CAUSE NO.PD-0150-15

RECEIVED IN

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

IN THE

TEXAS GOURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

AUG 03 2015

Ab®!Acosla,GteJfc

I

FILED IN DANNY RAY RAJS^ER,APPELLANT PRD SE, COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

TlCHE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

AbelAcOSla, Clerk

PRO SE MOTION FOR EN BANC RECONSIDERATION OF APPELLANT'S

PRO SE MOTION TO EXCEED THE -15- PAGE LIMIT AS DENIED WITHOUT

ANY CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE RELIEF TO REDRAW STRICKEN "PDR"

TO THE HONORABLE JU0GES OF SAID COURTS

NOW <20ME3,DANNY RAY RANCHER, Appellant/Pro se and pursuant to USCA.CONST.

vAMENDS.ist/5th,14th;Tex*Const.Arts.5§4,5§5,l§13(Open Courts);TRAP.Rules 49.7,

49-*-$?,2(c), and files Motion for En Banc Reconsideration of Appellant's Pro

se Motion to Exceed the -15- page Limit As Denied Without any Further Consider

ation of Requested Alternative Relief to Redraw Stricken "PDR". And in support

there of would respectfully show as follows!

I.

On July 14,2015, Post Card Notice was entered in absence of any OUurt of

Criminal Appeals' Signature or Action Taken Sheet signatured by any Panel of

Judges to constitute a Quorom's Denial of Appellant's Pro se Motion to Exceed

the page Limit regarding the stricken Pro se "PDR".

Only on July 27,2015, was Appellant Pro se made aware of this Court of Crim

inal Appeals' Notice denying his Motion to exceed the page limit when prison mail

room officials deliverd such Notice. Which entailed a-13- day delay wherein the

Post Card Notice was/is Postdated JULY 22,2015, which was/is another -8- full days

after such denial was entered on July 14,2015.

II.

TEX.CONST.ART.5§4(a)(b),pertinent here provides: "COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS;JUDGES."

(a) The Court of Criminal Appeals Shall consist of Bight Judges and One Presiding

1
Judge." (fc# "For the purpose of hearing acses, the Court of Criminal Appeals

may sit in panels of Three Judge, the designation thereof to be under Rules

established by the court. In a panel of Three Judges, Two Judges Shall const

itute a Qugurom and the concurrence of two judges Shall be Necessary for a de^-

cision. The presiding Judge,under the rules established by the court,shall

convene the court en banc for the purpose of hearing cases. . . When convened

en banc, five judges shall constitute a quorom and the concurrence of five

judges shall be necessary for a decision."

8 "The question of the number of judges necessary to authorize the transact

ion of business by a cm'rt is as a general rule to be determined from the Con

stitution or statutory provisions creating and regulating courts,and as a general

rule a majority of the members of a court is a "quorom" for the transaction of

business and the decision of cases and in the absence of a "quorom",or the number

required by law to hold court, a judgement rendered by the remaining judges is a

nullity." See LONG V. STATE, (GR.APP. 1910) 59 TEX, GRIM... 103,127 SW. 551, AM.ANN.

CAS.ill2h,1244.

TRAP. RULE 67.1, provides: "FOUR JUDGE VOTE." "By at least Four Judges,the Court

oi Criminal Appeals may grant review of a court of appeals' decision in a criminal

case at any time before the mandate of the court of appeals issued,"

TRAP.RULE 69.1, provides: "GRANTING OR REFUSAL." "If Four Judges do not vote

to grant a Petition for Discretionary Review* the Court will enter a docket not

ation that the Petition is Refused. "If Four Judges Vote to Grant the Petition

the Court will enter a docket notation that the Discretionary Review is Granted."

TEX.CONST.ART.5§5, pertinent here provides: "JURISDICTION OF COURT OF CRIMINAL

APPEALS*" (a) "The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have final appellate juris

diction coextensive with the limits of the State, and its determinations shall

be final, in all criminal cases of whatever grade, with such exceptions and un

der such regulations as may be provided in this Constitution or as prescribed

by law."

