In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 04-3824

DEAN HUDSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 02 C 1751—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

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ARGUED JUNE 2, 2005—DECIDED JUNE 21, 2005

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Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EVANS,

Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. During his brief stint as an employee at a Wal-Mart store in Indianapolis, plaintiff Dean

Hudson did not get along with co-worker Nicholas Ramirez.

Verbal sniping between Hudson and Ramirez eventually led

to a physical altercation at work, and Wal-Mart fired both

men shortly thereafter. Hudson, who was hospitalized for

injuries sustained in the altercation, filed a workers’ compensation claim based on the incident. He then brought suit

in state court, alleging that he was fired in retaliation for

the workers’ compensation filing. Wal-Mart removed the
2 No. 04-3824

suit to federal court on the basis of diversity and moved for

summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.

We affirm.

I. Background

The following facts are either undisputed or presented in

the light most favorable to Hudson. Hudson began working

at Wal-Mart as a Sales Associate on January 10, 2002.

From approximately February 2002 until his termination,

Hudson worked in the Sporting Goods Department. On

April 10, 2002, Ramirez began working at Wal-Mart as

a Stocker, and he often worked in or near the Sporting

Goods Department. Hudson was not shy about sharing

his opinion of Ramirez’s work ethic and performance.

Supp. App. 112-13. Hudson told Ramirez that he could

never find him when he needed him, and that it seemed like

Ramirez had no interest in helping. Id. Hudson informed coworkers that Ramirez was “worthless” and that he could not

work with Ramirez. Hudson Depo. at 192-93. Hudson also

complained to at least three supervisors about Ramirez. Id.

at 167-69. 

On April 26, 2002, Hudson and Ramirez were the only

employees working in the Sporting Goods Department.

Hudson complained to Acting Service Manager Portia Pate

about Ramirez that night. Hudson said that Ramirez was

“worthless” and that he and Ramirez were not getting

along. Supp. App. at 118; Hudson Depo. at 169. Pate told

Hudson to leave Ramirez alone and let management handle

it if he was not doing his job. Hudson Depo. at 180-81. That

same night, Hudson told Assistant Manager Matt Stetson

that he could not work with Ramirez and that he wanted

management to “get rid of” Ramirez. Id. at 178. Hudson

also told Stetson that he and Ramirez had gotten into a

“verbal confrontation” that evening. Id. at 168. Stetson

separated Hudson and Ramirez by moving Ramirez to

another department. Sometime between midnight and 12:30
No. 04-3824 3

1 Although Hudson denies making this statement and the previous statement, we include them in our opinion for the sole purpose

of relating the information that Wal-Mart assembled during its

investigation. The information from the investigation is relevant

to Wal-Mart’s non-retaliatory explanation for Hudson’s termination and Hudson’s pretext showing. At that stage, the focus is

not on whether Wal-Mart credited the witnesses that we would

have credited or Hudson would have credited, but on whether

Wal-Mart came to an honest conclusion about the situation based

on the information uncovered by the investigation. Stewart v.

Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The focus of a

pretext inquiry is whether the employer’s stated reason was

honest, not whether it was accurate, wise, or well-considered.”).

a.m. on April 27, 2002, Hudson and Ramirez got into an

argument in the Hardware Department. Ramirez struck

Hudson in the side of the head and continued to strike him

in the head and eye. Hudson suffered a dislocated shoulder

and was taken to a hospital for treatment.

Later that day, Store Manager Shannon Cremeens began

investigating the incident. Pate, Associate Saressa Owens,

and Stetson all provided Cremeens with written statements

regarding their knowledge of the events leading up to the

incident. According to Pate, Hudson complained to her

about Ramirez that night, saying that Ramirez was not

performing his work responsibilities. Pate instructed

Hudson to let management handle it and warned him to

lower his voice because Ramirez was within earshot of the

conversation. Owens reported that Hudson and Ramirez

had been arguing since Ramirez was hired. On the night

preceding the incident, Hudson told Owens that he and

Ramirez had gotten into an argument, and Hudson said

that Ramirez “wasn’t shit” and “would never be shit.” On

the night of the incident, Owens heard Hudson tell Ramirez

that he was “going to kick his ass at two o’clock when he get

(sic) off.”1

 Stetson reported that Hudson approached him the

night before the altercation and stated that he could not

work with Ramirez. 
4 No. 04-3824

Co-Manager Michael Jodrey visited Hudson in the hospital to hear his side of the story. Hudson told Jodrey that

Ramirez was yelling at him and threatening him with

raised fists, and that Hudson walked away. According to

Hudson, Ramirez approached him later and punched him

repeatedly.

Based on the information obtained during the investigation, Cremeens concluded that Hudson and Ramirez

should be terminated for violating Wal-Mart’s Workplace

Violence Policy. The Workplace Violence Policy provides, in

relevant part:

Harassment, violence, threats of violence, and other

similar conduct are unacceptable behaviors and

violations of Company policy. Any Associate who

violates this policy will be disciplined, up to and

including termination from the Company. 

Ramirez, who left the store and never returned after the

incident with Hudson, was fired on May 1, 2002. Hudson

was fired on May 6, 2002, which was the first day he returned to Wal-Mart after the incident. Hudson appealed his

termination internally at both the district and regional

level. During those appeals, which were unsuccessful,

Hudson admitted that he was partially at fault for the

altercation. 

A few days after the incident, Hudson contacted Lori

Kord, Wal-Mart’s Personnel Manager, and asked how to file

for workers’ compensation benefits. After contacting the

insurance carrier about Hudson’s potential claim, Kord told

Hudson that she “could not guarantee” that Hudson’s claim

would be covered. Hudson felt like Kord “didn’t cooperate

with [him]” because she did not provide him with the

workers’ compensation paperwork. Hudson Depo. at 155.

However, Kord did not refuse to give him the paperwork.

Id. Hudson also asked Kord about filing a workers’ compensation claim just prior to his exit interview with Jodrey on
No. 04-3824 5

May 6, 2002. Hudson ultimately filed for workers’ compensation benefits on May 15, 2002, nine days after he was

fired. Hudson was granted relief by the Indiana Workers’

Compensation Board, and Wal-Mart has appealed the

determination to the Indiana Court of Appeals.

II. Discussion

Hudson’s sole claim is that he was fired in retaliation

for filing a workers’ compensation claim. We review the

district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the familiar Rule 56 standards. 

Indiana generally adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine. However, in Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind.

249 (Ind. 1973), the Indiana Supreme Court carved out an

exception to that rule. The plaintiff in Frampton alleged

that she was hesitant to file a workers’ compensation claim

after a work-related injury because she feared a retaliatory

termination. Id. at 250. The plaintiff eventually filed a

claim and was fired without explanation about one month

later. Id. The plaintiff filed suit to challenge the termination, but the suit was dismissed based on Indiana’s

employment-at-will doctrine. Id. The Indiana Supreme

Court reversed. Id. at 254. The Court explained that “[t]he

basic policy behind [the workers’ compensation statute] is

to shift the economic burden for employment connected

injuries from the employee to the employer.” Id. at 251.

That policy would be frustrated if employees opted not to

file workers’ compensation claims due to fear of reprisal. Id.

at 251-52. As a result, the Court recognized a cause of

action for employees discharged in retaliation for filing

a workers’ compensation claim. Id. at 253. These types of

retaliation claims are now known as Frampton claims in

Indiana.

To maintain a Frampton claim, Hudson must establish a

causal connection between his termination and the filing of

his workers’ compensation claim. Goetzke v. Ferro Corp.,
6 No. 04-3824

280 F.3d 766, 774 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Hudson does not

have direct evidence, he must rely on indirect evidence of

retaliatory motive, such as proximity in time between the

filing of the claim and the termination or evidence that the

employer’s asserted lawful reason for the discharge is a

pretext. Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1262

(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). Hudson can establish pretext by demonstrating that Wal-Mart’s explanation

for the firing was either dishonest or “patently inconsistent

with the evidence before the court.” Markley Enters., Inc. v.

Grover, 716 N.E.2d 559, 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 

At the outset, it appears that Hudson’s claim founders on

timing because he did not file his workers’ compensation

claim until after he was fired. If Hudson did not file his

claim until after his termination and Wal-Mart did not

know that he intended to file a workers’ compensation claim

until it received notice of the filing, then Hudson would not

be able to establish causation. However, Hudson testified

that he contacted Lori Kord, Wal-Mart’s Personnel

Manager, and asked how to file for workers’ compensation

benefits shortly after the incident, which would have been

at least a few days before he was fired. A reasonable jury

could infer that news of this inquiry made its way to management at the Indianapolis Wal-Mart, particularly considering that management was questioning store employees

about Hudson subsequent to the altercation with Ramirez.

In addition, even though the Frampton Court spoke in

terms of retaliation for the filing of a workers’ compensation

claim, its rationale is broad enough to cover plaintiffs in

Hudson’s circumstances who have at least informed their

employer of an intent to file a claim prior to being discharged. Otherwise, an employer could avoid the dictates of

Frampton and the Indiana Workman’s Compensation

Statute by preemptively terminating employees as soon as

it caught wind that an injured employee was considering a

claim. Consequently, the fact that Hudson did not file for
No. 04-3824 7

workers’ compensation benefits before his termination is

not fatal to his claim. Nevertheless, Hudson does not have

enough evidence of causation to reach a jury.

Hudson claims to have both pretext evidence and proximity in time evidence that raise questions about Wal-Mart’s

motivations for firing him. We start with the proffered

pretext evidence. Wal-Mart has offered a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for firing Hudson: He was involved in a

physical altercation at work with a co-worker after weeks of

bickering. Specifically, Cremeens concluded that Hudson

violated Wal-Mart’s Workplace Violence Policy by provoking

the altercation with Ramirez. Pernice v. City of Chicago,

237 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2001) (“It is well-established

that an employee can be terminated for violations of valid

work rules that apply to all employees.”). Hudson’s attempts to undermine this explanation are both unpersuasive and largely irrelevant. Hudson first argues that it is

suspicious that Wal-Mart fired him five days after firing

Ramirez rather than firing them simultaneously. We fail to

see how this is a suspicious circumstance. Ramirez ran out

of the store after the incident, never returned, and was fired

on May 1; Hudson was fired five days later, which was the

first day he returned to work. Hudson offers nothing other

than speculation to prove that the lag between the terminations was an indication of retaliation, and a plaintiff’s

speculation is insufficient to establish pretext.

Hudson next challenges the accuracy of Cremeens’ conclusions about the incident, describing himself as “the innocent

victim in a workplace skirmish.” Pl.’s Brief at 23. This

description is inconsistent with Hudson’s admission during

his internal appeals that he was partially at fault for the

altercation, and also difficult to square with the record of

Hudson’s campaign to “get rid of” Ramirez. The argument

is also beside the point. The judiciary is not a super-personnel department that reexamines and reinvestigates employee disputes. Foster v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 168 F.3d
8 No. 04-3824

1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 1999). Our only concern is whether

Wal-Mart’s proffered explanation is a lie to cover-up for

retaliation, and Wal-Mart’s conclusion that Hudson was not

“an innocent victim in a workplace skirmish” was not so

patently inconsistent with the evidence that it suggests that

retaliation was afoot. 

Hudson’s final pretext argument is equally as feeble. He

asserts that Wal-Mart’s investigation “lacked integrity”

because Cremeens believed the statements of third parties

over his version of the story. This is a tough argument to

make—Wal-Mart credited the consistent statements of

Hudson’s co-workers and supervisors over his own statement, and Hudson was the only one with an obvious interest in the outcome of the investigation. Ramirez, the

other potentially interested party, did not contribute to the

investigation because he left Wal-Mart for good after the

incident. At any rate, like Hudson’s other arguments, it

does not call into question the sincerity of Wal-Mart’s conclusions about the incident. 

That leaves us with Hudson’s proximity evidence. Hudson

notes that he was fired shortly after inquiring about his

workers’ compensation rights and insists that this timing

evidence is sufficient in and of itself to raise an inference of

retaliatory intent. We disagree. First, the same underlying

incident led to both Hudson’s termination (at least the

stated reason for it, which Hudson has not effectively

undermined) and his workers’ compensation claim, which

makes Hudson’s timing evidence a wash. Second, timing

evidence is rarely sufficient in and of itself to create a jury

issue on causation. Indeed, in the analogous Title VII

context, we have held that timing, “standing alone, does not

create a genuine issue as to casual connection.” Foster, 168

F.3d at 1034 (citation omitted). Other evidence of retaliation, whether significant or modest, could make the timing

evidence stronger and provide a plaintiff with a basis to

argue that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. But in
No. 04-3824 9

the instant case, Hudson’s timing evidence falls flat; it is

not buttressed with other evidence that suggests retaliatory

motivations. It would also be inappropriate to attach

significant weight to Hudson’s proximity evidence in that

Wal-Mart has offered a strong, credible reason for firing

Hudson. Cygan v. Wis. Dep’t of Corrs., 388 F.3d 1092, 1102-

03 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that employee must rely on more

than post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning where employer

has offered a well-supported, innocent explanation for

action). It is difficult to think of a better reason to fire an

employee than for involvement in a physical altercation at

work with a co-worker. More importantly for our purposes,

the record supports Wal-Mart’s explanation, Hudson’s only

plausible riposte is proximity evidence, and no reasonable

jury could find that Hudson was fired in retaliation for his

inquiry about workers’ compensation rights on that basis

alone. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the decision of

the district court.
10 No. 04-3824

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—6-21-05