IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

K&G CONCORD, LLC and CSS 

CONCORD, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CHARCAP, LLC, CHARCOAL PIT, 

INC. and KITCHEN SINK, INC.,

Defendants.

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C.A. No. 12563-VCMR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: May 26, 2017

Date Decided: August 1, 2017

Basil C. Kollias and Douglas J. Cummings, Jr., KOLLIAS LAW, LLC, 

Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Kelly E. Farnan and Travis S. Hunter, RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., 

Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Defendants.

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Vice Chancellor.
2

This case involves two well-known Delaware restaurants located on Concord 

Pike in Wilmington, the Charcoal Pit and the Claymont Steak Shop. The Charcoal 

Pit is a long-revered Delaware institution, a nostalgic symbol to many native 

Delawareans of hamburgers and milkshakes. The Claymont Steak Shop is a relative 

newcomer to the sale of cheesesteaks, but the great success of its original location 

led the owners to open another Claymont Steak Shop restaurant next door to the 

Delaware stalwart. The parties initially entered into a bidding war for the property, 

with the owners of the Claymont Steak Shop winning out. 

This dispute arose after the Claymont Steak Shop, following a year-long 

extensive construction period, opened its doors and its numerous customers and 

large delivery trucks began driving over the neighboring Charcoal Pit property. The 

Charcoal Pit’s owners erected a fence to abate the high traffic. The Claymont Steak 

Shop’s owners bring this suit claiming there is an implied easement over the 

Charcoal Pit property to allow the Claymont Steak Shop’s employees, customers, 

and vendors to reach the stoplight and the northbound lanes of Concord Pike. The 

plaintiff restauranteurs contend that their competitor has caused significant damage 

to their business and their vendor relationships by erecting the fence. For the reasons 

discussed below, I find that no easement by estoppel or prescription exists, and the 

defendants are within their rights to construct a fence on their private property.
3

I. BACKGROUND

These are my findings of fact based on the parties’ stipulations, over 420 

documents, and testimony of thirteen witnesses during a three-day trial that occurred 

on March 15-17, 2017. I accord the evidence the weight and credibility I find it 

deserves.1

A. Parties and Relevant Non-Parties

Plaintiff K&G Concord, LLC (“K&G”) is a Delaware limited liability 

company owned by husband-and-wife Basil Kollias and Dimitra Kollias.2 Mr. 

Kollias has been a Delaware transactional real estate attorney for over fifteen years.3 

Plaintiff CSS Concord, Inc. (“CSS”) is a Delaware corporation also owned by the 

Kolliases (CSS, collectively with K&G, “Plaintiffs”).

4

 K&G currently owns the 

property located at 2720 Concord Pike, Wilmington, Delaware (the “2720 

 

1 Citations to testimony presented at trial are in the form “Tr. # (X)” with “X” 

representing the surname of the speaker, if not clear from the text. After being 

identified initially, individuals are referenced herein by their surnames without 

regard to formal titles such as “Dr.” No disrespect is intended. Exhibits are cited as 

“JX #,” and facts drawn from the parties’ Joint Pre-Trial Stipulation and Order are 

cited as “PTO ¶ #.” Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the parties’ briefs are to 

post-trial briefs.

2 PTO ¶ 1.

3

Id.

4

Id. ¶ 2.
4

Property”).5 CSS is the tenant of K&G on the 2720 Property and operates the 

Claymont Steak Shop restaurant.6 

Defendant Charcap, LLC (“Charcap”) is a Delaware limited liability company 

owned by Louis Capano, Jr. (“Capano”) and Louis Capano, III, a father-and-son real 

estate development team.7 Charcap owns the property located at 2600 and 2706 

Concord Pike, Wilmington, Delaware (the “Charcap Property”). The Capanos also 

own the property directly to the south of the Charcap Property at 2530 Concord Pike, 

Wilmington, Delaware (“2530 Property”).

8

 The Charcap Property has two tenants, 

the Charcoal Pit restaurant (the “Charcoal Pit”) and a Dunkin’ Donuts.9 Defendant 

Kitchen Sink, Inc. (“Kitchen Sink”) operates the Charcoal Pit Restaurant on the 

Charcap Property (Kitchen Sink, collectively with Charcap, Charcoal Pit, Inc., 

“Defendants”).

10

 

 

5

Id. ¶ 12.

6

Id. ¶¶ 16-17.

7

Id. ¶ 3.

8

Id. ¶ 5.

9

Id. ¶ 7.

