# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 66/2010

| | ISSN 1725-5198
  doi:10.3000/17255198.C_2010.066.mlt |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5317 ta' Marzu 2010 |

ISSN 1725-5198

doi:10.3000/17255198.C_2010.066.mlt

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 66

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5317 ta' Marzu 2010

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| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Riżoluzzjonijiet, rakkomandazzjonijiet u opinjonijiet |
| | OPINJONIJIET |
| | Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data |
| 2010/C 066/01 | Opinjoni tal-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data dwar il-proposta għal Regolament tal-Kunsill dwar kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud (tfassil mill-ġdid) | 1 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

I   Riżoluzzjonijiet, rakkomandazzjonijiet u opinjonijiet

OPINJONIJIET

Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data

2010/C 066/01

Opinjoni tal-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data dwar il-proposta għal Regolament tal-Kunsill dwar kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud (tfassil mill-ġdid)

1

| | II   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2010/C 066/02 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.5712 – Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings/Mitsubishi Rayon Co) (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2010/C 066/03 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.5750 – Wabco/Würth/JV) (
  1
  ) | 10 |

II   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Kummissjoni Ewropea

2010/C 066/02

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.5712 – Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings/Mitsubishi Rayon Co) (
  1
  )

1

10

2010/C 066/03

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.5750 – Wabco/Würth/JV) (
  1
  )

1

10

| | IV   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | AVVIŻI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2010/C 066/04 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 11 |
| 2010/C 066/05 | Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-kwantità disponibbli għat-tieni semestru tal-2010 għal ċerti prodotti fis-settur tal-ħalib u tal-prodotti tal-ħalib fil-kuntest ta' ċerti kwoti li fetħet il-Komunità | 12 |

IV   Avviżi

AVVIŻI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Kummissjoni Ewropea

2010/C 066/04

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

11

2010/C 066/05

Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-kwantità disponibbli għat-tieni semestru tal-2010 għal ċerti prodotti fis-settur tal-ħalib u tal-prodotti tal-ħalib fil-kuntest ta' ċerti kwoti li fetħet il-Komunità

12

| | V   Opinjonijiet |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2010/C 066/06 | Sejhiet għall-proposti fil-kuntest tal-programm ta' ħidma Persuni tal-2010, tas-7 Programm Kwadru tal-KE għall-attivitajiet ta' Riċerka, Żvilupp Teknoloġiku u Dimostrazzjoni | 13 |
| 2010/C 066/07 | Sejħa għal proposti għal azzjonijiet ta’ modal shift, katalisti, Toroq tat-Tbaħħir, azzjonijiet għal evitar tat-traffiku u ta’ tagħlim komuni fi ħdan it-tieni Programm Marco Polo (Regolament tal-Kunsill u tal-Parlament (KE) Nru 1692/2006 – ĠU L 328, 24.11.2006, p. 1) | 14 |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2010/C 066/08 | Għajnuna mill-Istat – il-Ġermanja – Għajnuna mill-Istat C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) – Għajnuna addizzjonali għal WestLB AG fir-rigward tas-segregazzjoni ta' assi – Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 108(2) tat-TFUE (
  1
  ) | 15 |

V   Opinjonijiet

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Kummissjoni Ewropea

2010/C 066/06

Sejhiet għall-proposti fil-kuntest tal-programm ta' ħidma Persuni tal-2010, tas-7 Programm Kwadru tal-KE għall-attivitajiet ta' Riċerka, Żvilupp Teknoloġiku u Dimostrazzjoni

13

2010/C 066/07

Sejħa għal proposti għal azzjonijiet ta’ modal shift, katalisti, Toroq tat-Tbaħħir, azzjonijiet għal evitar tat-traffiku u ta’ tagħlim komuni fi ħdan it-tieni Programm Marco Polo (Regolament tal-Kunsill u tal-Parlament (KE) Nru 1692/2006 – ĠU L 328, 24.11.2006, p. 1)

modal shift

(Regolament tal-Kunsill u tal-Parlament (KE) Nru 1692/2006 – ĠU L 328, 24.11.2006, p. 1)

14

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Kummissjoni Ewropea

2010/C 066/08

Għajnuna mill-Istat – il-Ġermanja – Għajnuna mill-Istat C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) – Għajnuna addizzjonali għal WestLB AG fir-rigward tas-segregazzjoni ta' assi – Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 108(2) tat-TFUE (
  1
  )

1

15

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| | (1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE |

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(1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
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MT

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I Riżoluzzjonijiet, rakkomandazzjonijiet u opinjonijiet

OPINJONIJIET

Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data

| 17.3.2010 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.3.2010

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 66/1

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Opinjoni tal-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data dwar il-proposta għal Regolament tal-Kunsill dwar kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud (tfassil mill-ġdid)

2010/C 66/01

IL-KONTROLLUR EWROPEW GĦALL-PROTEZZJONI TAD-DATA,

Wara li kkunsidra t-Trattat li jistabbilixxi l-Komunità Ewropea, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 286 tiegħu,

Wara li kkunsidra l-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 8 tagħha,

Wara li kkunsidra d-Direttiva 95/46/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-24 ta' Ottubru 1995 dwar il-protezzjoni ta' individwi fir-rigward tal-ipproċessar ta' data personali u dwar il-moviment liberu ta' dik id-data (1) ,

Wara li kkunsidra r-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-18 ta' Diċembru 2000 dwar il-protezzjoni ta' individwi fir-rigward tal-ipproċessar ta' data personali mill-istituzzjonijiet u l-korpi tal-Komunità u dwar il-moviment liberu ta' dik id-data, u b’mod partikolari l-Artikolu 41 tiegħu (2) ,

ADOTTA L-OPINJONI LI ĠEJJA:

I.   INTRODUZZJONI

| 1. | Fit-18 ta' Awwissu 2009, il-Kummissjoni adottat proposta għal Regolament tal-Kunsill dwar kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud (“VAT”) (3). Il-proposta fil-fatt tikkostitwixxi emenda tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 dwar il-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud, li diġà ġie emendat diversi drabi (4). Madankollu, għall-fini ta' ċarezza u komprensjoni faċli, il-Kummissjoni għażlet li tuża l-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid, li jfisser li r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798//2003 ser jiġi rrevokat jekk il-proposta attwali tkun adottata mill-Kunsill. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Fit-18 ta' Awwissu 2009, il-Kummissjoni adottat proposta għal Regolament tal-Kunsill dwar kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud (“VAT”) (3). Il-proposta fil-fatt tikkostitwixxi emenda tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 dwar il-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva fil-qasam tat-taxxa fuq il-valur miżjud, li diġà ġie emendat diversi drabi (4). Madankollu, għall-fini ta' ċarezza u komprensjoni faċli, il-Kummissjoni għażlet li tuża l-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid, li jfisser li r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798//2003 ser jiġi rrevokat jekk il-proposta attwali tkun adottata mill-Kunsill.

| 2. | Fil-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid, id-diskussjoni leġislattiva hi fil-prinċipju ristretta għall-emendi sostantivi proposti mill-Kummissjoni u ma tittrattax id-“dispożizzjonijiet mhux mibdula” (5). F'din l-Opinjoni, madankollu, il-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data (“KEPD”) ser jiddiskuti r-Regolament attwali u l-emendi sostantivi proposti għalih fl-intier tagħhom. Analiżi sħiħa bħal din hi meħtieġa sabiex jiġi valutat sew l-impatt tal-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Il-KEPD ser jirrakkomanda aġġustamenti li jirrelataw ukoll għal tali dispożizzjonijiet mhux mibdula. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jieħu kont ta' dawn ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet minkejja l-kamp ta' applikazzjoni limitat tal-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid. F'dan ir-rigward, il-KEPD jindika l-Artikolu 8 tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali dwar il-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid li jipprevedi l-possibbiltà li jiġu emendati dispożizzjonijiet mhux mibdula. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fil-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid, id-diskussjoni leġislattiva hi fil-prinċipju ristretta għall-emendi sostantivi proposti mill-Kummissjoni u ma tittrattax id-“dispożizzjonijiet mhux mibdula” (5). F'din l-Opinjoni, madankollu, il-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data (“KEPD”) ser jiddiskuti r-Regolament attwali u l-emendi sostantivi proposti għalih fl-intier tagħhom. Analiżi sħiħa bħal din hi meħtieġa sabiex jiġi valutat sew l-impatt tal-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Il-KEPD ser jirrakkomanda aġġustamenti li jirrelataw ukoll għal tali dispożizzjonijiet mhux mibdula. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jieħu kont ta' dawn ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet minkejja l-kamp ta' applikazzjoni limitat tal-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid. F'dan ir-rigward, il-KEPD jindika l-Artikolu 8 tal-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali dwar il-proċedura ta' tfassil mill-ġdid li jipprevedi l-possibbiltà li jiġu emendati dispożizzjonijiet mhux mibdula.

| 3. | Il-bażi legali tal-proposta hi l-Artikolu 93 tat-Trattat KE, li jippermetti lill-Kunsill jadotta miżuri rigward it-tassazzjoni indiretta. Il-Kunsill jiddeċiedi b'unanimità dwar proposta tal-Kummissjoni u wara li jkunu ġew ikkonsultati l-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew. Il-bażi legali u l-proċedura speċifika mhux ser jinbidlu wara d-dħul fis-seħħ tat-Trattat ta' Lisbona. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Il-bażi legali tal-proposta hi l-Artikolu 93 tat-Trattat KE, li jippermetti lill-Kunsill jadotta miżuri rigward it-tassazzjoni indiretta. Il-Kunsill jiddeċiedi b'unanimità dwar proposta tal-Kummissjoni u wara li jkunu ġew ikkonsultati l-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew. Il-bażi legali u l-proċedura speċifika mhux ser jinbidlu wara d-dħul fis-seħħ tat-Trattat ta' Lisbona.

| 4. | Il-KEPD ma ġiex ikkonsultat kif meħtieġ mill-Artikolu 28(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Għaldaqstant l-opinjoni attwali hija bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 41(2) tal-istess Regolament. Il-KEPD jirrakkomanda li referenza għal din l-opinjoni tkun inkluża fil-preambolu tal-proposta. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Il-KEPD ma ġiex ikkonsultat kif meħtieġ mill-Artikolu 28(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Għaldaqstant l-opinjoni attwali hija bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 41(2) tal-istess Regolament. Il-KEPD jirrakkomanda li referenza għal din l-opinjoni tkun inkluża fil-preambolu tal-proposta.

| 5. | Il-KEPD huwa konxju tal-importanza li titjieb l-effettività tal-miżuri kontra l-frodi transkonfinali u li jinkiseb ġbir akbar ta' VAT f'sitwazzjonijiet transkonfinali. Għalkemm l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni, li huwa parti mill-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi tal-VAT, jinvolvi prinċipalment informazzjoni dwar persuni ġuridiċi, huwa ċar li d-data rigward persuni fiżiċi qed tiġi pproċessata wkoll. Il-KEPD jirrikonoxxi li biex jinkisbu dawn l-għanijiet huwa meħtieġ li tiġi pproċessata d-data personali. Il-KEPD jenfasizza madankollu li l-ipproċessar ta' tali data għandu jkun f'konformità mar-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Il-KEPD huwa konxju tal-importanza li titjieb l-effettività tal-miżuri kontra l-frodi transkonfinali u li jinkiseb ġbir akbar ta' VAT f'sitwazzjonijiet transkonfinali. Għalkemm l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni, li huwa parti mill-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u l-ġlieda kontra l-frodi tal-VAT, jinvolvi prinċipalment informazzjoni dwar persuni ġuridiċi, huwa ċar li d-data rigward persuni fiżiċi qed tiġi pproċessata wkoll. Il-KEPD jirrikonoxxi li biex jinkisbu dawn l-għanijiet huwa meħtieġ li tiġi pproċessata d-data personali. Il-KEPD jenfasizza madankollu li l-ipproċessar ta' tali data għandu jkun f'konformità mar-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data.

| 6. | Sitwazzjonijiet li jinvolvu l-iskambju transkonfinali ta' data personali fl-UE jistħoqqilhom attenzjoni speċjali peress li huma jimplikaw żieda fl-iskala tal-ipproċessar ta' data li neċessarjament twassal għal inċertezza għas-suġġetti tad-data: jistgħu jkunu involuti atturi mill-Istati Membri l-oħrajn kollha, il-liġijiet nazzjonali ta' dawn l-Istati Membri l-oħrajn jistgħu jkunu applikabbli u jistgħu jkunu xi ftit differenti mil-liġijiet li s-suġġetti tad-data jkunu familjari magħhom, jew japplikaw f'sistema legali li ma tkunx familjari għas-suġġett tad-data. |
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6.

Sitwazzjonijiet li jinvolvu l-iskambju transkonfinali ta' data personali fl-UE jistħoqqilhom attenzjoni speċjali peress li huma jimplikaw żieda fl-iskala tal-ipproċessar ta' data li neċessarjament twassal għal inċertezza għas-suġġetti tad-data: jistgħu jkunu involuti atturi mill-Istati Membri l-oħrajn kollha, il-liġijiet nazzjonali ta' dawn l-Istati Membri l-oħrajn jistgħu jkunu applikabbli u jistgħu jkunu xi ftit differenti mil-liġijiet li s-suġġetti tad-data jkunu familjari magħhom, jew japplikaw f'sistema legali li ma tkunx familjari għas-suġġett tad-data.

| 7. | Wara li analizza l-qafas legali li joħroġ mir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 u l-aġġustamenti attwalment proposti, il-KEPD jikkonkludi li, għalkemm hemm diversi elementi pożittivi, mhumiex sodisfatti r-rekwiżiti kollha li joħorġu mir-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Wara li analizza l-qafas legali li joħroġ mir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 u l-aġġustamenti attwalment proposti, il-KEPD jikkonkludi li, għalkemm hemm diversi elementi pożittivi, mhumiex sodisfatti r-rekwiżiti kollha li joħorġu mir-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data.

| 8. | Qabel ma jispjega din il-fehma f'aktar dettall fil-parti III (regoli applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data) u l-parti IV (analiżi dettaljata tal-proposta), il-KEPD fil-parti li jmiss ser l-ewwel jiddeskrivi l-kuntest tal-proposta attwali, il-qafas legali eżistenti u l-aġġustamenti proposti. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Qabel ma jispjega din il-fehma f'aktar dettall fil-parti III (regoli applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data) u l-parti IV (analiżi dettaljata tal-proposta), il-KEPD fil-parti li jmiss ser l-ewwel jiddeskrivi l-kuntest tal-proposta attwali, il-qafas legali eżistenti u l-aġġustamenti proposti.

II.   KOOPERAZZJONI TAL-UE FIL-QASAM TAL-VAT

II.1.   Kuntest

| 9. | Il-proposta attwali tirriżulta minn diskussjoni fil-livell ta' UE li bdiet uffiċjalment f'Mejju 2006 b'Komunikazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni dwar il-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fiskali fis-suq intern (6). Imħeġġa mill-Kunsill u l-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kummissjoni ppubblikat Komunikazzjoni oħra f'Diċembru 2008, dwar strateġija koordinata biex tissaħħaħ il-ġlieda kontra l-frodi tal-VAT fl-UE (7). Il-Komunikazzjoni ħabbret diversi bidliet għad-Direttiva tal-VAT 2006/112/KE u ħabbret ukoll it-tfassil mill-ġdid attwali tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1987/2003 (8). |
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9.

Il-proposta attwali tirriżulta minn diskussjoni fil-livell ta' UE li bdiet uffiċjalment f'Mejju 2006 b'Komunikazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni dwar il-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fiskali fis-suq intern (6). Imħeġġa mill-Kunsill u l-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kummissjoni ppubblikat Komunikazzjoni oħra f'Diċembru 2008, dwar strateġija koordinata biex tissaħħaħ il-ġlieda kontra l-frodi tal-VAT fl-UE (7). Il-Komunikazzjoni ħabbret diversi bidliet għad-Direttiva tal-VAT 2006/112/KE u ħabbret ukoll it-tfassil mill-ġdid attwali tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1987/2003 (8).

| 10. | Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 s'issa kien ir-Regolament ta' referenza għall-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva dwar kwistjonijiet tal-VAT. Madankollu, skont studju reċenti mill-Kummissjoni li kien ippubblikat fit-18 ta' Awwissu 2009, l-istess jum bħall-proposta attwali, l-intensità tal-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva bejn l-Istati Membri biex ilaħħqu mal-evażjoni u l-frodi intra-Komunitarja tal-VAT kienet meqjusa bħala waħda mhux sodisfaċenti (9). L-għan prinċipali tal-proposta attwali hu għalhekk l-aġġustament tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 b'tali mod li l-effettività tal-miżuri kontra l-frodi transkonfinali tiżdied u li jinkiseb ġbir akbar ta' VAT f'sitwazzjonijiet transkonfinali. |
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10.

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 s'issa kien ir-Regolament ta' referenza għall-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva dwar kwistjonijiet tal-VAT. Madankollu, skont studju reċenti mill-Kummissjoni li kien ippubblikat fit-18 ta' Awwissu 2009, l-istess jum bħall-proposta attwali, l-intensità tal-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva bejn l-Istati Membri biex ilaħħqu mal-evażjoni u l-frodi intra-Komunitarja tal-VAT kienet meqjusa bħala waħda mhux sodisfaċenti (9). L-għan prinċipali tal-proposta attwali hu għalhekk l-aġġustament tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 b'tali mod li l-effettività tal-miżuri kontra l-frodi transkonfinali tiżdied u li jinkiseb ġbir akbar ta' VAT f'sitwazzjonijiet transkonfinali.

II.2.   Is-sistema attwali ta' kooperazzjoni: Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003

| 11. | Bir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 l-UE introduċiet sistema komuni ta' kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u skambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri biex dawn ikunu jistgħu jeffettwaw valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT. Ir-Regolament fih lista ta' awtoritajiet kompetenti u jobbliga lill-Istati Membri biex jagħżlu uffiċċju ċentrali wieħed ta' kollegament li jkun responsabbli mill-kuntatti mal-Istati Membri l-oħra fil-qasam tal-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva. |
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11.

Bir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 l-UE introduċiet sistema komuni ta' kooperazzjoni amministrattiva u skambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri biex dawn ikunu jistgħu jeffettwaw valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT. Ir-Regolament fih lista ta' awtoritajiet kompetenti u jobbliga lill-Istati Membri biex jagħżlu uffiċċju ċentrali wieħed ta' kollegament li jkun responsabbli mill-kuntatti mal-Istati Membri l-oħra fil-qasam tal-kooperazzjoni amministrattiva.

| 12. | L-iskambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jseħħ fi tliet sitwazzjonijiet: skambju ta' informazzjoni fuq talba, skambju ta' informazzjoni mingħajr talba minn qabel (skambju spontanju), u ħżin ta' data f'bażi ta' data elettronika li tinżamm minn kull Stat Membru, li parti minnha tista' tiġi aċċessata direttament mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti ta' Stati Membri oħrajn. |
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12.

L-iskambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jseħħ fi tliet sitwazzjonijiet: skambju ta' informazzjoni fuq talba, skambju ta' informazzjoni mingħajr talba minn qabel (skambju spontanju), u ħżin ta' data f'bażi ta' data elettronika li tinżamm minn kull Stat Membru, li parti minnha tista' tiġi aċċessata direttament mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti ta' Stati Membri oħrajn.

| 13. | Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 barra minn hekk jordna lill-Istati Membri biex jiżguraw li persuni involuti fil-forniment intra-Komunitarju ta' oġġetti u ta' servizzi jkunu jistgħu jiksbu konferma tal-validità tan-numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT ta' kwalunkwe persuna speċifikata. Is-sistema li tippermetti lil dawn il-persuni jagħmlu dan hi magħrufa bħala s-sistema ta' skambju ta' informazzjoni dwar il-VAT (il-“VIES”). |
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13.

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 barra minn hekk jordna lill-Istati Membri biex jiżguraw li persuni involuti fil-forniment intra-Komunitarju ta' oġġetti u ta' servizzi jkunu jistgħu jiksbu konferma tal-validità tan-numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT ta' kwalunkwe persuna speċifikata. Is-sistema li tippermetti lil dawn il-persuni jagħmlu dan hi magħrufa bħala s-sistema ta' skambju ta' informazzjoni dwar il-VAT (il-“VIES”).

| 14. | Inġenerali, ir-Regolament jippreskrivi li l-komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni għandha ssir b'mezzi elettroniċi. Il-Kummissjoni hija għaldaqstant responsabbli għall-iżvilupp ta' netwerk komuni ta’ komunikazzjoni jew interface komuni tas-sistema (is-“CCN/CSI”) sa fejn dan ikun meħtieġ biex ikun jista' jseħħ l-iskambju ta’ informazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri. L-Istati Membri huma responsabbli għall-iżvilupp tas-sistemi nazzjonali tagħhom sa fejn ikun meħtieġ sabiex tkun tista' tiġi skambjata informazzjoni bl-użu tas-CCN/CSI. Ir-Regolament fih aktar regoli dwar relazzjonijiet mal-Kummissjoni, kontrolli simultanji u l-iskambju ta' data li toriġina minn pajjiżi terzi. |
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14.

Inġenerali, ir-Regolament jippreskrivi li l-komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni għandha ssir b'mezzi elettroniċi. Il-Kummissjoni hija għaldaqstant responsabbli għall-iżvilupp ta' netwerk komuni ta’ komunikazzjoni jew interface komuni tas-sistema (is-“CCN/CSI”) sa fejn dan ikun meħtieġ biex ikun jista' jseħħ l-iskambju ta’ informazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri. L-Istati Membri huma responsabbli għall-iżvilupp tas-sistemi nazzjonali tagħhom sa fejn ikun meħtieġ sabiex tkun tista' tiġi skambjata informazzjoni bl-użu tas-CCN/CSI. Ir-Regolament fih aktar regoli dwar relazzjonijiet mal-Kummissjoni, kontrolli simultanji u l-iskambju ta' data li toriġina minn pajjiżi terzi.

| 15. | Mhux definit it-tip ta' informazzjoni li tista' tiġi skambjata bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti fuq talba jew b'mod spontanju. L-Artikolu 1 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 jirreferi biss għal “informazzjoni” li tista' tgħinhom biex jagħmlu valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT. Il-bażi ta' data elettronika fiha d-dikjarazzjonijiet rikapitulattivi tal-persuni taxxabbli identifikati għal finijiet ta' VAT li jinġabru f'konformità mad-Direttiva tal-VAT ġenerali. Dawn id-dikjarazzjonijiet fihom in-numri ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT tal-persuni differenti taxxabbli involuti u l-valur totali tal-fornimenti ta' oġġetti mwettqa mill-persuna taxxabbli. Il-VIES tippermetti biss il-konferma tal-validità ta' numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT. |
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15.

Mhux definit it-tip ta' informazzjoni li tista' tiġi skambjata bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti fuq talba jew b'mod spontanju. L-Artikolu 1 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 jirreferi biss għal “informazzjoni” li tista' tgħinhom biex jagħmlu valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT. Il-bażi ta' data elettronika fiha d-dikjarazzjonijiet rikapitulattivi tal-persuni taxxabbli identifikati għal finijiet ta' VAT li jinġabru f'konformità mad-Direttiva tal-VAT ġenerali. Dawn id-dikjarazzjonijiet fihom in-numri ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT tal-persuni differenti taxxabbli involuti u l-valur totali tal-fornimenti ta' oġġetti mwettqa mill-persuna taxxabbli. Il-VIES tippermetti biss il-konferma tal-validità ta' numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT.

II.3.   It-titjib previst f'termini ġenerali

| 16. | Bil-proposta attwali l-Kummissjoni tipprevedi li żżid l-effettività tal-kooperazzjoni attwali billi tirrendi l-awtoritajiet kompetenti konġuntament responsabbli għall-protezzjoni tad-dħul mill-VAT fl-Istati Membri kollha, billi tmexxi 'l quddiem l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti u billi ttejjeb il-kwalità u l-konsistenza ta' din l-informazzjoni (10). |
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16.

Bil-proposta attwali l-Kummissjoni tipprevedi li żżid l-effettività tal-kooperazzjoni attwali billi tirrendi l-awtoritajiet kompetenti konġuntament responsabbli għall-protezzjoni tad-dħul mill-VAT fl-Istati Membri kollha, billi tmexxi 'l quddiem l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti u billi ttejjeb il-kwalità u l-konsistenza ta' din l-informazzjoni (10).

| 17. | It-titjib fl-iskambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri jinkiseb billi jiġu definiti l-każijiet li fihom l-Awtoritajiet Kompetenti ma jistgħux jirrifjutaw li jwieġbu għal talba għal informazzjoni jew għal inkjesta amministrattiva u billi jiġu speċifikati l-każijiet li fihom l-informazzjoni għandha tiġi skambjata b'mod spontanju (11). Il-proposta tintroduċi wkoll skadenzi aktar stretti u tagħmel aktar enfasi fuq l-użu ta' mezzi elettroniċi. |
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17.

It-titjib fl-iskambju ta' informazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri jinkiseb billi jiġu definiti l-każijiet li fihom l-Awtoritajiet Kompetenti ma jistgħux jirrifjutaw li jwieġbu għal talba għal informazzjoni jew għal inkjesta amministrattiva u billi jiġu speċifikati l-każijiet li fihom l-informazzjoni għandha tiġi skambjata b'mod spontanju (11). Il-proposta tintroduċi wkoll skadenzi aktar stretti u tagħmel aktar enfasi fuq l-użu ta' mezzi elettroniċi.

| 18. | Il-konsistenza tal-informazzjoni disponibbli fil-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi titjieb billi jiġi definit liema tip ta' informazzjoni l-Istati Membri huma obbligati jdaħħlu fil-bażi ta' data nazzjonali tagħhom. Il-proposta, barra minn hekk iżżid l-aċċess dirett awtomatizzat għall-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti ta' Stati Membri oħrajn. L-informazzjoni disponibbli għal persuni taxxabbli oħrajn permezz tal-VIES hija ssupplimentata bl-isem u l-indirizz tal-persuna li hija reġistrata b'numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT. |
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18.

Il-konsistenza tal-informazzjoni disponibbli fil-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi titjieb billi jiġi definit liema tip ta' informazzjoni l-Istati Membri huma obbligati jdaħħlu fil-bażi ta' data nazzjonali tagħhom. Il-proposta, barra minn hekk iżżid l-aċċess dirett awtomatizzat għall-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti ta' Stati Membri oħrajn. L-informazzjoni disponibbli għal persuni taxxabbli oħrajn permezz tal-VIES hija ssupplimentata bl-isem u l-indirizz tal-persuna li hija reġistrata b'numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT.

| 19. | Barra minn hekk il-proposta tispeċifika l-każijiet li fihom l-Istati Membri jistgħu u għandhom iwettqu kontrolli multilaterali. Flimkien ma' dan hija toħloq bażi legali għall-istabbiliment ta' struttura operattiva komuni għall-kooperazzjoni multilaterali (Eurofisc). Din is-sistema tippermetti skambju rapidu ta' informazzjoni mmirata bejn l-Istati Membri kollha kif ukoll l-istabbiliment ta' analiżi komuni tar-riskju strateġiku. |
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19.

Barra minn hekk il-proposta tispeċifika l-każijiet li fihom l-Istati Membri jistgħu u għandhom iwettqu kontrolli multilaterali. Flimkien ma' dan hija toħloq bażi legali għall-istabbiliment ta' struttura operattiva komuni għall-kooperazzjoni multilaterali (Eurofisc). Din is-sistema tippermetti skambju rapidu ta' informazzjoni mmirata bejn l-Istati Membri kollha kif ukoll l-istabbiliment ta' analiżi komuni tar-riskju strateġiku.

| 20. | Il-proposta finalment tintroduċi obbligu ta' feedback li jippermetti lill-Istati Membri jivvalutaw l-effettività tal-iskambju ta' informazzjoni. |
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20.

Il-proposta finalment tintroduċi obbligu ta' feedback li jippermetti lill-Istati Membri jivvalutaw l-effettività tal-iskambju ta' informazzjoni.

| 21. | Ser jiġu elaborati aktar għadd ta' kwistjonijiet f'konformità ma' proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. Dawn huma pereżempju l-formoli standard li jintużaw meta l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jitolbu informazzjoni, il-mod li bih l-obbligu ta' feedback hu rranġat, il-kriterji li jintużaw biex ikun deċiż jekk għandhomx isiru bidliet fid-data maħżuna fil-bażi ta' data elettronika u għall-istabbiliment tal-Eurofisc. |
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21.

Ser jiġu elaborati aktar għadd ta' kwistjonijiet f'konformità ma' proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. Dawn huma pereżempju l-formoli standard li jintużaw meta l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jitolbu informazzjoni, il-mod li bih l-obbligu ta' feedback hu rranġat, il-kriterji li jintużaw biex ikun deċiż jekk għandhomx isiru bidliet fid-data maħżuna fil-bażi ta' data elettronika u għall-istabbiliment tal-Eurofisc.

III.   REGOLI APPLIKABBLI GĦALL-PROTEZZJONI TAD-DATA

| 22. | F'każijiet li tkun qed tiġi pproċessata data personali, għandha tiġi rispettata l-leġislazzjoni Komunitarja dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Fil-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data “data personali” tiġi definita b'mod ġenerali bħala “kull data li jkollha x'taqsam ma' persuna naturali identifikata jew identifikabbli” (12). Kif iddikjarat qabel, l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni fil-kuntest attwali huwa dirett prinċipalment lejn persuni ġuridiċi. Ser ikun fih ukoll, madankollu, informazzjoni rigward persuni fiżiċi. It-terminu “informazzjoni” li jinsab fl-Artikolu 1(1) tar-Regolament propost tal-Kunsill jidher li jinkludi wkoll aktar informazzjoni dwar persuni fiżiċi li jaħdmu għall-persuni ġuridiċi jew b'mod ieħor konnessi mal-persuni ġuridiċi (ara wkoll il-punt 31 hawn taħt). |
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22.

F'każijiet li tkun qed tiġi pproċessata data personali, għandha tiġi rispettata l-leġislazzjoni Komunitarja dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Fil-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data “data personali” tiġi definita b'mod ġenerali bħala “kull data li jkollha x'taqsam ma' persuna naturali identifikata jew identifikabbli” (12). Kif iddikjarat qabel, l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni fil-kuntest attwali huwa dirett prinċipalment lejn persuni ġuridiċi. Ser ikun fih ukoll, madankollu, informazzjoni rigward persuni fiżiċi. It-terminu “informazzjoni” li jinsab fl-Artikolu 1(1) tar-Regolament propost tal-Kunsill jidher li jinkludi wkoll aktar informazzjoni dwar persuni fiżiċi li jaħdmu għall-persuni ġuridiċi jew b'mod ieħor konnessi mal-persuni ġuridiċi (ara wkoll il-punt 31 hawn taħt).

| 23. | Għall-ipproċessar ta' data mill-Istati Membri, huma applikabbli r-regoli nazzjonali li jimplimentaw id-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Fir-Regolament attwali tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003, speċifikament fil-Premessa 17 u l-Artikolu 41, issir darbtejn referenza għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Il-KEPD jinnota li dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet jirreferu biss għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE fir-rigward tal-possibbiltà li jiġu ristretti ċerti drittijiet li huma garantiti mid-Direttiva. Il-Premessa u l-Artikolu jerġgħu jidhru fil-proposta tal-Kummissjoni (bħala Premessa 35 u Artikolu 57) iżda ser isirulhom xi bidliet, li ser jiġu diskussi f'aktar dettall fil-punt 49 u aktar 'l isfel. F'dan l-istadju huwa rilevanti li wieħed isemmi li l-Kummissjoni tipproponi li ddaħħal sentenza ġenerali fl-Artikolu 41 (l-Artikolu l-ġdid 57) li tgħid li “[k]ull ħżin jew skambju ta' informazzjoni msemmi f'dan ir-Regolament huwa soġġett għad-dispożizzjonijiet li jimplimentaw id-Direttiva 95/46/KE”. Il-KEPD jilqa' din iż-żieda u jħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex idaħħal tali dikjarazzjoni fil-Premessa wkoll. |
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23.

Għall-ipproċessar ta' data mill-Istati Membri, huma applikabbli r-regoli nazzjonali li jimplimentaw id-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Fir-Regolament attwali tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003, speċifikament fil-Premessa 17 u l-Artikolu 41, issir darbtejn referenza għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Il-KEPD jinnota li dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet jirreferu biss għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE fir-rigward tal-possibbiltà li jiġu ristretti ċerti drittijiet li huma garantiti mid-Direttiva. Il-Premessa u l-Artikolu jerġgħu jidhru fil-proposta tal-Kummissjoni (bħala Premessa 35 u Artikolu 57) iżda ser isirulhom xi bidliet, li ser jiġu diskussi f'aktar dettall fil-punt 49 u aktar 'l isfel. F'dan l-istadju huwa rilevanti li wieħed isemmi li l-Kummissjoni tipproponi li ddaħħal sentenza ġenerali fl-Artikolu 41 (l-Artikolu l-ġdid 57) li tgħid li “[k]ull ħżin jew skambju ta' informazzjoni msemmi f'dan ir-Regolament huwa soġġett għad-dispożizzjonijiet li jimplimentaw id-Direttiva 95/46/KE”. Il-KEPD jilqa' din iż-żieda u jħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex idaħħal tali dikjarazzjoni fil-Premessa wkoll.

| 24. | Għalkemm il-Kummissjoni mhix involuta direttament fl-iskambju ta' data bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti, l-Artikolu 51(2) juri li l-Kummissjoni ser tirċievi “kull informazzjoni disponibbli rilevanti għall-applikazzjoni li dawn jagħtu għal dan ir-Regolament”, “informazzjoni ta' statistika”, u “kull informazzjoni oħra” li tgħinhom biex jagħmlu issir valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT kif imsemmi fl-Artikolu 1 (13). Kif issemma qabel fil-punt 14, il-Kummissjoni hija wkoll responsabbli għal kwalunkwe żvilupp tan-netwerk ta’ komunikazzjonijiet komuni/għaqda ta’ sistemi komuni (CCN/CSI) li jkun meħtieġ' sabiex jippermetti l-iskambju ta’ din l-informazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri (Artikolu 55). Kif joħroġ ċar mill-Artikolu 57(2) din ir-responsabbiltà tista' taħt ċerti kondizzjonijiet tinvolvi l-aċċess għall-informazzjoni li kienet skambjata permezz tas-sistema. |
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24.

Għalkemm il-Kummissjoni mhix involuta direttament fl-iskambju ta' data bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti, l-Artikolu 51(2) juri li l-Kummissjoni ser tirċievi “kull informazzjoni disponibbli rilevanti għall-applikazzjoni li dawn jagħtu għal dan ir-Regolament”, “informazzjoni ta' statistika”, u “kull informazzjoni oħra” li tgħinhom biex jagħmlu issir valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT kif imsemmi fl-Artikolu 1 (13). Kif issemma qabel fil-punt 14, il-Kummissjoni hija wkoll responsabbli għal kwalunkwe żvilupp tan-netwerk ta’ komunikazzjonijiet komuni/għaqda ta’ sistemi komuni (CCN/CSI) li jkun meħtieġ' sabiex jippermetti l-iskambju ta’ din l-informazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri (Artikolu 55). Kif joħroġ ċar mill-Artikolu 57(2) din ir-responsabbiltà tista' taħt ċerti kondizzjonijiet tinvolvi l-aċċess għall-informazzjoni li kienet skambjata permezz tas-sistema.

| 25. | Isegwi minn dan ta' hawn fuq li l-Kummissjoni ser tkun qed tipproċessa data personali wkoll. Hija b'hekk marbuta bir-regoli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data applikabbli għall-istituzzjonijiet u l-korpi tal-UE li huma stabbiliti fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 u soġġetti għas-superviżjoni tal-KEPD. Għall- finijiet ta' ċarezza u sabiex ma jkun hemm l-ebda dubju dwar l-applikabbiltà tar-Regolament, il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex fil-Premessi jinkludi referenza għar-Regolament kif ukoll f'dispożizzjoni sostantiva. |
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25.

Isegwi minn dan ta' hawn fuq li l-Kummissjoni ser tkun qed tipproċessa data personali wkoll. Hija b'hekk marbuta bir-regoli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data applikabbli għall-istituzzjonijiet u l-korpi tal-UE li huma stabbiliti fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 u soġġetti għas-superviżjoni tal-KEPD. Għall- finijiet ta' ċarezza u sabiex ma jkun hemm l-ebda dubju dwar l-applikabbiltà tar-Regolament, il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex fil-Premessi jinkludi referenza għar-Regolament kif ukoll f'dispożizzjoni sostantiva.

| 26. | Jekk tiġi pproċessata data personali, l-Artikolu 16 u 17 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 21 u 22 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 jirrikjedu li jkunu żgurati l-kunfidenzjalità u s-sigurtà tal-ipproċessar tad-data. Mhuwiex iddikjarat f'tant kelmiet fl-Artikolu 55 li għadu kemm ġie ċċitat jekk il-Kummissjoni hijiex responsabbli għaż-żamma u s-sigurtà tas-CCN/CSI (14). Sabiex jiġu evitati d-dubji rigward ir-responsabbiltà dwar l-iżgurar ta' tali kunfidenzjalità u sigurtà, il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jiddefinixxi b'mod aktar ċar ir-responsabbiltà tal-Kummissjoni f'dan ir-rigward, biex jenfasizza l-obbligi tal-Istati Membri u biex dan kollu jitpoġġa fid-dawl tar-rekwiżiti li joħorġu mid-Direttiva 95/46/KE u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. |
| --- | --- |

26.

Jekk tiġi pproċessata data personali, l-Artikolu 16 u 17 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 21 u 22 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 jirrikjedu li jkunu żgurati l-kunfidenzjalità u s-sigurtà tal-ipproċessar tad-data. Mhuwiex iddikjarat f'tant kelmiet fl-Artikolu 55 li għadu kemm ġie ċċitat jekk il-Kummissjoni hijiex responsabbli għaż-żamma u s-sigurtà tas-CCN/CSI (14). Sabiex jiġu evitati d-dubji rigward ir-responsabbiltà dwar l-iżgurar ta' tali kunfidenzjalità u sigurtà, il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jiddefinixxi b'mod aktar ċar ir-responsabbiltà tal-Kummissjoni f'dan ir-rigward, biex jenfasizza l-obbligi tal-Istati Membri u biex dan kollu jitpoġġa fid-dawl tar-rekwiżiti li joħorġu mid-Direttiva 95/46/KE u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001.

| 27. | Iċ-ċarezza għal min ser ikun responsabbli għall-konformità mar-regoli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data (fit-terminoloġija dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data msemmi bħala il-“kontrollur” (15)), hija importanti wkoll fir-rigward tal-istabbiliment tal-Eurofisc. L-Artikolu 35 jispjega li l-Eurofisc ser ikun magħmul minn uffiċjali kompetenti maħtura mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri. Il-Kummissjoni ser tipprovdi lill-Eurofisc l-appoġġ tekniku, amministrattiv u operattiv. L-istruttura proposta tqajjem mistoqsiji rigward il-liġi applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data (Direttiva 95/46/KE jew ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001) u r-responsabbiltà għall-konformità ma' dawn ir-regoli. Il-Kummissjoni biħsiebha żżomm lill-Istati Membri responsabbli waħedhom jew flimkien mal-Kummissjoni, jew l-Eurofisc bħala tali, u forsi flimkien mal-Kummissjoni, ser tkun l-awtorità responsabbli? Il-KEPD jappella lil-leġislatur biex jiċċara dawn il-kwistjonijiet u biex jiżgura li r-responsabbiltajiet ikunu allokati b'mod ċar. |
| --- | --- |

27.

Iċ-ċarezza għal min ser ikun responsabbli għall-konformità mar-regoli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data (fit-terminoloġija dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data msemmi bħala il-“kontrollur” (15)), hija importanti wkoll fir-rigward tal-istabbiliment tal-Eurofisc. L-Artikolu 35 jispjega li l-Eurofisc ser ikun magħmul minn uffiċjali kompetenti maħtura mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri. Il-Kummissjoni ser tipprovdi lill-Eurofisc l-appoġġ tekniku, amministrattiv u operattiv. L-istruttura proposta tqajjem mistoqsiji rigward il-liġi applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data (Direttiva 95/46/KE jew ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001) u r-responsabbiltà għall-konformità ma' dawn ir-regoli. Il-Kummissjoni biħsiebha żżomm lill-Istati Membri responsabbli waħedhom jew flimkien mal-Kummissjoni, jew l-Eurofisc bħala tali, u forsi flimkien mal-Kummissjoni, ser tkun l-awtorità responsabbli? Il-KEPD jappella lil-leġislatur biex jiċċara dawn il-kwistjonijiet u biex jiżgura li r-responsabbiltajiet ikunu allokati b'mod ċar.

