If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

November 19, 2019

v No. 344931

Ingham Circuit Court

CARL MARSHALL PRICE, LC No. 16-000946-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and GADOLA and REDFORD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 

750.321, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 

750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 86 to 180 months for the 

voluntary manslaughter conviction, and to a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm 

conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.

I. FACTS

On August 18, 2016, defendant fatally shot Robert Wray in front of defendant’s home. 

Defendant admits that he shot Wray but contends that he acted in self-defense. 

Before the confrontation, defendant and Wray apparently were not acquainted. At about 

7:30 p.m. that day, Wray left home driving a car that belonged to his girlfriend, Leslie Latham. 

According to Latham, Wray was in a good mood when he left their home and planned to visit a 

friend. Latham also testified that Wray had been drinking alcohol throughout the day. 

At some point during his drive, Wray drove past defendant and a group of men playing 

basketball in the street in front of defendant’s home. According to defendant’s statement to 

police, Wray was driving fast and almost hit defendant with his car. The record is not clear

regarding whether there was a confrontation at that time between Wray and the basketball 

players. According to Latham, Wray returned home at 8:50 p.m. and changed into all black 

clothing, then took a black and gray 9 mm gun and a mask from a bedside drawer. Latham 

testified that Wray appeared angry and refused to respond to her questions about where he was 
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going. A blood test later revealed that Wray had a blood alcohol level of .241, and also revealed 

the presence of THC, which is associated with marijuana use. 

Wray’s daughter, Jazmin Wray, testified that at this point she was in Latham’s car 

because Wray had picked her up from her home, near defendant’s home. Wray drove Jazmin 

back to her home where he parked the car. Wray told Jazmin he would be right back and walked 

toward defendant’s house. Jazmin later testified that she did not see Wray carrying either a gun 

or a mask. 

When Wray arrived on the sidewalk in front of defendant’s house, an argument broke out 

between Wray and some of the basketball players. According to defendant’s initial statement to 

police, he was in the house when he heard his sister arguing with Wray. He went outside and 

saw Wray arguing and wrestling with one of the basketball players; Wray appeared to be 

intoxicated or high. Initially, defendant told police that he did not know the names of the other 

basketball players. Defendant joined the group of basketball players, armed with his .45 caliber 

gun for which he had a concealed weapon permit. Defendant told police that he saw one of the 

men, later identified as Dennis Wardlaw, struggling with Wray on the ground and attempting to 

wrest the gun from Wray. He heard two shots fired, then heard two more shots fired and felt a 

gunshot graze his leg. Defendant told police that when he saw Wray attempt to stand up, he fired 

his gun. He explained that his first shot did not hit Wray, and so he walked toward Wray, and 

continued to shoot until he had fired all eight bullets from his gun. He estimated that he had hit 

Wray two or three times. He further told police that he did not believe that anyone else shot 

Wray. 

Police arrived at the scene shortly after the shooting. Defendant was standing on the

porch of his home with his hands up. He was cooperative with police and told them that some 

guy had “come here with some b*** sh**,” and that he had shot the man. Later that night, 

defendant gave a statement to police. He told officers that he had never seen Wray before that 

day and only confronted Wray after hearing his sister arguing with him in the yard, and upon 

seeing the other men in the yard wrestling with Wray. He again admitted that he shot Wray. 

Defendant was arrested. 

Four days later, defendant requested to speak with the detectives again. During this 

interview, defendant admitted that he knew the other men and identified them as his brother,

Kevin Price, and three other men with street names of Truth (Dennis Wardlaw), Trill (Darnell 

Wardlaw), and Red (Tory Crusoe). Defendant told police that he was in his home when he heard 

Wray arguing with the men outside. Defendant went outside and joined the other men who had 

surrounded Wray. Dennis Wardlaw confronted Wray and suggested that they fist fight in the 

street. In response, Wray began to pull out a 9 mm gun. Defendant told police that Wardlaw and 

Wray began to struggle for the gun and fell to the ground; then Wray fired two shots. The other 

men scattered, two more shots were fired from Wray’s gun, and defendant felt a bullet graze his 

leg. Defendant told police that when he saw Wray start to stand back up, he was afraid that 

Wray would stand over Wardlaw and shoot him, then empty his gun on the others standing in the 

yard, including defendant’s sister. Defendant shot Wray in the back, and the victim did not get 

up again. Defendant told police that he was the only person who shot Wray and that he did not 

know who else had been shooting. 
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The police investigation later determined that Wray had been shot six times, including a 

gunshot to the back of his head, which was fatal. Dennis Wardlaw had been shot twice, and 

defendant received a minor injury when a bullet grazed his leg. The investigation also revealed 

that Wray’s gun had been fired five times, defendant’s gun had been fired eight times, and 

another gun had been fired four times. Sergeant Michael Lee testified that he examined the 

firearms, bullet fragments, and shell casings discovered at the scene of the shooting. Police 

found four .40 caliber shell casings, five 9 mm shell casings, and eight .45 caliber shell casings. 

