apartment. See id. at 984. I.B. was not yet 

awake, and after the TV was installed, Crimi stated he went in to wake I.B. 

up. According to Crimi, I.B. was under a blanket and her eyes were slightly 

open and only showing the white part of the eye. She was not responsive. 

Crimi maintained he tried to perform CPR, and when that didn’t work, he 

placed I.B. in the bathtub. See id. at 986-987. At some point, Crimi did a 

search on his phone for “how to wake up a knocked out toddler,” with 

“knocked out,” according to Crimi, meaning not waking up. Id. at 987. He 

then tried to call Brown, could not reach her, and called his mother and then 

911. See id. at 989. Crimi maintained he never hit, kicked, or did anything to 

cause physical harm to I.B. See id. at 1006.

Following the five-day trial, the jury convicted Crimi of third-degree 

murder, aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”). 

The court sentenced Crimi to 216 to 444 months’ incarceration for the murder 

conviction, and to a consecutive term of 12 to 36 months of incarceration for 

the EWOC conviction. Crimi filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court 

denied. 
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Crimi filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court directed Crimi to 

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. Crimi 

complied, raising ten issues. The trial court summarily dismissed Crimi’s 

claims as meritless in its three-page Rule 1925(a) opinion. Crimi now raises 

the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in not dismissing the case when 

seven defense ex parte motions under seal were provided to 

the prosecuting district attorney by the clerk of courts.

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in its conduction of jury selection, 

when individual voir dire was requested by both parties and 

granted by the court and then [the court] did not allow counsel 

to conduct their own voir dire and ask the potential jurors 

questions.

3. Whether the Trial Court erred in granting evidence of prior bad 

acts under [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 404(b).

4. Whether the Court erred in allowing hearsay evidence of the 

Commonwealth’s forensic pathologist.

5. Whether the Trial Court erred in denying the motion for 

acquittal or a new trial based on sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence and not dismissing first-degree murder on motion for 

demurrer.

6. Whether the Trial Court erred in not considering [Crimi’s] 

expressed remorse, lack of aggravating circumstances and 

evidence of mitigating factors when sentencing [Crimi] to 

consecutive sentences at the high end of the sentencing range.

7. [Whether] [t]he Commonwealth committed prosecutorial 

misconduct in not providing a picture testified by mother that 

was taken of the minor child by mother after her fall with 

mother the evening prior to the alleged injuries.

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. 
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In his first issue, Crimi essentially claims the trial court abused its 

discretion by not dismissing his case after it was discovered that the clerk of 

courts had inadvertently delivered the ex parte defense motions to the DA. 

Crimi does not provide more than a selective and incomplete background 

explaining his claim, but he does make a series of generalized claims that the 

Commonwealth's actions violated his rights to due process, equal protection, 

effective counsel and against self-incrimination, and asserts the DA engaged 

in misconduct. He claims the remedy for these violations should have been 

dismissal of all charges, not the transferral of the prosecution of his case. This 

claim fails.

In making his argument, Crimi fails to acknowledge that one of the

remedies he proposed for the clerk of courts’ dissemination of the ex parte

motions was the transfer of the prosecution of the case from the DA’s office 

to the OAG. After a hearing, this is the exact remedy the trial court gave Crimi. 

The court gave the following background and explanation for the award of the 

remedy:

[Seven ex parte defense] motions were delivered by the clerk of 

courts to the [DA]’s office and docketed and identified on the 

public docket. The titles of the motions [were placed on the 

outside of the sealed envelope and] identified the subject of each 

motion. The assistant district attorney [(“ADA”)] stated that he 

glanced at the motions and saw their titles. Regarding one motion, 

he read it and conferred with an out of county district attorney for 

witness preparation regarding a witness referred to in the motion. 

The ADA was credible when he testified that it had not occurred 

to him that he should not have received the motions.
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Subsequently, [Crimi’s] counsel discovered that the ADA 

had been given copies of the motions by the clerk of courts. The 

ADA removed the motions from the ADA file and returned them to 

defense counsel.

***

[Crimi] requests dismissal of all the charges based on his 

defense having been compromised. Such an extreme remedy is 

not warranted. But the fact[s do] demand a remedy. ... The 

appearance of and the actual denial of due process and the 

appearance of unfairness to this indigent defendant in this capital 

case warrants untarnished prosecutorial eyes.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/2020, at 2-3, 6-7. The trial court then directed that 

the prosecution of the case be transferred to the OAG’s office, just as Crimi 

requested. 

Crimi’s only acknowledgement of this remedy and his only argument 

regarding its alleged inadequacy in his appellate brief is the following 

statement:

The removal of the District Attorney’s office only did so much as 

a protective order was not issued until after the case was 

transferred and the Commonwealth via the District Attorney and 

Attorney General's Office had already spoken, emailed and met.

Appellant’s Brief at 38.

Although Crimi does not explain this assertion further, he appears to 

contend that the remedy of transferring prosecution to the OAG did not cure 

any violation of his rights because although prosecution was transferred, there 

had been communication between the two offices about the case. Again, Crimi 

does not reference this in his appellate brief, but he did file a motion for 

reconsideration from the court’s decision to transfer prosecution of the case. 
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At the hearing on that reconsideration motion, Crimi specifically argued the 

court should either dismiss the charges or bar death as a possible penalty 

because “[a]pparently, there’s been communication [about the ex parte

motions] between the [ADA] and the [AOG]’s office about the case.” N.T., 

11/5/2020, at 4. After hearing testimony on the matter, including from the 

ADA, the court made this specific finding:

The court finds that no information was released to the Attorney 

General’s Office whatsoever concerning the ex parte motions 

under seal. The [DA]’s office specifically did not reveal such 

information. The [OAG]’s office is a blank slate on that issue and 

knows nothing about it, and the Court makes that specific finding 

based upon the testimony here today.

Id. at 31.

Given this specific credibility finding by the court, which Crimi does not 

even acknowledge, Crimi has not put forth any meritorious argument that the 

court abused its discretion by transferring prosecution of the case as a remedy 

for the inadvertent disclosure of the ex parte defense motions. This claim 

warrants no relief.

In his second claim, Crimi argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying his request that voir dire of the jury pool be conducted individually, 

and instead conducting voir dire en masse. This claim also fails.

As Crimi explicitly acknowledges, individual voir dire is only required in 

capital cases. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 631(F). Although it is true Crimi’s case was 

originally a capital case, the OAG withdrew the intention to seek the death 

penalty, making Crimi’s case a non-capital one. Again, as Crimi recognizes, in 
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such non-capital cases, the trial court has the discretion to determine who will 

ask questions of the jurors and whether the jurors will be questioned 

collectively or individually. See id. “[T]he sole purpose of examination of 

jurors under voir dire is to secure a competent, fair, impartial and 

unprejudiced jury,” and, as such, “the inquiry should be strictly confined to 

disclosing qualifications of a juror and whether the juror has formed a fixed 

opinion or may be otherwise subject to disqualification for cause.” 

Commonwealth v. Ellison, 902 A.2d 419, 423-424 (Pa. 2006) (citation 

omitted).

Here, in arguing the trial court abused its discretion, Crimi outlines 

general law about voir dire and then tacks on the following bald assertions:

The way the questioning was done by the Court resulted in few to 

no responses of the jury pool. Counsel was not permitted to follow 

up on questions to the jurors. Counsel was not given a proper or 

adequate opportunity to question[ ] the jurors to determine the 

jurors[’] qualifications.

Appellant’s Brief at 42. 

As the Commonwealth points out, Crimi does not elaborate on these 

assertions or point to the place in the record where any of these alleged issues 

occurred, as specifically required by our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). He does not identify any juror who required follow-up 

questions where none were given, or provide the additional questions that he 

asserts counsel was not allowed to ask. He does not identify any seated juror 

who indicated an inability to be fair and impartial. In the end, Crimi’s 
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undeveloped claims are waived, see id.; Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 

1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that arguments that are not sufficiently 

developed are waived), and certainly fail to convince us that the court abused 

its discretion in the manner in which it conducted voir dire. No relief is due on 

this claim.

In his third allegation of error, Crimi alleges the trial court abused its 

discretion in allowing evidence of his prior bad acts. He argues the trial court 

should not have allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of his use 

of, and attempts to obtain, marijuana or evidence of his social media posts in 

the weeks leading up to I.B.’s death. This claim is waived, and in any event, 

lacks merit.

Crimi first generally asserts the trial court erred by allowing evidence of 

his use of, and inability to obtain, marijuana in the time leading up to I.B.’s 

death. Crimi, however, once again does not provide this Court with the 

background relevant to this claim, nor does he identify the specific evidence 

he is challenging or point to the places in the record where this evidence was 

referenced. His claim is waived for these reasons. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c); 

Love, 896 A.2d at 1287. Even if we were to overlook waiver, Crimi has not 

established his claim warrants relief.

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence of Crimi’s 

“drug use and threats of killing others in the weeks preceding [I.B.]’s death.” 

See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant's Pretrial Motions, 8/3/21, 4-5 
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(unpaginated). More specifically as to the drug use, the Commonwealth 

outlined in its pretrial filings that it planned to introduce evidence of Crimi’s 

Facebook posts indicating his frustration with I.B. and his relationship with 

Brown, how he needed “to smoke,” and that he had been seeking drugs and 

continued to do so up until the morning of I.B.’s death. See id. at 4-5 

(unpaginated). The Commonwealth argued this evidence was admissible to 

show Crimi’s state of mind, motive, and the history of the case. See id.; N.T., 

7/1/2021, at 24. Ultimately, the trial court granted the motion and found 

evidence of Crimi’s drug use was admissible for the limited purpose of 

showing, inter alia, motive and the history of the case. See Trial Court Order, 

9/3/2021, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

At trial - and again Crimi does not specifically identify the challenged 

evidence or reference its place in the record - the Commonwealth did present 

evidence of several of Crimi’s Facebook posts indicating Crimi was frustrated 

and “in pain”, and that Crimi wanted or needed “to smoke.” See N.T., 

10/6/2021, at 691-717 (Special Agent David Scicchitano reading Facebook 

posts from Crimi’s Facebook account). There was one Facebook post from 

November 16, 2017 where Crimi stated I.B. had “just pooped on me and I 

need to smoke.” See id. at 700. The posts also generally relayed Crimi’s 

attempts to obtain drugs, up to and including on November 25, 2017. See id.

at 691-717. 
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Crimi acknowledges the Commonwealth used this evidence of his drug 

use to support its argument that Crimi sought marijuana as a coping 

mechanism for his increasing frustration with his childcare responsibilities. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 47-48. Crimi argues, however, the trial court should 

not have allowed the Commonwealth to introduce the evidence because it is 

irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. 

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse 

of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706, 709 (Pa. Super. 

1995). Generally, the threshold question with the admission of evidence is 

whether the evidence is relevant. See Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 236 

A.3d 93, 98 (Pa. Super. 2020). Pursuant to our Rules of Evidence, evidence is 

relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence and that fact is of consequence in determining 

the action. See id.; Pa.R.E. 401. Even if evidence is relevant, however, the 

court can still exclude the evidence if it concludes that the probative value of 

the evidence is outweighed by, among other things, a danger of unfair 

prejudice. See Pa.R.E. 403. 

When evidence involves “a crime, wrong, or other act[,]” it is 

inadmissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that the person 

acted in accordance with that character. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Such evidence 

may be admissible, however, when relevant for another purpose such as 

proving motive or lack of accident or establishing the history of the case. See
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Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1988). 

It is only admissible for such a purpose in criminal cases, though, when the 

trial court determines that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 

potential for unfair prejudice. See id. In this context, unfair prejudice means 

a “tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s 

attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Pa.R.E. 

403 cmt.

Here, the trial court found that the evidence of Crimi’s drug use was 

relevant to establishing motive and the history of the case, was not unduly 

prejudicial, and was therefore admissible. In support of his argument that the 

trial court abused its discretion in reaching this conclusion, Crimi argues the 

evidence should not have been admissible as the Commonwealth failed to 

establish a timeline or nexus connecting his marijuana use and I.B.’s death 

and there was no evidence that he killed I.B. solely because he could not 

obtain drugs. The Commonwealth responds:

First, the Commonwealth did establish a timeline for when 

[Crimi] posted about wanting to obtain drugs or “smoke,” because 

the posts were dated. Those dates demonstrated that the posts 

were created within the weeks prior to I.B.’s death, and they were 

usually accompanied by expressions of frustration either with I.B. 

or his relationship with [ ] Brown.

Second, the Commonwealth never contended that [Crimi] 

killed I.B. because he couldn’t obtain drugs ... [T]he posts about 

needing to get drugs and/or to smoke were part of a larger 

narrative showing [Crimi’s] downward spiral [and increasing 

frustration with I.B. and Brown] in the weeks leading to I.B.’s 

death.
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Commonwealth’s Brief at 38-39. 

We agree with the Commonwealth that Crimi’s arguments that the trial 

court abused its discretion in allowing the evidence referencing his drug use 

are unconvincing. Therefore, even if the issue were deemed not to be waived, 

Crimi has failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion, and his claims 

to the contrary merit no relief. 

In the latter part of his third issue, Crimi also condemns the 

Commonwealth’s use of his social media posts referencing murder and his 

desire to kill something. He does not identify any of those posts, except one 

where “when allegedly attempting to obtain marijuana, [Crimi] stated, ‘[B]y 

the way I really appreciate I been wanting to kill people lately ha ha.’” 

Appellant’s Brief at 51. He summarily claims these posts were inadmissible 

because they were not directed toward anyone individually, in particular 

toward I.B. However, as the Commonwealth explains, these posts helped 

explain Crimi’s increasing frustration with his situation and relationship with 

Brown, and were probative as evidence of Crimi’s motive, not as evidence that 

he actually threatened I.B. In short, Crimi’s undeveloped claim does not 

establish an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and it does not 

warrant relief. 

In his fourth claim, Crimi asserts the trial court abused its discretion by 

allowing hearsay evidence of the Commonwealth’s forensic pathologist. Again, 

without cogently explaining his claim, Crimi argues he was denied his right to 
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confront the “medical examiner” because the medical examiner did not testify 

and he therefore could not cross-examine her about her opinions in the 

autopsy report. We agree with the Commonwealth that this claim was not 

properly preserved and is therefore waived.

As the Commonwealth explains, and the record reflects, the forensic 

pathologist who had performed the autopsy and completed the autopsy 

report, Dr. Barbara Bollinger, was no longer with the forensic pathology 

practice by the time Crimi’s trial began. Therefore, another forensic 

pathologist from the practice, Dr. Rameen Starling-Roney, reviewed the 

autopsy report, other reports prepared by other medical experts that were 

reviewed as part of the autopsy and photographs, and testified at Crimi’s trial 

about the opinions and conclusions he had reached. The Commonwealth 

continues:

[A]t no time did [Crimi] object to Dr. Starling-Roney 

testifying about the findings of Dr. Bollinger during the autopsy 

while explaining the basis for his own conclusions. He certainly 

never suggested that in relying on Dr. Bollinger’s report, it 

rendered Dr. Starling-Roney’s testimony impermissible hearsay or 

violated his confrontation clause rights. Indeed, the only such 

objection raised was when Dr. Starling-Roney attempted to 

reference the findings of the neuropathologist who examined 

I.B.’s brain post-mortem, and whose findings were incorporated 

into the autopsy report. See N.T.[,] 10/5/2021, [at] 341-342. The 

trial court overruled that objection insofar as Dr. Starling-Roney 

explained that forensic pathologists frequently rely on the reports 

of medical professionals in forming their opinions regarding the 

cause and manner of death, including the type of report generated 

by the neuropathologist. [See id.]

Aside from this specific objection with respect to the 

neuropathologist’s report, [Crimi] never objected to Dr. Starling-
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Roney’s reliance on Dr. Bollinger’s autopsy findings generally, let 

alone on the basis of hearsay or a constitutional violation. 

Accordingly, this claim is waived on appeal. See Pa.R.E. 103(a) 

([providing that a] party may claim error in admission of evidence 

only when [the] party makes a timely and specific objection).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 41-42. 

Crimi does not direct us to any place in the record where he properly 

preserved this evidentiary challenge, and the record supports the 

Commonwealth’s conclusion that Crimi failed to lodge a timely objection to 

the testimony he now claims was inadmissible hearsay and violative of his 

confrontation rights. The claim is waived. See Pa.R.E. 103(a); Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (stating that issues not raised in the trial court are waived and may 

not be raised for the first time on appeal.) 

Next, Crimi claims the trial court erred in denying his post-sentence 

motion for acquittal or a new trial based on his assertions that the evidence 

was insufficient to support his third-degree murder conviction and that such a 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. He asserts the evidence was 

insufficient because it was primarily based on Brown’s credibility and her “selfserving statement that [I.B.] said ‘bye mommy’ before she left for work.” 

Appellant's Brief at 60. He asserts the Commonwealth did not prove malice 

and offers only this single conclusory statement in support: “The 

Commonwealth did not [prove] malice through the evidence that was provided 

during trial.” Id. at 61.
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While Crimi does identify his third-degree conviction as the charge he 

seeks to challenge and does mention the element of malice in his appellate 

brief, he did not do so in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In fact, again as 

the Commonwealth points out, Crimi’s Rule 1925(b) statement did not identify 

the specific verdict or the specific element of any such verdict Crimi was 

alleging the Commonwealth had failed to prove. Instead, in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement, Crimi merely asserted: “The Trial Court erred in denying the 

motion for acquittal or a new trial based on sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence.” Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 5/9/2022, 

at 1 (unpaginated). 

This Court has made clear:

In order to preserve a challenge to either the sufficiency or weight 

of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) concise 

statement must state with specificity the elements or verdicts for 

which the appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient or 

against the weight of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation 

omitted). Otherwise, the issue is waived. See id.

Here, Crimi merely made the general assertion in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement that the trial court erred in failing to grant him relief based on his 

sufficiency and weight of the evidence claims, without identifying which charge 

or specific element or elements he was challenging. His sufficiency and weight 

claims are therefore waived. See id. 
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In his sixth claim of error, Crimi argues the trial court abused its 

discretion by sentencing him in the high end of the standard sentencing range. 

He essentially asserts the trial court’s failure to duly consider his evidence of 

mitigation led to what he sees as an excessive sentence. This claim is also 

waived, but this time, it is for lack of development. 

When an appellant raises claims challenging the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence, as Crimi does here, this Court will only review the claims if 

the appellant shows he filed a timely notice of appeal, properly preserved his 

claims at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion, included a statement 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (f) in his brief, and raised a substantial question 

that his sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. See 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (defining a 

substantial question as one where the appellant advances a colorable 

argument that the sentencing court’s actions were either inconsistent with a 

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental 

norms underlying the sentencing process).

Crimi has met these requirements. He filed a timely appeal, preserved 

his claim in a post-sentence motion and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in 

his brief. He also cited a case supporting his contention that his claim that the 

trial court imposed an excessive sentence without duly considering mitigating 

circumstances raises a substantial question under the Sentencing Code. See

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating 
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that an excessive sentence claim, in conjunction with an assertion that the 

sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial 

question).

Turning to the merits of Crimi’s discretionary sentencing claim, we note 

that Crimi’s Rule 2119(f) statement is focused on the fact that Crimi was 19 

years old at the time of the offenses and the mitigating effect he believes his 

age should have had on his sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-20. 

However, in his argument section, Crimi cites general law on sentencing and 

then offers only this single sentence in support of his argument:

At sentencing[,] evidence of mitigation was presented regarding 

[Crimi’s] background, his age, his character, his low likelihood of 

reoffending, his lack of prior adult criminal record, advancing legal 

and scientific theory of youthful offenders’ brain development 

reducing their risk to society as they mature, and his behavior and 

advancements during his period of incarceration. 

Appellant’s Brief at 64.

He then gives a stand-alone cite to the notes of testimony from his 

sentencing hearing where he presented evidence of mitigation. Despite 

providing this general list of, and general citation to, the mitigation evidence 

he presented at sentencing, Crimi does not specify in any meaningful way the 

mitigation evidence he presented or even attempt to explain how the trial 

court abused its discretion in how it considered this evidence. In fact, he does 

not make any argument at all regarding the trial court’s discretion or abuse 

thereof. Moreover, Crimi’s skeletal argument does not account for the fact that 

the trial court had the benefit of a presentence investigation report as well as 
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sentencing memoranda from Crimi and the Commonwealth, and heard from 

multiple witnesses at the sentencing hearing. Crimi’s claim is woefully 

undeveloped, and it is waived for that reason. See Love, 896 A.2d at 1287.

Crimi’s seventh and final claim is described by the Commonwealth as 

“convoluted,” “nonsensical,” and “waived.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 53. The 

claim involves a picture of I.B. taken by Brown after I.B. fell from her booster 

seat on November 24, 2017, the night before she was killed. Crimi alleges the 

Commonwealth “had access to the picture for years” but did not turn this 

picture over to Crimi during discovery. Appellant’s Brief at 67. It appears he 

is claiming this intentional withholding of the picture constituted prosecutorial 

misconduct, although he does not explain how he was prejudiced or even what 

specific relief he is seeking. This claim, like his others, does not provide Crimi 

with any basis for relief.

In making his claim, Crimi acknowledges that at trial, Brown was shown 

Commonwealth Exhibit 8, a photograph, and Brown testified that the injury in 

that photograph is the one from when I.B. slid off her booster seat and hit her 

head on the table. See Appellant’s Brief at 66; see also N.T., 10/5/2021, at 

531. At that time, however, Crimi did not make any objection in relation to 

the photograph or Brown’s testimony related to the photograph. In fact, Crimi 

does not point to any place in the record where he raised the Commonwealth’s 

alleged misconduct related to this photograph before the trial court and before 
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he raised it on appeal. As such, this claim is waived. See Pa.R.E. 103(a); Pa. 

R.A.P. 302(a).

As none of Crimi’s claims on appeal merit relief, we affirm the judgment 

of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/01/2023