Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2519 | August 7, 2019 Page 1 of 20

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael J. Woody

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael E. O’Neill

Michelle P. Burchett

Schererville, Indiana

Karl L. Mulvaney

Nana Quay-Smith

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Harold D. Wallick,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Eric B. Inman, M.D.,

Appellee-Defendant.

August 7, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CT-2519

Appeal from the

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable

Patrick J. Dietrick, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D12-1601-CT-847

Altice, Judge.

[1] Harold Wallick brought a medical malpractice action against his 

anesthesiologist, Eric B. Inman, M.D., and a jury rendered a verdict in favor of 

Inman. On appeal, Wallick challenges the jury selection process, arguing that 

the trial court should not have denied six of his for-cause challenges to 
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prospective jurors. He raises two issues that we consolidate and restate as: 

Was the trial court’s decision to deny one or more of the for-cause challenges

illogical and arbitrary?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In April 2013, Wallick filed a Proposed Complaint with the Indiana 

Department of Insurance alleging that Inman negligently administered general 

anesthesia during a cardiac ablation procedure and that, as a result, Wallick 

suffered a stroke and vision loss. A Medical Review Panel reviewed the 

submissions and decided that Inman met the standard of care in treating 

Wallick. Thereafter, in January 2016, Wallick filed a medical malpractice 

complaint in state court, and the case proceeded to a nine-day jury trial before 

the Honorable Patrick Dietrick in September 2018. 

[4] After the court’s opening remarks and party introductions, the potential jurors 

took an oath, as required by Ind. Jury Rule 13, to honestly answer each 

question asked by the court or counsel during jury selection. The trial court 

collectively asked the potential jurors a series of questions. For instance, the 

court asked whether any of them was related to or had relationships with any of 

the parties, attorneys, or witnesses, had heard about the case or the claims of 

the parties, had “any bias for or prejudice against any of the parties to this 

case,” or had any preconceived opinions concerning the parties, the case, or its 

outcome. Transcript at 11-12. No one responded in the affirmative. The trial 
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court also advised the juror pool that each chosen juror would be required to 

take an oath to “decide this case fairly and impartially without bias or prejudice 

on the evidence received during the trial and in accordance with the instructions 

of the court” and asked if any person felt that he or she could not abide by such 

an oath. Id. at 15. None of the potential jurors at issue in this appeal responded 

to the court.

[5] Pursuant to J.R. 14(a), requiring the trial court to introduce the case, Judge 

Dietrick informed the jury panel about the nature of the case and issues to be 

decided, stating:

In this case, Plaintiff Harold Wallick has sued Defendant Eric B. 

Inman, M.D. Mr. Wallick claims that Dr. Iman committed

malpractice by failing to use the degree of care and skill that a 

reasonably careful, skillful, and prudent anesthesiologist would 

use under the same or similar circumstances. Mr. Wallick 

further claims that Dr. Inman’s conduct was more likely than not 

a responsible cause of Mr. Wallick’s permanent brain injury, 

profound decrease in field of vision, compromised ability to get 

around due to vision loss, and other harms and losses of the 

nature requiring reasonable compensation. Mr. Wallick has the 

burden to prove his claims by a greater weight of the evidence. 

Defendant Eric B. Iman, M.D. denies the Plaintiff’s allegations 

of malpractice. Dr. Inman has no burden to disprove the Plaintiff’s 

claims. In this case, specifically, Dr. Inman contends that he 

acted in accordance with the applicable standard of care in 

providing anesthesia to Mr. Wallick on June 28, 2011. Dr. 

Inman further contends that no action or omission on his part 

was the responsible cause of any of the injuries o[r] damages 

claimed by the Plaintiff. Dr. Inman further disputes the extent 

and severity of the injuries and damages as claimed by the 

Plaintiff. That, ladies and gentlemen, are the issues in this cause. 
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The jury in this case will consist of six jurors and two alternates.

At this time, the attorneys will be allowed to ask questions of 

those persons seated in the jury box as potential jurors. After 

both attorneys have had an opportunity to question the 

prospective jurors, they are permitted to strike or otherwise 

excuse persons from the jury.

Transcript at 22-23 (emphases added). 

[6] Wallick’s counsel began questioning of the first panel, which consisted of the 

following fourteen potential jurors: Alcorn, Wynne, Dick, Walters, Harris, 

Mannon, Curtis, Ridner, McCalep, Knox, Bright, Wright, Biddle, and Thrash. 

Among other things, Wallick’s counsel asked whether anyone had feelings 

about medical malpractice cases and whether suing a doctor for money “leaves 

a bad taste[.]” Id. at 26-27. He also asked the fourteen seated prospective jurors 

if any of them were leaning toward the doctor’s side before evidence was 

presented. Wallick’s counsel reminded the prospective jurors that this was not 

a criminal case, where the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt, and 

explained that this was a civil case, where the burden of proof is “more likely 

true than untrue; the greater weight of the evidence.” Id. at 58. He discussed

the burden of proof as follows:

[L]et me ask you about the burden of proof, in the criminal case 

and the judge told you this isn’t a criminal case. In a criminal 

case, the case has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Basically, you have to be sure as a juror that the person 

committed the offense or you should find them not guilty. In a 

civil case like this, the burden of proof is more likely true than 

untrue; the greater weight of the evidence, which is 51-49. So I 

competed in powerlifting so I use analogies of the greater weight 
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of the evidence, so if you’ve got 1,000 pounds of evidence, then if 

501 pounds is in the patient’s favor then the patient is going to 

win, or 100 pounds 51 to 49. Let’s say, you know, some folks 

think that’s okay if you’re talking about minor injuries, a little 

money, but if the damages are several million dollars or a very 

significant injury, a lot of folks think it’s too easy for a patient to 

come in and only have to prove the case just by the greater 

weight of the evidence. Who feels like the patient – the greater 

weight of the evidence is a little unfair from the doctor’s side? 

The patient should have to prove it by more than 51-49? . . . 

What would you want to see me prove in this case in order to satisfy you 

to find in favor of the patient? Should it be 90-10 or 80-20 or where 

would you start? Or do you think the criminal standard would 

be better, that it would be appropriate for malpractice cases?

Id. at 58-59 (emphasis added).

[7] Wallick’s counsel then began to ask the jurors individually about the burden of 

proof. Juror Wright liked the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Id. at 59. Juror Walters did not think 51-49 “is very fair” and felt the case 

needed to be “very strong.” Id. She would want the winner to be just under 

beyond a reasonable doubt or around 90%. Juror McCalep also felt that the 

evidence needed to be strong and agreed with Wallick’s counsel when he asked 

if she would require plaintiff to prove his case by 90-95% instead of “51 to 49.” 

Id. at 61. Juror Biddle felt that the greater weight needed to be more than 51% 

and that the percentage should be 75%. Juror Bright felt 60% was reasonable. 

Juror Curtis felt the “51-49” characterization was arbitrary and that he could 

not award damages for a case that is more likely true than untrue. Id. at 66. 

Wallick’s counsel asked Juror Alcorn if he would want the plaintiff to prove his 
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case by more than “the greater weight of the evidence,” and Alcorn said that he 

would want the plaintiff to prove his case by “90-95,” as the greater weight of 

the evidence would not be enough proof to satisfy him. Id. at 71. Juror Wynne

did not feel that “51-49” would be enough for her to find in favor of Wallick 

and felt she would need “[p]robably 75 or over.” Id. at 72. Juror Ridner said 

he would want “80-90% at least.” Id. Juror Dick said he would need plaintiff 

to prove his case “100%.” Id. at 73. Throughout this line of questioning to the 

various potential jurors, Wallick’s counsel would sometimes ask if it was the 

juror’s “final answer.” Id. at 61, 66-67, 71, 72, 74.

[8] Dr. Inman’s counsel asked for and received a sidebar conference, during which 

he stated his intent to ask for a mistrial, arguing:

What I’ve seen happen over the course over one, two, three, four, 

five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, out of the fourteen people, this is 

pure and simple jury nullification. This whole percentage, there 

is no law. You’re going to instruct them.

Id. at 74. After stating that it had been “waiting for the objection[,]” the trial 

court stated that it would be asking questions and following up with each of the 

potential jurors. Id. The court then engaged in the following exchange with 

Wallick’s counsel:

COURT: [Y]ou make a challenge for cause right now, I’m not 

granting it. I’m going to ask those questions. You don’t instruct 

these jurors. I do.

COUNSEL: Oh I understand that. 
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COURT: . . . You’ve planted it in their minds something that 

you think is going to be an instruction and it’s not going to be an 

instruction. I will instruct them on the burden of proof and if 

they tell me under oath that they can follow my instructions, they 

are not being kicked. Do you understand that? 

COUNSEL: Yes.

Id. at 76.

[9] After Wallick’s counsel completed his questioning, the trial court asked 

questions as follow-up to Wallick’s voir dire, including the following:

[T]he court has a few questions. The first one is to all of you. 

Can you listen attentively to the evidence; can you apply the law 

in obedience to the instructions given to the facts which you find 

may exist and can you reach a verdict which is fair and impartial 

as to each part of this controversy? Does everyone understand 

that? Does everyone understand that question? You’re going to 

get instructions from the court, okay? So [Wallick’s counsel] was 

asking you questions regarding burden of proof and your personal feelings 

on burden of proof and there were percentages thrown out. Does everyone 

remember that line of questioning? The court’s question is this: I’m 

going to instruct you as to what the burden of proof is. So it is the judge 

instructing you on the law. Can you all follow my instructions? Will 

you put aside your personal beliefs as to burden of proof and follow the 

law as I instruct? Can everyone do that? Can anyone not do that?

Id. at 82-83. After engaging in dialogue with Juror McCalep, the court again

asked the seated prospective jurors if they could “put aside personal beliefs to 

certain issues with respect to burden of proof and standard of care and follow 
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the instructions I give you[,]” affirmatively asking “is there anyone that can’t do 

that?” Id. at 83. The response was silence.

[10] Based on the answers each had given regarding burden of proof, and what they 

felt they would need to find in order to find in plaintiff’s favor, Wallick’s 

counsel challenged for cause the following nine of the initial fourteen 

prospective jurors: Alcorn, Wynne, Dick, Curtis, Ridner, McCalep, Wright, 

Biddle, Walters. In a sidebar, the trial court engaged in the following exchange 

with Wallick’s counsel:

COURT: Without having had instruction from the court, you 

asked them their belief. 

COUNSEL: Right. 

COURT: They stated their beliefs. 

COUNSEL: They told me I would have to prove the case, some 

of them said beyond a reasonable doubt and some of them said 

100%. I mean the burden of – I can’t try the whole case and give 

them all the instructions but the burden of proof in this case is the 

greater weight of the evidence so it’s just 51 to 49. That’s not an 

arbitrary number. That’s the instructions the court is going to 

give. 

COURT: And we’re going to see if these panelists can under 

oath state to the court that they will follow the instructions that I 

give them. Once againCOUNSEL: I’m not disputing that they can say that they can 

follow the instructions of the court, but I think the court needs to 
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explain to them, you know, you were asked if you could decide 

this case based on the greater weight of the evidence which isCOURT: Which has not been defined or put into instructions 

yet.

* * *

COURT: So if I ask them if- will they follow the instructions 

that I give them when I give them the instructions, not questions 

from counsel during voir dire and they say “Yes,” that’s the 

answer I’m going for. 

COUNSEL: Your Honor, I defined burden of proof-

* * *

COURT: It’s not your place to define anything to them during 

voir dire, especially not an instruction of the court. The rule of 

law that the court is going to give on the burden of proof in this 

case, it’s not your burden to prove The Indiana Supreme Court 

or jury instructions say – 

* * *

COUNSEL: Your Honor, I am [sic] instructed them 

appropriately on what the burden of proof is. 

COURT: You don’t instruct them. I do. 

Id. at 88-90. The court then individually asked each one of the nine challenged 

jurors whether they would be able to put aside their personal beliefs and follow 
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the instructions as given by the trial court, including but not limited to those 

with respect to the burden of proof. Six answered in the affirmative – Alcorn, 

Walters, Curtis, Ridner, Wright, and Biddle – and the trial court denied 

Wallick’s for-cause challenges to those prospective jurors. Based on answers 

given by Jurors Wynne, Dick, and McCalep, the trial court granted Wallick’s 

request and struck those three for cause, replacing them with Jurors Newton, 

Liput, and Hunter.

[11] The trial court gave Wallick’s counsel time to question the new prospective 

jurors, and thereafter, he made for-cause challenges of Jurors Newton and 

Hunter because Juror Newton stated that she would feel more comfortable with 

a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden and “would need to know that there was a 

lot of proof[,]” and Juror Hunter said he would need a higher burden of proof 

than the greater weight of the evidence. Id. at 106, 111-12. The trial court 

conducted follow-up questions, asking each if he or she, upon being instructed 

by the court on the applicable burden of proof, could put aside a personal 

opinion or feeling regarding burden of proof and follow the court’s instruction 

as to the applicable burden of proof. Juror Hunter said he would follow the 

court’s instructions, and Wallick’s for-cause challenge of Hunter was denied. 

Juror Newton did not agree that she could follow the court’s instructions, and 

the trial court granted Wallick’s challenge and struck Newton. With regard to 

the denied challenges, Wallick’s counsel argued to the court in a sidebar that 

“how can they know if they can follow the court’s instruction [when] they don’t 

know what that burden of proof instruction is[,]” to which the trial court 
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responded, “They never know until they’re instructed and you’ve given what I 

think is probably an impermissible burden of proof by interjecting percentages 

and yard lines[.]” Id. at 119-20.

[12] The court replaced Juror Newton with Gregory and allowed Wallick’s counsel 

to question Gregory, who said he was not fond of attorneys or doctors, suspects 

lawsuits in general are frivolous, and did not want to be there. Wallick made a 

for-cause challenge to Juror Gregory, which the trial court denied.

1

[13] Inman’s counsel began his voir dire examination, reminding the potential 

jurors:

Judge Dietrick is going to read you the legal instructions and tell 

you what the law is. You’re going to take an oath to follow that 

law. That’s kind of a lot of the debate we’ve had today about 

what is the burden of proof and what does that mean. Judge 

Dietrick will tell you that. The facts, you are the judges of the 

facts.

Id. at 126. Among other things, Inman’s counsel asked the potential jurors 

whether they thought it was fair to hear all the evidence, i.e., all sides of the 

story, before making a decision and whether they had or knew someone with 

high blood pressure or who had suffered a stroke. He also individually asked 

the prospective jurors – Ridner, Hunter, Knox, Bright, Wright, Biddle, Thrash, 

 

1 In a sidebar with counsel, the trial court observed, and we agree, that if “not wanting to be here” constituted 

for cause, “then we would never seat a jury.” Transcript at 124. 
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Curtis, Mannon, Harris, Walters, Liput, Gregory, and Alcorn – whether each 

could leave sympathy outside the jury room and base the case on the law that 

the judge would give them and the evidence and witness testimony. All replied 

in the affirmative, except for Juror Gregory, who said he did not know if he 

could. Counsel for Inman made no for-cause challenges.

[14] Counsel for Wallick renewed his challenge to Juror Gregory for cause, arguing 

that Gregory expressly stated that he did not think he could pay attention to all 

the evidence because he was in an environment that he did not want to be in. 

The trial court asked Juror Gregory if he suffered from any physical or mental 

disability that would prevent him from rendering satisfactory jury service, and 

he replied that he did not. The trial court denied Wallick’s for-cause challenge 

as to Juror Gregory.

[15] Thereafter, the parties each made three peremptory strikes. Wallick struck: 

Gregory, Wright, and Ridner; Inman struck: Bright, Curtis, and Knox. The 

jury was comprised of: Alcorn, Liput, Walters, Harris, Mannon, and Hunter. 

Biddle and Thrash were accepted as alternates by Inman, but Wallick renewed 

a motion to strike Biddle for cause, which the court denied. Wallick now 

appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[16] Wallick made twelve for-cause challenges, of which the trial court granted four

and denied eight. Six of those eight denials are at issue in this appeal. The 

right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is a cornerstone of our criminal 
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justice system. Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind. 2012). A 

constitutionally impartial juror is one who is able and willing to lay aside his or 

her prior knowledge and opinions, follow the law as instructed by the trial 

judge, and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court. Id. 

“Removing prospective jurors – whether peremptorily or for cause – who 

cannot perform these tasks is the mechanism parties and trial courts use to 

achieve an impartial jury.” Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241, 245-46 (Ind. 2014). 

[17] The trial court has broad discretionary power in regulating the form and 

substance of voir dire examination. Hadley v. State, 496 N.E.2d 67, 72 (Ind. 

1986). Ind. Trial Rule 47(D) governs the examination of jurors and provides:

The court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct 

the examination of prospective jurors, and may conduct 

examination itself. The court’s examination may include 

questions, if any, submitted in writing by any party or attorney. 

If the court conducts the examination, it shall permit the parties 

or their attorneys to supplement the examination by further 

inquiry. The court may impose an advance time limitation upon 

such examination by the parties or their attorneys. At the 

expiration of said limitation, the court shall liberally grant 

additional reasonable time upon a showing of good cause related 

to the nature of the case, the quantity of prospective jurors 

examined and juror vacancies remaining, and the manner and 

content of the inquiries and responses given by the prospective 

jurors. The court may prohibit the parties and their attorneys 

from examination which is repetitive, argumentative, or 

otherwise improper but shall permit reasonable inquiry of the 

panel and individual prospective jurors.
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[18] Peremptory challenges give parties the nearly unqualified right to remove any 

prospective juror they wish, restricted only by the parties’ finite allotment of 

challenges and the constitutional ban on racial, gender, and religious 

discrimination. Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 246. A peremptory challenge is often 

exercised on “hunches and impressions” and parties generally are not required 

to explain their reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. Id. For-cause 

challenges, by contrast, are available to exclude any prospective juror whose 

“views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a 

juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Id. (quoting 

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)); see also Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 

231, 239 (Ind. 2015). There are no limits on the number of for-cause 

challenges, but each must be supported by specified reasons that demonstrate 

that, as a matter of law, the venire member is not qualified to serve. Oswalt, 19 

N.E.3d at 246. 

[19] Indiana Jury Rule 17 identifies a number of circumstances in which the trial 

court in a civil or criminal case “shall sustain” a challenge for cause, including 

if the prospective juror:

(3) will be unable to comprehend the evidence and the 

instructions of the court due to any reason including defective 

sight or hearing, or inadequate English language communication 

skills;

(4) has formed or expressed an opinion about the outcome of the 

case, and is unable to set that opinion aside and render an 

impartial verdict based upon the law and the evidence;
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* * *

(8) is biased or prejudiced for or against a party to the case[.]

[20] We afford substantial deference to trial judges regarding the decision to grant or 

deny a challenge for cause, as the trial court has the unique opportunity to 

observe and assess the demeanor of prospective jurors as they answer the 

questions posed by counsel. Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 245; Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 

239. We will reverse the trial court’s decision on a for-cause challenge “only 

when it is ‘illogical or arbitrary.’” Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 245 (quoting Whiting, 

969 N.E.2d at 29); see also Merritt v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 765 

N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2002).

[21] Here, Wallick asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his for-cause 

challenges to the following six individuals: Alcorn, Gregory, Walters, Ridner, 

Hunter, and Wright.2

 He explains that five of those six “would require Wallick 

to prove his case by more evidence than the law required[,]” and two of the five 

“indicated they were leaning in favor of Inman before hearing any evidence.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. The remaining for-cause challenge, as to Juror Gregory, 

was based on Gregory’s voir dire responses – stating that he was not fond of 

attorneys or doctors, hates court, and did not think he could listen to all the 

evidence – which Wallick claims reflects a “stated inability to discharge his 

 

2 For clarification, we note that Gregory, Ridner, and Wright were stricken through Wallick’s peremptory 

challenges and did not serve on the jury. 
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duties as a civil juror.” Id. Wallick claims that the trial court’s denial of his 

requests to strike those six prospective jurors for cause was illogical and 

arbitrary and denied him a fair trial.

[22] We first address the five potential jurors who Wallick claims took the position 

that they would require him to prove his case by more than the law requires, 

that is, more than the greater weight of the evidence. As an initial matter, we 

observe that the questions that Wallick’s counsel posed regarding burden of 

proof were asked in terms of what the person would require/prefer/be 

comfortable with/want to see in order to find for plaintiff, sometimes using 

quantified percentages such as whether the person would be satisfied with a 51-

to-49 scenario. Because the individuals gave answers indicating that, to find in 

Wallick’s favor, they would prefer or want to see a higher amount of proof, 

some saying something akin to beyond a reasonable doubt, Wallick’s counsel 

asked the court to strike the five for cause. The trial court reminded Wallick’s 

counsel that the individuals had not yet been instructed on the burden of proof 

or what constitutes a “greater weight of the evidence” and that what counsel 

was doing “by interjecting percentages and yard lines” during jury selection was 

not permissible. Id. at 119-20. The trial court thereafter individually asked each 

of those five (as well as others) whether he or she could set aside personal 

feelings or beliefs and follow the instructions and law that the court would give, 

including with regard to burden of proof. Each of the five jurors at issue here

responded in the affirmative.
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[23] Wallick recognizes on appeal that a trial court has broad discretion to 

rehabilitate jurors and deny for-cause challenges, but asserts that the trial court’s

attempted “rehabilitation” of the jurors in this case was ineffective and only 

resulted in the individuals giving meaningless, empty promises. Appellant’s Brief

at 5. Specifically, Wallick claims that the trial court’s inquiry – asking the 

person if he or she could set aside personal biases, beliefs, and prejudices and 

follow instructions as given – simply posed a “magic question” that, if answered 

with a yes, “made the . . . veniremen’s biases and prejudices disappear into thin 

air like they never even existed” and rendered an “otherwise incompetent” 

prospective juror able to serve. Id. at 5, 7. He claims that “[t]he court’s 

decisions to deny Wallick’s cause challenges . . . based solely on the biased 

jurors’ affirmative responses to the court’s ‘magic question’ were arbitrary and 

illogical” because “the magic question” fails to remove individuals who cannot 

perform the task of impartial deliberations and, instead, merely keeps people on 

the jury who have admitted they are partial and biased. Id. at 15-16. 

[24] In support, Wallick refers us to various out-of-state cases which either did not 

allow juror rehabilitation “through these types of ‘magical’ questions” or took a 

critical view of it. Id. at 22. Wallick urges that “Indiana should establish a rule

that (1) bars trial courts from engaging in juror rehabilitation by using the 

“magic questions” and (2) requires trial courts’ rehabilitation to focus on 

eliciting reliable testimony for determining the competence of a juror.” Id. at 

23-24. Assuming without deciding that other jurisdictions do not allow, or take 

a critical view of, such manner of rehabilitation, as Wallick claims, we find that 
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Indiana does not preclude it, and we decline his invitation to impose such a 

limitation on a trial court’s substantial deference in jury selection matters. 

[25] Here, the trial court individually asked each of the five jurors at issue if he or 

she could set aside personal beliefs or opinions and follow the court’s 

instructions that would be given, including with regard to the burden of proof. 

Each answered affirmatively. The trial court observed these jurors, and “we 

will not second guess its determination that they were sincere” in indicating 

they would follow the court’s instructions. See Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 240

(affirming trial court’s denial of for-cause challenges to two jurors, one with 

regard to his answers concerning appropriate penalty for murder and another 

regarding her sympathy for elderly or young victims, noting “trial court 

observed these jurors’ assurances of impartiality”). Based on the record before 

us, we find that the trial court did not act illogically or arbitrarily when it denied 

Wallick’s for-cause challenges to the five individuals who initially indicated 

they would want or prefer to see a higher burden of proof than the required 

“greater weight of the evidence” standard applicable in medical malpractice 

cases. See e.g., Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 262 (Ind. 2003) (holding no 

error in denying for-cause challenge to prospective juror who initially stated she 

would prefer to hear defendant testify, might have difficulty considering 

mitigation, and might be biased against someone who committed murder, but 

also stated that, though she might not like the law, she would follow the law as 

instructed), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1072 (1999).
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[26] The sixth and final for-cause challenge that Wallick appeals is that of Juror 

Gregory, who testified that he hated court and was not fond of doctors and 

lawyers. We appreciate the grain of truth in the lighthearted comment that 

Wallick’s counsel made to Gregory: “You dislike both sides equally? You’re 

the perfect juror.” Transcript at 122. Because Juror Gregory also stated that he 

would find it hard to pay attention to all the evidence, counsel for Wallick 

renewed his motion to strike Gregory for cause. The trial court asked Juror 

Gregory if he suffered from any physical or mental disability that would prevent 

him from rendering satisfactory jury service, and he replied that he did not. 

The trial court was within its discretion to deny Wallick’s for-cause challenge to 

Gregory. 

[27] It cannot be disputed that the trial court in this case gave considerable leeway to 

Wallick’s counsel, allowing over ninety minutes of questioning and then posing 

its own follow-up inquiries to Wallick’s twelve for-cause challenges (nine of the 

fourteen in the initial panel and three of the four replacements). Notably, the 

court struck four potential jurors whose answers reflected that he or she could 

not follow the instructions as given. The trial court devoted a generous amount 

of time to jury selection in order to make sure each person, including those 

challenged for cause, was competent to sit on the jury. We find no abuse of the 

court’s substantial discretion and conclude that the trial court did not act 

illogically or arbitrarily when it denied the six for-cause challenges at issue. 

[28] Judgment affirmed. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2519 | August 7, 2019 Page 20 of 20

Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.