Police determined that the eight .45 caliber shell casings came from the .45 caliber gun registered 

to defendant and found at the scene of the shooting. The five 9 mm shell casings had been fired 

by a tan camouflage-colored 9 mm gun found underneath Wray, including a shell casing 

fragment found in Dennis Wardlaw’s clothing. The magazine of the 9 mm gun had four rounds 

remaining in it, and there was an additional round in the chamber of the gun. One of the shots 

that hit Wray and one of the shots that hit Wardlaw were from a .40 caliber gun. A .40 caliber 

gun was not located at the scene. 

The forensic pathologist examining Wray testified that he had died as the result of 

gunshot wounds, specifically a gunshot wound to the head. Wray had been shot six times, once 

in the head, twice in the back, once in the front below his right shoulder, once in the arm, and 

once in the leg. The gunshot wound to the head had been fatal; the other gunshot wounds were 

not necessarily fatal, although could have been fatal if sufficient blood loss had occurred. The 

gunshot wound to Wray’s leg had been caused by a shot fired from a .40 caliber gun, and the 

gunshot wounds to Wray’s back and head were fired from a .45 caliber gun. 

Defendant was charged with second-degree murder and felony-firearm. At the 

conclusion of trial, the jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter and felony-firearm. 

Defendant now appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, contending that the prosecution 

failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution’s burden of disproving that 

defendant acted in self-defense. We disagree. 

The due process clause, US Const, Am XIV, requires that every element of a crime be 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a criminal conviction. People v Hampton, 407 

Mich 354, 366; 285 NW2d 284 (1979). The elements of the crime may be satisfied by 

circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence. People v 

Henderson, 306 Mich App 1, 9; 854 NW2d 234 (2014). The inferences drawn from the 

evidence, and the weight to be accorded those inferences, are decided by the jury, and not by this 

Court on appeal. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Although this 

Court reviews de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, People v Lane, 308 Mich 

App 38, 57; 862 NW2d 446 (2014), we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to determine whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find 

that the elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Oros, 502 

Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018). This standard is deferential, and as the reviewing court 
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we are “required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the 

jury verdict.” Id. 

In this case, defendant was charged with second-degree murder and convicted of 

voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is established when the evidence demonstrates 

that the defendant “killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, 

and there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions.” 

People v Reese, 491 Mich 127, 143; 815 NW2d 85 (2012) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The element that distinguishes second-degree murder from manslaughter is malice, 

which is an element of murder that is negated in voluntary manslaughter by the presence of 

provocation and heat of passion. Id. at 152. Thus, provocation is not an element of 

manslaughter, but rather is a circumstance that negates the presence of malice. People v 

Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 536; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). A defendant acts with malice where he 

acts with “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in 

wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to 

cause death or great bodily harm.” People v Henderson, 306 Mich App 1, 9-10; 854 NW2d 234 

(2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The degree of provocation necessary to negate 

malice is that which causes a defendant to act out of passion rather than reason. People v 

Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 714-715; 703 NW2d 204 (2005). 

Here, defendant does not dispute that the prosecution established the elements of 

voluntary manslaughter, but instead contends that he produced evidence to establish a prima 

facie case of self-defense, and that the burden then shifted to the prosecution to disprove that 

defendant had acted in self-defense, and that the prosecution in this case failed to carry that

burden of proof. Self-defense is an affirmative defense that justifies otherwise punishable 

criminal conduct and applies when the defendant acted intentionally but under circumstances that 

justified his or her actions. People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 707; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). The 

Self-Defense Act (SDA), MCL 780.971, et seq., codified the circumstances in which a person is 

justified in using self-defense. People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 35; 832 NW2d 409 

(2013). With respect to the use of deadly force, the SDA provides, in relevant part: 

(1) An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at 

the time he or she uses deadly force may use deadly force against another 

individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if 

either of the following applies: 

(a) The individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly 

force is necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm 

to himself or herself or to another individual. [MCL 780.972.] 

