JUDICIAL WATCH, INC. , P laintif f,
v. UNITED STAT ES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendan t.

UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE DIS TRICT OF COLUM BIA

Civil Action 06-00406 (HHK )

MEMORAN DUM OP INION AND ORDER Plaintiff J udicial Watch, Inc. brought this action ag ainst the U.S. Depa rtment of Just ice (“D OJ ”), se ekingthe re lease of ce rtain re cords r elated to the g overnme nt’s Terr orist Surveillance Prog ram pursua

nt to the Fre edom of I

nformation Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552. On March 3, 2010, afte r DOJ had rele ased a number of doc uments and withheld others unde r F OIA’s var ious exemptions , the par

ties submitt ed a joint stipulation of dismi ssal [#29] . J udicial Watch subsequently

filed a motion for attorney fee s [#30] , which DOJ opposes. Upon consider ation of the motion, the oppositi on there to, and the re cord of this case, the Court c oncludes that the motion shoul d be g rante d.
I. BACKG ROUND On J anuar

y 6, 2006, J udicial Watch filed a FOIA re quest with DOJ, s eekingleg al opinions, orders, and othe r docume nts related to the T err orist Surveillance Program, a domestic surveillance initiative authorized by President Geor g e W. Bush in 2002. On Mar ch 6, having
rec eived no r esponse f

rom DOJ, J udicial Watch initiated this action. There afte r, the pa rtiesjointly

stipulated that: (i) DOJ would complete its production of documents by September 15, 2006; (ii) DOJ would produce a Vaughn index of all recor ds withheld from Judi cial Watch by October 13, see Vaughn v . Rosen , 484 F.2d 820, 827–28 ( D.C. Cir. 1973); and (iii) by October 31, J udicial Watch would notify DOJ whether it intended to cha lleng e any withholdings and if so, which ones. See J oint St ipulation [ #7] ¶¶ 1–3. The Court ac cepte d the par ties’ stipulation by minute order. See Minute Order of Aug . 7, 2006. After the agree d-upon steps we re c ompleted, DOJ moved for summary judgme nt as to its withholding of 294 doc uments pursuant to FO IA’s Exemption Five. Def .’s Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J . [#9] ; see5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (protec ting “ inter-a g ency or intra- ag ency

memorandums or letters which would not be ava ilable by law to a pa

rty other than a

n ag ency [si c] in li tiga

tion with the ag ency .”). The Court gr anted the motion for summar y judgme nt as to fiftee n documents that J udicial Watch conc eded c ould be withheld, but denied it in all other re spects, conc luding that DOJ had failed to ade quately explain why

the re maining doc uments were exempt from disclosure a

nd why cer tain documents conta ined no segreg able infor mation. See Mem. Op. & Orde r of Ma

rch 20, 2008 [#19] at 13. After the Court’s r uling, the pa

rties eng ag ed in furthe r neg otiations that resulted in DOJ’s release of 68 more doc uments and then the dismissal of the
case . J udicial Watch then moved f or attorne y

fee s.
II. ANALYSIS A FO IA plaintiff is elig ible to rec eive “ rea sonable attorney fee s and other litig ation costs” if she has “ substantially

preva iled” in the ca se in question. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (E)( i). I f elig ible, a plaintiff must also show that she is “e ntitled” to a fe e aw ard; only then will she be

2g rante d fee s and costs. See J udicial W atch, Inc . v. FBI

, 522 F.3d 364, 371 ( D.C. Cir. 2008). Be cause elig ibilit y

is a threshold re quirement, the Court turns fir st to that iss ue. A. Judi cial Watch “Sub stantially Pr evailed” in thi s Action 1. The Court Nee d Not Det erm ine Which “S ubs tantially Pr evailed” Stand ard to Apply The “ substantially

preva iled” re quirement pre sents an unusual c omplication here beca use its meaningchang ed duringthe pende ncy of this action. Fr om 2001 throug h 2007, “in orde r for plaintiffs in FOIA ac tions to become elig ible for a n awa rd of attorney

fee s, they

must have ‘be en
awa rded some r elief by

[a] court,’ e ither in a judg ment on the merits or in a c ourt-orde red consent de cre e.” Oil, Chem. &Atomic W orkers Int’ l Union v. Dep’ t of Energy (“ OCAW ”), 288 F.3d 452, 456–57 ( D.C. Cir. 2002) (alter ation in orig inal) (quoting Buck hannon Bd. &Care Home, I nc. v. W . Va. Dep’ t of Health &Human Re s. , 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). O n the last day of 2007, howe ver, the OPEN Gover nment Act of 2007, Pub. L . No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007), took ef

fec t. Under the OPEN Gover nment Act, a F OIA plaintiff has substantially preva iled if she has obta ined re lief fr om a cour t as described above or via “a voluntary

or unilatera l chang e in position by the ag ency , if the complaina nt’s claim is not insubst antial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (E)( ii). The ac t’s “voluntary or unilatera l chang e” la

nguag e re instated the “cataly st” test for f

ee e ligibility , which had be en re jected by the Supreme Court in Buck hannon. See 532 U.S. at 610. As a re sult of this m id-litigation cha ng e in the g overninglaw, the pa rties dispute which standard the Court should apply : the cata ly st test (which took eff ect while this ca se wa s pending ) or the stricte r Buck

hannon test (which wa s in effe ct when the case was filed) . The Court

3conclude s, howeve r, that it need not re solve that question beca use eve n under the stricter Buck hannon test, J udicial Watch has substantially preva iled. 2. Judi cial Watch Has Obtain ed Relief Through “a Judi cial Order, oran Enf orce able Writte n Agree m ent or C onsent Decr ee” The Buck hannon test require s a plaintiff to have “obtained r elief through . . . a judicial order , or an e nforc eable written agree ment or conse nt decr ee.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (E); see OCAW , 288 F.3d at 455–57. J udicial Watch points to two actions of this Court that ost ensibly
awa rded r elief to Judicial W atch in the ne cessa ry fashion: first, the Court’s August 7, 2006
acc eptanc e of the parties’ joint st ipulation; and second, the Court’s Ma rch 20, 2008 pa

rtial g rant and par tial denial of DO J ’s motion for summary judgme nt. DOJ responds that ne ither eve nt constituted an aw ard of

relief on the merits of Judicial W atch’ s FOI A claim. The Court conclude s that J udicial Watch substantially preva iled by

virtue of the Court’ s August 2006
acc eptanc e of the parties’ joint st ipulation. The Court’s minute orde r of August 7, 2006 stated that the Court “appr oves of the parties’ stipulations . . . and the parties shall be g overne d by the dea dlines set forth ther ein.” Minute Order

of August 7, 2006. The stipulation in question read: “On or befor e September

15, 2006, DOJ shall complete production of all re cords r esponsive to Plaintiff’s J anuar y 6, 2006 Fr eedom of

Information Ac t reque st that are not subjec t to claims of exemption.” J oint Stipul ation ¶ 1. Judi cial Watch asse rts that the Court’s adoption of the stipulation constituted a judicial awa

rd of r elief on the merits; DOJ counter s that the Court’s minute order was mer ely proce dural. DO J ’s re sponse is unavailing
.

4In the aptly titled Judicial W

atch , 522 F.3d 364, the D .C. Circuit held that the plaintiff had pre vailed bec ause “ the par ties had stipulated that the def endant a g ency

would produce the reque sted rec ords by

a date cer

tain and the tria l court appr oved the pa rties’ joint stipulation.” Id
. at 368 (interna l quotation marks omitted). The Judicial W atch court found the case befor e it to be a c lose para llel to Davy v. CIA , 456 F.3d 162 ( D.C. Cir. 2006), which similarly held that the plaintiff had pr evailed on the basis of a joint stipulation, approved by the district court, that the defe ndant would provide “ all responsive doc uments, if any ,” by cer tain dates. Id . at 164 (quoting Davy v. CIA , No. 00-02134 (D .D.C. May 17, 2001)). In Judicial W atch , as in Davy , the D.C. Circuit emphasized that “[p] rior to the par ties’ joint sti pulation and orde r, . . . ‘[the defe ndant] was not under

any judicial direc tion to produce doc uments by specific dates; the . . . orde r chang ed that by

requiringthe [defenda

nt] to produce all responsive doc uments by the spec ified dates.’” Judicial W

atch , 522 F.3d a

t 367–68 (quoting Davy , 456 F.3d at 166); see also Campaign for Responsible Trans plantation v. FDA , 511 F.3d 187, 197 ( D.C. Cir. 2007); Edmonds v. FBI

, 417 F.3d 1319, 1321–23 ( D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court’s August 7, 2006 minut e orde r fits square ly within the holdings of these case s. The pa rties’ stipulation, which the minute orde r appr oved, re quired DO J to “complete production” of

responsive, non- exempt records by a ce rtain date
. See J oint St ipulation ¶ 1. The stipulation’s langua g e is functionally indisti nguishable fr om that in Davy , wher e the stipulation, approve d by

the district court, stated that the defe ndant would provide “ all responsive documents, if any ,” by

cer tain dates. Davy , 456 F.3d at 164 (quoting Davy v. CIA , No. 00-02134 (D.D.C. May

17, 2001)) ( internal quotation marks omitted). As in Judicial W atch and Davy , this Court’s minute order “ requir[ed] the [defendant] to produce a ll responsive docume nts by the
5specifie d dates.” Judicial W atch , 522 F.3d at 367–68 (quoting Davy , 456 F.3d at 166) (interna l quotation marks omitted). DOJ’s response — that the Court’s or der w as mere ly proce dural be cause it did not rule on the merits of Judicial W atch’ s claim — is an ar gument that the D.C. Circuit has re peate dly reje cted. DO J ’s ar gument is based on OCAW , in which the D.C. Circuit held that an or der requiringthe def

endant to “c omplete its recor d revie w in 60 day s” could not ser ve as the basis for a dete rmination that the plaintiff had pr evailed, be cause the orde r neither cre ated a n obliga tion to turn over a

ny specific documents nor r ejec ted the def endant’ s justifications for withholding a ny information. See O CAW

, 288 F.3d at 458–59. In a vac uum, DOJ ’s re adingof OCAW would be
rea sonable, but Davy , Campaign for Responsible Trans plantation , and Judicial W atch all expressly considere d and re

jected suc h a re ading
. See J udicial W atch , 522 F.3d at 369–70 (desc ribingthe g overnme nt’s repe ated de ploy ment of this argument). The Judicial W atch court went so fa

r as to obser

ve that “the g overnme nt’s decision to dust off a thor oug hly discredited argument and pre sent it to us anew wa stes both our time and the g overnme nt’s resour ces.” Id . at 370. This Court will foll ow the cle ar holding s of these bindingprec edents. Ac cording ly , the Court concludes that J udicial Watch substantially preva iled by

virtue of the Court’ s August 7, 2006 minute order. 1

Be cause the Court conclude s that J udicial Watch substantially preva iled by

virtue 1 of the Court’s August 7, 2006 minut e orde r, it does not separ ately consider the eff

ect of its partial denial of D OJ ’s summary judgme nt motion. See E dmonds , 417 F.3d at 1327 (wher e a F OIA plaintiff has substantially preva iled as to one issue, it is not necessa ry to consider whe ther she also substantially

preva iled as to others). 6B. Judi cial Watch Is Entitled to an Aw ard of Attorney F ees

Once a F OIA plaintiff has e stablished that she is elig ible for attorney fee s, she must nex t establish that she is entitled there to. To determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to rec eive a fee
awa rd, the c ourt balanc es four fac tors: “(1) the public benef it derived fr om the case ; (2) the
commerc ial benef

it to the plaintiff; (3) the natur e of the plaintiff’s intere st in the recor ds; and (4) the re asonable ness of the a g ency ’s withholding.” Judicial W atch , 522 F.3d at 371 (quoting Tax Analysts v. U.S. De

p’t of Justice , 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 ( D.C. Cir. 1992)) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). The “ commerc ial benef it” and “pla intiff’s intere st” fac tors are closely rela ted and ar e ofte n considere d toge ther. Tax Analysts , 965 F.2d at 1095. Upon consideringall of the fac tors, the Court conclude s that J udicial Watch is entitled to rece ive a f ee a war d. 1. P ubl ic Benefit The public-be nefit fa ctor we ighs in fa vor of grantingattorney

fee s “whe re the complainant’s victor

y is likely to add to the fund of inf

ormation that citizens may use in making vital politi cal c hoices.” Cotton v. Heym an , 63 F.3d 1115, 1120 ( D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Fenster v . Brown , 617 F.2d 740, 744 ( D.C. Cir. 1979)) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). J udicial Watch ave rs that the mater ial it sought, which w as re lated to the g overnme nt’s controve rsial Ter

rorist Surveillance Prog ram, is pre cisely the sort of infor

mation that is valuable to the public in making suc h choice s. The Court agree s. In Electronic Privac

y Information Center v. D epartment of Justice , 416 F. Supp. 2d 30 (2006), this Court noted “the great public and media attention that the gove rnment’s wa rra ntless surveillance prog ram ha s g arne red.” Id . at 42. Indeed, the Terr orist Surveillance Program ha s been the subject of leg islative inquiry , seeDavid Stout, Defenseof Eavesdropping Is Me t W ith
7Skepticism in Se nate , N.Y. T I M E S , Fe b. 6, 2006, and sig nificant litigation. See, e .g. , W ilner v. Nat’l Sec. Age ncy , 592 F.3d 60 ( 2d Cir. 2009), cert. de nied 131 S. Ct . 387 (2010); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc . v. Bush , 507 F.3d 1190 ( 9th Cir. 2007). The dissemination of the information at issue is clea rly in the public interest. DOJ does not dis pute that the information sought by J udicial Watch is useful to the public, but argues that any benef it the public has rec eived f rom J udicial Watch’s suit is larg ely neg ated by

the fa ct that many

of the re quested doc uments were the subject of the ear lier-f iled FOIA claim in Electronic Privac y Information Center . This response is unava iling. Although the cour t must consider “the e x tent to which the information relea sed [in a FOI A suit] is alrea dy in the public domain,” Nw. Coal. for Alternati ves to Pe sticides v. Browner , 965 F. Supp. 59, 64 (D.D.C. 1997), the defe ndant bea rs the burde n of establishingthat fac t. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in W ash. v. U.S. De

p’t of Health &Human Serv s. , 481 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111 (D.D.C. 2006). Conclusory asser tions will not suffice
. See id . (notingthat “cour ts consistently

require substantiation” of ar guments that information is alrea dy publicly available ). Fur ther, it is not enoug h that some other pr ivate par ty has ac cess to the mate rial in question: “only materia l that has met a thre shold level of public dissemination will not further ‘public understanding ’ within the meaning of [FOIA’s] fee w aiver

provisions.” Campbell v. U.S. De p’t Justice , 164 F.3d 20, 36 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). Be cause DOJ has made no ef fort to show that the information containe d in the rec ords at issue her e has r eac hed that leve l — or any level — of public dissemination, the Court finds that this fac tor weighs in favor of J udicial Watch, albeit with somewhat less for ce tha n if none of the documents re quested ha d been r elea sed bef ore.

82. Com m erc ial Benef it and Nature of In ter est The sec ond and third elig ibilit y fac tors hold that “when a [FOIA] li tiga

nt seeks disclosure for a commerc ial benef

it or out of other pe rsonal motives, an a war d of attorne y ’s fe es is g ener ally inappropriate.” Tax Analysts , 965 F.2d a t 1095. Here , J udicial Watch ar gues that its purpose — to obtain and disseminate information of interest to the public — is entirely non-commer cial and public-oriente d and thus favor s an aw ard of fee s. The Court finds this argument, to which DOJ does not respond, pe rsuasive. See U .S. Dep’ t of Def. v. Fe d. Labor Relations Auth. , 510 U.S. 487, 495–96 (1994) ( descr ibing F OIA’s cor e purpose of contributingto the public understanding of the ope rations or a ctivities of g overnme nt); cf. Judicial W atch, Inc . v. U.S. De

p’t of Commerce , 384 F. Supp. 2d 163, 168–69 (D.D .C. 2005) (findingthe first three elig ibilit y fac tors to weig h in J udicial Watch’s fa vor in a F OIA suit), rev’d in part on other grounds , 470 F.3d 363 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Ac cording ly , these fa ctors also we igh in f avor of g rantingJ udicial Watch a f ee
awa rd. 3. Reasonableness of Agency Withholdi ng Finally , the re asonable -basis-in-la w fa ctor is “intende d to weed out those c ases in which the g overnme nt was ‘r eca lcitrant in its opposit ion to a valid claim or other wise eng ag ed in obdurate behavior .’” Tax Analysts , 965 F.2d at 1097 (quoting Cuneo v. Rumsfe ld , 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). He re, Judicial Watch argues that DOJ’s conduct wa s clea rly obstructive bec ause D OJ failed to re spond to J udicial Watch’s F OIA re quest by the statutory deadline, thus for cingJ udicial Watch to commence this action. DOJ counters that the
rea sonablene ss of its conduct is evince d by the fa ct that J udicial Watch eve ntually dropped its claim to more than thre e quar ters of the documents it orig inally reque sted. The Court agree s with
9DOJ t hat its conduct after the commenc ement of the suit does not appear particula rly
unrea sonable; it cannot a g ree , howeve r, that DOJ’s failure to r espond to J udicial Watch’s orig inal reque st in a timely fashion wa s appropr iate. J udicial Watch sent its orig inal reque st to DOJ on J anuar y 6, 2006. In three letters, date d J anuar y 11, 12, and 19, re spectively , various DOJ components acknow ledg ed re ceipt of Judicial Watch’s re quest and grante d it ex pedited proc essing . Even so, DOJ failed to provide a response to J udicial Watch within twenty business day s as re quired by 5 U.S.C. § 552(A)(6) (a) (i). Eve n though D OJ ’s conduc t after the suit was filed wa s g ener ally rea sonable, this initial failure to respond still weig hs in favor of a fe e aw ard. See D avy v. CIA , 550 F.3d 1155, 1166 ( D.C. Cir. 2008) (Tatel, J ., concur

ring ) (statingthat the re asonable ness-of- withholding fa ctor’s pur pose “will be ill-serve d if the g overnme nt can pr evail on this fac tor by saying nothingand for cingthe reque ster to sue, only

then to offe r no re sistance” (interna l quotation marks omitted)). In sum: all four elig ibilit y fac tors weig h, to vary

ing de g ree s, in favor of

g rantinga fe e
awa rd her e. Consequently , the Court will now turn to the amount of J udicial Watch’s re quest. C. The Am ount of

F ees t o Which Ju dicial Watch is E ntitled FOIA provides that a

plaintiff who is elig ible and entitled may be aw arde d “ reasonable attorney fee s and other litig ation costs.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)( E)(i) ( emphasis adde d). The usua l method of ca lculatinga re asonable fee amount is to “multi ply the hours re asonably

expended in the litigation by

a re asonable hourly

fee , producingthe ‘lodestar ’ amount.” Bd. of Trs. of Hotel &Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. J PR, Inc

. , 136 F.3d 794, 801 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). In turn, a re asonable hourly fee is determined “ acc ordingto the preva iling mar ket rates in the rele vant community , reg ardle ss of whethe r plaintiff is re prese nted by private or

non-prof it counsel.” Blum v. Stenson , 10465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). F or public-inter est or g overnme nt lawy ers who do not have

customary

billing ra tes, courts in this circuit have fre quently employ ed the “

Laffey Matrix,” a schedule of fe es base d on y ear s of attorne y experience that was de veloped in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines , Inc. , 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D .C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds , 746 F.2d 4 ( D.C. Cir. 1984). See Cov ington v. District of Columbia , 57 F.3d 1101, 1105–11 ( D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting the value of

the Laffey matrix and af

firminga fe e aw ard ba sed in part on its use). O nce the Court has dete rmined the prope r lodestar amount, it has discretion to adjust that amount on the basis of
cer tain fac tors. See W

eisberg v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Justice , 745 F.2d 1476, 1499–1500 ( D.C. Cir. 1984); Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Ve terans v. Sec ’y of De f. , 675 F.2d 1319, 1328–29 ( D.C. Cir. 1982). The Court will first addr ess J udicial Watch’s rate ca lculations and hours e x pended. 1. Rate Calculations an d Hou rs Expended i n Li tigation Her e, Judi cial Watch used the Laffey Matrix t o calc ulate the pr oper hour ly rate for e ach of the attorne y s and par aleg als who worke d on this case. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex . 1 at 7. B eca use DOJ does not dispute J udicial Watch’s ra te ca lculations, the Court will acce pt them. The Court further conclude s that J udicial Watch’s time entrie s are sufficie ntly clea r and de tailed to car

ry J udicial Watch’s burde n of establishingthe re asonable ness of its fee reque st. See R ole Mode ls Am., Inc . v. Brownlee , 353 F.3d 962, 970 ( D.C. Cir. 2004). DOJ, however, take s issue with the number of hour s for whic h J udicial Watch see ks compensation. DOJ acc uses J udicial Watch of fa iling to exercise “ billing judg ment” as descr ibed in Hensley

v. Ec kerhart , 461 U.S. 424 (1983): The district court . . . should exclude from th[ e] initial fee calc ulation hours that wer e not ‘re asonably expended.’
. . . Counsel for the preva iling party should make a g ood faith eff ort to exclude from a fee reque st hours that are excessive, redun d an t , o r 11otherwise unnece ssary , just as a lawyer in private prac tice ethically is obligated to

exclude such hours fr om his fee submission. Id. at 434 (interna l citations omit ted). The problem with DOJ’s argument is that it fails to explain why any

particula r time entry

is unreasona

ble. DOJ sugg ests that the time billed for J udicial Watch’s opposition and surre ply to DOJ ’s motion for summary judgme nt — 72.05 hours — “stand[s] out as particula rly excessive.” De f.’s Opp’ n to Pl.’s Mot . at 15. DOJ’s only argument in support of this claim is that these hours wer e billed “with no appa rent re duction to indicate e x erc ise of billing judg ment.” Id . But billing judg ment is just t hat — judgment . The Supreme Court’s c ommand that district courts exclude hours that we re not “ rea sonably expended” doe s not assume that all ca ses will nece ssarily have some particula

r propor tion of hours that fa ll into t hat categ ory . See City of Rive rside v. Rive ra , 477 U.S. 561, 569 n.4 (1986) (“ Hensley require s a fe e applica nt to ex erc ise ‘billing judg ment’ not bec ause he should
nece ssarily

be compe nsated for

less than the ac tual number of hour s spent litigatinga ca se, but beca use the hours he does see k compensation for must be reasonable .”). F urther, a s DOJ acknow ledg es, Judi cial Watch did identify a number of billing items, albeit a sma ll number, for which it would not reque st compensation. DOJ has thus failed to provide “ specific counter vailing e vidence ” that esta blishes the unrea sonablene ss of any specific portion of J udicial Watch’s re quest. Piper v. U.S. D ep’t of Justice , 339 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 (D.D .C. 2004) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Ve terans , 675 F.2d at 1326) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Acc ording ly , the Court will not ex clude a ny of the time entrie s for whic h J udicial Watch has reque sted compensation. Cf. Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violenc e v. U .S. Dep’ t of Tr easury , 49 F. Supp. 2d 3, 6 (D.D .C. 1999) (dec lining to re duce a fee awa rd whe re, a lthough se vera l

12attorney s expended a hig h number of hour s for the pla intiff, the plaintiff had a lrea dy reduc ed the amount somewhat a

nd the def

endant ha d failed to identify any duplicative or unpr oductive work). 2. DOJ’s P roposed Lodestar Adjustm ent Finally , DOJ sugg ests that the fe e aw ard should be a djusted downwar d by fifty perc ent to ref lect the f act that Judicial W atch ultimately obtained less than one quarte r of the doc uments it initially soug ht. DOJ does not explain why fifty perc ent would be a

proper reduc tion. J udicial Watch does not respond to this argument. DOJ i s corr ect that, a s a g ener al matter, a “plaintiff’ s overa ll success on the me rits . . . must be considere d in determiningthe re asonable ness of a fee awa rd.” Judicial W

atch v. U.S. Dep’ t of Commerce , 470 F.3d 363, 369 ( D.C. Cir. 2006) (citingFarrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992); Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434–35). In case s involving multiple discrete c laims or issues that can be considere d separ ately , this rule require s that hours spent on any unsucce ssful claims be excluded fr om compensation. Hensley , 461 U.S. at 434–35. In case s where the plaintiff’s suit cannot be divided into discrete c laims on which the plaintiff ha s won or lost, “the district cour t should focus on the sig nificanc e of the overa ll relief obtaine d by the plaintiff in re lation to the hours re asonably

expended on the litiga

tion.” Id. at 435. Courts have te rmed this latter, holistic approa ch the “ g ener al re duction” method. See M cDonne ll v. United States , 870 F. Supp. 576, 588 (D.N.J. 1994) (collec ting c ases)
. Her e, DOJ sugg ests a g ener al re duction of fifty perc ent to acc ount for Judi cial Watch’s “limited deg ree of ac hievement in this case .” De f.’s Opp’ n at 14. DOJ provides no basis for its

13fifty -per cent f igur e. Moreove r, DOJ’s argument appea rs to neg lect the f

act that F OIA ca ses 2 routinely result in the disclosure of a re latively

small proportion of the docume nts origina lly reque sted. Be cause a F OIA plaintiff ca nnot know at the outset which doc uments are subject to exemptions and which a

re not, the nor

mal FOIA litigation proc ess re quires the plaintiff to r equest a broa d swath of mate rial, which w ill then be winnowed until the ag ency has re lease d all nonexempt records. See, e .g. , Pub. Citiz en He alth Research G rp. v. Nat’l Inst. of Health , 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.D.C. 2002) (notingthat “in the ty pical F OIA ca se, some of Plaintiff’s initial reque sts [ are ] vol untarily withdrawn a

nd others [are] satisfied by the ag ency”). That is what
occur red he re. Mor e importantly , DOJ has neither sug g ested nor pr ovided support for a conclusion that Judi cial Watch’s ove rall ef fort expended or

reque sted lodestar a

mount are unusual for a

FOIA ca se in this district or of simil ar c omplex ity
. Cf. Ashton v. Pierce , 580 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D.D .C. 1984) (re ducinga re quested fe e aw ard be cause it was “c lear that what
was a n essentially

straig htforwa

rd lawsuit has be en allotted a dispropor tionate amount of time”)
. In light of D OJ ’s fa ilure either to identify

any discrete issues as to which Judi cial Watch
was unsucc essful, see J

udicial W atch , 470 F.3d 370–71, or to establish that the “over all relief obtained” w as disproportionate “ to the hours . . . expended on the litigation,” the Court conclude s that DOJ has not carrie d its burden of e stablishing that a de parture from the lodesta r is appropr iate. See Cope land v. Marshall , 641 F.2d 880, 892 ( D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The burden of justifying a

ny deviation from the ‘ lodestar’ rests on the pa rty proposingthe deviation.”)
. DOJ properly

esche ws basingits proposed reduc tion on the ratio of re lease d 2 documents to withheld documents; the Hensley Court expl ained that suc h a mec hanica l approa ch would “pr ovide[] littl e aid in dete rmining what is a re asonable fee in light of a ll the rele vant fa ctors.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 435 n.11. 14Acc ording ly , the Court will awar d J udicial Watch the full lodestar amount: $26,601.25. Furthe r, beca use DOJ has not challeng ed Judi cial Watch’s e ntitlement to $250.00 in l itigation costs (the filing f ee f or this action), the Court will awa rd Judi cial Watch that amount as w ell. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)( E)(i) ( allowingcourts to awa rd “f ees a nd other litiga

tion costs”).
III. CONCLUSION J udicial Watch has e stablished that it is bot h elig ible for a nd entitled to an awa

rd of attorney fee s in this case. F urther, it has pr ovided documenta tion that is sufficiently

detailed a

nd clea r to allow the Court to assess the r easona bleness of the hours it has expended and the rate s at which it reque sts compensation. Fina lly , DOJ has failed to justify a depa rture f rom the lodestar amount either by

identifying disc rete issues on which Judi cial Watch did not preva il or by establishing that J udicial Watch expended more hours than we re r easona ble in light of the overa ll relief obtained. Acc ording ly , it is t his 31 day of Mar ch 2011 her eby st ORDERED that DOJ shall pay J udicial Watch attorne y

fee s in the amount of $26,601.25 and litigation costs in the amount of $250.00.

Henr y H. Kenne dy , J r. United States District J udg e

15