J.A19044/14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JANET L. RYAN REALTY, INC., T/D/B/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

CENTURY 21-AMERICAN HERITAGE : PENNSYLVANIA

REALTY AND BEYNON & COMPANY :

INCORPORATED, :

:

Appellants :

:

v. :

:

SANDRA LANGTON, :

:

Appellee : No. 1989 WDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

Civil Division No(s).: 562 of 2012

JANET L. RYAN REALTY, INC., T/D/B/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

CENTURY 21-AMERICAN HERITAGE : PENNSYLVANIA

REALTY AND BEYNON & COMPANY :

INCORPORATED, :

:

v. :

Appellees, :

:

SANDRA LANGTON, :

:

Appellant : No. 2007 WDA 2013

Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County

Civil Division No(s).: 562 of 2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 17, 2015

Appellants/Cross-Appellees, Janet L. Ryan Realty, Inc., trading or 

doing business as Century 21-American Heritage Realty, and Beynon & Co., 

Inc. (collectively, “Brokers”) appeal from the orders entered in 

Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas resolving their and 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Sandra Langton, motions for summary judgment. 

Each party alleges numerous trial court errors with respect to the merits. 

We affirm in part and vacate in part, as set forth below.

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court’s 

opinion. Trial Ct. Op., 11/25/13, at 1-5. We add that the listing contract 

required the owners of the property to convey the property title to any 

purchaser. Ex. B to Brokers’ Compl., 1/27/12. The contract also included 

language that the undersigned signatories represent they are the sole 

owners of the property. Id. As the trial court’s opinion noted, only Steven 

Langton—Langton’s husband—signed the listing contract. Trial Ct. Op. at 2. 

Brokers timely appealed, and Langton timely cross-appealed. The trial 

court did not order the parties to file Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements, although 

it filed a Rule 1925(a) decision adopting its prior opinion. Order, 12/18/13. 

We address Brokers’ appeal first.

Brokers raise the following issues on appeal:

Whether awarding a sales commission to [Brokers] on a 

sale that occurred more than one year following the 

termination of their Listing Contract would violate the Real 
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Estate Licensing and Registration Act [(“RELRA”)], 63 P.S. 

§ 344.503(a)(10).

Whether [Brokers] can receive a sales commission on a 

sale by Langton to Dent Properties when Century 21 . . . 

introduced Michael Dent (the principal of Dent Properties) 

to Langton?

Whether [Brokers] were the “efficient procuring cause” of 

the sale of Langton’s property to Dent Properties, as a 

result of which they are entitled to a sales commission.

Whether the termination of the Listing Contract only 

precluded [Brokers] from continuing to display Langton’s 

property to possible buyers, but did not prevent them from 

receiving a sales commission if Langton thereafter sold the 

property to a person or entity that was introduced to her 

by [Brokers] during the time that the Listing Contract was 

in full force and effect?

Brokers’ Brief at 4.

We summarize three of Brokers’ arguments in support of all of their 

issues, as they are interrelated.1 They contend that RELRA does not bar a 

sales commission if the sale occurred after the listing agreement terminated 

 

1 Brokers’ brief raised four arguments, which do not correspond with the four

issues presented. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116, 2119. Its unjust enrichment 

argument, for example, is not explicitly raised in its four issues. We decline 

to find waiver, however. See PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Powell, 100 A.3d 611, 

615 (Pa. Super. 2014) (declining to find waiver for two issues despite 

numerous violations of appellate briefing rules); see also Commonwealth 

v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011) (“The briefing requirements 

scrupulously delineated in our appellate rules are not mere trifling matters of

stylistic preference; rather, they represent a studied determination by our 

Court and its rules committee of the most efficacious manner by which 

appellate review may be conducted so that a litigant’s right to judicial review 

as guaranteed by Article V, Section 9 of our Commonwealth’s Constitution 

may be properly exercised.”).
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pursuant to a “definite termination date.” See 63 P.S. § 455.604(a)(10). 

