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******************************************************GILMORE v. PAWN KING, INC.—DISSENT ESPINOSA, J., dissenting. The certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut1 present us with a choice among three alternatives. The first alternative is to conclude that, consistentwith ourpriorstatutoryinterpretation, arate limiting statute within the pawnbroking statutory scheme, General Statutes § 21-44,2 regulates the rates that pawnbrokers may charge in repurchase transactions. The second choice is to conclude thatthe general usury statute, General Statutes § 37-4,3 which expressly exemptspawnbrokersfromitsscope, nonethelessregulates pawnbrokers and restricts the rates that they may charge in repurchase transactions. Finally, we could concludethatthere are no limits onthe ratesthatpawnbrokersmaychargeforrepurchasetransactions, aproposition that we rejected in the same decision in which
we concluded that pawnbrokers are indeed governed by the pawnbroking statutes when they loan money to clients, even when the pawnbrokers designate the loan by another name. See Rhodes v. Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 513 A.2d 124 (1986).
Likethe DistrictCourt, I concludethatthereasonable interpretation ofthe sparse legislative record accompanying the 1997 amendment to § 21-44; Public Acts 1997, No. 97-164, § 5 (P.A. 97-164); is that it fails to reveal a clear intent to overrule Rhodes, and, therefore, this court’s interpretation ofGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 in Rhodes controls. By contrast, contrary to
our prior interpretation ofthe pawnbroking statutes in Rhodes and in the absence of any clear evidence of legislative intent to overrule that decision, the majority concludes today that the rate restrictions of § 21-44 do not apply to a pawnbroker’s loan of money upon the depositofpersonalproperty, solongasthepawnbroker has designatedthatloanbythename ‘‘repurchasetransaction’’ rather than ‘‘pawnbroking loan.’’ Instead, in direct contradiction to the express exclusion of pawnbrokers from the rate restrictions set forth in § 37-4, the majority concludes that, ifpawnbrokers assign the label ‘‘repurchase transaction’’ to a transaction involving the loan of money on the deposit ofpersonal property, § 37-4 does, infact, applyto pawnbrokers. Fortwo reasons, I cannot agree withthe majority’s conclusions. First, the majority’s conclusion that § 21-44 does not apply to repurchase transactions runs counter to our
case law, in which we consistently have required unequivocal evidence of legislative intent before concluding that the legislature overruled one of our decisions interpreting a statute. The majority accomplishes this result without ever expressly addressing the question of whether the legislature intended to overrule Rhodes through its enactment of P.A. 97-164, thereby injecting uncertainty into the precedential force andeffect of this court’s interpretive decisions. Second,
even if I agreed with the majority’s unspoken holding thatRhodes has beenlegislatively overruled, I couldnot agreewithits conclusionthat § 37-4governsrepurchase transactions, which: (1) is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute exempting pawnbrokers from the rates set forth therein; (2) relies on a series of unsupported assumptions regarding the legislative intentunderlyingP.A. 97-164; and (3) failsto giveproper effect to this court’s prior interpretation ofthe relevant statutory language in § 37-4. Rather than follow the convoluted path taken by the majority to its interpretation of § 37-4, I would hold that, ifthe legislature overruled Rhodes, a proposition with which I disagree, the only logical conclusion remaining would be that the legislature intended to allow pawnbrokers to charge any rate, without limit, to the loan of money on the deposit of personal property, so long as pawnbrokers
use the label ‘‘repurchase transactions.’’ As I have already stated, I would conclude thatRhodes continues to control, andthatapawnbroker’s repurchase transactions are governed by § 21-44 of the pawnbroking statutes. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
REPURCHASE TRANSACTIONS ARE GOVERNED BY THE PAWNBROKING STATUTES
The majority acknowledges that in Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 89, this courtinterpreted General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 to govern repurchase transactions, but the majority then lays the foundation for its subsequent analysis by characterizing the rationale ofRhodes very narrowly. Without directly stating so, the majority infers that the legislature overruled Rhodes by deleting the phrase ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ from § 21-44; P.A. 97-164; despite the equivocal nature ofthe substantive changes to § 21-44 made by the 1997 amendment, the eleven year gap between the publication ofRhodes and the 1997 amendment to § 21-44, the lack of any statement of legislative intent to overrule this court’s decision in Rhodes, and the fact that P.A. 97-164 had a purpose wholly unrelated to the financing arrangements ofpawnbrokingtransactions. Inso doing, the majority fails to give proper weight to a long line of decisions ofthis court, in which only clear evidence in the legislative record has been held sufficient to support a conclusion that the legislature intended to overrule this court’s interpretative decision. The majorityalso fails to give propereffectto the mostfundamental principle underlying Rhodes: that repurchase transactions are pawnbroking loans by another name. In part I ofthis dissent, I begin withRhodes, in which this court rested its conclusion on broader principles thanacknowledgedbythe majority. Ithen detailseveral decisions that illustrate our consistent reliance only on clear evidence oflegislative intent to support a conclu-sion that the legislature intended to overrule one ofour decisions interpreting astatute. Applying that standard, I evaluate the legislative record, concluding that such clear evidence of legislative intent is lacking therein.
The issue ofwhether § 21-44 regulates the rates that pawnbrokers may charge in repurchase transactions presents a question of statutory interpretation, over whichwe exerciseplenaryreview, guidedbywellestablishedprinciplesregardinglegislativeintent. SeeKasica

v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013) (explaining plain meaning rule under General Statutes § 1-2z and setting forth process for ascertaining legislative intent). Notwithstanding the passage of § 1-2z, in
our construction of statutes, this court’s starting point, when we already have interpreted the statute in question, is our prior construction of that statute. See id., 93–94 (in interpreting statutory text, we are bound by
our prior constructions of statute); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 282 Conn. 477, 500–501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (§ 1-2z did not overrule this court’s prior interpretations ofstatutes). This approachis consistentboth with the principle ofstare decisis and the principle that
ourpriordecisions interpreting astatute are nottreated
as extratextual sources forpurposes ofconstruing that statute and may be consulted as part of our reading of the statutory text. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia, supra, 94 (relying on prior construction ofstatute during plain language portion of § 1-2z analysis); In reElvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 500–501, 78 A.3d 797 (2013) (same). Therefore, because this court already has construed General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 in Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 89, to apply to repurchase transactions, prior to the enactment of P.A. 97-164, the question of statutory construction in the present case is a narrow one. That is, I begin with the question of whetherthe legislature intendedto overrulethis court’s decision in Rhodes when it amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 21-44 in P.A. 97-164. Put simply, if the legislature did not intendto overruleRhodes by amending § 21-44 in 1997, then Rhodes controls. I observe further that in light ofthe presumption that the legislature is aware ofourdecisions construingstatutes;Blonski v. Metropolitan District Commission, 309 Conn. 282, 304, 71 A.3d 465 (2013); the majority’s failure to begin with the question of whether the legislature intended in P.A. 97-164 to overruleRhodes subverts the goal of statutory construction, to discern the intent of the legislature. Accordingly, I begin by reviewing this court’s previous interpretation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 in Rhodes

. We definedtheissuepresentedinRhodesas ‘‘whether

apawnbrokerwho engages in arepurchase transaction is, for purposes of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)] § 21-44, a pawnbroker who takes or receives, directly
or indirectly, interest in return for the use ofmoney heloans on the pledge of personal property.’’ Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 94. At the time that we decided Rhodes, General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21- 44 provided: ‘‘No pawnbroker or loan broker or person who loans money on the pledge of personal property shall take or receive, directly or indirectly, for the use of money loaned on personal property, any more than the following rates: For the use of money amounting to fifteen dollars or less, five per cent per month or fraction thereof; forthe use ofmoney exceeding fifteen dollars in amount and not exceeding fifty dollars in amount, three per cent per month or fraction thereof; for the use ofmoney exceeding fifty dollars in amount, two per cent per month or fraction thereof.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Our construction of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 in Rhodes was guided by the remedial purpose of the pawnbroking statutes, which were enacted ‘‘to protect impecunious borrowers from extortionate interest rates and oppressive financing terms that some pawnbrokersmightotherwise impose.’’Rhodesv.Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 97. We specificallyobservedthat, at the time that the predecessors of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) §§ 21-44 and 21-454 were enacted, repurchase transactions ‘‘were recognized as vehicles used by unscrupulous pawnbrokers to extract usurious interest rates from their customers.’’ Id.
Consistentwith ourrecognitionthat one ofthe remedial purposes of the pawnbroking statutes was to prevent pawnbrokers from relying on repurchase transactions to legitimize usurious lending practices,
ourconstructionofGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21- 44 inRhodes was firmly grounded on the principle that repurchasetransactionsdifferfromconventionalpawnbroking loans inname only. Id., 96. Moreover, ourstatement inRhodes thatthe two transactions are equivalent must be understood in light of our express recognition thatpawnbrokershistoricallyhavereliedontheirability to choose among the two labels forpawnbroking transactions, repurchase transactions and pawnbroking loans, in orderto circumventrestrictions onthe interest rates that they may charge. Id. That is, we recognized inRhodesthat, whenpossible, pawnbrokershistorically hadtaken advantage ofdifferentlegal rules that applied to the purportedly different pawnbroking transactions—pawnbroking loans and repurchase transactions—and that pawnbrokers had relied on their ability to evade pawnbroking laws by selecting the more advantageous label for the transaction, despite the fact that, inactuality, thetwotypes oftransactions are indistinguishable. Id., 96–98; see also S. Levine, A Treatise
on the Law of Pawnbroking (1911), pp. 115–16.
The courtinRhodesturnedtothelanguage ofGeneral Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44, therefore, with three principlesservingasitsanalyticalfoundation: thepawn-broking statutes have the remedial purpose of protecting impecunious borrowers from usurious interest rates; pawnbroking loans and repurchase transactions
are distinguishable in name only; and, when possible, pawnbrokers have capitalized on that very limited distinction, and relied on any different legal treatment accorded to the two transactions in order to evade interest rate restrictions on pawnbroking transactions. The courtthen deliberatedthe significance ofthe provisionthat General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 applied to rates received by pawnbrokers either ‘‘directly or indirectly, for the use of money loaned on personal property

. . . .’’ Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 94. We observed that, by expressly stating that the restrictions imposed by General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 applied not only to direct, but also to indirect interest rates, ‘‘the legislature indicated that it intended the statutes to regulate not only those transactions that take the classic form of a conventional pawnbroking loan, butalso financing arrangementsthat, in substance if not in form, amount to the economic equivalents of such a loan.’’ Id., 96. We explained: ‘‘The difference between the repurchase price and the original sales price of the item amounts to a fee that the customer must pay for the use of the pawnbroker’s money. Whether or not the parties to the transaction label it
asinterest, thispremium constitutesthetype ofindirect interest envisaged by the drafters of §§ 21-44 and 21- 45.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id. Thus, this court’s analysis rested firmly on the principle that the only distinction between repurchase transactions and pawnbroking loans was the label that the pawnbrokers applied to the transaction. Indeed, we citedwith approval the trial court’s apt summary ofthe situation: ‘‘[O]ne should not be able to avoid atax on shoes by calling shoes slippers

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 92. Therefore, becausethe difference was one inlabel only,
we viewed repurchase transactions as charging the client for the use of money loaned, and we interpreted the concept of‘‘indirect interest’’ to encompass the rate charged in a repurchase transaction, notwithstanding the fact that the transaction is labeled a ‘‘repurchase transaction’’ rather than a ‘‘loan,’’ and the rate is designated as a ‘‘fee’’ imposed on the service rather than ‘‘interest’’ charged on the principal ofthe loan. We concluded, therefore, that General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 regulated the rates charged by pawnbrokers in repurchase transactions. Id., 103. The majority is incorrect, therefore, in suggesting that the analysis in Rhodes rested solely on the inclusion ofthe word ‘‘indirectly’’ in General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44. Certainly, we relied on the inclusion of that term as part of our analysis, but the more important, fundamental principle guiding our analysis was the recognition that repurchasetransactionsandpawnbrokingloansare distinct in name only.Eleven years after this court’s decision in Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 89, the legislature enacted P.A. 97-164, ‘‘AnActconcerningthe RegulationofPawnbrokers.’’ Section 5 of P.A. 97-164 amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 21-44, and, among other changes, deletedthephrase ‘‘directlyorindirectly.’’ The majority relies on the deletion of the words ‘‘directly

or indirectly’’ from § 21-44 to infer a legislative intent to overrule Rhodes

. I disagree that the omission ofthat phrase, viewed in the context of the entire legislative record, provides clear evidence that the legislature intended that § 21-44 henceforth apply only to conventional pawnbroker loans. Althoughwe have notexpresslystatedwhatevidence is sufficient to allow us to conclude that a legislative amendmentwasintendedto overrule ourpriordecision construing a statute, we consistently have required clear evidence in the legislative record to support such
a conclusion. In most instances, we have relied on express statements by legislators during floor debate to conclude that the legislature intended to overrule
one of our decisions interpreting a statute. See, e.g., Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., supra, 282 Conn. 503–504 (

Borden, J., concurring) (observing that express statements of legislators in legislative history of § 1-2z clarified legislative intent to overrule in part this court’s decision in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 816 A.2d 562 [2003]); In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 628–29, 784 A.2d 317 (2001) (relying on testimony before Judiciary Committee that No. 86-185 of 1986 Public Acts was intended to address ‘‘a recent [S]upreme [C]ourt case in 1985 that says you can’t take
an appeal if the [S]uperior [C]ourt

. . . moves a child

. . . from the juvenile docket to the regular docket’’ to conclude that act was intended to overrule In re JuvenileAppeal[85–AB], 195 Conn. 303, 488A.2d 778 [1985] [internal quotation marks omitted]); Allard v. Liberty Oil Equipment Co., 253 Conn. 787, 801–802, 756 A.2d 237 (2000) (relying on express statements bylegislators to conclude that legislative history made ‘‘clear’’ that principal purpose of No. 99-69 of 1999 Public Acts was to legislatively overrule in part this court’s decision in Bhinderv. Sun Co., 246 Conn. 223, 717A.2d202 [1998]). Moreover, in the absence of an express statement of legislative intent, we have interpreted subsequent legislation, to the extent possible, to be consistent with
our prior decisions, and have specifically declined to draw inferences that were not directly supported by the legislative record oflegislation enacted in response to one of our decisions. For example, in Gormbard v. Zurich Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 808, 820–21 n.8, 904 A.2d 198 (2006), we concluded, onthe basis ofexpress statements during the floor debate on No. 83-461 ofthe 1983 Public Acts, that the legislature intended to overrule this court’s holding in Harvey v. Travelers IndemnityCo., 188 Conn. 245, 248, 449 A.2d 157 (1982), in which this court had interpreted General Statutes § 38-175c to require as a matter of public policy that ‘‘an insurer

. . . provide uninsured motorist coverage for injuries that an insured sustains while occupying an uninsured vehicle that the insured, or a family member of the insured, owns.’’ Gormbard v. Zurich Ins. Co., supra, 820 n.8. We declined, however, to read the legislative overrulingoftheHarveydecisionmorebroadly, observing that ‘‘[t]here is nothing in the language of the 1983 amendment or in the relevant legislative history, however, to indicate that the legislature disagreed with our determination inHarveythat, as ageneral matter, uninsured motorist benefits must be portable if they are to fulfill the broad remedial purpose of the [uninsured motorist] statute.’’ Id., 821 n.8; see alsoKalams v. Giacchetto, 268 Conn. 244, 260–61 n.11, 842 A.2d 1100 (2004) (declining to read legislature’s prompt, subsequent amendment of General Statutes [Rev. to 1999] §§ 51- 241 and 51-243, which added presumption of unity of interest for purposes of determining each party’s number of peremptory challenges, and imposed proportional limits on number ofperemptory challenges party maybe allowed; PublicActs 2001, No. 01-152, §§ 1, 2; as evidence oflegislativeintenttopasscontrarylegislation overrulingMarshallv.HartfordHospital, 65 Conn.App. 738, 783 A.2d 1085, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 938, 786 A.2d 425 [2001], where Appellate Court applied General Statutes [Rev. to 1999] §§ 51-241 and 51-243 to conclude that defendants who lacked unity ofinterest were entitled to four peremptory challenges each). These decisions illustrate that we draw an inference that the legislature has intendedto overrule one ofourinterpretive decisions only when necessary, and only to the extent necessary. It makes sense in light of our role to apply this presumption—thatinthe absence ofclearandunequivocal evidence of legislative intent to overrule one of our prior interpretive decisions, that decision continues to control the meaning ofthe relevant statutoryprovision. It is our province to say what the law means. Marbury

v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (‘‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’’). Once this court has spoken on the meaning of a statute, the presumption is that ifthe legislature disagrees with our interpretation, it will express its intent clearly and unequivocally.
In the present case, the legislative record does not provide clear evidence that the legislature intended to overrule Rhodes when it amended § 21-44 in 1997. I beginwiththetwo most obviousreasons formyconclusion: the amendment happened eleven years after Rhodes was decided, and there is no mention whatsoever of Rhodes in the legislative record. The eleven year gap between the release of this court’s decisionin Rhodes and the enactment of P.A. 97-164 is a long time. As I have noted previously in this dissent, this court presumes that the legislature is aware of our interpretation ofastatute. Blonskiv. MetropolitanDistrict Commission, supra, 309 Conn. 304. Therefore, in inferring legislative intent on the basis of the legislature’s response, or lack thereof, to our interpretation of a statute, we have placed great emphasis on the passage of time between the release of a decision of this courtandanyrelevantlegislative actionorinaction. For example, we have relied onthe prompt, subsequent passageofcontrarylegislationasevidencethatalegislative amendment to a statute was passed directly in response to one of our decisions. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hillcrest Associates, 233 Conn. 153, 167–68 n.7, 659 A.2d 138 (1995) (observing, with respect to enactment ofresponsive legislation one year following decision of this court, that ‘‘[a]lthough there is no printed legislative history available for [the] statutory amendment, its passage so promptly afterthe decision in Dime Savings Bank v. Pomeranz, [123 Conn. 581, 196 A. 634 (1938)], compels the inference that it
was enactedinresponseto that decision’’). By contrast,
one ofthe indicators oflegislative acquiescence to our interpretation of a statute is the passage of ‘‘an appropriate interval [oftime] to permitlegislative reconsideration

. . . without corrective legislative action

. . . .’’ Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., supra, 282 Conn. 494–95. Although we have never identified a particular length oftime that we will consider sufficient to constitute an ‘‘appropriate interval’’ to provide support for an inference of legislative acquiescence, we have relied
on intervals significantly shorter than eleven years to support that inference. See, e.g., Commission on HumanRights & Opportunities v. Sullivan, 285 Conn. 208, 221, 939 A.2d 541 (2008) (eight years); Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction, 254 Conn. 214, 252, 756 A.2d 1264 (2000) (six years). The passage of eleven years between Rhodes and the enactment of P.A. 97- 164, accordingly, makes one questionwhetherthe legislature was targeting Rhodes when it amended § 21-44 in 1997.
One would expect that, if the legislature did indeed wait eleven years before overruling Rhodes, it would have been aware of the need to make its intent even
more clear than in those cases in which it has reacted quickly to overrule one of our interpretive decisions. Thatexpectationfindsfurthersupportinthe drasticand controversial nature of a reversion to the pre- Rhodes system, which allowed pawnbrokers to select which laws govern their transactions simply by selecting the
more advantageous label. This is notthe kind ofchange that would have passed without even so much as a nod. The legislative record, however, confirmswhatthe eleven year gap suggests. The legislature did not have Rhodes inmind at allwhen it amended General Statutes(Rev. to 1997) § 21-44 in P.A. 97-164. Neither the substantive changestothe statute northe legislative record provides anything even approaching clearevidencethat the legislature intended to overrule Rhodes

. The substance of the 1997 amendment to § 21-44, for instance, at best yields equivocal evidence of the legislature’s intent. The defendants point to the fact that in 1997, P.A. 97-164 deleted from § 21-44 the key statutory term on which this court in Rhodes relied to conclude that the statute extended to repurchase transactions—the term ‘‘indirectly.’’ In Rhodes, we interpreted ‘‘indirectly’’ to refer to ‘‘indirect interest,’’

a term that we read to encompass the ‘‘fee’’ charged in repurchasetransactions.Rhodesv.Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 96. I disagree with the majority that the fact that the legislature deleted the entire phrase, rather than deleting only the term ‘‘indirectly,’’ is insignificant. The deletion of the term ‘‘directly,’’ prevents the change from constituting clear and unequivocal evidence of legislative intentto overruleRhodes and makes itpossible to construe the amendment in a manner consistent with Rhodes, in which we relied only on the inclusion of the term ‘‘indirectly’’ in General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 to conclude that the statute governed repurchase transactions. In order to legislatively overrule Rhodes, therefore, the legislature needed only to delete the term ‘‘indirectly’’ and leave the term ‘‘directly’’ inplace. Withthatamendment, § 21-44would have provided that ‘‘[n]o pawnbroker

. . . shall take
or receive, directly, for the use of money loaned on personal property, any more than the following rates

. . . .’’ Such a change would have removed all doubt regarding the legislature’s alleged intent to exclude repurchase transactions from the purview of § 21-44. Theomissionofbothterms, bycontrast, arguablyleaves the original meaning of the statutory language intact, because under the current revision, § 21-44 applies to rates received, without any limitation as to the manner in which the rate is received, for the use of money loaned on personal property.5
The purpose of P.A. 97-164 further undercuts the majority’s conclusion. The Public Act was focused on increasing the record keeping requirements on pawnbrokers to aid law enforcement in the ‘‘control of [the] flow ofstolen goods.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 4, 1997 Sess., p. 1233, testimony ofJohnM. Bailey, ChiefState’sAttorney. The applicable rate restrictions governing pawnbroking transactions
were not even remotely part of that agenda. The complete lack of legislative focus on pawnbroking interest rates is further supported by the absence of any testimony offered to the Judiciary Committee or any remarks made on the Senate and House floors that indicated, either expressly or impliedly, that the legislatureintendedtomakeanychangeintheraterestrictions governing pawnbroking transactions, and the lack ofany reference whatsoever in the legislative record to the Rhodes decision. The absence of any remarks addressingraterestrictionchangesto § 21-44reinforces the conclusion that the legislature’s intent in enacting P.A. 97-164 in 1997 focused on the sole purpose of the act, to aid law enforcement in the control of the flow ofstolen goods, and that this court’s holding inRhodes
was simply not its concern. In summary, the majority’s position, that the legislature intended to overrule Rhodes by deleting the word ‘‘indirectly’’ from General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 21-44, would require the assumption that, eleven years after our decision in Rhodes, the legislature intended to effect a major change in the law, despite the lack of any acknowledgment of its intent to do so, in a public act that was not focused on regulating interest rates. It is unreasonable to presume that the legislature would effect such a major change in the law in such a circumspect and stealthy manner. The majority relies on changes made by P.A. 97-164 to three of the pawnbroking statutes to argue that the legislativeintentisclear. GeneralStatutes (Rev. to 1997) §§ 21-41 and 21-42 were amended to incorporate references to repurchase transactions; P.A. 97-164, §§ 3, 4; and General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 21-47 was amended to add a reference to outright purchase transactions; P.A. 97-164, § 7; transactionswhichthemajority inexplicably characterize as repurchase transactions. I discount the majority’s mistaken reliance on the 1997 change to § 21-47 as irrelevant and do not address it.6 I disagree that the changes to §§ 21-41 and 21-42 in the 1997 amendment rise to the level of clarity that we consistently have required to infer legislative intent to overrule one of our decisions. Significantly, the reference to repurchase transactions in General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 21-41 (a) was subsequently deleted by No. 11-100, § 4, of the 2011 Public Acts (P.A. 11-100). Applying the majority’s reasoning, we should conclude thatthe deletion ofthe referenceto repurchasetransactions from § 21-41 (a) means that the legislature signified an intent that § 21-41, which sets forth record keepingandproofofidentityrequirementsandprovides protectionforminors, does notapplyso long as apawnbroker labels the transaction a repurchase transaction.
The majority also relies on a single relevant change in P.A. 11-100, which added a reference to repurchase transactions to General Statutes § 21-45. What the majority overlooks is that although § 21-45 now mentions repurchase transactions, the language ofthe statute conflatesrepurchasetransactionsandpawnbroking loans in a mannerthat supports the conclusion that the legislature intended to subject the transactions to the
same rules. The full text of § 21-45 provides: ‘‘No pawnbrokershallsell ordispose ofanypersonalpropertyleft with such pawnbroker in deposit or pledge for money loanedorasaresultofthepurchaseofsuchpropertyonconditionofselling thesame backagainatastipulated price in less than sixty days from the date when the
same is leftin deposit orpledge orpurchased on condition of selling the same back again at a stipulated price, except when such sale or disposition is to the person who deposited, pledged or sold such property
oranauthorizedagentofsuchperson. Allsuchproperty may be sold or disposed of at the place of business of such pawnbroker or at public sale after such sixty-day period. Upon the expiration ofsixty days from the date when such property is left with a pawnbroker, if the person who deposited or pledged such property fails to redeem any such property in accordance with the terms of the transaction, such right of redemption or repurchase on the part ofthe person who deposited or pledged such property shall be extinguished and the pawnbrokershallacquirethe entire interestintheproperty that was held by the person who deposited or pledged such property prior to such deposit or pledge without further notice to such person.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The first sentence of § 21-45, which imposes a sixty day waiting period before a pawnbroker may sell or dispose ofpersonal property left with the pawnbroker, specifies two means by which property may be ‘‘left with such pawnbroker’’: (1) in deposit or pledge for money loaned; or (2) as aresult ofthe purchase ofsuch property on condition of selling the same back again at a stipulated price. In the first sentence of § 21-45, depositing and pledging personal property are treated
aspart ofapawnbroking loantransaction, andpurchasing personal property on condition of selling the same back again at a stipulated price is treated as part of a repurchase transaction. The final sentence of § 21-45, however, makes no mention ofproperty that the pawnbroker has acquired by means of a purchase, and expresslyapplies onlytopropertythathasbeen ‘‘deposited or pledged.’’ One would expect, therefore, that the final sentence of § 21-45 would apply only to pawnbroking loans, because items ofproperty that are the subject of repurchase transactions are not ‘‘deposited or pledged’’ but are ‘‘purchased on condition of selling the same back again at a stipulated price.’’ The final sentence of § 21-45, however, provides that after the sixty day waiting period, the ‘‘right of redemption or repurchase’’ is extinguished. (Emphasis added.) This conflation ofthe two types oftransactions—in the statute that the court in Rhodes specifically read together with § 21-44—provides strongsupportformyreading of the pawnbroking statutes, namely, that the legislature’s intent in the pawnbroking statutes, consistent with this court’s decision inRhodes, is to treat repurchase transactions and pawnbroking loans as interchangeable.7
If the legislature had intended to overrule Rhodes, it could have made its intent clear by amending the pawnbroking statutes to reject the fundamental princi-ple articulated in Rhodes, that pawnbroking loans and repurchase transactions should be treated as interchangeable.8 That is, the legislature could have defined ‘‘repurchase transactions’’ and ‘‘pawnbroking loans’’ as separate and distincttransactions. Whenthe legislature enacted P.A. 11-100, however, which added a new definitional section, General Statutes § 21-39a, to the pawnbroking statutory scheme, it did not add definitions for pawnbrokingloans orrepurchasetransactions. Instead, P.A. 11-100, § 1, added a definition of pawnbroker as ‘‘a person who is engaged in the business of loaning money on the deposit or pledge of wearing apparel, jewelry, ornaments, household goods or otherpersonal property or purchasing such property on condition of selling the same back again at a stipulated price

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 21-39a (1). The business ofpawnbroking, therefore, is defined to include both types of transactions: conventional pawnbroking loans and repurchase transactions.9
This broad definition supports a commonsense interpretation of the statutory scheme, which is that it governs pawnbrokers regardless of which label they append to their transactions. We recognized this in Rhodes, when we offeredthisverypractical insight into
our statutory construction of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44: ‘‘Itwould have been unreasonable forthe legislature to have required pawnbrokers who conduct repurchase transactions to be licensed, without also requiring their compliance with [the] other pawnbroking statutes.’’ Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 103. The court in Rhodes abided by a basic tenet of statutory construction, that we do not abandon common sense when we undertake the task of interpreting
a statute. ‘‘[W]e will not undertake an examination of [a statutory provision] with blinders on regarding what the legislature intended [it] to mean.

. . . In interpreting a statute, common sense must be used

. . . . The law favors rational and sensible statutory construction.

. . . The unreasonableness ofthe result obtained by the acceptance ofone possible alternative interpretation of
an act is a reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would provide a result that is reasonable.

. . . When two constructions are possible, courts will adopt the one which makes the [statute] effective and workable, and not one which leads to difficult and possibly bizarre results.

. . . We have long followedtheguidelinethat [t]heintentofthelawmakers is the soul of the statute, and the search for this intent
we have held to be the guiding star ofthe court. It must prevail over the literal sense and the precise letter of the language of the statute.

. . . When one construction leads to public mischief which another construction will avoid, the latter is to be favored unless the terms of the statute absolutely forbid [it].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connelly v. Commissioner ofCorrection, 258 Conn. 394, 407, 780 A.2d 903 (2001).Common sense dictates that the pawnbroking statutes governpawnbroking transactions; Rhodes dictates that they do and the legislative record does not provide clearand unequivocal evidence thatthe legislature ever has disagreedwiththatproposition. Itherefore disagree with part I of the majority opinion.
II
THE USURY STATUTE DOES NOT GOVERN

PAWNBROKERS
In order to conclude that § 37-4, the general usury statute, applies to pawnbrokers, the majority not only must ignore the statute’s express statement to the contrary, itmustalso inferthatin 1997, whenthe legislature amended the pawnbroking statutes in an amendment thatfocused on stemmingthe flow ofstolen goods; P.A. 97-164; it simultaneously, without a single stroke of the pen, or even an oblique reference anywhere in the legislative record, amended the general usury statute, which is in a completely different statutory scheme, to exclude pawnbrokers only when they are engaged in certain transactions.
The third question certified by the District Court, to beaddressedonlyifweansweredthefirsttwoquestions in the negative, requires us to determine whether repurchase transactions constitute loans subject to the interest rate limits imposed by § 37-4. ‘‘No person and
no firm or corporation or agent thereof, other than
a pawnbroker as provided in section 21-44, shall, as guarantor or otherwise, directly or indirectly, loan money to anyperson and, directly or indirectly, charge, demand, accept or make any agreement to receive therefore interest at a rate greater than twelve per cent per annum.’’ General Statutes § 37-4. The majority seizes on the phrase ‘‘as provided in section 21-44’’ in § 37-4 to claim that, when the legislature amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 21-44 in P.A. 97-164 to exclude repurchase transactions, it simultaneously changed the meaning of ‘‘a pawnbroker as provided in section 21-44’’ to apply only to pawnbrokers engaged in pawnbroking loans. The ceiling on interest rates is lower in § 37-4 than the maximum allowable rate in § 21-44. When the majority’s analysis of the supposed evolution of §§ 21-44 and 37-4 is viewed as awhole, it is claimingthatin 1997, thelegislature decidedto overrule Rhodes, with the purpose of decreasing the maximum amount that pawnbrokers may charge in repurchase transactions, and that it accomplished this purpose by bringing repurchase transactions within the scope of § 37-4. The arbitrariness ofthis supposed switch cannot be understated. The majority provides no explanation
as to why the legislature would draw a distinction between repurchase transactions and pawnbroking loans, why the legislature would do so without any evidence in the record that a single person or entityeversoughtsuch achange, orwhythe legislature would accomplish this bizarre change without any acknowledgment of its intent. In addition to all of these more globalproblems, the majority’s conclusion is not reconcilable with the meaning of the phrase ‘‘a pawnbroker
as provided in section 21-44’’ when it is understood in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole, and the evolution of § 37-4 in particular.
The majority’s error is apparent when one consults the plain language of § 37-4, which does not exclude a particular class or classes of transactions from its rate limits, but instead excludes a particular class of persons— pawnbrokers

. Themajoritythencompoundsthat
errorbymisconstruingthenature oftheanalyticalproblem presented by the statutory language. Instead of seeking to explain why the phrase ‘‘other than a pawnbroker as provided in section 21-44’’ in § 37-4 should be understoodto exclude particulartransactions rather than a class ofpersons, the majority appears to believe that the question ofstatutory construction is much easier—it seems to think that if it can demonstrate that § 37-4 is intended to apply to loans that involve the ‘‘indirect’’ charging ofinterest, thenithas demonstrated that the legislature intended to subject repurchase transactions to § 37-4. After setting forth the statutory text of § 37-4, the majority, rather than examining that textandthenreviewingthe language ofrelatedstatutes, proceeds directly to case law setting forth the well established principle that usury statutes apply to usurious loans regardless of the name by which the lender designates the loan. I am in complete agreement with that uncontroversial proposition, which could have beensupportedsimplybyreferringtotheplainlanguage of § 37-4, which provides that, for the persons and entities that are subject to it, the rate limit applies to direct andindirectloans, andtoratesthatconstitutethe direct and indirect charging of interest. The majority then changes the inquiry, focusing on the meaning of the phrase ‘‘directly or indirectly,’’ in § 37-4, a phrase that this courtalreadyhasinterpretedinRhodes, ratherthan the meaning of the phrase ‘‘other than a pawnbroker
as provided in section 21-44.’’ By doing so, the majority misconstrues the nature of the question of statutory construction presented in this certified question, and,
as I explain herein, for the second time in this appeal, fails to give proper effect to one of this court’s prior interpretations of a statute.
The scope of § 37-4 is defined by the classes of individuals to which the statute applies, namely, persons, firmsandcorporationsoragentsthereof—andoneclass ofindividuals to which it does not apply, pawnbrokers, whoaregovernedby § 21-44. Inotherwords, § 37-4does not exclude particular transactions from its purview; it excludes an entire category oflenders from its application. That does not mean that there are no particular transactions excluded from the rate limit in § 37-4. Toidentify those transactions, I turn to the extensive list setforthin General Statutes § 37-9.10 Section37-9 identifies seven different categories of transactions, most of whichalso containseveralsubcategories, towhich § 37- 4 does not apply. Reading the two statutes together clarifies that § 37-4 identifies the classes of individuals that are subject to its rate limits, while § 37-9 identifies, forthose classes that are subject to § 37-4, which transactions are nonetheless exempt from the rate limit. Significantly, a pawnbroking loan is not listed in § 37- 9 as one of the transactions that is excluded from the limit set forth in § 37-4, reinforcing the conclusion that pawnbrokers as an entire class are excluded from § 37- 4. The extensiveness ofthe list ofexcludedtransactions set forth in § 37-9 is significant in light of the principle of statutory construction that ‘‘[u]nless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended the list to be exclusive.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bridgeport Hospitalv. Commission onHumanRights & Opportunities, 232 Conn. 91, 101, 653 A.2d 782 (1995).
The legislative history ofthe exception in § 37-4 demonstrates that, rather than functioning as a limit on the class ofpersonstowhichthe exceptionapplies, namely, pawnbrokers, the phrase, ‘‘as provided in section 21- 44’’ provides a cross-reference to the applicable rate limit for pawnbrokers. The cross-reference initially appearedwhenthe usurystatute was originally enacted in 1907. Public Acts 1907, c. 238. At that time, the pawnbroking statutory scheme had not yet been delineated into separate statutes; see Public Acts 1905, c. 235; so the usury statute cross-referenced the entire chapter of the Public Act that set forth the laws governing the business ofpawnbroking, excluding pawnbrokers from the application of the usury statute. As soon as the pawnbrokingstatutoryschemewassetforthinseparate statutorysections in 1918, however, the cross-reference tothepawnbrokingstatutesinthe usurystatute’s exclusionofpawnbrokerswasmademore specific, expressly referencing the statutory provision that set forth the rate limits governing pawnbrokers. See General Statutes (1918 Rev.) § 4798 (‘‘[n]o person and no firm or corporation or agent thereof, other than a pawnbroker
asprovidedin section3011, shall, as guarantororotherwise, directly or indirectly, loan money to any person and, directly or indirectly, charge, demand, accept or make any agreement to receive, therefor, interest at a rate greater than twelve per centum per annum’’); General Statutes (1918 Rev.) § 3011 (‘‘[p]awnbrokers and loan brokers, and all persons who loan money on the pledge ofpersonal property, are prohibited from taking
or receiving directly or indirectly, for the use ofmoney loaned on personal property, any more than the following rates’’). The most reasonable interpretation of the change in cross-reference is that the legislature took the opportunity to make the cross-reference to thepawnbroking statutes more precise when the different pawnbroking provisions were designated by distinct statutory sections. The most logical choice for a more precise cross-reference, since the usury statute provided that the rate limits set forth therein did not apply to pawnbrokers, was to reference the rate-limiting statute that did applyto pawnbrokers. That is exactlywhat the legislature did in 1918. The same cross-reference is in the statutory text today, and refers to § 21-44 for the rate limits governing pawnbrokers.
Our case law confirms that § 37-4 delineates pawnbrokers as a class of individuals not subject to its rate limit. Specifically, we alreadyhave construedthepredecessorto § 37-4to exclude pawnbrokers as a class from the rate limits set forth therein. In State v. Hurlburt, 82 Conn. 232, 233, 72 A. 1079 (1909), the defendants appealed from thejudgment of conviction for violating the predecessor to § 37-4 (then chapter 238 ofthe 1907 PublicActs)11 onthe basis thatthe statute violatedtheir right to equal protection under both the state and federal constitutions, by restricting the interest rates that
some classes ofpersons could charge, while exempting other classes ofpersons from the rate limits. This court rejected the claim, concluding that there were reasonable bases for the distinctions drawn by the legislature, but the court did not reject the premise on which the claim rested, that the general usury statute excluded pawnbrokers as an entire class from its effect. Instead, this court endorsed that interpretation of the statute. Specifically, as to the exclusion of pawnbrokers as a class from the interest rate limits of the general usury statute, this court stated: ‘‘There was

