### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE July 2000 Session STATE OF TENNESSEE v. HENRY C. BOND Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County No. 63811, 65692 Ray L. Jenkins, Judge

No. E1999-02183-CCA-R3-CD October 6, 2000
The Defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of two counts of forgery not exceeding $500. The Defendant was sentenced as a career offender to conc urrent terms of six years on each conviction. On appeal, the De fendant contend

s that the evidenc

e is not suffic ient to support his convictions for f

orgery. Finding no erro

r, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal; J udgment of the Crim

inal Court Affirm

ed.
R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J OSEPH M. T IPTON , and J OHN E VERETT W ILLIAM S , JJ., joined.
Mark E. Stephens, District Public Defender; and David Gall, Assistant Public Defender, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Henry C. Bond.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; R. Stephen Jobe, Assistant Atto rney General; Randall E. Nichols, Distri ct A ttorney General, and Zane Scarlett, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
On April 9, 1997, the Defendant, Henry Bond, cashed a $450 check at Check

X-Change in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Defendant clai

m ed th at the check had been made out to him by Mark Cagle. The Defendant told the employee of Check X-C hange that Cagle had purchased a computer from him at a flea market. After verifying the identification of the Defendant by calling references and examining his photographic identification, the employee of Check X-Change cashed the check for the Defendant. At the request of the clerk, the Defendant also filled out an information card.
The Defendant r

eturned three da

ys later wit

h a second check made out to him by the same individual for t he identical amount of money. The Defendant said the check was pay ment for jewelry sold to Cagle at

th e flea market. The owner and manger of Check X-Change noticed that the endorsement was

similar to the handw

riting on the fro

nt of the check. Su

spicious, the owne

r told the Defendant to wait while she performed additional verification. During this period, the Defendant-2-

waited in the lobby of Chec k X-Change. At o

ne point, the Defe

ndant explained to

the owner that Cagle had accompanied him to Check X-Change thr ee days e arlier when he h

ad cashed the fir

st check. The owner was ab le to reach Cagle

, who told her he did

not issue the chec

k in question. The owner then contacted the po

lice, who came to

the scene. Cag

le drove to Check X

-Change to

speak withthe police and express his desire to p rosecute. The police then arrested the Defendant for for gery. Upon subsequent investigation, t he po lice discovered

that Cagle’s moth

er had sent him a packet of checks about

a week and a hal

f before the Apr

il 12 incident which Cagle never received. According to Cagle, he did not issue either check to the Defendant; nor were any of the

other checks in the packet ever discovered during the investigation.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The Defendant now argues that the evidence was ins

ufficient to

support the jury ’s verdict. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence, an appellate court’s standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essentia

l elements of the c

rime beyond

a reasonable do

ubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) ; State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Te nn. 1985); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule applies to findings of guilt based upon direc t evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dykes , 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this

Court should not re-

weigh or re-e

valuate the evidence

. State v. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (T enn. Crim. App. 1990

). Nor may th

is Courtsubstitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the evidence. Liakas v. State , 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 ( Tenn. 1956); State v. Buggs , 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999). On the con tra ry, this Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate viewof the evidence containedin the record, as well as all

reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. State v. Evans , 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). Questions concerning the credibility of t h e witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidenc e are resolved by the t rier of fact. Liakas , 286 S.W.2d at 859. Because a ver dict of guilt ag

ainst a defendant removes the pres

umption of innocenc

e and raises a pres umption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally in sufficient to susta

in a guilty verdict. Id.
In order to establ ish the crime of forgery, the State must show that the defendant forg ed a writing with intentto defraud another. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-114(a). In this case, the Defendant now concedes that the

checks present

ed were forge

d. However, he ma

intains that he did not personally

forge the checks and that he had no knowledge at the time he presented the checks to be cashed that they had bee n forged. This Court must defer findings of intent to the jury unless no reasonable

pe rson c ould have found as the jury did. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). In this case, the-3-

finding of intent to defraud by the jury wa

s well within reaso

n given the surr

ounding circums

tances. The Defendant pre sented two ch ecks from the same individual and alleged that both checks were payment from two separate exchanges at the flea market. The

checks were for an identical amount and were prese

nted within three d

ays of eac h other. Both

checks were from a book of checks that Cagle had never received in the mail. None of the other checks from that book of checks ever turned up after the Defendant was arrested. Moreover, the handwriting on the checks was very si

milar to the endorsements on the checks. These coincidences are suspicious and certainly could be used by a reasonable person to infer intent to defraud.
The Defendant argues that because he did not attempt to flee, he obv iou sly w as not aware that he had presented forged c hecks. Howev er, there are o ther reasons why

the Defendant c

ould have chosen to wait in the lobby of Check X-Change; for example, the Defendant could

have truly believed the owne

r was verify

ing the informat

ion, or the Defen

dant could

have thought he did not have the choice to leave, particularly after the arr ival of the investigating police officer. Regardless, the Defendant did not

meet his b urden of showing that no reasonable person could have inferred intent to defraud from the evidence presented. Accordingly

, we AFFIRM

the convictions.

___________________________________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE