J-S12006-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TRACY S. NEWCOMER

v.

RICHARD C. NEWCOMER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1382 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at 

No(s): S-1901-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2018

Richard C. Newcomer (“Husband”) appeals from the order, entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, distributing the parties’ 

marital property and ordering Tracy S. Newcomer (“Wife”) to pay Husband 

alimony in the amount of $1,473.84 per month until December 31, 2017.

1

 

After our review, we affirm based on the opinion authored by the Honorable

Jacqueline L. Russell. 

The parties married in 1998 and separated in 2013. They have three 

minor children, ages 17, 15 and 12. The parties share physical custody of the 

two youngest children; Wife has primary physical custody of the oldest child. 

None of the children has special needs. At the time of the hearings before 

____________________________________________

1 Husband has been receiving alimony pendente lite (APL) since August 2014; 

upon divorce the APL award converted to alimony. 
J-S12006-18

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the master, in October and December of 2016, Wife was 50 years old and 

Husband was 47 years old. 

Prior to the marriage, Wife obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Business 

Administration and a Master’s Degree in Human Resources; she is employed 

at Country Meadows Retirement Community. Wife earns approximately 

$140,000.00 per year. Husband has taken some college level classes in 

horticulture; he has been self-employed as a landscaper since 1993. Husband 

can operate a bucket truck, a backhoe, a chipper and a stomper. Husband 

also has an active commercial driver’s license (CDL). Husband’s 2015 Federal 

Income Tax Return for his landscaping business showed gross receipts of 

$35,455.00 for his landscaping and snowplowing business, and other income, 

including alimony, of $22,237.00.2 

The parties stipulated to the value of the marital assets. The master 

held hearings on October 10, 2016, December 6, 2016, and December 28, 

2016. On April 18, 2017, the master issued his report and recommendation. 

Both parties filed exceptions, and, on August 3, 2017, the trial court entered 

an order, adopting the master’s findings and recommendations, and 

distributing the marital property as follows: 51% to Husband ($422,521.00) 

and 49% to Wife ($420,681.00). The court also ordered Wife’s alimony 

payment to Husband continue to December 31, 2017. Husband appealed. 

____________________________________________

2 An interim order entered on August 27, 2014, determined that Husband’s 

monthly net income was $833.15 and Wife’s monthly net income was 

$7,928.37. 
J-S12006-18

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Both Husband and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Husband 

raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Whether the lower court erred in setting forth an equitable 

distribution scheme that does not reflect a proper 

consideration of the facts as applied to the factors set forth 

in the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, and, instead, reflects bias 

in favor of Wife?

2. Whether the lower court erred in awarding alimony only 

until December 31, 2017?

3. Whether the lower court erred in failing to award attorney 

fees and costs to Husband?

4. Whether the lower court erred in failing to set forth the basis 

of, and reasoning behind, its equitable distribution scheme?

5. Whether the lower court erred in discriminating against 

Husband?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7. 

A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of 

equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the 

propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of 

marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal 

procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which 

requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court 

will not find an “abuse of discretion” unless the law has been 

overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. 

In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, 

courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We 

measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of 

effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a 

just determination of their property rights.

Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the 

evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse 

those determinations so long as they are supported by the 
J-S12006-18

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evidence. We are also aware that a master’s report and

recommendation, although only advisory, is to be given the fullest 

consideration, particularly on the question of credibility of 

witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to observe and 

assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties.

Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 386-87 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 455-56 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted)). 

Essentially, Husband argues that he should continue receiving alimony

beyond December 31, 2017, in light of the disparity in the parties’ incomes 

and in light of the fact that he suffers from back issues that limit his ability to 

work. The trial court noted, however, that Husband offered no medical 

testimony to support work restrictions for his back and takes no medication. 

Husband also argues that he requires approximately $76,000.00 for tuition 

because he intends to acquire a degree in mechanical engineering so that he 

can obtain a job that does not require physical labor. The court noted that 

the master found Husband was underemployed and that Husband’s testimony 

was simply not credible. The court accepted the master’s determination with 

respect to Husband’s credibility. See Morgante, supra. 

Further, the court reviewed the statutory factors, applied them to the 

parties’ stipulations and the master’s findings, and set forth its reasoning for 

the equitable distribution order. The trial court listed the factors a court must 

consider in the implementation of an equitable distribution scheme and in the 

award of alimony, and evaluated the master’s reference to them and all 
J-S12006-18

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relevant factual information assigned to them. Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/17, at 

9-12. 

We also agree with the court that the fact that it accepted the master’s 

credibility determination did not establish that the court was biased against 

Husband or discriminated against him. Husband was awarded more than half 

of the marital estate and alimony for one year. He was also awarded the 

marital home and liquid assets, whereas the bulk of the assets awarded to 

Wife were retirement funds. 

 Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, the record, the relevant law and 

the well-reasoned analysis by the trial court in the two opinions rendered in 

this case, the August 3, 2017 Opinion and the November 9, 2017 Rule 1925(a) 

Opinion, we conclude that the court properly disposed of Husband’s claims on 

appeal. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s two opinions as our own and 

affirm the order on that basis. We direct the parties to attach these opinions 

in the event of further proceedings. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2018
Circulated 03/22/2018 03:37 PM

Page 1 of 32 Schuylkill County Government 

•• 

Received 9/18/2017 3:17:33 PM Superior Court Middle District 

Filed 9/18/2017 3:17:00 PM Superior Court Middle District 

1382 MDA 2017 

\")\ \'\ Ji��\),'\ iv �}

3 COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF SCHUYLKILL COUNTY--CIVIL ACTION-LAW 

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�\x\� TRACY S. NEWCOMER, : No. S-1901-2013 

�- ) \ Plaintiff 

. \ ,.1� -- DIVORCE CODE -- w vs. 

Docket# 16 D 5574 

RICHARD C. NEWCOMER, 

Defendant 

Lori Schafer Guzick, Esquire - for Plaintiff 

Arlen R. Day, II, Esquire - for Defendant 

Kent Watkins, Esquire - Master 

DECISION 

RUSSELL, J. 

\ . 

! 

· ... ·} 

Both Plaintiff Tracy S. Newcomer and Defendant Richard C. Newcomer complain 

about the Master's report and recommendations in this divorce action. The Master's 

findings and recommendations, except as otherwise noted, follow. 

Master's Findings 

The Master finds that Plaintiff was born October 19, 1966, resides with the 

parties' three children - born May 12, 2000, March 28, 2002 and July 23, 2005 - with 

Defendant sharing custody of the two younger children. Plaintiff and the children are in 

good health. 

Plaintiff has a bachelor's degree in business administration and a master's 

degree in human resources which were earned before the marriage. Plaintiff has been 

employed at Country Meadows Retirement Community the last eight years, earning 

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Page 2 o� 32 Schuyikiil County Government 

about $120,000.00.

1 Defendant was born December 15, 1969, resides in the former 

marital residence, is self-employed as a landscaper and tree trimmer, can operate 

various equipment and has a COL. Defendant contends that he is limited in 

employment opportunities due to having back problems. Plaintiff has been paying 

Defendant alimony pendente lite since August 27, 2014. 

