Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1601-CR-15 | August 19, 2016 Page 1 of 6

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jessi Apollos,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

August 19, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1601-CR-15

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Amy Jones, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G08-1501-CM-618

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1601-CR-15 | August 19, 2016 Page 2 of 6

[1] Jessi Apollos appeals her conviction for Criminal Trespass,1 a class A 

misdemeanor. Apollos argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting the 

conviction. We agree, and reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the 

conviction.

Facts

[2] In December 2014, Apollos was seeking to move into a new residence. After a 

conversation with Apollos on social media, Andre Francois told Apollos that 

he was seeking to rent out a room in his house. On December 5, 2014, Apollos 

went to see Francois’s residence. He offered her a furnished bedroom in his 

house in exchange for rent, and Apollos accepted. Francois did not draft a 

written lease, and the parties never agreed upon a precise amount of rent that 

would be owed by Apollos. 

[3] Apollos moved in on December 14, 2014. Francois knew that Apollos was 

leaving her former residence permanently. He had cleaned out a closet in his 

own bedroom for her belongings. Apollos kept all of her belongings at the 

house, had a key to the house, and received mail at the house. Apollos and 

Francois became involved in a sexual relationship. Shortly after Apollos 

moved in, her car was stolen and she lost her job. Francois indicated that he 

might be willing to accept childcare services (he has a minor child who lives in 

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1601-CR-15 | August 19, 2016 Page 3 of 6

the home) in exchange for Apollos’s residency. She provided overnight 

childcare on approximately ten occasions.

[4] On January 6, 2015, Apollos and Francois got into an argument. Francois 

ultimately told Apollos that she could not live there anymore. He was angry 

and packed up her belongings, telling her to leave the house about ten times. 

Each time Apollos responded, “No, I live here.” Tr. p. 25. She called the 

police and was frantic and sobbing, saying that her “boyfriend” was trying to 

kick her out of their house and she had nowhere to go. State’s Ex. 2. 

Indianapolis Police Officer Scott Emminger responded to the scene and found 

Apollos “upset” and “loud,” and asked her to calm down. Tr. p. 57-58. 

Apollos told Officer Emminger that she lived there, but as she had no written 

lease to show him as proof, he asked her to leave. She declined the officer’s 

offer to drive her to a homeless shelter. Ultimately, he arrested her for criminal 

trespass.

[5] On January 6, 2015, the State charged Apollos with class A misdemeanor 

criminal trespass. On March 27, 2015, the State added a charge of class B 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct.2 On December 14, 2015, the jury found 

Apollos guilty as charged. The same day, the trial court sentenced Apollos to 

an aggregate term of 365 days, fully suspended to probation. Apollos now 

appeals.

 

2 Apollos is not appealing the disorderly conduct conviction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1601-CR-15 | August 19, 2016 Page 4 of 6

Discussion and Decision

[6] Apollos argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her criminal trespass 

conviction. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will consider 

only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the conviction. Gray 

v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). We will affirm if, based on the 

evidence and inferences, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 

2009). To convict Apollos of class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, the State 

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly or 

intentionally refused to leave Francois’s residence after Francois asked her to 

leave, and that Apollos had no contractual interest in the property. I.C. § 35-

43-2-2(b)(2). Apollos argues that the State failed to establish that she had no 

contractual interest in the property and that she acted with the requisite mens 

rea.3

[7] The State need not disprove every conceivable contractual interest, but it must 

disprove contractual interests reasonably apparent from the circumstances 

under which the trespass allegedly occurred. Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 

(Ind. 2012). A “contractual interest” is the right to be present on another’s 

property, arising from an agreement between two parties that creates an 

obligation to do or not do a particular thing. Semenick v. State, 977 N.E.2d 7, 10 

 

3 Because we resolve this case in Apollos’s favor based on the element of lack of contractual interest, we need 

not and will not consider her argument regarding mens rea.
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2012). A lease need not be in writing to be a binding agreement. 

Barber v. Echo Lake Mobile Home Cmty., 759 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001).

[8] In this case, both Apollos and Francois understood that an agreement existed, 

pursuant to which Apollos would live at Francois’s residence in exchange for 

rent and/or childcare services for Francois’s daughter.4 Tr. p. 19-21, 23-24, 71-

72, 79, 82-83. The precise terms may not have been agreed upon, but both 

parties understood that an agreement existed. Even if Apollos had breached 

that agreement by failing to make a rent payment, the lease—and Apollos’s 

contractual interest in the property—did not automatically terminate. Ind. 

Code § 32-31-1-8(5) (providing that a lease does not terminate automatically for 

failure to pay rent unless it contains an express term requiring the tenant to pay 

rent in advance and the tenant fails to pay); I.C. § 32-31-1-6 (providing that a 

landlord must give the tenant at least ten days’ notice before he can terminate 

the lease for failure to pay rent).5 Therefore, her contractual interest in the 

property still existed on the day she allegedly trespassed on that property.

[9] Because it is undisputed that Apollos and Francois both understood that they 

had agreed that Apollos would live in Francois’ residence in exchange for 

money and/or childcare services, we find that the evidence does not establish 

 

4 Even the prosecutor understood that the parties had a “renter agreement.” Tr. p. 100. 

5

In its brief, the State acknowledges that there was a “tenancy at sufferance,” appellee’s br. p. 14, meaning 

that the lease did not terminate automatically even if Apollos had breached it. I.C. § 32-31-1-6.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A04-1601-CR-15 | August 19, 2016 Page 6 of 6

beyond a reasonable doubt that Apollos did not have a contractual interest in 

the property. In other words, we find that the State failed to disprove 

contractual interests reasonably apparent from the circumstances under which 

the trespass allegedly occurred. Consequently, we reverse the criminal trespass 

conviction for insufficient evidence.

[10] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to 

vacate the criminal trespass conviction and adjust Apollos’s sentence 

accordingly.

Vaidik, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.