### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JA N U A RY 19, 200 6 S es sio n
P A M EL A KA Y E S M IT H v
. WI LL IA M M IC HA EL F A IR

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 161106-04 R.D . Rita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2005-00455-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 28, 2006

Th e pa rt ie s w e re div or c e d in Oc tob e r of 19 99

. Th e fi na l de c re e of div or c e inc or

po rate d th e pa

rt ie s’ marital dissolution agr eeme nt which provided a formula f or establishing the fathe r’s child support obligation. The fathe r subs eq u en t l y fi led a pe tition t o modify his child support obligation, which culminated in the entry

of a c onsent order

incorporating a

perma n en t p ar enting plan utiliz ing essential l y

t h e s am e f

o rm u l a f o r e s t ab l i s h i n g t h e f

at h er ’s ch i l d s u p p o rt o b l i gat i o n fo u n d i n t h e m arital dis so lut iona g re e me nt. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, fathe r re ta ine d ne w co un se l a ndfi le d a no the r p e tit ionto mod if y his c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n s e e kin g t o ha ve it s e t a t $2 ,1 00 a mon th p ur su a nt t o th e c hil d support g uidelines. I n response , the mother filed a motion to dismiss the petition for, among other
rea sons, failure to state a cla im upon whic h re l i ef could be g rante d. At a hea ring on the mother’s motion, the father pr esente d sever al ex h i b i t s whi ch we re c onsidered by the trial court, thereby
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summ ary judgme nt. The trial court dismissed the fathe r’s pe tition for, among other re asons, fa ilure to state a c laim for which r elief c ould be g rante d. The father timely

filed an a ppeal to this Court. On appea l, the mother re quests her attorney ’s fe es inc ur re d in de fe nd ing thi s app e a l. We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on , a ndwe re ma ndthi s c a se to the tr ia l c ou rt

fo r the e ntry

of a n o rd e r a wa

rd ing the mothe r h e r r e a so na ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Mitchell D. Moskovitz , Adam N. Cohen, Me mphis, TN, for Appe llant

J ohn C. Ry land, Memphis, TN, for Appellee-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

On Octobe r 13, 1999, t he C ircuit Court of Shelby Countyenter ed a F inal Dec ree of Divorc e g ranting Pamela Kay e Smith (“Mother” or “A ppellee” ) an absolute divorce from Willi am Michae l Fa ir (“F ather ” or “Appe llant”). The decr ee inc orporated a Ma rital Dissolution Agre ement (“ MDA”) executed by

the parties. The MDA pr ovided that Mother would r etain custody of the pa rties’ minor daug hter, and Father would rec eive visitation. Pursuant to the MDA, Father was to pay child support
a s f oll ow s:
4. CH IL D SUPPO RT. Com me nc ing on the fi rs t day of the fi rs t month following the ex ecution of this Marital Dissolution Ag ree ment, [Father] s h al l pay to [ Mother] in child support the sum of $1 ,5 00

. [F a the r] sha ll pa y to [M oth e r], a s a dd iti on a l c hil d s up po rt , on or befor e F ebrua

ry 1 of ea ch y ear

an amount equa l to 21% of the amount by

which [Fathe r’s] net income (a s defined by the Tenne ssee Child S upport Guidelines) ha s exceede d $85,714.28 durin g the prec eding y ear . At such time, [Father ] agr ees to furnish to [ Mother] all of hi s calc ulations for dete rmination of his excess child support ob lig a tio n, inc lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to , W- 2' s, K- 1' s, 10 99 ' s a s w e ll as all docume nts and other e vidence of income rec eived by [Father] during such y ear

. . . . The pa rties ac knowledg e that no action by the parties will be eff ective to r educe child support afte r the date o f each pa y ment and the yu n d e r s t a n d t h a tc o u r tap p r o v a l m u s tb e o b t a i n e d b e f o r e c h i ld support can be reduc ed or pr orate d unless such payments are
auto ma ti cal ly re du c e d o r t e rm inate d u nd e r the te rm s o f this
a g re e me nt.

I n the final decre e, the circ uit court determined that the MDA adequately and suff iciently provided for the support of the parties’ minor daug hter.

On F e br ua ry 1, 20 01 , M oth e r f

ile d a pe tit ion fo r c on te mpt a g a ins t F a the r i n th e c ir c uit c ou rt

. There in, Mother alleged t h at Father failed to comply with para g raph f

our (4) of the MDA by

not paying c hild support on the date spec ified there in, failed to pay additional chi l d support for 1999, and failed to provide Mother w ith documentation to support Fathe r’s c alculation of his child support obligation. Further , Mother soug ht to modify , among other thing s, certain provisions in the MDA g overning Father’s visitation and his obligation to provide health insuranc e for their daughte r. Afte r a ns we ri ng Mothe r’ s p e tit ion , F a the r f ile d h is o wn pe tit iona g a ins t Mo the r s e e kin g to h oldhe r i n-3-

contempt and to modify

the final decr ee. Re g arding his child support obligation, F ather ’s petition stated:

As draf ted, the fina l decr ee of divorce require s [Father] to pay an unlimited amount of child support, as it is simpl y 21% of [F a th e r ’ s ] in c o me r e g ar d le s s o f h o w mu c h [F a th e r ] e ar n s

. [F a th e r ], there fore , may

be re quired to pay

a g reater a mount of chi l d support than is c on te mpl a te d by

the Gu ide lin e s. Th is, the re fo re , w ou ld r e su lt in a wi nd fa ll t o [Mot her] as any a mou nt i n e xce ss o f w hat is
ne c e s s ar y f

o r th e b e n e f

it o f th e c h il d is r e a ll y a li mo n y u sed for the b e n e f it o f [M o th e r ].

On Octobe r 17, 2001, the c ircuit court enter ed a consent order modify ing the Final Dec ree of Divorc e and dismiss ing the parties’ respe ctive petitions for contempt with pr ejudice. The order provided that
c e rt a in p ara g ra

ph s o f the MD A r e g ard ing the su pp ort a nd pa re nti ng of the pa

rt ie s’ daug hte r w e re to be dele ted. I n their place , the parties ag ree d to substitute the terms of a Permane nt Parenting Plan, which the c ircuit court incor porate d into the consent orde r. Reg arding Father’s c h ild support obligation, the Perma nent Pare nting Plan provide d as fo llo ws :
1.2.1 CHI L D SUPPOR T PER TENNESSEE CHI L D SUPPOR T

GUIDEL INES Father shall pay

chi ld support, in accor dance with the Ten n es see Child Support Guidelines, in the amount of $1,500 per month . . . .

1. 2. 2 Othe r C hil d Su pp ort: In a dd iti on to the c hil d sup po rt se t f orth in Section 1.2.1, Fathe r shall pay to Mother ea ch y ear , as additional child support, an amount equa l to 21% o f t h e amount by which Father’s ne t income (a s defined by the Tenne ssee Child Support Guidelines) ha s exceede d $85,714.28 during the pre ceding y ear

. . . . I n the eve nt the parties c annot re ach an ag ree ment on the amount of additional child support owed, e ither party shall have the rig ht to have the court addre ss the issue.

On J uly 17, 2003, afte r re taining ne w counse l, Fathe r filed a Petition t o M o d i fy Fi n al Dec ree of Divorce to Establish S et Amount Of Child Support in t he cir cuit court. There in, F ather alleg ed the fo l l o wi n g:
2. Pur su a nt t o th e [Perma ne nt P are nti ng Pla n], F a the r w a s

order ed to pay child support direc tly to Mother in the amount of $1, 5 0 0 p er month. Father was a lso require d to pay to Mother, as-4- additional ch i ld support, an amount equa l to 21% of the amount by wh ic h F a the r’ s n e t in c ome (a s d e fine d b y the Te nn e sse e Chi ld Support Guidelines) has e x cee ded $85,714.28 during the pre ceding y ear

. 3. Father a lleg es that this Honorable Court should establish a set amount of child support that Father should pay to Mother. . . . Father contends that he should curr ently pay set child support in the amount of $2,100 base d on his inc ome in 2002, and due to this amount being in full compliance w ith the Guidelines, Father should not be re quired to p a y a n a dd iti on a l tw e nty -o ne (2 1% ) pe rc e nt a bo ve sa id amou nt t o Mother.

I n response , Mother filed a motion seeking to ha ve Father’s petition dismissed by arg uing that it was barr ed by the doctrine of res judicata, the parties’ ag ree ment reg arding child support was c ontrac tual in nature a nd not subject to modification, and t h e p et i t i o n failed to state a claim for which re lief could be g rante d.

At one o f th e n u me r o u s h e ar in g s o n M o th e r ’ s mo ti o n to d is mi s s th e p e ti ti o n , c o u n s el for F a the r p re se nte d th e c ir c uit c ou rt wi th s e ve ra l e xhibi ts t o c on sid e r. I n Se pte mbe r o f 2 00 4, the c ir c uit court sent a

letter to the pa

rties in dicating its int ention to gr ant Mother’ s motion t o dismiss . On November 16, 2004, Father filed a motion see king to a lter or a mend the trial c ourt’s ruling . The trial court he ard f

urther a rg ument from the parties on J anuary 11 and 13, 2005. On January 13, 2005, the circ uit court enter ed an or der g ranting Mother’s moti on to dismi ss Fathe r’s pe tition for the fo llo wi ng re a so ns : ( 1) the pe tit ionfaile d to state a c la im u po n w hic h r e lie f c ou ld b e g rante d b e c aus e it f a ile d to a lle g e a ny

sig nif ic a nt v ari a nc e or

oth e r reco gniz e d g ro un d f or mod if ic a tio n o f c hil d support; (2) the doc trine of r es judicata barr ed F ather

from proc eeding on his pe tition bec ause the relief reque sted there in constituted the same relief requested by Father in his earlier petition, which the trial court dismi ssed with prejudice pursuant to a c onsent order ; and (3) F ather ’s petition sought retroa ctive modification of child suppor t i n v i olation of section 36-5- 101(a) (5) of the Tenne ssee Code. On January

21, 2005, the circ uit court enter ed an or der de ny ing F ather ’s motion to alter or amend the c ourt’s judg ment. Father timely filed a notice of appe al to this Court.
On appe al, Father a sks this C ourt to determine w hether the trial court erre d by

g ranting Mother’s motion to dismi ss his pe tition. Mother asks this Court t o asce rtain whe ther she is e ntitled to her attorney ’s fe es and litig ation expenses incurre d in defe nding this appea l. For the rea sons set forth more fully

here in, we af

firm the ac tion of the circ uit court in dismis sin g Father’s pe tition. Moreove r, we g rant Mother ’s re quest for attorney ’s fe es i n cu rr ed i n defe nding this appe al and
re ma ndthe c a se to the tr ia l c ou rt fo r the e ntry

of a n o rd e r t o th a t e ff

e c t.-5- II. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
As one of th e j u stifications for dismissing F ather ’s petition in this case , Mother alleg ed, pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 12.02(6) , that the petition failed to state a claim upon which re lief could be g rante d. A Rule 12.02(6) motion “a dmits t he truth of all releva nt and material
averments contained in the complaint, but a sserts that such fa cts do not constitute a cause of a ction.” Stein v. Davidson Hot el Co. , 945 S.W .2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997) . As such, “ma t t er s outside the pleading s should not be considere d in de ciding whether to g rant the motion.” T r a u -Med of Am ., Inc. v. Allstat e Ins. Co. , 71 S.W .3d 691, 696 (Tenn. 2002). When revie wing a trial court’s g rant of a def endant’ s motion t o dismiss , “we take all alleg ations of fact in the plaintiff’s c omplaint as true,
a ndre vie w the low e r c ou rt s’ le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness.” Ste in , 945 S.W .2d at 716.

At one of the hearings he ld by the trial court to address Mother ’s motion to dis miss, counsel for F ather prese nted the court with severa l exhi bits to consider i n rea ching a dec ision. I nstead of excluding these items, the trial court had them marke d as exhibit s. I n the orde r g ranting Mother’s mot ion , th e tr ia l c ou rt did state that F a the r’ s pe tit ion faile d to state a c la im u po n w hic h r e lie f c ou ld be g rante d, sig na lin g that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t con sid e r an ythi ng oth e r tha n the pa rt ie s’ ple a din g s. Whi le no t ex press ly

re fe re nc ing the e xhibi ts, the tr ia l c ou rt did , h ow e ve r, state that it re a c he d it s decision based upon “the entire rec ord in this cause .” We do not f ind the se exhibi ts any wher e in the
re c or d b e fo re thi s Co urt. T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e du re 12 .0 2 p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

I f, o n a mo ti o n a s s e r ti n g th e d e f e n s e n u mb e r e d ( 6 ) to d is miss for failure to state a c laim upon which re lie f can be g rante d, matters
ou tsi de the ple a din g are pr e se nte d to a ndno t e xclu de d b y the c ou rt , the mot i o n s h all be tre ated a s one for summary

judgme nt and disp o s e d o f

a s p r o v id e d inRu le5 6 , a n d a ll p ar ti e s s h a ll b e g iv en rea sonable opportunity to prese nt all materia l made pertinent to such a motion by

Rule 56.

T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 12.02 (2005). As we have pr eviously stated,
[t ]rial co u rts have disc retion to ac cept or exclude matters bey ond the pleading s, Fe dera l Pra ctice and Procedur e, su pr a , § 1366, at 491, and may preve nt a conversion from taking plac e by declining to c on sid e r e xtra ne ou s matte rs . 2 A Ja me s W. M oo re & Jo D. Luc a s, Moore’ s Federal Prac t i ce P 12.09[ 3], at 12-107 (2d ed. 1994) (“Moor e’s F eder al Prac tice”)

. They must, howeve r, conve rt a Te nn. R. Civ. P . 12.02(6) motion to dismi ss to a motion for summary judgme nt if they do not exclude the extraneous evidenc e. Hixson v. Stickley , 4 93 S.W. 2d47 1, 47 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 3) ; D.T. M cCall & Sons v. Seagrave s , 796 S.W .2d 457, 459-60 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1990).-6-

Pac. E. Corp. v. Golf Life Holdin g Co. , 902 S.W .2d 946, 952 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

S i n ce t h e trial court did not ex clude the e x hibits but had them mar ked as e x hibits for the court’s c onsideration in ruling on Mother’s motion to dismi ss, Mothe r’s mot ion to dism iss was
converted into a motion for summary judgme nt. We review a trial court’ s g ran t of summary judgme nt to a party

under the following standard of revie w:
The stan d ar d o f review for a trial c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt is de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. See G uy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. , 79 S.W. 3d 52 8, 53 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; Car v e ll v. Bottoms , 9 00 S.W. 2d23 , 2 6 (T e nn

. 19 95 ). Sum mary jud g me nt i s app ropria te wh e re “ the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, a ns we rs to int e rr og a torie s, a nd admissi on s o n f ile , to g e the r w ith the a ff

ida vit s, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving pa

rty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la w.” T e n n

. R

. C i v

. P

. 56 .0 4; Byr d v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993). The pa

rty seeking summary

judgme nt has the burde n of persua ding the court that its mot ion satisfies these re quirements. See By rd , 8 47 S.W. 2da t 21 1; D o wn e n v
. A ll s ta te I n s
. Co. , 8 1 1 S

. W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991) . When considering a summary judgme nt mot ion , co urts mus t vie w the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the nonmoving pa

rty and must draw a ll reasona ble infer ence s in that party ’s fa vor. See G uy , 79 S. W.3 d at 53 4; By rd , 847 S.W .2d at 215. Sum mary jud g me nt sh ou ld the re fo re be g rante d on ly wh e n th e fa c ts
a ndc on c lus ion s to be dr a wn fr om the fa c ts p e rm it a re a so na ble p er s o n to rea ch but one c onclusion. See G uy , 7 9 S. W. 3 d at 534; Car v e ll , 900 S.W .2d at 26.

Go df re y v . Rui z , 90 S.W .3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)

.
III
. A N A L Y SIS On appe al, Father a

rg ues that, despite the title of his peti t i o n , h e “w as ac tually seeking
c lari fi c a tio n of the pa

rt ie s’ writt e n ag re e me nt, a s opp os e d to a modif ic a tio n of s up po rt .” He a tte mpt s to convince this Court that his petition is actually a petition for a

decla ratory judgme nt seeking an interpre tation of the parties’ Permane nt Parenting Plan. Reg arding this contention, Fathe r ar g ues that a g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t e xists a s to wh e the r the pa rt ie s, wh en agree ing to the c hil d support provisions in the Permanent Pare nting Plan, intended f or F ather to pay more child support than re quired by

the Child S upport Guidelines. We find F ather ’s ar g u ment in this reg ard to be wi tho ut m e ri t.-7-

Father wa s entitled to insti tute a dec laratory judgme nt a ction to ha ve the trial court inter pret the Permane nt Parenting Plan and dec lare his rights ther eunder

. See T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 29-14-103 (2 00 0 & Sup p. 20 05 ); Pylant v. Spivey , 174 S.W .3d 143, 147 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In acc ordanc e with our prac tice of c onstruing c omplaints li bera lly in favor of

a plaintiff, Winc he ste r v. L itt le , 996 S.W .2d 818, 822 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), we have st ated that a petiti on, no matter how poorly draf ted, should not be summarily dismiss ed if a cause of action can be g leane d from it s contents, Dobbs v. Guenther , 846 S.W .2d 270, 273 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). A s we ha ve pre viouslyexplained,

[t]he ple a din g s r e qu ir e d b y theTe nn e ssee Ru le s o f C ivi l Procedur e provide the vehicle for identifying and ref ining the matters
a t is su e in a la ws uit

. Th e y pr ov ide the pa rt ie s a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt

wi th notice of the claims and d ef en s es involved in the ca se. Poster v. An dre ws , 18 2 T e nn . 6 71 , 6 77 , 1 89 S.W. 2d58 0, 58 2 ( 19 43 ); Ha mm e tt v. Vogue , Inc. , 179 Tenn. 28 4 , 290, 165 S.W .2d 577, 579 (1942). Th us , e ve n und e r tod a y ’s re la xedru le s o f p le a din g , it is n e c e ssa

ry to include e n o u gh fac ts in a complaint to articulate a claim for r elief. J as pe r Eng ine & Tra ns mi ssi on Ex c ha ng e v . Mill s , 911 S.W .2d 719, 720 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Th e failu re to as se rt a c la im or de fe ns e in a time ly ma nn e r i s de e me d a waive r of the ri g ht to re ly on the c la im or de fe ns e la te r in the proc eeding

. Ca s te ll i v

. Lien , 910 S.W. 2d42 0, 42 9 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1995). Thus, unless the unpled claim has bee n tried by consent in the trial court, it cannot provide a basis for a judgme nt in favor of the claimant. Fidelity-Phe nix Fire Ins. Co. v. J ackson , 181 Tenn. 45 3, 46 3, 18 1 S. W.2 d 6 25 , 6 29 (1 94 4) ; Roddy v . Volunteer Me d. Clin ic , Inc ., 92 6 S. W.2 d 5 72 , 5 76 -7 7 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) ; John J. Heirigs Constr. C o. v. Ex ide Corp. , 7 09 S.W. 2d60 4, 60 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 6 )

. Si mi la

r ly , a n u n p le d c laim

c a n n o t b e a s s e r te d f

o r the first time on appea l. Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Cr ed i t Union , 810 S.W. 2d14 7, 15 3 (Ten n. 19 91 ); Davis v. Tenne ssee De p’t of Employme nt Sec. , 2 3 S. W.3 d 3 04 , 31 0 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 99 ); Cob ble v. Mc Camey , 790 S.W .2d 279, 283 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). The c ourts should avoid construing pleading s in any artificia lly

technica l sense. Thus, they should g ive the lang uag e of a pleading its fair and natural construc tion, Farmers State B a n k v. Jones , 34 Tenn. App. 57, 69, 232 S.W .2d 658, 663 (1950), a nd they sh ou ld g ive e ff

e c t to the su bs ta nc e of a ple a din g rathe r tha n it s f orm. Fann v. City of Fairview , 905 S.W .2d 167, 175 n.14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 94 ); Brown v

. City of Manc hester , 722 S.W. 2d 39 4, 39 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 86 ). Ho we ve r, the c ou rt s mu st s top sh ort of re a din g a c la im into a pleading wher e none e x ists. Donaldso n v. Donaldson , 557 S.W. 2d60 , 6 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; Rampy v. ICI Acry lics, Inc. , 898 S.W .2d 196, 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).-8-

Rawli ngs v . John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 78 S.W.3 d 291 , 300 (T e nn . Ct. App . 2 00 1) (f oo tno te omitted).

Father e ntitled his petit ion as a petiti on to modify his child support obligation, and he stated there in that he should only have to pay $ 2 ,100.00 in child support pursuant to the Child S upport Gu ide lin e s. No thi ng mor e is a lle g e d. No wh e re in the pe tit ion do we fi nda ny re fe re nc e to a

dis pu te over the meaning of a provision in the Permane nt Par enting Plan, nor does the petition r equest the tr ia l c ou rt to i nte rp re t th e Pe rm a ne nt P are nti ng Plan a nd de c lare F a the r’ s ri g hts the re un de r. Whil e Father c erta inly

had the means at his disposal to amend his pleading by way of Tenne ssee Rule of Civ il Pr oc e du re 15 .0 1, we fi ndno su c h moti on in the re c or d be fo re thi s Court. I n fa c t, w he n c e rt a in defic iencies in F ather ’s pleading wer e mentioned by Mothe r’ s co u n s el at a he aring on Father’s motion to alter or a mend the trial c ourt’s judg ment, Father’s c ounsel ref ere nced the possibili ty

of
a me nd ing the pe titionun de r Rule 15 , b ut s ta te d “ I do n’ t th ink I ne e d to, but I ’m he ari ng fr om this order being enter ed that I

may .” Although we construe pleading s liberally , it is not the function of this Court to c reate a claim wher e none e x ists. See Rawlin gs , 78 S. W.3 d at 30 0; Dobbs , 846 S.W .2d at 273. A c c o r d in g ly , w e mu s t f in d th a t F a th e r ’ s p e ti ti o n d idn o t c o n tain a d e c la r a to r y judgme nt
cause of ac tion.

Father arg ues that, even if we decline to f ind that the petition c ontained a d eclaratory judgme nt cause of ac tion, we should nevertheless find that the issue wa s tried by consent of the parties. “ When issues not raised by the pleading s are tried by ex p re s s o r implied consent of the p arties, they

shall be treated in all respe cts as if they had bee n raised in the ple ading s.” T EN N

. R. C IV

. P. 15.02 (2005). I t is true, as Father point s out, that Father’s me morandum of law in support of his petition refe renc ed the pa rt i es’ disagr eeme nt over the la ng uag e in the Perma nent Pare nting Plan. Mother re sponded by filing h er own memorandum of la w attempting to refute Father’s interpre tation of the child support provisions. During the numerous he aring s to address Mother ’s motion to di smiss, counsel for the pa rties re fer ence d the interpre tation of the Permane nt Parenting Plan.

Father, however, has overlooke d a crucial aspect of the procedura l rule allowing the trial of iss ue s by c on se nt. “ Ge ne ra lly sp e akin g , tr ia l by imp lie d c on se nt wi ll be fo un d wh e re the p art y opposed t o the amendme nt [ knew] or should rea sonably have know n of the evide nce relating to the
ne w i ssu e , d id n ot o bje c t to thi s evide nce , and wa s not prejudiced the reby .” Za c k Che e k Bui lde rs, In c. v. M cL eod , 5 97 S.W. 2d88 8, 89 0 ( Te nn . 1 98 0) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o Chi lds v . Ro ane Coun ty B d. of Educ. , 9 29 S.W. 2d36 4, 36 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) . T he c a se s c ite d b y F a the r i n support of his c ontention that this issue was tried by consent dealt with the introduction of evidenc e in the court be low. See , e.g. , Kensin ger v. Conlee , No. 02A01-9811-CV- 00322, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXI S 525, at *20 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p

. J u ly 30, 1999) (f

inding that the pa

rties tried a

decla ratory judgme nt action conc erning a marital dissolut ion ag ree ment by consent whe re the court e ntertaine d t es t i m o n y fr o mn u m er o u s wi t n es s es ). T h e o n l y ev i d en ce p re s en t ed b y Fa t h erd u ri n g t h e p ro ce ed i n gs below came in the form of exhibi ts, w hich are not inc luded in the rec ord filed on appea l. Moreover , we c annot subscribe to Fathe r’s c ontention that the vari o u s m emora nda and the statements of the lawy ers at the hearings r ender the issue tried by

consent of the parties. “Alleg ations in ple ading s are-9-

not, of course , eviden ce of the fa cts ave rre d,” Hillh aven Corp. v. State ex rel. Manor Care, Inc. , 56 5 S.W.2 d 210 , 212 (T e nn . 1 97 8) , a nd“ me re state me nts of c ou ns e l are no t e vid e nc e or a su bs titute for testimony ,” Me tro . Gov ’t of Na shv ill e & D av ids on Co . v . Sha c kle tt , 554 S. W.2d 601, 605 (Tenn. 1977). Thus, we have no evidenc e in the rec ord befor e this Court to indi cate that the parties tried a dec laratory

judgme nt action by

consent. As such, we cannot a llow Fathe r to assert his declaratory judgme nt claim for the f

irst time on appeal. See Rawlin gs , 78 S.W .3d at 300.

We n ow turn to the pr op ri e ty of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s deci sion t o d ism iss F a the r’ s p e tit ionto mod if y his c hil d s up po rt

ob lig atio n, wh ic h w e mus t r e view as a g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt t o Mother. The trial court c oncluded that F ather ’s petition should be dismis sed bec ause, among othe r thi ng s, he faile d to a lle g e a ny sig nif ic a nt v ari a nc e or oth e r re c og nize d g ro un d for mod if ic a tio n of h is
c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n. On app eal , Mo the r c on te nd s th a t F a the r’ s c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n is contra ctual in nature and is , there fore , not subject t o modification. Even a ssuming, for purposes of this appea l, that Father is not prec luded by the doctrine of res judicata f rom seeking a modification and that the entire child support obligation is subject to modific ation, it wa s appropriate for the trial court to g rant summary

judgme nt to the Mother.

I n h is p e tit ion , F a the r m e re ly re qu e ste d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt se t a de fi nit e a mou nt o f c hil d support owed to M o t h er in the amount of $2,100 pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. The statut e in e ff

e c t w he n th is c a se wa s trie d b e low pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:

I n case s involving child support, upon application of e ither party , the court s h al l decr ee an incre ase or decr ease of such a llowance when the re is f ou ndto b e a

sig nif ic a nt v ari a nc e , a s d e fi ne d inthe c hil d support g uidelines established b ysubsection (e ), betwe en the g uidelines and the amount of support curr ently order ed . . . .

T EN N

. C ODE A NN . § 36-5-101( a)( 1) (Supp. 2000). “ The pa rty seeking the modification bea rs the burden of showing the nec essary signific ant variance .” Eat he rly v . Ea the rly , No. M2000-00886- COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 323, at *10 (Tenn. Ct

. Ap p . May 4, 2001) (no pe rm. app. filed). Thus, we have pr eviously stated:
An obligor

pare nt may

reque st a prospective modification of his or her chil d support at any time. To obtain a modification, the pare nt must prove (1) the amount of his or her curr ent net income and (2) the e x istence of

a “sig nificant va

rianc e” be tween his or he r cur rent child support obligation and the obligation that would be require d by the C hild Support Guidelines based on his or her curr ent income. F or the purpose of

child support, a “significant varia nce” is “at lea st 15% if the cur rent support is one hundred dollars ($ 100.00) or g reater pe r mon th anda t le a st f

if te e n d oll ars ($ 15 .0 0) if

the c ur re nt s up po rt

is less than one hundr ed dollars ( $ 100.0 0 ) p er month.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. r. 1240-2-4- .02(3). B eca use the Child Support Guidelines-10- calc ulate child support oblig ations based on the obligor pare nt’s net income and the number of c hil d re n t o be supported, a signific ant varia nce may

arise e ither fr om a cha ng e in the numbe r of childre n entit l ed to support or by

a chang e in the oblig or par ent’s income. Child support controver s ie s most often involve disputes reg arding the obligor pare nt’s income. Once an oblig or par en t m ak es out a prima f acie case for modify ing his or he r child support, the burden shifts to the c ustodial pare nt to prove that the requested modification is not war rante d by th e g u id e li n es. See E

ath e rly v . E

ath e rly , 2 0 0 1 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 32 3, 20 01 WL

46 86 65 , at *1 1 ( ho ldi ng that th e bu rd e n o f p ro of to establish willful and voluntary undere mploy ment is on the custodial spo u s e )

. I f

th e c u s to d ia l p ar e n t f

a il s to r e b u t th e o b li g o r

p ar e n t’ s pr ima f a c i e c a s e , t h e c o u r tm u s tm o d i f y t h e o b l i g o r

p ar e n t ’ s c hil d support obligation. A custodial pare nt may rebut a n obligor

pare nt’s prima fa c ie c a se by

pr ov ing : ( 1) that mo re c hildren are e nti tle d to support than claimed by the obl igor pare nt, (2) that the obligor pare nt did not acc urate ly report a ll of his or her income , (3) that the oblig or pare nt is willfullyand voluntarily unemploy ed or unde remploy ed, (4) that the obl igor pare nt owns valuable assets or re source s that warr ant deviating from the g uidelines, or (5) any other circumstances delineate d in Tenn. C omp. R. & Reg s. r. 1240-2-4- .04 (1997) that
wa rr a nt d e viatio n f

ro m th e g uid e lin e s.
Chor os t v . Cho ro st , No. M2000-00251-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 441, at *18–20 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2003) (footnotes omitted) (no pe rm. app. filed)

. When r eviewing a trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt to a party , we a re mindful of the fo l l o wi n g:
When th e pa rty se e kin g su mma

ry jud g me nt m ake s a

pr op e rl y su pp orte d mo tio n, the bu rd e n th e n s hif ts t o th e no nmo vin g pa

rt y to set forth spec ific fa cts, not leg al conc lusions, by using a ffidavits or the discovery

materia ls li sted in Rule 56.03, establishing that ther e ar e indeed, mate rial fact s creating a g enuine issue that ne eds to be
r e s o l v e d b y t h e tr i e r

o f f a c ta n d t h a ta

tr i a l i s t h e r e f

o r e n e c e s s ar y. By rd v . Ha ll , 8 4 7 S

. W

. 2 d 2 0 8 , 2 1 5 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ). Du ri n g t h e c o u rs e o f t h e n u m er o u s h ea ri n gs conducte d on Mother’s moti on to dismiss Father’s pe tition t o modify his child support obligation, we f ind no evidence specific ally desig ned to create a genuine issue of m aterial fac t as to whethe r a signific ant variance exis ted in this case. Se e T ur ne rv . T ur ne r , 91 9 S. W.2 d 3 40 , 3 45 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1995) (noting our i nability to determine whether a si g nificant variance exis ted due to the lack of a ny e vid e nc e in the re c or d to c on du c t su c h a n a na ly sis ). As pr e vio us ly no te d, F a the r c a nn ot r e lyT he tr a n sc rip t o f t he heari ng s uggest s t hat t hese exhi b i t s i ncl ud ed Father ’ s cal cul at i o n of hi s chi l d s up p o rt 1

o b liga tio n , M o the r’s c a lc u la tio n o f F a the r’s c h ild su p p o rt o b liga tio n , an d a c o p y o f F a the r’s 2 0 0 2 inc o m e tax re tur n

. W e are co gni zant o f t he f act t hat , when a t ri al co urt co nvert s a m o t i o n t o dis m i ss i nt o a m o t i o n fo r s um m ary ju d g m e n t b y vir tue o f e n te rta inin g m a te ria ls o u tsid e th e p le a d ing s, “ a ll p a rtie s sh a ll b e g ive n r e a so n a b le o p p o rtu n ity to pres ent al l mat eri al made per t i nen t t o s uch a mot i on by Rul e 56. ” T E NN

. R. C IV

. P . 1 2 .0 2 (2 0 0 5 ); s ee als o T eas t er v. T en n . D ep ’t o

f C o rr. , N o. 01A01- 9608- CH

- 00358, 1998 T en n

. App. LEX I S 256, a t * 8–9 (T enn. C t

. A pp. Apr

. 24, 19 98 )

. Af

t er t he hea r i ng at whi ch t hes e exh i bi t s wer e i nt r od uce d, s eve r al mo r e hea r i ng s on M ot her ’ s mo t i on fol l owed gi vi ng Father t he o p p o rt uni t y to p res ent a d d i t i o nal e vi d ence t o c reat e a genui ne i ss ue o f m at eri al f act

. O n ap p eal , Father , by ar gu i ng al t er nat i ve s t andar ds of r evi ew, r eadi l y conc edes t hat t he i nt r od uct i on of t he exh i bi t s qui t e poss i bl y conv er t ed M ot h er ’ s mot i on t o di s mi s s i n t o a m ot i on f or s u mmar y ju dg men t

. M or eov er , Fat h er ’ s c ou n s el s ou g h t t h e i n t r odu ct i on
o f t he ex hib i t s at t he he aring , an d we p resu m e that his co un sel wa s aw are o f the p ro ce d ura l e f

fec t o f his ac t i o ns. T hu s, Fat her ca nn ot ar gu e t hat he di d n ot hav e s uf f i ci ent opp ort un i t y t o pres ent addi t i onal ev i dence or t hat he was un awar e t hat M o t he r’ s m o t i o n w as c o nv erted t o a m o t i o n for su m m ary jud gm en t b y i ntro d uc t i o n o f t he ex hib i t s.

T hi s p rovis i o n of t he M D A was not ab rogated b y t he t ri al co urt ’ s ent ry of t he co nsent ord er i m p l em ent i ng t he 2
P e rm a n e n t P a re n ting P la n

. -11- on the exhibit s introduced at one of the hearings as evidenc e of the exis tence of a sig nificant va rianc e in this case since these e x hibits are not in the re cord be fore this Court. I n the abse nce of such 1 evidenc e, we must presume that the e vidence did not create a g enuine issue of materia l fac t making summary judgme nt inappropriate in this case. See Parchman v. Parchm an , No. W2003-01204- COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 768, at *7–8 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2004) (no pe rm. app. fi le d) ; She rro d v . W

ix , 8 49 S.W. 2d780, 78 3 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; McDonald v. Onoh , 772 S.W. 2d91 3, 91 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 9) ; Thr e ad gil l v . T hre ad gil l , 74 0 S. W.2 d 4 19 , 4 26 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 87 ). We h oldthat, e ve n if F a the r’s pet iti on wa s n ot b arr e d b y the do c tr ine of

re s ju dic a ta and that his entire c hild support obligation was subjec t to modification, he failed to cre ate a g enuine issue o f m aterial fac t as to whether a sig nificant va

rianc e existed in thi s case . Acc ording ly , we aff irm the trial court’s decision.
Finally , Mother asks this Court to awar d her the attorney ’s fee s and litigation expenses she has incurr ed in def

ending this appeal. In support of her reque st, she relies on the p ar ties’ MDA, wh ic h p ro vid e s:

2 4

. B R E A C H A N D W A IV E R

. S h o u l d e i t h e r p ar t y i n c u r

a n y expense or leg al fe es as to [sic] a re sult of t he breac h of any portion of th is M ar it a l D is s o lu ti o n A g r e e me n t b y th e o th e r p ar ty , th e Co u rt shall awa rd re asonable attorney ’s fe es and suit ex penses to the nondefaulting party

which ar e re asonablyincurre d. No bre ach, w aiver , or def ault of any o f t he terms of this ag ree ment shall constitute a waiver o f anysubsequent bre ach or default of any

of the terms of
a g re e me nt. 2-12-

Further, Mother

relies on the f

ollowing statute:
The plainti ff spouse may

rec over f rom the def

endant spouse, and the spouse or

other pe rson to whom the custody of the child, or
c hil dr e n, is a wa

rd e d may recover fr om the oth e r s po us e re a so na ble attorney fee s i n cu rred in enforc ing any decr ee f or alimony

and/or child support, or in reg ard to a ny suit or action conc erning the adjudication of the custody or t he chang e of custody of any child, or children, of the parties, both upon the orig inal divorce hearing and at any subsequent hea

ring , which fe es may

be fixed and allowed by

the court, be fore whom such ac tion or proce eding is pen ding, in the dis c re tio n o f s uc h c ou rt

.
T EN N

. C ODE A NN

. § 36-5-103( c) ( Supp. 2000).

Tenne ssee a dhere s to the “Ameri ca n Rule,” which pr ovides that, absent a statute or ag ree ment to the contra

ry , litigants ar e re sponsible for their ow n attorney ’s fe es. Sta te v . Br own & William son Tobacco Corp. , 18 S.W .3d 186, 194 (Tenn. 2000). “The re is no absolute right to such fee s, but the ir awa

rd in c ustody and support proce eding s is f amiliar and al m o s t comm onplace .” Deas v. De as , 774 S.W .2d 167, 170 (Tenn. 1989). The de cision as to whether an aw ard of

attorney ’s fee s is warranted on appe al re sts in the soun d discretion of this Court. Archer v. Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995 ). E x ercising our discretion, we ag ree with Mother’s contention t h at an aw ar d of attorne y ’s fe es is war rante d in this case. Se e Ta y lor v . Fe ze ll , 158 S.W. 3d35 2, 36 0 ( Te nn

. 20 05 ) (f ind ing that a n a wa

rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s w a s w arr a nte d p ur su a nt t o the af oreme ntioned statute and a contra ctual ag ree ment re gar d i ng attorney ’s fe es conta ined in the parties’ MDA). W e re m an d t his case to the trial court for the entry of an a war d of Mother’ s re a so na ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur

re d inde fe nd ing thi s a

pp e a l.

IV. C ONCL US I ON

F or the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the tr ia l c ou rt

a ndre ma ndthi s c a se to the trial court for the entry of an order awa rding Mother her rea sonable attorney ’s fe es incurr ed in defe nding this appe al. Costs of this a ppeal are to be taxed to the Appellant, Willi am Michae l Fair , a n d h i s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE