FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT OCT 25, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1113 7

____ ____ ____ _ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 1- 06 25 8- CR-J EM UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us WALTER J. BROWNE , a.k .a. Bu st er, PATRICI A A. DE VANEY, a.k .a. Pat ric iaBro wne , a.k .a. Pat ric iaCard on e, a. k.a. Patric ia Browne Cardone, D ef en dants -Appe llants .

____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ _ (O ct ob er 25, 200 7)Honora ble J ane A . Restani, Chief J udg e, United States Court of International Trade , * sitti ngby desig nation. 2 Before TJO FL AT and HU LL , C ircuit Judg es, and REST AN I, Judge. * TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: T he c ri m es in thi s c as e ar ose f ro m the a ct ivi tie s of

W al te r J. Br ow ne and h is sis te r, P atri ci a A . D ev an ey , a s ahig h- ranki ng o ff ic ia l and a dm ini str at ive a ssi stant, re spe ct ive ly , in tw o la

bor uni ons. A cc use d of

li nin g th ei r poc ke ts b y

abusi ng the ir posit ions in the union s, the defe ndants in this broth er-a nd-sister operation were prosecuted und er the R acketeer Influenced and Corrupt O rganizations Act (“ RI CO ”) , the T af

t- H ar tle y A ct , and o the r fe de ra l st at ute s pr osc ri bin g em be zz le m en t and f

ra ud. A ft er atw o- m onth j oin t tri al , Br ow ne w as c onvi ct ed of ei ght c ount s and a cquitte d of

se ve n c ount s, and D ev an ey w as c onvi ct ed

of nin e co unt s and a cquitte d of

six c ount s. T he G ove rn m en t ob ta ine d an or de r of forfe iture for which the defendants were held jointly and severally

liable. In ad dit ion , the de fe ndants r ec ei ve d pr iso n se nte nc es , and D ev an ey w as or de re d to pay r es tit uti on. B othnowappe al , c ont es tin g th e le ga l and f ac tua l su ppor t f or the ir RICO and Ta ft-H artley

Ac t convictio ns, the district court’ s denial of severance, and the order of forf

eiture. W e af fi rm the de fe ndants ’ c onvi ct ion s and s en te nc es in al l r es pe ct s. T heL icense d seame n include ca ptains, mates (fir st, second, and third) , and eng ineer s (chief , 1 first-assistant, sec ond-assistant, and third-a ssistant). Unlicensed se amen pr imarily take dire ction from the of

fice rs, and usua lly

outnumber license d seame n on a vesse l. Howeve r, not all licensed se ame n a re de e me d s up e rv iso rs fo r c oll e c tiv e ba rg a ini ngpurp os e s; g e ne ra lly , c a pta ins , f ir st mates, and c hief a

nd first-assistant eng ineer s are considere d supervisors. 3 str uc tur e of the opi nio n is a s f

oll ow s: P ar

t I pr ovi de s th e fa ct s r el ev an t f or pur pose s of thi s a ppe al . P ar

t I I de sc ri be s th e ch ar ge s a ga ins t the de fe ndants and the proceedings in th e district court. Parts I II through VI e xam ine the issues raised on a ppe al by the de fe ndants . I. A s an un de rs tandi ng o f the m em be rs hip and o rg an iz at ion al str uc tur e of the tw o la bor uni ons is c ru ci al to thi s a ppe al , w e fi rs t de sc ri be the se uni ons, the de fe ndants ’ inv olv em en t the re w ith , and the inc ide nts le ad ing to pr ose cu tio n. Fo unde d in187 5, D ist

ri ct 1- Mari ne E ngi ne er s B en ef ic ia l A sso ci at ion( “ D 1- ME BA ”) is anA FL -C IO -c hart er ed la bor or ganiz at ionhe ad quart er ed in W as hin gto n, D . C. T hr ough out the r el ev an t pe ri od, D 1- ME BAr ep re se nte d bo th licensed and unl icensed seam en in its m aritim e divisio ns. T hese seam en served 1 on a ll m anne r of

shi ps, inc lud ing shi ps i n in te rn at ion al c om m er ce , r ea dy

r es er ve fo rc e ve sse ls, m ili tary

se al if t c om m an d sh ips , N at ion al O ce an ic and A tm osph er ic Adm inistration research vessels, ships of instit ution s such as Scripps Resear ch In sti tut e an d W oods H ole Re se ar chCe nte r, and S ta te n I sland f er ri es .4

Ina ddi tio n to r ep re se nti ng s eam en , D 1- ME BAa lso r ep re se nte d no nm ar iti m e w orke rs . I n it s P ro fe ssi ona l O ff ic e In dustri al D ivi sio n ( “ PO ID ”) , D 1- ME BAr ep re se nte d land- ba se d e m plo y ee s who h an dle d th e fr ei ght and o ff ic es of s h i p p i n g co m

p an i es wh o s e mar i t i m e e m p l o yees we re re p re s en t edb y D1 -M EB A’s m ar iti m e div isi ons. D 1- ME BAa lso r ep re se nte d vari ous publ ic -s ec tor e m plo y ee s, rangi ng f ro m sc hool bus dr ive rs to cu sto dia l w orke rs , in its F ed er at ionof P ubl ic Em ploy ees (“ D1-ME BA/F OP E” ) divisio n, which was headquarter ed in Broward County , F lorida. A lthou gh POID and D1-ME BA/F OP E w ere adm inistered as se parate div isi ons, the ir

m em be rs w er e co nsi de re d f

ull vot ing m em

be rs of D 1- MEBA. W alter J. “ Buster” Br owne becam e executive director of D1-M EB A/FO PE in 197 7. Under Browne’ s leadership, the m em bership of D1-ME BA/F OP E gr ew ste ad ily . I n 19 88, D 1- ME BAm er ge d w iththe N at ion al Mari tim e U nio n, auni on th atpri m ari ly repre se nt edun li cen se d s eam en , andbe cam e D1- MEBA/ NMU. So m et im e the re af

te r, Br ow ne w as f

or ce d ou t of

the ne w ly

m er ge d e nti ty

by D 1- M E B Ap r e s i d e n tG e n e D e F r i e s . B r o w n e w e n tt o Wa s h i n g t o n , D . C . , an db e c a me inv olv ed in a m ove m en t t o ou st D eF ri es . T he m er ge r did not la st; D eF ri es andBr owne wa s named in the same indictment for his role in rig g ing the elec tion in favor of 2 DeF ries, to which he pled guilty . 5 oth er s w er e ind ic te d onc harg es inc lud ing e le ct ionr igg ing and e m be zz le m en t, and

2 in l at e 1991 , D 1- ME BAvot ed to se ce de and r ec onst itu te it se lf a s an auto nom ous en tity und er it s or igi na l nam e. I t r et ai ne d anum be r of unl ic en se d se am enw ho w orke d onstate -o pe rate d f er ri es in A la ska

and W as hin gto n st at e. I n 19 92, the ne wle ad er shi p of

D 1- ME BAr es tor ed

Br ow ne to his f

orm er pos iti on a s D 1- MEB A/FO PE ’ s executive director. During the fall of 1993, Br owne’ s sister, P atricia A . D evaney , attem pted suicide byingestin g a large quantity of pills and alcoho l. T he failed attem pt was pr ec ipi ta te d by

he r de pr es sio n, he av y

dr ink ing , and the los s of he r j ob at the Br ow ar d C ounty

she ri ff ’ s of fi ce . A ft er

r ec ei vin g ps y ch ia tr ic and r eh ab ili ta tiv e tr eatm en t, D ev an ey

m ove d in to B ro w ne ’ s ho use . B ro w ne hir ed D ev an ey a s hi s adm inistrative assist ant and gave her a c ar. A lthou gh Devaney initiallyperform ed cl er ic al w ork, she late r be gan takin g c harg e of the div isi on’ s f

inanc es , c au sin g th e of fi ce m an ag er

w ho h ad pr ev iou sly

handl ed the f inanc es to be co m e of

fe nde d and to qu it . As exec utive director, B rowne w as perm itted to m ake union-related te le phon e ca lls on unio n c el l ph one s and unio n c al lin g c ar ds. H e w as a lso6

perm itted to in cur ce rtain entertainm ent and travel expenses, so long as they we re re la te d to the uni on’ s bu sin es s. U nde r the L ab or Mana ge m en t R ep ortin g and Disclosure A ct, the unio n was r equired to file a L abor Or ganization Annual Re port, or

L M- 2, de ta ili ng f

inanc ia l r ec ei pts and d isb ur se m en ts, inc lud ing uni onre la te d e xpe ndi tur es , and t o r et ai n su ff ic ie nt r ec or ds d oc um en tin g and e xpl ai nin g such transactions for at least five y ears. Se e 29 U. S. C. §§ 43 1(b), 436; 29 C.F .R. § 403 .3. A ccordingly , D 1-MEB A r egulation s required that each e m ploy ee pe rs ona lly

c om ple te e xpe nse vou ch er s and atta chsub stanti at ing doc um en ts j ustify ing th e expenses, such as re ceipts. C ontrary to these regulations , D evaney often com

pleted Browne’ s expense vou chers. Furtherm ore, D1-M EB A ac co unt an ts n oti ce d th at

sup portin g do cum en ta tio n f or e xpe nse s c harg ed

to Br ow ne ’ s un ionc re dit

c ar d w as f

re que ntl y late or m iss ing . InO ct obe r 1993 , Br ow ne be gan w orkin g a s alob by ist and c onsu ltant f

or Hvide Mar ine, I nc. ( “ Hvide”), a m arine com pany operating outof Port E verglades in B ro w ar d C ounty . B ro w ne a cc ep te d m onthly paym en ts f

ro m H vid e fr om O ct obe r 1993 to Jul y

199 8. I n to ta l, the se paym en ts am ount ed to $254 , 000. By late 1993, the swe lling ranks of D 1-MEB A/FO PE and PO ID m em bers began to generate fr iction. Bec ause of previous attem pts byleaders of the form er m er ge d e nti ty

to m ar sha l the inc re as ing num be r of vot es he ld b y

m em be rs of D 1-7

ME BA/F O PE and P O ID , m em be rs of the m ar iti m e div isi ons fe ar ed that those non m ar iti m e div isi ons w oul d e ve ntu al ly dil ute the tr ad iti ona l m ar iti m e fo cu s of the unio n. F or their part, m em bers of D 1-MEB A/FO PE and PO ID believed they w oul d be be tte r se rv ed

by ase parate uni on. D 1- ME BAthe re fo re de ci de d to c re at e anauto nom ous af

fi liate uni on, the N at ion al F ed er at ionof P ubl ic and P ri va te E m plo y ee s ( “N FO PA PE ”) , to re pr es en t di re ct ly the barg ai nin g un its of

D 1- MEBA/ FOPE an d P OID. W ith the help o f a $250,000 loan from D1-M EB A, NF OP AP E hea dquarters w er e es ta bli she d inF ort L au de rd al e, F lor ida . T he ne wuni on w as or ganiz ed int o tw o di vis ion s: the F ed er at ionof P ri va te E m

plo y ee s and the F ed er at ionof P ubl ic E m plo y ee s. B ro w ne w as nam ed pr es ide nt o f N FO PA PE and d ivi sio na l pr es ide nt of the F ed er at ionof

P ubl ic E m

plo y ee s. D ev an ey

a lso be gan w orkin g f

or N FO PA PE , answ er ing to both B ro w ne and G ilb er t C ar ri llo , w ho w as hir ed

a s in hous e co unse l of

the F ed er at ionof

P ubl ic E m

plo y ee s. Br ow ne w as ke ento es ta

bli sh N FO PA PE ’ s auto nom y f ro m D 1- ME BAand it s Wash in gt on , D.C. hea dq ua rte rs . He di rect edth e d raft in g o f NFOPAPE’s own constitu tion to ensure that, despite its aff iliation with D 1-MEB A, NF OP AP E w oul d have it s own stru ct ur e an d id en tity . U nde r the a ff ili at iona gr ee m en t, ba rg ai ni ng un it s fr om

D1-M EBA wou ldbe tra ns ferr edby elect io n t o NFOP APE.8

Upon N FO PA PE ’ s c re at ion , P O ID ’ s barg ai nin g un its w er e tr an sf er re d to the Fe de ratio n of

P ri va te E m

plo y ee s. I n a ddi tio n, appr oxi m at el y ha lf of D 1- ME BA/F O PE ’ s barg ai nin g un its w er e tr an sf er re d to the F ed er at ionof

P ubl ic Em ploy ees; the rem aining u nits were retained by D1-M EB A until they

we re lik ew ise tr an sf

er re d by late 199 6 or

e ar ly 199 7. T hus, Br ow ne c ont inu ed to se rv e as D 1- ME BA/F O PE ’ s e xe cutiv e dir ec tor f or ac oupl e y ears , r em ai nin g onD 1- MEBA’s p ayro ll . A s w ithhis pos iti on at D 1- ME BA , Br ow ne ’ s po sit ion s at N FO PA PE a lso pe rm itt ed him to inc ur tr av el and e nte rt ai nm en t e xpe nse s r el at ed to uni on busi ne ss, f

or w hic h he c oul d be r ei m

bur se d by pe rs ona lly

sub m itt ing e xpe nse vouchers and su bstantiatin g docum entation. In addition, NF OP AP E policy re qui re d th e se cr et ar

y /tr ea sur er to ap pr ove suc h e xpe nse s. U nde r the div isi on by law s of the F ed er at ionof

P ubl ic E m

plo y ee s, it

w as a lso the r es pons ibi lity of the se cr et ar y -tre as ur er , tog ethe r w iththe div isi ona l pr es ide nt, to m ai nta in c ust ody of the boo ks and r ec or ds, to supe rv ise the f inanc ia l a cc ount s, to giv e fi nanc ia l r ep orts at m emb er s h i p m ee t i n g s , a n dt o s i g nch ec k s fo r d i s b u rs emen t fr o m th e d i v i s i o n ’s ac co unt s. Sh ortly a ft er N FO PA PE ’ s f

orm at ion , Br ow ne hir ed

G eo rg e Z ak ai b a s th e secretary -trea surer of the F ederation of Public E m ploy ees. Z akaib was a

form er9

custodi an and repairm an who served as shop stewar d of the custodi al unit. H e had ne ve r atte nde d c oll eg e, ha d no f inanc ia l tra ini ng, and h ad ne ve r be eninv olv ed

in uni on f inanc es . A s se cr et ar

y -tre as ur er , Z ak ai b pr im ar ily w orke d a s ar ec ru ite r of ne wm em be rs . A t m em

be rs hip m ee tin gs, his sol e re spon sib ili tie s w er e to l ea d th e ple dge of a lle gianc e an d to handl e the r af fl e tic ke ts. Z ak ai b di d no t have a cc es s to the unio n’ s book s and records, never signed payroll checks, and never review ed unio n credit car d bills , bank statem ents, enterta inm ent expenses, or travel expe nse s. R athe r, it

w as D ev an ey

w ho h an dle d th e uni on’ s bo oks an d r ec or ds, rece iv edan d p ai d b il ls , pro ces se d e xp en se vo uc he rs , andm an ag edpa yro ll . On se ve ra l oc ca sio ns, Z ak ai b c om pla ine d to D ev an ey

and r eque ste d th e oppo rt uni ty to reviewthe union ’ s book s and records, but Devaney told hi m to “ go fishin g.” D ev an ey c om pla ine d to Br ow ne that Z ak ai b w as “ start ing ar uc kus” about

the re co rd s, to w hic h B ro w ne r es pond ed that he w oul d “ take c ar e of it . ” Z ak ai b a lso co m pla ine d to Carr ill o and B ro w ne , e ve n th re at en ing to re sig n. A lth oughBr ow ne assured Zakaib that he would “ take car e of it, ” Z akaib’ s duties d id notchange. De spite havin g shown init ial im provem ent after

her tre atm ent, D evaney

had ev en tua lly

r el ap se d in to h eavy

dr ink ing and d ep re ssi on. C ar ri llo be cam e se ri ousl y co nc er ne d th at D ev an ey ’ s dr ink ing pr obl em s r en de re d he r unf it to h an dle the uni on’ s f inanc es , and f

eare d th at D ev an ey ’ s us e of

auni on c ar

w oul d c re at e10

lia bil ity iss ue s f or the uni on. C ar

ri llo spo ke w ithBr ow ne on m or e than on e occasion, re questin g that Browne take the unio n car away from De vaney and place D ev an ey in a re habil itatio n pr ogr am . B ro w ne did not do s o. In 1995 and1996 , an accountant retained by the union , G eorge Mar ibella, i n d i ca t edt o NF OP AP E o ff i ci al s th at ad d i t i o n al i n t ern al co n tro l s o v erth e u n i o n ’s ac co unt ing f

unc tio ns w er e ne ce ssary . I n Augus t or S ep te m be r 1996 , adis put e ar ose ove r N FO PA PE ’ s r ep ay m en t of the $25 0, 000 loan f

ro m D 1- ME BA . D 1- ME BAP re sid en t A le xande r Sh an dr ow sky w ro te ale tte r to B ro w ne r eque sti ng pe rm is si on to au di t t he bo ok s an d re co rd s o f NFOPAPE, whi ch Bro wne refu se d. Flanked by

D1-M EB A off

icials and an independ ent auditor, Shandrowsky then pa id a vis it to N FO PA PE he ad quart er s. B ro w ne a ga in r ef use d to a llo wa cc es s to the financial rec ords. In O ctober 1996, Shandrowsky term inated Browne a s ex ec uti ve dir ec tor

of D 1- ME BA/F O PE , pr im ar ily be ca use of Br owne ’ s r ef

usa l t o pe rm it D 1- ME BAto au dit N FO PA PE ’ s bo oks an d r ec or ds, but a lso be ca use he believed that Browne w as attem pting to “ raid” units in th e Br owar d Countyare a that w er e re pr es en te d by

oth er la bor or ganiz at ion s. F oll ow ing his te rm inatio n f r o m D1 - M EB A , NF O P A P E t o o ko v e r r e s p o n s i b i l i ty fo r

B r o w n e ’s s a l ary. Inlate 199 6, N FO PA PE r et ai ne d an ou tsi de a cc ount ing f irm to au dit the uni on’ s f inanc ia l st at em en ts g oin g f or w ar d. O ne of

that f irm ’ s partne rs , N ad ine11

Be llo w s, ha d se ve ra l oc ca sio ns t o r ep ort onthe audi te d f inanc ia l st at em en ts at the unio n’ s m em

bership m eetings. In her

letters to union m anagem ent, Be llows noted that the unio n’ s internal controls were “ we ak or non-existent,” because D evaney wa s handlin g the bulkof the bookk eeping and financial duti es. She re com m ended that su chdut ie s be div ide d am ong se ve ra l pe rs ons, to pr ovi de f or se gr eg at ionof dut ie s purs uant t o st an dard a cc ount ing pr oc ed

ur es . A s of

he r y ear- en d audi t f

or 1999 , B ellows noted that non e of the previous y ears’ rec omm endations had been im pl em en te d b y

th e u ni on . Be gin nin g in199 7, D ev an ey be gan auth or iz ing inc re as ed paym en ts t o herself through payroll. S he also issuedchecks to her husband, who had pr ev iou sly

be ene m plo y ed a s c onsu ltant t o th e uni on, and c as he d th e ch ec ks herself. In 1999, the union hired T ina Kaiser as a bookkeeper. Ka iser noticed sus pic iou s bo nus ch ec ks i ssu ed to D ev an ey

and h er hus band. N ot w an tin g to ap pr oa chBr ow ne , K ai se r m en tio ne d he r obse rv at ion s to se ve ra l othe r uni on of fi ci al s, inc lud ing P at

L am be rt , auni on r ep re se ntativ e at the Br ow ar d C ounty sheriff’ s office. A t the La bor Day picnic in Septem

ber 1999, Lam

bert inform ed Brow ne that Devaney

wa s stealing from

the union . In Novem

ber 1999, De vaney al te re d he r payro ll sc he m e. R athe r than is sui ng c he ck s to he rs el f or he r husb an d, she be gan is sui ng unw ar

rante d payro ll ch ec ks t o he r daught er , w ho e dit ed the18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) makes it unlawf ul for any person to conspire with any other pe rson 3 to violate §§ 1962(a) , 1962(b), or 1962(c) . 18 U. S.C. § 1 96 2( c ) m ake s it un lawf ul “ fo r a ny pe rs on e mpl oye d b y

or a sso c iate d w ith 4 any e nte rp ri se e ng a g e d in , o r t he a c tiv iti e s o f whic h a ff

e c t, i nte rs tate or

fo re ig n c omm e rc e , to conduct or

participate, direc tly

or indirec tly , in the conduct of such ente rprise’ s aff

airs through a pattern of rac ketee ringactivity

or collec tion of unlawful debt.”

12 unio n newsletter. D evaney then cashed the checks herself. InMarc h 20 00, D ev an ey w en t f ro m af ull -t im e to a

part -t im e em

plo y ee of the uni on i n or de r to w ork f or the Br ow ar d C ounty

she ri ff ’ s of fi ce . Whe n sh e requested her vacation p ay in advance, K aiser inform ed a union official that D ev an ey ha d a lr ea dy

r ec ei ve d he r va catio n pay . T he e nsui ng i nve sti ga tio n reveale d that Devaney

had em bezzled $116,207.66 from payroll, and she w as te rm inate d. O n M ay

16 o f that y ear, D ev an ey se nt the uni on a

le tte r of apol ogy an d ac he ck

f or $1, 500 as vol unt ar

y r es tit uti on. A ft er

the sa le of

he r co ndo fo r $56, 000, D ev an ey

bou ght he rs el f a ne wc ar

f or $21 , 000 an d se nt the uni on a $25, 000 ch ec k onO ct obe r 21. II. O n M ay 8, 200 3, aS outhe rnD istri ct of F lor ida gr an d j ur y r et ur ne d a tw en ty -c ount , se co nd s upe rs ed ing ind ic tm en t c harg ing Br ow ne and D ev an ey w ith vari ous of

fe nse s. C ount

1 c harg ed

both de fe ndants w ithc onsp ir ing to vio la te RICO . Count 2 charged both defendants with a substantiv e violation of RIC O

3 42 9 U. S . C . § 1 8 6 p ro h i b i t s an y p er s o nfr o mre qu es t i n g, d em an d i n g, re ce i v i n g, ac ce p t i n g, 5 or agree ing to r ece ive or a cce pt, any thing of value f rom ce rtain employers. Th e fe de ra l ma il f

ra ud statut e make s it

un lawf ul t o u se the Un ite d St ate s ma ils in 6 further ance of “a

ny scheme or ar

tifice to def

raud, or [t o] obt ain[] money

or prope rty

by means of false or fra udulent prete nses, re prese ntations, or promises.” 18 U.S.C. § 1341. In 1988, Con g re ss b ro a de ne d th e ma il f ra ud statut e so tha

t in a dd iti on to p ro te c tin ga g a ins t sc he me s to obtain money

and prope rty , the term “ scheme or ar tifice to def

raud” includes sche mes to deprive individuals of “the intang ible rig ht of honest servic es.” 18 U .S.C. § 1346. 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) prohibits any person f rom embezzli ngthe assets of a labor 7 org anization of which he is an of fice r or e mploy ee. Th e fe de ra l ba

nk fr a ud statut e pr oh ibi ts a

ny pe rs on fr om e xec uti ngor

atte mpt ingto 8 e xec ute a sc he me or

art if ic e (1 ) t o d e fr a

ud a fi na nc ia l in sti tut ion , o r ( 2) to o bta in a ny of the a sse ts owned by a fina ncial instituti on by

fra udulent means. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. 13 an d li ste d f

if te enpr ed ic at e ac ts c om

m itt ed by Br ow ne , D ev an ey , or

both. Co unt s 3 thr ough6 c harg ed Br ow ne w itha cc ep tin g paym en ts f ro m c er ta in em plo y er s invio la tio n of

§§ 3 02( b) (1 ) an d ( d) (2 ) of the T af t- H ar tle y A ct . S ee 29 U. S. C. §§ 18 6(b)(1), (d)(2). 5 Co unt 7 c harg ed

Br ow ne w ithc om

m itt ing “ hone st s er

vic es ” m ai l f

ra ud i n vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 13 41. 6 C o u n t s 8 an d9 c h ar g e db o th d e f e n d an t s an dDe v an e y a l o n e , r e s p e c t i v e l y, with em bezzlem ent from

a labor union in violatio n of 29 U. S. C. § 501 (c). 7 Co unt 10 c harg ed

D ev an ey und er 18 U . S. C. § 13 44 f

or bank f ra ud. 8 Co unt s 11 thr ough18 c harg ed both de fe ndants w ithc om m itt ing m ai l f

ra ud in v iol at ionof

18 U . S. C. § 13 41 b y

sub m itt ing e xpe nse vou ch er s f or the29 U.S.C. § 439(a) re quires eve ry labor union to submit to t he Secr etar y of L abor a

n 9 annual f inancial r eport (known as for ms L M-2 or L M-3) of sa laries, a llowance s, reimbursed expenses, and other

disbursements to all office rs and to employees r ece iving more than $10,000, and to maintain supportingdocumentation ther eof. 2 9 U. S . C . § 4 3 9 (c ) p ro h i b i t s th e w i l l fu l m ak i n g o f f al s e e n tri es o r c o n ce al i n g, 10 withholding, or de stroying a ny rec ords re quired to be ke pt in connection with 29 U.S.C. §§ 431 and 433. In pertinent pa

rt, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 mandates for feiture of any interest ac quired or 11 maintained in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and any proper ty constituting, or de rived fr om, any proce eds which the person obtaine d, direc tly or indirec tly , from ra ckete eringactivity or unlawf

ul debt collec tion in viol ation of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)( 1), (3) . 14 re im bur se m en t of

pe rs ona l e xpe nse s. Co unt 19 c harg ed

Br ow ne and D ev an ey

w ithf ai lin g to m ai nta in l ab or organization records in vio lation of 29 U.S. C. § 439 (a). Count 20 charged 9 D ev an ey und er 29 U . S. C. § 43 9( c) f

or de str oy ing and f

al sif y ing r ec or ds r el at ed

to the uni on’ s payro ll. 10 Fi na lly , the ind ic tm en t i nc lud ed af or fe iture c ount

a ga ins t bo th d ef

en dants , seeking forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 196 3 in the event of convi ction un der Co unt s 1 o r 2. 11 Br ow ne f ile d tw o pr etri al m oti ons fo r se ve ranc e w hic h w er e de nie d. T he de fe ndants w er e tr ie d inaj oin t tri al be gin nin g onApr il 5, 200 4. A t the c los e of the G ove rn m en t’ s c as e, the de fe ndants m ove d f or j udgm en t of

a cquitta l purs uant to Federal R

ule of Crim inal Procedure 29 on certa in count s. T he district court subs eque ntl y

gr an te d B ro w ne a cquitta ls o n th e m ai l f ra ud c harg es in Co unt s 17NFO PAPE’s insurer, Ulico Casua lty Company , paid NF OPAPE $87,100 for the losses 12 re late d to De va

ne y ’s pa y ro ll e mbe zzle me nt. 15 an d 18 , w hic h a lso e lim inate d P re dic at e A ct 15 o f Co unt

2, but r es er ve d r uli ng o n the r em ai nde r of

the c ount s. T he de fe ndants r en ew ed the ir Ru le 29 m oti ons at

the cl os e o f al l t he ev id en ce, o n wh ic h t he di st ric t co ur t re se rv edde ci si on . O n June 2, 200 4, the j ur

y f ound Br ow ne gui lty

of Co unt s 1- 3, 7, 12- 14, and 19. W ithr es pe ct

to the sub stanti ve RI CO vio la tio n, Co unt 2, he w as f

ound to have c om m itt ed P re dic at e A ct s 1, 2, 4, 13, and 1 4. D ev an ey w as f ound gui lty of Counts 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, and 17-20. T he j ury found that sh e had com

m itted Pr ed ic at e A ct s 10 -1 4 of

Co unt 2. Fo llo w ing se nte nc ing he ar ing s, Br ow ne r ec ei ve d c onc ur re nt p ri son se nte nc es of

70 m onths f

or Co unt s 1, 2, and 7 , 60 m onths o n C ount s 3, 12- 14, and 12 m onths o n C ount

19. H e al so r ec ei ve d th re e y ears ’ sup er vis ed r el ea se f or Co unt s 1- 3, 12- 14, and o ne y ear fo r Co unt 19. D ev an ey

r ec ei ve d c onc ur

re nt se nte nc es of

27 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t f

or Co unt s 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 17, and 1 8, and 12 m onths o n C ount s 19 -2 0. S he a lso r ec ei ve d f ive y ears ’ sup er

vis ed r el ea se and w as or de re d to pay

$87 , 100 in r es tit

uti on. F ina lly , the de fe ndants w er e he ld

12 j oin tly and s ev er al ly

li ab le und er

an or de r of

f or fe iture in the a m ount

of $592 , 271. 32.16

The district court denied the defendants’ m otion s for j udgm ent of acquittal an d f or ne wtr ia l. E ac h de fe ndant t im el y appe al ed . III . Brow ne first ar gues that the dis trict court er red in interpreting the crim inal section of the Taf

t-Hartley Ac t on which several of the c ount s against him we re based. S ee L abor Managem ent Relations (Ta ft-H artley ) A ct § 302 (as am ended), 29 U . S. C. § 18 6. T he ind ic tm en t c ont ai ne d f our c ount s a lle gin g se parate vio la tio ns b y

Br ow ne of

that se ct ionof

the A ct . S ec tio n 18 6 a lso se rv ed a s th e ba sis f or e igh t of the pr ed ic at e ac ts a lle ge d a ga ins t B ro w ne in supp ort of the subs tanti ve RI CO c ount . T he j ur y ult im at el y

f ound Br ow ne gui lty

of one T aftH ar tle y c ount and tha t he ha d c om

m itt ed thr ee of the T af t- H ar tle y pr ed ic at e ac ts alleged in Count 2 . These c ount s and predicate ac ts will be described in greater detail, infr a. Br ow ne arg ue s th at , und er the pr ope r int er

pr et at ionof

the statut e, the ev ide nc e ad duc ed

by the G ove rn m en t at tri al is ins uf fi ci en t t o su

ppor t hi s co nvi ct ionon the T af

t- H ar tle y c ount and the j ur

y ’ s f ind ing s of

c ulp ab ili ty

on the three T aft-H artley

predicate a cts. A s such, he suggests that he is entitled to entry of aj udgm en t of

a cquitta l onthe se c ount s. A lte rn at ive ly , he arg ue s th at the district court erre d in deny ing hi s request for a j ury instruction defining the termAlthough B rowne speaks br oadly of his entitlement to a new tr ial on all counts on 13 which he w as convic ted, his brief spe cifica lly identifies the RI CO conspirac y count, Count 1, the substantive RI CO count, Count 2, and the theft-of -honest-se rvice s mail fraud c ount, Count 7, as those which we re dire ctly implicated by

the purporte d failure of proof of the Ta ft-Ha

rtley Act count and pr edicate ac ts. W e discuss the viability of B rowne ’s convictions on these thr ee r elated counts in part I I .B., infr a. Al tho ugh B ro wn e ’s ini tia l br ie f p ro po se s th at he re c e ive a ne w tri a l on

the se thr e e c ounts , his argume nts g e ne ra lly

re ite rate the su ff

ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e c ha lle ng e that he ma de in h is unsucce ssful Rule 29 motion at the close of evide nce at the trial. The r emedy for a succe ssful sufficie ncy

challeng e under

Rule 29 would be entry

of judg ment of ac quittal, not a new trial, but it matters not. We treat his argument as a suf ficienc y challeng e, and w e ultimately deter mine that it mus t f a il. To the e xtent B ro wn e int e nd e d to arg ue se pa ra te ly tha t he is e nti tle d to a

ne w tri a l in the intere st of justice on Counts 1, 2, and 7 beca use of the insuff

iciency of the c halleng ed pr e dic ate a c ts, se e F e d. R. C ri m. P . 3 3( a ), we de e m su c h a n a rgume nt w a ive d. Se e F e d. R. Ap pe llate P. 2 8( a )( 9) . B ro wn e did no t pr ov ide any

re a so nin gor

c itatio ns in h is b ri e f o n a pp e a l to support such an a

rgument, nor do we find any evidenc e in our indepe ndent re view of the rec ord that Br owne moved the district court for a new trial on the g round of the insuff iciency of the predic ate a cts. After

the ver dict, Br owne did move the district c ourt for a new tria l on severa

nce g rounds, see part I I I , infra, but he specific ally reque sted only

judgme nt of ac quittal on Count s 1, 2, and 7. 17 “ em ploy ee” to exclude supervisors, thus requiring a new trial on the Taft- Hartley count and two of the three predicate acts that the j ury found Browne had co m m itt ed . U lti m at el y , he arg ue s, the inf irm iti es of

the T af t- H ar tle y c ount and predicate ac ts fatally

underm ine the rem aining cou nts on which he w as convicted – in cl udi ng the m ost

se ri ous RI CO c ount s. 13 O ur r ev ie wof

thi s is sue pr oc ee ds a s f

oll ow s. W e be ginin part I II . Aby de te rm ini ng the pr ope r int er pr et at ionof

§ 18 6, the n e xam ini ng the suf fi ci en cy of the evidence to supp ort Brow ne’ s convictio n on th e T aft-H artley violatio n alleged in Count 3, which was also alleged as P redicate Ac t 1. W e then consider in part III .B the rem aining two Taf t-Hartley predicate a cts that the jur y found Browne had18

co m m itt ed , a s w el l a s B ro w ne ’ s c onvi ct ion s f or the sub stanti ve RI CO vio la tio n, RI CO c onsp ir ac y , and “ hone st s er vic es ” m ai l f

ra ud. I n part

I II . C, w e ad dr es s Brow ne’ s argum ent challenging the j ury instruction s on certain of the T aft-H artley ch arg es . A. T he T af t- H ar tle y A ct , a s am en de d, r eg ulate s vari ous as pe ct s of la bor or ganiz at ion s and p ra ct ic es , but in part , the A ct

se rv es a s “ a co nf

lic t- of -i nte re st statut e de sig ne d to e lim inate pr ac tic es that have the pot en tia l f or c or ru pti ng the labor m ovem ent.” United State s v. Phillips, 19 F. 3d 15 65, 1574 (11t h Cir. 1994 ), am en de d onoth er

gr ound s by

59 F . 3d 1 095 (1 1thCi r. 199 5) . T o th is e nd, § 18 6 ge ne ra lly pr ohi bit s e m

plo y er s inind

ustri es a ff

ec tin g c om

m er ce f ro m pay ing anythi ng o f va lue to la

bor or ganiz at ion s or

the ir of fi ci al s, and c onve rs el y

pr ohi bit s la bor r ep re se ntativ es f

ro m r ec ei vin g anythi ng o f va lue f ro m e m plo y er s. S ee id. Br ow ne w as c harg ed

in Co unt s 3- 6 of

the se co nd s upe rs ed ing ind ic tm en t, an d inP re dic at e A ct s 1- 8 un de r the sub stanti ve RI CO c ount ( Co unt 2) , w ith vio la tio ns o f § 18 6( b) (1 ). T ha t su bse ct ionpr ovi de s, in pe rt ine nt p ar t: “ It sha ll be unl aw fu l f

or any pe rs on t o r eque st, de m an d, r ec ei ve , or a cc ep t, or

a gr ee to re ce ive or a cc ep t, any

paym en t, loan, or

de liv er y of any m one y or oth er thi ng o f va lue pr ohi bit ed

by sub se ct ion( a) of

thi s se ct ion . ” 29 U . S. C. § 18 6( b) (1 ). S ubse ct ion19

(a ), in tur n, e sta bli she s f our se ts o f ci rc um stanc es und er w hic h th e em

plo y er w ho m ak es or a gr ee s to the pr ohi bit ed

paym en t m ay

be c ri m ina lly

li ab le ; thus, the lia bil ity of the r ec ipi en t of

the pr ohi bit ed

paym en t i s c oe xte nsi ve w iththat of the em plo y er . T he G ove rn m en t f ram ed e ac h T af t- H ar tle y c ount and p re dic at e ac t i n th e i n d i c t men twi th r e f

e r e n c e t o p aym e n t s p r o h i b i t e db y § 1 8 6 ( a ) ( 2 ) s p e c i f i c a l l y, w hic h pr ovi de s inpe rt ine nt p ar t: It sha ll be unl aw fu l f

or any e m plo y er . . . to pay , le nd, or

de liv er , or

a gr ee to pay , le nd, or

de liv er , any

m one y or oth er thi ng o f va lue . . . to any la bor or ganiz at ion , or

any of fi ce r or e m plo y ee the re of

, w hic h r ep re se nts , se ek s to represe nt, or w ouldadm it to m em bership, any

of the em

ploy ees of such em pl oyer who are em

pl oyed i n a n i ndus try affect in g c omm erce [.] 29 U. S. C. § 186 (a), (a) (2) (e m phases added). The j ury found Browne guilty

of Count 3 and foun d that he had comm itted Predicate A cts 1, 2, and 4 of Count 2. Ea ch count and each predicate ac t alleged that Browne unlawfully

rec eived m onetary

paym ents from

a diffe rent em

ploy er w hose e m

plo y ee s D 1- ME BAand/ or N FO PA PE w oul d have a dm itt ed to m em bership. Count 3 and Predicate A ct 1 alleged the sam e conduct – nam ely , that be tw ee n O ct obe r 1993 and July 199 8, Br ow ne a cc ep te d a ppr oxi m at el y

$25 0, 000 fr om H vid e. P re dic at e A ct

2 a lle ge d th at

Br ow ne a cc ep te d a

ppr oxi m at el y

$12 , 500 from April to O ctober 1995 from an agent of Coastal G am ing Group, Inc. (“ Coastal Gam ing”), which was doing bu siness as International Cruises, Inc. In20

Pr ed ic at e A ct

4, the G ove rn m en t a lle ge d th at Br ow ne a cc ep te d a

ppr oxi m at el y $4,000 between Septem

ber 1994 and Ju ly

1996 from

the owner of Coleary Tr ansport, Inc. (“ Coleary Tr ansport”). Br ow ne c ont es ts the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in te rp re ta tio ns o f tw o pr ovi sio ns o f § 18 6 a s th ey

r el at e to the G ove rn m en t’ s c as e on e ac h of the se c ount s. F ir st, he ar gue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in ru lin g th at

the te rm “ em plo y ee , ” as use d in § 186 (a)( 2), includes supervisors. U nder Browne’ s interpretation, supervisors are ex cl ude d f

ro m the de fi nit ionof

“ em plo y ee ” by

the te rm s of

the appl ic ab le de fi nit ionse ct ion s inT itl e 29. T hus, he a sse rt s, the pr ope r int er pr et at ionof

the te rm “ em plo y ee ” re nde rs ins uppo rt ab le the j ur y ’ s f ind ing s onCo unt

3 and Predicate A cts 1 and 2 of Count 2 , a ll of which involve what Browne charac terizes as negotiation s for his unio ns to prov ide onlysupervisory em ploy ees to potential em plo y er s. Second, B rowne argues that the district court erred in interpreting the term

“ w oul d a dm it to m em

be rs hip ” as use d in§ 18 6( a) (2 ). I n sh ort, Br ow ne sug ge sts that the dis tr ic t c ourt i nte rp re te d th is p ro vis iontoo br oa dly , a llo w ing the j ur y to co nvi ct him of Co unt 3 and f ind him r es pons ibl e fo r ea chof

the thr ee pr ed ic at e acts on the basis of evidence that, in his estim ation, w as insufficient to prove what is r equir ed

und er the statut e – nam el y , an e xis tin g e m plo ym en t r el at ion shi p21

be tw ee n th e em

plo y er in que sti on and m em

be rs of the uni on. Fo r re as ons that w ill be e xpl ai ne d in fr a, thi s a ppe al doe s no t r equir e us t o int er pr et de fi nit ive ly

the te rm “ em plo y ee . ” A s su ch , w e le av e that i ssu e fo r another day , and for the lim ited purpos e of discussion here, we assum e that Br ow ne is co rr ec t i n hi s a sse rt ionthat the te rm “ em plo y ee ” in § 186 doe s no t inc lud e supe rv iso rs . I nst ea d, w e fo cu s our atte nti on o n th e “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” pr ovi sio n. U lti m at el y , w e m ust de te rm ine w ha t e le m en ts o f pr oof ar e re qui re d of

the G ove rn m en t t o ob ta in a c onvi ct ionund er

the A ct , and a ga ins t tho se w e m ea sur e the suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce on e ac h of

the c ont es te d c ount s an d pr ed ic at e ac ts. 1. W ith regard to the “ would adm it to m em bership” provis ion of § 18 6(a)( 2), Br ow ne arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt a

ppl ie d an “ undu ly

br oa d in te rp re ta tio n” in deciding h is m otion s for j udgm ent of acquittal. B rowne suggests that the dis trict co urt e rr ed

in its c onsi de ratio n of

his suf fi ci en cy of e vid en ce c ha lle nge to the T af t- H ar tle y c ount s be ca

use the c ourt f

oc use d it s ana ly sis on whe the r the em ploy ers at issue “ had the present intent . . . to em ploy ” m em

bers of D 1-MEB A or N FO PA PE by

hir ing the m

f or pos iti ons that ha d y et

to be c re at ed

but w oul d beIn e sse nc e , B ro wn e su g g e sts that th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a pp lic atio n o f a

“ pr e se nt i nte nt t o 14 employ” standa

rd ca used the c ourt to deny

entry of a judg ment of ac quittal on the basis of evidenc e per

taining to c erta in pre-hir e agree ments that Br owne ha d neg otiated with the employ ers on be half of the unions. These pre -hire a g ree ments provided for the possible future employ ment of union members, not the possible futur e unionization of the employ er’ s thencurr ent employ ees a s Br owne now c ontends is require d by the statute. Be cause we r eview de novo both the interpre tation of statutes and c halleng es to the s u f f ic ie n c y o f e v id e n c e , w e n e e d

n o t d w e ll o nh o wth e d is tr ic t c o urt a n a ly ze d th is is s u e . We would be re miss not t o note, howeve r, that the “ prese nt intent to employ ” standa rd applied by

the dis tr ic t c ourt

de ri ve d d ir e c tly

fr om B ro wn e ’s own p ro po se d in str uc tio n to the jur

y on the “ wo uld admit to membership” cla use. In his proposed instructions submitt ed bef ore the district court held its charg e conf

ere nce, B rowne sug g ested the f ollowing instruction, which the court u l t i m at e l y d e l i v e r e d

t o th e j ur y: Withre sp e c t to e sta

bli sh ingwh e the r N F OPA PE o r D ist ri c t Numb e r 1 - M EB A w a s a labor org anization which “would admit to membership” a ny of the e mploy ees of

the employ er, the term “w ould admit to membership” means that at the time the ac ts were perf ormed a nd done, ther e wa s either a prese nt intention for the employ ees of the employ er to a

pply for membe rship or that there was a prese nt intention for the employ er to o bta in w or

k in the are a and to e mpl oy

e mpl oye e s th at w ou ld o r c ou ld b e a dmi tte d into membership in NF OPAPE or District Number 1 - MEBA . (Emph asi s ad ded ). T hi s l anguage ap pear s t o h ave b een drawnfro m U ni tedS tat es v . S in k, 35 5 F. Supp. 1067, 1070–71 (E.D. Pa. 1973), whic h used such a standard in instructingthe jury . Moreove r, in its order de nying B rowne ’s post-trial motions for judg ment of ac quittal and new trial, the district court e x plicitly noted that the “pr esent intention” standa rd wa s included in the jury instructions “[a] t the Def endants’ r equest.” Although w e ca

nnot know for sure , Br owne’ s rec og nition of his role in crea ting this issue likely informed his dec ision on appeal not to cha lleng e the “ would admit to membership” jury ins tr uc tio n. Ins te a d, he lim its his argume nt o n th at c la us e to t he su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e in light o f what he un do ub te dly ho pe s w ill be a

mor e fa vo ra ble int e rp re tatio n o f t

he statut e by

thi s court. In any

event, we interpre t the statute and c onsider the suff iciency of the e vidence on the Ta ft -H art le y

c ounts ind e pe nd e ntl y

of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s o n th e se iss ue s.

22 filled in the future. In his view, in order for the G overnm ent to sus tain its bu rden 14 of pr oof und er the “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” cl au se , it

m ust pr ove “ ane xis tin g em pl oym en t re la ti on sh ip be twee n t he em pl oyer an d u ni on m em

be rs .” When construin g a crim inal statute, w e begin with the plain langu age;23

w he re “ the langua ge Co ngr es s c hose to expr es s it s in te nt i s c le ar and unam big uous , that i s a s f

ar a s w e go t o a sc er

ta in i ts i nte nt b ec au se w e m ust presum e that Congress said what it m eant and m eant what it said. ” U nited States v. S te el e, 147 F . 3d 1 316, 131 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) ( enbanc ) (c iti ng C onne ct ic ut N at ’ l B an k v. G er

m ai n, 503 U . S. 249 , 253 –54, 112 S . Ct . 114 6, 114 9, 117 L . E d. 2d 39 1 (1992)). B y

its term s, § 186(a)(2) prohibit s paym ents by an em ploy er to an of fi ce r of ala bor or ganiz at ionw he n th e la bor or ganiz at ion“ re pr es en ts, se ek s to represe nt, or w ouldadm it to m em bership, any

of the em

ploy ees of such em

ploy er w ho are e m

plo y ed in anind ustry a ff ec tin g c om

m er ce . ” 29 U . S. C. § 18 6( a) (2 ) (e m pha sis a dde d) . I n or de r to b e unde rs too d pr ope rl y , the “ w oul d a dm it to m em bership” clause m

ust be read in light o f the subsection as a whole – specifically , the “ who are em ploy ed” clause. T he plain langu age indicates that the re c anbe no c ri m ina l l ia bil ity und er § 18 6( a) (2 ) – or , by

e xte nsi on, f

or the int en de d r ec ipi en t of

apaym en t un de r § 18 6( b) (1 ) – un le ss, a t the ti m e the paym en t w as m ad e or

a gr ee d up on, the e m

plo y er c ur re ntl y ha d e m plo y ee s who would be adm itted to m em bership in th e union. The use of the present tense (“ are em plo y ed ”) im

pose s ate m

por al li m itatio n onthe e m plo ym en t st at

us o f tho se em plo y ee s whom

§ 18 6 w oul d pr ote ct

f ro m c or ru pt d oubl e- de al ing be tw ee n un ion officials and em

ploy ers. Cf. Allied Chem . & Alkali W orkers of A m erica , L ocal24

U nio n N o. 1 v. P itt sbur gh P la te G la ss C o. , 404 U . S. 157 , 166 , 92 S . Ct . 383 , 391 , 30 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1971) (interpreting the statuto ry definition o f “ em

ploy ee” under the T af t- H ar tle y A ct “ not to be str et ch ed

be y ond its pla in m eanin g e m br ac ing onl y tho se w ho w ork f

or anothe r fo r hir e” ), a cc or d. F ols om v. P ro spe ct

H ill Re sour ce s, Inc. (In r e Pr ospect Hill Resources, Inc. ), 837 F.2d 453, 455 (11t h Cir. 1988 ) (per cu ria m ); B la ss ie v. Kro ge r Co ., 34 5 F .2d58 , 68 (8t h C ir. 1 96 5) (Bl ack m un , J.) (“ An em ploy ee ordinarily

is a person presently

engaged in em

ploym ent.”) . T he f ewr ep or te d c as es to have c onsi de re d th e m eanin g of the “ w oul d a dm it to m em bership” clause do not com pel an alternative interpretation. Browne relies he av ily on Unit ed

S ta te s v. Co dy , in w hic h th e Se co nd C ir cu it re ve rs ed the co nvi ct ionof

auni on o ff

ic ia l, hol din g th at

the “ co nne ct ion ” be tw ee n th e uni on of fic ia l an d t he em

pl oyer was “ to o n eb ul ou s” to supp or t a c ha rg e u nd er § 18 6. U nit ed S ta te s v. Co dy , 722 F . 2d 1 052, 105 9 ( 2d C ir . 198 3) . T he e m plo y er in Co dy e m plo y ed no unio n m em

be rs a t the ti m e the uni on o ff ic ia l r ec ei ve d th e thi ng of va lue ( in tha t c as e, ar en t- fr ee apartm en t) , and the c ourt w as unp er sua de d by the Governm ent’ s argum ent that the em ploy er w ouldhave em

ploy ed union m em

bers on a future buildin g contract for which there w ere then no “ actual plans.” Id. at 1057 –59. H er e, Br ow ne dr aw s onthe langua ge of Co dy in sugg es tin g th at

the “ w oul dI t is ha rd ly de bata ble that a pa y me nt t o a un ion of fi c ia l who c ur

re ntl y re pr e se nts 15 employ ees of

the employ er w ould fall within the scope of § 186(a) (2), f

or that subsec tion pr oh ibi ts p ay

me nts to a

ny la bo r o rg anizatio n o r o ff

ic e r t he re of “ wh ic h r e pr e se nts , s e e ks to repr esent, or w ould admit to membership any of the e mploy ees of

such employer who are employ ed in an industry

aff ectingcommerc e.” 29 U .S.C. § 186(a)(2) (empha sis added). The statutory languag e is quite clea

r in its application when c urre nt employ ees of the employ er a

re alre ady repr esente d by

the labor or g anization. In g ener al, we be lieve that the Cody decision improper ly

emphasizes whether

the 16 “ mot ive ” be hin d th e pa

y me nts fa lls wi thi n th e c ate g or y of e vil s th at Co ngre ss m e ant t o a dd re ss by enac ting § 186. See Cody , 722 F.2d at 1058 (noting that one of the G overnme nt’s theories of 25 adm it to m em

be rs hip ” cl au se r equir es “ ane xis tin g e m plo ym en t r el at ion shi p, be tw ee n th e em

plo y er and m em be rs of the uni on. ” I d. a t 10 58 ( se co nd e m pha sis added). W e find the rea sonin g of Cody less than persuasive on this score, how ev er . A s w e have not ed above , the pla in l an gua ge of § 18 6( a) (2 ) ce rt ai nly re qui re s an e xis tin g e m

plo ym en t r el at ion shi p, but that a sso ci at ionne ed

not be w ith current union m em

bers – instead, it need only be the case that the em

ploy er has an ex ist ing e m

plo ym en t r el at ion shi p w ithe m plo y ee s who w oul d be a dm itt ed to the uni on. T he c ourt i n C ody , r es pond ing dir ec tly to the G ove rn m en t’ s tw o arg um en ts in tha t c as e, se em ed

to co nc ei ve of

onl y tw o po ssi ble the or ie s f

or apr ose cu tio n under § 186 : either (1) that the em ploy er c urrently

em ploy s indiv iduals who are al re ady uni on m em

be rs , in w hic h c as e a paym en t by the e m plo y er to a uni on of fi ci al w oul d c onst itu te avio la tio n, or ( 2) that the e m

plo y er w oul d a lle ge dly 15 hir e uni on m em

be rs in the f

uture , in w hic h c as e the re w oul d or din ar ily be no v i o l a t i o n . I d . Ye tb y i t s o w ne x a mi n a t i o no f th e s t a tu t o ry l an g u a g e an dh i s t o ry, 16lia

bil ity wa s “ too ind ir e c t to su

pp or t th e c la im that [th e un ion of fi c ia l] ha d s uf

fi c ie nt l e ve ra g e to extort from [ the employ er] or that [the employ er] had any incentive to bribe [t he union of fi c ia l]” ); id. at 10 59 (o bs e rv ing , in dis c us sin gano the r c a se , th at “ it c ou ld b e inf e rr e d th at a motive for the g ift was to discoura g e ef forts to org anize the employ er’ s worker s”). As Cody its e lf late r o bs e rv e s, “ the e mpl oye r’ s p ur po se fo r m akin ga

pa y me nt i s ir re le va nt s inc e a ll pay ments, aside fr om those statutorily excluded, are unlawful.” I d.; see a lso United States v. Ry an, 350 U.S. 299, 305, 76 S. Ct. 400, 404, 100 L . Ed. 335 (1956) ( dictum) (interpr etingan e arl ie r v e rs ion

of the § 1 86 a s “ a

c ri min a l pr ov isi on , ma lum pr oh ibi tum , whic h o utl aws a ll pay ments, with stated exceptions, betwee n employ er a nd repr esentative”); Phillips, 19 F.3d at 15 80 –8 1 ( “ Con g re ss m

us t ha ve int e nd e d s e c tio ns 18 6( a )( 1) –( 2) to p ro hib it p ay me nts to repr esentatives even if the y wer e made without any

intent to influence.” ) (dictum). Th e c a se c ite d b y

the Cod y c ourt in s up po rt

of that pr op os iti on , A lli e d Ch e mic a l & 17 Alkali Workers of Ame rica , L ocal Union No. 1 v. Pittsburg h Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. at 169, 92 S. Ct . at 392, does not, in our re ading , bear on the question. 26 the Co dy c ourt de sc ri be d athi rd

pos sib ili ty

that e nc om

pa sse s th e int er

pr et at ion re le vant h er e: “ subs ec tio n ( a) (2 ) w as a dde d . . . to de al w ithe m plo y er s’ a tte m

pts thr oughbr ibe ry

of uni on o ff

ic ia ls t o bl oc k un ion iz at ionof the ir pr es en t em plo y ee s. ” I d. T his int er

pr et at ionis ev ide nt f

ro m the pla in l an gua ge of § 18 6( a) (2 ); if

the “ co ndi tio na l ve rb ia ge ” of the “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” cl au se is to h av e any

m eanin g, se e id. , Co ngr es s m ust have int en de d § 1 86 t o ca pture paym en ts t o un ionof fi ci al s whe n th e em

plo y er e m plo y s in div idu al s who w er e not y et uni on m em

be rs . W e se e nothin g inthe statut e or it s le gis la tiv e his tor y to supp ort C ody ’ s se em ing a sse rt ionthat the e xis tin g e m plo ym en t re la tio nshi p m

ust be be tw ee n th e em

plo y er and c ur re nt unio n m em

be rs . S ee id. 17 T hus, the r el ev an t c onsi de ratio n inappl y ing §18 6( a) (2 )’ s “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” cl au se is w he the r the uni on w oul d a dm it any of the e m plo y ee s who27

we re c urrently

working for the em

ploy er at the tim e the subjec t paym ent was m ad e. W e not e that othe r co urts h av e co nsi de re d so m e fo rm of a“pr es en t i nte nt” te st, und er

w hic h th e de te rm inatio n of w he the r a uni on “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” w oul d turnon e ith er ( a) w he the r the e m

plo y er ha d, a t the ti m e of

the paym en t, the pr es en t i nte nt t o hi re ind ivi dua ls who e ith er w er e uni on m em

be rs or would be adm itted to m em bership after being hired, or (b) whether the union had the present intent to adm it the em ploy er’ s em

ploy ees at the tim e the paym ent was m ad e. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. P ec or a, 798 F . 2d 6 14, 622 ( 3d C ir . 198 6) ( co nsi de ri ng, but ul tim ately

rej ecting, a “present intent” theory ); U nited States v. S ink, 355 F. Su pp. 106 7, 107 1 ( E . D . P a. 197 3) ( de ny ing m oti ons fo r j udgm en t of a cquitta l and ne w tri al wher e th e jury hadbe en in st ru ct edth at“ wou ldad m itto m em be rs hi p . . . m eans at the ti m e the a ct s w er e pe rf orm ed and d one . . . the re w as apr es en t int en tio n f

or [ the e m plo y er ] to obt ai n w ork inthe P hil ad el phi a ar ea and t o e m

plo y emp l o yees th at wo u l dan dco u l db e a d m i t t edt o m emb er s h i p i n[t h e u n i o n ]”) , a ff ’d m em ., 485 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1973). A s the Third Circ uit didin Pecora , w e re j ect these form

ulation s as inconsis tent with the statutory language. T he first suggested

“pr es en t i nte nt” te st w oul d im pr ope rl y a llo wf or li ab ili ty und er the “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” cl au se of

§ 18 6( a) (2 ) in s itu at ion s whe re the e m plo y er ha d no curr en t e m

plo y ee s who w oul d be a dm itt ed to m em be rs hip , but

ins te ad ha d th eOur h old inghe re ru le s o ut t he po ssi bil ity

that th e statut e c ou ld i mpo se c ri min a l li a bil ity 18 on e ith e r a un ion of fi c ia l who re c e ive s a

pa y me nt, or a po te nti a l e mpl oye r who make s o ne , whil e the would-be employ er ha s no employ ees at that time who would be admitted. We rec og nize that this decision may

limitthe Gover

nment’s ability

to initi ate pr osecutions under § 186 when ther e is only a possible future employ ment relationship (i.e., no exi sting re lationship) betwee n a potential employ er a

nd individuals who would be admitted to membership in the union. Ar gua bly , s uc h a

re su lt w ou ld s e e m to ru

n c ounte r t o th e statut e ’s br oa dly state d p ur

po se to addre ss “instance s of bre ach of trust, corruption, disreg ard of the rig hts of individual e mpl oye e s, and

oth e r f a ilure s to ob se rv e high s tand ard s o f r e sp on sib ili ty and e thi c a l c on du c t” among“labor

org anizations, employ ers, labor relations consultants, and their offic ers a nd repr esentatives.” L abor- Manag ement Reportingand Disclosure Act of 1959 ( “L MRDA”), Pub. L . No. 86-257, § 2(b) , 73 Stat. 519, 519; see also Cody , 722 F.2d at 1059 (“[T]here may be circ umstances in which the possible future hiringof unionized worker s might lea d to abuses that § 186 was de signe d to preve nt.”); S. Rep. 86-187, at 13 (1959) (notingthat amendments to the e arl ie r v e rs ion

of § 1 86 un de r t

he Ta ft -H art le y

Ac t w ou ld “ str e ng the n[]” the statut e “ by makin git applicable to all forms of extortion and bribery in labor-mana g ement re lations some of which may sli p thro ugh th e pr e se nt l aw” ). F or e xamp le , it

may hy po the tic a lly

be po ssi ble (ye t pr ob a

bly rar e) that a prospec tive employ er, ha ving no e mploy ees at present, c ould anticipate ne eding un ion ize d la

bo r i n th e futur e and

– s e e kin gto o bta in a

“ sw e e the art

de a l” wi th t

he un ion in a dv anc e – c omm e nc e pa

yof fs to a g ive n unio n o ff

ic ia l. S uc h a

sc e na ri o w ou ld s e e m to e nc omp a ss t

he e vil s in

la bo r- ma na g e me nt r e latio ns tha

t Co ngre ss m e ant § 18 6 to pr e ve nt. No tw ith sta

nd ingCon g re ss’ s sw e e pin gstate me nts of pr inc ipl e , w e c a

nn ot r e a d th e pla in languag e of § 186( a)( 2), with its refe renc e to “e mploy ees . . . who are employ ed,” to a llow the imposit ion of criminal liability in circumstanc es involving nothingmore than a prospec tive e mpl oye r’ s p os sib le futur e hir ingof un ion me mbe rs . O f c ours e Con g re ss m ay , in its jud g me nt, seek to amend § 186 to expand its reach. Subsec tion (a)( 2) wa s added in just this way as par t of the L MRDA amendments in re sponse to a dec ision by a cour t of appe als rec og nizi nga similar c on str a int on the statut or

y langua g e . Se e Ve nti mig lia v. Un ite d St ate s, 24 2 F .2 d 6 20 , 6 23 (4 th Cir. 1957) (“Acriminal statute is not to be stretche d to case s not covere d, mere ly beca use it may seem to a c ourt that Congr ess would have done we ll to cover them.” ), super seded by statute, L abor- Manag ement Reportingand Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L . No. 86-257, sec . 505, § 302(a) (2), 73 Stat. 519, 537 (c odified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(2) ); S. Rep. 86-187, at 13 (notingthe addition of subsec tion (a)( 2)’s languag e in re sponse to Ventimiglia) . 28 pr es en t i nte nt t o hi re ind ivi dua ls i n th e futur e w ho w oul d be a dm itt ed to m em be rs hip . A s w e have e xpl ai ne d su pr a, thi s in te rp re ta tio n w oul d be inc onsi ste nt w iththe statut or y pr ovi sio ns r equir ing an e xis tin g e m plo ym en t re la tio nshi p be tw ee n th e em plo y er and the e m

plo y ee s who w oul d be a dm itt ed . 18At trial, the par ties stipulated that D1-MEB A and NF OPAPE were “labor 19 or g anizatio ns ,” and

that B ro wn e wa s a

n “ of fi c e r o r e mpl oye r t

he re of ” at th e re le va

nt t ime s, wi thi n th e me anin gof

§ 1 86 . F ur

the rm or e , B ro wn e did

no t c onte st h is r e c e ipt

of the pa y me nts alleg ed by

the Gover

nment. Instead, he focuse d his defense – just as he foc uses his arguments on appea l – on the circ umstances of the employ ees whom the Gover nment alleg ed would have been admitted to membership in the union at the time the pay ments were made. Ac cording ly , we narr ow our discussion to that issue and assume, a s Br owne did, that the e vidence was suff icient to satisfy the re maining e lements of the Ta ft-Ha rtley crimes a lleg ed. 29 Furthe rm or e, the se co nd f orm ulatio n – whic h w oul d r equir e that the uni on h av e the pr es en t i nte nt t o a dm it the e m plo y ee s – “ w oul d se em

to re nde r the ‘ w oul d adm it to m em

be rs hip ’ langua ge sup er fl uous , sin ce se ct ion[ 186( a) (2 )] a lso p ro h i b i t s p aym en t s t o o ff i ce rs o f al ab o r o rg an i za t i o nwh i ch ‘se ek s t o re p re s en t ’ a group of em

ploy ees, language m ore suited to the ‘ present intentio n’ situation than the phr as e at

iss ue he re . ” P ec or a, 798 F . 2d at 62 2. H av ing e sta

bli she d th e pr ope r int er

pr et at ionof

the “ w oul d a dm it to m em be rs hip ” cl au se , w e nowhave a ll the pie ce s to a sse m ble ac om ple te state m en t of th e m in im

um pro of requi redto su st ai n aco nv ic ti on un de r § 1 86 (a)( 2) . Co m bin ing a ll the e le m en ts, the G ove rn m en t w as r equir ed to pr ove , f

or e ac h T aftH ar tle y c ount and p re dic at e ac t ba se d on§ 18 6( a) (2 ), that B ro w ne r ec ei ve d or ac ce pte d th e al le ge d m one tary a m ount f ro m the e m plo y er , and tha t, a t the ti m e of the a lle ge d c ri m ina l a ct , the e m plo y er ha d e m plo y ee s inan in dustry

a ff ec tin g co m m er ce w hom

D 1- ME BAor

N FO PA PE w oul d have a dm itt ed to m em be rs hip . 19 A ga in, f or the sake of

dis cu ssi on h er e, w e as sum e Br ow ne ’ s su gge ste d de fi nit ionThe de scriptions of the evide nce that follow in this opi nion refle ct the re quirement that 20 we c on sid e r t

he e vid e nc e in t

he light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he Go ve rnme nt. 30 fo r the te rm

“ em plo y ee ” in § 186 (a )( 2) – tha t the te rm doe s no t i nc lud e supe rv iso rs . W iththat i n m ind , w e nowpr oc ee d to e xam ine the suf fi ci en cy of the ev ide nc e fo r the c ont es te d T af t- H ar tle y c ount and e ac h of

the c ont es te d pr ed ic at e ac ts. W e re vie wde nov o adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of j udgm en t of

a cquitta l on suf fi ci en cy of e vid en ce gr ound s. U nit ed S ta te s v. Y at es , 438 F . 3d 1 307, 131 1–12 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). In re viewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, w e co nsi de r the e vid en ce in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the G ove rn m en t, dr aw ing all rea sonable inferences and cre dibil ity choices in the Governm ent’ s favor. 20 United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137 , 1142 (11th Cir. 2003). I f a r easonable j ury co ul d c on cl ud e th atth e ev id en ce es tabl is he s g ui ltbe y on d areas on ab le do ub t, we w ill a ff irm the ve rd ic t. Ja ck son v. V ir gin ia , 443 U . S. 307 , 319 , 99 S . Ct . 278 1, 2789 , 61 L . E d. 2d 5 60 ( 1979 ); U nit ed S ta te s v. D rury , 396 F . 3d 1 303, 131 2 ( 11th Ci r. 200 5) . T his inquir

y doe s no t r equir e that the e vid en ce be inc onsi ste nt w ith

“ ev er y r ea sona ble hy pothe sis e xc ep t gu ilt . ” U nit ed S ta te s v. S tarr ett, 55 F . 3d 1525 , 154 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ). B ec au se w e re co gni ze that “ the jury is fre e to ch oo se be twee n o r am on g t he reas on ab le co nc lu si on s t o b e d rawn31

fr om the e vid en ce pr es en te d a t tri al , ” our suf fi ci en cy r ev ie wr equir es onl y

that a guilt y verdict be re asonable, not inevitabl e, based on the evidence presented at trial. See id. (“ In review ing cons piracy conviction s, the question is whether there is s ubst an tia l e vid en ce to supp ort the ve rd ic ts. ” (quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. Ru sso , 796 F.2d 144 3, 1455 (11th Cir. 1986 ))) . 2. W e begin with a re view of the e vidence in sup port of the allegation that be tw ee n O ct obe r 1993 and July 199 8, Br ow ne a cc ep te d a ppr oxi m at el y

$25 0, 000 from Hvide. T his sam e conduct und erlies substantiv e Count 3 and Predicate A ct 1. We fin d t ha t, wh en co ns tru edin th e li gh t m os t fa vo rab le to th e Gov ern m en t, a re as ona ble j ur y c oul d have c onc lud ed

be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t duri ng the relevant tim e period, H vide had no n-superviso ry em ploy ees who would have been ad m it te d t o D1 -MEBA an d NFOP APE. H vid e w as f

ound ed in 1958 by

agoo d f ri en d of Br ow ne ’ s nam ed

H an s H vid e, and h ad

thr ee div isi ons: atow ing div isi on that pr ovi de d tu g se rv ic es f or se ve ra l po rt s inthe sou the as te rnU nit ed S ta te s, an of

fs hor e en er gy

sup port di vis ion that provid ed suppo rt services f or offshore oil drilling, and a tanker divisio n that transported petroleum

and chem icals up the east and west coasts of the United St at es . B y

the ti m e H vid e w en t pu

bli c in 1 996, it

ha d e xpande d it s op er at ion s to a32

w or ldw ide m ar ine se rv ic es c om pany e m plo y ing ove r 3, 000 w orke rs . H vid e em plo y ee s c om

pr ise d th e cr ewof

the tow ing and t an ke r div isi ons. Even assum ing th at a portion of the licensed seam en would qualify as supe rv iso rs f

or c oll ec tiv e barg ai nin g purp ose s, and thus be e xc lud ed f ro m Br ow ne ’ s de fi nit ionof

“ em plo y ee s, ” a re as ona

ble j ur y c oul d c onc lud e that D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE w oul d have a dm itt ed to m em be rs hip the r em ai nin g l i ce n s eds ea m en , u n l i ce n s eds ea m en , a n dl an d -b as eds up p o rts t af f i nHv i d e’s em ploy . The G overnm ent adduced testim ony that the life blood of the un ions was re cr uitm en t; ac tiv e uni oni zatio n of ne wm em

be rs r ep la ce d r et ir ing w orke rs , increased the available j ob base, and ensured the survival of unio ns. Indeed, at N FO PA PE ’ s in ce pti on, Br ow ne “ w an te d to be able to or ganiz e any body and ev er y body in the pr ivate se ct or , ” both instate and o ut o f state . A cc or din gly , the divis ion by laws of the Federation o f Pr ivate Em ploy ees w ere broadly

drafted w ith out any r es tr ic tio ns o n th e ty

pe s of w orke rs w ho c oul d be a dm itt ed to N FO PA PE : A rt ic le I , se ct ion4( f) nam ed a s it s ob j ec t “ [t ] o br ing w ith in i ts m em be rs hip r an ks any

and a ll em

plo y ee s of

e m plo y er s w ith in the sc ope of thi s organization’s j urisdictio n.” T he re is no que sti on tha t H vid e’ s sh ipb oard c re wm em

be rs w er e pr ec ise ly th e typ e o f

w o rk e r s th a tw e r e a l r e a dy o r g an i z e di nD 1 - M E B A ’s mar i t i meA pledg e ca rd is a docume nt signe d by an employee indicating that he wishes a g iven 21 un ion to r e pr e se nt h im f

or c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini ngpurp os e s, and

it r e pr e se nts the fi rs t st e p in unioniz ing e mploy ees of

a g iven employ er. Followingthe Exx on-Va ldez oil s pill, C ong ress e nacte d the Oil Pollut ion Act of 1990 22 to preve nt the acc idental dischar g e of oil by phasingout single hulls in favor of double hulls for oil tankers. See 46 U .S.C. § 3703a. 33 divis ions, and Hvide’ s land-based sup port em ploy ees w ere of the ty

pe that wer e alrea dy organized in POI D. A s for whether N FO PA PE would have organized m aritim e w orkers, the Governm ent introdu ced “pledge cards” for tw o propos ed 21 div isi ons of

N FO PA PE that w oul d have or ganiz ed se am en , the U nit ed

S ea fare rs of Am erica and the Nautical W orkers of A m erica . Ne gotiatio ns concerning Hvide’ s doub le-hull tanker proje ct provide further s up p o rtth at D1 -M EB A a n dNF OP AP E wo u l dh av e s o u g h tt o o rg an i ze Hv i d e’s em ploy ees. In 1995, Hvide enter ed into a venture to bu ild state-of-the-ar t doub lehull o il tankers. Based on cer tain financing restrictions, Hvide and its partners 22 we re r equired to obt ain an agreem ent with a labor organization to crewthe new tanke rs . I n 19 95, H vid e ap pr oa ch ed Br ow ne to re que st h is a ssi stanc e in s ec ur ing suc h ala bor a gr ee m ent. B ro w ne in tur n sp oke w ithD 1- ME BAof fi ci al s, and i n early De cem ber 1995, union officials invited Hvide to the W ashingt on, D .C. he ad quart er s to dis cu ss h av ing uni on m em be rs c re wthe ne wtanke rs f ro m top to botto m . On D ecem

ber 4, Alexander Shandrowsky wa s elected as the new34

president of D1-ME BA. D espite Browne’ s encouragem ent, S handrowsky ref used to a gr ee to a co ntr ac t w ithH vid e, be lie vin g th at the te rm s of

the c ontra ct

w oul d have m ad e it “ by

f ar and aw ay , the w or st c ontra ct ” that D 1- ME BAha d. A lth oughthe de al ult im at el y f el l thr ough , the ne got ia tio ns s uppo rt the fi ndi ng tha t the e m

plo y ee s a lr ea dy

e m plo y ed by H vid e w er e the ve ry

ty pe s of em pl oyees t ha t D1 -MEBA an d NFOP APE wou ldha ve ad m it te d t o m em be rs hi p. Indeed, H vide wanted to be able to transfer som e of its em

ploy ees who were cr ew ing oth er

H vid e shi ps o nto the ne woil tanke rs . F urthe rm or e, dur ing the negotiatio ns, Browne discussedthe possi bilityof organizing the unl icensed se am enaboard

the oil tanke rs int o ane w , unl ic en se d di vis ionof N FO PA PE , to be ca lle d th e U nit ed

S ea fare rs of

A m er ic a. B ro w ne w en t so f ar a s to have ple dge c ar d s an dd i v i s i o nb yl aw s f o r th i s n e wd i v i s i o ndr aw nup an dr e v i e w e db y a NF OP AP E or ganizer, Er

nest Rum sby , whom

Brow ne inform ed would becom e a vi ce-p res id en t o f th atdi vi si on . Br ow ne ’ s pr inc ipa l arg um en t w ithr es pe ct to the H vid e paym en ts i s th at the “a d mi tt o me mb e r s h i p ” c l au s e d o e s n o ta p p l y b e c au s e H v i d e ’s e x i s t i n g mar i t i me em plo y ee s w er e al re ady

r ep re se nte d by

the S ea bul k O ff ic er ’ s A sso ci at ionand the Seabulk Seam en’ s Association. A lthou gh these associatio ns were not affiliatedArticle 20 of the AF L -CI O constitution prohibits the ra iding of one af filiated union by 23 another . 35 w iththe A FL -C IO , Br ow ne arg ue s th at the “ co ntr ac t- bar doc tr ine ” w oul d have 23 pr ev en te d D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE f ro m r ep re se nti ng H vid e’ s e xis tin g em plo y ee s. T he c ontra ct -b ar r ule pr ec lud es the f

ili ng o f a pe tit ionf

or an e le ct ion inv olv ing e m

plo y ee s c ove re d by

ac ontra ct

of no m or e than th re e- y ears ’ dur at ion , unl es s th e pe tit ionis fi le d w ith in a c er ta in t im e pe ri od p ri or

to te rm inatio n of

the ex ist ing c ontra ct . S ee L oc al U nio n 30 74, D istri ct 15, U nit ed

S te el W orke rs v. Shore, 386 F. Supp. 600, 602 (W .D . P a. 1974 ). Its purpose is “ to stabili ze f or a re as ona ble te rm an e xis tin g c ontra ct

ua l r el at ion shi p be tw ee n an e m plo y er and i ts em plo y ee s’ barg ai nin g r ep re se ntativ e. ” S ee N . L . R. B. v. A rthur S ar nowCandy Co . , 40 F . 3d 5 52, 557 ( 2d C ir . 199 4) ( quot ing Co ra llo v. Me rr ic k C en t. Carb ur et or , I nc . , 733 F . 2d 2 48, 252 ( 2d C ir . 198 4) ). I n othe r w or ds, Br ow ne asserts that the union s would not h ave sough t to represent H vide’ s em ploy ees b ec au s e t h ey co u l dn o t . Th e G o v ern m en tre s p o n d s th at th e S eab u l kOf fi ce r’s A sso ci at ionand the S ea

bul k S eam en ’ s A sso ci at ionw er e m er el y in- hous e as soc ia tio ns o f H vid e (H vid e w as late r re nam ed S ea bul k I nte rn at ion al I nc . ), and that su chinf

orm al a gr ee m en ts w oul d have pr es en te d no tr ue im pe dim en t t o or ga ni zat io n.36

Construin g the facts in the light m ost favorable to the Governm ent, it w as re as ona ble f or the j ur y to fi nd tha t the e xis te nc e of the se a gr ee m en ts w oul d no t h av e p re v en t edD1 -M EB A a n dNF OP AP E f ro m s ee k i n g t o o rg an i ze Hv i d e’s em plo y ee s. A s th e Pe co ra

c ourt ob se rv ed , “ the e xis te nc e of pos sib le r oa dbl oc ks” in the f orm of “pr ac tic al or

le ga l i m pe dim en ts t o th e ac tua l or ganiz at ionof agr oup of worker s” does not con clusivelyrender § 186(a)( 2) inapplicable. Se e Pe cora, 798 F. 2d at 62 3. E ve n if

the c ontra ct

bar w er e oth er

w ise appl ic ab le , the c ontra ct bar doctrine w ouldnot have prevented the operation o f § 186(a)(2) in this case. In the f ir st p la ce , the c ontra ct

bar is a c re at ionof

the N at ion al L ab or

Re la tio ns B oard ; itha s n o s ou rce i n a ny exp res s l an gu ag e o f th e Nat io na l Lab orRel at io ns Act. Pe co ra , 798 F . 2d at 62 1 n. 3; L oc al 154 5, U nit ed Br oth er hood of Carp en te rs and Jo in ers of Am eri ca, AFL-CI O v. Vin cen t, 2 86 F.2d12 7, 1 30 (2dCir . 19 60 ). Ac cordingly , the thre e-y ear period is no t an inflexible bar; it rem ains a policy

“ [w ] hic h th e Bo ar d init s di sc re tio n m ay appl y or w ai ve a s th e fa ct s of

agiv enc as e m ay de m an d inthe int er es t of sta bil ity and f ai rn es s inc oll ec tiv e barg ai nin g ag re em en ts. ” V inc en t, 286 F . 2d at 13 1 ( quot ing N . L . R. B. v. G ra ce Co . , 184 F . 2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950 )). Se co nd, and m or e im

portantl y , an “ ag re em en t c onst itu te s abar to the hol din g of

ar ep re se ntatio n e le ct ionf or the li fe of

the a gr ee m en t, up t o am ax im um37

of th ree years.” Arth urSarn ow Ca nd y Co ., 40 F.3dat 5 57 (em

ph as is ad de d) . A ft er thr ee y ears have e la

pse d, “ ins ur ge nt unio ns c anc ha lle nge inc um be nts f or j ur isd ic tio n. ” P ec or a, 798 F . 2d at 62 1 n. 3. T hus, H vid e’ s a gr ee m en ts c oul d no t have r ai se d an in sur

m ount ab le bar to the or ganiz at ionof H vid e’ s e m

plo y ee s by D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE f or the e nti re pe ri od tha t B ro w ne w as a cc ep tin g paym en ts f

ro m H vid e, nam el y , O ct obe r 1993 to Jul y 199 8. S ee id. ( “ It

is im pla usi ble that the c ontra ct

bar co uld

have pr ev en te d L oc al 863 f ro m a sse rt ing it s juri sd ic ti on du rin g t he en ti re d ecad e th atth e sc he m e was in op erat io n.” ). A r easonable j ury

could have conclud ed that D1-ME BA and NFO PA PE w oul d have sou ght

to or ganiz e H vid e’ s e xis tin g e m plo y ee s de spi te the pr es en ce of pr act ic al or l eg al roa db lo ck s t o a ctua l o rg an iz at io n. Hav in g s o d eci de d, a re as ona ble j ur y c oul d a lso c onc lud e be y ond a re as ona ble doubt tha t B ro w ne vi ol at edth e Taft -Hart le y Act wh en he acce pt edpa ym en ts fro m Hvi de . Thu s, we af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of the m oti on f

or j udgm en t of

a cquitta l onCo unt 3/P re dic at e A ct

1. B. H av ing de te rm ine d th at

Br ow ne ’ s c onvi ct ionon the T af t- H ar tle y vio la tio n em bodi ed in Co unt 3 and P re dic at e A ct

1 m ust stand, w e nowtur

n our atte nti on t o his suf fi ci en cy of e vid en ce c ha lle nge on the r em ai nin g T af t- H ar tle y pr ed ic at e ac ts38

an d othe r subs tanti ve c ount s of the ind ic tm en t. A s w iththe H vid e- re la te d c harg es , Br ow ne m ove d f

or e ntr y of j udgm en t of

a cquitta l onthe T af

t- H ar tle y vio la tio ns alleged in Predicate Ac ts 2 and 4 of Coun t 2, cla im ing th at the G overnm ent had ad duc ed ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce . S im ilar to the H vid e ch ar ge s, P re dic at e A ct s 2 and 4 e ac h a lle ge d th at

Br ow ne r ec ei ve d m one y f ro m adif fe re nt e m plo y er w hose em ploy ees either D 1-MEB A or NF OP AP E w ouldadm it to m em bership. T he j ury ultim ately

found that Browne com

m itted bot h these acts, and the dis trict court de nie d th e m oti on f

or j udgm en t of

a cquitta l. Br ow ne a sse rt s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in subm itt ing P re dic at e A ct s 2 and 4 to th e j ury , and that ul tim ately this error taints his convi ctions for RICO conspiracy , C ount 1, the substantiv e RI CO violatio n, Count 2, and honest services m ai l f ra ud, Co unt 7. 1. Brow ne’ s argum ent is lay ered, so we m ust dis assem

ble it before w e can engage in any

analy sis. For ease of discussion h ere, we take the substanti ve RICO vio la tio n a s our start ing poi nt. A s r el ev an t he re , RI CO ge ne ra lly pr ohi bit s a person who is affiliated w ith a broadly defined “ enterprise” f

rom conductin g that enterprise’ s affa irs through a “pattern of ra cketeer ing activity .” 18 U. S. C. § 19 62( c) . I n su

ppor t of thi s c ount , the G ove rn m en t w as r equir ed to pr ove : ( 1)39

that an e nte rp ri se e xis te d; ( 2) that the e nte rp ri se a ff ec te d in te rs ta te c om

m er ce ; ( 3) that the defendants were em ploy ed by or associated w ith the enterprise; (4) that the de fe ndants part ic ipate d, e ith er dir ec tly or ind ir ec tly , in the c ondu ct of the en te rp ri se ; and ( 5) that the de fe ndants part ic ipate d th ro ugh a pa tte rnof rackete ering activity . United States v. Starr ett, 55 F. 3d 15 25, 1541 (11t h Cir. 1995 ). W e ar e co nc er

ne d he re w iththe f

if th e le m en t – the “pa tte rnof ra ck et ee ri ng a ct ivi ty ” – w hic h, a t the thr es hol d, r equir es pr oof that B ro w ne com m itted at least two predicate rac keteering acts. 18 U. S. C. §§ 19 61(1), 1962(c); se e al so S tarr ett, 55 F . 3d at 15 41. T he G ove rn m en t a lle ge d atot al of f if te enpr ed ic at e ac ts i n th e se co nd superseding indictm ent, tw elve of w hich wer e char ged against Browne. T he j ury ind ic at ed it s f ind ing s of

“ Co m m itt ed ” or

“N ot C om

m itt ed ” fo r ea chde fe ndant o n ea cha lle ge d pr ed ic at e ac t by r es pond ing to a spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm . I n to ta l, the j ury found that Browne com

m itted five of the twe lve predicate ac ts charged ag ai nst him in Co unt 2. T w o of

the se – P re dic at e A ct s 13 and 1 4 – a lle ge d m ai l frau d v io la ti on s, an d B ro wne do es no t co nt es t t he jury’ s fi nd in gs on th es e act s. T he r em ai nin g th re e pr ed ic at e ac ts f ound by the j ur y w er e tho se a lle gin g vi olatio ns of the T af t- H ar tle y A ct : P re dic at e A ct s 1 ( pe rt ai nin g to H vid e) , 2 ( pe rt ai nin g to Co as ta l G am ing ), and 4 ( pe rt ai nin g to Co le ar y T ranspo rt ). W e have a lr ea dyB ro wn e do e s n ot c ha lle ng e his se nte nc e s in thi s a pp e a l, s o w e have no oc c a sio n to 24 consider whether

or to what e x tent a re versa l of the jury ’s finding s on Predicate Acts 2 and 4 wo u l d af fe cth i s s en t en ci n g. 40 re j ec te d B ro w ne ’ s c ha lle nge to Pr ed ic at e A ct 1, so o nly

a ct s 2 and 4 r em ai n in dis put e. W e co nc lud e that an e xam inatio n of the suf fi ci en cy of e vid en ce on the se tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts i s unne ce ssary to the dis posi tio n of

thi s a ppe al . A s w e w ill ex p l ai n , e v en i f B ro wn e w er e c o rr ec tan dh e w er e e n t i t l edt o re v er s al o f t h e ju ry’s fi ndi ngs on P re dic at e A ct s 2 and 4 , suc h an ou tc om e w oul d no t a ff ec t any of the s ub s t an t i v e c o u n t s o f

th e i n d i c t men to nwh i c h h e wa s f o u n dg u i l ty. 24 W ithr eg ar d to the sub stanti ve RI CO c harg e, Co unt 2, Br ow ne doe s no t ch al le nge the j ur

y ’ s f ind ing s onthe m ai l f

ra ud p re dic at e ac ts ( 13 and 1 4) , so h is argum ent does no t rest on any suggest ion th at the G overnm ent failed to prove at le as t tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts a s r equir ed by § 19 61( 5) , e ve n if

w e as sum e that A ct s 2 an d 4 are inv al id a s he c ont en ds. I nst ea d, Br ow ne f oc use s onthe suf

fi ci en cy of th e ev id en ce t o e st ab li sh pa rt o f th e fi fth ele m en t o f § 1 96 2( c). To es tabl is h t he fif

th ele m en t u nd er § 19 62 , th e Gov ern m en t m us t p ro ve two co m po ne nt s: th e p red ic at e act s m us t re la te to th e en te rp ris e ch arg ed , whi ch we have r ef er re d to a s th e “ re la tio nshi p c om pone nt, ” se e St ar

re tt, 53 F . 3d at 15 46; and

“ the pr ed ic at e ac ts m

ust a ct ua lly f orm apa tte rn , i. e. , r el at e to e ac h othe r an d have continu ity ,” United State s v. T o, 144 F.3d 737, 747 (11th Cir. 1998); see H. J., Inc.41

v. No rth wes te rn Bel l Tel . Co., 4 92 U.S. 22 9, 2 39 , 10 9 S . Ct. 2 89 3, 2 90 0, 1 06 L. E d. 2d 1 95 ( 1989 ) (h old ing that the G ove rn m en t m ust pr ove not

onl y that at l ea st two predicate acts w ere com m itted, but also “ that the racketee ring predicates are related, and that they

am ount to or pose a threat of c ontin ued crim inal activity ”), whi ch we ha ve cal le d t he “pa tt ern co m po ne nt .” Sta rret t, 5 3 F .3dat 1 54 6– 47 . As w e have e la

bor at ed the f orm er part of the pa tte rnc om

pone nt, the pr ed ic at e ac ts m ust relate to eac h other (as disting uished from the relationship com

ponent ), m eanin g th at

the pr ed ic at e ac ts m

ust “ have the sam e or

sim ilar pur

pose s, r es ult s, part ic ipants , vic tim s, or

m ethods of

c om m iss ion , or

oth er w ise [ be ] int er

re la te d by distin guish ing character istics and . . . not [be] isolated events.” Se e Se dim a, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co ., 47 3 U.S. 4 79 , 49 6 n .14 , 10 5 S . Ct. 3 27 5, 3 28 5 n .14 , 87 L. E d. 2d 3 46 ( 1985 ) (quot ing T itl e Xof the O rg an iz ed

Cr im e Co ntr ol A ct

of 197 0, 1 8 U. S . C . § 3 5 7 5 ( e ) ) . I ti s th e l a t t e r p arto f th e p a t t e rnc o mp o n e n t– c o n t i n u i ty – th a tB r o w n e c o n t e s t s i nth i s ap p e a l , s o we c o n f i n e o u r d i s c u s s i o na c c o r d i n g l y. W e w ill say

m or e ab out

c ont inu ity

be low , but

f ir st w e sum

m ar iz e the part ie s’ arg um en ts. B ro w ne sug ge sts that, be ca use of “ the c en tr al ity

of the T aftH ar tle y c harg es to the gov er

nm en t’ s c as e, ” thi s c ourt “ shou ld n ot ‘ ha zard a guess’” as to whether the j ury would have found th e re quired contin uity to satisfy the pa tte rnc om

pone nt s ole ly

on the ba sis of

the m ai l f

ra ud a ct s a lle ge d in42

Pr ed ic at e A ct s 13 and 1 4. I n su ppor t of his arg um en t, Br ow ne r el ie s he av ily on the decision o f the Se cond Circuit in United States v. D elano, 55 F. 3d 72 0 (2d Cir. 1995 ). I n th at

c as e, the j ur

y iss ue d aspe ci al ve rd ic t, f ind ing that the de fe ndant ha d c om m itt ed f ive RI CO pr ed ic at e ac ts and c onvi ct ing him on o ne sub stanti ve RI CO c ount

and o ne c ount

of RI CO c onsp ir ac y . D el an o, 55 F . 3d at 72 5. T he de fe ndant m ove d f

or j udgm en t of

a cquitta l, w hic h w as de nie d. I d. O n a ppe al , the court vacated the j ury ’ s finding s on three of the five predicate acts, holdi ng that the evidence wa s insu fficient. Id. at 727. T he other two predicate acts re m ained undi sturbed, and, in considering what eff ect its holdin g would have on th e RI CO co unt s, the c ourt a cknow le dge d th at , “ fo r the pur pose s of our r ev ie w , [ the de fen da nt ] en ga ge d i n . . . a pa tt ern of r ack et eeri ng th atin cl ud edat l eas t t wo pr ed ic at e ac ts. ” I d. a t 72 8. N ev er the le ss, the c ourt r ev er se d th e RI CO c ount s and re m an de d f

or ane wtr ia l. I d. a t 72 9. T he c ourt r ea sone d th at “ it w oul d be too spe cu la tiv e to a ssum e” that the j ur y w oul d have f

ound r el at edne ss and c ont inu ity on the ba sis of

the tw o r em ai nin g pr ed ic at e ac ts a lon e, not ing that “ the pr oof concerning [the invalidpredicate a cts] repre sented the bul k of this RICO pr ose cu tio n, e cl ips ing a ll el se . ” I d. a t 72 8–29 . H er e, Br ow ne ur ge s th is c ourt t o adopt Delano’ s reasoning. H e suggests th at because w e cannot know what ev ide nc e the j ur

y r el ie d onto fi nd tha t he ha d un de rt ak enac ont inu ous pa tte rnofIn B onne r v . Ci ty of Pr ic ha rd , 6 61 F .2 d 1 20 6, 12 09 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 1) (e n b anc ), thi s 25 c ourt a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt a ll d e c isi on s o f t he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981. 43 ra ck et ee ri ng a ct s, w e m

ust r ev er se the sub stanti ve RI CO c onvi ct ion . O ur r es olu tio n of

thi s is sue is not

a s si m ple a s th e G ove rn m en t at f ir st sugg es ts i n it s r es pons e. F or it s pr im ar

y arg um en t i n su

ppor t of the sub stanti ve RI CO c onvi ct ion , the G ove rn m en t c ite s pr ec ed en t of thi s c ir cu it as de te rm inativ e fo r the pr opos iti on tha t a

RI CO c onvi ct ionw ill sur viv e ap pe al w he ne ve r at

le as t two valid predicate ac ts rem ain, r egardless of w hether other predicate acts are inv al idate d. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. P ea co ck , 654 F . 2d 3 39, 348 ( 5thCi r. Aug. 198 1) (“ [C ] onvi ct ionund er

§ 19 62( c) r equir es onl y

that the de fe ndant b e co nvi ct ed of tw o a ct s of

r ac ke te er ing and tha t the [ ac ts] m ust be r el at ed

to the a ff ai rs of the enterprise . . . . ” (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted)), vacated in part on oth er grounds on reh’ g, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982 ); see also U nited 25 States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 668 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (“ [T ] he governm ent proved at le as t tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts o f ra ck et ee ri ng b ey ond a re as ona ble doubt. T his is al l the gove rn m en t ha d to pr ove to es ta bli sh a RI CO pa tte rnof

r ac ke te er ing and subs tanti ve RI CO li ab ili ty . ”) . H ow ev er , the se c as es sim ply do n ot a ddr es s th e co nti nui ty

r equir em en t of

the pa tte rnc om

pone nt. T ha t the tw o de ci sio ns o m itt ed any dis cu ssi on o f co nti nui ty

is unsurp ri sin g,44

as both were decided before the S uprem e Court pronoun ced definitively that co nt in ui ty andrel at ed ne ss are n eces sa ry co m po ne nt s o f a p at te rn un de r § 1 96 2. See H. J., Inc. , 492 U. S. at 239, 109 S. C t. at 2900 . Peac ock and Pepe w ere decided during a sim

pler tim e for the G overnm ent in RICO prosecutions , bef ore the statute was com

plicated by

such abstractions as “ continu ity .” T hus, Peac ock and Pepe do not address, m uch less decide, the continuityissue here. Mo reo ve r, th e Gov ern m en t i s fu ll y aware o f th e req ui rem en ts un de r H.J., In c. that pr ed ic at e ac ts m ust be r el at ed

to one oth er

and m ust be c ont inu ous – it even discuss ed them

extensively

in its alternative argum ent supp orting th e RI CO co nvi ct ion . S ee 492 U . S. a t 23 9, 109 S . Ct . a t 29 00 ( “ [T ] o pr ove apa tte rnof ra ck et ee ri ng a ct ivi ty

apla int if f or pr ose cu tor

m ust sho wthat the r ac ke te er ing pr ed ic at es are r el at ed

. . . . ”) ; i d. a t 23 8, 109 S . Ct . a t 29 00 ( “ Se ct ion196 1( 5) co nc er ns o nly the m ini m

um num be r of pr ed ic at es ne ce ssary

to es ta bli sh a pa tte rn ; an d it a ssum es that the re is som ethin g to aRI CO pa tte rnbe y ond sim ply the num be r of pr ed ic at e ac ts i nvol ve d. ”) ; c f. U nit ed S ta te s v. A le xande r, 888 F . 2d 777, 778 (11t h Cir. 1989 ) (c onsid ering anew , on re m and from the Suprem e Court fo r co nsi de ratio n inli ght

of H . J. , I nc . , w he the r tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts w er e suf fi ci en tly continu ous and related to establish a pattern where other pre dicate acts had been inv al idate d onappe al ), on r em an d f ro m 492 U . S. 915 , 109 S . Ct . 323 6, 106 L . E d.45

2d 5 84 ( 1989 ). F urthe rm or e, “ [i t] is by now w el l e sta bli she d th at

in or de r to p ro ve a ‘pat te rn of r ack et eeri ng act iv it y ’ itis no t s uf fic ie nt to si m

pl y est ab li sh two iso la te d pr ed ic at e ac ts. ” Ja ck son v. Be llS outh T el ec om m s. , 372 F . 3d 1 250, 126 4 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, P eacock and Pe pe are irrele vant to ou r discussio n here. Co nt in ui ty of rack et eeri ng act iv it y m ay be pro ve n “ in a va rie ty of way s,”

“ de pe nd[ ing ] on the spe ci fi c fa ct s of e ac h c as e. ” H . J. , I nc . , 492 U . S. a t 24 1–42 , 1 0 9 S . C t . a t2 9 0 2 . I ns p i t e o f th e c a s e - s p e c i f

i c n a tu r e o f

th e c o n t i n u i ty i n qu i ry, ce rt ai n ge ne ra l pr inc ipl es gui de the ana ly sis . C ont inu ity “ is b othac los ed - an d ope n- en de d c onc ep t, r ef

er ri ng e ith er

to a cl ose d pe ri od o f re pe at ed c ondu ct , or

to past condu ct that by

its nature proje cts into th e future w ith a threat of r epetition.” Id. at 241, 109 S. Ct. at 2902. “ A par ty alleging a RICO violatio n m ay dem onstrate continu ity

over a c losed period b y

proving a serie s of relate d predicates extending ov er a subst antial period of tim e. ” Id. at 242, 109 S. C t. at 2902 . P re dic at e ac ts “ ex te ndi ng o ve r a fe ww ee ks o r m onths and thr eate nin g no futur e cr im ina l c ondu ct ” do n ot s uf fi ce . S ee id. a t 24 2, 109 S . Ct . a t 29 02; Ja ck son v. Be ll So ut h Tel eco m

m s., 3 72 F.3dat 1 26 5– 66 . By contrast, the “ open-ended” theory of continuit y

relies not on a closed set of r ep eate d pr ior

a ct s c om m itt ed ove r a subs tanti al pe ri od o f tim e, but ins te ad on the “ thr eat of

c ont inu ity ” ex te ndi ng i nto the f uture . S ee Ja ck son v. Be llS outh46

T el ec om m s. , 372 F . 3d at 12 65. T he bur de n un de r thi s th eo ry c anbe m et

by pr oof that ( 1) the “ ra ck et ee ri ng a ct s th em se lve s in cl ude aspe ci fi c thr eat of r ep et iti on extending indefinitely

into th e future, ” or (2) the predicate off enses are “part of an ongo ing entit y ’ s regular w ay of doing b usiness ,” includin g where “ the predicates can be attributed to a defendant operating as part of a long-term association th at exists for crim inal purpos es.” See H. J., Inc. , 492 U. S. at 242–4 3, 109 S. Ct. at 2902 ; Ja ck son v. Be llS outh T el ec om m s. , 372 F . 3d at 12 65. U nli ke und er the

“ cl ose d pe ri od” the or

y , c ont inu ity

m ay be e sta bli she d un de r the “ ope n- en de d” theory “ [t] houg h the num

ber of r elated predicates involved m ay be sm all and they m ay oc cur cl ose tog ethe r in t im e. ” H . J. , I nc . , 492 U . S. a t 24 2, 109 S . Ct . a t 29 02; see also T o, 144 F.3d at 747 (aff irm ing RICO subs tantive and cons piracy co nvi ct ion s whe re the e vid en ce w as suf fi ci en t t o sh owthat the de fe ndant com m itted three predicate acts, all within a span of several hours). G ive n th at

the j ur y r et ur ne d agui lty

ve rd ic t onthe sub stanti ve RI CO c ount , w e knowit

m ust have f ound c ont inu ity

in the pa tte rnof

r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty . T he instructio n given to the j ury on that coun t m irrored the E leventh Circuit pattern ins tr uc tio n, w hic h w e have pr ev iou sly he ld t o be suf

fi ci en t onthe iss ue of co nti nui ty , U nit ed

S ta te s v. K otv as , 941 F . 2d 1 141, 114 4 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) , and Br ow ne doe s no t c ont es t the ins tr uc tio n he re . B ec au se the spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm did47

no t re qu ire an y

sp eci fic fin di ng s o n c on ti nu it y , ho wev er, Bro wne arg ue s t ha t we w oul d be bli ndl y

gue ssi ng wha t the j ur

y r el ie d up on i n m ak ing it s f ind ing . B ut ne ith er our inquir y on a ppe llate r ev ie w , nor

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s ta sk i n c onsi de ri ng a m oti on f

or j udgm en t of

a cquitta l, r equir es us t o de te rm ine the spe ci fi c u n d e r l yi n g b a s i s o f

th e ju ry’s f

i n d i n g o nc o n t i n u i ty. Brow ne’ s continu ity

argum ent goes astray

in its focus on the j ury

outcom es re gard ing ind ivi dua l pr ed ic at e ac ts. A ny tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts c anbe suf fi ci en t f or th e ju ry t o fi n dco n t i n u i ty. Se e S t arre t t , 5 5 F. 3 dat1 5 4 5 (“[I]f an y two o f N o l an ’s th i rt y-fo u r p re d i ca t e a ct s es t ab l i s h th e r eq u i re dRI CO el emen t s , t h en No l an ’s RI CO c onvi ct ionis due to be a ff irm ed . ”) ; Unit ed

S ta te s v. Chur ch , 955 F . 2d 6 88, 694 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) ( re

j ec tin g asuf

fi ci en cy of e vid en ce c ha lle nge w he re e xa ct ly two predicate acts w ere available to supp ort the continu ity requirem ent); A le xande r, 888 F . 2d at 77 8 ( sam e) ; c f. 18 U . S. C. § 19 61( 5) ( “ ‘ [P ] atte rnof rackete ering activity ’ requires at le ast two ac ts . . . .” ). O f course the j ury m ay fi nd, in a giv enc as e, that the G ove rn m en t ha s pr ove n m or e than tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts, and the j ur

y in suc h ac as e m ay

r el y on a ll the pr ove n pr ed ic at e ac ts t o f ind co nti nui ty

suf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh a pa tte rn . T he sam e j ur

y the or et ic al ly

m igh t a lso , consist ent with the m inim um requirem ents of the statute and H. J., Inc. , f ind th at m ult ipl e pr ed ic at e ac ts w er e pr ove n be y ond a re as ona ble doubt, go o n to f

ind48

unanim ousl y

that the e vid en ce pr ovi ng j ust tw o of the a ct s a lso f

ulf ill s th e continu ity

requirem ent, and sto p its inq uiry there. In this latter scenar io, the j ury ha s no t c onsi de re d w he the r ev er y pr ove n pr ed ic at e ac t su

ppor ts a f ind ing of co nti nui ty , but

nothin g f urthe r is r equir ed

so l ong as a t l ea st tw o a ct s f ulf ill the re qui re m en t. I n m ost , if

not a ll, c as es , the j ur

y w ill have no o cc as ionto expla in the specific basis for its finding of conti nuity . Even in the instant case, in which the j ur y m ad e spe ci fi c fi ndi ngs on e ac h pr ed ic at e ac t vi a a spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm , the fi ndi ng o f co nti nui ty

c anonl y be inf er re d f ro m the e ve ntu al gui lty

ve rd ic t on Count 2 is sued bya properly instructed jury . The j ury ’ s decisions on ind ividu al pr ed ic at e ac ts i ndi cate nothin g a bout it s f ind ing of c ont inu ity . I n th is r eg ar d, the j ury ’ s finding of continuit y is, w ith regard to that lim ited issu e, m uch like a ge ne ra l ve rd ic t. T he j ur

y m ay have r el ie d onany

tw o of the pr ove n pr ed ic at e ac ts, or m or e, in fi ndi ng c ont inu ity , but it w ill not have ind ic at ed

w hic h sp ec if

ic a ct s fo rm ed the ba sis f

or it s de ci sio n. Insuc h si tuatio ns, our

ana ly sis is gui de d by

G ri ff in v . U nit ed

S ta te s, 502 U. S. 46, 112 S. C t. 466, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371 (1991). G riffin involved a consp iracy ch ar ge a lle gin g tw o f

ac tua lly dis tin ct obj ec ts o f the c onsp ir ac y in the sam e co unt of the ind ic tm en t. I d. a t 47 , 112 S . Ct . a t 46 8. A t tri al , the e vid en ce a ga ins t Gr iffin only

connected her to one of the two alleged obj ects, but th e j ury convicted49

he r of the c onsp ir ac y

c ount by ge ne ra l ve rd ic t a ft er

be ing ins tr

uc te d th at it c oul d fi nd g uil t up on p ro of

of e ith er obj ec t. I d. a t 47 –48, 112 S . Ct . a t 46 8. T he S up r e me C o u rta f

f i rme dth e c o n v i c t i o n , n o t i n g th e r u l e a tc o mmo nl awth a t“a ge ne ra l j ur

y ve rd ic t w as va lid

so l ong as it

w as le ga lly

sup porta ble on o ne of

the subm itt ed gr ound s – e ve n th oughthat gave no a ssuranc e that a va lid gr ound , rathe r than an in va lid

one , w as a ct

ua lly the ba sis f

or the j ur y ’ s a ct ion . ” I d. a t 49 , 112 S. Ct. at 469. T he Court distin guish ed prior decisions reversing general ve rd ic ts o n c ount s ba se d ona lte rn at e gr ound s whe n on e of the pos sib le gr ound s w as late r re ve al ed

to be e ith er

c onst itu tio na lly

or le ga lly f law ed , a s op pose d to being “ m erely

unsup ported by

sufficient evidence. ” Id. at 56, 112 S. Ct. at 472. In the latter ty

pe of case, “ the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to an y on e o f th e act s ch arg ed .” Id . at 5 6– 57 , 11 2 S . Ct. at47 3 (c it at io n o m it te d) . A lth oughaj ur

y , in its li m ite d r ole a s f

ac tf ind er , c annot

be tr ust ed to ide nti fy

and dis co unt “ a le ga lly

ins uf fi ci en t the or

y ” as aba sis f

or ave rd ic t, “ [q ] uit e the oppo sit e is tru e . . . w he n [ j ur or s] have be enle ft

the opt ionof

r el y ing upo n a fa ct ua lly ina de quate the or

y , sin ce j ur or s are w el l e qui ppe d to ana ly ze the ev ide nc e” and are pr es um ed not to re ly upo n th eo ri es that are not a de quate ly pr ove n. I d. a t 59 –60, 112 S . Ct . a t 47 4. W e have never a

pplied Griffin in this particular RIC O c ontext, but we see50

no r ea son w hy

it s r at ion al e doe s no t a

ppl y he re . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. V as tol a, 989 F. 2d 1 318, 133 0 ( 3d C ir . 199 3) ( hol din g, in a sim ilar RI CO c as e, that “ [t ] he ratio na le of

G ri ff in d ir ec tly

appl ie s” ). B ro w ne c ha lle nge s th e j ur y ’ s ul tim at e fi ndi ng o f co nti nui ty

und er the sub stanti ve RI CO c ount on the ba sis of

the p re s u m p t i v e e v i d en t i ary i n s u ff

i ci en cy o f c er t ai np re d i ca t e a ct s an dth e c o u rt ’s ina bil ity to de te rm ine w he the r the j ur y r el ie d onany

of tho se f ac tua lly ins uf fi ci en t pr ed ic at e ac ts. B ut b ec au se any c om bin at ionof

tw o f ac tua lly suf fi ci en t pr ed ic at e ac ts c ansup port a

f ind ing of c ont inu ity , that f

ind ing – and thus the sub stanti ve RI CO c onvi ct ion– m ay

stand “ if the e vid en ce is suf

fi ci en t w ithr es pe ct

to any [two ] of th e act s ch arg ed .” See Gri ffi n, 5 02 U.S. at 5 6– 57 , 11 2 S . Ct. at47 3. Re ve rs al of

e ith er aj ur y ’ s f ind ing of c ont inu ity

or ac onvi ct ionon a

sub stanti ve RI CO c ount

is not r equir ed sim ply be ca use som e pr ed ic at e ac ts are f ac tua lly ins uf fi ci en t, a s lo ng a s th er e re m ai n a t l ea st tw o a de quate ly pr ove n a ct s. T his r ule take s f

urthe r supp ort f

ro m the not ionthat c ourts m

ust be c ogni zant not to im pin ge upo n th e j ur

y ’ s f ac tf ind ing r ole w he n r ev ie w ing the suf fi ci en cy of ev ide nc e. T he na tur e of

the r ev ie wr ec ogni ze s “ the r es pons ibi lity of the tr ie r of fact f airly to resolve conflicts in the testim ony , to w eigh the evidence, and to draw re as ona ble inf er en ce s f ro m ba sic f ac ts t o ul tim at e fa ct s, ” pr es er vin g th at r ole

“ thr oughale ga l c onc lus ionthat up on j udi ci al r ev ie wa ll of the e vid en ce is to b e51

considered in the lig ht m ost favorable to the prosecution .” Jackson v. Vir ginia, 4 4 3 U. S . 3 0 7 , 3 1 9 , 9 9 S . C t . 2 7 8 1 , 2 7 8 9 , 6 1 L. Ed . 2 d5 6 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) . Ul t i mat e l y, the n, our r ev ie wf or suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce “ is o f co ur se w hol ly unr el at ed

to the que sti on o f howr at ion al ly the ve rd ic t w as a ct

ua lly r ea ch ed . . . . [ I] t do es not re qui re sc rutiny

of the r ea soni ng p ro ce ss a ct ua lly use d by the f ac tf ind er – i f known. ” I d. a t 31 9 n. 13, 99 S . Ct . a t 27 89 n . 13; c f. S ch lup v. D el o, 513 U . S. 298 , 330, 115 S. Ct. 851, 868– 69, 113 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1995) (observing that, under Jackson v. Virginia, review for suffic iency

of the evidence re quires not “ what reasonable trier s of fac t are likely to do,” but “ whether the trier of fact has powe r to m ak e a fi ndi ng o f gui lt . . . a s am atte r of law. . . . [ T ] he m er e ex ist en ce of sufficient evidence to convict would be determ inative . . . .” ). Suff iciency review ope rate s a s aba ck sto p to pr ote ct the de fe ndant’ s du e pr oc es s r igh ts, not a s a lic en se f or the c ourt t o se co nd- gue ss the j ur y . S ee Ja ck son v. V a. , 443 U . S. a t 31 9, 99 S . Ct . a t 27 89. Upon a suf fi ci en cy c ha lle nge , the c ourt m

ust de te rm ine onl y w he the r, on the ba sis of

the pr oof a dduc ed by the G ove rn m en t, aj ur

y c oul d rationally have rea ched a verdict of guilty bey ond a reasonable doub t. W hether the j ur y a ct ua lly c hose an ava ila

ble , r at ion al r es ult

ove r anir

ratio na l a lte rn at ive is ult im at el y

be y ond the c ourt’ s po w er to pol ic e, but

w e pr es um e that j ur ie s do not m ake irrational choi ces when presented with option s supp orted by evidence. See52

id. a t 31 9 n. 13, 99 S . Ct . a t 27 89 n . 13. In li gh t o f th es e p rin ci pl es , we can no t ac cep t Br own e’s su gg es ti on th atwe ad opt the r ea soni ng o f the S ec ond Ci rc uit in D el an o. T ha t c as e is unpe rs ua siv e be cau se itwou ldrequi re u nwa rran te d s pe cu la ti on in to th e jury’ s d eci si on m ak in g. T he c ourt st at es that i t m

ust de ci de w he the r, w ith out

the inv al idate d pr ed ic at e ac ts,

“ the j ur y non ethe le ss w oul d have f ound that D el an o c om

m itt ed . . . apa tte rnof rackete ering activity .” D elano, 55 F. 3d at 728 (em phasis add ed). W e disagree with that prem ise; as Jackson m akes clear , the question sho uld be whether a ratio na l j ur

y c oul d have f

ound that the pa tte rnr equir em en ts w er e m et . S ee 443 U . S. a t 31 9 n. 13, 99 S . Ct . a t 27 89 n . 13. N ei the r D el an o, nor the sol e ca se on which it relies, United State s v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 , 692–93 (2d Cir. 1990), provides anyauthority

for the propositio n that a court m ust reverse a RICO co nvi ct ionw he ne ve r the j ur y m igh t ( or

m igh t no t) have ba se d it s patte rnf ind ing on p re dic at e ac ts l at er

de te rm ine d to be ins uf

fi ci en t. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. E dw ar ds, 303 F . 3d 6 06, 642 ( 5thCi r. 200 2) . I n any e ve nt, D el an o’ s ho ldi ng ap pli es , a t m ost , to ca se s inw hic h th e inv al idate d pr ed ic at e ac ts d om inate the RICO p ro se cu ti on . See Un it edSta te s v . Dhi ns a, 24 3 F .3d63 5, 6 70 (2dCir . 20 01 ). Instead, w e favor the approach of the T hird Circuit in United States v. Va stola, w he re the c ourt r ej ec te d “ spe cu la tio ns a bout the j ur y ’ s r at ion al de lib er at ion53

process” and independen tly determ ined that there wa s sufficient evidence of at le as t tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts t o su ppor t a sub stanti ve RI CO c onvi ct ion , e ve n th oughit wa s im poss ible to determ ine from the verdict w hether the j ury actually found m ore than on e pr ed ic at e ac t. 989 F . 2d at 13 31. Upon our ind ep en de nt r ev ie w , w e have no tro ubl e co nc lud ing that the G ove rn m en t a dduc ed

suf fi ci en t e vid en ce f

or ar at ion al j ur

y to fi nd c ont inu ity am ong at least two predicate a cts. P redicate Ac t 1 was based upon evidence that fr om 199 3 th ro ugh 1998 , Br ow ne a cc ep te d $2 54, 000 fr om H vid e w hil e al so em plo y ed by D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE . P ur suant t o aw ri tte n “ co nsul ta tio n” agreem ent that was c harged to the Port E verglades Tow ing di visio n of Hvide, Br ow ne w as c om

pe nsate d f

or his c onsu lti ng w ork a t the r at e of $1, 500 pe r m onth fro m Octo be r 19 93 th ro ug h J an ua ry 19 94 , and$2 ,00 0 p er m on th th erea fte r. Br ow ne ’ s r et ai ne r w as r ai se d to $3, 500 pe r m onth inMarc h 19 94 and t o $5 , 000 per m onth in May

1994 . He continu ed to rece ive $5,000 per m onth until Janu ary 1997 , when his retainer w as lower ed to $4,000 p er m onth . His contract w as te rm inate d inO ct obe r 1998 a s ar es ult of the G ove rn m en t’ s c ri m ina l i nve sti ga tio n. Pr ed ic at e A ct

13 c harg ed

Br ow ne w ithm ai l f

ra ud. I n 19 95, aF lor ida

state legislator, Ron Gr eenstein, sought Browne’ s advice in assistin g a vision insurance com pany in its prop osal to cover local governm ent em ploy ees. T he proposed54

visio n plan had no thing to do with uni on bu siness. T he Governm ent introdu ced vouc he rs that B ro w ne , or oth er s at hi s di re ct ion , sub m itt ed e xpe nse vou ch er s f

or the reim bursem ent of expensive m eals and airplane tickets purchased in Novem ber 1 9 9 5 , J an u ary 1 9 9 6 , a n dFe b ru ary 1 9 9 6 . Th es e e x p en s es re l at edt o Gr ee n s t ei n ’s pr op os edvi si on pl an , no t t o u ni on bu si ne ss . Predicate A ct 14 also concerned m ail fra ud. T he Governm ent adduced ev ide nc e that B ro w ne f

re que ntl y sub m itt ed

vou ch er s pr ep ar ed

by him se lf or De vaney for the r eim

bursem ent of m eals w ith fam ily or fr iends that were unrelated to uni on bu siness, or that he subm itted vou chers for reim bursem ent of m eals that had been paid for by

union em

ploy ees at his direction. T he dates of the vouchers fo r w hic h B ro w ne w as f

ound gui lty of m ai l f ra ud s panne d si x y ears : Ju ly 8, 199 3; O ct obe r 27, 199 3; M ar ch25, 199 4; M ay 2, 199 4; Augus t 13 , 199 4; J anuary 7, 1996 ; June 17, 199 6; June 18, 199 6; O ct obe r 19, 199 6; D ec em be r 31, 199 6; July 7, 199 7; N ove m

be r 28, 199 7; and D ec em be r 3, 199 7. Predicate A cts 1, 13, and 14 satisfy the continu ity

requirem ent of the pattern com ponent . W e have previously aff irm ed a district court’ s dism issal of a plaintiff’ s subs tantive racketeer ing claim s where the alleged rac keteering activities pertained to the settlem ent of a single lawsuit, not a ser ies of law suits , over a ninem onth pe ri od o f tim e. Ja ck son v. Be llS outh T el ec om m s. , 372 F . 3d at 12 6755

(a ff irm ing dis m iss al “ [i ] n vi ewof the narr owsc ope of

the a lle ge d r ac ke te er ing act iv it y an d t he li m it edti m e fra m e in whi ch itis sai d t o h av e ta ke n p la ce”) . Unlike that case, Pre dicate A cts 1, 13, and 14 constitu te a “ series of r elated pr ed ic at es e xte ndi ng o ve r a subs tanti al pe ri od o f tim e” – nam el y , f ro m 199 3 to 1998 – and thus sa tis fy

c los ed -e nde d c ont inu ity . S ee H . J. I nc . , 492 U . S. a t 24 2, 109 S. Ct . a t 29 02. T he a ct s a lso e sta bli sh a suf fi ci en t thr eat of

r ep et iti on t o supp ort op en -e nde d c ont inu ity . T ha t i s, r athe r than po int ing to a “ uni que , f ir sttim e oc curr en ce , ” the a ct s w er e part of the de fe ndants ’ “ re gul ar

w ay of doi ng busin ess.” See id. at 1268. W e theref ore find that the Governm ent’ s evidence wa s suf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh c ont inu ity

f or pur pose s of the pa tte rnc om

pone nt. 2. Br ow ne sim ilarl y

arg ue s th at

his c onvi ct ionf

or the RI CO c onsp ir ac y

c ount , Count 1, m

ust be reversed because the j ury ’ s conspi racy verdict did not id entify the a ct s up on whic h w as the c onvi ct ionw as ba se d. A cc or din gly , he c ont en ds, the j ur y m ay have r el ie d up on the T af t- H ar tle y c harg es in co nvi ct ing him . A s w e have de cl ine d to a dopt

the r ea soni ng o f D el an o, and w e fi nd s uf fi ci en t e vid en ce in the tr ia l r ec or d th at

sup ports the Co unt

1 c onvi ct ion , e ve n a ssum ing that P re dic at e A ct s 2 and 4 of

Co unt 2 f ai l, w e af fi rm Br ow ne ’ s c onvi ct ion . Be ca use the re are f

ew er pr oof r equir em en ts unde r § 19 62( d) than un de r the56

subs tanti ve RI CO of

fe nse s – m ost

not ab ly , thr oughthe abse nc e of the r equir em en t of an overt act – the c onsp iracy offense r eaches a wider range of conduct. See United States v. Harriston, 329 F.3d 779, 785 (11th Cir. 2003 ). Adefendant m ay be gui lty of c onsp ir ac y

e ve n if he did not c om m it the sub stanti ve a ct s th at c oul d co nst itu te vio la tio ns o f §§ 1 962( a) , ( b) , or ( c) . U nit ed

S ta te s v. A lon so, 740 F . 2d 862, 871 –72 (1 1thCi r. 198 4) . T he tou ch sto ne of li ab ili ty is ana gr ee m en t t o part ic ipate in a RI CO c onsp ir ac y , w hic h m ay be sho w n intw o w ay s: ( 1) sho w ing ana gr ee m en t onthe ove ra ll obj ec tiv e of the c onsp ir ac y , or

( 2) sho w ing that a de fe ndant a gr ee d to c om

m it pe rs ona lly

tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts, the re by a gr ee ing to part ic ipate in a “ sin gle obj ec tiv e. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Abbe ll, 271 F . 3d 1 286, 129 9 (1 1thCi r. 200 1) . “ If

the gov er

nm en t c anpr ove an a gr ee m en t onan ov er al l obj ec tiv e, it

ne ed not pr ove ade fe ndant p er sona lly a gr ee d to c om

m it tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts. ” I d. I n th e ab se nc e of dir ec t e vid en ce of

an a gr ee m en t onan ov er al l obj ec tiv e, the G ove rn m en t m ay pr ove suc h an a gr ee m en t thr ough“ inf er en ce s f ro m the conduct of the alleged participants o r fr om circum stantial evidence of a schem e, ” U nited States v. S ilvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quot at ionm ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed ), a m ount ing to ev ide nc e that e ac h de fe ndant ne ce ssari ly

m ust have kno w n th at

the oth er s w er e al so c onsp ir ing to part ic ipate in the sam e en te rp ri se thr oughapa tte rnof r ac ke te er ing . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ca str o, 8957

F.3 d 1 44 3, 1 45 1 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 6) . Br ow ne a sse rt s th at

the G ove rn m en t’ s c as e w as not ba se d onan a gr ee m en t on an “ ove ra ll obj ec tiv e, ” but ins te ad f oc use d onpr ovi ng an a gr ee m en t t o c om m it pe rs ona lly

tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts, a s to w hic h th e ev ide nc e is i nsuf fi ci en t. T he Go v ern m en tre s p o n d s th at th e e v i d en ce i s s u ff i ci en tt o s u s t ai nBr o wn e’s convictio n und er e ither theory . Beca use we find that the Governm ent presented suf fi ci en t c ir cum stanti al e vid en ce that B ro w ne a gr ee d to the ove ra ll obj ec tiv e of the e nte rp ri se – i . e. , to co ntr ol the f inanc ia l a ff

ai rs of the uni on and m isu se it s as se ts and i nf

lue nc e fo r pe rs ona l ga in – w e do n ot r ea chthe que sti on whe the r the e v i d e n c e wa s s u f

f i c i e n tt o c o n v i c tB r o wn e b a s e do na“ s i n g l e o b je c t i v e ” th e o ry. Br ow ne w as e xe cu tiv e dir ec tor of D 1- ME BA , pr es ide nt o f N FO PA PE , and div isi ona l di re ct or

of the F ed er at ionof

P ubl ic E m

plo y ee s. Whil e se rv ing in tho se posi tio ns, Br ow ne pla ce d hi s si ste r, D ev an ey , in ch ar ge of handl ing div isi on fi nanc es a t D 1- ME BA/F O PE and m ad e he r the de f ac to s ec re tary

/tr ea sur er of N FO PA PE and the F ed er at ionof P ubl ic E m

plo y ee s. D ev an ey

pr oc es se d th e expense vou chers subm itted by Brow ne and others at Brow ne’ s direction, w hich cl ai m ed r ei m bur se m en t f

or non -unio n e xpe nse s and c ont ai ne d othe r fa lse inf orm at ion . Many

of the se e xpe ndi tur es w er e w ith out sup por tin g do cum en ta tio n, as r equir ed

und er the L MRD A . D ev an ey

a lso pur ch as ed

a ir plane ti ck et s f

orSee 29 U.S.C. § 432; 29 C.F.R. § 404.3. 26 Section 1-262 of the B rowa rd County Code then in eff

ect r equire d any

person 27 communicatingdirec tly

with any county commissioner for the purpose of influencingleg islation to f ile re g istratio n f

or ms w iththe c ounty

a dmi nis tr ator , a s w e ll a s a n a nnua l st ate me nt l ist inga ll lobbying e x penditures a

nd the source s that funded suc h expenditures.

58 pe rs ona l tri ps t o N ewY ork C ity that sh e ch ar ge d to Br ow ne ’ s un ionc re dit c ar d. In199 5, N FO PA PE or ganiz er Rum sby tw ic e as ke d B ro w ne f

or pe rm iss ion to organize the em

ploy ees of P aram ount Ve ndin g Com pany . Brow ne instructed him not to “ m ess with this com pany ,” because they

we re a “ friend or a friend of a friend.” In addition, from 1993 to 199 8, Br owne ac cepted $254,000 from Hvide, ane m plo y er w hose e m

plo y ee s D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE w oul d have a dm itt ed to m em be rs hip . F or

his r ec ei pt o f that m one y , Br ow ne w as r equir ed to subm it to the O ff ic e of L ab or Mana ge m en t S tandard s aL ab or O rg an iz at ionO ff

ic er and E m plo y ee Re port, or

L M- 30, apub lic doc um en t r ep ortin g th e re ce ipt of anythi ng of va lue f ro m an e m plo y er . I n a ddi tio n, loc al or din an ce r equir ed Br ow ne to fi le 26 lob by ing r eg istratio n f

orm s and annua l e xpe ndi tur e state m en ts. B ro w ne f ai le d to 27 fi le e ith er the L M- 30 f

orm s or the r equir ed

lob by ing f

orm s w ithr es pe ct

to the m oney he rec eived from

Hvide. T es tim ony

a lso de m onstrate d ho wBr ow ne c onc ea le d th e af fa ir s of the en te rp ri se f

ro m dis co ve ry . I n 19 96, Br owne r ef use d to pe rm it D 1- ME BAof fi ci al s to a udi t the boo ks and r ec or ds o f N FO PA PE , e ve n w he n he kne wit w oul d le ad

to59

the los s of

his pos iti on at D 1- ME BA/F O PE . I n a ddi tio n, Br ow ne did nothin g in re spon se to Carr ill o’ s su spi ci ons that D ev an ey w as im pr ope rl y handl ing the uni on’ s f inanc es . B ro w ne and D ev an ey tog ethe r de fl ec te d Z ak ai b’ s r eque sts f or ac ce ss t o th e uni on’ s bo oks an d r ec or ds, and d isr eg ar de d th e fi nanc ia l a dvi ce of N FO PA PE ’ s a cc ount an ts t o e sta bli sh i nte rn al c ontro ls o ve r the a cc ount ing func tio ns o f the uni on. I n 19 99, Br ow ne f ai le d to take pr om

pt m ea sur es upo n le ar nin g of D ev an ey ’ s payro ll the ft

f ro m L am be rt , and the e m

be zz le m en t continu ed for an a dditi onal six m onth s. Aj ury could infer from

these fac ts that th ere was an ag reem en t o n t he ov eral l o bjec ti ve ch arg edin th e in di ct m en t. A cc or din gly , w e af

fi rm Br ow ne ’ s c onvi ct ionon C ount 1. 3. Br ow ne ’ s f

ina l su ff ic ie nc y c ha lle nge c ont en ds tha t the re w as ins uf fi ci en t ev id en ce t o s up po rt h is co nv ic ti on forho ne stser vi ces m ai l fr au d, Co un t 7 . Brow ne raises no specific challenges to his convi ction. Instead, he argues m ore broadly that, beca

use the evidence does not suppo rt the three T aft-H artley predicate ac ts of which he w as convicted, the evidence is insufficient to supp ort Co unt 7. T o th e ex te nt tha t w e have a lr ea dy r ej ec te d B ro w ne ’ s c ha lle nge to Co unt 3/Predicate A ct 1, B rowne’ s argum ent fails on its own term s. More f u n d a men t a l l y, h o w e v e r , B r o w n e ’s e f f o rt s t o p o rtr ay C o u n t7 a s mer e l y a60

“ kitchen-sink ” approach to capturing the condu ct underly ing th e T aft-H artley counts is m isgui ded. H onest services m ail fra ud const itutes a crim e that is distin ct fr om avio la tio n of

the T af t- H ar tle y A ct , and r ea ch es c ondu ct that i s no t ne ce ssari ly

avio la tio n of

the T af t- H ar tle y A ct . H er e, w e have li ttl e dif fi cu lty concludin g that the evidence adduced at trial w as sufficient for a rea sonable jury to c onvi ct

Br ow ne of

hon es t se rv ic es m ai l f

ra ud. Co unt 7 a lle ge d us e of

the m ai ls i n f

urthe ranc e of

asc he m e to d ef

ra ud D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE of Br ow ne ’ s ho ne st s er

vic es . T o pr ove “ hone st s er vic es ” m ail fra ud, the G overnm ent m

ust sh ow that the acc used intent ionallyparticipated in a sc he m e or

art if ic e to d ep ri ve the pe rs ons or e nti ty to w hic h th e de fe ndant ow ed af idu ci ar y duty of the int an gib le r igh t of

hon es t se rv ic es , and u se d th e U nit ed S ta te s m ai ls t o c ar

ry out that sc he m e or

art if ic e. S ee 18 U . S. C. § 13 46 (p re dic at ing am ai l f

ra ud p ro se cu tio n ona“ sc he m e or art if ic e to d ep ri ve anothe r of the int an gib le r igh t of

hon es t se rv ic es ”) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. H oosh m an d, 931 F . 2d 725, 731 ( 11th C ir . 1991 ) (d ef ini ng e le m en ts o f m ai l f

ra ud) . W e have a lso he ld that a de fe ndant’ s no n- ac tio n or non -d isc los ur e of

m at er ia l f

ac ts i nte nde d to c re at e a fa lse and f

ra udul en t r ep re se ntatio n m ay c onst itu te avio la tio n of

the m ai l f

ra ud statute where the defendant had a duty , e xplicit o r im plicit, to disclose m aterial in fo rm at io n. Un it edSta te s v . W aym er, 5 5 F .3d56 4, 5 71 (11 th Cir . 19 95 ).In p e rt ine nt p art , 2 9 U .S. C. § 50 1( a ) p ro vid e s th at: 28 The off icer s, ag ents, shop stewar ds, and other r epre sentatives of a labor org anization o c c u p y p o s i t i o n s o f

tr u s ti nr e l at i o nt o s u c ho r g an i z at i o nan d i t s m e mb e r s a s a

g r o u p . It is, theref ore, the duty

of ea ch such pe rson, takinginto account the spe cial proble ms and functions of a

labor org anization, to hold i ts money and prope rty

solely for the be nefit of the or g anizatio n a

nd its me mbe rs and

to m ana g e , inve st, and

e xpe nd the same in acc ordanc e with its constituti on and bylaws and a ny resolutions of the g overningbodies adopted ther eunder , to refr ain from de alingwith such org anization as an adve rse pa rty or in behalf of

an adve rse pa

rty in any matter c onnecte d with his duti es and f rom holding or acquir ing a

ny pecunia ry or per sonal interest whic h conflicts with the intere sts of such or g anizatio n, and

to a c c ount t o th e or g anizatio n f or any pr of it r e c e ive d b y

him in wh ate ve r c a

pa c ity in c onne c tio n w ithtr ans a c tio ns c on du c te d b y him or un de r h is direc tion on behalf of the org anization. . . . 61 Fed eral law i m

po se s fi du ci ary res po ns ib il it y up on lab orun io n o ffi ci al s. U nit ed S ta te s v. Ro dr igu es , N o. 03- 1054 9, 200 7 U . S. App. L E X IS 139 40, a t *6 (9 th C ir . Jun e 11, 200 7) ( m em . ); U nit ed S ta te s v. Bo ff

a, 688 F . 2d 9 19, 930 –31 (3 d Ci r. 198 2) ( “ [T ] he L MD RA[ sic ] e sta bli she d, a s am atte r of

f ed er al law , uni on m em bers’ right to the ho nest and faithful services of union o fficials. ”). Contrary to the T af t H ar tle y A ct ’ s f oc us u pon a uni on o ff

ic ia l’ s r ec ei pt o f m one y

or athi ng of va lue f ro m an e m plo y er , § 50 1( a) of

the L ab or

Mana ge m en t R ep ortin g and D isc los ur e A ct

“ im pose s f idu ci ar y r es pons ibi lity

in its br oa de st s en se , and i s no t co nf ine d to f inanc ia l de al ing s by

uni on o ff

ic ia l” ; un ionm em

be rs are ow ed

“ the loy al, faithful, and ho nest services of their union official.” See Boffa , 688 F. 2d at 930– 31. S pe ci fi ca lly , § 50 1( a) inc lud es , int er a lia , the r equir em en ts tha t a uni on o f f i c i a l mu s tr e f

r a i nf r o m d e a l i n g wi th th e l ab o r o r g an i z a t i o na s ana d v e r s e p arty, an dmu s ta c c o u n tt o th e l ab o r o r g an i z a t i o nf

o r c e rt a i np r o f

i t s r e c e i v e db y h i m. 2862

Ther e w as sufficient evidence at tr ial to establish the elem ents of the crim e. Co ntr ar y to Br ow ne ’ s c la im

that the re w as ins uf

fi ci en t e vid en ce of

c ondu ct on w hic h ho ne st s er

vic es m ai l f

ra ud c oul d be ba se d, ar ea sona ble j ur y c oul d have co nc lud ed

be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t B ro wne vio late d hi s f idu ci ar y dut ie s to the unio n and its m em

bers based on evidence that Browne r eceived m onetary paym en ts thr oughthe U nit ed S ta te s m ai ls f

ro m H vid e, w hose e m

plo y ee s D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE w oul d have a dm itt ed to m em be rs hip ; f ai le d to dis cl ose suc h paym en ts t o th e uni on and o n L M- 30 f orm s; and f

ai le d to f ile lob by ing re g i s tra t i o ns t at emen t s i nBr o wa rdCo u n ty. W e h av e a l re ad y re je ct edBr o wn e’s ar gum en t tha t D el an o r equir es r ev er sa l ba se d onthe the or et ic al pos sib ili ty that the j ur y m ay have r el ie d onP re dic at e A ct s 2 ( pe rt ai nin g to Co as ta l G am ing ) an d 4 (p ert ai ni ng to Co le ary Tran sp or t) o f Co un t 2 in co nv ic ti ng Bro wne of C ou nt 7. Be ca use Br ow ne r ai se s no f

urthe r ch al le nge s, w e af

fi rm Br ow ne ’ s c onvi ct ionof hone st s er

vic es m ai l f

ra ud. C. H av ing de te rm ine d th at

Br ow ne ’ s su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle nge s f

ai l, w e tur

n to his ch al le nge to the j ur

y ins tr uc tio n. H e cl ai m s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have charged the j ury

on the exclusio n of superviso rs from the term “ em ploy ees” under the statute. I n his prop osed ins tructions, Brow ne proposed a one-sentenceTh e pa rt ie s’ br ie fs state that B ro wn e ’s c ha lle ng e to t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur

y ins tr uc tio n is 29 subject to abuse- of-discr etion revie w. We disag ree . Br owne did not propose a proper theory -ofde fe ns e ins tr

uc tio n, but in ste a d p ro po se d a n a dd iti on

to t he c ourt ’s ins tr

uc tio n o n th e e le me nts that w ou ld h ave e xclu de d s up e rv iso rs fr om t he de fi nit ion

of “ e mpl oye e s. ” Th e c ourt

oth e rw ise g ave no ins tr

uc tio n d e fi nin gthe te rm . T his is m or e akin to a fa ilure by

the dis tr ic t c ourt

to ins tr uc t on on e e le me nt o f a

n o ff e ns e tha n a fa ilure to e xpla in a

sp e c if ic de fe ns e the or

y , a nd is there fore subject to de novo re view. Even if we wer e to apply

the abuse -of- discretion standa rd, howe ver, it would not alter the outcome. Our

circ uit uniformly

finds an abuse of discre tion where a district cour t “applies a

n incorre ct leg al standar d [or] follows improper pr ocedur es in makingthe deter mination.” Bur

r & For man v. B lair, 470 F .3d 1019, 1030 n.31 (11th Cir. 2006); Klay v. Humana, I

nc., 382 F .3d 63 additio n to the court’s proposed instructio n on th e elem ents of the Ta ft-H artley co unt s. T he se nte nc e w oul d have sim ply state d th at

“ em plo y ee s” do n ot i nc lud e supe rv iso rs . A t the c harg e co nf er en ce , Br ow ne a ga ins t r eque ste d th is i nstru ct ion an d w as de nie d. B ro w ne arg ue s th at the r ef usa l i nf ec te d C ount

3/P re dic at e A ct

1 (p ert ai ni ng to Hvi de ) an d P red ic at e Act2 (p ert ai ni ng to Co as ta l Gam in g) . As we have a lr ea dy

e xpl ai ne d su

pr a, r ev er sa l of

the j ur y ’ s f ind ing s onP re dic at e A ct

2 w oul d no t a ff

ec t any of the sub stanti ve c ount s of the ind ic tm en t onw hic h B ro w ne w as c onvi ct ed ; thus, w e ar e co nc er ne d on ly w ithCo unt

3/P re dic at e A ct

1. W e re vie wj ur

y ins tr uc tio ns d e novo to de te rm ine w he the r the y m iss ta te the lawor m isl ea d th e j ur

y to the obj ec tin g part

y ’ s pr ej udi ce . U nit ed

S ta te s v. H an se n, 262 F . 3d 1 217, 124 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( pe r curi am). I f the ins tr uc tio ns ac curate ly

state the law , the tr ia l j udge ha s w ide dis cr et ionto de te rm ine the ir sty le an d w or din g. U nit ed

S ta te s v. K enne y , 185 F . 3d 1 217, 122 2–23 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) (per c uriam ). 291241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004); Chicag o Tribune Co. v. B ridg estone/F irestone, Inc., 263 F .3d 1304,

1309 (11th Cir. 2001) (pe r cur iam). In other wor ds, as ar ticulated by

the Supreme Court, “ [a] district court by

definition abuses its discretion whe n it makes an e rror of law.” Koon v. United State s, 51 8 U .S. 81 , 1 00 , 1 16 S. Ct . 2 03 5, 20 47 , 1 35 L . E d. 2d 39 2 ( 19 96 ), su

pe rs e de d b y

statut e on other grounds as noted in United States v. Ma ndhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1249 ( 11th Cir. 2004); id. (“The abuse- of-discr etion standard inc ludes revie w to deter mine that the discre tion was not guided by err oneous leg al conc lusions.”); see Youngv. New Proc ess Steel, L P, 419 F.3d 1201, 12 03 (1 1th

Cir . 2 00 5) (“ [Th e ] limi te d s tand ard [of a bu se of dis c re tio n] do e s n ot m e an mu c h in thi s c a se , whic h tu

rn s o n a pure law i ssu e . . . . We d e c ide pure law i ssu e s d e no vo , whic h is another way of say ing that a rulingbased on a n err or of law

is an abuse of

discretion.” ( citations omitted)). We there fore follow the Supreme Court’ s lead in dete rmining that “[l] ittle turns . . . on whether

we labe l reviewof this particular question abuse of

discretion or de novo, for a n abuse- of-discr etion standard doe s not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate corr ection.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 100, 116 S. Ct. at 2047–48; see United States v. Ba rner , 441 F.3d 1310, 1315 n.5 (11th Cir. 2006) (“ The disagree ment [over which standa rd of r eview to a

pply in prosecutor ial vindictiveness ca ses] is perhaps more a ppare nt than rea l, for eve n under a n abuse of

discretion standard, e rror s of law r ece ive no def ere nce.” ). 64 A ga in a ssum ing that B ro w ne c or re ct ly a sse rt s th at

the sup er vis or y e xc lus ion ap pli es to § 18 6, it

f oll ow s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in de cl ini ng t o a dvi se the j ury of that definition andthat Brow ne’ s propos ed j ury charge a ccurate ly

rec ited the law. It does not autom atically follow, however, that the district court’ s failure co nst itu te d r ev er sib le e rr or . Adis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ai lur e to i nstru ct

aj ur y on a ll of the statut or y e le m en ts o f anof

fe nse is subj ec t t o harm le ss- er ro r an al y sis . S ee Mi tc he ll v. E sparz a, 540 U . S. 12, 16, 124 S . Ct . 7, 10, 157 L . E d. 2d 2 63 ( 2003 ); N ed er v. Un i t edSt at es , 5 2 7 U.S . 1 , 9 , 1 1 9 S. Ct . 1 8 2 7 , 1 8 3 3 1 4 4 L. Ed . 2 d3 5 (1 9 9 9 ) ( “ [A ]n instructio n that om its an elem ent of the offense does not necessarily render a cr im ina l tri al f

undam en ta lly

unf ai r or an un re lia

ble ve hic le f

or de te rm ini ng g uil t or inno cence. ”). T he corre ct focus of harm less-err or analy sis is whether it is clear65

be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t a

r at ion al j ur

y w oul d have f

ound the de fe ndant guilt y in the absence of the er

ror. Put another w ay , the f ocus is whether “ the j ury verdict would have been the sam e absent the err or” or “whether the record co nta ins e vid en ce that c oul d r at ion al ly le ad to a co ntr ar

y f ind ing w ithr es pe ct

to the om itt ed

e le m en t. ” S ee N ed er , 527 U . S. a t 17 , 19, 119 S . Ct . a t 18 37, 183 9. It is clear bey ond reasonable do ubt th at, even assum ing th e supervisory ex cl usi on a

ppl ie s to § 18 6, the f

ai lur e to i nstru ct

the j ur y that the de fi nit ionof

“ em plo y ee s” e xc lud es sup er

vis or s w as harm le ss e rr or . W ithr es pe ct to the H vid e ch ar ge , the e vid en ce a dduc ed a t tri al c ove re d asig nif

ic an tly br oa de r range of em ploy ees than m erely

supervisors. At tr ial, the G overnm ent presented ove rwhe lm ing e vid en ce that no t a ll lic en se d se am enare c onsi de re d “ supe rv iso rs ” for purposes of collective bargaining; that D1-ME BA and NFO PA PE repre sented non- supe rv iso ry

e m plo y ee s; and tha t H vid e em plo y ed both li ce nse d and unlicensed seam en on its exis ting sh ips and also em ploy ed worker s in its offsho re div isi on tha t w er e of

the pr ec ise ty

pe of w orke rs that w er e al re ady or ganiz ed

by D 1- ME BAand N FO PA PE . A ddi tio na l t es tim ony e sta bli she d th at

D 1- ME BAand NFOPAPE act iv el y

org an iz e to in crea se th ei r job ba se an d e ns ur e th ei r su rv iv al . W ith or without Browne’ s propos ed instruction , w e have no reasonable doubt th at the j ury would have reac hed the sam e conclusion that D1-ME BA and NFO PA PE66

w oul d have sou ght

to or ganiz e H vid e’ s e m

plo y ee s, and thus co nc lud e that e ve n if the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in str

uc tio n onan e le m en t of

§ 18 6( a) (2 ) w as e rr one ous, any suc h e rr or

w as harm le ss and d oe s no t e nti tle Br ow ne to a ne wtr ia l. IV. Br ow ne c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed by de ny ing his m oti on, m ad e pur suant t o F ed er al Ru le of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 14, to se ve r his tr ia l f ro m that of De vaney . W e disagree. It is w ell settled that defendants who are indicted together are usuallytried together. Za firo v. United States, 506 U.S . 534, 537–38, 113 S. Ct. 933, 937, 122 L. E d. 2d 317 (199 3) (“ Ther e is a pref erence in the federa l sy ste m f or j oin t tri al s of

de fe ndants w ho are ind ic te d to ge the r. ”) ; Unit ed S ta te s v. Magdaniel-Mora, 746 F.2d 715, 718 (11t h Cir. 1984 ) (“ To r epeat the fam iliar, pe rs ons ind ic te d to ge the r or din ar ily sho uld be tr ie d to ge the r. ”) . T his is part ic ularl y

tr ue in co nspi ra cy

c as es . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bake r, 432 F . 3d 1 189, 123 6 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United State s v. Be ale, 921 F.2d 1412 , 1428 (11th Cir. 1991 ) (“ The gener al rule is that defendants charged w ith a com m on consp iracy shou ld b e tr ie d to ge the r. ”) . T he re fo re , w e ar e ge ne ra lly r el uc tant t o se co nd- gue ss the district court’ s decision o n severance. Baker , 432 F. 3d at 123 6. W e re view the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of Br ow ne ’ s m oti on t o se ve r fo r ab use of dis cr et ion ; t o showsuc h an a

buse , Br ow ne m

ust dis ch ar ge the “ ‘ he av y

bur de n’ ” of67

de m onstratin g ‘ co m

pe lli ng p re

j udi ce ’ f ro m the j oin de r. ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. N ovaton , 271 F . 3d 9 68, 989 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. P ep e, 747 F. 2d 63 2, 651 (11th Cir. 1984)). In Z afiro v. United State s, 506 U. S. 534, 113 S. Ct. 933, the Suprem e Court set forth a tw o-step test to determ ine “ whether a defe ndant is enti tled to a new tr ial due to a district court’ s refusal to sever prior to trial or to grant a m istrial once trial has com m enced.” U nited States v. Blankensh ip, 382 F.3d 1110, 1122 (11th Cir. 2004 ). Adefendant m

ust first dem onstrate that the joint trial re sulted in prej udice to him ; and second, m

ust sh ow that severance is the proper re m edy for that pr ej udi ce . I d. a t 11 22; se e al so Z af ir o, 506 U . S. a t 53 8–39 , 113 S . Ct . a t 93 8 (“ Rule 14 does no t require sever ance even if prej udice is sho wn; rather, it leaves the ta ilo ri ng o f the r el ie f to b e gr an te d, if any , to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s so und discretion.”). U nder this test, “ [t] here are only two cir cum stances in which se ve ranc e is the onl y

pe rm iss ibl e re m edy ”: w he re the re is a se ri ous ri sk tha t a j oin t tr ia l ( 1) “ w oul d c om

pr om ise aspe ci fi c tr ia l r igh t of one of the de fe ndants , ” or

( 2) w oul d “pr ev en t the j ur

y f ro m m ak ing ar el ia

ble j udgm en t a

bout gui lt or inno cence. ” Blankenship, 382 F. S upp. 3d at 112 2–23 (quoting Za firo, 506 U.S . at 539 , 113 S . Ct . a t 93 8. Brow ne claim s that severance w ouldhave perm itted him to call D evaney

as68

a de fe nse w itn es s of

fe ri ng e xc ulp at or

y te sti m ony , w he re as D ev an ey r ef use d to testify in a j oint trial. T herefor e, Brow ne asserts that his m otion for sever ance falls under the second category , which includ es prej udice resulting “ if essential exculpatory

evidence that would be available to a defe ndant tried alone were un av ai labl e in a joi nt tri al .” Zafir o, 5 06 U.S. at 5 39 , 11 3 S . Ct. at93 8. This circ uit’s f

ram ew ork for analy zing a m otion to sever based on the desire to o ff er the e xc ulp at or

y te sti m ony

of ac o- de fe ndant i s w el l e sta bli she d. T he de fe ndant m

ust f ir st d em onstrate : “ (1 ) a bona f ide ne ed f or the te sti m ony ; ( 2) the subs tanc e of

the de sir ed

te sti m ony ; ( 3) the e xc ulp at or y na tur e an d e ff

ec t of the de sir ed te sti m ony ; and ( 4) that the c ode fe ndant w oul d in de ed have te sti fi ed

a t a se pa rat e tr ia l.” Un it edSta te s v . Cob b, 1 85 F.3d11 93 , 11 97 (11 th Cir . 19 99 ). O nc e the de fe ndant m ak es that thr es hol d sh ow ing , the c ourt m ust the n: “ (1 ) ex am ine the sig nif

ic an ce of the te sti m ony

in re la tio n to the de fe ndant’ s th eo ry of the c as e; a sse ss the e xte nt o f pr ej udi ce c au se d by the abse nc e of

the te sti m ony ; ( 3) co nsi de r j udi ci al a dm ini str at ionand e co nom y ; and ( 4) giv e w ei ght

to the ti m el in es s o f th e m ot io n.” Bak er, 4 32 F.3dat 1 23 9. We f i n dn o ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o ni nth e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s d en i al s o f B ro wn e’s m oti ons fo r se ve ranc e ba se d onthe c ourt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

thi s f ram ew ork. I n hi s fi rs t pr etri al m oti on t o se ve r, Br ow ne a lle ge d th at if c al le d to te sti fy

a t a se parate69

trial, De vaney

would testify

that Brow ne did no t knowingl y charge per sonal expenses on th e union credit card, never instructed or directed her to falsify expe nse vou ch er s, and n ev er dis cu sse d th e subm iss ionof f al se e xpe nse vou ch er s; that sh e vol unt ar ily

f ab ri cate d nam es on d inn er vou ch er s a s am atte r of co nve nie nc e; and tha t B ro w ne “ al w ay s a ssum ed that sh e w as c om

ple tin g th es e vouc he rs c or

re ct ly . ” F urthe r, Br ow ne w oul d on ly use the uni on c el l ph one and ca lli ng c ar d to m ak e pe rs ona l c al ls “ sim ply a s am atte r of

c onve nie nc e. ” S he w oul d a lso te sti fy

that sh e tol d B ro w ne that he r N ewY ork tr ips w er e re la te d to unio n busi ness, she never told him that she tookher daughter, and she charged her tickets to the un ion credit card. Finally , she w ouldtestify that she “ tookevery poss ible precaution to conceal her cr im es” in order to avoid detection; th at her cr im es w er e ca

use d by he r de pr es sio n, a lc ohol abuse , gam bli ng a ddi ct ion , and fa ile d m ar

ri ag e; that sh e did

not c onsp ir e in any

m anne r w ithBr ow ne ; and tha t sh e ha s no e vid en ce or

r ea son to b el ie ve that B ro w ne kne wshe w as vic tim iz ing the un io n. T he dis tr ic t c ourt a dopt ed the m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n to d eny the m oti on f

or se ve ranc e. T ha t r ep ort f ound that “ the pr of

fe re d te sti m ony contains few specif

ic exonerative fa cts and consis ts of undo cum ented concluso ry allegations which m itigates against Browne’ s severance m otion ”; that such70

co nc lus or y a lle ga tio ns w er e furthe r “ subj ec t t o su bst an tia l and d am ag ing im peachm ent”; and that Browne f ailed to produ ce an a ffidavit from De vaney atte sti ng tha t sh e w oul d inf ac t t es tif y a t a se parate tr ia l. Si x m onths l at er , Br ow ne f ile d ar en ew ed

m oti on f or se ve ranc e, c la im ing to have cured the deficie ncies by having attached an affidavit from De vaney that wa s en t i re l y co n s i s t en twi th th e d es cr i p t i o no f h erp ro ff er edt es t i m o n y i nBr o wn e’s original m otion . The district court denied the m otion , noting that it was “ troubled by D ef en dant B ro w ne ’ s in fe re nc e that the la ck of an a ff idavit w as the sol e gr ound fo r the de nia l of

his or igi na l m oti on. Ac ur sor y r ev ie wof

[ the m ag istrate j udge ’ s] Re port and R ec om

m en da tio n pl ai nly

r ev ea ls a num be r of oth er gr ound s why

the m ot io n was de ni ed .” Inhis pos t- tr ia l m oti on, Br ow ne m ove d f or ane wtr ia l ba se d onthe se previous d enials. T he court renew ed its prior hold ings andnoted further that Brow ne failed to show “ actual, com pelling prej udice” from

the denial of severance be ca use the pr of

fe re d te sti m ony

“ w as , in fa ct , e lic ite d f

ro m oth er w itn es se s at tri al , su ch th atth e jury con si de redth es e al le ga ti on s an d re jecte d t he m .” O n a ppe al , Br ow ne li ke ns D ev an ey ’ s pr of fe re d te sti m ony

to that of the c odefendants in Tifford v. W ainwright, 588 F. 2d 95 4 (5th Cir. 1979), and United St at es v. Co bb, 185 F . 3d 1 193. W e dis ag re e. T if fo rd w as an a tto rn ey

w ho f ile d a71

petition for a wr it of habeas corpus contendi ng that th e Florida state c ourts had de nie d hi m

due pr oc es s by

r ef usi ng t o se ve r his tr ia l f

ro m that of his c ode fe ndants , one of

whom w as his c lie nt. A ll ha d be enc harg ed in co nne ct ionw ith a schem e to cash forged chec ks. T ifford, 588 F.2d at 955. T ifford asserte d that his c o- de fe ndants w oul d te sti fy in a se parate tr ia l tha t he ha d no kno w le dge of the schem e. Id. at 957. T he Fifth Circ uit no ted that the requirem ents for severance ha d be enm et , inc lud ing the f ac ts tha t pr ej udi ce r es ult ing f ro m the de nia l of T if fo rd ’ s m oti on w as “ co nc lus ive ly e sta bli she d” and tha t the pr of fe re d te sti m ony wa s es s en t i al t o re b u tth e p ro s ec u t i o n ’s p ro o f o nth e c ru ci al i s s u e o f T i ff o rd ’s kn owl ed ge of t he cri m in al act iv it ie s. Id . T houg h it is dif fi cu lt to d isc er

n m uc h of the c ourt’ s r ea soni ng f

ro m it s m ost ly c onc lus or

y pe r curi am

opi nio n, T if

fo rd doe s no t c om

pe l a f ind ing of abuse of discretion here. “ This Court’ s cases addressing severance m otion s have often loo ke d hard

a t the sub stanc e of

the a ff idavit s pr of

fe re d by the c o- de fe ndant who pu rp or te dl y

wou ldtes ti fy

in a se pa rat e tr ia l.” No va to n, 2 71 F.3dat 9 89 .

“ Cr ed ibi lity

is fo r the j ur

y , but the j udge is not

r equir ed to se ve r on p at en t fa br ic at ion s. I f the te sti m ony is pur el y c um ulativ e, or

of ne gli gib le w ei ght

or pr obativ e va lue , the c ourt i s no t r equir ed to se ve r. ” By

rd v. W ai nw ri ght , 428 F . 2d 1017 , 102 1 ( 5thCi r. 197 0) . T he c ourt i n T if fo rd w as pla inl y

satis fi ed w iththeBr owne a lso cites to United States v. DiBe rnar do, 880 F.2d 1216 ( 11th Cir. 1989), 30 which we find unava iling. In that case , the Gover nment appea led the dec ision of the district court to g rant de fenda

nts a new tria l based on the vie w that the cour t had er red when it sever ed the trial of a

co-de fenda

nt. I d. at 1222. On appe al, the cour t found that the motion to sever wa s proper ly g rante d. I d. at 1229. One of the co- defe ndants, D’Apic e, would have testified that the other de fenda

nts were not involved in a conspirac y to distribute pornog raphy with him and that they had no knowledg e of the criminal ac tiviti es. I d. at 1228. Citing Tiffor d, the cour t noted the centr al role oc cupied by

D’Apic e’s pr offe red te stimony and that the “ proposed testimony strong ly indicated that D’ Apice w as the only person involved in ce rtain aspe cts.” I d. The c ourt found no re ason to disturb the eva luation of a district judg e who ha d evaluated the propose d testimony twice a nd who was “ clea

rly familiar with the r eleva

nt fac ts on this i ssue.” I d. at 1229. Di B e rn ard o th

us de mon str ate s th at th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on on a mot ion to s e ve r i s c omm itt e d to its sound dis cre tion, and an appe llate cour t will gene rally

be re luctant to second- guess that decision. DiB erna

rdo also held only

that the trial cour

t’s decision to sever

“wa s within the trial court’s discr etion,” id. at 1228, not that seve ranc e wa s the only course of ac tion that would have 72 subs tanc e, e xc ulp at or

y e ff ec t, and o the r fe at

ur es of the pr of fe re d te sti m ony . N ot so with respect to D evaney ’ s affidavit, which w e agre e am ount s to und ocum ented co nc lu so ry

all eg at io ns subjec t t o s ub st an ti al an d d am ag in g i m pe ach m en t. Fu rth erm or e, we no te th atDeva ne y ’s tes ti m on y was i n n o way con tra ry

to he r own interests; one of her goals in thi s appeal is “ to clear her nam e as to the RIC O charges, ” w hich would be served by the proffer ed testim ony

that De vaney

acted en ti rel y of h er o wn v ol it io n a ndwas n ot in vo lv edin a co ns pi racy with Bro wne . Su chte sti m ony

is “ m or e se lf

-e xone ratin g th ane xc ulp at or y of [ Br ow ne ] , ” is

“ com pletely self-ser ving and thus lack[s] strong credibilit y .” Pepe, 747 F.2d at 651; se e al so N ovaton , 271 F . 3d at 99 0 ( “ [S ] ta te m en ts c onc er nin g th e te sti m ony that would becom e available by severing trials m

ust be specific and exonerative, rather than conclusory

or self-se rving, in order to j ustify severance .” ). 30been pr oper in those c ircumstance s. DiBe rnar do thus does not nece ssitate a findingof abuse of

discretion her e. 73 N or doe s B ro w ne ’ s pr of

fe re d te sti m ony

r es em ble that i n C obb. T he c ourt i n Co bb n ote d th at

it w as de al ing w ith“ one of tho se r ar e ca se s” w he re the de fe ndant’ s ne ed

f or the pr of fe re d te sti m ony

w as c le ar . 185 F . 3d at 11 97. T he

“ sole evidence” against the defendant on th e char ge of rec eiving st olen funds wa s the te sti m ony

of aw om anw ho c la im ed

to have se enthe de fe ndant r ec ei ve the m oney . Id. at 1198 . Cobb’s proff ered testim ony

cam e fr om

the only other av ai la ble pe rs on who w as pr es en t, and w oul d have dir ec tly c ontra dic te d th e onl y ev ide nc e ag ai nst

Co bb. I d. B y

c ontra st, the G ove rn m en t’ s e vid en ce a ga ins t Brow ne did no t hing e on the testim ony of a single witness, and as the district court not ed in de ny ing Br ow ne ’ s po st- tr ia l m oti on, “ the te sti m ony Br ow ne a lle ge s he would have elicited from De vaney wa s, in fa ct, elicited from other witnesses at trial.” Moreover, the interests of j udicial adm inistration and econom y we re considerable in this case. U nlike the joint trial in Cobb, which “ tookonly one day to c om ple te , ” id. a t 11 99 ( “ T ri al s do not ge t m uc h sh orte r than th at , so the c ost to the sy ste m

of ase ve ranc e in this c as e is m ini m al . ”) , the tr ia l of Br ow ne and D ev an ey la ste d a ppr oxi m at el y

tw o m onths. A s inN ovaton , w e fi nd c onsi de ratio nsThe Gove rnment’s a rgument that Deva

ney has wa ived the issue is mistaken, as 31 Deva ney ’s claim alleg es that the indictment fa iled to state an off ense – a claim which may

be hear d at any

time while the ca se is pending– and does not mer ely alleg e a de fec t in the indictment. See Fe d. R. Crim. P . 12(b)( 3). See United States v. Panare lla, 277 F.3d 678, 685 ( 3d Cir. 2002) (holdingthat “a c harg ing doc ument fails to state an of fense if the spec ific fa cts alleg ed in the char g ing doc ument fall beyond the scope of the re levant cr iminal statute, as a matter of statutory interpre tation”). We there fore do not rea ch the que stion whether Rule 12(b) (3)’ s require ment that defe nses or objec tions based on def ects in the indictment must be ra ised befor e tr ia l is a “ c la im- pr oc e ssi ngru le ” su sc e pti ble to f or fe iture or

wa ive r, or

wh e the r i t is a jurisdictional bar. See Bow les v. Russell, __ U.S. __, 127 S . Ct. 2360, 2365, 168 L . Ed. 2d 96 (2 00 7) (n oti ngthe “

jur isd ic tio na l di sti nc tio n” be tw e e n p ro c e dura l r ule s b a se d o n c ourt promulg ated r

ules and those ba sed on statutes); Ebe rhar t v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S. Ct . 403, 407, 163 L . Ed. 2d 14 (2005). 74 of j udi ci al e co nom

y to “ w ei gh[ ] he av ily ” ag ai nst se ve ranc e “ in l igh t of

the subs tantial sy stem ic interest in handlin g this com plex, conspiracy

case in one trial (whic h la ste d tw o m onths) . ” N ovaton , 271 F . 3d at 99 0, 991 . W e theref

ore af firm the trial court’ s denial of severance.

V. De vaney raises three challenges to her conviction s. F irst, she ar gues that the Governm ent failed to charge a proper RIC O off

ense, and that therefore, 31 ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce sup porte d he r co nvi ct ion s onCo unt s 1 and 2 . S he ad dit ion al ly

c la im s th at

Co unt 1 sh oul d be va cate d du e to the ins uf fi ci en cy of ev id en ce s up po rti ng th e ex is te nc e o f an ag reem en t b et ween Bro wne an d Dev an ey . Third, she argues that the district court erre d by ref using to m odify

the RICO p at t erno ff

en s e i n s tru ct i o nwi th re s p ec tt o th e f o u rt h el emen to f C o u n t2 . We co nsi de r the se arg um en ts i n turnand c onc lud e that the y are w ith out

m er it.75 A. D ev an ey arg ue s th at

f or pur pose s of 18 U . S. C. § 19 62( c) , the G ove rn m en t could no t plead and prove that D1-ME BA and NFO PA PE we re the “ enterprise” w ithw hic h th e de fe ndants w er e as soc ia te d and the “ vic tim ” of the pr ed ic at e ac ts of r ac ke te er ing . D ev an ey

poi nts to ce rt ai n st at em en ts i n R ev es v. E rn st & Y oung , 507 U.S . 170, 113 S. Ct. 1163 , 122 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1993), and N ational Org an iz at io n o f W om en , Inc . v. Sch ei dl er, 5 10 U.S. 24 9, 1 14 S. Ct. 7 98 , 12 7 L. Ed. 2d 99 (199 4), f

or the proposi tion th at w hile 18 U.S .C. §§ 196 2(a) and (b) are co nc er ne d w itha ct ivi tie s th at

vic tim iz e the e nte rp ri se , § 19 62( c) is lim ite d to pr os cri bi ng act iv it ie s t ha t u se th e en te rp ris e as a “ ve hi cl e” t o b il k t hi rdpa rti es . D ev an ey ’ s arg um en t dr aw s he av ily f ro m ade ci sio n of

the T hir d C ir cu it, Jaguar Car s, I nc. v. Roy al O aks Motor Car C o., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995). That ca se inv olv ed

ac ivi l R IC O a ct ionbr ough t by Ja guar au tom obi le c or

por at ion ag ai nst aJa guar de al er shi p and i ts o w ne rs f or de fr au din g Ja guar of

m or e than a m ill iondol lars thr oughthe sub m iss ionof f ive y ears ’ w orth o f fr au dul en t w ar ranty cl ai m s to Ja guar. I d. a t 26 1. T he c en tr al iss ue in Ja guar Cars w as w he the r the Ja guar de al er shi p w as suf fi ci en tly dis tin ct f ro m it s owne rs to sa tis fy

the re qui re m en t tha t the “pe rs on” a sso ci at ed w iththe e nte rp ri se be dis tin ct f ro m the

“ en te rp ri se ” its el f. I d. a t 26 0. T he c ourt he ld tha t the dis tin ct ive ne ss r equir em en tAppar ently , at least one court within the Third Circuit has c hosen to disreg ard the 32 dictum. See Poly

mer Dy namics, Inc. v. B ayer Corp., N o. CI V. A. 99-4040, 2000 WL1146622, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug . 14, 2000) (notingthat a “pla intiff also ca n be an e nterprise ” and c iting case s). 76 w as m et by br ing ing ac la im

a ga ins t the de fe ndant- ow ne rs a s pe rs ons co nduc tin g the dealership enterprise through a pattern of rac keteering activity . Id. at 268. In so h old ing , the c ourt no te d th e state m en t of the Re ve s C ourt tha t “ ‘ Co ngr es s co nsi ste ntl y

r ef er re d to sub se ct ion( c) a s pr ohi bit ing the ope ratio n of an e nte rp ri se through a pattern of r acketeer ing activityand to sub sections (a) and (b) a s prohibi ting acquis ition of an enterprise. ’ ” Id. at 267 (quoti ng Reves, 507 U. S. at 182, 113 S . Ct . a t 11 71) . T he c ourt f urthe r obse rv ed

that the S ch ei dle r Co urt “ he ld that the ‘ en te rp ri se ’ in subs ec tio n ( c) is pr ope rl y vie w ed a s th e ‘ ve hic le thr ough w hic h th e unl aw fu l patte rn of r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty

is co m m itt ed , r athe r than th e victim of that activity .’ ” Id. (quoting Scheidler, 510 U.S . at 259, 114 S. Ct. at 804) . T he T hir d C ir cu it thu s c onc lud ed :

[A ] vic tim

c or por at ion‘ dr ai ne d of

it s own m one y ’ by

pil fe ri ng of fi ce rs and e m

plo y ee s c oul d no t r ea sona bly be vie w ed

a s th e en te rp ri se thr oughw hic h e m plo y ee pe rs ons carr ie d ou t the ir rackete ering activity . Rather, in such an ins tance, the proper en te rp ri se w oul d be the a sso ci at ionof e m plo y ee s who are vic tim iz ing the c or por at ion , w hil e the vic tim c or por at ionw oul d no t be the en te rp ri se , but

ins te ad the § 19 62( c) c la im an t. Id . W e find this dictu m in Jaguar Cars to be unpersuasive. L ike the district 3277

court in LaS alle Bank L ake V iew v. Se guban, 937 F. Supp. 1309 (N. D. Ill. 1996 ), we are o f th e o pi ni on th atth e Sch ei dl er Co ur t’s s ta te m en t ca nn ot be so co ns tru ed . InS ch ei dle r, the pla int if

f- cl ini cs a lle ge d th at

anti -a bortio n pr ote ste rs c onsp ir ed to conduct th e af

fairs of an enterprise to shut do wn abortion clinics throu gh a pattern of r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty . S ch ei dle r, 510 U . S. a t 25 3, 114 S . Ct . a t 80 1. T he iss ue in Scheidler w as whether the alleged enterprise or rackete ering acts m ust have an ec onom ic m oti ve . I d. a t 25 4, 114 S . Ct . a t 80 2. I n ho ldi ng tha t an e co nom ic m oti ve w as unn ec es sary , the c ourt e xpl ai ne d th at “ the ‘ en te rp ri se ’ in subs ec tio n (c ) co nnot es ge ne ra lly

the ve hic le thr oughw hic h th e unl aw fu l patte rnof rackete ering activity

is com m itted, rather than the victim of that activity .” Id. at 259, 114 S. Ct. at 804 (em phasis add ed). By

so qualify ing its language, theref ore, the S ch ei dle r Co urt di d no t f or ec los e the pos sib ili ty

that the e nte rp ri se c ana lso be the vic tim

of the a lle ge d R IC O vio la tio n. S ee a lso L aS al le Bank L ak e V ie w , 937 F. S upp. a t 13 23 ( “ [T ] his c ourt do es not a gr ee w iththe le ap of

log ic m ad e by

the T hir d C ir cu it fr om

the S upr em e Co urt’ s S ch ei dle r state m en t tha t ‘ en te rp ri se s’

‘ ge ne ra lly ’ are not

‘ vic tim s, ’ to the c onc lus ionthat ‘ en te rp ri se s’ c annot be

‘ victim s.’ ”). Nor c an the selected statem ent from Reves be interpre ted to m ean that §§ 19 62(a) and (b) hold a m onop oly on situ ations where an enterprise has been78

v i ct i m i ze d . Th e i s s u e i nRe v es wa s h o w m u ch i n v o l v emen ti na c o rp o ra t i o n ’s af fa ir s an ou tsi de a cc ount ing f irm m ust have in or de r to b e de em ed apart ic ipant i n the conduct of tho se aff

airs. See Reves, 507 U.S . at 176– 77, 113 S. C t. at 1168 –69. T he Co urt he ld m er el y that the de fe ndant “ m

ust part ic ipate in the op erat io n o r m an ag em en t o f th e en te rp ris e it se lf.” Id. at18 5, 1 13 S. Ct. at 11 73 . The C ourt’ s statem ent that “ Congress consis tently ref erre d to sub section (c) a s pr ohi bit ing the ope ratio n of an e nte rp ri se thr oughapa tte rnof r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty and to sub sections (a) and (b) a s prohib iting acquisition of an enterprise, ’ ” id. at 182, 113 S . Ct . a t 11 71, thu s un de rs co re d th e Co urt’ s a ppl ic at ionof

an “ ope ratio n or m an ag em en t” te st, not

the va lid ity

of avic tim /ve hic le dis tin ct ion . O ur hol din g to day

is co nsi ste nt w ithour

e n banc opi nio n inU nit ed S ta te s v. G old in I ndus tr ie s, I nc . , 219 F . 3d 1 268 (1 1thCi r. 200 0) , in w hic h w e he ld tha t i n the c ont ex t of

a§ 19 62( c) c harg e, the r equir em en t of dis tin ct ion“be tw ee n th e RI CO pe rs on and the RI CO e nte rp ri se is ne ce ssary be ca use the e nte rp ri se it se lf can be apa ssi ve ins tr

um en t or vic tim of the r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty . S ee Be nne tt [v . United States T rust Co. of N ewYork] , 770 F. 2d [308, 315 (2dCir. 1985 )] (“ Such a dis tin ct ionf

oc use s th e se ct ionon the c ulp ab le party and r ec ogni ze s th at

the en te rp ri se it se lf

is of te n apa ssi ve ins tr

um en t or vic tim of the r ac ke te er ing activity .” ). ” Id. at 1270 (em phasis add ed). W e believed then, as w e do now, that79

“ Co ngr es s’ int en tio n in§ 19 62( c) to targ et aspe ci fi c vari ety

of c ri m ina l a ct ivi ty [i nc lud es ] ‘ the e xpl oit at ionand a ppr opr ia tio n of

le git im at e busi ne sse s by c or ru pt indiv iduals,’ ” not m erely the use of an enterprise to sw indle thi rd parties. See G old in I ndus . , I nc . , 219 F . 3d at 12 70. A cc or din gly , D ev an ey ’ s arg um en t t o va cate he r co nvi ct ion s onCo unt s 1 an d 2 o n th is g ro und is w ith out m er it. B. D ev an ey a lso c ha lle nge s he r co nvi ct ionon C ount 1 on the gr ound

that the Governm ent did no t present sufficient evidence of an a greem ent betwee n Devaney an d B ro w ne on the ove ra ll obj ec tiv e of the c onsp ir ac y

or an a gr ee m en t by D ev an ey to co m m it pe rs ona lly

tw o pr ed ic at e ac ts. O ur

r ev ie wof

the e vid en ce in the lightm ost favorable to the Governm ent indicates that there is m ore than en oughe vid en ce in the r ec or d to sup port he r co nvi ct ionbe y ond a re as ona ble doub t on the form er theory , and we there fore do not reach the latter . D ev an ey ’ s in suf

fi ci en cy c ha lle nge r es ts o n th e fl aw ed arg um en t tha t the ev ide nc e supp ortin g he r co nspi ra cy c onvi ct ionr equir es “ care fu l pars ing ” by el im inatin g th e pr ed ic at e ac ts f ound to be c om

m itt ed by Br ow ne a lon e, the predicate ac ts foundto be com m itted by herself a lone, and the predicate a cts that th e ju ry fo u n dh adn o tb ee nco m m i t t ed . Ha v i n g d o n e s o , s h e p o i n t s t o Co u n t2 ’s80

Predicate A ct 14 – m ail fra ud conn ected to the subm issio n of an expense voucher on N ove m

be r 28, 199 7 – a s th e onl y a ct that the j ur

y f ound that B ro w ne and D ev an ey ha d c om m itt ed j oin tly . S he arg ue s th at

ba se d onthat a ct , the e vid en ce is insufficient to sh ow either an agreem ent on an “ overall objec tive” or the existence of a “ si ng le ob

jecti ve ” co ns pi racy. D ev an ey ’ s arg um en t f

undam en ta lly

m isc onstru es the lawand undul y co nstri ct s th e sc ope of

e vid en ce that m ay

be c onsi de re d by

aj ur y w ithr es pe ct

to a RI CO c onsp ir ac y

c harg e. F ir st, w e not e that C ount 1 di d no t i nc or

por at e by re fe re nc e the sub stanti ve RI CO c harg e in C ount 2. R athe r, it

a lle ge d apa tte rnof ra ck et ee ri ng a ct ivi ty

f ro m 199 3 to 200 3, c onsi sti ng o f m ult ipl e ac ts i nc lud ing T af t- H ar tle y vio la tio ns, e m

be zz le m en t, bank f

ra ud, and m ai l f

ra ud. T hus, in pr oc ee din gs o n C ount

1, the G ove rn m en t w as not li m ite d to pr ovi ng the spe ci fi c pr ed ic at e ac ts c harg ed

in Co unt 2. F urthe rm or e, Co unt

1 c en te re d onthe a ct

of ag re em en t: w he the r or

not the j ur y be lie ve d th at

[ the de fe ndant] a ct

ua lly com m itted the predicate acts has nothing to do with whether the j ury be lie ve d th at

he a gr ee d to c om

m it the pr ed ic at e ac ts. A gr ee m en t t o co m m ittwo pre di cat e act s, an d n ot th e act ua l co m m is si on of t wo pr ed ic at e act s, i s t he ke y

is su e in a RICO c on sp ira cy ch arg e. U nit ed S ta te s v. Ru sso , 796 F . 2d 1 443, 146 1 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) . A cc or din gly , “ the j ur y w as f re e to c onsi de r any

a ct of [ the ty pe a lle ge d a s r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty in81

Co unt 1] that oc curr ed

w ith in the ti m e fr am e of the c onsp ir ac y . ” U nit ed S ta te s v. Ph ill ips , 874 F . 2d 1 23, 127 ( 3d C ir . 198 9) ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. E lli ott , 571 F. 2d 8 80, 911 ( 5thCi r. 197 8) ( “ W e have lon g f oll ow ed the r ule that the gove rn m en t i s no t l im ite d to ove rt a ct s pl ea de d inthe ind ic tm en t i n pr ovi ng a co nspi ra cy ; i t m ay

sho woth er

a ct s of the c onsp ir at or s oc curr ing dur ing the li fe of the conspiracy .” ). Se co nd, the f

ac t tha t on e co nspi rator

m ay have be enunaw ar e of

pr ed ic at e cr im es c om

m itt ed by ac o- co nspi rator

doe s no t ne ce ssari ly

ne ga te the e xis te nc e of a co nspi ra cy . R eg ar dle ss o f the m ethod use d to e sta bli sh the a gr ee m en t, the Governm ent need not prov e that eac h conspi rator agr eed w ith every other co nspi rator , kne wof

his f el lowc onsp ir at or s, w as aw ar e of a ll of the de ta ils of

the co nspi ra cy , or

c ont em plate d part ic ipatin g inthe sam e cr im e. U nit ed S ta te s v. T o, 144 F. 3d 7 37, 744 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) ; C as tr o, 89 F . 3d at 14 51 ( ci tin g P ep e, 747 F . 2d at 659–6 0). “ [T ] he fac t that ‘ each conspirator m ay have contem

plated participating in d iffer ent and unrelated crim es is irrelevant. ’ ” T o, 144 F.3d at 744–45 (quo ti ng Sta rret t, 5 5 F .3dat 1 54 4) . Co ntr ar y to D ev an ey ’ s arg um en t, the re fo re , the e vid en ce in supp ort of Co unt 1’ s R IC O c onsp ir ac y

c harg e w as not

li m ite d to the pr ed ic at e ac t tha t the j ur y f ound w as j oin tly

c om m itt ed by Br ow ne and D ev an ey

a s th e ba sis of

Co unt82

2’ s su bst an tiv e RI CO vio la tio n. I nst ea d, pr oof of an a gr ee m en t onan ov er al l obj ec tiv e m ay

be e sta bli she d th ro ugh suf

fi ci en t c ir cum stanti al e vid en ce f ro m which a r ational jury

could conclud e bey ond a reasonable doub t that Devaney

“ m ust ne ce ssari ly

have kno w n” that B ro w ne w as a lso c onsp ir ing to part ic ipate in the sam e en te rp ri se thr oughapa tte rnof r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty . S ee Ca str o, 89 F . 3d at 145 1. D ev an ey r el ie s he av ily

on Unit ed

S ta te s v. G onz al ez , 921 F . 2d 1 530 (1 1th Ci r. 199 1) , to ar gue that the re w as no e vid en ce that sh e ag re ed w ithBr ow ne a s to th e o ve ral l o bjec ti ve . InG onz al ez , Mi ch ae l T im oth y S w ee tonw as c harg ed

w itha RICO conspiracy

in connection with the L eQ uire drug ring which im ported co ca ine f ro m Co lom bia to landi ng s tr ips in G eo rg ia , A la bam a, and T enne sse e. I d. at 153 3. S w ee tonw as am em be r of agr ound c re wde plo y ed

to a landi ng s ite in Sy lvania , G eo rg ia , w hose j ob i t w as to sc out the landi ng are a an d un loa d c oc ai ne f r o m an a i r

p l an e arr i v i n g o nM ay 2 3 , 1 9 8 3 . I d . a t1 5 3 3

– 3 4 . Th a tjo b we n taw ry, and Swe eton was indicted along with oth ers in the drug ring. A lthou gh thi s court fo und that the re w as suf

fi ci en t e vid en ce to co nvi ct S w ee tonund er

a“ sin gle objec tive” theory , w e held that there w as insufficient evidence of a “ wide[r ] ag re em en t” by

S w ee tonto j oinac onsp ir ac y w ithan ov er al l ob

j ec tiv e of vio la tin g RI CO . I d. a t 15 42–4 4. W e not ed that the re w as no e vid en ce ty ing S w ee tonto any83

ac tiv ity of the dr ug r ing oth er

than th e Sy lvania

inc ide nt: “ no w itn es s c oul d rem em ber seeing Sw eeton, or hearing of his nam e, prior to the news that som ethin g ha d go ne w ro ng at S y lvania . I n c ontra st t o th e oth er de fe ndants , he is not seen, or known of, at or ar oundLe Quire’ s hom e or [the] fixed base operation.” Id . a t 15 42. I n th ose c ir cum stanc es , the re fo re , w e fo und pr oof of an a gr ee m en t t o anove ra ll co nspi ra cy

to be la ck ing . Inc ontra st t o th e de ar

th o f ev ide nc e w ithr es pe ct to Sw ee ton , the re is am

ple ci rc um stanti al e vid en ce to supp ort a f ind ing that D ev an ey

a gr ee d to the ove ra ll obj ec tiv e of

the a lle ge d e nte rp ri se – nam el y , to co ntr ol the f inanc ia l a ff

ai rs of the unio n and m isuse its assets and influence for per sonal gain. Brow ne hired D ev an ey to be his a dm ini str at ive a ssi stant, in w hic h c ap ac ity she c am e to w ie ld extraordinary

control over the book s, r ecords, and finances of the union . W ith that au tho ri ty , D ev an ey

w as able to enri chhe rs el f thr oughhe r payro ll sc he m e an d by ch ar gin g pe rs ona l e xpe nse s to the uni on. F or his part , Br ow ne w as able to use his influence to obtain paym ents from em ploy ers. In addition, De vaney ’ s activities both fac ilitated Browne’ s fraudulent expenses and sh ielded them from view. In filling ou t Brow ne’ s expense vou chers, De vaney adm itted to fabricating the nam es of persons attendin g dinn ers and ascr ibing a union-related purpose to person al m eals. De vaney

herself attended several expensive din ners that we re not relate dThe Reve s “oper ation or mana g ement” te st is applicable to cr iminal RI CO case s. 33 Starrett, 55 F .3d at 1542. Howe ver, w e have held that the test does not apply to the conspirac y offe nse, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). I d. at 1547. 84 to uni on bu siness. She also fa iled to m aintain adequate docum entation for claim ed expenses. H er r ole thus b rought h er “ squarely within [the alleged] enterprise. ” Se e G onz al ez , 921 F . 2d at 15 41. I n turn , Br ow ne w ar de d of f the c om pla int s of u n i o no ff i ci al s an dac co u n t an t s wh o ex p re s s edco n ce rn s o v erDe v an ey’s p er fo rman ce an dcr i t i ci ze dth e ab s en ce o f c h ec k s an db al an ce s o v erth e u n i o n ’s fi n an ci al af

fa i rs . In d ee d , wh en Za k ai b re p ea t ed l y re qu es t edac ce s s t o th e u n i o n ’s book s and records, De vaney appealed to Brow ne to “ take car e of it. ” The sum of this evidence is such th at w e cannot say that a rational jury co uld not have f ound be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t D ev an ey

a gr ee d to the ove ra ll obj ec tiv e ch ar ge d. W e the re fo re a ff irm D ev an ey ’ s c onvi ct ionon C ount 1. C. D ev an ey ’ s th ir d arg um en t onappe al is that the dis tr ic t c our t e rr ed in re fu sin g to m odi fy

the pa tte rnRI CO j ur

y ins tr uc tio n w ithr es pe ct

to the f ourth el em en t of

the Co unt

2. T he j ur

y w as ins tr uc te d th at the f ourth e le m en t of

the 33 subs tantive RICO offense r equired finding bey ond a reasonable doub t that De vaney “ conducted or participated in th e conduct of the enterprise’ s affa irs.” Over De vaney ’ s objection, the district court delivere d the unm odified pattern85

ins tr uc tio n f or thi s e le m en t, w hic h r ea ds: [T ] he G ove rn m en t m

ust pr ove be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t the D ef en dant w as som ethin g m or e than an ou tsi de r le ndi ng a id t o th e en te rp ri se . I t m

ust be pr ove d th at

the D ef en dant h ad

som e part

in ei the r the m an ag em en t or the ope ratio n of

the a ff ai rs of the e nte rp ri se itself. Thus, it nee d not b e proved that the Def endant had prim ary re spon sib ili ty

or e ve n am an ag er ia l po sit ion ; i t i s e noug h if the D ef en dant w as inv olv ed

in co nduc tin g th e ope ratio n of the a ff ai rs of the e nte rp ri se a s alow er

le ve l part ic ipant. Elev en th Cir cu itPat te rn Ju ry Ins tru ct io n, Offe ns e In st ru ct io n 7 1.1 (20 03 ). De vaney has no quarrel w ith the first two sentences of the pattern ins tr uc tio n, w hic h sh e adm its are li ft ed dir ec tly f ro m the S upr em e Co urt’ s op ini on in Rev es . Her ob

jecti on is li m it edto th e se co ndcla us e o f th e th irdsen te nc e. D ev an ey a ske d th e dis tr ic t c ourt t o om it the langua ge that “ it is e noug h if the D ef en dant w as inv olv ed

in co nduc tin g th e ope ratio n of the a ff ai rs of the e nte rp ri se as alow er

le ve l part ic ipant, ” an d to sub sti tut e the langua ge : “but the G ove rn m en t m ust pr ove be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t the D ef

en dant h ad

som e part

in di rect in g t he en te rp ris e’s affa irs .” As D evaney ’ s challenge wa s properly preserved, we reviewthe district co urt’ s r ef

usa l t o a cc ep t D ev an ey ’ s r eque ste d m odi fi catio n to the w or din g of the ins tr uc tio n f or an a buse of dis cr et ion . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. P rathe r, 205 F . 3d 1 265, 1270 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( “ W e re vie wthe le ga l c or re ctne ss o f a j ur

y ins tr uc tio n de novo , but defer

on questi ons of ph rasing absent an abuse of discretion.”) ( internal86

citation om itted); United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2000 ) (“ ‘ T he dis tr ic t c ourt ha s br oa d di sc re tio n inf orm ulatin g aj ur

y c harg e so lon g a s th e ch ar ge a s aw hol e ac curate ly r ef le ct s th e lawand the f

ac ts. ’ ”) ( quot ing Un i t edSt at es v . Tu rn er , 8 7 1 F. 2 d1 5 7 4 , 1 5 7 8 (1 1 th Ci r. 1 9 8 9 ). A d i s tri ct co u rt ’s failure to give a r equested jury instruction is an abuse of discretion if the requested ins tr uc tio n “ (1 ) w as c or

re ct , ( 2) w as not

sub stanti al ly

c ove re d by

the c harg e ac tua lly giv en , and ( 3) de al t w ithsom e poi nt i n th e tr ia l so im portant tha t f

ai lur e to give the requested inst ruction seriousl y im paired the defendant’ s ability to condu ct hi s d efen se .” Uni te d S ta te s v . Eckh ard t, 4 66 F.3d93 8, 9 47 –4 8 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 6) . U nde r our

de fe re nti al standard

of r ev ie w , w e re ve rs e onl y

if “ w e ar e le ft

w itha subs tanti al and e ra dic ab le doubt a s to w he the r the j ur y w as pr ope rl y

gui de d init s de lib er at ion s. ” I d. W e fi nd n o a

buse of dis cr et ionin the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ef usa l t o m odi fy

the pa tte rnins tr

uc tio n to inc or

por at e D ev an ey ’ s pr opos ed langua ge . T he re c anbe no doub t tha t D ev an ey ’ s pr opos ed ins tr uc tio n w as sub stanti al ly

e nc om pa sse d inthe instructio n delivered by

the district court. T he first sentence of the patter n ins tr uc tio n e xpl ai ns tha t the G ove rn m en t m ust pr ove thi s e le m en t be y ond a reasonable doubt. The pr opos ed language that a defendant m ust have “ som e part in d ir ec tin g th e en te rp ri se ’ s a ff ai rs ” is l ike w ise f

ull y a ddr es se d by

the se co nd87

se nte nc e of

the pa tte rnins tr

uc tio n, w hic h r equir es that a de fe ndant m

ust have

“ som e part

in ei the r the m an ag em en t or the ope ratio n of

the a ff ai rs of the en te rp ri se it se lf

. ” T o m an ag e or

ope rate an e nte rp ri se ’ s a ff ai rs is to d ir ec t the e n t e r p r i s e ’s a f f a i r s . S e e R e v e s , 5 0 7 U . S . a t1 7 9 , 1 1 3 S . C t . a t1 1 7 0 ( “[ B ]u ts o me part in dir ec tin g th e en te rp ri se ’ s a ff ai rs is re qui re d. T he ‘ ope ratio n or m an ag em en t’ te st e xpr es se s th is r equir em en t i n af orm ulatio n th at

is ea sy to ap ply . ”) . N otw ith standi ng D ev an ey ’ s se m an tic pr ef er en ce , to inc or

por at e D ev an ey ’ s pr opos ed

ins tr uc tio n w oul d be to re nde r re dund an t the se co nd c lause of th e th irdsen te nc e. T he langua ge that D ev an ey w oul d have str ic ke n is an a cc ur at e re fl ec tio n of the lawin thi s c ir cu it. T he r ef er en ce to “ co nduc tin g th e ope ratio n of the a ff ai rs of ane nte rp ri se a s alow er

le ve l part ic ipant” c ont ai ne d inthe se co nd c lause of the thi rd se nte nc e cl ose ly

tr ac ks the Re ve s op ini on, w hic h st at es : “ A n e nte rp ri se is

‘ ope rate d’ not

j ust by upp er m an ag em en t bu t a lso by low er r ung part ic ipants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper m anagem ent.” Reves, 507 U.S . at 184, 113 S . Ct . a t 11 73. I n R ev es , the e xpl an at ionthat l ow er -l ev el part ic ipants unde r the dir ec tio n of

upp er m an ag em en t m ay

be f ound to sa tis fy the “ ope ratio n or m an ag em en t” te st w as ne ce ssary to en sur e that the Co urt’ s f ind ing that the part ic ular out sid er

in que sti on –

i. e. , the out sid e ac co unt ing f irm – di d no t op er at e88

or m an ag e the e nte rp ri se w oul d no t un dul y r es tr ic t the sc ope of

li ab ili ty f or ins ide rs . Ade fe ndant m

ust “ ‘ know ing ly

im ple m en t[ ] ’ and ‘ m ak e’ de ci sio ns” in or de r to b e lia

ble und er the “ ope ratio n or

m an ag em en t” te st, se e O ff ic ia l C om m . of Unsecure d Creditors of PSA , I nc. v. Edw ards, 437 F.3d 114 5, 1156 (11th Cir. 2006 ) (quoting Starrett, 55 F.3d at 1548), but those actions m ay be perfor m ed unde r the dir ec tio n of

upp er m an ag em en t. S ee U nit ed S ta te s v. O re to, 37 F . 3d 739, 750 –51 (1 st C ir . 199 4) ( statin g th at “ [s ] pe ci al c ar e is r equir ed in tr an slatin g Reves’ concern w ith ‘ horizontal’ c onnection s – focusing on the liabili ty of an out sid e advis er

– i nto the ‘ ve rt ic al ’ que sti on o f howf ar RI CO li ab ili ty

m ay e xte nd within the enterprise but down the organizational ladd er”; that def endants were liable by being “ plainlyintegral to carr y ing ou t the [orders f

rom above] ”; and that

“ Congress intend ed to reac h all who participate in the conduct of that enterprise, whether they

are generals or f

oot so ldiers”). Be ca use the pa tte rnins tr

uc tio n gi ve n by

the dis tr ic t c ourt w as le ga lly accurate and wa s m ore than adequate in addressing Devaney ’ s propos ed ins tr uc tio n, D ev an ey

ha s f ai le d to e sta

bli sh an a buse of dis cr et ion . VI . W ith respect to sentencing, Devaney contends th at the forf

eiture order against her shou ld be vacated for tw o reasons. F irst, she ar gues that the dis trictIn this case, f orfe iture wa s order ed pursua nt to §§ 1963(a)( 1) and ( a)( 3), which pr ovide 34 in pertinent par

t that persons convic ted of violating§ 1962 “shall for feit to the United States . . . any interest the pe rson has a cquire d or maintained in violation of sec tion 1962; [ and] any proper ty constituting, or de rived fr om, any proce eds which the person obtaine d, direc tly or indirectly , from ra ckete eringactivity or unlawf

ul debt collection in violation of section 1962.” 89 co urt sh oul d no t have a dj udge d he r j oin tly and s ev er al ly

li ab le f or the f ull a m ount of the f or fe iture or de r, and s houl d have r ed uc ed the f or fe iture a m ount

by the am ount of her voluntary

restitution . Second, she argues that the order of forf eiture vio la te d th e E igh th A m en dm en t’ s pr ohi bit iona ga ins t e xc es siv e fi ne s.

“ W e re vie wde nov o th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s le ga l c onc lus ion s r eg ar din g forfe iture and the court’ s finding s of fac t for clear er ror. ” Puche, 350 F.3d at 1153 . Whe the r a fo rf

ei tur e or de r is c onst itu tio na lly e xc es siv e unde r the E igh th Am en dm en t i s al so subjec t t o d e n ov o re vi ew. Id. A. U nde r 18 U . S. C. § 19 63, atr ia l c ourt m ust or de r fo rf

ei tur e in a ddi tio n to oth er pe na lti es f

or vio la tio n of

RI CO . A s in div idu al s c onvi ct ed und er § 19 62, 34 Br ow ne and D ev an ey

f al l square ly

w ith in the f

or fe iture pr ovi sio n. A t se nte nc ing , the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d af or fe iture or de r ag ai nst

the de fe ndants in the a m ount of $592 ,254.79, f

or which they

we re held j ointl y

and severally

liable. This figure w as r ea ch ed

by sum m ing the a m ount s r ec ei ve d by Br ow ne f

ro m avari ety of sour ce s a s ar es ult

of hon es t se rv ic es m ai l f

ra ud and T af

t- H ar tle y vio la tio ns90

($ 468, 208. 52) ; the a m ount r ec ei ve d by

D ev an ey thr oughpayro ll em

be zz le m en t an d bank f

ra ud ( $116 , 207. 66) ; the a m ount obt ai ne d th ro ugh the sub m iss ionof fr au dul en t vo uc he rs ( $4, 638. 82) ; e xpe nse s st em m ing f ro m Br ow ne ’ s us e of

the uni on c el l ph one and unio n c al lin g c ar d ( $2, 471. 79) ; and the a m ount c onne ct ed

to Dev an ey ’s tra ve l t o New Yo rk($1 ,42 8.0 0) . De vaney challenges two aspects of the c om putatio n of her forf

eiture lia bil ity . F ir st, she arg ue s th at she sho uld

not have be enhe ld j oin tly

and s ev er al ly lia ble f or Br ow ne ’ s ho ne st s er

vic es m ai l f

ra ud and T af

t- H ar tle y vio la tio ns b ec au se they we re not rea sonablyforesee able to her. Sec ond, she argues that the forfe iture am ount sho uld have be enr ed

uc ed by the $26 , 500 of

vol unt ar y r es tit uti on tha t sh e m ad e to the uni on f

or he r payro ll em

be zz le m en t. W e dis cu ss the se arg um en ts i n tur n and c onc lud e that the y

f ai l. W e first c onsid ered the issue of j oint andseveral liability in the context of a fo rfei tu re o rd er i n Un it edSta te s v . Cap or al e, 80 6 F .2d14 87 (11 th Cir . 19 86 ). Af ter exam ining the statutory schem e as a whole and the purpose of the forfeiture pr ovi sio n, w e co nc lud ed

that “ im posi tio n of

j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty in a forfe iture order upon RICO co-conspirators is not o nly perm issib le but necessary in these circum stances to effe ctuate the purpose of the forfeiture provisio n.” Id. at 1506 . T o sa ddl e the G ove rn m en t w ithar equir em en t “ to d et er m ine the pr ec ise91

al loc at ionof

r ac ke te er ing pr oc ee ds” be tw ee n de fe ndants w oul d su bst an tia lly im pa ir “ the e ff ec tiv en es s of

[ the ] r em edy , ” as “ of

fe nde rs w oul d si m

ply have to m ask the allocation of the proceeds to avoidforfe iting them altogether.” Id. at 1508 . I t w as e noug h inthat c as e that “ the gov er nm en t c anpr ove the a m ount of the proceeds and identify

a finite group of people receiving the proceeds.” Id. In Ca por al e, the re fo re , the im

posi tio n of

j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty a s a“ co lle ct ion device” w as necessary

to effe ctuate RIC O. Id. Caporale did no t hold , how ever, that j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty m ay onl y be im pose d w he re the G ove rn m en t c annot pr ove the a m ount

of il l- gotte n ga ins that w as f unne le d to e ac h de fe ndant. D ev an ey r el ie s pr inc ipa lly

upo n U nit ed

S ta te s v. S ac co cc ia , 823 F . S upp. 994 (D . R. I. 199 3) , a ff

’ d, U nit ed S ta te s v. H ur le y , 63 F . 3d 1 ( 1st Ci r. 199 5) , to ar gue that a

de fe ndant m ay

not be he ld l ia

ble to fo rf

ei t the pr oc ee ds o f ra ck et ee ri ng a ct ivi ty

ge ne rate d by

ac onsp ir ac y

that w er e not

r ea sona bly foresee able to the defendant. I n Saccocc ia, each defe ndant was found gui lty of a RI CO c onsp ir ac y

vio la tio n and o ne or

m or e re la te d su

bst an tiv e of

fe nse s st em

m ing from a conspiracy

to launder the proceeds of illegal narcotics sales for a Co lom bian dr ug c ar te l. S ac co cc ia , 823 F . S upp. a t 99 7. I n de te rm ini ng the am ount of f or fe iture to be im

pose d one ac h de fe ndant, the dis tr ic t c ourt l ooke d to the S en te nc ing G uid el ine s, U . S. S. G . § 1B 1. 3( a) (1 )( B) , w hic h r equir e that “both92

ba se of fe nse le ve ls and a dj ustm en ts f or spe ci fi c of

fe nse c hara ct er ist ic s be determ ined on th e basis of ‘ all rea sonablyforesee able acts and om issio ns of others in furtherance of

the j ointl y

undertaken crim inal activity .’ ” Id. at 1004. T he court concluded th at “ [s] ince crim inal forfeiture is a form of punish m ent, it follows that the sam e pr inc ipl es of

se nte nc ing a cc ount ab ili ty sho uld appl y . ” I d. T he F ir st Circuit agree d, noting in addition that the sam e principle underlies establish ed case lawholdi ng a defendant subs tantively liable for the f

oreseeable c rim inal co nduc t of

oth er m em be rs of the c onsp ir ac y . H ur le y , 63 F . 3d at 22 ( ci tin g Pi nk ert on v. Un it edSta te s, 3 28 U.S. 64 0, 6 6 S . Ct. 1 18 0, 9 0 L. Ed. 1 48 9 (1 94 6) ). T he c ourt de ci de d no t “ to d ep ar t f ro m thi s pr inc ipl e of

a ttr ibu te d c ondu ct

w he n it co m es to ap ply

the f or fe iture r

ule s, w hic h have a spe ct s bo th o f subs tanti ve li ab ili ty an d of pe na lty . ” I d. W e re spe ct fu lly

dis ag re e w iththe r ea soni ng o f the se opi nio ns, a s w e do n ot be lie ve that se ct ion1B 1. 3( a) (1 )( B) c anbe c onf la te d w iththe S en te nc ing Guidelines applicable to forfeiture under RI CO. T he Guidelines expressly deal w ithf or fe iture in se ct ion5E 1. 4, w hic h pr ovi de s init s e nti re ty that “ [f ] or fe iture is to b e im pose d up on a

c onvi ct ed

de fe ndant a s pr ovi de d by statut e. ” U . S. S. G . § 5 E 1. 4. T he c om

m en tary the n li sts the vari ous statut es , inc lud ing 18 U . S. C. § 19 62, and notes th at forf

eiture is m andatory

and autom atic upon conv iction of an93

underly ing offense. N or do w e be lie ve that the “ re as ona bly f or es ee ab le ” lim itatio n op er at ive on the im posi tio n of

vic ar iou s P ink er

tonli ab ili ty

is ap pli ca

ble he re . T he a ct s f

or w hic h D ev an ey

dis cl ai m s f

or fe iture li ab ili ty

are not “ m er el y apart of the ram if ic at ion s of

the plan w hic h c oul d no t be r ea sona bly f or es ee n a s ane ce ssary

or na tur al c onse que nc e of

the unl aw fu l a gr ee m en t. ” P ink er ton , 328 U . S. a t 64 8. T he RICO conspiracy

count of which both Browne and De vaney we re c onvi cted al le ge d, int er

a lia , that the de fe ndants a gr ee d to c ondu ct and p ar tic ipate in the co nduc t of

the a ff ai rs of the e nte rp ri se thr oughapa tte rnof a ct ivi ty inc lud ing vio la tio ns o f the T af

t- H ar tle y A ct and h one st s er

vic es m ai l f

ra ud, and o ne of

the m ult ipl e obj ec ts o f the r ac ke te er ing c onsp ir ac y w as to use the inf

lue nc e of D 1- MEBA, NFOPAPE, an d t he ir r es pe ct iv e d iv is io ns forth ei r pe rs on al ga in . A cc or din gly , the se of

fe nse s w er e the ve ry

obj ec ts o f the unl aw fu l c onsp ir ac y and we re c omm itted in furtherance there of. In that sense, their c omm issio n was i n h e r e n t l y “ r e a s o n ab l y fo r e s e e ab l e ” t o De v an e y. T he f ac t tha t D ev an ey

w as not he rs el f ch ar ge d w iththe c om m iss ionof

the T af t- H ar tle y or hon es t se rv ic es m ai l f

ra ud p re dic at e ac ts d oe s no t a bsol ve he r of lia bil ity f or the c onsp ir ac y . C f. U nit ed S tate s v. F au lkn er , 17 F . 3d 7 45, 775 ( 5th Cir. 1994 ) (“ The R ICO offense her e is not m erely the com m issio n of particular94

pr ed ic at e ac ts, but

ac onsp ir ac y

‘ to c ondu ct

or part ic ipate , dir ec tly

or ind ir ec tly , in the conduct of’ an enterprise. ” (quoting 1 8 U. S. C. § 196 2(c)) ). A lthou gh Devaney claim s that the dist rict court ruled on her Rule 29 m otion for j udgm ent of acquittal that sh e ha d no t c onsp ir ed w ithBr ow ne w ithr es pe ct to the T af

t- H ar tle y and hone st s er

vic es m ai l f

ra ud v iol at ion s, our

pe ru sa l of

the tr ia l r ec or d r ev ea ls oth er w ise ; the c ourt f

ound suf fi ci en t e vid en ce to pe rm it the j ur y to co nsi de r thi s al le ge d ob

j ec t of the c onsp ir ac y , and the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t f

ound he r gui lty

of so co nspi ri ng w ithBr ow ne . T hus, the m one y pr oc ur ed thr oughBr ow ne ’ s T af

tH ar tle y vio la tio ns and h one st s er vic es m ai l f

ra ud w as a cquir ed

thr ough ra ck et ee ri ng a ct ivi ty

dir ec tly in furthe ranc e of

the obj ec ts o f the c onsp ir ac y and w as part of the c onsp ir ac y ’ s c om

m on p ool of

pr oc ee ds. I n th is r es pe ct the conspiracy

resem bled a partnership in a crim inal plan, in whose proceeds D evaney he ld an in te re st. O u r f i n d i n g th a tf

o r f e i tu r e i nth i s c i r c u ms t an c e i s n o ts ub j e c tt o th e s a me

“ re as ona bly f or es ee ab le ” lim itatio n th at ope rate s onvic ar iou s P ink er tonli ab ili ty fo r the sub stanti ve of

fe nse s of ac o- co nspi rator

is al so c onsi ste nt w ithour opi nio n in C ap or al e. I n th at

c as e, w e not ed

that the im

posi tio n of

j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty on a forfe iture wa s not whollyinconsis tent with traditional concepts of crim inal la w andna m edPin ke rto n l iabi li ty as on e ex am pl e. Cap or al e, 80 6 F .2dat 1 50 8.Deva ney urg es us that it is “incomprehe nsible” to “graf t a common-lawprinciple of 35 vicar ious liabili ty

and not the common-la

w limitation on t hat liability .” We note, howe ver, that the impositi on of joint and sever al liability for a forf eiture or der ope rate s as a pe nalty collection device and not as a

theory of substantive liability . See Capora le, 806 F.2d a t 1508 (noting that forf eiture “ g oes only

to the penalty

imposed rather

than to the individual’s criminal liability ”); see a lso United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 924 ( 11th Cir. 2001) (“It is bey ond doubt that criminal for feiture is part of a defe ndant’s sente nce. 18 U .S.C. §§ 1963(a), 3554; United States v. Bissell, 866 F .2d 1343, 1349 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (“ Criminal forfe iture oper ates in per sonam ag ainst the defe ndant, servingas a pe nalty , upon conviction.”) . . . .”); c f. Hurle y , 63 F.3d at 22 (collec ting c ases that c onclude that f orfe iture provisions involve joint and severa l liabilit y and acknow ledg ing that “[t] his is a somewhat bac kwar d way of putting the matter, since ‘joint and s e v e r a l ’ r o u g h l y

d e s c r i b e s th e r e s u l tw i th o u te x p l a i n i n gth e un d e r l yi n gth e o r y o f l i a b i l i ty” ) . In thi s r e sp e c t, w e dis a g re e wi th H ur le y ’s c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of fo rf e iture ru le s a s f

e atur ing“ a sp e c ts both of substantive liability and of pe nalty ,” Hur ley , 63 F.3d at 22.

95 H ow ev er , our

dis cu ssi on d id n ot s top the re ; w e obse rv ed that: The im posit ion of joint and several liability on a forfe iture is even le ss the or et ic al ly

pr obl em at ic than vi cari ous lia bil ity f or asub stanti ve convictio n m ight b e because it goes only to the penalty

im posed rathe r than to the ind ivi dua l’ s c ri m ina l l ia bil ity . I n a ddi tio n, tr ad iti ona l no tio ns o f cr im ina l l aware not a lto ge the r an al ogou s be ca use RI CO it se lf

by de sig n is not

tr ad iti ona l c ri m ina l l aw : i t re pr es en ts a

r ad ic al de part

ur e fr om c om m on l awnot ion s of

li ab ili ty an d p un is hm en t i n c riminal law i n anu m be r of res pe ct s. Id . I nde ed , to hol d othe rw ise w oul d be to as sig n to the G ove rn m en t the one ro us 35 ta sk o f pr ovi ng t o th e tr ia l j udge w hic h pr oc ee ds w er e re as ona bly f or es ee ab le to ea chde fe ndant i n ac onsp ir ac y . S uc h am ove w oul d si gni fi cantl y blunt the ef fe ct ive ne ss o f a w ea

pon that C ongr es s sp ec if

ic al ly auth or iz ed

“ to s tr ike a t the he ar t of an il le ga l e nte rp ri se by

c onf isc at ing ta int ed

pr ope rty and p ro ce ed s in hope s of puttin g th e cr im ina l e nte rp ri se out of bus ine ss. ” S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. G ilb er t, 244 F . 3d 8 88, 909 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ; se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. Ba

j ak aj ian,Th e MV RApr ov ide s th at r e sti tut ion wi ll b e or de re d to any

vic timfo r “ an o ff

e ns e 36 ag ainst proper

ty under this title, . . . including a ny offe nse committed by

fra ud or dec eit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)( 1)(A) (ii). A victim is defined a s any person dire ctly

harme d by

a def endant’ s criminal conduc t in the course of a sche me, conspira cy , or patter n. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)( 2). 96 524 U.S . 321, 332 n.7, 118 S. Ct. 2028 , 2035, 141 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1998) (“ It w as onl y in 1970 that C ongr es s r es ur re ct ed the E ngl ishc om

m on l awof

pun iti ve forfe iture to com

bat organized crim e and m aj or drug traff icking.”). De vaney also argues that the am ount of forf eiture ought to have been reduced by

the two chec ks totalin g $26 ,500 that she sent to th e union after an int er na l i nve sti ga tio n di sc ove re d th at she ha d e m

be zz le d $1 16, 207. 66 f

ro m NF OP AP E’ s payroll. T his argum ent is specious and can be dealt w ith in sh ort or de r. Res ti tu ti on pu rs ua nt to th e Ma nd at ory Vict im s R es ti tu ti on Act (M VRA) an d f or fe iture pur suant t o 18 U . S. C. § 19 63 are both m an da tor y in thi s c as e, and each ser ves a differ ent goal. Restitution is to be paid in th e full am ount of eac h 36 victim ’ s losses. 18 U. S. C. § 366 4(f)( 1)(A ). A t sentencing, the probation officer , w ho p re pare d th e Pr es en te nc e In ve sti ga tio n R ep ort, r ec om m en de d r es tit

uti on i n the a m ount

pa id t o N FO PA PE by

it s in sur er , $87 , 100. P re sum ab ly , thi s am ount refl ect edth e two ch eck s t ha t Dev an ey sen t t o t he un io n. Whil e the f

oc us o f re sti tut ionis on the vic tim , f or fe iture f

oc use s onthe defendant. I n additio n to forcing the dis gorgem ent of disho nest profits, theref ore, forfe iture is also a puniti ve action against the defendant. Caporale , 806 F. 2d at97

1507 ; se e al so L ibr etti v. U nit ed S ta te s, 516 U . S. 29, 39, 116 S . Ct . 356 , 363 , 133 L . E d. 2d 2 71 ( 1995 ) (n oti ng tha t “ Co ngr es s c onc ei ve d of f or fe iture a s punis hm en t for the com

m issio n of various drug andrac keteering activities,” and it is im posed

“ ‘in ad d i t i o nt o an y o th ers en t en ce ’” ( qu o t i n g 1 8 U.S .C . § 1 9 6 3 )) . De v an ey’s int er es t i n th e pr oc ee ds o f he r payro ll em be zz le m en t w as f

or fe ite d and v es te d in the U nit ed

S ta te s go ve rn m en t up on h er c onvi ct ion , but

that i nte re st d at ed

ba ck to the ti m e of

the a ct that m ad e the int er es t su bj ec t t o f or fe iture – i n othe r w or ds, when D evaney

em bezzled the m oney

from NF OP AP E. Cf. Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 903 n. 38 ( not ing that un de r the r el at ionba ck doc tr ine , “ any

sub se que nt transf

er of part or a ll of ade fe ndant’ s ta int ed

pr ope rty doe s no t auto m at ic al ly

e xti ngui sh the governm ent’ s superior entitlem ent to the property ”). T he fac t that Devaney subs eque ntl y

se nt $ 26, 500 to the uni on d oe s no t di ve st the G ove rn m en t of any po rti on of i ts in te res t i n t he $1 16 ,20 7.6 6 o bt ai ne d t hr ou gh th e p ayro ll sch em e. A cc or din gly , D ev an ey ’ s c ha lle nge to the f or fe iture or de r on the se gr ound s fa ils . B. D ev an ey ’ s la st- dit che ff

ort t o va cate the f

or fe iture or de r re sts upo n th e ar gum en t tha t the inc lus ionof $46 8, 208. 52 r ec ei ve d by Br ow ne thr oughthe T af

tHartley and honestservices m ail fra ud vio lations, as applied to her, constitutes an98

ex ces si ve fin e in vi ol at io n o f th e Eig ht h Am en dm en t. Fo rf ei tur es are sub

j ec t t o th e E igh th A m en dm en t’ s pr ohi bit iona ga ins t ex ce ssi ve f

ine s “ if the y c onst itu te pun ish m en t f

or an of fe nse . ” Ba

j ak aj ian, 524 U. S. at 328, 118 S. C t. at 2033 . Subje ct forf eitures violate the Excessive Fines Cl au s e i f t h ey ar e “gr o s s l y d i s p ro p o rt i o n al t o th e g ra v i ty o f t h e d ef en d an t ’s of fe nse . ” I d. a t 33 7, 118 S . Ct . a t 20 38. T his , in tur n, is de te rm ine d by

e xam ini ng thr ee f ac tor s: ( 1) w he the r the de fe ndant f al ls i nto the c la ss o f pe rs ons at w hom the cr im ina l st at

ute w as pr inc ipa lly

dir ec te d; ( 2) oth er

pe na lti es auth or iz ed

by the le gis la tur e (o r the S en te nc ing Co m m iss ion ); and ( 3) the harm c au se d by

the de fe ndant. I d. a t 33 7–40 , 118 S . Ct . a t 20 38–3 9. The f orfeiture order

in questio n, which was “ im posed at the culm ination of a cr im ina l pr oc ee din g and r equir e[ d] c onvi ct ionof an un de rl y ing f

el ony , ” id. a t 32 8, 118 S. Ct. at 2033, constitu ted puni shm ent for an off ense and wa s thus a “ fine.” O n th e fi rs t f

ac tor , D ev an ey

w as pr ec ise ly

the ty pe of de fe ndant t ow ar d w hom RI CO is pr inc ipa lly

dir ec te d – 1 8 U . S. C. § 19 62( c) targ et s no t j ust le ad er s, but al so th os e who op erat e o r m an ag e th e cri m in al en te rp ris e, whi le 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (d ) sw ee ps m or e br oa dly to inc lud e al l pe rs ons w ho c onsp ir e to v iol at e any of the oth er sub se ct ion s. S ec ond, D ev an ey f ac ed astatut or y m ax im um of 40 y ears ’ im pr iso nm en t and $ 500, 000 fi ne ( i. e. , 20 y ears and $ 250, 000 ea chf or Co unt s 199

an d 2) , and a

G uid el ine s se nte nc e range of 37 t o 46 m onths’ im

pr iso nm en t and a fine of $7,500 to $1 m illion . Thus, the f orfeiture her e w as significantlyless than the m ax im

um f ine a llo w ab le und er

the G uid el ine s, se ve re ly

und er m ini ng D ev an ey ’ s arg um en t tha t the f or fe iture or de r is g ro ssl y

out of pr opor tio n to the gr av ity of he r of fe nse . T hir d, w e co nsi de r the harm c au se d by

D ev an ey ’ s vi olatio n of the RI CO c onsp ir ac y

statut e. I n e na ct ing the statut e, Co ngr es s “ int en de d to p r o v i d e n e ww e ap o n s o f

u np r e c e d e n t e ds c o p e f

o r ana s s au l tup o no r g an i z e dc r i me an d it s e co nom ic r oot s” by pr ovi din g “ enhanc ed

sanc tio ns and n ewr em ed ie s to de al w iththe unl aw fu l a ct ivi tie s of tho se e nga ge d inor ganiz ed c ri m e. ” Ru sse llo v. U nit ed S ta te s, 464 U . S. 16, 26– 27, 104 S . Ct . 296 , 302 , 78 L . E d. 2d 1 7 ( 1983 ) (citing Pub. L . N o. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (197 0)) (quotations o m itted). T hat Co ngr es s auth or iz ed

am ax im um f ine of $25 0, 000 an d 20 y ears ’ im pr iso nm en t each f or Counts 1 and2 further underscores that it view ed such vio lations as se ri ous tr an sgr es sio ns. W e adhe re to Co ngr es s’ s vi ewthat D ev an ey ’ s vi olatio ns of § 19 62 c onst itu te asig nif ic an t harm . Mo re ove r, he r fr au dul en t a ct ivi tie s and part ic ipatio n inan un law fu l c onsp ir ac y harm ed tw o la bor uni ons an d th ei r m em be rs . D ev an ey ’ s r el ianc e on B aj ak aj ian is sor el y m isp la ce d. I n th at

c as e, the de fe ndant p le d gu ilty

to fa ili ng t o r ep ort $3 56, 144 in c as h th at he w as tr y ing toThe Court also noted that B ajaka jian did not fit int o the class of persons for

whom the 37 repor ting statute w as principa lly desig ned – he w as neither a money launder er, nor

a drug traff icker , nor a tax evade r. Unde r the Sentenc ing Guidelines, the maxim um sentence that Ba j ak aj i anco u l d

h av e r ec ei v edwa s s i x m o n th s ’ i mp ri s o nm en tan d a f i n e o f $ 5 , 0 0 0 , s u gges t i n g a low level of c ulpability . Finally , the har m that Ba jakajian c aused w as minimal, as it affe cted only the g overnme nt “in a re latively minor way .” B ajaka

jian, 524 U.S. at 338–39, 118 S. Ct . at 2038–39. 100 take ove rs ea s. I n f

ind ing that hi s f

or fe iture of

the e nti re a m ount

w as gr oss ly dis pr opor tio na te to the of

fe nse , the Co urt f

ound sig nif ic an t the f

ac t tha t the defendant’ s “ crim e w as solely a re porting offense, ” and “ the violatio n was unrelated to any

other illegal activities.” B aj akaj ian, 524 U. S. at 337–3 8, 118 S. Ct . a t 20 38. I n th is c as e, D ev an ey and B ro w ne w er e co nvi ct ed of c onsp ir ac y

to 37 ab use the ir

pos iti ons in the uni ons an d to m isu se uni on a sse ts f or pe rs ona l ga in and subs tantive RICO violatio ns. A ccordingly , the district court’ s forfeiture order wa s within consti tutio nal boun ds. D evaney has sim ply failed to dem onstrate that the am ount of forf

eiture is grossly

disprop ortional to th e gravity of her off

ense. VI I. Fo r the r ea sons he re in s ta te d, the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s AFFIR MED.