Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1412-PC-608| February 29, 2016 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

APPELLANT PRO SE

Glenn Carpenter 

Pendleton, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General 

George P. Sherman 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Glenn Carpenter, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

February 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A04-1412-PC-608 

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Anne Flannelly, 

Magistrate 

The Honorable John M.T. Chavis, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

49F15-9901-DF-11314 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1412-PC-608| February 29, 2016 Page 2 of 6

Case Summary 

[1] Fifteen years after pleading guilty to and being sentenced for Class D felony 

theft in Marion Superior Court, Glenn Carpenter filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging that the magistrate who accepted his guilty plea and 

sentenced him did not have authority to do so. We, however, find that 

Carpenter has waived any challenge to the magistrate’s authority because he 

did not object at the trial-court level. We therefore affirm the post-conviction 

court. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On July 7, 1999, Carpenter, who was represented by counsel, and the State 

entered into a plea agreement in which Carpenter agreed to plead guilty to 

Class D felony theft. That same day, Carpenter’s guilty-plea hearing was held 

in Marion Superior Court, Criminal Court 15, before Magistrate Mark Renner,1

who accepted Carpenter’s guilty plea and sentenced him—in accordance with 

the plea agreement—to 545 days with 507 days suspended and 180 days of 

 

1

 There is some issue as to whether Mark Renner was a magistrate or master commissioner in July 1999. At 

the post-conviction hearing, the court stated the following regarding Renner’s status: “The Court is aware of 

the fact that currently he’s a commissioner; he’s never been elected a judge; and at one point he was a 

magistrate.” P-C Tr. p. 12. 

Regardless of Renner’s status at that time, a master commissioner has the same powers and duties as a 

magistrate. See Ind. Code Ann. 33-33-49-16(e) (West 2004); see also Ind. Code 33-5.1-2-11(e) (1996 Supp.) 

(version in effect when Carpenter pled guilty). Therefore, it does not matter whether Renner was a 

magistrate or master commissioner. But because the deputy clerk’s letter (Exhibit B) refers to Renner as a 

magistrate, we do so as well. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1412-PC-608| February 29, 2016 Page 3 of 6

probation. See Ex. B (Order of Judgment of Conviction signed by “Mark F. 

Renner”). The CCS entry for July 7, 1999, however, notes that the presiding 

judge of Criminal Court 15, the Honorable John M.T. Chavis II, disposed of 

the case. Ex. A. 

[3] Fifteen years later, in March 2014, Carpenter, pro se, filed a petition for postconviction relief. He argued that Magistrate Renner “did not have statutory 

authority to sentence [him] and enter a final judgment” because Magistrate 

Renner did not get “approval of the Presiding Judge of the Court” in violation 

of Indiana Code section 33-23-5-9. Appellant’s Supp. App. p. 2-3. Although 

Carpenter was pro se when he filed his petition for post-conviction relief, he 

was represented by counsel six months later at the evidentiary hearing. 

[4] At the hearing, post-conviction counsel admitted into evidence Carpenter’s 

CCS, plea agreement, and judgment of conviction. Counsel also admitted into 

evidence a letter from the deputy clerk of Criminal Court 15. According to the 

letter, the “file . . . does not have any Appointment and Acceptance Documents 

in the Court Clerk[’]s Order Book Entries for the appointment of Magistrate 

Mark Renner due to the age of the case. Appointment documents were not 

required back then . . . .” Ex. B. In addition, post-conviction counsel secured 

the following stipulation from the State: “State stipulates to [the postconviction] court’s recognition of non-elected judicial officer status of 

Commissioner (then-Magistrate) Mark Renner.” P-C Tr. p. 12 (formatting 

altered). After the hearing, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact 

and conclusions of law denying Carpenter relief. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1412-PC-608| February 29, 2016 Page 4 of 6

[5] Carpenter, pro se, now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[6] Carpenter contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition 

for post-conviction relief. Carpenter makes several arguments on appeal, all of 

which revolve around Magistrate Renner’s authority to enter a final order on 

his guilty plea and sentence him. When Carpenter pled guilty, Indiana Code 

section 33-4-7-8 (1998) provided: 

(a) Except as provided under subsection (b), a magistrate shall 

report findings in an evidentiary hearing, a trial, or a jury’s verdict 

to the court. The court shall enter the final order. 

(b) If a magistrate presides at a criminal trial, the magistrate may do 

the following: 

(1) Enter a final order.[2]

(2) Conduct a sentencing hearing. 

(3) Impose a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal 

offense. 

(Emphasis added). In 2004, this statute was recodified at Indiana Code section 

33-23-5-9. See P.L. 98-2004. According to case law interpreting Indiana Code 

 

2

 According to case law interpreting this statute, a magistrate’s power to enter a final order includes the 

power to enter a judgment of conviction. See Boyer v. State, 883 N.E.2d 158, 161-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1412-PC-608| February 29, 2016 Page 5 of 6

section 33-23-5-9, because a guilty-plea hearing is not the same as a criminal 

trial and Section 33-23-5-9 references only “a criminal trial,” a magistrate does 

not have authority to enter a final order and sentence a defendant who pleads 

guilty. See Long v. State, 962 N.E.2d 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

3

 

[7] It is well settled that the authority of a court officer appointed to try a case does 

not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. 

1994) (specifically addressing failure of trial court to validly appoint judge pro 

tempore). Accordingly, if a defendant does not object “at the original trial to 

the jurisdiction of a court officer to enter a final appealable order,” then the 

defendant waives “the issue both on appeal . . . and on collateral attack in a 

proceeding for post-conviction relief.” Id. at 33. 

[8] In a case similar to this one, McMichel v. State, a master commissioner—who 

was not a duly appointed judge pro tempore—accepted the defendant’s guilty 

plea and sentenced him. 655 N.E.2d 61, 62 (Ind. 1995). The defendant did not 

object to the master commissioner’s authority to act as a judge over his case. Id. 

Instead, seven years later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief claiming that his conviction was invalid because the master commissioner 

did not have authority to accept his plea or sentence him. The Indiana 

 

3

 In 2015, our legislature amended Indiana Code section 33-23-5-9(b) to rectify this omission, and the 

amended statute now provides: “If a magistrate presides at a criminal trial or a guilty plea hearing . . . .” 

P.L. 173-2015, Sec. 5 (emphasis added); see also Ind. Code Ann. § 33-23-5-9(b) (West 2015 Supp.). 

Thus, a magistrate may now enter a final order and sentence a defendant who pleads guilty. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1412-PC-608| February 29, 2016 Page 6 of 6

Supreme Court held that because the defendant did not challenge the authority 

of the court officer in the trial court so as to properly preserve the issue for 

appeal, his petition for post-conviction relief should be denied due to waiver. 

Id. at 63. 

[9] Likewise, here, Carpenter did not object to Magistrate Renner’s authority to act 

as a judge over his case. Instead, fifteen years later, Carpenter filed a petition 

for post-conviction relief claiming that Magistrate Renner did not have 

authority to accept his guilty plea and sentence him. But even assuming that 

Magistrate Renner acted without authority, the court’s jurisdiction was not 

affected. Carpenter has waived this issue for failing to object at the trial-court 

level.4

 We therefore affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of Carpenter’s 

petition for post-conviction relief. 

[10] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur. 

 

4

 Carpenter also argues on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Magistrate 

Renner’s authority at the trial-court level, even though Carpenter did not raise this issue in his pro se petition 

for post-conviction relief. See Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1171 (Ind. 2001) (noting that issues not raised 

in a petition for post-conviction relief may not be raised for the first time on post-conviction appeal), reh’g 

denied. 

But even if trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to Magistrate Renner’s authority at the trial-court 

level, Carpenter has not alleged how he was prejudiced because a magistrate—rather than the regular sitting 

judge—accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him. See Hall v. State, 646 N.E.2d 379, 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1995), reh’g denied, trans. denied. For similar reasons, we find no merit to Carpenter’s argument on appeal that 

his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not amending his pro se petition to add an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim.