This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0654

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Demetrious Limel Parker,

Appellant.

Filed February 16, 2016

Affirmed

Stauber, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-14-25125

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge.

*

 

 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

STAUBER, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of possession of a firearm by an ineligible 

person, arguing that the prosecutor committed reversible error by eliciting testimony 

about the substance of a confidential reliable informant’s (CRI) tip and that the district 

court abused its discretion by not ordering the disclosure of the CRI’s identity or 

examining the CRI in camera. Because the prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice 

appellant, and because appellant did not establish a basis for disclosure of the CRI’s 

identity or an in camera inquiry of the CRI, we affirm. 

FACTS

In August 2014, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for a Minneapolis

house based on information from a CRI that a person known as “Meechi” possessed a .45 

caliber handgun at the residence. The CRI positively identified appellant Demetrious 

Limel Parker as “Meechi.” Parker has a second-degree burglary conviction that prohibits

him from possessing firearms. 

During the execution of the search warrant, law enforcement discovered a Taurus 

.45 caliber pistol with a magazine containing eight rounds under a mattress in an upstairs 

bedroom. Detective Andrew Suerth recorded an interview with Parker at the house 

shortly after the search warrant was executed. In the interview, Parker said that he had

been staying at the residence for a couple nights and admitted that he handled the 

handgun and was storing it for a friend; he also said that it did not belong to the owner of 

the residence. He stated the gun was a .45 caliber, and he believed it was loaded.
3

Prior to trial, Parker moved the district court to compel disclosure of the CRI’s

identity or alternatively to conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether the CRI’s

identity should be revealed. The district court denied Parker’s motion. On the morning 

of trial, the prosecutor raised the issue of how much information from the CRI’s tip 

would be admissible, stating “it’s my understanding [the] defense is not objecting to the 

information that the officer had a [CRI] and that’s how he had the defendant’s name and 

address. . .” Defense counsel responded that he had “no objection to the officer 

indicating that a warrant was obtained based on information from an informant,” and only 

objected to the jury knowing Parker was wanted on a felony warrant for a probation 

violation. 

At trial, Suerth testified that a CRI told him sometime in early August a person 

known as “Meechi” possessed a firearm and provided information regarding “Meechi’s” 

location, later identifying Parker as “Meechi.” Suerth stated that “[w]ithin 72 hours of 

applying for the warrant, the [CRI] had seen [Parker] with a handgun inside of [the 

residence searched].” After this testimony, the jury was played a recording and provided 

a transcript of Suerth’s initial interview with Parker.

Parker testified in his defense. At trial, he denied ever seeing, handling, or moving 

the handgun. He stated that he “was just making up a story” during the initial interview 

to protect the owner of the house and her son, claiming that his first instinct was to take 

the blame and that it was lucky guess the handgun was a loaded .45. 
4

During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that “the information also 

included [Parker] having a gun in early August” near the residence. The prosecutor 

continued, saying:

Well, just keeping in mind that the CRI said the 

defendant had the gun in [the residence], that the defendant 

later admitted to having the gun. The CRI's info, the 

information given, Meechi living in this address has a gun. All

those things turned out to be true. And it wasn't just a 

coincidence that he gave this address and gave this name and 

pointed officers in that direction and this defendant, first night 

he's ever stayed at this house, happened to be sleeping on a gun.

The jury found Parker guilty. This appeal follows. 

D E C I S I O N

I. Testimony about the CRI’s statements

Parker first argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting 

testimony regarding what the CRI told Suerth. Because Parker did not object at trial, we 

review the allegation of prosecutorial misconduct under a modified plain-error standard. 

State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this standard, the appellant 

must first show that there was error and that the error was plain. State v. Martin, 773 

N.W.2d 89, 104 (Minn. 2009). If the appellant makes such a showing, the burden shifts 

to the state to show that the appellant was not prejudiced by the error. Id. If the state 

cannot show that the plain error did not affect the appellant’s substantial rights, we then 

assess “whether the error should be addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the 

judicial proceedings.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. The primary concern in addressing 
5

prosecutorial misconduct is whether the alleged misconduct deprived the defendant of his 

right to a fair trial. State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2008).

