IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

September 19, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY J. HARRIS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County

No. 93061, 96566 Bobby R. McGee, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2016-01952-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Defendant, Anthony J. Harris, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of felony 

murder and one count of facilitation of attempted second degree murder. He received an 

effective sentence of twenty-two years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence at 

trial was insufficient to support each of his convictions, that his due process and speedy 

trial rights were violated by the timing of the superseding indictment, that the trial court 

erred by not allowing Defendant’s expert witness to testify, that the State failed to

properly preserve evidence, and that the State made improper remarks in their closing 

argument. After review, we hold that Defendant is not entitled to relief on any of his 

claims. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE 

OGLE and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Joseph A. Fanduzz, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Anthony Jay Harris.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant 

Attorney General; Charme P. Allen, District Attorney General; and Leslie Nassios, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural History

12/07/2017
- 2 -

The Knox County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, along with his co-defendant, 

Michael Olebe, with first degree premeditated murder on November 3, 2009,

1

for his role 

in the July 4, 2008 death of William Wheeler, Jr. The State filed a motion to amend the 

indictment on February 18, 2011. Subsequently, the Knox County Grand Jury filed a 

superseding indictment on February 22, 2011, that charged Defendant with first-degree 

premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of a 

kidnapping, and first-degree felony murder committed in the perpetration of a theft. On 

that same day, Defendant filed a response to the State’s motion to amend the original 

indictment, and two days later, Defendant moved for the felony murder counts to be 

stricken from the superseding indictment. The trial court never ruled on the State’s 

motion to amend the original indictment. On March 1, 2011, a judgment was entered 

dismissing Defendant’s first-degree premeditated murder charge from the original 

indictment. That same day, only one week after the filing of the superseding indictment, 

trial began. 

The testimony at trial regarding the events on July 4, 2008, was fairly consistent 

among all of the witnesses, including Syeisha Kilby, Lisa Tannehill, Laquinda Hardin, 

and Defendant, who testified on his own behalf. Thus, we will present the facts of the 

case as a single narrative up to the point that the State’s case and the defense’s case 

diverge.

On the morning of July 4, 2008, Defendant woke up to his girlfriend, Lisa 

Tannehill, telling him that Laquinda Hardin, Defendant’s first cousin, wanted Defendant 

to bring her son home. Ms. Hardin’s son had spent the night at Ms. Tannehill’s house 

after a playdate with Ms. Tannehill’s son. To take Ms. Hardin’s son home, Defendant 

drove to Alcoa, Tennessee. Upon his arrival at Ms. Hardin’s house, Defendant met 

William Wheeler, Jr., the victim, who had given Ms. Hardin a ride to her house. After 

talking for a while, Defendant and the victim went back to Defendant’s house that he 

shared with Ms. Tannehill. 

Upon returning to Defendant’s house, Defendant introduced the victim to Ms. 

Tannehill, put on some music, and offered the victim vodka, gin, and moonshine. 

According to Defendant, the victim requested some gin, and Defendant poured him a cup. 

At that point, Defendant decided to take a shower. After bathing, Defendant joined the 

victim for another drink. On top of that drink, the victim had a shot of moonshine. Some 

conversation occurred, and then the victim expressed his desire for some crack cocaine. 

Defendant and the victim left in the victim’s car to go find some crack cocaine. 

 

1

The technical record does not contain Defendant’s original indictment. However, Defendant’s 

response opposing the State’s motion to amend the indictment provides the date that the original 

indictment was entered. 
- 3 -

Defendant and the victim proceeded to the victim’s house where the victim took a 

shower and had another drink. The two men spent about thirty minutes at the victim’s 

house before they drove to an area of town known as Lonsdale in search of some crack 

cocaine. At a place called “Under the Tree,” the victim was able to get his hands on 

some crack cocaine, and Defendant met a girl that he knew from school nicknamed 

“Binky.” “Binky” joined the two men in the victim’s car, and they drove to a house that 

belonged to an acquaintance of “Binky.” At that house, “Binky” and the victim went into 

a room by themselves for about thirty minutes. When they emerged, “Binky” left the 

house to get some more crack, and Defendant observed that the victim was high. Once 

“Binky” returned, she and the victim went back into the room for about fifteen more 

minutes. “Binky” left, and Defendant went inside the room to check on the victim. The 

victim could not talk. In the words of Defendant at trial, the victim was “geeked.” 

According to Defendant, the victim wanted some more crack. However, neither of 

the men had any money. So, Defendant called Michael Olebe, nicknamed “O.D.,” and 

spoke with him on the phone. Defendant and the victim drove to Mr. Olebe’s house to 

see if Mr. Olebe would sell them some crack on credit. However, Mr. Olebe refused their 

request. In order to work out a deal, Defendant offered Mr. Olebe a pistol to hold as 

collateral until Defendant could get home and get the money. Mr. Olebe accepted this 

deal. As part of the deal, Defendant received forty dollars’ worth of powdered cocaine, 

which he split with the victim. Both men snorted the cocaine powder. Next, Mr. Olebe 

and the victim spent some time outside of Mr. Olebe’s house by themselves. Defendant 

claims that the victim asked him to hold onto the victim’s phone during the time that the 

victim and Mr. Olebe were outside. Defendant maintains that he returned the phone to 

the victim when he came back inside. All three men—Defendant, the victim, and Mr. 

Olebe—left Mr. Olebe’s house in the victim’s vehicle. 

The three men drove to an ATM. The victim’s bank records show that he made a 

transaction at approximately 3:11 p.m. on July 4, 2008. The video footage from the 

ATM shows the victim getting out of the driver’s seat of a small SUV and walking up to 

the ATM. The video also depicts a person sitting in the front passenger seat of the SUV 

with their arm sticking out of the open window, and there is a shadow in the back seat 

that makes it appear as if someone was in the back seat. According to Defendant, Mr. 

Olebe was in the passenger seat and Defendant was in the back seat. 

From the ATM, the three men travelled to Morningside Park and met a woman, 

who was later identified as Syeisha Kilby. Ms. Kilby admitted that she had been 

“drinking a lot” on July 4, 2008, having consumed approximately “six beers and some 

liquor” before speaking to Defendant, the victim, and Mr. Olebe. When the men talked 

to Ms. Kilby, she and Mr. Olebe began flirting with each other. While Mr. Olebe 

continued to speak with Ms. Kilby, Defendant and the victim shared some vodka. 
- 4 -

Eventually, Ms. Kilby joined the three men in the car and they drove from Morningside 

Park to Franklin T. Fishback’s house. 

Up to this point in the sequence of events that occurred on July 4, 2008, the facts 

presented at trial were consistent. The testimony at trial diverged when describing the 

following events. On one hand, we have the testimony of Defendant, and on the other, 

the testimony of Ms. Kilby and the other witnesses presented by the State. Additionally, 

Ms. Kilby’s testimony is not entirely consistent with that of other witnesses presented by 

the State. We set forth the testimony in turn, beginning with the testimony of the

Defendant. 

A. Defendant’s Testimony

According to Defendant, the group went to Mr. Fishback’s house because “[Ms. 

Kilby] had stated she wanted to trade sex for some crack.” Everyone was intoxicated. 

While the group was at Mr. Fishback’s house, a fight broke out between Mr. Olebe and 

the victim. Mr. Olebe pulled the victim into the back seat of the SUV. Mr. Fishback told 

them to leave. At this point, Defendant was in the driver’s seat and Ms. Kilby was in the

front passenger’s seat. The victim and Mr. Olebe were in the back seat fighting. 

Defendant described the altercation between the victim and Mr. Olebe as a simple fight, 

until “the gun goes off. . . . [Mr.] Olebe shot [the victim].” At that point, Mr. Olebe 

exclaimed, “I shot the m—f—er in the leg.” Further struggle ensued, and Defendant 

“heard another shot.” Defendant maintained that Mr. Olebe had possession of the gun the 

entire time. Then, “[Ms. Kilby] said [‘]be quiet, listen. This m—f—er’s snoring.[’] She 

said [‘]give it here. I’ll shoot the m—f—er.[’]” According to Defendant, Ms. Kilby got 

on her knees in the passenger seat and leaned between the seats. Mr. Olebe positioned 

the victim’s body and pulled the victim’s shirt up. Then, Defendant heard a third shot. 

Defendant testified that he, Mr. Olebe, and Ms. Kilby drove to Riverside to dump 

the body. On their first attempt, a car drove by. So, they circled the area, came back to 

the same place, and dumped the body of the victim. From there, they travelled to a house 

owned by Larissa Harris. While at Ms. Harris’s house, Defendant sat on the steps of the 

house while Mr. Olebe and Ms. Kilby cleaned out the victim’s vehicle. During this time, 

Defendant spoke to Derrick Harris, Ms. Harris’s brother. Mr. Olebe and Ms. Kilby got a 

gasoline can from one of Ms. Harris’s neighbors, and they drove to Quick Pantry and put 

some gasoline in the can. 

The victim’s car was then driven to a location close to Mr. Olebe’s house. Mr. 

Olebe poured gasoline on the vehicle, and Ms. Kilby lit a piece of paper and threw it 

inside the vehicle. Once the vehicle was ablaze, Defendant, Mr. Olebe, and Ms. Kilby 

walked back to Mr. Olebe’s house. At this point, the group parted ways. According to 

Defendant, Mr. Olebe went home with the gun that was used to shoot the victim.
- 5 -

Meanwhile, Defendant, with Ms. Kilby in tow, went to his ex-father-in-law’s house to 

ask for a ride. 

Later in the evening, Defendant and Ms. Kilby rejoined Mr. Olebe at Walter P. Taylor 

Homes. Mr. Olebe stayed with them for around an hour. After Mr. Olebe left, Ms. 

Tannehill picked up Defendant and Ms. Kilby and dropped off Defendant at “Gene’s 

Place.” Defendant went inside, and Ms. Kilby eventually joined him. Defendant claims 

that he got the gun back from Mr. Olebe that same night and returned it to Ms. Tannehill 

the next day. Eventually, Defendant spoke with Investigator Charles Lee and gave him 

an account of what occurred. 

B. Testimony of Syeisha Kilby

The State presented the testimony of Ms. Kilby, and her testimony recounting the 

events of July 4, 2008, crucially differs from Defendant’s. According to Ms. Kilby, 

Defendant and the victim began arguing at Mr. Fishback’s house because Defendant 

wanted to drive. Defendant and the victim started scuffling, and Defendant made him get 

in the back seat by pushing the victim as Mr. Olebe pulled the victim into the back seat. 

The victim was struggling and fighting when he kicked out a window in the car. At that 

point, Mr. Fishback came outside and told them that they could not be fighting at his 

house. So, they drove away in the car. When they left, Defendant was driving the car, 

Ms. Kilby was in the passenger seat, Mr. Olebe was in the back seat behind the 

passenger, and the victim was in the back seat in the middle. As they drove away, Mr. 

Olebe was punching the victim repeatedly and choking him. Ms. Kilby testified, “[The 

victim] was sitting up but he was in the middle and he was leaned forward and [Mr.] 

Olebe was choking him from the side.” Ms. Kilby described Mr. Olebe as having his 

back against the inside of the rear passenger door. 

Ms. Kilby recounted that, after a few turns, Defendant pulled a gun out of his 

waistband, told the victim “to shut up or he was going to kill him,” and pistol whipped 

him. Shortly thereafter, the victim was not quiet, and Defendant reached between the 

seats and shot the victim. After that, Defendant handed the gun to Mr. Olebe and another 

shot was fired. Ms. Kilby only heard two shots. According to Ms. Kilby, she never fired 

the gun. After Mr. Olebe shot the victim, he handed the gun back to Defendant. Then, 

Mr. Olebe belted the victim into the backseat behind the driver.

Ms. Kilby claims that after driving around for a while, they stopped on Riverside 

Drive and Mr. Olebe pulled the victim out of the backseat and dumped the victim’s body. 

Once the victim’s body was dumped, Ms. Kilby stated that they went to a house that

belonged to Defendant’s cousin. Ms. Kilby claimed that she sat on the steps of the house 

while Mr. Olebe and Defendant cleaned out the car. Ms. Kilby and Mr. Olebe went to a 

neighbor’s house and asked for a gas can. Defendant, Ms. Kilby, and Mr. Olebe drove to 
- 6 -

Quick Pantry and Mr. Olebe went inside and bought some gas. Ms. Kilby recounted, 

“They doused the car with gasoline and set it on fire. . . . with a match.” 

After setting the car on fire, Ms. Kilby and the two men went to a house. 

Defendant told Ms. Kilby that the house belonged to his “uncle.” At that house, 

Defendant burned and smashed the victim’s cell phone in the back yard and gave the gun 

to his “uncle,” who wrapped the gun in a towel and took it to his basement. Mr. Olebe 

never went inside the house with Defendant and Ms. Kilby. 

According to Ms. Kilby, Mr. Olebe went to his house to change his clothes and 

returned about thirty minutes later. At that point, Defendant’s “uncle” gave the group a 

ride to Walter P. Taylor Homes. After a few hours, Mr. Olebe left and gave his cellphone 

number to Ms. Kilby. He told her to do whatever Defendant told her to do or he would 

kill her. After this statement was made, Ms. Kilby never saw Mr. Olebe again. Ms. 

Kilby claims that she and Defendant went to Gene’s Place to get some crack cocaine. On 

the ride to Gene’s Place, Ms. Kilby overheard Ms. Tannehill telling Defendant that she 

was going to call the police if he did not return her gun. Defendant and Ms. Kilby left 

Gene’s Place, went to Walter P. Taylor Homes, smoked some crack cocaine, and 

continued drinking. Ms. Kilby described herself as intoxicated. At around noon the next 

day, Defendant and Ms. Kilby parted ways and never had contact again. 

Ms. Kilby testified that she spoke with Investigator Lee, told him about all of the 

events, and showed him the locations where everything occurred. At trial, Ms. Kilby 

identified Defendant as the person who first shot the victim. On cross-examination, Ms. 

Kilby was impeached with a prior inconsistent statement regarding some details of the 

story such as whether they went to an ATM, at what point she first saw the gun, and the 

color of the gun. 

C. Testimony of Other Witnesses

The State also called Mr. Fishback to testify at trial, and he had his own account of 

what happened at his house. On the day of the shooting, Defendant, Mr. Olebe, and two 

people unknown to Mr. Fishback arrived at his house. Mr. Olebe was the first person to 

exit the vehicle, and Mr. Fishback noticed Defendant and an unknown woman in the back 

seat of the car. The other person unknown to Mr. Fishback was the driver of the vehicle. 

After exiting the vehicle, Mr. Olebe approached Mr. Fishback and “pulled [Mr. Fishback] 

off to the side and said he wanted tough up or rough up or – actually he was saying in 

other words he wanted to whip somebody’s butt inside of my home.” Mr. Fishback 

refused to allow Mr. Olebe to “rough up” anyone at his house, and Mr. Fishback went 

back inside his house. Moments later, Mr. Fishback returned outside to see Mr. Olebe 

grab the man in the driver’s seat by the mouth and pull him backwards between the seats

toward the backseat of the vehicle. Mr. Fishback observed the man flipping around and 
- 7 -

thought that the man “couldn’t breathe.” The man being attacked kicked out the window 

behind the driver’s seat, and the glass fell onto Mr. Fishback’s driveway. At some point, 

Defendant got in to driver’s seat and drove off. 

Larissa Harris and her brother, Derrick Harris, provided further detail on the

events of July 4, 2008. The home at which the car was cleaned out belonged to Ms. 

Harris. On the day of the shooting, Mr. Olebe called Ms. Harris and asked if she was 

home, but she never gave Mr. Olebe permission to be on her property. Incidentally, Mr. 

Harris went by his sister’s house. When Mr. Harris arrived, he saw Mr. Olebe, whom he

had met once before, in front of the house. Mr. Olebe claimed that he was waiting on 

Ms. Harris. Mr. Harris also saw Defendant sitting on the steps at the corner of the house 

drinking a half-gallon of vodka. Mr. Harris approached Defendant and noticed that 

Defendant had his head down and was shaking his head. Mr. Harris asked, “What’s 

wrong?” In response, Defendant just shook his head and mumbled, “We just f-d 

someone up.” When Mr. Harris asked Defendant to be more specific, Defendant said, 

“We just fucked someone up.” Mr. Harris replied, “What?” Defendant repeated, “We 

just fucked someone up.” Mr. Harris questioned, “For real?” At that point, Mr. Harris 

looked toward his right and saw a woman “cleaning out a car.” Mr. Harris never spoke 

with the woman, and Mr. Olebe had already left. Mr. Harris left the house as the woman 

was cleaning out the car, and Defendant remained on the steps. Though he could not be 

sure, Mr. Harris believed that Defendant had a gun in his waistband. 

With regard to the gun that was used in the attack, the State put on testimony of 

Ms. Tannehill and a firearms examiner. Ms. Tannehill testified that, at some point, she

discovered that her gun was missing. This prompted her questioning of Defendant 

regarding the whereabouts of her gun while she drove Defendant and Ms. Kilby to 

Gene’s Place. In response to Ms. Tannehill’s inquiry, Defendant stated that her gun was 

“over at his cousin’s house.” On July 5, 2008, the gun was returned to Ms. Tannehill, but 

it later went missing again. Ms. Tannehill never recovered the gun. Ms. Tannehill 

described the gun as a gray 9 millimeter manufactured by Skyy that was purchased from 

Coal Creek Armory. 

Officer Patricia Resig, the firearms examiner with the Knoxville Police 

Department, analyzed the bullets recovered from the victim’s body and clothing. While 

she could not definitively say that the two recovered bullets were fired from the same 

gun, she did determine that the bullets were fired from a gun with rifling consisting of 

seven lands and grooves and a right hand twist. Officer Resig explained that the lands 

and grooves inside the barrel of a firearm create impressions on a bullet as it travels down 

the barrel after being fired. These impressions can be used to compare two bullets to see 

if they were fired from the same gun or to match a bullet to the gun from which it was 

fired. Through her research, she discovered that Skyy Industries manufactured a 9

millimeter pistol with seven lands and grooves and a right hand twist and that no other 
- 8 -

firearm in the Federal Bureau of Investigation database had those characteristics. 

Investigator Lee collected a handgun from Mr. Olebe’s mother after she called and told 

him that she was in possession of a handgun that she believed was missing. However, 

Investigator Lee testified that the firearm that he collected was not the firearm that fired 

the bullets recovered from the victim. 

Dr. Darinka Mileusnic-Polchan testified that one bullet was recovered from the 

victim’s body and another was recovered from the victim’s shorts. However, Dr. 

Mileusnic-Polchan concluded that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds. The wound 

that “essentially killed [the victim]” was the wound to the upper gastric region. Dr. 

Mileusnic-Polchan stated that the distance from which the gun was fired to inflict this 

wound was “less than [a] foot.” The victim also had a gunshot wound to the lumbar 

region of the back that was a “contact gunshot wound, meaning that when the shot was 

delivered the muzzle was tightly applied against the skin on the body.” The other very 

close range gunshot wound was a wound to the victim’s left leg. Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan 

could not offer an opinion on which gunshot wound was inflicted first. When asked 

about the possibility of the driver firing the shots, she responded, “Some of the wounds, I 

would say it’s possible. Some of the wounds it’s not.” Dr. Mileusnic-Polchan 

documented approximately thirty-five different blunt force trauma injuries on the victim.

Fourteen of those injuries were to the victim’s head. Multiple sharp force trauma injuries 

were noted as well, but Dr. Mileusnic-Pochan noted that the sharp force trauma injuries 

were relatively superficial. 

Defendant attempted to present expert testimony about the possibility of firing a 

gun from the driver’s seat and striking a passenger in the rear seat. The State objected to 

the introduction of this testimony. After Defendant’s offer of proof, the trial court 

excluded the testimony.

A jury convicted Defendant of facilitation of attempted second degree murder as a 

lesser-included offense of first degree murder in Count One and facilitation of felony 

murder as a lesser-included offense of felony murder in both Counts Two and Three. The 

trial court merged Counts One and Three into Count Two and imposed a total effective 

sentence of twenty-two years to be served consecutively to an unrelated federal sentence. 

Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial that was denied. Now, Defendant appeals. 

Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support 

each of his convictions, that his due process and speedy trial rights were violated by the 

timing of the superseding indictment, that the trial court erred by not allowing 

Defendant’s expert witness to testify, that the State did not properly preserve evidence, 

and that the State made improper remarks in their closing argument. The State contests 
- 9 -

each of these claims. Following out review, we hold that Defendant is not entitled to 

relief.

I. Validity of the Superseding Indictment

Defendant argues that the superseding indictment violated his right to a speedy 

trial because there was a nineteen-month delay between Defendant’s arrest and the 

superseding indictment. Defendant maintains the reason for the delay is unclear. He

claims he was prejudiced by the short length of time to prepare a defense and by losing 

around one year of jail credit on his federal sentence. Also, Defendant argues that the 

superseding indictment violated his right to due process because he was prejudiced and 

the circumstances reveal that the State was seeking a tactical advantage over Defendant. 

Further, Defendant contends that the delay in the issuance of the superseding indictment 

was through no fault of his own. The State responds by arguing that Defendant failed to 

provide an adequate record for review of this issue. We agree with the State. 

A defendant has the duty to prepare a transcript of the evidence necessary to 

convey a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the lower court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). If such a transcript is not available, a defendant “shall prepare a 

statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means . . . filed with the 

clerk of the trial court within 60 days after filing the notice of appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 

24(b). Allegations contained in pleadings and statements made by counsel during a 

hearing or the trial are not evidence, and “neither can be considered in lieu of a verbatim 

transcript or statement of the evidence and proceedings.” State v. Draper, 800 S.W.2d 

489, 493 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Accordingly, Defendant’s failure to include a 

complete record of the proceedings forming the basis of this issue results in a waiver of

any challenge to the lower court’s rulings. See State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560-61 

(Tenn. 1993) (determining appellant’s failure to provide court with complete record 

relevant to issue presented constitutes waiver of issue). In the absence of a complete 

record, “the appellate court must conclusively presume that the ruling of the trial judge 

was correct, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction, or the 

defendant received a fair and impartial trial.” Draper, 800 S.W.2d at 493. The record in 

this case does not contain a transcript or statement of the evidence presented at the 

hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment and to strike the felony murder 

counts held by the trial court on February 28, 2011. Thus, the record is inadequate for 

our review and this Court is precluded from reviewing Defendant’s claims that his rights 

to due process and a speedy trial were violated. 

Even if this Court conducted a plain error analysis, Defendant would not be 

entitled to relief because the record on appeal does not “clearly establish what occurred in 

the trial court,” the first factor in the plain error analysis. See State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 

274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000). Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
- 10 -

II. Preservation of Evidence

Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the 

indictment based upon the State’s failure to preserve the vehicle in which the shooting 

took place. According to Defendant, the vehicle could have provided exculpatory 

evidence regarding how the bullets were fired and where they struck the vehicle. The 

State argues that Defendant has not provided an adequate record for our review because 

the record does not contain a transcript of the hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

the indictment. We agree with the State. 

As set forth above, a Defendant has a duty to prepare an adequate transcript or a 

statement of the evidence, and failure to do so results in waiver of the issue. Tenn. R. 

App. P. 24(b); see also Ballard 855 S.W.2d at 560-61; Draper, 800 S.W.2d 493. The 

trial court’s minutes from February 28, 2011, indicate that Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

the indictment came to be heard and was denied. No transcript for this hearing is 

included in the record. Because Defendant has failed to include a transcript of the 

hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment, this Court is precluded from reviewing 

Defendant’s claim that the State failed to properly preserve evidence. Further, the lack of 

an adequate record also prevents Defendant’s issue from receiving plain error review 

because the record does not “clearly establish what occurred in the trial court.” See 

Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282-83. 

III. Exclusion of Expert Testimony

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by disallowing his proposed expert’s

testimony because the trial court improperly excluded the testimony based upon the trial 

court’s own opinion of the “veracity of [the expert’s] testimony rather than an application 

of the legal standards for opinion testimony.” The State argues that the trial court 

properly applied the factors found in McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 

257 (Tenn. 1997), and did not abuse its discretion. We agree with the State. 

At trial, the Defendant sought to introduce the testimony of James Parham, a civil 

engineer with experience in accident reconstruction. After the State’s objection, 

Defendant gave an offer of proof where Mr. Parham described his methodology of 

creating a model of the victim and the gunshot wounds. He stated, “My opinion is that 

the likelihood of the shot being–any of the three shots occurring from the driver’s seat is 

more probable than not a likelihood.” Then, Mr. Parham gave what appears to be a 

conflicting response only a few questions later in the cross-examination by the State 

when he stated, “Well, I can rephrase it into a more reasonable doubt. It would be very 

difficult, if not impossible, for these shots to have come from the driver’s seat.” On 

cross-examination, he admitted that he was not trained in forensic pathology, anatomic 
- 11 -

pathology, or terminal ballistics. Further, he conceded that his model was incapable of 

independent movement. Mr. Parham was unable to cite any sources to support the use of 

a model to replicate firing angles with respect to terminal ballistics, his methodology had 

not been peer reviewed, and he could not point to a specific error rate. Further, Mr. 

Parham admitted that he had never testified about bullet trajectory in a moving vehicle. 

In making its ruling on the admissibility of Mr. Parham’s testimony, the trial court 

found:

[T]here is no recognized methodology for conducting the kind of testing 

that Mr. Parham conducted. No known rate of error for this kind of 

scientific analysis. No peer review has been done of his particular 

procedures. This is not a known body of science. This was a reenactment 

prepared for litigation.

The trial court noted that “there is no way that the expert can testify that the car he used 

was in the same condition as the car that was involved in this crime.” The trial court 

added that “the dummy that’s been used is not a completely accurate copy of the victim[;]

furthermore, it’s rigid, it can’t twist, it can’t fight, it can’t struggle, it can’t move.” Based 

upon those reasons, the trial court held that Mr. Parham’s “expert opinion will not 

substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence” and that Mr. Parham’s 

expert opinion “doesn’t help the jury determine a fact in issue.” Accordingly, the trial 

court excluded Mr. Parham’s testimony. 

A trial court has broad discretion over matters regarding the qualifications, 

admissibility, relevancy, and competency of expert testimony. See McDaniel, 955 

S.W.2d at 263-64; Ballard, 855 S.W.2d at 562. A trial court’s ruling shall not be 

overturned unless the trial court abused its discretion in admitting or excluding the expert 

testimony. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d at 562. “[A]n appellate court should find an abuse of 

discretion when it appears that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, or 

reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party 

complaining.” State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn. 1997). 

Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence sets forth the requirements for the 

admissibility of opinion testimony by an expert witness:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will substantially 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
- 12 -

The expert’s opinion must be supported by trustworthy facts or data “of a type reasonably 

relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 

subject.” Tenn. R. Evid. 703. The determining factor is “whether the witness’s 

qualifications authorize him or her to give an informed opinion on the subject at issue.” 

State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 834 (Tenn. 2002). Evidence constitutes “‘scientific, 

technical, or other specialized knowledge,’ if it concerns a matter that ‘the average juror 

would not know, as a matter of course.’” State v. Murphy, 953 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 

1997) (quoting State v. Bolin, 922 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tenn. 1996)). 

In McDaniel, our supreme court adopted the following non-exclusive list of 

factors that a trial court should consider when determining the reliability of expert 

testimony: (1) whether the scientific evidence has been tested and the accompanying 

methodology with which it was tested; (2) whether the evidence has been subjected to 

peer review or publication; (3) whether the potential rate of error is known; (4) whether 

the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific community; and (5) whether the expert 

conducted the research in the field independent of litigation. 955 S.W.2d at 265. A trial 

court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure that the expert testimony meets “‘the same level of 

intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’” 

Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Kumho Tire 

Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1998)). However, the McDaniel factors are only 

relevant to the extent they are reasonable measures of testing the reliability of the 

proposed expert testimony. Id. at 277. 

In this case, it is apparent that the trial court considered the factors outlined in 

McDaniel even though the court did not mention the case by name. For the first 

McDaniel factor, the trial court found that Mr. Parham did not follow a “recognized 

methodology.” With regard to the second McDaniel factor, the trial court found that no 

peer review had been performed on the procedures conducted by Mr. Parham. Pertaining 

to the third McDaniel factor, the trial court found that there was no known error rate. On 

the fourth McDaniel factor, the trial court found that “this is not a known body of 

science.” For the final factor, the trial court found that Mr. Parham’s reenactment was 

“prepared for litigation.” The trial court properly applied McDaniel and made a finding 

with regard to each factor. Then, the trial court made a ruling in accordance with Rule 

702 when the court found that the testimony would not assist the trier of fact. It is 

obvious that the trial court applied the correct legal standard and used sound logic and 

reasoning. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

IV. Improper Remarks during Closing Argument

Defendant argues that the State made improper remarks about the credibility of 

Ms. Kilby and Defendant during closing argument that rendered his conviction 

fundamentally unfair. The State responds by contending that Defendant “waived this 
- 13 -

issue because he did not make a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor’s 

comment” and that Defendant cannot show plain error. We agree with the State. 

During closing argument, the State made statements regarding Ms. Kilby’s 

testimony. The State explained that the inconsistencies in her testimony could be 

attributed to Ms. Kilby’s use of drugs and alcohol on the day of the attack on the victim. 

The State claimed that Ms. Kilby “choked up” on some things when she talked to 

Investigator Lee, but that Ms. Kilby attempted to “clarify it later in her interview.” The 

State further argued that Ms. Kilby’s testimony was “very consistent” with that of 

Investigator Lee. The State also pointed to various reasons why the Defendant might 

have an incentive to be less than truthful in his statements to the police and during his 

testimony. The State pointed out all of the things that Defendant did not tell the police 

that were presented through the testimony of other witnesses. The State said, “[W]hen 

more than one person is involved in a crime[,] sometimes it’s a race to the police station 

to see who gets there first to get the best treatment. You know, to get the jump on their 

accomplices. And that’s exactly what was going on with him.” Later, the State argued, 

“[T]alk about inconsistences. I mean, you heard what we heard yesterday and today. 

You can discount anything this man said. His testimony is not credible.” The State 

implored the jury to “weigh their testimony and just ask yourselves who supports [Ms. 

Kilby’s] version? Who has a reason to lie?” Defendant did not object to any these 

statements.

Appellate relief is generally not available when a party has “failed to take 

whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of any 

error.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a). A defendant’s “failure to object to the State’s argument 

at trial precludes [this Court’s] review of the issue, subject to our noticing ‘plain error.’” 

State v. Derrick Dewayne Lyons, No. M2014-00178-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 475158 at 

*9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2015) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e); Tenn. R. App. 36(a); 

State v. Little, 854 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

Jun. 11, 2015). However, “[w]hen necessary to do substantial justice, an appellate court 

may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at any time, even 

though the error was not raised in the motion for a new trial or assigned as error on 

appeal.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). Each of the following five factors must be established 

by the record before plain error exists: 

(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court; (b) a 

clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c) a 

substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected; (d) the 

accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of 

the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.” 
- 14 -

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000) (adopting the test established in State 

v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). The burden is on the 

defendant to establish all five factors, and “complete consideration of all the factors is not 

necessary when it is clear from the record that at least one of the factors cannot be 

established.” Id. Furthermore, the error must be of “such a great magnitude that it 

probably changed the outcome of the trial.” Id.

In this case, there was no breach of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. While the 

scope and depth of closing argument is generally a matter within the trial court’s 

discretion, State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Tenn. 1994), the State is not free to do 

what they wish. Arguments are required to be “temperate, based upon the evidence at 

trial, relevant to the issues being tried, and not otherwise improper under the facts of the 

law.” State v. Goltz, 111 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (citing Coker v. State, 911 

S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). Although not exhaustive, this Court has 

recognized five general areas of potential prosecutorial misconduct during closing 

arguments: (1) intentionally misstating the evidence or misleading the jury as to the 

inferences it may draw; (2) expressing personal beliefs or opinions as to the truth or 

falsity of any testimony or the guilt of the defendant; (3) inflaming or attempting to 

inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury; (4) injecting issues broader than the guilt 

or innocence of the accused; and (5) arguing or referring to facts outside the record unless 

the facts are matters of common knowledge. Goltz, 111 S.W. 3d at 6. 

As mentioned above, this is a case of two competing accounts of the events that 

occurred on July 4, 2008. Naturally, a large portion of the closing arguments for both 

sides would pertain to the credibility of the witnesses. Contrary to Defendant’s 

argument, the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument, when taken in context, were 

not statements of the prosecutor’s personal beliefs or opinions about the witnesses’ 

testimony. It appears from the record that the prosecutor was using the testimony of 

other witnesses to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Kilby. Similarly, the prosecutor 

described the precarious situation that Defendant was in to show a motivation for him to 

be less than truthful. At no point did the prosecutor express a personal opinion or belief 

as to the truth or falsity of each witness’s testimony. Thus, no clear and unequivocal rule 

of law has been breached, and no further analysis is warranted. Defendant has failed to 

establish that plain error exists. 

V. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions of 

facilitation of felony murder where the underlying felony is kidnapping, facilitation of 

felony murder where the underlying felony is theft, and facilitation of attempted second 

degree murder. Specifically, Defendant argues that his convictions for felony murder 

cannot stand because there was no evidence regarding his intent to commit kidnapping or 
- 15 -

theft. Further, Defendant argues that “it is unclear how the jury found that anyone in the 

car attempted second degree murder in addition to someone else committing felony 

murder.” The State contends that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s 

convictions and that any inconsistencies in the verdicts do not affect the validity of his 

convictions. We agree with the State. 

Well-settled principles guide this Court’s review when a defendant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence. A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence and 

replaces it with a presumption of guilt. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 

1992). The burden is then shifted to the defendant on appeal to demonstrate why the 

evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 

(Tenn. 1982). The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979). On appeal, “the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” 

State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 2003). As such, this Court is precluded from 

re-weighing or reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. 

Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substitute our own 

“inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” Matthews, 

805 S.W.2d at 779. Further, questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the 

weight and value to be given to evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by such 

evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett, 

788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). “The standard of review ‘is the same whether the 

conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 

S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 

2009)).

A. Facilitation of Felony Murder

Felony murder is “[a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or 

attempt to perpetrate any . . . theft [or] kidnapping[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-202. Generally, 

facilitation of a felony requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that “the accused (a) 

knew another person was going to commit a specified felony and (b) knowingly 

furnished substantial assistance in the commission of the felony although the accused did 

not possess the requisite intent to be guilty of the felony.” State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 

945, 950-51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); see T.C.A. § 39-11-403. Specifically, facilitation 

of felony murder requires proof that:

1. One of the felonies listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) or (3) 

was committed;
- 16 -

2. The victim was killed during the commission of that offense;

3. The defendant knew that another person intended to commit the 

underlying felony, but he or she did not have the intent to promote or assist 

the commission of the offense or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the 

offense; and

4. The defendant knowingly furnished substantial assistance to that person 

in the commission of the underlying felony. 

State v. Margie Jeanette Farley, No. M2003-02826-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 366890, at 

*9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb, 16, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 27, 2005); see also

State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 719-20 (Tenn. 2001). The underlying felonies in this case 

are kidnapping and theft. T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a). Kidnapping occurs when a person 

“knowingly removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with 

the other’s liberty” under such circumstances that the other person is exposed to a 

“substantial risk of bodily injury.” T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302(a), -303(a). “A person commits 

theft of property if, with the intent to deprive the owner of property, the person 

knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective 

consent.” T.C.A. § 3914-103. 

When viewed in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at trial 

showed that Defendant pushed the victim into the back seat of the vehicle with Mr. 

Olebe’s assistance. Then, the car window was kicked out, and Mr. Olebe proceeded to 

violently beat the victim. A reasonable juror could find that the victim was kidnapped 

when Defendant and Mr. Olebe forced the victim into the back seat of the car, interfering 

with the victim’s liberty, and that the circumstances exposed the victim to substantial risk 

of bodily injury because a window was kicked out and the victim was beaten. 

Additionally, the evidence at trial showed that as the above kidnapping as was taking 

place, Defendant took over driving the vehicle. A reasonable juror could also conclude 

that Mr. Olebe and Defendant intended to deprive the victim of his vehicle when they 

forced him into the backseat, and obviously, the victim did not consent. The evidence 

also showed that the victim was killed after the group left Mr. Fishback’s house and that 

the victim was still fighting and struggling in the back seat at the point that he was shot. 

A reasonable juror could conclude that the kidnapping and theft were still in progress at 

the time that the victim was shot because he was still resisting confinement and refusing 

to consent to the taking of his property. 

With regard to the last two elements, the jury could infer that Defendant knew of a 

plan by Mr. Olebe to commit the kidnapping and theft from the circumstantial evidence

that Defendant and Mr. Olebe spoke on the phone, Defendant took the victim to Mr. 
- 17 -

Olebe’s house, Defendant pushed the victim into the back seat, Defendant took over 

driving the victim’s car, and Defendant destroyed the victim’s phone. Further, a 

reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant furnished substantial assistance by 

shoving the victim into the back of the car, driving the car, or handing Mr. Olebe the gun. 

Therefore, a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant 

was guilty of two counts of facilitation of felony murder with kidnapping and theft as the 

underlying felonies.

B. Facilitation of Attempted Second Degree Murder

The elements of facilitation listed above also apply to facilitation of attempted 

second degree murder. As applicable in this case, second degree murder is a “knowing 

killing of another[.]” T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1). 

A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability 

otherwise required for the offense:

(1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute 

an offense, if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person 

believes them to be;

(2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and 

believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the 

person’s part; or

(3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that 

would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the 

conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a 

substantial step toward the commission of the offense.

T.C.A. § 39-12-101(a). In other words, “to support a conviction for facilitation of 

attempted second degree murder . . . the evidence must establish the defendant knew the 

[gunman] intended to commit a knowing killing and substantially assisted in the 

commission of the offense.” State v. Pharez Price, No. M2002-01717-CCA-R3-CD, 

2003 WL 1868653 at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 

Oct. 13, 2003). “It is no defense to prosecution for criminal attempt that the offense 

attempted was actually committed.” T.C.A. § 39-12-101(c).

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a reasonable juror 

could credit the testimony of Ms. Kilby and find the following: Defendant told the victim 

“to shut up or he was going to kill him;” Defendant handed the gun to Mr. Olebe; and Mr. 

Olebe fired two shots which struck the victim. Defendant’s earlier statement of his intent 
- 18 -

to kill the victim could give rise to the inference in a reasonable juror’s mind that 

Defendant knew that Mr. Olebe also intended to kill the victim when Defendant handed 

him the gun. Thus, a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Defendant knew Mr. Olebe intended to knowingly kill the victim and that Defendant 

substantially assisted him by handing him the gun. The evidence is sufficient to support a 

conviction for facilitation of attempted second degree murder. 

When it comes to Defendant’s argument that “it is unclear how the jury found 

that anyone in the car attempted second-degree murder in addition to someone else 

committing felony murder,” we do not see how it is “unclear.” A reasonable juror could 

find that two distinct events took place. One event occurred when Defendant facilitated 

attempted second degree murder by handing Mr. Olebe the gun before Mr. Olebe shot the 

victim, inflicting a non-fatal wound. The victim’s eventual death does not mean that 

Defendant’s conviction for attempt cannot stand. See T.C.A. § 39-12-101(c); State v. 

Thorpe, 463 S.W.3d 851, 862 (Tenn. 2015) (stating that “[p]roof that the defendant failed 

to complete the crime is not an element of the offense of criminal attempt.”). A separate 

event occurred when Defendant facilitated felony murder by pushing the victim into the 

back seat, driving the car, and providing the gun during the commission of a theft and

kidnapping during which the victim was killed. If Defendant’s argument were 

interpreted as an argument that the verdicts were inconsistent, as the State interprets 

Defendant’s argument in their brief, we refuse to disturb jury verdicts by speculating as 

to how they were reached. See Wiggins v. State, 494 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tenn. 1973). The 

evidence is sufficient for all of Defendant’s convictions.

Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. 

____________________________________

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE