T he H onorabl e Raner C . C o l l i ns, D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he U

. S. D i s t r i ct * C o urt f o r t he D i st ri ct of A ri zo na, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v. P ED R O C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 12-30233

D.C. No. 2:12-cr- 02027- WFN-1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Washington Wm. FremmingNielsen, Senior District Judge , Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 11, 2013—Seattle, Washington Filed June 3, 2013
Be fore : A. Wallace Ta shima and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit J udg es, and Rane r C. Colli ns, District J udg e. *

Opinion by

J udg e Callaha

nU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw Affir ming a conviction and sentenc e for failingto reg ister under the S ex Offende r Reg istration and Notification Act ( S O R N A ) , th e p an e l h e l d

th atC o n gr e s s h a s th e a utho ri ty under the Commerce Clause to e nact SORNA and to re quire the def endant, a convict ed sex offende r who traveled interstate, to re g ister as a

sex offender

. Th e pa ne l als o h e ld t

hat th e de fe nd ant’ s a dmi ssi on in h is ple a a gre e me nt that the vic tim of his se xua l abu se wa s una ble to consent because of her intox ication i s sufficie nt, under the modified categ orica l a

pproac h, to rende r his state convic tion un de r O r. Re v. Stat. § 26 3. 42 5 ( 19 98 ) a c ri me of se xua l a bu se pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2242, thereby rende ringhim a Tier I I Is ex o ff en d er ats en t en ci n g.

CO UN SEL
Rebec ca L . Pennell, Fe dera l Defe nders of Eastern Was hin g ton

& I da ho , Y akim a , Wa sh ington , f or De fe ndantAp pe lla nt.
M i c h a e l C

. O r

m s b y , Un i t e d S t a t e s A tt o r n e y , an d A l i s o nL. Gre g oire (a

rgued), A ssistant United St ates Attorne y , Yakima, Washington, for

Plaintiff-Appellee

.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 3

C abre r a rai s es a t hi r d i s s ue: whet her t he gover nment i mp r op er l y deni ed 1 hi m a t hi rd le v e l o f red uct i o n f o r accep t ance o f

res p o nsi b i l i t y unde r t he U n i t ed St at es Se n t en ci n g G u i del i n es § 3E1. 1( b)

. H owe v er , C ab rera reco gni zes t hat we reject ed t h is p o si t i o n i n Uni t ed St at es v
. J ohns on , 5 8 1 F.3d 99 4 , 10 0 1 (9t h C i r. 20 0 9 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat “ the a llocati o n and expen di t ur e of

p r ose cut ori al r es our ces f or t he pur po s es of

def endi ng an appe al i s a r at i on al ba s i s f or de cl i n i n g t o mov e f or t h e t h i r d r edu ct i on p o i nt ”), and t hat our t hree- judge pa nel i s f

o recl o sed f

rom reconsi d eri ng the issu e
. See Uni t ed St at es v
. G ay , 96 7 F.2d 32 2 , 32 7 (9t h C i r. 19 9 2 ). T hu s , Cab r er a h as r ai s ed t he i s s ue t o pres er ve i t s houl d t he l aw c han ge.

OP IN ION
CAL LAHAN, Circ uit J udg e: Pe dr o Ca

br e ra -Guti e rr e z (“ Ca

br e ra”) a

pp e a ls h is conviction and se ntence fo r failing to re g ister under the Sex Offe nder Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA” ). On appea l he adva

nces two a

rgu m en ts. First, he a sserts that Con gre ss l a c ke d a

uth ority un de r the Comme rc e Cla us e to compel his reg istration as a sex offend er . Second, he c o nt e n d s th ath e s h o u l d

h av e b e e ns e nt e n c e d

a s a T i e r I, ra the r t ha n a Ti e r I I I , sex of

fe nd e r. We h old

that Co ngre ss has authority

under the Commerce Clause to compel Cabre ra, a convic ted sex offende r who tra veled inter state, to reg ister under SORNA. We also hold t h at under the modified cate g orica l approa ch, Cabre ra’ s plea to the state cha rg e of sexual ab u s e rendere d him a Tier I I Isex offender

. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm Cabr era ’s conviction and se ntence

. 1
I
Cabrer a wa s born in Mexi co and has bee n remove d from the United States seve ra l t i mes. In 1998, Cabrer a wa sU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 4

c onvic te d in

Or e go n o f s e c on d d e gre e se xua l a ssa ult . In h is guilty plea state ment, Cabrer a admitted:
Ion May 2, 1998 did knowingly have se x ual intercour se with [redac ted] and she w as unable to leg ally

consent to having sex ual intercour se with me beca use she was un der the influenc e of a lcohol at the time of the sexual interc ourse. Fur

ther [reda cted] was 15 year s old on May

2, 1998.
Cabrer a wa s sentence d to 36 months’ im p risonment and require d to reg ister as a

sex offender . When Cabrer a wa s rele ased f rom custody in Septe mber 2000, he was a dvised of his responsibility

to re gi s t er a s a sex offende r under Ore g on law and pr omptly

remove d to Mex ico.
On F e br ua ry 3, 20 12 , Ca

br e ra wa s arr est ed for

a tr a ff ic vi ol atio n in

Ya kim a , Wa sh ington . H e wa s su bs e qu e ntl y ch ar ged in the district court with failingto reg ister as a sex offe nder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Specifica lly , the indictment alleg ed that Cabre ra w as an ind i v i dual who wa s re qu i r e d t o r e g i s t e r un d e r S O R N A , an d h av i n g tr av e le d in int e rs tate c omm e rc e , d id k no wi ng ly fa il t o r e g ist e r i n violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. The indictment fur ther a lleg ed that Cabrer a had f

ail ed to meet his reg istration obligation duringa period of time from F ebrua ry 3, 2011, th ro u gh Februar y 3, 2012.
Ca br e ra fi le d a mot ion to dis mis s, arguin g that Co ngre ss lacke d authority t o re quire him to reg ister as a sex offender

. T h e d i s tri ctco urtd en i ed th e m o t i o n , n o t i n g th atal th o u gh United States v. Ge orge , 625 F.3d 1124 ( 9th Cir. 2010), had been va cate d, 672 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2012), “the Court f indsU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 5 the reasoningin George persua sive and notes that the opinion was va cate d on differ ent grounds.” The rea fter, Ca brer a e nte re d a c on dit ion a l pl e a

of guil ty , p re se rv inghis ri ght t o a pp e a l th e de nia l of

his mot ion

to d ism iss

. A Pre-S entence Investig ation Report (“ PSR ”) w as prepa red which listed Cabre ra’s offe nse leve l as 16 under Un ite d St ate s Se nte nc ingGuid e lin e s § 2A 3. 5( a )( 1) be c a us e he was require d to r eg ister as a Tier I I Isex offender . Cabrer a ob je c te d to the PSR. He argue d that hi s p ri or c onvic tio n o nly qualified him as a T ier I

sex offender , not a Tier I I Ioffe nder, beca use his Oreg on conviction was not c ompara ble to, or more seve re than, “ag gravated s exual abuse or se x ual abuse ,” as def ined in 42 U.S.C. § 16 9 1 1

. The district cour t rejec ted this argument noting that Cabrer a’s guilty plea a dmitted that the g irl was intox icated a nd 15 year s old. T he cour t ga ve Cabrer a cr edit for time ser ved on a prior convic tion and sentenc ed him to 17 months i n prison wi th three year s of supervised r elea se. Cabre ra f iled a timely

not i ce of appea l from his conviction and se ntence

. II
We first review

the district court’s de nial of Cabre ra’ s motion to dismiss the i ndictment. We reviewthat decision de novo. Un ite d S

tates. v . M

ilo v an ov ic , 6 78 F .3 d 7 13 , 7 19 (9 th Cir . 2 01 2) (e n b anc ); United States v. Mark s , 379 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
Ca br e ra argues th at SO RN A r e qu ir e s se x off e nd e rs to register their name s, addre sses, employ ment or school information, and to appear in person at lea st once a year for verific ation of their infor

mation. This, Cabrera

asser ts, is an unconst itutional regulation of his inactivity under theU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 6 Supreme Court’s re cent opinion in National Fede ration of Indepe ndent Business v. Se belius , – U. S . –, 132 S. Ct . 2566 (2012). Cabr era ac cepts that Congre ss has broad pow ers under the Commerce Clause, but points outthat in Sebelius , theCourt state d th at “ [c]o ns tr

uin gtheComme rc e Cla

us e to p e r m i tC o n gr e s s t o r e gu l a t e i n d i v i d u a l s p r e c i s e l y be c ause the y aredo ing no thi ng wo uld op e n a n e w a nd po te nti a lly

va st domain to congressional a uthority .” Id

. at 2587. C abre ra further argues that, unlike the Aff ordable Care A ct, SORNA has nothingto do with commerce . Its purpose is to “protec t the publ ic from sex offe nders and offe nders a g ainst children.” 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 1 6 9 0 1

. H e ar gu e s th atth i s p ur p o s e , wh ile laudable, is not an a

ppropriate purpose unde r the Commerc e Clause bec ause public sa fety measure s lie exclusively in the re a lm o f t he State s. In anti c ip ati o n o f th e g o v e r nme nt’ s r e li an c e o n“an a dd iti on a l jurisd ic tio na l ho ok ,” su c h a s tr ave l a c ross stat e lines, Cabrer a argues that SORNA re quires all sex offende rs to reg iste r, reg ardle ss of trave l, and that the duty to reg ister un de r S OR

NApr e c e de s any

a c t of tr ave l. Thus , he c ontin

ue s, “SORNA would hold an individual who fa ils to reg ister, trave ls and then re g isters equa lly responsible a s an individual who neve r reg isters, befor e or afte r trave l.” He a rgues, citing S eb eli us , 132 S. Ct . at 2590, that “the proposition that Congr ess may

dictate c onduct of a n i n d ividual today [i .e., reg isteringas a se x o ffe nder] beca use of pr ophesied futur e activity [i .e., interstate trav el ] fi nds no support in the applicable Commerce Clause prec edent.” Cabrer a conc ludes that beca use C o n gress lacks the power to require an ind ivi du a l to re g ist e r a s a se x off e nd e r, it f

ol lows tha

t it cann ot penalize him for fa iling to re g ister, eve n if he ha s trave led in interstate c ommerce
.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 7 Cabrer a’s a

rguments may

be cr eative but they

are not persua sive. In United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme Court re cognized three broa d cat egorie s of act iv it y th at C o n gr e s s ma

y r e gu lateun d e r

it s c o mme rce power : (1) “Congress may regulate the use of the cha nnels of int e rs tat e co mme rc e ;” (2 ) “ Con gre ss i s e mpo we re d to re gu late and

pr ote c t th e ins tr

ume nta lit ie s o f i nte rs tate commerc e, or persons or things in i nterstate c ommerce , even tho ugh th e thr e at ma

y c omeon ly

fr om i nt ras tate a c tiv iti e s;” and (3 ) “ Con gre ss’ c omm e rc e a uth ority inc lud e s th e po we r t o re gulate tho se a c tiv iti e s h avin ga su bs tanti a l r elatio n to interstate c ommerce .” Id. at 558– 59 . The g ov e rnme nt a sse rt s that th e r e qu ir e me nt o f inte r s tate tr av e l me e ts “ th e f irst two c at e g o r i e s o f

C o n gr e s s ’ s C o mm e r c e C l a u s e a uth o r i ty, be c a us e an inte rs tate tr ave le r i s b oth a person “ in i nte rs tate c omm e rc e ” and

on e wh o u se s the “ c ha nn e ls o f i nte rs tate commerc e.”
W e h el di n George , 625 F.3d at 1130, vacate d on other grounds , 672 F.3d 1126, that “Congress had the power under its broa d commerc e clause authority to e nact th e S ORNA,” and we now reaff

irm that holding, whic h has bee n embra ced by our fe llow circuits. In George , we e x plained:
SORNA was ena cted to keep tra ck of se x offe nders. See Carr v. U ni ted States , –

U. S. –, 130 S. Ct . 2229, 2240, 176 L . Ed

. 2d 1152 (2010) ( “[SORNA wa s] ena cted to a ddress the defic iencies in prior law that had enabled se x offe nders to slip thro u gh the cr acks.” ). Such offe nders a

re r equ ired to “r eg ister, and ke ep reg istrat i on curr ent, in eac h jurisdiction” wh e r e th e o f

f e n d e r l i v e s , w o r

k s , o r g oe s to school. 42 U.S.C. § 169 1 3 (a). As stated byU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 8

S e e Un ited S ta te s v . G o u ld , 56 8 F.3d 45 9 , 47 1 (4t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ho l d i ng 2 “t hat § 2 2 5 0 (a) d o es no t vi o l at e t he C o m m erce C l ause”); Uni t ed St at es v. W ha l ey , 577 F. 3d 254, 258 ( 5t h Ci r
. 2009) (s t at i ng “ [ t ] h r ou g h § 2250, C o n g re ss h a s fo rb id d e n se x o ff e n d e rs fro m u sin g the c h a n n e ls o f i n te rs ta te comme r ce t o e v ade t h ei r r eg i s t r at i on r equ i r eme n t s , a n d w e h av e n o dou bt tha t i t wa s w ithin it s p o w e r u n d e r th e C o m m e rc e C la u se to d o so ” ); Uni t ed St at es v. H i nckl ey , 55 0 F.3d 92 6 , 94 0 (10 t h C i r. 20 0 8 ) ( st at i ng “ [b]y requir i ng t hat a s ex o f

f end er t ravel i n i nt ers t at e co m m erce b ef o re f i nd i ng a r egi s t r at i on vi ol at i on, SO R N A r emai ns wel l wi t hi n t he cons t i t ut i onal b o u n d a rie s o f t h e C o m m e rc e C la u se ” ), abr ogat ed on ot hergr ounds by R eynol ds v. Uni t ed St at es , – U .S . – , 1 3 2 S

. C t. 9 7 5 , 9 7 8 (2 0 1 2 ); Uni t ed the E ighth

Ci r c u it , “ [t ]h is la

n gu a g e in d ic ate s Congr ess wante d reg istration to t ra ck the movement of sex offende rs th rough differ ent jurisdictions.” Unite d S tates v . H

owe ll , 552 F.3d 709, 716 ( 8th Cir. 2009). “Unde r § 2250, Congr ess limited the en forcement of the re g istration require ment to only those sex off en d ers who w ere either c onvicted of a fe de ra l sex of

fe ns e or wh o mo ve in i nte rs tate commerc e.” Id

. (ci ti ng 18 U. S.C. § 2 2 50(a) (2)) . The re quirements of § 16913 are rea sonably aimed at “regulating pe rsons or things in interstate commerc e and the u s e of t h e channels of inter state commer ce.” Id . at 7 1 7 (qu o t i n g [ United States v. ] May , 535 F.3d [912] at 921 [ (8th Cir. 2008)]) (quotation marks omitted).
625 F.3d at 1129–30.
In Georgeweno te d th at, in ad dit ion to t he Ei ghth Cir c uit , theF ourt h, F if th, Te nth , a

nd El e ve nt h Ci rc uit s h a d u ph e ld SORNA’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause

. 2U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 9

S t a t es v
. A m b ert , 561 F.3d 1 2 0 2 , 12 10 ( 11 t h Ci r
. 200 9) ( hol di ng t hat

“ Sect i o n 2 25 0 i s a pr op er r egu l at i on f al l i ng un der ei t her of

t he f i r s t t wo Lop ez c a te g o rie s b e c a u se it re g u la te s b o th th e u se o f ch a n n e ls o f i n te rs ta te co m m erce and t he i nst rume nt al i t i es of i nt ers t at e co m m erce”).
See Uni t ed St at es v
. G uz m an , 5 9 1 F.3d 83 , 90 (2d C i r. 20 1 0 ) ( st at i ng 3

