NUMBER 13-21-00133-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M.A., A CHILD

On appeal from the 343rd District Court

of Bee County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Longoria, Hinojosa, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant P.A. appeals the trial court’s judgment involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights with respect to her minor child A.M.A.

1 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 24, 2019, A.M.A. was born testing positive for cocaine and suffering 

from withdrawal symptoms. The hospital where A.M.A. was born discharged her into the 

1 We refer to appellant and the child by their initials in accordance with the rules of appellate 

procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2

care of the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) who removed 

A.M.A. under exigent circumstances. Subsequently, the Department placed A.M.A. with 

V.H. and V.H., at P.A.’s request and upon the Department having conducted a home 

assessment. On August 27, 2019, the Department filed its “Original Petition for Protection 

of a Child, for Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship,” affidavit in support of removal, and supporting documentation.

A jury trial was held in which the jury determined that P.A.’s rights to A.M.A. should 

be terminated. A subsequent order to that effect was rendered.

This appeal followed. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief 

accompanied by a motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

(1967).

II. ANDERS BRIEF

P.A.’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that she has 

diligently reviewed the entire record and has concluded that the appeal “presents no 

legally non-frivolous questions.” See id.; Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul.

Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen 

appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination appeal and 

concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file an Anderstype brief.”). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a 

professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an 

appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. 

proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points 
3

of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and 

procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”).

Counsel has informed this Court in writing that she has: (1) notified P.A. that she 

has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided P.A. with copies of both 

pleadings; (3) informed P.A. of her rights to file a pro se response,2 to review the record 

preparatory to filing that response, and to seek review if we conclude that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) supplied P.A. with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate 

record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014). More than an adequate time has passed, and P.A. has filed neither a motion 

for pro se access to the record nor a pro se response.3

III. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the 

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 

488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at 

*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have 

reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible error. 

See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature 

of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the 

briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals 

2 In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response 

need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response 

should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in 

deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

3 We note that in her brief, P.A.’s counsel moved to extend P.A.’s pro se brief deadline to August 

5, 2021. P.A. did not request access to the record or file any motion, response, or request with this Court. 

We dismiss counsel’s motion as moot.
4

met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). We have specifically 

reviewed the trial court’s findings under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the family code, 

and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to 

those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (holding that “due 

process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its 

analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) 

of the Family Code”).

IV. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

P.A.’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see 

also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is 

frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant.”). However, when an Anders

brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed counsel 

extends to “all proceedings in [the Texas Supreme Court], including the filing of a petition 

for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, a motion to 

withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id. Counsel is permitted to 

withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client has no grounds to seek 

further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not constitute good cause. Id.

Here, counsel’s motion does not show “good cause” for withdrawal, accordingly, 

counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied. See id.

45

4 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations 

[in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders

brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016).

5 Any pending motions remaining in this matter are dismissed as moot.
5

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

NORA L. LONGORIA 

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

26th day of August, 2021.