Present: All the Justices 

FIRST VIRGINIA BANK 

v. Record No. 950149 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 March 1, 1996 

FRANCIS X. O'LEARY, 

ETC., ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

Paul F. Sheridan, Judge 

 In this appeal, we determine whether state and local taxing 

authorities are bound by Code § 6.1-125.3(D), which requires 

creditors seeking funds from a joint bank account to obtain a 

summons notifying nondelinquent owners of the account of "an 

order of garnishment, attachment or other levy" addressed to that 

account.1

 

 1Code § 6.1-125.3(D) provides, in relevant part: 

 Upon an order of garnishment, attachment or other 

levy addressed to a party to a joint account . . . the 

financial institution shall file an answer setting 

forth the form of account, whether it has funds 

responsive to the process, and such information as it 

has as to the names and addresses of the parties to the 

account. The financial institution shall by firstclass mail send a copy of such answer to the 

petitioning creditor or counsel of record. From the 

time of service of such garnishment, attachment or 

levy, the financial institution shall hold the amount 

subject to such garnishment, attachment or levy, or 

such lesser amount or sum as it may have, which amount 

shall be set forth in its answer. . . . If the 

petitioning creditor shall desire to pursue the 

question of ownership of such funds held subject to the 

claim of two or more parties to the deposit account, it 

shall provide the clerk with a copy of the documents 

originally served on the original defendants or 

judgment defendants and request the clerk to issue a 

summons accompanied by such copy with a copy of the 

notice at the end of this subsection. Upon payment of 

the appropriate fees, the clerk shall issue such 

summons to be served on such other party having an 

interest or apparent interest in such account. . . . 

If such summons is received either by certified or 
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(..continued) 

 The facts before us are undisputed and arise from three 

cases that were consolidated for purposes of this appeal. First 

Virginia Bank (the Bank) appeals two judgments in favor of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Taxation (the 

Department), and one judgment in favor of Francis X. O'Leary, 

Arlington County Treasurer (the Treasurer). 

 The Department, pursuant to Code § 58.1-1804, issued a 

"notice of tax lien and demand for payment" to the Bank to 

satisfy unpaid taxes owed by two taxpayers.2

 The Deputy 

registered mail or acknowledged in writing within 

twenty-one days on or by such financial institution, it 

shall continue to hold such funds pending further order 

of the court. If such financial institution shall not 

within twenty-one days from the filing of such answer 

be served with or acknowledge such an order, it may 

treat the garnishment, attachment or levy, insofar as 

it relates to such joint . . . accounts, as terminated 

on the twenty-second day and being of no further force 

or effect. . . . The notice to the co-depositor 

described in this subsection shall contain 

substantially the following information: "Attached is 

a copy of the documents served on a financial 

institution to cause it to withhold money from an 

account in which you may have an interest. If you wish 

to protect your interests, you or your attorney should 

take appropriate legal action promptly." 

 2Code § 58.1-1804 provides, in relevant part: 

 The Tax Commissioner may apply in writing to any 

person indebted to or having in his hands estate of a 

taxpayer for payment of any taxes . . . more than 

thirty days delinquent, out of such debt or 

estate. . . . 

 The Tax Commissioner shall send a copy of the 

application to the taxpayer, with a notice informing 

him of the remedies provided in this chapter. 

 If the person applied to does not pay so much as 
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(..continued) 

Treasurer, pursuant to Code § 58.1-3952(A), issued a "notice of 

tax lien and demand for payment" to the Bank to satisfy 

delinquent personal property taxes owed by one holder of a joint 

account.3

 Each of three delinquent taxpayers held an account at 

the Bank jointly with a nondelinquent holder. Since the Bank did 

not receive notice that the nondelinquent joint account holders 

had been served with notice pursuant to Code § 6.1-125.3(D), the 

Bank refused to comply with these demands for payment. 

