NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GEORGE D. PREWITT,

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

ROBERT D. SNYDER, ACTING SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2017-1076

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 16-1552, Judge Bruce E. Kasold.

______________________ 

Decided: February, 14, 2017

______________________ 

GEORGE D. PREWITT, Greenville, MS, pro se. 

COURTNEY D. ENLOW, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR.; JONATHAN KRISCH, Y. KEN LEE, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
2 PREWITT v. SNYDER

Before DYK, MAYER, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

George D. Prewitt appeals a decision of the Court of 

Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) denying 

his petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ 

of mandamus. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In 1969, Prewitt sustained a “through and through 

gunshot wound” to the left side of his neck while serving 

in Vietnam. J.A. 57. After evaluating Prewitt’s injury, on 

June 17, 1970, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”)

rated Prewitt 30 percent disabled. On March 28, 1980, the 

VA sent Prewitt a letter declining to grant him “unemployability benefits” for a “permanent and total disability.” J.A. 69. Prewitt responded in a Notice of 

Disagreement (“NOD”) dated April 4, 1980, in which he 

disputed the VA’s disability rating in light of his limited 

range of movement. The VA replied to Prewitt on June 5, 

1980, by increasing his disability rating to 40 percent. The 

VA also stated that it considered the increase to have 

“satisfie[d]” the grounds of Prewitt’s disagreement, and 

that the agency would “take no further action on 

[Prewitt’s] appeal” unless Prewitt indicated otherwise 

within thirty days. J.A. 35.

On May 5, 2016, Prewitt filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus in the 

Veterans Court seeking to compel the VA to issue a

Statement of the Case (“SOC”) responding to his April 

1980 NOD. His petition also sought to compel the VA to: 

(1) certify a substantive appeal of a decision rendered by a 

VA regional office on April 21, 2015, to the Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals, see 38 C.F.R. § 19.35; (2) produce 

documents related to a separate controversy concerning 

an alleged overpayment of benefits and stay the withholding of any benefits pending a decision on the overpay-
PREWITT v. SNYDER 3 

ment; and (3) process a motion for revision of a June 1970

regional office decision based on an assertion of clear and 

unmistakable error, for which the regional office issued 

an SOC in August 2015.1

The Veterans Court denied Prewitt’s petition, and he 

appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(1) to review whether Prewitt “satisfied the legal 

standard for issuing the writ.” Beasley v. Shinseki, 709 

F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

Mandamus is a drastic remedy reserved for the most 

“extraordinary causes.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for 

Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). Thus, a 

petitioner seeking a writ of mandamus has the burden of 

showing a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ’s 

issuance and the inadequacy of other alternative forms of 

relief. See id. at 380–81. 

Regarding Prewitt’s request for a writ seeking to 

compel the issuance of an SOC covering his April 1980 

NOD, we agree with the Veterans Court that Prewitt has 

not shown a clear and indisputable right to issuance of 

the writ. The VA’s June 1980 reply indicated that its 

decision to increase Prewitt’s disability rating resolved 

the NOD, as far as the agency was concerned. The VA 

further indicated that Prewitt could continue to pursue 

the matter if he disagreed, and Prewitt does not allege 

that he did so at the time. Although veterans are pre-

 

1 In an earlier case involving a claim for benefits relating to Prewitt’s gunshot wound, we remanded for 

further proceedings to the Veterans Court, which in turn 

remanded to the Board. See Prewitt v. Shinseki, 512 F. 

App’x 1020, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The relationship between those proceedings and Prewitt’s request for a writ 

is unclear.
4 PREWITT v. SNYDER

sumed to seek the maximum benefit allowed by law, see 

AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993), that presumption—assuming that it applies retroactively—is of no help 

to Prewitt because the VA did in fact address his claim for 

“permanent and total disability” when it granted an 

increase to his rating. If Prewitt disagreed with that 

decision, per the VA’s reply, he was required to raise the 

issue with the agency at that time. He did not do so. Thus, 

Prewitt has not shown that his right to mandamus is 

“clear and indisputable.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. 

With respect to the petition’s remaining grounds, 

Prewitt has failed to show that alternative forms of relief 

would be inadequate. Nor has Prewitt shown that he is 

“uniquely burdened by the duration of the appeals process,” or “special circumstances that would justify issuance of the writ.” Beasley, 709 F.3d at 1159. Accordingly, 

the denial of Prewitt’s petition by the Veterans Court is 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.