[Cite as State v. Golson, 2017-Ohio-4438.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104776

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

EDWIN GOLSON

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART 

AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-16-603305-A and DL 15111747 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., Blackmon, J., and Celebrezze, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 22, 2017 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Timothy Young 

Ohio Public Defender 

BY: Victoria Bader 

Assistant State Public Defenders 

250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400 

Columbus, Ohio 43215 

Michael Walton 

1053 Genesee Ave., N.E. 

Warren, Ohio 44483 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Brian D. Kraft 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street, 9th Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Edwin Golson (“Golson”), appeals his sentence and 

classification as a Tier II sex offender. He raises four assignments of error: 

1. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas erred when it classified 

Edwin Golson as a Tier II sex offender registrant, as defined in R.C. 

2950.01(F)(1), because the application of the adult registration requirements 

of R.C. Chapter 2950 to juvenile offenders creates an unconstitutional 

irrebuttable presumption in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of 

the Ohio Constitution. 

2. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas erred when it classified 

Edwin Golson as a Tier II sex offender registrant, as defined in R.C. 

2950.01(F)(1), because the application of adult registration requirements of 

R.C. Chapter 2950 to juvenile offenders constitutes cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 

Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution. 

3. Edwin Golson was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial 

counsel failed to object to the imposition of an adult classification on a 

juvenile offender. Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 9 and 10. 

4. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas erred when it failed to 

credit Edwin Golson with time served in connection with his offense 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.19 and R.C. 2967.191 in violation of the Due Process 

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 

Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. 

We find some merit to the appeal, affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse it in 

part, and remand the case to the trial court to grant Golson 308 days of jail-time credit. 

I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} Golson was charged in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court with one count of 

rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 

2905.01(A)(4), one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), one 

count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), and one count of robbery 

in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). Golson was 17 years old at the time the offenses were 

committed, and the state filed a motion to transfer the case to the Cuyahoga County 

Common Pleas Court, General Division (“adult criminal court”or “common pleas court”) 

pursuant to the discretionary bindover provision set forth in R.C. 2152.12(B). 

{¶3} In accordance with R.C. 2152.12(B), the court held a probable cause hearing. 

The victim, T.M.,1

 testified that Golson attacked her on the night of August 24, 2015, 

while she was walking to MetroHealth Hospital to visit a family member. As T.M. was 

walking eastbound on Storer Avenue toward West 25th Street, she observed Golson, 

whom she knew from the neighborhood, riding a bicycle on the other side of the street. 

Golson crossed the street, approached T.M., and demanded that she give him her cell 

phone. T.M. described the ensuing struggle: 

He just told me to shut up and drop the phone. And I told him that I wasn’t 

going to drop the phone, and then he started going down my pants, and I was 

trying to fight him. 

And he’s punching me with his left hand near my left eye. And then when 

he punched me on the right side, while he was trying to take my pants off is 

when I dropped my phone. And then after that, I don’t remember what 

happened. 

 1 Pursuant to Loc.R. 13.2(B)(1)(d) of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, we 

refer to the victim of a sexual offense by the victim’s initials. 
T.M. explained that Golson strangled her until she lost consciousness. When she awoke, 

she found that her pants and underwear had been removed and placed beside her on the 

ground. She also realized that she awoke several feet away from where she lost 

consciousness and that her cell phone was gone. 

{¶4} T.M. was talking to her mother on the phone when Golson attacked her. 

After regaining consciousness, T.M. ran for help, and a man on the street allowed her to 

call her mother on his cell phone. Based on the conversation with her mother, T.M. 

estimated that she lost consciousness for approximately 20 minutes. 

{¶5} T.M.’s sister met T.M. at the scene and accompanied her to MetroHealth 

Hospital where a rape kit was collected. Golson’s DNA was not found in any of the 

evidence. However photographs taken at the hospital depicted swelling and bruising on 

the left side of T.M.’s face, particularly around the left eye. Several photographs showed 

T.M. wearing a neck brace. T.M. testified she wore the neck brace for a week and a half 

after the incident for neck support and pain relief. 

{¶6} Based on T.M.’s testimony, the juvenile court found probable cause to believe 

that Golson committed the offenses alleged in the complaint. In accordance with 

R.C. 2152.12(C), the court ordered a psychological evaluation and investigation to 

determine Golson’s amenability to juvenile rehabilitation. 

{¶7} The investigating probation officer, Matthew Scarl (“Scarl”), testified at the 

amenability hearing that Golson had previously been adjudicated delinquent of two 

burglaries and one robbery. The burglaries were both second-degree felonies and the 
robbery was a third-degree felony. Golson also had five prior misdemeanors, and two 

probation violations. Although Golson had never been sentenced to an Ohio Department 

of Youth Services (“ODYS”) corrections facility, he had previously been placed in 

community correctional facilities after running away while he was on home detention and 

after violating probation for negative behavior. 

{¶8} Golson’s trial counsel argued that Golson demonstrated amenability to 

juvenile rehabilitation because he successfully completed the services offered by the 

juvenile court system. The state argued that although Golson completed the services, he 

failed to benefit from them as evidenced by the fact that he continues to reoffend, and his 

offenses have become increasingly violent. The juvenile court agreed with the state, 

concluded that Golson was not amenable to juvenile rehabilitation, and bound him over to 

the adult criminal court. 

{¶9} Golson was subsequently indicted by a grand jury on one count of rape in 

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), one count of kidnapping in violation of 

R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), with a sexual motivation specification, one count of felonious 

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), one count of aggravated robbery in violation of 

R.C. 2911.01(A)(3), and one count of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2). Golson 

later pleaded guilty to one count of kidnapping with the sexual motivation specification, 

one count of felonious assault, and one count of aggravated robbery. The state dismissed 

the remaining charges and stipulated that the felonious assault and aggravated robbery 

charges merged for sentencing. The court sentenced Golson to ten years on the 
kidnapping charge with the sexual motivation specification, and five years on the 

aggravated robbery charge, to be served consecutively. The court also imposed five years 

of postrelease control and classified Golson as a Tier II sex offender. Golson now 

appeals his sentence and Tier II sex offender classification. 

II. Law and Analysis 

A. Irrebuttable Presumption

{¶10} In the first assignment of error, Golson argues the trial court erred when it 

classified him as a Tier II sex offender as defined in R.C. 2950.01(F)(1). He contends the 

application of adult registration requirements to him, a juvenile offender, violates his 

constitutional right to due process because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that he is 

as culpable as adults who commit the same offense, which is not necessarily true of all 

juveniles. 

{¶11} Golson failed to object to the constitutionality of applying adult sex-offender 

registration and notification requirements to him. An appellate court will generally “‘not 

consider any error which counsel for a party complaining of the trial court’s judgment 

could have called but did not call to the trial court’s attention at the time such error could 

have been avoided or corrected by the trial court.’” State v. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 102783, 2016-Ohio-922, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 489 

N.E.2d 277 (1986). Thus, Golson forfeited the constitutional challenges to the 

application of adult sex-offender registration and notification requirements set forth in 

R.C. Chapter 2950 to him. 
{¶12} “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, 

waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ * * * Mere 

forfeiture, as opposed to waiver, does not extinguish an ‘error.’” State v. Quarterman, 140 

Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, quoting United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Thus, we have discretion to 

consider a forfeited constitutional challenge to a statute, but review the trial court’s 

decision for plain error. Id., citing State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 

N.E.2d 31, ¶ 377-378. 

{¶13} In order to find plain error, it must be determined that (1) but for the error, 

the outcome of the proceedings clearly would have been different, and (2) reversal is 

necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id., citing State v. Davis, 127 Ohio 

St.3d 268, 2010-Ohio-5706, 939 N.E.2d 147, ¶ 29; Crim.R. 52(B). The burden of 

demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it. Id., citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 17. Additionally, “a forfeited 

constitutional challenge to a statute is subject to review ‘where the rights and interests 

involved may warrant it.’” Id., quoting In re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286 

(1988), syllabus. 

{¶14} Courts have no discretion in classifying adult sex offenders under 

R.C. Chapter 2950, the Adam Walsh Act. R.C. Chapter 2950 presumes that adults who 

commit certain sexually oriented offenses automatically pose a future threat to public 

safety. Thus, a sex offender’s classification is automatically determined by the offense. 
R.C. 2950.01(E)-(G). The duration of the offender’s obligation to register his personal 

information, as well as the frequency with which he must report to authorities, depends on 

his level of classification. R.C. 2905.04 through 2950.07. A Tier II sex offender must 

register for 25 years and verify his address every 180 days. R.C. 2950.07(B)(2); 

R.C. 2950.06(B)(2). 

{¶15} Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of a first-time sex offense through a 

juvenile disposition are not subject to automatic tier classifications. This is because the 

goal of Ohio’s juvenile justice system is 

to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of 

children, to protect the public from the wrongful acts committed by juvenile 

delinquents, and to rehabilitate errant children and bring them back to 

productive citizenship, or, * * * to supervise, care for and rehabilitate those 

children. 

In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, ¶ 77, quoting In re 

Caldwell, 76 Ohio St.3d 156, 157, 666 N.E.2d 1367 (1996). In furtherance of these 

legislative purposes, the juvenile court must hold a hearing before classifying a juvenile 

sex offender. R.C. 2152.831. In determining the tier level of a juvenile sex offender, the 

juvenile court must consider, inter alia (1) the offender’s age, (2) the offender’s prior 

criminal or delinquency records, (3) the age of the victim or victims, (4) the nature of the 

sexually oriented offense, (5) whether the child has shown any genuine remorse for the 

offense, (6) the public interest and safety, and (7) the results of any treatment provided to 

the child and of any follow-up professional assessment of the child. R.C. 2152.83(D); 

R.C. 2950.11(K). Moreover, the juvenile court has discretion to decide the appropriate 
tier level of a particular juvenile offender depending on the circumstances of the case; it is 

not automatic. Id. 

{¶16} Golson argues the irrebuttable presumption that applies to adult sex 

offenders, i.e., that they pose a high risk of reoffending and therefore the public must be 

protected, should not apply to him because he was a juvenile at the time he committed the 

sexually oriented offense. He asserts there are “reasonable alternative means” set forth in 

R.C. 2152.82 through 2152.85, applicable to juvenile sex offenders, that should be applied 

to him instead. 

{¶17} We previously addressed this argument in State v. Martin, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 102783, 2016-Ohio-922. Martin was automatically classified as a Tier III 

sex offender as a result of his rape and kidnapping convictions with sexual motivation 

specifications. Martin argued that application of the irrebuttable presumption in R.C. 

Chapter 2950 to him, a juvenile, violated his constitutional right to due process. 

{¶18} We rejected Martin’s argument on grounds that he was not classified as a 

Tier III sex offender in the juvenile court; but in the adult criminal court. Id. at ¶ 18. We 

explained that “once a juvenile offender has been bound over to adult criminal court, the 

juvenile is no longer a ‘child’ pursuant to R.C. 2152.02(C)(4), and is subject to adult 

penalties.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 

N.E.2d 829; State v. Curtis, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-55, 2016-Ohio-6978, ¶ 72. 

{¶19} Martin was bound over to the adult criminal court pursuant to the mandatory 

bindover provisions in R.C. 2152.12. This court recognized that “Martin’s real contention 
is with the mandatory bindover statute, * * * not the ‘automatic and lifetime requirement 

of sex-offender registration and notification.’” Martin at ¶ 27. However, Golson was 

not subject to a mandatory bindover and had the benefit of a hearing to determine his 

amenability to the care and rehabilitation services of the juvenile system before being 

transferred to the adult criminal court. Before transferring Golson’s case to the adult 

criminal court, the trial court held a hearing and determined there was probable cause that 

Golson committed the offenses alleged in the complaint as required by R.C. 2152.12(B). 

{¶20} Having determined there was probable cause for the charges, the juvenile 

court ordered a psychological evaluation and investigation to determine Golson’s 

amenability to juvenile rehabilitation and held an amenability hearing as required by 

R.C. 2152.12(C). Based on the investigative reports, the testimony of the investigating 

officer, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that Golson was not amenable 

to rehabilitation in the juvenile court. Golson does not challenge the propriety of the 

amenability hearing, the court’s finding that he was not amenable to juvenile 

rehabilitation, or any other aspect of the discretionary bindover. 

{¶21} Golson’s right to due process was honored and protected by the discretionary 

bindover procedures followed by the juvenile court. Once Golson was transferred to the 

adult criminal court, he was no longer a “child” for purposes of juvenile rehabilitation and 

was lawfully subject to the adult sex offender classification. Therefore, even if Golson 

had objected to the constitutionality of applying R.C. Chapter 2950 to him, the outcome 

would not have been different. 
{¶22} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

{¶23} In the second assignment of error, Golson argues the automatic classification 

that designated him a Tier II sex offender constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under 

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the 

Ohio Constitution. Again, Golson asserts the juvenile sex offender registration 

requirements under R.C. 2152.92 should be applied to him instead of the adult 

classifications set forth in R.C. Chapter 2950 because he was a juvenile at the time he 

committed the offense. 

{¶24} In In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729, the 

Ohio Supreme Court held that automatic, lifelong sex-offender registration and 

notification requirements on juvenile sex offenders tried within the juvenile system 

violate (1) the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in 

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio 

Constitution, and (2) the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at ¶ 1. 

{¶25} However, as previously stated, Golson was no longer a “juvenile offender” 

once he was transferred to the adult criminal court. A juvenile offender is “one who 

remains under the authority of the juvenile court.” In re C.P. at ¶ 45. Indeed, the court 

in In re C.P. explained that its holding only applies to sanctions imposed on juveniles who 

remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 28. 
{¶26} Golson nevertheless argues that the trial court’s automatic classification of 

him as a Tier II sex offender was unconstitutional because it is cruel and unusual to punish 

juvenile offenders as though they were adults. Golson cites three United States Supreme 

Court cases to support his argument. However, all the cases cited by Golson involve 

death or life sentences imposed on juveniles without the possibility of parole. See Miller 

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (life sentence without 

possibility of parole is unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of a homicide offense); 

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (capital 

punishment unconstitutional for juveniles); and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 

2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (life sentence without possibility of parole is 

unconstitutional for juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide offense). 

{¶27} In Martin, we held it is illogical to equate having to register as a sex offender 

with a death or life sentence without the possibility of parole. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 102783, 2016-Ohio-922, at ¶ 21. Indeed, we concluded in Martin that an automatic 

sex offender classification of a juvenile bound over to the adult court does not constitute 

cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at ¶ 18-20. 

{¶28} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

{¶29} In the third assignment of error, Golson argues his Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel was violated because his trial counsel failed to object to the 

imposition of an adult classification on a juvenile offender. 
{¶30} To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Golson must show 

that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced 

his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 

(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). To establish 

prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate there is a “reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland at 694. 

{¶31} As previously stated, even if Golson’s trial counsel had objected to the 

automatic Tier II classification, the outcome of the proceedings would not have been any 

different. Having been bound over to the adult criminal court, Golson was no longer a 

“juvenile offender,” and was subject to the automatic sex offender classification laws 

applicable to adult sex offenders. Martin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102783, 

2016-Ohio-922, ¶ 19, citing State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 

N.E.2d 829. See also Curtis, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-55, 2016-Ohio-6978, ¶ 72. 

{¶32} The adult criminal court has no discretion with respect to adult sex-offender 

classifications; the classifications are automatically determined by the offense. And since 

the automatic classification of a juvenile offender in the adult criminal court does not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment, an objection on that basis would have been futile. 

Id. at ¶ 21. 

{¶33} Therefore, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

D. Credit for Time Served
{¶34} In the fourth assignment of error, Golson argues the trial court failed to give 

him credit for time served in the juvenile detention center and in the county jail pending 

resolution of the charges against him. He contends he is entitled to 308 days of jail-time 

credit. 

{¶35} R.C. 2967.191 provides that a prison term shall be reduced “by the total 

number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for 

which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced.” Time spent in confinement includes 

time spent in detention awaiting transfer from the juvenile court to the adult court as well 

as time spent in the county jail awaiting trial and sentencing. Id.; Curtis, 3d Dist. Allen 

No. 1-15-55, 2016-Ohio-6978, at ¶ 84. 

{¶36} The state concedes that Golson is entitled to 308 days of jail time credit. 

{¶37} Therefore, the fourth assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶38} The trial court’s judgment sentencing Golson to an aggregate 15-year prison 

term and classifying Golson as a Tier II sex offender is affirmed. However, we remand 

the case to the trial court to grant Golson 308 days of jail-time credit. 

It is ordered that appellee and appellant share the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR