United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 02-2402

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Loretta Page, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Arkansas Department of Correction; *

Larry Norris; *

*

Defendants-Appellees, *

* Appeal from the United States

East Arkansas Regional Unit; * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Arkansas.

Defendant, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

James T. Banks, Assistant Warden, *

East Arkansas Regional Unit; *

*

Defendant-Appellee, *

*

Equal Employment Opportunity *

Commission; J. Glover; M. Riley, *

*

Defendants. *

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Submitted: October 21, 2002

Filed: November 1, 2002

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*

The Honorable William R. Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Loretta Page, an Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) officer, appeals

the district court’s*

 adverse rulings in her employment discrimination case. Having

reviewed the parties’ arguments, we affirm.

First, Page contends the district court committed error when it dismissed Page’s

employment discrimination claims against her supervisors Larry Norris and James T.

Banks. Because supervisors are not “employers” for purposes of Title VII liability,

the claims against Norris and Banks were properly dismissed. See Bales v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1111 (8th Cir. 1998) (supervisors are not individually

liable under Title VII).

Second, Page argues the district court committed error when it granted the

defendants’ motions for summary judgment on her claims of race and sex

discrimination, and retaliation. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo,

affirming if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. See IES Ind., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 351

(8th Cir. 2001) (standard of review). Page contends the ADC discriminated against

her on the basis of her race (African-American) and sex (female) when she was

transferred from the mailroom back to making rounds throughout the prison (working

“shift”). Page, however, cannot establish a prima facie case of race and sex

discrimination. See Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th Cir. 1997)

(elements of prima facie case for Title VII discrimination claim). Page’s qualification

for the mailroom position is debatable: two audits of the mailroom criticized her
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performance. Additionally, the move from mailroom to “shift” is not an adverse

employment action because Page received the same pay and later received promotions

and raises while working “shift.” Finally, Page was replaced in the mailroom not by

someone outside the protected class, but by another African-American woman. 

Page also alleges her transfer from working in the mailroom to working “shift”

was retaliation by the ADC for the discrimination-based grievance she filed against

her mailroom supervisor. Again, Page fails to establish a prima facie case. See

Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P.,141 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1998) (elements of

prima facie case for retaliation). Page cannot show the transfer was an adverse

employment action, nor can she demonstrate a causal connection between the

grievance she filed and her transfer. Thus, the district court properly granted

summary judgment on Page’s claims of discrimination and retaliation. 

Third, Page claims the district court abused its discretion when it denied Page’s

request to disqualify the Arkansas Attorney General’s office as the ADC’s counsel.

See United States v. Lashley, 251 F.3d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 2001) (standard of review).

Page emphasizes the right to conflict-free representation; however, our cases explain

that this Sixth Amendment right is held by criminal defendants objecting to their own

attorneys, see, e.g., Taylor v. Dickel, 293 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining the

limitations of this right). These cases are inapplicable to Page, a civil plaintiff

objecting to opposing counsel. Although Page can invoke ethical rules that govern

Arkansas attorneys’ conduct, after reviewing these rules, we conclude the Attorney

General’s office is free from conflicts which would violate these rules. The district

court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Page’s motion to disqualify opposing

counsel. 

Finally, Page argues the district court abused its discretion when it did not

allow her to amend her complaint and her other motions under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e). See Moysis v. DTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 819, 829 n.3 (8th Cir. 2002)
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(standard of review). We agree with the district court that Page cannot, after an

adverse grant of summary judgment, rely on Rule 59(e) to raise factual arguments she

could have raised earlier. Id. 

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.