Filed 7/3/24 In re I.G. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re I.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

B331605

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00691A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Appellant E.G. (father) appeals from juvenile court 

jurisdictional and dispositional orders asserting dependency 

jurisdiction over minor I.G. and ordering father to test for drugs. 

We affirm the orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2023, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral 

indicating S.G. (mother) tested positive for marijuana and PCP 

when she gave birth to I.G. Mother also admitted she had used

methamphetamine two weeks earlier. I.G. spent several days in 

the neonatal intensive care unit because he had “no active cry” at 

birth.

On January 3, a DCFS social worker interviewed mother at 

the hospital. Mother reported she was enrolled in a drug 

rehabilitation program and had arranged for I.G. to live with her 

at the rehabilitation facility. The social worker discussed a safety 

plan with mother, which required her to engage in rehabilitation

services and check in with the social worker weekly. The social 

worker told mother I.G. could remain in her care as long as she 

remained in treatment. Mother and I.G. were discharged from 

the hospital in mid-January 2023 and began living at the 

rehabilitation facility.

Mother said she had a nine-year “ ‘on-again, off-again’ ”

relationship with I.G.’s father. She denied having any plans to 
3

return to a romantic relationship with him. A hospital social 

worker later reported father had visited mother and I.G. in the 

hospital “almost daily.” Mother had told the hospital social 

worker that she and father had “an extensive domestic violence 

relationship.”

During his initial interview, father told the social worker 

he smoked marijuana every two days, and he later tested positive 

for marijuana. Father stated he would stop smoking marijuana if 

necessary.

Both parents admitted past involvement with DCFS and 

the three other children they had together. Mother indicated 

past domestic violence with father had led to the children being 

removed from her custody. She said the last violent incident with 

father happened three years earlier. She admitted smoking 

marijuana and methamphetamine during her pregnancy with 

I.G. She had not obtained prenatal care because she did not want 

DCFS to remove the baby from her custody and her older

children had already been removed.

Father indicated the DCFS cases concerning his older 

children with mother resulted from the parents’ domestic violence 

and mother’s drug use. Father admitted he had been in “multiple 

domestic violence relationships” and that he and mother had an 

extensive history of domestic violence. He reported the last 

violent incident was a year and a half earlier, in 2021. Father 

attributed the domestic violence to mother’s continued use of 

methamphetamine. Although during prior dependency cases 

father had reunified with the other children he shared with 

mother, the children were removed again because of mother’s 

continued drug use. Father reported that he was “tired of trying 

to fight for his children” and did not reunify. He did not feel 
4

DCFS gave him a fair opportunity to raise the children, who were 

later adopted by a maternal family member. He indicated he did 

not intend to continue a romantic relationship with mother.

In early February 2023, mother told the social worker she 

was willing to participate in voluntary family maintenance 

services if she could move to an outpatient program. Mother 

reported there was “drama” between her and other residents at 

the rehabilitation facility, and she did not want I.G. to be exposed 

to any “negativity.” The social worker reminded mother that the 

current safety plan allowed I.G. to remain in mother’s care only 

so long as she remained at the rehabilitation facility.

The next day, mother was expelled from the drug 

rehabilitation program because she refused to engage in services

and had “issue[s] with other residents.” Father picked up I.G.

from the facility and returned to his home, where he lived with a

paternal cousin. The social worker observed the home was 

furnished and had appropriate food and clothing for I.G., and 

father had a plan to care for I.G. Around this time, father 

enrolled in a 12-step program to address his marijuana use.

Mother told the social worker she was entering a women’s 

center to complete drug rehabilitation services. Around a week 

and a half later, a counselor from the center informed the social 

worker that mother had left the program almost immediately.

In late February, the social worker attempted to contact 

mother several times, but the calls went straight to voicemail and 

mother did not respond to the social worker’s messages. Father 

reported that mother called him around this time and asked him 

to pick her up to visit I.G. When he refused, mother threatened 

him. Mother told father she was living “under a bridge off of 

Whittier Blvd.” According to maternal aunt, mother went to stay 
5

at maternal grandfather’s home, but soon left, and was “most 

likely living in the riverbed in Pico Rivera.”

On February 24, 2023, DCFS filed a petition alleging I.G. 

was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), due to the parents’ 

history of engaging in domestic violence which resulted in I.G.’s 

siblings receiving permanent placement services; subdivisions (b)

and (j), due to mother’s substance abuse and father’s failure to 

protect I.G. and his siblings from mother’s substance abuse; and 

subdivision (b), due to father’s substance abuse and mother’s 

history of mental and emotional problems.

