The t r ans cr i pt of t he pl ea s ubm i s s i on he ar i ng i s not i ncl uded i n t he appe l l at e r ec or d. N eve r t hel es s , w e have 1 gl ea ned t hes e m i ni m al f ac t s f r om t he r em ai nder of t he r ec or d. W e a l s o not e t hat t he j udgm ent f or m s pr ovi de t hat t he d efen d an t e n t ered h i s g u i l t y p l ea u n d er t h e t erm s o f N o rt h C a ro l i n a v. A l f o rd , 4 0 0 U .S . 2 5 , 9 1 S . C t. 1 6 0 (1 9 7 0 ), w h e re in t he U ni t ed St at es Supr em e Cour t he l d t hat a cr i m i nal def enda nt m ay e nt er a gui l t y pl ea w i t hout adm i t t i ng gui l t i f t he defenda nt i nt el l i gent l y c oncl udes t hat hi s be s t i nt er es t s w oul d be s er ved by a pl ea of gui l t y. 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 24, 200 8 STATE OF TENNESS EE v . DONALD BLEVI NS Appeal from t he Criminal Court for Sul livan Cou nty No. S51,714 R. Jerr y Beck, Judge

No. E2007-01588-CC A-R3- CD - Filed August 26, 2008

Th e de fe nd a nt, Do na ld B le vin s, ple a de d g uil ty i n th e Sul liv a n Co un ty C ri minal Co urt to a sin gle count of re ckless homicide in exc hange f or a two- year

sentenc e w i t h the manner of service of

the sentenc e to be de termined by the tria l court. The tri al co u rt d enied a ll forms of alternative se nte nc ing , a ndthede fe nd a nt n ow app e a ls. W e re ve rs e the jud gme nt o f the tria l c ou rt

.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Judgment of the C riminal Court Reve rsed
J A M ES C UR W OOD W I TT , J R ., J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELL ES and R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER , JJ., joined.
Michae l LaGua

rdia (at trial), an d C

. Brad Sproles (on a ppeal) , Kingsport, Tenne ssee, f or the app e lla nt, Do na ld B le vin s. Robert E. C o o per, Jr ., Attorney Ge nera l and Reporter ; Rachel W est Harmon, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; H. Gr eele y Wells, Jr., District Attorne y Gene ral; and Julie Can t er , As sistant District Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
On Februa

ry 8, 2007, the de fendant entered a p l ea o f gui lty to the singl e, cha rged offe nse of r eckle ss homicide based upon the d eath of the victim, Jonathan Light. The plea 1 agre em en t called f

or a two- year

sentenc e with the manne r of se rvice to be determined by the trial c ou rt

. At

the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tr ia l cou rt a nd c ou ns e l for the pa rt ie s re c a lle d the fa c ts of the c ase during the following colloquy:-2- The Court: All right. When I f irst said this was an unusual case , it involves where the Def endant allegedly had some patche s and what is described in the probation report as a Dura gesic patch . . . . What wa s the gene ric or name of the drug? I t came out during the stipulation at the time of the plea.
Ge ne ra l Ca nte r: Ju dg e , I be lie ve it w a s f e ntany l.
Mr. LaG uardia : I think that’s corr ect, Your Honor.
The Court: Doesn’t describe in the indictment. It was . . . a pre scr i p t i o n t ype thing. You put it on your skin. And the De fe nd a nt ate it o r s ome thi ng . I me a n th e vic tim

.

. . . . The Court: Okay. Morphine patch in exc hange f or selling other patches for

[the de fendant] at Model City Apartments. And also gave some todipols and some soma.

Then t h e medical c ame out fr om the medical examiner that it could have c aused the death. Most likely did. A nd yo u c omp ro mis e d it

by thi s p le a

a gr e e me nt.
Mr. LaG uardia : That’s c orre ct, Your H onor. Ge ne ra l Ca nte r: Ju dg e , Mr

. Li gh t, the vic tim , wa s 33 ye ars old at the time of his death.
T h e Co u r t: Ok a y
. I t s a y s h e r e in th e r e p o r t

. . . the way that the doctors a

pproac hed it, . . . the dec ease d probably took more than on e kin d of dr

ug
. An d it wa s a de a th c aus e d from m ult ipl e substances. The y said that the l ethal . . . dosage of fe ntanyl . . .provided in this report as a gener al gui deline, although it . . . cannot be said . . . what would have oc curr ed if it had be en used a lone.

But Dr . Fe rs le w, wh o is the e xp e rt fr om o ve r at E a st Te nn e sse e State , . . . e xp la ine d th a t e a c h in div idu a l’ s b od y is differ ent. . . . Dr. Fer slew said that Mr. Light was evidently a hea vy us e r .
. . a nd the re fo re pr ob ably ha d e xtr e me ly h ightol e ranc e to the m.

Th e re fo reit’ s impo ssi ble to s a y if the fe ntany l . . . in itself would have been lethal. Both doctors concluded and r eiterated that th is d e a th r e su lte d f

ro m th e c on su mpt ionof

mul tip le su bs ta nc e s, a ll o f w hic h mi gh t no t be a ttribu te d to the De fe nd a nt. Is that c or re c t, Ge ne ra l?-3- Ge n er al C an t er : Judge, it’s clea r thatt h e D ef

endant suppli ed the fenta nyl which . . . the doctor s indi ca t ed that [the victim’s] blood contained a lmost 50 t imes the lethal dosage

. An d that drug wa s supplied b y th e D e f

e n d a n t. [ T h e v ic ti m’ s ] s y s te m a ls o c o n tain ed be nz od ia z e pin e s a nda lc oh ol.
The de fendant testified that afte r being expose d to “toxic che micals” while w orking c on str uc tio n on “a nu c le ar wa ste du mp” in O ak Ri dg e , T e nn e sse e , h e e xp e ri e nc e d n ume ro us he a lth pr ob le ms that e ve ntu a lly le d to his be ing pr e sc ri be d the Du ra ge sic patc h th a t he la te r t rans fe rr e d to the vic tim

. Ac c or din g to the de fe nd a nt, he fi rs t met the vic tim wh e n the vic tim app ro a c he d him w ith a n o ff e r t o s e ll h im t oo ls that, a s th e de fendan t lat e r d isc ov e re d, thevic tim ha d s tol e n f

ro m a neighbor. During t his encounte r, t he victim asked the defe ndant about the patch on his arm, and the defe ndant explaine d that it was for pain. The victim then inquired about pur chasin g s ome of the defe ndant’s pain medic ation.

Th e de fe nd a nt s ta te d that sh ou ld h e be inc arc e rate d, his ins ur a nc e c ov e ra ge wo uld terminate and that his monthly prescription drug e xpenses would incr easefrom appr oximately $5 per month to $532 per month a nd would consume a sizea ble portion of his $1100 per month income. The de fendant te s t ified that he w as unable to work bec ause of his health problems but that he sometimes helped his landlord, Dua ne Murray, with remode ling jobs. The defe ndant stated that beca use of his exposur e to toxic che micals, he st ruggled with memory and cognitive func tion. The defe ndant admitted that he sold “ one or two” fenta nyl patches to obtain mone y to purcha se gasoline and tobac co.
Duane Murray, the def endant’ s landlord and f

riend, test i fi ed t h at the victim had rec ently moved in “with the woman [he] rente d to.” Mr. Murray testified that prior to his exposure in Oak Ridge, the de fendant was “ha rd-wor king” and “ wouldn’t stop or try to slack” when on the job

. Af te r his e xp os ur e , the de fe nd a nt w a s u na ble to k e e p th e sa me wo rk ho ur s o r p e rf

orm th e sa me typ e s o f w or

k th a t he ha d b e fo re . M r. Mu rr a y s ta ted that th e de fe nd a nt h a d p ro ble ms w ithhis cognitive func tion as evidenced by his inability to compre hend and r eca ll sim ple instructions. Mr. Murray testified that the defe ndant had only know n the victim f or “a day or two bef

ore the incident occur red.”
At the conc lusion of the h ea ri n g , the trial court “denied pr obation in all forms of alternative rele ase” on the sole basis of the vic tim’s mother’s statement, co n t ained within t he prese ntence report, that “ the Def endant aggra vated [the victim] for wee ks to se ll these patche s for him.” The court reiter ated that the vic tim’s mother’s statement wa s “the diff ere nce in pr obation and no t pr ob a tio n. ” Th e de fe nd a nt o bje c te d to the tria l c ou rt ’s c on sid e ri ng the st ate ment fo r tho se purposes on the ba sis that it was unreliable hearsay and was, in fac t, controve rted by the testimony of bo th the de fe nd a nt a nd Mr

. Mu rr a y. Th e tr ia l c ou rt re sp on de d to the ob je c tio n by statin g that it ha d ma de its ru lin g a ndinv ite d th e de fe nd a nt t o c ha lle ng e the ru lin g o n a pp e a l. In this appea l, the defe ndant challenge s the trial court’s consideration of the victim’s mother’s stateme nt, which he be lieves constitutes unreliable hear say. F urther, he contends that the trial court e rre d by denying probation or other alternative sente ncing. The State ar g u es t h at t heBec aus e t he of f ens e i n t hi s c as e occ ur r ed pr i or t o t he e f f ec t i ve da t e of t he 2005 a m endm ent s t o t he Se nt enc i ng 2 A ct and t he defenda nt di d not exe cut e a w ai ver of hi s e x pos t f ac t o pr ot ec t i ons , t he defenda nt w as s ent enc ed pur s uant to th e 2 0 0 3 v e rs io n o f t h e A c t. See T .C .A . § 4 0 -3 5 -1 1 4 ( S u p p . 2 0 0 5 ), c o m p iler ’s n o te s; s ee al s o St at e v. Rober t Lam ont M o ss, Jr. , N o . M 2 0 0 6 -0 0 8 9 0 -C C A -R 3 -C D , sli p o p . at 5 n .1 (T e n n . C rim . A p p ., N a sh v ill e , D e c . 4 , 2 0 0 7 ). -4- defe ndant has forfeited his right t o challenge the admissibilit y of the stateme nt by failing to lodge a conte mp o r a n e o u s o b

je c ti o n
. I n th e a lt e r n a ti v e , it a s s e r ts th a t th e tria l c o u r t p r o p e r ly c o n s idere d the statement a nd that the orde r of total inca rce ration was appropriate. For re asons discussed more fully below, we hold that the trial court e rre d by denying a se ntence of full probation.

Considering first the St ate ’ s c la im th at t h ed e fendant forfe ited appellate consideration of thi s is su e , th e re c or d e sta

bli sh e s that the de fe nd a nt app are ntl y ma de no ob je c tio ns to the c on te nts of the pre sentenc e report prior to the sentenc ing he aring and did not object whe n the State tender ed the re port into evidence . Once the trial court indicated that it would consider t h e s t at em en t as substantive evidenc e of the circumstances of the offe nse, the de fendant objected on the gr ounds that the statement wa s unreliable hear say. The trial court overr uled the objec tion without concluding that the statement wa s reliable. U nder the se circumstance s, we decline to treat the i ssue as waived and ho ld that it

is j us tic ia

bleon app e a l.
We now examine the content and c ontext of the stateme nt at issue. The re cord e sta bli sh e s th a t th e vic tim ’s mothe r, in an in te rv ie w w iththepr e pa re r o f the pres enten c e re po rt , objected to the imposition of pro b at ion or other a lternative se ntencing on the ba sis that “the defe ndant aggr avated h er s o n for we eks to sell these patches for him.” The stateme nt offer s no contex t b y w h ic h th e te r m “ w e e k s ” c o u ldb e c o mp r e h e n d e d a s a n y d e te r mi n ab le p e r io d o f time. Simi larly , t h er e i s no context fr om which to asce rtain exa ctly what wa s meant by the term

“ a gg ra vate d. ” Ne ve rthe le ss, du ri ng the se nte nc ing he ari ng , th e tria l c ou rt , a lt ho ug h in iti a lly e xp re ssi ng c on c e rnthat it c ou ld not c on sid e r the sta te me nt be c aus e it did no t f a ll w ith in the a mbi t of “vic tim im pact e vidence ,” conside red the statement as substantive e vidence of the c ircumstance s of the of fe ns e . Fr om this state me nt, the tria l c ou rt c on c lu ded th at “th e [d ]e fe nd a nt w a sn ’t on ly selling th a t d a y , b u t b a s e d u p o n th e mo th e r ’ s s tate me n t

. . . h e w a s d o in g th is b e f o r e
. ” T h e trial court, with o u t an y e x a mi n a ti o n o f th e f a c to r s r e late d to im

p o s in g a f u ll y in c ar c e r a ti v e s e n te n ce, ba se d it s d e nia l of

a ny fo rm of a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing e nti re ly o n the vic tim ’s mothe r’ s st a te me nt: “And that’ s what tips the scale is that one word ther e, . . . make a cle ar r ecor d on it. .

. . So that’s the diffe renc e in probation and not probation. I’ll dra w your issue c lear for you.”
W he n a de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e s th e ma nn e r of se rv ic e of a se nte nc e , this c ou rt ge ne ra lly conducts a

de novo re view of the rec ord with a pre sumption t hat the determinations made by the tria l court a re c orre ct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d) (2003). This pr esumption, how ever , is conditioned upon 2 the a ff ir mativ e sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tria l c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant facts and circumstance s. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . The burde n of showing that the sentenc e is improper is upon the de fendant. Id

. If the revie w ref lects the trial court prope rly consider ed all rele vant fac tors and its findings of f act a re a dequate ly supported by the rec ord, this court must affirm the sentenc e, “e ven if we woul d h av e p re fe rre d a diffe rent re sult.” State v. Fletc her , 8 05 S.W .2 d 7 85 , 7 89 (Ten n. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Inthe e ve nt the re c or d f a ils toT h e 2 0 0 5 am en d m en t t o C o d e sect i o n 4 0 -35 -10 2 (6) p rov i d es t h at t h o se defen d an t s w h o m eet cert ai n s t at u t o ry 3 pr er equi s i t es “ s houl d be c ons i der ed as a f avor abl e ca ndi dat e f or a l t er nat i v e sentencing opt i ons i n t he abs enc e of evi denc e t o t he cont r ar y. A c our t s hal l cons i der , but i s not bound by, t hi s a dvi s or y s ent enc i ng gui del i ne. ” T. C. A

. § 40- 3 5 -10 2 (6) (20 0 6 ). -5- de mon str a te there qu ir e d c on sid e ratio n b y th e tr ia l c ou rt , a pp e llatere vie w o f the se nte nc e is p ur e ly de novo. Ashby , 823 S.W.2d at 169.

In making its sentencing de termination in the prese nt case , th e t ri al court, at the conclusion of the se ntencing hea ring, was obl i g ed to determine the propriety of sentenc ing alternatives by considering (1) the evidenc e, i f an y, rec eived at the guilty plea and sente ncing hearings, (2) the pre sentenc e re port, (3) the principles of se ntencing and argume nts a s to sentencing alternatives, (4) the n at u re and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved, (5) e vidence and information offe red by the parties on the e nhance ment and mitigating factors, ( 6) any state ments the de fe nd a nt m a de in h is b e ha lf abo ut s e nte nc ing , a nd(7 ) the po te nti a l f or re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( a ), (b ); -1 03 (5 ); State v. Holland , 860 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

.

Under the 2003 ver sion of the S entenc ing Act, an “espe cially mitigated or standar d offe nder c onvicted of a

Class C, D, or E felony is pre sumed to be a f avora ble candidate for alternative sentenc ing options i n the abse nce of evidenc e to the contra ry.” T.C.A. § 40- 35-102(6) (2003). Further, a defe ndant is e ligible f or probation “if the sentenc e actua lly imposed upon such 3 de fe nd a nt i s e igh t ( 8) ye ars or les s, ” an d th e tria l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to c on sid e r p ro batio n a s a sentenc ing option. Id. § 40-35-303( a), (b). A def endant’ s potential for re habilitation or lack ther eof should be examined when determining if an a lternative se ntence is appropriate. Id. § 40-35-103( 5). S en t en cing i ssues areto be deter mined by the fa cts and c ircumstance s made known in e ach c ase. See State v . Taylor , 744 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

The trial court’s determinations of whether the defe ndant is entitled to an alternative sentenc e and w hether

the def endant is a suitable ca ndidate for full probation ar e diffe rent inquiries with differ en t b u rdens of proof. State v. Boggs , 932 S.W.2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

. When, a s is the case here , the defendant is entitled to the s tatutory presumption favoring alternative sentenc ing, the State must overcome the presumption by the s howing of “evidence to the contra ry.” Ashby , 82 3 S.W .2 d at 16 9; State v. Bingham , 9 1 0 S. W

. 2 d 4 4 8 , 4 5 5 ( T e n n
. Crim

. A p p
. 1 9 9 5 ), overruled in part on other grounds by Stat e v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3 d 1, 9- 10 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; see T.C.A. §§ 40-35-102( 6), -103. What constitut es “evidence to the contra ry” c an be f

ound in Tennesse e Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 , w hic h p ro vid e s: Sentence s involving confine ment should be based on thefo llo wi ng c on sid e ratio ns : (A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protec t society by re straining a de fe nd a nt w ho ha s a

lon g h ist ory o f c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) Confinement is nece ssary to avoid de prec iating the se ri ou sn e ss o f th e of

fe ns e or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula rl y s uit e d to-6- provide a n eff

ective de terre nce to other s like l y to commit si milar offe nses; or (C) Measur es less restric tive than confine ment h ave fre quently or rec ently been applied unsucce ssfully to the defendant[.] T.C.A. §40-35-103( 1).

Conversely, the de fendant is require d to establish his “suitabilit y for f ull probation as distinguished from his favora ble candidacy f

or al t er n at i v e sente ncing in gener al.” State v. Mounger , 7 S.W .3 d 7 0, 78 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 99 ); see T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 3( b) ; Bingham , 910 S.W.2d at 455-56. A defendant seeking full probation bea rs the burde n of showing that probation will “subserve the ends of justice and the best interest[s] of both the public and the defe ndant.” Sta te v. Dy kes , 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Ho op e r v . S tat e , 297 S.W.2d 78, 81 (1956)) , overruled on othe r gr o u n d s by Hoope r , 29 S.W.3d at 9-10. Among the f actor s applicable to probation consider ation are the circ umstances of the offe nse; the def endant’ s criminal re c or d, so c ia l hi sto ry , a ndpr e se nt con di ti on; th e de te rr e nt e ff e c t up on the de fe nd a nt; a ndthe be st interests of the de fendant and the public. State v. Gre ar , 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978)

.

Because the trial c ourt failed to c onsider on the rec ord the fa ctors contained in Code section 40-35- 103 prior to imposing a fully incarc erative sentenc e, our revie w of the se ntence is de no vo wi th n o p re su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss. Upon our de novo revie w, we decline to utilize the statement given by the vic tim’s mothe r t o th e pr e pa

re r o f the pr e se nte nc e re po rt . A lth ou gh , as the State c or re c tly po int s o ut, thi s court ha s gener ally deeme d the information included w ithin presentenc e re ports such as the de fe nd a nt’ s p ri or

c ri min a l r e c or d, e mpl oy me nt i nf orma tio n, a ndthelik e a s r e lia ble he ars a y, thi s designation would not extend to t he underlying hearsay contained w ithin the victim’s mot her’ s state me nt. Be c aus e there c or d d oe s no t e sta bli sh the re lia

bil ity of the un de rl yin g h e ars a y s ta te me nt, we will not consider it. See T. C.A

. § 40 -3 5- 20 9( b) (2 00 3) (a llo wi ng the us e of re lia ble he ars a y in a sente ncing hea

ring). Therema ining evidence counter weighs the de nial of probation.
The re cord e stablishes that although the 45-yea r-old def endant ha d eight prior misdemeanor c onvictions, five were for minor traff

ic offe nses and two we re more than 20 yea rs old. In conse quence , we c annot say that c onfinement is nec essary beca use of the d ef

en d ant’s criminal history. Further, despite the t rial court’s finding to the contra ry, there is no proof in the re cord that the def endant’ s transfe r of the tr ansdermal patch to the vi cti m and the ac companying sale of the rema ining four patche s was anything more than an isolated incide nt as the def endant c laimed. Mo re ov e r, the e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e d th a t, d ue to h is o ng oin g he a vy dr ug us e , th e vic tim ’s de a th c ou ld not be direc tl y a tt

r ib u te d to h is in g e s ti o n o f th e g e l c o n tain e d w ith in th e tr a n s d e r ma l p a tc h , and furthermore, the vic tim’s willful i ngestion of the gel wa s contrary to the fore seea ble and intended us e o f t h e a n a l g e s i c
. A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s c o n d u c t r e s u l t i n g i n h i s c o n v i c t i o n i s no t so e gr e gio us a s to wa

rr a nt c on fi ne me nt ba se d up on the c ir c ums ta nc e s of the of fe ns e
. Fin a lly , th e re is no e vid e nc e that th e de fe nd a nt h a d e ve r v iol a te d th e c on dit ion s of a se nte nc e inv olv ing re le a se int o the community.B e c a u se th e d e fe n d a n t p le a d e d g u ilt y to re c k le ss h o m ic id e , h e is i n e lig ib le fo r c o m m u n ity c o rr e c tio n s. See 4 T

. C

. A

. § 4 0 -36 -10 2 (a)( 1 )( B ) ( 2 0 0 3 ). -7-

Be c a us e n o n e o f

t h e t h r e e f

a c t o r s i n C o d e s e c t i o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 0 3 i s ap p l i c ab l e t o t his de fe nd a nt, he re ta ins his pr e su mpt ion of fa vo ra ble c a nd ida c y fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing

. Furthe r, it is our view that the de fendant has established his suitabilit y for pr obation. The e vidence established 4 that in a dd iti on to h is r e la tiv e ly m ino r c ri min a l r e c or d, thede fe nd a nt w a s h on or ably dis c ha rg e d in 19 79 a ft e r a thr e e -y e ar stin t in the mil ita ry a nd ha d mai ntaine d ste a dy e mpl oy me nt unt il h e be c a me disabled while wor

king in Oak Ridge, Tenne ssee. As a result of his di sability, the defendant takes numerous medications and exper ience s difficulty wi th memory and c ognitive function. The defe ndant t es t i fi ed , and Mr. Murr ay conf irmed, that despite his disability, the defe ndant often a c c omp a nie d M r. Mu rr a y o n r e mod e lin g jo bs

.

Ac c or din gly , th e jud gme nt o f the tria l c ou rt de ny ing pr ob a tio n is re ve rs e d. Th e c aus e is remande d to the trial court f or the imposition of a probationary sentenc e.

___________________________________ JAMES CURWOOD WI TT, JR., JUDGE