MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 4 ME 5 Docket: Ken

- 24

- 24 Submitted	on

Memoranda : January	24,	2024 Decided: January	24,	2024 Panel: STANFILL ,	 C.J.,	 and MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS , and DOUGLAS , JJ

. ,	 and HUMPHREY ,	A.R.J. DONALD	J.	TRUMP

v. SECRETARY	OF	STATE et	al.

PER	CURIAM [¶1] “ With	the	exception	of	opinions	issued	on	solemn	occasions	under article	 VI,	 Section	 3,	 of	 the	 Constitution,	 the	 judiciary	 in	 this	 state	 is	 not empowered	 to	 render	 advisory	 opinions.” Bar	 Harbor	 Banking	 &	 Tr.	 Co.	 v. Alexander ,	411	A.2d	74,	76	(Me.	1980) .		Consistent	with	our	judicial	role ,	and	to avoid	 issuing	 advisory	 opinions ,	 we	 adhere	 to	 a	 final	 judgment	 rule	 that requires a trial	court ’s decision to	be	final before	we	consider	an	appeal. See id. ; State	 v.	 Me.	 State	 Emps.	 Ass’n ,	 482	 A.2d	 461,	 463 ,	 465 (Me.	 1984) .	 	 “The reasons	 for	 the	 final	 judgment	 rule	 are	 many	 and	 strong.	 	 It	 helps	 curtail interruption,	delay,	duplication	and	harassment;	it	minimizes	interference	with the	 trial	 process;	 it	 serves	 the	 goal	 of	 judicial	 economy;	 and	 it	 saves	 the2 appellate	court	from	deciding	issues	which	may	ultimately	be	mooted,	thus	not only	leaving	a	crisper,	more	comprehensible	record	for	review	in	the	end	but also	in	many	cases	avoiding	an	appeal	altogether.” Me.	State	Emps.	Ass’n ,	482 A.2d	at	46 4

. [¶ 2 ] Here,	 t he	 Secretary	 of	 State and	 three	 challengers	 to	 Donald J. Trump’s	 primary	 petition

— Kimberley	 Rosen,	 Thomas	 Saviello,	 and	 Ethan Strimling

— appeal	from	a n interlocutory order of	the	Superior	Court	(Kennebec County, Murphy,	J. )	remanding	to the	Secretary	of	State the	matter	in	which the Secretary	of	State decided	that the	petition submitted	by former	President	of the	 United	 States	 Donald	 J.	 Trump as	 a	 candidate for	 the	 Maine	 Republican Party’s presidential	 primary was	 invalid because	 of	 a	 false	 decl aration	 of qualification	on	his	candidate	consent	form. Because	the	appeal	is	not	from	a final	judgment,	w e	dismiss	the	appeal	as	interlocutory and	not	justiciable

. I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 3 ]		By the	filing	deadline	of	December	1,	2023,	Donald	J.	Trump	filed	a petition	 for	his	candidacy	 for	President	of	 the	United	States	and	submitted	a required notarized candidate	 consent	 form	 for	 the	 Republican	 Party ’ s presidential	primary. See 21

- A	M.R.S.	§	336	(2023), amended	by P.L.	2023,	ch. 304,	§	A

- 5	(emergency,	effective	June	26,	2023) (to	be	codified	at	21

- A	M.R.S.3 § 336) ; P.L.	 2023,	 ch.	 389,	 § 2 (effective	 Oct.	 25,	 2023) (to	 be	 codified	 at
21

- A M.R.S.	 §	 336(3))

. On	 the	 fo r m	 provided, Trump	 suppl ied identifying information , state d his	voting	residence,	and included his	notarized	signature beneath	the	following	language: Qualifications	of	President	of	the	United	States	(U.S. Constitution,	Article	II,	Section	1)

§ Be	a	natural	born	U.S.	Citizen

§ Have	been	a	resident	of	the	United	States	for	at	least	14	years

§ Be	at	least	35	years	of	age

____________________________________________________________________________ Candidate ’ s	Consent I	 hereby	 declare	 my	 intent	 to	 be	 a	 candidate	 for	 the	 Office	 of President	of	 the	United	States	and	participate	in	 the	Presidential Primary	for	the	party	named	above	to	be	held	on	March	5,	2024,	in the	State	 of	Maine.	 	 I	 further	 declare	 that	my	 residence	is in	 the municipality	and	state	listed	above;	that	I	am	enrolled	in	the	party named	on	 this	consent;	 that	 I	meet	 the	qualifications	 to	hold	 this office	as	listed	above;	and	that	this	declaration	is	true. [¶ 4 ]		By	December	8,	2023

— the	statutory	deadline	for	raising	challenges to	 the	 petition

— the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 received	 three	 challenges. 1 See
21

- A M.R.S.	 § 336(3) ;	 21

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 337(2)(A) (2023)

. Rosen,	 Saviello,	 and Strimling together argued	 that	 Trump	 should	 be	 removed	 from	 the	 primary

1 Because	two	of	the	challengers,	Mary	Ann e Royal	and	Paul	Gordon,	have	not	appealed	from	the Secretary	of	State’s	decision on	their	challenges or from the	trial	court’s	order , we	do	not	discuss	the issues	that	they raised	in	their	challenges.4 ballot	 because,	 having	 previously	 taken	 an	 oath	 as	 President	 of	 the	 United
States “to	 support	 the	Constitution	 of	 the	United	States ,”	Trump “ engaged	in insurrection	or	rebellion	against	the	same , ” which	precludes	him	from	holding the	 office	 of	 President	 under	 Section	 3	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment. U.S. Const.	amend.	XIV,	§	3. 2 T he	Secretary	of	State held	a	hearing in	accordance with	21

- A	M.R.S.	§	337	and	the	Maine	Administrative	Procedure	Act,	5	M.R.S. §§ 9051

- 9064 (2023),	 on	 December	 15,	 2023. The	 Secretary	 of	 State was required	to determine , after the	hearing, whether “ any	part	of	the	declaration ” in	the	candidate	consent	form	was	false,	thereby	rendering the	consent	and	the primary	 petition	 void. 21

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 336(3)	 (“If,	 pursuant	 to	 the	 challenge procedures	in	section	337,	any	part	of	the	declaration	is	found	to	be	false	by	the Secretary	of	State,	the	consent	and	the	primary	petition	are	void.”). [¶ 5 ] On	December	19, after	the hearing	and	the parties’	initial	briefing, the	 Colorado	 Supreme	 Court	 certified	 an	 opinion	 holding	 that	 Trump	 was

2 This	section	provides: No	person	shall	be	a	Senator	or	Representative	in	Congress,	or	elector	of	President and	Vice	President,	or	hold	any	office,	civil	or	military,	under	 the	United	States,	or under	any	State,	who,	having	previously	taken	an	oath,	as	a	member	of	Congress,	or as an	officer	of	 the	United	States,	or	as	a	member	of	any	State	legislature,	or	as	an executive	 or	judicial	 officer	 of	any	State,	 to	 support	 the	 Constitution	 of	 the	United States,	shall	have	engaged	in	insurrection	or	rebellion	against	the	same,	or	given	aid or	comfort	to	the	enemies	thereof. But	Congress	may	by	a	vote	of	two

- thirds	of	each House,	remove	such	disability. U.S.	Const.	amend.	XIV,	§	3.5 disqualified under	Section	3	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment from	appearing	on the	primary	ballot	in	Colorado. Anderson	v.	Griswold ,	No.	23SA300, 2023	WL 8770111,

--- P.3d

--- (Colo.	 Dec.	 19,	 2023) , cert.	 granted sub	 nom.	 Trump	 v. Anderson , No.	23

- 719,	2 024	WL	61814	 (U.S.	 Jan.	5,	2024). On	December	21, 2023,	 t he	 Secretary	 of	 State	 accepted	 supplemental	 briefs	 from	 the	 parties addressing	the	Colorado	decision

. [¶ 6 ] In	t he	Secretary	of	State ’s	decision,	issued	on December	28,	2023 ,
s he	 concluded	 that	 she	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 exclude	 unqualified	 candidates from	the	primary	ballot	and	found	that	Trump	was	not	qualified	to	appear	on the	 ballot	 because	 he	 had	 sworn,	 as	 President,	 to	 support	 the	 United	 States Constitution	and	had	 then	enga ged	in	insurrection	against	 the	United	States.
See U.S.	Const.	amend.	XIV,	§	3. She	suspended	the	effect	of	her	decision	until the	Superior	Court	ruled	on	any	appeal. [¶ 7 ] Trump timely	appealed	to	the	Superior	Court by	filing	a	petition	for review	 of	 final	 agency	 action	 on	 January	 2,	 2024,	 within	 five	 days	 after	 the Secretary	of	State	issued	her	decision

. See 21

- A M.R.S.	 § 337(2)(D); 5	M.R.S. § § 11001 ,	 11002	 (2023) ; M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80C. Among	 other	 proceedings	 in	 the Superior	Court, Trump	moved	to	stay	the court proceedings after th e Supreme
Court of	 the	 United	 States issued	 a	 writ	 of	 certiorari on	 his	 appeal	 from6 Anderson	 v.	 Griswold ,	 No.	 23SA300 ,	 2023	 WL	 8770111 , --- P.3d

--- . The Secretary	of	State	and	Rosen,	Saviello,	and	Strimling	opposed	Trump’s	motion to	stay. [¶ 8 ]		After	receiving	briefs	from	all parties	and	several	amici,	the	court entered an	order on	January	17,	2024

. Among	other	rulings,	t he	court	denied Trump’s motion	 to	 stay the	 court	 proceedings ; stayed ,	 by	 agreement	 of	 all parties, the	effect	of	the	Secretary	of	State ’ s	ruling	pending	the	outcome	of	the United	States	Supreme	Court ’ s	decision	in Anderson ; and	remanded the matter to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 with	instructions	 to issue	 a	 new	 ruling “ modifying, withdrawing,	 or	 confirming ” her December	 28 decision after the	 Supreme Court	reaches a	decision	i n Anderson

. The	court	reasoned	that	a	remand	was necessary	 because	 Maine ’ s	 statutory	 scheme	 contemplates	 the	 Se cretary	 of
State

— not	 the	 courts

— having	 the	 initial	 authority	 to	 decide	 a	 challenge asserting the	fals ity of	a	candidate ’ s	oath in	a	candidate	consent	form

. 3 [¶ 9 ] The	Secretary	of	State appealed	to	us by	filing	a	notice	of	appeal	in the	 Superior	 Court	 on	 January	 19,	 2024, within the	 three

- day	 period established by	section	337(2)(E)

. See	also M.R.	Civ. P. 80C( n );	5	M.R.S.	§	11008

3 See	 Bar	 Harbor	 Banking	 &	 Tr.	 Co.	 v.	 Alexander ,	 411	 A.2d	 74,	 77	 (Me.	 1980)	 (explaining	 the “judicial	 policy	 of	 not	 deciding	 an	issue	 concerning	 which	 an	 administrative	 agency	 has	 decision capacity	until	after	the	agency	has	considered	the	issue”	( alteration	and quotation	marks	omitted))

.7 (2023). On	 that	 same	 day,	w e	 ordered the	Secretary	 of	State and	any	 other appellants to	 show	 cause	 why the appeal	 should	 not be	 dismissed	 as interlocutory

. Rosen,	Saviello,	and	Strimling	thereafter	filed	a timely notice	of appeal. On	January	23,	2024,	we accepted	memoranda	on	the	issue .		We now dismiss	 the	 appeal	 because	 we	 conclude	 that	 it	 is	 interlocutory and	 that	 no statutory	or	judicially	created exception	to our rule requiring	a	final	judgment on	appeal applies

. II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 10 ]	 	 An	 appeal	 to the	 Law	 Court i s	 generally “ not	 ripe	 for	 appellate review	unless	 the appeal	is	 from	a	 final	judgment. ” Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. State Tax Assessor , 2006 ME 18, ¶ 3, 892 A.2d 1162

. It	is	well	settled	that	w hen a	matter	has	been	remanded	to	an	agency	for	further	proceedings,	the Superi or Court decision is	 not	 a	 final	 judgment because	 it	 does	 not	 fully	 decide	 and dispose	 of	 the	 entire	 case, “ leaving	 no	 further	 questions	 for	 .	 .	 .	 future consideration	and	judgment	by	the	administrative	agency. ” Est.	of	Pirozzolo	v. Dep ’ t	 of	 Marine	 Res. ,	 2017	 ME	 147,	 ¶ 5,	 167	 A.3d	 552 (quota tion	 marks omitted); see	also ,	e.g. , Fox	Islands	Wind	Neighbors	v.	Dep’t	of	Env’t	Prot. ,	2015 ME	53,	¶	9,	116	A.3d	940. Rule	80C(m)	expressly	contemplates	that	any	appeal to	us	occurs	after	the	remand and	that issues	generated	before	a	remand	to	an8 agency	will	be	considered	if	raised	in	an	appeal	brought	after	the	entry	of	a	final judgment. 4 See	also	Farrell	v.	State,	Dep’t	of	Hum.	Servs. ,	415	A.2d	828,	829	(Me. 1980)	(“Our	dismissal	of	plaintiff’s	appeal	is	solely	because	it	is	premature	and does	not	foreclose	later	review	of	the	whole	case	to	determine	whether	he	has been	caused	any	prejudice	by	the	action	of	the	Superior	Court.”). [¶1 1 ] W e	 have,	 on	 rare	 occasions,	 considered	 appeals from remand orders “ when	 the	 remaining	action [wa s ] essentially	ministerial,	 such	as	 the formal	issuance	of	a	permit, ” Est.	of	Pirozzolo ,	2017	ME	147,	¶	5,	167	A.3d	552 (quotation	marks	omitted) .		T he	remand order here ,	however, direct s actions that	 are	 more	 than	 ministerial

. W here “ the	 issue	 which	 the	 parties	 seek	 to present	 to	 this	 court	 might	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 action	 taken	 pursuant	 to	 the remand	 order,	 we	 will	 usually	 refrain	 from entertaining	 the	 appeal. ” Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 2 ] Although	 the	order	on	appeal	here	is	patently	interlocutory, the Secretary	 of	 State and	 the	 challengers	 to	 Trump’s	 petition contend	 that (A) there	 is	 statutory	 authorization	 for	 an	 interlocutory	 appeal	 and	 (B)	 two

4 “ If	the	court	remands	the	case	for	further	proceedings,	all	issues	raised	on	the	court ’ s	review	of the	agency	action	shall	be	preserved	in	a	subsequent	appeal	taken	from	a	final	judgment	entered	on review	of	such	agency	action.” M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C(m).		The	1997	Advisory	Committee’s	Note	to	Rule 80C(m)	states , “Rule	80C(m)	is	amended	to	clarify	that	an	order	of	remand	from	the	Superior	Court to	 the	 governmental	 agency	 is	 not	 a	 final	 judgment	 from	 which	 an	 appeal	 lies,	 absent	 special circumstances.”9 judicially	created exceptions	to our final	judgment	rule apply : ( 1 ) the	judicial economy	exception and ( 2 ) the	death	knell	exception. See Me

. State	Emps.	Ass ’ n , 482	A.2d at 464

. A. Statutory	Authorization	for Interlocutory	Appeal [¶1 3 ] T he	Secretary	of	State	argu e s that	section	337(2)(E)	requires	us	to enter	a	final	opinion	on	the	merits	of	the	matter	before	us

. The	judicial	review portions	of	section	337(2)	provide in	relevant part as	follows:
D. A	 challenger	 or	 a	 candidate	 may	 appeal	 the	 decision	 of	 the Secretary	of	State	by	commencing	an	action	in	the	Superior	Court. This	action	must	be	conducted	in	accordance	with	the	Maine	Rules of	Civil	Procedure,	Rule	80C,	except	as	modified	by	this	section

. .	.	. The	court	shall	issue	a	written	decision	containing	its	 findings	of fact	 and	 conclusions	 of	 law	 and	 setting	 forth	 the	 reasons	 for	 its decision	within	20	days	of	the	date	of	the	decision	of	the	Secretary of	State.
E. Any	aggrieved	party	may	appeal [to	the	Law	Court] the	decision of	 the	 Superior	 Court,	 on	 questions	 of	 law,	 by	 filing	 a	 notice	 of appeal	within	3	days	of	that	decision.

.	.	. As	soon	as	the	record	and briefs	 have	 been	 filed,	 the	 court	 shall	 immediately	 consider	 the case. The	court	shall	issue	its	decision	within	14	days	of	the	date	of the	decision	of	the	Superior	Court.
In	accordance	with section	337(2 ) (D) ,	the	Superior	Court	conducted	the	action by	 following	Rule	80C	of	 the	Maine	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure,	which	provides that	“[t]he	manner	and	scope	of	review	of	final	agency	action	or	the	failure	or refusal	of	an	agency	to	act	shall	be	as	provided	by	5	M.R. S.A.	§	11007(2)	through10 § 11007(4).”		M.R.	Civ.	P.	80C(c). As	authorized	by	section	11007,	t he	Superior Court	decided	to	“[r]emand	the	case	 for	 further	proceedings	.	.	.	or	take	such action	 as	 the	 court	 deems	 necessary.” 5	 M.R.S.	 § 11007(4)(B)	 (2023) .	 	 The Secretary	of	State	then	appealed	to	us,	invoking	21

- A	M.R.S.	§	337(2)( E ). [¶1 4 ]	 	 W e	 have entertaine d appeals	 from	 orders	 other than	 final judgments where	 the re	is specific	statutory	authorization	 for	such	an	appeal from	a	particular	interlocutory	order. Me.	Cent.	R.R.	Co.	v.	Bangor	&	Aroostook
R.R.	 Co. ,	 395	 A.2d	 1107,	 1113	 (Me.	 1978).	 	 For	instance, the	 Legislature	 has expressly	 authorized interlocutory	 appeal s “ from	 [a]n	 order	 denying	 an application	 to	 compel	 arbitration

. ” 14 M.R.S.	 § 5945(1)(A)	 (2023) ; see Champagne	v.	Victory	Homes,	Inc. ,	2006	ME	58,	¶	7,	897	A.2d	803

. We	review jeopardy	and	medical	treatment orders in	child	protection	proceedings	because the	 Legislature	 has specifically authorized	 those	 interlocutory	 appeals even though	 the orders do	 not	 finally	 resolve	 a	 child	 protection	 matter :	 “A	 party aggrieved	by	an	order	of	a	court	entered	pursuant	to	section	4035	.	.	.	or	4071 may	appeal	directly	to	the	Supreme	Judicial	Court	sitting	as	the	Law	Court

.	.	. .”
22 M.R.S.	 §	 4006 (2023); see 22	 M.R.S.	 § 4035 (2023)	 (jeopardy	 orders);
22 M.R.S.	§ 4071	(2023) (medical	treatment	orders) ; In	re	Dakota	P. ,	2005	ME11 2,	¶	12,	863	A.2d	280. By	statute , c ertain	decisions	in	criminal	matters	may also be	appealed	immediately even	though	they	are	not	final	judgments: An	appeal	may	be	taken	by	the	State	in	criminal	cases	on	questions of	law	from	the	District	Court	and	from	the	Superior	Court	to	the Supreme	Judicial	Court	sitting	as	the	Law	Court:	From	an	order	of the	court	prior	to	trial	which	suppresses	any	evidence,	i ncluding, but	not	limited	to,	physical	or	identification	evidence	or	evidence of	 a	 confession	 or	 admission;	 from	 an	 order	 which	 prevents	 the prosecution	from	obtaining	evidence;	from	a	pretrial	dismissal	of an	indictment,	information	or	complaint;	or	from any	other	order of	 the	 court	 prior	 to	 trial	 which,	 either	 under	 the	 particular circumstances	 of	 the	 case	 or	 generally	 for	 the	 type	 of	 order	 in question,	 has	 a	 reasonable	 likelihood	 of	 causing	 either	 serious impairment	to	or	termination	of	the	prosecution. 15	M.R.S.	§	2115

- A (1) (2023). In the	presence	of	such	an	explicit	authorization, we	honor	“a	legislative	intention	to	create	an	exception	to	the	final	judgment rule	allowing	immediate	appeal	of	such	interlocutory	orders.” Me.	Cent.	R.R.	Co. , 395	A.2d	at	1113. [¶1 5 ]	 	 Here,	 there	 is	 no	 such	 explicit	 authorizatio n. To	 the	 contrary, section	337(2)( D )	states	that	the	appeal	“must	be	conducted	in	accordance	with the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Civil	 Procedure,	 Rule	 80C,	 except	 as	 modified	 by	 this section.”		Nothing	in	section	337	modifies	the	final	judgment	rule	or	authorizes any	interlocutory	appeal.		Moreover, t he	statute	requires	the	Superior	Court	to “issue	a	written	decision	containing	its	findings	of	fact	and	conclusions	of	law and	 setting	 forth	 the	 reasons	 for	its	 decision

. ” 21

- A M.R.S.	 § 337(2)(D)

. By12 statute, the	 Superior	 Court	 is	 expressly	 authorized	 to enter	 a	 decision “[r]emand [ing] the	case	for	further	proceedings	.	.	.	or	tak [ing] such	action	as the	court	deems	necessary.” 5	M.R.S.	§ 11007(4)(B)

. [¶1 6 ]		As	to	the statutory	authorization	of	an	appeal	from	“the	decision of	 the	 Superior	 Court”	 and	 the direction	 in	 the	 statute	 that	 we	 “issue	 [a] decision”	 within	 fourteen	 days	 a fter	 the	 Superior	 Court’s	 decision , id. § 337(2)(E), the Legislature	 cannot “supplant	 the	 power	 of	 the	 courts	 to determine	whether	a	justiciable	 controversy	 has	 been	 presented.” Bryant	 v. Town	of	Camden ,	2016	ME	27,	¶ 14	&	n.	4,	132	A.3d	1183	(citing	Me.	Const.	art. III,	 §§	 1,	 2	 (establishing	 the	 separation	 of	 powers	 between	 the branches	 of Maine’s	government	and	prohibiting	any	branch	from	exercising	the	powers	of another branch)). Our	decision	to	dismiss	the	appeal	as	interlocutory	within that	period	may	not be	the	final	word	in the	matter,	but	it	decides	the	case	as	it has	been presented to	us

. Accordingly,	we	are	not	persuaded	that	the	statute requires	us	to	disregard	the lack	of justiciability	of	the	decision	challenged	on appeal. 5

5 We	note	this	is	not	the	first	time	a	matter	has	been	remanded	to	the	Secretary	of	State	upon	the Superior	Court’s	judicial	review	of	an	election

- related	decision.		In Reed	v.	Sec’y	of	State ,	2020	ME	57, 232	A.3d	202,	the	Secretary	of	State	issued	a	decision	declaring	a	petition	 for	a	direct	initiative	of legislation	valid	and the	proposed	legislation eligible	 for	a	statewide	vote. Id. ¶	7; see 21

