RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3299-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY HOLLAND, a/k/a

JEFFREY R. HOLLAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted January 12, 2022 – Decided February 14, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos: 16-07-2123 

and 16-07-2129.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, 

Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

Defendant Jeffrey Holland appeals his conviction for three first-degree 

murders and related charges, and his sentence, which included multiple 

consecutive terms, yielding an aggregate sentence of 180 years with 158 years 

of parole ineligibility. He also appeals from an order that denied his motion to 

sever counts eight through fourteen of Indictment No. 16-07-2123. We affirm 

defendant's conviction but remand for resentencing of certain counts. 

Defendant was accused of the murders of Tiniquah Rouse, Ashley Jones, 

and Jarrell Marshall. Investigators believed the murders were connected

because both Rouse and Jones were previously sexually involved with 

defendant, and Marshall was Jones's new boyfriend. In addition, investigators 

believed that surveillance footage recovered at both crime scenes showed 

defendant wearing similar clothing. 

I.

On January 29, 2016, Rouse was murdered in her apartment in Newark. 

Harold McSwain, a neighbor, saw Rouse's door was open, noticed water was 

running, found her body in the bathtub, and called 911. 

Upon their arrival, police found Rouse's naked, slightly contorted body on 

the floor. The bathroom floor and hallway were covered in water, and the tub 
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was partially filled. A hair curling iron was inserted in Rouse's vagina and anus. 

Detective Christopher Brown found Rouse's infant son in the bedroom closet 

underneath some clothes. 

Rouse did not have a pulse when EMS arrived and was pronounced dead 

at the hospital at approximately 12:18 a.m. An autopsy determined the cause of 

death as compression to the neck and drowning. No viable fingerprints of the 

perpetrator were discovered in the apartment. 

Defendant testified on his own behalf about his version of the events. He 

explained that he and Rouse had a "sexual relationship" but did not consider 

each other boyfriend and girlfriend. He also had a sexual relationship with 

Saleemah Anderson, Rouse's roommate and cousin. On the day of the incident, 

defendant was bored and "wanted to have a good time." He texted Anderson 

and went to Rouse's apartment, arriving at approximately 5:00 p.m. Anderson 

was not home. The two engaged in sexual activity "the way [they] normally do" 

in Rouse's bedroom. According to defendant, Rouse "likes to be choked and 

tied up and spit on and stuff of that sort." The two engaged in sexual activity 

again, at which time defendant choked Rouse. Defendant testified that he found 

a brown wire and asked if Rouse wanted him to use it, and she agreed. The 
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judge sustained objections from the prosecutor about anything Rouse said that 

night. Defendant further testified:

I choked her. I proceeded to choke her harder at 

her request. In the process of having sex, . . . she's like 

making like this arching like movement. And it didn't 

really cause me like no concern because I just figured 

she was having an orgasm and it wasn't unusual for her 

to move in that manner when she [would] have 

orgasms. So after I ejaculated and . . . got [up] from on 

top of her, I noticed . . . she wasn't moving. She still 

didn't get up. She wasn't saying anything. And I kind 

of heard this gurgling noise . . . . That's when I became 

concerned. I went to her, I tried to get the restraints off 

her hand, I couldn't. I ran to the kitchen, grabbed a 

knife out the sink and cut it off.

Defendant stated he then took Rouse to the bathroom and tried to resuscitate 

her. He testified that he "completely panicked" and wiped down everything in 

the apartment that he had touched. Defendant also took everything off the bed 

and put it into a suitcase, including the used sheets, blankets, and sex toys. He 

tried washing out her vagina with soap from the bathroom, and then found a 

curling iron under her sink. He inserted one part of it into her vagina and the 

other into her anus and turned the iron on to destroy his DNA. 

Defendant then wrapped the baby, who had previously been on the bed, in 

a blanket and placed him inside of the bedroom closet. He stated that he turned 

the water on in the bathtub so that it would flood the apartment and alert 
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someone to come find the baby. Defendant left the apartment unlocked and 

discarded the suitcase in a dumpster. He then returned to the apartment because 

he realized he left a bottle of soda there, which may have had his DNA on it. 

After that, he returned home at around 11:00 p.m., where he lives with his father 

and brother. Defendant admitted that it was him in the surveillance video going 

in and out of Rouse's apartment with the suitcase, wearing a black Northface

jacket, jeans, and gray shoes. 

Officers recovered the suitcase, which contained an air mattress pump, 

lotion, a sex toy, clothing, and a receipt, which were all Rouse's belongings.

Police also found electrical cords, one with a long hair in it, and a serrated steak 

knife in the suitcase. Police could not find Rouse's phone, but cell tower records 

showed it was near defendant's home in East Orange on January 29 after Rouse 

was already dead. 

Defendant claimed he woke up around 9:00 a.m. the following day and left 

his home wearing red sneakers, a red sweatshirt, green cargo pants, and carrying 

a blue backpack that contained his Northface jacket. He discarded the jacket in 

a trash chute in a nearby building. Defendant claims he spent the rest of the day 

with his brother. That night, he returned to Rouse's apartment building to see if 

there was a police presence. 
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The trial court found that the video surveillance footage recovered from the 

interior and exterior of the building revealed: 

• 5:08 p.m. An individual with long dreadlocks, ripped jeans with the 

left black pocket sticking out of the rip of the left jean legs, rips on 

the right jean leg, a black Northface jacket, a hat, and a mask over 

his mouth, walked to [Rouse's apartment building].

• 5:12 p.m. An unknown person lets the individual into the building 

and the individual is seen walking to the stairwell.