 The Department and the Treasurer (collectively, the 

Department) filed pleadings in the trial court alleging that the 

Bank's refusal to release the funds violated Code §§ 58.1-1804 

ought to be recovered out of such debt or estate, the 

Tax Commissioner shall procure a summons directing such 

person to appear before the appropriate court, where 

the proper payment may be enforced. Any person so 

summoned shall have the same rights of removal and 

appeal as are applicable to disputes among individuals. 

 3Code § 58.1-3952(A) provides, in relevant part: 

 The treasurer or other tax collector of any county 

. . . may apply in writing to any person indebted to or 

having in his hands estate of a taxpayer for payment of 

taxes more than thirty days delinquent out of such debt 

or estate. . . . The taxes, penalties and interest 

shall constitute a lien on the debt or estate due the 

taxpayer from the time the application is 

received. . . . The treasurer or collector shall send 

a copy of the application to the taxpayer, with a 

notice informing him of the remedies provided in this 

chapter. 

 If the person applied to does not pay so much as 

ought to be recovered out of the debt or estate, the 

treasurer or collector shall procure a summons 

directing such person to appear before the appropriate 

court, where proper payment may be enforced. 
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and -3952, respectively. The trial court ruled that the notice 

provisions of Code § 6.1-125.3(D) do not apply to tax liens 

issued under Code §§ 58.1-1804 and -3952. The trial court also 

ruled that there is a presumption that all joint account holders 

own an account in equal shares, and that the Treasurer and the 

Department had "a right to the funds in the account equal to that 

of delinquent taxpayer joint depositor." Based on these rulings, 

the trial court ordered the Bank to comply with the demands for 

payment in the amount of the tax liens or 50% of the funds on 

deposit, whichever amount was less. This appeal followed. 

 The issue before us is one of first impression. The Bank 

argues that each tax lien at issue is an "other levy" within the 

meaning of Code § 6.1-125.3(D). The Bank also asserts that, 

since the taxing statutes do not specifically address the 

imposition of a tax lien on a joint bank account, the notice 

provisions of Code § 6.1-125.3(D) govern that procedure. 

 In response, the Department argues that Code § 6.1-125.3(D) 

does not apply to a tax lien, which is a type of administrative 

process. It asserts that the statute applies to judicial process 

only, as demonstrated by the language "an order of garnishment, 

attachment or other levy." We agree with the Department. 

 In determining whether the phrase "order of garnishment, 

attachment or other levy" includes the tax liens at issue, we 

consider the entire text of Code § 6.1-125.3(D). "A cardinal 

rule of statutory construction is that a statute be construed 
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from its four corners and not by singling out a particular word 

or phrase." Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. 

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 529, 536, 248 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1978). 

Further, a legislative enactment "should be interpreted, if 

possible, in a manner which gives meaning to every word." 

Monument Assoc. v. Arlington County Bd., 242 Va. 145, 149, 408 

S.E.2d 889, 891 (1991). 

 We also construe Code § 6.1-125.3(D) with reference to Code 

§§ 58.1-1804 and -3952. We accord each statute, insofar as 

possible, a meaning that does not conflict with the other 

statutes. See Albemarle County v. Marshall, Clerk, 215 Va. 756, 

761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975). 

 The requirements of Code § 6.1-125.3(D) arise entirely 

within the context of judicial proceedings. This section 

requires a financial institution to "file an answer" on receipt 

of "an order of garnishment, attachment or other levy."4 The 

 

 4The process that issues to a third party in a garnishment 

proceeding is termed a "summons." See Code § 8.01-511. The 

process which issues against specific property in an attachment 

proceeding is termed an "attachment." See Code § 8.01-540. We 

conclude that these types of process are covered by the language 

of Code § 6.1-125.3(D), because the two phrases, "garnishment, 

attachment or levy" and "order of garnishment, attachment or 

other levy," are used interchangeably in Code § 6.1-125.3(D). 
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institution must also mail a copy of its answer to the 

petitioning creditor or "counsel of record." 

