2021 IL App (2d) 200111-U 

No. 2-20-0111 

Order filed June 10, 2021

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 16-CF-2262 

) 

JESUS BERMUDEZ, ) Honorable 

) Donald M. Tegeler Jr., 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice Birkett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The evidence supported defendant’s conviction of a sexual assault that occurred 

several years earlier when defendant was residing with the victim’s family. The 

trial court found the victim credible; the record showed no motive to lie, and the 

discrepancies in the State’s evidence were collateral to the issue of defendant’s 

guilt.

¶ 2 Defendant, Jesus Bermudez, appeals his conviction of predatory criminal sexual assault of 

a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)). He contends that the evidence was insufficient 

to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
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¶ 4 Defendant was charged with two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, in 

that he knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration with C.O., who was under the age of 13 

when the act was committed. He was also charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual 

abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(b), (c)(1)(i) (West 2016)), both of which alleged that he committed an 

act of sexual conduct with C.O. by touching her vagina for his sexual arousal. The allegations 

came to light in December 2016 when C.O. made them to a therapist.

¶ 5 Before trial, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to permit propensity 

evidence (see 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2016)) in the form of testimony from C.O.’s older sister, 

M.O., about an incident with defendant in the family home when M.O. was about 15 years old.

¶ 6 At the June 2019 bench trial, Craig Salisbury, a licensed therapist, testified that he met with 

C.O. in December 2016 because she was having sleep problems, which are usually a sign of 

depression or anxiety. C.O. was 17 at the time. C.O. scored high on a depression skill test, and 

he screened her for abuse or neglect. C.O. told Salisbury that she had been sexually abused. C.O.’s 

parents were brought in so that Salisbury could help facilitate C.O. in telling her parents about the 

abuse. Salisbury advised the family to call the police.

¶ 7 Dr. Raymond Davis, a pediatrician and child-abuse-pediatric physician, testified as an 

expert. Davis evaluated C.O., who told him that defendant sexually abused her from approximately 

6 or 7 years of age until she was 12 and that there had been sexual penetration. She told Davis that 

the incidents occurred “many times when they were on the couch and sometimes in her bedroom.” 

She said that “[m]ost often the family wasn’t there, the parents weren’t there, or [M.O] was in the 

shower.” Davis stated that C.O. did not give “real specifics” about the contact other than that there

was penetration. He said that he typically did not “go into great detail like a forensic interview 

would do in those situations.” No sexual assault kit was obtained because of the time-lapse 
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between C.O.’s last reported assault and the evaluation. C.O.’s sexual assault examination was 

essentially normal. Davis stated that the sleep issues C.O. suffered from could be related to the 

abuse, but he noted that he was not a qualified psychiatrist. He recommended that C.O. continue 

counseling and perhaps obtain a referral for an evaluation of post-traumatic stress. On crossexamination, Davis acknowledged that he had noted in his written report that C.O.’s sleep issues 

were “not related to events.” He clarified that, by “events,” he meant C.O.’s disclosure of the 

abuse and his examination of her.

¶ 8 C.O. testified that she was born on January 14, 1999, and she was 20 years old at the time 

of trial. She lived in Carpentersville, Illinois, with her parents. C.O. testified that, when she was 

young, she lived at the same location with her mother, Maria; her father, Maurilio; M.O.; and

defendant, who was known as “Chikin.” Defendant moved into their home when she was very 

young and lived in the bedroom between C.O.’s bedroom that she shared with M.O. and her 

parents’ bedroom. 

¶ 9 C.O. testified about an incident, when she was six or seven, where defendant made her feel 

uncomfortable. She stated that she was on the couch in the living room when defendant came up 

to her, took off both of their pants, and put his penis in her vagina. She said that defendant had to 

crouch down and that she was facing away from the couch while he was standing toward the couch. 

The incident ended when he took out his penis and C.O. saw “sperm” come out onto the couch. 

She testified that defendant was nervous when that happened, and he cleaned it up. She said that 

the incident caused her pain. The incident occurred “[m]aybe in the middle of the day” when no 

one else was in the room. She did not remember who was in the house at the time, where her 

family was, if defendant said anything, or what she was doing when he came into the room.
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¶ 10 C.O. initially testified that such an incident occurred more than once but that it happened 

on the couch only one time. The other incidents occurred in her bedroom. However, she later 

testified that a second incident happened on the couch and that this incident was like the first. C.O. 

said that she was sitting on the couch when defendant came up, took off both of their pants, and 

put his penis inside her vagina. No one else was in the living room, but C.O. was not certain if 

anyone else was at home. 

¶ 11 C.O. testified to additional incidents that occurred in the bedroom that she shared with 

M.O., who was five or six years older than her. The sisters shared a bunk bed, and C.O. said that 

she would invariably sleep on the top bunk and M.O. would sleep on the bottom bunk. The siblings 

went to different schools, and M.O. would get up much earlier than C.O., who would continue 

sleeping while M.O. was in the shower. M.O.’s showers normally took about 45 minutes to an 

hour. C.O.’s parents would also be sleeping during that time with their door closed and would not 

wake up until around the time that M.O. was done with her shower. C.O. testified that, on some 

mornings when her sister would begin to shower, defendant would come into her room and begin 

touching her vagina both over and under her clothes while she was sleeping. C.O. testified that 

she was approximately aged 9 when the incidents began and that they continued until she was 

around 11 (i.e., around 2010), when defendant moved out of the house. Defendant could hear 

when the water in the bathroom stopped running because it was right next to the bedroom, and he 

would stop touching her and leave when the water stopped. Defendant did not touch any part of 

her body other than her vagina, and she could not see him doing anything else with his free hand. 

C.O. said that she did not tell anyone at the time because she was young and “didn’t really know 

what was going on.” She also was embarrassed and afraid to report it to anyone. C.O. said that, 
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in December 2016 when she reported the incidents to Salisbury, she did not know defendant’s 

whereabouts or whether he had a job. She did not report the matter for money or attention.

¶ 12 On cross-examination, C.O. said that defendant never threatened her or told her not to tell 

anyone about what happened. She did not remember if she told a detective that defendant never 

touched her under her clothing. She also conceded that she did not remember specifics as to when 

the events occurred, such as if they happened on a weekday or a weekend, and she did not know 

what time of year they occurred. She also admitted that her testimony was different than her 

statement to a detective that her mother was in the shower, her sister was at school, and her father 

was at work during the incidents. C.O. also acknowledged during cross-examination that she told 

a detective that she had been having trouble sleeping and that she wanted to go to college after 

high school. When she reported the incidents, she wanted to go to the Art Institute to study 

cinematography and was concerned about her grades and finances affecting her ability to get into 

the school. She never did get into the Art Institute. However, she claimed that her concern about 

getting into the Art Institute was not causing her sleepless nights.

¶ 13 M.O. described defendant as a distant relative who lived with the family when she was 

younger. He moved out when M.O. was approximately 16 years old, or around 2010. M.O. said 

that generally she would sleep on the top bunk and C.O. would sleep on the bottom but that they 

would rotate if M.O. fell asleep on the bottom bunk, which happened “[l]ess than half” or “close 

to half” of the time. M.O. usually got up around 6 a.m. to get ready for school. At that time, her 

father would already be at work and her mother would still be sleeping.

¶ 14 For the State’s propensity evidence, M.O. testified about an incident with defendant that 

occurred when she was about 15 years old. Her parents had left to run an errand, and defendant 

was in the kitchen area watching a movie. He told her to look at the TV to see what he was 
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watching. There was a couch along the wall nearest the kitchen, but the couch was “a little bit 

forward” toward the TV, so that one could pass behind the couch. She stood up behind the couch 

to look at the TV. Defendant then came and stood behind her, and the only parts of their bodies 

that were touching were his pelvis area and her butt. As he stood behind her, she felt that his penis 

was hard. M.O. did not react to him standing behind her, because she was scared. The incident 

lasted about two minutes and ended when she pulled away. Defendant then sat back down. M.O. 

did not tell anyone about this incident because she “didn’t think it would be taken seriously or 

[she] was just ashamed and scared.”

¶ 15 C.O’s mother, Maria, testified that defendant rented a room in the home for about 10 years. 

She and Maurilio slept in the bedroom farthest from the bathroom, C.O. and M.O. used the 

bedroom closest to the bathroom, and defendant lived in the bedroom in between. Maria was 

shown current photos of the living room, which depicted couches. She claimed that, from 2005 to 

2010, the couches were arranged differently, with one against a window and another against the 

opposite wall. There was not a couch against the wall nearest to the kitchen.

¶ 16 Maria stated that M.O. would normally shower early in the morning. While M.O. was 

showering, Maurilio would “be going to work” or she and Maurilio would be sleeping in their 

bedroom. She never observed defendant “around” C.O. from 2005 to 2010, and they did not

interact very often. When asked if there were ever times where defendant would be alone with 

C.O., Maria initially answered no. However, she did not remember if there were times when she 

would leave the house and C.O. might still be there. She also said that there might have been times 

when defendant was alone in the house with C.O. When asked to clarify, she said “I don’t 

remember. Maybe once I went to the store, but I would not leave them alone.” When asked if 

there was ever a time that she would take a shower while both defendant and C.O. were in the 
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house, she answered, “Yes.” Defendant’s room had direct access to the outdoors and he had a 

television in the room. Thus, he would have to enter the living space only to use the restroom and 

the kitchen. He was able to come and go from the house without Maria or Maurilio knowing if he 

was there. Asked if defendant was welcome at family celebrations, Maria answered that she could 

“really only remember that time,” and she identified a photo showing defendant at a Christmas 

celebration with the family. She then said that defendant sometimes joined other family 

celebrations. He lived with the family until about a week before his wedding.

¶ 17 Maurilio testified that defendant was a distant relation but “like a nephew of [his].” 

Defendant was “part of the family.” Maurilio and defendant worked together at a landscape and 

maintenance company but in different areas, and defendant left for work later than Maurilio. They 

also worked together in snow removal. There were times during the winter, up to a month or two,

when defendant would be unemployed. Maurilio agreed that defendant could come and go from 

the house without him knowing about it.

¶ 18 The defense called police sergeant Adil Acevedo as a witness. Acevedo spoke with C.O.

about her allegations against defendant. He asked her if her body reacted “in a certain way” when 

defendant put his penis in her vagina, and she replied that she could not remember. Later in his 

testimony, he clarified that his question was referring to whether C.O. felt pain when defendant 

placed his penis in her vagina, although Acevedo admitted that he did not use the word “pain” with 

her. He also testified that C.O. told him that, when this incident occurred, her mother was in the 

shower and M.O. and her father were not home. C.O. said that the incident did not last very long 

because defendant “was trying to be sneaky about it so [her] parents wouldn’t notice.” C.O. told 

Acevedo that defendant would only touch her over her clothes in the bunk bed because he could
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not get her clothes off. However, Acevedo did not recall specifically asking C.O. about skin-toskin contact.

¶ 19 The trial court found defendant guilty on one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of 

a child. The court stated that it gave the propensity evidence from M.O. little to no weight. The 

court then noted discrepancies in C.O.’s testimony but found that she was credible and that the 

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one incident of penetration occurred. The court did 

not find, however, that a second incident occurred, and commented that C.O. may have confusedly 

separated one incident into two. 

¶ 20 The court also found insufficient evidence of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, as it was 

unclear whether defendant had skin-to-skin contact with C.O.’s genitals or just touched her over 

her clothing.

¶ 21 Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that, due to inconsistencies in the testimony, the 

evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That motion was denied, 

defendant was sentenced to six years’ incarceration, and he appeals.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. He argues that there were inconsistencies in the evidence and that there was no 

evidence corroborating C.O.’s testimony. 

¶ 24 An accused commits predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if he commits an act of 

sexual penetration with a victim who is under 13 years of age and the accused is age 17 or over. 

720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1). On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant 

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
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doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 

This standard applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and 

circumstantial evidence meeting this standard is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. People 

v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009).

¶ 25 The trier of fact has the responsibility to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh their 

testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 84 

(1999). The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even 

though it is contradicted by the defendant. People v. Morehead, 45 Ill. 2d 326, 329-30 (1970). A 

reviewing court will not reverse a conviction simply because the evidence is contradictory. People 

v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 306 (1978). Nor will a court reverse simply because the defendant 

claims that a witness was not credible. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211-12 (2004); People v. 

Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 428 (2002). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of 

fact. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000); People v. Kotlarz, 193 Ill. 2d 272, 298 (2000).

¶ 26 Here, defendant’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is essentially an attack on C.O.’s 

credibility. Defendant initially argues that C.O.’s testimony was neither corroborated nor clear 

and convincing. However, our supreme court has rejected the requirement that a sex-crime 

victim’s testimony be clear and convincing or substantially corroborated. People v. Schott, 145 

Ill. 2d 188, 202 (1991). Instead, “criminal convictions are not to be overturned on review unless 

the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s 

guilt.” Id. at 203.

¶ 27 Arguing that reasonable doubt existed, defendant points to inconsistencies in the testimony

such as where C.O. slept, how close defendant was with the family, the position of the couches in 

the living room, and whether defendant was ever alone with C.O. Not all such inconsistencies, 
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however, had any bearing on the offense of which defendant was convicted. Defendant was 

convicted of an incident of sexual penetration occurring in the living room but was acquitted of 

the incidents occurring in the bedroom. The bunk arrangements of the sisters were collateral to 

the allegations concerning the sexual assault in the living room. Similarly inconsequential were 

the minor discrepancies in the testimony concerning defendant’s presence at holiday functions. 

While defendant correctly notes that Maria testified that she did not normally leave defendant and 

C.O. alone together, she also testified that she might have showered while both defendant and C.O. 

were in the house and that there might have been times when defendant was alone with C.O. in the 

house. Thus, it was plausible to conclude that defendant had an opportunity to assault C.O. 

Meanwhile, M.O. provided testimony tending to show that defendant had a propensity to commit 

sexual abuse in the living room. The fact that Maria and M.O. may have had conflicting 

recollections of where the couches in the living room were positioned in the past did not eliminate 

the value of this evidence. Nonetheless, for unspecified reasons, the trial court accorded the 

evidence little or no weight. However, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient 

evidence of guilt apart from the propensity evidence. 

¶ 28 Most importantly, the trial court specifically found C.O. credible despite discrepancies in 

the testimony. The record shows no motive for C.O. to lie. Defendant argues that C.O. fabricated 

the allegations so that she would appear more sympathetic in making her reports of sleep 

disturbances, depression, or anxiety. Defendant suggests that C.O.’s issues were due not to past 

abuse but concerns about her future. The record does not support that claim. C.O. specifically 

testified that she did not report the matter to get attention, and Davis stated that the sleep issues 

C.O. suffered from could be related to the abuse, although he was not a qualified psychiatrist. He 

clarified that his written statement that C.O.’s issues were unrelated to “events” meant that her 
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issues were not related to her disclosure of abuse or his examination of her. The trial court, having 

heard and seen the witnesses, was in the best position to weigh discrepancies in the testimony. 

Given the deferential role of appellate review, we will not reassess C.O.’s credibility. In our view, 

the inconsistencies in the evidence were not severe enough to render the evidence so improbable 

or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 Defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court of Kane County. 

¶ 31 Affirmed.