10 Id. ¶ 8.
5

Non-party Andrew Fox is a commercial real estate agent who represented 

K&G in its purchase of the 2720 Property.11 Non-party Grant H. Gregor is a 

professional land surveyor with Merestone Consultants (“Merestone”) and was 

engaged by K&G to develop a site and parking plan for the 2720 Property.12 Nonparty Steven Donald Kryak was the construction manager hired by K&G for the 

construction of the Claymont Steak Shop on the 2720 Property.13 

Non-party Michael Sciota is the Director of Operations for Kitchen Sink and 

general manager of the Charcoal Pit.14 Non-party Stephen Lloyd Johns is a 

professional engineer and professional land surveyor employed with Vandemark & 

Lynch.

15

 The Capanos retained Johns to develop the record plan for the 2530 

Property.16 

 

11 Tr. 530 (Fox).

12 Id. at 552 (Gregor).

13 Id. at 501 (Kryak).

14 PTO ¶ 4.

15 Tr. 288 (Johns).

16 Id.
6

Non-party Ronald Lee Eldredge was the owner-operator of the Dunkin’ 

Donuts on the Charcap Property from 1981 until 1996.17 Non-party Rajesh Patel is 

the current owner of the Dunkin’ Donuts, having owned it since 1998.

18

 

Non-party Stuart Rosen has been a commercial real estate broker for 

approximately 35 years.19 In 1993, Rosen was hired by Nationwide Furniture 

Rentals & Sales, Inc., a predecessor to the various mattress stores that leased the 

2720 Property from 1993 to 2012, to find a location for a store on Concord Pike.

20

 

Rosen handled the preparation of the lease.

21

 Non-party Garey McDonald is an 

employee of Mattressfirm, formerly Sleepy’s and Mattress Giant.

22

 

Non-party David Cianfaro has been a resident of North Wilmington since 

1989 and is a marketing associate for Sysco Foods Philadelphia (“Sysco”), which 

involves coordinating operations and instructing truck drivers on their delivery 

routes.23 

 

17 Id. at 235 (Eldredge).

18 Id. at 621 (Patel).

19 Id. at 383 (Rosen).

20 Id.

21 Id. at 383-85.

22 Id. at 338-44 (McDonald).

23 Id. at 677, 682 (Cianfaro).
7

B. Facts

1. The history of the properties

Robert Hunt Whitten purchased the 2720 Property in 1961.24 Between 1961 

and 1964, Whitten developed the previously vacant land and built a photography 

studio.25 In 1973, a traffic light was installed at the intersection of Concord Pike and 

Woodrow Avenue with a direct entrance onto the Charcap Property.26 There is no 

direct entrance from the Woodrow Avenue light to the 2720 Property.27 There also 

is no direct access from the northbound side of Concord Pike.28 The only direct 

access point to the 2720 Property is from the southbound side of Concord Pike.

29

Mr. Kollias testified at trial that he visited Whitten’s photography studio twice 

as a child in the 1970s.30 Mr. Kollias testified that his family drove from the traffic 

light at Woodrow Avenue, across the Charcap Property, to access and park on the 

 

24 JX 314. 

25 JX 29, at 9, 93, 94; JX 209.

26 JX 85. 

27 JX 49.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Tr. 91-93.
8

2720 Property.31 Mr. Kollias testified that he had never seen Whitten personally use 

the Charcap Property to access his own building.32 From 1964 until 1999, Whitten 

ran his photography business out of that building.33 

 From 1992 until 1993, Tabriz Oriental Rug Store rented the first floor of the 

2720 Property from Whitten.

34

 In 1993, a mattress store began to look for a space 

to open a store on Concord Pike.35 Rosen, the real estate agent retained by the 

mattress store to scout out an appropriate location, testified that he had personally 

accessed the rear of the 2720 Property during his research by way of the traffic light 

and the Charcap Property.36 Pursuant to the original lease negotiated and drafted by 

Rosen, from September 1, 1993 until November 30, 2012, various mattress stores

 

31 Id.

32 Id. at 139. Plaintiffs also presented testimony from Eldredge and McDonald 

regarding use of the Charcap Property. But McDonald and Eldredge did not have 

personal knowledge of Whitten using the Charcap Property; rather they speculated 

as to whether common sense or ease would have dictated its use. Id. at 241-43, 269 

(Eldredge); 358-62 (McDonald).

33 JX 29, at 107-14.

34 JX 357; Tr. 384-88 (Rosen).

35 Tr. 384-88 (Rosen).

36 Rosen also testified that “it makes perfect sense” to use the traffic light to get to the

rear of the 2720 Property. Id. at 414-15.
9

leased space from Whitten on the 2720 Property.37 While originally only leasing the 

bottom level of Whitten’s building, a 1999 amendment was executed to expand the 

lease to the entire second floor after Whitten closed his photography studio.

38

 That 

lease had a parking provision which states:

PARKING:

6. During the term of this Lease and any renewals and/or 

extensions thereof, Tenant is granted the right of exclusive

use of the parking area located directly in front of the 

Building and the Demised Premises and the right of nonexclusive use of the side and rear parking areas of the 

Building in conjunction with the occupant of the upper 

floor of the Building.39

Rosen testified at trial that this language does not address how one would enter or 

exit the property.40 

McDonald worked for Mattressfirm, Sleepy’s, and Mattress Giant, from 

around 2002 until around 2012.41 He personally observed traffic patterns to and 

from the mattress stores.

42

 He testified that the mattress store was one of the slow 

 

37 JX 358; JX 68. The mattress store changed owners throughout the years, but the 

business remained the same. 

38 JX 69; Tr. 438 (Rosen).

39 JX 358, at 2.

40 Tr. 426.

41 Id. at 342-44.

42 Id. at 341.
10

stores with an average of five to ten customers per day who typically parked in the 

front of the building.43 This was corroborated by Patel who testified the mattress 

store was “not busy at all”; and that sometimes he saw customers parked in front of 

the store.44 McDonald testified that typically six-wheel delivery trucks delivered

mattresses from the warehouse about once per week, and they would come up the 

northbound side of Concord Pike and use the traffic light to access the mattress 

store.45

In 1986, the Capanos bought the Charcoal Pit restaurant, located on the 

Charcap Property, from Louis Sloan.46 From 1986 to 1995, Kitchen Sink leased the 

land from Sloan and operated the Charcoal Pit Restaurant.

47

 On November 27, 1995, 

the Capanos, through Charcap, bought the Charcap Property from Sloan.

48

 Sloan 

executed an affidavit certifying that he knew of no easements that were not provided 

for in the transaction.49 Capano testified that when he purchased the property, he 

 

43 Id. at 371-73.

44 Id. at 623.

45 Id. at 363-65.

46 Id. at 458 (Capano).

47 PTO ¶¶ 8-9; Tr. 458-59 (Capano).

48 JX 74, at 111; Tr. 459 (Capano).

49 JX 80.
11

was not aware of vehicles using the Charcap Property to access the 2720 Property.50 

After the sale, Charcap continued to lease a portion of the property to the Dunkin’ 

Donuts.51

GasCap, LLC (“GasCap”), another Capano-related entity, owns the 2530 

Property.52 The Bella Coast restaurant operates on the 2530 Property.53 The record 

plan for the 2530 Property contains the following note from the Delaware 

Department of Transportation:

The Developer should pursue a cross-access agreement 

with the parcel to the north to establish an interconnection 

with the existing Charcoal Pit restaurant so that site traffic 

may utilize the signal located at the intersection of US 

Route 202, Woodrow Avenue, and The Charcoal Pit 

entrance.

54

 

The cross-access easement between the 2530 Property and the Charcap Property was 

executed on June 5, 2012.55 

 

50 Tr. 460.

51 JX 74, at 59.

52 Tr. 289-90 (Johns).

53 Id.

54 JX 28, at n.33.A; Tr. 292-95 (Johns).

55 JX 257.
12

2. K&G buys the 2720 Property

In 2012, the Kolliases, through K&G, submitted a bid for $715,000 to buy the 

2720 Property from Whitten’s widow, Ellen Cornish-Whitten.

56

 The asking price 

was $750,000.57 Capano submitted a competing bid for the property.

58

 The 

Kolliases then submitted another bid a few days later raising the offer from $715,000 

to $760,000.59 Capano submitted a higher bid.

60

 Fox told the Kolliases the only way 

to win the property was to submit an increased offer of $800,000 with a 5 P.M. 

deadline and a better commission split for Mrs. Whitten’s real estate agent.

61

Mrs. Whitten accepted the $800,000 K&G bid, and the parties executed the 

sale on November 5, 2012.62 The agreement allowed for a thirty-day due diligence 

period.63 As part of its due diligence, K&G hired Merestone and Ten Bears 

Environmental, LLC to determine whether future development of the property was 

 

56 Tr. 536-37 (Fox).

57 Id. at 532 (Fox).

58 Id. at 486 (Capano).

59 Id. at 535 (Fox).

60 Id. at 487 (Capano).

61 Id. at 536 (Fox).

62 JX 30.

63 Id.
13

feasible and to conduct an environmental survey and title search.

64

 None of these 

processes revealed an easement over the Charcap Property.65 The transaction closed 

on December 19, 2012.66 As part of the sale, Mrs. Whitten executed an affidavit 

stating there were no easements affecting the 2720 Property that had not been 

provided for in the agreement.

67

After the closing, the Kolliases began developing the property. Merestone 

created a record plan and parking plan for the site that included a traffic generation 

diagram depicting the trips coming in and out of the direct access entrance to 

Concord Pike.68 Gregor testified that at the time he prepared the record plan, he 

informed Mr. Kollias that there was only one entry and exit path on the property and 

that it would be tight for delivery and garbage trucks to travel along the north side 

of the building to the Concord Pike entrance.69 Both the record plan and the 

 

64 Id.; Tr. 150-52 (B. Kollias).

65 Tr. 153 (B. Kollias).

66 PTO ¶ 12.

67 JX 43, at 9.

68 JX 26; JX 39; JX 40.

69 Tr. 569-72.
14

application to the New Castle County Department of Land Use are signed and 

certified by Mr. Kollias.70 

New Castle County responded to K&G’s application by advising:

Due to the high turnover rate of a typical restaurant use, 

the access to the property to the south is important to 

maintain safe vehicular circulation. The access aisle on 

the north side of the building is marginally wide enough to 

accommodate two-way travel. Please provide a cross 

access/shared maintenance agreement to this office and 

the Department of Law . . . The 20.8’ wide area in the rear 

of the building, that was left unmarked from parking, may 

be used to improve vehicular circulation. The agreement 

will need to be accepted prior to plan approval.71

The Delaware Department of Transportation also responded to the record plan with 

the suggestion that “[a] combined access with the parcel to the north or south should 

be considered along Concord Pike.”72

In Merestone’s response to these comments, Gregor wrote: 

Cross access through the property to the south is not 

viable. It is expected that the owner will resist 

cooperation. . . . We have configured the parking in the 

back to potentially allow physical access between this 

property and the one to the south should the opportunity 

present itself.73

 

70 JX 26; JX 82.

71 JX 19.

72 JX 20.

73 JX 22; JX 23.
15

Gregor testified that he discussed these responses with Mr. Kollias before they 

were submitted; the responses were based on discussions he had with Mr. Kollias; 

and Mr. Kollias accepted and was aware of the responses.74 Mr. Kollias was sent 

copies of the various documents containing the comments.75 Mr. Kollias testified at 

trial that he never had any discussions with the owner of the property to the south of 

the 2720 Property. He also stated that Merestone’s statements were not accurate 

because he believed he already had a right to a cross-access easement.76

Eventually, the Delaware Department of Transportation and New Castle 

County Department of Land Use approved the plans, and the final parking plan and 

record plan do not mention an easement.77 Gregor testified that no plan was ever 

approved that showed a cross-access easement.

78

3. K&G constructs the Claymont Steak Shop and Charcap 

erects barriers

The construction permit was issued to K&G on September 11, 2014, and the 

demolition of the old building and construction of the new structure began around 

 

74 Tr. 582-86.

75 JX 417.

76 Tr. 202-04.

77 JX 39; JX 40.

78 Tr. 575-76.
16

that time.

79

 Kryak, the site construction manager, directed contractors to use the 

Woodrow Avenue traffic light and cross over the Charcap Property to access the 

2720 Property because in most cases “they were longer vehicles, trailers, backhoes, 

that kind of thing, and they could not get in from right in front of Claymont Steak 

Shop.”

80

 During demolition, a construction fence was put up for safety concerns, 

and during that time, the only direct access to the property available was to enter at 

the Woodrow Avenue traffic light and cross the Charcap Property.81 

Capano testified at trial that he wanted to be neighborly and allowed the 

construction vehicles to use the property for access.82 Even though Capano was 

concerned about larger trucks or equipment coming across his property, he was 

willing to allow it because it was a temporary situation.

83

 Capano further testified 

that he had a conversation with Mrs. Kollias on his property shortly before she

opened the restaurant; they discussed the fact that he had been a good neighbor and 

 

79 JX 50; Tr. 519-20 (Kryak).

80 Tr. 510-11 (Kryak).

81 Id. at 507-10.

82 Id. at 463-64.

83 Id.
17

allowed her to use his property for the construction.84 He testified that no one had 

ever approached him regarding cross access over the property.85

Mrs. Kollias testified that the conversation with Capano occurred after Patel 

informed her that Capano was going to put up a fence to block her use of the Charcap 

Property.

86

 Mrs. Kollias testified that on the same day, Capano told her that Patel 

wanted him to put a fence up because her restaurant was going to create a lot of 

traffic.87

Shortly before the opening of the restaurant in October 2015 and towards the 

end of construction, parking block strips were placed on the Charcap Property.88 

Vehicles continued to drive over the parking blocks, and the Defendants placed a 

second layer of parking block strips across their property.

89

 Both Patel and Sciota, 

the general manager of the Charcoal Pit, testified that after the opening of the 

Claymont Steak Shop, the frequency of traffic over the Charcap Property increased 

 

84 Id. at 465-66.

85 Id.

86 Id. at 27-28.

87 Id. at 31.

88 Id. at 68 (D. Kollias); id. at 513 (Kryak).

89 Id. at 513 (Kryak); PTO ¶ 26.
18

significantly, and safety concerns arose.90 The type of vehicle also became a 

concern; 18-wheel trucks were crossing the property, obstructing parking for long 

periods of time, and leaving the property in an unsafe manner.91 Sciota became 

concerned about liability and voiced this to Capano.92 In response, on July 7, 2016, 

Sciota had a fence erected on the Charcap Property.93 After delivery trucks 

continued parking and obstructing the Charcap Property’s parking lot to deliver to 

Claymont Steak Shop, Sciota instructed that the fence be extended in September 

2016.94

C. Parties’ Contentions

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that they have acquired an easement by 

prescription and by estoppel over Defendants’ Charcap Property. Plaintiffs also seek 

an injunction preventing Defendants from obstructing access across the Charcap 

Property to the 2720 Property. Defendants answer that no easement over the 

Charcap Property exists; thus, there is no right to a permanent injunction. 

 

90 Tr. 624-30 (Patel); id. at 649-53 (Sciota).

91 Id. at 650 (Sciota); id. at 625 (Patel).

92 Id. at 656 (Sciota); id. at 466-68 (Capano).

93 PTO ¶ 28; Tr. 655 (Sciota).

94 Tr. 655-56, 667 (Sciota); JX 83; PTO ¶ 30.
19

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by laches, unclean hands, 

and waiver/abandonment.

95

 

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs assert that they have an implied easement under two exceptions to 

the statute of frauds—easement by prescription and easement by estoppel. Because 

easements by prescription evade the requirements of the statute of frauds and “work 

a forfeiture of title,” they are disfavored.96 Therefore, the Court employs a 

heightened evidentiary standard, and the claimant “must establish each element by 

evidence that is clear and convincing.”97 Similarly, because estoppel is an equitable 

doctrine that creates an exception to the statute of frauds, “a party seeking to enforce 

a parol contract faces an enhanced evidentiary burden, and must demonstrate by 

clear and convincing evidence that such an exception is applicable.”98 This 

 

95 Defendants also argue that certain of Mrs. Kollias’s testimony at trial regarding the 

purported easement should be excluded and certain of Mr. Kollias’s testimony 

regarding the easement by prescription should be excluded. Defendants also argue 

that certain exhibits should be excluded as hearsay. Because I do not rely on any of 

the enumerated exhibits or testimony, and because I ultimately rule that Plaintiffs 

have not established the right to an easement, I need not decide these matters.

96 Dewey Beach Lions Club, 2006 WL 701980, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2006) (citing 

Anolick v. Holy Trinity Greek Orthodox Church, Inc., 787 A.2d 732, 740 (Del. Ch. 

2001); Berger v. Colonial Parking, Inc., C.A. No. 1415-VCH (May 20, 1993) 

(OPINION)).

97 Id.

98 Hionis v. Shipp, 2005 WL 1490455, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 

323 (Del. 2006).
20

heightened standard “recognizes that non-compliance with the regular formalities 

required of real estate transactions should not be lightly tolerated,” and a plaintiff

must provide “very strong evidence, which leaves the court with the same degree of 

certainty that a formal written contract ordinarily provides.”

99

A. Plaintiffs Have Not Established an Easement by Prescription

In order to obtain an easement by prescription, the claimant “must 

demonstrate that he, or a person in privity with him,” used the burdened estate “(1) 

openly, (2) notoriously, (3) exclusively, and (4) adversely to the rights of others for 

an uninterrupted period of 20 years.”100 Defendants do not dispute that Whitten, 

who owned the 2720 Property from 1961 to 2012, was in privity with Plaintiffs;

therefore, I turn to whether Plaintiffs have shown by clear and convincing evidence 

that the use of Defendants’ property satisfied the elements necessary to create an 

easement by prescription.

101

 

 

99 Id.

100 Dewey Beach, 2006 WL 701980, at *3 (citing Anolick, 787 A.2d at 740).

101 JX 416, Ex. B; JX 314, at 12. Plaintiffs and Defendants dispute when the 

prescriptive period should begin, but I need not decide this issue because Plaintiffs 

have not proven the elements necessary for an easement by prescription. Pls.’ 

Opening Br. 26; Defs.’ Answering Br. 31.
21

Plaintiffs claim Whitten operated a photography studio on the second floor of 

the property from 1964 until 1999.102 Although Plaintiffs presented evidence that 

Whitten maintained a storage space in the back of the property and would himself 

visit the property from time to time for maintenance, Plaintiffs did not present any 

credible evidence to show that Whitten, his customers, or his service agents used the 

Charcap Property after 1999.

Instead, Plaintiffs focused on Whitten’s tenants’ usage of the land during the 

relevant time period. From September 1, 1993, until November 30, 2012, various 

mattress stores leased part of the 2720 Property from Whitten.103 Under Delaware 

law “use by a tenant can be employed in finding the requisite prescriptive period 

only when such use can be said to have been expressly or impliedly (from the 

circumstances) embraced within the terms of the tenancy itself.”

104

 “Otherwise, it 

 

102 Pl.’s Opening Br. 36.

103 PTO ¶ 14. Because this period satisfies the requisite amount of time, I need not 

look to prior tenants’ use. 

104 Toto v. Gravino, 144 A.2d 237, 239 (Del. Ch. 1958); see also BRUCE & ELY, THE 

LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN LAND § 5:19 (Thomson Reuters 2017) (“Some 

jurisdictions, however, adhere to the view that adverse use by a tenant inures to the 

benefit of the landlord only when the asserted easement is within the express or 

implied terms of the lease.”) (citing Toto, 144 A.2d 237).
22

would merely be a continuing trespass by the tenant, the benefit of which the 

landlord could not claim.”

105

The easement is not expressly contained in the lease between Whitten and the 

mattress stores.106 The question, therefore, is whether any easement over the 

Charcap Property is implied in Whitten’s lease with the mattress stores. In Toto v. 

Gravino, the Court found an implied easement in the lease where evidence at trial 

revealed that the original landlords believed they had the right to and did use the 

alley at issue. The Court found, post-trial, that the subsequent tenants and ultimate 

successors-in-interest believed the leases “covered the right of such tenants to use 

the alley; the tenants also so believed and acted upon that belief; when the plaintiffs 

purchased the property in 1943, they believed they had the right to use the alley.”107 

The Court in that case stressed that “the physical appearance of the particular alley 

in relation to plaintiffs’ property and the established ‘use’ pattern were of additional 

 

105 Toto, 144 A.2d at 239.

106 JX 358. The lease mentions the tenant’s “right of non-exclusive use of the side and 

rear parking areas of the Building in conjunction with the occupant of the upper 

floor of the Building.” Id. at 2. This language does not speak to the purported 

easement over the Charcap Property. This analysis is consistent with Rosen’s 

testimony at trial confirming that this language does not address how one enters or 

leaves the property. Tr. 426.

107 Toto, 144 A.2d at 239.
23

compulsive importance” in finding the implied easement.108 “[T]he alley [was] the 

only means to obtain access from the front of the property to the alley side and the 

rear of plaintiffs’ premises” and had for more than twenty years been used by the 

previous landlords, tenants, and “persons servicing the property.”109 Notably in 

Toto, the Court found that the evidence showed the plaintiffs had occupied the land 

themselves as owners for over fifteen years and the previous landlords themselves 

had occupied the property and used the easement.

110

 

In Berger v. Colonial Parking, Inc., this Court distinguished Toto and refused 

to impute the tenant’s use of the easement to the prior landlords because there was 

no evidence of the prior landlords’ own use of the easement.111 “[T]here can be no 

privity of estate between the owner-landlord and its tenant as to the easement and 

the tenant’s use cannot be imputed to the owner-landlord even if the tenant believed 

that the easement was covered by the lease” unless the owner-landlord used or had 

a claim to the easement himself.

112

 

 

108 Id.

109 Id.

110 Id.; cf. Berger v. Colonial Parking, Inc., 1993 WL 2087061, at *5-6 (Del. Ch. June 

9, 1993).

111 Berger, 1993 WL 2087061, at *6.

112 Id. (citing 4 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1146, at 778 (3d ed. 1975)).
24

Here, Whitten died in 2012 and, thus, was unable to testify at this trial. Not a 

single witness of the thirteen witnesses at trial credibly testified to having personal 

knowledge of Whitten’s use of the Charcap Property during his ownership of the 

2720 Property. Similarly, none of the 421 exhibits presented evidence of Whitten’s 

actual use of the Charcap Property during that time.

113

 Thus, Plaintiffs did not 

present clear and convincing evidence that Whitten believed he had a claim to or 

used the easement.

114 As such, Plaintiffs have not met the requisite prescriptive 

period necessary to establish an easement by prescription, and this claim is denied.

115

B. Plaintiffs Have Not Established an Easement by Estoppel

“[A]n easement by estoppel is created when 1) a promisor’s representation 

that an easement exists has been communicated to a promissee; 2) the promisee 

believes the promisor’s representation; and 3) the promisee acts in reliance upon the 

 

113 Dewey Beach Lions Club, Inc. v. Longanecker, 2006 WL 701980, at *5 (Del. Ch. 

Feb. 24, 2006).

114 Additionally, even if Plaintiffs had made the requisite showing as to Whitten’s use, 

there are significant time gaps, specifically from 1996-2002, for which they 

presented no evidence regarding the use of the purported easement. 

115 Also, even if I were to tack the prior tenants’ use of the property to the current 

owners, the Plaintiffs have not established by clear and convincing evidence that the 

mattress stores’ use of the Charcap Property was of the same scope the Plaintiffs

now claim. At trial, McDonald testified that the mattress stores received deliveries 

once a week and that perhaps a handful of customers visited the store a day. 

Plaintiffs on the other hand, run a restaurant that serves several dozen customers a 

day and requires weekly large shipments from multiple 18-wheel trucks. See JX 40 

(traffic generation diagram). “The scope of a prescriptive easement is defined by the 

character and nature of the use that created it.” 28A C.J.S. Easements § 193.
25

promisor’s representation.”116 At trial, Plaintiffs admitted that no one ever expressly 

told them that an easement existed over the Charcap Property.117 Instead, Plaintiffs 

argue that Defendants’ (1) allowance of access over the Charcap Property to remain 

open during the competitive bidding process for the 2720 Property, (2) permission 

for Plaintiffs’ construction vehicles to use the Charcap Property, and (3) failure to 

discuss the purported easement with the Kolliases despite a duty to disclose satisfies 

the first prong of the test necessary to prove an easement by estoppel.

In support of their first argument, Plaintiffs point to the use of the Charcap 

Property while Plaintiffs and Defendants were engaged in a bidding war over the 

2720 Property. Plaintiffs argue that they believed that the path over the Charcap 

Property was “an easement and would remain open” because use of the Charcap 

Property “remained open” despite “increased bidding by Defendants.”118 Plaintiffs 

do not explain how a competitive bidding process creates a representation or 

impression that an easement exists. Moreover, “[a]n easement by estoppel claimant 

cannot rely on an assertion that may be checked easily in the public records or that 

 

116 Hionis v. Shipp, 2005 WL 1490455, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2005), aff’d, 903 A.2d 

323 (Del. 2006) (citing Hammond v. Dutton, 1978 WL 22451, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 

20, 1978)).

117 Tr. 64 (D. Kollias), 158 (B. Kollias).

118 Pls.’ Opening Br. 48.
26

is contrary to information in the claimant’s possession.”119 Mr. Kollias testified at 

trial that there was no recorded easement.120 In fact, representations that there were 

no easements across the property appeared in a title search and Mrs. Whitten’s title 

affidavit.

121

 All relevant information pointed to the fact that no easement existed.

The permission for the construction vehicles to use the Charcap Property

temporarily does not create a representation that a permanent easement for large 

delivery vehicles and dozens of customers exists.122 Moreover, “[c]ourts are 

reluctant to find an easement by estoppel on the basis of ‘mere passive 

acquiescence.’”123 While there may be a duty to disclose the existence of an 

easement (or lack thereof) where “the servient estate owner observes the claimant 

improving the servient estate,” this duty usually does not attach where “the servient 

 

119 BRUCE & ELY, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 6:1 (Thomson 

Reuters 2017).

120 Tr. 153, 155, 216-222. 

121 Tr. 150-53 (B. Kollias); JX 30; JX 43, at 9. 

122 Even if it could be said that Plaintiffs somehow relied on this permission to their 

detriment, the allowance of construction vehicles on a necessarily temporary basis 

is an easement of a different scope than the permanent allowance of frequent large 

delivery trucks and dozens of customers a day. See JX 40 (traffic generation 

diagram).

123 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 119, § 6:1. “[O]ne’s mere acquiescence in the making of 

improvements by another for the purpose of making a use of the latter’s land, which 

involves a violation of a natural right appertaining to the former’s land, involves no 

estoppel to deny the existence of an easement in diminution of such natural right.” 

3 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 801 (3rd ed. Thomson Reuters 2016).
27

estate owner stands by while the claimant improves the claimant’s own property, the 

alleged dominant estate.”124 Here, Defendants did not observe Plaintiffs somehow 

improving the Charcap Property, the alleged servient estate, in anticipation of its

use; rather, they allowed Plaintiffs’ construction vehicles to improve Plaintiff’s own

2720 Property, the alleged dominant estate. “Furthermore, there is authority that an 

obligation to speak does not arise when a claimant is already in possession of the 

relevant information.”125 Here, the Kolliases were aware that no easement existed 

over the property from various sources.

126

 Thus, no omission by Defendants created

an easement by estoppel.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that based on the 2530 Property record plan, 

Defendants had a duty to discuss the cross-access between the properties. The 2530 

Property record plan refers to the parcel directly to the south of the Charcap Property, 

 

124 BRUCE & ELY, supra note 119, § 6:1.

125 Id.

126 For example, the title search showed no easement existed over the Charcap 

Property; an appraisal report listed the entrance to the 2720 Property directly from 

Concord Pike; the parking plan prepared by the Kolliases’ land surveyor and signed 

and certified by Mr. Kollias himself contained no representation of an easement; 

Mrs. Whitten certified that she never had an easement over the Charcap Property;

and DelDOT and the Department of Land Use’s communications discussed no cross 

access over the Charcap Property and suggested an attempt to obtain such cross

access. Tr. 153, 155, 216-222 (Kollias), 575 (Gregor); JX 15; JX 19; JX 20; JX 26; 

JX 31; JX 43.
28

where the Bella Coast restaurant currently operates.

127 The relevant portion of the 

2530 Property record plan states:

The Developer should pursue a cross-access agreement 

with the parcel to the north to establish an interconnection 

with the existing Charcoal Pit restaurant so that traffic may 

utilize the signal located at the intersection of US Route 

202, Woodrow Avenue, and the Charcoal Pit entrance.128

Plaintiffs argue that this record plan shows an “assemblage of parcels” that includes 

the 2530 Property and the Charcap Property.129 Thus, Plaintiffs argue, the reference 

in the record plan to the “parcel to the north” or the “adjacent property to the north” 

is a reference to the 2720 Property. This interpretation, however, is contradicted by 

the document itself.

130

 The document defines the site solely as the 2530 Property;

therefore, any discussion of the parcel to the north is in fact the Charcap Property. 

There is no discussion of an easement with the 2720 Property.131 

 

127 JX 28; JX 280; Tr. 289-93 (Johns).

128 JX 28; JX 280, n.33A.

129 Pl.’s Opening Br. 51.

130 Plaintiffs attempt to discredit the testimony of Johns, the preparer of the document, 

because he was compensated for his testimony and has done many projects for the 

Defendants. Plaintiffs offer no credible evidence as to why Johns was an unreliable 

witness or why the plain wording of the document should be ignored. Pl.’s Opening 

Br. 51 n.40.

131 In addition, Plaintiffs actually point to the analogous record plan for the 2720 

Property, which contains no mention of easements or the pursuit of easements for 

the 2720 Property and is signed and certified by Mr. Kollias. Pl.’s Opening Br. 51 
29

Plaintiffs have not met the heightened evidentiary burden to prove that 

Defendants made a representation that an easement existed over the Charcap 

Property. Because Plaintiffs have not satisfied the first element, I need not discuss 

the other two elements for the creation of an easement by estoppel. Additionally, 

because I do not find that Plaintiffs are entitled to an easement over Defendants’ 

property, I need not discuss Defendants’ affirmative defenses. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I find that Plaintiffs do not have an easement over 

Defendants’ property either by prescription or by estoppel, and Plaintiffs’ claims are 

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

n.40; JX 26. This actually provides even more evidence for the fact that no easement 

was being discussed, contemplated, or pursued; see supra note 126.