J-S18007-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

IBRAHIM ALY

Appellant No. 1505 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 21, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006077-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 06, 2017

Appellant, Ibrahim Aly, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Honorable Diana Anhalt of the Philadelphia Court of Common 

Pleas following a probation violation hearing. We quash. 

The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. On 

September 12, 2013, Appellant was convicted of theft1and receiving stolen 

property.2Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a 

period of time served to twenty-three months’ incarceration, with a 

concurrent two year probationary period. Appellant was immediately 

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

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
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paroled, and as a condition of his probation, was required to comply with 

mental health treatment and drug testing. 

After refusing to comply with mental health treatment and testing 

positive for marijuana, Appellant absconded from supervision on October 12, 

2014. On January 28, 2015, Appellant was notified of alleged violations of 

the conditions of his probation and an absconder warrant was subsequently 

issued for his arrest. Appellant was eventually arrested on March 20, 2015. 

The trial court held a probation violation hearing on April 21, 2015. 

Appellant was found guilty of violating the conditions of his probation, and 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve his back time, granted him 

immediate parole and re-imposed a concurrent two-year probationary 

period. 

Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely pro se post-sentence motion 

contesting the judgment of sentence. This appeal follows. However, because 

we find that the order Appellant purports to appeal from was not a final 

order, we cannot address Appellant’s appeal on the merits.

“As a preliminary matter, we must first ascertain whether the 

judgment of sentence is properly appealable, because the question of 

appealabilty implicates the jurisdiction of this court.” Commonwealth v. 

Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. Super. 1997). Further, despite the fact 

that neither party addressed the issue of jurisdiction, we may raise the 

question of jurisdiction sua sponte. See Roman v. McGuire Mem’l, 127 

A.3d 26, 31 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 134 A.3d 57 (Pa. 2016). 
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The Judicial Code provides that the Superior Court shall have 

exclusive appellate jurisdiction of all appeals from final orders of 

the courts of common pleas, except such classes of appeals as 

are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or the 

Commonwealth Court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742. In the context of 

criminal proceedings where, as here, the case has proceeded 

through the sentencing phase, the appeal lies from the entry of 

the final judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 

437 Pa. Super. 518, 520, 650 A.2d 475, 476 (1994). Pursuant to 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, the question of 

whether the judgment of sentence is final and appealable 

depends upon whether a defendant files the now optional postsentencing motions. 

When post-sentencing motions are not filed, the judgment 

of sentence constitutes a final and appealable order for the 

purposes of appellate review and any appeal therefrom must be 

filed within thirty (30) days of the imposition of sentence. 

Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 1410A(3),[3] 42 Pa.C.S.A. and comments 

thereto; Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 437 Pa. Super. at 520, 

650 A.2d at 476-477. If post-sentencing motions are timely 

filed, however, the judgment of sentence does not become final 

for purposes of appeal until the trial court disposes of the 

motion, or the motion is denied by operation of law. Id., at Rule 

1410A(2) and comments thereto; Commonwealth v. 

Chamberlain, 442 Pa. Super. 12, 16, 658 A.2d 395, 397, 

appeal quashed, 543 Pa. 6, 669 A.2d 877(1995). Moreover, the 

comments to Rule 1410 explicitly provide that “no direct appeal 

may be taken by a defendant while his or her post-sentence 

motion is pending.” Comments to Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 1410, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. 

Borrero, 692 A.2d at 159-160. 

Here, the certified record reflects that Appellant was sentenced on 

April 21, 2015. He filed a post-sentence motion on April 30, 2015 and then a 

notice of appeal on May 21, 2015, prior to the trial court issuing an order 

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3 Rule 1410 was renumbered Rule 720, effective March 1, 2000. 
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disposing of the post-sentence motion or the denial of the order by operation 

of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(3). If an appropriate order denying the postsentence motion had been noted on the docket, we could have regarded this 

appeal as having been filed within thirty days of the day on which the postsentencing motions should have been denied by operation of law. Cf. 

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a). However, because an appropriate order has not been 

entered on the docket denying the post-sentencing motion as an operation 

of law, the judgment of sentence has not yet been finalized. See Borreo, 

692 A.2d at 159-160. 

Thus, we are without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 742.

Appeal quashed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/2017