J-S31013-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: L.A.C.H.

APPEAL OF: C.H. & A.H.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1911 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): No. 227 OC 2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, DUBOW, and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JUNE 2, 2017

C.H. (“Father”) and A.H. (“Stepmother”) appeal the order entered on 

November 17, 2016, that denied their petition seeking to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of K.D.H. (“Mother”), pursuant to the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), to L.A.C.H. (“Child”), the female 

child of Father and Mother, born in August 2008. We affirm.

In its opinion, the orphans’ court set forth the factual background and 

procedural history of this appeal, which we adopt herein. See Orphans’ 

Court Opinion, 1/24/17, at 1-14 (unpaginated). On September 28, 2016, 

Father and Stepmother filed the petition seeking to involuntarily terminate 
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the parental rights of Mother to Child pursuant to section 2511(a)(1),1and a 

report of intention for Stepmother to adopt Child. The orphans’ court held an 

evidentiary hearing on November 16, 2016. At the hearing, Father and 

Stepmother presented the testimony of Cami Hrisak, Child’s therapist, as an 

expert as a licensed clinical social worker and in the field of counseling. 

Stepmother and Father testified on their own behalf. They also presented 

the testimony of S.J., who is Child’s teacher at school. Finally, Father and 

Stepmother presented the testimony of D.S., the headmaster at Child’s 

school.

Mother testified on her own behalf. She also presented the testimony 

of Jory Hubler, who is employed at Misty Isle Bridges; and S.M. and K.W., 

who are Mother’s friends.

Based on this testimony and the documentary evidence admitted at 

the hearing, the court entered its order denying the termination and 

adoption petitions. Father and Stepmother timely filed a notice of appeal and 

concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

On appeal, Father and Stepmother raise three issues:

1. Did the Orphans Court abuse its discretion and err as a 

matter of law in failing to consider the statute in 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511 (a)(1) which states that “[t]he parent by conduct 

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1 The petition provided that Father and Stepmother were married in June 

2014, and that Father had primary physical custody of Child since a March 6, 

2015 stipulation and custody consent order, which provided Mother an 

opportunity for supervised visits with child through Misty Isle Bridges.
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continuing for a period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or

failed to perform parental duties.” [emphasis added] 

...

2. Did the Orphans Court abuse its discretion and err as a matter 

of law in failing to consider the statute in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 

(a)(2) which states that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” 

[emphasis added]

...

3. Did the Orphans Court abuse its discretion and err as a matter 

of law in failing to consider under “Other considerations” (23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(c)[)] that Mother had been designated a sexual 

abuse perpetrator by the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare 

Children and Youth Services under the Child Line Abuse Registry 

for acts perpetrated on the child in question.

...

Father’s and Stepmother’s Brief, at 5-6 (emphasis and brackets in original). 2

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

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2 We note that the concise statement did not include the statutory section in 

the third issue. We, nevertheless, find the issue preserved for our review.
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the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of 

discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, 

unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the 

fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial 

judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and 

often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child 

and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained that

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

In their brief, Father and Stepmother contend that the orphans’ court 

abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law in concluding that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the involuntary termination of Mother’s 
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parental rights under § 2511(a)(1). Alternatively, they argue the court 

abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law in concluding that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights under § 2511(a)(2).3Finally, they urge that the court abused 

its discretion in failing to consider, under “Other considerations,”4that 

Mother had been designated a sexual abuse perpetrator by the Pennsylvania 

Department of Welfare Children and Youth Services under the Child Line 

Abuse Registry for acts perpetrated on Child. 

This Court may affirm the lower court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

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3 The orphans’ court never reviewed § 2511(a)(2), finding that section was 

not raised in the petition. We agree with the court that Father and 

Stepmother waived § 2511(a)(2) by failing to raise that section in the lower 

court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The fact that Father and Stepmother raised the 

claim in their concise statement does not alter our conclusion. See 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating 

“[a] party cannot rectify the failure to preserve an issue [for appeal] by 

proffering it in response” to the court’s request for a Rule 1925(b) 

statement).

4

Father and Stepmother cite § 2511(c) as providing for “Other 

considerations.” This citation appears to be a typographical error, as the 

section captioned “Other considerations” is § 2511(b), infra. Section 

2511(c), is captioned, “(c) Right to file personal and medical history 

information.” Section 2511(c) provides, “At the time the decree of 

termination is transmitted to the parent whose rights have been terminated, 

the court shall advise the parent, in writing, of his or her continuing right to 

place and update personal and medical history information whether or not 

the medical condition is in existence or discoverable at the time of adoption, 

on file with the court and with the Department of Public Welfare pursuant to 

Subchapter B of Chapter 29 (relating to records and access to information).” 

(footnote omitted). 
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2511(a), along with section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Section 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b), provide as 

follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

With respect to § 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held that

[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 
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In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988).

Further, this Court has stated that

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations 

omitted).

Father and Stepmother argue that the record clearly established that 

Mother’s conduct over the six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition demonstrated that Mother had a settled purpose of relinquishing her 

parental claim and failed to perform her parental duties with regard to Child 

during the six-month period preceding the filing of the termination petition.

In its opinion, the court ably and methodically considered the evidence 

presented at the hearing, and addressed Father’s and Stepmother’s issues. 

The court’s credibility determinations are supported by competent evidence 

in the record, so we will not disturb them. Accordingly, we adopt the court’s 

discussion herein. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/24/17, at 15-18 

(unpaginated). 

Next, in regard to Father’s and Stepmother’s third issue, that the court 

failed to properly consider Mother’s record as “indicated” for child abuse as 

“Other considerations” under the Adoption Act, see Orphan’s Court Opinion, 
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1/24/17, at 4-5 (explaining circumstances of the “indicated” finding) 

(unpaginated), we view this issue as a matter being raised in relation to 

Child’s needs and welfare, under § 2511(b), see note 4, supra. 

Here, the court found, on the record, that there had been a fairly 

strong bond between Mother and Child at one time in this matter, and that 

there might still be a bond. See N.T., 11/16/16, at 268. The court, however, 

was unable to determine the present existence of a bond because of the 

interference of Father and Stepmother with Mother having the supervised 

visitation to which she was entitled. See id., at 267-268. Thus, the court 

found that Father and Stepmother had failed to sustain their burden of 

proof. See id., at 268-269. 

We have thoroughly reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, and the 

applicable law with the above standards of review in mind. The record 

supports the court’s factual findings, and the court’s legal conclusions are 

not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. As we agree with 

the court that termination of Mother’s parental rights under § 2511(a)(1) 

was not warranted, and under section 2511(a)(2) was waived, the court 

properly did not proceed to conduct a § 2511(b) analysis. 

We find no abuse of the court’s discretion in failing to find that 

Mother’s record as “indicated” for child abuse impacted on Child’s needs and 

welfare under § 2511(b). The court found from the evidence that Father and 

Stepmother had interfered with Mother’s previous close relationship with 
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Child by their placement of insurmountable obstacles between her and Child, 

so that Father and Stepmother interfered with the bond between Mother and 

Child. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 1/24/17, at 18 (unpaginated). This 

determination is supported by competent evidence in the record. 

Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s order based on the 

discussion in the court’s opinion entered on January 24, 2017. See Orphans’ 

Court Opinion, 1/24/17, at 15-18 (unpaginated).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/2/2017