J-A17043-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TALATHA MCLAURIN, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE 

ESTATE OF YVONNE G. FIELDS, 

DECEASED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ARIA HEALTH, ARIA HEALTH SYSTEM, 

ARIA HEALTH PHYSICIAN SERVICES, 

ARIA HEALTH FOUNDATION, GREGORY 

C. BOLTON, SR., M.D., QUEST 

DIAGNOSTICS CLINICAL

LABORATORIES, INC., QUEST 

DIAGNOSTICS INCORPORATED, AND 

ROBERT M. LUCAS, M.D., D.D.S., PH.D.,

Appellants No. 2582 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order June 29, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No.: #03934, April Term, 2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2017

Appellants, Quest Diagnostics, Inc. and Quest Diagnostics Clinical 

Laboratories, Inc., appeal from the order of June 29, 2016, which granted in 

part and denied in part its request for a protective order. We vacate in part 

and remand.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter 

from the trial court’s February 16, 2017 opinion and our independent review 

of the certified record.

This professional negligence and medical malpractice 

action was brought following the death of [sixty-three] year old 

Yvonne G. Fields who died of complications related to 

endometrial cancer of the uterus. The decedents’ estate, 

represented by her daughter, Talatha McLaurin[, Appellee], 

alleges that [Appellants and the co-defendants] failed to properly 

evaluate or timely diagnose cancer. The complaint named 

various Quest Diagnostics entities and Robert M. Lucas, M.D.[,] a 

pathologist who worked for Quest Diagnostics. It also named 

the gynecologist, Gregory C. Bolton, M.D., who treated the 

decedent.

With specific reference to [Appellants], [Appellee] claims 

that a slide with an endometrial tissue biopsy specimen was 

misread. The specimen was reportedly collected by Doctor 

Bolton and submitted to Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories 

in Horsham, where it was received, accessioned, interpreted by 

Doctor Lucas, and reported by [Appellants] as atrophic 

endometrium. [Appellee] avers that it should have been 

reported as insufficient tissue.

(Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/17, at 2-3).

On May 1, 2015, Appellee filed the instant medical malpractice action. 

During discovery, a dispute arose between Appellee and Appellants 

regarding Appellee’s request that Appellants produce their internal policies 

and procedures pertaining to the interpretation of pathology specimens. 

Appellants unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate an agreement with 

Appellee in the form of a stipulated protective order, which stated that 
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Appellee and her counsel would not disseminate or use the documents 

outside of the litigation. 

On March 2, 2016, Appellee filed a motion to compel production of the 

documents. At a hearing on March 16, 2016, Appellants advised the trial 

court that they wished to present the documents to the court for review and 

to argue for a protective order. The trial court advised Appellants to address 

the issue via a separate motion for a protective order, which Appellants filed 

on March 21, 2016. 

On June 8, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for a 

protective order. By order of June 29, 2016, the trial court granted the 

motion in part and denied it in part.1 On July 6, 2016, Appellants filed a 

motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on September 12, 

2016. The instant, timely appeal followed. On January 17, 2017, the trial 

court ordered Appellants to file a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellants filed a timely Rule 1925(b) 

statement on February 3, 2017. See id. On February 16, 2017, the trial 

court filed an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

On appeal, Appellants raise the following question for our review:

____________________________________________

1 The trial court granted the motion as to documents from the personnel file 

of Dr. Lucas and with respect to various contracts between Appellants and 

some of the co-defendants in this matter.
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Should [Appellants’] request to produce [their] secret, 

proprietary and competitively sensitive documents, which are 

based on and derived from years of data and analysis unknown 

to the public, only under the terms of a standard [p]rotective 

[o]rder which would limit [Appellee’s] ability to disseminate the 

confidential and proprietary documents, be granted?

(Appellants’ Brief, at 3).

Prior to addressing the merits of Appellants’ contention, this Court is 

obligated to “first ascertain whether the [order appealed from] is properly 

appealable, because the question of appealability implicates the jurisdiction 

of this [C]ourt.” Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (citations omitted). “The general rule is that, unless otherwise 

permitted by statute, only appeals from final orders are subject to appellate 

review.” Commonwealth v. Sartin, 708 A.2d 121, 122 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(citations omitted). In relevant part, the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure define a “final order” as any order that “disposes of all claims and 

of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).

In the instant matter, the trial court’s June 29, 2016 order is not final, 

as it concerned a discovery matter. See Jones v. Faust, 852 A.2d 1201, 

1203 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“in general, discovery orders are not final, and are 

therefore unappealable”). Thus, the challenged order constitutes a nonfinal, interlocutory order.

Interlocutory orders are appealable in certain circumstances. Our 

Supreme Court explained:
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in addition to an appeal from final orders of the Court of 

Common Pleas, our rules provide the Superior Court with 

jurisdiction in the following situations: interlocutory appeals that 

may be taken as of right, Pa.R.A.P. 311; interlocutory appeals 

that may be taken by permission, Pa.R.A.P. [312]; appeals that 

may be taken from a collateral order, Pa.R.A.P. 313; and appeals 

that may be taken from certain distribution orders by the 

Orphans’ Court Division, Pa.R.A.P. 342.

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 43 A.3d 470, 478 n.7 (Pa. 2012) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

The order at issue is not appealable as of right (per Pa.R.A.P. 311) and 

Appellants did not ask for or receive permission to appeal the order (per 

Pa.R.A.P. 312). Thus, the question before this Court is whether the order in 

this case (or any aspect of the order) is appealable under the collateral order 

doctrine. See Pa.R.A.P. 313.

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 defines a collateral order 

as one that: “1) is separable from and collateral to the main cause of 

action; 2) involves a right too important to be denied review; and 3) 

presents a question that, if review is postponed until final judgment in the 

case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” In re Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 

51 A.3d 224, 230 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). An order is “separable from and collateral to the main 

cause of action” if the order “is entirely distinct from the underlying issue in 

the case and if it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the 

underlying dispute.” K.C. v. L.A., 128 A.3d 774, 778 (Pa. 2015) (internal 
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quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, with respect to the 

“separability” prong of the test, our Supreme Court explained that, 

“[a]lthough [the Supreme Court will] tolerate a degree of interrelatedness 

between merits issues and the question sought to be raised in the 

interlocutory appeal, the claim must nevertheless be conceptually distinct 

from the merits of plaintiff's claim.” Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 

A.3d 306, 312 (Pa. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court has also emphasized that:

the collateral order doctrine is a specialized, practical [exception 

to] the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of 

right. Thus, Rule 313 must be interpreted narrowly, and the 

requirements for an appealable collateral order remain stringent 

in order to prevent undue corrosion of the final order rule. To 

that end, each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be 

clearly present before an order may be considered collateral.

Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46-47 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).

In keeping with the narrow interpretation of the collateral order 

doctrine, our Supreme Court has held that “the collateral order rule’s threepronged test must be applied independently to each distinct legal issue over 

which an appellate court is asked to assert jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 

313.” Rae v. Pa. Funeral Dir.'s Ass'n, 977 A.2d 1121, 1130 (Pa. 2009). 

Therefore, even if the collateral order test “is satisfied with respect to one 

[appellate] issue,” the assertion of jurisdiction does not necessarily mean 

that we have “jurisdiction to consider every issue within the ambit of the 

appealed order[.]” Id. at 1123. 
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Here, Appellants claim that the trial court erred in denying their 

request for a protective order to preclude any dissemination of their 

standard operating procedures. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 11). We can 

address this claim without analyzing Appellee’s underlying medical 

malpractice claim. See Crum v. Bridgestone/Firestone North American 

Tire, LLC, 907 A.2d 578, 583 (Pa. Super. 2006). Thus, Appellants have met 

the first prong.

With respect to the second prong, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

has explained that this prong is satisfied “if the interests that would 

potentially go unprotected without immediate appellate review of that issue 

are significant relative to the efficiency interests sought to be advanced by 

adherence to the final judgment rule.” Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547, 

552 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). Further, “it is not sufficient that the issue 

be important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply 

rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” 

Melvin, supra at 47 (citation omitted). 

Here, Appellants assert that the documents in question contain trade 

secrets and failure to protect them will result in the exposure of those 

secrets, causing “irreparable competitive harm[.]” (Appellants’ 

Brief, at 11). We have stated, “[t]he right to confidentiality in matters 

involving proprietary and trade secrets is rooted in public policy and impacts 

on individuals and entities other than those involved in the current 
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litigation.” Crum, supra at 584 (citation omitted). Further, Pennsylvania 

Rule of Civil Procedure 4012(a)(9), which controls the discovery of trade 

secrets, permits the trial court to order “that a trade secret or other 

confidential research, development or commercial information shall not be 

disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.” Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a)(9). 

Thus, we find that the trade-secret protection is entrenched in public policy 

beyond the litigation at hand, and is important enough to justify immediate 

appellate review. See Crum, supra at 584. 

Lastly, we look at the irreparable loss prong. Again, Appellants argue 

that the failure of the trial court to enter the protective order will risk 

exposure of their trade secrets. (See Appellants’ Brief, at 11). Our 

Supreme Court has stated, “[t]here is no effective means of reviewing after 

a final judgment an order requiring the production of putatively protected 

material.” Ben, supra at 552 (citation omitted). Clearly, if disclosed, the 

confidentiality of the information in question is lost. Accordingly, Appellants 

have met the third prong.

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the June 29, 2016 order 

denying in part the motion of Appellants for a protective order is collateral 

and appealable of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313. Therefore, we will now address 

the merits of Appellants’ contention.

With respect to our standard of review, we have held:
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It is the responsibility of the trial court to oversee discovery 

between the parties and therefore it is within that court’s 

discretion to determine the appropriate measure necessary to 

insure adequate and prompt discovery of matters allowed by the 

Rules of Civil Procedure. With regard to requests for protective 

orders . . . [,] 

[t]here are no hard-and-fast rules as to how a motion for a 

protective order is to be determined by the court. Whether to 

grant or deny the motion, and what kind or kinds of protective 

orders to issue are matters that lie within the sound judicial 

discretion of the court, and the court’s determination as to these 

matters will not be disturbed unless that discretion has been 

abused.

Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905, 908 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal 

discontinued, 611 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1992) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court, in reaching its 

conclusions, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill 

will.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 839 A.2d 433, 435 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citation omitted).

As discussed above, Appellants sought entry of a protective order 

under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4012(a)(9), to protect against 

the dissemination of any documents produced during discovery. Again, we 

note that Rule 4012(a)(9) states:

(a) Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 

discovery or deposition is sought, and for good cause shown, the 

court may make any order which justice requires to protect a 

party or person from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, 

oppression, burden or expense, including one or more of the 

following:
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* * *

(9) that a trade secret or other confidential research, 

development or commercial information shall not be 

disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.

Pa.R.C.P. 4012(a)(9).

In the instant matter, in their motion, Appellants claim that a 

protective order was necessary because the documents included trade 

secrets, namely:

developmental research [which contains] detailed information as 

to [Appellants’] techniques and methodologies, so if the 

[s]tandard [o]perating [p]rocedures are not protected, a 

competitor could readily compare its procedures with those of

[Appellants] and identify those areas needing particular attention 

to gain improved performance, eliminating its own expenditures 

associated with the evaluation and development of such policies 

and procedures. . . .

(Appellants’ Motion for Entry of a Protective Order, 3/21/16, at 6). The trial 

court denied Appellants’ motion. Firstly, in its decision, the trial court 

appeared to misunderstand the nature of the Appellants’ request, noting that 

Appellants, “failed to cite to a single medical malpractice action in which a 

judge sitting in Pennsylvania entered a protective order that protected a 

defendant’s policies and procedures from production during discovery.” 

(Trial Ct. Op., at 4) (emphasis added). The court further found that “a 

critical factor” was Appellants’ failure to offer redacted documents or any 

papers in response to Appellee’s discovery request. (Id.).
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However, on review, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court 

is mistaken. Here, Appellants were not seeking to prevent the discovery of 

the documents. Rather, in their motion, Appellants specifically stated, 

“[Appellants are] not refusing to produce the requested documents. 

[Appellants are] asking only that [their] legitimate business interest in 

protecting [their] [s]tandard [o]perating [p]rocedures . . . from broad 

dissemination requires entry of a protective order.” (Appellants’ Motion for 

Entry of a Protective Order, 3/21/16, at 4-5) (emphasis added). At both the 

hearing on Appellee’s motion to compel and the hearing on the motion for a 

protective order, Appellants reiterated that they had no objection to 

producing the documents. (See N.T. Motion to Compel Hearing, 3/16/16, at 

11, 20-21; N.T. Motion for a Protective Order Hearing, 6/08/16, at 10-13, 

15). They also stated they had no objection to its use in the litigation and 

its dissemination to the parties and any expert witnesses, but only wished to 

protect it from dissemination to the public and their competitors. (See N.T. 

Motion to Compel Hearing, at 11, 20-21; see N.T. Motion for a Protective 

Order Hearing, at 10-13, 15). Therefore, it is evident that Appellants sought 

only to protect the dissemination of the documents to the broader public, not 

to prevent Appellee’s discovery of the documents and their use in the instant 

matter. Thus, the trial court’s analysis of whether or not the documents are 

discoverable is not germane to the issue of whether a protective order 
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should issue, or whether the circumstances justify such a measure to protect 

against dissemination of confidential material. 

We note that, in its opinion, the trial court did hold that the material in 

question was not a trade secret. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 4). However, its 

brief discussion of the issue appears to be inextricably entwined with its 

mistaken belief that Appellants sought protection from production during 

discovery, rather than protection from disclosure to the public. (See id.). 

Further, in making its ruling, while invoking the correct standard of review, 

the trial court did not discuss any of the evidence provided by Appellants 

and did not discuss, in specific detail, how Appellants failed to meet that 

standard.2 (See id. at 3-4). 

Our Court has defined a trade secret as, “any formula, pattern, device 

or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which 

gives [it] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do 

not know or use it.” Crum, supra at 585 (citation omitted). We have held 

____________________________________________

2 We are sympathetic to the difficulties faced by the trial court in this matter. 

Appellants’ failure to submit the documents in question for review by the 

trial court and their refusal to provide specific information regarding the 

information contained within them, clearly hampered the proceedings below 

and made review by this Court exceedingly complicated. However, we 

believe, as discussed infra, that the affidavits submitted by Appellants’ 

employees provided sufficient information to meet the standard for finding 

that the documents constituted a trade secret. 
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that the following factors should be considered in determining whether

information is a trade secret:

1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] 

business; 2) the extent to which it is known by employees and 

others involved in [the] business; 3) the extent of measures 

taken by [it] to guard the secrecy of the information; 4) the 

value of the information to [it] and to [its] competitors; 5) the 

amount of effort or money expended by [it] in developing the 

information; and 6) the ease or difficulty with which the 

information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 

The crucial indicia for determining whether certain information 

constitutes a trade secret are substantial secrecy and 

competitive value to the owner. 

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Appellants submitted affidavits from Leslie Kennedy, the quality 

assurance manager for Quest Diagnostic Clinical Laboratories, Inc., and from 

Dr. Harvey Ronald Kennedy, M.D., the senior medical director for national 

medical quality at Quest Diagnostics. (See Affidavit in Support of Protective 

Order, 3/17/16, at unnumbered page 1; Second Affidavit in Support of 

Protective Order, 6/17/16, at unnumbered page 1). We have reviewed 

these documents with the above-stated factors in minds. Appellants do not 

make the documents in question available to the public and they are only 

disseminated to a limited number of Appellants’ employees. (See Affidavit 

in Support of Protective Order, at unnumbered page 3; see Second Affidavit 

in Support of Protective Order, at unnumbered page 3). In order to guard 

the secrecy of the information contained within the documents, employees 

must sign confidentiality agreements and any breach of that confidentiality 
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subjects the employee to disciplinary action up to and including discharge 

and potential legal liability. (See Affidavit in Support of Protective Order, at 

unnumbered pages 3-4). Appellants contend that the information has great 

value to its competitors because the standard operating procedures are 

based on years of compilation of nationwide research, data and statistics, 

leading to a higher quality of testing than their competitors. (See Affidavit 

in Support of Protective Order, at unnumbered pages 4-5; see Second 

Affidavit in Support of Protective Order, at unnumbered pages 2-3). Further, 

Appellants contend that they invested substantial monies in gathering this 

data, which Appellants review annually, and writing new or revised 

procedures expends many hours of labor. (See Affidavit in Support of 

Protective Order, at unnumbered pages 4-5). For these reasons, this 

information would be of substantial value to Appellants’ competitors. 

Thus, in sum, the evidence provided by Appellants shows that the 

standard operating procedures are based on statistics, data, and 

information, which indicates their value to them and that the information 

could disadvantage them if disseminated to the public. Clearly, Appellants 

have taken many measures to safeguard the standard operating procedures 

and closely held the information contained therein. Given this, we hold that 

the trial court erred in determining that Appellants had not shown that the 

documents in question were a trade secret. See Dibble v. Penn State 

Geisinger Clinic, Inc., 806 A.2d 866, 871-72 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal 
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denied, 820 A.2d 705 (Pa. 2003) (holding that trial court erred in denying 

protective order and finding documents did not contain trade secrets for one 

hundred eight documents in medical malpractice case including HMO’s 

procedures for its physicians, where HMO guarded confidentiality of 

documents, expended funds developing information, and dissemination could 

create competitive disadvantage). 

Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we vacate those portions 

of the June 29, 2016 order denying the motion of Appellants for a protective 

order. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order of 

confidentiality to prevent dissemination of the information at issue.

Order vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/3/2017