UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION 

www.flsb.uscourts.gov

In re: Chapter 11 Cases 

LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC, Case No. 21-13797-SMG 

LPT, LLC, Case No. 21-15537-SMG 

LIBERTY POWER MARYLAND, LLC, Case No. 21-15539-SMG 

LIBERTY POWER DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA, LLC, Case No. 21-15540-SMG 

Debtors. (Jointly administered 21-13797-SMG) 

/ 

MOTION TO ENFORCE SECOND BAR DATE ORDER [ECF NO. 752] AND 

TO COMPEL PAUL SAPAN AND PRATO & REICHMAN, APC 

TO COMPLY THEREWITH 

Liberty Power Holdings, LLC (“Holdings”), Liberty Power District of Columbia, LLC 

(“Liberty District of Columbia”), LPT, LLC (“LPT”) and Liberty Power Maryland, LLC (“Liberty 

Maryland”)(collectively, the “Debtors”), by and through their undersigned counsel, file this Motion 

to Enforce Second Bar Date Order [ECF No. 752] and to Compel Paul Sapan and Prato & Reichman, 

APC to Comply Therewith (the “Motion”) and in support thereof state as follows: 

I. JURISDICTION 

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. 

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This matter is a core proceeding pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b). 

2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Paul Sapan and Prato & Reichman, APC, 

including because the Debtors will be serving this Motion in the same manner as provided in 

Bankruptcy Rule 7004. See In re DBSI, Inc., 451 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 

3. The statutory predicates for the relief sought herein are §§105(a) and 503(a) of the 

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Bankruptcy Code. 

II. BACKGROUND 

4. On April 20, 2021 (the “Holdings Petition Date”), Holdings filed a voluntary 

petition in this Court for relief under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Since that 

time, Holdings has operated as a debtor-in-possession pursuant to Sections 1107 and 1108 of the 

Bankruptcy Code. 

5. On June 4, 2021 (the “Subsidiary Petition Date”), the Subsidiary Debtors each filed 

chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions, which bankruptcy cases (the “Bankruptcy Cases”) were jointly 

administered with the chapter 11 case of Holdings, including to facilitate the sale of all or 

substantially all of the Debtors’ assets, including without limitation, retail customer contracts, 

pursuant to Sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. 

6. As of the date hereof, no creditors’ committee has been appointed in these cases. 

In addition, no trustee or examiner has been appointed. 

7. For a detailed description of the Debtors and their operations, the Debtors 

respectfully refer the Court and parties in interest to the Declaration of Bob Butler, Chief 

Restructuring Officer, in Support of the Chapter 11 Petition and First Day Motions (the “First Day 

Declaration”)[ECF No. 10]. 

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS BAR DATES AND THE COURT’S RELATED 

ORDERS 

8. On December 29, 2021, the Debtors filed the Debtors’ Expedited Motion (I) To 

Establish a Bar Date for the Filing of Motions Seeking the Allowance and/or Payment of 

Administrative Expense Claims, and (II) to Designate the Form and Manner of Notice of 

Administrative Claims Bar Date (the “First Bar Date Motion”) [ECF No. 510]. 

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9. On January 12, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting the Administrative 

Claim Motion (the “First Bar Date Order”)[ECF No. 526] establishing a bar date of February 9, 

2022 as the deadline for the filing of administrative expense claims in these Bankruptcy Cases 

under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.1

 

10. On July 13, 2022, the Debtors filed the Debtors’ Motion (I) To Establish a Second 

Administrative Claims Bar Date for Certain Putative Creditors to File (I) Motions Seeking the 

Allowance and/or Payment of Administrative Expense Claims, and (II) to Designate the Form and 

Manner of Notice of Second Administrative Claims Bar Date (the “Second Bar Date Motion”) 

[ECF No. 735]. 

11. As set forth therein, the Debtors filed the Second Bar Date Motion in part to deal 

with any potential administrative claims of Mr. Paul Sapan (“Sapan”), who had filed and was 

prosecuting a class action lawsuit against Holdings (among others) in the United States District 

Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division (the “California District Court”) 

styled Paul Sapan v. Liberty Power Corp., L.L.C., Liberty Power Super Holdings, LLC, Liberty 

Power Holdings, LLC, Case No. 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES (the “Sapan Class Action Lawsuit”). 

12. On July 27, 2022, the Court held a hearing on the Second Bar Date Motion. A copy 

of the transcript of such hearing is attached hereto as Exhibit “A” (the “Transcript”). At such 

hearing, Christopher Reichman, Esq. of Prato & Reichman, APC (“Mr. Reichman”), who is 

counsel to Sapan in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, made an appearance and asserted several 

objections to the Second Bar Date Motion.2 See Transcript at p. 4, lines 3-6. The Court overruled 

 

1

 The Debtors have since confirmed that the First Bar Date Order was served on Paul Sapan through his counsel, Prato 

& Reichman, APC, who was listed as one of the 1,199 confidential parties that were set forth on that certain Certificate 

of Service, dated January 14, 2022 and filed at ECF 541, with an address c/o Prato & Reichman, APC, 8555 Aero 

Drive, Suite 303, San Diego, CA 92123. Notwithstanding, Sapan, though his counsel, has claimed that they never 

received the First Bar Date Order. If needed, the Debtors will provide evidence of such service. 

2 Mr. Reichman made his appearance as follows: “Good afternoon, your Honor, Chris Reichman, appearing for the 

Sapan versus Liberty Power class action case. I am the class counsel in the Central District of California.” 

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such objections and made clear to Mr. Reichman that he could file a motion or request for an 

administrative expense claim on behalf his client on or before the deadline that the Court was 

establishing in connection with the Second Bar Date Motion. 

13. At the July 27th hearing, the Court also explained to Mr. Reichman that there was 

no prejudice or lack of due process to his client by the Court granting the Second Bar Date Motion, 

which would allow Sapan twenty-five (25) days from its entry to file a request for an administrative 

expense claim. Further, in response to Mr. Reichman’s questions about needing to take discovery 

in respect of any such administrative claim, the Court outlined for Mr. Reichman that under Rule 

9014 of the Bankruptcy Rules, litigation of an administrative claim triggers a contested matter that 

allows discovery to take place in the Bankruptcy Cases without any prejudice to Sapan. 

14. Thereafter, on July 29, 2022, the Court entered its Order Granting the Second 

Administrative Claim Motion (the “Second Bar Date Order”)[ECF No. 752] establishing a second 

bar date of August 23, 2022 (25 days from the date of the Second Bar Date Order) (the “Second 

Claims Bar Date”) as the deadline for the filing of administrative expense claims in these 

Bankruptcy Cases under section 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 

15. On July 29, 2022, the Debtors served the Second Bar Date Order via first-class 

mail, through their noticing agent Stretto, on (i) Paul Sapan, c/o Prato & Reichman, APC, 8555 

Aero Dr., Suite 303, San Diego CA 92123, and (ii) Paul Sapan, c/o Prato & Reichman, APC. 3675 

Ruffin Rd., Suite 220, San Diego, CA 92123. See Certificate of Service at ECF No. 758. 

Additionally, upon the request by Mr. Reichman to undersigned counsel, undersigned counsel 

emailed a copy of the Second Bar Date Order directly to Mr. Reichman on August 5, 2022. See

Email, dated August 5, 2022, from Paul J. Battista, Esq. to Christopher Reichman, Esq. attached 

hereto as Exhibit “B.” 

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16. Notwithstanding providing actual and formal notice of the Second Bar Date Order 

as set forth above, Sapan did not file a motion or request for the allowance and/or payment of an 

administrative expense on or before the Second Claims Bar Date. 

17. Moreover, contrary to and in violation of the express terms of the Second Bar Date 

Order, Sapan and his counsel Prato & Reichman, APC, have continued their aggressive 

prosecution of the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit in the California District Court in an effort to 

liquidate Sapan’s post-petition claim against Holdings, which conduct has and continues to cause 

the Debtors to expend substantial resources in defense thereof. 

18. Worse, as set forth below, undersigned counsel attempted to avoid the filing of this 

Motion and confronted Mr. Reichman with the fact that his continued prosecution of the Sapan 

Class Action Lawsuit was in violation of the Second Bar Date Order. In response, Mr. Reichman 

took the position that neither he nor Mr. Sapan are bound by this Court’s Second Bar Date Order 

and therefore have intentionally failed and refused to comply with it. 

IV. THE SAPAN CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT. 

19. The Complaint in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit alleges one cause of action 

against Holdings, among other non-debtor entities, for an alleged post-petition violation of the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (47 U.S.C. §227 and 47 C.F.R. §64.1200 – “TCPA”). 

A copy of Complaint in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit is attached hereto as Exhibit “C” (the 

“Sapan Complaint”).3

 

20. As set forth in the Sapan Complaint, Mr. Reichman and the law firm of Prato & 

Reichman, APC, are counsel for “Plaintiff Paul Sapan.” In subsequent pleadings filed in the Sapan 

Class Action Lawsuit, Mr. Reichman and Prato & Reichman, APC appear as “Attorneys for 

 

3

 References to pleadings in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit are cited as [CA Dkt.___]. 

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Plaintiff [Paul Sapan] and the Proposed Class.” The putative class, however, has not been certified 

by the California District Court as of the date hereof. Moreover, no motion to certify a class is 

pending before the California District Court. 

21. The Debtors assert that Sapan is known as a prolific TCPA litigant who has been a 

plaintiff in approximately 74 TCPA lawsuits, mostly in the State of California. 

22. Moreover, at the time of the filing of the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, Sapan, Mr. 

Reichman and Prato & Reichman, APC had actual knowledge of the Holdings’ Bankruptcy Case. 

See Sapan Complaint at ¶¶21 & 22.

23. Notwithstanding having failed to file a motion or request for an administrative 

expense claim as required by the Second Bar Date Order, as discussed above, Sapan, through his 

counsel Prato & Reichman, APC, continued their prosecution of the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit. 

In connection therewith and among other things, on August 29, 2022, a mere six (6) days after the 

Second Claims Bar Date, Sapan filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Joint Discovery Dispute

(the “Motion to Compel Discovery”) moving to compel Holdings to respond to Sapan’s 

Interrogatories and Request for Production. [CA Dkt. 57]. A copy of the Motion to Compel 

Discovery is attached hereto as Exhibit “D.” In response, Holdings moved to reschedule the 

hearing on the Motion to Compel Discovery for the same date as a hearing on Holdings’ separate 

motion to stay the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit based on this Court’s Second Bar Date Order (the 

“Motion to Stay”).4 

24. On September 2, 2022, undersigned counsel to the Debtors sent a demand (the 

“Demand”) to Mr. Reichman advising him that the continued prosecution of the Sapan Class 

 

4

 In its Motion to Stay, Holdings also raised Sapan’s failure to comply with this Court’s First Bar Date Order, although 

Sapan, through his counsel, Mr. Reichman, has taken the position that he did not receive the First Bar Date Order. 

Holdings’ Motion to Stay remains pending before the California District Court, that Court having continued the 

hearing on such Motion to December 15, 2022. 

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Action Lawsuit violated the Second Bar Date Order and demanding that he dismiss the Sapan 

Class Action Lawsuit as against Holdings. The Demand made specific reference to paragraph 3 

of the Second Bar Date Order, which states as follows: 

“Any holder of an Administrative Claim who fails to comply with the terms of this 

Order shall be and is hereby barred from pursuing such Administrative Claim in these 

chapter 11 cases or otherwise. In addition, any such Administrative Claim not 

subject of an appropriate motion by the Second Administrative Claims Bar Date 

shall be and is hereby denied with prejudice.” 

(emphasis added). 

25. On the same day, September 2, 2022, Mr. Reichman responded to the Demand and 

made a number of statements, including among other things, that he was not a bankruptcy lawyer, 

that he was not representing Mr. Sapan when he appeared at the hearing on the Second Bar Date 

Motion, that he was only representing the yet uncertified class in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, 

that he never accepted service of anything on behalf of Sapan in the bankruptcy case, that he is not 

pursuing an Administrative Claim in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit and that this Court does not 

have and cannot exercise jurisdiction over Sapan or Prato & Reichman, APC. Based on these 

positions, Mr. Reichman refused to comply with the Demand and refused to dismiss the Sapan 

Class Action Lawsuit as to Holdings. A copy of the Demand and Mr. Reichman’s response is 

attached hereto as Composite Exhibit “E.” 

26. Consistent with that position, on September 6, 2022, Mr. Reichman filed an 

Objection [CA Dkt. 59] (the “Sapan Objection”) in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit opposing 

Holdings’ request to continue the hearing on the Motion to Compel Discovery being prosecuted 

by Sapan. A copy of such Sapan Objection is attached hereto as Exhibit “F.” In the Sapan 

Objection, Mr. Reichman makes a number of incorrect and inaccurate statements and arguments 

concerning bankruptcy law and these Bankruptcy Cases, including that this Court does not have 

the power to extinguish Sapan’s alleged post-petition class action claim against Holdings. 

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27. On September 14, 2022, the California District Court granted Sapan’s Motion to 

Compel Discovery, but specifically noted that “if the bankruptcy court rules that Plaintiff’s 

TCPA claim is barred by some missed deadline in that court, then Defendant can use that ruling 

here.” See Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery [CA Dkt. 64] attached hereto 

Exhibit “G.” 

28. Sapan continues to pursue discovery aggressively in the California District Court 

proceeding. Through counsel, he is demanding numerous supplemental interrogatory answers and 

additional documents. See Discovery Dispute Letter, dated November 4, 2022 attached hereto as 

Exhibit “H.” In addition, Sapan is seeking to depose a corporate representative and numerous 

other witnesses associated with the Debtors. See Email, dated November 14, 2022 and Notice of 

Deposition, dated November 18, 2002 attached hereto as Exhibits “I” and “J’ respectively.5

 

29. As set forth below, the Debtors seek an Order of this Court determining that Sapan’s 

TCPA claim is barred by his failure to comply with this Court’s Second Bar Date Order and that 

such claim has been denied, which Order the Debtors will file with the California District Court in 

the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit. 

V. RELIEF REQUESTED

30. The Debtors request that the Court enforce its Second Bar Date Order by (i) finding 

that Sapan’s failure to file an appropriate motion with this Court for the allowance and payment 

of an Administrative Claim by the deadline set forth therein bars Sapan from pursuing any claims 

against Holdings (or the other Debtors) in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, including because such 

 

5

 As the Court is aware, the Debtors have been winding down their operations and have limited cash collateral 

remaining and limited resources to continue to respond to Sapan’s aggressive tactics in violation of the Second Bar 

Date Order. 

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claims are subject of the Second Bar Date Order, and (ii) finding that Sapan’s claims against the 

Debtors are denied with prejudice. 

31. To be clear and as set forth above, the Second Bar Date Order provides that “any 

holder of an Administrative Claim who fails to comply with the terms of the Bar Date Order 

shall be and is hereby barred from pursuing such Administrative Claim in these chapter 11 

cases or otherwise.” See ¶3 of the Second Bar Date Order (emphasis added). Moreover, the 

Second Bar Date Order provides that “any such Administrative Claim not subject of an appropriate 

motion by the Second Administrative Claims Bar Date shall be and is hereby denied with 

prejudice.” Id. (emphasis added). 

32. In this case, Sapan has had more than ample opportunity to present his claims 

against Holdings to this Court for allowance and payment, and yet has intentionally failed and 

refused to do so. Accordingly, because Sapan has failed to comply with the Second Bar Date 

Order, he not only is barred from continuing to pursue his claims against Holdings in the Sapan 

Class Action Lawsuit, but any such claims should be denied with prejudice. 

VI. BASIS FOR RELIEF REQUESTED 

A. Bankruptcy Courts have Authority to Set and Enforce Bar Dates for Chapter 

11 Administrative Expense Claims. 

33. Bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to establish and enforce bar dates under 

sections 105 and 503 of the Bankruptcy Code “for cause.” See Ellis v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 

LLC, 11 F.4th 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2021) (“We hold that section[] 503...of the Bankruptcy Code 

authorize bankruptcy courts to set and enforce bar dates for administrative expense claims....”); 

see also Hall Fin. Group, Inc., v. DP Partners, Ltd., Partnership (In re DP Partners Ltd. 

Partnership), 106 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Circ. 1997). This discretion furthers the ultimate goals of 

Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. See In re Isis Foods, Inc., 27 B.R. 156, 158 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 

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34. First, section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the payment of administrative 

expenses, including ‘the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate....’” Sharon 

Steel Corp. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 

503(b)). In addition, claims for a debtor’s post-petition violation of law are subject to 

administrative claim priority status. See In re N.P. Mining Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 

1992). 

35. “Given that the Court has discretion to determine when administrative claims are 

to be paid, it naturally follows that it has the discretion as to when such claims should be 

presented.” In re Reams Broadcasting Corp., 153 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993). 

36. Second, section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth a bankruptcy court’s power 

to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions 

of” title 11. Courts have interpreted this section, as they have for section 503, to include the power 

to set and enforce bar dates. See In re PT-1 Communications, Inc., 386 B.R. 402, 409 (Bankr. 

E.D.N.Y. 2007). 

37. Placing the discretion of setting and enforcing bar dates within the hands of 

bankruptcy courts is consistent with the “underlying tenets of modern bankruptcy law which 

encourages the rehabilitation of an honest Chapter 11 entity.” See In re Isis Foods, Inc., 27 B.R. 

156, 158 (W.D. Mo. 1982). Having the discretion to impose deadlines insures the smooth 

administration of Chapter 11 reorganization. See In re Reams Broadcasting Corp., 153 B.R. at 

523; In re Holywell Corp., 68 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (“It is essential that 

administrative expense claims, which are entitled to first priority in a bankruptcy distribution, be 

established with finality before any distribution may be made to any subordinate classes of 

creditors.”). 

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38. Setting and enforcing bar dates also “establishes a flexible system which allows 

consideration of such factors as the particular needs of each administrative claimant, the length 

and expense of the case's administration, and the amount of available assets, in determining fair 

and equitable interim distributions pending final resolution of the case.” In re Reams Broadcasting 

Corp., 153 B.R. at 522 (quoting In re Isis Foods, Inc., 27 B.R. at 158). 

B. The Bankruptcy Court has Jurisdiction to Enforce its Own Orders. 

39. Having entered the Second Bar Date Order, this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction to enforce such order in these Bankruptcy Cases under the court’s “arising in” 

jurisdiction. See Alderwoods Grp., Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2012); In re: 

Motors Liquidation Company, 514 BR 377, 381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); affirmed sub nom In 

the Matter of Motors Liquidation Company, 829 F.3d 135 (2nd Cir. 2016); In Re: New River 

Dry Dock, Inc., 497 BR 359, 361 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013).

40. Under the facts and circumstances of these Bankruptcy Cases, the Debtors assert 

that Sapan and his counsel, Mr. Reichmann, are not prejudiced by the Debtors seeking to enforce 

this Court’s Second Bar Date Order by and through this Motion as opposed to instituting an 

adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7065 for injunctive relief, including 

because (i) Mr. Reichman, as counsel to Sapan, attended the July 27th hearing on the Second Bar 

Date Motion and objected to the entry of the Second Bar Date Order, (ii) Sapan had ample 

opportunity to assert his claims in this Court, (iii) undersigned counsel to the Debtors 

communicated with counsel to Sapan in an effort to avoid the filing of this Motion to no avail, and 

(iv) Sapan, through his counsel Mr. Reichmann, continues to aggressively prosecute his claim 

outside of this Court despite being barred by the Second Bar Date Order from doing so. See, for 

example, In re: Hayden 477 B.R. 260 at 264, n. 3 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012); In re: Braniff 

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International Airlines, Inc., 164 B.R. 820 at 831 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1994); In re: Seatco, Inc., 257 

BR 469 at 478 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001); In re: Service Merchandise Company, 256 B.R. 755 at 

765-66 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2000). 

41. In addition, the Debtors are serving this Motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7004 

so as to avoid any issues with notice of the relief sought herein. 

C. Sapan’s Arguments to Avoid Compliance with, and the Effect of, the Second 

Bar Date Order are Misplaced and Should be Overruled. 

42. In his response to the Demand set forth above, Mr. Reichman asserts several bases 

for trying to avoid the effect of the Second Bar Date Order, all of which are without merit. First, 

Mr. Reichman asserts that he is not a lawyer in Florida, he is not a bankruptcy lawyer and he did 

not and has never represented Sapan in any Florida court or in the bankruptcy court. Based on 

those assertions, Mr. Reichman argues that notice of the Second Bar Date Motion was not valid as 

to Sapan. Mr. Reichman also suggests that he made his appearance at the July 27th hearing as 

“lead class counsel,” implying that he was not counsel to Sapan when he made such an appearance. 

Mr. Reichman’s arguments are without merit. First, Mr. Reichman did not have an issue appearing 

at and arguing against the Second Bar Date Motion at the July 27th hearing even though he is not 

a Florida lawyer and even though he is not a bankruptcy lawyer. 

43. Second, Mr. Reichman and his law firm are listed on the pleadings in the Sapan 

Class Action Lawsuit as either “Attorney for Plaintiff Paul Sapan” [See Sapan Complaint attached 

hereto as Exhibit “A”] or as “Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class” [See Sapan Objection 

attached hereto aa Exhibit “F”]. To be clear, Paul Sapan is the plaintiff in the Sapan Class Action 

lawsuit. Unless and until a motion for class certification is granted by the California District Court, 

Mr. Reichman and his law firm are counsel to Paul Sapan only. 

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44. Third, by and through the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, Sapan was and is asserting 

a claim against Holdings, which is exactly the reason the Second Bar Date Motion and ultimately 

the Second Bar Date Order was served on Sapan by and through his counsel in the Sapan Class 

Action lawsuit, Mr. Reichman. Mr. Reichman misses the issue when he claims that he never 

agreed to accept service of the Second Bar Date Motion or the Second Bar Date Order on behalf 

of Sapan. The relevant inquiry is whether Sapan, as the holder of a putative Administrative Claim 

against Holdings, had sufficient notice of the bar date in the Second Bar Date Order to be bound 

by such order and the bar date therein. 

45. The answer is an unequivocal yes. Mr. Reichmann is counsel to Sapan in the very 

matter in which Sapan is asserting his claim against Holdings. Moreover, Sapan, through such 

counsel, showed up and opposed the Second Bar Date Motion. Still further, the Second Bar Date 

Order was served on Sapan through his counsel, Mr. Reichman, by first class mail and by email. 

There is no due process issue here because Sapan had both formal and actual notice of the Second 

Bar Date Order and the terms thereof. See In re: LeCentre on Fourth, LLC, 17 F.4th 1326 (11th

Cir. 2021)(concluding that actual notice is sufficient to satisfy due process even if the debtor 

violates procedural requirements for providing notice under the Bankruptcy Rules). Moreover, 

notice served on a party's attorney satisfies the requirement to provide notice to such party. In re 

Residential Cap., LLC, No. 12-12020 (MG), 2015 WL 2256683, at *6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 11, 

2015). Specifically, in bankruptcy cases notice to an attorney who is representing a client in a 

claim against the debtor is generally proper. Id.; see also Maldonado v. Ramirez, 757 F.2d 48, 51 

(3d Cir. 1985) (finding that notice of a bankruptcy sent to a creditor's attorney imparts notice of 

the bankruptcy to the creditor when the attorney is representing the creditor in its claim against the 

debtor). 

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46. In both the Sapan Objection filed in the California District Court and the response 

to the Demand Letter, Mr. Reichman asserts for the first time6

 that Sapan’s claim is not an 

Administrative Claim and therefore the claim he is asserting in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit is 

not barred by the Second Bar Date Order. Once again, Mr. Reichman’s argument is misplaced. 

In the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, Sapan asserts that Holdings violated the TCPA after the 

Petition Date, and is seeking damages as a result thereof. If Sapan were to prove such violation 

and the damages resulting therefrom, then such damages would constitute an administrative claim 

under the Bankruptcy Code.7

 In the case of In re N.P. Mining Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 

1992), the Eleventh Circuit, focused on the federal policy outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) and 

concluded that a bankruptcy estate must be operated in compliance with state law. Id., at 1453. 

“[C]ompliance with the law in operation of the estate is important enough to impose the burden of 

paying penalties for non-compliance on the estate as a first priority expense.” In re Motel 

Investments, Inc., 172 B.R. 105, 107 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (where debtor operates in a highly regulated 

industry, “where compliance with regulations and payment of penalties for non- compliance is a 

necessary incident of doing business, penalties for non-compliance may be administrative 

expenses of the estate”). See also, In re Kmart Corp., No. 08 C 2101, 2008 WL 5070306, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2008) (holding a post-petition employment discrimination and defamation 

claim was an administrative expense subject to the administrative claims bar date). 

47. Therefore, the claims asserted by Sapan in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit are 

subject to the Second Bar Date Order. 

WHEREFORE, the Debtors respectfully request the entry of an Order (i) enforcing the 

Second Bar Date Order and barring Sapan from continuing to pursue his claims against Holdings 

 

6

 Mr. Reichman did not make this argument at the July 27th hearing on the Second Bar Date Motion. 7

 The Debtors reserve all rights in connection therewith. 

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in the Sapan Class Action Lawsuit, including any discovery in connection therewith; (ii) denying 

any claims of Sapan against Holdings, and (iii) awarding any other or further relief that this Court 

deems just and proper. 

Dated: November 21, 2022. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

 GENOVESE JOBLOVE & BATTISTA, P.A. 

 Attorneys for Debtors-in-Possession 

100 Southeast Second Street, Suite 4400 

 Miami, Florida 33131 

 Telephone: (305) 349-2300 

 Facsimile: (305) 349-2310 

 By: /s/ Paul J. Battista 

 Paul J. Battista, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 884162 

pbattista@gjb-law.com

Mariaelena Gayo-Guitian, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 813818 

mguitian@gjb-law.com

Heather L. Harmon 

Florida Bar No. 13192 

hharmon@gjb-law.com

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Christopher J. Reichman SBN 250485

PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

8555 Aero Drive, Suite 303

San Diego, CA 92123

Telephone: 619-683-7971

Email: chrisr@prato-reichman.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

PAUL SAPAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

PAUL SAPAN, individually and on 

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C., 

LIBERTY POWER SUPER HOLDINGS,

LLC, LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS,

LLC,

Defendants.

Case No.: 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

Violation(s) of Telephone 

Consumer

Protection Act of 1991

Jury Trial Demanded

Plaintiff PAUL SAPAN (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of the Class 

described below, by their attorneys, make the following allegations based upon 

information and belief, except as to allegations specifically pertaining to Plaintiffs 

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and their counsel, which are based on personal knowledge. Plaintiffs bring this 

action for injunctive relief and damages against Defendants, and each of them, 

demanding a trial by jury.

JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

1. Plaintiff is, and at all times herein mentioned was, a resident of the 

County of Los Angeles, but has recently moved to the County of Orange, State of 

California.

2. Defendant LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C. is, and at all times 

herein mentioned was, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, located in Florida

doing business in the County of Orange, State of California. 

3. Defendant LIBERTY POWER SUPER HOLDINGS, LLC is, and at 

all times herein mentioned was, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, located in 

Florida doing business in the County of Orange, State of California. 

4. Defendant LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC is, and at all times 

herein mentioned was, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, located in Florida

doing business in the County of Orange, State of California. 

5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and alleges on that information and 

belief that Defendant LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C is ultimately the parent 

corporation of Defendant LIBERTY POWER SUPER HOLDINGS, LLC and 

Defendant LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC (all collectively referred to

herein as “liberty Power” or “Defendants”).

6. This case is filed pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

of 1991, 47 U.S.C. §227 et. seq. The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that 

federals courts have federal question subject matter jurisdiction over such civil 

actions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. Mims v. Arrow Fin. Services, LLC, --

U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 740, 753 (2012). The state law claim herein arises out of a 

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common nucleus of operative facts and is subject to supplemental jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

7. At all times herein mentioned each defendant was the partner, agent 

and employee of each co-defendant herein and was at all times acting within the 

scope of such partnership, agency and employment and each defendant ratified the 

conduct of each co-defendant herein.

8. At all times herein mentioned each employee, representative, officer, 

director, or consultant of any Defendant was acting as its agent.

NATURE OF THE ACTION AND CLASS DEFINITION

9. Plaintiffs bring this class action against Defendants for injunctive 

relief and damages and all other relief available at law and in equity on behalf of 

themselves and members of the following class of persons:

All persons and entities located within the United States of America who 

claim to be able to provide a phone bill or statement showing they were a 

residential telephone subscriber and that their number was registered on the

National Do-Not-Call Registry to whose residential telephone Defendants 

and/or its agents transmitted two or more telemarketing calls in one 

calendar year without prior express written consent from the called party or 

an ‘existing business relationship’ at any time from April 22, 2021 to the 

present, including up to and through trial.

10. Defendants, in their combined business, are an electric power reseller

whose primary business was the solicitation of retail electricity customers.

11. Defendants did this in pertinent part by telemarketing, either directly 

or by use of agent call centers working on their behalf.

12. Defendants’ telemarketing did not respect the National Do Not Call 

Registry and illegally and intentionally made sales calls to residential numbers on 

the Do Not Call Registry including the named Plaintiff’s and many others.

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FACTUAL SUMMARY FOR NAMED PLAINTFF

13. Defendants made twenty-eight (28) live calls to PAUL SAPAN’s

home phone number (310-444-1999) wherein they tried to pitch their electricity

reseller services between October 5, 2020 and June 15, 2021.

14. Mr. Sapan made a log of all the calls he received from Defendants

with the date and time sent and the Caller ID information in a spreadsheet, which is 

attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein as if set forth verbatim.

15. Mr. Sapan’s residential line has been tariffed as a residential line since 

he was assigned it by the phone company and it has been continuously registered 

on the National “Do-Not-Call” Registry from at least December 22, 2007 to the 

present.

16. Mr. Sapan never gave any of the Defendants express written 

permission to call him, nor does he have an established business relationship nor 

personal relationship with any Defendant.

17. In fact, Mr. Sapan repeatedly told Defendants’ representatives during 

the calls he was not interested in their services yet they persisted in calling him.

18. And Defendants were very persistent, illegally calling him as many as 

seven times in one day.

19. In each call Mr. Sapan answered Defendants’ boiler room callers 

either identified themselves as being with Liberty Power or used the same Caller 

ID Number as another call in which they identified themselves.

20. While each of the calls complained of above used the Caller ID 

number, they did not transmit Caller ID name information as required by law. 

47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(e).

PLAINTIFF CLASS IS ONLY FOR CALLS MADE AFTER THE FILING 

OF BANKRUPTCY AT THIS TIME

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21. On April 20, 2021 DEFENDANT LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C. 

appears to have filed for Chapter 11 reorganization in the Southern District of 

Florida Bankruptcy Court even though it is a Delaware company. (S.D. Fla. 

Bankr. Case No. 21-13797-PDR). None of the other subsidiary defendant entities

have provided bankruptcy filing notice to Plaintiff to date.

22. However, as alleged above, Defendants’ illegal calling campaign 

continued postpetition, with at least one of their calls coming more than a month 

after the filing on June 15, 2021.

23. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that each claim is separate and 

distinct for jurisdictional and other purposes. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 

S.Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021).

24. The current class is for post-petition calls only.

25. Plaintiff does foresee some possibility that all the calls may be found 

to be nondischargeable as willful and malicious injuries. 11 U.S.C 523(a)(6), and 

amendment could be later requested to include all the calls, but that is not pleaded 

at this time. 

LIABILITY OF ALL DEFENDANTS

26. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that LIBERTY POWER 

CORP, L.L.C., is the ultimate parent corporation of LIBERTY POWER SUPER 

HOLDINGS, LLC and LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC.

27. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that LIBERTY POWER 

CORP, L.L.C. provides “management and operating services” to LIBERTY 

POWER SUPER HOLDINGS, LLC and LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC.

And that the primary purpose of the subsidiaries is to be the purchasers of the 

electricity and limit LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C. liability exposure to those 

wholesalers.

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28. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that LIBERTY POWER 

CORP, L.L.C., directs all actions of LIBERTY POWER SUPER HOLDINGS,

LLC and LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC, including those pertinent to this 

Complaint.

29. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that the reseller electricity

being telemarketed is a combined product/service of the electrical power of the 

subsidiar(ies) and the management and operating services of the parent.

ACTUAL HARM & WILFUL AND INTENTIONAL CONDUCT

30. Plaintiff pleads on information and belief that for all calls he did not 

answer, Defendants called him in order to pitch their mortgage refinancing 

consultation services.

31. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Defendants also 

transmitted the other calls, which went unanswered, in order to pitch their 

mortgage refinancing consultation services.

32. Plaintiff has been harmed by the junk calls complained of herein by 

the direct waste of his time during the calls themselves, the indirect waste of time 

in having to break from other important tasks and spend time catching up after 

these junk calls, the waste of telephone service which he and not Defendants must 

pay for, the costs of having to pursue legal remedies, and in the aggravation and 

consequent health effects of stress these illegal intrusions have caused.

33. During at least one of the unanswered calls at issue Mr. Sapan wanted 

to make an outgoing call at the same time and was not able to do so, being 

involuntarily disposed of the use of his phone by Defendants’ illegal calls.

34. Defendants made the calls described above intentionally, in the sense 

that Defendants intended to call each number they called in pitching their services

regardless of whether it was on the National Do Not Call Registry and that the call 

was made knowing it would invade the victim’s privacy.

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35. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Defendants made the 

calls described above knowing that they were made in contravention of the TCPA 

and other telemarketing laws and regulations.

36. Defendants have been caught before for using unscrupulous and 

illegal telemarketing. See, Bill Heltzel, “Liberty Power Agrees To Refund 

Customers For Unscrupulous Tactics”, Westchester & Fairfield County Business 

Journals, April 12, 2018 (https://westfaironline.com/101417/liberty-power-agreesto-refund-customers-for-unscrupulous-tactics/). 

37. Defendants have been sued recently for other TCPA violations. See, 

e.g., Katz v. Liberty Power Corp, LLC (D. Mass. Case No. 1:18-cv-10506-ADB).

38. Mr. Sapan sent Defendants a formal demand letter on February 1, 

2021, which their counsels responded to, and Defendants still kept making illegal 

calls to Mr. Sapan thereafter including up through June 15, 2021.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

39. Description of the Class: Plaintiffs bring this class action against 

Defendant for injunctive relief and damages and all other relief available at law 

and in equity on behalf of themselves and members of the following class of 

persons:

All persons and entities located within the United States of America who 

claim to be able to provide a phone bill or statement showing they were a 

residential telephone subscriber and that their number was registered on the

National Do-Not-Call Registry to whose residential telephone Defendants 

and/or its agents transmitted two or more telemarketing calls in one 

calendar year without prior express written consent from the called party or 

an ‘existing business relationship’ at any time from April 22, 2021 to the 

present, including up to and through trial.

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40. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendants, any 

entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest, and Defendants’ officers, 

directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, 

subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or 

judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate 

families and judicial staff.

41. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify the Class description and the 

Class period based on the results of discovery.

42. Numerosity: The proposed Class is so numerous that individual 

joinder of all its members is impracticable. Due to the nature of the evidence of 

the number of calls made by Defendants, Plaintiffs believe that the total number of 

Class members is at least in the thousands and members and the members are 

geographically dispersed across California and the United States. While the exact 

number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time, such 

information can be ascertained through appropriate investigation and discovery, 

namely through Defendants’ call records. The disposition of the claims of the 

Class members in a single class action will provide substantial benefits to all 

parties and to the Court.

43. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate: There are 

many questions of law and fact common to the representative Plaintiff and the 

Class, and those questions substantially predominate over any questions that may 

affect individual Class members. Common questions of fact and law include, but

are not limited to, the following:

a. Whether Defendants transmitted two or more sales calls in any one 

calendar year to numbers on the National “Do-Not-Call” Registry.

b. Whether Defendants transmitted these calls without prior express 

consent from the owners of those lines or a business relationship with them 

established before the calls were made.

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c. Whether the transmission of these calls was done willfully or 

knowingly by Defendants.

44. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the 

members of the Class. Plaintiffs and all members of the Class have been similarly 

affected by Defendants’ common course of conduct since Defendants’ have 

repeatedly called the Class to sell their products and/or services.

45. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately 

represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have retained counsel 

with experience in handling complex litigation. Plaintiffs and their counsel are 

committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the Class and have the 

financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests 

adverse to those of the Class.

46. Superiority of a Class Action: Plaintiffs and the members of the 

Class suffered, and will continue to suffer, intangible and tangible harm as a result 

of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. A class action is superior to other 

available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the present controversy. 

Individual joinder of all members of the class is impractical. Even if individual 

class members had the resources to pursue individual litigation, it would be unduly 

burdensome to the courts in which the individual litigation would proceed. 

Individual litigation magnifies the delay and expense to all parties in the court 

system of resolving the controversies engendered by Defendants’ common course 

of conduct. The class action device allows a single court to provide the benefits of 

unitary adjudication, judicial economy, and the fair and efficient handling of all 

class members’ claims in a single forum. The conduct of this action as a class 

action conserves the resources of the parties and of the judicial system and protects 

the rights of the class member. Furthermore, for many, if not most, a class action 

is the only feasible mechanism that allows therein an opportunity for legal redress 

and justice

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47. Adjudication of individual class member’s claims with respect to 

Defendants would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other 

members not parties to the adjudication and could substantially impair or impede 

the ability of other class members to protect their interests.

CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: TCPA VIOLATION

CALL TO NUMBER ON THE NATIONAL “DO-NOT-CALL” REGISTRY

(On Behalf of the Plaintiff Class)

48. Plaintiff realleges all paragraphs above and incorporates them herein 

by reference.

49. Plaintiff is bringing this action pursuant to the provisions of the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (47 U.S.C. §227 and 47 C.F.R. 

§64.1200 – “TCPA”).

50. Subdivision (c) (2) of Section 64.1200 of Title 47 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations makes it unlawful for any person to “initiate any telephone 

solicitation” to “A residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her 

telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish 

to receive telephone solicitations”.

51. At all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff had registered his 

residential telephone number on the national do-not-call registry maintained by the 

U.S. Government.

52. Defendants have called Plaintiff’s residential telephone line for 

solicitation purposes during the statutory period of the last 4 years, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1658. These calls are the only calls known to Plaintiff at this time and

Plaintiff states on information and belief, without yet having the aid of full 

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discovery, that it is quite likely that Defendant has made many more violative calls 

to Plaintiff’s residential telephone line. These calls were not made in error, nor did 

Defendant have express permission from Plaintiff to call, nor did Defendant have a 

personal relationship with Plaintiff. 37 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (c) (i), (ii), & (iii).

53. Subdivision (c)(5) of section 227 of title 47 of the United States Code 

permits a private right of action in state court for violations the national do-not-call 

registry rules promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff may obtain relief in the form of 

injunctive relief, or Plaintiff may recover $500.00 for each violation, or both. If 

the court finds that defendants' violations were willful or knowing, it may, in its 

discretion, award up to three times that amount.

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WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for judgment against defendants, and each of 

them, as follows:

On the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

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1. For an award of $500.00 for each violation of 47 C.F.R. §64.1200 (c) (2);

2. For an award of $1,500.00 for each such violation found to have been 

willful;

On the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:

3. For compensatory damages according to proof;

4. For punitive damages;

On the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

5. For preliminary and permanent injunctions, enjoining Defendants, and 

each of them, from engaging in unfair or unlawful business practices 

pursuant to section 17203 of the Business and Professions Code;

On ALL CAUSES OF ACTION:

6. For attorney’s fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 

1021.5.

7. For costs of suit herein incurred; and

8. For such further relief as the Court deems proper.

DATED: August 13, 2021 PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

/s/Christopher J. Reichman, Esq.

By: Christopher J. Reichman, Esq.

Prato & Reichman, APC

Attorneys for Plaintiff

PAUL SAPAN

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Notice of Motion and Motion

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Christopher J. Reichman SBN 250485

Justin Prato SBN 246968

PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

3675 Ruffin Road, Suite 220

San Diego, CA 92123

Telephone: 619-886-0252

Email: Jmprato@gmail.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

and the Proposed Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL SAPAN, individually and on 

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C., 

LIBERTY POWER SUPER 

HOLDINGS, LLC, LIBERTY POWER 

HOLDINGS, LLC,

Defendants.

Case No.: 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES

[Discovery Document: Referred to 

Magistrate Judge Karen E. Scott]

NOTICE OF MOTION AND 

MOTION FOR JOINT 

DISCOVERY DISPUTE 

RESOLUTION 

Hon. Judge Karen E. Scott

Hearing Date: September 27, 2022

Hearing Time: 10:00 AM

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California, at 411 West 4th Street, Court Room 6D, Santa Ana, 

CA 92701-4516, on September 27, 2022 at 10:00 AM, Plaintiffs Paul Sapan and 

the putative class will and hereby do move the Court to compel the Defendants, 

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LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS, LLC to respond to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories and 

Request for Production. This motion is based on the declarations, exhibits and 

Joint Stipulation pursuant to Local Rule 37-2 and all other filings made in this 

case. 

DATED: August 29, 2022 PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

__/s/ Justin Prato______

By: Justin Prato, Esq.

Prato & Reichman, APC

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Paul Sapan, and the putative class

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OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE

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Christopher J. Reichman SBN 250485

Justin Prato SBN 246968

PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

8555 Aero Drive, Suite 303

San Diego, CA 92123

Telephone: 619-886-0252

Email: jmprato@gmail.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

and the Proposed Class

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL SAPAN, individually and on 

Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C., 

LIBERTY POWER SUPER HOLDINGS,

LLC, LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS,

LLC,

Defendants.

Case No.: 8:21-cv-01749-MEMFKES

OBJECTION TO AND 

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 

REQUEST TO RESCHEDULE

HEARING DATE EX PARTE 

APPLICATION OF

DEFENDANT LIBERTY 

POWER HOLDINGS, LLC TO 

CONTINUE HEARING ON 

MOTION TO COMPEL

OBJECTION

The Plaintiff, Paul Sapan (“Plaintiff”) hereby files this objection and 

opposition to the Ex Parte application filed by the Defendant, Liberty Power 

Holdings, LLC (“Defendant” or “Liberty Power”) to reschedule the hearing set for 

September 27, 2022. Plaintiff believes the Court should deny the application for 

the following reasons: 

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OBJECTION AND OPPOSITION TO EX PARTE

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PLAINTIFF NEVER AGREED TO DELAY THE MOTION TO COMPEL 

INDEFINITELY

Liberty Power falsely claims that there was an agreement to have the motion 

to compel discovery responses heard after the motion to stay. Plaintiff never made 

any such agreement nor anything close to it. Defendant can point to no email or 

writing evidencing any such agreement. Nowhere in any of the emails provided by 

the Defendant in their exhibits does counsel for Plaintiff generally agree to have 

the motion to compel heard after the motion to stay. Plaintiff did not and would 

not have agreed to that. What Plaintiff did agree to is exactly what was asked by 

Mr. Zdebski which was, “We will agree to reset the hearing on the motion to stay 

to September 22nd if plaintiff will agree not to seek to set a hearing on his motion 

to compel prior to September 22nd”. [Defendant Exhibit 3]. Plaintiff did not 

schedule the compel motion prior to September 22nd. Plaintiff also did not agree 

to putting off the filing indefinitely. Plaintiff now objects to having a hearing on 

this issue in late November and for very good reason. 

HOLDING THE HEARING IN NOVEMBER IS A HUGE DISCOVERY 

DELAY AND VERY PREJUDICIAL TO THE PLAINTIFF’S ABILITY TO 

COMPLY WITH THE COURT’S SCHEDULE

The only defendant to answer is Liberty Power Holdings, LLC.

1

 Defendant 

has refused to answer in any discovery in this case on the basis that they might get 

a stay. To be clear, as of the writing of this opposition, this Court has issued no

stay in this case and no theory of a motion to stay was raised in the scheduling 

conference as a reason for any discovery delay. And this case involves only post1 There are actually three Liberty Power entities named as defendants in this case. Two of the other Liberty Power 

entities have defaulted apparently in hopes that the appearing defendant will defend for them.

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bankruptcy petition activity so there is automatic bankruptcy stay and the 

bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction to impose any other stay. Thus, the 

Defendant’s entire argument here really boils down to their claim that they do not 

need to participate in discovery until some motion they want to make has been 

heard in the future. As this Court knows, courts rarely ever stay discovery just 

because a motion is pending. Allowing such a broad pre-stay before a stay motion 

is even heard is not only detrimental to this case but sets a bad precedent in any 

case. All a Defendant would need to do to evade discovery is file a motion to stay 

no matter how meritless and would thus be able to upset any scheduling order.

Plaintiff has a very good reason for objecting to this months-long discovery 

delay scheme. The scheduling order requires Plaintiff must file his Motion for 

Class Certification by March 16, 2023. [Dckt. No. 45 pg 3]. If the Defendant’s ex 

parte is granted, that will leave only three months including the Christmas holiday

for Plaintiff to conduct all of its class discovery, assuming the stay is not granted, 

which is the likely outcome since it is predicated on a bankruptcy theory but 

outside the stay allowed for in the bankruptcy code. Plaintiff would have to ask for 

revisions to the scheduling order which certainly is not efficient for the Court or 

the parties who agreed to the Scheduling Order dates in a Revised Scheduling 

Chart filed on June 2, 2022. [Dckt. No. 43]. 

Defendant’s complaints are of their own making. Liberty Power elected to 

set aside the default against them in order to engage in this case rather than address 

default judgment collections in the bankruptcy milieu. [Dckt. No. 18]. Engaging 

in a civil case necessarily requires discovery compliance. The Defendant failed to 

raise any issue of a stay motion during the 26(f) process, much less any argument 

Liberty Power should be excused from making any discovery responses at all. The 

Defendants also waited until August 5, 2022 to file their request for a stay. [Dckt. 

No. 47]. That is almost three months after they filed their answer in this case. 

[Dckt. No. 33]. Liberty Power then elected to delay filing its stay motion until 

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after its discovery responses were due—and this after requesting a stipulated 

extension to the production date. This delay was unnecessary and is made 

performed in bad faith since Defendants have exhibited a consistent pattern of 

attempting to delay and frustrate this civil case with references to a bankruptcy 

proceeding which has not invoked any stay.

Additionally, Plaintiff would like to point out that for all the complaints of 

the Defendant about resources available to defend this action, that did not stop 

them from filing a completely frivolous counter claim which was voluntarily

dismissed by Defendant when Plaintiff indicated it would file an Anti-SLAPP 

motion during an L.R. 7-3 conference. [Dckt. No. 46]. Liberty Power has shown 

it does not lack for resources when going on the attack, they only complain about 

resources when it comes to participating in good faith in normal procedures such as 

discovery.

THE BANKRUPTCY COURT DID NOT AND DOES NOT HAVE THE 

POWER TO EXTINGUISH PLAINTIFF’S POST-PETITION CLASS 

ACTION CLAIM

The primary gist of Liberty Power’s ex parte application appears to be a 

inchoate argument that the bankruptcy proceeding and Defendant’s hope that the 

bankruptcy court will disallow an Administrative Claim by Plaintiff will somehow 

for some unknown reason moot this case and thus a stay would be no harm. The 

argument is fuzzy at best because Liberty Power can point to no law, statute, or 

authority that requires Plaintiff to even make an Administrative Claim for a postpetition lawsuit, much less that any authority that would support slowing or

stopping such a post-petition lawsuit. Liberty Power is intentionally evading the 

simple fact that a Chapter 11 bankruptcy is a reorganization, not a dissolution and 

any a post-petition debt such as a judgment in this lawsuit is likely nonCase 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Document 59 Filed 09/06/22 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:733 Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 47 of 73
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dischargeable in that proceeding, whether Plaintiff files an Administrative claim or 

not. This is why Liberty Power cannot cite to any law, statute, or authority

requiring the relief they seek.

Specifically, the Defendant states, “Because Plaintiff failed to timely file an

administrative claim in the bankruptcy court, any potential judgment that he might

obtain in this Court will not be collectable from the bankruptcy estate of Liberty

Power..” [Ex Parte, pg. 2 ln. 16-18]. Reading this statement, the Defendant seems 

to be contending that the Plaintiff can no longer pursue his claim in any court. 

That may be true as to an Administrative Claim in the bankruptcy court. 

Plaintiff does not care about an Administrative Claim in the bankruptcy court. 

Plaintiff wishes to pursue his post-petition case in civil court and get a civil 

judgement. And this is clearly his right and no law, statute, or authority bars 

Plaintiff’s post-petition claim from proceeding. Plaintiff can collect against the 

reorganized entity or against the defaulted non-bankrupt defendant Liberty Power 

Super Holdings LLC.

The lack of any law, statute, or authority is why the bankruptcy court has not 

issued an automatic stay nor any stay on its own merits and why this Court should 

follow suit. Liberty Power’s Chapter 11 reorganization filing before the TCPA 

violations alleged in this case does not entitle it to any stay, automatic or 

otherwise.

Additionally, the Defendant infers that it plans on going out of business after 

the bankruptcy. However, that is not what a Chapter 11 does, the Defendant would 

have to file a Chapter 7 in order to dissolve the company. If the company is really 

going to be out of business, and the Defendant converted their Chapter 11 to a 

Chapter 7, then the new petition date would include this case, and so an automatic 

stay would issue. See, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1019 (“Conversion of a Chapter 11 

Reorganization Case”). Plaintiff would then have to file an Administrative Claim 

in bankruptcy court or have its debt discharged. However, the Liberty Power has

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chosen not to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy or convert their Chapter 11. This casts 

extreme doubt on their claims that Liberty Power will in fact be out of business 

after the bankruptcy and their claims that there are no assets of any value. 

THE DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION SHOULD BE DENIED

Defendant certainly has not met the standard of it will suffer irreparable 

prejudice if the requested relief is not granted on an ex parte basis. Most if not all 

of Liberty Power’s arguments about the irreparable prejudice has to due with 

spending time and money on discovery when the case might be stayed if they win 

a motion later down the line. That assumes the case will be stayed. This is an 

assumption, and not even a very good one where there is no law, statute, or 

authority on point requiring any stay, and Defendant’s own briefing tacitly admits

it. Just like the future stay motion, this ex parte application is without merit. 

Defendant cannot claim any irreparable harm because there is none. At worst it 

will cost Defendant the small modicum of time to answer exactly sixteen (16) 

tightly limited document inspection requests and four (4) interrogatories. Just as 

Plaintiff stated in its opposition to Defendant’s motion to stay, “being required to 

defend a suit, without more, does not constitute a ‘clear case of hardship or 

inequity’” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). And it 

is equally true here that there is no irreparable prejudice in simply having to 

answer limited discovery like any other civil defendant.

DATED: September 6, 2022 PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

__/s/ Justin Prato______

By: Justin Prato, Esq.

Prato & Reichman, APC

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Paul Sapan, and the putative class

Case 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Document 59 Filed 09/06/22 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:735 Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 49 of 73
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 

Case No. 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Date: September 14, 2022 

Title: PAUL SAPAN v. LIBERTY POWER CORP, LLC, et al. 

PRESENT: 

THE HONORABLE KAREN E. SCOTT, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Jazmin Dorado Not Present

Courtroom Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR 

PLAINTIFF: 

None Present

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR 

DEFENDANT: 

None Present

 

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Compel Discovery [Dkt. 57] 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. (Dkt. 57.) The Court 

finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; 

L.R. 7-15. The hearing noticed for September 27, 2022 is ordered OFF CALENDAR. 

I. Background. 

In October 2021, Plaintiff Paul Sapan filed this putative class action against 

multiple defendants including Liberty Power Holdings, LLC (“Defendant”), the only 

defendant to answer. (Dkt. 1, 33.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) by repeatedly calling his home phone 

number even though it was on the national “Do Not Call” registry. 

Procedural developments relevant to the instant discovery dispute are as follows: 

• In May 2022, the parties filed a Rule 26(f) Report. (Dkt. 40.) That filing 

explains, “Plaintiff’s Complaint notes that twenty-seven (27) of the calls were made 

before two of the three Liberty Power defendants filed for bankruptcy protection, but the 

final call was made weeks after the bankruptcy filings and is the actionable call in this 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 

Case No. 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Date: September 14, 2022 

 Page 2 

class action case.” (Id. at 2.) The parties advised the Court, “No specific discovery 

disputes are anticipated at this time.” (Id. at 10.) While they disagreed over the 

sequencing and deadlines, both parties proposed proceeding with discovery. (Id. at 10-

11.) The parties subsequently agreed to provide initial disclosures in June 2022 with a 

fact discovery cutoff in January 2023. (Dkt. 43.) 

• On June 14, 2022, the Court issued a scheduling order establishing a class 

certification discovery cutoff date of January 13, 2023 and a fact discovery cutoff date of 

September 29, 2023. (Dkt. 45.) 

• On June 17, 2022, Plaintiff served written discovery consisting of interrogatories 

(“Rogs”) and Requests for Production (“RFPs”). (Dkt. 57-2 ¶¶ 2-5.) The Rogs contained 

four questions asking Defendant to identify third-party service providers it used and 

phone numbers called by Defendant or on Defendant’s behalf. (Dkt. 57-3.) There were 

16 RFPs seeking various documents, including call logs, prior complaints, internal “Do 

Not Call” lists, TCPA-related policies, and third-party service agreements. (Dkt. 57-4.) 

• On August 3, 2022, Defendant served responses to this discovery. (Dkt. 57-3 

[Rogs]; Dkt. 57-4 [RFPs].) Defendant raised numerous objections, but objected on one 

particular ground to every discovery request (the “Disproportionality Objection”): 

• On August 5, 2022, Defendant moved to stay this case “pending resolution of 

[Plaintiff’s] claim in [Defendant’s] bankruptcy case currently in Florida,” citing 

principles of judicial economy. (Dkt. 47 at 2.) That motion has been briefed. (Dkt. 52 

[opposition]; Dkt. 56 [reply].) The Court rescheduled the hearing for November 17, 

2022. (Dkt. 55.) 

• On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant to respond to 

the Rogs and RFPs. (Dkt. 57.) The Court construes the motion as seeking to adjudicate 

the validity of the Disproportionality Objection, because Plaintiff’s portion of the Joint 

Stipulation does not address Defendant’s other objections. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 

Case No. 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Date: September 14, 2022 

 Page 3 

• On September 13, 2022, both parties filed supplemental briefs. (Dkt. 61 

[Defendant]; Dkt. 62 [Plaintiff].) 

II. Legal Standard. 

Civil litigants can obtain discovery “that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense 

and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Proportionality is 

evaluated “considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of 

the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” (Id.) If the requesting party 

demonstrates relevance, then the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show 

disproportionality with competent evidence. Masimo Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. SA CV 

20-00048 JVS-JDE, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104554, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022). 

III. Summary of the Parties’ Arguments. 

Plaintiff argues Defendant’s bankruptcy does not excuse Defendant from 

responding to discovery in this case. While the Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) 

imposes an automatic stay on some civil litigation against a debtor, it does not apply to 

this case, because Plaintiff’s claims involve post-petition activities. (Dkt. 57-1 at 5.) 

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant’s blanket assertion of the Disproportionality 

Objection, without any reference to the type of discovery requested or a particularized 

explanation of the resources required to respond, does not carry Defendant’s burden as 

the party resisting discovery. (Id. at 6.) 

Defendant first argues that even if Plaintiff’s lawsuit is not subject to the 

automatic stay, Plaintiff’s discovery requests are. Defendant reasons: 

[T]he automatic stay does prohibit “any act to obtain possession of 

property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise 

control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 

[Defendant’s] assets, including its documents and information, are 

property of the bankruptcy estate and are therefore constrained by 

the proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court. 

(Dkt. 57-1 at 12.) 

Next, Defendant argues that it has adequately supported its Disproportionality 

Objection. Defendant contends that it lacks “resources (i.e., employees) to search for, 

identify, and produce documents and information in response to Plaintiff’s discovery.” 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 

Case No. 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Date: September 14, 2022 

 Page 4 

(Id. at 13.) As supporting evidence, Defendant cites bankruptcy court records purporting 

to demonstrate that (1) Defendant’s senior secured lender, BETM, controls its assets and 

(2) Defendant and its co-debtors have about $371,000 in available cash. (Id.; Dkt. 61.) 

Finally, Defendant contends that the burden of responding to the discovery outweighs its 

likely benefit, because even if the discovery responses would enable Plaintiff to obtain a 

judgment, “it is unlikely that there will be assets available” to satisfy that judgment. (Id. 

at 14.) 

IV. Discussion. 

The Court rejects Defendant’s first argument. Defendant has not cited any case 

holding that propounding discovery in civil litigation that is not subject to the automatic 

bankruptcy stay is an act “to obtain possession of property of the [debtor’s] estate” or “to 

exercise control over property of the estate.” Providing copies of documents to the 

opposing party via civil discovery does not deprive the debtor of possession or control 

over the documents. Similarly, Defendant has not demonstrated that information it might 

provide in Rog responses is “property” of its bankruptcy estate, or that it would lose 

“possession” or “control” over such information by disclosing it to Plaintiff. See 11 

U.S.C. § 541 (defining property of the estate). 

Regarding disproportionality, the Court rejects the argument that the benefit of 

discovery (however great) is outweighed by its burden (however minimal) if the plaintiff 

is unlikely to collect on any eventual judgment. Such an argument, if credited, would 

turn every discovery dispute into an evaluation of the responding defendant’s assets. 

Moreover, Defendant has not adequately demonstrated that its reorganization will make it 

impossible to pay any resulting judgment, no matter the size or payment structure. To the 

extent Defendant contends that it lacks authority to allocate any resources to responding 

to discovery, Defendant will need to raise that concern with the bankruptcy court. It is 

apparent that Defendant has been able to allocate assets to date to litigate issues in this 

case. 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail in this case, because Plaintiff 

twice missed the deadline for filing an “administrative claim” in the bankruptcy court, 

which somehow bars Plaintiff’s recovery in this action. (Dkt. 61 at 3-4.) First, it is not 

clear why Plaintiff’s TCPA claim would be characterized as an “administrative claim.” 1

 

1

 “Under the Bankruptcy Code, certain types of claims are entitled to administrative claim status. These expenses 

include ‘the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate’ and are accorded top-tier priority for 

payment, even ahead of most other ‘priority’ claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C) and (2). The theory behind this ... is 

that the services rendered to a debtor, which help preserve the value of the estate, whether for continuation of the 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 

Case No. 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Date: September 14, 2022 

 Page 5 

But even if it were, Defendant must raise this argument to the bankruptcy court. If the 

bankruptcy court rules that Plaintiff’s TCPA claim is barred by some missed deadline in 

that court, then Defendant can use that ruling here. 

Essentially, the Disproportionality Objection is an effort by Defendant to grant 

itself a stay, even though the bankruptcy court has not imposed one and the District Judge 

is still considering the issue. Defendant contends that if its stay motion cannot be heard 

earlier, then it will lose the relief it seeks. But the general rule is that when a party moves 

for a stay, the litigation is not stayed unless and until the stay motion is granted. 

Defendant has not even asked the District Judge to advance the hearing on its stay 

motion. The District Judge controls the pre-trial calendar, and the Magistrate Judge 

cannot prejudice the Plaintiff by allowing discovery to stall until November when the 

class certification discovery cutoff date is in January 2023 (Dkt. 45 at 3) and Defendant 

agreed to proceed with discovery in the Rule 26(f) Report, despite knowing about its 

bankruptcy proceedings. 

For these reasons, the Disproportionality Objection is OVERRULED. Within 

twenty-one (21) days, Defendant shall produce documents and serve amended written 

responses to the Rogs and RFPs that do not rely on Defendant’s pending stay motion or 

bankruptcy proceedings as a reason to object. Defendant shall reconsider its other 

objections and only assert those which it believes in good faith apply. It must be clear 

from Defendant’s written responses if Defendant is withholding responsive documents on 

the basis of a particular objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). If Defendant is going to 

withhold responsive documents due to privilege, then Defendant must provide a privilege 

log with its amended responses. 

 Initials of Deputy Clerk JD 

business or immediate liquidation, benefit all of the pre-petition creditor body.” In re First Magnus Fin. Corp., 390 

B.R. 667, 673 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2008). 

Case 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES Document 64 Filed 09/14/22 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:774 Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 54 of 73
Prato & Reichman, APC 

 

3675 Ruffin Road • Suite 220 • San Diego, CA 92123 

Phone (619) 516-3300 • www.prato-reichman.com • Fax (619) 241-8309 

November 4, 2022

Sent Via Electronic Mail To:

Michael A DiNardo, Esq.

YK LAW LLP

445 S Figueroa St, Suite 2280

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Email: MDiNardo@yklaw.us

RE: Discovery Dispute Letter Concerning Liberty Power Holdings, LLC’s 

 Amended Responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Written Discovery in

Sapan v. Liberty Power Corp, LLC, et. al., 8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES

Dear Mr. DiNardo, 

In accordance with Local Rule 37-1 and the Chambers Rules of Magistrate Judge 

Karen E. Scott this letter is to set a time and date to meet and confer over the Defendant’s 

amended responses to Plaintiff’s first set of discovery, namely Request for Production Set 

1 and Interrogatories Set 1 to which the amended responses were received via email on 

October 5, 2022. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges to following deficiencies in the responses:

Deficiency as All Interrogatories and Document Requests

Liberty Power Holdings, LLC (“LPH”) in item number 2 of a section titled 

‘Specific Objections To Definitions and Instructions’ in both responses objects to the 

defined term YOU and/or YOUR as including agents and wholly owned subsidiaries. 

LPH states that it will only respond to all interrogatories “on its own behalf and not on 

behalf of any other entity.” This does not comport with clear black letter law as to 

subsidiaries and parent corporations. Cases in Ninth Circuit district courts interpreting 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 33 and 34 consistently require an 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 55 of 73
interrogatory to respond as to all wholly-owned members of the corporate family and 

document production including all documents in the possession of wholly-owned 

subsidiaries and parents. See, e.g., In re ATM Fee Litigation, 233 F.R.D 542 (N.D. Cal. 

Dec. 5, 2005) (“federal law requires that a parent respond to an interrogatory under FRCP 

Rule 33 with information from a subsidiary if it has access to that information and if the 

information is relevant and not privileged.”); AFL Telecom’s LLC v. SurplusEQ.com, 

2012 WL 2590557 (D. Ariz. July 5, 2012) (wholly owned subsidiary must produce 

documents in possession of parent company); MLC Intellectual Property, LLC v. Micron 

Technology, Inc., 2018 WL 6175982, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2018); Valdez v. Genesis 

Healthcare LLC, 2021 WL 5989963, at *8 (“A parent corporation is deemed to have 

possession, custody or control over documents possessed by a subsidiary that the parent 

corporation owns or wholly controls.”); & etc. Plaintiff demands that Defendant

supplement its responses to include any responsive non-privileged information and 

documents retained by or pertaining to its wholly-owned subsidiary Liberty Power 

Corp. L.L.C. and/or its parent corporation Liberty Power Super Holdings, LLC.. 

Deficiencies as to the Interrogatories

Interrogatory No. 1

The response does not actually answer the question asked. The interrogatory 

asks LPH to identify by name all companies that provided any kind of 

telecommunications services. The LPH response that it claims without a shred of 

evidence that it “did not engage in any outbound, cold calling” is non-responsive 

argument. Call logs from the telecommunication vendors will establish the facts of 

what calls were made and/or received. The offer of production of the telesales 

vendors is also not responsive since it fails to identify which carriers provided 

phone service to LPH and its call center(s). Plaintiff demands that Defendant

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 56 of 73
supplement its response with an actual response to the question in the interrogatory 

identifying all telecommunications providers. 

Interrogatory No. 2

The response refers to the response for Interrogatory No. 1 above, and 

suffers the same defect. Plaintiff demands that Defendant supplement its response

with an actual response to the question in the interrogatory identifying all

telemarketing lead vendors. 

Interrogatory No. 3

The response refers to the response for Interrogatory No. 1 above, and 

suffers the same defect. Plaintiff demands that Defendant supplement its response

with an actual response to the question in the interrogatory identifying all outbound 

numbers called by LPH for solicitation without qualification (e.g., whether for 

residential or any other solicitation purpose). 

Interrogatory No. 3

The response refers to the response for Interrogatory No. 1 above, and 

suffers the same defect. Furthermore, the interrogatory does not ask what calls 

LPH in its own subjective opinion may or may not have authorized, it asks for the 

phone numbers for all persons called for solicitation purposes by LPH’s lead 

vendors. Plaintiff demands that Defendant supplement its response with an actual 

response to the question in the interrogatory identifying all outbound numbers 

called by LPH lead vendors and/or all inbound numbers from warm transfer calls. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 57 of 73
Deficiencies as to the Requests for Production

Request No. 4

The request is for any documentation of communications between any 

Liberty Power company (see general objection to “YOU” dispute above) and any 

lead vendor. This would most definitely include call records of inbound warm 

transfers, which LPH admits they received in addition to emails, invoices, & etc. 

Since LPH admits it received warm transfers and had telephones to receive them 

on, there must be call logs. Plaintiff demands the Defendant supplement its 

responses by producing call logs for its call centers as well as ALL 

communications with its lead vendors including emails, invoices, & etc. 

Request No. 5, 6, 13, 14, 15

The response is imprecise and breezily says there “there are no documents 

responsive to this request”. The first problem is that this was conditioned on the 

objection to YOU including all Liberty Power companies above. The second

problem is a possible failure to understand the requirement for a “reasonably 

inquiry” and investigation under FRCP 26 and that documents in LPH’s

“possession, custody, or control”, is stated in the disjunctive so actual possession 

of a document or thing is not required if it is within Respondent’s custody or 

control. FRCP. 34(a)(1) [emphasis added], see also, In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 

F3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 1995). The third problem is that it fails to state whether 

responsive documents existed in the past but have been discarded or destroyed. 

For documents which LPH knows or knew existed at one point, but are no longer 

in its possession, custody, or control, LPH must state it is ‘unable to comply’ and 

state the reason, e.g. the document was destroyed, lost, etc. See, Searock v. 

Stripling, 736 F.2d 650, 653-654 (11th Cir. 1984). 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 58 of 73
These are significant problems because it is almost certain that responsive 

documents do or did exist and that responsive documents are within LPH’s control 

if they did proper investigation and requested them from vendors. For example, 

billing and financial documents evidencing payment to lead vendors almost 

certainly exist (RFP No. 5), call logs or lead data sheets showing the leads being

transferred would have been a part of what LPH bought from the lead agents they 

admit they employed (RFP No. 6), and call records for all outbound and inbound 

calling undoubtedly were part of the invoicing from carriers/vendors (RFP No. 13, 

14, 15). If Respondent knows of a document that it can obtain, it must 

produce it, and if Defendant knows documents did in the pass exist it must 

state that and the reason they are no longer extant.

Request No. 8

The proportionality objection based on cost is incorrect and incomplete. The 

objection fails to address relevance which is exceptionally high given that there are 

only 10 search terms and really only 6 since four of them are variations on 

“TCPA” and all of the terms are distinctly specialized terms specific to 

telemarketing and TCPA compliance (“telemarketing”, “cold call”, “lead agent”, 

“warm transfer”, “Do-Not-Call Registry” “Do Not Call”, “Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act”, “telephone consumer protection act”, “TCPA”, “tcpa”, OR 

“TCPA compliance”). The only term arguably subject to general use is “Do Not 

Call” which Plaintiff specifically restricted to only the capitalized words to limit 

general use overlap, and Plaintiff is willing to narrow the documents if the search 

cannot distinguish between capitalized and uncapitalized words. All of the others 

can really only relate to the activity at issue in this lawsuit. Defendant’s objection 

does not address in any way the extremely high relevance and importance to the 

case of these highly on-point documents. 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 59 of 73
And the alleged cost estimate is devoid of any actual evidence to support it

and is seriously inflated. LPH’s sole arguable piece of evidence is that they 

performed the searches and found 14,000 documents, but they do not provide any 

affidavit giving any actual facts regarding these searches. LPH then jumps from 

confusingly saying they performed the searches and came up with 14,000 

documents to also saying they are somehow incomplete to estimating the total will 

exceed 20,000 documents. Since LPH will not or cannot say how the completed 

search is incomplete, their much higher 20,000 estimate is unsupportable. Also, 

LPH’s review rate of 60 document per hour for initial review in addition to higher 

level review is inflated. Standard review rates cited by document review vendors 

for simple reviews of emails, correspondence, and the like not containing 

databases, formulas, or other coded information range from 100 documents per 

hour (https://percipient.co/electronic-discovery-and-esi-document-reviewcalculator/) for traditional review to over 200 documents per hour for more 

advance AI-assisted document review (Hilgers Graben, 

https://hilgersgraben.com/services/discovery-counsel/, PDF containing 200 

document per hour estimate available at page 20 of 

:https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja

&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiih63XjPL6AhUaK0QIHdVBBPwQFnoECCEQAQ&url

=https%3A%2F%2Fhilgersgraben.com%2Fwpcontent%2Fuploads%2F2020%2F02%2FWho-Actually-Is-Reviewing-MyDocuments.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3CfLXJn79wJwsoGQv4sl5c). There is no 

indication that the documents to be reviewed are coded databases or scientific 

formulas and it is almost certain they are not given the search terms, so we can 

expect a review rate of roughly double Defendant’s 60 document per minute 

estimate. A total of 14,000 documents reviewed at 120 pages per hour which is 

less than half the median point in the more realistic rates we cited above equals 116 

document review hours, which even at the excessively high $105/hr rate cited by 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 60 of 73
Defendant is only $12,250. And the actual cost will be considerably less since it 

does not take into account duplicates, which usually reduces the total documents 

number by 30-40% for exact duplicates and can go significantly higher for content 

duplication where the digital data is different but the content is the same, which in 

turn would bring the price down to $8,000 or less. Frankly prices in this range and 

even those in Defendant’s overinflated estimate are fully in line with discovery 

responsibilities in complex class action litigation and LPH did agree the Manual 

for Complex Litigation section for class actions should apply to this case in the 

Joint Scheduling Report. And this price is not unduly burdensome given the 

likelihood of very high relevance since the search terms are quite specialized as 

discussed above. Plaintiff demands production of all responsive documents. 

Request No. 11

The request is limited in scope to only government actions taken against

Defendant during the class period. It is not narrowed as to content of the 

adversarial governmental actions because Plaintiff cannot determine without 

seeing such documents whether the complaint speaks directly or indirectly to 

issues in the case. For a pertinent example, Plaintiff is aware that Defendant has a 

number of state attorney general actions against it that have to do with claims of 

sales deception and misrepresentation and some or all of those happened via illegal 

telephone calls. See, e.g., People of the State of Illinois v. Liberty Power Holdings 

LLC, Case No. 2020CH01954, Complaint, para. 31, 35, 59, 70, 73, 75-76 (alleging 

count under Illinois Telephone Solicitations Act, 815 ILCS 413/15), 140-156 

(detailing 16 recorded telemarketing calls to Illinois residents), see also, In re 

Liberty Power Holdings, LLC Bankruptcy Litigation, Case No. 21-13797-SMG, 

Dckt No. 273 (describing Massachusetts Attorney General investigation ongoing 

since 2015 into the same sort of deceptive sales tactics as the Illinois Attorney 

General action noting no complaint has been filed but stipulations to extend tolling 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 61 of 73
of the statute of limitations have been agreed); “A.G. Schneiderman Announces 

$550,000 Settlement With Energy Service Company That Illegally Deceived New 

York Consumers”, New York State Office of the Attorney General press release 

dated April 11, 2018, available ar: https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2018/agschneiderman-announces-550000-settlement-energy-service-company-illegally

(Beginning in 2012, Liberty conducted door-to-door sales and telemarketing to 

New York residential customers...” [emphasis added]). 

Any adversarial government actions within the class period are be 

discoverable since they may well speak to Defendant’s expansive use of illegal 

telemarketing whether that is the primary gravamen of the action or ancillary to 

complaints about deceptive or otherwise illegal practices because we already know 

such actions exist like the example above. While the instant case is not about 

misrepresentation it is most certainly about illegal calls making all of these 

documents likely to lead to admissible evidence since we already know some are in 

fact highly relevant. For any adversarial government actions wherein the case 

documents are a matter of freely accessible public record Plaintiff is willing to 

accept the case name, number, and year designation and will gather the public 

documents himself. Plaintiff demands production of all responsive documents. 

Request No. 12

Defendant uses the same boilerplate objection it used to number 11 claiming 

the request is “without limitation as to scope”, but this must be a mistake. Request 

number 11 was not limited by content of the adversarial government proceedings 

documents, but Request number 12 is most definitely limited to private-party 

complaints “concerning telemarketing practices”. The objection is without merit

as are all others since complaints about illegal calling are directly relevant to a case 

about illegal calling. Plaintiff demands production of all responsive

documents. 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 62 of 73
Request for Sanctions

Plaintiff intends on requesting attorney’s fees sanctions if our meet and confer 

cannot amicably resolve these issues and he has to file a motion to compel. 

Request to Meet and Confer

Plaintiff request to meet and confer over the above issues pursuant to Local Rule 

37-1. Plaintiff requests available times the week of October 10-14, 2022 for an inperson or telephonic discussion of these disputes. Please provide available dates 

by November 9, 2022 At this time Plaintiff, suggests using the Magistrate’s 

informal telephonic conference process to resolve this dispute and would like to 

discuss use of this informal process at the meet and confer.

Sincerely,

/s/Christopher J. Reichman, Esq.

Christopher J. Reichman, Esq.,

Attorney for Plaintiff & Class

Direct phone: (619) 683-7971

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 63 of 73
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the above and foregoing instrument as well as all attached documents 

were served upon all counsel of record in the above entitled and numbered cause on the 

date listed below.

__X__ Via Electronic Mail/US Mail

Michael A DiNardo, Esq.

YK LAW LLP

445 S Figueroa St, Suite 2280

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Email: MDiNardo@yklaw.us

DATED: November 11, 2022 PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

/s/Justin Prato, Esq.

By: Justin Prato, Esq.

Prato & Reichman, APC

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 64 of 73
Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 65 of 73
________________________________________________________________________________________________________

 Deposition Notice

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Christopher J. Reichman SBN 250485

Justin Prato SBN 246968

PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

3675 Ruffin Road, Suite 220

San Diego, CA 92123

Telephone: 619-886-0252

Email: chrisr@prato-reichman.com

Attorneys for Class and Named Plaintiff

PAUL SAPAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL SAPAN, individually and on Behalf 

of All Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LIBERTY POWER CORP, L.L.C., 

LIBERTY POWER SUPER HOLDINGS,

LLC, LIBERTY POWER HOLDINGS,

LLC,

Defendants.

Case No.:8:21-cv-01749-MEMF-KES

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT LIBERTY 

POWER HOLDINGS L.L.C. 

DEPOSITION OF PERSON 

MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE

NOTICE OF TAKING DISPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION

///

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 66 of 73
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 Deposition Notice

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TO: Michael A. DiNardo

 YK LAW, LLP

Attorneys for Defendant

Liberty Power Holdings, LLC

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) and 45 

Plaintiff will take the depositions upon oral examination, to be recorded by 

stenographic means and by an officer authorized by law to administer oaths. Such 

deposition will be taken pursuant to agreement via a Zoom using the link provided 

to counsel upon confirmation of the deposition. Plaintiff’s counsel will be located 

at the offices of Shelburne Sherr Court Reporters, 550 W C Street, Suite 700 San 

Diego, CA 92101. Plaintiff is demanding that Defendant, Liberty Power Holdings 

LLC (“LPH”) designate the person or persons most knowledgeable (“PMK”) and 

that they are prepared to testify on behalf of LPH concerning the subject matter 

described on Attachment A hereto. Finally, the Plaintiff and LPH agree that the 

deposition will be conducted under the guidelines agreed upon in Attachment B. 

The deposition(s) will commence at December 8, 2022 9:00 am PST and for the 

maximum amount of time permitted. If necessary, each deposition will be 

adjourned until completed

DATED: November 18, 2022 PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

/s/Justin Prato, Esq.

By: Justin Prato, Esq.

Prato & Reichman, APC

Attorneys for Plaintiff,

Paul Sapan

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 67 of 73
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Attachment A

PMK Description:

The person most knowledgeable regarding sales of services or products of LPH via 

telemarketing including telemarketing practices and oversight of such activities, 

including but not limited to, compliance with the do-not-call provisions of the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act. It would also include knowledge of hiring or

retaining of agents or representatives regarding telemarketing, including the

purchasing of leads from lead agents. 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 68 of 73
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Attachment B

Pursuant to Rules 29 and 30(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

the parties jointly move for the Court to enter the following stipulated deposition 

protocol for the deposition of Plaintiff Paul Sapan (“Plaintiff”), which will be taken 

by Defendant, LPH and through their attorneys of record, on December 8, 2022. 

(subject to schedule modifications, if necessary, agreed upon by counsel for both 

parties):

1. Based on agreement, the deposition of Plaintiff will 

proceed with the deponent and/or attorneys for the parties being in separate, remote 

locations. The deposition agent and counsel for Plaintiff may be in the same room. 

The deposition will be conducted by video through the use of a Zoom-based 

program called Remote Counsel, which will be operated by Shelburne Sherr Court 

Reporters & Videography (“Shelburne Sherr”), located at Shelburne Sherr Court 

Reporters, 550 W C Street, Suite 700 San Diego, California 92101. 

2. On the day of the deposition the deponent, and Plaintiff’s

counsel, and Defendant’s counsel will connect to the video feed by clicking on the

provided link, and will connect to audio by dialing by phone into a conference line, 

that will be e-mailed to them by Shelburne Sherr at least 24 business hours prior to 

the deposition. Attendees must not forward the link they receive by e-mail, or 

allow anyone else to use the link sent to them. Attendees who are not speaking 

may choose not to receive the video feed by dialing in by phone only.

3. Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s counsel, and Defendant’s counsel are 

each responsible for having all necessary equipment, and high-speed internet 

access, in good working order to enable Defendant’s counsel to depose Plaintiff by 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 69 of 73
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the means specified in the deposition notice and in an environment reasonably free 

of distraction and interference.

4. Exhibits may be: (1) uploaded to Remote Counsel during 

or prior to the deposition, to be held confidentially by Shelburne Sherr until 

introduced by counsel during the deposition, when a copy of the exhibit will be 

made available electronically to all attendees; (2) transmitted to the parties during 

or prior to the deposition by a file transfer service (e.g., USAfx); (3) e-mailed to 

the Defendant’s counsel prior to the deposition to be produced to the deponent. 

5. Exhibits may be marked during or prior to the deposition. 

The official copies of the exhibits will be provided to the court reporter at the

conclusion of the deposition. 

6. During the deposition, the deponent, Plaintiff’s counsel, 

and Defendant’s counsel must be on-camera at all times that the deposition is on 

the record. All other attendees will not be on camera and will not speak on the 

record or otherwise disrupt the deposition, and must keep their audio connection on 

mute to avoid unintentional noise. 

7. The parties agree to not use the “chat” feature to 

communicate with the deponent during the deposition with the exception of the 

facilitation of displaying and viewing exhibits, in which case any “chat” messages 

will be sent to “everyone.”

8. Any private communication, such as via e-mail, 

telephone, private chat, text message, or other electronic or virtual means, between 

the deponent and counsel is strictly prohibited while the deposition is in session.

9. While the deposition is on the record, no person may 

communicate with the deponent off the record, except regarding the application of 

privilege when it is stated on the record that such communications are taking place. 

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 70 of 73
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10. Any attorney-client conversations should be held outside 

the presence of the audio/video interface.

11. No one else is to be in the same room as the deponent

while the deposition is on the record. If somebody enters the room while the 

deposition is ongoing the deponent will immediately advise all counsel.

12. During the deposition, the deponent will not use, consult, 

or refer to any document or writing in any form including, but not limited to, 

handwriting, typewriting, transmitting by e-mail or facsimile, and every other 

means of recording upon any tangible thing, any form or communication, including 

letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, other than the exhibits Plaintiff is 

given during the deposition. Nor will the deponent speak with any person during 

the course of the deposition concerning the subject matter of this case, other than 

their counsel. While the deposition is on the record, they will not use a cell phone; 

tablet, laptop, or desktop computer; or any other electronic device to communicate 

with any person. If the deponent needs technical assistance during the course of

the deposition, the individual providing the assistance will be announced at the 

earliest opportunity.

13. Because the court reporter will not be physically present

in the same room as the deponent, the oath will be administered and the 

stenographic record will be taken remotely. In lieu of an oath administered inperson, the deponent will orally declare their testimony in this matter under penalty 

of perjury as directed by the remote court reporter.

14. In the event of technological difficulties or other 

interruptions affecting the deposition, it shall be suspended for an appropriate 

length of time. In the event of technological difficulties or other interruptions 

affecting other attendees the deposition will continue.

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 71 of 73
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15. In the event that progress at the deposition is slowed by 

technological limitations, the parties may stipulate to extend the deposition beyond 

seven hours or to resume the deposition the following the day.

16. Should technical issues prevent the court reporter from 

reliably hearing or transcribing the testimony at the deposition and such technical 

issue cannot be remedied in a timely manner, counsel for the parties shall meet, 

confer, and cooperate with one another regarding the rescheduling of the 

deposition in person. 

17. All objections to the use and admissibility of the 

transcript of the deposition taken pursuant to this request based on the fact that the 

deposition was taken by remote means are deemed waived.

18. Unless otherwise stated, all other rules contained in the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Local Rules govern the deposition.

19. Nothing in this agreement waives the rights of any Party 

to seek any appropriate relief from the Court.

20. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a consent to 

proceed in any subsequent depositions via videos or a waiver of any request for an 

in person deposition.

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 72 of 73
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, Justin Prato., declare that I am a resident of the State of California and I am over 

the age of eighteen years and not a party to the action. My business address is

3675 Ruffin Road, Suite 220, San Diego CA 92123. On the date of signing this 

affidavit reflected below, I served the forgoing instrument on the interested parties 

in this case. I did this by placing a true copy of such documents, enclosed in a

sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at 

San Diego, California, addressed to the following recipients:

Michael A. DiNardo

YK Law LLP

455 S. Figueroa St., Suite 2280

Los Angeles, CA 90071

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 

above is true and correct, and that this document is executed in San Diego, 

California on the date below.

DATED: November 18, 2022 PRATO & REICHMAN, APC

/s/Justin Prato, Esq.

By: Justin Prato, Esq.

Prato & Reichman, APC

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Case 21-13797-SMG Doc 812 Filed 11/21/22 Page 73 of 73