• 5:13 p.m. The individual is now seen on the fourth floor of the 

building. The individual walks to and then waits outside [Rouse's 

apartment].

• 5:16 p.m. The individual is let in. No one is seen entering or exiting 

[Rouse's apartment] until almost [seven] hours later.

• 11:00 p.m. The individual that entered earlier now leaves wearing 

the same clothes. However, this time, the individual has a red glove 

on his left hand holding a suitcase and a white cloth in his right 

hand. The individual is then observed pulling the suitcase and 

proceeding down the stairwell and into the vestibule area in front of 

entrance of [the building]. The individual then exits the apartment 

building with the suitcase.

• 11:14 p.m. The individual returns to the apartment building . . . 

wearing the same clothes.

• 11:15 p.m. While inside the vestibule, the individual pulls up his 

mouth mask and goes to the stairs and up to the fourth floor. As he 

walks past the fourth floor camera, he is observed with the same 

clothes, but the mask is now on and he is putting on red gloves. He 

then enters [Rouse's apartment] without delay.
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• 11:18 p.m. The individual is still wearing the same clothes, but he 

is now holding a green bottle and his dreadlocks are tucked into his 

Northface jacket.

• 11:19 p.m. The individual leaves [the apartment] and exits the 

apartment building.

• 11:42 p.m. McSwain, riding his bike, arrives at [the building].

• 11:44 p.m. McSwain walks down the fourth-floor hallway and 

enters [Rouse's apartment].

• 12:09 p.m. McSwain is seen opening [the] building for police and 

EMS.

• 12:21 p.m. EMS is observed carrying a swaddled baby out of [the 

apartment].

Saleemah Anderson knew defendant as "Rodrese," – defendant's middle 

name. On January 31, Anderson identified defendant on surveillance footage. 

She also identified him in the courtroom. Anderson identified the suitcase as 

Rouse's. 

Defendant was previously in a sexual relationship with Jones. They have 

two children together. They previously lived together, until she received 

housing assistance and moved. 

During the evening of January 30, 2016, police reported to Jones's 

apartment in response to a report of a shooting. A neighbor called 911 after 

hearing gunshots coming from the apartment. Jones and Marshall were found 
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dead in the apartment. Police found three children in the apartment crying in 

the bedroom where Jones and Marshall lay dead. Jones was holding one of the 

children. Two of the children were defendant's biological children, the other 

was Marshall's child with another woman. 

The door to the apartment was kicked in and nearly off its hinges. Seven 

shell casings were found near Marshall, and there were bullet holes in the 

window and near where Jones lay. Autopsies revealed that Jones had two 

gunshot wounds to the head, and Marshall had multiple gunshot wounds to the 

neck, torso, arms, and legs. The medical examiner found Jones's cause of death 

was the gunshot wound to the head and Marshall's was multiple gunshot wounds. 

No fingerprints of the perpetrator were found at the scene. 

Surveillance footage recovered from the building revealed:

• 8:14 p.m. An individual wearing green cargo pants, a red sweatshirt 

with white strings and the hood over his head, a black Northface 

jacket, red sneakers, and a red glove is observed going up the 

stairwell at the apartment building.

• 8:20 p.m. The individual, wearing the same clothes, is observed 

going down the stairwell.

Seven gunshots and a woman's scream can be heard on another 

surveillance video. Jones and Marshall were fatally shot within minutes of each 

other. An individual is then seen running away from the building. 
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After receiving Miranda1 warnings and waiving those rights, defendant 

was interviewed by detectives on January 31, 2016, at about 4:30 a.m. He 

consented to detectives searching his cellphone. Defendant was held on several 

unrelated arrest warrants. 

The two incidents were initially investigated separately, but as the 

investigations progressed, defendant became a suspect in all three murders. 

Detective Anthony Lima noticed that the suspects in the three murders were 

wearing similar clothing, their descriptions matched, and the suspect in the 

surveillance videos resembled defendant. Investigators obtained search 

warrants for defendant's residence, the clothing he wore on January 31, 2016, 

and his person. 

During the search of defendant's residence, detectives seized green cargo

pants, a black ski mask in the pants pocket, and red gloves. They also found 

defendant's sneakers, his driver's license, documents belonging to Jones, a gun 

holster, two handgun magazines, and nineteen live rounds of ammunition. 

Defendant did not have a permit to carry a gun. They also recovered a key to 

the front door of Jones's apartment and one of defendant's cellphones, which 

showed text messages from Jones asking defendant to leave her alone. The text 

1

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
10 A-3299-18

messages include defendant stating, "I could have killed you three times" to 

Jones, and that the only reason he did not kill Marshall was because he left his 

gun at his house. He also texted her saying he would kick her door in, which is 

exactly how officers found the door the night of the shooting. Defendant 

testified that he was out of state when he sent that message and did not mean it, 

he was "just harassing." 

Investigators also recovered Facebook messages that defendant sent to 

Dominique Street describing sexual acts Jones performed on him, along with the 

message, "Nah dis b**ch just dirty. [I'm] just waiting on my moment to kill this 

b**ch." He sent similarly vulgar messages to Jones' entire friend list on 

Facebook. Detectives examined defendant's internet search history on his phone 

and found that just hours before Rouse was killed, defendant searched "New 

Jersey law on Murder" multiple times. On January 27, defendant searched where 

to buy 0.40 caliber ammunition. Jones and Marshall were killed with 0.40 

caliber ammunition. 