Brokers maintain that the statutory requirement for a “definite termination 

date” in a listing agreement does not bar a broker from receiving a sales 

commission “if the property was purchased by someone who was originally 

shown the property” during the term of the listing agreement but purchased 

the property after the agreement’s expiration. Brokers’ Brief at 11. They 

state the court erred by invalidating a “savings clause” that purportedly 

permitted a post-termination sales commission. Brokers argue they were 

the “efficient procuring cause of the sale” and showed the property—held as 

a tenancy by entirety—to a corporate alter ego of the actual purchaser. Id.

at 18, 21-22. Langton counters that because she never signed the listing 

contract, she is not obligated to pay Brokers the sales commission. In 

essence, Langton contends Brokers’ statutory or contractual arguments are 

premature. We hold Brokers are not entitled to relief.

In Charlie v. Erie Ins. Exch., 100 A.3d 244 (Pa. Super. 2014), we 

set forth the well-settled standard of review:

Pennsylvania law provides that summary judgment may 

be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly 

shows that no genuine issues of material fact exist and 

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. The moving party has the burden of proving that 

no genuine issues of material fact exist. In determining 

whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must 

view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the 

moving party. 
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Id. at 250 (citation and punctuation omitted). We can affirm the trial court 

on any basis. Donnelly v. Bauer, 720 A.2d 447, 454 (Pa. 1998).

In Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378 (Pa. 1986), our Supreme 

Court stated the law on a tenancy by the entirety:

A tenancy by the entireties is a unique form of coownership grounded in the common law concept that 

husband and wife were but one legal entity. It exists when 

property, either real or personal, is held jointly by a 

husband and wife, with its essential characteristic being 

that each spouse is seised of the whole or the entirety and 

not a divisible part thereof. Neither spouse in a tenancy 

by the entireties may independently appropriate property 

to his or her own use to the exclusion of the other, and 

neither spouse, acting independently, may sever the estate 

by, for example, conveying part of the property away. 

A tenancy by the entireties is also characterized by the 

right of survivorship; upon the death of one spouse the 

survivor becomes the sole owner of the entireties property.

Because a tenancy by the entireties is grounded in the 

unity of the marital relationship, it can be severed only in 

certain limited circumstances. It is, of course, terminated 

upon the death of one of the co-tenants. During the 

parties’ lifetimes it may be severed by: a joint conveyance 

of the estate, divorce, or mutual agreement, either express 

or implied.

Id. at 380-81 (footnote and citations omitted).

In Regions Mortg., Inc. v. Muthler, 889 A.2d 39 (Pa. 2005), our 

high court examined whether a wife could be obligated to pay a mortgage2

on a property that passed to her upon her husband’s death when she did not 

 

2 A mortgage is a contract. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ctr. Venture, 

650 A.2d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 1994). 
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sign the mortgage. Id. at 40. The Muthler Court set forth the facts, as 

follows:

In 1999, Joseph and Susan Muthler purchased a 

property from Elwood Bennett; the property was titled in 

the names of both Joseph and Susan. The Muthlers jointly 

applied for a mortgage, and both of their names appeared 

on the mortgage documents. Prior to closing, however, 

the mortgagee, CTX Mortgage Company, unilaterally 

removed Susan's name from the mortgage. Thereafter, 

the mortgage named only Joseph, although it correctly 

indicated he was married. Schedule “A” to the mortgage 

contained a description of the property and clearly stated 

the property was owned jointly by Joseph and Susan. 

Both the mortgage and Schedule “A” were prepared by 

CTX.

Joseph died shortly after the property was purchased. 

Susan contacted Regions Mortgage, Inc., successor to CTX, 

in an attempt to transfer the mortgage to her name; 

Regions refused. Eventually, Susan contacted an attorney 

who advised her that the property passed to her absolutely 

upon Joseph’s death and, as she was neither a named 

mortgagor nor a signatory to the mortgage, she had no 

obligation to pay it. Susan adopted this position, and 

stopped making payments. Regions then filed an action to 

quiet title.

Id. 

Our Supreme Court held against Regions and in favor of Susan. Id. at 

42. The Muthler Court reasoned that Regions did not fulfill the 

requirements for reforming the mortgage loan to bind Susan, and “Susan 

Muthler is entitled to take the property free and clear of any 

encumbrance[,]” i.e., the mortgage loan. Id.; accord 21 Standard Pa. 

