Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1612-CR-2821 | July 27, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Matthew D. Anglemeyer

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 27, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1612-CR-2821

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable William Nelson, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G18-1507-F6-25672

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1612-CR-2821 | July 27, 2017 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Following a jury trial, Michael Johnson was convicted of intimidation, a Level 

6 felony; sexual battery, a Level 6 felony; battery, a Class B misdemeanor; 

public intoxication, a Class B misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class B 

misdemeanor. On appeal, Johnson challenges his convictions for sexual battery 

and intimidation, raising one issue for our review: whether the evidence is 

sufficient to support his convictions. Concluding the evidence is sufficient, we 

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Tonya Anderson is a certified nursing assistant working in home healthcare. 

On July 18, 2015, Anderson went to David Britton’s home where she assists 

him with food preparation, taking medicine, and putting on clothes. When 

Anderson arrived, Britton and his friend, Steven Orman, were sitting on 

Britton’s front porch.

[3] Shortly thereafter, Michael Johnson, a neighbor from across the street, 

approached them. Johnson carried a half-empty bottle of liquor and smelled 

strongly of alcohol. Britton did not want Johnson on his porch and Anderson 

told Johnson that “David doesn’t want you up here . . . .” Transcript, Volume 

2 at 10. Johnson told Anderson “F you B . . . don’t worry about this stuff . . . 

it’s not none of your business . . . .” Id. Johnson was “totally drunk” and when 

Anderson threatened to call the police, Johnson responded he would “burn 
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down the house” and “kill [her] and David if the police showed up . . . .” Id. at 

11-12. Eventually, Anderson called the police, who escorted Johnson back to 

his home with orders to remain there.

[4] Immediately after the police departed, Johnson returned to Britton’s home. 

Anderson told Johnson to leave and that she was going to call the police. 

Johnson again threatened to “burn the house down . . . .” Id. at 16. Johnson 

then climbed up on the porch, pushed Anderson against the wall, and put one 

hand around her neck. Johnson then placed his other hand up her dress and on 

her vagina, saying, “B you know you like this.” Id. at 17. Anderson then

pushed Johnson away. The police returned and arrested Johnson.

[5] The State charged Johnson with intimidation, a Level 6 felony; sexual battery, a 

Level 6 felony; battery, a Class B misdemeanor; public intoxication, a Class B 

misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class B misdemeanor. A jury found 

Johnson guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced Johnson to an aggregate 

sentence of 910 days. Johnson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[6] Johnson’s arguments challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 

convictions. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is 

well-settled:
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First, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Second, we consider only the evidence supporting the 

judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 

such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is 

substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element 

of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have 

found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e 

consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [verdict].

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citations and quotations 

omitted).

II. Sexual Battery

[7] Johnson argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for sexual 

battery. Indiana’s sexual battery statute provides, in pertinent part,

A person who, with intent to arouse or satisfy the person’s own 

sexual desires or the sexual desires of another person:

(1) touches another person when that person is:

(A) compelled to submit to the touching by force 

or the imminent threat of force;

* * *

commits sexual battery, a Level 6 felony.

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(A). The element of force may be implied from the 

circumstances and need not be physical or violent. Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 

N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 1991). Moreover, “it is the victim’s perspective, not the 

assailant’s, from which the presence or absence of forceful compulsion is to be 
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determined.” Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996). The test is a 

“subjective test that looks to the victim’s perception of the circumstances 

surrounding the incident in question.” Id. Therefore, the issue is “whether the 

victim perceived the aggressor’s force or imminent threat of force as compelling 

her compliance.” Id.

[8] Johnson contends the State failed to prove he compelled Anderson to submit to 

the touching by force or imminent threat of force. Johnson argues he did not 

compel Anderson with force, but that “[h]e just did it.” Brief of Appellant at 

15. However, Johnson’s argument completely ignores crucial portions of 

Anderson’s testimony. Anderson testified Johnson returned to Britton’s porch 

and she told him he needed to leave. Johnson then approached her and moved 

“close in [her] face,” pushed her against the wall, and put one hand around her 

neck. Tr., Vol. 2 at 17. Johnson then placed his other hand up her dress and on 

her vagina, saying, ““B you know you like this.” Id. Anderson responded by 

angrily shoving him in the chest. Johnson’s act of pushing Anderson against 

the wall and holding her by her neck is sufficient evidence to prove Johnson 

used force to compel her to submit to his unwanted touching.1 

 

1

Johnson also alleges because “[h]e just did it[,]” and Anderson did not have the “opportunity to grant or 

deny” consent to the touching, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Br. of Appellant at 15. 

There is no statutory requirement that Anderson have the opportunity to “grant or deny consent[,]” id., nor 

can this be reasonably inferred from our opinion in Chatham v. State, 845 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006), to which Johnson cites. The sexual battery statute only requires that Johnson touched Anderson with 

the intent to satisfy his own or her sexual desires and that Anderson was compelled to submit to the touching 

by force or imminent threat of force. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(A).
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III. Intimidation

[9] Johnson also alleges there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for 

intimidation. In order to convict Johnson of intimidation, the State was 

required to prove that he communicated a threat to another person, with the 

intent that the other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. 

Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) (2014).

[10] Here, Johnson approached Britton’s home while unwelcome and was asked to 

leave. When Anderson threatened to call the police, Johnson responded he 

would burn the house down “if [she] call[ed] the police . . . and he [would] kill 

[her] and David if the police showed up.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 12. Anderson then 

called the police and they escorted Johnson back to his home. Johnson again 

returned to Britton’s porch and Anderson told him to leave. Once again, 

Johnson responded he would “burn the house down . . . [and] kill ya’ll” if the 

police returned. Id. at 16.

[11] Johnson urges that we reverse his intimidation conviction and alleges his threat 

was conditional and therefore insufficient to support his conviction. In support 

of his argument, Johnson cites to Causey v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1239 (Ind. Ct. App.

2015). In Causey, police officers responded to a report of a disturbance at the 

defendant’s residence. After law enforcement arrived and tried to talk with the 

defendant, he told the officers to get off his property and stated, “[i]f you come 

any closer I’ll shoot.” Id. at 1240. A panel of this court reversed the 

defendant’s intimidation conviction and held the defendant’s threat was 
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“conditional” and intended to dissuade the officers from coming any closer, 

and was not a threat related to any past conduct of the officers. Id. at 1241.

[12] However, in Roar v. State, 52 N.E.3d 940 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), adopted and 

incorporated by Roar v. State, 54 N.E.3d 1001 (Ind. 2016), another panel of this 

court disagreed with Causey. In Roar, the defendant saw the victim serve an 

eviction notice on the defendant’s sister. The defendant began yelling at the 

victim, verbally abusing her and accusing her of being unprofessional. The 

defendant threatened to kill her “if [she] came back on the property.” Id. at

943. In disagreeing with Causey, the Roar majority opinion noted,

Mere use of conditional language in the course of 

communicating a threat does not vitiate the statute’s application 

when the factual predicate for the threat was a prior lawful act of 

the victim. Stated another way, the language a defendant uses in 

communicating a threat may be relevant to the fact-finder’s 

assessment of the defendant’s intent, but the language used is not 

the only relevant consideration.

Id. at 944. Moreover, our supreme court granted transfer in Roar and adopted 

the majority’s analysis. Roar, 54 N.E.3d at 1001; see also Chastain v. State, 58 

N.E.3d 235, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting by granting transfer and adopting 

the majority opinion in Roar, our supreme court disapproved of the analysis and 

holding in Causey), trans. denied.

[13] In this case, Johnson twice threatened Anderson. The first threat occurred after

Anderson lawfully asked him to leave the premises, threatened to call the 

police, and then did so. The second threat occurred when Johnson returned 
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and Anderson again stated she would call the police if he did not leave. The 

police again were called. Therefore, despite Johnson’s conditional language, 

each threat was based on a prior lawful act by Anderson and is sufficient 

evidence to support Johnson’s conviction for intimidation.

Conclusion

[14] We conclude there is sufficient evidence to sustain Johnson’s convictions for 

sexual battery and intimidation. Accordingly, we affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.