In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-1691 

SHANNON E. MCHENRY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:16-cv-03425-MPB-WTL — Matthew P. Brookman, Magistrate Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 15, 2018 — DECIDED DECEMBER 26, 2018 

____________________ 

Before BAUER, KANNE, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Shannon E. McHenry, a 49-year-old former 

hair stylist who suffers from a host of medical problems (both 

physical and mental), challenged the denial of her application 

for Social Security disability benefits. An Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ) denied her application for disability insurance 

benefits after finding that, although she suffers from degenerative disc disease and fibromyalgia, she lacked sufficient 
2 No. 18-1691 

medical evidence that the conditions were disabling, and that 

she was not credible about her limitations. The district court 

upheld the ALJ’s decision. McHenry now appeals, contending that the ALJ erred by failing to have a medical expert review a consequential MRI report, by not accounting for 

McHenry’s mental or social limitations in her Residual Functional Capacity (RFC), and by discounting McHenry’s credibility. Because we agree with McHenry that the ALJ should 

have acquired a medical expert to review a consequential MRI 

report, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

McHenry, then 45 years old, applied for Title II disability 

insurance benefits in 2013, alleging impairments that included degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, and depression. Her back pain started in 1990 after a car accident, and in 

2005, an MRI of her lumbar spine showed “[m]ild disc space 

narrowing at L1-2 and mild spondylitic spurring at L3-4.” 

McHenry began regular treatment for back pain and sciatica. 

Despite her pain, she worked as a hair stylist until at least 

2009. 

When she initially applied for disability benefits on December 8, 2013, McHenry alleged an onset date of January 1, 

2009. After this application was denied, McHenry’s oral request for an amended onset date of January 1, 2011—the date 

she alleged in her Title II disability application on December 

11, 2013—was accepted by the ALJ at an administrative hearing on March 17, 2015. She was last insured to qualify for benefits on December 31, 2013. Because McHenry was required 

to establish that she became disabled before the date last 
No. 18-1691 3

insured to qualify for benefits, see Shideler v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 

308, 311 (7th Cir. 2012), the relevant time period is from January 2011 to December 2013. 

In June 2011, McHenry began seeing a nurse practitioner, 

Jennifer Huisman. McHenry complained of back pain, stress, 

lack of sleep, and depression, and reported a history of fibromyalgia and chronic pain. She also told Huisman that she 

was working full-time and caring for her elderly mother. At 

this examination, Huisman observed that McHenry was diffusely tender at 16 of 18 trigger points, but that she did not 

appear to be in acute distress. She had a steady gait, no limitations in movement, full muscle strength, and normal reflexes. 

Over the next two years, McHenry was examined eighteen 

times by Huisman and another nurse practitioner. During 

these exams, McHenry exhibited a steady gait, normal reflexes, normal muscle strength, and negative straight-leg raising tests. In August 2013, close to McHenry’s date last insured, she was “[t]alkative” and “[i]n good spirits.” She 

walked steadily and had equal and symmetrical deep tendon 

reflexes. At a few exams, however, McHenry had numerous 

positive trigger points. And after McHenry traveled to Alaska 

for a month-long trip in November 2013, she experienced debilitating back pain that required her to lie in bed for a week. 

At her next medical exam, she reported that she felt she could 

no longer “keep a job.” Her nurse practitioner at the exam 

noted that McHenry had difficulty getting down from the examination table. 

During the relevant period, McHenry’s medical providers 

regularly treated her with a half-dozen medications at once. 
4 No. 18-1691 

In July 2011, McHenry complained about the concentrationrelated side effects of these medications, which included feeling “loopy.” Her medical provider noted in July 2011 that her 

methadone needed to be titrated to reduce sedation side effects (i.e., drowsiness). But physical examinations during the 

relevant period do not indicate that McHenry otherwise displayed significant side effects beyond not being able to drive 

or operate machinery. In June 2011, while on these medications, she told Huisman that she worked “full-time.” One 

month later, she reported to Huisman that Prozac managed 

her depression symptoms. Huisman recorded in September 

2011 that McHenry had “no problems w[ith] her meds.” At 

this appointment, McHenry specifically denied “nausea, 

vomiting, or diarrhea.” In November 2013, a month before the 

end of the relevant period, McHenry told nurse practitioner 

Vicky Owens that she “has always worked.” Owens recorded 

that McHenry was “[t]aking her medications without any adverse effects.” 

Dr. Bruce Ippel, a physician, began treating McHenry two 

months after the relevant period. From April 2014 to mid-June 

2014, he observed that McHenry suffered from a limited 

range of motion and muscle weakness. She also tested positive (for pain related to disc disease) in a bilateral straight-leg 

raising test. An April 2014 MRI showed that McHenry had 

multiple impinged nerve roots in addition to spinal cord compression. On a form signed on December 5, 2014, Dr. Ippel 

wrote that McHenry’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 

spine met the severity required in 20 CFR § 404.1520(d), Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 1.04A [“Listing 1.04A”]. He observed that McHenry had sensory loss (numbness and tingling). In February 2015, two years after the relevant time 
No. 18-1691 5

period, Dr. Ippel reported that her medications’ side effects 

gave McHenry communication difficulties; cognitive problems; impaired judgment, decision-making, and memory; as 

well as confusion and drowsiness. Dr. Ippel opined that 

McHenry’s debilitating condition dated back to June 2011. 

After the Social Security Administration twice denied benefits, McHenry requested an administrative hearing. There, 

before an ALJ, McHenry testified that she could no longer 

work because of her back pain, cubital tunnel syndrome, sciatica, pinched nerve, spinal stenosis, and fibromyalgia. She 

described numbness in her fingers due to the pinched nerve 

in her shoulder blade, difficulties raising her left arm above 

her head, and numbness and tingling in her right leg. She said 

that she had moved in with her mother, who had to do “pretty 

much everything” for her, including her laundry. She could 

feed her cat, dust, and take a shower on her own, but she 

needed help washing her hair. She also needed help entering 

and exiting the tub to bathe. She said that she did not drive 

“at all” and had not since 2010. She also said that her medication (at that time, methadone three times per day, in addition 

to Norco, another opioid) made her “kind of loopy,” as well 

as “sleepy” and “confused, dizzy.” 

The ALJ asked a vocational expert to consider the work 

that would be available to a person of McHenry’s age and experience who could do a full range of light work, with the following limits: occasional lifting and reaching overhead; frequent use of the upper extremities for handling, fingering, 

grasping, and feeling type of activities; occasional climbing of 

ramps and stairs, balancing, kneeling, and stooping; never 

crawling, crouching, or climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; 
6 No. 18-1691 

and alternating positions between sitting, standing, and walking once every forty-five minutes, while being able to maintain the alternate position for up to five minutes before resuming the previously held position. The VE testified that these 

limitations would prevent such a person from working as a 

hair stylist but allow her to work as a ticket seller and parking 

lot cashier. 

Applying the administration’s five-step analysis, 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4), the ALJ first determined that McHenry met 

the insured status requirements and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date, January 1, 2011 (Step 1). The ALJ then found that although 

McHenry’s degenerative disc disease and fibromyalgia were 

severe (Step 2), they did not meet or equal a listed impairment 

(Step 3), and her mental impairments caused no restrictions 

on her ability to work (Step 4). At Step 4, the ALJ assigned a 

residual functional capacity consistent with the hypothetical 

claimant he had described to the VE. 

In assessing the severity and intensity of McHenry’s 

symptoms, the ALJ found that her testimony overstated her 

limitations and was not supported by the medical evidence. 

The ALJ assumed McHenry was untruthful because in March 

2012, she had reported to her nurse practitioner that she “rearended another car,” despite having testified at her hearing 

that she had not driven a vehicle since 2010. The ALJ also discredited McHenry’s description of the severity and intensity 

of her impairments by invoking McHenry’s reports to her 

providers that she engaged in various exercises that he determined were inconsistent with her claims of disability, such as: 

yoga; riding her bike; gardening; and traveling to Alaska for 
No. 18-1691 7

about a month, twice. The ALJ also gave no weight to the 

April 2014 MRI showing severe nerve root compression or to 

Dr. Ippel’s opinions because the ALJ found that they were not 

consistent with the medical records during the relevant period. 

Finally, the ALJ concluded that McHenry could perform 

jobs that existed in the national economy, so she was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, and the magistrate judge upheld the ALJ’s denial of benefits. McHenry appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Because the Appeals Council declined McHenry’s request 

for review, the ALJ’s ruling represents the Social Security 

Commissioner’s final decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Minnick v. 

Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015). We directly review 

the ALJ’s decision, id., and we review with deference, refraining from substituting our judgment for that of the ALJ’s, 

Shideler v. Astrue, 668 F.3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 2012), and limiting 

our analysis of error to the grounds addressed by the ALJ, see 

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943). We reverse the 

ALJ’s determination only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence. Minnick, 775 F.3d at 935. 

A. The ALJ’s Listing 1.04A Analysis 

McHenry first argues that the ALJ erred at Step 3 when he 

failed to subject a recent MRI to medical scrutiny. McHenry’s 

April 2014 MRI demonstrated that McHenry had multiple impinged nerves in addition to spinal cord compression, which, 

McHenry contends, shows she met Listing 1.04A. Because the 
8 No. 18-1691 

2014 MRI raised a question of when her arguably disabling 

condition began, McHenry contends that only a medical expert could have drawn inferences from this medical evidence. 

But here, McHenry argues, the ALJ independently and impermissibly compared the MRI results with earlier medical records to determine, as the ALJ put it, whether the impairments 

“actually existed at the same or similar level” during the relevant time period. 

We agree with McHenry that the ALJ impermissibly assessed the MRI report on his own without the assistance of a 

medical expert. We have said repeatedly that an ALJ may not 

“play[] doctor” and interpret “new and potentially decisive 

medical evidence” without medical scrutiny. Goins v. Colvin, 

764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014) (ruling that the ALJ erred in 

failing to submit claimant’s first MRI in 11 years to medical 

scrutiny and in interpreting results herself). An ALJ may not 

conclude, without medical input, that a claimant’s most recent MRI results are “consistent” with the ALJ’s conclusions 

about her impairments. Akin v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 314, 317–18 

(7th Cir. 2018). 

In this case, the ALJ alone compared the test results with 

earlier treatment records to determine if McHenry’s back impairment in April 2014 existed at the same level of severity 

during the relevant period. As in Akin, where we reasoned 

that the ALJ was not qualified to determine on his own 

whether the MRI results would corroborate the claimant’s 

complaints “without the benefit of an expert opinion,” 887 

F.3d at 318, here, the ALJ was not qualified to assess on his 

own how the April 2014 MRI results related to other evidence 

in the record. 
No. 18-1691 9

McHenry also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the 

only medical opinion regarding whether McHenry’s condition met Listing 1.04A. Her treating physician, Dr. Ippel, 

opined that McHenry did meet Listing 1.04A during the relevant time period. We have previously held that a medical advisor’s retrospective diagnosis may be considered only if 

“corroborated by evidence contemporaneous with the period 

of eligibility.” Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2009); 

Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, 

treatment notes from McHenry’s November 2013 exam indicate some measure of debilitating back pain and so supply evidence to corroborate Dr. Ippel’s retrospective diagnosis. And 

while we cannot, any more than the ALJ can, draw a medical 

inference without objective evidence, we note that McHenry 

raises a plausible argument that it is unlikely that the level of 

nerve-root and spinal-cord compression present in her April 

2014 MRI developed in the three months after the relevant 

time period ended. 

To be sure, McHenry bore the burden to show that her 

back pain met or medically equaled all the criteria under Listing 1.04A between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2013. 

20 CFR §§ 404.1520, 404.1526(a); Maggard v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 

376, 380 (7th Cir. 1999). “An impairment that manifests only 

some of [the required criteria], no matter how severely, does 

not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). As the 

ALJ detailed, over the course of eighteen physical examinations during the relevant time period, McHenry was not diagnosed with the “neuro-anatomic distribution of pain,” limited 

spinal motion, motor loss with sensory or reflex loss, or positive straight-leg raising tests—all requirements to meet Listing 1.04A. But, while her final two physical exams in late 2013 
10 No. 18-1691 

showed no physical signs of nerve impingement, treatment 

notes from her November 2013 exam show that McHenry reported experiencing back pain so debilitating that she needed 

to lie in bed for a week. During this exam, McHenry also 

shared that she felt she could no longer “keep a job.” 

Thus, the ALJ’s determination that McHenry’s condition 

did not meet Listing 1.04A’s requirement was not supported 

by substantial evidence because he failed to obtain a medical 

expert to review the April 2014 MRI and he rejected the only 

medical opinion regarding whether McHenry’s condition met 

Listing 1.04A. 

The ALJ’s errors at Step 3 warrant remand. For the sake of 

completeness, we address McHenry’s remaining arguments, 

which we do not find persuasive in light of the deferential 

standard. 

B. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Assessment 

McHenry contends that the ALJ improperly determined 

McHenry’s RFC by first, not accounting for McHenry’s anxiety-related limits on social functioning and limits in her ability to sustain concentration because of her medications’ side 

effects; and second, by discounting McHenry’s credibility. 

1. McHenry’s Mental or Social Limitations 

McHenry contends that the ALJ erred by omitting from 

McHenry’s RFC anxiety-related limits on social functioning, 

as well as limits in McHenry’s ability to sustain concentration 

because of her medications’ side effects. Because she complained about concentration-related side effects of her medications, she asserts that the ALJ wrongly concluded that 
No. 18-1691 11

treatment notes during the relevant period failed to disclose 

any adverse side effects, especially for a continuous period of 

at least twelve months. 

McHenry did occasionally describe side effects. One treatment note states that her methadone needed to be titrated to 

reduce sedation side effects, and she was advised not to drive 

or operate machinery. Yet she also told her medical providers 

that she had “no problems w[ith] her meds,” and that she was 

“[t]aking her medications without any adverse effects.” 

McHenry specifically denied “nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea,” 

and she reported that Prozac managed her depression symptoms. Moreover, McHenry’s own accounts show that she 

worked while she took her prescription medications. True, 

Dr. Ippel opined that McHenry had communication difficulties; cognitive problems; impaired judgment, decision-making, and memory; and confusion and drowsiness, but he said 

so in February 2015, over one year after the date last insured. 

Further, the mere listing of side effects is insufficient to establish functional limitations, and no evidence shows how 

McHenry’s medications affected her ability to work. See Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005). There is even 

less evidence with respect to any limiting effects on her social 

functioning caused by anxiety. And McHenry does not suggest any. Therefore, the ALJ did not erroneously fail to limit 

social interactions as part of McHenry’s RFC. 

2. McHenry’s Credibility 

McHenry also takes issue with the ALJ’s credibility determination, a conclusion we will disturb only if it is “patently 

wrong.” See Curvin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2015); 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413–14 (7th Cir. 2008). 
12 No. 18-1691 

She first contends that the ALJ erred in finding that she 

was dishonest about driving without probing further at the 

administrative hearing. The ALJ deemed McHenry untruthful because she testified that she had not driven since 2010 yet 

had reported to her nurse practitioner that she “rear-ended 

another car” in March 2012. According to McHenry, the ALJ 

needed to ask her about this discrepancy before making an 

adverse credibility finding. McHenry is wrong. True, an ALJ 

may not draw negative inferences from a claimant’s failure to 

seek treatment without first considering the individual’s explanation. S.S.R. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7, Titles II and 

XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims: Assessing 

the Credibility of an Individual’s Statements; Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 840 (7th Cir. 2014). But whether McHenry 

testified credibly about driving is not a matter of her medical 

treatment history, so the ALJ did not need to inquire. 

Neither did the ALJ err when he discredited McHenry’s 

descriptions of the severity and intensity of her impairments 

during the relevant period by invoking her physical activities, 

including yoga, biking, gardening, and extensive travel. 

McHenry does not minimize the exertional level or the extent 

of her activities. See Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 753 

(7th Cir. 2004) (requiring an ALJ to distinguish “between a 

person’s being able to engage in sporadic physical activities 

and her being able to work eight hours a day”); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that minimal 

activities do not show that a claimant can engage in “substantial physical activity”). Instead, she again argues that the ALJ 

could not use her physical activity against her without probing the extent of it with questions at the hearing. But an ALJ 

has the burden of inquiry only when drawing inferences 
No. 18-1691 13

about the severity of a condition from the failure to seek or 

continue medical care, S.S.R. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7, because lack of money or insurance might explain possible discrepancy. See Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 840. In this case, McHenry 

neither failed to seek nor failed to continue medical care. 

Finally, as the Commissioner highlights, McHenry barely 

discusses one basis of the adverse credibility finding. In her 

disability application, she stated that she stopped working on 

January 1, 2009—which was the onset date she first listed before amending it to January 1, 2011—due to her impairments, 

and at her hearing she testified that she had not worked since 

January 1, 2011. But she told her medical providers during the 

relevant period, which began on January 1, 2011, that she still 

worked as a hair stylist. Not only does this undermine her 

credibility generally, it also contradicts her account of the 

physical limitations caused by her back impairment. 

McHenry now surmises that her providers must have misunderstood her statements that she tried to work and to cut her 

family’s hair. But McHenry’s speculation (and her disparagement of the ALJ), do not amount to a showing that the ALJ 

was “patently wrong.” See Curvin, 778 F.3d at 651. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Our task is to determine whether substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s conclusion; here, it does not. Thus, we 

VACATE the judgment of the district court upholding the 

ALJ’s decision to deny McHenry benefits and REMAND for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.