`[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 240 (Friday, December 13, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 100898-100917]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-28993]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 25

[IB Docket No. 21-456; FCC 24-117; FR ID 265639]


Spectrum Sharing Rules for NGSO Fixed-Satellite Service Systems

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; denial of reconsideration.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC 
or Commission) clarifies the methodology to be used in compatibility 
analyses by non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) fixed-satellite 
service (FSS) system licensees. The Second Report and Order adopts 
specific degraded throughput methodology criteria that NGSO FSS systems 
licensed in a later processing round must include in compatibility 
analyses, in absence of a coordination agreement, to demonstrate that 
they can operate compatibly with and protect NGSO FSS systems 
authorized in earlier processing rounds. The Second Report and Order 
clarifies these methodologies to promote market entry, regulatory 
certainty, and spectrum efficiency through good-faith coordination. The 
Commission also adopts an Order on Reconsideration dismissing in part 
and, on alternative and independent grounds, denying a petition for 
reconsideration.

DATES: Effective on January 13, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For additional information on this 
proceeding, contact Carolyn Mahoney, Satellite Programs and Policy 
Division, Space Bureau, at (202) 418-7168 or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  This is a summary of the Commission's 
Second Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, in IB Docket No. 
21-456, FCC 24-117, adopted on November 5, 2024 and released on 
November 15, 2024. The full text of this document is available at 
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA), requires 
that an agency prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for notice and 
comment rulemakings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule will 
not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.'' Accordingly, the Commission has 
prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) concerning the 
potential impact of the rule changes contained in the Second Report and 
Order and Order on Reconsideration. The FRFA is set forth in the 
appendix of the document available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-117A1.pdf and a summary is included in the 
Procedural Matters section below.

Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis

    The Second Report and Order contains modified information 
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(PRA), Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the 
PRA. OMB, other Federal agencies, and the general public will be 
invited to comment on the modified information collection requirements 
contained in this document.
    The Commission assessed the effects of requiring later-round NGSO 
FSS grantees to submit compatibility showings with respect to earlier-
round grantees with whom coordination has not yet been reached. The 
Commission finds that doing so will serve the public interest and is 
unlikely to directly affect businesses with fewer than 25 employees.

Congressional Review Act

    The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 
concurs that this rule is non-major under the Congressional Review Act, 
5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Second Report 
and Order and Order on Reconsideration to Congress and the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

Synposis

I. Introduction

    In the Second Report and Order, the Commission continues to refine 
the Commission's rules governing spectrum sharing among a new 
generation of broadband satellite constellations to promote market 
entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency through good-faith 
coordination. Specifically, the Commission clarifies certain details of 
the degraded throughput methodology that, in the absence of a 
coordination agreement, must be used in compatibility analyses by non-
geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO FSS) 
system licensees authorized through later processing rounds to show 
they can operate compatibly with, and protect, NGSO FSS systems 
authorized through earlier processing rounds. The Commission adopts a 3 
percent time-weighted average throughput degradation as a long-term 
interference protection criterion, a 0.4 percent absolute increase in 
link unavailability as a short-term interference protection criterion, 
and declines to adopt additional protection metrics or to adopt an 
aggregate limit on interference from later-round NGSO FSS systems into 
earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. In an accompanying Order on 
Reconsideration, the Commission denies a Petition for Reconsideration 
(88 FR 58540, August 28, 2023) of the Report and Order (88 FR 39783, 
June 30, 2023). These actions continue the Commission's efforts to 
promote development and competition in broadband NGSO satellite 
services.

II. Background

    The Commission is committed to updating and refining its rules 
governing NGSO FSS systems, at a time when these systems are being 
deployed at unprecedented scale. NGSO FSS satellites traveling in low- 
and medium-Earth orbit provide broadband services to industry, 
enterprise, and residential customers with lower latency and wider 
coverage than previously available by satellite.
    Processing Round Procedure Overview. Applications for NGSO FSS 
system licenses and petitions for declaratory ruling seeking U.S. 
market access for non-U.S.-licensed NGSO FSS systems are considered in 
groups based on filing date, under a processing round procedure. 
Pursuant to the Commission's rules, a license application for ``NGSO-
like'' satellite operation, including operation of an NGSO FSS system, 
that satisfies the acceptability for filing requirements is reviewed to 
determine whether it is a ``competing application'' or a ``lead 
application.'' A competing application is one filed in response to a 
public notice initiating a processing round. Any other application is a 
lead application. The public notice for a lead application initiates a 
processing round and establishes a cut-off date for competing NGSO-like 
satellite system applications. After the close of the processing round, 
the Commission grants all the applications for which the

[[Page 100899]]

Commission finds that the applicant is legally, technically, and 
otherwise qualified, that the proposed facilities and operations comply 
with all applicable rules, regulations, and policies, and that grant of 
the application will serve the public interest, convenience and 
necessity.
    NGSO FSS System Spectrum Sharing Overview. The Commission has 
adopted rules for spectrum sharing among NGSO FSS systems. NGSO FSS 
space station license applications granted with a condition to abide by 
these sharing rules are exempt from frequency band segmentation 
procedures that otherwise apply to applications for NGSO-like satellite 
operation. Instead, NGSO FSS operators must coordinate with one another 
in good faith the use of commonly authorized frequencies. If two or 
more NGSO FSS satellite systems fail to complete coordination, a 
default spectrum-splitting procedure using a [Delta]T/T of 6 percent 
threshold applies, pursuant to Sec.  25.261(c) of the Commission's 
rules. In the NGSO FSS Report and Order (82 FR 59972, December 18, 
2017), the Commission stated that it would ``initially limit'' sharing 
under the [Delta]T/T of 6 percent threshold to qualified applicants in 
a processing round. The Commission explained that treatment of 
applicants after a processing round would be on a case-by-case basis 
and would consider both the need to protect existing expectations and 
investments and the benefits of additional entry, as well as any 
comments filed by incumbent operators and reasoning presented by the 
new applicant.
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The NPRM (88 FR 39783, June 30, 
2023) in this proceeding sought comment on potential rule changes to 
clarify the relative obligations between NGSO FSS systems approved in 
different processing rounds. Specifically, the Commission proposed to 
limit the existing NGSO FSS spectrum-splitting procedure in Sec.  
25.261(c) to those systems approved in the same processing round, and 
to require systems approved in a later processing round to coordinate 
with, or demonstrate they will protect, earlier-round systems. The 
Commission invited comment on how to quantify inter-round protection 
and whether it should sunset after a period of time. The Commission 
also proposed to require all NGSO FSS grantees, regardless of their 
processing round status, to coordinate with each other in good faith, 
and sought comment on specific information sharing obligations that 
could facilitate operator-to-operator coordination.
    Report and Order. In response to the record developed through the 
NPRM, the Report and Order adopted rule changes designed to promote 
market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency of NGSO FSS 
systems. The Commission, for the first time, limited the default 
spectrum-splitting procedure in Sec.  25.261(c) to NGSO FSS systems 
approved in the same processing round and required NGSO FSS systems 
approved in a later processing round to coordinate with, or demonstrate 
they will protect, earlier-round systems, subject to a sunsetting 
provision. The Commission also required all NGSO FSS grantees to 
coordinate with each other in good faith. Regarding the technical 
demonstrations of compatibility of later-round NGSO FSS systems with 
earlier-round systems, the Commission concluded that an interference 
analysis based on a degraded throughput methodology offered the most 
technically promising path for NGSO FSS inter-round sharing and 
required later-round systems to use such a methodology. In adopting a 
sunsetting provision for the inter-round protection requirement, the 
Commission concluded that protection of earlier-round NGSO FSS systems 
must ensure a stable environment for continued service and investment 
but should not hinder later-round systems indefinitely. The Commission 
decided that NGSO FSS systems will be entitled to protection from 
systems approved in a subsequent processing round until ten years after 
the first authorization or market access grant in that subsequent 
processing round. After that date, all systems in both processing 
rounds will be treated on an equal basis with respect to spectrum 
sharing in the absence of a coordination agreement, and the default 
spectrum-splitting procedure in Sec.  25.261(c) will also apply between 
systems in the two rounds. In sum, prior to commencing operations, an 
NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either certify it has 
completed a coordination agreement with any operational NGSO FSS system 
licensed or granted U.S. market access in an earlier processing round, 
or submit a showing for Commission approval that it will not cause 
harmful interference to any such system with which coordination has not 
been completed using a degraded throughput methodology.
    Further Notice. In conjunction with the decision in the Report and 
Order to adopt an inter-round protection requirement described above, 
the Commission adopted the Further Notice (88 FR 40142, June 21, 2023) 
to finalize the details of the degraded throughput methodology. The 
Commission invited specific comment on the appropriate values and 
assumptions to be used in this requirement, as well as on whether the 
Commission should adopt a rule limiting aggregate interference from 
later-round NGSO FSS systems into earlier-round systems. Ten comments, 
eight reply comments, and several ex parte presentations were filed in 
response to the Further Notice.
    Petition. On July 20, 2023, OneWeb filed a Petition for Partial 
Reconsideration of the Report and Order concerning the sunset period 
adopted with the new inter-round protection requirement. Kuiper opposed 
the OneWeb Petition, SpaceX commented on it, and OneWeb replied to 
Kuiper's opposition.

III. Discussion

1. Second Report and Order

    In this Second Report and Order, after review of the record, the 
Commission clarifies certain details of the degraded throughput 
methodology that, in the absence of a coordination agreement, must be 
used in compatibility analyses by NGSO FSS system grantees, authorized 
through later processing rounds, to show they can operate compatibly 
with, and protect, NGSO FSS systems, authorized through earlier 
processing rounds. Specifically, the Commission adopts a 3 percent 
time-weighted average throughput degradation as a long-term 
interference protection criterion and a 0.4 percent absolute increase 
in link unavailability as a short-term interference protection 
criterion. The Commission declines to adopt additional protection 
metrics or to adopt an aggregate limit on interference from later-round 
NGSO FSS systems into earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. The Commission's 
decisions in the Second Report and Order rely on its predictive 
judgment in the highly complex and dynamic area of spectrum sharing 
among a new generation of innovative NGSO FSS systems. The Commission's 
decisions strive to balance its competing goals of providing regulatory 
certainty for, and adequate protection of, earlier round systems vis-a-
via later entrants while encouraging new entry and coordination among 
NGSO FSS operators.
1. Long-Term Interference Metric
    Further Notice. In the Further Notice, the Commission outlined its 
expected steps in a degraded throughput analysis and sought comment on 
the proposed process. Specifically, noting that 3

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percent had been suggested as an appropriate value for several aspects 
of the degraded throughput analysis, including a long-term interference 
limit based on reduction in time-weighted average throughput, the 
Commission invited comment on the appropriate values for such a limit, 
including technical justification.
    Comments. Four out of the five commenters proposing a specific 
threshold value for degraded throughput support using the 3 percent 
value noted in the Further Notice. Kuiper, for example, observes that a 
3 percent throughput-degradation threshold has been adopted 
internationally to protect V-band GSO networks from NGSO FSS systems 
and argues that it provides a conservative measure of protection for 
incumbent systems due, in part, to conservatism in the methodology a 
new entrant must use to estimate interference. Viasat agrees that use 
of the 3 percent threshold should adequately safeguard systems from 
adverse performance degradation experienced over an extended period of 
time. Telesat, while initially arguing that ``[t]he long-term criterion 
is sufficiently stable and there is a sufficient record, including 
through recent ITU studies, to support adopting a 3 percent degradation 
limit,'' more recently concludes that specific degraded throughput 
criteria should be left to coordination discussions among satellite 
operators to determine. Telesat now believes that the record is 
sufficiently complete to allow the Commission to adopt rules, endorsing 
the 3 percent degraded throughput value for the long-term protection 
criterion proposed by SpaceX. Intelsat initially indicated that further 
study would be required before concluding upon a degraded throughput 
value, but now supports the 3 percent value as well. TechFreedom argues 
it is premature to adopt protection criteria. Public Knowledge and New 
America Open Technology Institute also support adopting a 3 percent 
degraded throughput threshold.
    SpaceX, which initially commented that a 3 percent degraded 
throughput value required further study, subsequently submitted its own 
spectrum sharing study evaluating the 3 percent limit. Using publicly 
available information and reference standard antenna patterns, SpaceX 
performed 123 dynamic (Monte Carlo) simulations of interference from 
various 2020 processing-round NGSO systems into various 2016 
processing-round NGSO systems. In 112 of the 123 studied cases, 
degradation was below 3.12 percent, which SpaceX argues empirically 
supports the Commission adopting a 3.0 percent degradation of average 
spectral efficiency as a single-entry long-term interference criterion 
for compatibility determinations.
    Only OneWeb proposes a long-term interference metric other than 3 
percent, arguing that a 3 percent time-weighted average degraded 
throughput limit will substantially harm NGSO FSS operators and 
disincentivize coordination. OneWeb asserts that an aggregate 
interference and rain fade criterion of no more than 10 percent 
degradation in average throughput is appropriate for an NGSO FSS 
system, that apportionment of this allowed percentage of interference 
to other NGSO systems should be no more than 2.5 to 3.85 percent, and 
that when accounting for the existence of multiple co-frequency NGSO 
systems, the single-entry average degraded throughput should be less 
than 1 percent for each individual NGSO system. OneWeb further claims 
that if a 3 percent limit were adopted per system and six NGSO FSS 
systems were operating co-frequency, then a 15 percent degradation in 
average throughput would occur from the 5 interfering systems to the 
victim system. No other commenter supports OneWeb's proposal; SpaceX, 
Kuiper, and Telesat raise numerous technical concerns with it; and 
commenters suggest alternative explanations for the results of OneWeb's 
analysis.
    OneWeb also argues that SpaceX's study purporting to affirm the 3 
percent metric relies on flawed assumptions that undermine its 
conclusions. Specifically, OneWeb contends that the study fails to 
accurately model system-specific details that could impact whether a 
previous-round system may experience harmful interference. OneWeb's 
analysis incorporating its revised assumptions argues that the 3 
percent metric results in substantially higher levels of interference 
than projected by both SpaceX and Kuiper, which could exceed 5 percent 
when taking into account a small deployment of Kuiper customer 
terminals without adding any contribution from the Viasat system. Thus, 
OneWeb concludes that SpaceX's study fails to adequately predict the 
interference levels prior-round NGSO systems would receive. OneWeb 
further highlighted its support for a 1 percent or less average 
degraded throughput as the long-term criterion that should be adopted.
    Decision. The Commission adopts a 3 percent time-weighted average 
degraded throughput threshold as the long-term interference metric that 
must be complied with in any inter-round compatibility showing 
submitted by a later-round NGSO FSS grantee. The 3 percent time-
weighted average degraded throughput is calculated on a per link basis. 
The Commission concludes that adopting this value best furthers its 
goals of providing regulatory certainty for, and adequate protection 
of, earlier-round NGSO FSS systems while allowing for new entry and 
coordination among NGSO FSS operators. First, this value has been 
developed and adopted internationally as sufficient for the protection 
of GSO satellite networks using adaptive coding and modulation 
techniques, which are also used by NGSO FSS systems. Second, the 3 
percent throughput-degradation threshold limits the interference 
allowed at any location, not the expected average of interference 
across all locations. Since the worst-case locations will likely drive 
the discussion of appropriate system parameters and any mitigation 
measures, actual interference should be less than 3 percent in many 
circumstances. Third, the Commission's technical review of the SpaceX 
study on the record indicates that the study reliably supports the 
conclusion that a 3 percent threshold is achievable by later-round 
systems, and therefore encourages competitive new entry, by 
demonstrating that the simulated degradation was near or below 3 
percent in 112 of the 123 studied cases of later-round systems 
protecting earlier-round systems.
    The Commission disagrees with OneWeb that a 3 percent degraded 
throughput threshold would disincentivize coordination, for three 
reasons. First, not all links considered in the SpaceX study meet this 
degraded throughput threshold. Additional links or different assumed 
parameters might also not meet the threshold, and therefore the 3 
percent degraded throughput threshold would incentivize coordination or 
require mitigation. Second, this protection requirement is unilateral, 
and later-round systems will have an incentive to coordinate to receive 
some accommodation, or protection from interference, from earlier-round 
systems. And third, the 10-year sunset period ensures that earlier-
round systems and later-round systems will be treated on an equal basis 
after the sunset, and any compatibility analyses will no longer permit 
the later-round system to operate in cases where it would exceed the 
default spectrum-splitting mechanism in Sec.  25.261(c).
    In contrast, a criterion of 1 percent or lower has not been 
demonstrated to allow for competitive new entry by any study. The 
Commission also finds the technical basis for this criterion to be

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flawed. The Commission agrees with Telesat that OneWeb is incorrect in 
claiming that Note 3 of Recommendation ITU-R S. 2131-1 provides a 10 
percent limit on time-weighted average degraded throughput for an FSS 
link employing adaptive coding and modulation (ACM). In addition, the 
single-entry interference criterion proposed by OneWeb is based on an 
isolated scenario that does not represent the broad variation of 
throughput degradation that can occur due to rain fade. Further, the 
single-entry throughput degradation values suggested by OneWeb are 
based on arbitrary assumptions. And the idea conveyed by OneWeb that 
the allowable degradation from one interference source should simply be 
computed by considering the degradation allowance from all interference 
sources and then dividing by the number of interference sources is 
simply incorrect, because it does not take into account the manner in 
which ACM is implemented in modern satellite links.
    On the other hand, declining to adopt any specific long-term 
interference protection criterion could invite unnecessary and lengthy 
debates among later-round operators submitting compatibility analyses 
and earlier-round operators subject to those analyses with whom a 
coordination agreement has not yet been reached. Instead, the 
Commission concludes that establishing a specific long-term 
interference protection metric, as technically supported on the record, 
will provide a clear benchmark for new entrants, around which parties 
may tailor any alternative long-term protections mutually agreed in 
coordination.
2. Short-Term Interference Metric
i. Relative vs. Absolute Increase in Unavailability
    Further Notice. In addition to seeking comment on defining a long-
term interference metric in the degraded throughput analysis, the 
Further Notice sought comment on setting a short-term interference 
metric expressed as a change in the earlier-round system's link 
unavailability time percentage. The Commission invited comment on the 
appropriate value for this limit, including technical justification.
    Comments. On the issue of defining a short-term interference 
metric, commenters differed on whether to use a relative change in link 
unavailability, an absolute change in link unavailability, or both. 
Ultimately, commenters on this issue support the use of an absolute 
metric; no commenter opposes use of an absolute metric or only supports 
use of a relative metric. SpaceX, for example, explains that because 
next-generation satellite systems are designed to be resilient to 
signal degradation, these systems frequently maintain a high degree of 
link availability--typically in excess of 99 percent--despite varying 
environmental effects and interference from other NGSO systems. This 
equates to a typical baseline unavailability of less than 1 percent, 
but with such levels of unavailability as the baseline, SpaceX states 
that very small changes in link performance can trigger ``wild swings'' 
in a relative unavailability metric, even if the absolute level of link 
availability remains close to its baseline value. O3b and Intelsat each 
propose a formula to determine an absolute allowed increase in 
unavailability that changes with the baseline availability, reflecting 
concerns that a single value for increase in unavailability may not 
adequately protect high availability links. OneWeb supports an absolute 
increase in unavailability and supports O3b's proposal for a variable 
absolute increase in unavailability based on the service requirements 
of the link to cover a wider range of use cases.
    Decision. The Commission agrees with the general consensus among 
commenters on this issue. The Commission concludes that the use of an 
absolute increase in link unavailability as the short-term interference 
metric provides a more reliable measure of short-term interference that 
is not as susceptible to significant fluctuations as a relative 
increase metric would be. The Commission therefore adopts an absolute 
increase in link unavailability as the sole short-term interference 
metric required in an inter-round compatibility showing submitted by a 
later-round grantee. As discussed in greater detail below, the 
Commission declines to adopt proposals for a formulaic approach for a 
variable absolute increase in unavailability in establishing a short-
term interference metric.
ii. Value
    Further Notice. The Further Notice also invited specific comment on 
the appropriate value for the short-term interference metric, with 
accompanying technical justification.
    Comments. Commenters are divided on the appropriate value for the 
short-term protection criterion. OneWeb asserts that if the Commission 
adopts an absolute change in link unavailability as the short-term 
metric, the single-entry limit should be ``substantially lower than'' 
0.01 percent to account for uses which may necessitate higher levels of 
availability, such as links designed to meet a 99.99 percent 
unavailability requirement. Viasat claims that a 0.05 percent tolerable 
packet loss rate from all sources ``is the minimum necessary 
requirement'' and states that a smaller value, such as 0.01 percent, 
would provide a margin to allow for other sources of short-term packet 
loss. Intelsat initially argued that further study would be required 
before determining protection criteria values, although now supports an 
absolute metric based on a sliding-scale formula, similar to O3b's, for 
the short-term protection criterion. Similarly, Telesat had also 
initially argued that no single short-term metric is appropriate for 
all links in all coordinations based on its own study, but now agrees 
that the SpaceX proposal strikes the right balance in protecting 
incumbent NGSO systems while supporting the entry of new NGSO systems 
and supports the 0.4 percent metric.
    SpaceX argues that its study of several 2016 processing-round and 
2020 processing-round systems using 123 dynamic (Monte Carlo) 
simulations establishes an ``empirical zone of reasonableness'' for the 
values of the absolute change in link availability. The values in the 
SpaceX study range from 0 to 0.382 percent at a carrier-to-noise (C/N) 
threshold of 0 dB, and SpaceX states that the upper end of this range 
is appropriate for both uplink and downlink. SpaceX therefore contends 
that its study provides empirical support for short-term interference 
up to approximately 0.4 percent absolute change in link availability at 
a C/N threshold of 0 dB. SpaceX further argues that its conservative 
use of a C/N threshold of 0 dB to assess changes in link availability 
further supports allowing short-term interference up to 0.4 percent 
absolute change. SpaceX suggests that setting such a value will 
incentivize a later-round system to try to limit inline events to an 
earlier-round system toward achieving this level of short-term 
interference or if it cannot, to coordinate with the earlier-round 
system to more efficiently use the shared spectrum. Telesat supports 
the proposed SpaceX approach, noting that it is the only approach that 
encourages coordination amongst operators by establishing a backstop 
value to protect incumbent operators while also supporting good faith 
coordination and promoting competition.
    Kuiper supports the proposed SpaceX 0.4 percent absolute increase 
in unavailability metric as well. Kuiper initially proposed the 
Commission adopt a 0.1 percent absolute increase in

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link unavailability as a threshold for short-term interference, which 
Kuiper argued would offer sufficient room for new entrants to bring 
their systems into operation, even in drier climates, while being 
highly protective to incumbents. Kuiper now urges the Commission to 
adopt an absolute threshold in the range of 0.1 to 0.4 percent for 
short-term protection as proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, respectively, 
arguing that this would incentivize both new entrants and incumbents to 
negotiate in good faith while minimizing impacts on vulnerable links 
and operations in both systems. Kuiper also explains that arguments 
claiming that a short-term threshold in this range would discourage 
coordination between incumbents and new entrants ignore the realities 
of coordination, which occurs when both parties are incentivized to 
negotiate a more mutually beneficial outcome than an alternative 
compatibility showing scenario. Kuiper notes that even with 
interference thresholds tilted in favor of new entrants, rather than 
with a more balanced approach as proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, new 
entrants would retain these incentives and continue to coordinate with 
incumbents. Regarding incumbents, Kuiper argues that while incumbents 
have incentives to minimize potential impacts of new entrants, an 
overly protective short-term threshold, like the O3b proposed formula, 
would incentivize incumbents to make unreasonable coordination demands 
and leverage those protections against new competition.
    O3b proposes the Commission use a formula, rather than a fixed 
percentage value, to determine the allowed increase in unavailability 
of an earlier-round system link. O3b proposes that the permitted 
increase in unavailability = -0.12 * baseline availability + 12.02. O3b 
argues that its formula appropriately adjusts protection levels to 
service requirements and reflects a broad range of technical 
characteristics and protection requirements. OneWeb agrees and argues 
the SpaceX proposal would eliminate later round systems' incentive to 
coordinate, unacceptably undermine established operators' service 
quality, render it impossible for operators to guarantee a defined 
quality of service to their customers, and subvert the purpose of the 
processing round framework. OneWeb further asserts that a 0.4 percent 
absolute increase is ``overly-relaxed'' and risks undermining U.S. 
credibility as a stable investment environment and deterring 
international coordination with U.S. systems. Intelsat supports O3b's 
proposed formula approach and proposes the Commission adopt a slightly 
modified version of the formula, increasing the minimum unavailability 
degradation value. Intelsat proposes that the permitted increase in 
unavailability = -0.12 * baseline availability + 12.05, modifying the 
minimum unavailability degradation factor from 12.02 to 12.05 which 
Intelsat argues allows for flexibility regarding the percent of link 
unavailability for high availability links. OneWeb also supports 
adopting O3b's proposed formula, should the Commission decline to issue 
a further notice and comment. SpaceX and Kuiper oppose this approach, 
arguing that O3b's formula is overly protective of earlier-round 
systems and would incentivize those incumbents to leverage strict 
limitations on later-round systems, thus discouraging market entry and 
innovation and leading to inefficient spectrum sharing. Telesat also 
raises concerns, flagging that the O3b formula has not been previously 
considered by the Commission or ``related forums such as the ITU'' and 
involves granular details that are better addressed in coordination 
between parties than by the Commission.
    In the alternative, O3b and OneWeb suggest the Commission seek 
further comment on an appropriate short-term interference criterion and 
each of the corresponding proposals through a second further notice of 
proposed rulemaking. O3b argues that the SpaceX and Kuiper proposals 
are both untimely and warrant additional inquiry. SpaceX and Kuiper 
argue that the record is complete with detailed analyses, and 
demonstrates that parties have moved toward a consensus on values and 
methodology, and encourage the Commission to move forward with a final 
order. Telesat agrees, finding that the record is sufficiently complete 
to allow the Commission to finalize the rules for spectrum sharing and 
arguing that further delay will not lead to better rules, but rather, 
foster lingering uncertainty as to the framework in which NGSO 
operators coordinate their activities. Telesat additionally notes that 
the record demonstrates that there may never be a perfect formula that 
optimally addresses all possible NGSO system interactions which all 
parties agree upon, given the nature of the complex analyses and 
systems involved in developing specific metrics, and thus the 
Commission is justified in moving forward with a final order.
    Decision. After review of the record, the Commission adopts a 0.4 
percent absolute increase in link unavailability at a C/N threshold of 
0 dB as the short-term interference metric to be used in inter-round 
compatibility analyses. For the reasons discussed below, the Commission 
concludes that this 0.4 percent value, more so than the 0.1 percent 
value, 0.01 percent or less values, or the formulas proposed by O3b or 
Intelsat on the record, most closely aligns with the Commission's goals 
of providing regulatory certainty for and ensuring adequate protection 
of earlier-round incumbents while offering the best opportunities for 
later-round new entrants and competition and encouraging coordination.
    First, the Commission finds that this criterion will adequately 
protect earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. Like the long-term interference 
metric adopted above, this short-term interference metric will limit 
the increase in link unavailability at any analyzed location. Since the 
worst-case locations will likely drive operators' determinations of 
appropriate system parameters and any mitigation measures, the actual 
increase in unavailability will be less than 0.4 percent in many 
circumstances. In addition, the use of a C/N threshold of 0 dB to 
assess changes in link availability is at the upper end of the -3 dB to 
0 dB range for C/N thresholds supported on the record for compatibility 
analyses, and renders the 0.4 percent value more conservative. Because 
the C/N threshold is intended to reflect the minimum carrier received 
signal, relative to noise, necessary to maintain a link, real values 
for the C/N threshold may be closer to -2 dB or -3 dB. At these lower 
C/N thresholds, the absolute change in link availability is typically 
lower than at the 0 dB threshold. Thus, using a 0 dB C/N threshold may 
overestimate the interference from a later-round system to an earlier-
round system's link whose actual C/N threshold is lower. The Commission 
further concludes this value will be sufficiently protective of 
earlier-round systems because of the decisions below to use simplifying 
assumptions in the analysis--such as modeling 50 percent or 100 percent 
deployment of an incumbent system even if it has not yet deployed in 
those numbers, or using an assumed satellite selection strategy when 
the actual satellite selection strategy is not provided by the 
incumbent--that may also tend to overestimate the actual interference 
caused to an incumbent system by the later round system. These 
simplifying assumptions in the analysis itself tend to offer incumbents 
more protection. Therefore, the Commission considers the totality of 
the analysis when deciding upon the likely real-world interference 
caused by a later-

[[Page 100903]]

round system satisfying the 0.4 percent absolute increase in link 
unavailability metric at a C/N threshold of 0 dB.
    Second, the Commission concludes that adopting a 0.4 percent 
absolute increase in unavailability metric will simultaneously support 
competitive new entry because it will accommodate several modeled 
second-round systems, both uplinks and downlinks, per the 123 dynamic 
(Monte Carlo) simulations in the SpaceX study, which the Commission 
notes are a better representation of the dynamic nature of NGSO systems 
than a static analysis would reflect. Further, the Commission has 
reviewed the SpaceX study and find that the data, assumptions, and 
methodology employed are reasonable for purposes of adopting a 0.4 
percent short-term interference metric to be used in inter-round 
compatibility analyses. To be sure, O3b argues that the study is too 
limited in the operating metrics considered and is accordingly not 
reflective of real-world parameters. Such individualized parameters 
will be considered in individual compatibility analyses. In the event 
that other system combinations, or the use of different assumed 
parameters, result in exceedances of this short-term limit, this will 
require mitigation measures to be applied by the later-round operator 
or coordination with earlier round operators.
    Third, the Commission concludes that adopting this short-term 
protection value will support competitive new entry while continuing to 
encourage good-faith coordination among both incumbents and new 
entrants, which offers the best avenue for efficient spectrum sharing 
among NGSO FSS systems. Unlike the requirement for later-round systems 
to protect earlier-round systems under the inter-round protection 
requirement prior to the sunset period, incumbents have no 
corresponding requirement to protect new entrants during this period, 
and therefore an overly conservative protection requirement for the 
benefit of incumbents may discourage incumbents from negotiating more 
lenient limits for new entrants. On the other hand, permitting new 
entrants to operate with an overly lenient limit may discourage them 
from negotiating with incumbents for more restrictive protections for 
the benefit of incumbents. The short-term interference metric the 
Commission adopts here strikes the right balance to encourage 
coordination among earlier and later-round systems. The Commission 
disagrees with assertions that the 0.4 percent absolute increase will 
risk investment in U.S. systems by discouraging international systems 
from coordinating with U.S. systems. While it is unclear which specific 
circumstances are in reference, the Commission reminds both incumbents 
and new operators that coordination with the ITU is separate from 
coordination within the U.S. and is required of all international 
systems under the ITU Radio Regulations. The Commission's rules require 
both parties to engage in good faith coordination. Providing an avenue 
for meaningful competition by both incumbents and new entrants will 
encourage both sides to agree upon any more specific, mutual protection 
measures during coordination.
    The Commission is not persuaded by alternative proposals. The 
Commission disagrees with the proposed 0.01 percent or lower threshold 
advocated by Viasat. Unlike the 0.4 percent absolute increase in 
unavailability metric, which the SpaceX Monte Carlo study in the record 
indicates is achievable for several modeled second-round systems, there 
is no evidence in the record from proponents of a 0.01 percent or lower 
threshold showing that it is achievable and provides for competitive 
new entry. And while a 0.1 percent limit would accommodate most second-
round system links analyzed in the SpaceX study, a 0.4 percent limit 
will provide greater opportunities for new entry while still providing 
adequate protection of incumbent systems due to the conservative 
assumptions incorporated into the standard and the calculation of 
increase in unavailability and at the same time providing incentives 
for good faith coordination. Stricter limits for particular links can, 
of course, be agreed in coordination. The SpaceX study indicates 0.4 
percent to be the upper limit in the studied cases in both uplink and 
downlink, and accommodates user terminals and gateway earth stations. 
Indeed, the Commission notes that Kuiper's initial study, which 
proposes the 0.1 percent limit, uses the SpaceX study as partial 
justification for its chosen interference limit and nonetheless 
acknowledges that ``SpaceX's justification for a higher [0.4 percent] 
threshold has merit.'' Further, Kuiper has since advocated for the 
Commission to adopt a threshold within the 0.1 and 0.4 percent range as 
proposed by Kuiper and SpaceX, respectively, noting that these 
proposals represent a reasonable range that balances competing 
interests and incentives.
    The Commission also does not agree with O3b and Intelsat that their 
proposals to create a variable, sliding-scale metric for absolute 
increase in unavailability would better serve the Commission's goals 
than the adoption of a 0.4 percent absolute increase in link 
unavailability metric at a C/N threshold of 0 dB. As an initial matter, 
both the O3b and Intelsat formulae appear to be based on the protection 
of only a narrow set of systems. In addition, the Commission disagrees 
with O3b's claim that the proposed formula would not impose additional 
complications on operators compared to an established absolute 
threshold value. Incorporating a variable, sliding-scale short-term 
interference metric would be more burdensome for later round systems to 
implement considering that detailed information of the incumbent 
system, including the receiver characteristics, would be required in 
order to calculate the baseline availability required by the sliding-
scale formula. Absent cooperation from the operator of the incumbent 
system, it would be difficult to obtain this information, particularly 
for new entrants. The Commission does not find the alleged benefits of 
this approach as compared to a non-variable metric outweigh these 
burdens. Given the conservative assumptions in the analysis itself, the 
Commission is also concerned that O3b and Intelsat's more stringent 
formulae may unnecessarily restrict competitive new entry. O3b and 
Intelsat's principal objection to the use of a single 0.4 percent 
absolute value is that it would create a more noticeable impact on 
customers served by higher availability links than on those served by 
lower availability links. However, it is precisely a concern about the 
overprotection of high availability links that has driven the general 
consensus on the record towards using an absolute metric of increase in 
unavailability, rather than a relative metric.
    Moreover, O3b's assumed baseline availability rates of the 
incumbent system may be higher on paper than in reality, to the extent 
O3b excludes from the baseline the effects of other existing sources of 
interference, such as interference from GSO networks, other NGSO 
systems, and intra-system noise. Accordingly, the relative impact on 
high availability links may be overstated. In addition, while O3b 
argues that a 0.4 percent absolute increase in unavailability metric 
would ``make it impossible for operators to guarantee a defined quality 
of service to their customers'' because of the additive effect of 
short-term interference from multiple later-round systems, the 
potential for aggregate interference is not limited to the use of this 
value and would exist under O3b's formula as well. Further, just as the 
Commission expects the real-world impact of a later-round system 
complying with the 0.4

[[Page 100904]]

percent increase in unavailability limit to be less than 0.4 percent in 
many cases, given the conservative assumptions in the analysis noted 
above, the Commission similarly expects that any cumulative, real-world 
effects of two or more later-round systems will likely be less than a 
simple multiplication of the 0.4 percent limit by the number of later-
round interferers that O3b assumes because it fails to account for 
mitigation techniques or other spectrum-sharing measures that may be 
applied by the NGSO FSS systems and reduce their overall aggregate 
impact.
    While O3b also argues that a 0.4 percent increase in unavailability 
limit would ``eliminate later round systems' incentive to coordinate'' 
because all links in the SpaceX study can be accommodated under this 
short-term limit, other links or parameters not included in the SpaceX 
study, some of which O3b points out, might exceed the 0.4 percent 
short-term limit. In any event, O3b itself notes that not all links in 
the SpaceX study meet the 3 percent degraded throughput long-term limit 
the Commission adopts above. Cases where a later-round system cannot 
meet either the short-term or long-term limit will encourage the later-
round operator to complete coordination with the incumbent operator. 
Later-round operators will also be incentivized to coordinate in order 
to potentially receive some protection, or accommodation, from earlier-
round operators. Further, the 10-year sunset period the Commission 
adopted in the Report and Order ensures that earlier-round systems and 
later-round systems will be treated on an equal basis after the sunset 
period, and any compatibility analyses will no longer permit the later-
round system to operate in cases where it would exceed the default 
spectrum-splitting mechanism in Sec.  25.261(c). Accordingly, later-
round system operators will have several incentives to complete 
coordination with earlier-round operators. Moreover, Sec.  25.261(b) of 
the Commission's rules requires NGSO FSS licensees and market access 
recipients to coordinate in good faith the use of commonly authorized 
frequencies regardless of their processing round status.
    To the extent an incumbent wishes to ensure the highest 
availability for particular use cases, such as when offering its 
services to government or enterprise customers, it may discuss such 
particular uses during coordination with new entrants and new entrants 
will have several incentives to complete the coordination. The 
Commission has expressly recognized that the physical realities of 
interference in spectrum-based services should guide both system design 
and reasonable expectations of operation. The likelihood of harmful 
interference should be assessed under a range of operating conditions. 
Further, the Commission has encouraged operators, and specifically NGSO 
FSS operators, to design systems for a shared and dynamic operating 
environment and plan to manage potential interference in such dynamic 
environments. Operators providing important communications with 99.5 
percent or greater service availability require systems equipped with 
redundancy to compensate for potential short-term impacts caused by 
inline events. The Commission has detailed best practices for satellite 
operator emergency planning and preparedness with specific 
recommendations to determine system resiliency and redundancy. To the 
extent operators have concerns about protecting particular types of 
links operating in the non-federal FSS, such as those they may be 
offering to government or enterprise customers, such concerns are best 
addressed in coordination agreements rather than in a non-federal 
spectrum sharing framework.
    In addition, the Commission does not agree with O3b that a 0.4 
percent value ``subvert[s] the purpose of the processing round 
framework'' because it is higher than the spectrum-splitting trigger, 
which O3b calculates for its system would be between 0.01 and 0.04 
percent absolute increase in unavailability. Although it is possible 
for a very small number of links of the earlier-round systems in which 
the [Delta]T/T of 6 percent (I/N of -12.2 dB) (the trigger for 
coordination among systems in the same processing round) may be 
exceeded, such exceedance would be limited in terms of the number of 
links affected and the length of time. The Commission is not convinced 
that such short-term impact would be significant on the earlier round 
systems. The short-term protection criteria the Commission adopts here 
is a unilateral protection of earlier-round systems by later-round 
systems and does not require any reduction in spectrum usage or other 
operational changes by the earlier-round system. In contrast, exceeding 
the more sensitive trigger for spectrum-splitting in Sec.  25.261(c) 
for systems approved in the same processing round creates a mutual 
obligation for both systems to split their commonly authorized 
frequencies for the duration of the potential interference event. 
Nevertheless, for links of an earlier-round system in which the 
[Delta]T/T is 6 percent or greater, later-round systems are required to 
coordinate with the earlier-round systems of these links prior to 
commencing operation.
    The Commission is further not persuaded by calls to seek comment on 
the short-term interference metric through a second further notice of 
proposed rulemaking. The Further Notice sought comment on setting a 
short-term interference metric. In response to the Further Notice, 
interested parties have had ample opportunity to comment on all 
proposals, as illustrated by their record submissions. Adopting a 
specific limit for increase in unavailability, rather than adopting no 
limit or deferring the issue to a later time as some commenters 
advocate, will result in a more complete set of required interference 
metrics applicable to an inter-round compatibility analysis and 
therefore will provide greater regulatory certainty to earlier-round 
operators and later-round operators. Conversely, not adopting any 
specific acceptable short-term interference threshold or deferring the 
issue to a later time would deprive new entrants of the certainty that 
they can provide some level of service without the agreement of an 
earlier-round operator. The SpaceX study indicates 0.4 percent to be 
the upper limit in the studied cases in both uplink and downlink, and 
accommodates user terminals and gateway earth stations. Stricter limits 
for particular links can, of course, be agreed in coordination.
    Therefore, the Commission concludes an absolute increase in 
unavailability value of 0.4 percent at a C/N threshold of 0 dB will 
appropriately balance the Commission's goals of providing regulatory 
certainty for, and adequate protection of, incumbent systems while at 
the same time ensuring competitive new entry and encouraging 
coordination among NGSO FSS operators.
3. Minimum Link Availability
    Further Notice and Comments. In conjunction with the Commission's 
consideration of long-term and short-term interference criteria, 
SpaceX, on the basis of its study of several 2016 processing-round and 
2020 processing-round systems, proposes that the Commission adopt a 
99.0 percent link availability without the interferer at a C/N 
threshold of 0 dB as a minimum benchmark for an earlier-round system to 
show it merits the backstop levels of short-term and long-term 
interference protection from a later-round system that the Commission 
is considering. SpaceX states this minimum benchmark indicates a well-
designed, efficient

[[Page 100905]]

earlier-round NGSO system with a robust signal-to-noise ratio and that 
all first-round links studied by SpaceX achieved this minimum 
benchmark, except one link at 98.7 percent. Requiring a minimum 99.0 
percent link availability, SpaceX argues, would prevent an incumbent 
whose publicly-available information shows its link achieves a 99.9 
percent link availability at a C/N threshold of 0 dB, for example, from 
claiming that it can actually achieve only a 90 percent link 
availability at that threshold. Such a claim would tend to exaggerate 
the extent to which the earlier round system is susceptible to 
interference from every second-round system. SpaceX also contends that 
a rule requiring a first-round system to show a 99.0 percent link 
availability without the interferer at a C/N threshold of 0 dB 
incentivizes efficient spectrum sharing through coordination, since ``a 
first-round system that cannot achieve this minimum benchmark level of 
performance on a given link--indicating its inefficient use of 
spectrum--would have to coordinate with the second-round system to 
determine a more efficient spectrum sharing arrangement.'' O3b, in 
proposing its increase in unavailability threshold formula, supports 
protection of links with baseline availabilities as low as 97 percent, 
and argues the SpaceX proposal would unfairly provide no protection for 
links with lower baseline availability levels that meet the needs of 
customers with a higher interference tolerance.
    Decision. The Commission agrees with SpaceX that an inefficient 
incumbent system design should not unreasonably hamper future entry. 
Further, the Commission has reviewed the SpaceX study and finds that 
the data, assumptions, and methodology employed are reasonable and note 
that, although O3b has commented that the study could be expanded upon 
using different system parameters, no commenter objects to the data, 
assumptions, or methodology SpaceX used. While O3b's formula shows 
protection of links with baseline availabilities as low as 97 percent, 
its formula inherently recognizes that lower performing links should 
receive less protection and does not specifically justify or 
technically support requiring protection of links below 99.0 percent 
availability. Rather, the Commission concurs with SpaceX that a 99.0 
percent link availability without the interferer at a C/N threshold of 
0 dB is a reasonable minimum benchmark to guard against the risk of 
low-performing incumbent links. The Commission therefore will require 
this benchmark as a minimum value to be incorporated into an inter-
round compatibility showing to demonstrate compliance with the long-
term and short-term interference metrics adopted above.
4. Additional Interference Metrics
i. Loss of Synchronization
    Further Notice. The Further Notice also asked whether additional 
means are needed to protect earlier-round systems against loss of 
synchronization due to potentially high levels of short-term 
interference.
    Comments. Most commenters on this issue oppose including additional 
criteria to protect against loss of synchronization. Telesat argues 
that doing so is unnecessary because in modern satellite systems the 
concept of link unavailability also protects against the loss of 
synchronization as long as an appropriate C/N objective is chosen. 
Kuiper states that including such a protection criteria would undermine 
incentives for a resilient design of modems and receivers and result in 
a less efficient spectrum sharing framework. Kuiper additionally 
maintains that any issues an incumbent may have regarding 
synchronization loss is best addressed in good-faith coordination with 
new entrants. Commenters also note that information on the particular 
modems used by incumbents, which is required to determine a protection 
criteria necessary to prevent loss of synchronization for a particular 
system, is not typically disclosed in domestic or international 
filings. Kuiper suggests the appropriate way to address particularized 
interference concerns of a given incumbent is not through systematic 
changes to the methodology but instead through operator-to-operator 
coordination.
    Two commenters support requiring later-round operators to 
specifically protect against an incumbent's loss of synchronization, 
arguing that consideration of loss of synchronization does not render 
analyses overly complex, and that when information has been shared 
pursuant to good-faith coordination, the consideration of these 
additional metrics is straightforward and can ensure protection of a 
variety of NGSO system designs and service characteristics. OneWeb also 
argues the Commission should account for short-term degraded throughput 
events where an operator may experience high levels of degradation 
causing a modem to lose synchronization or suffer other critical 
errors. OneWeb argues that loss of synchronization should be a required 
metric in any compatibility showing to ensure that operators have a 
complete picture of the interference environment if operators cannot 
achieve a coordination agreement.
    Decision. The Commission declines to mandate new entrants protect 
incumbent systems against loss of synchronization, or incorporate a 
short-term degraded throughput metric, beyond the protections afforded 
by the long-term and short-term interference protection criteria the 
Commission adopts above. The Commission agrees with commenters who 
argue that doing so would risk incentivizing inefficient system 
designs, including the choices of modems and receivers that are not 
capable of quickly re-establishing synchronization in a shared spectrum 
environment. The Commission also agrees with Telesat that doing so is 
unnecessary because a limit on the increase in link unavailability also 
protects against the loss of synchronization. In addition, requiring 
new entrants to meet such protection criteria that are defined solely 
by incumbents, to address particular interference sensitivities of 
incumbent systems, outside of protections mutually agreed in 
coordination, would create uncertainty for new entrants and could 
unduly restrain new entry and competition.
ii. Carrier-to-Noise Objectives
    Further Notice. The Further Notice sought specific comment on 
whether an earlier-round operator should be able to specify two C/N 
objectives--one relative to the C/N level below which the victim modem 
would lose signal lock with the satellite and another relative to the 
C/N level below which the victim link would become unavailable because 
it is not able to offer the minimum wanted throughput.
    Comments. Several commenters on this issue support the Commission 
adopting a single minimum C/N objective relative to link 
unavailability, rather than include multiple C/N objectives such as one 
below which the victim modem would lose lock. SpaceX proposes the 
Commission adopt a reference C/N threshold between -3 dB and 0 dB, 
because this range accounts for both real modem performance and the 
modulation and coding rates of broadband satellite waveforms within a 
reasonable margin. O3b suggests the Commission specify 0 dB as the 
standard C/N level to account for the threshold performance that 
efficient modems should be capable of achieving. Noting that the 
commonly used adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) standard DVB-S2X can 
demodulate

[[Page 100906]]

signals with C/N levels as low as -3 dB, Intelsat recommends the 
required minimum C/N value should align with ACM standards and should 
accurately reflect the earlier NGSO system's requirements.
    Several commenters also oppose allowing an incumbent to specify an 
additional C/N level below which its modem would lose lock, because 
doing so could invite gamesmanship, or otherwise require information on 
all of the potential modems and receivers used by the incumbent system, 
details of which are not typically available through publicly available 
filings. Kuiper argues that accounting for this factor in interference 
analyses could undermine incentives for a resilient design of modems 
and receivers, whereas rejecting proposals to account for link loss 
will require operators that choose designs ill-suited for a shared-
spectrum environment to ``internalize the costs of their decisions.''
    O3b, however, argues the Commission should allow an earlier-round 
operator to justify a system-specific alternative minimum C/N threshold 
by identifying, subject to reasonable explanation and support, the 
required C/N level needed to maintain link usability. O3b argues these 
C/N values would typically be incorporated into coordination 
discussions, so later-round systems should be aware of the earlier-
authorized operators' protection requirements.
    Decision. The Commission agrees with the general consensus on the 
record that reference C/N threshold values of between -3 dB and 0 dB 
are appropriate to account for the performance of efficient, modern 
modems and receivers. The Commission will adopt a C/N value of 0 dB 
that must be used in a compatibility showing with an earlier-round 
system as proposed by O3b and within the ranges supported by SpaceX and 
Intelsat as it reflects a reasonable, upper-limit for modern NGSO 
systems. The Commission also concludes that allowing an incumbent to 
specify an additional C/N level below which the victim modem would lose 
lock, if it is more sensitive than this range, could reward inefficient 
system designs at the expense of more competitive new entry. The 
Commission therefore declines O3b's proposal to require later-round 
grantees to demonstrate they will meet any alternative incumbent-
specified C/N level needed to maintain lock. Nonetheless, operators in 
coordination will be free to discuss and agree upon the use of other C/
N levels when concluding a coordination agreement that leaves both 
parties better off than would operating under any submitted 
compatibility showing.
iii. Aggregate Interference
    Further Notice. The Further Notice also noted concerns about 
aggregate interference from multiple NGSO systems. The Commission 
invited comment on whether to set a limit on permissible aggregate 
interference from later-round systems into earlier-round systems. The 
Commission also asked whether the Commission should expect that there 
will be a maximum number of NGSO FSS systems that can be accommodated 
in a given frequency band and if so, how that should affect any inter-
round protection criteria and the opening of additional processing 
rounds. Finally, the Commission inquired as to how the degraded 
throughput methodology should accommodate multiple NGSO systems that 
span multiple processing rounds.
    Comments. Most commenters on the issue of aggregate interference 
limits oppose them as unworkable and unnecessary. Commenters argue that 
setting aggregate interference limits is unnecessary for several 
reasons. As an initial matter, Mangata argues that the primary concern 
with respect to interference between NGSO systems is the occurrence of 
inline interference events, and the probability of an inline event 
involving multiple NGSO systems, with all the varying constellation 
designs and the resulting look angles, is very low. As such, Mangata 
contends that per-system limits established in this proceeding will be 
sufficient to mitigate any such concerns. Second, commenters argue that 
both advances in technology and the use of increasingly higher-
frequency bands should make it possible for more operators to coexist 
within a band than is otherwise possible today. Third, commenters argue 
that required coordination or spectrum-splitting among later-round 
operators should further reduce the expected aggregate interference.
    Commenters also argue there is no demonstrated need on the record 
to adopt aggregate interference threshold for now. Kuiper notes that, 
given the long deployment timelines of NGSO FSS systems, such aggregate 
interference would not manifest for years--giving the Commission ample 
time to address this issue should it actually arise. Some commenters 
therefore recommend the Commission defer consideration of aggregate 
interference levels for protecting earlier round systems until there is 
more real-world data that can be evaluated to determine the effect of 
aggregate interference on individual system operations.
    Commenters further state that numerous implementation questions 
remain unsettled which would also make it difficult to enforce 
aggregate interference criteria, and this uncertainty raises the 
question of whether and how the Commission would administer an 
aggregate framework for NGSO sharing when the number of potential 
systems is perpetually in flux. Indeed, commenters state there is 
currently no known basis for any later-round applicant even to measure 
aggregate interference that might result from the combined operations 
of multiple systems.
    Commenters also dispute that establishing aggregate interference 
limits is a prerequisite to establishing per-system limits, and further 
dispute that per-system limits should be derived by simply dividing the 
aggregate limit among the number of later-round systems, because doing 
so assumes that each system contributes equally to aggregate 
interference. They argue such an assumption ``defies reality'' and 
``would significantly overstate actual interference'' because 
``cumulative interference could only result where multiple satellites 
communicate with earth stations at the same location, with the same 
frequency, and at the same time.'' Commenters further note that some 
authorized systems may not deploy.
    Commenters also raise concerns with adopting an aggregate 
interference limit in the context of the Commission's licensing regime 
for NGSO FSS systems. SpaceX argues the Commission cannot adopt an 
aggregate interference cap under its current processing round framework 
because the number of NGSO systems that will deploy in a given 
processing round and spectrum band is uncertain and highly variable. 
Kuiper contends that, given the Commission has adopted a framework 
designed to promote coordination and efficient coexistence, it would be 
irrational to adopt an aggregate limit on the assumption that parties 
neither coordinate nor take measures to efficiently share spectrum. 
Kuiper also suggests that the same arguments raised in favor of an 
aggregate cap on interference could be made to cap the number of 
applicants in a single processing round, where more applicants in a 
processing round can mean reduced spectrum access for any given 
licensee required to share spectrum on equal terms with 
contemporaneously licensed systems. Intelsat warns that adopting an 
aggregate interference cap would be an

[[Page 100907]]

end-run around the purposes of the sunset framework the Commission just 
adopted, which are to promote competition and to encourage NGSO 
operators to innovate and use spectrum more efficiently.
    Importantly, SpaceX warns that ``an aggregate cap on interference 
would involve arbitrary line-drawing that risks stifling new NGSO 
system entry,'' and numerous other commenters make similar statements. 
Instead, these commenters argue that NGSO systems can account for the 
total interference environment within their private negotiations, and 
that the Commission has determined in other contexts that operators 
themselves could account for aggregate interference concerns as a part 
of good-faith coordination.
    A minority of commenters do express support for the adoption of 
aggregate interference limits. OneWeb argues the establishment of 
aggregate limits on interference into NGSO FSS systems is a 
prerequisite to establishing per-system limits, and that failing to 
adopt aggregate limits could result in more systems being authorized 
than can reasonably be accommodated. OneWeb suggests the Commission 
could accept operators in an initial processing round ``up to'' the 
established aggregate limit and, once those systems deploy, or fail to 
do so, the Commission could determine the number of additional systems 
that can be supported in later processing rounds. Considering 
degradation due to rain fade and other sources of interference, OneWeb 
argues that an aggregate limit of 2.5 to 3.85 percent time-weighted 
average degraded throughput should be given to all NGSO FSS systems.
    Viasat suggests the Commission develop aggregate interference 
limits by defining the total amount of interference that any individual 
NGSO system should be expected to tolerate, then allocating this amount 
between different NGSO FSS systems and processing rounds, while 
ensuring adequate opportunities for additional market entry. Viasat 
argues an acceptable aggregate interference limit, including all 
interference sources (NGSO, GSO, and terrestrial), would be less than 
0.05 percent. ViaSat notes that aggregate interference limits on NGSO 
FSS systems have been adopted to protect GSO networks, though there 
remains no mechanism for allocating the overall interference budget 
between different NGSO operators.
    ITIF suggests the Commission could apply an aggregate limit to 
later-round systems, which would be divided equally among the later-
round systems that actually deploy. TechFreedom also argues the 
Commission should consider how many NGSO systems a given frequency band 
support, but states it is premature to do so based on the current 
record.
    Decision. The Commission declines to adopt limits on aggregate 
interference into an NGSO FSS system. First, there has been no 
demonstration of a need for such limits at this time. No second-round 
system is required to deploy its full constellation until 2029 at the 
earliest. Indeed, some proposed systems may never deploy their 
authorized number of satellites, or deploy any satellites at all. Even 
if the Commission felt it appropriate to adopt aggregate interference 
limits from later-round systems at this time, the Commission agrees 
with Kuiper, among others, that unresolved questions remain as to the 
derivation of any aggregate limits. The Commission also disagrees with 
OneWeb that a simplistic, worst-case assumption of multiplying the 
single-entry limit by six operational NGSO FSS systems reflects a 
realistic assessment of the interference environment because it fails 
to account for mitigation techniques or other spectrum-sharing measures 
that may be applied by the NGSO FSS systems and reduce their overall 
aggregate impact. Nor does the Commission agree with OneWeb that the 
Commission should adopt aggregate interference limits to prevent ``more 
operators being granted authorizations to operate in a given band than 
can reasonably be accommodated.'' The Commission's experience has shown 
that not all authorized systems deploy their fully planned 
constellations, if they deploy at all. The recent generation of NGSO 
FSS systems has shown to be iterative in nature, with companies filing 
for systems in the first and second processing rounds, and using 
techniques like adaptive coding and modulation to adapt to changing 
spectrum environments. Blocking new entry while the Commission waits to 
see which NGSO FSS systems will deploy, out of a fear of future 
aggregate interference that may never arise, would artificially and 
unreasonably inhibit competition to the benefit of some incumbents but 
contrary to the public interest. Should a demonstrated need arise in 
the future, the Commission may revisit the question of aggregate 
limits. And, of course, operators are free to discuss and agree upon 
ways to account for any aggregate interference effects during their 
good-faith coordination discussions.
5. Other Sources of Interference in Baseline
    Further Notice. The Further Notice invited specific comment on how 
to determine the appropriate baseline for the earlier-round system, and 
whether it should include existing sources of interference, such as 
interference from GSO networks or intra-system interference. The 
Commission also inquired whether a degraded throughput methodology 
should compare an incumbent's baseline level of performance given only 
natural degradation to that same incumbent's expected performance given 
only a single new entrant's operations, or whether the comparison 
should include the operations of multiple new entrants.
i. GSO Interference
    Comments. Most commenters on this issue oppose including GSO 
interference in the baseline calculation. Commenters argue that 
including additional degradations in the baseline from interference due 
to GSO networks could overly complicate the analysis because there is 
no standardized model for such interference and no clear way to impute 
such interference across all systems given the different approaches 
NGSO systems employ to address GSO interference. Commenters also note 
that the Commission has set aside certain portions of the Ka-band in 
which GSO networks must protect NGSO systems, and argue that 
``[e]xisting NGSO operators should not be penalized for being subject 
to interference from secondary GSO networks.''
    Intelsat, however, supports including GSO interference in the 
baseline calculation. Intelsat argues that failing to account for all 
noise sources that contribute to the overall noise an NGSO system 
experiences will ultimately lead to the overprotection of earlier-round 
systems and, as a result, artificially reduce competition among NGSO 
satellite services. Intelsat argues the specific level of existing 
noise to be accounted for in each frequency range should be as accurate 
as possible and based on services deployed in that frequency range, 
which will vary depending both on the Commission's rules that apply in 
the bands and on the intensity with which the bands are used. While 
conceding that GSO noise still needs to be modeled and developed to 
ensure that it is accurately represented, Intelsat argues there are 
likely baseline metrics that can be used in all or most scenarios to 
simulate GSO interference for which NGSO operators must account. 
Intelsat suggests the Commission need not define the metric

[[Page 100908]]

for inter-system interference from existing GSO systems because the 
party conducting the analysis can determine whether to include this 
element and provide any necessary justification for that choice.
    Decision. The Commission declines to incorporate GSO interference 
into the baseline. The Commission acknowledges that omitting existing 
sources of interference in the baseline, such as GSO interference, will 
tend to underestimate the interference experienced by an incumbent. 
However, the Commission disagrees with Intelsat that parties should be 
able to create and use their own metric for GSO interference affecting 
the incumbent's baseline in order to ease their burden of demonstrating 
compliance with the required interference limits. The Commission is 
concerned that Intelsat's proposal, in the absence of an agreed model 
or clear way to impute such interference across all NGSO FSS systems, 
and the need to carefully consider GSO deployments and regulatory 
frameworks in different frequency bands, would create unnecessary 
disputes that would be time-consuming for Commission staff to assess 
and strain the Commission's limited resources. Accordingly, the 
Commission concludes that any alleged benefit of incorporating GSO 
interference into the baseline does not outweigh the burdens on parties 
and Commission staff in determining the appropriate way to incorporate 
such interference at this time. Parties are free to explore such 
interference effects during the detailed information sharing and 
discussions that accompany good-faith coordination among NGSO FSS 
operators, and which, the Commission finds, ultimately lead to the most 
efficient use of spectrum by the concerned operators.
ii. Intra-System Interference
    Comments. Most commenters on this issue also oppose including 
intra-system interference in the baseline. These commenters state that 
satellite operators do not routinely disclose how they mitigate intra-
system interference because such mitigation techniques have little to 
no impact on the operations of other constellations, may be 
competitively sensitive, and change with user needs. Kuiper argues that 
requiring consideration of intra-system interference would either leave 
new entrants to guess how each incumbent addresses intra-system 
interference, inviting inaccuracy and dispute, or necessitate an 
unnecessary and potentially intrusive mandate to share such 
information. Kuiper suggests that an administrable degraded throughput 
methodology is likely to omit several existing noise sources, such as 
intra-system interference and interference from other NGSO FSS 
operators, given the practical difficulties of faithfully incorporating 
such factors into the analysis.
    Intelsat, however, again argues that the earlier-round system's 
performance baseline should consider all realistic sources of noise 
degradation, including intra-system degradations. Intelsat contends 
that intra-system interference and non-time-varying sources could be 
standardized to a single value, and notes that ITU Resolution 770 uses 
1 dB of margin to account for these cases. Intelsat asserts that intra-
system noise is a critical factor that should be included in 
compatibility analyses and argues there is no technical reason not to 
account for intra-system noise as a realistic assumption that would 
improve sharing among NGSOs.
    Decision. The Commission declines to incorporate intra-system 
interference into the baseline. Given that information on intra-system 
interference changes with user needs, the Commission is concerned that 
incorporating such interference into the baseline would create 
additional disputes between parties, and burdens on the Commission's 
limited staff resources in resolving those disputes, in the absence of 
a clear way to incorporate such interference into the baseline. 
Further, the record is not sufficiently developed to determine whether 
the 1 dB margin used to account for intra-system interference and non-
time-varying sources with respect to interference into GSO networks in 
V-band under ITU Resolution 770 would be appropriate to systems in 
other frequency bands. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that any 
alleged benefit of incorporating intra-system interference into the 
baseline does not outweigh the burdens on parties and Commission staff 
in determining the appropriate way to incorporate such interference at 
this time. Parties in coordination are free to explore such 
interference effects during their detailed information sharing and 
discussions.
iii. Interference From Other NGSO FSS Systems
    Comments. The only specific comments on this issue supported 
comparing an incumbent's baseline against its expected performance 
given the operations of a single (rather than multiple) new entrant. In 
particular, Kuiper argues that, while accounting for the noise 
environment an incumbent faces because of other incumbent NGSO FSS 
operators may make the analysis more accurate, the burden of increased 
complexity outweighs any benefit of this accuracy. Rather, Kuiper 
argues the Commission should follow the path taken by satellite 
operators in coordination--to model only the incumbent and new 
entrant's systems. Kuiper states that instead of ignoring interference 
from other NGSO FSS systems, the Commission can account for it when 
establishing an interference threshold and recognize that excluding 
this interference makes any threshold that it adopts more conservative 
and protective than it appears.
    Decision. The Commission declines to require compatibility analyses 
to include effects of multiple NGSO FSS systems in the baseline 
interference of the incumbent system because doing so could create 
uncertainty and disputes, with accompanying strain on the Commission's 
limited staff resources to assess those disputes, as to which 
additional NGSO FSS systems should be considered in a given analysis 
and how their effects should be incorporated in the analysis. 
Accordingly, the Commission conclude that any alleged benefit of 
incorporating interference from multiple NGSO FSS systems into the 
baseline does not outweigh the burdens on parties and Commission staff 
in determining the appropriate way to incorporate such interference at 
this time. Although including this interference is not common in 
operator's own coordination discussions, parties in coordination are 
free to explore such interference effects during their detailed 
information sharing and discussions.
6. Rain Attenuation
    Further Notice. The Commission also asked how rain fade conditions 
in different locations should be incorporated into the degraded 
throughput analysis, how many locations should be evaluated, and 
whether any locations should include sites outside the United States.
    Comments. Most commenters on this issue support using three 
geographically diverse locations within the United States for 
application of a rain attenuation standard, one for each of low, medium 
and high rain rates. These commenters assert that using three data 
points will provide sufficient scope for an interference assessment, 
while at the same time not demanding an analysis that could become 
unwieldly with an excessive number of data points. SpaceX contends that 
these locations should reflect the actual deployments of earlier-round 
systems and, where possible, rely on locations that operators

[[Page 100909]]

jointly establish in good-faith coordination.
    Intelsat argues that four to five sites located within the United 
States in representative geographic areas with different rain rates 
``should suffice.'' O3b proposes that the Commission require parties to 
employ at least four different latitudes between 10 degrees and 70 
degrees North Latitude as test points in the analysis and consider a 
range of rain conditions at each latitude.
    Additionally, several commenters recommend that the Commission 
require operators to use a common rain-attenuation model that 
references attenuation characteristics from the latest versions of 
Recommendations ITU-R P.618 and P.676.
    SpaceX also argues that the Commission should standardize the rain 
fade conditions that represent the low, medium, and high rain 
attenuation conditions for NGSO system deployments, and proposes to 
define low rain areas as having <=30 mm/hr, moderate rain areas as 
having 40-50 mm/hr, and high rain areas as having >=80 mm/hr. O3b 
similarly suggests rain rates for 0.01 percent of an average year that 
vary between dry (20-30 millimeters/hour) to wet (up to 80 millimeters/
hour).
    Finally, Intelsat argues that, to account for other link losses, 
the Commission should either calculate the non-precipitation impairment 
values using the methodology specified in Recommendation ITU-R P.618 or 
use a standardized approach to these additional degradations.
    Decision. The Commission declines to mandate specific rain fade 
assumptions to be used in an inter-round compatibility analysis. 
Rather, the Commission will assess rain fade assumptions on a case-by-
case basis as to whether they are reliable and representative. While 
the Commission concludes based upon review of the record that inter-
round compatibility analyses with three geographically diverse 
locations at various latitudes within the United States may be 
sufficient in many cases for application of a rain attenuation standard 
(one for each of low, medium and high rain rates), the Commission will 
assess rain fade assumptions, including the number of locations, on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether they are reliable and 
representative.
    The Commission agrees with the majority of commenters on this issue 
that three locations would typically provide sufficient scope for the 
analysis without overburdening it because three locations will allow 
for the selection of sites with each of low, medium, and high rain 
rates. But regardless of the number of locations assumed (whether three 
or more or less than three), the operator submitting an inter-round 
compatibility analysis must demonstrate that the number of locations 
assumed is reliable and representative given the assumed operations of 
the earlier-round system. For example, if an earlier-round system 
operated only in a geographically limited area, such as at high 
latitudes, then a later-round operator might reasonably use location 
and rain fade assumptions that reflect the actual service area of the 
earlier-round system even if less than three locations. Similarly, to 
ensure the most accurate modeling, these locations can reflect the 
actual coverage of earlier-round systems and, where possible, rely on 
locations that operators jointly establish in good-faith coordination 
discussions.
    The Commission will also assess the rain attenuation model used in 
an inter-round compatibility analysis on a case-by-case basis as to 
whether it is reliable and representative. As an illustrative example, 
a party preparing an inter-round protection showing may model rain 
attenuation as per the current versions of ITU-R Recommendations P.618-
14 and P.676-13, as recommended by commenters, and specify the rain 
fade conditions that represent the low, medium, and high rain 
attenuation conditions for NGSO system deployments, with rain rates for 
0.01 percent of an average year in low rain areas as <=30 mm/hr, in 
moderate rain areas as 40-50 mm/hr, and in high rain areas as >=80 mm/
hr. The Commission will assess such rain fade assumptions on a case-by-
case basis as to whether they are reliable and representative. Finally, 
as an illustrative example, a party might use Recommendation ITU-R 
P.618 to account for other link losses and will assess its 
appropriateness on a case-by-case basis, considering how these other 
link losses are treated in coordination and similar contexts and their 
particular applicability to the cases studied.
7. Standardized Parameters
    Further Notice. The Further Notice inquired as to whether the 
Commission should use standardized antenna patterns and noise 
temperatures for the computation of C/(I+N) in a degraded throughput 
method.
    Comments. Commenters supporting standardized parameters argue that 
the Commission should allow later-round applicants to use certain 
default system parameters for earlier-round applicants that reflect a 
baseline of accepted system performance, below which the earlier-round 
applicant should not be entitled to protection.
    SpaceX argues that establishing default parameter values will 
ensure that compatibility showings uniformly implement the best 
practices of efficient NGSO systems when the parties and the Commission 
lack access to operational information. SpaceX also argues that default 
parameter values will give notice to operators that any sharing 
framework will not accommodate filings or system designs that are based 
on inefficiencies intended to block competition.
    Intelsat also argues the Commission should also adopt or clarify 
the nominal or standard earth station parameters that should be used 
where the information is not provided in the operator's authorization 
and not already provided for in the Commission's rules.
    Commenters propose specific operational assumptions the Commission 
could standardize, including: assuming earth stations from the victim 
and the interfering systems are collocated for both uplink and downlink 
cases; considering satellite beams of the selected satellites as 
pointing toward the earth station location in both uplink and downlink 
cases; for uplink cases, considering only one interferer location at 
each time step; and implementing one-second time step durations in the 
analysis.
    Intelsat further proposes that, absent information on an 
incumbent's tracking strategy, later-round grantees should default to 
using random selection as the tracking strategy to determine the 
available satellites that meet other operational parameters such as 
minimum elevation angle, GSO exclusion angle, and Nco (the maximum 
number of beams which can be illuminated simultaneously in the 
polarization considered).
    SpaceX recommends reference parameters for downlinks and uplinks 
that operators should use when operational information is missing or 
incomplete. As standardized downlink parameters, SpaceX proposes an 
earth station receive noise temperature of 200K and satellite antenna 
patterns contained in Recommendation ITU-R S.1528. As standardized 
uplink parameters, SpaceX proposes a satellite receive noise 
temperature of 500K, earth station antenna diameters of 2.4m (gateway) 
and 1.0m (user terminal), and earth station antenna patterns contained 
in the ITU Radio Regulations Appendix 8, Annex 3.
    Intelsat also suggests the Commission should standardize the method 
and waveform used for the conversion from C/N values to spectral 
efficiency, and

[[Page 100910]]

suggests using the method defined in Section 2.3 of the Annex of 
Recommendation ITU-R S.2131-1, which considers a DVB-S2X waveform and 
is widely used in the satellite industry.
    OneWeb, however, opposes making use of standardized parameters, 
arguing that the parameters for NGSO FSS systems vary widely and 
default NGSO system or earth station parameters are unlikely to 
effectively protect incumbent operators. In particular, OneWeb 
disagrees with considering only collocated earth stations. OneWeb 
asserts that this is an oversimplification and that aggregate 
interference of multiple stations within the same interfering system 
also needs to be addressed. Additionally, OneWeb opposes a standardized 
practice of considering only one interferer location at each time step, 
claiming that the interference potential could be underestimated if 
multiple earth stations are not accounted for and that earth station 
deployment models can be addressed in detailed coordination.
    Decision. The Commission declines to mandate specific parameters 
and assumptions to be used in an inter-round compatibility analysis. 
Rather, the Commission will assess these parameters and assumptions on 
a case-by-case basis as to whether they are reliable and 
representative. To facilitate the work of new entrants in preparing the 
showings and Commission staff and incumbents in reviewing them, the 
Commission lists below illustrative examples of parameters and 
assumptions that operators might consider using in any necessary 
compatibility showings:
    (1) assume earth stations from the victim and the interfering 
systems are collocated for both uplink and downlink cases;
    (2) consider satellite beams of the selected satellites as pointing 
toward the earth station location in both uplink and downlink cases;
    (3) for uplink cases, consider only one interferer location at each 
time step;
    (4) implement one-second time step durations in the analysis;
    (5) use of the method and waveform for the conversion from C/N 
values to spectral efficiency method defined in Section 2.3 of the 
Annex of Recommendation ITU-R S.2131-1;
    (6) assume earth station antenna diameters of 2.4m (gateway) and 
1.0m (user terminal);
    (7) use the earth station antenna patterns contained in the ITU 
Radio Regulations Appendix 8, Annex 3;
    (8) assume an earth station receive noise temperature of 200K;
    (9) use the satellite antenna patterns contained in Recommendation 
ITU-R S.1528;
    (10) assume a satellite receive noise temperature of 500K; and
    (11) assume random selection as the tracking strategy to determine 
the available satellites that meet other operational parameters such as 
minimum elevation angle, GSO exclusion angle, and Nco.
    The Commission concludes that providing these illustrative examples 
of parameters and methodological approaches could make the preparation 
and review of compatibility analyses less burdensome and could avert 
unnecessary disputes among operators. The Commission emphasizes, 
however, that the Commission will assess these parameters and 
assumptions on a case-by-case basis as to whether they are reliable and 
representative, including by considering any alternative publicly 
available information or information that the incumbent provides during 
operator-to-operator coordination and any justifications raised by the 
parties. For example, the Commission will assess on a case-by-case 
basis whether it is appropriate for parties to assume that earth 
stations are collocated and to consider only one interferer location at 
each time step, including as it may be necessary due to the absence of 
detailed earth station deployment models and satellite receiving beams 
layout. The Commission believes that a case-by-case approach, in 
combination with the list of illustrative example parameters above 
taken from the record, will provide parties appropriate flexibility in 
tailoring their analyses while facilitating the preparation of these 
analyses by new entrants.
8. Use of Information Gained Through Coordination
    Further Notice. The Further Notice sought comment on what other 
technical data is needed to appropriately evaluate degraded throughput 
effects, and how the Commission can ensure that any degraded throughput 
analysis appropriately protects the specific characteristics of an NGSO 
system's operations, including what role Schedule S information should 
play in the analysis.
    Comments. Commenters agree that as part of the good faith 
coordination among NGSO FSS operators required by the Commission, 
operators share technical and operational information about their 
systems, which is a better reflection of their actual or planned 
operations than can be drawn solely from information in the public 
record. Commenters therefore support the Commission allowing later-
round operators to use operational information gained during 
coordination to enhance the accuracy of their compatibility showings 
with an earlier-round system, and to submit such showings to the 
Commission on a confidential basis, allowing the earlier-round operator 
to review the showing to ensure the information exchanged in good-faith 
coordination is properly represented and analyzed while preventing 
competing operators from viewing potentially commercially sensitive 
operational data.
    Commenters disagree, however, on whether later-round operators 
should be required to use more realistic operational information gained 
during coordination in their compatibility showings whenever possible, 
or whether later-round operators should have the choice of using either 
public or private data on the earlier-round system. Both sides raise 
the prospect of gamesmanship--if there is a requirement to use private 
data, the earlier-round operator could selectively provide system 
details that make it appear more sensitive to interference while 
omitting details that could facilitate sharing; while if there is the 
option, but no requirement, a later-round could choose any combination 
of public or private information to ease its compatibility showing, 
even public information that, commenters agree, may not reflect actual 
operations. Kuiper argues that, if later-round systems are given the 
option of using public or private information, the earlier-round 
operator will still have the opportunity to review the showing and 
comment on the appropriateness of the parameters used. SpaceX also 
notes that later-round operators may need to disclose confidential 
parameters in any compatibility studies before the Commission to show 
compliance with backstop interference values, supporting the disclosure 
of parameters as needed to maximize efficient spectrum sharing.
    Decision. The Commission agrees with commenters that the use of 
operational information shared during coordination should enhance the 
accuracy of compatibility showings, and will allow later-round 
operators to base their analyses on such information to the extent it 
is available and permitted by the incumbent operator to be reflected in 
a compatibility analysis submitted to the Commission. Analyses based on 
operational information shared during coordination may be submitted on 
a confidential basis when satisfying the requirements of the 
Commission's confidentiality rules (assuming the

[[Page 100911]]

incumbent operator has permitted this information to be reflected in a 
compatibility analysis). However, the Commission agrees with Kuiper 
that later-round operators should have the flexibility to use publicly 
available parameters of the earlier-round system, even if alternative 
parameters are provided in coordination, and to justify that decision 
when submitting a compatibility analysis. The Commission will assess 
the use of publicly available information in these instances on a case-
by-case basis to determine if the analysis is adequately representative 
of the earlier-round system, considering as well any arguments that the 
later-round operator has selectively used publicly available 
information to its advantage to ease its protection showing. In 
addition, because the incumbent's privately shared operational data may 
be used in a compatibility analysis submitted to the Commission only if 
it consents to such use, the Commission does not believe that allowing 
use of such data will disincentivize information sharing during 
coordination, especially where the incumbent`s consent may be 
contingent upon sharing the information on a confidential basis.
9. Incorporation of Deployment Milestones Into Compatibility Analyses
    Comments. Several commenters note that when the operator of a 
later-round NGSO FSS system is preparing a compatibility showing for an 
earlier-round system, the earlier-round system may not yet be fully 
deployed and, indeed, may never fully deploy or deploy at all. 
Commenters argue that later-round operators should be given the 
flexibility to provide compatibility analyses based either on the 
number of satellites at the 50 or 100 percent deployment milestones of 
the earlier-round system, whichever has yet to be achieved, or on the 
``number of satellites actually deployed'' and operating. Commenters 
suggest that later-round operators should not be held to the parameters 
of such showings before the actual deployment of the earlier-round 
system, and that later-round operators should be able to update their 
showings to account for later deployments, if not accounted for in the 
initial analysis.
    SpaceX, for example, argues that accounting for milestone 
requirements in compatibility analyses would better reflect the 
operational realities of NGSO systems and better calibrate the need for 
regulatory certainty with opportunities for new entry. SpaceX also 
argues that accounting for deployment milestones in compatibility 
showings better accommodates the interference risk to earlier-round 
systems as they grow and change, given that NGSO operators frequently 
file modifications as they build out systems that differ from those 
initially authorized. SpaceX further asserts that by emphasizing the 
deployment milestone requirements, the Commission can encourage 
earlier-round systems to share higher-fidelity information about their 
near-term deployment plans for new satellite launches to ensure 
protection for those satellites.
    Decision. The Commission agrees that later-round NGSO FSS operators 
should not be restrained by a requirement to protect not yet deployed 
earlier-round systems. At the same time, the Commission is cautious 
about permitting compatibility analyses considering solely the number 
of deployed satellites at a given time, which may need to be updated 
with each subsequent launch of an earlier-round system and consume 
unnecessary resources for the earlier-round operator, and Commission 
staff to review. Therefore, the Commission will permit compatibility 
analyses to consider only the deployment configuration of the earlier-
round system at the six-year, 50 percent milestone if this milestone 
has not yet been met. If the 50 percent deployment milestone has been 
met, compatibility analyses must consider the fully deployed system. In 
the event the earlier-round system misses a milestone and its 
authorization is automatically reduced to the number of satellites 
deployed on the date of the missed milestone, compatibility analyses 
need only consider the number of actually deployed satellites.
10. Mitigation Techniques
    Further Notice. The Further Notice also asked what mitigation 
techniques would be appropriate for a later-round system to implement 
in the event that any protection criteria were not otherwise satisfied 
in a compatibility showing.
    Comments. Commenters on this issue agree that the Commission should 
not limit the mitigation techniques available to a new entrant where 
its constellation would otherwise exceed the interference thresholds, 
though some commenters specifically note that, once an operator commits 
to using certain mitigation techniques, it should be held to that 
commitment through licensing conditions.
    Decision. The Commission concurs that elaborating a list of 
appropriate mitigation techniques could unnecessarily restrict operator 
flexibility and spectral efficiency, and therefore will not limit the 
potential mitigation techniques that can be employed. Further, the 
Commission agrees that, when mitigation techniques are used as a basis 
for demonstrating compatibility with an earlier-round system, the 
later-round system will be required to employ those mitigation 
techniques to the extent necessary to protect the earlier-round 
system's actual operations.
11. Timing of Acceptance of Compatibility Showings
    Comments. Some commenters argue that the Commission should refuse 
to accept a compatibility showing from a later-round operator until the 
operator makes a ``valid prior coordination attempt'' with the earlier-
round operator, or until ``after coordination has failed.'' Mangata 
notes that the Commission's rules already require good faith 
coordination among all NGSO FSS grantees and argues the Commission 
``need not exclude valid degraded throughput analyses to enforce 
coordination since engaging in such coordination efforts is already 
required.''
    Decision. The Commission declines to adopt any limit on when a 
later-round NGSO FSS grantee may submit an inter-round compatibility 
analysis based on the state of its coordination with an earlier-round 
operator. Later-round grantees are under an obligation to coordinate in 
good faith with other NGSO FSS operators, before and after submission 
of any compatibility showings. The Commission does not believe it would 
be productive to codify, and potentially adjudicate, a requirement that 
later-round operators coordinate ``enough'' before the Commission will 
review a demonstration that their operations will be compatible with an 
earlier-round operator. Rather, to the extent earlier-round operators 
may be concerned that its operational data will not be used in the 
compatibility showing, they may affirmatively reach out to provide such 
information and, a later-round grantee may not refuse such an offer 
consistent with its obligation to coordinate in good faith.
12. Post-Sunset Sharing Regime
    Further Notice. When adopting a sunset period to accompany the new 
inter-round protection requirement in the Report and Order, the 
Commission determined that, after sunset, new entrants will be subject 
to co-equal spectrum sharing with incumbents. In the absence of a 
coordination agreement, this is accomplished through spectrum-splitting 
when the [Delta]T/T of 6 percent threshold is exceeded. Nonetheless, 
the Further Notice sought

[[Page 100912]]

additional comment on what criteria should be applied among NGSO 
systems after the sunset period.
    Comments. Most commenters on this issue support the Commission's 
initial decision in the Report and Order to apply the default spectrum-
splitting procedure between earlier and later-round systems after 
sunsetting occurs. They argue that placing parties on an equal footing 
under the Commission's default spectrum-splitting rules represents the 
simplest and most reasonable approach to sunsetting, that alternatives 
to spectrum splitting do not have a similar ability to incentivize both 
sides to reach a coordination agreement, and that not applying the 
spectrum-splitting rules equally after sunset would perpetuate a 
stratified spectrum-sharing regime that gives incumbents a permanent 
advantage over later-round grantees.
    SpaceX, which supports applying the Commission's default spectrum-
splitting procedure after the sunset date, nonetheless argues that the 
Commission should ensure that systems with deployment milestones after 
the sunset date do not avoid good-faith coordination simply because 
their deployment commitments extend into the post-sunset regime. While 
SpaceX supports applying the Commission's default spectrum-splitting 
procedure after the sunset date, it proposes a revision to the 
procedure to reward the more efficient system with the first choice in 
a spectrum split, and to apply this backstop both to systems within the 
same processing round and to different-round systems after protections 
sunset.
    Telesat asks the Commission to defer consideration of any revisions 
of the current regime until a later date, when the Commission has 
gained more experience in understanding how NGSO systems can coexist.
    ViaSat, SpaceX, and OneWeb reiterate earlier arguments that the 
Commission should revise the default spectrum-splitting mechanism as it 
applies to systems authorized in the same processing round, but do not 
argue that a different sharing regime should apply between earlier and 
later-round systems following sunset. OneWeb also argues the Commission 
should lengthen the sunset period for later-round operators until they 
have deployed their full systems, and only after consider applying the 
same metrics between prior-round operators and later-round operators.
    Decision. The Commission reaffirms the decision in the Report and 
Order to place earlier and later-round operators on an equal footing 
after the sunset date by applying the default, spectrum-splitting 
mechanism to both sets of operators at that time. Doing so ensures that 
earlier-round advantages do not continue indefinitely, and simplifies 
the regulatory framework when systems authorized through multiple 
processing rounds may be operating. However, the Commission declines to 
adopt proposed changes to the default, spectrum-splitting mechanism 
itself, as applied to systems within a processing round, because such 
changes are beyond the scope of this proceeding. Further, the 
Commission notes that no commenter advocates different treatment of 
later-round operators post-sunset than among earlier-round operators. 
Indeed, the equality of treatment of later-round operators after the 
sunset date is a key component of the sunset provision. And while the 
proposal to lengthen the sunset period for certain operators is also 
beyond the scope of the Further Notice's inquiry, the Commission 
retains the authority to enforce its good-faith coordination 
requirement in cases where a later-round operator with deployment 
milestones after the sunset date is alleged to be avoiding good-faith 
coordination. The Commission expects any such cases to be rare, 
however, because operators receive benefits of reaching stable 
coordination agreements not only in operation but in securing the 
necessary funding for constellation deployments.
13. Digital Equity and Inclusion
    The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to advance digital 
equity for all, including people of color, persons with disabilities, 
persons who live in rural or Tribal areas, and others who are or have 
been historically underserved, marginalized, or adversely affected by 
persistent poverty or inequality, invited comment on any equity-related 
considerations and benefits (if any) that may be associated with the 
proposals and issues discussed in the Further Notice.
    The Commission did not receive specific comment on this topic. 
Nonetheless, the Commission finds that the rule changes in the Second 
Report and Order will continue to encourage a more stable and 
competitive environment for the development of NGSO FSS systems well 
suited to reaching underserved areas with new broadband capacity, and 
therefore that this rulemaking will enhance digital equity and 
inclusion.

