[Cite as In re C.D., 2024-Ohio-446.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re: :

C.D., : No. 22AP-649

 (C.P.C No. 17JU-4272)

[J.A., :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant]. :

In re: :

C.D. et al., : No. 22AP-650

 (C.P.C. No. 17JU-14613)

[J.A., :

 (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant]. :

In re: :

C.D. et al., : No. 22AP-674

 (C.P.C. No. 17JU-14613)

[V.A., :

 (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant]. :

In re: :

C.D., : No. 22AP-675

 (C.P.C. No. 17JU-4272)

[V.A., :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Defendant-Appellant]. :
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 2

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on February 8, 2024

On brief: Yeura R. Venters, Public Defender, and Timothy E. 

Pierce, for appellant J.A. Argued: Timothy E. Pierce.

On brief: William T. Cramer, for appellant V.A.

On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for Franklin County Children 

Services. Argued: Robert J. McClaren.

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

Domestic Relations Division, Juvenile Branch

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, mother J.A. and maternal grandfather V.A.,

appeal the October 20, 2022 order of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 

Domestic Relations Division, Juvenile Branch, denying V.A.’s motions for legal custody, 

divesting J.A. of her parental rights, and granting permanent custody of J.A.’s three 

children C.D. (d.o.b. 09/06/14, hereinafter “C.D. 1”), C.D. (d.o.b. 02/20/16, hereinafter 

“C.D. 2”), and C.D. (d.o.b. 03/11/17, hereinafter “C.D. 3”), to Franklin County Children 

Services for purposes of adoption. (Oct. 20, 2022 Decision & Jgmt. Entry at 20-30.) J.A. 

asserts three assignments of error with the trial court’s decision:

[I.] The lower court’s decision terminating MotherAppellant’s parental rights to parent her three children in 

17JU4272 and 17JU141613 was not founded on sufficient 

evidence and ran against the manifest weight of the evidence.

[II.] The lower court erred in granting PCC to FCCS when 

FCCS failed to make intensive efforts to identify and engage 

kinship caregivers and the lower court failed to make the 

findings necessary to relieve FCCS of that obligation under R.C. 

2151.4115 et. seq. The lower court’s actions violated Mother -

Appellant’s Right to Due Process of Law under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the 

Due Course of Law provisions of Article I, Sections 1 and 16 of 

the Ohio Constitution, R.C. 2151.011(B)(2) and (B)(50), R.C. 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 3

2151.353(A)(3), R.C. 2151.4115 et. seq., Juv. R. 2(V) and 2(II), 

and R.C. 5103.23

[III.] The lower court erred when it failed to appoint separate 

counsel for [C.D. 1] when her wishes were inconsistent with the 

best interest recommendation of GAL Baron. The court’s 

failure to due so violated the child’s rights under the Fifth, 

Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution, the Due Course of Law provisions of Article I, 

Sections 1 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution, the Right to Counsel 

provision of Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, and 

Juv. R. 4(A)

V.A., in turn, asserts a single assignment of error with the trial court’s decision:

[I.] The agency failed to make intensive efforts to identify and 

engage kinship caregivers and the juvenile court failed to make 

the findings necessary to relieve the agency of that obligation 

under R.C. 2151.4115 et seq.

On review, we overrule all four assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court.

{¶ 2} During the period after the permanent custody motion was filed, father C.D. 

apparently stopped participating in the case and communicating with his attorney, who 

withdrew from representation. In November 2019, R.A. and V.A. were added as parties 

and were permitted to pursue their legal custody motions pro se, and the children remained 

together in the same foster placement. According to a report filed by the guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) on January 31, 2020:

{¶ 3} Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”) initially became involved with 

J.A. and the children’s father C.D. in late 2014, and in February 2015 FCCS filed a complaint 

alleging that C.D.1, then aged five months, was an abused and dependent child. C.D.1 had 

tested positive for opiates, oxycodone, and benzodiazepines at the time of birth, and J.A. 

had tested positive at the same time. Initially, a safety plan was adopted, and J.A. was 

recommended to services and drug screening, but she did not comply. As a result, on 

February 19, 2015, the court granted a Temporary Order of Protective Service (“TOPS”) to 

FCCS and a Temporary Order of Custody (“TOC”) to C.D.1’s maternal grandmother R.A. 

The court ordered that parental visitation be supervised and for parents to drug screen. 

Subsequently, the court adjudicated C.D.1 to be an abused child and granted an order for 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 4

Temporary Court Commitment (“TCC”) and placed C.D.1 in the custody of R.A. with 

continued Court Ordered Protective Supervision (“COPS”) by FCCS.

{¶ 4} About a year later, C.D.1 was returned to J.A.’s custody and the COPS order 

was dissolved. But on March 31, 2017, FCCS filed a new complaint alleging C.D.3, then 

aged three weeks, to be an abused and neglected child for similar reasons—J.A. had 

apparently admitted to recent heroin use, and had failed to persist with drug treatment, 

and C.D.3 appeared to be suffering from withdrawal symptoms. After his birth, C.D.3 was 

kept in the hospital for several weeks, and J.A. had little to no contact with him. Father,

C.D., also failed multiple drug screens and had never linked with services in the interim 

period. C.D.3 was ordered into the temporary custody of FCCS and was subsequently 

placed in the home of R.A. and V.A. C.D.1 and C.D.2 were also removed from J.A.’s custody, 

and on February 27, 2018, the trial court ordered C.D.1 and C.D.2 to be placed in the 

temporary custody of FCCS, and they too were placed with R.A.

{¶ 5} But on May 30, 2018, FCCS filed shelter care motions for all three children, 

arguing that J.A. had been spending all day at R.A.’s home to help care for the children, in 

violation of court orders, and when a caseworker made an unannounced visit to R.A.’s home 

on May 18, the caseworker discovered J.A. supervising the children on the front porch of 

the residence. J.A. ran with the children, and when the caseworker investigated further, 

R.A. reported to the caseworker that J.A. was not there. The court ordered that all three 

children be removed from R.A.’s care, and they were all placed in a foster home, where they 

have remained. In response to the filing of the shelter care motions, R.A. filed for legal 

custody of all three children, and on October 9, 2018, FCCS filed motions for permanent 

custody (“PCC”) of C.D.1, C.D.2, and C.D.3. R.A.’s attorney withdrew from representation, 

and shortly thereafter, V.A. filed motions for legal custody of the children. His motions 

were dismissed based on his failure to appear at a hearing, but he then filed renewed 

motions to be made a party and for custody “because they are blood and I will take good 

care of them.” (Nov. 20, 2018 Mot. to Set Custody at 1, filed in 17JU-4272; Oct. 23, 2018 

Mot. to Set Custody at 1, filed in 17JU-14613.)

Contact with the parents has been at the supervised visits at 

FCCS only. Grandparents attend family visits at FCCS every 

third Wednesday of the month. All other visits are with parents 

and children only. Prior attempts to speak with the 

grandparents have been met with resistance; at one visit the 

maternal grandfather stated that no one was going to talk with 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 5

GAL until his lawyer gave permission. The GAL has limited 

interaction with parents. Attempts to discuss progress or case 

plan issues has been at end of supervised visits at FCCS and 

rushed as the parents were trying to catch the COTA bus back 

to their home. All attempts prior to this have been to no avail, 

as mother did not answer her phone. Contact had been 

through text or third parties. Mother stated that she didn’t 

have any minutes left on the phone plan. GAL attempted to 

contact mother at phone number on record, however, the 

number was not in service as of October 11, 2019. On 

January 13, 2020, Mother’s community control was revoked in 

Fairfield County, and she was recently transported to Ohio 

Reformatory for Women to serve a 24 month sentence.

* * *

When Mother visited, she actively engaged with the children, 

playing with each child, getting on the floor to be at their level. 

When Father visited, he remained on couch for the most part, 

interacting in a more passive manner. When the children 

would go to be with him and he would engage at that time. 

Interaction by Father became more active over the last several 

visits, play wrestling with the boys and playing catch. However, 

parents have stopped visiting on or around August, 2019 and 

Mother is currently incarcerated, serving a two year sentence. 

Grandfather has mobility issues, stays seated, but is attentive 

to the activities of the children. Grandmother spends most of 

the visit preparing the plates for food for everyone in 

attendance, drinks, cleaning up. Family often brings items for 

the children, toys, clothes, tablets. In the early visits, family 

would send extra food, snacks and toys and other items home 

with the foster family. This is no longer the case, the only 

exception when they have celebrated birthdays of the children.

* * *

Parents have not seen the children since July 2019 and have 

not spoken to them since September 2019. 

Following the November 19, 2019 maternal grandfather’s 

request for increased visits was granted and there were changes 

to the visitation plan. Visits between grandparents and 

children are now on a weekly basis. Notably, at the last 

observed visit, [C.D.2] was reluctant to go to the grandparents. 

He was resisting requests to sit with Maternal Grandfather and 

Maternal Grandmother in the waiting room while waiting to be 

taken to the room for the visit.
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 6

(Emphasis sic.) (Jan. 31, 2020 Guardian Ad Litem’s Report at 5-9.)

{¶ 6} The permanent custody trial was continued several times. On January 20, 

2022, the parties came together for trial, which was again continued, but on that date FCCS 

also requested the court to terminate V.A.’s visitations:

MR. MCCLAREN: Yes, Your Honor. There was at the last time 

with the previous judge there’s a mot -- there was visitation 

granted on one case number regarding a [C.D.3] and we would 

ask that that visitation orders rescinded. The visitation has not

went as well with grandfather. His interactions consist of gift 

giving and junk food. He doesn’t respect their boundaries. He 

has asked -- requires -- he’s required the child to give him a hug 

and get on his lap when he didn’t want to. Would require kisses

of the children. Grandfather has told the caseworker she needs 

to force [C.D.3] to come to the visits and he was advised that 

we don’t put hands on children to make them go. The children 

have stated they’re going to visits for gifts and junk food. 