. . . reasonable
cause for the exception as to pawnbrokers. Their business can only be carried on by those found by public authority to be suitable persons to engage in it, and its character is such as to make it not improper to allow
a charge of interest beyond the limit of [15 percent] a year. Public Acts [1905, c. 235, p. 438].’’ State v. Hurlburt, supra, 234. Hurlburt makes clear that the predecessorto § 37-4distinguishesamongclasses ofindividuals, and that the exclusion in the predecessor to § 37- 4 applies to pawnbrokers as a class, not to one type of transaction in which pawnbrokers might enter. The court inHurlburt grounded its holding on the principle thatthere was areasonable basis forallowingpawnbrokers, as a class, to charge a higher rate than other lenders—in the present case, the rate that is set forth in § 21-44. If the legislature disagreed with this court’s interpretation ofthe predecessor to § 37-4 inHurlburt, it could have amended the usury statute to clarify its intent, as surmised by the majority, that the exclusion in the usury statute functions as one with an elastic scope, expandingand contractinginharmonywith § 21- 44. Instead, by remaining silent, the legislature acquiesced to our reading of the exclusion as one intended to identify a class of individuals excepted from thelimits set forth in § 37-4. My construction of §§ 21-44 and 37-4, which results in the same interest rate limits applying to both pawnbroking loans and repurchase transactions, is also consistent with abasic principle ofusury law, namely, that itisthenature ofthetransaction, ratherthantheparties’ designation, that controls the governing rules. See 53A Am. Jur. 2d 796, Moneylenders and Pawnbrokers § 2 (2006); see also Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 416, 497 P.2d 23 (1972) (‘‘casting a loan transaction in the form of a sale with an option to repurchase will not insulate the transaction from usury laws’’). The majority’s statutory construction, by contrast, violates that basic principle by effectively allowing pawnbrokers to determine which rules govern their transactions by selecting the designation that yields the most favorable rate limits. That is, under the majority’s construction of §§ 21-44 and 37-4, pawnbrokers who wish to charge the higher interest rates allowed under § 21-44 may simply label the transaction a pawnbroking loan.
In summary, I find the majority’s interpretation of § 37-4—that the phrase ‘‘other than a pawnbroker as provided in section 21-44’’ refers only to pawnbroking loans—unpersuasive. That interpretation must take as its starting pointthatthe phrase ‘‘as provided in section 21-44’’ was intended to limit the scope ofthe exception in § 37-4, ratherthan function as apractical cross-reference to the applicable rate limit for pawnbrokers. As I have explained, that assumption is not supported by the plain language ofthe statute, particularly when it is read together with § 37-9. The majority’s interpretation further ignores our prior interpretation of the statute, to which the legislature has acquiesced. State v. Moulton, 310 Conn. 337, 361 n.22, 78A.3d55 (2013) (acknowledging that ‘‘under the doctrine of legislative acquiescence, legislative cognizance ofthe courts’ prior interpretation of [astatute is] presumed, andthe failure ofthe legislature to enact corrective legislation constitute[s] evidence of its agreement with that interpretation’’). The more reasonable reading of § 37-4 is that it excludes pawnbrokers as a class of persons, who continue to be governed by § 21-44, regardless ofwhich
name they append to their transactions, as this court held in Rhodes

. Accordingly, I dissent.

1 The three questions certified by the District Court are as follows: ‘‘1. Does [General Statutes] § 21-44 restrict ‘rates of interest’ chargeable by a pawnbroker, or does it more generally restrict the ‘rates’ chargeable for the

use of money obtained from a pawnbroker in connection with a repurchase transaction? ‘‘2. Did the Connecticut legislature, in its 1997 amendment to

. . . § 21- 44, exempt repurchase transactions and the attendant fees charged from the limits on rates received by pawnbrokers? ‘‘3. Ifso, are repurchase transactions, as described by the court inRhodes

v. [Hartford, 201 Conn. 89, 513 A.2d 124] (1986), considered loans subject to the interest rate limits imposed by [General Statutes] § 37-4?’’

2 General Statutes § 21-44 provides: ‘‘No pawnbroker orperson who loans money on the deposit or pledge of personal property shall take or receive,for the use of money loaned on personal property, any more than the following rates: For the use of money amounting to fifteen dollars or less, five per cent per month or fraction thereof; for the use ofmoney exceeding fifteen dollars in amount and not exceeding fifty dollars in amount, three per cent per month or fraction thereof; for the use ofmoney exceeding fifty dollars in amount, two per cent per month or fraction thereof.’’

3 General Statutes § 37-4 provides: ‘‘No person and no firm or corporation

or agent thereof, other than a pawnbroker as provided in section 21-44, shall, as guarantor or otherwise, directly or indirectly, loan money to any person and, directly or indirectly, charge, demand, accept or make any agreement to receive therefor interest at a rate greater than twelve per cent per annum.’’

4 We read General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 together with General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-45. General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-45 provides: ‘‘No such lender shall sell or dispose ofany personal property left with him in pledge for money loaned in less than six months from the day when the same is left in pledge as aforesaid. All such property shall be sold

or disposed of, at public or private sale, only after advertisement in a daily newspaper published in the town in which such lender carries on business, at least once two days before the date ofthe sale or sales, which advertisement shall state the numbers ofthe pledge tickets representing the property offered for sale, and the date or dates when such tickets were issued.’’

5 It is possible that the legislature believed that, in light ofthe conclusion inRhodes that General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 21-44 applies to repurchase transactions, the phrase ‘‘directly or indirectly’’ was no longer necessary. It is also entirelypossible thatthe legislature viewed the change as a clarifying technical change. See, e.g., HistoricDistrict Commissionv. Hall, 282 Conn. 672, 679n.7, 923A.2d 726 (2007) (notinglegislativehistorydiscussingamendmentthat‘‘wouldclarifyandmakeabroadrange ofsubstantiveandtechnical changesinthelawgoverningtheformationandoperationofhistoric districts created by municipalities’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The truth is that the legislative record does not resolve the ambiguity. It is unnecessary, however, to determine definitively what the legislature did intend, because the onlyquestionpresentediswhetheritis clearthatthe legislature intended to overrule Rhodes by amending § 21-44 in 1997. The absence of clear evidence ofthatintentrequiresusto construethe changeinamannerconsistent withRhodes

. The existence ofreasonable alternative readings ofthe amendment is sufficient.

6 The majority overlooks the fact that the pawnbroking statutes recognize that pawnbrokers engage in outright sales. That is, in addition to referring to purchasing property on condition of selling the same back again at a stipulated price, the pawnbroking statutes also refer to outright purchase transactions, which of course are the transactions most likely to be connected to the flow of stolen goods.

7 The majority’s explanation for the conflation ofthe two terms is unconvincing. The opinion surmises that it is the result of a ‘‘drafting error.’’ See footnote 13 of the majority opinion.

8 The majority inverts the properpresumption that applies when inferring legislative intent to overrule one of our interpretive decisions. Specifically, the majority relies on the fact that the legislature has not amended § 21-44 torefertorepurchasetransactionsassupportforits claimthatthelegislature has therefore failed to make its intent not to overrule Rhodes clear.

9 The mere fact that the definition ofpawnbroker in § 21-39a (1) incorporates the transaction names used by pawnbrokers does not, as claimed by the majority, constitute aclearrejection ofthis court’s recognition inRhodes that the transactions are different in name only; Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. 96; a principle on which the majority relies in its analysis of § 37- 4. Rather, the inclusion of both terms in the definition of the practice of pawnbroking is consistentwiththe evolution ofthepawnbroking statutes as making more clear overtime that repurchase transactions andpawnbroking loans are covered equally by the pawnbroking statutes.
10 General Statutes § 37-9 provides: ‘‘The provisions of sections 37-4, 37- 5 and 37-6 shall not affect: (1) Any loan made prior to September 12, 1911; (2) any loan made by (A) any bank, as defined in section 36a-2, or any outof-state bank, as defined in section 36a-2, that maintains in this state a branch, as defined in section 36a-410, (B) any wholly-owned subsidiary of such bank or out-of-state bank, except a loan for consumer purposes, or (C) any Connecticut credit union, as defined in section 36a-2, or federal credit union, as defined in section 36a-2; (3) any bona fide mortgage ofreal property for a sum in excess of five thousand dollars; (4) (A) any loan, carrying an annual interest rate of not more than the deposit index deter-mined pursuant to subsection (c) of section 49-2a for the calendar year in which the loan is made plus seventeen per cent, made to a foreign or domestic corporation, statutory trust, limited liability company, general, limited or limited liability partnership or association organized for a profit

or any individual, provided such corporation, trust, company, partnership, associationorindividualis engagedprimarilyin commercial, manufacturing, industrial or nonconsumer pursuits and provided further that the funds received by such corporation, trust, company, partnership, association or individual are utilized in such entity’s business or investment activities and

are notutilizedfor consumerpurposes andprovidedfurtherthatthe original indebtedness to be repaid is in excess often thousand dollars but less than

or equal to two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or, in the case of one or
more advances of money of less than ten thousand dollars made pursuant to a revolving loan agreement or similar agreement or a loan agreement providing for the making of advances to the borrower from time to time up to an aggregate maximum amount, the total principal amount ofall loans owing by the borrower to the lender at the time of any such advance is in

excess of ten thousand dollars but less than or equal to two hundred fifty thousand dollars, or (B) any loan made to aforeign or domestic corporation, statutory trust, limited liability company, general, limited or limited liability partnership or association organized for a profit or any individual, provided such corporation, trust, company, partnership, association or individual is engagedprimarilyin commercial, manufacturing, industrial ornonconsumer pursuits and provided further that the funds received by such corporation, trust, company, partnership, association or individual are utilized in such entity’s business or investment activities and are not utilized for consumer purposes and provided further that the original indebtedness to be repaid is in excess oftwo hundred fifty thousand dollars, or, in the case of one or
more advances of money of less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars made pursuant to a revolving loan agreement or similar agreement or a loan agreement providing for the making ofadvances to the borrower from time to time up to an aggregate maximum amount, the total principal amount of allloans owingbythe borrowerto the lenderatthetime ofany such advance is in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars; (5) any obligations, including bonds, notes or other obligations, issued by (A) the state, (B) any municipality, including any city, town, borough, district, whether consolidatedornot, orotherpublicbodycorporate, or (C) anyauthority, instrumentality, public agency or other political subdivision of the state or of a municipality; (6) any loan made by (A) the state, (B) any municipality, including any city, town, borough, district, whether consolidated or not, or other public body corporate, or (C) any authority, instrumentality, public agency or other political subdivision of the state or of a municipality; (7) any loan made forthe purpose offinancing the purchase ofa motorvehicle,

a recreational vehicle or a boat, carrying an interest rate of not more than (A) eighteen per cent per annum on loans made on or after July 1, 1981, and prior to October 1, 1985, and (B) on loans made on or after October 1, 1985, and prior to October 1, 1993, (i) sixteen per cent per annum for

new motor vehicles, recreational vehicles or boats, and (ii) eighteen per cent per annum for used motor vehicles, recreational vehicles or boats, payable in four or more monthly, quarterly or yearly installments which is unsecured or in which a security interest is taken in such property; (8) any loan by an institution of higher education made to an individual for the purpose of enabling attendance at such institution and carrying an interest rate of not more than the greater of (A) the maximum rate then permitted by section 37-4, or (B) a rate which is not more than five per cent in excess of the discount rate, including any surcharge, on ninety-day commercial paper in effect from time to time at the federal reserve bank in the federal

reserve district where such institution is located; (9) any loan made to a plan participant or beneficiary from an employee pension benefit plan as defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Public Law 93-406, as from time to time amended. The provisions of part III of chapter 668 shall not apply to loans made pursuant to subdivision (7) of this section. No provision of this section shall prevent any such bank, outof-state bank, Connecticut credit union or federal credit union or other lender from recovering by an action at law the amount ofthe principal and the interest stipulated orinterest atthe legal rate, ifinterestis not stipulated, in any negotiable instrument which it has acquired for value and in good faith without notice of illegality in the consideration. For the purpose of this section: ‘Interest’ shall not be construed to include attorney’s fees, including preparation ofmortgage deed and note, security agreements, title search, waivers and closing fees, survey charges or recording fees paid by the mortgagor or borrower; ‘consumer purposes’ shall mean the utilization offunds for personal, family or household purchases, acquisitions or uses.’’

11 Chapter 238, § 1, ofthe 1907 Public Acts provides: ‘‘No person, firm, orcorporation, or any agent thereof, other than a national bank or a bank or trustcompanydulyincorporatedunderthelaws ofthisstate orapawnbroker

as provided in chapter 235 of the public acts of 1905, shall directly or indirectly loan money to any person and directly or indirectly charge, demand, accept, or make an agreement to receive therefor, interest at a greater rate than fifteen per centum per annum. The provisions of this section shall not apply to loans made to any national bank or any bank or trust company duly incorporated under the laws of this state, or to any bona fide mortgage of real or personal property.’’