United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-3364

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jeremy Lee Warren

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau

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 Submitted: June 5, 2017

 Filed: September 5, 2017

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Jeremy Lee Warren pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the district court calculated an 1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh Jr., United States DistrictJudge for the

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Eastern District of Missouri.
advisory sentencing guidelines range of 51 to 63 months in prison. The government

moved for an upward variance in light of Warren’s extensive criminal history, and the

district court granted the variance, sentencing him to 75 months’ imprisonment. The

district court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to any other sentences

imposed in other courts. Warren appeals, arguing the district court erred in granting

the upward variance and in imposing the sentence to run consecutively. We affirm.

Warren argues that the district court abused its discretion in considering the

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Feemster, 572

F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standard of review). “A district court abuses

its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received

significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or

(3) considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a

clear error of judgment.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The

district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign

some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” 

United States v. Reynolds, 643 F.3d 1130, 1136 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United

States v. San-Miguel, 634 F.3d 471, 476 (8th Cir. 2011)). To successfully challenge

a district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, a defendant “must show more

than the fact that the district court disagreed with his view of what weight ought to

be accorded certain sentencing factors.” United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991,

995 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

Contrary to Warren’s arguments, however, we cannot say the district court

abused its discretion. First, at the time Warren was sentenced for the present offense

in 2016, he had one prior felony conviction from 2004, two from 2005, one from

2006, one from 2010, and one from earlier in 2016. The district court thus “did not

abuse its discretion by placing particular emphasis on [Warren’s] consistent and

recurring criminal conduct.” United States v. Jenkins, 758 F.3d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir.

2014). Second, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by not

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giving more weight to Warren’s addiction to methamphetamine, which began when

he was 13 years old. As the district court and Warren’s counsel noted at sentencing,

Warren was previously given the opportunity—but failed—to complete a drug

treatment program. The district court further encouraged Warren to take advantage

of the drug program in the federal prison system, which the district court

characterized as “the best in the world.” Finally, to the extent the district court

expressed surprise that Warren continued to commit felony crimes after a 2014

accident left him partially paralyzed from the waist down, we cannot say the district

court gave “significant weight” to this factor. See Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. The

district court, as Warren notes on appeal, expressed its surprise as a mere

“afterthought.” Accordingly, Warren has not shown more than disagreement with

how the district court weighed the factors under § 3553(a). Townsend, 617 F.3d at

995.

In light of the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, we also

cannot say that the district court’s 12-month upward variance was substantively

unreasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“[I]f the sentence

is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of

unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify

the extent of the variance.”). Nor can we say it was unreasonable to impose the

sentence consecutive to Warren’s other sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b)

(sentencing court must consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining whether to

impose a consecutive sentence); United States v. Bryant, 606 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir.

2010) (stating that an appellate court reviews imposition of consecutive sentencesfor

“reasonableness” and that, generally, “there is no requirement that a district court

provide a separate statement of reasons” for its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors

when imposing a consecutive sentence).

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

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