 The Bank's position would require us to find that the term 

"file" means nothing more than "send." However, throughout the 

Code and the Rules of Court, the term "file" is used to convey 

the act of lodging pleadings and notices with the clerk of the 

court. See, e.g., Code §§ 8.01-73, -229; Rule 1:4. The Bank's 

argument also overlooks the fact that Code § 6.1-125.3(D) 

requires the financial institution to send a copy of its answer 

to the petitioning creditor or to counsel of record. The Bank's 

position would make this requirement an unnecessary act, since 

the Bank sent its answer directly to the petitioning creditor. 

 We also observe that the term "counsel of record" has a 

specific meaning when used in the Code and the Rules of Court. 

Rule 1:5 defines this term as including "a counsel or party who 

has signed a pleading in the case or who has notified the other 

parties and the clerk in writing that he appears in the case." 

Thus, the use of the above terms in Code § 6.1-125.3(D) indicates 

that a court action has been initiated, and that a response to 

court-issued process is required. 

 Code § 6.1-125.3(D) also stipulates procedures which involve 

action by the clerk of the court. If the petitioning creditor 

wishes to pursue the question of ownership of jointly-held funds, 

the creditor must request the clerk to issue a summons and a 

notice to the co-depositor. Before a summons will be issued by 
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the clerk, the creditor must also provide the clerk with a copy 

of the documents "originally served on the original defendants or 

judgment defendants." This language indicates that a prior 

adjudication involving the account holder has occurred, forming 

the basis for the garnishment, attachment or other levy. 

 If the financial institution receives or acknowledges within 

21 days a copy of the summons issued by the clerk, the financial 

institution is required to hold the funds requested pending 

"further order of the court." (Emphasis added.) By implication, 

this language presupposes that prior court process has issued. 

 In contrast, judicial action is not required for the 

issuance of a "Notice of Tax Lien and Demand for Payment" under 

Code §§ 58.1-1804 and -3952. These tax liens are administrative 

process issued by authority of the Tax Commissioner, under Code 

§ 58.1-1804, or by the "treasurer or other tax collector of any 

county, city or town," under Code § 58.1-3952. 

 In these statutes, the person owing the tax is referred to 

as the "taxpayer," not the "defendant." Thus, while Code 

§ 6.1-125.3(D) requires the petitioning creditor to provide the 

clerk with a copy of the documents originally served on "the 

original defendants or judgment defendants," there is no party in 

Code §§ 58.1-1804 and -3952 who can be identified by these terms. 

 Based on these distinctions, we conclude that the 

legislature did not intend that Code § 6.1-125.3(D) apply to the 

receipt of administrative process by a financial institution. 
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Therefore, we hold that the Department is not subject to the 

requirements of Code § 6.1-125.3(D) when it issues a notice of 

tax lien and demand for payment to a financial institution which 

has in its possession funds owned by a delinquent taxpayer in a 

joint bank account. 

 Nevertheless, the Bank contends that the due process rights 

of the nondelinquent co-depositors were violated by the taxing 

statutes. We do not reach this issue, however, because the Bank 

lacks standing to assert the due process rights of another. See

Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 

of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1982). 

Therefore, we do not decide here the question whether Code 

§§ 58.1-1804 and -3952 provide nondelinquent joint account 

holders remedies sufficient to protect their due process rights.5 

 

 5We also note that the parties agree the trial court erred 

in ruling there is a presumption that all joint account holders 

own an account in equal shares. See Code § 6.1-125.3(A). Based 

on this ruling, the trial court limited the Bank's obligation to 

comply with the demands for payment to the amount of the tax 

liens or 50% of the funds in the account, whichever amount was 

less. However, we do not further address this ruling, because 

the Department has not assigned cross-error to the ruling and the 

Bank lacks standing to assert the rights of the nondelinquent codepositors. 
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 For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court's 

judgment. 

Affirmed.