### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE D ec embe r 11, 200 7 S es sio n
REBECCA WO ODY v. A.W. CHE STERT ON COMPANY ET AL 

### .

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 06CI520 Jackie Schulten, Jud ge

No. M2007- 01210-COA-R 9-CV - Filed Marc h 13, 2008

An insulator and his wife sued multipl e corporate defe ndants for damages re lated to his development of mesot h el i o m a from exposure to a sbestos. Most of the defe ndants filed motions for summary judgment based upon a rele ase agree ment signed by the pl aintiffs in 1980 in settlement of anothe r la ws uit c on c e rn ing a sb e sto s e xp os ur e . T he tria l c ou rt de nie d th e mot ion s for su mma ry jud gme nt. We ha ve conc luded that, e x cept a s to any claims arising from post-relea se asbe stos exposure, the trial court e rre d in denying the motions for summary judgment.
Tenn. R. App . P. 9 Interloc utory Appeal; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d in Part, Reve rsed in Part

A NDY D. B ENNETT , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J., and J ON K ER R Y B LA C KW OOD , S P .J., joined.
Dwight E. Tar water , Thomas A. Bicker s, John W. E l d er , and Joshua R. Wa lker, Knoxville, Te nn e sse e , fo r the app e llants , Ba ye r C ro pSc ie nc e , I nc ., Ce rt a in T e e d Co rp or a tio n, Ge ne ra l E le c tric Company, Geor gia-Pac ific LLC, Industrial Holdings Corporation, and U nion Carbide Corporation.

Michae l J. King and M. Denise Mor etz, Knoxville, Te nnessee , for the appellants, National Service Industries, Inc ., Mobil Corporation, and CBS C orporation.
Jimmy F . Rodgers, Jr., Chattanooga , Tenne ssee; John E. “Re tt” Guer ry, III, and Robert J. Klug, Sr., Mt. Pl easant, South C arolina, f or the a ppellee, Re becc a Woody.

OP IN ION
WayneWoody, a me mber of the Asbestos and Insulators Worke rs Union, and his wife , Rebec ca W ood y , fi l ed s u it in federa l district court in June 1979 against 25 corporations that
a lle ge dly “ c aus e d a sb e sto s a nd a sb e sto s ins ulatio n mate ri a ls to be pla c e d inthestr e a m of int e rs tateW ayne S. W oody v. J ohns

- M anvi l l e Sal es Cor p. , N o . C IV -1 -7 9 -1 5 8 (E .D . T e n n .), di s m i s s ed Se pt

. 30, 1980. 1

M s. W o o d y filed a n a m e n d e d c o m p la in t af te r h e r h u sb a n d ’s d e at h su b stitu tin g h e rs e lf a s p la in tiff, in d iv id u a lly 2
and as t he s ur vi vi ng s pous e of W ayne W oody.

T he defe nd ant s i nv ol ved i n t hi s appeal ar e A

. W

. C hes t er t on C om pany ; A dv ance A ut o Par t s , I nc .; B ay er 3
Cr opSc i enc e, I nc. ; Bor g W ar ner M or s e TE C, I nc. ; Br ee di ng I ns ul at i on Com pany, I nc. ; Br ee di ng I ns ul at i on Com pany, C hat t anoo ga, I nc. ; CB S C orporat i on ; Cert ai nTee d Co r po r a t i on ; Crane Co m pany ; Ford M ot or Com pany ; Fost er W heel er C orporat i on ; G ener al E l ect r i c C om pany ; G ener al M ot ors C orporat i on ; G eorgi a- Paci fi c, L L C ; G oo dy ear T i r e & Ru bb er C o m p an y ; G o u l d s P u m p s; In d u st rial H o l d i n g s C o rp o rati o n ; In g erso l l -R an d C o rp o rati o n ; M are m o n t E x h au st P ro d u cts, I n c

. ; Mo b i l C o r p o r a t i o n ; N a t i o n a l S e r v i c e I n d u s t r i e s , I n c

. ; P h a r ma c i a C o r p o r a t i o n f / k / a Mo n s a n t o C o mp a n y ; P n e u mo A bex LL C, a s s ucc es s or i n i nt er es t t o A l ex Cor por at i on; Ri l ey Pow er , I nc. ; a nd U ni on Car bi de Cor por at i on.
-2- commerc e. ” Mr. Woody ha d been dia gnosed with asbestosis, a non-ma lignant, asbestos-re lated

1 lung disease. He and his wife sought da mages for his asbestos-re lated illness, which they a lleged to be cause d by occupational e xposure to the defe ndants’ asbestos and insulation materials. They
wer e re prese nted by counse l and settled the lawsuit in Septe mber 1980 for a lump sum payment of $3 5, 00 0. 00 . A s pa

rt of these ttl e me nt, Mr . W oo dy a ndhis wi fesig ne d a Comple te Re le a se of

Al l Claims (“rele ase” ), the e ffe ct of whic h is at issue in the prese nt case

.
InSe pte mbe r 2 00 6, Mr . W oo dy wa s d ia gn os e d w ithpl e ur a l me so the lio ma , a ma lig na nt,
a sb e sto s- re late d lu ng dis e a se . T he pr e se nt l a ws uit wa s f ile d b y M r. W oo dy a ndhis wi fein November

2006 shortly before h i s d ea t h as a r esult of mesothelioma. The c omplaint named 37 2 defe ndant corporations; only one of the corporations, CertainTe ed C orporation, was a party to t he 1979 lawsuit. Acc ording to the complaint, Mr. Woody was e xposed, in both occupational and nonoccupational se ttings, to “asbe stos r elated materia ls and other asbestos containing produc ts mined, or manufa cture d, proce ssed, imported, conve rted, c ompounded, sold, distributed or installed” by the defe ndants. As a r esult of these exposures, the complaint allege s, Mr. Woody de veloped
me so the lio ma . A lth ou ghthec omp la int do e s n ot s pe c if

y e xp os ur e date s, Mr . W oo dy c on tin ue d to
wo rk a s a n in su lator

a ft e r s ign ing the19 80 re le a se , a ndtheplain ti ff’s claims arebr oa d e no ug h to include post-re lease exposure s. Causes of a ction for ne gligence, stric t liabilit y, brea ch of wa rranty, civil conspirac y, and loss of consortium are a sserted.

After filing answer s pleading re lease as a de fense , 27 of the defe ndants either f iled or joined 3 in m oti on s f

or su mma ry jud gme nt, a sse rt ing that the 19 80 re le a se ba rr e d a ll o f the W oo dy s’ c la ims

. On April 12, 2007, t he trial court entered an order ruli ng on 21 motions for summ ary judgment, one of wh ic h wa s grante d on the ba sis that the na me d co mpany ha d “ ne ve r b e e n inthea sb e sto s b us ine ss, has nev er em p l o y ed [Mr. W oody], and in no re spect ha s had any c ontact with any of the issues inv olv e d inthec a se .” Th e c ou rt de nie d th e oth e r 2 0 mo tio ns fo r s umm ary jud gme nt based on its
c on c lus ionthat “ theprior rel ease do e s n ot b ar the Pla int if f’ s late r c la im b a se d u po n s ub se qu e ntl y diagnosed mesothelioma.” In agreed orders e ntere d on May 7, 2007, the same ruling was applied to the other summary judgment motions.
We gr anted the de fendants’ application for interlocutory a

ppeal pur suant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9.-3- AN AL YSI S

Inthi s in te rl oc uto ry app e a l, we are a sk e d to de te rm inewh e the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d in denying the def

endants’ motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgments do not enjoy a presumption of correc tness on appea l. Be llS ou th A dv e r. & Pub. C o . v. Johnson , 1 00 S.W .3 d 2 02 , 2 05 (T e nn . 2 00 3) . T his c ou rt mus t ma

ke a fr e sh determination that the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W

. 2d 49, 50 (Tenn. 1997) . We c onsider the e vidence in the light mos t favora ble to the non-moving party and resolve all infere nces in that party's favor. Go dfr ey v . R uiz , 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)

. Pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, summary j udgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answer s to interrogatories , and admissions on file, together with the
a ff ida vit s, if a ny , s ho w that th e reis n o g e nu ineiss ueof a ny mate ri a l f a c t a ndthat th e mov ing pa rty is entitled to judgm ent as a matter of la w.” In the prese nt c ase, the re levant fa cts arenot in disput e; the re fo re , w e mus t de te rm inethele ga l e ff e c t of the19 80 re le a se on theun dis pu te d f a c ts. The following provisions of the 1980 r elea s e ar e es sential to determining its effe ct on the Woodys’ c laims in thi s case :

For the sole and only conside ration of Thirty- Five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00), to the unde rs i g n ed in hand paid, rec eipt of which is her eby acknowl edged, we hereby re lease and discha rge [ names of de fendants in feder al district court ca se], their agents, servants, succe ssors and pre dece ssors and any corpor at i on acquir ed by, assoc iated with or a ffiliated with ea ch as pa rent or
su bs idi ary , a ndfu rthe r r e le a se a ll o f the re sp e c tiv e of fi c e rs , d ir e c tor s, a ge n t s , s e rv an ts and employee s of said compa nies, and further re lease an y oth e r p e rsons , c or po ra tio ns , o r e nti tie s, e v e n th ou gh no t na me d h e re in , involved in the distribution, sale, pr od uc tio n, ma nu fa c turing , mi nin g, or pr oc e ssi ng of

a ny ins ulatio n p ro du c t, fr om any a nd a ll c la ims , a c tio ns , c aus e s of a c tio n, de ma nd s, ri gh ts, da ma ge s, c os ts, loss of service s or consortium, e x penses and compensation whatsoever , which the undersigned now have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of all known and unknown,foreseen and unforeseen, bodily and persona l inj urie s a ndpr op e rty d a ma ge, and th e c on se qu e nc e s th e re of , r e su lti ng or

to r e su lt from exposur e to any insulation materia l, any asbestos-containing materia l or any alleged dust-pr oducing material on the part o f t h e u n dersigned W ayne S. Woody, including all claims for loss of consortium by the undersigned Rebec ca W oody, or
a ny oth e r c la im s he mig ht h a ve ari sin g o ut o f h e r h us ba nd ’s a lle ge d p e rs on a l in jurie s.

. . . . The unde rsigned her eby dec lare and repr esent that the injuries sustained ar e o r may b e p e r man e n t o r p r o g r e s s iv e a n d th a t r e c o v e r y th e r e f r o m is u n cer tain and indefinite, and in making this Release it is under s t o o d and agr eed that the undersigned r ely wholly upon their judgment, belief, and knowledge of the nature , extent, ef fec t, and duration of said injuries and li ability there for and is made withoutB y co n t ras t , un d er m o d i fi ed co m p a ra tiv e n e g l i g en ce, a de fend an t i s “l i ab l e o n l y for t h e p ercen t ag e o f a 4 pl ai nt i f f ’ s dam ages occas i on ed by t hat def endan t ’ s negl i gence. ” M cIn t yre , 8 3 3 S .W .2 d a t 5 8

. -4- relianc e upon any statement or re prese ntation of the party or parties here by rele ased or their r epre sentatives or by any physician or sur g eo n by them employed. Thi s Re le as e is i nte nd

e d to c ov e r a ny an d a ll i nju rie s o f an y na tur e , in c lud ing the po ssi ble

se qu e lae the re of, inc lud ing bu t no t lim ite d to as be sto sis , c or pu lm on ale , lun g c an c e r, an d o the r fo rm [s] of cance r, or mesothelioma.

It is und e r s to o d a n d a g r e e d th a t th is s e tt le me n t is th e c o mp r o mi s e of a doubtful and disputed cl ai m an d that liability on t he part of the party or parties here by rele ased, and that said rele asee s deny liability therefor

.

(empha sis added).
(1)

Ms. Woody argues that the 1980 r elea se cannot properly shield fr om liabilit y defe ndants not named in the r elea se due to the a bsence of consider ation from those de fendants.

A r e le a se is a

c on tr a c t; the re fo re , th e ru le s o f c on str uc tio n a pp lic ableto c on tr a c ts a

pp ly i n construing the terms of a re lease

. Ri c hla nd Cou ntr y Clu b, In c . v . CR C Eq uit ie s, In c ., RCC , 832 S.W .2 d 5 54 , 5 57 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 1)

. By its te rm s, there le a se pu rp orts t o r e le a se fr om l ia bil ity the named c orporations and their agents as well as “any other persons, corpor ations, or entities, eve n though not named her ein, i nvolved i n the di stribution, sale, production, manufa cturing, mining, or proce ssing of any insulation produc t, a sbestos-containing product, or allege d dust-producing pr od uc t.” Th e reapp e ars to b e no dis pu te be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s inthepr e se nt c a se that th e app e llants fi t w ith in this c a te go ry of re le a se d e nti tie s. Th e qu e sti on is wh e the r the se de fe nd a nts c a n p ro pe rl y benef it from the re lease when they w ere not named in or a party to the re lease and gaveno consideration to the Moodys for rele ase f rom liability.
In interpr eting this rel ease provision, it is i mportant to note that the re lease was e xecute d prior to the Tenne ssee Supreme Court’s decisi o n i n McI ntyre v . Balentine , 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), in w hich the court adopted modified compar ative fault. Under the principles of contributory negligenceand joint and seve ral liability, an injured party could seek f ull compensation from one
a mon g mul tip le tortf

e a so rs , a ndthat to rt fe a so r c ou ld the n s e e k c on tribu tio n f ro m othe r t ortf

e a so rs

. 4 The Uniform Contr i b u t i o n Among Tort-fe asors Ac t, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 11-101 et seq. , provides that a r elea se given to one of two or more tortfea sors “doe s not discharge any of the other tort-f

easor s from liability for the injury or wr ongful death unless its terms so prov ide .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-11- 105(a) (1) (em p h asis added) . Furthermore , “A tort-f easor who enter s into a
se ttl e me nt w itha

c la imant i s n ot e ntitl ed to rec ov e r c on tribu tio n f ro m a no the r t ort- fe a so r w ho se liability for the injury or wrongf ul death is not extinguished by the settlement.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 29-11-102( d). Unde r this system, a settling defendant could, in essence, b u y i t s right to seek-5-

contribution from other tortfea sors by including those other tortfea sors in the rele ase. See E vans v. T i l l et t B r o s. Const. C o., Inc. , 5 45 S.W .2 d 8 , 1 1- 12 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 97 6) ; B a l l i n g e r v

. O w e n sIllinois, Inc. , 829 F.2d 38, No. 86-5755, 1987 WL 44451, at *1 (6 Cir. Sept. 14, 1987) (no petition th for c ert. filed)

. Th e 19 80 re le a se wa s s up port e d b y c on sid e ratio n inthat th e se ttl ing de fe nd a nts pa id $35,000.00 to the plaintiffs and the de fendants rece ived a r elea se of their liability as well as the liability of other possible tor t fe as o rs , against whom the de fendants now had the right to see k contribution. There is no require ment that eac h rele ased tortf easor provide its own consider ation, just that the promise is supported by consideration. Bu rc he ll I ns . S v c s. , In c. v. Wes tern Si zzl in St eakh ou se o

f Dy e rsb ur

g , N o

. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 1 0 0 1-COA-R3-CV, 2004 W L 1459398, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Ju ne 29 , 20 04 ) (n o Te nn

. R. Ap p. P. 11 app lic a tio n fi led); se e als o M or iso n v . G e ne ra l M

oto rs Corp. , 428 F.2d 952, 953-54 (5 Cir. 1970). th

In Ballinger , a ca se interpr eting Tenne ssee law , the re l ease s from liability for asbestos
e x p o s u r e c o n tain e d lan g u a g e c o v e r in g th e n a me d d e f e n d a n ts a s w e ll a s a ll o th e r p e rsons or corpor ations who might be liable. Ballinger , 1987 WL at *1. The c ourt upheld the a pplication of the re lease s to other allege d tortfea sors. Id. ; see als o Morison , 4 28 F.2 d at 95 2; Peters v . Butler , 251 A. 2d60 0, 60 2 ( Md . 1 96 9) ; Hasselrode v . Gnagey , 172 A.2d 764, 765 (Pa. 1961).

W e the re fo refi ndthat, i n a c c or da nc e wi th i ts p la in la ng ua ge , th e re le a se in this c a se pr op e rl y cover s the appe llants.
(2)
Ms. Woody fu rt h er argue s that Tennesse e law doe s not allow the rele ase of “unac crue d/potential/future/prospec tive cause s of ac tion.”
As previously stated, a

rele ase is a c ontrac t and is subject to t h e ru les of construc tion applicable to contrac ts. Richland , 8 32 S.W .2 d at 55 7. An y “ [a ]mbig uo us la ng ua ge in a c on tr a c t is construed a gainst the draf ter.” Jack son v. Miller , 776 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). T he following principles apply whe n interpre ting a rele ase:
Gene rally spea

king, the scope and extent of [a] r elea se depe nds on the intent of the parties a s expre ssed in the instrument. A gener al re lease cover s all claims betwee n the parties which are in e xistence and within their contemplation; a re lease confine d to p articular m a tte rs or

c aus e s o pe rate s to re le a se on ly s uc h c la ims a s f a ir ly c ome within the terms of the re lease

. Cro ss v . E arls , 51 7 S.W .2 d 75 1, 75 2 ( Te nn . 1 97 4) ; see also Sherman v. Am. Water Heater Co., Inc

. , 50 S.W.3d 455, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). The following principles apply in dete rmining the intent of thepa rt ie s:
“In inter pretin g a re lease to determine w hether a particular c laim has bee n dis c ha rg e d, theprima

ry ru le of c on str

uc tio n is tha t the int e nti on of thepa rt ie s sh a ll-6-

go ve rna ndthi s in te nti on is t o b e de te rm ine d with a c on sid e ratio n of w hat w a s w ith in the c on te mpl a tio n of the pa rt ie s whe n the re le a se wa s exe c ute d, wh ic h inturn is to be re solved in light of all of the surrounding fac ts and circ umstances unde r which the parties a cted.”

Evans , 545 S.W.2d at 11 (quoti n g 66 A M .J UR .2 D Release § 3 0) ; see also Jac kson , 776 S.W.2d at 118.

Insu pp ort of he r arg ume nt that Te nn e sse e la w do e s n ot a llo w the re le a se of fu tur e c la ims , Ms. W oo dy c ite s Po ste r v . A ndre ws , 189 S.W.2d 580 (Tenn. 1943) , and Coc ke v . S tua rt , 7 Tenn. (Peck) 137 (1823). Both ca ses involved caus es o f ac t i o n that did not exist at the time when the plaint if fs sig ne d th e re le a se s, a ndth e rel e a se s d id n ot e xp re ssl y c ov e r s uc h c la ims . W hil e so me language used by the c ourt in Cocke and quoted by the court in Poster suggests that a prospe ctive claim cannot be rele ased, subsequent case s have clarified the issue by indicating that claims arising afte r the signing of a r elea se may be rele ased if the language of the re lease so provides. In Sherman, the issue was w hether

a re lease signed by an e mployee at the time of her te rm i n at i o n cover ed an indemnification cla im. Sherman , 50 S.W.3d at 456. Under the terms of the rele ase, the employee agre ed not to file suit against the compa ny “base d on any matter occur ring from th e b eg i n n i n g of time to the date this Agree ment is signed.” Id. at 45 8. In te rpreti ng th e wor di ng of there le a se to impose temporal re strictions, the court rule d that t h e indemnification claim was not barr ed by the rele ase. Thecourt made the following statement while discussing a similar Colorado c ase: Colorado law, like Te nnessee law, provide s that a re lease ordinarily oper ates on matters expr essed ther ein which a re a lrea dy in existence at t he ti me of the giving of the release, and demands subsequently m aturing are not as a rule discharged by the rele ase unless expre ssly embrac ed there in o r f a lling w ithin the fair

import of the terms employ ed

. Id. a t 46 0 ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also Tierney & Black , Inc. v . S ie me ns Po we r Co rp ., 79 Fed. Appx. 740, 742 (6 Cir. 2003).

th

We r eturn a gain to the proposition that it is the lang u age of the re lease that determines whether it covers injuries that a

rise prospe ctively. This is true eve n with respec t to injuries resulting fr om a c ts o r o mis sio ns that ha d n ot o c c ur re d at the tim e of there le a se , if there le a se its e lf

e xp re ssl y so pro vid e s. It

is w e ll- se ttl e d th a t “ pu bli c po lic y o f T e nn e sse e fa vo rs fr e e do m to c on tr a c t a ga ins t liability for negligence .” Dixon v. M anier , 545 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) ( upholding
a re lease from liability for negligenc e signed by a customer prior to application of a hair stra ightener
a t a c os me tol og y s c ho ol) ; see also Empre ss Health and Beauty Spa, Inc. v. Turner , 503 S.W.2d 188, 1 9 0 (T enn. 1973) ( upholding exculpatory c lause in re lease used by hea lth club). The c ourts have in v a li d a te d s o me e x c u lp a to r y c o n tr a c ts b a s e d u p o n p u b li c p o li c y c o n s id e r a ti o n s

. S ee M aggart v. Almany Re altors, Inc. , No. M 2005-02532-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL 2198204 at * 6 ( Tenn. Ct. App. July 26, 2007) (perm. app. gra nted Nov. 13, 2007). Thus, in determining the prospe ctive application of a pa rticular r elea se, a court must distingui sh betwee n two types of “f uture” claims: (a) claims for inj urie s d isc ov e re d p os t- re le a se that r e su lte d f ro m pr e -r e le a se oc c ur

re nc e s (in thi s ca se , e xp os ur e to
a sb e sto s) ; a nd(b ) c la ims ba se d upo n inju ri e s tha t re su lte d fr om pos t- re le a se oc c ur re nc e s. A r e le a se-7-

covering the second c ategory of cla ims is an exculpatory provision, contrac ting against liabilit y for future ne gligence. See E

mpr e ss He alth , 503 S.W.2d at 190-191.
Applying these principles to the c ase at bar, we have c oncluded that the 1980 r elea se bar s any claims based upon injuries cause d by Mr. Woody’s pre- rele ase exposure to asbestos, including the de ve lop me nt o f m e so the lio ma . T he la ng ua ge of there le a se e xp re ssl y state s th a t it re le a se s a ll c la ims “which the undersigned now h av e or which may here afte r ac crue on acc ount of or in any way growing out of all known and unknown, fore seen and unfore seen ” inj urie s “ re su lti ng or to r e su lt from” e xposure to asbe stos by Mr. Woody. The re lease further provides that it is intended to “cove r any and a ll injuries of any nature , including the possible sequelae there of, including but not lim ited to asbestosis, cor pulmonale, lung c ance r, and othe r form[s] of c ance r, or mesothe lioma.” Thus, t he language of the re lease provides that it cover s any inj uries, including m esothelioma, that might later de ve lop a s a

re su lt o f M r. W oo dy ’s prior e xp os ur e to a sb e sto s. Th is i nte rp re tatio n is c on sis te nt w ith other ca ses interpre ting sim ilar asbe stos relea ses. See She ppard v. Acands, I

nc. , N os

. CV 95 03 23 56 0S, CV 99 03 68 05 3S, 20 05 W L 1 43 38 75 (C onn. S up er. Ct. May 2 6, 20 05 ); Sp ad ar o v. Abe x C o r p. , 1 99 3 W L 6 03 37 8 ( De l. S up e r. Ct. Se pt. 9, 19 93 ); Fisher v. Owens- Corning Fiberglass Corp. , 868 F.2d 1175 (10 Cir. 1989). th

After car eful re view of the rele ase language and the c ircumstance s surrounding its signing,
a s p art o f th e s e tt le me n t o f a p e n d in g la w s u it , w e h a v e c o n c lu d e d th a t th e r e le a s e does not cove r claims as to injuries arising out of post-relea se asbestos exposure . The langua ge of the rele ase doe s not expre ssly address liability for asbestos exposure occur ring afte r t he si gning of t he re lease , and there is no indication that such injuries wer e within the contemplation of the parties at the time of there le a se . W e ne e d n ot d e c ide , th e re fo re , w he ther a n e xc ulp a tory pr ov isi on in a n a sb e sto s r e le a se such as that signed by Ms. W oody would violate public policy.
Ms. Woody argues t hat t he Tennessee Supreme Court’s de cision in Potts v. Celotex Corp. , 796 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. 1990) , nece ssitates a conc lusion that mesothelioma is n o t co v ered by the rele ase. We must disagr ee. In Po tts , the court concluded that asbestosis and mesothelioma ar e two distinct diseases in the context of determining when a ca use of a ction ac cr u es for statute of limit ations purposes. Id. at 684-85. Th e two-disease a nalysis has no bea ring on the scope of a rele ase, w hich is determined by the intent of the parties as expressed in the re lease . The following analysis from a

simil ar c ase, Sheppard v. Ac ands, Inc. , likewise applies he re:
Th e tw o d ise a se ru le , h ow e ve r, is a ru le prima

ri ly r e late d to thestatut e of lim itatio ns

. It does, in the conte xt of asb es t o s l itigation, recognize that the diagnosis of a nonmal ig n a n t a s b e s to s r e late d d is e a s e b e g in s th e ru n n in g o f th e s tatu te o n ly f or that disease. T he later

diagnosis of a malignant related condition cre ates a new c ause of
a c tio n w iththec omm e nc e me nt o f the statut e pe ri odbe ing wh e n th e late r d ia gn os is was made . This rule d o es n o t af fec t the question of the validity of the re lease at issue. The pa

rties her e, as they h ad a right to do, rea ched an agre ement which included a r elea se of the de fendant Gener al Elec tric of any and all claims, present and future, of and for all potential liabiliti es re sulting or to result from ex p o s ure to a n asbestos-c ontaining material. The plaintiffs’ exposure to asbestos had occurr ed and
was c omplete at the t ime the release is as [sic] exec uted and it was the manifestation-8-

of the disea se which postdate d the re lease s. The language of the re lease fore saw the possibili ty that other disease s might manifest themselves in the future and provide d for and included such an event, should it occur

. Sh e pp ar d , 2005 WL at *3.

Inc on c lus ion , th e 19 80 re le a se c ov e rs a ll c la ims ari sin g o ut o f M r. W oo dy ’s e xp os ur e to asbestos p ri o r to the signing of the re lease ; this i ncludes c onditions, i ncluding mesothelioma, discovere d afte r the signing of the re lease that resulted f ro m p re -r el ease asbestos exposur e. The 1980 rele ase doe s not, how ever , bar any claims related to asbestos exposur e that occ urre d afte r the signing of the rele ase.
Cos ts o f a

pp e a l area sse sse d a ga ins t th e app e llants , f or wh ic h e xe c uti on ma y is su e if
nece ssary.

___________________________________ ANDY D . BENNETT, JUDG E