The parties agree2 on the date of separation values of the following assets and 

liabilities: 

PSECU account#9592 (Plaintiff) - $7,413.00 

PSECU account #8356 (Plaintiff) - $93,695.00 

Country Meadows 401(K) (Plaintiff)- $57,181.003 

29 shares Met Life stock (Plaintiff) - $1,563.004 

Contents of marital home removed by Plaintiff - $2,400.00 

[From the above accounts cash was withdrawn by Defendant in 

the amount of $2,400.00 and 2013 real estate taxes on the 

marital home in the amount of $5,366.00 were paid] 

Marital home - $381,000.00 

187 Sunline Trailer - $300.00 

2900 Wilderness Camper - $1,800.00 

2003 EZ Dump Trailer - $2,500.00 

2.003 Ford Truck - $10,000.00 

1 The Master also reports that Plaintiff earns in excess of $130,000.00 annually. Plaintiff testified at the 

December 28, 2016 hearing that she earned about $140,000.00 per year. 

2 The record does not indicate agreement by the parties on all assets identified. 

3 It is not evident how this figure was determined. The date of separation was April 30, 2013 and per 

documentation in lhe record the balance of the account on March 31, 2013 was $46,047.20 and on June 

30, 2013 it was $49,417.41. Plaintiff, however, agrees with the figure assigned by the Master. 

� The parties have not disputed the classification of the asset as marital. The record indicates Plaintiff 

possessed a pre-marital asset which resulted in the stock issuance. 

2 
Pagel of 32 Schuylki�l County Government 

2003 Hawk Trailer - $2,500.00 

1995 Ford Pick-Up Truck - $500.00 

1988 Ford Truck - $1,000.00 

1978 International Scout - $400.00 

2005 Dodge Ram 1500 - $1,509.00 

Honda motorcycle - $450.00 

Lawnmower- $80.00 

2005 Chipper - $5,000.00 

2007 Tire Machine/Balancer - $450.00 

Air compressor - $450.00 

Rototiller - $800.00 

Miscellaneous tools, saws and sprayers - $1,500.00 

55" Sony TV and stand - $600.00 

Bed - $250.00 

PSECU account #9004 (Defendant) - $317.00 

PSECU account #0180 (Defendant)-$12,120.00 

Metro Bank account #4763 (Defendant) - $914.00 

Metro Bank account #9544 (Defendant} - $1,450.00 

Santander Bank account #9650 (Defendant) - $9,680.00 

Santander Bank account #4913 (Defendant) - $4,826.00 

Santander IRA (Defendant) - $600.00 

1955 Chevrolet Bel Air - $2,000.00 

2013 HD Soft Tail - $10,203.00 

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Page 4 of 32 Schuyl.kill County Government 

Contents remaining in marital home - $2,500.00 

Crawler Roto (sold by Defendant) - $3,800.00 

1978 truck (sold by Defendant) - $600.00 

2000 Kawasaki motorcycle (sold by Defendant) - $400.00 

F250 truck (sold by Defendant) - $500.00 

2005 John Deere backhoe - $12,500.00 

1997 Bucket truck - $10,500.00 

1999 Jeep Cherokee- $1,000.00 

2005 Kawasaki 4-wheeler - $2,000.00 

SP Construction trailer - $100.00 

Ricky's bedroom furniture • $500.00 

Chase Bank mortgage - $72,000.00 

Metro Bank Heloc - $1,969.00

5 

The parties married on Juty 11, 1998 and separated on April 30, 2013. This is 

the first marriage of each party. Both parties contributed to household duties during the 

marriage. 

UPS stock owned by Plaintiff redeemed during the marriage was used to pay 

marital debts and expenses, all of Plaintiff's life insurance policies are term with no cash 

value and the real estate purchased by Plaintiff after separation is not marital property. 

5 The Master made no finding about the Cabela's card referenced in Defendant's brief. No exception was 

filed about the card despite Defendant's argumenl Nevertheless, testimony indicated the debt was paid 

in full prior to separation. 

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Page 5 or 32 Schuylki.l Co\Dlty Governmmit 

The marital portion of Plaintiff's Wells Fargo IRA is $7,290.70, Plaintiffs UPS 

401 K retirement plan has a marital value of $187, 125.00 and the balance remaining of 

Plaintiffs UPS stock does not represent an increase in value during the marriage. The 

Master finds that Defendant's testimony "on the whole" was not credible and that his 

claim that there was $40,000.00 in cash in the parties' closet and that Plaintiff's 

employer paid her "for more than the outstanding loan balance on her car ...• ,a 

Although the parties stipulated that the Metro Bank home equity line of credit had 

a balance of $1,969.64 at separation, the current balance is $50,000.00 because 

Defendant took an advance on the line of credit. Therefore, the liens against the marital 

residence total $122,000.00. 

In his review of the factors relative to equitable distribution, the Master includes 

the following additional information. 

Defendant appears under-employed based upon his skills and training and he 

has taken no steps to increase his earning power since separation. Neither party 

contributed to the education, training or increased earning power of the other. Neither 

party offered testimony about the opportunity of either for future acquisition of capital 

assets. Plaintiff has steady income with medical, retirement, insurance and other 

benefits for herself and the children. Defendant will be obligated to purchase his 

medical insurance and finance his retirement, insurance and other benefits. Both 

parties contributed to the acquisition and appreciation of marital property and to the 

maintenance of the household and had a middle class lifestyle during the marriage. 

6 The sentence is-incomplete. However, it is assumed that the Master meant to Indicate that the claims 

by Defendant about cash and Plaintiff's employer were not credible. Likewise, it is believed the Master 

meant to find that Defendant's contention that Plaintiff took many thousands of dollars· worth of personal 

property was unfounded since while contending that Plaintiff took much marital furniture when she left 

Defendant, the latter also claimed that Plalntlff bought new furniture after separation. 

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l?age 6 of 32 Sohuylk��l County Government 

The encumbering of the marital real estate with an additional $50,000.00 debt by 

Defendant dissipated the equity in the property and would have to result in a deduction 

in his share of equitable distribution. Prior to equitable distribution, Plaintiff has 

substantial value in real estate and bank accounts in her name. 

Plaintiff is in a more stable economic circumstance than Defendant. The parties 

"submitted speculation" as to the tax ramifications applicable to equitable distribution but 

no account was presented. 

Defendant set forth speculative expenses for sale, transfer or liquidation "with a 

particular" of the marital real estate7 but no testimony, cross-examination or rebuttal was 

offered. The Master recognizes that transfer tax and a realtor's commission would be 

involved in the sale of the marital residence. 

Defendant requests counsel fees and permanent alimony. Alimony is to 

rehabilitate a party in need. Defendant made no effort toward any rehabilitation beyond 

the skills he has and did not present a plan as to why he should be receiving additional 

alimony. The fy'laster recommends finding that permanent alimony is not necessary 

based upon equitable distribution. Since 2014, Defendant has been receiving alimony 

pendente lite which award, the Master observes, is to enable a party to maintain a 

divorce action and is not a substitute for income when the party is employed or 

employable. Additionally, Defendant borrowed $50,000.00 against the marital real 

estate since separation. Therefore, the Master recommends that the request for 

counsel fees be denied. 

The Master recommends that Plaintiff receive: 

1 . 

It appears the Master meant to state a particular asset of the estate rather than refer solely to the real 

estate. 

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Page 7 o:f' 32 Schuyl.kil.l. Co\Ulty Goverrooent 

PSECU account #9592 

PSECU account #8356 

Country Meadows 401 (K) 

29 Shares of Met Life Stock 

2000 Wilderness Camper 

2003 Ford Truck 

Honda Motorcycle 

1955 Chevrolet Bel Air 

2005 Kawasaki 4-Wheeler 

Personal Property in Plaintiff's Possession 

UPS 401(K) 

The Master recommends that Defendant receive the following: 

M�rital home subject to the condition that he refinance 

the existing debt on the marital home within one hundred 

twenty (120) days from the final Divorce Decree in order to 

remove Plaintiff's name from any obligations associated with 

the real mortgage with Chase Bank and the Home Equity 

Line of Credit with Metro Bank 

1987 Sunline Trailer 

2.000 Wilderness Camper 

3000 EZ Dump Trailer 

2003 Ford Truck 

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Page 8 of 32 Sohuyl..lti�i county Government 

2003 Hawk Trailer 

1995 Ford Pick-Up Truck 

1988 Ford Truck 

1978 International Scout 

2005 Dodge Ram 1500 

Honda Motorcycle 

Lawnmower 

2005 Chipper 

2007 Tire Machine/Balancer 

Air Compressor 

Rototiller 

Miscellaneous tools, saws and sprayers 

55" Sony TV and Stand 

Bed 

Cash removed from PSECU account #9592 ($2,400.00) 

PSECU account #9004 

PSECU account #0180 

Metro Bank account #4 763 

Metro Bank account #9544 

Santander Bank account #9650 

Santander Bank account #4913 

Santander IRA 

1955 Chevrolet Bel Air 

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Page 9 or 32 Schuyl.kill. County Government 

2013 HS Soft Tail 

2005 John Deere Backhoe 

1997 GMC Bucket Truck 

1999 Jeep Cherokee 

2005 Kawasaki 4-Wheeler 

SP Construction Trailer 

In determining the exceptions, the Court reviewed the record, the Master's report, 

the parties' briefs and the pertinent statutory provisions, the latter which include the 

following. 

With respect to equitable distribution, the Divorce Code provides, in part, as 

follows: 

(a) General rule.--Upon the request of either party in an 

action for divorce or annulment, the court shall equitably 

divide, distribute or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital 

property between the parties without regard to marital 

misconduct in such percentages and in such manner as the 

court deems just after considering all relevant factors. The court 

may consider each marital asset or group of assets independently 

and apply a different percentage to each marital asset or group 

of assets. Factors which are relevant to the equitable division 

of marital property include the following: 

(1) The length of the marriage. 

(2) Any prior marriage of either party. 

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of 

income, vocational skills, employability, estate, 

liabilities and needs of each of the parties. 

(4) The contribution by one party to the education, 

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Page 10 o� 32 Schuylkill County Government 

training or increased earning power of the other party. 

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions 

of capital assets and income. 

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, 

but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or 

other benefits. 

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in 

the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or 

appreciation of the marital property, including the 

contribution of a party as homemaker. 

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party. 

(9) The standard of living of the parties established 

during the marriage. 

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at 

the time the division of property is to become 

effective. 

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications 

associated with each asset to be divided, distributed 

or assigned, which ramifications need not be 

immediate and certain. 

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation 

associated with a particular asset, which expense 

need not be immediate and certain. 

(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian 

of any dependent minor children. 

23 Pa.C.S. 3502(a). 

The Divorce Code states, in part, the following relative to an award of alimony. 

(a) General rule.- Where a divorce decree has been entered, 

the court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, to either 

party only if it finds that alimony is necessary. 

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(b) Factors relevant.--ln determining whether alimony is necessary 

and in determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of 

payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors, 

including: 

(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities 

of the parties. 

(2) The ages and the physical, mental and emotional 

conditions of the parties. 

(3) The sources of income of both parties, including, but 

not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other 

benefits. 

(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties. 

(5) The duration of the marriage. 

(6) The contribution by one party to the education, 

training or increased earning power of the other party. 

(7) The extent to which the earning power, expense 

or financial obligations of a party will be affected by 

reason of serving as the custodian of a minor child. 

(8) The standard of living of the parties established 

during the marriage. 

(9) The relative education of the parties and the time 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training 

to enable the party seeking alimony to find 

appropriate employment. 

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties. 

{11) The property brought to the marriage by either party. 

(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker. 

(13) The relative needs of the parties. 

(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties 

during the marriage. The marital misconduct of either 

of the parties from the date of final separation shall not 

be considered by the court in its determinations relative 

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to alimony . . 

{15) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications 

of the alimony award. 

(16) Whether the party seeking alimony lacks 

sufficient property, including, but not limited to, 

property distributed under Chapter 35 (relating to 

property rights), to provide for the party's reasonable 

needs. 

(17) Whether the party seeking alimony is incapable 

of self-support through appropriate employment. 

23 Pa.C.S. 3701 (a).(b). 

Finally, the Divorce Code states that in "proper cases," the reasonable counsel 

fees and expenses may be allowed. 23 Pa.C.S. 3702. 

Exceptions 

Plaintiff and Defendant both complain that the Master erred by proposing that five 

items of personal property be distributed to both parties. Those items are: 

2000 Wilderness Camper: valued at $1,800.00 

2003 Ford Truck: valued at $10,000.00 

Honda Motorcycle: valued at $450. 00 

1955 Chevrolet Bel Air: valued at $2,000.00; and, 

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Page 13 of 32 Schuylkill County Government 

2005 Kawasaki 4-wheeler: valued at $2,000.00.

8 

The parties stipulated to the values of the items with the exception of the 4- 

wheeler. Neither specifically objects to the value the Master placed on that item. Both 

parties suggest that Defendant be awarded the items as Defendant either possesses or 

disposed of them. The Court will sustain the exceptions and award the items to 

Defendant. The balance of Defendant's exceptions will be addressed next. 

Defendant complains that the Master erred in finding the marital portion of 

Plaintiffs Wells Fargo IRA to be $7,290.70, with the pre-marital portion being $1,133.47. 

Defendant contends that the marital portion is $10,211.99. Defendant argues that 

Exhibit D-11 indicates that the IRA value was $8,424.17 as of May 31, 2013. However, 

Exhibit D-43 indicates that the value was $11,345.46 on December 31, 2016. Plaintiff 

claims the Master did not err in the valuation as the value at separation was $8,424.17. 

Neither party addressed the reason for the increase in value or specifically argued why 

the date of separation or that nearer to the final hearing of December 28, 2016 was the 

proper valuation date. 

In light of the facts, it appears no marital funds were contributed to the IRA postmarriage. Consequently, the Master's valuation date is accepted as 23 Pa.C.S. 

3501 (a.1) provides that the increase in value during the marriage of nonmarital property 

should be measured from the date of marriage to either the date of separation or that 

closest to the equitable distribution hearing depending on which date results in a lesser 

8 In his brief, Defe'r1dant claims the Master erroneously referred to a 2000 Kawasaki which does not exist. 

The Master identified a 2000 Kawasaki motorcycle valued at $400.00 and the twice-awarded 2005 

Kawasaki 4-wheeler valued at $2,000.00. Although Defendant briefed the claim, he did not file a specific 

exception about the alleged error. The Court could find no reference to the motorcycle which the Master 

indicated had been sold in the hearing record. However, the record indicates Defendant testified to 

selling a Honda XR dirt bike for $400.00 resulting in any error of identification by the Master irrelevant to 

the proposed distribution. 

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Page 14 of 32 Schuylkill County Govenm,ent 

increase.

9 Additionally, Defendant contends that the Master erred in not distributing the 

Wells Fargo IRA of $10,211.99. Plaintiff contends that she was the owner of the IRA 

prior to marriage and there was no need to recommend a distribution. Although it could 

be argued that the Master erred in not mentioning the disposition in his proposed award, 

any potential error is harmless as the asset belongs to Plaintiff. 

Defendant also complains that the Master determined the marital portion of 

Plaintiff's UPS Savings Plan to be $187,125.00 and contends that the amount should be 

$258,429.38. Defendant claims that Plaintiff stipulated that the value of the UPS 

Savings Plan was $285,588.56, as indicated in Exhibit D-21 (Transcript, December 28, 

2016, page 95). He contends that the value as of the date of the marriage was 

$27, 159.18. Defendant argues that the difference supports his valuation of the marital 

portion. Plaintiff argues that the balance in the savings plan at separation was 

$214,284.18 and since $27, 159.18 was pre-marital, the marital portion is $187, 125.00. 

She cites her Exhibit #6 and testimony from the October 10, 2016 hearing, transcriot at 

pg. 40, in support of her posltion. The Court finds the pertinent marital value to be 

$258,429.38 as the valuation date closest to the last hearing on equitable distribution is 

the most equitable as no evidence indicates either party did anything following 

separation to affect the value of the asset. 

Defendant claims the Master erred in not finding that the UPS stock had a marital 

value of $8,014.56. He argues that as of the date of marriage, Plaintiff had 2,653 

shares of UPS stock valued at $90,202.00, that during the marriage Plaintiff obtained 

additional UPS stock - namely, 5,822.0533 shares - and that during that time she sold 

8,401.39 shares of stock, the latter totaling $560,321.91. According to Defendant, the 

9 The decrease in the nonmarital UPS stock account, nevertheless, offsets this increase. 

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Page 15 of 32 Schuylkill County Government 

remaining 73.663 shares were acquired by Plaintiff during the marriage in 2006 and 

2007. Plaintiff argues that she owned 2,653 shares of stock when she married 

Defendant, that she owned 73.6633 shares at separation, that the last sale occurred in 

2008, and that the values of her stock were $90,202.00 at the date of marriage and 

$6,266.32 at separation, respectively. Plaintiff claims that the value of the asset which 

she terms nonmarital decreased by $83,935.68. 

The record indicates that Plaintiff held UPS stock in an account at marriage. The 

stock split, shares were sold, purchased and given to charity. Defendant did not identify 

evidence in the record to indicate that the account decreased to "O" or any figure less 

than "74" shares at any time during the marriage such that the remaining shares may be 

directly traceable to marital purchases. As the value of the entire account decreased 

over the marriage, it was not error for the Master to consider the remaining value of the 

asset as nonmarital. 

Defendant complains that the Master failed to factor dividends of about $800.00 

from the UPS stock received by Plaintiff following separation into the distribution 

scheme. Plaintiff does not address the latter issue. The amount presumably was 

included in calculating Plaintiff's earnings for consideration in the award of child support 

and alimony pendente lite which Defendant has received since 2014 as Plaintiff testified 

that the dividends were included in her income for tax purposes. The Master's 

exclusion of the limited income received by Plaintiff applicable to the nonmarital asset 

post-separation is not found in error. Accordingly, the exception is denied. 

Defendant contends that the Master erred in discounting his testimony regarding 

his health issues. Defendant argues that the Master failed to consider that the record 

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P1>ge 16 of 32 Schuylki.11 county Government 

contained no evidence disputing Defendant's testimony about his having back problems 

and the degree they impacted and may impact his earnings and earning capacity. 

Plaintiff counters by arguing that no medical testimony was offered to indicate that 

Defendant could not work. Further, she states that Defendant testified to seeing a 

doctor only once or twice a year and to not taking medication for his back. The Master 

heard the testimony, evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, was in the best position 

to judge their credibility and to assign weight to the respective testimony. 

In light of the limited evidence offered on the matter, it is not found that the 

Master erred as claimed by Defendant especially since the Master found Defendant not 

to be a credible witness. Nevertheless, it is noted that testimony or other evidence 

specifically contradicting Defendant's claims about suffering a back problem were not 

elicited. Defendant testified to the labor involved in his work, how he takes time off from 

work if he is in pain, that he does not desire to take medication to mask the symptoms 

and has tried to avoid invasive procedures which may preclude his working in his 

current occupation. Defendant, however, engaged in the same work prior to and 

throughout the marriage and following separation. The back problems have not 

precluded him from continuing what the evidence indicates is a labor-intensive 

business. Nevertheless. based on the evidence elicited, the Court may only speculate 

what Defendant may specifically or, in general, earn in another field of endeavor. 

Defendant contends that the Master erred in finding him under-employed since 

he claims no evidence established he was able to obtain employment in a particular job 

that was available to him which he could perform and which would increase his earnings 

or earning capacity. Plaintiff argues that Defendant is forty-seven years old, in good 

16 
Page 17 or 32 Schuylkill County Government 

health, has been a self-employed landscaper since 1993 and has numerous skills. She 

notes that Defendant testified to his having built two homes with the assistance of his 

father, including the marital residence that has a stipulated value of $381,000.00. 

Further, she argues Defendant ran a towing business during the marriage, has a 

commercial driver's license, can operate numerous types of heavy equipment and 

purchases and resells vehicles online and at auto shows for additional income. Despite 

his numerous skills, Plaintiff argues Defendant only claimed $8,000.00 in income in 

2015. 

The Master's findings are not in error based upon the evidence he heard. 

Although Plaintiff apparently signed income tax returns over the years verifying what the 

parties were reporting Defendant earned, she did not testify that the returns were in 

error or that she had complained about Defendant's lack of contribution to household 

income despite his having all the skills she now argues he possesses. Nevertheless, 

the record establishes Defendant is capable of engaging in numerous fields. As 

Defendant testified that his self-employment is seasonal, he did not explain what he 

more recently does in the off-season or why he is not engaged in some work at that 

time. Clearly, he is now not employing all of his potential skills in a field - such as 

commercial truck driver or tow truck driver - during that time. Defendant claimed that he 

did various wo�k in prior years during the off-season which he no longer does. Although 

he testified that was due, in part, to the cost involved, he offered no reason he could not 

obtain off-season work in some field - whether working for someone else or otherwise. 

Moreover, in light of all the evidence about Defendant's abilities, it would appear 

his income is either underreported or some undisclosed facts explain his true financial 

17 
Page 18 of 32 Sohuyl.k.il.l County Government 

situation. Although the Master made no particular finding about Defendant's earning 

capacity relative to his health and skills, as noted, the Master found Defendant not to be 

a credible witness. Plaintiff offered no particularized information on the subject - such 

as by identifying a salaried position or hourly wage work available and compatible with 

Defendant's skills. As a result, the record does not enable the Court to find Defendant 

capable of engaging in some specific work which is currently or likely to be available 

and the salary or rate of pay for the position. However, it does establish that Defendant 

is not working at his capacity. 

Defendant claims that the Master erred in finding that neither party offered 

testimony regarding his/her opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income. The 

Master did not err relative to the presentation of testimony directed specifically to that 

issue. However, the evidence did establish that based on the respective reported 

incomes of the parties and their educational backgrounds, a finding can be and should 

have been made that Plaintiff's current ability to acquire assets exceeds that of 

Defendant at this time. It is noted that Defendant claims he is financially unable to 

obtain another home from which to run his business and that impacts his ability to 

acquire assets. However, no reasonable financial motive for him to maintain a home in 

Schuylkill County valued at $381,000.00 so to enable a business which purportedly 

results in income limited to about $8,000.00 net per year was provided. 

Defendant complains that the Master erred in his findings regarding Defendant's 

obtaining a line of credit which the Master somehow "factored as credit to Defendant 

instead of a debt," when considering issues of alimony, attorney fees and costs. 

According to Defendant, he had extended a $50,000.00 home equity line of credit 

18 
Page 19 of 32 Schuylkill County Government 

during the pendency of this action. The parties stipulated that the line of credit had a 

balance of $1,969.00 as of the date of separation. Defendant argues that in considering 

Defendant's request for an award of al!mony and attorney fees, the Master applied that 

debt to reduce the value of the marital residence and recommended that Defendant pay 

the money back in 120 days. Defendant argues that he incurred $26,338.23 in attorney 

fees and costs, per Exhibit 0-42, and that he obtained the home equity line of credit to 

maintain the litigation. 

Plaintiff argues that she has been paying periodic alimony pendente lite to 

Defendant in the amount of $1,473.84 since August 27, 2014 - totaling more than 

$53,000.00 as of the date of her memorandum - which, she says, should have been 

used for Defendant's litigation casts. Rather, Plaintiff claims Defendant purchased a 

boat, a 4-wheeler, a $35,000.00 vehicle and pieces of equipment for his business during 

separation, citing testimony received on December 28, 2016 at pages 136 and 206 of 

the transcript. Further, Plaintiff complains that she produced hundreds of documents in 

this litigation and that delays in the divorce proceedings were caused by the necessity 

that she produce those documents upon the expectation that Defendant was calling an 

accountant to �estify about them and that the delays only served to increase counsel 

fees while Defendant called no accountant to testify. As a result, Plaintiff attributes 

unspecified delays in the proceedings, the continued APL payments and the increased 

attorney fees incurred by both parties to Defendant's conduct during the litigation. 

The record reveals that the litigation was indeed delayed due to Defendant's 

insistence on receiving documents from Plaintiff or about her assets. The parties 

should have been prepared for the Master's hearing when first scheduled. Plaintiff 

19 
Page 20 of; 32 Schuylk�l.l. County Government 

correctly notes that no expert witness was called by Defendant to testify. The first 

Master's hearing was held on October 10, 2016, the second was held on December 6, 

2016, and the third was held on December 28, 2016. The Master did not err in 

considering delays in the proceedings sought by Defendant, Defendant's purchasing a 

$4,500.00 boat and various motor vehicles while receiving alimony pendente lite and his 

contending that he needed the APL, together with the approximate $50,000.00 line of 

credit extension, to live and continue the litigation. Nevertheless, the record indicates 

the delays between hearings were limited and based upon Defendant's requests for 

financial documents which did result in the production of relevant information. Although 

the record does not support a finding that the requests were unwarranted, neither party 

explained why the information had not been obtained or provided earlier or why it took 

over three year� for this divorce action to proceed to hearing. 

The Master certainly could consider that Defendant failed to credibly explain why 

he purchased the various items of personalty during the litigation while in the difficult 

financial situation he claimed to face.10 The Master appropriately assigned the increase 

in the line of credit which resulted in increasing the lien against the marital residence as 

Defendant's responsibility. He further properly considered the surrounding facts 

involving Defendant's financial claims. 

In this regard, the Master found the marital line of credit debt to be $1,969.00. 

He proposed that since Defendant extended the home equity line of credit which 

resulted in increasing the lien against the marital residence without Plaintiffs 

10 In his testimony, Defendant did not clearly identrfy the amount of attorney fees and costs incurred 

specifically related to the divorce action, separate from the parties' custody dispute. 

20 
Page 21 of 32 Schuylk:i.l.l. County Gove=t 

knowledge, Defendant, who the Master proposed receive the home, should be 

responsible to satisfy the entire debt. No error exists in that recommendation.

11 

Defendant complains that pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 3502(a)(10.1), the Master was 

required to consider tax ramifications associated with each asset to be distributed or 

divided. Defendant claims that he testified that he would incur an eighteen percent 

income tax consequence if a business asset were sold, including the marital residence. 

According to Defendant, he had claimed depreciation of over fifty percent of the 

$101,500.00 which he assigned as business use of the marital residence. Further, he 

complains that the Master did not factor the one percent real estate transfer tax that 

would be incurred if the residence were sold- namely, $3,810.00. 

Plaintiff argues that the testimony about tax consequences was not worthy of 

belief as Defendant did not possess the pertinent knowledge to offer a tax opinion, 

Defendant testified that he relied upon an accountant for tax assistance and he did not 

express an int�ntion to sell the marital residence or any other asset. In fact, Defendant 

testified that he desired to maintain the residence. His income reported for tax 

purposes has been limited and nothing established Defendant's expertise to opine 

about tax consequences and the effect of an asset's sale at an unknown time in the 

future upon his income tax liability. As a result, the Master did not err in not considering 

the income tax consequences of the sale of any asset based on the record established 

by Defendant. It is, however, expected that if Defendant refinances the debt on the 

home or must sell the home, that expenses will be incurred. It is appropriate that if such 

'' ln the event Defendant - who desired to be awarded the home - is unable to satisfy the debt by 

refinancing or otherwise in the period proposed by the Master, the property may be sold with Defendant 

receiving the net proceeds. 

21 
Page 22 ot 32 Schuylkill. Co\Ulty Government 

event arises due to his compliance with the equitable distribution award, that the 

reasonable settlement expenses incurred be shared. 

Defendant complains that the Master did not suggest an award of alimony be 

granted to him. Defendant claims he does not have funds to obtain the education he 

desires. Defendant actually testified that he did not desire to obtain further education 

until his children were no longer in school. Defendant also claims that upon divorce, he 

would incur health insurance expenses in excess of $750.00 per month. Defendant 

testified to what he believed the cost would be to obtain health insurance similar to that 

provided to him through Plaintiffs employment without apparently having looked for 

insurance coverage limited to medical coverage or based upon his income. Plaintiff 

provides medical, dental and optical coverage for the entire family at a cost of about 

$445.00 per month. Defendant argues that he makes about $25,000.00 per year, is 

proposed to be awarded no retirement or financial accounts as per the Master's 

recommendation and yet must pay $122,000.00 in debt within 120 days while trying to 

obtain health insurance and pay his attorney fees.

12 

Defendant argues that he should receive indefinite alimony of $2,500.00 per 

month or receive financial assets in the divorce action so he can pay off the mortgage 

and home equity line of credit. Specifically, Defendant testified that he-wanted to be 

awarded the $381,000.00 house, plus $287,000.00, and all of the personal property in 

his possession, or, the $381,000.00 house, all personal property in his possession, the 

PSECU account of $93,695.00 and $2,500.00 per month in alimony indefinitely. 

Alimony is to be awarded if "necessary." The Master identified the relevant 

factors under 23 Pa.C.S. 3701 and, except as observed herein, did not err in doing so. 

12 The attorney fee bills submitted into evidence ir.dicate almost complete satisfaction. 

22 
Page 23 of 32 Sohuy1.k�11 County Government 

The parties were married only fifteen years and are relatively young. The Master found 

both to be healthy. The parties share custody of two children and Plaintiff is the primary 

custodian of the third. Plaintiff earns much more than Defendant, who, however, has 

not satisfactorily explained his only reporting limited income despite his skills, many 

years of employment and accumulated assets. Plaintiff had educational degrees prior 

to marriage and while Defendant says he would like to obtain a degree, he does not 

desire to make an effort to do so in the near future. Both parties - primarily Plaintiff - 

brought property into the marriage which was utilized to maintain their life style and to 

build their home. Plaintiff pays the children's medical bills and provides for their 

numerous activities the costs of which are not insignificant. Plaintiff had placed money 

in educational accounts for the children until the parties' separation. Plaintiff purchased 

a home upon separation and mortgages exist on that home and the marital home. 

Neither party has any unusual need and both have the abilities to support themselves 

through appropriate effort and employment. Defendant will have sufficient property 

I 

through equitable distribution and income via employment to provide for his reasonable 

needs without an alimony award for an extended time. Under the circumstances, it is 

found reasonable for him to receive alimony until December 31, 2017 in the amount 

currently received in alimony pendents lite. During this period, Defendant will have time 

to obtain insurance, refinance the home, if necessary, and prepare for the reduction in 

funds now provided by Plaintiff. 

Defendant complains that the Master erred in considering the entire value of 

Defendant's business assets rather than simply the increase in value of the assets. 

Defendant argues that as of the date of marriage, the assets of the business totaled 

23 
Page 24 of 32 Schuylk5.ll County Gove=t 

$28,346.00, according to Defendant's Exhibit 0-37, and he claims that the current value 

is $57,009.00. With an eighteen percent tax consequence, Defendant contends the 

marital value is.$23,504.00. Plaintiff argues that the only business assets considered 

for equitable distribution during the litigation were the assets purchased during the 

marriage, that none of Defendant's pre-marital assets or those gifted to him was 

considered, and all items considered had been purchased with marital funds. 

Defendant does not contest findings about any financial business assets but only 

various items of equipment. It is not known what happened to all items of equipment 

that may have existed at the date of marriage, how or when they were transferred or 

disposed and what, if anything, occurred with any value attributed to any pre-marital 

asset when disposed, transferred, etc. Had any pre-marital business asset existed at 

separation, it would belong to Defendant unless the facts established otherwise. The 

only evidence elicited supported a determination that the assets acquired during the 

marriage became marital assets upon acquisition. As a result, there exists no error in 

the Master's determination. 

Plaintiffs exceptions 13 are as follows: 

First, Plaintiff complains that the Master erred in recommending an off-set 

distribution by awarding the equity of the marital home to Defendant and the retirement 

accounts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims she needs the tax-free equity of the home because 

being awarded retirement accounts does not help her current financial condition since 

13 Per Plaintiffs brief, she wlthdraws her Exception #4 that the Master erred In falling to recommend that 

the Wells Fargo Stock and UPS stock be distributed to her. 

24 
Page 25 of 32 Scbuylki�l County Government 

she cannot withdraw the financial funds until retlrernent." Plaintiff also claims that a 

distribution of the retirement accounts would secure Defendant's financial future. 

Plaintiff testified her monthly bills are $7,965.00. Similar to Defendant, Plaintiff 

purchased assets, in particular, a $255,000.00 home, accumulated debt and dissipated 

funds during separation. The evidence indicates the parties have disparate incomes. 

Plaintiff does not incur typical vehicle expenses as her vehicle and related costs are 

provided or covered, respectively, by her employer. Plaintiff receives a 3 - 5% salary 

increase per year and has medical, optical and dental insurance available at some cost 

through her employment. She has a 401K p!an provided by her current employer. As 

of the October 10, 2016 hearing, she testified the value was $46,047.00. However, at 

the December 28, 2016 hearing, she testified that the value was $76,304.50 as of 

September 30_ 2016. 

Plaintiff testified that she wants to be awarded $150,000.00 in cash from the 

equity in the marital home, which would likely require that it be sold or refinanced, and 

she does not want to be obligated to pay alimony to her husband who historically 

reported earning little in comparison to her during the marriage - at least per the joint tax 

returns of the parties. Defendant's being approved for the refinancing of about 

$275,000.00 for the current liens of $122,000.00 and Plaintiff's desired award of 

$150,000.00 and Defendant's ability to pay the refinanced mortgaged debt are all quite 

questionable. Defendant, on the other hand, wants to receive the house, personal 

property and a large sum of cash, or, the house, a lesser amount of cash, the 

personalty, and alimony forever. Neither party is satisfied with the Master's nearly equal 

14 Plaintiff claims she had to borrow money from her parents for a down payment on a $255,000.00 home 

she purchased after separation. Plaintiff actually testified that her parents gave her $69,000.00 as a gift 

to purchase the home. 

25 
Page 26 of 32 Schuylkil.i County Government 

distribution of assets 15 and likely will not be with the Court's. Despite the claimed 

financial problems, pursuant to which each bases his/her reason to need cash, each 

has accumulated rather significant assets and debts 16 following separation and each 

believes the other should provide the cash. The Court is to divide, distribute or assign 

assets in kind or otherwise in such manner as deemed just. Except as modified, the 

recommendation of the Master results in justice to both parties under the 

circumstances·. Neither has the cash available the other desires and such could not be 

obtained without unnecessary cost or hardship to the payer. 

Plaintiff next complains that the Master erred in failing to apply the decrease in 

value of the UPS stock against the increase in value of the Wells Fargo IRA which 

assets were both nonmarital per 23 Pa.C.S. 3501(a.1). As discussed previously, 

Plaintiff contends that she owned 2,653 shares of UPS stock when first married and 

73.6633 shares when separated and that she owned that number since 2008. At 

marriage, she claims the stock was worth $90,202.00 and at separation it was worth 

$6,266.32, resulting in a decrease in value of $83,935.68. Plaintiff also has a Wells 

Fargo Bank IRA. She made an initial contribution of $1, 133.47 prior to the marriage and 

its balance at separation was $8,424.17. Consequently, Plaintiff argues there was no 

increase in nonmarital assets. Because the Master did not address the issue, she 

claims it is not clear if the decrease was considered in the distribution of assets to each 

party. The issue was considered by the Court herein and previously addressed with 

Defendant's exceptions. 

15 The record refers to additional equipment in Defendant's possession not identified by the Master such 

as a $1,000.00 trailer. Any equipment in his possession not specifically identified is being awarded to 

Defendant. 

16 Plaintiff testified to dissipating a financial account and incurring over $40,000.00 in credit card debt. 

26 
Page 27 of 32 Sohuylk�ll County Government 

Plaintiff argues that the Master erred in not distributing the desk/hutch to the 

child, Rachael Newcomer, on her eighteenth birthday. The complaint does not involve 

equitable distribution between the parties. Assets of a child belong to the child and the 

parties may agree to make no claim against a child's asset. 

Plaintiff claims the Master erred in failing to explain the percentage of the estate 

distributed to each party as it is too difficult for her to understand if the distribution 

scheme is equitable. The Master dearly specified the assets that he recommended be 

distributed to each party and identified the values of each asset. No singular asset was 

divided nor was it necessary to assign present values or later distribution values to any 

asset or a portion thereof. Each party will receive the financial accounts in his/her 

respective name. Plaintiff will receive the tangible personal property she possesses and 

Defendant will receive the house, encumbered by the liens which he must satisfy to 

release Plaintiff from responsibility thereon, and the personal property in his possession 

together with the proceeds previously obtained from the sale of the specified items of 

property. The distribution results in a near equal split of property. Except as noted in 

this determination, the Master properly addressed the pertinent issues affecting 

equitable distribution, alimony and attorney fees and his proposal is being adopted with 

some modification. 

27 
Circulated 03/22/2018 03:37 PM

COURT ()F CUMMO'J PLCAS OF SCIIUYLK. L COUN rv .. cr.u, AC I ION-LAW 

TRACY S NEWCOMER, 

Pla.r.: r: 

vs 

RICH/\RD C ,EV1COMFR. 

Oefendam 

No S 190• 2013 

·· IJl'·JORCE CODE •• 

Oocket e 16 D 5574 

RUSSi:cLL •. 

l or, Schafer Gt,z1ck tsqt.ue for Pia n!iff 

Arlen R. Oa,. II, Esqu re . fo1 Defendant 

OPINION AND ORDER 

PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925 

. 

Oefer,cfa11VApoellanl Richa1U C. Newcom�, filed an appeal rrc-n this co.m's order 

of A:1vus1 3. 2017 wh ch clirectoo lhe d,stribu·,0° ol proper1y and debts awarded 

alimony for a li11ited nrne 10 Appellart and errereo a decree in d1vo1ce After being 

ordered to fi'e a concise statement of issues lntenoeo lo be raised on appeal. Appellant 

filed a nine-page document extensively hst109 numerous complaints A lengthy 

recitation of the pertinent histo,y. testimony, documentary evioence. master's report 

excepte-rs and cot Hts analysis of the exceptions w, I not be recounted in response 10 

Appellant's complaints as ,tis believed the decision of August 3, 2017 sets forth the 

history and basis for the 1ulmgs on the exceptions. 

Due 10 the nature or u,e numerous complaints on appeal by Appellant. many of 

which claim that this court did not properly coo sider a specmc statutory equitable 

drstnbunon factor - all of which are to be consK:lered comprehensrvely, rather than in a 

1 
vacuum - some of the pages of this court's August 3, 2017 decision where particular 

exceptions were addressed are noted herein. 

As one of his later numbered complaints in his 19-25 statement, Appellant 

contends that the court discriminated against him, was biased in favor of Appel lee and 

that he had a hiqher burden of proof. The court accepted the master's determination 

that Appellant was nota credible witness in numerous respects. Simply because a 

party is not found credible does not render a court's determination biased. 

Nevertheless, this court reviewed the entire record in determining whether the master's 

credibility determination was well-grounded and analyzed the 'evidence pertinent to 

each exception. 

As his first complaint - with multiple subparagraphs - Appellant contends that this 

court did not consider the facts and applicable Divorce Code factors, including 

Appellant'salleged health issues, while having placed no burden on Appellee to 

contradict Appellant's testimony. With regard to Appellant's complaints at 1 (a) and (b) 

in his statement, this court discussed the_ record, the master's determination on the 

issue of Appellant's health, the master's finding that Appellant lacked credibility, noted 

·,; the lack of specific contradictory evidence to Appellant's claim of his suffering back 

problems and the fact that Appellant, nevertheless, continued and wanted to continue to 

engage in his labor intensive self-employment (pages 15 and 16 of the decision). 

On pages 16 throu_gh 18 of the decision, this court addressed Appellant's working 

capacity, observed that the record did not enable the court to find him capable of 

engaging ir'f a speoflc job which was currently or likely available or the likely 

compensation for that position. The court noted, however, that Appellant testified that 

2 
his self-employment was seasonal and that he did not explain why he did not-engage in 

work during theoff-season as he had in the past prior to the parties' separation. 

Contrary to Appellant's complaint, those were the facts, not speculation. Simply-Stated, 

Appellant - who in the off-season had plowed snow, towed vehicles, drove truck and 

had a commercial driver's license - was capable of working in the off-season, had 

worked in the off-season while the parties resided together and offered no basis for his 

not seeking some employment during the off-season since the parties' separation. 

Contrary to Appellant's complaints, the differences in Appellee's earnings 

through employment established by her W2 forms and Appellant's tax. return information 

from hrs self-employment were discussed at several parts of the decision as were the 

parties' liabilities. and needs. 

Similarly, the marital debt - being the real estate mortgage and home equity line 

of credit against the home which Appellant requested be awarded to him - was clearly 

discussed and set forth in the decision and in the final order (pages 4, 5). Likewise, the 

employment benefit information is set forth in various sections of the decision. Both 

parties incurred substantial debt following separation - Appellee purchased a home 

encumbered by a mortgage, bought furnishings for the home and incurred credit card 

debt in excess of $40,000.00, while Appellant extended the home equity debt against 

the marital residence and purchased vehicles, including a new truck and a boat. 

Contrary to Appellant's complaint, the decision details the purchases, debts, the premarital property of Appellee and the property awarded in equitable distribution. 

Appellant complains about the lack of contributions by Appellee. The court 

discussed the acquisition of marital property and Appellant's involvement in the 

3 
construction of the marital home (page 4). Contrary to Appellant's claim that Appellee 

gffered no proof of contribution by her, the record contains paqes of testimony from 

Appellee of her using a significant amount of pre-marital property, in particular, through 

the sale of her stock, towards the costs of construction, including payment of 

construction loans, for the marital home which the parties agreed had a fair market 

Value of $381,000.00. Moreover, the issue of lack of contributions by Appellee was not 

a subject of Appellant's exceptions to the master's award, and, therefore, has been 

waived. Benson v. Benson, 515 A2d 917 (Pa. Super. 1986) (complaints waived if not 

subject of exceptions). In fact, Appellant argued in his brief in support of his exceptions 

that "both" parties contributed. (Appellant's brief, pg. 12 (May 19, 2017) ). 

Appellant complains that this court erred in not considering the value of property 

set apart to each other. The court's award was entered following a consideration of the 

nature and type of property and the value of each item. The decision together with 

-decree clearly identify the values of the items of property and specifies the particular 

award to each party. 

With regard to Appellant's complaint about Appellee's Wells Fargo account, the 

issue was addressed on page 13 of t1ile decision. The UPS Savings Plan determination, 

about which Appellant complains, is set forth on pages 14 through 15 of the decision. 

This court does not know the basis for Appellant's contention that the court threatened 

him with termination of alimony pendente lite for his seeking delays in the proceedings. 

Appellant also did not except to the master's award in this regard. 

Appellant complains that the court "counted" the home equity line of credit debt 

against him twice. Following separation, Appellant extended the line of credit lien 

4 
aqainst the real estate without informing Appellee or obtaining Appellee's consent. As a 

result, the real estate is burdened by additional debt. The court has no idea what 

Appellant means by contending that this court factored the debt "twice" against him. 

The lien was extended post-separation by Appellant. It serves toreduce the equity in 

the marital home. Appellant claimed he used the funds for his expenses to live. 

However, he also acknowledged buying various assets, including a truck and boat, 

during the relevant period while also rec�iving his self-employment income and alimony 

pendente lite. Those constitute the facts and are discussed in the court's decision at 

several places including paces 18 through 21. 

Appellant contends that this court erred in factoring non-marital value into 

Appellant's business. The evidence with regard to Appellant's business indicated that it 

was not a corporate business and no good will or receivables were mentioned by the 

parties. The only business assets addressed were items of tangible personal property 

and bank accounts. The record supports the evaluation of the evidence by the master 

as to the nature of those assets being marital property and the assignment of their 

v_alues. 23 Pa.C.S. 3501 (a) (property acquired during the marriage is presumed marital 

unless acquired by method specified). 

Appellant contends that this court erred in not properly considering the standard 

of living of the parties. Both parties complained about their lack of resources to live in 

the same manner in which they had while residing together. Both complained that they 

had gone into debt during the pendency of the divorce. The master and court, including 

at pages 24 through 26 of the decision, considered the liabilities incurred by both parties 

during the separation and their standards of living. 

5 
Appellant complains that the court did not properly consider his economic 

circumstances. Appellant says the equitable distribution award requires that he pay an 

outs tanging debt. However. it was Appellant who desired to be awarded the 

$381,000 00 home on which the pre-separation $72,000.00 mortgage and approximate 

$2,000.00 home equity liens existed. The award requires that he satisfy the existing 

debts to remove Appel lee's name from any obligations associated with the mortgage 

and home equity line of credit. Obviously, Appellant may seek to have Appellee 

released from liability on the debts by refinancing - with Appellee sharing in the costs to 

do. so, as this court ordered - or by his reaching some other agreement With the 

pertinent lien holders. Appellant complains that he is financially incapable of doing that. 

The court could have directed that the home be sold and the net proceeds be awarded 

to Appellant. However, the award of the home to Appellant coincided with his request 

Nevertheless. the home may also be sold per the court's award if Appellant does not 

desire to maintain it. He will then receive the net sales proceeds with both parties first 

sharinp in the expenses of sale. 

Appellant complains that the court did not consider the tax ramifications. The 

court evaluated the evidence regarding tax ramifications on pages 21 through 22 of the 

decision. Appellant complains the court erred in not considering the costs of sale of the 

marital residence, The court considered those costs in its decision on pages 21 through 

22 and in the final order at paragraph 2 which provides for the sharing of settlement 

charges for any refinancing and for any possible sale costs, including realtors 

commission. 
Appellant complains about the award of alimony. The court has no idea what 

Appellant means by the complaint about the home equity line of credit debt. As 

indicated, Appellant incurred the post-separation debt which, however, serves as a lien 

against the marital estate. Similarly, Appellee complained that she had incurred a 

substantial amount of debt in obtaining a mortgage loan for the home she purchased, 

furnishings for the house, the children's medical expenses, their activities and other 

living expenses for herself and the children following the separation. Appel lee 

complained that she did not have funds to pay alimony to Appellant while Appellant was 

seeking alimony indefinitely. The discussion of alimony is set forth, in part, on pages 22 

through 23 of the court decision. 

Appellant complains that the court erred in failing to aware attorney fees and 

costs to him. Contrary to Appellant's allegation, the court did not apply the home equity 

loan against him in denying an award of attorney fees. The evaluation of an attorney 

fee award and the sup.porting evidence, and lack thereof, is set forth on page 22 of the 

decision. 

Appellant complains that this court erred in failing to set forth the reasoning for 

, , the equitable distribution award. The court evaluated the exceptions of the parties, 

analyzed each one .and determined that, with limited modifications, the master's 

recommendation resulted in equitable justice to both parties. The basis of the award of 

mostly tangible personal property and real property to Appellant and financial assets 

held in Appellee's name to Appellee is encompa,ssed in the decision. 

Appellant contends that this court erred in not remanding the matter to the 

master with regard to the issue of the disparity for future acquisition of assets and 

7 
incomes. The court addressed the issue of disparity on page 18 of the decision. 

Further, the divorce action was filed in 2013, numerous continuances and several 

master's hearings were held. The parties had ample time to complete the record, 

Appellant never contended that the record was incomplete, that it was not sufficient for 

the master to make a recommendation or for the court to rule on exceptions and neither 

party requested a remand for the purpose of-submitting more evidence upon their filing 

exceptions to the master's recommendation. Similarly, Appellant claims that because 

he now believes that insufficient evidence of value existed in the record and clarification 

was needed on tax consequences or sale costs, the court erred in not remanding the 

case to the master for the purpose of having the parties submit more evidence. The 

parties were well aware of the master's determination, both filed exceptions and 

Appellant made no complaint about the state of the record which, nevertheless, was 

more than sufficient to make a proper determination. No need exists to remand the 

case to the master for him to hold further hearings· and any request to do so by 

Appellant has been waived. 

8