alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                           5

<S>                                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                       3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                      Sep-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                         Oct-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                           Dec-31-1999
<CASH>                                                       1,293
<SECURITIES>                                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                                    0
<ALLOWANCES>                                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                             1,293
<PP&E>                                                           0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                                   0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                       46,838
<BONDS>                                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                            0
<PREFERRED>                                                      0
<COMMON>                                                     5,175
<OTHER-SE>                                                 (50,720)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                                 1,293
<SALES>                                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                                 0
<CGS>                                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                    0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                            10,313
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                             175
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                                  0
<INCOME-TAX>                                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                              0
<DISCONTINUED>                                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                  0
<CHANGES>                                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                                     0
<EPS-BASIC>                                               (0.002)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                               (0.002)



</TABLE>
Sherman K. FLYNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-1828

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed July 31, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Suntron Corporation (the Company) for
the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, James K. Bass, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1)
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and  (2)
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. /s/ James K. Bass
    
    April 6, 2005James K. Bass
    
    DateChief Executive Officer
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 

# Explore Search: Cascading Hazards

Filters

              - connect_staff_profiles(5)

## By Location

## By Year

              - 2024(14)
              - 2023(13)
              - 2022(6)
              - (-)2021(5)
              - 2019(1)

staff profileBrian Meyers

staff profileEmily Bryant

staff profileScott E. Graham

staff profileBenjamin A. Pauk

staff profileRobert Mertens
[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 201 (Monday, October 19, 1998)]
[Corrections]
[Page 55918]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: X98-11019]



Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 201 / Monday, October 19, 1998 / 
Corrections

[[Page 55918]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
[Docket No. RP98-432-000]


Crossroads Pipeline Company; Notice of Compliance Filing

Correction

    In notice document 98-27129, appearing on page 54463 in the issue 
of Friday, October 9, 1998, the docket number is corrected to read as 
set forth above.
BILLING CODE 1505-01-D
1

Filed 7/7/15 Smith v. Super. Ct. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ROBERT SMITH,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

RIVERSIDE COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

E063336

(Super.Ct.No. ICR15111)

OPINION

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. James S. Hawkins, 

Judge. Petition is granted.

Robert Smith, Jr., in pro. per., for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Alan D. Tate, Deputy District Attorney, for 

Real Party in Interest.
2

DISCUSSION

Trial courts have little discretion to deny a request for post-conviction discovery 

under Penal Code section 1054.9. (See Catlin v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 300.) 

As the statute does not provide for representation by counsel (cf. Pen. Code, § 1405, 

which does provide for the appointment of counsel when a defendant seeks DNA testing), 

courts should not impose unnecessary procedural bars. While it is not entirely clear how 

petitioner presented his request to the trial court, we are persuaded that he is entitled to a 

point-by-point determination on the merits of his requests. 

We are not persuaded that the statute requires petitioner to first request discovery 

from the People, and at this point, given the time which has been expended, it seems 

preferable in any event to place the matter before the trial court for a final resolution 

rather than to inject additional delay.

We do not mean that trial courts are obliged to rule on requests that do not meet 

the statutory requirements, but we note that petitioner has now established that he cannot 

obtain the desired materials from trial counsel. Insofar as he requests materials to which 

he would not have been entitled at trial, and which are therefore not covered by Penal 

Code section 1054.9, the trial court may of course deny relief.

DISPOSITION

On April 27, 2015, petitioner filed a motion to seal declaration in support of the 

petition for writ of mandate. Petitioner’s request to seal the declaration is granted; 

however, the declaration was not significant to this court’s decision.
3

The petition for writ of mandate is granted in part. Let a peremptory writ of 

mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order 

denying petitioner’s request, and to reconsider the request on the merits. 

Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, 

copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of 

service on all parties.

In the interest of justice, this order shall be final forthwith.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

HOLLENHORST

J.