“An error is ‘plain’ if it is clear or obvious.” Id. A prosecutor’s conduct 

constitutes plain error when it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” 

Id. It is plain error for a prosecutor to intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony. State v. 

Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 744 (Minn. 2003). Therefore, we must first determine whether the 

testimony regarding the CRI’s statements was admissible. Testimony that law 

enforcement received a tip, for the purposes of explaining their actions, is not

inadmissible hearsay. State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2002). But a law 

enforcement officer “testifying in a criminal case may not, under the guise of explaining 

how the investigation focused on defendant, relate hearsay statements of others.” Id. 

(quotation omitted). Therefore, Suerth’s statements regarding the substance of the CRI’s 

statements constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the prosecutor’s elicitation of such 

statements was plain error.

Because there was plain error, the burden shifts to the state to show that the error 

did not prejudice Parker. Martin, 773 N.W.2d at 104. We consider three factors in 

determining prejudice: (1) the strength of the evidence against the defendant; (2) the 

pervasiveness of the misconduct; and (3) whether the defendant had the opportunity to 

rebut the inadmissible testimony. Jones, 753 N.W.2d at 692-93.

First, the evidence against Parker is strong. Parker suggests that the jury simply 

had to decide whether Parker was truthful in his initial statement to Suerth or if he was 

truthful at trial when he claimed he accepted responsibility for the handgun because he 
6

did not want the owner of the house to be “in trouble.” But even without the CRI’s 

statements or Parker’s initial admission, there is evidence Parker possessed the handgun:

it was found under the mattress in the room where Parker had been staying and where he 

was sleeping when the warrant was executed.

Moreover, the jury surely found Parker’s trial testimony not credible. It is 

unlikely that a person who is ineligible to possess a firearm would “take the blame” for a 

handgun found in a house where he sometimes sleeps but does not reside. There is no 

indication that the owner of the home was ineligible to possess a firearm such that Parker 

needed to protect the owner. Parker’s explanation that it was a “lucky guess” that he 

knew the model of the handgun and that it was loaded was not persuasive given the 

relevant circumstances. 

Second, we consider the pervasiveness of the misconduct. The prosecutor stated 

in his opening remarks that a police officer “had information that [Parker], who you have 

heard is prohibited, had a firearm.” During trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from

Suerth about the substance and timing of information he received from the CRI. And in 

closing arguments, the prosecutor provided a basis for the CRI’s credibility. Because the 

prosecutor mentioned the substance of the tip during multiple stages of trial, the 

misconduct was pervasive. But the prosecutor also relied on other arguments; the 

substance of the tip was not the primary focus. Additionally, unlike caselaw where a 

conviction was reversed for misconduct regarding hearsay evidence, there was no 

specific pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the substance of the tip. See, e.g., Ray, 659 

N.W.2d at 744-45 (concluding that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he 
7

repeatedly tried to elicit testimony about the substance of a tip that had previously been 

ruled inadmissible); Litzau, 650 N.W.2d at 184 (concluding that the cumulative effect of 

multiple errors, including the prosecutor eliciting hearsay testimony about the substance 

of a tip and referring to the hearsay in closing arguments, warranted a new trial). 

Therefore, we cannot conclude that the pervasiveness of the misconduct warrants a new 

trial.

Third, Parker asserts he had no opportunity to rebut the misconduct. But, prior to 

trial, the prosecutor raised the issue of admissibility of information from the CRI, stating 

that he “wanted to be sure concerning what objections the defense may make as to how 

much of that information would be brought before the jury.” Parker only objected to

reference of his outstanding felony warrant, and did not object to “information provided 

by the officer executing the warrant.” Parker failed to utilize this opportunity to argue 

that the substance of the tip was hearsay.1

Based on the totality of the factors, we cannot conclude that testimony about the 

substance of the tip had a significant effect on the verdict. Therefore, Parker’s substantial 

 

1 Parker also argues that he did not have the opportunity to rebut the CRI’s testimony 

because he could not cross-examine the CRI. This essentially implicates the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which “guarantees the accused the right 

to confront the witnesses against him.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 864 (Minn. 

2008). Unobjected-to Confrontation Clause violations are reviewed under the plain error 

standard. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 311 (Minn. 2006). Like unobjected-to 

prosecutorial misconduct, an unobjected-to Confrontation Clause violation must affect 

“substantial rights” before relief is granted, meaning that the error must affect the 

outcome of the case. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 864. Because the balance of the factors 

shows that the inadmissible testimony did not affect the verdict, Parker is not entitled to a 

new trial based on a Confrontation Clause violation. 
8

rights were not affected and a new trial is not required. See, e.g., State v. Prtine, 784 

N.W.2d 303, 315 (Minn. 2010) (concluding that hearsay testimony did not have a 

significant impact on the verdict). 

II. Disclosure of the CRI’s identity

Parker argues that the district court erred by not ordering the disclosure of the 

CRI’s identity or, alternatively, by not conducting an in camera investigation of the CRI. 

It is the defendant’s burden to establish the need for disclosure. State v. Ford, 322 

N.W.2d 611, 614 (Minn. 1982). We review the district court’s decision regarding 

disclosure of a CRI’s identity for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d 

84, 90 (Minn. 2008). The state has the privilege to withhold the identity of a CRI 

because of its interest in protecting those who furnish information to the police. Id. But

disclosure of a CRI’s identity is required when it “is relevant and helpful to the defense of 

an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Id. (quotation omitted). A

request for disclosure is considered on a case-by-case analysis focused on fundamental 

fairness, balancing the need to protect the flow of information and the need to prepare a 

defense. Id. The district court considers four nonexclusive factors in assessing the need 

for disclosure: (1) whether the CRI is a material witness; (2) whether the CRI’s testimony 

is material to the issue of guilt; (3) whether law enforcement’s testimony is suspect; and 

(4) whether the CRI’s testimony might expose entrapment. Id. The overarching concern 

in applying these factors is “whether disclosing the informant’s identity would be helpful 

to the defense in overcoming an element of the charge.” Id. at 92.
9

Parker asserts that the CRI is a material witness because the fact that the CRI 

observed Parker with the handgun is highly probative of the fact that Parker 

constructively possessed the handgun. The district court found that although only the 

CRI observed Parker actually possess the handgun, the state would rely on Parker’s own 

admission. Parker was charged based on the handgun being under his mattress and his 

admissions, not solely the CRI’s observations. Thus, the CRI was not a material witness. 

Likewise, because the handgun was found under a mattress in Parker’s room and Parker 

admitted he was holding the handgun for a friend, the CRI’s statements about seeing 

Parker with the handgun prior to the search warrant are confirmatory but not strictly 

material to the issue of guilt. As discussed above, we cannot conclude that Parker would 

not have been convicted without the CRI’s statements. Moreover, Parker does not assert 

that the officer’s testimony was suspect or that there was entrapment. Therefore, the 

factors weigh against disclosing the CRI’s identity. There is no other indication that the 

informant’s identity could help Parker overcome any element of ineligible possession of a 

firearm. Because the district court considered the necessary factors and the CRI’s 

testimony was likely not material, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

refusing to order the disclosure of the CRI’s identity. 

Parker also contends that the district court should have conducted an in camera 

hearing to determine whether the CRI’s identity should be disclosed. The defendant 

bears the burden to show the need to examine a CRI in camera. State v. Wessels, 424 

N.W.2d 572, 574 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1988). “All that is 

needed to justify an in camera inquiry is a minimal showing of a basis for inquiry but 
10

something more than mere speculation by the defendant that examination of the 

informant might be helpful.” State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Minn. 1989). Parker 

provides no reasoning as to how an in camera examination would aid his defense. 

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting such an 

inquiry. 

Affirmed.