Grandfather doesn’t engage in any bonding activities and his

method of interaction give the children no choice but to engage.

* * *

There was an incident on December 8th where we asked 

grandfather what he would do to get the child out of the car 

when child refuses to visit. He states he would simply grab the 

child and take him out of the car like he would (inaudible) of a 

grocery store and suggested the children should be punished 

for not coming to visits. So we understand that [C.D.3] doesn’t 

want to attend for the visits and the other two children while 

they’re not under orders, we’ve had them come to act in good 

faith, but they do not seem interested in further visitation with 

the grandfather. We’d ask that that order be rescinded.

(Jan. 20, 2022 Tr. at 5-6.) The GAL agreed with this motion:

MS. MUMAW: Thank you, Your Honor. We are in agreement 

with the motion. The children have repeatedly and vehemently 

stated that they do not want to go to these visits. They sit out 

in the car sometimes. They’ve been kicking and spitting and 

not wanting to go into the visit. They talk about not like being 

afraid of their -- of their grandfather, being uncomfortable. 

They don’t want to do this. 

Your Honor, at this point today we would recommend PCC, but 

if there is to be reunification in this case, it would be with the 

mother who has been working the case plan. It would not be 

with grandfather. There are numerous reasons why he’s not 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 7

able to care for the children and it’s not appropriate to continue 

to force children to try to bond with someone that they’re afraid 

of, that they don’t want to be around, that -- who is not 

respecting their boundaries. And Your Honor, with another 

continuance for I don’t know how many more months, we don’t 

want the children to be continued to be subjected to this.

Id. at 6-7. V.A. was not personally present at the hearing as a result of illness, but appeared 

by phone, and after hearing from V.A. and from his counsel, the court granted the motion 

to suspend visitation. V.A. filed a responsive motion on January 27, 2022, requesting 

visitation be immediately reinstated or in the alternative an evidentiary hearing on his 

motion. In the interim, the case was assigned to a visiting judge for trial, and that motion 

was heard at the time of the pre-trial hearing. At that hearing, V.A. admitted that while he 

kissed the children at all the visits, no one had complained to him or told him to stop. He 

also admitted that he had complained about the children not being forced to attend the 

visits, but that when staff informed him that they were not permitted to put hands on a 

child and force the child to attend the visits, he demanded the staff tell him “under what 

section of the law that it was under so I could go home and look it up.” (Mar. 30, 2022 Tr.

at 174-76.) After that hearing, the trial court ordered visits with the grandparents to resume 

twice a month.

{¶ 7} The trial on FCCS’ permanent custody motion and V.A.’s motion for legal 

custody began on July 25, 2022, continued on July 26, and ended on July 29, 2022. R.A.’s 

motion for legal custody did not proceed, as she did not appear at trial, and service had not 

been perfected for that motion. (See July 25, 2022 Tr. at 5-6.) The court granted FCCS’ 

motion for permanent custody, denied V.A.’s motion for legal custody, made extensive 

factual findings about J.A.’s participation in the case and failure to complete the case plan, 

V.A.’s difficult relationship with the children, and the best interests and needs of the 

children for placement. (See generally Oct. 20, 2022 Jgmt. Entry.) Specifically, the court 

found as follows:

The Court finds Mother’s testimony as to her abstinence from 

drug abuse after her release from Alvis [Halfway] House not 

credible. The Agency made multiple referrals for [J.A.] to 

[alcohol and drug] treatment * * *. She admitted to probably 

missing twenty-two (22) screens between November 15, 2021, 

and January 3, 2022. Between January 10 and June 23, 2022, 

she admitted to missing sixty-seven (67) screens. Between 

June 29 and the commencement of the trial on July 25, 2022, 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 8

she submitted 10 negative screens. In total, since her release 

from Alvis [Halfway] House on September 29, 2021, [J.A.]

missed ninety-six (96) of the required screens. In the 30 days 

prior to trial, [J.A.] had one positive screen which she 

attributed to the fact that she “celebrated.”

* * *

[C.D.3] has been in the custody of the Agency since March 31, 

2017, while [C.D.1] and [C.D.2] have been in the custody of 

the Agency since February 27, 2018, yet [J.A.] is still not 

prepared to meet their basic needs.

* * *

Grandparents were very consistent in coming to visitations 

with the Children. Both [V.A.] and [R.A.] have a strong belief 

that the [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3] should be with family: 

“They are blood.” However, they also believed that the 

Children should be forced to come to visitations regardless of 

the Children’s wishes.

* * *

GAL Baron had seen the Children with [J.A.] approximately 35 

times, with Grandparents (some in their home during kinship 

placement) approximately 15 times and with their foster 

parents (in both foster homes) approximately 50 times since 

January of 2018. Grandparent’s visitations with the Children 

after their removal from kinship placement went well and the 

Children were happy to see them. There were no concerns with 

visitations in 2018 and 2019. GAL Baron resumed observing 

the in person visitations [after the Covid disruption and 

approval of CASA of Franklin County] in May of 2021. GAL 

Baron testified that in May of 2021, the visitations had 

changed. The Children were very reluctant to go into a visit. 

[J.A.] came to the car and asked [C.D.3] to come with her. He 

said no. [J.A.] grabbed [C.D.3] and he started screaming. It was 

so intense she put him down. He went straight to his foster 

mother for comfort. [C.D.3] continued to sometimes refuse 

visitation after [C.D.1] started to attend. From her observations

and training, GAL Baron opined that [C.D.1] would approach 

[J.A.] but was “cautious” and “lukewarm” towards her.

GAL Baron observed no subsequent improvement in the family 

relationships. She observed that [C.D.1] kept her distance from 

[V.A.] and did not hug. [C.D.1] did not appear to want to be 

kissed by or hug Grandmother [R.A.]. When [C.D.2] entered 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 9

the lobby of the visitation center, he stood by his foster mother. 

Grandfather said in the Children’s presence that he wanted the 

judge to order the Children to come into the visitation. [C.D.2]

would not come into several visitations after that. [C.D.2]

continued to keep his distance from Grandparents. He did not 

engage with [J.A.] or Grandparents. [C.D.3] had some 

interaction with [J.A.] and [R.A.] but was “distant.” [C.D.3]

appeared to avoid Grandfather and was unhappy when 

Grandfather put [C.D.3] on his lap.

* * *

Caseworker Watkins saw the Children in their foster home 

monthly. She opined: [C.D.1] was bonded with both foster 

parents and was very close with her foster mother; [C.D.2] and 

[C.D.3] interacted with and appeared to be bonded with both 

foster parents; and each of [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3]

displayed evidence of having a strong healthy bond with their 

foster parents. The Court finds that the Children do not have 

a strong healthy bond with Parents or Grandparents but have 

a strong bond with their foster parents.

* * *

All children need and deserve permanency and security, some 

even more so than others. The Court finds that it would be very 

detrimental to their mental health and sense of security to 

separate [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3] from each other, and no 

party suggested this as a possible outcome.

* * *

[J.A.], age 37, has an extremely short period of sobriety, 

admitted to a long history of drug abuse, relapses, criminal 

behavior, incarceration, and has demonstrated instability as a 

parent. Since September 29, 2021, she has lived in the home of 

[B.W.], the father of her 3-month-old twins. She stated that she 

works five 12 hour days per week and has childcare for the 

twins. [The childcare provider would be providing much more 

parenting time than she for [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3].]

[J.A.] believed that she now has a stable and supportive partner 

in providing a home for her young twins and that she and 

[B.W.] could do so the same for three children not his own.

“His [three] kids are welcome; my [three] kids are welcome.”

She is number 2,492 on the waiting list of the Columbus 

Metropolitan Housing Authority and is on the HUD list. Her 

history with [B.W.] as a partner has been less than a year.
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 10

Unfortunately, the Court finds that [J.A.], even with the 

support of [B.W.], cannot provide for the basic and special 

needs of [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3]. Even if she could do so, 

granting custody to [J.A.] is not the best option for the three 

Children.

* * *

[C.D.3], [C.D.2], and [C.D.1] are only ages 5, 6, and 7. [C.D.1]

and [C.D.2] have significant special needs. [V.A.] loves the 

Children; he has a strong belief that family should raise their 

“Blood.” This was evidenced by his persistent efforts to obtain 

more visitation with the Children, doing his best to bond with 

the Children, taking parenting classes on his own, making 

improvements to his home, and his appearance at trial despite 

his injuries and obvious discomfort. Unfortunately, [V.A.]’s 

relationship with the Children did not progress enough to 

warrant an increase in visitation. If he were granted custody of 

[C.D.1], [C.D.2], or [C.D.3], the Court has no doubt that [V.A.]

would do his very best to parent the Children, but the Court 

doubts [V.A.] would respect their boundaries and doubts he 

would comply with court orders restricting access of [J.A.] to 

the Children. Unfortunately, the Court finds that [V.A.], even 

with the help of [R.A.], cannot provide for the basic and special 

needs of the Children. Even if he could do so, granting custody 

to [V.A.] is not the best option for the three Children.

* * *

The Court herein concludes that Franklin County Children 

Services had no duty to place the Children with their 

grandfather, [V.A.]. Even if the Agency herein had a duty to 

make “reasonable efforts” to effectuate a relative placement of 

[C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3], the credible evidence 

demonstrated that the Agency made such efforts in this case. 

Those efforts were unsuccessful, in part, because Grandfather 

did not comply with the Agency’s requirements and the Court’s 

orders. Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt that he will 

comply with future orders of the Court and there is reason to 

doubt that he will be able to keep the Children in a safe and 

stable placement.

* * *

The Court finds that [C.D.3] was in the continuous custody of 

the Agency for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), from 

May 26, 2017, to the date of the October 9, 2018, filing of the 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 11

motion for permanent custody in 17 JU 4272, a period of over 

12 months.

The Court finds that [C.D.1] and [C.D.2] were in the continuous 

custody of the Agency for purposes of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), 

from February 27, 2018, to the date of the March 3, 2022, filing 

of the second motion for permanent custody in 17 JU 14613, a 

period of over 12 months.

Therefore, the Agency need not provide any additional 

evidence as to the First Part of the permanent custody test.

* * *

The Court herein has considered all best interest factors as to 

each of [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and [C.D.3] and weighed all those 

factors to determine the best option for each child. Having 

considered the evidence as to the best interest of the Children, 

the Court finds that attempting to return [C.D.1], [C.D.2], and 

[C.D.3] to either Parent would be unsuccessful and contrary to 

their best interest. Placing any or all the Children in [V.A.]’s 

custody would not be in their best interest; it would not even be 

in [V.A.]’s best interest.

* * *

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that: 

The Agency’s October 9, 2018, motion for permanent 

custody of [C.D.3] and the Agency’s March 3, 2022, 

motion for permanent custody of [C.D.1] and [C.D.2] , 

are granted.

The November 20, 2018, motion of [V.A.] seeking 

legal custody of [C.D.3] filed in 17 JU 4272 and the 

November 20, 2018, motion of [V.A.] seeking legal 

custody of [C.D.1] and [C.D.2] filed in 17 JU 14613 are 

each denied. 

[C.D.1] and [C.D.2], and [C.D.3] are each committed 

to the permanent custody of Franklin County 

Children Services for the purpose of adoption.

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 14-30. J.A. and V.A. each filed notices of appeal, and these appeals

have proceeded according to law.
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 12

{¶ 8} As stated above, J.A. asserts three assignments of error with the court’s 

judgment, and V.A. asserts one assignment of error. But V.A.’s sole assignment of error is 

essentially identical to J.A.’s second assignment of error, and for that reason, we will 

address them together. Accordingly, we will begin our analysis with J.A.’s first assignment 

of error, which asserts that the trial court’s decision granting permanent custody and 

thereby terminating her parental rights was not supported by sufficient evidence and was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶ 9} Parents have a constitutionally protected fundamental interest in the care, 

custody, and management of their children. But parental rights are not absolute, and a 

parent’s natural rights are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child. Accordingly, 

the state may terminate the parental rights of natural parents, but such termination must 

be in the best interest of the child. See generally In re J.W., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-122, 2019-

Ohio-4775, at ¶ 22 (citations and quotations omitted). R.C. 2151.413 authorizes a public 

children services agency to file a motion requesting permanent custody of a child for which 

it has temporary custody, and when the child has been in the temporary custody of a public 

agency for 12 or more months out of a consecutive 22-month period, the agency is required 

to file a permanent custody motion. R.C. 2151.413(D)(1), cited in In re J.W. at ¶ 23. R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) permits a court to grant permanent custody of a child to a public agency if, 

after a hearing, it determines by clear and convincing evidence, that “(1) any of the 

circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) exist, and (2) such relief is in the best 

interest of the child.” In re K.M., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-64, 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 14. “Clear and 

convincing evidence” is “more than a mere preponderance of the evidence but does not 

require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re J.W. at ¶ 14, and Cross v. Ledford, 161 

Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. Rather, it means evidence that 

produces a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. In re K.H., 119 

Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, ¶ 42, citing Cross at paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 10} Moreover, a trial court’s decision to grant a permanent custody must not be 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgments are not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence when all material elements are supported by competent, credible evidence. 

Accordingly, an appellate court will not overturn a permanent custody order when it is 

supported by competent, credible evidence. Further, in reviewing a judgment granting 

permanent custody to FCCS under the manifest weight standard, an appellate court must 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 13

make every reasonable presumption in favor of the judgment and the trial court’s findings 

of facts. If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the court of appeals 

must give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most 

favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s verdict and judgment. See generally In re J.W.

at ¶ 21 (citations and quotations omitted).

{¶ 11} Thus, “[a] decision to award permanent custody requires the trial court to 

take a two-step approach.” In re K.L., 10th Dist. No. 13AP-218, 2013-Ohio-3499, ¶ 18. 

“First, a trial court must determine if any of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) 

apply,” and second, the court determines whether granting permanent custody to FCCS is 

in the best interest of the child. Id. at ¶ 18-20. Relevant to this appeal, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) 

provides the following circumstances under which FCCS is authorized to file a motion for 

permanent custody:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the 

temporary custody of one or more public children services 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more 

months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children 

services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as 

described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised 

Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an 

equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be 

placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable 

time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(b) The child is abandoned.

* * *

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more 

public children services agencies or private child placing 

agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twentytwo-month period * * *.

Once it is established that one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) circumstances is met, a trial court 

ruling on a motion for permanent custody must determine whether permanent custody is 

in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e) set forth the relevant 

factors that the court must consider in determining what is in the best interests of the child, 

and all of these factors are of equal importance under the statute. In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio 

St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56.
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 14

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the 

child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-ofhome providers, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the 

maturity of the child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the 

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 

twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month 

period * * *;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement 

and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a 

grant of permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this 

section apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Weighing these factors, the trial court must determine that an award 

of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest by clear and convincing evidence.

{¶ 12} As the trial court found, the “first half” of the permanent custody test is easily 

met in this case. It is uncontested that in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), C.D.1, 

C.D.2, and C.D.3 were each in the custody of FCCS for a period of over 12 months prior to 

the filing of the permanent custody motion. And as the trial court observed, FCCS “need 

not provide any additional evidence as to the First Part of the permanent custody test.”

(Emphasis sic.) (Oct. 20, 2022 Decision & Jgmt. Entry at 28.) But there was even more

supporting that first portion of the test, as the court also found, based on clear evidence in 

the record, that none of the children “can be placed with either Parent within a reasonable 

time and should not be placed with either Parent,” as “notwithstanding reasonable case 

planning and diligent efforts * * * the Parents have failed continuously and repeatedly to 

substantially remedy the conditions” that caused removal of the children, that both the 

mother and father “demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the Children by failing to 

timely engage in and complete the reunification case plan,” and that the father had 

“abandoned” the children. Id. at 28. But even without those additional findings, as a result 

of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) the only question left for the trial court to decide was the “second 

half” of the permanent custody test—whether the termination of parental rights and grant 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 15

of permanent custody to FCCS was established by clear and convincing evidence to be in 

the best interest of C.D.1, C.D.2, and C.D.3, using the five factors set forth in R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1).

{¶ 13} And we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision that the trial court’s 

judgment terminating J.A.’s parental rights and concluding that a return to the custody of 

J.A. was against the children’s best interests was unsupported or against the weight of that 

evidence. Relevant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the evidence demonstrated that by May 0f 

2021, all three children had difficult interactions with their mother and were wary of their 

grandfather, to the point that C.D.3 refused to visit with him and physically fought his 

mother when she attempted to physically force him out of the car to attend a visit. (Decision 

& Jgmt. Entry at 18.) C.D.2 refused to come to several visitations, and would not engage 

with either J.A. or V.A. Id. The children’s foster mother testified to a similar story regarding 

C.D.1. Id. Based on this and other evidence presented at trial, the trial court concluded that 

“the Children do not have a strong healthy bond with Parents or Grandparents but have 

a strong bond with their foster parents.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 18. Relevant to R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1)(b), the court found that C.D.1, during her therapy, indicated that “she cares 

for her biological family but expressed the desire to stay where she is.” Id. at 21. C.D.2’s 

therapist testified that “he doesn’t remember living with [J.A.]; he didn’t talk about her,” 

but that he was beginning to work through his early trauma and starting to form a bond 

with his foster parents. Id. at 23. C.D.3 had only limited bonds with J.A. and V.A., and V.A. 

did not respect boundaries to make C.D.3 comfortable. Although on several occasions 

C.D.1, C.D.2, and C.D.3 expressed the desire to stay with their foster family, on July 22, 

2022 C.D.2 did state that he wanted to live “with Mommie [J.A.].” Id. at 20. But the GAL 

indicated that was inconsistent with his wishes on three prior occasions, and on that same 

date when he entered a visit, he stood close to his foster mother rather than J.A. or V.A.

{¶ 14} The trial court determined that the most persuasive evidence of the children’s 

desires could be found in the testimony of their respective therapists. Id. at 21. J.A. argues 

that consideration of this testimony as evidence of the children’s wishes was in violation of 

the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), which states that the court must consider 

“[t]he wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian 

ad litem * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Id. J.A. argues that this case is analogous to In re 

Ridenour, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-146, 147-48, 2004-Ohio-1958, in which the court reversed 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 16

a judgment of permanent custody where neither the child directly nor the GAL testified as 

to the placement wishes of the child, and where the only evidence of the child’s placement 

wishes was entered through the testimony of caseworkers. Id. at ¶ 46-47. See also In re 

Swisher, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1408, 2003-Ohio-5446, ¶ 40. We disagree. Here, the court’s 

decision to disregard the in camera interviews of the children was driven by its concern that 

the foster mother may have unintentionally influenced their statements by allowing them 

to “practice” their in camera interviews prior to the court’s decision to conduct those 

interviews and disregarded specific statements to the GAL for the same reasons. (Decision 

& Jgmt. Entry at 20-21.) This is substantially different than the situation faced in Ridenour

and Swisher, where the courts did not conduct any in camera interviews and the GALS did 

not offer any information at all regarding the placement wishes of the children. In those 

cases, the evidence required to support a finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(b) did not exist 

at all, whereas here, the court determined it was best to disregard the evidence because 

although “the Court does n0t believe the Children’s foster mother intended to influence and 

coach [C.D.1], it will be extremely difficult for [J.A.] and [V.A.] to accept this as 

unintentional and difficult for them to believe that [C.D.1] was not coached on her 

answers.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 20. Indeed, if the trial court had considered those in

camera interviews and statements of the GAL, the result would have been the same—both 

C.D.1 and C.D.2 specifically stated in their interviews that they wished to stay with their 

foster family and did not want to live with J.A. or V.A. Id. at 19. Moreover, the GAL

expressed her belief that the children had not been coached and that these wishes were 

genuine. Id. at 20. Any error that occurred in the trial court’s procedure in this case did 

not affect its judgment at all and was not objected to by the parties.

{¶ 15} Relevant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(c), the court found that the children had 

been in the same foster home together since October 1, 2020, that J.A. was incarcerated in 

jail, then in prison from November 29, 2019 through November 2020, and was in Alvis 

Halfway House from November 2020 through September 29, 2021. C.D.1 was moved from 

the custody of J.A. in February 2015 to the temporary custody of R.A., back to the custody 

of J.A. again in April 2016, back to kinship placement with R.A. in February 2017, then to 

a different foster home in May 2018, and finally to her current foster home in October 2020.

C.D.2 lived with J.A. from February 2016 through February 2018, then to kinship 

placement with R.A. until May 2018, then into a foster home with his sister C.D.1, and then 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 17

to his current foster home in October 2020. C.D.3 was placed in a foster home immediately 

after being discharged from the hospital after his birth until August 2017, then in kinship 

care with R.A. until May 2018, then into a foster home with his brother and sister until 

October 2020, and then finally to his current foster home. The children’s foster parents are 

interested in adopting them.

{¶ 16} Relevant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2)(d), the therapists of both C.D.1 and C.D.2 

asserted that both children needed permanency and that changes in their current 

placement could be retraumatizing. Id. at 22 and 23. The court also concluded that C.D.3 

has “no identified special needs perhaps because he has experienced less instability in his 

life.” Id. at 23. But the court found that J.A.’s short period of sobriety prior to trial, her 

“long history of drug abuse, relapses, criminal behavior, [and] incarceration,” as well as the 

short duration of her relationship with and financial dependence upon her current partner,

B.W., demonstrated her continued unsuitability as a custodian. Id. V.A. was likewise 

deemed unable to care for the children—he and R.A. have lived together on and off for the 

past 45 years and for the 7 years prior to trial, raising 2 other teenage grandchildren. V.A. 

used a walker and “moved about very little even during the three day trial.” Id. at 24. 

Notwithstanding what the court viewed as V.A.’s genuine love for his grandchildren, the 

court held that his “relationship with the Children did not progress enough to warrant an 

increase in visitation.” Id. at 24. The court further observed that while it believed V.A. 

would do his best to parent, it “doubts [V.A.] would respect their boundaries and doubts he 

would comply with court orders restricting access of [J.A.] to the Children.” Id. Ultimately, 

the court concluded that “even with the help of [R.A.],” V.A. “cannot provide for the basic 

and special needs of the Children,” and therefore placement in his custody could not be in 

their best interest.

{¶ 17} Given all of the foregoing, the trial court’s decision terminating J.A.’s parental 

rights, was clearly and convincingly supported by the evidence, and was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence at trial. Accordingly, J.A.’s first assignment of error is 

overruled.

{¶ 18} J.A.’s second assignment of error and V.A.’s sole assignment of error both 

rest on FCCS’ alleged noncompliance with Ohio’s new kinship caregiver law, which became 

effective on September 30, 2021. See 2021 Ohio H.B. 110, Section 101.01 (enacting R.C. 

Sections 2151.4115 through 2151.4122). The statute requires a “public children services 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 18

agency or private child placing agency [to] make intensive efforts to identify and engage an 

appropriate and willing kinship caregiver for the care of a child who is in * * * Temporary 

custody of the agency.” R.C. 2151.4116(A). Under R.C. 2151.4117(A), the court is directed 

“[a]t every court hearing” to determine whether FCCS has “continued intensive efforts to 

identify and engage appropriate and willing caregivers for the child.” Under R.C. 2151.4118, 

the court may issue an order that the continuation of the child’s placement in the home of 

a non-kinship caregiver is in the best interest of the child and that continued intensive 

efforts are unnecessary based on findings set forth in R.C. 2151.4119. And under R.C. 

2151.4119, the juvenile court must find that the child has been living in a stable home 

environment with the current caregiver for the past twelve months, the current caregiver 

has expressed an interest in providing permanency for the child, and removing the child 

from that placement would be detrimental to the child’s emotional well-being. Both V.A. 

and J.A. assert that at hearings after the effective date of the statute, the trial court failed to 

determine whether or not FCCS had engaged in “intensive efforts” to place C.D.1, C.D.2.,

and C.D.3 with V.A.

{¶ 19} But the statute does not require intensive efforts to place a child with a 

kinship caregiver, it requires intensive efforts to “identify and engage” a kinship caregiver. 

As V.A. was already identified and engaged in the case and had already expressed a desire 

to take custody of the children by virtue of his motion for legal custody, it is fatuous to argue 

that FCCS failed to comply with the statute—it clearly made the intensive efforts required, 

even before the statute was enacted and became effective.

{¶ 20} As such, the only argument remaining under these assignments of error is 

that the court failed to make the express order of R.C. 2151.4118 based on the express 

findings set forth in R.C. 2151.4119. But this argument too fails—in the trial court’s 

judgment entry granting FCCS’ permanent custody motion, the court specifically found that 

C.D.1, C.D.2, and C.D.3 had been living with the current foster parents from October 1, 

2020 onwards, (Decision & Jgmt. Entry at 21), that they had strong bonds with the foster 

parents, (id. at 18), that the foster parents are interested in adoption, (id. at 24), and that 

any change in placement would be traumatizing to the children. Id. at 22-23. These are, of 

course, the exact findings requirement by R.C. 2151.4118 and 2151.4119. Accordingly, even 

though the trial court did not specifically mention the code section numbers of the new 

kinship caregiver law, both it and FCCS satisfied the requirements of that law in this case. 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 19

For those reasons, we overrule J.A.’s second assignment of error and V.A.’s sole assignment 

of error.

{¶ 21} Finally, J.A. asserts that the trial court erred by failing to appoint separate 

counsel for C.D.1, who had expressed her desire to reside with V.A. and R.A., as these 

placement desires conflicted with the GAL’s placement recommendation. According to 

testimony at the trial and the report of the GAL, C.D.1 had expressed the wish to live with 

her grandparents on November 29, 2019, December 30, 2019, and January 20, 2020. (See, 

e.g., Jan. 6, 2022 Guardian Ad Litem’s Report at 40-42.) The GAL also reported that on 

August 20, 2020, C.D.1 stated that she wants to live with her grandparents:

but also expressed that she was “afraid” if that were to occur. 

Despite attempts to understand the fear, she was unable to 

articulate the fear Her facial expression also indicated some 

real anxiety. The GAL informed the Court that [C.D.1]’s 

expressed wishes were not consistent with the GAL’s 

recommendation at that time, but the Court declined to 

appoint counsel at that time.

Id. at 41-42. In the months prior to trial, C.D.1’s consistent wishes were to remain with the 

foster family—“she has been asking questions about family, what adoption means, and if 

the foster family would adopt her (and her brothers), to which the family answers in the

affirmative.” Id. at 42. The GAL’s report continued:

She did not appear excessively distressed at the thought of not 

seeing the extended family. GAL informed her that court date 

is coming up soon and it was important for her to tell GAL what 

she wanted. (She has been reluctant to discuss placement over 

the last few months). She seemed very worried that she would 

be forced to leave the home. GAL told her that is the very 

reason why it is important to say what she wants. She clearly 

stated that she wants to remain with the foster family. It should 

be noted that she looks forward to the monthly visits with 

grandparents primarily because her older cousin is there and 

she spends most of her time with him. A reminder that child 

does not state she looks forward to spending time with family, 

but is more interested in the gifts and dinner provided.

Id. at 42-43. It is true that “when a guardian ad litem who is appointed as the juvenile’s 

attorney recommends a disposition that conflicts with the juvenile’s wishes, the juvenile 

court must appoint independent counsel to represent the child.” In re Williams, 101 Ohio 

St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, ¶ 18. But we have held that “Parents have standing to appeal 
Nos. 22AP-649, 22AP-650, 22AP-674, & 22AP-675 20

an error committed against their children only if the error is prejudicial to the parents’

rights.” In re S.S., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-322, 2012-Ohio-4794, ¶ 26. See also In re S.B., 183 

Ohio App.3d 300, 2009-Ohio-3619, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), and In re B.L., 10th Dist. No. 04AP1108, 2005-Ohio-1151, ¶ 44. Consequently, a parent has standing to appeal an error 

committed against a child only when the parent and child share interests in that they both 

seek reunification. In re B.L. at ¶ 44.

{¶ 22} Here, even though C.D.1 expressed the desire to live with her grandparents 

earlier in the case, she definitely did not express the desire to be placed in the custody of 

her mother. And even more importantly, it is beyond dispute that C.D.1 had abandoned 

her conflicting desire well prior to the trial in this case. By the time the GAL filed her report, 

let alone the time of the trial itself, C.D.1 had become unwavering in her desire to stay with 

her brothers and her foster family. Accordingly, J.A. lacks standing to raise this assignment 

of error—C.D.1 never sought reunification and abandoned her desire to live with her 

grandparents, and therefore J.A.’s interests did not align with those expressed by C.D.1 at 

any point. J.A.’s third assignment of error is therefore overruled.

{¶ 23} For all these reasons, we conclude that appellant J.A.’s three assignments of 

error are overruled, appellant V.A.’s sole assignment of error is overruled, and the 

judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations, Juvenile 

Branch granting permanent custody of C.D.1, C.D.2, and C.D.3 to FCCS are affirmed.

Judgments affirmed.

MENTEL, P.J., and LELAND, J., concur.