2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-11-2002

Harris v. Terhune

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket No. 01-3490

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Harris v. Terhune" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 265.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/265
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 01-3490 

 ___________ 

 TERRANCE D. HARRIS, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 

 JOHN S. TERHUNE; 

 WILLIE BOGGAN; SHERRY JONES; 

 LAMKIN, Investigator; ASCIONE, Corrections Officer; 

 MOORE, Corrections Officer; SPERIER, Corrections Officer; 

 FINLEY, Corrections Officer; JOHN DOE, I-X; 

 CORBIN, Corrections Officer; JOSEPH BUTLER; JACK OSVART; 

 PRIM SENHA; SHELIAH THOMAS; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 

 NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

 _______________________________________________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the District of New Jersey 

 D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-03543 

 (Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez) 

 ___________________ 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

 March 4, 2002 

Before: SCIRICA and ROSENN, Circuit Judges, and WARD, District Judge* 

 

 *The Honorable Robert J. Ward , United States District Judge for the Southern District 

of New York, sitting by designation. 

 (Filed April 11, 2002) 

 __________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 __________________ 

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 

 Terrence Harris brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of 

New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that various employees of the New Jersey 

Department of Corrections interfered with his free exercise of religion and retaliated 

against him for filing grievances while he was incarcerated at the Albert C. Wagner 

Youth Correctional Facility in New Jersey. The District Court granted summary 

judgment for defendants. We will affirm. 

 I. 

 We exercise plenary review over an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. 

DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47 (3d Cir. 2000). "Summary judgment is appropriate only if 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law." Id. at 50 (citations omitted). 

 In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must draw all 

 reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in the light most favorable 

 to the non-moving party. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate 

 that the evidence creates no genuine issue of material fact. Once the 

 moving party has met this initial burden, the non-moving party must present 

 concrete evidence that supports each essential element of its claim. 

 

Skerski v. Time Warner Cable Co., 257 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

 On his free exercise of religion claim, Harris contends that corrections officer 

Wayne Corbin placed a substantial burden on his daily call to prayer, a central practice of 

the Muslim religion. We have stated that "[i]nmates clearly retain protections afforded by 

the First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free 

exercise of religion" subject to certain valid penological objectives. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 

50-51 (quotations and citations omitted). Defendants fulfilled their initial burden under 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 by demonstrating an absence of evidence to support Harris’ claim of 

interference with his free exercise of religion. As the District Court noted, defendants 

submitted affidavits and evidence of Harris’ disciplinary record which showed that Harris 

received only one disciplinary charge during the time period in question and that Corbin 

never issued Harris a disciplinary charge or interfered with Harris’ free exercise of 

religion. 

 Harris did not set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial nor did he 

submit any depositions or affidavits to support his claim. Because Harris did not meet 

his burden under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, granting summary judgment for the defendants was 

proper. 

 III. 

 The government may not retaliate against an individual for exercising his 

constitutionally protected right to file grievances. A prisoner-plaintiff must comply with 

a three part test when making a retaliation claim. See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3d 

Cir. 2001). First, a plaintiff must prove "the conduct which led to the alleged retaliation 

was constitutionally protected." Id. at 333 (citation omitted). Second, he "must show that 

he suffered some ’adverse action’ at the hands of prison officials." Id. (citation omitted). 

Finally, he must prove "that his constitutionally protected conduct was ’a substantial or 

motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him." Id. (citing Mount Healthy Bd. of Ed. 

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). 

 Harris failed to offer any evidence that filing grievances was the "substantial or 

motivating factor" in his receiving a disciplinary sanction of ten days detention for failure 

to obey an order. Because Harris did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could conclude the prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his rights, he did 

not meet his obligation under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. 

 Lastly, Harris contends that summary judgment was premature because he was 

denied an adequate opportunity to obtain discovery. We are not convinced. Notably 

absent from Harris’ brief is any request of discovery being served upon the defendants or 

any meaningful petition to the District Court that discovery was incomplete. In any case, 

Harris fails to point to what discovery he now wants besides an unfounded allegation that 

the prison disciplinary record already disclosed by the defendants as being incomplete. 

 IV. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 

judgment. 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing opinion. 

 /s/ Anthony J. Scirica 

 Circuit Judge 
DATED: April 11, 2002