UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1552

FENYANG AJAMU STEWART,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEM; NORTH CAROLINA 

AGRICULTURAL & TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY; NATIONAL 

INSTITUTE OF AEROSPACE ASSOCIATES, INC.; WILLIAM EDMONSON, 

NIA Distinguished Langley Professor, Full Professor, North 

Carolina A&T State University; JOHN KELLY, Chairman; 

ELECTRIC AND COMPUTER ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT, NORTH CAROLINA 

A&T STATE UNIVERSITY; CATHY HOPKINS, Human Resources 

Director, National Institute of Aerospace,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:15-cv-01487-AJT-JFA)

Submitted: November 29, 2016 Decided: December 12, 2016 

Before WYNN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

Fenyang Ajamu Stewart, Appellant Pro Se. Matthew Thomas 

Tulchin, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
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Carolina; Eve Grandis Campbell, O’HAGAN MEYER PLLC, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Fenyang Ajamu Stewart appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his civil rights complaint and its orders denying his 

motions for reconsideration. Stewart’s complaint alleged claims 

against two groups of defendants — the National Institute of 

Aerospace Associates, Inc. (“NIA”) and Cathy Hopkins, NIA’s 

Director of Human Resources (collectively, “NIA defendants”), 

and the University of North Carolina System, North Carolina 

Agricultural & Technical State University (“NC A&T”), William 

Edmonson, and John Kelly (collectively, “North Carolina 

defendants”). We vacate the district court’s order dismissing 

Counts 2 through 4 of Stewart’s amended complaint as to the NIA 

defendants, affirm the district court’s orders in all other 

respects, and remand for further proceedings.

The district court concluded that Stewart’s claims against 

the North Carolina defendants were barred by Eleventh Amendment 

immunity. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an 

action under the Eleventh Amendment. Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 

773 F.3d 536, 542 (4th Cir. 2014). Stewart concedes that the 

Supreme Court has found that such claims are barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 

(1979). While Stewart contends that the Supreme Court erred in 

so ruling, we are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. Stop 

Reckless Econ. Instability Caused by Democrats v. Fed. Election 
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Comm’n, 814 F.3d 221, 230-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, S. 

Ct. , No. 16-109, 2016 WL 4001325 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2016). 

Accordingly, we affirm the portions of the district court’s 

order dismissing the North Carolina defendants, as well as the 

district court’s orders denying Stewart’s motions for 

reconsideration.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a 

complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and “draw[ing] all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the [nonmoving party].” 

Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 

462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). To 

survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level” and sufficient “to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). A court may dismiss on the grounds 

of a statute of limitations defense if the necessary facts 

“clearly appear on the face of the complaint.” Waugh Chapel S., 

LLC v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 27, 728 F.3d 

354, 360 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Stewart contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing Counts 2 and 3 of the amended complaint, asserting 
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claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) against the NIA defendants, 

because the federal four-year statute of limitations applies. 

We agree. Generally, § 1981 claims are governed by the most 

analogous state statute of limitations. James v. Circuit City

Stores, Inc., 370 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2004). The district 

court applied this general rule and found Virginia’s two-year 

statute of limitations applicable. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-

243(A) (2015). However, if a claim is based on § 1981(b), which 

covers “claims based on conduct occurring after the formation of 

the contractual relationship,” then the federal four-year 

statute of limitations applies. James, 370 F.3d at 421.

We conclude that Stewart’s claims in Counts 2 and 3 are 

based on postformation conduct, and thus the four-year statute 

of limitations applies. See Buntin v. City of Boston, 813 F.3d 

401, 405 (1st Cir. 2015) (applying four-year statute of 

limitations to retaliation claim under § 1981); White v. BFI 

Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding 

that hostile work environment claims are subject to four-year 

statute of limitations). Because these claims concern events 

that occurred in 2012 and Stewart filed his complaint in October 

2015, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing 

these claims as time-barred.

Stewart next contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing Count 4 of the amended complaint, which he alleges 
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was brought under § 1981(b), and not under Virginia law as the 

district court concluded. We agree. Count 4 of Stewart’s claim 

cited § 1981 and alleged that the NIA defendants did not pay him 

an adequate stipend and removed him from his doctoral program on 

the basis of his race. We conclude that the district court 

should have analyzed the claim under § 1981 and not Virginia 

law. Thus, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing 

Count 4 against the NIA defendants, and remand for further 

consideration of this claim.

Finally, Stewart contends that the district court erred in 

dismissing his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1968 (2012). We 

conclude that the district court correctly dismissed this claim, 

as Stewart’s allegations of racial discrimination do not 

constitute a predicate act of racketeering under RICO. US 

Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC, 615 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 

2010) (“To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege 

that the defendants engaged in, or conspired to engage in, a 

pattern of racketeering activity.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining racketeering 

activity).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders, with 

the exception of the court’s disposition of Counts 2 through 4 

of Stewart’s amended complaint against the NIA defendants. As 
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to those claims, we vacate the district court’s dismissal and 

remand for further proceedings. We further deny Stewart’s 

motion to appoint counsel and to participate in oral argument. 

By this opinion, we express no view on the merits of Stewart’s 

claims against the NIA defendants. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED