J-S17008-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HAROLD ROBERT BURTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2691 EDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 26, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005776-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 12, 2024

Harold Robert Burton appeals from the order dismissing as untimely his 

second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We 

affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the background of this matter as follows:

A jury found [Appellant] guilty of drug delivery resulting in 

death, criminal use of a communications facility[,] and possession 

with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Th[e PCRA] court 

sentenced him on October 31, 2018, to an aggregate term of 

[thirteen] to [thirty-five] years in a state correctional institution. 

The Superior Court affirmed [Appellant]’s judgment of sentence 

on direct appeal and our Supreme Court declined review on April 

6, 2021. Commonwealth v. Burton, 234 A.3d 824 (Pa.Super. 

2020), appeal denied, 252 A.3d 234 (Pa. 2021). 

[Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition on April 29, 2021. 

Th[e PCRA] court appointed counsel, but following a Grazier
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hearing[1] granted [Appellant]’s request to represent himself. In 

an amended and later supplemented pro se petition, [Appellant] 

alleged counsel ineffectiveness and judicial bias. The 

Commonwealth opposed relief and th[e PCRA] court denied the 

petition after a hearing. The Superior Court affirmed that decision 

on January 11, 2023, and our Supreme Court declined review on 

July 18, 2023. Commonwealth v. Burton, 292 A.3d 1092 

(Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, 301 A.3d 864 (Pa. 2023).

[Appellant] filed a “Second or Subsequent Petition for Post 

Conviction Collateral Relief Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §[§] 9541-

9546,” on July 27, 2023. In summary, he alleged (1) trial counsel 

failed to request a jury instruction on mistake of fact, (2) trial 

counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the victim’s actions 

in relation to causation[,] and (3) he is serving a sentence greater 

than the lawful maximum. He also requested the recusal of the 

[PCRA judge] on the basis of alleged partiality.

Th[e PCRA] court denied the recusal request on August 28, 

2023, and gave [Appellant] notice of its intent to dismiss the 

instant petition [pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“Rule 907 notice”)]

due to untimeliness. After considering [Appellant]’s response to 

the [Rule 907] notice, [which also newly asserted a claim of 

interference by a government official,] th[e PCRA] court dismissed 

the instant petition[.] 

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/7/23, 1-2 (cleaned up).

Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court did not 

order him to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and none was filed. The PCRA court authored a Rule 

1925(a) opinion explaining its rationale for dismissing the petition. Appellant 

presents a single issue for our review:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing Appellant’s 

second or subsequent PCRA petition by concluding that

[Appellant] is not entitled to the post-conviction relief he seeks 

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1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (requiring an on-therecord determination as to voluntariness of waiver of counsel).
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under the PCRA, because jurisdiction is lacking over this untimely 

petition, where the statute’s plain language and structure 

demonstrate that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)’s time limits are not 

jurisdictional.

Appellant’s brief at 1-2 (cleaned up).

This Court addresses the propriety of the PCRA court’s dismissal order 

as follows: “In general, we review an order dismissing or denying a PCRA 

petition as to whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the 

record and are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 285 A.3d 

652, 657 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). “As to legal questions, we apply a 

de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions[.]” Id.

(citation omitted).

We first determine whether Appellant’s petition was timely, because 

neither this Court nor the PCRA court has jurisdiction to consider the merits 

of any claims raised in an untimely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. 

Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1030-31 (Pa.Super. 2019). In this respect, the 

PCRA provides as follows:

Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the 

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States 

or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time 

period provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) (emphasis added). Any petitioner invoking one of these 

exceptions must file a petition “within one year of the date the claim could 

have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Additionally, this Court has 

stated that the petitioner “bears the burden of pleading and proving an 

applicable statutory exception.” Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 488 

(Pa.Super. 2018). 

Since Appellant did not appeal his judgment of sentence to the Supreme 

Court of the United States, the judgment became final on July 5, 2021, ninety 

days after our Supreme Court declined review. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) 

(explaining that “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review”); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (“A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking 

review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary 

review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the Clerk 

within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review”). There 

is no dispute that the instant petition, filed in July 2023, was facially untimely. 

Therefore, Appellant had the burden to plead and prove one of the enumerated 

exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar in his petition before the PCRA court could 

consider the merits of any of his claims.
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Based upon our review of the petition, it is plain that Appellant did not 

invoke any exceptions to the timeliness requirement, other than averring that 

a “miscarriage of justice” should permit review of his claims. See PCRA 

Petition, 7/27/23, at 3-4. However, this is insufficient to satisfy a timeliness 

exception. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa.Super. 

2007) (stating that “the courts of Pennsylvania will only entertain a 

‘miscarriage of justice’ claim when the initial timeliness requirement is met”). 

Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in concluding that the petition was 

untimely and that Appellant had failed to plead or prove an exception.2 

However, that does not end our review. In response to the PCRA court’s 

Rule 907 notice and again in this Court, Appellant challenges the 

constitutionality of the PCRA’s time-bar. We have jurisdiction to address this 

claim irrespective of the timeliness of the underlying petition. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Branthafer, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 WL 1472452 (Pa.Super. 

2024) (considering the petitioner’s attack on the constitutionality to the 

PCRA’s timeliness requirements in addition to concluding that the underlying 

petition was untimely). 

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2 The fact that Appellant belatedly attempted to raise the governmental 

interference exception in response to the court’s Rule 907 notice does not alter 

this conclusion, since he was not given leave to amend the petition. See

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa.Super. 2007) (concluding 

that this Court lacked jurisdiction to review any claims in an untimely petition 

that did not set forth any exceptions to the time bar, despite raising them on 

appeal). 
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Our High Court has directed that “we must presume that statutes are 

constitutional and require those challenging the constitutionality of a statute 

to demonstrate that it clearly, plainly, and palpably violates the constitution.” 

Commonwealth v. Berry, 167 A.3d 100, 104 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). Further, “the party challenging a statute’s constitutionality bears a 

heavy burden of persuasion.” Commonwealth v. Pitt, ___ A.3d ___, 2024 

WL 1291959, at *5 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citation omitted).

In his brief, Appellant argues that we should disregard the proclamation 

made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 

722 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1998), that the PCRA’s timeliness requirement is

jurisdictional in nature. More specifically, he contends that this holding is 

faulty because it is dicta, inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, 

and goes against the legislative intent. See Appellant’s brief at 8-18. Further, 

Appellant avers that other jurisdictions do not interpret their post-conviction 

relief statutes to include a time-bar that is jurisdictional or disallowing of

equitable tolling. Id. at 18-22. Finally, he maintains that the Pennsylvania 

courts’ reliance on this rule has caused the denial of justice for other

petitioners who could not fairly present their claims, and will do the same to 

him. Id. at 9-10, 26.

The PCRA court’s opinion focused primarily on the timeliness of the 

underlying petition. However, as to Appellant’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar, it opined that “the PCRA 

time limitation period long has been held to pass constitutional muster.” PCRA 
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Court Opinion, 12/7/23, at 5 (citing Peterkin and Commonwealth v. 

Tedford, 228 A.3d 891, 907 (Pa. 2020)). We agree. 

It is long-established that this Court “is bound by existing precedent 

under the doctrine of stare decisis and continues to follow controlling 

precedent as long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme 

Court.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 143 (Pa.Super. 2014). 

Since the decision of Peterkin in 1988, we have continually interpreted the 

PCRA as conferring jurisdiction only if the time-bar is satisfied. See, e.g.,

Branthafer, 2024 WL 1472452, at *4 (“Thus, bound by the decisions of our 

Supreme Court, we continue to adhere to the principle that the PCRA time 

limitation is jurisdictional in nature”). Accordingly, we decline Appellant’s 

invitation to deviate from Peterkin and other binding precedent. Although 

he cites to secondary sources that have criticized the holding in Peterkin, he 

has not advanced any cases indicating that the decision has been overturned,

nor has he raised any new argument that meets his “heavy burden of 

persuasion” in convincing us that the ruling is facially unconstitutional. Pitt, 

2024 WL 1291959, at *5. 

Furthermore, as the PCRA court noted, this is not a circumstance where 

the jurisdictional time-bar denied Appellant from fairly presenting his postconviction claims, as he had the ability to fully litigate any matters concerning 

the effectiveness of trial and direct appeal counsel or the legality of his 

sentence in his first PCRA petition. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/23, at 5 n.5 
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(stating that Appellant “failed to address why he could not have brought the 

instant claims in his first, timely petition”).

In sum, Appellant has failed to convince us that the PCRA court erred 

and that relief is due. Therefore, we affirm the order dismissing his petition.

Order affirmed.

Date: 6/12/2024