Cite as 28 I&N Dec. 450 (BIA 2022) Interim Decision #4036 

450 

Matter of Luk Rial KOAT, Respondent

Decided January 27, 2022

U.S. Department of Justice 

Executive Office for Immigration Review 

Board of Immigration Appeals

 Section 714.1 of the Iowa Code is divisible with respect to whether a violation of the 

statute involved theft by taking without consent or theft by fraud or deceit, permitting an 

Immigration Judge to review the conviction record under a modified categorical approach 

to determine whether the violation involved aggravated felony theft as defined in section 

101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2018). 

FOR RESPONDENT: Allison J. Heimes, Esquire, Omaha, Nebraska 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Kathleen M. Zapata, 

Associate Legal Advisor 

BEFORE: Board Panel: O’CONNOR and BAIRD, Appellate Immigration Judges; 

DE CARDONA, Temporary Appellate Immigration Judge. 

O’CONNOR, Appellate Immigration Judge: 

 In a decision dated July 9, 2020, an Immigration Judge determined that 

the respondent’s convictions for theft in the first degree under Iowa law and 

aggravated robbery in the second degree under Minnesota law rendered him 

removable as charged and denied his applications for relief from removal. 

The respondent has appealed from the Immigration Judge’s determination 

regarding his removability. Because we conclude that the respondent’s Iowa 

theft offense is an aggravated felony, his appeal will be dismissed. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The respondent is a native of Ethiopia and citizen of South Sudan who is 

a lawful permanent resident of the United States. In November 2018, he was 

convicted of aggravated robbery in the second degree under Minnesota law, 

and, in May 2019, he was convicted of theft in the first degree in violation of 

sections 714.1 and 714.2(1) of the Iowa Code. For the latter offense, he was 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed 10 years. 

 Based on these convictions, the respondent was placed in removal 

proceedings and charged with removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2018), 

as a respondent convicted of an aggravated felony theft offense for which the 
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451 

term of imprisonment is at least 1 year as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) 

of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2018).1

 He was also charged with 

removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act, as a respondent 

convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of 

a single scheme of criminal misconduct. 

 The Immigration Judge sustained both charges, finding that the 

respondent’s conviction for theft in the first degree under Iowa law is 

a conviction for an aggravated felony theft offense and that this offense and 

his Minnesota aggravated robbery are crimes involving moral turpitude. The 

Immigration Judge further found both convictions barred the respondent 

from applying for relief from removal and denied his applications. 

 On appeal, the respondent contends the Immigration Judge erred in 

finding that his conviction for theft in the first degree under Iowa law is a 

conviction for an aggravated felony theft offense and a crime involving moral 

turpitude.2

 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has submitted 

a brief in opposition to the appeal.3

 For the following reasons, we conclude, 

upon our de novo review, that the respondent’s conviction for theft in the 

first degree under sections 714.1 and 714.2(1) of the Iowa Code is 

a conviction for an aggravated felony theft offense that renders him 

removable as charged under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. See 

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2021). Because this conclusion is dispositive of 

the respondent’s removability, we need not address whether he was 

convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude under section 

237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) 

(per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make 

findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they 

reach.”). 

 

1

 The respondent had been previously placed in removal proceedings based on different 

convictions. He was found to be removable based on these convictions but was granted 

relief from removal. 

2

 The respondent does not challenge the Immigration Judge’s determination that his 

Minnesota aggravated robbery offense is a crime involving moral turpitude, nor does he 

challenge the Immigration Judge’s grounds for denying his applications for relief. We 

deem any arguments in this regard to be waived. See, e.g., Matter of Y-I-M-, 27 I&N Dec. 

724, 730 n.2 (BIA 2019). 

3

 We requested supplemental briefing from the parties and amici curiae on whether State 

case law establishes that section 714.1 of the Iowa Code is divisible with regard to the type 

of theft involved in a violation of the statute. We acknowledge and appreciate the briefs 

submitted by the parties and amici. 
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452 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Categorical Approach 

 To determine whether the respondent’s crime is an aggravated felony 

theft offense, we employ the categorical approach by comparing the elements 

of his Iowa statute of conviction to the generic definition of aggravated 

felony theft at section 101(a)(43)(G). See Matter of Delgado, 27 I&N Dec. 

100, 100–01 (BIA 2017). If the elements of the statute of conviction plainly 

reach conduct outside the generic definition, or if there is a realistic 

probability the statute would be used to prosecute such conduct, the statute 

is overbroad and does not categorically match the generic definition. See 

Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013). 

 If the respondent’s statute of conviction is overbroad, we must consider 

whether it is divisible—that is, whether it “sets out one or more elements of 

the offense in the alternative.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 

(2013). If it is divisible, we may examine the relevant conviction records—

including the criminal complaint and plea agreement—under a modified 

categorical approach to identify under which statutory alternative the 

respondent was convicted. See id.; see also Shepard v. United States, 544 

U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 

 For purposes of the categorical approach, the Supreme Court provided 

a specific definition for the term “elements,” stating that they “are the 

‘constituent parts’ of a crime’s legal definition,” which the “prosecution must 

prove to sustain a conviction” and “the jury must find beyond a reasonable 

doubt to convict the defendant.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 

2248 (2016) (citation omitted). In contrast to “elements,” the Court stated 

that alternative “means” in a statute merely describe diverse ways “of 

satisfying a single element,” or “spell[] out various factual ways of 

committing . . . the offense.” Id. at 2249. In other words, “means” “are 

‘circumstance[s]’ or ‘event[s]’ having no ‘legal effect [or] consequence’” 

that need not “be found by a jury.” Id. at 2248 (alterations in original) 

(citation omitted). If the respondent’s statute of conviction lists alternative 

“means,” rather than “elements,” then we do not apply the modified 

categorical approach, and his conviction cannot serve as a predicate for his 

removal. See id. at 2251. 

 The courts have specified “authoritative sources of state law” we may 

look to in determining whether, for purposes of divisibility, a statute sets 

forth alternative “elements,” rather than “means”: (1) the statutory language; 

(2) State court decisions; (3) relevant jury instructions; and (4) if State “law 

fails to provide clear answers,” the record of conviction. Id. at 2249, 

2256–57; see also Martinez v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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453 

B. Aggravated Felony Theft 

 Generic theft under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act is defined as “the 

taking of, or exercise of control over, property without consent whenever 

there is criminal intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of 

ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.” Matter 

of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436, 440–41 (BIA 2008) (footnote 

omitted). This definition does not encompass crimes committed by fraud or 

deceit because such an offense “ordinarily involves the taking or acquisition 

of property with consent that has been fraudulently obtained.” Id. at 440. 

 Section 714.1 of the Iowa Code sets forth a number of alternative 

definitions of “theft”—some of which involve generic theft, while others 

involve theft by fraud or deceit. Compare Iowa Code Ann. § 714.1(1) (West 

2019) (criminalizing theft by taking without consent), with Iowa Code 

§ 714.1(3) (theft by deception), and Iowa Code § 714.1(6) (theft by check).4

 

 

4

 At the time of the respondent’s offense, section 714.1 of the Iowa Code provided, in 

pertinent part, that an individual 

commits theft when the person does any of the following: 

1. Takes possession or control of the property of another, or property in the 

possession of another, with the intent to deprive the other thereof. 

2. Misappropriates property which the person has in trust, or property of another 

which the person has in the person’s possession or control, whether such 

possession or control is lawful or unlawful, by using or disposing of it in a manner 

which is inconsistent with or a denial of the trust or of the owner’s rights in such 

property, or conceals found property, or appropriates such property to the person’s 

own use, when the owner of such property is known to the person. 

. . . . 

3. Obtains the labor or services of another, or a transfer of possession, control, 

or ownership of the property of another, or the beneficial use of property of 

another, by deception. . . . 

4. Exercises control over stolen property, knowing such property to have been 

stolen, or having reasonable cause to believe that such property has been stolen, 

unless the person’s purpose is to promptly restore it to the owner or to deliver it to 

an appropriate public officer. . . . 

5. Takes, destroys, conceals or disposes of property in which someone else has 

a security interest, with intent to defraud the secured party. 

6. Makes, utters, draws, delivers, or gives any check, share draft, draft, or 

written order on any bank, credit union, person, or corporation, and obtains 

property, the use of property, including rental property, or service in exchange for 

such instrument, if the person knows that such check, share draft, draft, or written 

order will not be paid when presented. 

. . . . 

7. Obtains gas, electricity or water from a public utility or obtains cable 

television or telephone service from an unauthorized connection to the supply or 
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Accordingly, section 714.1 is overbroad relative to the definition of 

aggravated felony theft under section 101(a)(43)(G). See Moncrieffe, 569 

U.S. at 190–91. 

 We must therefore determine whether the alternative definitions of theft 

under section 714.1 of the Iowa Code are alternative elements of the statute, 

rendering it divisible with respect to whether a violation of the statute 

involved theft by taking without consent or theft by deception or fraud.5

 See 

Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Based on the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in 

State v. Nall, 894 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 2017), the Immigration Judge found, 

and the DHS argues on appeal, that the respondent’s statute of conviction is 

divisible. 

 In that case, the Iowa Supreme Court held that to be convicted of theft by 

taking under section 714.1(1), “a person must acquire property without the 

consent or authority of another.” Id. at 524 (emphasis added). The defendant 

in Nall was convicted of theft by taking under section 714.1(1) after she used 

 

service line or by intentionally altering, adjusting, removing or tampering with the 

metering or service device so as to cause inaccurate readings. 

8. Knowingly and without authorization accesses or causes to be accessed 

a computer, computer system, or computer network, or any part thereof, for the 

purpose of obtaining computer services, information, or property or knowingly and 

without authorization and with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of 

possession, takes, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of a computer, 

computer system, or computer network or any computer software or computer 

program, or computer data contained in a computer, computer system, or computer 

network. 

9. a. Obtains the temporary use of video rental property or equipment rental 

property with the intent to deprive the owner of the use and possession of the video 

rental property or equipment rental property without the consent of the owner. 

. . . . 

10. Any act that is declared to be theft by any provision of the Code. 

Section 714.2(1) of the Iowa Code, in turn, provided, in relevant part, that the “theft of 

property exceeding ten thousand dollars in value, or the theft of property from the person 

of another . . . is theft in the first degree.” 

5

 We recognize that in Matter of Reyes, 28 I&N Dec. 52, 52–54 (A.G. 2020), the Attorney 

General concluded that a respondent had been convicted of an aggravated felony under 

a State theft statute where all the elements in each alternative statutory definition of theft, 

and thus all the means of committing theft under the statute, corresponded to either an 

aggravated felony theft or an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit in which the loss 

to the victim exceeds $10,000 under section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Act. However, Matter 

of Reyes does not apply here because, at the time of the respondent’s offense, not all thefts 

by fraud under section 714.1 involved a loss of more than $10,000, as required by section 

101(a)(43)(M)(i). See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 714.2(2) (West 2019) (grading “theft of 

property exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars but not exceeding ten thousand 

dollars” as theft in the second degree (emphasis added)). 
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455 

counterfeit checks and “a phony money order” to make bank withdrawals 

and pay for services. Id. at 515–16, 525. Because the defendant had obtained 

the consent of her victims through fraud and deceit, the court concluded that 

her conduct could not support a charge for theft by taking under section 

714.1(1) and reversed her conviction. Id. at 524–25. 

 Significantly, the court then said that this very same conduct may support 

a “charge under section 714.1(6) (theft by check).” Id. at 525. This statement 

suggests that the alternative definitions of theft listed at sections 714.1(1) and 

(6) are alternative elements of the statute, which the State must prove to 

sustain a conviction. If these definitions are merely means of committing 

theft, and the individual definition under which a defendant is charged and 

convicted has no “legal effect [or] consequence,” then the court in Nall would 

have upheld the defendant’s conviction. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 

 It is likewise significant that in a separate case the court reversed 

a conviction for theft by check under section 714.1(6), while opining that the 

defendant’s conduct could support a conviction for theft by deception under 

section 714.1(3). State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671–72 (Iowa 2020). 

In doing so, the court recognized that sections 714.1(3) and (6) “overlap” but 

emphasized that the overlap is not complete and that each provision covers 

some conduct not covered by the other provision. Id. at 672 (quoting State 

v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Iowa 1996) (noting that sections 714.1(3) 

and (6) are “complementary rather than redundant”)). Again, if it is legally 

irrelevant under which subsection of 714.1 a defendant is convicted, we do 

not see why the Iowa Supreme Court would have reversed the convictions in 

Nall and Schiebout if the conduct at issue could support a conviction for theft 

under at least one of those subsections.6

 The legislative history of section 714.1, which the court addressed at 

length in Nall, lends additional support to our conclusion that theft by taking 

under section 714.1(1) and theft by fraud or deceit under sections 714.1(3) 

and (6) are alternative crimes with discrete elements. In 1978, the Iowa 

Legislature collected a number of “definitions of theft” under section 714.1 

“that had been previously scattered” throughout the Iowa Code, including 

theft by taking and theft by fraud and deception. Nall, 894 N.W.2d at 519. 

However, the Iowa Supreme Court noted in Nall that this restructuring “does 

not necessarily mean that the legislature intended [theft by taking under] 

 

6

 We additionally note that the court stated that each definition of theft in a prior version 

of section 714.1 requires proof of a different “degree[] of intent: 714.1(1) requires intent 

to deprive; 714.1(3) requires deception; 714.1(4) requires knowledge; 714.1(5) requires 

intent to defraud; and 714.1(6) requires knowledge.” Eggman v. Scurr, 311 N.W.2d 77, 

79 (Iowa 1981); see also Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 819, 824 (BIA 2016) (stating 

that a statute is divisible into separate offenses with distinct mental states if the State is 

required to prove that these offenses were committed with a particular mental state). 
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Iowa Code section 714.1(1) to subsume the other subsections of newly 

enacted section 714.1.” Id. Significantly, the court stated: 

If section 714.1(1) applied whenever the defendant tricked the victim into voluntarily 

transferring property, there would be no need for section 714.1(3) covering [theft by 

deception]. Similarly, if passing a knowingly bad check or money order to obtain 

services or property violated section 714.1(1), then section 714.1(6) would seem 

unnecessary. 

Id. at 519–20 (citations omitted). 

 The court observed that “the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld 

[a] defendant’s conviction for theft by taking even though the defendant had 

been charged only with theft by deception.” Id. at 521 (citing State 

v. Jonusas, 694 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Neb. 2005)). “As in Iowa, the two theft 

alternatives are separately defined . . . .” Id. However, unlike Iowa law, 

Nebraska law contains a consolidation provision, stating that “all variants of 

theft constitute a single offense.” Id.; see also id. at 521–22 (noting that “the 

Iowa legislature chose not to adopt [a similar] consolidation provision . . . 

when it enacted” section 714.1). The court in Nall found it significant that 

most jurisdictions that lack such a consolidation provision “recognize[] and 

enforce[] distinctions among . . . various theft offenses.” Id. at 523 

(collecting cases). Accordingly, the court concluded that the Iowa 

Legislature intended to distinguish between different modes of theft when it 

enacted section 714.1. It only intended section 714.1(1) to reach theft 

involving a taking without consent, not theft by fraud or deceit, and any other 

interpretation would render sections 714.1(3) and (6) superfluous. Id. at 524. 

 The relevant Iowa jury instructions also support our view that theft by 

taking under section 714.1(1) and theft by fraud or deceit under sections 

714.1(3) and (6) are separate crimes with discrete elements. See Martinez, 

893 F.3d at 1071. Iowa provides separate instructions for theft by taking, 

deception, and check under sections 714.1(1), (3), and (6), respectively, and 

each of these instructions sets forth distinct elements that the State must 

prove and a jury must find.7

 Because the State must prove that a defendant 

 

7 The instruction for theft by taking, at Iowa Crim. Jury Instr. § 1400.1 (Iowa Bar Assoc. 

2018), provides that the State must prove the following elements: 

1. On or about the ______ day of _____, 19__, the defendant took possession or 

control of (property). 

2. The defendant did so with the intent to deprive (victim) of the (property). 

3. The property, at the time of the taking, [belonged to] [was in the possession of] 

(victim). 

The instruction for theft by deception, at Iowa Crim. Jury Instr. § 1400.10, provides that 

the State must prove these elements: 
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committed one of these specific forms of theft, we conclude that these 

definitions of theft under section 714.1 are alternative elements, not 

alternative means of committing a theft offense. Cf. State v. Duncan, 312 

N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1981) (stating that if “alternative method[s] of 

committing” an offense are consistent with and “not repugnant to each other” 

the State need not prove that the defendant committed one specific alternative 

(citation omitted)). 

 Finally, even if the above sources do not clearly resolve the means versus 

elements inquiry, we may “peek” at the respondent’s record of conviction 

“for ‘the sole and limited purpose of determining whether [the definitions 

under section 714.1 are alternative] element[s] of the offense.’” Mathis, 136 

S. Ct. at 2256–57 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). The 

criminal complaint and plea agreement in the record reveal that the 

respondent was charged with and convicted of one count of theft in the first 

degree under section 714.1. This count alleged that he “did take property 

from the person of another with intent to deprive the person thereof.” The 

conviction record’s “referenc[e] [to] one alternative” form of theft—

specifically, theft by taking under section 714.1(1)—“to the exclusion of” 

theft by deception or by check supports our view that these alternative 

definitions of theft are separate offenses with distinct elements. Id. at 2257. 

 In light of our review of the above “authoritative sources of state law,” 

we conclude that theft by taking under section 714.1(1) and theft by 

deception and check under sections 714.1(3) and (6), respectively, are 

alternative crimes with discrete elements, rendering the statute divisible with 

 

1. On or about the ______ day of _____, 20__, the defendant did (set forth acts of 

deception—words, conduct, or representation) to (victim). 

2. The defendant knowingly deceived (victim) in one or more of the following ways: 

(add the appropriate subsections of 702.9 of the Code). 

3. The defendant obtained [labor or services] [transfer of possession] [control or 

ownership] [the beneficial use of property] from (victim) by the deception. 

Finally, the instruction for theft by check, at Iowa Crim. Jury Instr. § 1400.17, provides 

that the State must prove the following elements: 

1. On or about the ______ day of _____, 20__, the defendant did [make] [utter] 

[draw] [deliver] [give] to (victim) a [check] [draft] [written order] in the amount of 

$_______. 

2. The [check] [draft] [written order] was drawn on (e.g., bank). 

3. The defendant received [property] [services] [money] in exchange for the [check] 

[draft] [written order]. 

4. The defendant knew at the time [he] [she] gave the [check] [draft] [written order] 

to (victim) it would not be paid by the [bank] [other institution] because (state facts 

shown by evidence, e.g., insufficient funds, closed account, no account).
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respect to whether a violation of section 714.1 involved aggravated felony 

theft, or theft by fraud or deceit. Id. at 2256. 

 Citing State v. Williams, 328 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1983), and State 

v. Conger, 434 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988), the respondent argues that 

the definitions of theft at section 714.1 are alternative means, rather than 

elements. We are not persuaded that these cases, which predate Mathis and 

its progeny by several decades, support the respondent’s argument. These 

State court decisions may, at first blush, appear to conclude that the 

definitions of theft at section 714.1 are alternative means of committing theft, 

rather than alternative elements. However, we recently emphasized that it is 

important to read such cases carefully, paying close attention to the context 

in which a State court used terms like “elements” and “means” and the 

specific questions addressed. See Matter of Laguerre, 28 I&N Dec. 437, 441 

(BIA 2022). 

 In Conger, 434 N.W.2d at 409, a defendant was convicted of a single 

count of theft after a jury was given instructions for both theft by taking under 

section 714.1(1) and exercising control over stolen property under section 

714.1(4). The defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the jury 

to convict him of theft without being unanimous as to the type of theft 

committed. The Iowa court of appeals upheld the conviction, noting that 

a “person cannot commit theft by taking without also exercising control over 

the property, so the two . . . . alternatives are not inconsistent or repugnant in 

that they represent different points of time within one crime.” Id. at 409–10. 

This language appears to suggest that theft by taking and exercising control 

over stolen property are alternative means of committing theft, not elements. 

 However, the court noted it could only reach this result because these 

statutory alternatives are “consistent with and not repugnant to each other.” 

Id. at 409. As we explained above, theft by taking under section 714.1(1) 

and theft by fraud or deceit under sections 714.1(3) and (6) are clearly 

inconsistent with, and thus repugnant to, each other because the former 

section requires a taking without consent, while the latter do not. 

Accordingly, we believe Conger is consistent with our conclusion that theft 

by taking and theft by fraud or deceit are alternative crimes with distinct 

elements under section 714.1, rather than means of violating the statute. 

 In Williams, 328 N.W.2d at 505–06, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded 

that the State’s decision to amend the form of theft charged—from theft by 

taking under section 714.1(1) to theft by exercising control of stolen property 

under section 714.1(4)—after the defense had rested was reversible error. 

The court noted that a charge may be amended “only if (1) substantial rights 

of the defendant are not prejudiced thereby, and (2) a wholly new or different 

offense is not charged.” Id. at 505 (citation omitted). The court’s decision 

rested solely on its finding that the “first prong, no prejudice to substantial 

rights of defendant, [was] not satisfied in the . . . case.” Id. It then noted that 
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an “amendment without prejudice . . . might have been made . . . , alleging 

the alternate theory of theft by exercising control over stolen property” 

because the State “would not have been alleging a ‘wholly new and different 

offense’ but merely an alternative means of committing the same offense.” 

Id. at 506 & n.3 (emphasis added). Because this latter statement was not 

necessary to the court’s holding, which rested solely on the finding of 

prejudice, we consider it dicta. See Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 661 

(8th Cir. 2008) (defining “dicta” as a statement that “is unnecessary to the 

decision in the case” (citation omitted)). 

 More importantly, Williams did not discuss the issue we address today, 

namely, whether Iowa’s theft statute is divisible with respect to whether 

a violation involved theft by taking under section 714.1(1) or theft by fraud 

or deceit under sections 714.1(3) and (6). As noted, our review of State law 

reflects they are discrete crimes with distinct elements. Williams also did not 

accord the term “alternative means” the specific meaning and significance 

the Supreme Court did in Mathis. Nor could it have. Williams was issued 

years before the Supreme Court first articulated the categorical approach in 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and decades before the Court 

articulated the distinction between “means” and “elements” in Mathis. We 

doubt the court in Williams intended to describe each subsection of section 

714.1 as mere facts, “extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements.” Mathis, 

136 S. Ct. at 2248. 

 We therefore hold that section 714.1 of the Iowa Code is divisible with 

respect to whether a violation of the statute involved theft by taking or theft 

by fraud or deceit. It was therefore permissible for the Immigration Judge to 

review the respondent’s conviction record, including his plea agreement and 

criminal complaint, to determine whether his violation involved generic 

theft. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. As noted, this record establishes that he 

was specifically convicted of theft by taking under section 714.1(1) of the 

Iowa Code, the elements of which match the generic definition of aggravated 

felony theft under section 101(a)(43)(G). See Nall, 894 N.W.2d at 524. 

There is no dispute that the respondent’s theft offense is one for which the 

term of imprisonment is at least one year, as required by section 

101(a)(43)(G) of the Act. We will therefore affirm the Immigration Judge’s 

conclusion that the respondent’s conviction for theft in the first degree under 

sections 714.1(1) and 714.2(1) of the Iowa Code is one for an aggravated 

felony theft offense that renders him removable as charged under section 

237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 

ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed.