21

- 1195

- cv Velez v. Cuomo



## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT


# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT ’ S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “ SUMMARY ORDER ” ). A PARTY CIT ING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 2 New York, on the 2 9 t h da y of M a r c h , two thousand twenty

- two

. 3 4 PRESENT: 5 BARRINGTON D. PARKER , 6 MICHAEL H. PARK , 7 BETH ROBINSON , 8 Circuit Judges. 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 BIANCA VELEZ, MOMMY ’ S ME TIME , 12 13 Plaintiff

- Appellant, 14 15

v. 21

- 1195 16 17 GOVERNOR ANDREW CUOMO, 18 MAYOR BILL DE BLASIO, GAVIN 19 NEWSOM, GOVERNOR OF 20 CALIFORNIA, JAY INSLEE, 21 GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, 22 GRETCHEN WHITMORE, GOVERNOR 23 OF MICHIGAN, TONY EVERS, 24 GOVERNOR OF WISCONSIN, TOM 25 WOLF, GOVERNOR OF 26 PENNSYLVANIA , 27 28 Defendant s -

Appellee s . 29

_____________________________________ 30 31 FOR PLAINTIFF

- APPELLANT: Bianca Velez
, pro se , 32 Lakeland
, FL

. 33 34 FOR DEFENDANT S

- APPELLEES: No appearance. 352 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the North ern District of 1
New York ( Sharpe
, J. ). 2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 3

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 4

Bianca Velez , a Florida resident proceeding pro se, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5
against the Mayor of New York City, the Governor of New York, and the governors of several 6

other states (“Defendants”) , purportedly challenging those jurisdictions’ COVID

- 19

- relate d 7
orders. A magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending 8
dismissal with leave to amend based on Velez’s failure to allege standing to sue and to present a 9

clear statement of her claims under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . The district court adopted 10

the R&R. Velez then filed an amended complaint alleg ing that Defendants had engaged in general 11
corruption and unlawful conduct in connection with allegedly unconstitutional COVID

- 19

- related 12
policies. The magistrate judge iss ued another R&R, recommending dismissal on the same grounds 13

as before. Velez filed a purported second amended complaint but no objections to the R&R. 14
Thereafter, the district court adopted the R&R, dismissed the first amended complaint, construed 15

the new filing as a motion for leave to amend
, and denied that motion because the previously 16
identified errors had not been cured in the proposed pleading. We assume the parties ’ familiarity 17
with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 18
Velez has failed to raise any arguments before this Court that meaningfully challenge the 19

basis for the district court’s decisions below. Although we “liberally construe pleadings and briefs 20
submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they 21

suggest,” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind , 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) ( citation 22
omitted), pro se appellants m ust still comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), 233 which “requires appellants in their briefs to provide the court with a clear statement of the issues 1
on appeal,” Moates v. Barkley , 147 F.3d 207, 209 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, despite affording pro se 2
litigants “some latitude in meeting the rules governing litigation,” we “normally will not[] decide 3
issues that a party fails to raise in his or her appellate brief.” Moates , 147 F.3d at 209 ; see also 4
Terry v. Inc. Village of Patchogue , 826 F.3d 63 1, 632

– 33 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Although we accord 5
filings from pro se litigants a high degree of solicitude, even a litigant representing h im self is 6
obliged to set out identifiable arguments in h is principal brief.” ( cleaned up )). And we do not 7
normally enter tain challenges to district court rulings where the “substance of the . . . ruling” is 8
mentioned only “obliquely and in passing.” Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC , 728 9
F.3d 139, 142 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013) ; see also Norton v. Sam’s Club , 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998) 10
(“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be 11
addressed on appeal.”). 12

Nowhere in her brief does Velez challenge the district court’s reasoning that dismissal was 13
appropriate because sh e failed to establish standing to sue or to provide a clear statement of her 14
claims. Rather, she simply expounds upon her broad allegations that Defendants “ were attacking 15
civil rights and liberties with legitimate lies and false claims deceiving the nati on and breaching 16
the public trust with felonious acts of deprivations of rights under the color of law.” Appellant’s 17

Br. at 6. By not arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint or in construing 18
her second amended complaint as a mo tion for leave to amend and denying it, she has waived any 19
challenge to the district court’s order on appeal. 20

We have considered all of Velez’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 21
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 22

FOR THE COURT: 23 Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 24