S e e D a v id so n v . B e ll , N o. M 2003- 01128- CC A- R3- H C, 2004 W L 2159019, at * 1 ( T en n
. Cr i m. App. Se pt

. 27, 1 2 0 0 4 ), per m . app. de ni ed (T e n n . F e b . 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 ).



### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs O ct obe r 24, 200 5
WAY NE DA VID SON v. QU ENT ON WHITE ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 03C-3274 M ariet ta Ship ley, Judge

No. M2004- 01498-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Janu ary 12, 2006

This ap p e a l i n v o lv e s a

d is p u teb e tw e e n a

p r is o n e r a n dth e T e n n e s s e e D e p artm e n t o f Co rr e c tion reg arding his eligibility

to be consider ed for

parole . The prisone r file d a civil rig hts action in the Circ u it Co u rt f

o r D a v id s o n Co u n ty a g a in s t th e D e p artm e n t a n d th r e e o f it s e mp lo y e e s seeking decla ratory relief and dama g es bec ause hehad not bee n decla red elig ible to be consider ed for parole

. Th e De pa rt me nt’ s e mpl oy e e s mo ve d to dis mis s th e c omp la int be c aus e thepriso ne r h a d f a ile d to specify whether they wer e being sued in their per sonal or off icial ca pacities. The court dismissed the complaint afte r being informed that the prisoner had be en conside red f or and ha d been de nied pa ro le . We ha ve de te rm ine d th a t th e tria l c ou rt pr op e rl y dis mis se d th e c omp la int

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined. Way ne Da vidson, Nashville, Tenne ssee, Pro Se. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Mic hael E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; and Ma rk A

. H u d s o n , S e n i o r

C o u n s e l , f

o r t h e ap p e l l e e s , Q u e n t o n W h i t e a n dT i mT e rry.

OP IN ION
I. Way ne Da vidson was convicte d of sec ond deg reeburg lary in May 1985. After the j ury found him to b e a ha bitua l c ri min a l, h e wa s se nte nc e d to lif e imp ri so nme nt. Af

te r b e ing pa

ro le d in 1 Dec ember

1998, Mr. Davidson resided in Mor g an County , Tenne ssee. Howeve r, in F ebrua ry 2001, his parole of

fice r obtained a

p ar ole violation warr ant bec ause his ex-g irlfriend ha d filed cha rg es ag ainst him in t he Morg an County Gene ral Sessions Court for har assment and s t al k i n g. Mr.M r
. D av i ds on s ou g h t j u di ci al r ev i ew of t h e D epa r t men t ’ s de ci s i on
. H owe v er , bot h t h e Ci r cu i t Cour t for 2 D a v id s o n C o u n ty an d this c o u rt d e te rm ine d tha t his p e tit io n w a s fil e d to o late

. D avi dson v. Tr au gh ber , N o. M 2004- 0 1 6 3 6

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 20 0 5 W L 3 5 5 7 7 7 6 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. D ec. 29 , 20 0 5 ) ( p et

. reh’ g f i l ed Jan. 5, 20 0 6 ). -2- Davidson’s pa

role wa s revoke d in J une 2001, and he was inc arc erated at the Riverbe nd Maxi mum Security Prison in Nashville.
Th e Te nn e sse e B oa

rdof Pr ob a ti on and Paro le c on sid e re d M r. Da vid so n f or pa ro le in Dec ember

2001. It declined to par ole hi m and set another hearing for J une 2003. As the J une 2003 hearing a pproac hed, Mr. Davidson was informed that the Department would not ce rtify him as being elig ible for pa

role c onsiderat i o n b ecause the c harg es ag ainst him in t he Morg an County Gene ral Sessions Court were still pending

. I n J uly 2003, Mr. Davidson soug ht a dec laratory order from the De pa rtme nt r e g ard ing his e lig ibi lity fo r p aro le c on sid e ratio n. Th e De pa rtme nt d e c lin e d h is r e qu e st in September 2003. 2
On No ve mbe r 17 , 20 03 , Mr

. Da vid so n f ile d an a c tio n u nd e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 in the Cir c uit Court for Da vidson Countyseeking decla rat o ry relief

and dama g es. He named the T ennesse e D e p art m e n t o f C o rr e c t i o n , t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r o f C o rr e c t i o n , a n da

r e c o r d s c l e rk

a s d e f e n d a n t s
. In J anuary 2004, the individual defe ndants moved to dismiss t he claims ag ainst them because Mr. D a v i d s o n h a df

a i l e dt o s p e c i f

y w h e t h e r h e w a s s u i n g t h e mi n t h e i r o f f i c i a l o r i n d i v i d u a l c ap a c i t y. Mr . D a vid so n’ s o nly

re sp on se wa s to mov e to ame ndhis com pl ain t to a dda no the r e mpl oy e e a s a de fe nd a nt.
I n Fe bruary

2004, the trial court, acting on its own init iative, contac ted the clerk of the Morg an County Gene ral Sessions Court to ascertain the status of the c harg es ag ainst Mr. Davidson. After being informed that the char g es had been dismiss ed with pr ejudice, the court filed an o rder continuing the hearing on the motion to dismiss for six ty day s to a wait further action by the B oard. On April 28, 2004, the de fendants filed a notice w ith the trial court stat i n g that the B oard ha d c on sid e re d M r. Da vid so n f or pa ro le on Ap ri l 21 , 2 00 4 andthat th e B oa rd ha d d e c lin e d to pa

ro le him

. Acc ording ly , the def

endants re quested the court t o dismiss Mr. Davidson’s c omplaint becauseit was now moot. The trial court dismi ssed the complaint o n M ay 2 5 , 2 0 05, and Mr. Davidson has appealed.
II.
We have de ter m i n ed that Mr. Davidson’s c laims ag ainst the Depa rtment’s individual employ ees w ereproperly dismiss ed beca use Mr. Davidson failed to state whethe r he w as suing them for damag es in their ca

pacity as state o ff

i ci al s or in their individual capa cities. Plaintiffs seeking dama g e s u nd e r 42 U.S .C

. § 1983 mus t se t f orth c le arl y

in the ir ple a din g s th a t th e y

aresu ing state de fe nd a nts fo r d a ma g e s inthe ir ind ivi du a l c apa c iti e s a ndno t si mpl y in the ir c apa c ity a s st a te officia ls. W

e lls v . B ro wn , 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989). Be causeMr. Davidson’s c omplaint does not satisfy

this requireme nt, the trial court prope rly dismiss ed his monetary

claims ag ainst the individual employ ees of

the Depa rtment.-3- III . Mr . D a vid so n’ s c la ims a g a ins t th e De pa rtme nt mus t a lso be dis mis se d f or tw o r e a so ns . F ir st, he c a nn ot r e c ov e r m on e tary dama g e s w ith ou t pr ov ing that hewa s a c tually inj ur e d b y

s o m epu tativ e ly illegal conduct by

the def endants. He h as al l eged no such injury in this case bec ause hehas no constitutionally protec ted l iberty interest in being parole d. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-503( b) (2003) ; Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W .2d 728, 733 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Second, the re cord de monstrates that Mr . D a vid so n h a s a lr e a dy re c e ive d th e re lie f h e wa s se e kin g , i. e ., a pa ro le he ari ng . Ac a se become s moot when it no longe r serves as a means to pro v i d e s o m e sort of judicial relief to the prevail i n g party

. Kno tt v . S te wart Co un ty , 185 Tenn. 623, 626, 207 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (1948); Ford Consum er F in. Co. v. Clay , 9 84 S.W. 2d61 5, 61 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; Massengill v. Ma sse ng ill , 3 6 T e nn . A pp . 3 85 , 3 88 -8 9, 25 5 S. W.2 d 1 01 8, 10 19 (1 95 2)

. B e c aus e there c or d r e fl e c ts that Mr . D a vid so n h a s r e c e ive d th e pa ro le he ari ng he so ug ht, the re is no fu rthe r re lie f f or thec ou rt s to g rant. Th e re fo re , th e c a se is n ow moo t.
IV.
We affirm the dismiss al of the complaint and remand the case to the trial court f or whatever further proce eding s may be re quired. We tax the costs of this appeal to Way ne Da vidson for which e xec uti on , if

ne c e ssa ry , may iss ue . We als o fi nd th at Mr . D a vid so n’ s a pp e a l is frivo lou s in acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 41-21-807( c), - 816(a) (1) ( 2003).

______________________________ WILL I AM C. K OC H, JR., P. J., M. S.