(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07–455. Argued March 25, 2008—Decided May 19, 2008 

After respondent gave false information on his customs form while attempting to enter the United States, a search of his car revealed explosives that he intended to detonate in this country. He was convicted of, inter alia, (1) feloniously making a false statement to a 

customs official in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1001, and (2) “carr[ying] 

an explosive during the commission of” that felony in violation of

§844(h)(2). The Ninth Circuit set aside the latter conviction because 

it read “during” in §844(h)(2) to include a requirement that the explosive be carried “in relation to” the underlying felony. 

Held: Since respondent was carrying explosives when he violated

§1001, he was carrying them “during” the commission of that felony. 

The most natural reading of §844(h)(2) provides a sufficient basis for

reversal. It is undisputed that the items in respondent’s car were 

“explosives,” and that he was “carr[ying]” those explosives when he

knowingly made false statements to a customs official in violation of

§1001. Dictionary definitions need not be consulted to arrive at the

conclusion that he engaged in §844(h)(2)’s precise conduct. “[D]uring” 

denotes a temporal link. Because his carrying of explosives was contemporaneous with his §1001 violation, he carried them “during” that 

violation. The statute’s history further supports the conclusion that

Congress did not intend a relational requirement in §844(h) as presently written. Pp. 2–6 

474 F. 3d 597, reversed. 

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in 

which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined as to Part I. THOMAS, J., filed an 

opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which 

SCALIA, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

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Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 07–455 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. AHMED RESSAM 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 19, 2008] 

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

Respondent attempted to enter the United States by car

ferry at Port Angeles, Washington. Hidden in the trunk of 

his rental car were explosives that he intended to detonate 

at the Los Angeles International Airport. After the ferry

docked, respondent was questioned by a customs official, 

who instructed him to complete a customs declaration

form; respondent did so, identifying himself on the form as 

a Canadian citizen (he is Algerian) named Benni Noris

(his name is Ahmed Ressam). Respondent was then directed to a secondary inspection station, where another 

official performed a search of his car. The official discovered explosives and related items in the car’s spare tire

well. 

Respondent was subsequently convicted of a number of 

crimes, including the felony of making a false statement to

a United States customs official in violation of 18 U. S. C. 

§1001 (1994 ed., Supp. V) (Count 5) and carrying an explosive “during the commission of” that felony in violation of 

§844(h)(2) (1994 ed.) (Count 9). The Court of Appeals for 

the Ninth Circuit set aside his conviction on Count 9 

because it read the word “during,” as used in §844(h)(2), to 
 

 

2 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

Opinion of the Court 

include a requirement that the explosive be carried “in 

relation to” the underlying felony. 474 F. 3d 597 (2007).

Because that construction of the statute conflicted with 

decisions of other Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari.1 552 U. S. ___ (2007). 

I 

The most natural reading of the relevant statutory text

provides a sufficient basis for reversal. That text reads: 

“Whoever— 

“(1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony

which may be prosecuted in a court of the United 

States, or 

“(2) carries an explosive during the commission of any

felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the 

United States, 

“including a felony which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous

weapon or device shall, in addition to the punishment

provided for such felony, be sentenced to imprisonment for

10 years.” 18 U. S. C. §844(h). 

It is undisputed that the items hidden in respondent’s

car were “explosives.”2 It is also undisputed that respon-

—————— 

1Both the Third and Fifth Circuits have declined to interpret 

§844(h)(2) as requiring that the explosive be carried in relation to the

underlying felony. See United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F. 2d 1169, 

1178–1179 (CA3 1986) (“The plain everyday meaning of ‘during’ is ‘at 

the same time’ or ‘at a point in the course of. . . . It does not normally

mean ‘at the same time and in connection with. . . .’ It is not fitting for

this court to declare that the crime defined by §844(h)(2) has more

elements than those enumerated on the face of the statute”); United 

States v. Ivy, 929 F. 2d 147, 151 (CA5 1991) (“Section 844(h)(2) . . . does

not include the relation element Ivy urges. . . . We . . . refuse to judicially append the relation element to §844(h)(2)”). 2Because respondent concedes that the items in his car were “explosives,” we have no occasion to determine the boundaries of that term as 

used in the statute. Specifically, we do not comment on when, if ever, 
 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

dent was “carr[ying]” those explosives when he knowingly 

made false statements to a customs official, and that those 

statements violated §1001 (1994 ed., Supp. V). 

There is no need to consult dictionary definitions of the 

word “during” in order to arrive at the conclusion that

respondent engaged in the precise conduct described in

§844(h)(2) (1994 ed.). The term “during” denotes a temporal link; that is surely the most natural reading of the

word as used in the statute. Because respondent’s carrying of the explosives was contemporaneous with his violation of §1001, he carried them “during” that violation. 

II 

The history of the statute we construe today further

supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend to

require the Government to establish a relationship between the explosive carried and the underlying felony. 

Congress originally enacted §844(h)(2) as part of its “Regulation of Explosives” in Title XI of the Organized Crime

Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 957. The provision was

modeled after a portion of the Gun Control Act of 1968, 

§102, 82 Stat. 1224, codified, as amended, at 18 U. S. C.

§924(c) (2000 ed. and Supp. V). The earlier statute mandated at least 1 and no more than 10 years’ imprisonment 

for any person who “carries a firearm unlawfully during

the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in 

a court of the United States.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (1964 

ed., Supp. IV). Except for the word “explosive” in

§844(h)(2), instead of the word “firearm” in §924(c)(2), the

two provisions as originally enacted were identical. 

In 1984, Congress redrafted the firearm statute; it 

increased the penalties attached to the provision and, 

most significantly for our purposes, deleted the word 

—————— 

“such commonplace materials as kerosene, gasoline, or certain fertilizers,” post, at 2 (BREYER, J., dissenting), might fall within the definition 

of “explosive.” 
 

 

4 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

Opinion of the Court 

“unlawfully” and inserted the words “and in relation to”

immediately after the word “during.” §1005(a), 98 Stat.

2138. Reviewing a conviction for an offense that was 

committed before the amendment but not decided on 

appeal until after its enactment, the Ninth Circuit held 

that the original version of the firearm statute had implicitly included the “in relation to” requirement that was 

expressly added while the case was pending on appeal. As 

then-Judge Kennedy explained: 

“The statute as written when Stewart committed the 

offense provided in pertinent part that it was a crime

to ‘carr[y] a firearm unlawfully during the commission 

of any felony. . . .’ 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (1982). In 

1984, Congress revised section 924(c) . . . . The 1984 

amendment substituted for the word ‘during’ the 

phrase ‘during and in relation to.’ 18 U. S. C. A. 

§924(c) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). Our 

study of the legislative history of the amendment . . .

indicates the ‘in relation to’ language was not intended to create an element of the crime that did not 

previously exist, but rather was intended to make 

clear a condition already implicit in the statute. The 

legislative history reveals that because the amendment eliminated the requirement that the firearm be

carried unlawfully, 18 U. S. C. A. §924(c) (West Supp.

1985), the ‘in relation to’ language was added to allay

explicitly the concern that a person could be prosecuted under section 924(c) for committing an entirely

unrelated crime while in possession of a firearm. 

Though the legislative history does not say so expressly, it strongly implies that the ‘in relation to’ 

language did not alter the scope of the statute . . . .” 

United States v. Stewart, 779 F. 2d 538, 539–540 

(1985) (citations omitted). 

Relying on that Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeals 
 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

in this case concluded that the explosives statute, like the

firearm statute, implicitly included a requirement of a

relationship between possession of the item in question 

and the underlying felony. Whatever the merits of the 

argument that §924(c) as originally enacted contained a

relational requirement, the subsequent changes to both 

statutes convince us that the Government’s reading of

§844(h) as presently written is correct. 

III 

In 1988, Congress enacted the “Explosives Offenses 

Amendments,” §6474(b), 102 Stat. 4379, which modified 

the text of §844(h). Those amendments increased the 

penalties for violating the provision, §6474(b)(2), id., at 

4380; they also deleted the word “unlawfully,”

§6474(b)(1), ibid. Unlike its earlier amendment to the 

firearm statute, however, Congress did not also insert the 

words “and in relation to” after the word “during.” While 

it is possible that this omission was inadvertent, that 

possibility seems remote given the stark difference that 

was thereby introduced into the otherwise similar texts of 

18 U. S. C. §§844(h) and 924(c). 

Even if the similarity of the original texts of the two

statutes might have supported an inference that both 

included an implicit relationship requirement, their current difference virtually commands the opposite inference.

While the two provisions were initially identical, Congress’ 

replacement of the word “unlawfully” in the firearm statute with the phrase “and in relation to,” coupled with the

deletion of the word “unlawfully” without any similar

replacement in the explosives statute, convinces us that 

Congress did not intend to introduce a relational requirement into the explosives provision, but rather intended us

to accept the more straightforward reading of §844(h).

Since respondent was carrying explosives when he violated §1001, he was carrying them “during” the commis-
 

6 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

Opinion of the Court 

sion of that felony. The statute as presently written requires nothing further.

Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

reversed. 

It is so ordered. 
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Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 07–455 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. AHMED RESSAM 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 19, 2008] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 

Because the plain language of the statute squarely 

answers the question presented in this case, I join only

Part I of the Court’s opinion. 
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Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 07–455 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. AHMED RESSAM 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 19, 2008] 

JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting. 

The statute before us imposes a mandatory 10-year 

sentence on any person who “carries an explosive during 

the commission of any [federal] felony.” 18 U. S. C. 

§844(h)(2). The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statute as

requiring a “relation” between the explosives-carrying and

the felony (here, making a false statement to a customs 

officer), such that the explosives-carrying “‘facilitated’” 

or “aided” the commission of the felony. 474 F. 3d 597, 

604 (2007). The Court interprets the statute to the contrary. It holds that the statute requires no more than a 

“temporal link” between the explosives-carrying and the 

felony, that is to say, the two need only have occurred at

the same time. See ante, at 3. I cannot agree with either 

interpretation. 

I 

My problem with the Court’s interpretation is that it 

would permit conviction of any individual who legally 

carries explosives at the time that he engages in a totally 

unrelated felony. “Explosives,” the statute tells us, includes not only obviously explosive material such as “gunpowders” and “dynamite” but also any “chemical compounds” or “mixture[s]” or “device[s]” whose “ignition by 

fire, by friction, by concussion” or other means “may cause

an explosion.” 18 U. S. C. §844(j). And that definition 
 

2 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

encompasses such commonplace materials as kerosene,

gasoline, or certain fertilizers. Moreover, the “carr[ying]” 

to which the statute refers includes carrying that is otherwise legal. Further, the statute applies to the carrying

of explosives during “any” federal felony, a category that

ranges from murder to mail fraud. See §1111 (2000 ed.

and Supp. V); §1341 (2000 ed., Supp. V). 

Consequently the Court’s opinion brings within the

statute’s scope (and would impose an additional mandatory 10-year prison term upon), for example, a farmer

lawfully transporting a load of fertilizer who intentionally

mails an unauthorized lottery ticket to a friend, a hunter 

lawfully carrying gunpowder for shotgun shells who buys

snacks with a counterfeit $20 bill, a truckdriver lawfully 

transporting diesel fuel who lies to a customs official about 

the value of presents he bought in Canada for his family,

or an accountant who engaged in a 6-year-long conspiracy 

to commit tax evasion and who, one day during that conspiracy, bought gas for his lawnmower. In such instances 

the lawful carrying of an “explosive” has nothing whatsoever to do with the unlawful felonies. I cannot imagine

why Congress would have wanted the presence of totally 

irrelevant, lawful behavior to trigger an additional 10-year

mandatory prison term. 

The statute’s language does not demand such an interpretation. I agree with the majority that the word “during” requires a “temporal link.” See ante, at 3. But a 

statement that uses the word “during” may or may not 

imply other limitations as well, depending upon the context in which the statement is made. Thus, when I tell a 

friend from Puerto Rico, “I wear gloves during Washington’s winter,” he does not think I mean baseball mitts. 

Rather, I imply (and he understands) a relation or link 

between the gloves and the winter. When I say to a group 

of lawyers, “I take notes during oral argument,” I imply 

(and they understand) that the notes bear a relation to the 
 

 

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

law being argued. But when I say, “I called my brother 

during the day,” I do not imply any particular relation

(other than a temporal relation) between the day and the 

phone call. Context makes the difference. 

Here, the statute’s context makes clear that the statutory statement does not cover a “carr[ying]” of explosives 

that is totally unrelated to the “felony.” The lengthy

mandatory minimum sentence is evidence of what the 

statute’s legislative history separately indicates, namely 

that Congress sought to criminalize and impose harsh 

penalties in respect to the “intentional misuse of explosives,” see H. R. Rep. No. 91–1549, p. 38 (1970) (emphasis

added) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). A person who lawfully

carries explosives while committing some other felony

does not even arguably “misuse” those explosives unless

the carrying has something to do with the other felony.

Nor in the absence of some such relationship is there any

obvious reason to impose an additional mandatory 10-year

sentence on a person who unlawfully carries explosives 

while committing some other felony.

Similar reasoning led the Ninth Circuit in 1985 to interpret a related statute, which punished the carrying of a 

firearm “during” the commission of a federal felony, as 

requiring a significant relationship between the firearmscarrying and the other felony. See United States v. Stewart, 779 F. 2d 538. JUSTICE (then-Judge) KENNEDY recognized that “‘Congress did not intend to penalize one who 

happens to have a gun in his possession when he commits 

an entirely unrelated offense.’” Id., at 540 (quoting United 

States v. Moore, 580 F. 2d 360, 362 (CA9 1978)). In my

view, that same reasoning should apply when we interpret 

the explosives statute, which was originally modeled on

the firearms statute. See H. R. Rep., at 69 (the explosives

statute “carries over to the explosives area the stringent 

provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 relating to the 

use of firearms and the unlawful carrying of firearms to 
 

4 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

commit, or during the commission of a Federal felony”). 

I recognize that the language of the firearms statute

now differs from the language of the explosives statute in

an important way. The firearms statute originally punished (with a 1-to-10-year sentence) a person who “carries

a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any [federal] felony.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). 

In 1984, Congress amended the firearms statute by providing a mandatory minimum punishment of five years 

and by striking the word “unlawfully.” §1005(a), 98 Stat. 

2138. When it did so, Congress also added to the statute

specific words of limitation, namely the words “and in

relation to” (so that the statute covered any person who 

carried a firearm “during and in relation to” the commission of a “felony”). Ibid. 

The words “in relation to” do not appear in the explosives statute. But neither did those words appear in the 

pre-1984 version of the firearms statute that was the 

subject of the Ninth Circuit opinion in Stewart (yet the

Ninth Circuit nonetheless found an implicit relational 

requirement). And the fact that these words now appear 

in the firearms statute but not the explosives statute 

cannot make the determinative difference. 

The history of the firearms statute makes clear that the

reason Congress added to that statute the words “in relation to” has to do with Congress’ decision to remove from 

the firearms statute the word “unlawfully”. By removing

that word, Congress indicated that the firearms statute 

should apply to “persons who are licensed to carry firearms” but who “abuse that privilege by committing a

crime with the weapon.” S. Rep. No. 98–225, p. 314, n. 10

(1983). At the same time, however, Congress believed that 

the statute should not apply where the firearm’s presence

“played no part in the crime, such as a gun carried in a

pocket and never displayed or referred to in the course of a 

pugilistic barroom fight.” Ibid. The addition of the words 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

“in relation to” made this dual objective textually clear. 

The absence of the words “in relation to” here must lead 

us to ask (but it does not answer) the question: Did Congress intend something different in respect to the explosives statute? There are strong reasons for thinking it did 

not. Congress, after all, amended the explosives statute in

response to the Department of Justice’s express request to

“bring” the explosives statute “in line with” the firearms 

statute. See 131 Cong. Rec. 14166 (1985); see also 134 

Cong. Rec. 32700 (1988) (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting

that the purpose of amending the explosives statute was to

“bring it in line with similar amendments [previously]

adopted . . . with respect to the parallel offense of using or

carrying a firearm during the commission of federal offenses”). Congress accordingly increased the mandatory

minimum punishment to five years and struck the word

“unlawfully.” See §6474(b), 102 Stat. 4379–4380. If Congress, in neglecting to add the words “in relation to,” 

sought to create a meaningful distinction between the 

explosives and firearms statutes, one would think that 

someone somewhere would have mentioned this objective. 

Further, to read the two statutes differently would

break the very parallel treatment of firearms and explosives that led Congress, at the Department of Justice’s

urging, to amend the explosives statute in the first place.

It would produce the peculiar and unfair results I previously mentioned. See supra, at 2. It would conflict with 

Congress’ original rationale for enacting the explosives 

statute (to punish the misuse of explosives). And it would 

risk incoherent results: Why would Congress wish not to 

punish a policeman for carrying an unrelated revolver 

during the commission of a felony, but then wish to punish

that same policeman for carrying unrelated gunpowder for

unrelated bullets? 

At the same time one can explain the absence of the 

words “in relation to” in less damaging ways. The legisla-
 

6 UNITED STATES v. RESSAM 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

tive drafters of the explosives amendment may have assumed that prior judicial interpretation, (namely, United 

States v. Stewart, 779 F. 2d 538) made the words “in relation to” unnecessary. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 

580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to

adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute

without change”). Or, as the majority recognizes, the 

omission of the language may reflect simple drafting 

inadvertence. See ante, at 5. 

I concede that the presence of a phrase in one statute 

and the absence of the same phrase in another related 

statute can signal an intended difference in relative statutory scope. But that is not inevitably so. Cf. Russello v. 

United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (noting only a presumption that Congress has acted intentionally and purposely if it “includes particular language in one section of

a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). And here the circumstances that I have mentioned make this a case in 

which that linguistic fact is not determinative. 

No more here than elsewhere in life can words alone 

explain every nuance of their intended application. Context matters. And if judges are to give meaningful effect

to the intent of the enacting legislature, they must interpret statutory text with reference to the statute’s purpose 

and its history.

The Court, with its decision today, makes possible the 

strange results I describe above precisely because it resolves the statutory interpretation question by examining 

the meaning of just one word in isolation. In context, 

however, the language excludes from the statute’s scope 

instances in which there is no significant relation between 

the explosives-carrying and the felony. A contextual 

interpretation furthers Congress’ original purpose, is less

likely to encourage random punishment, and is consistent 
Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

with the statute’s overall history. As a result, like the 

Ninth Circuit, I would read the statute as insisting upon

some (other than merely temporal) relationship between

explosives carrying and “felony.” 

II 

At the same time, I cannot agree with the Ninth Circuit

that the statute restricts the requisite relationship to one 

in which the carrying of the explosives “‘facilitated’” (or 

“aided”) the felony. 474 F. 3d, at 604. In my view, the 

statute must also cover a felony committed to facilitate the 

carrying of explosives. Why should it matter in which 

direction the facilitating flows? Either way, there is a

relation between the carrying of explosives and the other

felony. Either way, one might reasonably conclude that 

the presence of the explosives will elevate the risks of

harm that otherwise would ordinarily arise out of the 

felony’s commission. Either way, one might consider the

explosives “misused.” Thus, I believe the statute applies 

if the felony, here, the making of a false statement to 

a customs officer, facilitated or aided the carrying of 

explosives. And I would remand the case for the Circuit 

to determine the presence or absence of that relevant 

relation. 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.