A. Order on Reconsideration

    Petition. OneWeb petitions for reconsideration (OneWeb Petition) of 
the sunset period adopted with the inter-round protection requirement 
in the Report and Order. OneWeb specifically requests that the 
Commission partially reconsider the sunset period for first round 
operators because it believes that the Commission failed to consider 
the evidence in the record and applied an unjustifiable sunset period 
to them. In support of its petition, OneWeb makes three principal 
arguments.
    First, OneWeb argues that the Commission effectively reduced the 
sunset period for first-round operators ``by 30 percent'' compared to 
operators in later processing rounds because the 10-year sunset period 
began on the date of the first authorization in a subsequent processing 
round, which occurred in 2020, leading to a sunset period ending in 
2030, whereas the Report and Order that established the sunset date was 
not adopted and released until 2023. OneWeb states this creates an 
``effectively seven-year sunset period for interference protections'' 
for first-round operators. OneWeb argues that such treatment undermines 
the benefit first-round operators should receive for their pioneering 
efforts and that, given the time required to implement technical 
changes in constellation designs and operations, the sunset period 
impairs first-round operators' ability to develop appropriate 
mechanisms to co-exist with later-arriving operators, potentially 
subjecting first-round operators to harmful interference. OneWeb 
further contends that, although the Commission stated in 2017 that it 
would consider NGSO FSS applications filed after the first processing 
round on a ``case-by-case'' basis, OneWeb had no prior reasonable 
expectation that all later-round operators would be entitled to operate 
on a co-equal basis with first-round systems eventually. OneWeb claims 
that the Commission's decision here is contrary to past precedent, 
where it denied Kuiper's waiver request to be treated on an equal basis 
with systems that filed applications within a previous processing 
round. OneWeb also argues that the Commission failed to consider 
relevant information in the record and failed to provide a sufficient 
explanation for its decision.
    Second, OneWeb argues that the consideration of several questions 
in the Further Notice on the technical rules surrounding interference 
protections that affect the sunset period ``further cuts into the 
already shorter sunset period for First Round operators.'' OneWeb 
states these questions include: what protection levels should be 
imposed during and after the sunset period; whether there is a maximum 
number of NGSO systems that can be accommodated in a given frequency

[[Page 100913]]

band; how the number of NGSO systems accommodated should affect inter-
round protection criteria and the opening of different rounds; and what 
``co-equal'' means when established operators are to operate a co-equal 
basis with newer entrants.
    Finally, OneWeb notes that several second-round applications from 
the 2020 processing round remain pending. If granted, the operators 
would have up to nine years to deploy their full constellations under 
the Commission's milestone rules. Therefore, OneWeb argues, the sunset 
of the inter-round protection requirement in 2030 will mean that 
``first-round operators would be protected from interference for little 
or no time after second-round grantees are fully deployed,'' 
``effectively placing the later-arriving operators in the first 
processing round in the context of interference protections'' and 
``remov[ing] any meaningful incentive for second-round operators to 
coordinate with First Round operators.'' OneWeb now requests that the 
Commission specifically establish the sunset for first-round 
protections at ten years from adoption of the Report and Order 
consistent with the notice for subsequent rounds, or at ten years from 
final adoption of the spectrum sharing framework metrics under the 
Further Notice.
    Comments. Kuiper opposed the OneWeb Petition. Kuiper contends that 
it fails to identify any material error in the Report and Order 
warranting reconsideration, and otherwise relies on arguments that the 
Commission has fully considered and rejected or that OneWeb could have 
but did not present earlier in this proceeding.
    Kuiper argues the Commission specifically addressed the question of 
whether the sunset should apply to first-round operators and concluded 
that, as applied, it gave ``incumbent NGSO FSS grantees sufficient time 
to evaluate and adapt to the eventual, equal sharing environment'' and 
that not applying the sunset in this way ``would substantially 
frustrate the purpose of sunsetting by locking in incumbent protections 
that are not assured under the current, case-by-case regime.'' Kuiper 
also states that OneWeb has offered no evidence--either now or before 
the Report and Order was adopted--that a seven-year period would afford 
insufficient time to prepare for co-equal spectrum sharing with second-
round systems, or evidence that the thirteen years OneWeb will have had 
between its market access grant in 2017 and the end of the sunset 
period in 2030 would be insufficient.
    Kuiper states that OneWeb appears to misread the Commission's 
reason for discussing the full deployment milestone, stating that at no 
point does the Commission suggest that it is choosing that milestone as 
a means to protect incumbents--instead, the Commission chose it in 
recognition that once a new entrant has fully deployed its 
constellation, it should generally have the right to co-equal 
treatment. And Kuiper notes that, as the Commission explained in direct 
response to OneWeb's argument, the fact that the full deployment 
milestone for some (or even many) later-round operators will not occur 
until after the 2030 sunset is irrelevant because `` `the speed of 
deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the overall time 
that the incumbents will be protected by systems approved in the later 
processing round.' ''
    Kuiper further states that the Report and Order did not premise the 
adoption of the sunset period on providing inter-round protections 
after second-round systems have fully deployed and are providing 
service, instead reasoning that first-round operators would need some 
``period of time'' after an application had been granted in a new 
processing round to plan for co-equal sharing, and that the ten-year 
period, which would run from the grant of the first license in the next 
processing round, ``appropriately balance[d] the need for stability for 
incumbent operations and the possibility for new entrants to compete on 
an equal footing once they have built out their systems.''
    Kuiper also argues that OneWeb incorrectly assumes that second-
round operators will delay offering any service until they are fully 
deployed, but that even if later-licensed systems did delay offering 
service in this manner, such delay would have no impact on the time 
given to OneWeb to operate with special protections.
    Kuiper further asserts that OneWeb's claim that the decision 
removes ``any meaningful incentive for second-round operators to 
coordinate'' ignores the Commission's thorough treatment of such 
incentives and record evidence that a sunset is likely to enhance the 
incentives for all parties to coordinate. And Kuiper argues that 
OneWeb's argument that it has invested ``billions of dollars'' and 
``made significant financial investments in their next generation 
satellites based on the Commission's framework existing prior to the 
adoption of a sunset period'' ignores the billions of dollars that 
second-round operators have invested in their own systems.
    Kuiper finally argues that none of the questions in the Further 
Notice implicate the length or application of the sunset period to 
first-round operators, and notes that OneWeb itself explicitly told the 
Commission that the ``proposed sunset schedule''--that is, a 2030 
sunset for second-round operators--``affords the Commission time to 
further consider these issues.''
    OneWeb replied to Kuiper's opposition, arguing that the opposition 
fails to counter the issues raised in its petition and reiterating 
arguments in the petition. OneWeb maintains that neither the Report and 
Order nor Kuiper have addressed the disparate treatment of first-round 
operators who have insufficient time to prepare for co-equal spectrum 
sharing. OneWeb contends that Kuiper ignores that the outcome of the 
Further Notice further diminishes first-round operators' time to 
prepare for the ``fully defined regulatory framework'' given that they 
will have to comply with the new rules.
    SpaceX also responded to the OneWeb Petition, arguing that the ten-
year sunset period adopted by the Commission ``strikes the appropriate 
balance'' between incumbents and new entrants but stating that careful 
consideration should be given when incorporating deployment milestones 
for later-round systems to minimize any advantages for operators that 
refuse to coordinate.
    Decision. The Commission dismisses in part and, on alternative and 
independent grounds, deny the OneWeb Petition in full on the merits. 
Under Sec.  1.429(l)(3) of the Commission rules, the Commission may 
dismiss a petition for reconsideration that presents arguments 
previously considered and rejected. OneWeb previously raised the issue 
that the 10-year sunset period would effectively eliminate advantages 
of first-round operators because of the timing of second-round grants, 
since first-round operators would be protected from interference for 
little or no time after some second-round grantees are fully deployed. 
The Commission fully considered and rejected this argument in the 
Report and Order, finding that while the sunset may occur before some 
later-round systems have reached the full deployment milestone at nine 
years, contrary to OneWeb's argument, this would not ``effectively 
eliminate'' advantages for first-round operators, since the speed of 
deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the overall time 
that the incumbents will be protected by systems approved in the later 
processing round. Accordingly, the Commission dismisses this part of 
the OneWeb Petition pursuant to Sec.  1.429(l)(3).
    On alternative and independent grounds, the Commission denies the

[[Page 100914]]

OneWeb Petition on the merits. The Report and Order for the first time 
adopted an inter-round protection requirement to replace the 
Commission's explicit policy of case-by-case licensing of NGSO FSS 
systems after the cutoff date in an initial processing round. In doing 
so, the Commission considered numerous sunsetting proposals on the 
record, ranging from 6 years after the application cut-off date in a 
processing round to 15 years commencing from release of the Report and 
Order for the current Ku-/Ka-band processing rounds and 15 years from 
the first authorization or market access grant in a subsequent 
processing round for future processing rounds.
    First, the Report and Order ensured all NGSO FSS operators 
authorized through a processing round the same 10-year period of time, 
following the first authorization in a subsequent processing round, 
during which they are protected by systems approved in that subsequent 
processing round under the newly adopted inter-round protection 
requirement. The 10-year period, tied to the first authorization in a 
later round, balances the Commission's goals to afford later-round 
systems equal spectrum sharing opportunities under the spectrum-
splitting procedure once their full service constellations are 
operational, while providing earlier-round systems time to adjust to 
the constellations ultimately deployed by later-round grantees, with 
simplicity and regulatory clarity. While it is true that first-round 
operators effectively had notice of seven years of protection from all 
second-round grantees under the new inter-round protection requirement, 
applying a 10-year sunset provision from the date of the release of the 
Report and Order would result in an effective 13-year sunset period for 
the first system authorized in the second processing round, contrary to 
the Commission's rationales for adopting the 10-year inter-round 
protection period and its goal of promoting new entry.
    Indeed, the basis for the adoption of a 10-year period was not 
because it was the minimum necessary period for earlier-round systems 
to adjust to new entrants. Rather, the Commission concentrated on the 
deployment timelines of later-round systems and reasoned that sunset 
period should ``relieve earlier-round grantees of the uncertainty of 
near-term, equal sharing with new entrants'' while giving later-round 
systems an equal opportunity to operate with their full service 
constellations, which may be completed at the nine-year final 
deployment milestone. For OneWeb's first-round system approved in 2017, 
and for other first-round systems, the Commission continues to find 
that a sunset date in 2030 (ten years after the first grant in the 
subsequent processing round, which occurred in 2020) relieves them of 
the uncertainty of near-term, equal sharing with new entrants intended 
by the sunset period. The Report and Order further noted the iterative 
development of NGSO FSS systems and the fact that many earlier-round 
grantees, like OneWeb, have proposed updated, second-generation systems 
filed in a later processing round that will benefit from the sunsetting 
period applied to second-round systems. As Kuiper notes, OneWeb 
provided no specific evidence to support its assertion that the sunset 
period as adopted is in fact insufficient.
    The Report and Order also determined that sunsetting will not upset 
existing expectations of interference protection because, under 
Commission policy in effect prior to the Report and Order, later-round 
applicants were considered on a case-by-case basis as to whether they 
will be entitled to share spectrum on an equal basis with earlier-round 
systems--as such there was never a guarantee that earlier-round 
grantees would be entitled to protection from later-round systems. 
OneWeb's citation to a grant condition in which a later-round licensee 
was required to protect NGSO FSS systems authorized through an earlier 
processing round does not create a reasonable expectation that OneWeb 
would be protected indefinitely from all later-round applicants. The 
Report and Order acknowledged the Commission's then-existing policy of 
case-by-case licensing of NGSO FSS systems filed after a processing 
round, including licensing conditions, and based on the record in the 
proceeding decided to adopt a generally applicable inter-round 
protection requirement with an accompanying sunset provision. While 
OneWeb argues the Commission ``provided no notice that all such later-
round operators would be entitled to co-equal operations,'' the policy 
of case-by-case licensing meant that any future applicant--or all 
future applicants--could be afforded co-equal status with earlier-round 
systems. The sunset period also does not effectively create an open-
ended processing round because the sunset guarantees a period of time 
of unequal protection for earlier-round systems, during which earlier-
round systems are not required to protect later-round systems, while an 
open-ended processing round would immediately treat all NGSO FSS 
systems on an equal basis.
    Second, the Report and Order tied the 10-year sunset date to the 
date of the first authorization in a later processing round. In doing 
so, the Commission acknowledged that ``the sunset may occur before some 
later-round systems have reached the full deployment milestone at nine 
years'' but reasoned, contrary to OneWeb's argument, this would not 
``effectively eliminate'' advantages for first-round operators, since 
the speed of deployment of the later-round systems would not affect the 
overall time that the incumbents will be protected by systems approved 
in the later processing round. Similarly, the Commission does not share 
OneWeb's concern that some ``second-round operators' fully-deployed 
systems would never have to protect First Round operators, effectively 
placing the later-arriving operators in the first processing round,'' 
``contrary to the Commission's acknowledgement that First Round 
operators should have some benefits, and remov[ing] any meaningful 
incentive for second-round operators to coordinate with First Round 
operators.'' The basis for the 10-year sunset period was not to lock in 
coordination advantages for earlier-round systems. Rather, the 
Commission determined that fully deployed later-round systems should be 
able to operate on an equal basis with earlier-round systems; not that 
they must protect earlier-round systems for a specific period of time 
after full deployment. Further, the benefit to earlier-round operators 
is that they are entitled to a 10-year period after the initial grant 
in a later processing round in which later-round systems must protect 
the earlier-round system while accepting any interference caused by the 
earlier-round system, unless a coordination agreement has been reached. 
And as explained in the Report and Order, the Commission does not 
expect the sunset period to introduce significant coordination delays 
because the period is long enough that a later-round grantee would not 
wish to operate for years without an agreement with earlier-round 
grantees.
    Finally, the Commission disagrees that the exploration of issues in 
the Further Notice, some of which OneWeb itself requested, justifies 
changing the sunset provision. Specifically, OneWeb argues that having 
as open issues ``what protection levels should be imposed during and 
after the sunset period'' and ``what `co-equal' means when established 
operators are to operate a co-equal basis with newer entrants'' 
shortens the time period for it to prepare for new entrants at the end 
of the sunset

[[Page 100915]]

period. In the Second Report and Order above, the Commission reaffirms 
the decision in the Report and Order to apply the default, spectrum-
splitting mechanism between earlier and later-round systems after 
sunset. Therefore, there is no change in the post-sunset regime from 
what was adopted in the Report and Order. In addition, the Second 
Report and Order declines to adopt any cap on the number of NGSO FSS 
systems that can operate in a given frequency band, negating OneWeb's 
concern that doing so may render the sunset period superfluous. 
Similarly, the Second Report and Order does not place any restrictions 
on ``the opening of different processing rounds,'' nor limit ``the 
number of NGSO systems accommodated.'' The changes the Commission has 
adopted in the Second Report and Order to the inter-round protection 
requirement also do not ``shorten'' the sunset period for first-round 
systems because, while they will apply immediately upon the effective 
date of the rule changes, they will not apply between first and second-
round systems after the sunset period.

IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 
(RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated in the Further Notice released in April 2023. The 
Commission sought written public comment on the proposals in the 
Further Notice, including comment on the IRFA. No comments were filed 
addressing the IRFA. The Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) 
conforms to the RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Second Report and Order

    The Second Report and Order continues to facilitate the deployment 
of non-geostationary satellite orbit, fixed-satellite service (NGSO 
FSS) systems capable of providing broadband and other services on a 
global basis, by refining the Commission's rules governing spectrum 
sharing among a new generation of broadband satellite constellations to 
promote market entry, regulatory certainty, and spectrum efficiency 
through good-faith coordination. The Commission amends its rules 
governing the treatment of NGSO FSS systems filed in different 
processing rounds clarifying certain details of the degraded throughput 
methodology that, in the absence of a coordination agreement, must be 
used in compatibility analyses by NGSO FSS system licensees authorized 
through later processing rounds to show they can operate compatibly 
with, and protect, NGSO FSS systems authorized through earlier 
processing rounds.
    Specifically, the Second Report and Order clarifies details 
regarding the implementation of a degraded throughput methodology by 
adopting a 3 percent throughput degradation as a long-term interference 
protection criterion, a 0.4 percent absolute increase in link 
unavailability as a short-term interference protection criterion, and 
declining to adopt additional protection metrics or to adopt an 
aggregate limit on interference from later-round NGSO FSS systems into 
earlier-round NGSO FSS systems. It also affirms that the default, 
spectrum-splitting mechanism will be applied among NGSO systems in 
different processing rounds after the sunset period. The actions the 
Commission takes in this proceeding further its efforts to promote 
development, and competition among broadband NGSO FSS system 
proponents, including the market entry of new competitors.

B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response 
to the IFRA

    There were no comments filed that specifically addressed the 
proposed rules and policies presented in the IRFA.

C. Response to Comments by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 
Business Administration

    Pursuant to the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, which amended the 
RFA, the Commission is required to respond to any comments filed by the 
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
and to provide a detailed statement of any change made to the proposed 
rules as a result of those comments. The Chief Counsel did not file any 
comments in response to the proposed rules.

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities To Which 
the Rules Will Apply

    The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the 
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) is independently 
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and 
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the SBA.
    Satellite Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms 
``primarily engaged in providing telecommunications services to other 
establishments in the telecommunications and broadcasting industries by 
forwarding and receiving communications signals via a system of 
satellites or reselling satellite telecommunications.'' Satellite 
telecommunications service providers include satellite and earth 
station operators. The SBA small business size standard for this 
industry classifies a business with $44 million or less in annual 
receipts as small. U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that 275 firms 
in this industry operated for the entire year. Of this number, 242 
firms had revenue of less than $25 million. Consequently, using the 
SBA's small business size standard most satellite telecommunications 
service providers can be considered small entities. The Commission 
notes however, that the SBA's revenue small business size standard is 
applicable to a broad scope of satellite telecommunications providers 
included in the U.S. Census Bureau's Satellite Telecommunications 
industry definition. Additionally, the Commission neither requests nor 
collects annual revenue information from satellite telecommunications 
providers, and is therefore unable to more accurately estimate the 
number of satellite telecommunications providers that would be 
classified as a small business under the SBA size standard. For 
purposes of this proceeding it is likely that there are very few 
entities meeting the SBA's definition of small satellite 
telecommunications providers that are small satellite system operators 
involved in designing, manufacturing, and launching a satellite due to 
the generally a high fixed cost of these activities.
    All Other Telecommunications. This industry comprises firms 
``primarily engaged in providing specialized telecommunications 
services, such as satellite tracking, communications telemetry, and 
radar station operation. This industry also includes establishments 
primarily engaged in providing satellite terminal stations and 
associated facilities connected with one or more terrestrial systems 
and capable of transmitting telecommunications to, and receiving 
telecommunications from, satellite systems. Providers of internet 
services (e.g., dial-up ISPs) or Voice over internet Protocol (VoIP) 
services, via client-supplied telecommunications connections are also 
included in this

[[Page 100916]]

industry. The SBA small business size standard for this industry 
classifies firms with annual receipts of $40 million or less as small. 
U.S. Census Bureau data for 2017 show that there were 1,079 firms in 
this industry that operated for the entire year. Of those firms, 1,039 
had revenue of less than $25 million. Based on this data, the 
Commission estimates that the majority of ``All Other 
Telecommunications'' firms can be considered small.

E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    The Second Report and Order amends rules that are applicable to 
space station operators requesting a license or grant of U.S. market 
access from the Commission. Specifically, the Second Report and Order 
adopts changes to the spectrum sharing requirements among NGSO FSS 
satellite systems approved in different processing rounds, and 
specifies details of the technical demonstration that space station 
licensees and market access grantees that were authorized through a 
later processing round must submit to show that they will not cause 
harmful interference to space station licensees and market access 
grantees that were authorized through an earlier processing round, 
prior to the sunsetting period, if the later-round grantees have not 
certified that they have reached a coordination agreement with the 
earlier-round grantees. The technical demonstration of compatibility 
between the later-round system and the earlier-round system is based on 
a degraded throughput methodology and assessing absolute increase in 
link unavailability.
    The adopted metrics, values, and assumptions to finalize degraded 
throughput methodology will impact information later-round NGSO FSS 
system operators are required to report in compatibility analysis 
submissions. However, because of the costs involved in developing and 
deploying an NGSO FSS satellite constellation, the Commission 
anticipates that few NGSO FSS operators affected by this rulemaking 
would qualify under the SBA definition of ``small entity,'' and 
therefore small entities are not likely to have to hire professionals, 
or incur any compliance costs as a result of the Second Report and 
Order.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    The RFA requires an agency to provide, ``a description of the steps 
the agency has taken to minimize the significant economic impact on 
small entities . . . including a statement of the factual, policy, and 
legal reasons for selecting the alternative adopted in the final rule 
and why each one of the other significant alternatives to the rule 
considered by the agency which affect the impact on small entities was 
rejected.''
    The Second Report and Order defines specific metrics for long-term 
interference and short-term interference that must be used in 
compatibility analyses demonstrating that a later-round NGSO FSS system 
will adequately protect an earlier-round system. Agreeing with the 
general consensus of commenters, the Second Report and Order adopts a 3 
percent degraded throughput threshold as the long-term interference 
metric for inter-round compatibility analyses and a 0.4 percent 
absolute increase in link unavailability as the short-term interference 
metric based on the technical record developed in this proceeding. The 
Commission concludes that establishing a specific long-term 
interference protection metric consistent with the technical evidence 
in the record provides the benefit of a clear standard for new 
entrants, and a benchmark that parties can use to negotiate any 
alternative long-term protections mutually agreed to in coordination.
    The Commission specifically considered, and declined, adopting 
additional protection metrics for loss of synchronization, multiple 
carrier-to-noise (C/N) objectives, or aggregate interference limits in 
part because of the additional complexities and costs that complying 
with such additional metrics could entail. Similarly, the Commission 
considered, and rejected, incorporating interference from additional 
sources in the baseline calculation, such as from GSO networks, other 
NGSO FSS systems, and intra-system noise, in part to simplify the 
analysis required of new entrants in the absence of a coordination 
agreement. Moreover, to lower burdens on later-round operators, the 
Commission provides illustrative examples of parameters that may be 
used when preparing compatibility analyses and which will be considered 
on a case-by-case basis as to whether they are reliable and 
representative. The Commission also considered and reaffirmed its 
decision from the Report and Order to apply the default, spectrum-
splitting mechanism to earlier and later-round operators after the 
sunset date to place them on equal footing, noting that facilitating 
equal treatment of later-round operators after the sunset date was a 
key component of the sunset provision. Additionally, by reaffirming 
this decision the Commission ensures that earlier-round advantages do 
not continue indefinitely, and simplifies the regulatory framework when 
systems authorized through multiple processing rounds may be operating.

G. Report to Congress

    The Commission will send a copy of the Second Report and Order, 
including this FRFA, in a report to be sent to Congress pursuant to the 
Congressional Review Act. In addition, the Commission will send a copy 
of the Second Report and Order, including this FRFA, to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA.

V. Ordering Clauses

    Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 7(a), 
10, 303, 308(b), and 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 
47 U.S.C. 154(i), 157(a), 160, 303, 308(b), 316, that is the Second 
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration is adopted, the policies, 
rules, and requirements discussed herein are adopted, and Part 25 of 
the Commission's rules is amended.
    It is further ordrered that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 
and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 
154(i), 154(j), 405, and 47 CFR 1.429(b), (l)(3), that the petition for 
reconsideration filed by WorldVu Satellites Limited in IB Docket No. 
21-456, is dismissed in part and, on alternative and independent 
grounds, denied.
    It is further ordered that the Second Report and Order and Order on 
Reconsideration shall be effective 30 days after publication in the 
Federal Register, except that Sec.  25.261(d), which may contain new or 
modified information collection requirements, will not become effective 
until the Office of Management and Budget completes review of any 
information collection requirements that the Space Bureau determines is 
required under the Paperwork Reduction Act. The Commission directs the 
Space Bureau to announce the effective date of Sec.  25.261(d) by 
subsequent Public Notice.
    It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of Secretary 
shall send a copy of the Second Report and Order and Order on 
Reconsideration, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, 
to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
    It is further ordered that the Commission's Office of the Managing 
Director, Performance Program

[[Page 100917]]

Management, shall send a copy of the Second Report and Order and Order 
on Reconsideration in a report to be sent to Congress and the 
Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review 
Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 25

    Satellites.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 25 as follows:

PART 25--SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 310, 319, 
332, 605, and 721, unless otherwise noted.


0
2. Amend Sec.  25.261 by revising paragraphs (d) and (e) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  25.261   Sharing among NGSO FSS space stations.

* * * * *
    (d) Protection of earlier-round systems. Prior to commencing 
operations, an NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient must either 
certify that it has completed a coordination agreement with any 
operational NGSO FSS system licensed or granted U.S. market access in 
an earlier processing round, or submit for Commission approval a 
compatibility showing which demonstrates by use of a degraded 
throughput methodology that it will not cause harmful interference to 
any such system with which coordination has not been completed. If an 
earlier-round system becomes operational after a later-round system has 
commenced operations, the later-round licensee or market access 
recipient must submit a certification of coordination or a 
compatibility showing with respect to the earlier-round system no later 
than 60 days after the earlier-round system commences operations as 
notified pursuant to Sec.  25.121(b) or otherwise.
    (1) Compatibility showings must contain the following elements:
    (A) A demonstration that the later-round system will cause no more 
than 3 percent time-weighted average degraded throughput of the link to 
the earlier-round system, for links with a baseline link availability 
of 99.0 percent or higher at a C/N threshold of 0 dB;
    (B) A demonstration that the later-round system will cause no more 
than 0.4 percent absolute change in link availability to the earlier-
round system using a C/N threshold value of 0 dB, for links with a 
baseline link availability of 99.0 percent link availability or higher; 
and
    (C) With respect to an earlier-round system that has not yet 
satisfied its 50 percent deployment milestone pursuant to Sec.  
25.164(b)(1), the compatibility showing may consider only 50 percent 
deployment of the earlier-round system; if the 50 percent deployment 
milestone has been satisfied, the showing must consider 100 percent 
deployment of the authorized system.
    (2) Compatibility showings will be placed on public notice pursuant 
to Sec.  25.151(a)(13).
    (3) While a compatibility showing remains pending before the 
Commission, the submitting NGSO FSS licensee or market access recipient 
may commence operations on an unprotected, non-interference basis with 
respect to the operations of the system that is the subject of the 
showing.
    (4) A later-round NGSO FSS system will be required to conform its 
operations to its compatibility showing submitted for the protection of 
an earlier-round system to the extent necessary to protect the actual 
number of deployed and operating space stations of the earlier-round 
system.
    (e) Sunsetting. Ten years after the first authorization or grant of 
market access in a processing round, the systems approved in that 
processing round will no longer be required to protect earlier-rounds 
systems under paragraph (d) of this section, and instead will be 
required to share spectrum with earlier-round systems under paragraph 
(c) of this section.

[FR Doc. 2024-28993 Filed 12-12-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P`