“ [ w] e h av e n o di f

f i cul t y conc l udi ng t hat§ 22 50 ( a) i s a pr op er co ngres si o nal exerci se of t he co m m erce p o wer unde r Lop ez ”).
See Un i t ed S t at es v. F er na nd es , 63 6 F.3d 12 5 4 , 12 5 6 n. 2 (9t h C i r. 4 2011) ( n o t i n g t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t S ORNA “ i s a n i n v a l i d e x e r c i s e of C o n g re ss’ p o w e r u n d e r th e C o m m e rc e C la u se w a s reje c te d b y this c o u rt” i n G eor ge ); U ni t ed St at es v. Val ve r de , 62 8 F.3d 11 5 9 , 11 6 1 (9t h C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) (n o ting tha t G eo rg e’s ho l d i ng of co nst i t ut i o nal i t y was bi nd i ng). The Second Circuit has a lso affirme d the constitutionality of SORNA under the Commerce Clause

. In at least two e x tant 3 o pinions we have approving ly ref ere nced George

. 4 Moreove r, th e S upreme Court’s opinions in Reynolds v. United States , – U.S. –, 132 S. Ct . 975 (2012), a nd Car r v. United States , – U.S. –, 130 S. C t. 2229 ( 2010), af firming but limi ting SORNA, implicitly aff irm SORNA’s c o n s t i tut i o n a l i ty. In s um, we se e no re a so n to depa rt fr om our pr e vio us ly expressed opinion and re aff irm that Congr ess had the power under the Commerce Clause to enac t SORNA.
Cabrer a’s attempt to separate SORNA’s interstate tra vel and duty to r e g ist e r c omp on e nts fa ils fo r s e ve ra l r e a so ns
. First, beca

use Cabrer a was charg ed and convicted of failing to r e g ist e r a ft e r h avin gtr ave le d in int e rs tate c omm e rc e , it

is qu e sti on a blewh e the r h e may

pr op e rl y c hall eng e theduty

toU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 10

T h e pr opr i et y of

SO RN A’ s a ppl i ca t i on t o in tra sta te t r a v e l by a s ex 5
o f f end er i s b ef

o re t he Sup rem e C o urt i n Uni t ed St at es v
. Kebode aux , N o. 1 2 -4 1 8 , cer t

. gr an t ed , 13 3 S. C t

. 92 8 (20 1 3 ). re g ist e r w ith out inte rs tate tr ave l. More importantly , such a 5 parsingof S ORNA has been re jected by the Supreme Court and the c ircuit courts that have considere d the issue. In Car r , the Court explained that “Sec t i o n 2250 is not a stand-alone re sp on se to t

he pr ob le m of mi ssingse x off e nd e rs ; it is e mbe dd e d in

a br oa de r s tatu to ry

sc he me e na c te d to a dd

re ss thede fi c ie nc ie s in prior law that had e na ble d s e x off

e nd e rs to slip thro ugh th e cra c ks .” 13 0 S. Ct. at 22 40 . T he Se ve nth Circuit expl ained the sy

mbiotic r elationship betwee n the two sections in Un ite d S

tates v . S an de rs , 622 F .3 d 779 , 7 83 (7 th C i r. 2 0 1 0 ), s t at i n g: [S ]ection 16913 cannot b e divorce d from section 2250 i n evaluating whe ther the Comm e r c e Cl a

u s e g iv e s Co n gr e s s the authority to r equire anyone convicted of a sex of fe ns e to r e g ist e r. Impo sin ga duty to reg ister as a matter of fede ral law woul ddo littl e to solve the prob l em of sex offende rs slipping through the cr acks a bsent the enfor ceme nt mechanism supplied by section 2250. Interstate tr avel by

a sex offe nder is not mere ly a jurisdictional hook but a critical part of the proble m that Congre ss was at t empting to so lve , fo r wh e ne ve r se x o ff e nd e rs c ro ss state lines they tend t o evade the abili ty of any individual state to track them a nd there by “thre aten the e fficacy of the statutory scheme . . . .” [ Car

r , 1 30 S. Ct .] at 22 39 ; s ee also id. at 2238 (i t was re asonable forU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 11

See G uz m an , 5 9 1 F

. 3d a t 90 ( s t at i n g t h at“ Se ct i on s 2250 a n d 16913 6
wer e e nac t ed as par t of t he A dam W al s h Chi l d P r ot ect i on an d Saf et y Act o f 2 0 0 6 , an d a re c le a rly c o m p le m e n ta ry” ); W ha l ey , 577 F. 3d a t 259 ( s a m e ); Un ited S ta te s v . Ho w e ll , 5 5 2 F

. 3 d 7 0 9 , 7 1 6 ( 8 t h Ci r
. 2 0 0 9) ( concl udi ng t hat “ t he s t at ut ory s che me C ongr es s cr eat ed t o enf orce § 1 6 9 1 3 d em o nst rat es C o ngres s was f o cused o n t he i nt ers t at e m o vem ent o f sex o ff

e n d e rs , no t t h e intra sta te a c tivity o f sex o ff e n d e rs ” ); A m b ert , 5 6 1 F. 3d at 1212 ( comme n t i n g t h at “ an ex ami n at i on of § 16913 and § 22 50 makes t he i nt er s t at e f ocus abun dant l y cl ear , ” a nd “ t he onl y f eder al enf orce ment provi s i on ag ai ns t i ndi vi duals i s f ound i n § 225 0, wh i ch
e x pl i c i t l y s u bj e c t s s t a t e s e x of f e n de r s t o f

e de r a l pr os e c u t i on un der S O R N A o n ly i f t h e y tra v e l i n inte rs ta te o r fo re ign c o m m e rc e a n d fail to regi st er under § 16 9 1 3 ”) ( i nt ernal quo t at i o n m arks om i t t ed ). Con gre ss to g iveState s p ri mary re sp on sib ili ty to supervise a

nd ensure compliance among state sex off

ender s and subject such off ender s to fede ral c rimin al l iability only when “ they us e thec ha

nn e ls o f i nte rs tate c omm e rc e in e va din ga State ’s re a ch”) ; id . at 2240 (a ct of tr av e l b y s e x o f

f e n d e r i s n o tm e r e l y a jurisdictional predicate bu t is “the very c on du c t at whic h Co ngre ss t oo k a im” ); id . at 2241 (sec t ion 2250 “subject[s] to fede ral prosec u t ion sex offe nders who e lude SORNA’s regi s tra t i o n re qu i reme nts by trave ling in interstate commerc e”)

. Th e Se c on d, F if

th, Ei ghth, and

El e ve nth

Cir c uit s a

rein acc ord. 6
Fur thermore , we have re cently upheld the re g i s t ra tion re qu i re m en t un d er th e Ne ce s s ary an d P ro p er C l au s e
. In United States v. Elk Shoulde r , 6 96 F .3 d 92 2, 93 1– 93 2 ( 9th Cir. 2012), we he ld:U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 12

See G uz m an , 591 F. 3d a t 91 ( s t at i n g “ [ t ] o t h e ex t ent that § 16913 7 regul at es s o l el y i nt ras t at e act i vi t y , it s m eans are reasonab l y a d ap t ed to t he at t ai nm ent of

a l eg i t i mat e en d u n der t h e comme r ce pow er ”) ( qu ot at i on m a rk s a n d c itatio n s o m itt e d ); Uni t ed St at es v
. Pendl et on , 636 F. 3d 78, 88 (3d C i r. 20 1 1 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat “ § 1 6 9 1 3 i s a l aw m ad e i n pursuance o f t he con s t i t u t i on be ca u s e i t i s n ec es s ar y an d pr oper f or ca r r y i n g i n t o e x ec u t i on C o ngres s’ s p o wer unde r t he C o m m erc e C l ause”) ( q uo t at i o n m arks and c itatio n s o m itt e d ); G o u ld , 56 8 F. 3d at 475 ( s t ati ng “ [ r ] equi r i ng al l s ex o f f end ers t o regi st er i s an i nt egral pa rt of C o ngres s’ regul at o ry ef f o rt and t he regul at o ry s chem e co ul d be unde rcut unl ess t he i nt ras t at e act i vi t y were re g u la te d ” ) (q u o ta tio n m a rk s a n d c itatio n o m itt e d ); W ha l ey , 5 77 F

. 3d at 2 6 1 (conc l ud i ng t hat “ t hat requi ri ng s ex o f f end ers to regi st er b o t h be f o re a n d a fter the y tra v e l i n inte rs ta te c o m m e rc e
. . . is ‘re a so n a b ly ad a p te d ’ t o t he go al of ensur i ng t hat s ex o f f end e rs r e g is t er and up d at e p revi o us re g istra tio n s w h e n m o v ing a m o n g ju risd ic tio n s” ); Uni t ed St at es v. V asquez , 61 1 F.3d 32 5 , 33 1 (7t h C i r. 20 1 0 ) ( ho l d i ng t hat “ [t ]o t he ext ent t hat § 1 6 9 1 3 regul at es s o l el y i nt ras t at e a c tivity, t he regul at o ry m eans Th e Su p r e m e C o urth a s “ m a d e c l e ar th at , in determining whe ther the N ece ssary and Proper Cl ause grants Congress the le g islative authority to e nact a particula r fede ral s tatute, we look to s ee whether

the statute constitutes a m ea n s that is rationally related to the imp le me nta ti on of a c on st it ut iona lly enumer ated powe r.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct . at 1956. . . [A] reg istration require ment aimed at informingthe public of the ide n t i t y and location of individuals convicted of sex offe nses is rea sonably

related to Congr ess’s authority to ensure the safe ty

of the public, which in turn flows from its authority to enac t and e nf or c e c ri min a l la

ws
. Th e Se c on d, Th ir d, F ourt h, F if th, S event

h a nd El e ve nth Cir c uit s arein a gre e me nt. Acc ording ly , we r ejec t Cabrer a’s 7U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 13

chos en ar e r eas onabl y adapt ed t o t he at t ai nment of a l egi t i mat e end un der th e c o m m e rc e p o w e r” ) (q u o ta tio n m a rk s o m itt e d ); A m b ert , 56 1 F. 3d at 1 2 1 2 (s t at i ng t hat “ Se ct i o n 16 9 1 3 i s reasonab l y ad ap t ed t o t he at t ai nm ent o f a l egi t i m at e end unde r t he co m m erce cl ause”). contention that Congress lac k ed the authority to enac t SORNA an d re quire that a convicted se x offe nder, like Cabrer a, who tra

vels interstate r eg ister. Finally , whateve r the merits of Cabrer a’s r eadingof S eb elius , SO RN A d oe s n ot r e gulate ind ivi du a ls “pr e c ise ly becaus e th e y

ar e d o in gn o th in g , ” 1 3 2 S. Ct

. at 2 5 8 7. SORNA applies only

to individuals who have bee n convicted of a se x ual offe nse. Thus, re g istrat i o n is require d only of those individuals who, through beingcriminally charg ed and convicted, have place d themselves in a cate g ory o f p ersons who pose a

specific dang er to society . Moreove r, SORNA’s application t o C ab rer a is based on his fur ther a dmitted activities of trave ling in interstate commerce and then failing to reg ister. Thus, SORNA does not punish the ty pe of inactivity addre ssed in Sebelius

. We adher e to precede nt and so un d r e a s o n in g in c o n c lu d in g th at Co n gr e s s h a d the a uth ority to e na c t SO RN A and

that SO RN A’ s a

pp lic atio n to Ca br e ra is c on sti tut ion a l.
III
We nextconsider Ca

bre ra ’s challeng es to his sentence

. We reviewa district c ourt’s interpre tation of the Sentenc ing Guidelines de novo, a

nd the cour

t’s fac tual finding s for c lear err or. United States v. S wank, 676 F.3d 919, 921 ( 9th Cir.U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 14

In t hese cases , we have no t ed “ an i nt raci rcui t co nf l i ct as t o whet her t he 8 st and ard o f

revi ew f o r ap p l i cat i o n o f

the G ui d el i nes t o the f

act s i s d e no vo or a bus e of

di s cr et i on. ” Swank , 6 7 6 F .3d a t 9 2 1

– 2 2 . H o w ev er, a s in t ho se c a s e s , w e n e e d n ot r e s ol v e t h i s c on f l i c t be c a u s e ou r c on c l u s i on i s t h e s a me u n d e r e ithe r sta n d a rd

. See Swank , 6 7 6 F .3 d a t 9 2 2 ; L a u rie n ti , 6 11 F

. 3d at 552.
4 2 U .S.C

. § 1 6 9 1 1 (4 ) d efi ne s a T i er III o f f en d er a s f

o l l o w s: 9

T he t er m “ t i er III s ex of f ender ” mean s a s ex of

f ender who se of f ense i s p uni shable b y i m p ri sonm ent f o r mo re tha n 1 ye a r a n d

-- (A ) i s co m p arab l e t o or m o re s evere t han t he f o l l o wi ng of f ens es , or an at t emp t or cons pi r acy t o c om mi t s uch an of f ens e: ( i ) ag gr ava t ed s exu al abus e or s exu al ab use ( as d escri b ed i n s ec tio n s 2 2 4 1 and 22 4 2 of T i t l e 1 8 ); or ( i i ) a bu s i v e s ex u al c on t ac t (a s des cr i bed i n s ec t i on 2244 of T i t l e 18) a g ai ns t a mi n or w h o h as n ot att aine d t he ag e o f

1 3 years; ( B ) i nv ol ves ki dnappi ng of a mi nor ( un l es s comm i t t ed by a pa r en t or g u ar di an ) ; or 20 12 ); Un ite d S

tates v . La ur ie nti , 6 11 F .3 d 5 30 , 5 51 –5 2 ( 9th Cir. 2010). 8 As applied to Cabre ra’ s situation, 42 U.S.C . § 16911(4) de f i n e s a “ t i e r I I I s e x o f

f e n d e r ” a s “ a s e x o f

f e n d e r wh os e offe nse is punishable by

imprisonment for more tha n 1 year and . .

. is c ompara

ble to or more se vere than . . . ag gravated sexual abuse or sex ual abuse (as de scribed in se ctions 2241 and2242 of Title 18).” Section 2242 define s the crime of 9U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 15

( C ) occu r s af

t er t he of

f ender becomes a t i er I I s ex o f f end er.
1 8 U .S.C

. § 2 2 4 2 rea d s: 10

W hoeve r, in t he s peci al mar i t i me and t er r i t ori al juri sdi ct i o n of t he U ni t ed S t at es o r i n a F ed eral pri son, o r i n any pri son, i nst i t ut i o n, or f aci l i t y i n whi ch p ers o ns ar e h el d i n c u s t ody by di r ec t i on of or pu r s u an t t o a cont r act or agr eement wit h t he hea d of an y Feder al d e p a rtm e n t o r a g e n c y, kn o w ing ly-- ( 1) caus es a n ot h er pe r s on t o e n g ag e i n a s ex u al a ct by t hr eatening or pl aci ng t hatot her per s on i n f ear ( ot her t han by t hr eat eni ng or pl aci ng t hatot her per s on i n f ear t hat any pe rs o n w il l be s ub ject ed t o de at h, s eri o us bodi l y i n j u r y , or k i dn appi n g ) ; or ( 2) e ng age s i n a se xu al ac t wi t h a not her per s on i f t hat
o the r p e rs o n is-- ( A) i n ca pabl e of

a ppr ai s i n g t h e n at u r e of t he con du ct ; or ( B ) ph y s i ca l l y i n ca pabl e of dec l i n i n g pa r t i ci pat i on i n, or com muni cat i ng un wi l l i ng nes s t o eng age i n, t hat se x u a l ac t;

o r at t em p t s t o do s o , s hal l b e f i ned unde r t hi s t i t l e and i mp r i s oned f

or a ny t er m o f

y ear s or f

or l i f e. sexual abuse to inc lude knowing ly eng ag ing “in a se x ual ac t with a nother person if that other person is – (A) inc apable of a pp ra isi ngthenatur e of

thec on du c t; o r ( B ) p hy sic a lly incapa ble of de clining pa

rticipation in, or communicating unwillingness to eng ag e in, that sexual act.” 10U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 16 The Oreg on statute g overning Cabrer a’s prior conviction stated: (1) A person c ommits the crime of sexual abus e in th e s e c o n d

d e gr e e wh e nth at p e r s on subjects another person to sexual intercour se, de viate se xua l inte rc ours e
. . . a nd thevic tim does not consent ther eto. Or. Rev. Stat. § 263.425 (1998).
Cabrer a argues that the district cour t misunderstood the natur e of his ple a . H e a sse rt s th at he“ ne ver a dmi tte d to havingintercour se with someone inca pable of providing actua l consent, as require d by fede ral law. All [ he] admitted wa s h avin gse xua l inte rc ours e wi th som e on e wh o w a s le g a lly incapa ble of c onsenting , due to be ing unde r the influenc e of alcohol and dueto a g e.” Cabrer a claims that beingunder the inf lue nc e of dr ug s or al c oh ol “d oe s not v iti ate thec a pa c ity to make voluntar

y decisions.”
Ca br e ra a lso argue s th at th e limit ed natur e of his admission has signific anceunder O reg on law. He asser ts that un de r “ Or e g on

law a ll i nd ividua ls und e r 1 8 a rele g a lly incapa ble of c ons enti ngto intercourse , reg ardle ss of ac tual consent,” and inca

pacity based on the minor’s ag e is second degree sexual a ssault. SeeOr. Rev. Stat. § 163.315. Cabre ra contra sts this with a

n Ore g on law that provides that a per son who is mental ly

incapa citated or

phy sically

helpless ca

nnot c on se nt to int e rc ours e , and that a vio latio n of thi s s tat ute constitutes first degree rape
. SeeOr. Rev. Stat. § 163.375(d). Ca br e ra c la ims that wh e n he ple d guil ty , he “ on ly int e nd e d to es tablish the offe nse of se cond degree child abuse, not the more serious offense of first degree rape .”U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 17

I t i s un di s put ed t hati f

C abre r a i s not a T i er II I o f f ender , he i s a T i er 11 I of f end er. C ab re rago es o nt o ar gu e, ci t i n g Y oung v. H

o lder , 697 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2012) (e n banc) , that beca use “the mod if ie d c ate g orical a

pp ro a c h o nly

c a ptu re s th os e fa c ts nece ssarily

admitted by

a def endant a s part of his plea , . . . [w] here a par

ticular fa ct i s n ot nece ssary to sustain a c onvic tio n, it c ann ot be de e me d a dmi tte d unle ss t he re c or d is absolutely

clea r that this was the defe ndant’s int ent.” Cabr era rea sons that becau s e the only fac t nece ssary

for his Ore g on conviction was th at the victim was unde r the a g e of 18, the additional fac t that the victim h ad al so been drinking might hav e un d ersc ored he r inability to consent, but “did not establish that she was so intox icated that she wa s incapa ble of d oing so.”Cabrer a conc ludes that bec ause he“did not nece ssarily

admit to having inter course with an indi vidual incapa ble of providingactua l consent, the ‘se x ual abuse ’ re qu ir e me nt u

nd e r f e de ra l la w w a s not me t,”and

he sh ou ld not have be en cla ssified as a T ier I I Ioffe nder. 11
We a gre e wi th t

he pa rt ie s th at th e Or e g on convic tio n is not a categ orica l match to 18 U.S.C. § 2 2 4 2 , but conclude that the application of the modified cat egoric al appr oach establishes that Cabrer a is a Tier I I Ioffe nder. Cabr era ’s plea is a document that the c ourt may consider unde r the modified cate g orica l approa ch. U n i te d S ta tes
. v
. C

a s t i l lo - M a r in , 684 F.3d 914, 919 (9 th Cir. 2012) (noting that, “[u] nder the modified categ orica l approa ch, cour ts may rely

only on d o cum en t s t h a tgi v e [ i t ] th e c ert ai nty o f agen er i c f

i n d i n g, including the statutory

definition, charg ing doc ument, written ple a a gre e me nt, tr ans c ript o f p le a c oll oq uy , an d a ny e xplic it fac tual findingby

the trial judg e to which the def en d ant assented”(interna l quotation marks and citations omitted)).U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 18

If the la n g u a g e in § 2 2 4 2 (1 )( A ) re q u iring tha t t h e vic tim b e “inc a p a b le 12
o f ap p rai si ng t he nat ure of the cond uct ” were l i m i t ed t o t he m eani ng p rop o sed b y C ab rera, t he d i sj unct i ve l anguage i n § 22 4 2 (1)(B ) providi ng t h ati t i s a l s o sexual a b us e t o e n g ag e i n a s ex u al a ct w i t h a pe r s on “phys i cal l y i ncap ab l e o f de cl i ni ng pa rt i ci p at i o n i n, o r co m m uni cat i ng u n w ill ing n e ss to e n g a g e in” the se x u a l ac t, w o u ld b e a t l e a st p a rtia lly re d u n d a n t. See Sout h D akot a v
. Yank t on Si oux Tr i be , 522 U

. S. 329, 347 ( 19 98 ) ( r ei t er at i ng t hatcour t s s houl d avoi d i nt er pret i ng st at ut es i n a way t hat renders s o m e wo rds al t o get her r ed und ant ).
C a b re ra c ites c a se s h o ld ing tha t i n to x ic a tio n d o e s n o t ne c e ssa rily 13 inv a lid a te a c o n se n t t o se a rc h

. S ee Un i t ed S t a t es v
. W a t t ers , 572 F. 3d 479, 4 8 3

– 8 4 (8 th C ir. 1 9 9 9 ); Un ited S ta te s v . S c h e e ts , 1 8 8 F .3 d 8 2 9 , 8 3 9 (7 th C i r
. 199 9). T hes e cas es ar e i napposi t e f or a t l eas t t wo r eas ons
. Fi r s t , t hey
co ncern ef

f o rt s b y de f

end ant s t o us e t hei r i nto x icat i o n as a d ef ense, and Cabrer a’s a

rguments conce rning Ore g on law and his plea agree ment arenot persua sive. First, the fede ral definition of “sexual abuse” as set for th in 18 U.S.C . § 2 2 4 3, which require s that the victim be “inca pable of appra ising the nature of th e c o n d

u c t, ” d o e s n o t c o v e r o n ly c o nv ic ti o n s wh e re the vic tim wa s “ inc a

pa ble of c on se nt b y

re a so n o f m e nta l de fe c t, ment al incapa citation or phy sical helplessne ss.” Such a limit ed interpr etation is contrar y to a common-se nse re ading of thestatut e , w ou ld r e nd e r a se c tio n o f t

he statut e re dund ant, and

is n ot s up po rt e d b y

any a uth oriti e s. 12 Second, intox ication ca

n be the c au s e o f a vic tim’s incapa city

to cons en t. Se eUn ite d S tates v . S mi th , 606 F.3d 1270, 1281–8 2 (10th Cir. 2010) (notingthat victim was he avil y int oxic ate d b e fo rethea ssaul t) ; United States v. Carter , 410 F.3d 1017, 1027 ( 8th Ci r. 2005) (holdingthat evidenc e the victim smoked marijuana and dra nk alcohol, and felt drowsy

and re ally

tired, wa s sufficient to conc lude that the victim was unable t o appra ise the natureof the perpe trator’ s conduct). 13U NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 19

se c o n d , C a b re ra in h is p le a s ta te m e n t ad m itt e d tha t his v ic tim w a s u n a b le t o co nsent be cause of her i nt o xi cat i o n.
B ec au s e we h ol d t h atCabr er a’ s s t at ement that hi s v i ct i m c ou l d n ot 14
cons ent due t o i nt oxi cat i on i s s uf f i ci entt o re nder hi m a T i er III s ex o f f end er, we need no t , and do not, co nsi d er whet her t he vi ct i m ’ s y o ung age woul d m eet § 22 42 ’ s def i ni t i on of

s exu al abus e. Third, our opinion in Y

oung d o es n o t support Cabrer a’s argument. As he notes, we the re he ld that “[w] hen apply ing themodified

c ate g oric a l a

pp ro a c h in

thec onte xt of

a guil ty ple a , w e mus t de te rm inewh e th er a guil ty ple a to a n o ff e ns e d ef i n edb y a n o n gen er i c s t atute ne c essa ril y admitted

e le me nts of the g eneric offe nse.” 697 F.3d at 983 (quotationm arks omitted). Here , Cabrer a ac knowledg ed in his plea stateme nt that his victim, due to int ox ication, was “ i n capable of appra ising the nature of the conduct,” and thus , he “nec essarily admitted” that his state conviction was f or sexual abuse, a s defined by

18 U.S.C. § 2242. In other words, he c ho se to a dmi t to an e le me nt o f t he state c ri me – th at hi s victim did not consent due to her lack of c apac ity to do so – by confe ssing to fa cts that also define d his crime as a sexual offe nse under

fede ra l law. Perha

ps he could have bee n convicted unde r Ore g on law on anothe r basis that might not have satisfied the fe dera l definition of sexual abuse. 14 Howeve r, Cabrer a chose first to a dmit to his v i ct i m’s incapa city

to consent in a manne r that cle arly satisfied the fede ral de finition of sex ual abuse . Acc ording ly , the district court prope rly

deter mined that he was a Tier

I I Isex offender

. IV
Cabrer a, havingbeen c onvicted in Ore g on of the crime of sexual abuse and ha

ving be en orde red to re g is t er as a sexU NI TED S T A T ES V
. C A BRERA -GUT I ER RE Z 20 offe nder, c hose to tr avel interstate and failed to re g ister under SORNA. We conclude, a s have our sis t er circ uits, that Con gre ss h a s th e aut ho rity un de r t he Comme rc e Cla

us e to ena ct SORNA and to requir e Cabre ra to re g ister under SORNA as a se x offe nder. W e also c onclude that Cabr era ’s admission in his plea st at em ent that the victim of his sexual a bu se wa s una

bleto c on se nt b e c a

us e of he r i nto xicat ion

is sufficie nt, under the modified cate g orica l approa ch, to re nder his state c on vic tio n a

c ri me of

se xua l a bu se purs ua

nt t o 18 U.S.C. § 2 242. Acc ording ly , Cabrer a’s c onviction and sentenc e ar e AF F IRM ED

.