When a defendant asserts self-defense, he or she is obligated to satisfy the initial burden 

of producing evidence to establish the elements of a prima facie case of self-defense. People v 

Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 630; 858 NW2d 98 (2014). Once a defendant satisfies the initial 

burden of setting forth a prima facie case of self-defense, the burden shifts to the prosecution to 

exclude beyond a reasonable doubt the possibility that the killing was done in self-defense. 

Dupree, 486 Mich at 710, 712. 
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In this case, defendant produced evidence to set forth a prima facie case of self-defense. 

The evidence suggests that on the evening of August 18, 2016, defendant and several other men

were playing basketball in the street outside defendant’s home and had some sort of encounter 

with Wray as he drove by. Wray returned home, changed into black clothing, and retrieved a 

gun and a mask. He appeared angry, and quarreled with his girlfriend, refusing to explain where 

he was going. Shortly thereafter, Wray arrived in front of defendant’s home angry, highly 

intoxicated, and armed with a loaded gun. 

Upon hearing the argument between Wray and Wardlaw, defendant, armed with his own 

gun, joined the group of men. Dennis Wardlaw confronted Wray, who pulled out his gun. 

Wardlaw and Wray then struggled for Wray’s gun. Shots were fired, and defendant felt a 

gunshot graze his leg. Defendant then saw Wray starting to stand up. Defendant told police that 

he feared that if Wray stood up he would stand over Wardlaw and shoot him and “empty his clip 

on everybody,” including defendant’s sister who was nearby. Defendant told police that he 

therefore shot repeatedly at Wray, and believed that he hit Wray at least two times. Ballistics 

evidence verified that five shots were fired from Wray’s gun. These facts provide evidence on 

the elements of self-defense, supporting defendant’s assertion that he honestly and reasonably 

believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent the imminent death of or bodily 

harm to himself or others. The burden then shifted to the prosecution to disprove beyond a 

reasonable doubt the possibility that the killing was done in self-defense. See Dupree, 486 Mich 

at 710, 712. 

The prosecution argues that it met its burden of disproving defendant’s self-defense claim 

by demonstrating that defendant’s version of events was not credible because it was contradicted 

by the evidence and also by the inconsistencies in defendant’s statements. We agree that the 

prosecution produced sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant’s 

theory of self-defense had been disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Defendant’s theory of self-defense was that he acted to defend himself and others when 

Wray began to fire his gun because he reasonably and honestly believed that he needed to act 

with deadly force. Defendant told police that he shot Wray only after Wray shot four times. The

weight given this assertion depends in large part upon the credibility of the person asserting it, 

the determination of which is the province of the jury. People v Young, 472 Mich 130, 143; 693 

NW2d 801 (2005). Here, the details of defendant’s two statements to the police were 

contradictory in part. During his second interview, defendant admitted that initially he had lied 

about not knowing the identities of the other men, and lied when he told police that he heard his 

sister arguing with Wray. Initially, defendant claimed that he watched from the porch as Wray 

began wrestling with one of the people on the lawn, but in the second interview, defendant 

admitted that he was standing with the other men when the fight began. Although these 

discrepancies alone do not establish that defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of 

others, it does provide the jury with facts from which to measure defendant’s credibility. 

The prosecution also presented conclusive evidence that, contrary to defendant’s 

statements, defendant and Wray were not the only shooters. The ballistics evidence presented by

the prosecution supports the conclusion that some other shooter fired four shots from a .40

caliber gun, one of the shots hitting Wray. This evidence casts doubt on defendant’s version of 

the events and also upon the level of peril confronting defendant and whether it was necessary 
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for him to act with deadly force and deliver the fatal shot to Wray. Accordingly, the prosecution 

submitted sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant’s assertion of 

self-defense was disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Defendant also contends that during trial the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial 

misconduct by vouching for witnesses and denigrating defendant, thereby depriving him of a fair 

trial. We disagree. 

We note that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate review by objecting to 

the prosecutor’s conduct at trial and requesting a curative instruction. People v Solloway, 316 

Mich App 174, 201; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). We review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649, 

660 n 5; 897 NW2d 195 (2016). “Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the 

conviction of an actually innocent defendant, or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 

272 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor committed errors that 

denied the defendant a fair and impartial trial. People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 88; 867 

NW2d 452 (2015). We evaluate a prosecutor’s statements in light of the defense arguments and 

their relationship to the evidence admitted. People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 22; 776 NW2d 314 

(2009). 

In this case, defendant argues that during closing argument the prosecutor unfairly 

vouched for the truthfulness of Latham and Officer Kevin Marshall. A prosecutor may not 

“vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some special knowledge 

concerning a witness’ truthfulness.” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 

(1995). Further, the prosecutor may not vouch for a witness’s credibility based on an assertion 

of the prosecutor’s integrity or the prestige of the position. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 

600, 633; 709 NW2d 595 (2006). But a prosecutor may argue that a witness is credible. Id. 

Defendant first cites the following statement by the prosecutor in closing: “You saw, 

ladies and gentlemen, what we assert to you is the extremely calm and professional manner in 

which Officer Kevin Marshall approaches this scene and interacted with the defendant and 

diffused the situation.” This comment addressed the job performance of the responding officer 

at the scene of the crime, and was not a comment on the testimony of Officer Marshall. The 

prosecutor went on to summarize the activities of the officers who responded to the scene and 

investigated the case, arguing that the evidence gathered by police provided the foundation for 

the truth. The prosecutor was commenting on the quality of work that produced the evidence, 

rather than on the prosecutor’s special knowledge about the veracity of the officer’s testimony. 

This was not a “vouching” statement.

Defendant also cites the following comments by the prosecutor in closing:

Leslie Latham gave us in this case what the people will assert to you was actually 

credible testimony, because Leslie Latham, as defendant’s [sic] girlfriend or close 
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friend or roommate, did not say anything particularly favorable about the . . . 

victim on the night in question. She said that he had been out and arrived home 

approximately 8:50. He initially appeared to be in an okay mood but then she 

noticed that his mood had changed. She admitted that Robert was a drinker, and 

she told us that particular day Robert had been drinking all day, and we know in 

this case that’s consistent with what we saw in Mr. Wray’s blood alcohol level 

when he was autopsied. 

Prosecutors are allowed great latitude in their closing arguments and generally are free to 

argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence relating to their theory of the 

case. Unger, 278 Mich App at 236. In this case, the prosecutor’s comment regarding Latham 

was a proper comment on how the evidence related to Latham’s testimony, and did not rise to the 

level of vouching. The prosecutor asserted that her testimony was credible, but did not base this 

argument on special knowledge or the prestige of the prosecutor’s office, but on the evidence 

corroborating the witness’s testimony. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 

16 (1998) (it is not vouching for the witness to argue that the facts and evidence demonstrated 

that the witness was credible). In fact, the prosecutor argued that Latham’s testimony could be 

considered credible because she said things that painted the victim, her boyfriend, in a somewhat 

unfavorable light. This was not improper argument. 

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor denigrated defendant when he stated:

We hear that [defendant] was sober. It is precisely because he was sober 

that night that his statements to the police are egregious. The defendant argued in 

this case that [he] put his hands up. He put his gun on the ground. He was 

complying. He did all of these things. Doesn’t it seem somewhat contrived to 

have done that when he was taken to the police station and he proceeded to lie and 

deceive over and over and over and over? Doesn’t that just seem contrived? 

It is improper for a prosecutor to denigrate a defendant “with intemperate and prejudicial 

remarks.” Bahoda, 448 Mich at 283. However, prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole 

and evaluated in context, including the arguments of the defense and the relationship they bear to 

the evidence. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Defendant 

argues that the prosecutor’s remarks denigrated his character, implied he lacked respect for the 

criminal justice system, denigrated his integrity, and encouraged the jury to convict based on 

emotional feelings. The prosecutor’s remarks were made in rebuttal to defendant’s closing 

argument. One of defendant’s arguments was that he acted in self-defense as evidenced by the 

fact that he was sitting at home while sober when he was attacked, and that he was then 

cooperative; he disabled his weapon, surrendered to the police, and admitted his involvement. In 

rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that inconsistencies in defendant’s statements meant that although 

he was cooperative, he was not truthful, and therefore his interactions with the police were 

contrived and dishonest. When a defendant advances evidence or a theory, prosecutorial 

argument on the inferences created is proper. People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 477; 592 

NW2d 767 (1999). A prosecutor may even argue from the evidence that a witness is unworthy 

of belief, id. at 478, and “need not confine argument to the blandest possible terms.” People v 

Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 66; 732 NW2d 546 (2014). The prosecutor’s comments during 
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closing argument did not improperly vouch for the credibility of witnesses, and did not 

improperly denigrate defendant’s character.

Affirmed.

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

/s/ James Robert Redford