ALD-077 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 18-3756

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IN RE: EL AEMER EL MUJADDID,

 Petitioner

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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey

(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 18-cv-14021)

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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

January 17, 2019

Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ and BIBAS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 29, 2019)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

On July 12, 2018, petitioner El Aemer El Mujaddid filed a complaint in the 

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, against numerous 

defendants relating to a traffic citation he had received. Mujaddid alleged, inter alia, 

causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 for the deprivation of his 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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constitutional rights. It appears that Mujaddid claimed his procedural and substantive 

due process rights had been violated, and that his arrest and criminal prosecution violated 

federal law. The matter was transferred to the Law Division, Camden County, in July 

2018, and an amended complaint was filed on August 1, 2018. The named defendants

thereafter removed the case to federal court the following month pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1441, on the basis of the District Court’s original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1343(a)(3).

Mujaddid opposes the removal and filed a motion in the District Court on October 

15, 2018, seeking to have the matter remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County. An initial scheduling conference was held on October 23, 

2018, before the Magistrate Judge to whom the matter was referred. While the

defendants filed a statement of material facts in response to Mujaddid’s remand motion 

on October 24, 2018, they sought an extension of time to file an answer or otherwise 

plead on October 26, 2018. Mujaddid filed a response in opposition to the defendants’ 

motion. A telephone status conference was conducted by the Magistrate Judge on 

November 28, 2018. There does not appear to have been any further action in the case 

since that time.

Approximately three weeks after the status conference, Mujaddid filed the instant

petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition seeking to compel the District Court to 

remand the matter to state court, to prohibit it from “proceeding” any further, and to 
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impose sanctions on the defendants and defense counsel. Additionally, Mujaddid seeks 

an award of monetary damages from the assigned District Court Judge and Magistrate 

Judge “under the Bivens doctrine” for what he claims are injuries suffered as a result of

various violations of his constitutional rights as a result of the manner in which District 

Court Judge and Magistrate Judge have handled the removal action. See Pet. at 3-4. For 

the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.

While Mujaddid characterizes his filing as both a petition for a writ of mandamus 

and prohibition, the same standard applies regardless of how the petition is viewed. See

United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that the 

requirements are the same for obtaining either writ); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 

1310, 1313 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that “the form is less important than the 

substantive question of whether an extraordinary remedy is available”) (internal 

quotations omitted).1 Mandamus is a drastic remedy that is granted only in extraordinary 

cases. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). Generally, 

mandamus is a “means ‘to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed 

jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.’” United 

States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 893 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk 

Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)). To demonstrate that mandamus is appropriate, a 

 

1

 We have explained that “a writ of mandamus may appear more appropriate when the 

request is for an order mandating action, and a writ of prohibition may be more accurate 

when the request is to prohibit action[.]” In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1313.
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petitioner must establish that he has “no other adequate means” to obtain the relief 

requested, and that he has a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ. 

Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).

Although Mujaddid’s petition is far from a model of clarity, it is clear that he has 

no “indisputable” right to issuance of a writ compelling the District Court to remand the 

matter to state court. As set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the district courts are tasked with 

determining, in the first instance, whether an action was properly removed. Additionally, 

this Court’s jurisdiction over District Court orders remanding removed cases to state 

court is constrained by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In the instant case, moreover, the District 

Court has not yet entered an order on Mujaddid’s remand motion. Even if we were to 

liberally construe Mujaddid’s petition as challenging the delay he has experienced in 

having his remand motion disposed of, we would conclude that mandamus relief is not 

warranted.

Although a District Court has discretion over the management of its docket, see In 

re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1982), a federal appellate 

court “may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that [the District Court’s] undue 

delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.” Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. The 

defendants responded to Mujaddid’s remand motion at the end of October 2018, and the 

Magistrate Judge conducted a status conference in November 2018. Thus, little more 

than two to three months have lapsed since the motion has been ripe for disposition. We 
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do not find a delay of this length troubling in the instant case. We are confident that the 

District Court will rule on Mujaddid’s motion in due course and without undue delay.

Mujaddid’s requests for monetary damages and sanctions in the context of this

mandamus proceeding are inappropriate. To the extent that he seeks damages from the 

District Court Judge and Magistrate Judge, he has the alternative remedy of filing a 

lawsuit in a court with jurisdiction over his claims. Mujaddid should note, however, that 

a District Court Judge and Magistrate Judge are entitled to absolute immunity from 

monetary damages for conduct performed in the course of their official duties. See

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). Finally, Mujaddid has not explained how 

an order imposing sanctions on the defendants or defense counsel in the underlying 

action would be “in aid of” our jurisdiction. See In re Arunachalam, 812 F.3d 290, 292 

(3d Cir. 2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Any argument that sanctions are warranted for their 

actions in the removed action is one for the District Court to consider in evaluating the 

remand order and the merits of Mujaddid’s civil complaint.

Given the foregoing, the petition will be denied.