He sent similar messages to one of Jones's friends, writing that he was 

waiting for the go ahead to "kill him" (meaning Marshall), that the children 

would be "better without" Jones and that he was "seriously thinking about 

paying Dominque a visit." He also wrote: "the way I move I rather just eliminate 
11 A-3299-18

both of them out of the picture"; "b**ch I’m senseless." "Just be patient and 

watch my work." He also stated that Jones was terrified of him "because she 

know[s] I'm ruthless." 

On January 31, 2016, defendant emailed his father prior to speaking to 

detectives, stating, "Dad I love [you with] all my heart if [you don't] hear from 

me by tomorrow evening[,] I got locked up . . . ." 

An Essex County grand jury returned three indictments against defendant. 

Indictment No. 16-07-2123 charged defendant with first-degree murder of 

Rouse, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2) (count one); two counts of third-degree 

endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (counts two and 

thirteen); second-degree desecration of human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-l(a)(2) 

(count three); second-degree desecration of human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-

l(a)(3) (count four); two counts of third-degree hindering apprehension or 

prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(l) (counts five and six); third-degree theft by 

unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (count seven); first-degree murder of 

Jones, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2) (count eight); second-degree possession of a 

weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count nine); two counts 

of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (counts 

ten and twelve); first-degree murder of Marshall, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2) 
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(count eleven); two counts of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (counts fourteen and fifteen); second-degree burglary, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (count sixteen); and first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 

2C:11-3(a)(3) (count seventeen). 

Indictment No. 16-07-2129 charged defendant with second-degree certain 

persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (count one). Indictment No. 

16-07-2128, which charged defendant with fourth-degree contempt of a 

domestic violence restraining order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b), was dismissed by the 

State following the verdict on the other indictments. 

Defendant moved to sever counts eight to seventeen, contending that 

joinder of the counts relating to the first and second incidents would be 

prejudicial. The State argued that while the two incidents were different events 

that happened at different times and locations, they eventually "became one 

case," with the identity of Rouse's killer leading directly to the identity of Jones's 

and Marshall's killer. 

In his oral decision, the judge performed a Cofield2analysis and 

summarized the essential facts of both incidents that made them similar. He

noted the following physical evidence shared between the incidents: defendant's 

2

 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). 
13 A-3299-18

distinctive dreadlocks, ripped jeans, Northface jacket, black face mask, red 

gloves, hat, green cargo pants, and red sweatshirt. After outlining the evidence, 

the court found that the two incidents were "so intertwined together that it would 

be next to impossible to separate" them. The court also found that the possible 

prejudice to defendant was outweighed by "the enormous probative value[.]" 

In a written decision, the judge recounted the pertinent facts and applied 

the applicable legal principles. Under the first prong of Cofield, whether the 

evidence of another crime is relevant to a material issue which is genuinely 

disputed, the court found that defendant's identity as the killer in both instances 

was genuinely in dispute because defendant originally denied involvement in 

either homicide. The evidence of identity proffered by the State showed that 

killer of all three victims was wearing similar items of clothing outside their

homes. Some of that clothing was found in defendant's apartment. This 

evidence would be used to prove his identity as the killer in both incidents. 

Under the second Cofield prong, that the other bad acts evidence be "similar 

in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged," the judge found 

that the two incidents involved homicides and similar related offenses that 

occurred within forty-eight hours of one another. Although the methods of 

killing were different, the crimes were otherwise sufficiently similar. 
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Under the third Cofield prong, whether the evidence of the misconduct is 

clear and convincing, the judge found there was "substantial evidence 

connecting [d]efendant" to all three homicides, noting: 

The surveillance video on January 29, 2016 from 

[the apartment building] where Rouse was killed, 

shows the suspect who has long black dreadlocks, 

ripped jeans with the left pock[et] sticking out of the rip 

of the left jean leg with rips on the right leg, a black 

half-mask, and red gloves. Defendant is shown on 

surveillance video at [his residence] and is shown via

photographs taken of him at University Hospital and 

surveillance video of him at the Essex County 

Prosecutor's Office to have long black dreadlocks. 

Defendant is shown via photographs taken of him at 

University Hospital and surveillance video of him at the 

Essex County Prosecutor's Office to have ripped jeans 

with the left pock[et] sticking out out of the rip of the 

left jean leg with rips on the right leg. Furthermore, a 

search of [d]efendant's apartment . . . revealed a pair of 

green cargo pants that contained a black half-mask and 

red gloves. 

The surveillance video on January 30, 2016 from 

[Jones's apartment building], where Jones and Marshall 

were killed, shows the suspect who has red gloves, 

green cargo pants, a red sweatshirt with white strings, 

and red sneakers. Defendant is seen on surveillance 

footage that same day, two hours after the JonesMarshall homicide, entering his apartment . . . wearing 

green cargo pants, a red sweatshirt with white strings, 

and red sneakers. Furthermore, a search of 

[d]efendant's apartment . . . revealed a pair of green 

cargo pants that contained red gloves. 
15 A-3299-18

Under the fourth Cofield prong, whether the probative value of the evidence 

outweighs the prejudice to defendant, the judge found the highly probative value 

of the evidence of the two homicides outweighed any prejudicial effect if the 

offenses relating to the two incidents were tired together. He noted the female 

victims had prior intimate relationships with defendant. In addition:

The two homicides took place within less than twentyfour hours of each other. The victims were pronounced 

dead by the same doctor and autopsied by the same 

medical examiner. The suspect was wearing similar 

clothes, which [d]efendant either was later also wearing 

at some point or was found to be in possession of. The 

investigations began within less than 24 hours of each 

other and rapidly became intertwined due to the 

similarities of the cases.

The judge further noted that while the murders were independent of each 

other, they were part of a chain of events 

that unfolded in a very short and rapid time span. 

Trying the murders together does not establish 

[d]efendant's propensity to commit crime nor would it 

have "a probable capacity to divert the minds of the 

jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation' of the 

issues in the case." Thus, the probative value of the 

evidence is not outweighed by any prejudicial effect 

and the fourth Cofield factor is satisfied. 

[(Citations omitted).]

Based on these findings, the court concluded that "[e]vidence from both 

homicides . . . would be admissible if the two homicides were tried 
16 A-3299-18

independently." Therefore, "it would be improper to sever the two cases." 

Accordingly, defendant's severance motion was denied. 

The case proceeded to trial. The prosecutor repeatedly referred to defendant 

as the person who killed Rouse, Jones, and Marshall. In his opening statement, 

the prosecutor explained that evidence would show that defendant was the 

person on the surveillance video entering Jones's apartment, even though the 

identity of that individual was in dispute. When reviewing surveillance footage, 

Lima and the prosecutor repeatedly used defendant's name when identifying who 

was at Jones's apartment. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's opening 

statement or to Lima's testimony. Instead, defense counsel argued that there was 

no one who was inside of the apartment that can say they saw defendant kill 

Marshall or Jones and there was no "viable evidence that shows that [defendant]

was even there." 

Without objection, FBI Special Agent John Hauger was admitted as the 

State's expert in historical cell site analysis. He analyzed two of defendant's cell 

phones. 

Hauger testified that defendant's cellphones were near the crime scenes at 

the time of each murder, first at Rouse's apartment, then at the dumpster, then 

moving back to his residence in East Orange, and then at Jones's apartment. 
17 A-3299-18

Hauger candidly acknowledged that he could not "tell you the exact spot a phone 

was historically." He also acknowledged that he did not do a drive test, which 

involves driving a cellphone up and down a street to see which tower it pings 

off and how far the tower's reach extends. He explained, however, that the 

cellphone chooses which tower to ping to, not the tower. 

The jury found defendant guilty of all counts of Indictment Nos. 16-07-

2123 and the certain persons offense charged in Indictment No. 16-07-2129. 

Defendant was sentenced on February 26, 2019. The judge asked defendant 

if he wanted to allocute, but defendant declined. The judge described defendant 

as "a total menace to society." It explained the brutality of the murders, and the 

fact that defendant "show[ed] absolutely no remorse whatsoever." In sentencing 

defendant, the judge indicated that he wanted to ensure the safety of public and 

that defendant would "not hurt anyone else again by his sentence today." 

The judge declined to find aggravating factor one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), 

even though he found defendant's conduct was "heinous, cruel, and depraved." 

On both indictments, the judge found aggravating factors three (the risk 

defendant will reoffend), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six (the extent of defendant's 

criminal record and the seriousness of the offenses committed), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(6); nine (the need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9); and fourteen (the 
18 A-3299-18

offense involved an act of domestic violence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(14). The 

court found no mitigating factors and was clearly convinced the aggravating 

factors substantially outweighed the non-existent mitigating factors. 

The judge explained that although there is a presumption of concurrent 

sentences, under State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), and subsequent case 

law, the presumption can be overridden if "the crimes and their objectives were 

predominantly independent of one another, the crimes involve separate acts of 

violence or threats of violence, the crimes were committed at different times or 

separate places, [and consider] whether or not the crimes involve multiple 

victims." The judge found that because the murders were separate acts of 

violence, occurred on consecutive but separate dates, and there were three 

separate victims, the murder sentences should run consecutive to each other. 

For each of the three murders (counts one, eight, and eleven), defendant 

received a sixty-year term, subject to the parole ineligibility and mandatory 

parole supervision imposed by the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, 

with counts eight and eleven running consecutively to each other and to count 

one. Defendant received five-year concurrent terms on counts two, five, and 

thirteen. On counts four, fourteen, and sixteen, he received concurrent ten-year 

terms. On count nine, he received a ten-year term, subject to a five-year period 
19 A-3299-18

of parole ineligibility. On count fifteen, defendant received a ten-year NERA 

term. Counts three, six, seven, ten, twelve, and seventeen were merged for 

sentencing purposes. On the certain persons count (Indictment No. 16-07-2129), 

defendant was sentenced to a consecutive ten-year term, subject to a five-year 

period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). 

This yielded an aggregate sentence of 190 years with 158 years of parole 

ineligibility. This appeal followed. 

Defendant raises the following points for our consideration.

POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER COUNTS 1-7 

FROM COUNTS 8-17 OF INDICTMENT NO. 16-07-

2123.

POINT II

THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF A DETECTIVE'S 

LAY OPINION, IDENTIFYING THE DEFENDANT 

AS THE SUSPECT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 

VIDEOS, WAS PLAIN ERROR, REQUIRING 

REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS.

POINT III

BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO 

DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS EXPERT'S 

METHODOLOGY WAS SCIENTIFICALLY 

RELIABLE, THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING 

AN FBI AGENT TO OPINE AS AN EXPERT THAT 
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CELL PHONE SERVICE RECORDS WERE 

CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFENDANT BEING AT 

THE HOMICIDE SCENE.

POINT IV

THE SENTENCING COURT VIOLATED THE 

DEFENDANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 

SILENCE AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 

COUNSEL BY FINDING AS AN AGGRAVATING

FACTOR THAT HE DID NOT SPEAK TO EXPRESS 

REMORSE. THE COURT ALSO MISAPPLIED THE 

YARBOUGH FACTORS ON COUNTS 8 AND 11. 

II.

We first address the denial of defendant's motion to sever counts one to 

seven from counts eight to fourteen. "A trial court's severance decision will be 

reversed only for an abuse of discretion." State v. Davis, 390 N.J. Super. 573, 

591 (App. Div. 2007) (citing State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996)). 

We are guided by the following basic principles governing joinder of 

offenses. Rule 3:7-6 provides:

Two or more offenses may be charged in the 

same indictment or accusation in a separate count for 

each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or 

similar character or are based on the same act or 

transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions 

connected together or constituting parts of a common 

scheme or plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be 

afforded as provided by [Rule] 3:15-2. 
21 A-3299-18

"Although joinder is favored, economy and efficiency interests do not 

override a defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 72

(2013). Rule 3:7-6 provides a remedy for prejudicial joinder, "referencing Rule

3:15-2(b), which vests a court with discretion to sever charges '[i]f for any other 

reason it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by a permissible or 

mandatory joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or accusation.'" 

Id. at 73. The Court explained: 

The relief afforded by Rule 3:15-2(b) addresses 

the inherent "danger[,]when several crimes are tried 

together, that the jury may use the evidence

cumulatively; that is, that, although so much as would 

be admissible upon any one of the charges might not 

have persuaded them of the accused's guilt, the sum of 

it will convince them as to all." State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 

580, 601 (1989) (quoting United States v. Lotsch, 102 

F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir. 1939)). 

[Ibid. (alteration in original).]

In determining whether to grant severance, a trial court must assess 

whether joinder would prejudice the defendant or the State. Ibid. "The test for 

assessing prejudice is 'whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, 

evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under 

[N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of the remaining charges.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. at 341). "The admissibility of the 
22 A-3299-18

evidence in both trials renders inconsequential the need for severance." Davis, 

390 N.J. Super. at 591 (citing State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 299 (App. 

Div. 1983)). 

Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits the use of other crimes, wrongs or acts "to prove 

a person's disposition in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in conformity with such disposition." However, such "evidence may be 

admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when 

such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute." N.J.R.E. 404(b)(2). 

The requirements of N.J.R.E. 404(b) must be met. Sterling, 215 N.J. at 

73 (citing Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338). In Cofield, the Court adopted the following 

four-part test to determine admissibility: (1) "[t]he evidence of the other crime 

must be admissible as relevant to a material issue"; (2) "[i]t must be similar in 

kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged"; (3) "[t]he evidence 

must be clear and convincing; and" (4) "[t]he probative value of the evidence 

must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice." 127 N.J. at 338. In addition, 

"such evidence is admissible only if it is relevant to prove a fact genuinely in 

dispute 'and the evidence is necessary as proof of the disputed issue.'" State v. 
23 A-3299-18

Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 518 (2002) (quoting State v. Hernandez, 170 N.J. 106, 118-

19 (2001)). 

Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that the denial of 

defendant's severance motion was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court 

provided cogent and thorough reasoning for denying defendant's motion to sever 

counts eight to fourteen. The court considered each prong of the four-part test 

separately, setting forth the pertinent facts in its analysis. We discern no abuse 

of discretion. 

Under the first prong, a material issue in the Jones and Marshall murders

was the identity of the suspect in the surveillance footage, and whether that 

suspect was defendant. Under the second prong, all three murders occurred 

within forty-eight hours, and the first and second victims were defendant's 

former girlfriends. The male victim was the current boyfriend of the second 

victim. Under the third prong, the court found that the evidence of the Rouse 

murder was clear and convincing; defendant admitted killing to Rouse but 

claimed he had no intent to kill her. Under the fourth prong, the court found the 

probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudice to defendant. 
24 A-3299-18

III.

Defendant contends that the admission of Detective Lima's lay opinion, 

identifying defendant as the suspect in the surveillance videos was reversible 

plain error. We disagree. 

An appellate court defers to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an 

abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021). We do so because 

"the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial 

court's discretion." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of 

Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). Under 

that deferential standard, we "review a trial court's evidentiary ruling only for a 

'clear error in judgment.'" State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020) (quoting 

State v. Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017)). 

Where there is no objection to testimony, we review for plain error. The 

admission of the unchallenged evidence constitutes plain error if it was "clearly 

capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. "Thus, the error will be 

disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised whether the jury came to 

a result that it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 

(2021) (quoting State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015)). 
25 A-3299-18

N.J.R.E. 701 permits testimony by lay witnesses "in the form of opinions 

or inferences" if it is "(a) is rationally based on the witness's perception; and (b) 

will assist in understanding the witness's testimony or determining a fact in 

issue." This testimony "must 'assist the trier of fact either by helping to explain 

the witness's testimony or by shedding light on the determination of a disputed 

factual issue.'" State v. Sanchez, 247 N.J. 450, 469 (2021) (quoting Singh, 245 

N.J. at 15). A witness should offer an opinion on something that the jury can 

come to a decision to on their own. Id. at 469-70. The purpose of the rule "is 

to ensure that lay opinion is based on an adequate foundation." Singh, 245 N.J. 

at 14 (quoting State. v. Bealor, 187 N.J. 574, 586 (2006)). 

Regarding identity, lay witness testimony may be admissible, but courts 

must consider the nature, duration, and timing of the witnesses' contacts with 

the defendant. Sanchez, 247 N.J. at 470 (citing U.S. v. Walker, 974 F.3d 193, 

205-06 (2d Cir. 2020)). Another factor to consider when permitting an officer 

to testify about identity at trial is whether there are other witnesses capable of 

doing so. State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 23 (2012). Courts will also look to whether 

the identification is helpful to the jury where surveillance photos are so blurry 

that the subject's features are unclear, but not so clear that jurors can make the 

comparison to the defendant themselves. Sanchez, 247 N.J. at 475. 
26 A-3299-18

Here, Detective Lima's fleeting reference to defendant did not constitute 

plain error given the other evidence produced at trial. Unlike in Lazo, the 

evidence implicating defendant in the murders was not limited to identifying the 

suspect depicted in surveillance videos. Defendant admitted his involvement in 

Rouse's death. The evidence included the incendiary text messages defendant 

sent Jones, his history with her and Marshall, his Facebook messages, his 

cellphone location near the crime scene, and the fact that the same caliber bullets 

used on Jones and Marshall were found in his home. Moreover, there were no 

other witnesses available to testify about presence at Jones's apartment during 

the incident. 

Lima's lay opinion testimony was not "clearly capable of producing an 

unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Defendant has not demonstrated there is "a reasonable 

doubt" that "the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached." 

Singh, 245 N.J. at 13 (quoting R.K., 220 N.J. at 456). 

IV.

We next address the admissibility of the historical cell tower evidence. 

The State's expert, FBI Special Agent John Hauger, opined that the cell phone 

service records were consistent with the defendant being at the homicide scene. 
27 A-3299-18

Defendant contends the State failed to demonstrate that the methodology used 

by its expert was scientifically reliable. We are unpersuaded. 

We review a trial court's evidentiary determination that a witness is qualified 

to present expert testimony under N.J.R.E. 702 for abuse of discretion "and will 

only [] reverse for manifest error and injustice." State v. Rosales, 202 N.J. 549, 

562-63 (2010) (quoting State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 455 (2008)). A trial 

court's decision to permit expert testimony is accorded deference. Townsend v. 

Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 52 (2015). Here, there was no objection to the expert's 

qualifications or the admission of his testimony. Therefore, the plain error rule 

applies. R. 2:10-2. 

N.J.R.E. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 

a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 

The party offering expert testimony bears the burden of establishing its 

admissibility. State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 167 (1997) (citing Windmere, Inc. 

v. Int'l Ins. Co., 105 N.J. 373, 378 (1987)). We apply the following three-prong 

test for the admission of expert testimony: 

(1) the intended testimony must concern a subject 

matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) 
28 A-3299-18

the field testified to must be at a state of the art such 

that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; 

and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to 

offer the intended testimony.

[Jenewicz, 193 N.J. at 454.] 

Special Agent Hauger has more than fifteen years' experience in the field 

of historical cell tower analysis. He was properly qualified as an expert based 

on his experience. 

In criminal cases, our courts apply the general acceptance test for 

reliability enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 

1923). State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 491-92 (2018). Here, only the second 

prong of the Frye test is at issue. "Scientific test results are admissible in a 

criminal trial only when the technique is shown to be generally accepted as 

reliable within the relevant scientific community." Ibid. To establish general 

acceptance, "the party proffering the evidence need not show infallibility of the 

technique nor unanimity of its acceptance in the scientific community." Id. at 

492. Here, the State must prove that the cell-site analysis methodology "and the 

interpretation of its results are non-experimental, demonstrable techniques that 

the relevant scientific community widely, but perhaps not unanimously, accepts 

as reliable." Harvey, 151 N.J. at 171. 
29 A-3299-18

When reviewing a decision on the admission of scientific evidence in a 

criminal case, "an appellate court should scrutinize the record and independently 

review the relevant authorities, including judicial opinions and scientific

literature." Harvey, 151 N.J. at 167; see also State v. Pickett, 466 N.J. Super. 

270, 303 (App. Div. 2021) (an appropriate review in a criminal case requires an 

appellate court to "independently scrutinize the record, including the 

comprehensive and amplified declarations of the experts, the scientific 

validation studies and peer-reviewed publications, and judicial opinions"). 

"Whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under 

N.J.R.E. 702 is a legal question we review de novo." State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 

265, 301 (2018). 

"Cell phones work by communicating with cell-sites operated by cellphone service providers. Each cell-site operates at a certain location and covers 

a certain range of distance." In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 

Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). "The 

geographic area covered by a particular tower depends upon 'the number of 

antennas operating on the cell site, the height of the antennas, topography of the 

surrounding land, and obstructions (both natural and manmade).'" Holbrook v. 

Commonwealth, 525 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Ky. 2017) (quoting United States v. Hill, 
30 A-3299-18

818 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2016)). "When a cell phone user makes a call, the 

phone generally 'connect[s] to the cell site with the strongest signal,' although 

'adjoining cell [towers] provide some overlap in coverage." Ibid. (alterations in 

original) (quoting Hill, 818 F.3d at 295). Other factors affecting which tower 

a cell phone connects to include the terrain, the antennae's angle, the phone 

itself, and environmental factors. Hill, 818 F.3d at 296. "As a cell phone user 

moves from place to place, the cell phone automatically switches to the tower 

that provides the best reception." State v. Johnson, 797 S.E.2d 557, 562 (W.Va. 

2017) (quoting In re Application for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. 

Recs., 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2005))

Numerous federal courts have acknowledged the general reliability of 

cell-tower analysis. See e.g., Hill, 818 F.3d at 297 ("District courts that have 

been called upon to decide whether to admit historical cell-site analysis have 

almost universally done so."). State appellate courts have also found cell-tower 

analysis to be generally reliable. See generally State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 

859, 871-76 (Iowa 2020) (surveying treatment of historical cell-site data by 

other jurisdictions); see also Commonwealth v. Nevels, 203 A.3d 229, 241 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2019) (concluding "there exists no legitimate dispute regarding the 

reliability of historical cell-site analysis"), aff'd, 235 A.3d 1101 (Pa. 2020); 
31 A-3299-18

Pullin v. State, 534 S.E.2d 69, 71 (Ga. 2000) (affirming the trial court's 

conclusion that "the geographic location of the cell calls in question is based on 

sound scientific theory and that analysis of the data can produce reliable 

results"). 

Special Agent Hauger did not perform a drive test to confirm the specific 

coverage areas of the nearby cell towers. In Holbrook, the testifying FBI agent 

also did not perform a drive test. 525 S.W.3d at 80. The agent testified that 

Holbrook's cell phone was within the general coverage area of the scene of the 

crime when the murder was committed. Id. at 81. The expert acknowledged 

"that while a drive test is the best way to refine the coverage area, the general 

principles of coverage apply regardless." Id. at 80. Noting that the expert's 

"testimony expressly identified limitations in the scientific techniques he 

employed[,]" the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the admission of the 

evidence regarding the general locations of the callers. Id. at 82. We reach the 

same conclusion here. "[W]hile the absence of a drive test may limit the degree 

of precision with which an expert may testify about cell phone locations, 

providing grounds for cross-examination, that absence does not negate the 

admissibility of such testimony." United States v. Nelson, 533 F.Supp. 3d 779, 

794 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Defendant relies on an unpublished opinion that he 
32 A-3299-18

contends reached a contrary result. The facts in that case are distinguishable. 

Moreover, unpublished opinions do not constitute precedent, are not binding, 

and shall not be cited by any court. R. 1:36-3. 

In Hill, the defendant challenged the reliability of historical cell site 

analysis based on the variables involved, arguing they rendered the methodology 

too unreliable to be admissible. 818 F.3d at 296. The court found that 

"[h]istorical cell-site analysis can show with sufficient reliability that a phone 

was in a general area, especially in a well-populated one. It shows the cell sites 

with which the person's cell phone connected, and the science is well 

understood." Id. at 298 (citing United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956

(N.D. Ill. 2012)). 

Despite the variables affecting cell sites, the court determined that 

exclusion of the evidence was not the correct remedy. Ibid. Instead, any 

limitations of the methodology should be presented to the jury for the jury to 

determine the weight of the resulting evidence. Id. 298-99; see also United 

States v. Jones, 918 F.Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (stating that "numerous other 

courts" have concluded that "the mere existence of factors affecting cell signal 

strength that the expert may not have taken into account goes to the weight of 
33 A-3299-18

the expert's testimony and is properly the subject of cross-examination, but does 

not render the fundamental methodology of cell site analysis unreliable"). 

Special Agent Hauger candidly explained the limitations of historical cell 

data analysis. The jury had the opportunity to consider those limitations and 

was free to give his opinions "whatever weight it deemed appropriate." Harvey, 

151 N.J. at 200. 

Having carefully reviewed the record in light of the applicable precedents, 

we find that the methodology used by the State's expert is "generally accepted 

as reliable within the relevant scientific community." Cassidy, 235 N.J. at 491-

92. We discern no abuse of discretion, let alone plain error. The trial court 

properly found that cell-site analysis is a sufficiently reliable method to 

determine the approximate location of a cell phone at the time the incident 

occurred. 

V.

Finally, we address defendant's argument that the trial court misapplied 

the Yarbough factors in imposing the consecutive prison terms and violated his 

Fifth Amendment right to counsel by considering his failure to personally 

express remorse as an aggravating factor. 
34 A-3299-18

Appellate courts review sentencing determinations deferentially. State v. 

Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). "The reviewing court must not substitute its 

judgment for that of the sentencing court." Ibid. (citing State v. O'Donnell, 117 

N.J. 210, 215 (1989)). We affirm a sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines 

were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing 

court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) 

"the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence 

clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." State v. Roth, 95 

N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). 

To facilitate appellate review, the sentencing court must "state reasons for 

imposing such sentence including . . . the factual basis supporting a finding of 

particular aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence[.]" R. 3:21-4(h); 

Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 73; see also N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2(e) (requiring a sentencing 

court to provide the "factual basis supporting its findings of particular 

aggravating or mitigating factors affecting sentence."). 

Additional review is undertaken when consecutive terms are imposed. In 

Yarbough, the Court adopted the following factors for trial courts to consider

when determining if prison terms should run concurrently or consecutively:

(1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which 

the punishment shall fit the crime;
35 A-3299-18

(2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or 

concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the 

sentencing decision;

(3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing 

court should include facts relating to the crimes, 

including whether or not:

(a) the crimes and their objectives were 

predominantly independent of each other;

(b) the crimes involved separate acts of 

violence or threats of violence;

(c) the crimes were committed at different 

times or separate places, rather than being 

committed so closely in time and place as 

to indicate a single period of aberrant 

behavior;

(d) any of the crimes involved multiple 

victims;

(e) the convictions for which the sentences 

are to be imposed are numerous;

(4) there should be no double counting of aggravating 

factors;

(5) successive terms for the same offense should not 

ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first 

offense; and

(6) there should be an overall outer limit on the 

cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple 

offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms 
36 A-3299-18

(including an extended term, if eligible) that could be 

imposed for the two most serious offenses. 

[100 N.J. at 643-44.]

The Legislature subsequently amended N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a) to clarify that 

"[t]here shall be no overall outer limit on the cumulation of consecutive 

sentences for multiple offenses." L. 1993, c. 233, § 1. 

"[T]he reasons for imposing a consecutive or concurrent sentence should 

be separately stated in the sentencing decision." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 

129 (2011) (quoting Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643). "An explicit statement,

explaining the fairness of the sentence imposed on a defendant for multiple 

offenses in a single proceeding . . . is essential to a proper Yarbough sentencing 

assessment." State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 268 (2021); see also State v. 

Chavarria, 464 N.J. Super. 1, 19 (App. Div. 2020) (explaining that a sentencing 

court "must 'articulate [its] reasons' for imposing consecutive sentences 'with 

specific reference to the Yarbough factors.'"). "When a sentencing court 

properly evaluates the Yarbough factors in light of the record, the court's 

decision will not normally be disturbed on appeal." Miller, 205 N.J. at 129. 

The court must also "be mindful of the real-time consequences of NERA

and the role that it customarily plays in the fashioning of an appropriate 

sentence." State v. Marinez, 370 N.J. Super. 49, 58 (App. Div. 2004). A 
37 A-3299-18

reviewing court will "consider the judge's evaluation of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors in that light." Id. at 58. Lengthy consecutive terms may be

manifestly excessive. See State v. Louis, 117 N.J. 250, 254-58 (1989) 

(aggregate term of 130 years with a 65-year parole disqualifier found excessive); 

State v. Candelaria, 311 N.J. Super. 437, 454 (App. Div. 1998) (finding six 

consecutive terms totaling 105 years plus a life sentence excessive). Here, the 

judge imposed three consecutive NERA terms, followed by a consecutive tenyear term, subject to a five-year period of parole ineligibility, yielding an 

aggregate 190-year term, that requires defendant to serve 158 years before being 

eligible for parole. 

The trial court noted defendant's failure to express remorse for his role in 

committing the homicides. The trial court may consider a defendant's lack of 

remorse during sentencing. See State v. Int. of D.S., 289 N.J. Super 413, 426 

(App. Div. 1996) (affirming a judge's decision that considered defendant's lack 

of remorse); State v. Jackson, 138 N.J. Super 431, 436 (App. Div. 1976) (same). 

However, "a defendant's refusal to acknowledge guilt following a conviction is 

generally not a germane factor in the sentencing decision." State v. Marks, 201 

N.J. Super. 514, 540 (App. Div. 1985). 
38 A-3299-18

The judge made the following findings. Defendant was thirty years old at 

sentencing. He was single, had four children, and earned a GED while at the 

Essex County Youth House. Defendant had adjudications of juvenile 

delinquency for aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, criminal 

sexual contact, and served an eighteen-month term at Jamesburg, where he 

maxed out after incurring a parole violation. Defendant also received a deferred 

disposition on an obstruction charge. 

As an adult, defendant had prior convictions for third-degree eluding and 

fourth-degree aggravated assault, and eight disorderly persons offenses. 

Defendant had seven domestic violence restraining orders entered against him. 

The judge found that defendant had been involved with the criminal 

justice system since age fifteen and had "been a total menace to society." He 

described defendant's actions as "cruel, depraved, and inhumane . . . ." The 

judge noted that defendant "killed Tiniquah Rouse in front of her five-monthold infant" and the next day "went to Ashley Jones's apartment where [he] kicked 

in the door and brutalized [Marshall] and [Jones] by shooting them multiple 

times in front of three young children." Defendant was the father of two of those 

children. 
39 A-3299-18

The judge found defendant "show[ed] absolutely no remorse whatsoever." 

The judge intended the sentence to "ensure the safety of" other people and 

prevent defendant from hurting anyone in the future. 

The judge engaged in an incomplete analysis of the Yarbough factors. He 

noted "that there shall be no free crimes in a system in which the punishment 

shall fit the crime." The judge concluded that the terms for the three murders

should run consecutively, finding the murders were "separate acts of violence"

that "were committed at two separate locations over the course of two . . . 

consecutive dates." 

As to the certain persons offense, the judge noted the statute "was meant 

to enhance the penalty for those individuals who have a prior conviction, 

otherwise this statute would serve absolutely no purpose whatsoever . . . ."

Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive sixty-year NERA terms for 

the murders and a consecutive ten-year term, subject to a five-year period of 

parole ineligibility on the certain persons offense pursuant to the Graves Act. 

Following merger, the aggregate sentence was 190 years with 158 years of 

parole ineligibility. 

The judge did not any expressly consider Yarbough factors: three (a) ("the 

crimes and their objectives were predominantly independent of each other"); 
40 A-3299-18

three (c) (whether the crimes were committed "so closely in time and place as 

to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior"); and five ("successive terms 

for the same offense should not ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the 

first offense"). In addition, the judge did not expressly consider the real-time 

consequences of the consecutive NERA and Graves Act terms. These omissions 

constrain us to vacate the consecutive sentences imposed on counts eight and 

eleven of Indictment No. 16-07-2123 and count one of Indictment No. 16-07-

2129, and remand for resentencing of those counts. See Chavarria, 464 N.J. 

Super. at 19 (App. Div. 2020) (vacating the consecutive sentences and 

remanding resentencing due to absence of "findings of the Yarbough factors"); 

State v. Soto, 385 N.J. Super. 247, 256 (App. Div. 2006) ("Failure to provide 

reasons for the imposition of a consecutive sentence may compel a remand for 

resentencing."). 

At resentencing, the judge shall provide a fulsome evaluation of each of 

the Yarbough factors and explain the fairness of the sentence imposed, 

considering the real-time consequences of the terms imposed. 

In sum, we affirm defendant's convictions but vacate and remand for 

resentencing of counts eight and eleven of Indictment No. 16-07-2123 and count 

one of Indictment No. 16-07-2129. 
41 A-3299-18

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.