Practice 2d § 116:8 (summarizing Muthler holding as, “A wife was entitled 

to take property titled in both the husband’s and wife’s names free and clear 
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of any encumbrance upon the husband’s death . . . where the wife was 

never a signatory to the mortgage”).

Instantly, similar to the wife in Muthler, who did not sign the 

mortgage, Langton did not sign the instant listing contract. See Muthler, 

889 A.2d at 42. In both this case and Muthler, the husband died, each 

passing the property to his wife via the right of survivorship inherent in a 

tenancy by the entireties. See id.; Clingerman, 519 A.2d at 380-81. 

Regions’ position mirrors Brokers’, in that both wished to bind the wife to a 

contract signed only by the now-deceased husband. See Muthler, 889 A.2d 

at 42. As our Supreme Court held in Muthler, we similarly hold that 

Langton “is entitled to take the property free and clear of any 

encumbrance[,]” i.e., the listing contract, which required the owner to 

convey title of the property to the purchaser. Id. We thus affirm the trial 

court, albeit on other grounds.3 See Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 454.

We summarize Brokers’ last argument. Brokers contend they are 

entitled to sales commissions pursuant to a theory of unjust enrichment. We 

hold Brokers are entitled to limited relief.

We set forth the following principles:

A claim for unjust enrichment arises from a quasi-contract. 

A quasi-contract imposes a duty, not as a result of any 

agreement, whether express or implied, but in spite of 

 

3 The trial court construed the listing contract and held that Langton did not 

have to pay Brokers any commission. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6-8.
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the absence of an agreement, when one party receives 

unjust enrichment at the expense of another.

The elements of unjust enrichment are benefits conferred 

on defendant by plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by 

defendant, and acceptance and retention of such benefits 

under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for 

defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value. 

Whether the doctrine applies depends on the unique 

factual circumstances of each case. In determining if the 

doctrine applies, we focus not on the intention of the 

parties, but rather on whether the defendant has been 

unjustly enriched.

Moreover, the most significant element of the doctrine 

is whether the enrichment of the defendant is unjust. The 

doctrine does not apply simply because the defendant may 

have benefited as a result of the actions of the plaintiff.

Stoeckinger v. Presidential Fin. Corp. of Del. Valley, 948 A.2d 828, 833 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis added and citations omitted); Lackner v. 

Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 34 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“By its nature, the doctrine of 

quasi-contract, or unjust enrichment, is inapplicable where a written or 

express contract exists.”).

Instantly, Langton did not sign the instant listing contract. Thus, 

because an agreement does not exist between Brokers and Langton, the 

doctrine of unjust enrichment applies. See Stoeckinger, 948 A.2d at 833; 

Lackner, 892 A.2d at 34. The trial court, however, did not explain its 

reasons for holding Langton was not entitled to relief based on unjust 

enrichment. Thus, we vacate the order to the extent the trial court denied 

relief on Brokers’ unjust enrichment claim, and remand for the trial court to 

explain its reasons for granting or denying relief.
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Having resolved Brokers’ appeal, we address the issue raised in 

Langton’s cross-appeal:

Is . . . Langton entitled to judgment in her favor . . . on 

her counterclaim for rental commissions withheld by 

[Brokers] since rental commissions were specifically 

excluded?

Langton’s Brief at 3. 

Langton contends that she signed a lease with American Industry Felt 

& Supply, which contained a clause providing for “no leasing commission.” 

She claims Brokers—despite the existence of such a clause—improperly 

withheld leasing, i.e., rental, commissions. Id. at 27-28. Langton bolsters 

her argument by referencing an addendum to an agreement of sale that 

allegedly did not provide for rental commissions. Id. at 28. Brokers counter 

that they signed neither the lease with American Industry Felt & Supply nor 

the addendum, and thus, could not be bound by any alleged “no leasing 

commission” clause. Brokers’ Reply Brief at 1. We hold Langton is due no 

relief based on this argument.4

In this case, the Brokers never signed the lease or the addendum, or 

otherwise evinced acceptance or intent to be bound to the aforementioned. 

See generally Ingrassia Const. Co. v. Walsh, 486 A.2d 478, 482-83 (Pa. 

Super. 1984) (discussing contract formation). Thus, Brokers would not be 

contractually obligated to forego any lease commission. See id. We 

 

4 We cannot reverse on an argument not raised by the parties. 
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reiterate that Langton raised no other argument for reversing the trial court. 

See generally Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 542 A.2d 525, 529-30 (Pa. 

Super. 1988) (holding failure to raise argument results in waiver). 

Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 

proceedings.

Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further 

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Emeritus Bender concurs in the result. 

Judge Olson concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/17/2015
Circulated 01/29/2015 02:39 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY, 

PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL DIVISION-LAW 

JANET L. RYAN REALTY, INC., 

t/d/b/a CENTURY 21-AMERICAN 

HERITAGE REALTY and BEYNON & 

COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 

PLAINTIFFS, 

VS. 

SANDRA LANGTON, 

DEFENDANT. 

NO. 562 OF 2012 

DECISION AND ORDER 

~~~ 3·~~ 

!.-~-; C~I 

~--! -~ 

This case is before me on motions for summary judgment 

filed by the plaintiffs and the defendant. The defendant, 

Sandra Langton, ("Sandra") and her husband, Steven E. 

Langton, were the owners of a building in New Kensington, 

Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania (the "Property") as 

tenants by the entireties. On February 12, 2009, Mr. 

Langton, without joinder of his spouse, executed a listing 

contract with the defendant, Janet L Ryan Realty, Inc. 

t/d/b/a Century 21-American Heritage Realty ("Century 21"), 

using the agency's pre-printed Commercial Listing Contract. 

Although Sandra did not execute this listing agreement, she 

testified at her deposition that she was aware of and in 

agreement with it. The listing contract gave Century 21 

the exclusive right to sell the Property for a term of one 

1 

[-........ ) 

'.~ 
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year commencing on February 12, 2009, and terminated the 

contract at the expiration of the said one year listing 

period. The contract also provided that the agreement may 

be terminated at any time after 183 days have elapsed from 

the commencement date by the owner giving ten days notice 

in writing delivered to the broker by certified mail with 

return receipt requested. The contract provided for a 

sales and/or leasing commission of 8 1/3 percent. 

Unfortunately, Steven Langton died on February 17, 

2009. At no time did Century 21 procure Sandra's signature 

on any listing agreement although the original agreement 

executed by her husband did indicate that it was binding 

upon his "heirs, executors, administrators, successors and 

assigns". Technically, Ms. Langton would not be an heir or 

successor of Mr. Langton since she was a tenant by the 

entireties at the time the original listing agreement was 

signed. 

Century 21 did obtain a buyer for the property and 

Sandra entered into an agreement of sale with an entity 

called American Industrial Felt and Supply Corporation 

("AIF"). This sales agreement was dated April 6, 2009, and 

listed Century 21 as the listing broker and the plaintiff, 

Beynon & Company as the selling broker. AIF is a 

corporation owned entirely by Patricia Dent and the 

2 
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agreement was executed by its president, Michael Dent, the 

son of Patricia Dent. The sales agreement provided that 

the closing was to take place on or before 20 days after 

the inspection period which itself was to expire 120 days 

after April 6, 2009, or on October 3, 2009. Accordingly, 

the last date for the closing would have been October 23, 

2009. 

On the same date as the sale agreement, the parties 

executed a lease which permitted AIF to take possession of 

the Property for a monthly rental of $4,000.00. The term 

of the lease was from April 1, 2009, to September 1, 2009, 

Paragraph 17 of this lease agreement provided that the 

commissions are "N/A". 

When AIF had trouble obtaining financing for its 

purchase of the Property, Century 21 prepared an 

Addendum/Endorsement to the agreement of sale extending the 

time period for which AIF could obtain mortgage approval to 

January 3, 2010, and the date for settlement to on or 

before January 23, 2010. It also indicated that AIF would 

continue to lease the property beginning October 3, 2009, 

until the date of settlement at an increased rental of 

$6,000.00 per month and that the Broker's fee "on both the 

Lease & Sale will remain at 8 1/3 percent, to be split 

3 
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equally between the Brokers". This Addendum/Endorsement 

was executed by the parties on October 1, 2009. 

The sale to AIF failed to close by January 23, 2010, 

apparently because the corporation was never able to secure 

mortgage financing. By documents generated by AIF and 

executed February 8, 2010, and effective February 8, 2010, 

and February 28, 2010, AIF and Sandra terminated the 

Agreement of Sale and the Lease. 

As set forth in the original listing contract, its 

term automatically expired on February 12, 2010. However, 

the listing agreement contained a clause that stated: 

"If within one year of the termination of this 

agreement, the Owner enters into an Agreement of Sale, or 

transfers/exchanges the property with any person to whom 

the property was shown, presented or submitted by the 

Broker, the sale or transfer shall be conclusively presumed 

to have been made by the Broker and the commission shall be 

paid by Owner to Broker." 

This one year period would have expired on 

February 12, 2011. Shortly after that date, on April 5, 

2011, the Property was sold to an entity listed on the deed 

of record as Dent Properties. 1 Dent Properties is a 

completely separate entity from AIF but is owned in equal 

shares by Michael Dent, the president of AIFi his mother, 

1 The complaint avers that the Buyer is Dent Holdings LLC. The deed of 

record indicates that the buyer was Dent Properties, LLC. Michael Dent 

in his deposition explained that Dent Properties was the incorrect name 

of the company and that the Property was acquired by Dent Holdings LLC. 

For purposes of this opinion, I will refer to this entity simply as 

Dent Properties. 

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Patricia Dent; and Robert Dent, the father of Michael Dent 

and spouse of Patricia Dent. Michael Dent signed the 

agreement of sale on behalf of AIF. He also executed the 

following documents all on behalf of Dent Properties: 

1. The deed to Dent Properties dated April 5, 2011; 

and 

2. The mortgage from Dent Properties to Sandra also 

dated April 5, 2011. The acknowledgment of this 

mortgage indicates that he was signing as president 

of Dent Properties and, along with Patricia J. Dent 

and Robert Dent, the mortgage note dated April 5, 

2011. 2 

Despite a demand to do so, Sandra refused to pay 

commissions to these plaintiffs and suit was filed against 

her to recover a leasing commission of $6,500 and a sales 

commission of $35,416.00. Ms. Langton has filed a 

counterclaim requesting repayment of the rental commissions 

withheld by the plaintiffs from rental payments received 

($2,500.00). As stated above, the plaintiffs and Sandra 

have filed motions for summary judgment. 

2 It is interesting to note that the sales agreements between Sandra and 

Dent Properties was dated AprilS, 2011, the same date as the closing 

of the sale of the Property. 

5 
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Regardless of which date I determine the listing 

agreement to be cancelled, i.e., September 17, 2009, or 

February 12, 2010, the plaintiffs argue that they are 

entitled to their commission even though the sale to Dent 

Properties occurred more than one year after the 

termination date. 3 The plaintiffs contend that the sale to 

Dent Properties was in fact a sale to "any person to whom 

the property was shown, presented or submitted by the 

broker ... " . The plaintiffs would have me conclude as a 

matter of law that the "person" referred to in this section 

of the listing agreement was in fact Michael Dent, the 

president of AIF, and the president and part owner of Dent 

Properties. Since the sale to Dent Properties took place 

more than one year after the listing agreement was 

terminated, I cannot "conclusively presume,,4 that the sale 

to Dent Properties was made by these Brokers and that the 

commission should be paid by Sandra to these Brokers. 

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue that I should still find 

3Sandra at her deposition sent a certified mail notice on September 18, 

2009 to Century 21 which was acknowledged to be received by Dave Allen 

of Century 21 at his deposition. The notice advised Mr. Allen that Ms. 

Langton would like to terminate her listing contract with Century 21. 

Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the listing agreement was 

terminated on September 17, 2009, and even if not so terminated, would 

have terminated automatically on 

February 12, 2010. 

4 As a footnote, I am not sure of the legal definition of a "conclusive 

presumption". 

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that they are entitled to the commission even without the 

conclusive presumption. 

For me to make a finding as a matter of law that the 

above-referred to claim is enforceable beyond the one year 

period would result in my condoning a violation of the Real 

Estate Licensing and Registration Act 63 P.S.§455.101 et. 

seq. ("RELRA"). This is because, as the Superior Court had 

noted in its opinion in Salove Company v. Enrico Partners, 

L.P., 2011 Pa. Super. 128 23 A.3d 1066 (2011), that the 

RELRA provides for suspension or revocation of a broker's 

license if they fail to specify a definite termination date 

in a listing contract 63 P.S.§455.604 (a) (10). 

The plaintiffs argue that there was a specific 

termination date in the listing contract, i.e., the one 

year automatic termination period referred to above. 

Therefore, they argue that there is no violation of the 

Act. They argue that the only indefinite period would be 

that which would apply if the Property was sold to the same 

person it was shown to while listing was in force. I cannot 

agree. If I were to follow the plaintiffs' logic then, as 

argued by Sandra in her brief" and at oral argument, many 

years could have passed and if the Property was sold to 

Michael Dent or any entity he was involved in, then these 

real estate agents would be entitled to a commission 

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because they showed the property to Michael Dent during the 

term of their listing agreement. Thus, the effect of such 

a clause is to cause the listing contract to fail to have a 

definite termination date. Furthermore, the listing 

contract was prepared by century 21 and therefore should be 

construed more strictly against Century 21. 

Century 21 had the power to include specific language 

controlling this type of situation. I am not even sure that 

the words "any person to whom the property was shown ... " 

would apply to the two entities in this case,AIF and Dent 

Properties, since they do not have complete common 

ownership. However, based on my determination that the 

referred to clause is not enforceable because it violates 

RELRA, I do not have to make the determination that Dent 

Properties is, in fact, the same "person" as AIF. 

The final matter for determination is whether or not 

the plaintiffs are entitled to the balance of their 

commissions they claim are due from the rental payments or 

conversely whether Ms. Langton is entitled to a $2,500 

judgment representing a "refund" for the commissions 

already withheld from rental payments made by AIF during 

the term of its occupancy of the Property. The listing 

contract provides as follows: 

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"In the event that the Property herein listed shall be 

leased during the term of this contract by the Broker or by 

the Owner or any other person, the Owner agrees to pay 

Broker a commission of 8 1/3 percent of the gross lease 

value. This commission shall be earned and payable in full 

at the time of the signing of the lease or concurrent w/ 

lease fees. In the event this listing is placed under 

lease and the property is subsequently sold to the tenant 

during the term of the lease or any renewal, then the 

agreed commission shall be due broker." 

There is no question that AIF occupied the Property 

and made rental payments to Sandra. There is no question 

that the listing contract provided for the above-stated 

lease commission payment. This commission language was in 

addition to the 8 1/3 percent sales commission language 

that was included in the same paragraph directly prior to 

the lease commission language. There is also no question 

that the sum of $2,500.00 was withheld from the rental 

payments and not paid to Ms. Langton apparently without 

objection from her. s 

Accordingly, I will enter the following Order: 

5 Sandra argues in her brief that she never acquiesced in plaintiffs 

receiving rent and withholding a rental commission based upon her note 

dated on or about April 26, 2010, when she asked her attorney, James 

Irwin, "will I still need to give rent $ to Dave & RT u • I do not agree 

that this note is evidence that Ms. Langton never "acquiesced u in the 

withholding of rental commissions especially when the note was written 

in April 2010 and AIF first occupied her Property on April I, 2009. 

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WESTMORELAND COUNTY, 

PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL DIVISION-LAW 

JANET L. RYAN REALTY, INC., 

t/d/b/a CENTURY 21-AMERICAN 

HERITAGE REALTY and BEYNON & 

COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 

PLAINTIFFS, 

VS. NO. 562 OF 2012 

SANDRA LANGTON, 

DEFENDANT. 

ORDER OF COURT 

tfL 

AND NOW, this 025 day of November 2013, it is hereby 

ORDERED and DECREED that the plaintiffs' and defendant's 

motions for summary judgment are sustained in part and 

denied in part. The defendant's counterclaim is hereby 

dismissed with prejudice. Counts 2 and 3 of the 

plaintiffs' complaint are dismissed. A judgment is entered 

on behalf of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, 

Sandra Langton, in the amount $6,500.00 together with costs 

on Count 1. 

BY THE COURT: 

10 

ATTEST: 

CHRISTINA O'BRIEN 

PROTHONOTARY