Affirmed and Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions filed October 

29, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00502-CV

CHRISTINE E. REULE, Appellant

V.

M & T MORTGAGE, M & T BANK, BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, 

BAYVIEW FINANCIAL TRADING GROUP, LP, BAYVIEW FINANCIAL 

LP, HUGHS, WATTERS, ASKANASE, LLP, CAROLYN TAYLOR, 

AUDREY LEWIS, JEFF LEVA, SANDY DASIGENIS, AND RLZ 

INVESTMENTS, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2008-75636

D I S S E N T I N G O P I N I O N

How are courts to determine appropriate and just sanctions against a litigant 

who claims to be disabled and says the conduct being sanctioned is the product of a 

disability? This thorny issue is a question of first impression in Texas. The panel 

is divided. Though the majority argues the litigant’s disabilities should play no 
2

role in the sanctions determination, the court disposes of the issue by finding 

briefing waiver.

1

 Under a merits analysis, even assuming the sanctioned conduct 

in this case was not disability-related, but willful and deliberate such that sanctions 

were warranted, the particular sanction imposed—writing rote sentences by 

hand—is demeaning and excessive, thus inappropriate for any litigant. For this 

reason, the trial court’s sanction should not stand.2

Appellant Christine Reule asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing sanctions against her for trial conduct. Her principal complaint is that 

the sanctions are inappropriate and unjust in light of her disabilities. Though 

Reule’s appellate briefing on the point is imperfect, it is sufficient under a liberal 

construction for this court to reach the merits of the sanctions issue. 3 And, doing 

 

1 We must construe appellate briefs reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right to appellate 

review is not lost by waiver. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f); Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d 585, 587 

(Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Because finding briefing waiver is a discretionary call, when a point is 

not well-briefed, the deficiency might preclude appellate review and it might not. See Statewide 

Hydraulics, Inc. v. EZ Mgmt. GP, LLC, No. 14-13-01049, 2015 WL 167160, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (presuming the brief challenged the 

critical findings when no findings specified in legal or factual sufficiency challenge because a 

point must be treated as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included); Elaazami v. 

Lawler Foods, Ltd., No. 14-11-00120-CV, 2012 WL 376687, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] Feb. 7, 2012, no pet.). Depending on context and circumstances, the appellate court can 

choose to find a point waived or it can choose to find that the briefing, though flawed, is 

sufficient under a liberal construction to reach the merits. See Statewide Hydraulics, Inc., 2015 

WL 167160, at *7; Elaazami, 2012 WL 376687, at *6 (noting that appellate courts have 

discretion to determine whether a point of error is waived on appeal due to inadequate briefing).

In this case, the court should choose a merits disposition. 

2

The majority misreads how the dissent would rule on the sanctions issue. See ante at p. 

25. The disposition under this dissenting opinion is not to reverse and remand “because the trial 

judge might not have had the knowledge or expertise to determine whether Reule’s sanctionable 

conduct was disability-related,” as the majority asserts, see ante at p. 25, but rather because the 

handwriting sanction is an inappropriate punishment for any litigant, as other courts have held. 

See Williams v. Tulane Univ. Med. Ctr., 588 So.2d 782, 783 (La. Ct. App. 1991); see also Parker 

v. Progressive Ins. Co., 720 So.2d 408, 412 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Williams for the 

proposition that sanctions may not be demeaning). 

3 Reule asserted in her brief that the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning her 
3

so would model the Supreme Court of Texas’s practice of construing points 

liberally “to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the rights of the 

litigants.”4 Under a merits analysis, the court should reverse the trial court’s 

sanctions order and remand the sanctions issue to the trial court for further 

consideration. Because the court instead affirms the sanctions, I respectfully 

dissent. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellee/defendant Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC filed a motion for 

sanctions seeking to recover attorney’s fees against Reule for litigation conduct 

that occurred during the parties’ six-day trial. Following a hearing on Bayview’s 

motion for sanctions, the trial court ordered Reule to pay monetary sanctions or 

submit to the trial court “a written statement in her own handwriting that states 

100 times that, ‘I will not waste the time of the Court, opposing counsel, jurors or 

court personnel.”5 

Bayview based its request for sanctions on Reule’s “delays throughout the 

trial.” Reule defended against the sanctions, stating, among other things, that she 

has a profound disability and identifying three distinct neurologically-based 

learning disabilities. Reule explained that she has dyslexia, Attention Deficit 

 

because she was sick and disabled. One reason Reule was sanctioned was because she was 

disorganized and inefficient during trial. In her appellate brief, Reule explains that the cause was 

her disabilities. Reule relies on the appropriate legal standard—abuse-of-discretion—and argues 

that in this situation there was no good cause to impose sanctions against her. And, she asserts 

the sanctions are excessive. Given the context and circumstances, this court should opt to 

dispose of the sanctions issue on the merits. See Statewide Hydraulics, 2015 WL 167160, at *7;

Elaazami, 2012 WL 376687, at *6. 

4

Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989) (noting “it is our 

practice to construe liberally points of error in order to obtain a just, fair and equitable 

adjudication of the rights of the litigants”).

5

Emphasis added.
4

Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and a processing disability. Reule argued that 

the sanctions were not warranted because she “didn’t do anything deliberately.” 

The hearing on the sanctions motion was brief. Reule, who had not before 

identified her dyslexia or ADHD, pointed to these and other disabilities as an 

explanation for the conduct. The trial judge did not respond to Reule’s disabilities 

explanation other than to state the monetary sanction was a conservative amount. 

The trial court signed an order for Reule to pay $900 in monetary sanctions, later 

amending the order to include the handwriting option as a means to avoid payment 

of the monetary sanctions. No party or counsel requested the handwriting 

sanction. Reule objected to the sanctions order. 

SANCTIONS ANALYSIS

An appellate court reviews the imposition of sanctions for an abuse of 

discretion.6 The test is whether the trial court acted without reference to guiding 

rules and principles because its ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.7 

Sanctions may be imposed for a variety of reasons—to enforce compliance 

with the relevant rules, to punish violators, to compensate the aggrieved party 

forced to incur costs to respond to baseless pleadings, or to deter other litigants 

from similar misconduct.8 The Supreme Court of Texas has cited factors helpful in 

 

6

Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); Corea v. Bilek, 

362 S.W.3d 820, 824 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.)(abuse-of-discretion standard of 

review applies to actions for sanctions under the trial court’s inherent powers); see In re S.M.V., 

287 S.W.3d 435, 442 (Tex. App.—Dallas, no pet.).

7 Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Downer v. 

Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985)).

8 Mann v. Kendall Home Builders Constr. Partners I., Ltd., 464 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
5

guiding the process of determining a penalty for sanctionable behavior.9 The 

factors include the offender’s good or bad faith, the degree of willfulness or 

negligence involved in the offense, and the offender’s knowledge or experience. 

In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, a reviewing court is to 

conduct a two-part inquiry to ensure that the sanctions are appropriate and just.10 

First, there must be a direct relationship between the improper conduct and the 

sanction imposed.11 Second, courts must ensure that less severe sanctions would 

not have been sufficient to promote compliance.12 No Texas case addresses how 

these general principles apply in the context of a disabled litigant who claims the 

sanctioned conduct was not deliberate or willful but disability-related. The first 

step in the general analysis, though, focuses on the blameworthiness of the litigant, 

a consideration that goes to the core of the issue presented. 

 Bayview’s counsel described the delays for which Reule was sanctioned as 

due in part to Reule’s lack of organization and inefficiency in dealing with 

documents. He explained how counsel had to take breaks so that Reule could 

gather her exhibits, and he complained that she took too long with them, describing 

how she “sat there and went page by page.” The case involved more than fifty 

exhibits, over 600 pages of documentary evidence. The print on many of the 

documents is in small font and single spaced, with dense paragraphs. The time 

Reule spent working with documents delayed the trial. Throughout the 

proceeding, the judge as well as defense counsel, endured tedious interruptions and 

down-time, at one point taking a nearly two-and-a-half hour break during direct 

 

9

Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 620 n. 5 (Tex. 2007).

10 See Am. Flood Research, Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 583.

11 Id.

12 See id.
6

examination so that Reule could compile needed exhibits.13 Defense counsel 

concluded that the trial judge “may have been fed up” and sent the jury home 

because Reule was “unable to proceed with her case even though it was in the 

middle of her examination.” In its sanctions motion, Bayview asserted that Reule 

wasted nine hours due to her lack of organization. At the sanctions hearing, 

Bayview’s counsel estimated that Reule probably made “a two to three day trial 

into a six day trial.” 

According to Reule, disorganization and inability to review documents 

efficiently are an inherent part of being dyslexic and having ADHD and processing 

problems. At the sanctions hearing, no one contested Reule’s disabilities.14

The fact pattern in today’s case is unusual in that the sanctioned litigant does 

not dispute the trial conduct for which she was sanctioned nor does she take the 

position that she did not understand what was expected of her at trial. Her defense 

is rooted in a professed lack of capacity to do what was required. The issue before 

the trial court and now before this court is whether the sanctioned trial conduct is 

the product of the litigant’s disabilities rather than willful and deliberate behavior. 

The main point of departure between the majority and the dissent is how to make 

that determination.

The Thorny Problem of Sanctioning Individuals with Disabilities

Is a litigant’s disability a relevant consideration in a sanctions analysis? If 

 

13 At times during the course of the litigation, Reule made remarks that showed a lack of 

respect for the trial court. But these remarks were neither the grounds for the sanctions motion 

nor the basis for the sanctions order. 

14 On appeal, the majority questions Reule’s disabilities, but the movant for sanctions did 

not dispute them. The record shows Reule receives social security disability benefits, though it 

is unclear whether these benefits are for the ADHD, dyslexia, learning disabilities, processing

disabilities, fibromyalgia, some combination of these disabilities, or for something else. 
7

so, what is the test for determining if the sanctioned conduct is disability-related? 

What is the test for determining whether a litigant is truly disabled? How is the 

trial court to determine the effect of a disability on a litigant’s conduct? If 

sanctions are warranted, what must the trial court do to ensure the sanction is 

appropriate and just in light of the litigant’s disability? These and other issues 

surround the thorny problem of sanctioning individuals with disabilities. 

The majority suggests that the trial judge could and did make the 

determination of whether the sanctioned conduct is disability-related based on 

Reule’s litigation conduct as a whole.15 This approach is problematic. What if the 

trial judge does not have the knowledge or expertise to determine whether the 

sanctioned conduct is disability-related? 

The majority’s approach might work in some cases, but not in all. As 

factfinder, the trial judge must discern between defiance and inability. Consider, 

for example, the litigant who fails to rise when the judge enters the courtroom. Is 

the litigant acting in defiance of proper courtroom demeanor? Or, is the litigant 

physically unable to perform the task? A judge must know the difference before 

imposing sanctions. Sometimes it is easy to tell. A wheelchair, for example, 

provides a visible and familiar sign of a litigant’s physical disability. The 

wheelchair instantly alerts the judge that the litigant’s failure to rise is not an act of 

defiance or disrespect, but an inability to do so due to a physical disability. Not all 

disabilities are so obvious.

When a litigant’s disability is not apparent, discerning between oppositional

behavior and inability is harder. A disability is sometimes masked by a seemingly 

normal exterior, and that sometimes causes observers to draw the wrong inferences 

 

15 See ante at p.26.
8

about a litigant’s behavior. The challenge for the trial judge is to discern between 

oppositional behavior and disability. For instance, consider the inferences a court 

might draw if a litigant who suffered from Tourette’s Syndrome punctuated his 

trial testimony with inappropriate outbursts that included vocal and vulgar slurs 

seemingly directed to the judge, opposing counsel, or jurors. On the surface, the 

behavior is outrageous, offensive, and utterly inappropriate. But, the analysis 

would surely change if the litigant disclosed that he suffered from a neurological 

disorder characterized by involuntary tics and vocalizations and often the 

compulsive utterance of obscenities.16

A trial judge ignorant of the disability and its unusual manifestations might 

hold such a disruptive litigant in contempt of court for foul language and 

unacceptable conduct. Yet, despite appearances, the litigant’s inappropriate 

outbursts would be the product of a disability, not oppositional behavior, defiance, 

or disrespect. Sanctioning such a litigant for uncontrollable outbursts would be 

every bit as wrong as sanctioning a paraplegic litigant for failing to rise when the 

judge entered the courtroom. Disabilities are no less real because they are 

invisible.

General Sanctions Principles Applied to the Disabled Litigant

General principles from sanctions jurisprudence suggest that if a court is 

considering imposing sanctions on a litigant alleging a disability, the court first 

must consider whether the litigant’s behavior is the product of defiance, which is 

sanctionable, or the product of disability, which is not.17 If the court determines 

 

16 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1831 (3d ed. 2010). The above hypothetical 

illustration is not to be read substantively as support for the nature or properties of Tourette’s 

Syndrome. The example is provided to illustrate the point, not for the technical accuracy of the 

description or application. 

17 See generally Am. Flood Research Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 583 (holding that a trial court 
9

that the litigant is acting willfully and deliberately, the court then must consider if 

the sanction contemplated is appropriate and just in light of the litigant’s 

disability.18 The legal standard recognizes the key difference between knowing 

what is expected and having the capacity to do it. Echoing this legal standard, 

Reule asserted that her actions were not deliberate. At the sanctions hearing, Reule 

defended against the sanctions motion by telling the trial court that she had “a 

profound disability that she was trying to deal with.” She mentioned three learning 

disabilities at the hearing. Responding to the complaints about the additional time 

it took her to work with the exhibits, Reule stated, “I’m dyslexic and I have a 

processing disability.” Reule was attempting to explain how she was overwhelmed 

with the stress from the trial when she stopped mid-sentence because she noticed 

the trial judge already was signing a sanctions order. She had not yet finished her 

explanation. 

The record does not reflect how dyslexia, ADHD, or learning and processing 

disabilities impact an individual’s ability to read and review documents efficiently 

or how these disabilities might have impacted Reule’s organizational failures and 

inefficiencies at trial. Yet, not all of the sanctioned shortcomings raise the same 

level of concern. It is one thing to sanction a disabled litigant for chronic tardiness 

to court. (There is no problem with that; everyone needs to be on time.) But, it is 

quite another to sanction a dyslexic individual for not reading documents fast 

enough during trial.19

The sanctions motion and hearing dealt exclusively with Reule’s behavior at 

 

imposing sanctions is obligated to ensure that the sanctions are appropriate and just).

18 Id.

19 The trial court did not allocate the sanctions among Reule’s various failures. 
10

trial. The majority’s litigation-conduct-as-a-whole approach to resolving the 

sanctions issue does not take into account the nature of the disabilities or the nexus, 

if any, between the disabilities and the sanctioned conduct, subjects that are 

typically beyond the knowledge of judges. Suppose in the Tourette’s Syndrome 

hypothetical, the trial judge, knowing nothing about the disability, had followed 

the majority’s litigation-as-a-whole model and concluded that the litigant had 

conducted himself properly for years without incident and so the obscenity-laced 

trial testimony must not have been disability-related. Or, suppose the record 

reflected that the litigant had testified in that offensive manner at every hearing in 

the case, spurring the judge to conclude the conduct was a matter of habit and not 

disability. Drawing inferences in this context can be unfair to individuals with 

disabilities, especially if they are pro se litigants who lack the financial means or 

legal know-how to make a showing that might persuade the court otherwise. 

The majority’s hostility to the notion that Reule’s disabilities played any role 

in the sanctioned conduct exemplifies the problem inherent in judges, unaided by 

medical expertise, drawing inferences and making judgments about disabilities 

based only on observations. In this context, judges do not know what they do not 

know. 

The majority makes observations about how Reule conducted herself over 

the course of the litigation and suggests that her pattern of conduct alone is enough 

to decide that sanctions are warranted, without regard to her disabilities. Given the 

technical subject matter (neurologically-based disabilities), more is needed to 

decide if there is a disability nexus. The undeniable reality is that judges typically 

will not know enough about a given disability or its manifestations to make a 

sound determination. This lack of knowledge also may prove problematic in 

deciding the appropriate sanction, should the court conclude that the litigant (or 
11

lawyer) is disabled but the conduct is not the product of the disability.

A trial court imposing sanctions must ensure that the sanctions are 

appropriate and just.20 A sanction that may be appropriate and just in one 

circumstance can be inappropriate and unjust in another. As part of the trial 

court’s duty to impose only appropriate and just sanctions, the trial court has an 

affirmative obligation to see that the sanction it chooses is appropriate and just 

based on the circumstances presented to the court. No matter how bad the 

litigation misconduct might be, it would be wrong to sanction a disabled litigant by 

ordering the litigant to do an activity that strikes at the heart of the litigant’s 

disability. Without a proper understanding of the disability, a judge might select a 

medically inappropriate sanction out of ignorance or oversight and unwittingly 

subject the disabled litigant to idiosyncratic difficulties (including physical pain) 

that would not be a problem for a litigant who did not have that disability. If a 

judge were to make such a selection, the sting of the disability-striking sanction 

would hardly be dulled because the judge did not intend the result. 

The selection of unconventional sanctions for disabled litigants presents 

risks. The problem and potential abuse of discretion rests not in the judge’s failure 

to know the particulars of the litigant’s ailments and their manifestations, but in the 

judge’s meting out the unconventional sanction without first finding out how it 

might affect the sanctioned individual given the disabilities disclosed. 

When a judge imposes sanctions on a disabled litigant (or lawyer), what is

required to determine the potential impact of the sanction on the disabled 

individual? Where do the burdens and presumptions fall? The disabled litigant is 

in the best position to know the likely impact of the sanction, but if the burden to 

 

20 Am. Flood Research Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 583.
12

show why the sanction is inappropriate falls on the disabled litigant, the costs 

associated with making the showing would render the task impossible, or at least 

unfeasible, for many disabled litigants, especially the self-represented and indigent 

ones. 

The Need for a More Tailored Legal Framework

While the existing sanctions factors provide a broad framework for guiding 

courts in making sanctions determinations, our jurisprudence would benefit from a 

more tailored legal framework, and perhaps special rules and procedures, for 

navigating the difficult issues that arise in sanctioning litigants and lawyers who 

allege disabilities. Ideally, these would take into account the individual’s 

particular disabilities, provide practical tools for all trial participants to better 

manage litigation expectations, and give the trial court a better framework to 

analyze the various issues before sanctioning disabled litigants or lawyers who 

increase system costs and burden system resources. Concerns about litigants like 

Reule taxing our legal system, championed in the concurring opinion, are 

important, yet there are also other, equally compelling considerations that impact 

large populations of disabled individuals. 

Litigants (and lawyers) with disabilities must overcome challenges their 

courtroom counterparts might never experience. Sometimes it takes disabled 

individuals longer to complete litigation tasks. Punishing them for causing 

disability-related delays is not the answer. If an individual lacks the capacity to 

change the behavior because of a disability, sanctions will not deter the unwanted 

conduct. In addressing the problem, courts must strike a balance between the 

special requirements of the disabled individual, the needs of other litigants, and the 

everyday demands of busy court dockets. And, judges must do so in a way that is 
13

compatible with the administration of justice.

Our legal system is best served when judges and lawyers make allowances

for individuals with special needs. In today’s case, both the trial court and 

opposing counsel granted Reule extensions on pretrial deadlines. When the exhibitnumbering requirements proved too challenging for Reule, the trial court modified 

them. When Reule was unable to locate exhibits during trial, the trial court and 

opposing counsel provided copies. When Reule needed to make changes to her 

exhibit list, they helped. Had Reule disclosed her dyslexia, ADHD, and other 

learning disabilities at some point before trial rather than waiting until the 

sanctions hearing, the trial court would have been better equipped to plan the 

proceeding and manage expectations. Reule could have made the trial court aware 

of how her disabilities were likely to affect her ability to perform at trial, giving the 

court an opportunity to address and perhaps minimize the difficulties before trial 

commenced. Still, under existing guidelines, Reule’s failure to disclose her 

disabilities before trial, or to request accommodations, does not preclude her from 

raising them in defense of a sanctions motion.21

A pro se disabled litigant overwhelmed by the magnitude of trial preparation 

can make a legal proceeding especially vexing for skilled professionals whose 

experience and training, if matched on the other side, would bring things to a

speedier conclusion. As this case illustrates, a single litigant’s lack of 

organization, attention, and agility can make a trial an irksome experience for all 

other participants. There is no denying that people with disabilities can slow 

things down—some do not move as quickly, some do not see or hear as clearly, 

and some do not read as easily. Yet, how we treat disabled individuals who appear 

 

21 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (stating that to preserve error for appeal, party must make 

timely and sufficiently specific objection in trial court). See also TransAmerican Natural Gas 

Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917–18 (Tex. 1991).
14

in our courtrooms says much about what we value in our legal system. 

There is no question that making allowances for individuals with special 

needs often produces inefficiencies and annoyances. But, at what point does our 

drive to get rid of these vexations yield to higher objectives? Though disabilityrelated delays and inefficiencies sometimes mean increased attorney’s fees for one 

side or the other, at what point do these costs become part of the inherent costs of a

justice system that is open to all? The existing sanctions guidelines and factors are 

helpful in analyzing the issues, but they do not adequately address the thorny 

problem of sanctioning the disabled litigant. 

We need a legal standard that both recognizes the special needs of 

individuals with disabilities and fosters litigation efficiency. The standard needs to 

be a workable one that will root out imposters and adequately protect the truly 

disabled, especially the indigent disabled. In a world where access to justice is 

becoming increasingly challenging for the poor, the numbers of indigent disabled 

in our courtrooms is sure to grow. There is a clear and compelling need for 

disabled litigants to be able to make disability showings in a reliable yet practical 

way. Resources are scarce. Proof is costly. And, fairness is paramount. Even 

though the outcome of this appeal does not turn on the thorny issue of sanctioning 

the disabled litigant,22 it is important to raise these concerns and ask the hard 

questions so that we can address the challenges. The legal standard that ultimately 

 

22 The majority’s conclusion that this dissent turns on the disability issue is puzzling. See 

ante at p. 25. The outcome under this dissent rests solely on the impropriety of the handwriting 

sanction under existing law rather than on the disability issue or the application of any new rule 

or procedure to address it. Because the sanctions order can and should be reversed on the basis 

that the handwriting sanction is demeaning, excessive, and inappropriate, disposition of the issue 

does not require the fashioning today of a new legal framework that appropriately balances the 

needs of disabled litigants with the demands of the justice system. This part of the dissent 

functions much like a concurring opinion, the purpose of which is to raise awareness of an 

emerging issue and highlight the jurisprudential considerations that surround it. 
15

develops will reach far beyond today’s case.

On this record, we have nothing that tells us whether the sanctioned trial 

behavior is disability-related. Nor does the record reveal whether the trial court 

properly considered the possibility that Reule’s disabilities contributed to the 

delays for which she was sanctioned. But, even assuming that the trial court 

rightly determined that the sanctioned conduct was willful and deliberate rather 

than disability-related, the trial court’s imposition of sanctions still constitutes an 

abuse of discretion because the handwriting sanction was neither appropriate nor 

just.23

Handwriting Rote Sentences: A Foul Choice for Litigation Sanctions

Reule argues the sanctions are excessive. To determine whether sanctions 

are excessive, a reviewing court necessarily must consider the particular sanction 

imposed.24 

The aim of sanctions is to deter, punish, and compensate, not to shame or 

humiliate. It is wrong to order a litigant—disabled or not—to do a demeaning 

activity as a sanction for litigation misconduct.25 As other courts have observed, 

handwriting sanctions are not only demeaning, but also pointless.26 They serve no 

valid purpose.27 Traditional sanctions, such as those provided in the Texas Rules 

 

23 See Am. Flood Research, Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 583.

24 See Hamill v. Level, 917 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. 1996); White v. Zhou Pei, 452 S.W.3d 

527, 545–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

25 Williams, 588 So.2d at 783 (holding that sanctioning of the plaintiff’s attorney to write 

50 times legibly, in his own handwriting, provisions of Louisiana law, was not appropriate, 

setting aside sanction, and remanding for assessment of appropriate sanction); see also Parker,

720 So.2d at 412 (citing Williams for the proposition that sanctions may not be demeaning). 

26 Williams, 588 So.2d at 783 (noting that handwriting sanctions are demeaning and serve 

no utilitarian purpose).

27 Id.
16

of Civil Procedure (or otherwise recognized by the Supreme Court of Texas) 

achieve deterrence, punishment, and compensation objectives while also 

preserving the dignity of the sanctioned individual and promoting public 

confidence in the fairness of our justice system. 

Ordering a litigant to pay monetary sanctions or else perform a demeaning 

activity is not within a judge’s discretion.28 In exercising its power to sanction, a 

court should not make the sanctioned litigant choose between losing dollars and 

losing dignity. For some litigants, it is a false choice. 

Reule is indigent.29 When the sanctioned litigant has no money, the 

monetary alternative is meaningless. Thus, the trial court’s order imposing 

sanctions on Reule is no less an abuse because the handwriting option is presented 

as an alternative to the monetary sanctions. If anything, heaping costs and 

attorney’s fees on an indigent litigant while offering the demeaning chore as a 

coercive substitute for payment exacerbates rather than lessens the abuse of 

discretion. And, the sanction undermines equal application of the law. Nonmonetary, non-demeaning alternatives are available. Sanctions that belittle and 

debase, whether ordered outright or as an alternative, are excessive, inappropriate, 

 

28 Reule complains in her appellate briefing that the sanctions are excessive and that the 

trial court abused its discretion in imposing them. The majority asserts that Reule did not argue 

the handwriting alternative was an abuse of discretion. But, appellate courts are to treat an issue 

or point as covering every subsidiary question that is fairly included in the issue or point. 

Weingarten Realty Investors v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 93 S.W.3d 280, 284 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Reule’s issue requires this court to determine whether the 

trial court abused its discretion by issuing a sanction that included a handwriting alternative 

because that is covered within Reule’s argument that the sanction is an abuse of discretion. See 

id. The appropriate-and-just determination is the heart of the inquiry. See Am. Flood Research 

Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 583.

29 Reule established her indigency in the trial court. The county did not dispute Reule’s 

indigency status either in the trial court or on appeal. Though the trial court found Reule’s 

indigency affidavit defective and ordered her to pay costs, Reule proved her indigency status and 

this court allowed her to proceed without paying costs. See Tex. R. App. P. 20.1(f). 
17

and unjust. They have no place in Texas courts. 

CONCLUSION

When a trial judge deciding a sanctions motion stands at the intersection of 

litigant-caused inefficiencies and that litigant’s disability, the judge ought not 

impose sanctions unless and until the judge has fair assurance that the conduct is 

not a product of the disability. A workable legal framework for making that 

determination has yet to be developed and, as demonstrated today, the challenge is 

to balance an assortment of considerations that may point in different directions in 

all but the simplest case. In this appeal, nothing in the record suggests the trial 

court considered the possibility that Reule’s disabilities contributed to the trial 

behavior for which she was sanctioned. Only moments passed between Reule’s 

identification of her disabilities and the trial court’s swift imposition of sanctions. 

But, assuming that the trial court properly determined that the sanctioned conduct 

was not disability-related and that sanctions were warranted, there is still reason to 

reverse and remand the sanctions issue to the trial court: Texas law requires the

sanction to be appropriate and just, and the handwriting sanction is neither.30

/s/ Kem Thompson Frost

Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and McCally (McCally, J., 

majority) (Boyce, J., concurring). 

 

30 See Am. Flood Research, Inc., 192 S.W.3d at 583; Williams, 588 So.2d at 783.