(b) "The appeal of all other criminal cases shall be to the Courts of Appeals*

as prescribed by law. In addition,the Court of Criminal Appeals may,on its own

motion review a decision of a Court of Appeals in a criminal case as provided by

law. DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT,

BUT OP SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION."

"THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS IS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH MUST BE GRANTED M A MEANINGFUL TIME AND IN A MEAN

INGFUL MANNER."ARMSTRONG V. MANZO, 85 S.CT. 1187 (1965).

"WHETHER A STATE: LAW *S PROPERLY CHARACTERIZED AS FALLING UNDER THE EX POST

FACTO CLAUSE IS A FEDERAL QUESTION THAT THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINES FOR ITSELF."

USCA.CONST. ART.l§10,CL.l. CARMBLL V. TEXAS, 120 S.CT. 1620 (2000).

"IN BEAZELL V. OHIO, 46 S.CT. 68 (1925). THE S!P?®!K COURT SUMMARIZED THE

CHARACTERISTICS OF AN EX POST FACTO LAW: IT IS SETTLED BY DECISIONS OF THIS COURT

SO WELL KNOWN THAT THIS CITATION MAY BE DISPENSED WITH THAT ANY STATUTE WHICH

PUNISHES AS A CRIME ANY ACT PREVIOUSLY COMMITTED WHICH WAS INNOCENT WHEN DONE,

WHICH MAKES MORE BURDENSOME THE PUNISHMENT FOR A GRIME, AFTER ITS COMMISSION, OR

DEPRIVES ONE CHARGED WITH CRIME OF ANY DEFENSE AVAILABLE ACCORDING TO LAW AT THE

TIME WHEN THE ACT WAS COMMITTED IS PROHIBITED AS EX .POST FACTO."

"Defendant's claim that his convictions were barred by EX POST FACTO CLAUSES

OF TEXAS AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS BECAUSE STATUTE UNDER WHICH THEY WERE

PROSECUTED HAD NOT YET BEEN K3ACTED AT TIME OF HIS ALLEGEDLY CRIMINAL CONDUCT

WAS NOT FORFEITABLE IRREGULARITY OF TRIAL PROCESS AND COULD BE RAISED FOR FIRST

2.
TIME ON APPEAL;DEFENDANT WAS NOT OBJECTING TO SUFFICIENCY OP CHARGING

-f<9nmY orJ,,^S «oio;* 292(a). See NGUYEN V. UNITED STATES, 123 S CT 31*n

op £SZ££S^ST^ waw rauus&s .snasB- V. N.L.R.B., Bro *£"?•* 130 S*CT. 2535'""*-* (2010).

"BECAUSE THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE FOR FEDERAL HABEAS RELIPp re; ruKTrtn*

SL22LTM8 S!BMB C0URTS *TM-' AND FAIR OPP^TuSto%£»£fSS^ SS51S2!Mi (XAIMS «*• ^^ <*AIMS ARE^iaS ToS^eSr??

S=SS55sSMb5Bs?.^

*<» »w«L that COURT. Id.. Qf. St PARTE JARBgTT. 891 SWi2tf.935 (TX.0R.1995).

ive right, Of alltl^nt^Sc^og^gf^^S6^ "^^ ***•*-

SB.'ES.^nSApS.T^r1 "* is "*T rt*t. see ^pahte spst^

S.CT. 2098 (1974). ACCESS TO THE COURTS." BLACKLEDGE V. PERRY, 94

GONZALEZ orjs.'gs"^^SoS^s^Lj^rr1r1T^°^ V. THALER, 132 S.CT. 641 (2012) SUP.CT.RULE 13>1^ See also ; •'**** !'•'

FURTHER ISSUES PRESENTED r''*Y '

Whether Strict Application of the Judfemade TRAP.Rule 9 a(U(o\tn\ i«_

e iS xn "ittuct with and Repugnant to USCA.CONST.ARTS.

3