1 Exemption No. 11125

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION RENTON, WASHINGTON 98057

- 3356

PARTIAL GRANT OF EXEMPTION

By a submission to the Department of Transportation’s Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) dated November 19 , 2014, Mr. Joseph R. Batten of National Air Cargo Group, Inc. (National Airlines )

– Director of Operations , petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption from the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Re gulations (14 CFR) 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 related to the requirements for transporting cargo.

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulations:

§ 91.9(a) Civil aircraft flight manual, markings, and placard requirements, which states that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards, or otherwise prescribed by the certific ating authority of the count r y.

§ 91.1025(a) Program operating contents, which requires the program operating manual include procedures for ensuring compliance with aircraft weight and balance limitations.

§ 121.135(a)(4) Manual contents, which require s that each manual required by § 121.133 must not be contrary to any Federal regulations or the certificate holder’s operations specifications or operating certificate. In the matter of the petition of

National Air Cargo Group , Inc.

for an exemption from §§ 91.9(a),

91.10 25(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations Regulatory Docket No. FAA

- 2014

- 09802 § 121.135(b)(21) Manual contents, which requires that each manual required by § 121.1 33 contain methods and procedures for maintaining the aircraft weight and center of gravity within approved limits.

§ 121.141 Airplane flight manual, which requires that each certificate holder shall keep a current approved airplane flight manual for eac h type of airplane that it operates except for non

- transport category airplanes; and that in each airplane required to carry an airplane flight manual, the certificate holder shall carry either the manual required by § 121.133 or an approved Airplane

Manua l.

The petitioner supports its request with the following. This information is quoted from the petition er’s letter dated November 19 , 2014. The complete petition may be found in the docket.

Reasons Why the Exemption Would Not Adversely Affect Public Safety

As explained below, National Airlines is not aware of data substantiating the application of the 9G requirement to freighter aircraft. However, more recent studies that were not available when the 9G forward restraint requirement was developed i n the 1950s demonstrate that a 3G forward restraint standard would have no adverse impact on safety, would provide an equivalent level of safety, and would be in the public interest.

A. Reports and Data Show that a 3G Forward Restraint Requirement Would H ave No Adverse Impact on Safety and Would Provide an Equivalent Level of Safety.

The deficiencies with the 9G forward restraint requirement are numerous.

First, the 9G standard was established in the 1950s, well before the B

- 747 aircraft was

certificated

.

Second, it considered analyses of passenger seats, passenger seat attachments, and the geometric relationship of the passenger seat to the interior of the passenger compartment.

This seat

- based requirement appears to have become a regulatory "come alon g" to apply to cargo transport, without any analysis of the validity or efficacy of applying such a seat

based requirement to the cargo compartment.

Third, since the 9G forward restraint standard predated the B

- 747 by more than a decade, it

did not accoun t for many of the B

- 747's exceptional characteristics. It does not properly reflect the actual loads and behavior of cargo restrained by the cargo restraint system, straps, and nets on a B

- 747. Nor does it take into account the spatial separation of B

- 7 47 upper deck occupants and the tall rigid cargo, the capability of the crown barrier net to restrain tall rigid cargo, or the crashworthiness and energy absorbing capability of the

B

- 747 upper deck structure.

Fourth, the 9G standard clearly did not account for the infinitesimal probability that all of the events necessary for an occupant on the upper deck of a B

- 747 freighter to be harmed by tall rigid cargo in an emergency landing would occur. U.S. Air Force studies concluded3 that a crash event at higher than 3G with cargo and passengers is "extremely rare", with a probability of one occurrence per 4 million hours of operation. Cargo Aircraft and Spacecraft Forward Restraint Criteria , Technical Report ASD

- TR

- 76

- 30 (December 1977) ( " 1977 USAF Tech nical Report"). Put another way, combining major and minor accidents for the period 1962 to July 1976, the probability of a crash at the "3G to N/S Level with Cargo and Passenger'' was "extremely rare" at 0.00000025 per hours/operation. 1977

USAF Technica l Report, at 38, 50. And, in November 1981, "CSAF/LET approved permanent reduction to 3G forward restraint, citing 7 years of operations (6.73M flight hours) with no cargo related accidents." Presentation: Cargo Restraint for Fixed Wing Aircraft, 21 May 02 , Aeronautical Systems Center, USAF. According to the same USAF presentation, "In concert with 2G up and 1.5G aft & laterally, 3G forward restraint has proven adequate and cost effective for 30 years of USAF cargo operations involving over 29M flight hours ."

Fifth, in commercial operations, more than 420 B

- 747 freighters have flown more than 20 million flight hours and 4 million flight cycles. There has been no report of cargo shifting forward and harming an occupant on a B

- 747 freighter during emergency l anding conditions (see NTSB Accident Aviation Database and 17 hull

- loss occurrences on B

- 747 freighters documented by the Aviation Safety Network, www.aviation

- safety.net; see also FAA Accident/Incident Data System). Based on a review of the B

- 747 model f reighter accidents, it can be concluded that any resulting injury or fatality related to the accidents was not attributable to cargo shifting forward. In fact, if a cargo shift was involved in any reported accident, it only involved cargo shifting aft, w ith no reported accidents involving a forward shift at all. Since the majority of cargo is below the tall

- rigid threshold, it can be concluded that tying down to flight loads at 1.5G (loading) has been shown to be sufficient

in actual incidents and accid ents to secure cargo against forward

- shifting, and this Petition

for a 3G tie down therefore is more than sufficient.

This conclusion is supported by the results of the 2008 accident of a Kalitta aircraft in

Brussels. That accident involved a B

- 747 freigh ter which suffered severe damage, breaking into three sections after an aborted takeoff due to a bird strike. Although the main deck floor beams in the forward cargo section were shattered in the accident, cargo in the other

sections which was restrained t o 1.5G was still secured to the aircraft, and the crew escaped uninjured. See Final Report, Ref. AAIU

- 2008

- 13 (issued July 2009), Belgium Federal Public Service Mobility and Transport, Air Accident and Investigation Unit.

Sixth, at forward load forces be tween 3G (the standard requested in this Petition and the standard adopted by the USAF) and 9G (the current standard), it is highly likely that the B

747 would not stay intact. At such high G

- force loads, whether the tall rigid cargo was shifting forward w ould be the least of the occupants' and crew's worries because the aircraft would likely not remain intact. As a 1977 USAF Technical Report pointed out: "The maximum landing loads that the C

- 130, C

- 141, and C

- 5 can generate are 0.94, 1.05, and 1.20G, resp ectively. This is assuming full reverse thrust, full braking, and a loose dirt runway. For any load above these, the aircraft is in a crash condition as defined by this report." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 21. And, according to Boeing, during hard

br aking the forward flight load factors are 1.5G for the B

- 747

- 400 and 1.2G for the4 B

- 747

- 8. Indeed, loads in the 9G range would not involve an "emergency landing condition", but rather a crash. The aircraft and the attachment points would fail well before

9G.

Seventh, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) , which the FAA considers to be a competent authority, implemented the reduced 3G forward restraint requirement, and there has been no report of an accident where occupants have been harmed by cargo shiftin g forward during emergency landing conditions. The 1977 USAF Technical Report, which was issued after the development of the passenger

- based 9G forward restraint standard, concluded that reducing the requirement to 3G for cargo operations would maintain s afety and result in significant cost savings and simplification. In pertinent part, the Report

summarized:

"The civilian fleet can also use the data in determining what design criteria to utilize. For example, either a 3G positive locking rail system or a 3G net in conjunction with current 1 1⁄2 G rail system would provide an adequate system rather than the 9G system in use today." 1977 USAF Technical Report, at 50

- 51.

Accordingly, National Airlines submit s that a 3G forward restraint requirement would

pro vide an equivalent level of safety to the outdated 9G standard.

Reason the Exemption Would Benefit the Public Interest

Granting this exemption would be in the public interest because it would enable U.S. operators of B

- 747 freighter aircraft to safely a nd efficiently carry tall rigid cargo, including multiple 20

- foot sea containers, aircraft engines, large oil/gas equipment, and large vehicles, for humanitarian, commercial, and U.S. military shippers around the world.

It would also enable B

- 747 operator s to more efficiently utilize and to realize the full capabilities of their B

- 747 aircraft. Shippers need access to reasonable, safe, and timely air transportation for their shipments of tall rigid cargo. Absent this exemption, shippers will

have fewer ch oices of carriers and fewer B

- 747 aircraft to handle critical missions, because, as explained above, the 9G forward restraint requirement effectively precludes U.S. B

- 747 freighter operators from competing for tall rigid cargo shipments, without any improv ement in safety. This, in turn, leads to delays for the delivery of critical cargo and/or substantially increases costs for shippers to get their cargo delivered. For example, U.S. exporters and importers are detrimentally affected as their costs are be ing driven up, and therefore their competitiveness is reduced. The U.S. military and NGOs with urgent humanitarian missions involving tall rigid cargo also encounter delays and substantially increased costs in having their vital shipments delivered.

Eve n in cases where a single item of tall rigid cargo could be carried, other tall rigid items could not be transported because the requisite tie

- down attachments needed to restrain to

9G would not be available for additional items. National Airlines estimat es that the need to provide frangible freight or restrain tall rigid cargo to the 9G standard reduces the cargo

carrying capability by a minimum of 30% and, in some cases, up to 50% of the allowable volume and weight allowed by the Boeing 747 weight and ba lance loading and control5 manual. The public interest would be much better served with a 3G restraint requirement because it would allow more pieces of tall rigid cargo to be carried on a single flight without any reduction in safety. Adherence to the 9G standard results in more flights required to transport the same amount of tall rigid cargo, making U.S. operators uncompetitive in the marketplace.

National Airlines is losing substantial business due to their inability to offer competitive bids to carry tall rigid loads as a result of the 9G forward load requirement. Many foreign competitors routinely carry 20

- foot containers and other tall rigid cargo without restraining

them to withstand a forward 9G force.

National Airlines estimates that it is losin g millions of dollars of air cargo business because it is unable to effectively compete for tall rigid cargo shipments in light of the 9G forward restraint requirement. National Airlines operates many of its flights as unscheduled "ad hoc" charters, and therefore frangible freight is most often not available. As the absence of the frangible cargo requires the use of 9G tie downs, National Airlines often loses charters to foreign competitors as the tie

- down requirements result in the inability to carry al l of the cargo required for the charter. As such, National Airlines has noted a significant reduction in business and the loss of millions of dollars in revenue due to the 9G requirement.

National Airlines additionally notes that on flights where nonreve nue frangible freight can be used, it has done so at the airline's (not the shipper's) expense, resulting in additional cost to the airline for the buildup and disposal of this cargo. This has also caused substantial losses due to these additional unrecoup ed costs.

In the context of economic regulation, Congress directed the Secretary to strengthen the competitive position of U.S. air carriers to at least ensure equality with foreign air carriers, including the attainment of the opportunity for U.S. air ca rriers to maintain and increase their profitability in foreign air transportation. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(15) and (e)(1). We believe that the FAA can act in the public interest and level the playing field without any diminution of safety by granting this e xemption to provide for a 3G forward restraint requirement.

Federal Register publication

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for waiving the requirement for Federal Register publication for public comment. This request is identical to a previ ously granted request, and it will not set a precedent in the long term. National Airlines requested an expedited processing of this exemption as it is identical to a previously granted request, and any delay would adversely affect National Airlines

and it s ability to fulfill the tall rigid cargo restraint requirements of its humanitarian, commercial, and military customers.

The FAA’s analysis

The Boeing 747 Cargo airplane can carry cargo in the fuselage aft of the flight deck that is taller than the heig ht of the flight deck floor structure above the main deck. When this tall cargo is rigid, such as an Intermodal Container, it is identified in the current Boeing 747 Weight & Balance6 (W&B) Manual 1 as “tall rigid cargo.” Because the upper portions of the tall rigid cargo can encroach on the flight deck floor during high “ G ” forward emergency landing load conditions, this tall rigid cargo, and all cargo aft of that location, needs to be restrained to 9 G forward emergency landing loads [Title 14, Code of Fed eral Regulations (14 CFR) 25.561] to protect the flight crew and other occupants. Standard height cargo (96 inches or less) is only restrained for 1.5 G forward flight loads since it fits below the flight deck (§ 25.787). The petitioner has indicated that u nder the current Boeing 747 W&B Manual, the carriage of tall rigid cargo ( including Intermodal

Containers ) is not economically viable due to number of straps required to secure the cargo for the

9 G forward load and the corresponding airplane space/volume required for the strap attachments to the airplane.

As an alternative to restraining the tall rigid cargo (and all cargo aft of the tall rigid cargo) for 9 G loads, the Boeing 747 W&B Manual permits the use of frangible cargo in the forward fuselage (no te: this approach is used for other cargo airplanes). Boeing’s definition for frangible cargo is that which would compress and conform to the fuselage in the event of an accident with forward loads exceeding 1.5 G . Using this method, the tall rigid cargo i s restrained for only 1.5 G forward loads, which then allows for the accommodation of more cargo. Frangible cargo precludes the tall rigid cargo from impacting the flight deck floor during a survivable crash event when the forward

loads exceed 1.5 G (tall ri gid cargo that becomes loose during a crash cannot impact the flight deck floor). This alternative method of preventing the cargo from impacting the flight deck floor has been shown to meet the forward emergenc y landing load requirements. The petitioner h as expressed concerns about the availability and associated costs of frangible cargo at many airports, resulting in severe limitations in the amount of tall rigid cargo that can be carried. Under the current Boeing 747 W&B Manual, the carriage of tall rig id cargo, including Intermodal Containers, is not economically viable without sufficient frangible cargo.

The following is the FAA’s analysis of each of the petitioner ’s numbered arguments regarding the alleged “deficiencies” of the existing 9 G standard

.

1. Since the codification of part 25, the emergency la nding condition requirements in § 25.561 have been updated three times 2

. The 9G forward load requirement was based on research

and in

- service data available when the rule was originally promulgated. Th e FAA reviewed this standard each time § 25.561 was updated, and concluded each time that the

research and data available at each amendment level indicated that the standard was still necessary and appropriate for the transport airplane fleet (which includ ed the Boeing 747 airplane )

. The Boeing 747 does not contain any unique features or attributes that affect the applicability and appropriateness of the 9G forward emergency landing load requirement.

2. As discussed in the United States Air Force (USAF) Ae ronautical Systems Division (ASD)

repo rt referenced by the petitioner [Cargo Aircraft and Spacecraft Forward Restraint Criteria, Tech nical Report ASD

- TR

- 76

- 30 (December 1977) ("1977 USAF Technical Report")], it was found during FAA crash tests that instrum entation on pallet loads and

seats recorded different G

- force levels at the same lateral location in the aircraft. It was

1 Boeing W&B Manual: The B oeing W&B Manual is referenced in the operating limitations section of the airplane flight manual. It is, therefore, legally mandatory under § 91.9.

2 14 CFR § 25.561 was revised at amendment 25

- 23, 5/8/1970; amendment 25

- 64, 6/16/1988; amendment 25

- 91, 7 /29/19977 determined that the difference in the resultant G

- load was attributable to the differences in the structural stiffness and correspond ing dynamic responses of seat installations as compared to cargo/cargo restraint systems. Therefore, while the seat requirement has

increased to a 16G forward dynamic load, the corresponding forward load for cargo has

remained at 9G ; both requirements pro tect occupants for the same airplane level event. Therefore, contrary to petitioner ’ s assertion, the 9G standard has been shown to be inadequate for seats, but appropriate for cargo.

3. As discus sed above, two methods for restraining tall rigid cargo for the forward emergency landing loads on a Boeing 747 are presented in the Boeing W&B Manual. One is to secure the cargo for the 9G forward load, and the other is to carry frangible cargo in front of the tall rigid cargo. While these methods have been show n to satisfy the requirements of §§ 25.561 and 25.787, these may not be the only acceptable methods. The FAA will consider proposals for changes to the Boeing 747 W&B manual for other methods, provided sufficient substantiating data is included with each p roposal. While the petitioner has

indicated that there may be features unique to the Boeing 747 cargo airplane that may mitigate the safety risk to occupants durin g a crash event, the petitioner has provided no data to show that the occupants would be aff orded the same level of safety (intended by the regulations) during a crash landing if the proposed lower emergency landing loads were employed

.

4. Crash landings in any kind of transport airplane are rare. Nevertheless, the FAA has imposed standards to ensure occupants are protected when survivable crash landings do

occur. The requirements in § 25.561 are intended to protect occupants in the event of a rare crash landing, up to what is considered a survivable event in a transport category airplane.

The requirement s ha ve evolved over many years, supported by extensive research and in

service data. To grant an exemption, we must find that it’s in the public interest, the primary consideration of which is safety. The petitioner has offered nothing to indic ate that, in the event of a rare crash landing, the occupants would be protected.

5. The emergency landing condition requirements in § 25.561 apply to all transport category airplanes. The 9G forward load factor in § 25.561 is considered adequate and appr opriate

for crash events that are considered survivable. While there may not have be en a specific

crash event involving a Boeing 747 where the airplane has been subjected t o a condition equivalent to the most severe event addressed by the regulatory standa rds (e.g., maximum forward emergency landing load) , the standards were developed with consideration of the available data deemed applicable to all transport category airplanes

. The longitudinal loads experienced during a survivable crash landing, and the p hysiological effects on occupants, are similar regardless of airplane type. As noted above, the FAA finds that the Boeing 747 does not contain any unique features or attributes that would warrant a forward emergency landing load factor different than that provided in § 25.561.

The fact that, to date, there has not been a Boeing 747 crash landing with the maximum forward emergency landing load is irrelevant to whether the standard is appropriate for protecting occupants in the event of a crash landing in w hich that load is experience d

.8 6. The petitioner is correct that the standards in § 25.561 are not intended to protect occupants only during emergency landings. They are intended to protect occupants in precisely those

circumstances in which the aircraft i tself may be destroyed, but the crash loads and their effects on occupants are survivable. During the promulgation of Amendment 25

- 64 (effective June 16, 1988) of § 25.561, the FAA increased certain load factors in § 25.561(b)(3)(iii) to ensure that compartments and items of mass would not fail during a

crash event that would otherwise be survivable. The 9G forward load factor was considered adequate and appropriate for crash events that were considered survivable. For

the survivable cra sh events considered in the FAA’s investigation (which included FAA and NASA research and a review of existing accident data), it was shown that the airplane structure remains substantially intact and provides a livable volume for the occupants throughout the impact sequence. The FAA findings were discussed in the FAA Notice of Proposed Rule Making for Amendment 25

- 64 of § 25.561, Docket No. 25040. The

p etitioner has provided no data demonstrating these findings are inapplicable to the Boeing

747 or that compliance with the current standards would not protect occupants in an otherwise survivable crash landing.

7. In the summary of the USAF report, it is stated that the probability of occurrence of a crash landing that would produce a longitudinal force bet ween the range of 3 G and 9 G on cargo was low , and this probability is not accounted for in the FAA rule . Consideration of this low probability, coupled with the unique mission of the USAF, supported the use of a lower longitudinal load factor than that us ed by the FAA for the civilian fleet. However, later USAF aircraft, including the KC

- 10 and the Boeing 767

- 2C tanker, were required by

the USAF to meet a 9 G forward emergency landing load requirement.

The probability of crash landing s of different leve ls of severity was not considered in the development of the emergency landing factors in § 25.561. These factors are intended to protect occupants in precisely those circumstances in which the aircraft itself may be destroyed, but the crash loads and thei r effects on occupants are survivable

.

The FAA 9 G emergency landing load standard can be traced back to promulgation of the emergency landing conditions requirement in Civil Air Regulations 4b.260, Amendment 4b

- 6, effective March 5, 1952. The origin of t he 9 G forward load requirement in the § 4b.260 was investigated and documented by ASD in the aforementioned USAF report. In the USAF study, the ASD traced the roots of this requirement back to crash investigations and crash tests of various aircraft types conducted between the 1920s and 1950s. Later investigations included the consideration of the differences in dynamic responses of crew/passenger seats, cargo/cargo restraint systems, and aircraft structure. The regulations have since been updated to imp rove crew and passenger safety for emergency landing and crash conditions.

The current regulatory standards have establish ed a level of safety for the overall airplane through the FAA’s rulemaking process. Based on review of available data, including t his USAF study, the FAA cannot justify what would amount to a significant reduction in the airworthiness safety standards. The FAA concludes that granting this exemption for all Boeing 747 cargo operations is not in the public interest, and is not a benefi t to the public as a whole as the alternative standard ( reduction in the emergency landing load factors of § 25.561 (b)(3)(ii) to 3 G forward ) proposed by9 the petitioner would be a reduction in the level of safety compared to that provided by the existing

ru le and would not provide adequate protection for occupants in the event of a survivable crash landing

.

The petitioner ’ s public interest justification is based primarily on the assertion that compliance with § 25.561 results in a competitive disadvantage relative to certain foreign operators that are not required to comply with this standard. This justification could be applied to any airworthiness standard with which a foreign operator is not required to comply, and is not, in itself, grounds for

findin g that it is in the public interest to allow a reduced level of safety.

Although currently approved methods for cargo retention that apply to the carriage of tall rigid cargo on the Boeing 747 may not be economically advantageous, the FAA recognizes tha t methods can be developed that are both practical and economically viable. New methods may include the addition of barrier nets, fixed airplane anchor point s , and other methods that have previously been employed in other mission specific airplane s

.

FA A has coordinated with United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) representatives regarding retrograde activity in Afghanistan: t he current US Administration has indicated that by the end of 2014, the US troops in Afghanistan will transition from a com bat to a support role, resulting in withdrawal of the majority of US troops from Afghanistan. This action will require the transport of a large quantity of cargo by contract air carriers. A significant amount of this cargo is considered “tall rigid cargo ” as described above. This is a unique, time

- limited mission, linked to US national security. As noted by the petitioner, granting of this exemption would allow National Airlines to carry cargo under contract of the US DoD to remove cargo from Afghanistan to support
US National interests.

The FAA’s Decision

The FAA has concluded that it is in the public interest to grant a time

- limited exemption from §§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135(b)(21), and 121.141

, to not apply the forward emergency la nding load factor of 9 G specified in § 25.561(b) (3)(ii) for restraint of cargo on the

main deck of Boeing 747 series airplanes

. This partial grant is identical to previously granted Exemption No. 11096 (copy enclosed)

. This exemption applies only to all

- cargo flights originating in Afghanistan for the transport of cargo for the DoD , including all flight segments to

reach the intended final destination

, provided the cargo or method to secure the cargo is not altered or changed prior to reaching the final d estination.

Section 25.561 provides requirements for emergency landing conditions on land or water where the airplane may be damaged or destroyed. The scope of this exemption is limited to the forward loads of the emergency landing conditions of section 25.561(b)(3)(ii). T h is exemption provides no relief from f light l oads

. Part 25 subpart C

– Structure, under the subheadings Flight Loads and Flight Maneuver and Gust Conditions

, provides requirements for in

- flight conditions for all transport category airplanes. All cargo must be secured to the loads prescribed for these in

- flight

conditions.10 This determination is based on the limited risk exposure of this specific mission coupled with the importance of the mission as it relates to US N ational security. This determination is also consistent with the USAF recommendation in the aforementioned report: “9 G was a reasonable level of restraint for protection of passengers, yet it was recognized that it could not be achieved under all circumstances, particularly not in combat conditions.”

Additional Information

The FAA has held discussions with the DoD regarding air carrier all cargo operational support for the DoD mission to remove military equipment out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. This DoD

effort be gan in 2013, involving the movement of approximately 24,000 vehicles and 20,000 shipping containers. In discussions with the DoD, DoD representatives have indicated that one mode of transit employed by the DoD to remove this cargo from Afghanistan is by t he use of air cargo carriers. Existing limitations in air carrier cargo operator manuals limit the amount of cargo that can be carried on Boeing 747 cargo airplanes, which is one of the primary airplane models used for this mission. Representatives of the DoD have indicated that these limitations may inhibit the ability of the DoD to meet their planned mission requirement to remove military equipment from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. B y easing the current limitations in the air carrier cargo

operator ma nuals, this exemption would allow the peti tioner to better support the DoD mission. Documentation of this communication may be found in docket FAA

- 2014

- 0184

.

The FAA is aware of concerns raised by the p etitioner regarding the perception of a lack of parit y within the air cargo transport industry as it relates to the usage of Boeing 747 cargo airplanes and compliance with the subject regulations. The FAA is investigating this issue to determine whether regulatory action is necessary and appropriate.

Th e Grant of Exemption

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a partial grant of exemption is in the public interest and provides a benefit to the public as a whole. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 4 4701, delegated to me by the Administrator, National Air Cargo Group, Inc. (National Airlines), is hereby granted a time

- limited exemption from §§ 91.9(a), 91.1025(a), 121.135(a)(4), 121.135( b)(21), and 121.141, to not apply the forward emergency landing l oad factor of 9 G specified in § 25.561(b) (3)(ii) , for restraint of cargo on the main deck of Boeing 747 series airplanes , subject to the conditions and limitations below.

Conditions and Limitations

1. This exemption applies only to all

- cargo flights origina ting in Afghanistan for the transport of cargo for the United States Department of Defense , including all flight segments to reach

the intended final destination , provided the cargo or method to secure the cargo is not altered or changed prior to reaching the final destination.

2. All cargo must be secured for all flight loads as required by 14 CFR part 25 , subpart C.

T his exemption provides no relief from 14 CFR part 25 , subpart C, flight loads.11 3. The flight crew must carry a copy of this exemption on all flights operated under this exemption.

This exemption expires one year from the date of issuance of this exemption , unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Issued in Washington , D.C. on D ecember 15, 201 4

.

//s//

John S. Duncan Director, Flight Standards Service