1

At the initial hearing on March 10, 2023, the court ordered 

I.G. detained from mother and released to father. Father was to 

submit to weekly random drug testing as a condition of the 

release to him.

In April 2023, mother agreed to participate in random drug 

and alcohol testing. Mother missed all eight tests reflected in the 

record.

At the June 7, 2023 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court

sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). 

The court found true the allegations related to mother’s 

substance abuse, father’s failure to protect I.G. and his past 

failure to protect I.G.’s siblings from mother’s substance abuse, 

and mother’s mental and emotional problems. Under section 300, 

subdivision (j), the court also found true allegations based on the 

parents’ domestic violence, which led to I.G.’s siblings receiving 

permanent placement services and created a continuing risk of 

harm to I.G.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
6

At the August 22, 2023 disposition hearing, the court 

declared I.G. a dependent of the court. Father did not object to 

this decision or ask the court to consider an alternative 

disposition. The court ordered I.G. removed from mother and 

released to father under DCFS supervision. Father requested 

that the drug testing order be changed from weekly to “random or 

on suspicion.” Father also asked that he be permitted to 

complete a 26-week domestic violence program or to address 

domestic violence in his individual counseling.

The court ordered father to submit to random drug testing 

for 90 days. If all test results were negative, the testing 

requirement would end, except for any on demand testing based 

on a suspicion that he was under the influence. As father had 

requested, the court also ordered him to complete a 26-week 

domestic violence program. Father’s case plan additionally 

included individual counseling and parenting counseling. Father 

had started individual counseling in July and was scheduled to 

begin a Fundamentals of Fatherhood Program shortly after the 

disposition hearing.

Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Father’s Challenge to the Juvenile Court’s 

Jurisdictional Findings is Nonjusticiable

Father contends substantial evidence did not support the 

juvenile court’s findings that I.G. was placed at risk of harm due 

to father’s failure to protect I.G. and his siblings from mother’s 

substance abuse. Father does not otherwise challenge the court’s 

jurisdictional order. We conclude father has not raised a 

justiciable issue.
7

“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an 

appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable 

issue.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 (I.A.).) “An

important requirement for justiciability is the availability of 

‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a 

practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.”

(Id. at p. 1490.)

It is further well established that “ ‘[w]hen a dependency 

petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor 

comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing 

court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over 

the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that 

are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial 

evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider 

whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for 

jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J.

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)

Here, in addition to the failure to protect findings father 

challenges on appeal, the juvenile court also found father’s 

history of domestic violence against mother placed I.G. at 

substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. The court 

additionally concluded mother’s drug use and her mental and 

emotional problems put I.G. at risk of suffering serious physical 

harm. Father does not challenge these findings. Thus, even if he 

were to prevail on his arguments on appeal, we would not disturb 

the court’s jurisdictional order. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 

283–284 (D.P.); I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491–1492.)

While father asserts this court may grant him effective 

relief in ongoing proceedings, he fails to identify any tangible 

impact his successful appeal could achieve. Father identifies no 
8

specific dispositional order that would be undermined by a 

reversal of the failure to protect allegations. He asserts he is

currently seeking to terminate dependency jurisdiction under 

section 364, but, as he recognizes, the result of that effort will 

depend on the court’s assessment of current conditions. (§ 364, 

subd. (c).) Striking jurisdictional allegations sustained as to 

father in June 2023 “would have neither legal nor practical 

consequence” in the ongoing proceedings, and therefore would not 

provide father any effective relief. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1493.)

Father alternatively asks us to exercise our discretion to 

reach the merits of his arguments. Although “no single factor is 

necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise 

discretionary review of a moot appeal,” appellate courts often

reach the merits when a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings 

could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction 

(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286, 285), or when a challenged 

finding “is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing 

conduct.” (Id. at pp. 285–286.)

Father contends the challenged allegations are likely to 

impact him in future proceedings because jurisdictional findings

are “consistently examined by social workers and judges to 

determine current risk based on past events,” citing In re 

Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134. However, a 

reversal of the order sustaining the challenged allegations in this 

case would not erase the prior sustained findings that father 

failed to protect I.G.’s siblings from mother’s drug use. And, as 

father acknowledges, the ultimate inquiry in any dependency 

matter focuses on current circumstances. (I.A., supra, 201 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [findings in dependency matters “require 
9

evidence of present detriment, based on the then prevailing 

circumstances of parent and child”].) Even if a court in a future 

proceeding considered the challenged findings as true, the court 

would still be obligated to independently assess then existing 

circumstances to evaluate the risk of harm to the minor. We 

further cannot conclude that the failure to protect allegations 

were particularly pernicious or stigmatizing, particularly in view 

of the domestic violence allegations father does not challenge, 

which indicate he repeatedly perpetrated violence on mother.

Father has not suggested a specific practical, tangible

impact the challenged language in the petition could have on him 

or his legal status. We therefore decline to exercise our discretion 

to reach the merits of his arguments regarding the court’s 

jurisdictional findings. (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493; 

see D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278 [speculative harm 

insufficient].)

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Declaring I.G. a Dependent of The Court and 

Ordering Father to Drug Test

Father also contends the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by declaring I.G. a dependent of the court and 

requiring father to test for drugs. We disagree.

As an initial matter, “a parent’s failure to object or raise 

certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from 

presenting the issue to the appellate court.” (In re Lorenzo C.

(1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338.) Father did not object to the 

juvenile court order declaring I.G. a dependent of the court. He

also did not object to the March 10, 2023 order requiring him to

submit to weekly random drug testing, or the August 22 order 

requiring 90 days of random drug testing. Indeed, father 
10

affirmatively requested the random drug testing required by the 

latter order, and therefore forfeited his argument by inviting any

error. (In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1196.) Father 

notes forfeiture is not automatic but fails to articulate any reason 

why the doctrine should not apply here.

Even if these contentions were not forfeited, we would 

reject father’s arguments. “After a juvenile court exercises 

jurisdiction over a child pursuant to section 300, it must 

determine the appropriate disposition for that child. [Citations.]

The court has broad discretion in selecting a disposition that 

serves the child’s best interests.” (In re M.D. (2023) 93 

Cal.App.5th 836, 856.) The court may declare the child a 

dependent of the court. (§§ 300, 360, subd. (d).) Alternatively, 

the court may order services to keep the family together under 

informal DCFS supervision. (§ 360, subd. (b).) After ordering 

informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b), “ ‘the 

court “has no authority to take any further role in overseeing the 

services or the family unless the matter is brought back before 

the court” pursuant to [section 360, subdivision (c)].’ ” (In re 

Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259.)

We will not disturb the juvenile court’s dispositional 

decision unless the court “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of legal 

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination [citations].” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M.

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 (Stephanie M.).)

Father contends the court should have exercised its 

discretion to order informal supervision under section 360, 

subdivision (b), instead of declaring I.G. a dependent of the court. 

He argues informal supervision was appropriate because the 

social worker observed father was motivated and had the 
11

capacity to protect I.G. and meet his needs. The social worker did 

not identify any significant safety concerns with I.G. remaining 

in father’s care.

Yet, other factors indicate continued court oversight was 

appropriate. Father and mother had an extensive history of 

domestic violence that endangered I.G. and his siblings. Mother 

used drugs, and there was no evidence her drug use had ceased. 

Prior to the disposition hearing, mother left two drug 

rehabilitation programs and failed to complete a single drug test. 

Father indicated the past domestic violence between the parents 

was related to mother’s drug use. Father and mother share three 

other children and a nine-year off-and-on romantic history. After 

the prior dependency case, which ended with the termination of 

parental rights, father and mother apparently maintained 

enough of a relationship that they conceived another child

together, I.G. Given the not unlikely possibility of a future 

reconciliation, or, at a minimum, interaction between the 

parents, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that a 

period of formal court supervision was necessary to protect I.G.

from any recurring parental violence or further exposure to 

mother’s drug use. In addition, father was only beginning to 

engage in three categories of services to comply with his courtordered case plan. Declaring the child a dependent of the court 

allowed the court to ensure father completed those services.

Considering all of these circumstances, the court was well within 

its discretion to declare I.G. a dependent of the court. (Stephanie 

M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)

The court also did not abuse its discretion by requiring

father to test for drugs. Father contends this aspect of the 

disposition order was not tailored to the family’s needs. He
12

observes that the court dismissed the jurisdictional allegation 

based on his drug use. Yet, the juvenile court may “formulate 

disposition orders to address parental deficiencies when 

necessary to protect and promote the child’s welfare, even when 

that parental conduct did not give rise to the dependency 

proceedings.” (In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25.) Father 

admitted to using marijuana every two days before I.G.’s birth. 

He tested positive for marijuana shortly after I.G.’s birth. I.G., 

an infant, was placed in father’s care alone. Although father 

committed to stop using marijuana, it was not an abuse of 

discretion for the court to ensure father adhered to that

commitment by requiring him to periodically test for drugs. (In 

re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [juvenile 

court may reasonably conclude substance abuse is an obstacle 

that must be addressed in reunification plan through drug and 

alcohol testing].) Further, the order was time limited, requiring a 

three-month period of testing, followed by testing only on 

suspicion of drug use. The court’s order was not arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd.
13

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.