KING

J.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION BY CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906

OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2003

In connection with the Report (as defined under the preceding Certification By Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003),
I, Walter Thomas Price III, Co-Chairman, President and Director of Price Asset Management, Inc., the general partner of the Partnership, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2003,
that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/ Walter Thomas Price IIIWalter Thomas Price IIIChairman, President and DirectorMarch 31, 2006




E-2
John M. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 1D17-0456

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

September 12, 2018

Charlie Cofer, Public Defender, and Elizabeth Hogan Webb, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville; John M. Johnson, pro se, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.

The petition for belated appeal is denied on the merits.

Ray, Makar, and Bilbrey, JJ., concur.
Grisell CERVERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, Appellee.

No. 3D17-1768

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed June 27, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
DISMISS; and Opinion Filed July 31, 2017.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-17-00562-CR

DEGETREION LATRELL SCOTT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-41943-M

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Brown, and Schenck

Opinion by Justice Schenck 

On May 26, 2017, Degetreion Latrell Scott filed a notice of appeal and a motion to 

extend the time to file his notice of appeal. In the motion, appellant states his notice of appeal 

concerns an April 13, 2017 order modifying the terms and conditions of his community 

supervision imposed following his placement on deferred adjudication for unauthorized use of a 

motor vehicle. Appellant conceded that the Court might ultimately determine that it does not 

have jurisdiction over the modification order he wished to appeal. We make that determination 

today.

Rather than rule on appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file his notice of 

appeal, the Court issued a letter to the parties requesting a letter brief to address whether the 

Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. In his letter brief, appellant conceded that there is no 

basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction and review the trial court’s modification order.
–2–

When a defendant is placed upon deferred adjudication, we have jurisdiction to review an 

order granting deferred adjudication and an order adjudicating guilt. See Davis v. State, 195 

S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). An order modifying the terms and conditions of 

community supervision is not appealable. See id. Thus, there is no basis for the Court to extend 

the time to file a notice of appeal in a case over which it has no jurisdiction. See id.; see also 

Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (upon concluding it is without

jurisdiction, court of appeals must dismiss appeal without taking any further action).

Appellant’s May 26, 2017 motion for extension of time for filing his notice of appeal is 

DENIED. The appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2

170562F.U05

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK

JUSTICE
–3–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

DEGETREION LATRELL SCOTT, 

Appellant

No. 05-17-00562-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-41943-M.

Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. 

Justices Francis and Brown participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2017.
## Breadcrumb

-  Home 

# Explore Search:  Meteor Crater

Filters

              - science_science(4)
              - products_data(3)
              - products_maps(1)
              - products_publications(17)
              - multimedia_image(5)
              - multimedia_image-141769(2)
              - multimedia_image-141771(1)
              - (-)multimedia_image-141776(1)
              - multimedia_image-204460(1)
              - multimedia_video(5)
              - multimedia_video-149194(2)
              - multimedia_video-149195(3)
              - (-)documents_file(2)
              - documents_file-149203(2)
              - news_news-149246(1)
              - news_other_news(1)
              - other_basic-43(1)

## By Location

              - arizona(3)

## By Year

Forms        September 26, 2018        Meteor Crater Sample Request Form

Forms        September 26, 2018        Meteor Crater Drill Cuttings Sampling Protocol

Illustrations        December 31, 2019        Arizona Landsat State Mosaic
**EXHIBIT 99.4**

**CFO CERTIFICATION UNDER 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
  ACT**



---





**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADDED BYSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with
  the Annual Report of FPB Bancorp, Inc. on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December
  31, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report),
  I, Nancy Aumack, Chief Financial Officer of FPB Bancorp, Inc., certify, pursuant
  to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
  2002, that:1.The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
  or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly
  presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
  of First Peoples Bank as of and for the period covered by the report.



|Date: | March 26, 2003 | By: | /s/ Nancy Aumack                     
|----- | -------------- | --- | -------------------------------------
|      |                |     |                                      
|      |                |     | Nancy Aumack, Chief Financial Officer
Jeremy M. CARTER, Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. OUELETTE & MAULDIN COURT REPORTERS, INC., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-0732

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

MAY 30, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Denied.
Edward BEARDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-5114

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed May 2, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-2241

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Marcus DeShawn Harmon-Wright

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Eastern

 ____________

Submitted: November 23, 2021

Filed: November 30, 2021

[Unpublished]

____________

Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Marcus Harmon-Wright appeals the above-Guidelines sentence imposed by the

district court1

 after he pled guilty to a firearms offense. His counsel has moved for

1The Honorable C. J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.
leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), arguing that the district court erred by applying an upward departure, and that

the sentence is unreasonable.

Upon careful review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by departing upward from the Guidelines; and did not impose a

substantively unreasonable sentence, as the court properly considered the factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not err in weighing the relevant factors. See

United States v. Vasquez, 552 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2009) (departures from

sentencing Guidelines are reviewed for abuse of discretion); United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (sentences are reviewed for

substantive reasonableness under deferential abuse of discretion standard; abuse of

discretion occurs when court fails to consider relevant factor, gives significant weight

to improper or irrelevant factor, or commits clear error of judgment in weighing

appropriate factors).

We have also independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75 (1988), and we find no non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we

affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

-2-
Exhibit



Exhibit 10.3



June 21, 2017
[NAME]
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
675 West Kendall Street
Cambridge, MA 02142


Dear [NAME]:
     You and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the “Company”), are parties to an employment agreement dated ________________, that sets forth certain terms of your employment with the Company (the “Employment Agreement”).  We have agreed to certain amendments to the Employment Agreement set forth below, which amendments will have an effective date as of the date first written above.
Except as set forth below, your Employment Agreement shall remain unchanged and shall continue in full force and effect according to its terms.  
		
	1.
	The last two sentences of Section 5.1(d) of the Employment Agreement shall be replaced in their entirety with the following:  




“The Employee shall also be entitled to immediate vesting, on the date of termination, of any restricted stock and restricted stock unit awards with underlying shares that vest solely through the passage of time (i.e., service-based vesting) and not upon the achievement of specified conditions or milestones (i.e., performance-based vesting), including any future restricted stock or restricted stock unit awards granted to the Employee after the date of this Agreement that contain service-based vesting provisions (collectively, “Outstanding Restricted Stock Awards”), in each case that would have vested during the period of twelve (12) months from the date of termination; provided that, if any such awards constitute “non-qualified deferred compensation” subject to Section 409A (as defined in Section 17), then such awards will vest on the date of termination and will be paid or settled, as applicable, in accordance with the schedule that applies to such awards notwithstanding the accelerated vesting provisions of this Section 5.1(d) to the extent necessary to avoid a prohibited distribution under Section 409A.  The Employee shall have no further rights with respect to any Outstanding Restricted Stock Awards that remain unvested after taking into account the previous sentence.”
Sincerely,
Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
By:  ___________________
Title:  __________________




The foregoing correctly sets forth the terms of my continued employment with the Company.  I am not relying on any representations other than as set out in the Employment Agreement and the amendment thereto set forth above.  I have been given a reasonable amount of time to consider this amendment and to consult an attorney and/or advisor of my choosing.  I have carefully read this amendment, understand the contents herein, freely and voluntarily assent to all of the terms and conditions hereof, and sign my name of my own free act.


__________________________________        Date:  ______________, 2017
[NAME]


    


- 1 -
EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this quarterly report of Transax International Limited (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB/A for the quarter ending September 30, 2005, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Adam Wasserman, Principal Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

         (1)      the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

/s/ Adam Wasserman
------------------
Adam Wasserman
Principal Financial and Accounting Officer
July 7, 2006
STATE EX REL. Delbert CELESTINE v. STATE of Louisiana

No. 2017-KH-0924

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

August 31, 2018

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. The application was not timely filed in the district court, and relator fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; *State ex rel. Glover v. State* , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated his application for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see*28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.
Brandon Seandrae ATWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D18-1122

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[June 21, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.