- A M.R.S. § 905(1)	(2018) ( since	amended	in	ways	not	relevant	here,	most	recently	by	P.L.	2023,	ch.	342,	§	1 (effective	Oct.	2 5 ,	2023) (to	be	codified	at	21

- A	M.R.S.	§	905(1)) ).		On	appeal	to	the	Superior	Court, the	court	remanded	the	matter	for	the	Secretary	of	State	to	take	additional	evidence,	after	which	the13 B. Judicially	Crea ted	Exceptions	to	the	Final	Judgment	Rule [¶1 7 ]		The	next	question	is	whether	a	judicially	created	exception	to	the final	 judgment	 rule weighs	 in	 favor	 of	 immediate	 appellate	 review	 of	 the Superior	Court’s	interlocutory	order.
1
. Judicial	Economy	Exception [¶1 8 ]	 	 The	 judicial	 economy	 exception applies	 when resolution	 of	 the appeal can “ establish	 a	 final ,	 or	 practically	 final, disposition	 of	 the	 entire litigation ” and	 the	 interests	 of	 justice	 require	 that	 an	 immediate	 review	 be undertaken. Me

. State	 Emps.	 Ass’n ,	 482	 A.2d at	 464

- 65; see Forest	 Ecology Network	 v.	 Land	 Use	 Regul.	 Comm ’ n ,	 2012	ME	 36,	 ¶	 17,	 39	 A.3d	 74 ; see also Maples	v.	Compass	Harbor	Vill.	Condo.	Ass’n ,	2022	ME	26,¶ 17	n.9,	273	A.3d	358 (“We	clarify	here	 that	 the	availability	of	 the	judicial	economy	exception	does not	depend	on	our	deciding	the	case	in	a	certain	way, cf.	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Agric.,	Rural
Hous.	Serv.	v.	Carter ,	2002	ME	103,	¶	13,	799	A.2d	1232,	and,	with	respect	to	the first	 requirement,	 a	 party	 need	 only	 demonstrate	 that,	 in	 at	 least	 one alternative,	 our	 ruling	 on	 appeal	 might	 establish	 a	 final,	 or	 practically	 final,

Secretary	of	State	issued	a	final	decision,	the	Superior	Court	reviewed	that	decision,	and	the	matter came	to	us	on	appeal. Reed ,	2020	ME	57,	¶¶	8

- 11,	232	A.3d	202.		This	process	enabled	us	to	make	a final	 decision	 that	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 any	 additional	 proceedings	 and	 decision

- making. See	 id. ¶¶ 12

- 24.14 disposition	of	the	entire	litigation, see,	e.g., Liberty	v.	Bennett ,	2012	ME	81,	¶	19, 46	A.3d	1141; Cutting	v.	Down	E.	Orthopedic	Assocs.,	P.A. ,	2021	ME	1,	¶¶	16

- 18, 244	A.3d	226.”). [¶ 19 ] Uncertainties	regarding multiple issues	of	federal	law	pervade	the proceedings	pending	in	Maine	and are	likely to require	additional	proceedings to	ensure	the	proper	application	of	the	law

. W e	would	run	a	high	risk	of issuing an	 advisory opinion if	 we	 decided	 the	 matter on	 the	 merits before	 a	 final judgment	has	been	entered. Especially	when	several	possible	outcomes	of	the present	appeal	would	not	finally	resolve	the matter , 6 w e	cannot	conclude	that
our	 review “ has	 the	 potential	 to establish	 a	 final	 disposition	 of	 the	 entire litigation. ” Forest	Ecology	Network ,	2012	ME	36,	¶ 23 ,	39	A.3d	74

. [¶ 2 0 ] T he expedited timeline	set	forth	by	statute	does	not	persuade	us of	the	need	for	our	immediate	review

. 7 I f	we	were	to	issue	a final	decision,	only then	 to	 learn from	 the	 Supreme	 Court that ,	 for	 instance, Section	 3	 of	 the

6 As	just	two	examples , we	could	vacate	the	Superior	Court’s	decision	and	remand the	matter	for the	court to reach a	final	judgment , or we	could affirm	the	Superior	Court’s	decision,	which	would result	in a	remand to	the	Secretary	of	State.

7 If a	final	determination	of	disqualification were	to	be made before	the ranked

- choice primary on	March	5,	2024 ,	the vote could proceed,	with	the Secretary	of	State issuing a	notice informing	voters of	the	disqualification

. See 21

- A	M.R.S.	§§ 1(27

- C)(E), 371(5) ,	441(1), 723

- A (2023) , amended	by P.L. 2023,	ch.	304,	§§	A

- 14	to	A

- 19 , A

- 39 (e mergency,	effective June 26 ,	2023,	except	as	to	21

- A	M.R.S. § 723

- A(5

- B),	which	is	effective	Jan.	1,	2024) (to	be	codified	at	21

- A	M.R.S.	§ 723

- A).15 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 is	 not	 self

- executing	 or	 that	 all	 findings	 regarding insurrection	must	be	reached	by	a	higher	standard	of	proof	than	the	Secretary of	State	applied, 8 a	flurry	of	court	activity	would	ensue	in	an	effort	to	reopen the	decision	of	the	Secretary	of	State or	seek	independent	judicial	relief ,	causing delay	that	the	existing	interlocutory	order might avoid.		This	is	not	an	instance in	 which judicial	 economy	 concerns	 encourage	 us	 to	 undertake	 immediate
review. [¶ 2 1 ]		Finally,	i n	their	discussion	of	the	judicial	economy	exception,	the challengers	 have	 also	 alluded	 to	 another	 potential	 exception	 to	 the	 final judgment	 rule	 without	 specifically	 raising	 it:	 the	 separation	 of	 powers exception.	 	 This	 exception	 applies	 if	 the	 Superior	 C ourt	 has	 interfered	 with “apparently	 legitimate	 executive	 department	 activity”	 in	 disruption	 of	 the administrative	 process,	 in	 a	 way	 that	 “encourages	 the	 circumvention	 of statutorily	 authorized	 investigation	 and	 enforcement	 mechanisms.” Bar Harbor	 Banking	 &	 Tr.	 Co. ,	 411	 A.2d at 75

- 77	 (reviewing	 a	 Superior	 Court’s temporary	 restraining	 order	 enjoining	 a	 scheduled	 administrative	 hearing). The	court	here	remanded	for	the	Secretary	of	State	to	exercise	her	statutorily

8 In	particular,	the	potential	for	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	to	require	additional	fact

- finding	by the	Secretary	of	State	weighs	against	our	acceptance	of	an	interlocutory	appeal. See	Wilcox	v.	City	of Portland ,	2009	ME	53,	¶¶	13

- 14,	970	A.2d	295

.16 authorized	 function	 of	making	a	 final	 determination	 of	whether	 “any	 part	 of [Trump’s]	declaration	is	.	.	.	 false”	after	the	Supreme	Court	decides Anderson

. 21

- A	M.R.S.	§	336(3).		Far	 from	interfering	with	“legitimate	executive	branch activity, ” the	Superior	Court	order	respects the separation	of	powers	and	the primary	role	of	the	Secretary	of	State	in	making	the	determination	at	issue.
2
. Death	Knell	Exception [¶ 2 2 ] “The	death	knell	exception	permits	judicial	review	when	failure	to do	 so	 would	 preclude	 any	 effective	 review	 or	 would	 result	 in	 irreparable injury.” M e. State	 Emps.	 Ass’n ,	 482	 A.2d	 at	 464	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). Thus,	 we	 will	 undertake	 immediate	 review	 when	 “the	 appellant	 would obviously	suffer	irreparable	harm	otherwise	and	the	issue	pressed	on	appeal would	be	effectively	mooted	if	not	immediately	addressed.” Id. “The	exception is	only	available	when	the	injury	to	the	plaintiff’s	claimed	right	would	otherwise be	imminent,	concrete,	and	irreparable.” Carter ,	2002	ME	103,	¶	12,	799	A.2d
1232 (quotation	marks	 omitted) ; s ee also Me.	 State	 Emps.	 Ass’n ,	 482	 A.2d	 at
464

- 65 ( declining	to	review	a remand order	when it could	be	challenged	after entry	of	a	final	judgment )

. [¶ 2 3 ]	 	 Even	 when	 ballot	 printing	 deadlines	 are	 at	 issue,	 we	 have not always	applied the	death	knell	exception. In Crafts	v.	Quinn ,	482	A.2d	825	(Me.17 1984) ,	 we	 declined	 to	 apply	 the	 death	 knell	 exception	 in	 a	 case	 where	 the plaintiffs	sought	injunctive	relief	to	allow	more	time	to	obtain	signatures	for	the Libertarian	Party’s	presidential	candidate ,	even	 though a	 final	disposition	by the	 Superior	 Court	 would	 not	 be	 reached	 before	 the	 election	 without	 our acceptance	of	an	immediate	appeal

. Id. at	827

- 2 9

. [¶ 2 4 ] In	contrast,	in All iance for	Retired	Americans	v.	Sec retar y	of	State , 2020	ME	123,	240	A.3d	45 ,	we	applied the	death	knell	exception	to	review	an interlocutory	order	denying	a	preliminary	injunction enjoining	the	rejection	of certain	 absentee ballots. Id. ¶¶	 1,	 5. Th e	 plaintiffs	 sought a	 declarat ory judgment that	 statutes	 governing	 the	 deadline	 for	 absentee	 ballots	 and	 the validation	and	rejection	of	absentee	ballots	were	unconstitutional as	applied during	 the	 COVID

- 19	 pandemic. Id. ¶	 1 &	 n.4

. We	 reviewed	 the	 decision immediately	 because	 “once	 the	 November	 election [wa s ] held,	 the	 claimed injury	 to	 [the	 plaintiff	 voters’]	 constitutional	 right	 to	 vote”

— which	 was “specific	 to	 th [e] pandemic

- affected	 election	 cycle

— [could	 not] be	 repaired, even	if	they	eventually	prevail [ed] on	their	complaint	for	declaratory	judgment after	the	election. ” Id. ¶	6

. [¶ 2 5 ]	 	 The	 Secretary	 of	 State suggests that there	 is	 irreparable	 harm because a	delay	in	certainty	about	whether	Trump’s	name	should	appear	on	the18 primary	 ballot will result	 in voter	 confusion .	 	 This	 uncertainty	 is,	 however, precisely what	 guides	 our	 decision not to	 undertake	 immediate	 appellate
review in	 this	 particular	 case

. T here	are multiple alternative	 outcomes	 that would be	 more	 effectively	 addressed	 through	 the	 Superior	 Court’s	 order of remand to	the	Secretary	of	State. [¶ 2 6 ] We	 are	 also	 struck	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 parties,	 including	 the Secretary	of	State,	all agreed	that the	effect	of the	Secretary	of	State’s decision should	be	stayed	until Anderson is	decided .		Given	that, we	cannot	conclude	that
concrete, irreparable	 harm	 would	 flow	 from	 our	 decision	 not	 to	 review	 this matter	immediately

. Carter ,	2002	ME	103,	¶	12,	799	A.2d	1232.		I ndeed,	there
is at	least	as	great	a risk of	additional	 process	and	 delay	if	we	 consider	 this appeal and reach	an	 ostensibly	 final	 decision,	and	 then	 the	Supreme	 Court’s decision	makes additional	court or	administrative action necessary	to comply with	the	federal	law	it	announces with	no	clear	path	for	resolution

. Given	the high	level	of	uncertainty,	t he	Secretary	of	State	has	not	identified	a concrete and irreparable	 harm arising	 from	 our	 decision	 not	 to	 review	 this	 matter immediately

. See	id.19 III.		CONCLUSION [¶ 2 7 ]		Our final	judgment	rule	exists	 for	situations	such	as	 this,	where other	decisionmakers ’ choices	are	likely	to	alter	the	landscape	of	the	case and narrow	 the	scope	of	our	 review

. See	Me.	State	Emps.	Ass’n ,	482	A.2d	at	464. Requiring	 a	 final	 judgment in	 this	 situation	 serves	 the	 interests	 of	 justice ; enhances administrative	 and judicial	 efficiency ; averts	 our	 issuance	 of	 what would	likely	be,	at	least	in	some	part,	an	advisory	opinion; and	allows	for	true and effective	 decision

- making	when the matter	is	 ripe. See Est.	 of	 Pirozzolo , 2017	ME	147,	¶ 5,	167	A.3d	552 ; Bar	Harbor	Banking	&	Tr.	Co. ,	411	A.2d	at	76

. The	entry	is: Appeal	dismissed	as	interlocutory.
Aaron	 M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General,	 Thomas	 A.	 Knowlton,	 Dep.	 Atty.	 Gen.,	 and Jason	 Anton,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.,	 Office	 of	 the	 Attorney	 General,	 Augusta,	 for appellant	Secretary	of	State Benjamin	Gaines,	Esq.,	Gaines	Law,	LLC,	Brunswick,	and	James	T.	Kilbreth,	Esq., Drummond	 Woodsum,	 Portland,	 for	 appellants	 Kimberley	 Rosen,	 Thomas Saviello,	and	Ethan	Strimling Bruce	W.	Hepler,	Esq.,	and	Benjamin	E.	Hartwell,	Esq.,	The	Law	Offices	of	Bruce W.	 Hepler,	 LLC,	 Portland;	 Scott	 E.	 Gessler,	 Esq.,	 and	 Geoffrey	 N.	 Blue,	 Esq., Gessler	Blue	LLC,	Greenwood	Village,	Colorado;	Ronald	D.	Coleman,	Esq.,	and Gary	M.	 Lawkowski, Esq ., Dhillon	 Law	 Group,	 Inc.,	Newark,	New	 Jersey,	 and Alexandria,	Virginia,	for	appellee	Donald	J.	Trump Kennebec	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP

- 2024

- 1 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY