### FILED April 5, 2016 In the Office ofthe ClerkofCourt WA State CourtofAppeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE JOSE ANTONIO ALVARADO, Appellant,
v. STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING, Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 33130-0-111

PUBLISHED OPINION

PENNELL, J.

- This caseturns onwhattype ofevidence the Department of Licensing (DOL) mustproduce at a contestedhearing in orderto disqualify a commercial driver's license (CDL) based on a positive drug test. Jose Alvarado argues thatprinciples ofstatutory interpretation andthe constitutional right ofdueprocess require the DOL disclose the laboratory data usedto generate a testresult instead ofmerely thetest's conclusions. Findingno suchrequirement under either standard, we affirm Mr. Alvarado's CDL disqualification. FACTS Jose Alvarado appliedto work as a commercial driver for the city ofSunnyside, an employer subjecttothe federal workplace drug and alcohol program, 49 C.F.R. pt. 40.No. 33130-0-III 

### Alvarado 

### v. Dep 't

### of Licensing
As part ofthe federal program, Mr. Alvarado submitted a preemployment drug test. The DOL subsequentlyreceived a report from a medical review officer stating Mr. Alvarado had tested positive for cocaine. Upon receiving the medical review officer's report, the DOL notified Mr. Alvarado it would disqualify his CDL. Mr. Alvarado requested a hearingto challenge the proposed disqualification. Atthe administrative hearing, Mr. Alvarado did nottestify, present witness testimony, or submit evidence to demonstrate the result was a false positive. Rather, he argued the matter shouldbe dismissed because RCW 46.25.125(4) requires the DOL toproduce a copy ofthe full laboratory report specifying the quantitative values ofhis drug test, not merely a report documenting a positive testresult. The hearing officer disagreed and upheld the DOL's disqualification. Mr. Alvarado appealed to the superior court. At this hearing, Mr. Alvarado reargued his position but again did not present evidence. The superior court affirmed the disqualification. Mr. Alvarado filed this timely appeal. ANALYSIS A. RCW 46.25.125 Mr. Alvarado argues the DOL violated RCW46.25.125 when it failed to produce a copy ofthe laboratory datareport at his disqualification hearing. According to Mr.
2No. 33130-0-III 

### Alvarado v. Dep 't

### of Licensing Alvarado, it was not sufficient for the medical review officer to sign a report statingthat 

### Mr. Alvarado hadtested positive for cocaine. Instead, he argues the plain language ofthe Washington statute requires disclosure ofthe quantitative data utilized by the drug laboratory tojustifythe positive test result. Issues ofstatutory construction are questions oflaw reviewed de novo. 

### State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 191, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). In construing a statute, the court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. 

### Lake v. WoodcreekHomeownersAss 'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010). "Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain meaning," which is "discerned from the ordinary meaning ofthe language at issue, the context ofthe statute in whichthat provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." 

### Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A court's inquiry ends ifthe statute is unambiguous after reviewing its plain meaning. 

### Id. The statute at issue here outlines the hearing rights ofa CDL holder who has received a notice ofdisqualification based on a positive drug or alcohol test. Itprovides
as follows: Forthe purposes ofthis section, or for the purpose ofa hearing de novo in an appeal to superior court, the hearing mustbe limited to the following issues: (a) Whetherthe driver is the person who is the subject ofthe report; 3

## 1 

# I 

# I No. 33130-0-III 

### Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing (b) whether the motor carrier, employer, or consortium has a program that is subject to the federal requirements under 49 C.F.R. 40; and (c) whether the medical review officer orbreath alcohol technician making the report accurately followed the protocols established to verify or confirmthe results, or ifthe driver refused a test, whether the circumstances constitute the refusal ofa test under 49 C.F.R. 40. Evidence may be presented to demonstrate that the test results are a false positive. Forthepurpose ofa hearing under this section, 

### a copy of apositive test resultwith a declaration by the tester or medical review officer or breath alcohol technician stating the accuracy of the laboratoryprotocols followed to arrive at the test result isprimafacie evidence: (i) Ofa verified positive drug test or positive alcohol confirmation test result; (ii) 

### That the motor carrier, employer, or consortium has a program that is subjectto the federal requirements under 49 C.F.R. 40; and (iii) That the medical review officer or breath alcohol technician making the report accurately followed the protocols for testing established to verify or confirm the results. RCW 46.25.125(4) (emphasis added). The crux ofthe parties' dispute pertains to what is meant by "a copy ofa positive test result." Mr. Alvarado argues this language refers to the quantitative data relied on to reach apositive test result. Focusing on the statute's use ofthe word "result," we disagree. A "result" is defined as "something obtained, achieved, orbrought about by calculation, investigation, or similar activity (as an answer to a problem or knowledge gained by scientific inquiry)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY



### 4i 

### 1 No. 33130-0-III 

### Alvarado 

### v. Dep 't

### of Licensing
1937 (1993). In other words, a result is the conclusion drawn from data analysis. It is not the analysis itself. Because the statute only requires a copy ofthe test "result," it does not contemplate disclosure ofthe quantitative data or information utilized to reach a positive test result. The context ofthe applicable statute solidifies this interpretation. As theparties agree, chapter 46.25 RCWwas written to comply with the federal Commercial Motor Vehicle SafetyAct of 1986 (CMVSA), Pub. 

### L. No. 99-570, title XII. 1 Indeed, the statute at issue, RCW49.25.125, references 49 C.F.R. 40, the federal regulations governing the CMVSA. Looking at these regulations, the medical review officerresponsible for reporting a drug test is specifically instructed to report the "[r]esult ofthe test" as "positive, negative, dilute, refusal to test, [or] test cancelled." 49 C.F.R. § 40.163(c)(6).2 Again, it is the conclusion that must be reported, not the datausedto generate the conclusion. This is consistent with federal regulations which strictly limitthe medical review officer's authority to disclose the quantitative values used to arrive at a test result. 49 C.F.R. § 40.163(g).

I There are no currently effective sections ofthe CMVSA. Therelevant law is now codified at 49 U.S.C. 

### § 31306. 2 The federal regulations refer to the medical review officer by the abbreviation MRO. 

### 5

### No. 33130-0-III 

### Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing
Mr. Alvarado correctlypoints out that, under 49 C.F.R. §40.87, the medical review officer cannot report a positive test result unless the amount ofdrugs in a test sample meets specified cutoffconcentrations. However, the fact thatthe medical review officer's conclusions mustbe consistent with certain guidelines does not meanthe officer's report must explain howthose guidelines were met in a given case. B. Due Process Apart from his statutory argument, Mr. Alvarado contends due process requires the DOL to produce a copy ofthe full laboratory report at a CDL disqualification hearing. Constitutional challenges are questions oflaw subject to de novo review. 

### Evans, 177 Wn.2d at 191. The State must provide due process when it deprives an individual oflife, liberty,
orproperty. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Driver's licenses, including CDLs, are property interests protected by procedural due process principles. 

### Amunrudv. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn.2d 208, 216, 143 P.3d 571 (2006). The fundamental components ofdue process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. 

### Watkins v. Dep 't of Licensing, 187 Wn. App. 591, 602, 349 P.3d 946 (2015). These are not mere formalities. Dueprocess must be "meaningful and appropriate to the nature ofthe case." 

### Svendgard
v. Dep'tofLicensing, 122 Wn. App. 670, 681, 95 P.3d 364 (2004).
6No. 33130-0-III 

### Alvarado v. Dep 't of Licensing
We considerthree factors when analyzing whetherthe State provided due process: (1) the private interestthat will be affected by the government action, (2) the risk of erroneously depriving a person ofthat interestthrough theprocedures used, andthe probable value, ifany, ofadditional procedural safeguards, and (3) the State's interest, including the function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens the additional requirements would entail. 

### Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 

### L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). Mr. Alvarado's challenge goes to the second

### Mathews factor. According to Mr. Alvarado, without disclosure ofa full laboratory report, the hearing rights afforded by statute are reduced to nothing more than a rubber stamp ofa medical review officer's report. We disagree. For one thing, the medical review officer's report is not a meaningless piece ofpaper. In Mr. Alvarado's case, it was signed underpenalty of perjury by a medical doctor, verifying that federal protocols were met in reaching a positive test result. In addition, Mr. Alvarado was afforded ample ability to contestthe accuracy ofthe report. He was entitled to demand a copy ofhis full laboratory report, including quantitative data, priorto the disqualification hearing. 49 C.F.R. 

### §40.329 (copies mustbe disclosed within 10 business days ofrequest). Atthe hearing, Mr. Alvarado had the right to testify, presenttestimony from witnesses, and submit exhibits.
7

### No. 33130-0-111 

### Alvarado v. 

### Dep 't

### of Licensing
RCW 46.20.332, .334. These safeguards were sufficientto protectMr. Alvarado from an
erroneous deprivation ofhis CDL, as required by due process. Because the State afforded Mr. Alvarado a meaningful procedure for contesting the disqualification ofhis CDL, his due process claim necessarily fails. Although Mr. Alvarado has an importantproperty interest in his CDL, the weight ofthis interest is tempered by the fact that a CDL holder's disqualification is stayed during the pendency of the hearing process. RCW46.25.125(6); 

### see City of Redmondv. 

### Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 670-71, 91 P.3d 875 (2004). Furthermore, the State has a significant interest in maintaining safety on the public roadways. The purpose ofchapter46.25 RCW is to be "liberally construed to promote the public health, safety, and welfare." RCW 46.25.005. This strong interest weighs against requiring production ofevidence that is notrequired by statute and is easily accessed by the CDL holder. The decision ofthe superior court is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

## j (~

# c~~JOPennell, J.

# ~ 

# ::r Fearing~'

8