******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM

CONWAY HARPER

(AC 37022)

DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Bear, Js.

Argued April 4—officially released August 2, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, geographical area number twenty,

Holden, J.)

Richard Emanuel, for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Richard J. Colangelo, Jr.,

state’s attorney, Katherine Donoghue, deputy assistant

state’s attorney, and Ori Beeri, legal intern, for the

appellee (state).
Opinion

SHELDON, J. The defendant, William Conway

Harper, appeals from the judgment of conviction rendered against him after a court trial on charges of criminal trespass in the third degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-109 (a) and possession of less than onehalf ounce of marijuana in violation of General Statutes

§ 21a-279a (a).1 On appeal, the defendant claims (1) that

the evidence was insufficient to support either of his

challenged convictions and (2) that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress the marijuana seized

from a vehicle in which he was a passenger upon which

the latter conviction was based. We reverse the defendant’s conviction for criminal trespass in the third

degree on the ground of insufficient evidence, but affirm

his conviction for possession of marijuana upon concluding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support that conviction and that the court properly denied

his motion to suppress.

After a pretrial hearing on the defendant’s motion to

suppress, the trial court found the following facts. On

the evening of July 13, 2012, Officers Julio Rodriguez

and Steven Luciano of the Norwalk Police Department

were working as members of a special services unit that

patrolled Norwalk housing areas, looking for criminal

activity such as narcotics transactions and trespassing.

As part of their regular routine, the officers patrolled

all of the housing projects in Norwalk due to numerous

complaints by local residents about ‘‘intruders bringing

in drugs, gangs, violence, and [a]ffecting the quality of

their’’ lives.

On July 13, 2012, at approximately 9 p.m., the officers

entered the parking lot of a housing project at 16 School

Street in Norwalk, which is a dead end, by making a

left turn from the main driveway, then a quick right

turn, which put them at the rear of the property between

buildings five and one. They observed that ‘‘No Trespassing’’ signs were posted throughout the property. At

the far end of the parking lot there was a dumpster,

which was surrounded on three sides by a fence that

bore a ‘‘No Trespassing’’ sign. The officers parked their

marked police cruiser behind a Honda Accord that was

parked next to the dumpster. Then they observed the

defendant, who appeared to be startled by their presence, emerge from behind the dumpster and walk

quickly and nervously to the Honda, with his head down,

trying to avoid eye contact with the officers. He entered

the passenger side of the vehicle.

The officers then observed another male, Kyle Freitag, emerge from behind the dumpster and walk nervously to the Honda, also with his head down and trying

to avoid eye contact with them, before entering the

driver’s side of the Honda. After entering the vehicle,

Freitag put it in reverse and tried to leave the area, but
he was unable to do so because the police cruiser was

parked immediately behind him.

Luciano testified that, due to his frequent patrols of

16 School Street, he had become familiar with most of

the residents of the property, but he did not recognize

either of the men in the Honda as a resident. The officers

ran the license plate of the Honda through the Department of Motor Vehicles’ database and discovered that

the vehicle was not registered to anyone residing at 16

School Street. On that basis, aware of the constant

complaints of residents about trespassers on the property, the officers exited their cruiser to determine what,

if any, reason the two men had for being on the premises. While walking toward the Honda, the officers

encountered Mary Horelick, a resident of 16 School

Street, who told them that she did not know the men in

the Honda, one of whom had just urinated on herfence.

Upon nearing the Honda, however, the focus of the

officers’ investigation changed when they smelled ‘‘the

pungent strong odor of marijuana,’’ coming from the

vehicle. This finding led them to call in a canine unit to

search the vehicle’s interior. Shortly thereafter, Officer

Garrett Kruger and his dog, Kimbo, arrived on the scene

and conducted a search of the Honda. The search

revealed a bag of marijuana on the floor of the vehicle,

near the front passenger seat, where the defendant had

been sitting.2 As a result of this discovery, the defendant

was placed under arrest. Despite the officers’ original

intentions when they first approached the Honda, they

never questioned either the defendant or Freitag as

to why they were at 16 School Street on the evening

in question.

After a trial to the court, the defendant was found

guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree and sentenced to a term of ninety days incarceration, execution

suspended, and one year of probation. The court also

found the defendant guilty of possession of less than

one-half ounce of marijuana and sentenced him on that

charge to a fine of $150. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as they pertain to each of

the defendant’s claims on appeal.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence adduced

at trial was insufficient to support either of his challenged convictions. ‘‘In [a defendant’s] challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence . . . [w]hether we review

the findings of a trial court or the verdict of a jury, our

underlying task is the same. . . . We first review the

evidence presented at trial, construing it in the light

most favorable to sustaining the facts expressly found

by the trial court or impliedly found by the jury. We

then decide whether, upon the facts thus established

and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the

trial court or the jury could reasonably have concluded
that the cumulative effect of the evidence established

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

In assessing the defendant’s claim that the evidence

against him was insufficient to establish his guilt . . .

we must look to the trial court’s findings of fact. . . .

[W]e give great deference to the findings of the trial

court because of its function to weigh and interpret the

evidence before it and to pass upon the credibility of

witnesses. . . .

‘‘In evaluating evidence that could yield contrary

inferences, the trier of fact is not required to accept as

dispositive those inferences that are consistent with

the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier [of fact] may

draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts

established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable

and logical. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would

support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask,

instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier of fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149, 157–58, 49 A.3d 962

(2012). With these principles in mind, we address the

charges of which the defendant was convicted in turn.

A

The defendant first claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction

for criminal trespass in the third degree. The state

charged the defendant, by way of an amended long

form information dated June 24, 2014, with ‘‘enter[ing]

. . . the property comprising a public housing project

located at 16 School Street, which is posted in a manner

prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the

attention of intruders, knowing that he did not have a

license or privilege to do so, in violation of . . . § 53a109 (a).’’3

In his brief to this court, the defendant concedes that the state proved that he entered the subject

premises, but argues that it failed to prove that the

premises were ‘‘posted in a manner prescribed by law

or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders’’ and that he entered those premises knowing that

he did not have a license or privilege to do so.

On the charge of criminal trespass in the third degree,

the trial court concluded that the defendant ‘‘did enter

or remain in the premises, to wit, and, posted in a

manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come

to the attention of the intruders, knowing he did not

have license or privilege to do so.’’

In determining that the premises were posted in a

manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of

intruders, the court credited the testimony of Aurora

Holley, an ‘‘occupant specialist’’ employed by the Norwalk Housing Authority, which owns the housing project located at 16 School Street. Holley testified that ‘‘No
Trespassing’’ signs are posted throughout the property

at 16 School Street, as required by law.4 Luciano testified

that, on the night in question, he observed two such

signs, one posted at the only entrance to the premises

and the other posted on a fence near the dumpster next

to which the Honda was parked. Although the defendant

rightly notes that those signs are not depicted in any

of the photographs that were admitted into evidence

at trial, and argues that there may have been insufficient

lighting for the defendant to see those signs, the court

was free to credit Luciano’s testimony that the signs

were present and visible to a person in the defendant’s

position on that evening. We thus conclude that the

court’s determination that the premises were posted in

a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention

of the defendant was well supported by the evidence

adduced at trial.

The defendant also claims that the evidence was

insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

he knew that he did not have a license or privilege to

be on the premises at 16 School Street. ‘‘A person acts

‘knowingly’ with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when

he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that

such circumstance exists . . . .’’ General Statutes

§ 53a-3 (12). Thus, to prove that the defendant knew

that he did not have a license or privilege to be at 16

School Street, the state was necessarily required to

prove that, in fact, he did not have such a right or

privilege. The defendant claimed at trial, as he does

now on appeal, that he had been invited to the premises

at 16 School Street, to meet a friend who then resided

there, in order to accompany her to her twenty-first

birthday party. In support of that claim, the defendant

offered the testimony of Tiffany Hall, of 16 School

Street, who testified, inter alia, that she had invited the

defendant, with whom she had been friends for eight

or nine years, to her twenty-first birthday party, which

she was throwing that evening at a local pub. Hall testified that she had handed the defendant an invitation to

her party, a copy of which was admitted into evidence

as ‘‘Defendant’s Exhibit C,’’ at about six or seven o’clock

on the evening of July 13, 2012. Although the invitation

indicated that the party would begin at 9 p.m. that

evening at a local pub, Hall testified that all of the

partygoers had been told to meet her at 16 School Street,

where they would follow her in her limousine to the

party. Hall testified that, while she was walking from

her apartment on the premises to herlimousine, she saw

the defendant and Freitag being arrested, prompting her

to call out to them, ‘‘Yo, you good?’’5 She testified that

she did not tell the arresting officers that the defendant

and Freitag were there for her party because other

officers were blocking her from reaching them.

In finding the defendant guilty of criminal trespass

in the third degree, the court concluded: ‘‘[T]here’s no
evidence at all, that I can see, or reasonable inference

therefrom, regarding criminal trespass in the third

degree, that [the defendant] had a privilege to be there.’’

In so concluding, the court improperly shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that he had a license or

privilege to be on the premises at 16 School Street,

rather than placing the burden on the state to prove

that he had no license or privilege to be there. It is

axiomatic that the defendant does not bear the burden

of disproving the statutory elements of any crime with

which he has been charged. Specifically, as it relates

to the defendant’s claim that he was on the premises

that evening because one of its residents had invited

him to be there, this court has held that when a defendant claims a license or privilege to be present on the

basis of the consent of the property owner, it is ‘‘the

state’s burden, in establishing . . . unlawful[ness]

. . . to prove that no such consent had been given.’’

State v. Grant, 6 Conn. App. 24, 31, 502 A.2d 945 (1986).

Here, the defendant claimed that he had been invited

to 16 School Street by Hall to follow her limousine to

her birthday party, which was being held at a local pub.

The trial court stated that it found Hall’s testimony to

be ‘‘credible,’’ but determined that, because the invitation that was admitted into evidence indicated the location of the party was a local pub, without making any

mention of 16 School Street, there was ‘‘nothing to

support th[e] inference’’ that Hall told the defendant to

meet at 16 School Street.6

The defendant’s explanation that he had been invited

by Hall to meet at her apartment complex to go to her

party is supported by the fact that he was there at

the time indicated on the invitation. Moreover, Luciano

testified that the dumpster next to which Freitag’s

Honda had been parked was located on the northwestern portion of the property at 16 School Street. Hall

testified that she resided in building 5. State’s exhibit

14, which is the ‘‘16 School Street Site Plan,’’ indicates

that building 5 is also located on the northwestern portion of the property. The defendant’s location in that

area was therefore consistent with his claim that he

was on the property to meet up with Hall. We thus

conclude that the court’s determination that there was

no evidence from which it could find that the defendant

had been invited to 16 School Street is contradicted by

the record.

Even, however, if the court had found Hall to be

‘‘incredible,’’ which it did not, mere disbelief of her

testimony that she had invited the defendant to meet

her at 16 School Street on the evening of his arrest

would furnish no basis for concluding, to the contrary,

that the defendant had no license or privilege to be at

16 School Street at the time of his arrest, much less

that he knew that he had no such license or privilege.

See State v. Alfonso, 195 Conn. 624, 633–34, 490 A.2d
75 (1985). The state was required to present affirmative

evidence to support those essential statutory elements,

but it failed to do so.

The state argues that it presented sufficient evidence

from which the trial court reasonably could have

inferred that the defendant had not been invited to 16

School Street, based upon his and Freitag’s suspicious

behavior when they first saw the police and the fact

that one or both of them urinated on an outside fence

on the premises instead of using a resident’s bathroom.

To this the state adds that neither the defendant, Freitag, nor Hall when she walked by them, ever told the

arresting officers that she had invited them to meet her

there that evening. The state argues that the foregoing

conduct of the defendant is inconsistent with that which

would have been expected from one who believed himself to be lawfully on a particular property. We disagree.

To begin with, the defendant’s and Freitag’s nervous

conduct on seeing the officers was consistent with that

of anyone who encounters law enforcement personnel

after being discovered urinating in public or while possessing illegal contraband. It reveals nothing about

whether or not they had been invited by a resident to

be on the premises that evening. Furthermore, once the

officers approached them as they sat in the Honda after

trying unsuccessfully to back out of their parking place

near the dumpster, the new focus of their investigation

became the marijuana whose pungent odor was clearly

detectible from outside the vehicle. Because the officers, from that point forward, concentrated their efforts

on searching the vehicle for contraband, they never

questioned the defendant and Freitag about their reasons for being on the premises that evening or gave

them any reason to believe that offering an explanation

on that subject would, inter alia, enable them to avoid

criminal trespass charges, aid their cause, or affect their

fate in relation to the marijuana. For similar reasons,

Hall had no reason to tell the officers, when she saw

the defendant and his companion being arrested for

unknown reasons, that they were present on the premises that evening as her guests. She was not questioned

on that subject and had no reason to volunteer information concerning it. Moreover, even if any of the foregoing evidence could have supported the inference that

the defendant and his companion did not believe that

they had a license or privilege to be at 16 School Street

that evening, such ambiguous conduct did not establish

that they in fact had no license or privilege to be there.

This scant evidence was simply insufficient to prove

by any standard, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the defendant knew that he did not have a license

or privilege to be on the premises at 16 School Street.

We thus agree with the defendant that the evidence

was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal

trespass in the third degree, because there is no reasonable view of the evidence that supported a finding of
guilty.

B

The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his conviction of possession of less

than one-half ounce of marijuana pursuant to § 21a279a (a). Because the marijuana seized in this case was

not found on the defendant’s person, the state was

required to prove that he constructively possessed it,

and the defendant argues that the state failed to do so.

We disagree.

‘‘[General Statutes] 51-164n (i) provides that in any

trial for the alleged violation of § 21a-279a (a), the burden of proof shall be by the preponderance of the evidence, rather than the higher criminal standard—proof

beyond a reasonable doubt—that governs most other

violations and infractions.’’ State v. Menditto, 315 Conn.

861, 875, 110 A.3d 410 (2015). Thus, ‘‘[i]n order to prove

that a defendant is guilty of possession of narcotics

. . . the state must prove [by a preponderance of the

evidence] that the defendant had either actual or constructive possession of a narcotic substance. . . .

Actual possession requires the defendant to have had

direct physical contact with the narcotics. . . . Constructive possession, on the other hand, is possession

without direct physical contact. . . . To prove either

actual or constructive possession of a narcotic substance, the state must establish [by a preponderance

of the evidence] that the accused knew of the character

of the drug and its presence, and exercised dominion

and control over it. . . .

‘‘Where . . . the [narcotic substance] was not found

on the defendant’s person, the state must proceed on

the theory of constructive possession . . . . One factor that may be considered in determining whether a

defendant is in constructive possession of narcotics is

whether he is in possession of the premises where the

narcotics are found. . . . Where the defendant is not

in exclusive possession of the premises where the narcotics are found, it may not be inferred that [the defendant] knew of the presence of the narcotics and had

control of them, unless there are other incriminating

statements or circumstances tending to buttress such

an inference. . . . In determining whether the attendant incriminating circumstances support an inference

of constructive possession, the proper focus is on the

relationship between the defendant and the contraband

found in the apartment rather than on the relationship

between the defendant and the apartment itself.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Nova, 161 Conn. App. 708, 718–19, 129 A.3d 146 (2015).

In finding the defendant guilty by a preponderance

of the evidence, the trial court noted the training and

experience ofRodriguez and Luciano, and credited their

testimony that they smelled what they believed to be
marijuana when they approached Freitag’s Honda—

Rodriguez from the driver’s side and Luciano from the

passenger side. The trial court credited Luciano’s testimony that the defendant, who had been sitting in the

passenger’s seat, exhibited behavior consistent with

being under the influence of marijuana, namely, ‘‘glassy

eyes, slurred words.’’ Luciano testified that the defendant reached down toward the floor of the vehicle with

his left hand prior to complying with Luciano’s order

to exit the vehicle. While the vehicle was searched by

the canine unit, Luciano testified that the defendant

became nervous and fidgety. A plastic bag of marijuana

was discovered on the floor near the passenger seat.

The discovery of the marijuana near the seat that the

defendant was sitting in, and his gesture toward the

bag of marijuana prior to exiting the vehicle demonstrated his knowledge that the bag was present and his

concern about it being discovered. His nervous behavior and his demonstration of symptoms of being under

the influence of marijuana are sufficient to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was

in constructive possession of the marijuana. Although

the defendant argues that the evidence at trial could

be construed in a manner consistent with his innocence,

it is the role of this court to determine whether the

findings made by the trial court are reasonably supported by the record, not to consider alternative views

of the evidence. We conclude that the trial court’s findings are supported by the record, and thus that the

evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana.

II

The defendant also claims that the court erred in

denying his motion to suppress and that he is entitled

to a new trial on the basis of that error on the charge

of possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana.

The defendant claims that the search of the vehicle and

the seizure of the marijuana on the evening in question

was conducted pursuant to an unlawful stop that was

not justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion

of criminal activity. We disagree.

‘‘Our standard of review of a trial court’s findings and

conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is

well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed

unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence

and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [W]here the

legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must

determine whetherthey are legally and logically correct

and whether they find support in the facts set out in

the memorandum of decision . . . . [T]he trial court’s

conclusions must stand unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with the facts. . . .

‘‘The law governing investigatory detentions is also
well settled. Under the fourth amendment to the United

States constitution and article first, §§ 7 and 9, of our

state constitution, a police officer is permitted in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to

detain an individual for investigative purposes if the

officer believes, based on a reasonable and articulable

suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal

activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an

arrest. . . . Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an

objective standard thatfocuses not on the actual state of

mind of the police officer, but on whether a reasonable

person, having the information available to and known

by the police, would have had that level of suspicion.

. . .

‘‘[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable

facts which, taken together with rational inferences

from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.

. . . [A]n investigative stop can be appropriate even

where the police have not observed a violation because

a reasonable and articulable suspicion can arise from

conduct that alone is not criminal. . . . In evaluating

the validity of such a stop, courts must consider

whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances,

the police officer had a particularized and objective

basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of

criminal activity. . . . This process allows officers to

draw on their own experience and specialized training

to make inferences from and deductions about the

cumulative information available to them that might

well elude an untrained person. . . .

‘‘Consequently, [w]e do not consider whether the

defendant’s conduct possibly was consistent with innocent activity but,rather, whetherthe rational inferences

that can be derived from it reasonably suggest criminal

activity to a police officer. . . . When reviewing the

legality of a stop, a court must examine the specific

information available to the police officer at the time

of the initial intrusion and any rational inferences to

be derived therefrom.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Peterson, 320 Conn. 720, 730–32, A.3d (2016).

Here, the defendant and the state disagree as to what

constituted the allegedly unlawful stop. The defendant

argues that the stop occurred when Freitag put the

vehicle in reverse and was prevented from leaving

because the police cruiser was behind it, and thus that

any evidence relied upon by the trial court that occurred

after that point, such as the officers’ testimony that

they smelled marijuana as they approached the vehicle

or the officers’ conversation with Horelick, could not

have been considered as contributing to a reasonable

and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The state

argues that the court did not make an explicit determination as to when the vehicle was stopped, but clearly
and properly considered the totality of the circumstances of the entire encounter, including events that

occurred after Freitag had put the vehicle in reverse

to attempt to leave. We need not resolve this dispute

because we conclude that the evidence presented at

the suppression hearing was sufficient to support a

finding of reasonable and articulable suspicion at the

time Freitag put his car in reverse to attempt to drive

away, and the defendant has asserted no independent

challenge to the subsequent search of the vehicle that

was conducted on the basis of additional information

that came to the officers’ attention after the stop.

The court specifically noted that Rodriguez and

Luciano patrolled the area frequently as part of a special

services unit to investigate constant complaints of

‘‘intruders bringing in drugs, gangs, [and] violence.’’ The

court found that the officers were familiar with and

knew most of the residents of 16 School Street, and at

9 p.m. on July 13, 2012, they saw two men, whom they

did not recognize as residents of 16 School Street,

emerge from behind a dumpster, which was surrounded

on three sides by a fence, upon which was posted a

‘‘No Trespassing’’ sign, and walk nervously and quickly

to a vehicle while trying to avoid eye contact with them.

On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that the

court properly determined that the police officers had

a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an

investigatory stop and thus that the trial court properly

denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.

The judgment of conviction of criminal trespass in

the third degree is reversed and the case is remanded

with direction to render judgment of acquittal on that

charge. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant was also charged with possession of a weapon in a motor

vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29-38 (a) and carrying a pistol

without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a). He was acquitted

of those charges.

2 The search of the vehicle also revealed two firearms. As noted, the

defendant was acquitted of both weapons offenses with which he was

charged.

3 General Statutes § 53a-109 (a) provides: ‘‘A person is guilty of criminal

trespass in the third degree when, knowing that such person is not licensed

or privileged to do so: (1) Such person enters or remains in premises which

are posted in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to

the attention of intruders or are fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner

designed to exclude intruders, or which belong to the state and are appurtenant to any state institution; or (2) such person enters or remains in any

premises for the purpose of hunting, trapping or fishing; or (3) such person

enters or remains on public land which is posted in a manner prescribed

by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders or is fenced

or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.’’

4 Holley also testified that guests of residents of 16 School Street are

permitted and, if they have not had a criminal record within five years, they

do not need to be accompanied by the resident who had invited them.

Because the defendant did not have a criminal record, this testimony does

not appear to be relevant.

5 Luciano confirmed that he heard Hall yell out to the defendant.

6 The court explained: ‘‘The inference to draw, if any, was that sometime

from the two hours, or so, of when it was handed to [the defendant], if I

believe the testimony of Ms. Hall, then she would have told him, verbally,
to meet at 16 School Street.

‘‘She testified, and corroborated, that at the time the limo was there, she

uttered the words, yo, are you good, quote unquote, which was corroborated

by Officer Luciano.

‘‘And as to whether or not she knew anything about the arrest that was

being affected and the police activity—or the reason for the police activity,

was not on this record. And that lends itself to speculation and conjecture.’’