Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2155 | September 30, 2019 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Joseph P. Hunter

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeremy Holland,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 30, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2155

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas A. 

Cannon, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

18C05-1703-MR-3

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2155 | September 30, 2019 Page 2 of 17

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, Jeremy Holland was convicted of murder, a felony;

aiding, inducing or causing criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony; and 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony. 

The trial court sentenced Holland to serve sixty-one years in the Indiana 

Department of Correction (“DOC”). Holland appeals, raising the following 

restated and expanded issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence of Holland’s statements to law enforcement;

1 and (2) whether the trial 

court erred in vacating Holland’s criminal confinement conviction rather than 

his felony murder conviction due to double jeopardy concerns. Concluding the 

challenged evidence was merely cumulative, the admission of which was

harmless, and the trial court properly vacated Holland’s lesser conviction, we 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On February 13, 2017, Terence Walker picked up Alonzo Williams from a 

residence on Walnut Street in Muncie, Indiana, where Holland and Joshua 

Erwin lived. Williams had his Tech 9 handgun with him, and they returned to 

Walker’s house. At the house, Walker informed Williams that Jeffrey Brown 

1 Holland raises the issue as error in denying a motion to suppress; however, Holland appeals the admission 

of this evidence after a completed trial. Thus, the issue is more appropriately framed as whether the trial 

court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial. See Packer v. State, 800 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003), trans. denied.
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had been involved in the murder of Joseph Johnson, Williams’ cousin, which 

had occurred eight days prior. Walker then showed Williams a text message he 

had received regarding the murder, which caused Williams to become “upset 

and confused.” Transcript of Evidence, Volume 2 at 191. Williams “said he 

needed to go make some money so he wanted to go sell some weed.” Id. at 

192. Sometime between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., Williams left his Tech 9 at 

Walker’s house, took Walker’s 9mm Ruger, borrowed Walker’s blue GMC 

Yukon SUV, and drove back to Holland’s house. 

[3] Around 11:00 p.m., Williams and Holland went to Brown’s house – where 

Brown lived with his wife and children. Brown’s wife knew someone had 

arrived at the house because she heard the loud noise of the SUV. Williams 

and Brown conversed on the back porch of the house while Holland smoked a 

cigarette in the kitchen. After Williams and Brown came back inside the house,

Brown told his wife, “I’ll be right back,” and the three men left. Id. at 241. 

Around midnight, they went to Walker’s residence so Williams could pick up 

his Tech 9. While Walker fixed one of the SUV’s headlights, Williams went 

inside and retrieved the Tech 9. Walker testified that he observed Brown and 

Holland in the SUV. At some point, Williams told Walker he and Holland 

“had a lick to set up to get Mr. Brown out of town[,]” meaning they planned to 

commit robbery. Id. at 197. When Williams and Holland left, the vehicle was 

in good condition and the headlight had been fixed. 

[4] Williams, Holland, and Brown, all armed with handguns, traveled to a house 

on Andover Street where Steven McPherson, Shelli Good, and Curtis Atkinson 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2155 | September 30, 2019 Page 4 of 17

lived. Williams supplied McPherson, Good, and Atkinson with some 

methamphetamine he brought with him, and the four of them ingested the 

substance. After, Williams asked to see Brown’s gun, grabbed it from Brown’s 

hand, and removed the magazine. Williams then pointed the gun at Brown, 

pushed him against the door, patted him down, and took methamphetamine 

from Brown’s pocket. At the same time, Holland was standing on the other 

side pointing his firearm at Brown. 

[5] Williams told Brown he was going to kill him for murdering his cousin and

Brown said he was not involved and pleaded for his life. Williams then 

instructed Good to get duct tape, so she grabbed a “black, cloth-like tape” from 

her dresser and pulled a drawstring from a pair of sweatpants and handed it to 

McPherson. Tr., Vol. 3 at 24. With his gun pointed at McPherson, Williams 

ordered McPherson and Atkinson to tie Brown up. While Holland had his gun 

pointed at Brown, Atkinson and McPherson used the string to tie Brown’s 

hands behind his back. Williams then ordered McPherson to go outside, start 

the SUV, and push the passenger seat closer to the dash. McPherson complied

and when he came back into the house, Williams and Holland still had Brown 

at gunpoint up against the door. McPherson recalled Williams telling Brown

he was “just going to drive [him] out of town, let [him] go and give [him] a 

pass.” Id. at 57. Williams and Holland escorted Brown out the back door, at 

gunpoint, and drove away in the SUV.

[6] At 1:00 a.m. the next morning, Gary Greenlee, Jr. heard a “loud muffler [of a 

vehicle]. . . going back and forth” near his home. Tr., Vol. 2 at 54. He 
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observed an SUV pull into his parents’ property across the street, which he 

described as a secluded wooded area. Later, he heard roughly seventeen 

gunshots. Greenlee contacted his parents to notify them of the shots and that 

the chain securing their property had been forced open; he also called 911.

2

 

Greenlee’s father, Gary Greenlee, Sr., drove across his property and wrapped 

the chain around a post and went back to bed. 

[7] Holland and Williams returned to the Walnut Street house around 1:30 a.m. 

Holland was calm but Williams appeared erratic, “a little hyped up” and

emotional. Tr., Vol. 3 at 84. Upon arrival, Williams possessed the Tech 9 

firearm and asked Erwin to clean the gun, but he refused. Around 10:00 or 

11:00 a.m., Williams returned Walker’s SUV in poor condition. Walker 

testified, “My front grill was gone and my headlights were busted out. On each 

fender . . ., it was dented in from a chain or something. . . . It had mud caked in 

the door wells, the wheel wells and in my front passenger seat.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 

200. Walker asked Holland about his 9mm Ruger, which Williams had taken 

earlier, and Holland stated that they sold it and he was going to try to replace it. 

Walker washed his SUV and took it to be repaired. 

[8] Just after noon, Greenlee Sr. went to fix the broken chain on his property and 

discovered the body of a partially covered man with his hands bound behind his 

2

It is unclear from the record how law enforcement responded to this call.
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back, later identified as Brown. Greenlee Sr. called 911 immediately and police 

arrived shortly thereafter. 

[9] An autopsy report revealed Brown had been shot ten times, including seven 

shots to his head and neck. At the scene, police recovered thirteen 9mm casings

and plastic pieces from a headlight assembly matching the SUV Williams had 

borrowed. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 98-99; Tr., Vol. 3 at 111. Police discovered tire 

and mud tracks matching Walker’s SUV, as well as blue paint on the chain 

from Greenlee’s property. One 9mm casing was also recovered from Brown’s 

hoodie during the autopsy. Cell phone records corroborated Holland’s 

movements from the general vicinity of the Andover Street house to the crime 

scene and then back toward his house on Walnut Street at the pertinent times. 

Tr., Vol. 3 at 217, 230.

[10] The same day as the murder, Jaime Phillips, Holland’s girlfriend, had been 

released from a hospital on the north side of Indianapolis and drove to 

Holland’s house. Phillips testified that Holland admitted to her that he and 

Williams borrowed Walker’s vehicle and planned on robbing Brown. Holland 

confessed that he and Williams went to Brown’s house, then the three of them 

went to a “junkie’s house on the north side of town” and Williams ordered the 

“junkies” to tie Brown up. Id. at 176. Holland further admitted they put 

Brown, tied up, in the backseat of the truck; Williams drove, and he was in the

passenger seat. Although Phillips stated Holland initially said he was not 

involved in Brown’s murder, Phillips later told police that Holland admitted he 
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was present when Williams shot Brown and that the incident “f**ked with his 

mind[.]” Id. at 191.

[11] Police began investigating Brown’s murder. Officer Kurt Walthour of the 

Delaware County Sheriff’s Office, in conjunction with the Muncie Police 

Department (“MPD”), interviewed Walker, Erwin, Good, McPherson, and 

Walker’s wife. On February 16, Holland was Mirandized, interviewed, and 

subsequently released. As a result of the investigation, Williams and Holland 

were identified as suspects in Brown’s murder.

[12] On March 4, Phillips called the police and alleged that two MPD investigators 

had confined her and Holland in the Walnut Street house – where she had been 

living with Holland and Erwin. MPD Officer Scott O’Dell responded and met 

Phillips outside the house, along with another officer on the scene. Phillips 

informed Officer O’Dell that Holland was inside, and, at the time, Officer 

O’Dell was aware Holland was a suspect in Brown’s murder.3 Officer O’Dell 

asked Phillips for permission to go inside to evaluate the scene where the 

alleged confinement occurred. Phillips consented. Officer O’Dell and Officer 

Jeff Pease followed Phillips inside the house. Phillips showed the officers the 

area she alleged the two investigators had confined them. At some point, the 

officers reached a locked bedroom door and Officer O’Dell asked who was 

inside to which Holland responded and asked the officers to slide a witness 

3 Officer O’Dell testified that he partook in the murder investigation.
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statement under the door. Holland eventually identified himself to the officers. 

Believing they had probable cause to arrest Holland at that time for felony 

murder, criminal confinement, and possession of a handgun by a serious violent 

felon, Officer Pease then kicked the door open. Holland was taken into custody

and transported to the police department. 

[13] At the station, Officer Walthour advised Holland of his Miranda rights4 and 

interviewed him. Holland admitted to being with Williams the night of the 

murder but denied being part of the murder. See Exhibits, Volume 6 at 2. 

Holland stated he did not see the murder take place. Following the interview, 

Officer Walthour prepared a probable cause affidavit for Holland’s arrest 

without a warrant and arrested Holland.

[14] Two days later, Officer Walthour received a text from Phillips indicating that 

Holland wanted to speak with him again. Holland was in jail, so they met in 

the interview room. Officer Walthour confirmed that Holland wished to speak 

with him and advised him of his Miranda rights. Holland signed a waiver and 

voluntarily spoke with Officer Walthour. Holland again denied involvement in 

Brown’s murder. He stated that he did not kill anyone and never witnessed the 

4 With respect to the advisement, Officer Walthour testified: “I have a sheet of paper, I do it the exact, same 

way every time, read [the rights] off to him, ask if he understood them, asked if he could read and write the 

English language, checked them off as I read each one of them to him, then I have him sign.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 

22. This form was admitted into evidence at trial. See Exhibits, Volume 1 at 1. 
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murder. Instead, Holland stated that Williams told him that he killed Brown. 

See id.

[15] On March 10, the State charged Holland with the following: Count 1, felony 

murder; Count 2, aiding, inducing, or causing criminal confinement, a Level 3 

felony; and Count 3, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, 

a Level 4 felony. Holland filed a Motion to Suppress the statements he made to 

law enforcement during his March 4 and 6 interviews. Holland argued his 

statements should be suppressed because they were a product of an illegal 

search and arrest and thus, violated the state and federal constitutions. 

Following a suppression hearing, the trial court denied Holland’s motion. 

[16] A jury trial was held during which Holland’s March 4 and 6 videotaped police 

interviews were admitted and played for the jury over his continuing objection. 

The jury found Holland guilty as charged. The trial court entered judgment of 

conviction for felony murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon. However, because kidnapping was the predicate felony for 

Holland’s felony murder conviction, the trial court declined to enter judgment 

of conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing criminal confinement, Count 2, 

due to double jeopardy concerns. The parties were given ten days to submit 

briefs on the double jeopardy issue. The State argued that a judgment of 

conviction on Count 2 would not violate double jeopardy. Holland, on the 

other hand, argued that his murder conviction should be vacated because “the 

continuing confinement began first” and “[o]nly one conviction can be 

entered[.]” Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 3 at 27-28. At the sentencing 
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hearing, the trial court denied Holland’s motion to vacate the conviction on 

Count 1 and declined to enter a judgment of conviction on Count 2 as it would 

violate double jeopardy. The trial court’s sentencing order provided, in 

pertinent part:

The Court finds that the Constitutional principle of double 

jeopardy bars the Court from entering judgment of conviction for 

Count 2, because to do so would impose multiple punishment for 

a crime which consists of the same act as an element of the crime 

of Felony Murder for which [Holland] was convicted. The 

actual evidence at trial does not differentiate the confinement of 

the victim separately from his removal by force from one place to 

another, the kidnapping. The acts of holding the victim at 

gunpoint, tying his hands behind his back, placing the victim in a 

car and driving him out into the country where he was taken out 

of the car, before being shot to death by [Holland’s] accomplice, 

are the predicate facts of the underlying felony, kidnapping, 

supporting the Felony Murder conviction. In this case, there is 

more than a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used 

to establish the essential elements of kidnapping, in the Felony 

Murder, Count 1, may also have been used to establish the 

essential elements of “confining” of the challenged offense, 

Count 2, Confinement. Therefore, the two (2) counts merge for 

sentencing purposes.

Id. at 88-89. The trial court sentenced Holland to fifty-five years on Count 1 

and six years on Count 3 to be served consecutively and executed in the DOC. 

Holland now appeals.

Discussion and Decision 
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I. Admission of Evidence

[17] Holland argues the trial court erred in admitting his statements to law 

enforcement during his March 4 and 6 interviews because the statements were 

the product of an illegal search and arrest. The State asserts that “[a]ny error . . 

. was immaterial because Holland’s statements were merely cumulative given 

the other evidence presented at trial that overwhelmingly proved Holland’s 

guilt[.]” Brief of Appellee at 26. 

[18] Our standard of review in this area is well-settled. The admission of evidence 

falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial 

court’s decision for an abuse of that discretion. Mack v. State, 23 N.E.3d 742, 

750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it. Morrison v. State, 824 N.E.2d 734, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005), trans. denied. However, if a trial court abuses its discretion by admitting 

challenged evidence, we will only reverse for that error if the error is 

inconsistent with substantial justice or if a substantial right of the party is 

affected. McVey v. State, 863 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal 

quotations omitted), trans. denied. Any error caused by the admission of 

evidence is harmless error for which we will not reverse a conviction if the 

erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative of other evidence properly 

admitted. Id.
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[19] Based on our review of the record, the evidence which Holland argues the trial 

court erred in admitting into evidence was merely cumulative of other properly 

admitted evidence demonstrating Holland’s guilt, including:

• Good, McPherson, and Atkinson all testified that Holland was in 

possession of a gun at the Andover Street house and pointed his gun at 

Brown while Brown was against the door and subsequently tied up. See

Tr., Vol. 3 at 23, 26, 33, 53-55, 148.

• Atkinson testified that while Holland held Brown at gunpoint, Holland 

warned Brown several times not to move. Id. at 152.

• Williams and Holland escorted Brown, who was still restrained, out the 

back door of the Andover Street house and into the SUV. Id. at 153. 

Holland went with Williams, who drove the vehicle, and Brown. 

• Walker testified that Williams and Holland returned to his house around 

midnight and he observed Brown and Holland seated in the SUV. See

Tr., Vol. 2 at 196. Williams told Walker “they had a lick set up to get 

Mr. Brown out of town.” Id. at 197. Walker testified his SUV was in 

good condition when Holland, Williams, and Brown left, but it was 

returned damaged and covered in mud. Id. at 197-200.

• Erwin testified that Williams and Holland returned to the Walnut Street 

house around 1:30 a.m. on February 14. He stated, “[Holland] was more 

calm and, like, any other day or night, and [Williams] was, you know a 
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little erratic. . . . He was a little hyped up, like, upset.” Tr., Vol. 3 at 84. 

Williams had the Tech 9 with him and asked Erwin to “take a look at it 

and clean it and check it out.” Id. at 86.

• Phillips testified that Holland confessed to her the following: he and 

Williams went to a house on the north side of town; Williams ordered 

“three white junkies” to tie Brown up; and he and Williams put Brown in 

the SUV. Id. at 176. Phillips also testified that she had previously told 

police that Holland had told her Williams shot and killed Brown. See id. 

at 178.

• Officer O’Dell testified that Phillips told him that Holland admitted to 

her that he was present when Williams shot Brown and that the incident 

“f**ked with his mind[.]” Id. at 191.

• Cell phone records and analysis revealed that on February 14 between 

12:19 a.m. and 12:49 a.m., Holland was in the general vicinity of the 

Andover Street house; between 12:59 a.m. and 1:25 a.m. Holland moved 

toward the general area of Greenlee’s property; between 1:32 a.m. and 

2:25 a.m. Holland moved toward the Walnut Street house. See Exhibits, 

Vol. 5 at 38-45.

[20] Given the ample evidence in the record of Holland’s involvement in the crime,

as demonstrated above, Holland’s statements to law enforcement were merely 

cumulative and even erroneous admission of the statements would not be 

reversible error. McVey, 863 N.E.2d at 440; see also Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 
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1223, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding the admission of cumulative evidence 

in the form of defendant’s statement to police to be harmless error).

II. Double Jeopardy

[21] Holland argues the trial court erred by declining to vacate his conviction for 

murder with the underlying kidnapping felony charge (Count 1) rather than his 

Level 3 felony conviction for aiding, inducing, or causing criminal confinement

(Count 2) due to double jeopardy concerns. Specifically, he maintains that 

“Count 2 was the more serious offense than the underlying kidnapping charge

[in Count 1 which] negated the underlying felony for the conviction on Count 

1” and therefore, Count 1 should have been vacated. Appellant’s Brief at 18. 

We disagree.

[22] Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a question of law which we 

review de novo. Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

Article 1, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “No person shall be 

put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” “Indiana’s Double Jeopardy 

Clause . . . prevent[s] the State from being able to proceed against a person 

twice for the same criminal transgression.” Howell v. State, 97 N.E.3d 253, 263 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. As our supreme court 

has explained, “two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ . . . if, with respect 

to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence 

used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish 

the essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717 
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N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) (emphasis in original). When both convictions 

cannot stand, the conviction with the less severe penal consequences should be 

vacated. Id. at 55.

[23] Here, the trial court stated the actual evidence presented at trial could establish 

the elements of kidnapping5and criminal confinement6:

The acts of holding the victim at gunpoint, tying his hands 

behind his back, placing the victim in a car and driving him out 

into the country where he was taken out of the car, before being 

shot to death by [Holland’s] accomplice, are the predicate facts of 

the underlying felony, kidnapping, supporting the Felony Murder 

conviction. In this case, there is more than a reasonable 

possibility that the evidentiary facts used to establish the essential 

elements of kidnapping, in the Felony Murder, Count 1, may 

also have been used to establish the essential elements of 

“confining” of the challenged offense, Count 2, Confinement. 

Therefore, the two (2) counts merge for sentencing purposes.

Appellant’s App., Vol. 3 at 89.

[24] Because there was a reasonable possibility the same evidence established the 

elements of kidnapping, the predicate felony proving felony murder, and also 

established the elements of criminal confinement, the trial court correctly 

5

“A person who knowingly or intentionally removes another person, by fraud, enticement, force, or threat of 

force, from one place to another commits kidnapping.” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(a) (2014).

6

“A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person’s consent 

commits criminal confinement. . . . [The offense is] a Level 3 felony if it . . . is committed while armed with 

a deadly weapon; . . . results in serious bodily injury to a person other than the confining person[.]” Ind. 

Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(2)(A), (B) (2014).
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declined to enter judgment of conviction and sentence on both felony murder 

and criminal confinement.7 Holland appears to argue that because kidnapping, 

the predicate felony supporting his felony murder conviction, carries a less 

severe consequence than his criminal confinement conviction, his murder 

conviction should have been vacated. However, Holland was convicted of 

felony murder and criminal confinement, not kidnapping and criminal 

confinement. Therefore, the trial court had to determine, as between felony 

murder and criminal confinement, which conviction should be vacated to avoid 

a double jeopardy violation. When two convictions cannot stand, the lesser 

conviction, that is “the conviction with the less severe penal consequences[,]”

should be vacated. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55. There is no question that 

Holland’s criminal confinement conviction carries a lesser sentence, a sixteen 

year maximum sentence, than his felony murder conviction, which carries a 

sixty-five year maximum sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b); Ind. Code § 

35-50-2-3(a). As such, the trial court properly vacated Holland’s criminal 

confinement conviction – the lesser conviction – due to double jeopardy 

concerns. Accordingly, we find no error.

7

In its appellate brief, the State maintains the trial court did not err in vacating Count 2 rather than Count 1

and thus, implicitly concedes there is a double jeopardy issue. 
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Conclusion

[25] For the reasons set forth above, we conclude Holland’s statements were merely 

cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial, the admission of which 

was harmless and does not constitute reversible error. We also conclude that

the trial court properly vacated Holland’s lesser conviction of criminal 

confinement rather than his felony murder conviction due to double jeopardy 

concerns. Accordingly, we affirm.

[26] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.