UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1639

MARVIN J. PERRY, INC.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. 

HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:08-

cv-00138-RWT)

Argued: October 28, 2010 Decided: February 25, 2011

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, 

in which Judge Motz and Judge Agee joined.

ARGUED: Clifton Merritt Mount, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jody Manier Kris, WILMERHALE, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gregory Lee 

VanGeison, ANDERSON, COE & KING, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland; 

Jeremy DuQuesnay Dresner, WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR, 

LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Under Maryland law, “[i]t is generally true that an insurer 

has no duty to defend a cause of action against an insured if 

that cause of action asserts liability on the part of the 

insured that comes within an exclusion in the insurance policy.”1

Plaintiff Marvin J. Perry, Inc. (“MJP”) contends that its 

business liability insurer, Defendant Hartford Casualty 

Insurance Company (“Hartford Insurance”), breached its 

contractual duty to provide a defense in an action brought 

against MJP. Because the underlying action involved only claims 

falling within an express contractual exclusion to Hartford

Insurance’s duty to defend, we affirm the district court’s grant 

of summary judgment for Hartford Insurance.

I.

MJP filed this action in an attempt to recover fees and 

costs incurred while defending a lawsuit brought against MJP by 

Perry & Wilson, Inc. (“P&W”).2

 1 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Ropka, 74 Md. App. 249, 

257, 536 A.2d 1214, 1218 (1987), cert. denied, 312 Md. 601, 541 

A.2d 964 (1988).

That suit ended in a settlement 

agreement, and the matter before us concerns whether Hartford

Insurance, by allegedly breaching its duty to defend, is 

2 The case was originally filed in Circuit Court for 

Montgomery County, Maryland, but was removed to federal district 

court on January 16, 2008. 
3

responsible for the defense expenses incurred by MJP before 

settlement with P&W. See Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 

Electro Enters., Inc., 287 Md. 641, 649, 415 A.2d 278, 283 

(1980) (“[W]henever an insured must conduct his own defense at 

his own expense as a result of an insurer’s breach of a 

contractual duty to defend its insured, the insured may recover 

the expenses of that defense from the insurer.”). Hartford

Insurance asserted that an exclusion in MJP’s insurance policy

relieved it of any duty to defend MJP against the suit brought 

by P&W. 

Following the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment 

by the parties, the district court issued an order granting 

Hartford Insurance’s motion. The court reasoned in a memorandum 

opinion that, based on the nature of the claims in the 

underlying suit, the “Intellectual Property Rights Exclusion” in 

the insurance policy relieved Hartford Insurance of the duty to 

defend. 

On appeal, MJP contends that the district court erred by 

granting summary judgment because the underlying suit involved a 

claim for unfair competition that was not subject to the 

“Intellectual Property Rights Exclusion,” and thus, Hartford

Insurance had a duty to defend. We disagree.
4

II.

It is well established that our review of a grant of 

summary judgment is de novo. French v. Assurance Co. of Am., 

448 F.3d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 2006). “Summary judgment is 

appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Additionally, we must apply Maryland law because the action 

was removed to the District of Maryland based on diversity, and 

Hartford Insurance issued its policy to MJP in Maryland. See

Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 

(1941) (holding that a federal court exercising diversity 

jurisdiction must apply the choice of law principles of the 

state in which the federal court is located); Glaser v. Hartford 

Cas. Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 529, 531 n.2 (D. Md. 2005) 

(indicating that in Maryland, the law used to construe an 

insurance policy is that of the state where the policy was 

delivered and premiums were paid).

III.

An insurer’s contractual duty to defend arises from the 

terms of the insurance policy. Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 

Co., 346 Md. 217, 225, 695 A.2d 566, 569 (1997); see also

Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 409, 347 A.2d 
5

842, 851 (1975) (“The promise to defend the insured, as well as 

the promise to indemnify, is the consideration received by the 

insured for payment of the policy premiums.”).

“The obligation of an insurer to defend its insured under a 

contract provision . . . is determined by the allegations in the 

tort actions. If the plaintiffs in the tort suits allege a 

claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend.” 

Brohawn, 276 Md. at 407, 347 A.2d at 850. Indeed, “[e]ven if a 

tort plaintiff does not allege facts which clearly bring the 

claim within or without the policy coverage, the insurer still 

must defend if there is a potentiality that the claim could be 

covered by the policy.” Id. at 408, 347 A.2d at 850. 

In determining whether a liability insurer has a duty 

to provide its insured with a defense in a tort suit, 

two types of questions ordinarily must be answered: 

(1) what is the coverage and what are the defenses 

under the terms and requirements of the insurance 

policy? (2) do the allegations in the tort action 

potentially bring the tort claim within the policy’s 

coverage? 

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 292 Md. 187, 193, 

438 A.2d 282, 285 (1981).

A. The Policy And The Applicable Exception

“In answering the first Pryseski inquiry, we focus on the 

terms of the insurance policies themselves to determine the 

scope and limitations of their coverage.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 
6

v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 104, 651 A.2d 859, 862 (1995). We 

construe the insurance policy according to contract principles. 

See Litz, 346 Md. at 224-25, 695 A.2d at 569. Thus, we must 

afford the contract terms their “customary, ordinary, and 

accepted meaning.” See Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. 

Co., 324 Md. 44, 56, 595 A.2d 469, 475 (1991). “Maryland does 

not follow the rule that insurance policies should, as a matter 

of course, be construed against the insurer.” Dutta v. State 

Farm Ins. Co., 363 Md. 540, 556, 769 A.2d 948, 957 (2001).3

Mindful of these principles of construction, we begin by 

noting that MJP’s insurance policy provided that Hartford

Insurance:

 “To 

determine the intention of the parties to the insurance 

contract, which is the point of the whole analysis, we construe 

the instrument as a whole.” Pacific Indem. Co. v. Interstate 

Fire & Cas. Co., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486, 488 (1985) 

(citations omitted). 

will pay on behalf of the insured those sums that the 

insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 

 3 Nonetheless, “[i]f the language is ambiguous, extrinsic 

evidence may be consulted[,]” Collier v. MD-Individual Practice 

Ass’n, Inc., 327 Md. 1, 6, 607 A.2d 537, 539 (1992), and “if 

ambiguity is determined to remain after consideration of 

extrinsic evidence, ‘it will ordinarily be resolved against the 

party who drafted the contract,’ where no material evidentiary 

factual dispute exists.” Clendenin Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. 

Co., 390 Md. 449, 459-60, 889 A.2d 387, 394 (2006) (quoting 

Collier, 327 Md. at 6, 607 A.2d at 539). 
7

because of . . . “personal and advertising injury” to 

which this insurance applies. [Hartford Insurance] 

will have the right and duty to defend the insured 

against any “suit” seeking those damages. However,

[Hartford Insurance] will have no duty to defend the 

insured against any “suit” seeking damages for . . .

“personal and advertising injury” to which this 

insurance does not apply. 

The policy defined “personal and advertising injury” as 

injury arising out of, inter alia, “[c]opying, in your 

‘advertisement’ a person’s or organization’s ‘advertising idea’

or style of ‘advertisement.’” “Advertisement” is defined to 

include “the widespread public dissemination of information or 

images that has the purpose of inducing the sale of goods, 

products or services through . . . [t]he Internet.”

“‘Advertising idea’ means any idea for an ‘advertisement[.]’” 

Thus, the policy obligates Hartford Insurance to defend 

against some suits alleging advertising injury. But the policy 

also states, in what the district court called the Intellectual 

Property Rights Exclusion, that the “insurance does not apply to 

. . . ‘personal and advertising injury’ . . . [a]rising out of 

any violation of any intellectual property rights, such as 

patent, trademark, trade name, trade secret, service mark or 

other designation of origin or authenticity.” Under Maryland 

law, “where the insurer properly and unambiguously uses language 

in its exclusion, the clear and specific terms must be enforced 

. . . .” Megonnell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 368 Md. 633, 
8

656, 796 A.2d 758, 772 (2002) (quoting Eric Mills Holmes & Mark 

S. Rhodes, Holmes’s Appleman on Insurance, 2d 276-81 (Eric Mills 

Holmes ed., vol. 2 § 7.2, West 1996)). 

In Superformance Int’l, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 

332 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2003), this Court interpreted an 

exclusion almost identical to that at issue in this case as 

relieving Hartford Insurance of the duty to defend claims of 

unfair competition claims based on, inter alia, trademark 

infringement. Id. at 222-24.4

 4 In its reply brief, MJP attempts to distinguish 

Superformance based on the nature of the underlying dispute. 

However, the nature of the dispute is not why Superformance is 

relevant to this case. Rather, Superformance provides useful 

guidance insofar as the Court interpreted the “trademark 

exclusion” (containing almost identical language to that 

constituting the “Intellectual Property Rights Exclusion” at 

issue here) to apply to all claims based on trademark violation. 

In other words, Superformance provides support for Hartford 

Insurance’s argument that if the unfair competition claim stems 

from a trademark violation, it is excluded under the policy. 

 Other circuits have also

recognized similar exclusions as relieving an insurer of the 

right to defend claims alleging trademark violations. See, 

e.g., Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d

729, 732-35 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that clause excluding 

coverage for injury “[a]rising out of any violation of any 

intellectual property rights” relieved Hartford Insurance of 

duty to defend suit alleging mislabeling of products and 

trademark violations); Parameter Driven Software, Inc. v. Mass. 
9

Bay Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that 

because “[a]ll four counts of [the] complaint were based upon 

[the insured’s] use of the trademark,” policy exclusion for 

advertising offenses “arising out of . . . infringement of 

trademark” applied to relieve insurer of duty to defend). 

Accordingly, we answer the first Pryseski inquiry by 

concluding that the language of the Intellectual Property Rights 

Exclusion establishes that Hartford Insurance is relieved of its 

duty to defend under the policy when a suit brought against the 

insured contains only allegations arising out of trademark or 

trade name violations. 

B. The Allegations In The Underlying Tort Action

Next we address the second Pryseski inquiry, which we use 

to determine whether the allegations in the underlying action 

potentially fall within the scope of coverage for “advertising 

injury,” as limited by the Intellectual Property Rights 

Exclusion.

In the underlying suit, P&W alleged “unfair competition by 

infringement of common-law rights” (Count One) as well as 

dilution and diminishment of P&W’s “famous mark” in violation of 

the Lanham Act (Count Two). MJP concedes that Count Two did not 

trigger Hartford Insurance’s duty to defend but contends that 

Count One did. Specifically, MJP argues that the complaint 
10

alleged an unfair competition cause of action that (1) arose 

from MJP’s internet marketing activities—thus qualifying as 

“advertising injury,” and (2) did not arise from a violation of 

P&W’s intellectual property rights—and therefore did not fall 

under the Intellectual Property Rights Exclusion. To determine 

the merit of MJP’s argument, it is useful to examine the nature 

of unfair competition claims under Maryland law before 

considering whether such a claim was raised in P&W’s complaint.

Unfair competition is generally defined in Maryland as 

“damaging or jeopardizing another’s business by fraud, deceit, 

trickery or unfair methods.” Baltimore Bedding Corp. v. Moses, 

182 Md. 229, 237, 34 A.2d 338, 342 (1943). It consists of 

attempting to pass the goods or business of one person off as 

those of another, either by an express or implied public 

representation to that effect. Edmondson Vill. Theatre v. 

Einbinder, 208 Md. 38, 44, 116 A.2d 377, 380 (1955).5

 5 The Einbinder court explained:

To 

Like most doctrines of the common law, the law of 

unfair competition is an outgrowth of human 

experience. The rules relating to liability for harm 

caused by unfair trade practices developed from the 

established principles in the law of torts. These 

rules developed largely from the rule which imposes 

liability upon one who diverts custom from another to 

himself by fraudulent misrepresentation that the goods 

he is offering are the goods produced by the other.

208 Md. at 43, 116 A.2d at 379. 
11

constitute unfair competition, “the acts complained of must be 

of such a nature as to mislead and deceive the public, so that 

the defendant is in effect taking advantage of the good will and 

business reputation which the complainant has built up through 

service or advertising or in any manner regarded as lawful and 

proper.” Id.

As recognized by Maryland courts, the doctrine of unfair 

competition is not limited to actions based on a violation of 

trademark. Moses, 182 Md. at 236, 34 A.2d at 342; see also

Einbinder, 208 Md. at 45, 116 A.2d at 380 (“While the law of 

trade-marks is a part of the doctrine of unfair competition, 

there is a difference between them.”).6

 6 The doctrine was expanded beyond trademark violation at 

least in part on the theory that, even when there has not been a 

technical trademark violation, the law must protect Business A 

from Business B’s improper appropriation of the goodwill 

associated with a word, mark, or symbol of Business A. The 

Einbinder court stated:

 However, the mere 

The infringement of a trade-mark is a violation by one 

person of an exclusive right of another person to the 

use of a word, mark or symbol. On the other hand, where 

two rivals in business have an equal right to use the 

same words on similar articles sold by them, but such 

words were used by one of them before the other and by 

association have come to indicate to the public that the 

goods to which they applied were produced by the former, 

the latter will not be permitted to use them in such a 

manner as to deceive or be capable of deceiving the 

public as to the origin, manufacture or ownership of the 

goods to which they are applied. 

208 Md. at 45, 116 A.2d at 380 (citation omitted). 
12

possibility that an unfair competition claim can exist 

independent of an allegation of trademark violation does not 

mean that an independent claim was raised in P&W’s complaint. 

Turning now to an examination of the underlying tort 

action, we focus initially on MJP’s contention that the 

complaint and excerpts from deposition testimony7

P&W’s complaint alleged that in December 1993, MJP formally 

transferred its furniture dealing business to P&W. Before the 

transfer to P&W, MJP operated as both a furniture manufacturer’s 

representative and a furniture dealer. As explained in P&W’s 

complaint, “[a] furniture manufacturer’s representative is 

merely an agent (generally paid on commission) for a furniture 

combine to 

evidence a claim for unfair competition based on the 

misappropriation of the “style of advertising of P&W” rather 

than a violation of P&W’s intellectual property rights. 

 7 Maryland law permits the consideration of extrinsic 

evidence proffered by the insured when necessary to determine if 

there is a potentiality of coverage under an insurance policy. 

Aetna, 337 Md. at 111-12, 651 A.2d at 866; Walk v. Hartford Cas. 

Ins. Co., 382 Md. 1, 12, 852 A.2d 98, 104 (2004) (“[I]n 

Maryland, an insurer’s duty to defend is not determined solely 

by the eight corner rule (reviewing the complaint and policy) 

but rather includes consideration of extrinsic evidence.”); see 

also Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 383 

Md. 527, 538, 860 A.2d 909, 915 (2004) (stating that “at least 

where the underlying complaint in the tort action neither 

conclusively establishes nor conclusively negates a potentiality 

of coverage, an insurer must examine any relevant extrinsic 

evidence brought to its attention that might establish a 

potentiality of coverage”).
13

manufacturer which contracts in its own name. A furniture 

dealer contracts and sells furniture in its own name.” The 1993 

transfer was of the “furniture dealer” portion of MJP’s 

portfolio; MJP retained certain “manufacturer’s representative” 

contracts. 

As part of the transfer, P&W became the owner of the assets 

of the furniture dealing business, including the trade name 

“Marvin J. Perry & Associates.” The complaint noted that since 

the transfer, P&W has continued to do business with the federal 

government using the trade name “Marvin J. Perry & Associates.” 

P&W has also registered its logo, including the trade name 

“Marvin J. Perry & Associates” as a trademark in Maryland. 

Further, according to the complaint “[s]ince 1993, [P&W] has 

spent considerable sums of money and devoted great effort to 

advertise and publicize the trade name ‘Marvin J. Perry & 

Associates’ to its primary customer, the federal government.” 

The complaint also alleged that in 1999 P&W registered the 

internet domain name “marvinjperry.com” and used it to operate a 

website for Marvin J. Perry & Associates. Because the federal 

government required internet publication of the price lists of 

the manufacturers represented by MJP, and because MJP did not 

yet have a website, P&W allowed MJP to post the price lists for 

the manufacturers MJP represented on marvinjperry.com. 

However, in 2002, an MJP employee “updated the website in a way 
14

that gave the appearance that there was one entity, Marvin J. 

Perry & Associates, which was engaged in both furniture dealer 

and manufacturer’s representative business.” Despite P&W’s 

objections, no changes were made to differentiate the 

businesses. Later, in 2005, an employee of MJP allegedly 

“accessed the marvinjperry.com website without authorization and 

unlawfully removed all contact information for [P&W’s] business, 

operating as Marvin J. Perry & Associates, and substituted 

contact information for [affiliates of MJP], as if they were the 

business trading as ‘Marvin J. Perry & Associates’ and owner of 

the website.”

The complaint, in Count One, stated that “[t]he mark 

‘Marvin J. Perry & Associates’ has come to indicate to 

purchasers that they are purchasing goods and services from the 

company that has used the name and been an authorized government 

contractor in that name since the mid-1970s, and in fact that 

they are purchasing the goods and services from [P&W] doing 

business as Marvin J. Perry & Associates.” P&W further alleged 

that “as indicated by defendants’ alterations to the website . . 

. defendants are attempting to deceive purchasers by their use 

of the name ‘Marvin J. Perry & Associates.’” 

Notwithstanding that the common theme of the complaint is 

P&W’s frustration at MJP’s attempts to use the Marvin J. Perry & 

Associates trade name and registered trademark, MJP contends 
15

that Count One asserted an unfair competition action that was 

based on MJP’s misleading use of “P&W’s style of advertising” on 

the internet. Hartford Insurance concedes that an injury 

arising from MJP’s web advertising would qualify as an 

“advertising injury” under the policy. Thus, the dispositive

question for this Court is whether P&W asserted an unfair 

competition claim that did not arise out of a violation of P&W’s 

trademark or trade name.

Notably, Count One is captioned “Unfair Competition by 

Infringement of Common-Law Rights” and includes six separate 

paragraphs discussing the “Marvin J. Perry & Associates” mark. 

Nonetheless, MJP points out that under Count One, P&W alleged 

that the “acts of [MJP] constitute unfair competition and an 

infringement of plaintiff’s common-law rights in the mark 

‘Marvin J. Perry & Associates.’” MJP asserts that the use of 

the conjunction “and” indicated that P&W was raising unfair 

competition claims independent of its trademark infringement

claim.

 MJP argues that P&W was concerned, at least in part, with 

how the “style” of advertising, rather than the use of the 

trademark “Marvin J. Perry & Associates,” deceived consumers 

into thinking the two businesses were one entity. Specifically, 

MJP contends that P&W’s complaint asserted a claim for unfair 

competition arising out of MJP’s use of a website to advertise
16

“in the same style as [P&W’s], ‘project categories,’ ‘contract 

categories,’ separate contact information, and companies 

represented by each litigant.” This contention is belied by the 

clear language of the complaint indicating that P&W was 

concerned with how, by making “alterations to the website, . . . 

defendants [were] attempting to deceive purchasers by their use 

of the name ‘Marvin J. Perry & Associates.’” 

Indeed, the complaint itself makes no reference to project 

categories, contract categories, or the specific companies 

represented by each litigant. Furthermore, there is no 

indication as to how the style of P&W’s website had developed a 

meaning such that utilizing a similar style would constitute 

unfair competition. Instead, the complaint makes clear that the 

reason that the web presentation was potentially confusing to 

customers was because the trade name “Marvin J. Perry & 

Associates” and trademarked logo containing the same were

utilized throughout the website.

MJP’s citation of the deposition testimony of Malcolm 

Wilson, P&W’s designee, does little to advance its argument to 

the contrary. When asked why he was dissatisfied with the 

marvinjperry.com website after it was altered by an MJP 

employee, Wilson replied “[b]ecause it created a vision that we 

were all one company.” Wilson reiterated that even after some 

changes in 2004, the website “still didn’t adequately separate 
17

the two companies.” This testimony merely reinforces the notion 

that the claims arose out of a concern about confusion in the 

market. Nothing in Wilson’s testimony indicated whether the 

feared confusion arose from the general “style” of the website

or instead from the use of the Marvin J. Perry & Associates name 

throughout the website. 

MJP also referenced the deposition testimony of Howard 

Yeager, its own managing director, as support for the contention 

that similarity in website style created the market confusion 

giving rise to P&W’s unfair competition claim. Brief of 

Appellant at 8. Yeager testified as to how a consumer visiting 

P&W’s website could access information regarding various project 

categories and contract categories in which P&W or MJP were 

involved. But nothing in Yeager’s testimony indicates that the 

market confusion complained of by P&W arose out of anything 

other than a violation of P&W’s intellectual property rights.

Likewise, MJP’s reference to the settlement agreement 

between the parties in the underlying suit provides scant 

support for its argument. MJP attempts to distinguish the 

supposed “website style” claims from the trademark claims by 

noting that, in the settlement agreement, there were separate 

paragraphs detailing the transition of the domain name to MJP’s 

website. Yet the fact that the settlement contemplated 

reassignment of the domain name “MarvinJPerry.com” only 
18

underscores that the underlying suit was not about “website 

style” but rather an infringement on right to use the trade name 

“Marvin J. Perry & Associates.”8

Indeed, the bulk of the settlement agreement concerned the 

allocation of rights to names related to “Marvin J. Perry.” For 

instance, one provision indicated that MJP would be the new 

owner of “a family of ‘Marvin J. Perry’ marks and trade names,

including but not limited to Marvin J. Perry, Marvin J. Perry, 

Inc., and Marvin J. Perry & Associates” while another discussed 

a royalty-free license for P&W to use the trade name “Marvin J. 

Perry & Associates” for a period of 10 years. Also, there was 

little mention in the settlement agreement about restrictions on 

the style or presentation of advertisement on the internet other 

than a restriction on the use of certain trade names/trademarks 

and domain names. Further, the settlement agreement called the 

underlying suit “a trademark infringement action.” 

 

Ultimately, as the district court stated, “the independent 

unlawful conduct that caused P&W’s business injury, which is the 

gravamen of P&W’s underlying complaint and an element of the 

tort [of unfair competition] is based upon MJP’s use of its 

 8 This Court, in a case arising out of Maryland, has held 

that the unauthorized use of a trademark in an internet domain 

name can constitute trademark infringement when the domain name 

is intended to confuse internet users. See People for the 

Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 

2001).
19

trade name, trademark, logo, and website . . . in violation of 

P&W’s registration and ownership of that name and mark[.]” As 

such, any allegation of unfair competition would necessarily be 

excluded from coverage as a claim “arising out of any violation 

of any intellectual property rights, such as . . . trademark, 

trade name . . . or other designation of origin or 

authenticity.” 

IV.

In sum, to determine whether Hartford Insurance, the 

liability insurer, had a duty to provide its insured, MJP, with 

a defense in the underlying tort suit brought by P&W, we answer 

the two Pryseski inquiries as follows: (1) Under the terms of 

the insurance policy, although coverage is provided for some 

advertising injury, the Intellectual Property Rights Exclusion 

relieves Hartford Insurance of its duty to defend when a suit 

brought against MJP contains only allegations arising out of 

trademark or trade name violations; and (2) The allegations in 

the underlying action by P&W, which focused exclusively on 

improper use of P&W’s trademark and trade name, did not 

potentially fall within the scope of the coverage provided. 

Accordingly, we hold that Hartford Insurance had no duty to 

defend against the underlying suit, and the district court did 
20

not err by granting Hartford Insurance’s motion for summary 

judgment. 

AFFIRMED