2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

2-14-2011

Louis Singleton Jr. v. DA Philadelphia

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-3421

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Louis Singleton Jr. v. DA Philadelphia" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1794.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1794
1

HLD-013(October 2010) NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

Nos. 10-3060 & 10-3421

___________

LOUIS SINGLETON, JR.,

Appellant

v.

DA PHILADELPHIA; MAYOR MICHAEL NUTTER, City of Philadelphia;

MR. CHARLES RAMSEY, Police Commissioner; MR. MAURIZIO, Detectives #604

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-05148)

District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal due to a Jurisdictional Defect and

Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 29, 2010

Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed February 14, 2011) 

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Louis Singleton, Jr., who is proceeding pro se, seeks review of 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s dismissal of his 

complaint. For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm the district court’s 

judgment.
2

I.

On April 7, 2010, Singleton filed an application to proceed in forma 

pauperis as well as a proposed complaint against Detective Matthew Maurizio, 

Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey, Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter, 

Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham, and an unknown police detective. He 

claimed that, on March 3, 2006, he was assaulted by Maurizio and his partner, and was 

subject to false charges for burglary. Singleton did not make any specific allegations as 

to Nutter, Ramsey, or Abraham. As relief, Singleton sought dental work, payment of his 

medical expenses, and compensation for pain and suffering. On April 14th, the district 

court entered an order granting Singleton’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and 

directed that the complaint be filed. The district court also screened the complaint under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed Abraham and Nutter from the action. Construing 

the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court determined 

that Abraham was shielded from suit by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, and that 

Singleton did not include any allegations that would allow it to find that Abraham or

Nutter deprived Singleton of his civil rights. 

Defendants Ramsey and Maurizio thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the 

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Singleton’s 

claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that, as to defendant Ramsey, 

Singleton failed to allege any personal involvement in the alleged assault. Singleton did 

not respond to the motion. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and further 

ordered that the complaint was dismissed with prejudice based on the statute of 
3

limitations. In making this decision, the district court also determined that equitable 

tolling of the statute of limitations was not appropriate. 

Singleton now appeals. 

II.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will 

summarily affirm the district court’s judgment because no substantial issues are presented 

by the appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

The district court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred. 

Singleton’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 

See Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that there is a twoyear statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions in Pennsylvania); 42 Pa. Cons. 

Stat. Ann. § 5524. The alleged assault of which Singleton complains occurred on March 

3, 2006. Because there is no doubt that Singleton was immediately aware of his injury, 

his §1983 claim accrued on the same day. See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of 

Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, the statute of limitations expired on 

March 3, 2008, two years before he filed his complaint. Further, to the extent that 

Singleton attempts to set forth a false arrest claim, that claim also accrued on March 3, 

2006, the date that he states he was arrested and charges were filed against him. See

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007) (“[T]he statute of limitations upon a § 1983 

claim seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the 

arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes 
4

detained pursuant to legal process.”). See also Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 

F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2010).

In support of his appeal, Singleton asserts that the statute of limitations 

should be equitably tolled because, before October 2008, he was in a work release 

program where did not have access to a law library and could not obtain the information 

necessary for filing this lawsuit. He does not explain why he waited until April 2010 to 

file his lawsuit other than stating that “somehow the chain of events have . . . been broken 

since [his] initial filing” in October 2008. Equitable tolling is extraordinary relief, and is 

appropriate only when: (1) a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff regarding his or her 

cause of action; (2) a plaintiff has been prevented from asserting a claim as a result of 

other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) a plaintiff has timely asserted his or her claim in 

the wrong forum. Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). None of these 

circumstances is present in this case. 

Further, the district court’s decision to dismiss Abraham and Nutter from 

the action was not erroneous. It is unclear why Singleton named Abraham as a 

defendant, who would, of course, be entitled to immunity for decisions made in her 

official role. In any event, the district court also appropriately determined that Singleton 

did not set forth any allegations that would allow it to find that Abraham and Nutter 

personally participated in the deprivation of Singleton’s constitutional rights. Nor do we 

see any way that Singleton might have amended his complaint to state a viable claim 

against any named defendant. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); 

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). As the district 
5

court’s August 4th order explained, granting leave to amend would be futile because “the 

litigation of this case would be time-barred.” 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents “no 

substantial question,” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6, and will thus summarily affirm the district 

court’s judgment. Singleton’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.