IV.   ANALIŻI DETTALJATA TAL-PROPOSTA

IV.1.   Data u speċifikazzjoni tal-iskop u l-iżgurar tal-ħtieġa għall-ipproċessar tad-data

| 28. | Il-KEPD jinnota li l-proposta ma tispeċifikax b'mod suffiċjenti t-tipi ta' data li tiġi skambjata u l-iskopijiet għaliex id-data tiġi skambjata. Barra minn hekk il-proposta ma tiżgurax b'mod suffiċjenti li data personali tiġi skambjata biss meta jkun meħtieġ. Dan kollu jidher mill-Artikolu 1(1) tar-Regolament propost tal-Kunsill. |
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28.

Il-KEPD jinnota li l-proposta ma tispeċifikax b'mod suffiċjenti t-tipi ta' data li tiġi skambjata u l-iskopijiet għaliex id-data tiġi skambjata. Barra minn hekk il-proposta ma tiżgurax b'mod suffiċjenti li data personali tiġi skambjata biss meta jkun meħtieġ. Dan kollu jidher mill-Artikolu 1(1) tar-Regolament propost tal-Kunsill.

| 29. | L-Artikolu 1(1) jinkludi l-iskop ġenerali tar-Regolament li hu l-iżgurar tal-konformità mal-liġijiet nazzjonali dwar il-VAT. Din trid tintlaħaq permezz ta' kooperazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri u l-iskambju ta' kwalunkwe informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri li tista' tgħin biex tiġi effettwata valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT, biex tiġi kkontrollata l-applikazzjoni korretta tal-VAT b’mod partikolari fi transazzjonijiet intra-Komunitarji u biex tiġi miġġielda l-frodi. |
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29.

L-Artikolu 1(1) jinkludi l-iskop ġenerali tar-Regolament li hu l-iżgurar tal-konformità mal-liġijiet nazzjonali dwar il-VAT. Din trid tintlaħaq permezz ta' kooperazzjoni bejn l-Istati Membri u l-iskambju ta' kwalunkwe informazzjoni bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri li tista' tgħin biex tiġi effettwata valutazzjoni korretta tal-VAT, biex tiġi kkontrollata l-applikazzjoni korretta tal-VAT b’mod partikolari fi transazzjonijiet intra-Komunitarji u biex tiġi miġġielda l-frodi.

| 30. | L-Artikolu 1(1) bħala tali ma jissodisfax ir-rekwiżiti li joħorġu mir-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data għaliex hu fformulat b'mod ġenerali wisq u jħalli ħafna lok għal diskrezzjoni. Dan joħloq ir-riskju ta' non-konformità sostanzjali mar-regoli applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data fil-prattika. |
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30.

L-Artikolu 1(1) bħala tali ma jissodisfax ir-rekwiżiti li joħorġu mir-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data għaliex hu fformulat b'mod ġenerali wisq u jħalli ħafna lok għal diskrezzjoni. Dan joħloq ir-riskju ta' non-konformità sostanzjali mar-regoli applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data fil-prattika.

| 31. | L-ewwel, il-kunċett ta' “kwalunkwe informazzjoni” huwa ġenerali wisq u jġib miegħu r-riskju ta' skambju sproporzjonat ta' informazzjoni. Kif intqal, jidher li dan jinkludi anki aktar informazzjoni dwar persuni fiżiċi li jaħdmu għall-persuni ġuridiċi jew b'mod ieħor konnessi mal-persuni ġuridiċi. F'dan ir-rigward, il-KEPD jixtieq jirreferi għad-dispożizzjonijiet li jittrattaw kategoriji speċjali ta' data u li fihom regoli speċifiċi u aktar stretti għall-ipproċessar ta' data relatata ma' reati, kundanni kriminali, sanzjonijiet amministrattivi jew sentenzi f'kawżi ċivili (16). |
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31.

L-ewwel, il-kunċett ta' “kwalunkwe informazzjoni” huwa ġenerali wisq u jġib miegħu r-riskju ta' skambju sproporzjonat ta' informazzjoni. Kif intqal, jidher li dan jinkludi anki aktar informazzjoni dwar persuni fiżiċi li jaħdmu għall-persuni ġuridiċi jew b'mod ieħor konnessi mal-persuni ġuridiċi. F'dan ir-rigward, il-KEPD jixtieq jirreferi għad-dispożizzjonijiet li jittrattaw kategoriji speċjali ta' data u li fihom regoli speċifiċi u aktar stretti għall-ipproċessar ta' data relatata ma' reati, kundanni kriminali, sanzjonijiet amministrattivi jew sentenzi f'kawżi ċivili (16).

| 32. | It-tieni, l-iskopijiet li għalihom l-informazzjoni tista' tiġi skambjata huma ġenerali ħafna, liema fatt imur kontra r-rekwiżit li l-fini għandha tkun speċifikata u tkun espliċita (17). |
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32.

It-tieni, l-iskopijiet li għalihom l-informazzjoni tista' tiġi skambjata huma ġenerali ħafna, liema fatt imur kontra r-rekwiżit li l-fini għandha tkun speċifikata u tkun espliċita (17).

| 33. | It-tielet, skont l-Artikolu 1(1), l-informazzjoni tista' tiġi skambjata meta din “tista” tgħin' lill-awtorità kompetenti fi Stat Membru ieħor. Jekk tkun involuta data personali, dan ikun f'konflitt mar-rekwiżit li d-data tiġi pproċessata biss safejn hu meħtieġ biex jinkiseb l-iskop stabbilit (18). Mingħajr tagħrif preċiż dwar liema tip ta' informazzjoni personali hu involut u mingħajr speċifikazzjoni ulterjuri tal-iskopijiet, huwa f'kwalunkwe każ impossibbli biex tiġi vvalutata l-ħtieġa tal-iskambju. |
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33.

It-tielet, skont l-Artikolu 1(1), l-informazzjoni tista' tiġi skambjata meta din “tista” tgħin' lill-awtorità kompetenti fi Stat Membru ieħor. Jekk tkun involuta data personali, dan ikun f'konflitt mar-rekwiżit li d-data tiġi pproċessata biss safejn hu meħtieġ biex jinkiseb l-iskop stabbilit (18). Mingħajr tagħrif preċiż dwar liema tip ta' informazzjoni personali hu involut u mingħajr speċifikazzjoni ulterjuri tal-iskopijiet, huwa f'kwalunkwe każ impossibbli biex tiġi vvalutata l-ħtieġa tal-iskambju.

| 34. | Hi għalhekk meħtieġa xi speċifikazzjoni ulterjuri rigward l-għan u t-tip ta' informazzjoni li tista' jew ser tiġi skambjata – mill-inqas fil-linji jew il-kategoriji prinċipali – sabiex l-iskambju jikkonforma mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. B'dan jiġi żgurat ukoll li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jkun rispettat. |
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34.

Hi għalhekk meħtieġa xi speċifikazzjoni ulterjuri rigward l-għan u t-tip ta' informazzjoni li tista' jew ser tiġi skambjata – mill-inqas fil-linji jew il-kategoriji prinċipali – sabiex l-iskambju jikkonforma mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. B'dan jiġi żgurat ukoll li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jkun rispettat.

| 35. | Meta jikkunsidra r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 fl-intier tiegħu u l-emendi għalih, il-KEPD jinnota li ma sarx provvediment għal speċifikazzjonijiet ulterjuri jew l-aktar l-aktar sar wieħed parzjali. Il-KEPD ser jelabora aktar dwar dan hawn taħt. Ser issir b'hekk distinzjoni bejn l-operazzjonijiet differenti ta' pproċessar li jsiru: skambju ta' informazzjoni fuq talba, skambju ta' informazzjoni b'mod spontanju, disponibbiltà tal-informazzjoni permezz tal-bażi ta' data elettronika għall-awtoritajiet kompetenti, informazzjoni disponibbli għal persuni oħra reġistrati għall-VAT (il-VIES) u l-ipproċessar tad-data mill-Eurofisc. |
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35.

Meta jikkunsidra r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003 fl-intier tiegħu u l-emendi għalih, il-KEPD jinnota li ma sarx provvediment għal speċifikazzjonijiet ulterjuri jew l-aktar l-aktar sar wieħed parzjali. Il-KEPD ser jelabora aktar dwar dan hawn taħt. Ser issir b'hekk distinzjoni bejn l-operazzjonijiet differenti ta' pproċessar li jsiru: skambju ta' informazzjoni fuq talba, skambju ta' informazzjoni b'mod spontanju, disponibbiltà tal-informazzjoni permezz tal-bażi ta' data elettronika għall-awtoritajiet kompetenti, informazzjoni disponibbli għal persuni oħra reġistrati għall-VAT (il-VIES) u l-ipproċessar tad-data mill-Eurofisc.

Informazzjoni fuq talba

| 36. | Fir-rigward tal-informazzjoni fuq talba, ma jsiru ebda speċifikazzjonijiet ulterjuri rigward it-tip ta' informazzjoni skambjata jew l-iskopijiet li għalihom iseħħ l-iskambju. L-Artikolu 7 jirreferi għall-“informazzjoni msemmija fl-Artikolu 1” u jiddikjara li din tinkludi “kull informazzjoni relatata ma' każ jew każijiet speċifiċi”. Talba għal informazzjoni tista' twassal għat-twettiq ta' inkjesta amministrattiva. Fl-Artikolu 9 ssir referenza wkoll għat-trasferiment ta' “kull informazzjoni rilevanti”. Mhux iċċarat liema tip ta' informazzjoni dan jista' jinkludi. L-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi pproċessata d-data mhumiex speċifikati ulterjorment u r-rekwiżit tal-ħtieġa ma jissemmiex. |
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36.

Fir-rigward tal-informazzjoni fuq talba, ma jsiru ebda speċifikazzjonijiet ulterjuri rigward it-tip ta' informazzjoni skambjata jew l-iskopijiet li għalihom iseħħ l-iskambju. L-Artikolu 7 jirreferi għall-“informazzjoni msemmija fl-Artikolu 1” u jiddikjara li din tinkludi “kull informazzjoni relatata ma' każ jew każijiet speċifiċi”. Talba għal informazzjoni tista' twassal għat-twettiq ta' inkjesta amministrattiva. Fl-Artikolu 9 ssir referenza wkoll għat-trasferiment ta' “kull informazzjoni rilevanti”. Mhux iċċarat liema tip ta' informazzjoni dan jista' jinkludi. L-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi pproċessata d-data mhumiex speċifikati ulterjorment u r-rekwiżit tal-ħtieġa ma jissemmiex.

| 37. | Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jispeċifika t-tip ta' informazzjoni personali li tista' tiġi skambjata, biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi skambjata data personali u jivvaluta l-ħtieġa tat-trasferiment, jew tal-inqas jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat. |
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37.

Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jispeċifika t-tip ta' informazzjoni personali li tista' tiġi skambjata, biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi skambjata data personali u jivvaluta l-ħtieġa tat-trasferiment, jew tal-inqas jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat.

Skambju spontanju ta' informazzjoni

| 38. | Għall-iskambju spontanju ta' informazzjoni huwa definit f'liema każijiet l-Istat Membru għandu jgħaddi informazzjoni lil awtorità kompetenti oħra. Fir-rigward ta' liema tip ta' informazzjoni li għandha tiġi skambjata jerġa' jsir riferiment għall-Artikolu 1(1). L-Artikolu 14(1) isemmi l-każijiet li ġejjin:






  (1) | fejn it-tassazzjoni hi meqjusa li sseħħ fl-Istat Membru tad-destinazzjoni u l-informazzjoni pprovduta mill-Istat Membru tal-oriġini hija meħtieġa għall- effettività tas-sistema ta' kontroll tal-Istat Membru tad-destinazzjoni; |
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38.

Għall-iskambju spontanju ta' informazzjoni huwa definit f'liema każijiet l-Istat Membru għandu jgħaddi informazzjoni lil awtorità kompetenti oħra. Fir-rigward ta' liema tip ta' informazzjoni li għandha tiġi skambjata jerġa' jsir riferiment għall-Artikolu 1(1). L-Artikolu 14(1) isemmi l-każijiet li ġejjin:

(1)

fejn it-tassazzjoni hi meqjusa li sseħħ fl-Istat Membru tad-destinazzjoni u l-informazzjoni pprovduta mill-Istat Membru tal-oriġini hija meħtieġa għall- effettività tas-sistema ta' kontroll tal-Istat Membru tad-destinazzjoni;

| (2) | fejn Stat Membru għandu raġuni biex jemmen li fl-Istat Membru l-ieħor sar jew jista' jkun li sar ksur tal-leġislazzjoni tal-VAT; |
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(2)

fejn Stat Membru għandu raġuni biex jemmen li fl-Istat Membru l-ieħor sar jew jista' jkun li sar ksur tal-leġislazzjoni tal-VAT;

| (3) | fejn hemm riskju ta' telf ta' dħul mit-taxxa fl-Istat Membru l-ieħor. |
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(3)

fejn hemm riskju ta' telf ta' dħul mit-taxxa fl-Istat Membru l-ieħor.

Għalkemm it-tieni u t-tielet sitwazzjoni speċjalment għadhom ġenerali, dawn it-tliet każijiet jistgħu jitqiesu fil-prinċipju bħala speċifikazzjonijiet ulterjuri tal-iskopijiet li għalihom tiġi skambjata d-data. L-ewwel sitwazzjoni b'hekk anki tinkorpora l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa. Madankollu, l-iskambju spontanju ta' informazzjoni mhuwiex ristrett għal dawn it-tliet sitwazzjonijiet. L-Artikolu 15 jiddikjara li kwalunkwe informazzjoni msemmija fl-Artikolu 1 li tagħha huma konxji l-awtoritajiet kompetenti u li “tista' tkun utli” għall-awtorità kompetenti ta' Stat Membru ieħor għandha wkoll tintbagħat b'mod spontanju.

| 39. | Il-bidliet proposti fil-fatt jiġġeneralizzaw aktar id-dispożizzjonijiet attwalment fis-seħħ. L-Artikolu 18 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 jiddikjara li l-kategoriji eżatti ta' informazzjoni li tiġi skambjata b'mod spontanju jridu jiġu definiti f'konformità mal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. Il-Kummissjoni issa tipproponi li tħassar din id-dispożizzjoni. |
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39.

Il-bidliet proposti fil-fatt jiġġeneralizzaw aktar id-dispożizzjonijiet attwalment fis-seħħ. L-Artikolu 18 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 jiddikjara li l-kategoriji eżatti ta' informazzjoni li tiġi skambjata b'mod spontanju jridu jiġu definiti f'konformità mal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. Il-Kummissjoni issa tipproponi li tħassar din id-dispożizzjoni.

| 40. | Il-KEPD jerġa' jħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jispeċifika t-tip ta' informazzjoni personali li tista' tiġi skambjata, biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi skambjata data personali u jivvaluta l-ħtieġa tat-trasferiment, jew tal-inqas jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat. |
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40.

Il-KEPD jerġa' jħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jispeċifika t-tip ta' informazzjoni personali li tista' tiġi skambjata, biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi skambjata data personali u jivvaluta l-ħtieġa tat-trasferiment, jew tal-inqas jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat.

Disponibbiltà ta' data permezz tal-bażi ta' data elettronika

| 41. | Fir-rigward tal-informazzjoni disponibbli lill-awtoritajiet kompetenti permezz tal-bażi ta' data elettronika, il-proposta hi aktar speċifika fir-rigward tat-tip ta' informazzjoni li tinsab fil-bażi ta' data. L-Artikolu 18 jipprevedi lista ta' informazzjoni li għandha tinħażen u pproċessata fil-bażi ta' data elettronika. Din tikkonċerna informazzjoni miġbura skont id-Direttiva ġenerali tal-VAT 2006/112/KE li hi informazzjoni miġbura permezz tad-dikjarazzjonijiet rikapitulattivi u l-informazzjoni miġbura mill-awtoritajiet nazzjonali għar-reġistrazzjoni ta' persuni taxxabbli mhux stabbiliti li jissuplixxu servizzi elettroniċi lil persuni mhux taxxabbli oħrajn. Informazzjoni oħra fil-bażi ta' data hi l-identità, l-attività jew il-forma legali ta' persuni li jkun inħarġilhom numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT u r-rekord tal-iskambji ta' informazzjoni fuq talba jew b'mod spontanju rigward dawn il-persuni. Il-lista u d-dettalji tad-data li ma tinġabarx skont id-Direttiva tal-VAT għandhom jiġu adottati f'konformità mal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. |
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41.

Fir-rigward tal-informazzjoni disponibbli lill-awtoritajiet kompetenti permezz tal-bażi ta' data elettronika, il-proposta hi aktar speċifika fir-rigward tat-tip ta' informazzjoni li tinsab fil-bażi ta' data. L-Artikolu 18 jipprevedi lista ta' informazzjoni li għandha tinħażen u pproċessata fil-bażi ta' data elettronika. Din tikkonċerna informazzjoni miġbura skont id-Direttiva ġenerali tal-VAT 2006/112/KE li hi informazzjoni miġbura permezz tad-dikjarazzjonijiet rikapitulattivi u l-informazzjoni miġbura mill-awtoritajiet nazzjonali għar-reġistrazzjoni ta' persuni taxxabbli mhux stabbiliti li jissuplixxu servizzi elettroniċi lil persuni mhux taxxabbli oħrajn. Informazzjoni oħra fil-bażi ta' data hi l-identità, l-attività jew il-forma legali ta' persuni li jkun inħarġilhom numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT u r-rekord tal-iskambji ta' informazzjoni fuq talba jew b'mod spontanju rigward dawn il-persuni. Il-lista u d-dettalji tad-data li ma tinġabarx skont id-Direttiva tal-VAT għandhom jiġu adottati f'konformità mal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija.

| 42. | Mill-1 ta' Jannar 2015, ser tiddaħħal ukoll fil-bażi ta' data l-informazzjoni dwar persuni li jissuplixxu servizzi, fost dawn data dwar il-fatturat ta' dawn il-persuni u informazzjoni dwar il-konformità ta' dawn il-persuni mal-obbligi tagħhom tat-taxxa, pereżempju preżentazzjoni tard tad-dikjarazzjoni u l-eżistenza ta’ djun fiskali (ara l-Artikolu 18(3)). |
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42.

Mill-1 ta' Jannar 2015, ser tiddaħħal ukoll fil-bażi ta' data l-informazzjoni dwar persuni li jissuplixxu servizzi, fost dawn data dwar il-fatturat ta' dawn il-persuni u informazzjoni dwar il-konformità ta' dawn il-persuni mal-obbligi tagħhom tat-taxxa, pereżempju preżentazzjoni tard tad-dikjarazzjoni u l-eżistenza ta’ djun fiskali (ara l-Artikolu 18(3)).

| 43. | L-Artikolu 22 jobbliga lill-Istati Membri biex jagħtu lill-awtoritajiet kompetenti minn Stati Membri oħrajn aċċess awtomatizzat għall-informazzjoni li tinsab fil-bażi ta' data elettronika. L-iskopijiet li għalihom l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jkunu jistgħu jikkonsultaw il-bażi ta' data mhumiex speċifikati aktar. Din hija bidla għat-test attwali tar-Regolament fejn hu stabbilit li l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jista' jkollhom aċċess dirett għal parti limitata tal-informazzjoni u “biss għall-prevenzjoni ta’ ksur tal-leġislazzjoni tal-VAT” u “meta tikkonsidraha neċessarja għall-kontroll tal-akkwist intra-Komunitarju ta' oġġetti jew il-provvista intra-Komunitarja ta' servizzi” (ara l-Artikolu 24 attwali). |
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43.

L-Artikolu 22 jobbliga lill-Istati Membri biex jagħtu lill-awtoritajiet kompetenti minn Stati Membri oħrajn aċċess awtomatizzat għall-informazzjoni li tinsab fil-bażi ta' data elettronika. L-iskopijiet li għalihom l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jkunu jistgħu jikkonsultaw il-bażi ta' data mhumiex speċifikati aktar. Din hija bidla għat-test attwali tar-Regolament fejn hu stabbilit li l-awtoritajiet kompetenti jista' jkollhom aċċess dirett għal parti limitata tal-informazzjoni u “biss għall-prevenzjoni ta’ ksur tal-leġislazzjoni tal-VAT” u “meta tikkonsidraha neċessarja għall-kontroll tal-akkwist intra-Komunitarju ta' oġġetti jew il-provvista intra-Komunitarja ta' servizzi” (ara l-Artikolu 24 attwali).

| 44. | Bit-twessigħ tal-possibbiltà ta' aċċess għall-bażi ta' data mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti, il-proposta żżid ir-riskji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Madankollu, jekk in-numru ta' oqsma ta' data personali maħżuna fil-bażi ta' data elettronika hu limitat kemm possibbli, din m'għandhiex għalfejn toħloq problema mill-perspettiva tal-protezzjoni tad-data. F'dak ir-rigward, il-KEPD jilqa' l-ispeċifikazzjoni tad-data li hemm fil-bażijiet ta' data. Il-proposta, madankollu, tgħid biss liema informazzjoni huma obbligati jaħżnu fil-bażi ta' data l-Istati Membri u ma tgħid xejn dwar jekk kwalunkwe informazzjoni oħra tistax ukoll tiddaħħal fil-bażi ta' data u jekk din l-informazzjoni tistax tiġi aċċessata minn awtoritajiet kompetenti oħrajn ukoll. Il-KEPD għalhekk jirrakkomanda lil-leġislatur biex jiddikjara espliċitament li, sa fejn għandha x'taqsam id-data personali, ebda data oħra m'għandha tiddaħħal fil-bażi ta' data, jew biex tal-inqas jiżgura li l-aċċess awtomatizzat hu ristrett għall-kategoriji msemmija ta' data. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ ukoll lil-leġislatur biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom il-bażijiet ta' data jistgħu jiġu aċċessati direttament u jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat. |
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44.

Bit-twessigħ tal-possibbiltà ta' aċċess għall-bażi ta' data mill-awtoritajiet kompetenti, il-proposta żżid ir-riskji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Madankollu, jekk in-numru ta' oqsma ta' data personali maħżuna fil-bażi ta' data elettronika hu limitat kemm possibbli, din m'għandhiex għalfejn toħloq problema mill-perspettiva tal-protezzjoni tad-data. F'dak ir-rigward, il-KEPD jilqa' l-ispeċifikazzjoni tad-data li hemm fil-bażijiet ta' data. Il-proposta, madankollu, tgħid biss liema informazzjoni huma obbligati jaħżnu fil-bażi ta' data l-Istati Membri u ma tgħid xejn dwar jekk kwalunkwe informazzjoni oħra tistax ukoll tiddaħħal fil-bażi ta' data u jekk din l-informazzjoni tistax tiġi aċċessata minn awtoritajiet kompetenti oħrajn ukoll. Il-KEPD għalhekk jirrakkomanda lil-leġislatur biex jiddikjara espliċitament li, sa fejn għandha x'taqsam id-data personali, ebda data oħra m'għandha tiddaħħal fil-bażi ta' data, jew biex tal-inqas jiżgura li l-aċċess awtomatizzat hu ristrett għall-kategoriji msemmija ta' data. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ ukoll lil-leġislatur biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom il-bażijiet ta' data jistgħu jiġu aċċessati direttament u jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat.

| 45. | Il-parti dwar l-iskambju ta' data permezz tal-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi fiha wkoll regoli li jirrigwardaw il-kwalità tad-data. L-Artikolu 20 jiddikjara li l-Istati Membri għandhom jiżguraw li l-bażijiet ta' data tagħhom jinżammu aġġornati u huma kompleti u eżatti. L-Artikolu 23 jipprevedi kontrolli regolari fuq l-informazzjoni sabiex tkun garantita l-kwalità u l-affidabbiltà tal-informazzjoni li jkun hemm fil-bażi ta' data. Dawn ir-rekwiżiti huma kompletament konformi mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-kwalità tad-data tal-Artikolu 6(1)(d) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(d) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Barra minn hekk, l-Artikolu 20 iħabbar li, permezz tal-użu tal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija, għandhom jiġu definiti l-kriterji biex jiġi determinat tibdil li mhux adattat, essenzjali jew bżonnjuż u li jista’ għaldaqstant ma jsirx. Il-KEPD jenfasizza li dawn il-kriterji għandhom ikunu konformi mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data (ara wkoll il-punti 57-59 hawn taħt). |
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45.

Il-parti dwar l-iskambju ta' data permezz tal-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi fiha wkoll regoli li jirrigwardaw il-kwalità tad-data. L-Artikolu 20 jiddikjara li l-Istati Membri għandhom jiżguraw li l-bażijiet ta' data tagħhom jinżammu aġġornati u huma kompleti u eżatti. L-Artikolu 23 jipprevedi kontrolli regolari fuq l-informazzjoni sabiex tkun garantita l-kwalità u l-affidabbiltà tal-informazzjoni li jkun hemm fil-bażi ta' data. Dawn ir-rekwiżiti huma kompletament konformi mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-kwalità tad-data tal-Artikolu 6(1)(d) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(d) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Barra minn hekk, l-Artikolu 20 iħabbar li, permezz tal-użu tal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija, għandhom jiġu definiti l-kriterji biex jiġi determinat tibdil li mhux adattat, essenzjali jew bżonnjuż u li jista’ għaldaqstant ma jsirx. Il-KEPD jenfasizza li dawn il-kriterji għandhom ikunu konformi mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data (ara wkoll il-punti 57-59 hawn taħt).

| 46. | L-Artikolu 19 jiddikjara li l-informazzjoni fil-bażi ta' data elettronika għandha tkun maħżuna għal mill-inqas ħames snin mit-tmiem tal-ewwel sena kalendarja li fiha ngħata l-aċċess għall-informazzjoni. Ma tingħatax ġustifikazzjoni għal tali perijodu ta' ħżin. Jekk tkun involuta data personali, il-provvediment ta' perijodu minimu mingħajr ebda referenza għall-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jmur kontra r-rekwiżit tal-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data li d-data m'għandhiex tkun maħżuna għal aktar milli meħtieġ. Il-KEPD għalhekk iħeġġeġ li terġa' tiġi vvalutata din id-dispożizzjoni fid-dawl tal-obbligu li joħroġ mill-Artikolu 6(1)(e) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(e) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 u jiġi determinat perijodu massimu ta' ħżin f'każ li tkun ikkonċernata data personali, bil-possibbiltà ta' eċċezzjonijiet f'ċirkostanzi eċċezzjonali biss. |
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46.

L-Artikolu 19 jiddikjara li l-informazzjoni fil-bażi ta' data elettronika għandha tkun maħżuna għal mill-inqas ħames snin mit-tmiem tal-ewwel sena kalendarja li fiha ngħata l-aċċess għall-informazzjoni. Ma tingħatax ġustifikazzjoni għal tali perijodu ta' ħżin. Jekk tkun involuta data personali, il-provvediment ta' perijodu minimu mingħajr ebda referenza għall-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jmur kontra r-rekwiżit tal-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data li d-data m'għandhiex tkun maħżuna għal aktar milli meħtieġ. Il-KEPD għalhekk iħeġġeġ li terġa' tiġi vvalutata din id-dispożizzjoni fid-dawl tal-obbligu li joħroġ mill-Artikolu 6(1)(e) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(e) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001 u jiġi determinat perijodu massimu ta' ħżin f'każ li tkun ikkonċernata data personali, bil-possibbiltà ta' eċċezzjonijiet f'ċirkostanzi eċċezzjonali biss.

Informazzjoni disponibbli permezz tal-VIES

| 47. | Il-Kapitolu IX tal-proposta jittratta l-informazzjoni disponibbli għal persuni taxxabbli. Kif spjegat fil-punt 13 hawn fuq, il-VIES attwalment tippermetti lill-persuni taxxabbli jiksbu konferma tal-validità tan-numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT li taħtu persuna tkun effettwat jew irċeviet provvista intra-Komunitarja ta' oġġetti jew servizzi. Il-Kummissjoni tipproponi ż-żieda ta' frażi li tiddikjara li tali konferma tintalab għall-fini ta' tali transazzjonijiet u barra minn hekk biex tipprovdi wkoll lill-applikant l-isem u l-indirizz assoċjati man-numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT. Il-KEPD hu tal-fehma li dawn ir-regoli huma f'konformità mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. |
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47.

Il-Kapitolu IX tal-proposta jittratta l-informazzjoni disponibbli għal persuni taxxabbli. Kif spjegat fil-punt 13 hawn fuq, il-VIES attwalment tippermetti lill-persuni taxxabbli jiksbu konferma tal-validità tan-numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT li taħtu persuna tkun effettwat jew irċeviet provvista intra-Komunitarja ta' oġġetti jew servizzi. Il-Kummissjoni tipproponi ż-żieda ta' frażi li tiddikjara li tali konferma tintalab għall-fini ta' tali transazzjonijiet u barra minn hekk biex tipprovdi wkoll lill-applikant l-isem u l-indirizz assoċjati man-numru ta' identifikazzjoni tal-VAT. Il-KEPD hu tal-fehma li dawn ir-regoli huma f'konformità mar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data.

Eurofisc

| 48. | Il-proposta tal-Kummissjoni toħloq bażi legali għall-istabbiliment ta' struttura operattiva komuni għall-kooperazzjoni multilaterali (Eurofisc). L-idea wara l-istruttura hi li jkun jista' jsir skambju rapidu ta' informazzjoni mmirata bejn l-Istati Membri kollha. L-istruttura hi maħsuba biex tkun tista' ssir analiżi tar-riskju u analiżi strateġika li abbażi tagħha hu promoss l-iskambju multilaterali ta' informazzjoni. Fl-Artikolu 36(2) hu ddikjarat li l-arranġamenti għall-iskambju ta' informazzjoni speċifika għall-istruttura għandhom jiġu determinati f'konformità mal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. FIl-kapitolu li fuqu għandha tkun stabbilita l-istruttura, ma ssir referenza għal ebda rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Il-KEPD jixtieq jenfasizza li - apparti mil-liġi applikabbli kif diskuss fil-parti III hawn fuq - it-tip ta' informazzjoni personali użata għandu jiġi speċifikat, l-iskopijiet li għalihom id-data personali ser tiġi investigata u skambjata għandhom jiġu ċirkoskritti, u għandha tingħata assigurazzjoni li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat. |
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48.

Il-proposta tal-Kummissjoni toħloq bażi legali għall-istabbiliment ta' struttura operattiva komuni għall-kooperazzjoni multilaterali (Eurofisc). L-idea wara l-istruttura hi li jkun jista' jsir skambju rapidu ta' informazzjoni mmirata bejn l-Istati Membri kollha. L-istruttura hi maħsuba biex tkun tista' ssir analiżi tar-riskju u analiżi strateġika li abbażi tagħha hu promoss l-iskambju multilaterali ta' informazzjoni. Fl-Artikolu 36(2) hu ddikjarat li l-arranġamenti għall-iskambju ta' informazzjoni speċifika għall-istruttura għandhom jiġu determinati f'konformità mal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija. FIl-kapitolu li fuqu għandha tkun stabbilita l-istruttura, ma ssir referenza għal ebda rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Il-KEPD jixtieq jenfasizza li - apparti mil-liġi applikabbli kif diskuss fil-parti III hawn fuq - it-tip ta' informazzjoni personali użata għandu jiġi speċifikat, l-iskopijiet li għalihom id-data personali ser tiġi investigata u skambjata għandhom jiġu ċirkoskritti, u għandha tingħata assigurazzjoni li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat.

IV.2.   Elementi oħrajn b'relevanza għall-protezzjoni tad-data

Artikolu 57: il-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop

| 49. | Il-Kapitolu XV tal-proposta jittratta l-kondizzjonijiet li jirregolaw l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni. Il-kapitolu fih dispożizzjonijiet li jindirizzaw il-prattikalitajiet rigward l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni. Artikolu wieħed hu ta' interess partikolari fir-rigward tal-protezzjoni tad-data, dan hu l-Artikolu 57. Dan jiddikjara li persuni li jittrattaw informazzjoni skambjata skont dan ir-Regolament ikunu marbuta bl-obbligu tas-sigriet uffiċjali. Għalkemm fil-ħames paragrafu jsir riferiment għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE (ara hawn taħt), l-obbligu tas-sigriet ma jitpoġġiex fil-kuntest tar-regoli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Il-KEPD jirrakkomanda lil-leġislatur biex iżid referenza fl-ewwel paragrafu għal-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data wkoll. |
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49.

Il-Kapitolu XV tal-proposta jittratta l-kondizzjonijiet li jirregolaw l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni. Il-kapitolu fih dispożizzjonijiet li jindirizzaw il-prattikalitajiet rigward l-iskambju ta' informazzjoni. Artikolu wieħed hu ta' interess partikolari fir-rigward tal-protezzjoni tad-data, dan hu l-Artikolu 57. Dan jiddikjara li persuni li jittrattaw informazzjoni skambjata skont dan ir-Regolament ikunu marbuta bl-obbligu tas-sigriet uffiċjali. Għalkemm fil-ħames paragrafu jsir riferiment għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE (ara hawn taħt), l-obbligu tas-sigriet ma jitpoġġiex fil-kuntest tar-regoli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. Il-KEPD jirrakkomanda lil-leġislatur biex iżid referenza fl-ewwel paragrafu għal-leġislazzjoni dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data wkoll.

| 50. | Il-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 57 jidher li jintroduċi l-użu ta' data għal skopijiet oħra barra dawk imsemmija preċedentement fir-Regolament. Il-paragrafu 3 jippermetti b'mod espliċitu l-użu ta' informazzjoni għal “skopijiet oħra” jekk, skont il-leġislazzjoni tal-Istat Membru tal-awtorità rikjesta, l-informazzjoni tista' tintuża għal skopijiet simili. F'dan ir-rigward, il-KEPD jindika l-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop li hu stabbilit fl-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Il-KEPD jissottolinja li jekk hi involuta data personali, din id-data fil-prinċipju ma tistax tintuża għal skopijiet oħrajn ħlief għal dak li tkun inġabret, sakemm ma jiġux sodisfatti kondizzjonijiet stretti skont l-Artikolu 13(1) tad-Direttiva jew l-Artikolu 20(1) tar-Regolament (ara l-punti 51-53 hawn taħt). Il-KEPD għalhekk jitlob lil-leġislatur biex jivvaluta mill-ġdid din id-dispożizzjoni fid-dawl tal-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop kif stabbilit fl-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. |
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50.

Il-paragrafu 1 tal-Artikolu 57 jidher li jintroduċi l-użu ta' data għal skopijiet oħra barra dawk imsemmija preċedentement fir-Regolament. Il-paragrafu 3 jippermetti b'mod espliċitu l-użu ta' informazzjoni għal “skopijiet oħra” jekk, skont il-leġislazzjoni tal-Istat Membru tal-awtorità rikjesta, l-informazzjoni tista' tintuża għal skopijiet simili. F'dan ir-rigward, il-KEPD jindika l-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop li hu stabbilit fl-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Il-KEPD jissottolinja li jekk hi involuta data personali, din id-data fil-prinċipju ma tistax tintuża għal skopijiet oħrajn ħlief għal dak li tkun inġabret, sakemm ma jiġux sodisfatti kondizzjonijiet stretti skont l-Artikolu 13(1) tad-Direttiva jew l-Artikolu 20(1) tar-Regolament (ara l-punti 51-53 hawn taħt). Il-KEPD għalhekk jitlob lil-leġislatur biex jivvaluta mill-ġdid din id-dispożizzjoni fid-dawl tal-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop kif stabbilit fl-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001.

Artikolu 57(5): restrizzjoni ta' ċerti drittijiet u obbligi speċifiċi dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data.

| 51. | Il-Premessa 35 tħabbar li għall-finijiet tar-Regolament huwa xieraq li jiġu kkunsidrati l-limitazzjonijiet ta' ċerti drittijiet u obbligi stabbiliti mid-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Qed isir riferiment għall-Artikolu 13(1)(e) tad-Direttiva li jippermetti tali limitazzjonijiet. Il-proposta żżid mal-premessa li dawn il-limitazzjonijiet huma meħtieġa u proporzjonali meta jitqies it-telf ta’ dħul potenzjali għall-Istati Membri u l-importanza kruċjali ta’ din l-informazzjoni sabiex il-frodi tiġi miġġielda b’mod effettiv. |
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51.

Il-Premessa 35 tħabbar li għall-finijiet tar-Regolament huwa xieraq li jiġu kkunsidrati l-limitazzjonijiet ta' ċerti drittijiet u obbligi stabbiliti mid-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Qed isir riferiment għall-Artikolu 13(1)(e) tad-Direttiva li jippermetti tali limitazzjonijiet. Il-proposta żżid mal-premessa li dawn il-limitazzjonijiet huma meħtieġa u proporzjonali meta jitqies it-telf ta’ dħul potenzjali għall-Istati Membri u l-importanza kruċjali ta’ din l-informazzjoni sabiex il-frodi tiġi miġġielda b’mod effettiv.

| 52. | Il-Premessa hi elaborata fl-Artikolu 57(5). Wara li tiddikjara li l-ħażna jew l-iskambju kollu ta' informazzjoni msemmi fir-Regolament hu soġġett għad-dispożizzjonijiet li jimplimentaw id-Direttiva 95/46/KE (ara l-punt 23 hawn fuq), tkompli tiddikjara li “l-Istati Membri għandhom, għall-iskop tal-applikazzjoni korretta ta' dan ir-Regolament, jirrestrinġu l-iskop tal-obbligi u d-drittijiet ipprovduti fl-Artikolu 10, fl-Artikolu 11(1), fl-Artikoli 12 u 21 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE sal-limitu meħtieġ sabiex jiġu salvagwardjati l-interessi msemmija fl-Artikolu 13(e) ta' dik id-Direttiva”. L-Artikoli msemmija fihom l-obbligu għall-kontrollur li jinforma lis-suġġett tad-data (Artikoli 10 u 11), id-dritt ta' aċċess għall-informazzjoni proprja (Artikolu 12) u d-dover tal-awtorità nazzjonali għall-protezzjoni tad-data li żżomm reġistru pubbliku dwar l-operazzjonijiet ta' pproċessar tad-data (Artikolu 12). |
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52.

Il-Premessa hi elaborata fl-Artikolu 57(5). Wara li tiddikjara li l-ħażna jew l-iskambju kollu ta' informazzjoni msemmi fir-Regolament hu soġġett għad-dispożizzjonijiet li jimplimentaw id-Direttiva 95/46/KE (ara l-punt 23 hawn fuq), tkompli tiddikjara li “l-Istati Membri għandhom, għall-iskop tal-applikazzjoni korretta ta' dan ir-Regolament, jirrestrinġu l-iskop tal-obbligi u d-drittijiet ipprovduti fl-Artikolu 10, fl-Artikolu 11(1), fl-Artikoli 12 u 21 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE sal-limitu meħtieġ sabiex jiġu salvagwardjati l-interessi msemmija fl-Artikolu 13(e) ta' dik id-Direttiva”. L-Artikoli msemmija fihom l-obbligu għall-kontrollur li jinforma lis-suġġett tad-data (Artikoli 10 u 11), id-dritt ta' aċċess għall-informazzjoni proprja (Artikolu 12) u d-dover tal-awtorità nazzjonali għall-protezzjoni tad-data li żżomm reġistru pubbliku dwar l-operazzjonijiet ta' pproċessar tad-data (Artikolu 12).

| 53. | Il-KEPD jenfasizza li l-Artikolu 13(e) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE jippermetti eżenzjonijiet għal ċerti dispożizzjonijiet tad-Direttiva u għandu jiġi interpretat b'mod strett. Il-KEPD jirrikonoxxi li f'ċerti ċirkostanzi jista' jkun meqjus meħtieġ għall-fini tal-prevenzjoni u l-kxif ta' frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa biex temporanjament jitneħħa d-dover li s-suġġett tad-data jiġi infurmat minn qabel, u d-dritt li jinkiseb aċċess għall-informazzjoni. Madankollu, l-Artikolu 13 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE jitlob li (1) tali restrizzjoni tiġi stabbilita f''miżura leġislattiva' u li (2) ir-restrizzjonijiet “jikkostitwixxu miżuri meħtieġa li jagħtu protezzjoni” lil wieħed mill-interessi elenkati. It-test attwali tal-Artikolu 57(5) propost ma jirriflettix l-ewwel rekwiżit billi ma jsir ebda riferiment għall-bażi meħtieġa fil-liġi. Il-KEPD għalhekk iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jinkludi dan ir-rekwiżit fl-Artikolu 57(5). It-tieni rekwiżit jista' jinqara fil-frażi “f’dak li jkun meħtieġ”. Madankollu, għall-fini tal-konsistenza l-KEPD jirrakkomanda li din il-frażi tiġi sostitwita bi “jekk jikkostitwixxu miżura meħtieġa”. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ ukoll lil-leġislatur biex jirrifjuta s-sentenza addizzjonali proposta fil-Premessa 35 li tiddikjara li l-limitazzjonijiet huma meħtieġa u proporzjonali, peress li din is-sentenza hija ġenerali wisq u m'għandha l-ebda valur legali ieħor. |
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53.

Il-KEPD jenfasizza li l-Artikolu 13(e) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE jippermetti eżenzjonijiet għal ċerti dispożizzjonijiet tad-Direttiva u għandu jiġi interpretat b'mod strett. Il-KEPD jirrikonoxxi li f'ċerti ċirkostanzi jista' jkun meqjus meħtieġ għall-fini tal-prevenzjoni u l-kxif ta' frodi fil-qasam tat-taxxa biex temporanjament jitneħħa d-dover li s-suġġett tad-data jiġi infurmat minn qabel, u d-dritt li jinkiseb aċċess għall-informazzjoni. Madankollu, l-Artikolu 13 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE jitlob li (1) tali restrizzjoni tiġi stabbilita f''miżura leġislattiva' u li (2) ir-restrizzjonijiet “jikkostitwixxu miżuri meħtieġa li jagħtu protezzjoni” lil wieħed mill-interessi elenkati. It-test attwali tal-Artikolu 57(5) propost ma jirriflettix l-ewwel rekwiżit billi ma jsir ebda riferiment għall-bażi meħtieġa fil-liġi. Il-KEPD għalhekk iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jinkludi dan ir-rekwiżit fl-Artikolu 57(5). It-tieni rekwiżit jista' jinqara fil-frażi “f’dak li jkun meħtieġ”. Madankollu, għall-fini tal-konsistenza l-KEPD jirrakkomanda li din il-frażi tiġi sostitwita bi “jekk jikkostitwixxu miżura meħtieġa”. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ ukoll lil-leġislatur biex jirrifjuta s-sentenza addizzjonali proposta fil-Premessa 35 li tiddikjara li l-limitazzjonijiet huma meħtieġa u proporzjonali, peress li din is-sentenza hija ġenerali wisq u m'għandha l-ebda valur legali ieħor.

Trasparenza

| 54. | L-Artikoli 10 u 11 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE fihom l-obbligu għall-kontrollur li jinforma lis-suġġett tad-data qabel ma tinġabar id-data jew, f'każ li d-data ma tinkisibx mis-suġġett tad-data, fil-ħin li tiġi reġistrata d-data. Dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet jistgħu jitqiesu bħala elaborazzjoni tal-prinċipju ġenerali tat-trasparenza li tagħmel parti mill-ekwità tal-ipproċessar kif mitlub fl-Artikolu 6(1)(a) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Il-KEPD innota li l-proposta ma fiha ebda dispożizzjonijiet oħra li jittrattaw il-prinċipju tat-trasparenza, pereżempju dwar kif is-sistema tiġi komunikata lill-pubbliku in ġenerali jew dwar kif is-suġġetti tad-data ser jiġu infurmati dwar l-ipproċessar tad-data. Il-KEPD għalhekk iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jadotta dispożizzjoni li fiha jiġu trattati t-trasparenza tal-kooperazzjoni u s-sistemi tal-appoġġ. |
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54.

L-Artikoli 10 u 11 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE fihom l-obbligu għall-kontrollur li jinforma lis-suġġett tad-data qabel ma tinġabar id-data jew, f'każ li d-data ma tinkisibx mis-suġġett tad-data, fil-ħin li tiġi reġistrata d-data. Dawn id-dispożizzjonijiet jistgħu jitqiesu bħala elaborazzjoni tal-prinċipju ġenerali tat-trasparenza li tagħmel parti mill-ekwità tal-ipproċessar kif mitlub fl-Artikolu 6(1)(a) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE. Il-KEPD innota li l-proposta ma fiha ebda dispożizzjonijiet oħra li jittrattaw il-prinċipju tat-trasparenza, pereżempju dwar kif is-sistema tiġi komunikata lill-pubbliku in ġenerali jew dwar kif is-suġġetti tad-data ser jiġu infurmati dwar l-ipproċessar tad-data. Il-KEPD għalhekk iħeġġeġ lil-leġislatur biex jadotta dispożizzjoni li fiha jiġu trattati t-trasparenza tal-kooperazzjoni u s-sistemi tal-appoġġ.

Artikolu 52: skambju ta' informazzjoni ma' pajjiżi terzi

| 55. | L-Artikolu 52 jipprevedi l-possibbiltà ta' skambju ta' informazzjoni ma' pajjiżi terzi. Dan jiddikjara li “informazzjoni miksuba taħt dan ir-Regolament tista” tkun ikkomunikata lil dak il-pajjiż terz, bil-kunsens tal-awtoritajiet kompetenti li pprovdew l-informazzjoni, skont id-dispożizzjonijiet interni tagħhom li japplikaw għall-komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni personali lill-pajjiżi terzi'. Il-KEPD jinsab kuntent li l-leġislatur hu konxju tar-regoli speċjali li japplikaw għall-iskambju ta' data personali għall-pajjiżi barra mill-UE. Għall-fini taċ-ċarezza tista' tiġi inkluża fit-test referenza espliċita għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE, li tiddikjara li tali trasferiment għandu jikkonforma mar-regoli domestiċi li jimplimentaw id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Kapitolu IV tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE li tittratta t-trasferiment ta' data personali lil pajjiżi terzi. |
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55.

L-Artikolu 52 jipprevedi l-possibbiltà ta' skambju ta' informazzjoni ma' pajjiżi terzi. Dan jiddikjara li “informazzjoni miksuba taħt dan ir-Regolament tista” tkun ikkomunikata lil dak il-pajjiż terz, bil-kunsens tal-awtoritajiet kompetenti li pprovdew l-informazzjoni, skont id-dispożizzjonijiet interni tagħhom li japplikaw għall-komunikazzjoni ta' informazzjoni personali lill-pajjiżi terzi'. Il-KEPD jinsab kuntent li l-leġislatur hu konxju tar-regoli speċjali li japplikaw għall-iskambju ta' data personali għall-pajjiżi barra mill-UE. Għall-fini taċ-ċarezza tista' tiġi inkluża fit-test referenza espliċita għad-Direttiva 95/46/KE, li tiddikjara li tali trasferiment għandu jikkonforma mar-regoli domestiċi li jimplimentaw id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Kapitolu IV tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE li tittratta t-trasferiment ta' data personali lil pajjiżi terzi.

| 56. | Il-proposta tirreferi biss għall-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri. Mhux ċar jekk hux ukoll previst skambju ta' informazzjoni (personali) lejn pajjiżi terzi fil-livell Ewropew. Dan huwa relatat mill-qrib mal-mistoqsijiet li tqajmu fil-Parti III hawn fuq rigward il-liġi applikabbli għat-twettiq tal-Eurofisc. Trasferiment ta' data personali lejn pajjiż terz minn istituzzjonijiet jew korpi Komunitarji għandu jikkonforma mal-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Il-KEPD jitlob lil-leġislatur biex jiċċara dan. |
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56.

Il-proposta tirreferi biss għall-awtoritajiet kompetenti tal-Istati Membri. Mhux ċar jekk hux ukoll previst skambju ta' informazzjoni (personali) lejn pajjiżi terzi fil-livell Ewropew. Dan huwa relatat mill-qrib mal-mistoqsijiet li tqajmu fil-Parti III hawn fuq rigward il-liġi applikabbli għat-twettiq tal-Eurofisc. Trasferiment ta' data personali lejn pajjiż terz minn istituzzjonijiet jew korpi Komunitarji għandu jikkonforma mal-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Il-KEPD jitlob lil-leġislatur biex jiċċara dan.

Komitoloġija

| 57. | Kif jidher ċar mill-analiżi ta' hawn fuq, hemm diversi kwistjonijiet rilevanti għall-protezzjoni tad-data li ser jiġu elaborati aktar f'regoli adottati skont il-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija kif stabbilit fl-Artikolu 60 tal-proposta (ara l-punti 41, 45 u 48 hawn fuq). Għalkemm il-KEPD jifhem il-ħtieġa prattika għall-użu ta' tali proċedura, hu jixtieq jenfasizza li r-riferimenti u l-garanziji prinċipali dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data għandhom jiġu stabbiliti fil-liġi bażika. |
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57.

Kif jidher ċar mill-analiżi ta' hawn fuq, hemm diversi kwistjonijiet rilevanti għall-protezzjoni tad-data li ser jiġu elaborati aktar f'regoli adottati skont il-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija kif stabbilit fl-Artikolu 60 tal-proposta (ara l-punti 41, 45 u 48 hawn fuq). Għalkemm il-KEPD jifhem il-ħtieġa prattika għall-użu ta' tali proċedura, hu jixtieq jenfasizza li r-riferimenti u l-garanziji prinċipali dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data għandhom jiġu stabbiliti fil-liġi bażika.

| 58. | Il-KEPD jixtieq jenfasizza li jekk jiġu diskussi regoli oħrajn permezz tal-Komitoloġija, dan għandu jsir b'kont meħud tar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data li joħorġu mid-Direttiva 95/46/KE u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ ukoll lill-Kummissjoni biex tinvolvi lill-KEPD u titlob il-parir tiegħu jekk tabilħaqq jiġu diskussi regoli ulterjuri b'relevanza għall-protezzjoni tad-data. Pereżempju dan ikun il-każ bl-istabbiliment tal-Eurofisc (ara l-punt 48 hawn fuq). |
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58.

Il-KEPD jixtieq jenfasizza li jekk jiġu diskussi regoli oħrajn permezz tal-Komitoloġija, dan għandu jsir b'kont meħud tar-rekwiżiti dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data li joħorġu mid-Direttiva 95/46/KE u r-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Il-KEPD iħeġġeġ ukoll lill-Kummissjoni biex tinvolvi lill-KEPD u titlob il-parir tiegħu jekk tabilħaqq jiġu diskussi regoli ulterjuri b'relevanza għall-protezzjoni tad-data. Pereżempju dan ikun il-każ bl-istabbiliment tal-Eurofisc (ara l-punt 48 hawn fuq).

| 59. | Sabiex jiġi żgurat l-involviment tal-KEPD meta jiġu adottati regoli oħrajn fuq il-bażi tal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija b'relevanza għall-protezzjoni tad-data, il-KEPD jirrakkomanda lil-leġislatur biex jinkludi tielet paragrafu fl-Artikolu 60 li jiddikjara li ġej “fejn il-miżuri implimentattivi jirrigwardaw l-ipproċessar ta' data personali l-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data għandu jiġi kkonsultat”. |
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59.

Sabiex jiġi żgurat l-involviment tal-KEPD meta jiġu adottati regoli oħrajn fuq il-bażi tal-proċedura ta' Komitoloġija b'relevanza għall-protezzjoni tad-data, il-KEPD jirrakkomanda lil-leġislatur biex jinkludi tielet paragrafu fl-Artikolu 60 li jiddikjara li ġej “fejn il-miżuri implimentattivi jirrigwardaw l-ipproċessar ta' data personali l-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data għandu jiġi kkonsultat”.

V.   KONKLUŻJONI U RAKKOMANDAZZJONIJIET

| 60. | Il-KEPD huwa konxju tal-importanza li titjieb l-effettività tal-miżuri kontra l-frodi transkonfinali u li jinkiseb ġbir aħjar ta' VAT f'sitwazzjonijiet transkonfinali. Il-KEPD jirrikonoxxi wkoll li biex jinkisbu dawn l-għanijiet huwa meħtieġ li tiġi pproċessata d-data personali. Il-KEPD jenfasizza madankollu li l-ipproċessar ta' tali data għandu jkun f'konformità mar-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. |
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60.

Il-KEPD huwa konxju tal-importanza li titjieb l-effettività tal-miżuri kontra l-frodi transkonfinali u li jinkiseb ġbir aħjar ta' VAT f'sitwazzjonijiet transkonfinali. Il-KEPD jirrikonoxxi wkoll li biex jinkisbu dawn l-għanijiet huwa meħtieġ li tiġi pproċessata d-data personali. Il-KEPD jenfasizza madankollu li l-ipproċessar ta' tali data għandu jkun f'konformità mar-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data.

| 61. | Wara analiżi tal-qafas legali li joħroġ mir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 u l-aġġustamenti attwalment proposti, il-KEPD jikkonkludi li, għalkemm hemm diversi elementi pożittivi, mhumiex sodisfatti r-rekwiżiti kollha li joħorġu mir-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data. |
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61.

Wara analiżi tal-qafas legali li joħroġ mir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 u l-aġġustamenti attwalment proposti, il-KEPD jikkonkludi li, għalkemm hemm diversi elementi pożittivi, mhumiex sodisfatti r-rekwiżiti kollha li joħorġu mir-regoli Komunitarji dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data.

| 62. | Fl-Opinjoni attwali l-KEPD ta parir lil-leġislatur kif ġej:






  — | Fir-rigward tal-kwistjoni dwar il-leġislazzjoni Komunitarja applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data, biex jiċċara r-responsabbiltajiet rispettivi tal-Istati Membri, il-Kummissjoni u l-Eurofisc rigward konformità ma' dawn ir-regoli. |
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62.

Fl-Opinjoni attwali l-KEPD ta parir lil-leġislatur kif ġej:

—

Fir-rigward tal-kwistjoni dwar il-leġislazzjoni Komunitarja applikabbli dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data, biex jiċċara r-responsabbiltajiet rispettivi tal-Istati Membri, il-Kummissjoni u l-Eurofisc rigward konformità ma' dawn ir-regoli.

| — | Fir-rigward tad-data skambjata fuq talba jew b'mod spontanju bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti, biex jispeċifika t-tip ta' informazzjoni personali li tista' jiġi skambjata, biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi skambjata data personali u jivvaluta l-ħtieġa tat-trasferiment, jew tal-inqas jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat. |
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—

Fir-rigward tad-data skambjata fuq talba jew b'mod spontanju bejn l-awtoritajiet kompetenti, biex jispeċifika t-tip ta' informazzjoni personali li tista' jiġi skambjata, biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom tista' tiġi skambjata data personali u jivvaluta l-ħtieġa tat-trasferiment, jew tal-inqas jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat.

| — | Fir-rigward tal-iskambju ta' data permezz tal-aċċessibbiltà diretta tal-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi, biex jiddikjara espliċitament li, sa fejn għandha x'taqsam id-data personali, ebda data oħra m'għandha tiddaħħal fil-bażi ta' data, ħlief dik diġà definita, jew biex tal-inqas jiżgura li l-aċċess awtomatizzat hu ristrett għall-kategoriji msemmija ta' data. U barra minn hekk biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom il-bażijiet ta' data jistgħu jiġu aċċessati direttament, biex jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat, u biex jiddetermina perijodu massimu ta' ħżin tad-data personali fil-bażi ta' data, bil-possibbiltà ta' eċċezzjonijiet f'ċirkostanzi eċċezzjonali. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fir-rigward tal-iskambju ta' data permezz tal-aċċessibbiltà diretta tal-bażijiet ta' data elettroniċi, biex jiddikjara espliċitament li, sa fejn għandha x'taqsam id-data personali, ebda data oħra m'għandha tiddaħħal fil-bażi ta' data, ħlief dik diġà definita, jew biex tal-inqas jiżgura li l-aċċess awtomatizzat hu ristrett għall-kategoriji msemmija ta' data. U barra minn hekk biex jiċċirkoskrivi l-iskopijiet li għalihom il-bażijiet ta' data jistgħu jiġu aċċessati direttament, biex jassigura li l-prinċipju tal-ħtieġa jiġi rispettat, u biex jiddetermina perijodu massimu ta' ħżin tad-data personali fil-bażi ta' data, bil-possibbiltà ta' eċċezzjonijiet f'ċirkostanzi eċċezzjonali.

| — | Fir-rigward tal-Artikolu 57 (u l-Premessa 35),






  — | biex iżid riferiment fl-ewwel paragrafu għal-leġislazzjoni Komunitarja dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

Fir-rigward tal-Artikolu 57 (u l-Premessa 35),

—

biex iżid riferiment fl-ewwel paragrafu għal-leġislazzjoni Komunitarja dwar il-protezzjoni tad-data;

| — | biex jivvaluta mill-ġdid il-paragrafi 1 u 3 fid-dawl tal-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop kif stabbilit fl-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46 u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. |
| --- | --- |

—

biex jivvaluta mill-ġdid il-paragrafi 1 u 3 fid-dawl tal-prinċipju li jillimita l-iskop kif stabbilit fl-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46 u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001.

| — | biex jinkludi fil-paragrafu 5 r-rekwiżit li hemm fl-Artikolu 13 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE li għandhom jiġu stabbiliti f'miżura leġislattiva r-restrizzjoni tal-obbligi u d-drittijiet imsemmija; |
| --- | --- |

—

biex jinkludi fil-paragrafu 5 r-rekwiżit li hemm fl-Artikolu 13 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE li għandhom jiġu stabbiliti f'miżura leġislattiva r-restrizzjoni tal-obbligi u d-drittijiet imsemmija;

| — | biex jissostitwixxi fil-paragrafu 5 l-frażi “sal-limitu meħtieġ” bi “jekk dan jikkostitwixxi miżura meħtieġa”; |
| --- | --- |

—

biex jissostitwixxi fil-paragrafu 5 l-frażi “sal-limitu meħtieġ” bi “jekk dan jikkostitwixxi miżura meħtieġa”;

| — | biex jirrifjuta s-sentenza addizzjonali proposta fil-Premessa 35. |
| --- | --- |

—

biex jirrifjuta s-sentenza addizzjonali proposta fil-Premessa 35.

| — | Fir-rigward tal-prinċipju tat-trasparenza, biex jadotta dispożizzjoni li fiha jiġu trattati t-trasparenza tal-kooperazzjoni u s-sistemi tal-appoġġ. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fir-rigward tal-prinċipju tat-trasparenza, biex jadotta dispożizzjoni li fiha jiġu trattati t-trasparenza tal-kooperazzjoni u s-sistemi tal-appoġġ.

| — | Fir-rigward tal-iskambju ta' data ma' pajjiżi terzi, biex jinkludi riferiment espliċitu għall-Kapitolu IV tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE fl-Artikolu 52 u biex jiċċara jekk huwiex previst skambju ta' informazzjoni personali lil pajjiżi terzi mill-Kummissjoni u/jew mill-Ewrofisc. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fir-rigward tal-iskambju ta' data ma' pajjiżi terzi, biex jinkludi riferiment espliċitu għall-Kapitolu IV tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE fl-Artikolu 52 u biex jiċċara jekk huwiex previst skambju ta' informazzjoni personali lil pajjiżi terzi mill-Kummissjoni u/jew mill-Ewrofisc.

| — | Fir-rigward tar-regoli adottati abbażi tal-Komitoloġija, biex iżid tielet paragrafu għall-Artikolu 60 li jiddikjara li ġej: “meta l-miżuri implimentattivi jirrigwardaw l-ipproċessar ta’ data personali, il-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data għandu jiġi kkonsultat”. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fir-rigward tar-regoli adottati abbażi tal-Komitoloġija, biex iżid tielet paragrafu għall-Artikolu 60 li jiddikjara li ġej: “meta l-miżuri implimentattivi jirrigwardaw l-ipproċessar ta’ data personali, il-Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data għandu jiġi kkonsultat”.

Magħmul fi Brussell, 30 ta’ Ottubru 2009

Peter HUSTINX

Kontrollur Ewropew għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data

---

(1)  ĠU L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

1

(2)  ĠU L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1.

2

(3)  COM(2009) 427 finali tat-18 ta' Awwissu 2009.

3

(4)  ĠU L 264, 15.10.2003, p. 1.

4

(5)  Ara l-Ftehim Interistituzzjonali tat-28 ta’ Novembru 2001 dwar użu aktar strutturat tat-teknika ta' tfassil mill-ġdid għal atti legali (ĠU C 77, 28.3.2002, p. 1).

5

(6)  Komunikazzjoni COM(2006) 254 tal-31 ta’ Mejju 2006 dwar il-ħtieġa li tiġi żviluppata strateġ ija koordinata bl-għan li titjieb il-ġlieda kontra l-frodi fiskali.

6

(7)  Ara l-Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tal-4 ta' Diċembru 2007 u s-7 ta' Ottubru 2008, ir-Riżoluzzjoni tat-2 ta' Settembru 2008 tal-Parlament Ewropew (2008/2033(INI)). Ara l-Komunikazzjoni COM(2008) 807 tat-1 ta' Diċembru 2008.

7

(8)  ĠU L 347, 11.12.2006, p. 1.

8

(9)  Rapport COM(2009) 428 tat-18 ta' Awwissu 2009 dwar l-applikazzjoni tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1798/2003.

9

(10)  Il-proposta tinkorpora l-bidliet għar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1798/2003 li huma previsti mir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 143/2008 u li ser japplikaw mill-1 ta' Jannar 2015 (ĠU L 44, 20.2.2008, p. 1.). Dawn il-bidliet jintroduċu regoli dwar il-post tal-forniment tas-servizzi, l-iskemi speċjali u l-proċedura ta' rifużjoni għall-VAT.

10

(11)  Ara l-Memoranda ta' Spjegazzjoni għall-proposta f'paġna 4.

11

(12)  Ara l-Artikolu 2(a) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 2(a) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Ara l-Opinjoni 4/2007 tal-20 ta' Ġunju 2007 tal-Grupp ta' Ħidma tal-Artikolu 29 għal spjegazzjoni tal-kunċett ta' “data personali” (disponibbli fi http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf).

12

(13)  Ara wkoll il-punt 28 u aktar. Fil-bqija ta' din l-opinjoni r-referenzi kollha għall-Premessi u l-Artikoli jirreferu għal dawk tal-proposta, dment li ma jkunx iddikjarat mod ieħor.

13

(14)  Għal kummenti rilevanti ara wkoll l-Opinjoni tal-KEPD tas-16 ta' Settembru 2008 dwar il-propsta għal Deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill dwar l-istabbiliment tas-Sistema Ewropea ta’ Informazzjoni ta’ Rekords Kriminali (ECRIS) (ĠU C 42, 20.2.2009, p. 1.), pt, 23 u aktar.

14

(15)  Ara l-Artikolu 2(d) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 2(d) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001. Iż-żewġ dispożizzjonijiet jipprevedu l-possibbiltà ta' kontroll individwali jew konġunt (“... waħdu jew flimkien ma’ oħrajn ...”).

15

(16)  Ara l-Artikolu 8(d) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 10(5) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001.

16

(17)  Ara l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 4(1)(b) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001.

17

(18)  Ara l-Artikolu 7 tad-Direttiva 95/46/KE u l-Artikolu 5 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 45/2001.

18

---

II Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 17.3.2010 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.3.2010

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

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Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.5712 – Mitsubishi Chemical Holdings/Mitsubishi Rayon Co)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2010/C 66/02

Fil-25 ta’ Frar 2010, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32010M5712. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32010M5712. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

| 17.3.2010 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.3.2010

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 66/10

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Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.5750 – Wabco/Würth/JV)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2010/C 66/03

Fil-11 ta’ Marzu 2010, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ġermaniż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32010M5750. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32010M5750. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

IV Avviżi

AVVIŻI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 17.3.2010 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.3.2010

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

Is-16 ta’ Marzu 2010

2010/C 66/04

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,3723 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 124,22 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4407 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,90690 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 9,7242 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,4516 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 8,0145 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 25,504 |
| EEK | Krona Estona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 264,19 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lats Latvjan | 0,7077 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 3,8865 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,0893 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,0944 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,5005 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,3944 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 10,6493 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,9477 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,9155 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 555,03 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 10,1320 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 9,3672 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,2570 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 12 581,48 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,5538 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 62,740 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 40,2510 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 44,497 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 2,4197 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 17,1894 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 62,4650 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,3723

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

124,22

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4407

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,90690

SEK

Krona Żvediża

9,7242

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,4516

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

8,0145

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

25,504

EEK

Krona Estona

15,6466

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

264,19

LTL

Litas Litwan

3,4528

LVL

Lats Latvjan

0,7077

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

3,8865

RON

Leu Rumen

4,0893

TRY

Lira Turka

2,0944

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,5005

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,3944

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

10,6493

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,9477

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,9155

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 555,03

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

10,1320

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

9,3672

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,2570

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

12 581,48

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,5538

PHP

Peso Filippin

62,740

RUB

Rouble Russu

40,2510

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

44,497

BRL

Real Brażiljan

2,4197

MXN

Peso Messikan

17,1894

INR

Rupi Indjan

62,4650

---

(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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| 17.3.2010 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66/12 |
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Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-kwantità disponibbli għat-tieni semestru tal-2010 għal ċerti prodotti fis-settur tal-ħalib u tal-prodotti tal-ħalib fil-kuntest ta' ċerti kwoti li fetħet il-Komunità

2010/C 66/05

Wara l-għoti ta' liċenzji tal-importazzjoni għall-ewwel semestru tal-2010 għal ċerti kwoti tariffarji msemmija fir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 2535/2001 (1), l-applikazzjonijiet għal-liċenzji koprew kwantitajiet iżgħar minn dawk disponibbli għall-prodotti kkonċernati. Għaldaqstant, jeħtieġ li tiġi kkalkolata, għal kull kwota kkonċernata, il-kwantità disponibbli għall-perjodu bejn l-1 ta' Lulju u 1-31 ta' Diċembru 2010 billi jitqiesu l-kwantitajiet mhux allokati li jirriżultaw mill-applikazzjonijiet għal liċenzji tal-importazzjoni mressqa bejn l-20 u t-30 ta' Novembru 2009 għall-butir li joriġina minn New Zealand fil-kuntest tal-kwoti bin-numri 09.4195 u 09.4182, kif ukoll għall-prodotti tal-ħalib li joriġinaw mir-Repubblika tal-Moldova fil-kuntest tal-kwota 09.4210.

Il-kwantitajiet disponibbli għall-perjodu mill-1 ta' Lulju sal-31 ta' Diċembru 2010 għat-tieni semestru tas-sena ta' importazzjoni ta' ċerti kwoti msemmija fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 2535/2001 huma indikati hawn isfel.

---

(1)  ĠU L 341, 22.12.2001, p. 29.

---

ANNESS

| Prodotti li joriġinaw mir-Repubblika tal-Moldova |
| --- |
| Nru tal-kwota | Kwantità (kg) |
| 09.4210 | 1 500 000 |

Prodotti li joriġinaw mir-Repubblika tal-Moldova

Nru tal-kwota

Kwantità (kg)

09.4210

1 500 000

| Butir li joriġina min-New Zealand |
| --- |
| Nru tal-kwota | Kwantità (kg) |
| 09.4195 | 26 494 400 |
| 09.4182 | 33 612 000 |

Butir li joriġina min-New Zealand

Nru tal-kwota

Kwantità (kg)

09.4195

26 494 400

09.4182

33 612 000

---

V Opinjonijiet

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Kummissjoni Ewropea

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Sejhiet għall-proposti fil-kuntest tal-programm ta' ħidma “Persuni” tal-2010, tas-7 Programm Kwadru tal-KE għall-attivitajiet ta' Riċerka, Żvilupp Teknoloġiku u Dimostrazzjoni

2010/C 66/06

B'dan qed tingħata notifika tat-tnedija tas-sejħiet għal proposti skont il-programmi ta' ħidma “Persuni” tal- 2010, tas-Seba' Programm ta' Qafas tal-Komunità Ewropea għar-Riċerka, l-Iżvilupp Teknoloġiku u l-Attivitajiet ta' Dimostrazzjoni (mill-2007 sal-2013).

Jintlaqgħu proposti għas-sejħiet li ġejjin. Id-dati tal-għeluq għas-sejħiet u l-baġits qegħdin imniżżlin fit-testi tas-sejħiet li jinsabu ppubblikati fuq il-websajt tal-CORDIS.

Il-Programm Speċifiku “Persuni”:

| Titlu tas-sejħa | Identifikatur tas-sejħa |
| --- | --- |
| Boroż ta' Studju Intra-Ewropej | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IEF |
| Boroż ta' Studju Internazzjonali Akkoljenti | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IIF |
| Boroż ta' Studju Internazzjonali Barra l-Pajjiż | FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IOF |

Titlu tas-sejħa

Identifikatur tas-sejħa

Boroż ta' Studju Intra-Ewropej

FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IEF

Boroż ta' Studju Internazzjonali Akkoljenti

FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IIF

Boroż ta' Studju Internazzjonali Barra l-Pajjiż

FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IOF

Din is-sejħa għal proposti għandha x'taqsam mal-programm ta' ħidma tal-2010 adottat bid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni C(2009) 5892, tad-29 ta' Lulju 2009.

L-informazzjoni dwar il-modalitajiet tas-sejħiet, il-programmi ta' ħidma u l-linji gwida għall-applikanti dwar kif għandhom jissottomettu l-proposti, tinsab disponibbli fuq il-websajt tal-CORDIS: http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/calls/

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17.3.2010

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 66/14

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Sejħa għal proposti għal azzjonijiet ta’ modal shift, katalisti, “Toroq tat-Tbaħħir”, azzjonijiet għal evitar tat-traffiku u ta’ tagħlim komuni fi ħdan it-tieni Programm Marco Polo

(Regolament tal-Kunsill u tal-Parlament (KE) Nru 1692/2006 – ĠU L 328, 24.11.2006, p. 1)

2010/C 66/07

Il-Kumissjoni Ewropea qiegħda hawnhekk tiftaħ sejħa għall-proposti għall-proċedura ta’ l-għażla 2010 taħt it-tieni Programm Marco Polo. Is-sejħa tagħlaq fit-18 Mejju 2010.

Aktar tagħrif dwar is-sejħa u għajnuna dwar kif għandhom jiġu sottomessi l-proġetti jistgħu jinsabu fuq dan il-Websajt:

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/marcopolo/calls/2010_en.htm

Il-helpdesk tal-Programm Marco Polo jista’ jiġi kkuntattjat permezz tal-e-mail: eaci-marco-polo-helpdesk@ec.europa.eu u feks: +32 22979506.

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PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 17.3.2010 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 66/15 |
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17.3.2010

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 66/15

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GĦAJNUNA MILL-ISTAT – IL-ĠERMANJA

Għajnuna mill-Istat C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) – Għajnuna addizzjonali għal WestLB AG fir-rigward tas-segregazzjoni ta' assi

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 108(2) tat-TFUE

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2010/C 66/08

Permezz tal-ittra li ġġib id-data tat-22 Diċembru 2009 riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jiġu wara dan is-sommarju, il-Kummissjoni nnotifikat lill-Ġermanja bid-deċiżjoni tagħha li tagħti bidu għall-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 108(2) tat-TFUE fir-rigward tal-għajnuna/miżura msemmija hawn fuq.

Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura, li dwarha l-Kummisjoni se tagħti bidu għall-proċedura, fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan is-sommarju u tal-ittra li ssegwi, lil:

| Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| --- |
| Id-Direttorat Ġenerali tal-Kompetizzjoni |
| Reġistru tal-Għajnuna mill-Istat |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIЁ |
| Feks +32 22991242 |

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

Id-Direttorat Ġenerali tal-Kompetizzjoni

Reġistru tal-Għajnuna mill-Istat

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIЁ

Feks +32 22991242

Dawn il-kummenti se jiġu kkomunikati lill-Ġermanja. Il-parti interessata li tressaq il-kummenti tista’ titlob bil-miktub biex l-identità tagħha tibqa’ kunfidenzjali, filwaqt li tagħti r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

I.   PROĊEDURA

| (1) | Fit-12 ta' Mejju 2009, fil-każ C 43/08 il-Kummissjoni approvat b'kundizzjoni l-għajnuna għar-ristrutturar lil WestLB fil-forma ta' tarka tar-riskju fuq il-portafoll ta' Phoenix ta' EUR 5 biljuni. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Fit-12 ta' Mejju 2009, fil-każ C 43/08 il-Kummissjoni approvat b'kundizzjoni l-għajnuna għar-ristrutturar lil WestLB fil-forma ta' tarka tar-riskju fuq il-portafoll ta' Phoenix ta' EUR 5 biljuni.

| (2) | Fl-10 ta' Diċembru 2009, il-Ġermanja nnotifikat rikapitalizzazzjoni favur WestLB mill-Ġermanja li tammonta għal EUR 3 biljun u garanzija mill-azzjonisti pubbliċi ta' WestLB li tammonta għal EUR 1 biljun, li huma meħtieġa biex jiffaċilitaw miżura ta' salvataġġ tal-assi fil-forma ta' bank ħażin. Il-bank ħażin għandu jieħu l-assi b'valur nominali ta' EUR 85.1 biljun. Il-miżura ta' salvataġġ tal-assi kienet antiċipata fid-Deċiżjoni ta' ristrutturar tat-12 ta' Mejju 2009. Madankollu, l-għajnuna addizzjonali meħtieġa issa la kienet notifikata u lanqas awtorizzata qabel. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Fl-10 ta' Diċembru 2009, il-Ġermanja nnotifikat rikapitalizzazzjoni favur WestLB mill-Ġermanja li tammonta għal EUR 3 biljun u garanzija mill-azzjonisti pubbliċi ta' WestLB li tammonta għal EUR 1 biljun, li huma meħtieġa biex jiffaċilitaw miżura ta' salvataġġ tal-assi fil-forma ta' bank ħażin. Il-bank ħażin għandu jieħu l-assi b'valur nominali ta' EUR 85.1 biljun. Il-miżura ta' salvataġġ tal-assi kienet antiċipata fid-Deċiżjoni ta' ristrutturar tat-12 ta' Mejju 2009. Madankollu, l-għajnuna addizzjonali meħtieġa issa la kienet notifikata u lanqas awtorizzata qabel.

II.   FATTI

| (3) | WestLB għandha l-intenzjoni li tagħmel segregazzjoni f'bank ħażin, tal-assi tossiċi u dawk mhux strateġiċi. Hija prevista proċedura f'żewġ stadji: Fl-ewwel stadju WestLB trid tagħmel segregazzjoni tal-assi tossiċi b'valur nominali ta' madwar EUR 23.8 biljun. Fit-tieni stadju, ippjanat għal April 2010, hi trid tagħmel segregazzjoni tal-assi mhux strateġiċi b'valur nominali ta' madwar EUR 61.3 biljun (b'total ta' EUR 85.1 biljun). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

WestLB għandha l-intenzjoni li tagħmel segregazzjoni f'bank ħażin, tal-assi tossiċi u dawk mhux strateġiċi. Hija prevista proċedura f'żewġ stadji: Fl-ewwel stadju WestLB trid tagħmel segregazzjoni tal-assi tossiċi b'valur nominali ta' madwar EUR 23.8 biljun. Fit-tieni stadju, ippjanat għal April 2010, hi trid tagħmel segregazzjoni tal-assi mhux strateġiċi b'valur nominali ta' madwar EUR 61.3 biljun (b'total ta' EUR 85.1 biljun).

| (4) | WestLB se tagħti lill-bank ħażin “ilqugħ għall-ekwità” ta' EUR 3 biljun biex ikopru t-telf mistenni. Billi WestLB m'għandhiex biżżejjed kapital, SoFFin se titfa l-ammont ta' EUR 3 biljun f'WestLB f'forma ta' sehem passiv. Telf addizzjonali għandu jkun kopert minn garanzija ta' EUR 1 biljun mill-azzjonijisti ta' WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

WestLB se tagħti lill-bank ħażin “ilqugħ għall-ekwità” ta' EUR 3 biljun biex ikopru t-telf mistenni. Billi WestLB m'għandhiex biżżejjed kapital, SoFFin se titfa l-ammont ta' EUR 3 biljun f'WestLB f'forma ta' sehem passiv. Telf addizzjonali għandu jkun kopert minn garanzija ta' EUR 1 biljun mill-azzjonijisti ta' WestLB.

| (5) | Il-Ġermanja ċċarat li l-implimentazzjoni tas-soluzzjoni tal-bank ħażin antiċipata fid-deċiżjoni tat-12 ta' Mejju għadha ma saritx. Barra minn hekk, dik is-soluzzjoni għandha bżonn l-ammont sinifikanti ta' għajnuna addizzjonali deskritta hawn fuq. Għalhekk, il-Ġermanja ppreżentat pjan ta' ristrutturar aġġornata li madanakollu jipprevedi biss tibdil żgħir. Il-Ġermanju tipprovdi wkoll numru ta' impenji li jippermettu l-bejgħ aċċellerat ta' WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Il-Ġermanja ċċarat li l-implimentazzjoni tas-soluzzjoni tal-bank ħażin antiċipata fid-deċiżjoni tat-12 ta' Mejju għadha ma saritx. Barra minn hekk, dik is-soluzzjoni għandha bżonn l-ammont sinifikanti ta' għajnuna addizzjonali deskritta hawn fuq. Għalhekk, il-Ġermanja ppreżentat pjan ta' ristrutturar aġġornata li madanakollu jipprevedi biss tibdil żgħir. Il-Ġermanju tipprovdi wkoll numru ta' impenji li jippermettu l-bejgħ aċċellerat ta' WestLB.

III.   VALUTAZZJONI

| (6) | Il-miżuri – ir-rikapitalizzazzjoni, il-garanzija u l-miżura ta' salvataġġ tal-assi – jikkostitwixxu għajnuna mill-Istat favur WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Il-miżuri – ir-rikapitalizzazzjoni, il-garanzija u l-miżura ta' salvataġġ tal-assi – jikkostitwixxu għajnuna mill-Istat favur WestLB.

| (7) | Waqt li r-rikapitalizzazzjoni tilħaq il-ħtiġijiet tal-Komunikazzjoni tar-Rikapitalizzazzjoni tal-5 ta' Diċembru 2008, il-miżura għas-salvataġġ tal-assi, li għandha tkun valutata skont il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Assi Danneġġjati tal-25 ta' Frar 2009, ma tistax tkun ikkunsidrata bħala kompattibbli f'dan l-istadju. Ma tilħaqx il-kundizzjonijiet ta' trasparenza u żvelar, valutazzjoni, qsim tal-piżijiet u rimunerazzjoni. Barra minn hekk, il-miżuri jqajjmu dubbji wkoll skont il-Komunikazzjoni dwar ir-Ristrutturazzjoni tat-22 ta' Lulju 2009 fir-rigward tal-possibilitajiet li għandu l-bank biex jerġa' jġib il-vijabbiltà, il-qsim tal-piżijiet u l-mitigazzjoni tat-tgħawwiġ tal-kompetizzjoni. Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta' hawn fuq, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li tibda l-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 198(2) tal-TFUE dwar is-salvataġġ tal-assi fil-forma ta' twaqqif ta' bank ħażin kif ukoll dwar l-għajnuna għar-ristrutturar lil WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Waqt li r-rikapitalizzazzjoni tilħaq il-ħtiġijiet tal-Komunikazzjoni tar-Rikapitalizzazzjoni tal-5 ta' Diċembru 2008, il-miżura għas-salvataġġ tal-assi, li għandha tkun valutata skont il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Assi Danneġġjati tal-25 ta' Frar 2009, ma tistax tkun ikkunsidrata bħala kompattibbli f'dan l-istadju. Ma tilħaqx il-kundizzjonijiet ta' trasparenza u żvelar, valutazzjoni, qsim tal-piżijiet u rimunerazzjoni. Barra minn hekk, il-miżuri jqajjmu dubbji wkoll skont il-Komunikazzjoni dwar ir-Ristrutturazzjoni tat-22 ta' Lulju 2009 fir-rigward tal-possibilitajiet li għandu l-bank biex jerġa' jġib il-vijabbiltà, il-qsim tal-piżijiet u l-mitigazzjoni tat-tgħawwiġ tal-kompetizzjoni. Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta' hawn fuq, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li tibda l-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 198(2) tal-TFUE dwar is-salvataġġ tal-assi fil-forma ta' twaqqif ta' bank ħażin kif ukoll dwar l-għajnuna għar-ristrutturar lil WestLB.

| (8) | Madanakollu, minħabba t-theddida imminenti għall-istabbiltà finanzjarja mingħajr il-miżuri, il-Kummissjoni tawtorizza l-miżura ta' rikapitalizzazzjoni, il-garanzija u s-salvataġġ tal-assi temporanjament għal sitt xhur bħala għajnuna ta' emerġenza skont l-Artikolu Artikolu 107(3)(b)TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Madanakollu, minħabba t-theddida imminenti għall-istabbiltà finanzjarja mingħajr il-miżuri, il-Kummissjoni tawtorizza l-miżura ta' rikapitalizzazzjoni, il-garanzija u s-salvataġġ tal-assi temporanjament għal sitt xhur bħala għajnuna ta' emerġenza skont l-Artikolu Artikolu 107(3)(b)TFUE.

TEST TAL-ITTRA

“The Commission wishes to inform Germany that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1) since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of the measures with the internal market.

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 12 May 2009, in Case C 43/08 (2) the Commission conditionally approved restructuring aid to WestLB AG (“WestLB”) in the form of a risk shield on the Phoenix portfolio of EUR 5 billion. It requires the sale of the bank by the end of 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 12 May 2009, in Case C 43/08 (2) the Commission conditionally approved restructuring aid to WestLB AG (“WestLB”) in the form of a risk shield on the Phoenix portfolio of EUR 5 billion. It requires the sale of the bank by the end of 2011.

| (2) | On 7 October 2009, in Case N 531/09 (3) the Commission approved as compatible emergency aid a risk assumption of EUR 6,4 billion (4) of the already protected Phoenix portfolio, which de facto further increased the initial risk shield. Germany committed to notify by 30 November 2009 a revised restructuring plan which would take into account any additional State aid not approved by the Decision of 12 May 2009 and therefore provide for additional restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 7 October 2009, in Case N 531/09 (3) the Commission approved as compatible emergency aid a risk assumption of EUR 6,4 billion (4) of the already protected Phoenix portfolio, which de facto further increased the initial risk shield. Germany committed to notify by 30 November 2009 a revised restructuring plan which would take into account any additional State aid not approved by the Decision of 12 May 2009 and therefore provide for additional restructuring.

| (3) | An updated restructuring plan was submitted on 15 December 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

An updated restructuring plan was submitted on 15 December 2009.

| (4) | On 10 December 2009, Germany notified a recapitalisation of WestLB amounting to EUR 3 billion as well as a guarantee of EUR 1 billion, which are necessary for the establishment of a bad bank by WestLB. The bad bank will relieve WestLB from assets with a nominal value of EUR 85,1 billion. That asset relief measure was envisaged in general terms in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009 (5). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 10 December 2009, Germany notified a recapitalisation of WestLB amounting to EUR 3 billion as well as a guarantee of EUR 1 billion, which are necessary for the establishment of a bad bank by WestLB. The bad bank will relieve WestLB from assets with a nominal value of EUR 85,1 billion. That asset relief measure was envisaged in general terms in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009 (5).

| (5) | Following discussions with the Commission, Germany provided several commitments and additional information by 16 December 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Following discussions with the Commission, Germany provided several commitments and additional information by 16 December 2009.

| (6) | Given the urgency to get a Commission decision on these measures, Germany has exceptionally agreed that the authentic language for this decision should be English. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Given the urgency to get a Commission decision on these measures, Germany has exceptionally agreed that the authentic language for this decision should be English.

2.   DESCRIPTION OF THE AID

WestLB AG

| (7) | The beneficiary WestLB is a public limited company, with its registered headquarters in North Rhine-Westphalia. WestLB is a service provider for Germany's largest savings banks network and public-sector clients. WestLB has until recently offered a universal bank's range of products and services, including products for private clients, midmarket companies and corporate enterprises, partly in cooperation with savings banks, partly via subsidiaries specialised in consumer loans, private banking and commercial real estate finance. In line with a restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009, which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, WestLB is currently unbundling its core activities and abandoning non-core activities. WestLB's published balance-sheet total was EUR 288 billion on 31 December 2008, while its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 88,5 billion. As of 30 September 2009, the bank's published balance-sheet total was equal to EUR 258,8 billion and its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 84,2 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The beneficiary WestLB is a public limited company, with its registered headquarters in North Rhine-Westphalia. WestLB is a service provider for Germany's largest savings banks network and public-sector clients. WestLB has until recently offered a universal bank's range of products and services, including products for private clients, midmarket companies and corporate enterprises, partly in cooperation with savings banks, partly via subsidiaries specialised in consumer loans, private banking and commercial real estate finance. In line with a restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009, which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, WestLB is currently unbundling its core activities and abandoning non-core activities. WestLB's published balance-sheet total was EUR 288 billion on 31 December 2008, while its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 88,5 billion. As of 30 September 2009, the bank's published balance-sheet total was equal to EUR 258,8 billion and its risk-weighted assets stood at EUR 84,2 billion.

| (8) | WestLB is currently owned by the Westfälisch-Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (WLSGV), which accounts for 25,03 % of its shares, the Rheinische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (RSGV), which owns 25,03 % and — both directly and indirectly, via the NRW.BANK (formerly known as Landesbank Nordhein-Westfalen) — the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (37,74 %), the Landschaftsverband Westfalen Lippe (LWL; 6,09 %), and the Landschaftsverband Rheinland (LVR; 6,09 %). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

WestLB is currently owned by the Westfälisch-Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (WLSGV), which accounts for 25,03 % of its shares, the Rheinische Sparkassen- und Giroverband (RSGV), which owns 25,03 % and — both directly and indirectly, via the NRW.BANK (formerly known as Landesbank Nordhein-Westfalen) — the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (37,74 %), the Landschaftsverband Westfalen Lippe (LWL; 6,09 %), and the Landschaftsverband Rheinland (LVR; 6,09 %).

2.1.   The restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009

| (9) | At the end of March 2008, WestLB's shareholders granted the bank an “impaired assets relief” measure through a risk shield of up to EUR 5 billion for a portfolio of structured securities with a nominal volume of approximately EUR 23 billion (“Phoenix”) in order to prevent bank resolution procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

At the end of March 2008, WestLB's shareholders granted the bank an “impaired assets relief” measure through a risk shield of up to EUR 5 billion for a portfolio of structured securities with a nominal volume of approximately EUR 23 billion (“Phoenix”) in order to prevent bank resolution procedures.

| (10) | WestLB is currently in the process of implementing the restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009 which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009. The implementation of the plan gives rise to significant divestures and a reshuffle of the bank's business model. In particular, WestLB will stop proprietary trading activities and, overall, reduce its assets by 50 %. The bank will focus on three core business areas: “transaction banking”; “medium-sized companies, savings banks partnership, and corporate banking”, and “capital market activities and structured finance” which all have to be structurally separated. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

WestLB is currently in the process of implementing the restructuring plan dated 30 April 2009 which was approved in the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009. The implementation of the plan gives rise to significant divestures and a reshuffle of the bank's business model. In particular, WestLB will stop proprietary trading activities and, overall, reduce its assets by 50 %. The bank will focus on three core business areas: “transaction banking”; “medium-sized companies, savings banks partnership, and corporate banking”, and “capital market activities and structured finance” which all have to be structurally separated.

| (11) | In order to achieve the targeted balance sheet reduction, the restructuring plan set out explicitly in Annex 2 point 3.3.l that the “reduction of the total balance sheet and the risk-weighted assets ... is based on the assumption that WestLB will fully dispose a number of assets grouped in an exit portfolio.” However, no additional aid was foreseen or authorised for this purpose. Regarding the exit portfolio it was planned from the very beginning to spin off both structured securities and non-strategic assets of approximately EUR 85 billion (the so-called “PEG” portfolio, of which the Phoenix portfolio is part) to a so-called bad bank, set up pursuant to the Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung, the German bad bank law (FMStFG). This transaction was initially scheduled to be completed well in advance of 31 December 2009, in order to meet the caps on the balance sheet total. Moreover, Germany committed to initiate the change of the bank's ownership structure through a public tender procedure before the end of 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In order to achieve the targeted balance sheet reduction, the restructuring plan set out explicitly in Annex 2 point 3.3.l that the “reduction of the total balance sheet and the risk-weighted assets ... is based on the assumption that WestLB will fully dispose a number of assets grouped in an exit portfolio.” However, no additional aid was foreseen or authorised for this purpose. Regarding the exit portfolio it was planned from the very beginning to spin off both structured securities and non-strategic assets of approximately EUR 85 billion (the so-called “PEG” portfolio, of which the Phoenix portfolio is part) to a so-called bad bank, set up pursuant to the Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung, the German bad bank law (FMStFG). This transaction was initially scheduled to be completed well in advance of 31 December 2009, in order to meet the caps on the balance sheet total. Moreover, Germany committed to initiate the change of the bank's ownership structure through a public tender procedure before the end of 2011.

| (12) | The spin-off could not be carried out as initially planned since WestLB's shareholders did not agree upon the set-up of the bad bank. Furthermore, the capital required to enable the spin-off of risky and non-strategic assets had been substantially underestimated. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The spin-off could not be carried out as initially planned since WestLB's shareholders did not agree upon the set-up of the bad bank. Furthermore, the capital required to enable the spin-off of risky and non-strategic assets had been substantially underestimated.

2.2.   The Decision of 7 October 2009

| (13) | In October 2009, additional aid in the form of a further risk assumption for the Phoenix portfolio in the amount of EUR 6,4 billion was required to address an additional capital shortage that had not been made known previously and was therefore not addressed in the Commission Decision of 12 May 2009. Due to increasing losses and mounting risk weights, the risk shield for the Phoenix portfolio was no longer sufficient to achieve a risk transfer. Therefore, the portfolio became subject to regulatory capital requirements again. As a result, WestLB's overall capital ratio fell to [< 7 %] (6) and, therefore, significantly short of the regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without the provision of additional capital or State aid, the German regulator BaFin would have been obliged to initiate bank resolution procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In October 2009, additional aid in the form of a further risk assumption for the Phoenix portfolio in the amount of EUR 6,4 billion was required to address an additional capital shortage that had not been made known previously and was therefore not addressed in the Commission Decision of 12 May 2009. Due to increasing losses and mounting risk weights, the risk shield for the Phoenix portfolio was no longer sufficient to achieve a risk transfer. Therefore, the portfolio became subject to regulatory capital requirements again. As a result, WestLB's overall capital ratio fell to [< 7 %] (6) and, therefore, significantly short of the regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without the provision of additional capital or State aid, the German regulator BaFin would have been obliged to initiate bank resolution procedures.

| (14) | This additional aid during the restructuring phase was temporarily approved for reasons of financial stability by the Commission in its Decision of 7 October 2009. However, that decision required a reassessment of the existing restructuring plan and the planned restructuring measures. Additionally, Germany provided a commitment that all shareholders would ensure the sale of the “core” bank, including establishing a core capital ratio of 7 %. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

This additional aid during the restructuring phase was temporarily approved for reasons of financial stability by the Commission in its Decision of 7 October 2009. However, that decision required a reassessment of the existing restructuring plan and the planned restructuring measures. Additionally, Germany provided a commitment that all shareholders would ensure the sale of the “core” bank, including establishing a core capital ratio of 7 %.

2.3.   The new measures — Bad bank and additional recapitalisation

| (15) | At the end of November 2009, the risk assumption granted under the Decision of 7 October expired before the intended asset relief measure had been implemented. In addition, despite an explicit commitment by Germany that all shareholders had undertaken to inject the capital required to increase WestLB's Tier 1 capital so that it had a Tier 1 ratio of 7 %, the savings banks failed to do so. As a result, the overall capital ratio fell to [< 6,7 %] and, thus, again short of regulatory minimum capital requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

At the end of November 2009, the risk assumption granted under the Decision of 7 October expired before the intended asset relief measure had been implemented. In addition, despite an explicit commitment by Germany that all shareholders had undertaken to inject the capital required to increase WestLB's Tier 1 capital so that it had a Tier 1 ratio of 7 %, the savings banks failed to do so. As a result, the overall capital ratio fell to [< 6,7 %] and, thus, again short of regulatory minimum capital requirements.

(a)   The recapitalisation of WestLB

| (16) | On 24 November 2009, Germany and WestLB's shareholders agreed upon the details of the creation of the bad bank under the FMStFG. WestLB is at present not sufficiently capitalized to finance this transaction without external support. Therefore, SoFFin will inject overall EUR 3 billion in at least three partial payments, taking place between 18 December 2009 and 30 April 2010, in form of a silent participation that can be converted into ordinary shares after 1 July 2010 (7). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

On 24 November 2009, Germany and WestLB's shareholders agreed upon the details of the creation of the bad bank under the FMStFG. WestLB is at present not sufficiently capitalized to finance this transaction without external support. Therefore, SoFFin will inject overall EUR 3 billion in at least three partial payments, taking place between 18 December 2009 and 30 April 2010, in form of a silent participation that can be converted into ordinary shares after 1 July 2010 (7).

(b)   The bad bank for WestLB

| (17) | WestLB intends to spin off its toxic and non-strategic assets into a bad bank under Section 8a of the FMStFG (8). Those assets have been assigned to two portfolios, the first called Phoenix portfolio, the second PEG portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

WestLB intends to spin off its toxic and non-strategic assets into a bad bank under Section 8a of the FMStFG (8). Those assets have been assigned to two portfolios, the first called Phoenix portfolio, the second PEG portfolio.

| (18) | The Phoenix portfolio contains toxic assets, mainly structured securities, with a nominal value of approximately EUR 23,8 billion (as of 30 June 2009). The Phoenix portfolio will be transferred to the bad bank with the original risk shield of 5 billion. |
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(18)

The Phoenix portfolio contains toxic assets, mainly structured securities, with a nominal value of approximately EUR 23,8 billion (as of 30 June 2009). The Phoenix portfolio will be transferred to the bad bank with the original risk shield of 5 billion.

| (19) | The remaining portfolio comprises mainly non-strategic assets, in particular corporate, State, municipal and student loans, as well as collateralized debt obligations, and other structured securities. It has a nominal value of approximately EUR 61,3 billion (as of 30 June 2009). |
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(19)

The remaining portfolio comprises mainly non-strategic assets, in particular corporate, State, municipal and student loans, as well as collateralized debt obligations, and other structured securities. It has a nominal value of approximately EUR 61,3 billion (as of 30 June 2009).

| (20) | The combined nominal value of the two portfolios is EUR 85,1 billion. According to information provided by Germany, the book value of the assets is equal to EUR [65-75] billion and the estimated real economic value equal to EUR [60-70] billion. No market value of the portfolios was submitted although the Commission has repeatedly asked for it. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The combined nominal value of the two portfolios is EUR 85,1 billion. According to information provided by Germany, the book value of the assets is equal to EUR [65-75] billion and the estimated real economic value equal to EUR [60-70] billion. No market value of the portfolios was submitted although the Commission has repeatedly asked for it.

| (21) | Regarding the set-up of the bad bank WestLB proposes a two-step procedure: in a first step, to be implemented before 31 December 2009, the Phoenix portfolio will be split off, with the retroactive cut-off date set at 1 January 2009. In a second step, planned for April 2010, WestLB intends to spin off the remaining portfolio, to be implemented retroactively with effect as of 1 January 2010. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Regarding the set-up of the bad bank WestLB proposes a two-step procedure: in a first step, to be implemented before 31 December 2009, the Phoenix portfolio will be split off, with the retroactive cut-off date set at 1 January 2009. In a second step, planned for April 2010, WestLB intends to spin off the remaining portfolio, to be implemented retroactively with effect as of 1 January 2010. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months.

| (22) | After the spin-off, those assets and liabilities will be held by the bad bank. In order to ensure that expected losses of the assets are sufficiently covered, WestLB will equip the bad bank with equity of EUR 3 billion. It will provide the capital step-by-step, in line with the staggered spin-off of assets and the corresponding need for capital. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months. |
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(22)

After the spin-off, those assets and liabilities will be held by the bad bank. In order to ensure that expected losses of the assets are sufficiently covered, WestLB will equip the bad bank with equity of EUR 3 billion. It will provide the capital step-by-step, in line with the staggered spin-off of assets and the corresponding need for capital. Germany requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months.

| (23) | Potential further losses will be covered by a guarantee by WestLB's shareholders in the amount of EUR 1 billion in total, provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia (EUR 0,482 billion), by the savings banks associations RSGV and WLSGV (EUR 0,501 billion), and by the regional authorities LVR and LWL (EUR 0,017 billion). Germany also requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Potential further losses will be covered by a guarantee by WestLB's shareholders in the amount of EUR 1 billion in total, provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia (EUR 0,482 billion), by the savings banks associations RSGV and WLSGV (EUR 0,501 billion), and by the regional authorities LVR and LWL (EUR 0,017 billion). Germany also requests the temporary authorisation of this measure for 6 months.

| (24) | Should the envisaged capital not suffice to cover the losses incurred in the future by the bad bank, such losses — pursuant to the FMStFG — must be covered by the shareholders of the beneficiary bank. However, that obligation to compensate further losses is capped in this case as regards RSGV and WLSGV at an amount of EUR 4 billion in total (EUR 4,5 billion considering EUR 0,5 billion related to the guarantee given as former owners, the so-called “Alteigentümergarantie”). In order to provide these EUR 4 billion, RSGV and WLSGV are permitted to build up adequate reserves for this obligation over a period of 25 years. Any further losses exceeding the equity of the bad bank and the existing guarantees will be borne by FMSA and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, releasing RSGV and WLSGV from their corresponding obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Should the envisaged capital not suffice to cover the losses incurred in the future by the bad bank, such losses — pursuant to the FMStFG — must be covered by the shareholders of the beneficiary bank. However, that obligation to compensate further losses is capped in this case as regards RSGV and WLSGV at an amount of EUR 4 billion in total (EUR 4,5 billion considering EUR 0,5 billion related to the guarantee given as former owners, the so-called “Alteigentümergarantie”). In order to provide these EUR 4 billion, RSGV and WLSGV are permitted to build up adequate reserves for this obligation over a period of 25 years. Any further losses exceeding the equity of the bad bank and the existing guarantees will be borne by FMSA and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, releasing RSGV and WLSGV from their corresponding obligations.

(c)   Envisaged further recapitalisation of WestLB

| (25) | Finally, SoFFin and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia have agreed to provide further equity for WestLB if such additional support is required to enable the sale of WestLB even after the establishment of the bad bank. 51 % of the capital needs will be provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia in the form of a first-loss guarantee, and 49 % will be provided by SoFFin. SoFFin has restricted its commitment to EUR 1 billion; hence, an overall support of EUR 2 billion must not be exceeded. This potential additional measure is not the subject of Germany's request for temporary authorisation for 6 months. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Finally, SoFFin and the Land North Rhine-Westphalia have agreed to provide further equity for WestLB if such additional support is required to enable the sale of WestLB even after the establishment of the bad bank. 51 % of the capital needs will be provided by the Land North Rhine-Westphalia in the form of a first-loss guarantee, and 49 % will be provided by SoFFin. SoFFin has restricted its commitment to EUR 1 billion; hence, an overall support of EUR 2 billion must not be exceeded. This potential additional measure is not the subject of Germany's request for temporary authorisation for 6 months.

(d)   Key assumptions of the restructuring plan

| (26) | The revised restructuring plan — of which a summary was provided on 15 December 2009 — foresees that, as initially planned, WestLB will withdraw from the markets for real estate finance (except for services provided to the saving banks), retail banking, asset management, and private equity. A core feature of WestLB’s strategic orientation towards a client-focussed business model remains the withdrawal from proprietary trading. However, WestLB had to revise the targets for profit set in the initial plan, as general market conditions over the last months proved to be worse than expected by WestLB. |
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(26)

The revised restructuring plan — of which a summary was provided on 15 December 2009 — foresees that, as initially planned, WestLB will withdraw from the markets for real estate finance (except for services provided to the saving banks), retail banking, asset management, and private equity. A core feature of WestLB’s strategic orientation towards a client-focussed business model remains the withdrawal from proprietary trading. However, WestLB had to revise the targets for profit set in the initial plan, as general market conditions over the last months proved to be worse than expected by WestLB.

| (27) | The bank now plans to achieve a target of EUR 500 million in profit before taxes only in 2014 at the earliest, and not by 2012, as initially planned. That revision of targets is not only due to general market conditions, but also due to the fact that its rating was recently downgraded to BBB+. WestLB estimates that a Single-A-Rating will not be reached again before 31 December 2010. Consequently, WestLB now has reduced access to funding whilst simultaneously it is exposed to stricter capital requirements and a significant increase in impairment charges for credit losses. Nevertheless, WestLB’s strategic thrust remains unchanged as compared to the initial plan. Deconsolidation will be extended and produce additional saving effects. Sectors without strategic importance and low expertise are to be phased out. WestLB will liquidate or sell at least five more affiliate companies than originally planned. Its offices in Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile will be closed. WestLB plans to withdraw from the funds business, own issues of closed-end investment funds, the private equity business, and the leveraged finance business. With regard to the substance of the business model, the revised restructuring plan shows overall only minor changes. |
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(27)

The bank now plans to achieve a target of EUR 500 million in profit before taxes only in 2014 at the earliest, and not by 2012, as initially planned. That revision of targets is not only due to general market conditions, but also due to the fact that its rating was recently downgraded to BBB+. WestLB estimates that a Single-A-Rating will not be reached again before 31 December 2010. Consequently, WestLB now has reduced access to funding whilst simultaneously it is exposed to stricter capital requirements and a significant increase in impairment charges for credit losses. Nevertheless, WestLB’s strategic thrust remains unchanged as compared to the initial plan. Deconsolidation will be extended and produce additional saving effects. Sectors without strategic importance and low expertise are to be phased out. WestLB will liquidate or sell at least five more affiliate companies than originally planned. Its offices in Buenos Aires and Santiago de Chile will be closed. WestLB plans to withdraw from the funds business, own issues of closed-end investment funds, the private equity business, and the leveraged finance business. With regard to the substance of the business model, the revised restructuring plan shows overall only minor changes.

| (28) | Germany agreed to the Commission's proposal to establish concrete parameters that will allow monitoring of WestLB's commitment, given in the context of the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, to cease proprietary trading activities. |
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(28)

Germany agreed to the Commission's proposal to establish concrete parameters that will allow monitoring of WestLB's commitment, given in the context of the restructuring Decision of 12 May 2009, to cease proprietary trading activities.

| (29) | On 16 December 2009, WestLB issued an ad hoc publication announcing that it might not be able to achieve a positive result in 2009 but probably record a loss. Therefore, it would not be able to pay dividends or coupons and such instruments would participate in the loss. |
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(29)

On 16 December 2009, WestLB issued an ad hoc publication announcing that it might not be able to achieve a positive result in 2009 but probably record a loss. Therefore, it would not be able to pay dividends or coupons and such instruments would participate in the loss.

3.   COMMENTS BY GERMANY

| (30) | Due to the fact that WestLB, a systemically relevant bank, would become subject to bank resolution procedures without State aid being granted, and the serious consequences that this event would entail for Germany's financial system and to the German economy, Germany requests an urgent temporary authorisation of the measures for six months. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Due to the fact that WestLB, a systemically relevant bank, would become subject to bank resolution procedures without State aid being granted, and the serious consequences that this event would entail for Germany's financial system and to the German economy, Germany requests an urgent temporary authorisation of the measures for six months.

| (31) | Germany agrees that the capital injection of EUR 3 billion by SoFFin constitutes State aid. Germany also does not dispute that the taking over of losses of the owners for the assets in the bad bank could constitute aid. However, in this particular case, Germany disputes the existence of elements of State aid. It claims that the spin-off of the assets would be accompanied by sufficient equity (the EUR 3 billion) to cover expected and unexpected losses. The additional explicit guarantee provided by the shareholders and their obligation to bear potential losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank should be considered as a mere safeguard for eventualities. Potential benefits stemming from State resources would be of theoretical nature only. Whereas Germany acknowledges that, in theory, this could be the case under very unrealistic assumptions as far as the guarantee is concerned, that possibility is entirely excluded as regards the shareholders obligation to bear losses potentially resulting from the resolution of the bad bank. |
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(31)

Germany agrees that the capital injection of EUR 3 billion by SoFFin constitutes State aid. Germany also does not dispute that the taking over of losses of the owners for the assets in the bad bank could constitute aid. However, in this particular case, Germany disputes the existence of elements of State aid. It claims that the spin-off of the assets would be accompanied by sufficient equity (the EUR 3 billion) to cover expected and unexpected losses. The additional explicit guarantee provided by the shareholders and their obligation to bear potential losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank should be considered as a mere safeguard for eventualities. Potential benefits stemming from State resources would be of theoretical nature only. Whereas Germany acknowledges that, in theory, this could be the case under very unrealistic assumptions as far as the guarantee is concerned, that possibility is entirely excluded as regards the shareholders obligation to bear losses potentially resulting from the resolution of the bad bank.

| (32) | Germany commits that WestLB shall pay a remuneration of 10 % p.a. which is to be paid retroactively for the EUR 3 billion recapitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Germany commits that WestLB shall pay a remuneration of 10 % p.a. which is to be paid retroactively for the EUR 3 billion recapitalisation.

| (33) | Germany furthermore commits to adjust the remuneration to bring it in line with the requirements of the Impaired Assets Communication should the valuation to be performed by the Commission reveal additional benefits to WestLB. |
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(33)

Germany furthermore commits to adjust the remuneration to bring it in line with the requirements of the Impaired Assets Communication should the valuation to be performed by the Commission reveal additional benefits to WestLB.

| (34) | Germany commits that the aid shall be limited to the minimum necessary by providing the recapitalisation pro rata and by implementing a redemption mechanism should future developments result in an overcapitalisation. |
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(34)

Germany commits that the aid shall be limited to the minimum necessary by providing the recapitalisation pro rata and by implementing a redemption mechanism should future developments result in an overcapitalisation.

| (35) | Additionally, Germany commits that SoFFin will receive proceeds resulting from the sale of WestLB or parts thereof prior to the other shareholders until the capital granted by it is paid back fully. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Additionally, Germany commits that SoFFin will receive proceeds resulting from the sale of WestLB or parts thereof prior to the other shareholders until the capital granted by it is paid back fully.

| (36) | Germany further commits that until the measures are terminated, WestLB will make payments on capital instruments only to the extent it is under an obligation to do so without releasing reserves or the special reserves pursuant to Section 340(g) of the German Commercial Code. Furthermore, these instruments shall participate in losses if losses could only be avoided through the release of such reserves. |
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(36)

Germany further commits that until the measures are terminated, WestLB will make payments on capital instruments only to the extent it is under an obligation to do so without releasing reserves or the special reserves pursuant to Section 340(g) of the German Commercial Code. Furthermore, these instruments shall participate in losses if losses could only be avoided through the release of such reserves.

| (37) | Germany commits to start the sales process of WestLB earlier than initially planned, i.e. [within the first half of] 2010. Furthermore, if the sale has not been concluded at the beginning of 2011, Germany commits to appoint, subject to a corresponding decision by the Commission, a divestiture trustee who has the power to sell WestLB or parts thereof. Germany, however, refuses to commit to additional restructuring or measures limiting distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Germany commits to start the sales process of WestLB earlier than initially planned, i.e. [within the first half of] 2010. Furthermore, if the sale has not been concluded at the beginning of 2011, Germany commits to appoint, subject to a corresponding decision by the Commission, a divestiture trustee who has the power to sell WestLB or parts thereof. Germany, however, refuses to commit to additional restructuring or measures limiting distortion of competition.

4.   ASSESSMENT

4.1.   Existence of State aid

| (38) | Article 107(1) TFEU provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Article 107(1) TFEU provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

| (39) | In concurrence with the German authorities, the Commission considers first that the EUR 3 billion capital injection of SoFFin and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion by WestLB's shareholders constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (9). No market investor would grant WestLB the same support under the current circumstances. |
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(39)

In concurrence with the German authorities, the Commission considers first that the EUR 3 billion capital injection of SoFFin and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion by WestLB's shareholders constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU (9). No market investor would grant WestLB the same support under the current circumstances.

| (40) | Additionally, the Commission considers that the establishment of a bad bank under the FMStFG can comprise additional aid to the beneficiary bank which must be assessed under the Commission’s Impaired Asset Communication (10) (“IAC”). The IAC provides guidance on the treatment under Article 107(3)(b) EC of asset relief measures by Member States, including in particular bad bank solutions as indicated in Annex II to the IAC. |
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(40)

Additionally, the Commission considers that the establishment of a bad bank under the FMStFG can comprise additional aid to the beneficiary bank which must be assessed under the Commission’s Impaired Asset Communication (10) (“IAC”). The IAC provides guidance on the treatment under Article 107(3)(b) EC of asset relief measures by Member States, including in particular bad bank solutions as indicated in Annex II to the IAC.

| (41) | The Commission recalls that according to the IAC impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses. It defines asset relief as any measure whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. In the present case the main purpose of the bad bank is to provide relief from risky and non-strategic assets of WestLB. The bad bank solution is intended to protect WestLB against the risk of future devaluation of assets included in the portfolio. The bad bank, in its design as well in its effects, allows WestLB to avoid considerable write-downs and at the same time reduces the bank's regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, the bad bank constitutes an asset relief measure and falls within the scope of the IAC (11). |
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(41)

The Commission recalls that according to the IAC impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses. It defines asset relief as any measure whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. In the present case the main purpose of the bad bank is to provide relief from risky and non-strategic assets of WestLB. The bad bank solution is intended to protect WestLB against the risk of future devaluation of assets included in the portfolio. The bad bank, in its design as well in its effects, allows WestLB to avoid considerable write-downs and at the same time reduces the bank's regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, the bad bank constitutes an asset relief measure and falls within the scope of the IAC (11).

| (42) | According to point 39 of the IAC an impaired asset measure constitutes State aid in so far as the transfer value exceeds the market value of the total portfolio. |
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(42)

According to point 39 of the IAC an impaired asset measure constitutes State aid in so far as the transfer value exceeds the market value of the total portfolio.

| (43) | In this case, the assets will be spun off at the book value of EUR [65-75] billion. However, WestLB provides the bad bank with equity in the amount of EUR 3 billion. Providing equity to the bad bank is, from an economic perspective, equivalent to a write-down before a transfer. Therefore, this equity can be subtracted from the book value in order to obtain the transfer value. The transfer value is thus EUR [62-72] billion. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

In this case, the assets will be spun off at the book value of EUR [65-75] billion. However, WestLB provides the bad bank with equity in the amount of EUR 3 billion. Providing equity to the bad bank is, from an economic perspective, equivalent to a write-down before a transfer. Therefore, this equity can be subtracted from the book value in order to obtain the transfer value. The transfer value is thus EUR [62-72] billion.

| (44) | As no market value has been submitted, the market value can deemed to be zero. Hence, the Commission at this stage deems that the aid amount is EUR [62-72] billion. |
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(44)

As no market value has been submitted, the market value can deemed to be zero. Hence, the Commission at this stage deems that the aid amount is EUR [62-72] billion.

| (45) | Finally, it shall be noted that apart from the risk shield of EUR 5 billion none of the aid to be received by WestLB has been subject to the final Decision of 12 May 2009. |
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(45)

Finally, it shall be noted that apart from the risk shield of EUR 5 billion none of the aid to be received by WestLB has been subject to the final Decision of 12 May 2009.

4.2.   Application of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU

| (46) | Article 107(3)(b) TFEU empowers the Commission to decide that aid is compatible with the internal market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission acknowledges that, overall, the threat of a serious disturbance in the German economy persists and that measures supporting banks are suitable to address that threat. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Article 107(3)(b) TFEU empowers the Commission to decide that aid is compatible with the internal market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission acknowledges that, overall, the threat of a serious disturbance in the German economy persists and that measures supporting banks are suitable to address that threat.

| (47) | Given the significance of its integration and cooperation with other public sector banks, the Commission accepts that WestLB is a systemically relevant bank. The Commission further notes that the measures which are linked to each other contractually and, therefore, interdependent, are suitable to address WestLB's breach of regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without these measures, the shortfall of regulatory minimum capital requirements would trigger bank resolution procedures by the competent regulatory authority. The Commission concludes that such a failure would entail serious consequences for the German financial sector and the real economy. The measures must therefore be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Given the significance of its integration and cooperation with other public sector banks, the Commission accepts that WestLB is a systemically relevant bank. The Commission further notes that the measures which are linked to each other contractually and, therefore, interdependent, are suitable to address WestLB's breach of regulatory minimum capital requirements. Without these measures, the shortfall of regulatory minimum capital requirements would trigger bank resolution procedures by the competent regulatory authority. The Commission concludes that such a failure would entail serious consequences for the German financial sector and the real economy. The measures must therefore be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

4.3.   Compatibility with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU

| (48) | The Commission has already made a first assessment regarding compatibility of some restructuring aid received by WestLB in its Decision of 12 May 2009. However, that decision did not authorise the additional aid which is the subject of the present decision. The compatibility of that additional aid needs therefore to be assessed separately. The Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009 (12) states in point 27 that such additional aid during the restructuring can only be provided if it is justified for reasons of financial stability and is limited to the minimum necessary to restore viability. Pursuant to point 16 of the Restructuring Communication such measures cannot be approved under a scheme but must be authorised ex ante individually. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Commission has already made a first assessment regarding compatibility of some restructuring aid received by WestLB in its Decision of 12 May 2009. However, that decision did not authorise the additional aid which is the subject of the present decision. The compatibility of that additional aid needs therefore to be assessed separately. The Restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009 (12) states in point 27 that such additional aid during the restructuring can only be provided if it is justified for reasons of financial stability and is limited to the minimum necessary to restore viability. Pursuant to point 16 of the Restructuring Communication such measures cannot be approved under a scheme but must be authorised ex ante individually.

4.3.1.   Recapitalisation

| (49) | As with any recapitalisation measure, the recapitalisation of WestLB in form of a silent participation by SoFFin amounting to EUR 3 billion needs to be examined in the context of the Communication of 5 December 2008 on the limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (Recapitalisation Communication) (13) independently of the fact that it is required and intended to establish a bad bank. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

As with any recapitalisation measure, the recapitalisation of WestLB in form of a silent participation by SoFFin amounting to EUR 3 billion needs to be examined in the context of the Communication of 5 December 2008 on the limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (Recapitalisation Communication) (13) independently of the fact that it is required and intended to establish a bad bank.

| (50) | The Recapitalisation Communication sets out that such measures are in principle appropriate if they prevent the insolvency of a bank and thereby serve financial stability as well as supporting the provision with credit of the real economy. However, such measures must limit distortions of competition to the minimum. To this end, section 2 of the Recapitalisation Communication requires an appropriate remuneration. As noted in point 11 of the Recapitalisation Communication, market-oriented pricing of capital injections would be the best safeguard against unjustified disparities in the level of capitalisation and improper use of such capital. Furthermore, section 2.3 of the Recapitalisation Communication explicitly states that such remuneration must be higher in the case of distressed banks, but pursuant to point 44 in any event as close as possible to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions. The German rescue scheme requires at least 10 % on average for banks that are not fundamentally sound, according to the institution's risk profile. This was confirmed as a benchmark for distressed banks in Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 in Case N 615/08 (14). WestLB is considered to be a distressed bank since it would have been subject to bank resolution procedures without aid being granted. Thus, the capital provided must be remunerated with at least 10 % p.a. to be compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. According to the commitments provided by Germany, WestLB will pay 10 % p.a. This rate is in line with the above requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Recapitalisation Communication sets out that such measures are in principle appropriate if they prevent the insolvency of a bank and thereby serve financial stability as well as supporting the provision with credit of the real economy. However, such measures must limit distortions of competition to the minimum. To this end, section 2 of the Recapitalisation Communication requires an appropriate remuneration. As noted in point 11 of the Recapitalisation Communication, market-oriented pricing of capital injections would be the best safeguard against unjustified disparities in the level of capitalisation and improper use of such capital. Furthermore, section 2.3 of the Recapitalisation Communication explicitly states that such remuneration must be higher in the case of distressed banks, but pursuant to point 44 in any event as close as possible to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions. The German rescue scheme requires at least 10 % on average for banks that are not fundamentally sound, according to the institution's risk profile. This was confirmed as a benchmark for distressed banks in Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 in Case N 615/08 (14). WestLB is considered to be a distressed bank since it would have been subject to bank resolution procedures without aid being granted. Thus, the capital provided must be remunerated with at least 10 % p.a. to be compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. According to the commitments provided by Germany, WestLB will pay 10 % p.a. This rate is in line with the above requirements.

| (51) | The recapitalisation must be seen in the context of the updated restructuring of WestLB which already provides for sufficient behavioural safeguards in line with point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication. Moreover, Germany has provided several commitments to ensure a restricted dividend policy and that the recapitalisation will be used only to implement the objectives of the original decision. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

The recapitalisation must be seen in the context of the updated restructuring of WestLB which already provides for sufficient behavioural safeguards in line with point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication. Moreover, Germany has provided several commitments to ensure a restricted dividend policy and that the recapitalisation will be used only to implement the objectives of the original decision.

| (52) | Therefore, the recapitalisation is compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. However, pursuant to point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication, it can only be authorised temporarily for six months until the presentation of a revised restructuring plan. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Therefore, the recapitalisation is compatible with the Recapitalisation Communication. However, pursuant to point 45 of the Recapitalisation Communication, it can only be authorised temporarily for six months until the presentation of a revised restructuring plan.

4.3.2.   Asset relief measures

| (53) | Asset relief measures by Member States, irrespective of their form, need to be assessed under the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Asset relief measures by Member States, irrespective of their form, need to be assessed under the IAC.

—   Eligibility of assets

| (54) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. It notes that assets which have triggered the financial crisis and are subject to severe downward value adjustments appear to account for the bulk of uncertainty and scepticism concerning the viability of banks. In this respect, US mortgage backed securities and associated hedges and derivatives are mentioned. The IAC also notes, however, that an overly narrow relief measure would not be advisable and refers to a proportionate approach permitting the extension of eligibility to well-defined categories of other assets as well. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. It notes that assets which have triggered the financial crisis and are subject to severe downward value adjustments appear to account for the bulk of uncertainty and scepticism concerning the viability of banks. In this respect, US mortgage backed securities and associated hedges and derivatives are mentioned. The IAC also notes, however, that an overly narrow relief measure would not be advisable and refers to a proportionate approach permitting the extension of eligibility to well-defined categories of other assets as well.

| (55) | The bad bank does not only consist of structured securities but comprises also corporate, State, municipal, and student loans. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The bad bank does not only consist of structured securities but comprises also corporate, State, municipal, and student loans.

| (56) | While in principle it would be questionable whether a spin-off of such assets at a transfer price above the market value is compatible with State aid rules, the IAC recognises in point 34 the necessity of a pragmatic and flexible approach to the selection of asset types for impaired assets measures (15). The Commission notes that the range of asset classes affected by the financial crisis became broader due to spillover effects. In particular, student loans and securities related to shipping, aircraft and real estate in general, face illiquid markets and/or are subject to severe downward adjustments. Asset relief for such assets can help to achieve the objectives of the IAC, i.e. to increase transparency and to contribute to financial stability, even if such assets are not included in the assets classes that initially triggered the financial crisis. Therefore, the Commission has in previous cases accepted asset relief measures for those assets (16). As set out in point 36 of the IAC, however, the comparatively broad range of assets affected requires an increased depth of restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

While in principle it would be questionable whether a spin-off of such assets at a transfer price above the market value is compatible with State aid rules, the IAC recognises in point 34 the necessity of a pragmatic and flexible approach to the selection of asset types for impaired assets measures (15). The Commission notes that the range of asset classes affected by the financial crisis became broader due to spillover effects. In particular, student loans and securities related to shipping, aircraft and real estate in general, face illiquid markets and/or are subject to severe downward adjustments. Asset relief for such assets can help to achieve the objectives of the IAC, i.e. to increase transparency and to contribute to financial stability, even if such assets are not included in the assets classes that initially triggered the financial crisis. Therefore, the Commission has in previous cases accepted asset relief measures for those assets (16). As set out in point 36 of the IAC, however, the comparatively broad range of assets affected requires an increased depth of restructuring.

—   Transparency and disclosure

| (57) | As regards transparency and disclosure, section 5.1 of the IAC requires full ex ante transparency and disclosure of impairments on the assets which are covered by relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the competent supervisory authority. This valuation must be provided to the Commission according to point 37 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

As regards transparency and disclosure, section 5.1 of the IAC requires full ex ante transparency and disclosure of impairments on the assets which are covered by relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the competent supervisory authority. This valuation must be provided to the Commission according to point 37 of the IAC.

| (58) | In that respect, the Commission notes that information provided by Germany so far only covers some of the assets to be taken over by the bad bank. Moreover, no detailed evaluation performed by independent experts has yet been submitted to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In that respect, the Commission notes that information provided by Germany so far only covers some of the assets to be taken over by the bad bank. Moreover, no detailed evaluation performed by independent experts has yet been submitted to the Commission.

| (59) | Consequently, the Commission notes that the IAC's criteria regarding transparency and disclosure are not met and, therefore, questions the compatibility of the measures with the State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Consequently, the Commission notes that the IAC's criteria regarding transparency and disclosure are not met and, therefore, questions the compatibility of the measures with the State aid rules.

—   Management of assets

| (60) | As regards management of assets, section 5.6 of the IAC requires a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its shielded assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. In this respect, the Commission notes that a bad bank ensures a clear functional and organisational separation, and is thus sufficient to achieve compliance. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

As regards management of assets, section 5.6 of the IAC requires a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its shielded assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. In this respect, the Commission notes that a bad bank ensures a clear functional and organisational separation, and is thus sufficient to achieve compliance.

—   Valuation

| (61) | Section 5.5 of the IAC explains that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition and to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Section 5.5 of the IAC explains that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition and to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies.

| (62) | Germany, so far, has only submitted estimated and/or preliminary figures and not disclosed all relevant details of the portfolios concerned and the methodology used for the assessment. Therefore, the Commission has doubts about the valuation of the real economic value of the portfolio being EUR [60-70] billion. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Germany, so far, has only submitted estimated and/or preliminary figures and not disclosed all relevant details of the portfolios concerned and the methodology used for the assessment. Therefore, the Commission has doubts about the valuation of the real economic value of the portfolio being EUR [60-70] billion.

—   Burden-sharing

| (63) | As regards ex ante burden-sharing, section 5.2 of the IAC points out that banks ought to bear the losses associated with the impaired assets to the maximum extent. Burden sharing is usually achieved by a transfer at the real economic value and requires a corresponding write down of the book value. Accordingly, the beneficiary bank must disclose incurred and expected losses of the portfolio, and should limit the transfer price to the real economic value. However, if the beneficiary bank capitalises the bad bank with sufficient equity and thereby enables the bad bank to absorb future losses, the same economic effect is obtained. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

As regards ex ante burden-sharing, section 5.2 of the IAC points out that banks ought to bear the losses associated with the impaired assets to the maximum extent. Burden sharing is usually achieved by a transfer at the real economic value and requires a corresponding write down of the book value. Accordingly, the beneficiary bank must disclose incurred and expected losses of the portfolio, and should limit the transfer price to the real economic value. However, if the beneficiary bank capitalises the bad bank with sufficient equity and thereby enables the bad bank to absorb future losses, the same economic effect is obtained.

| (64) | As indicated above, the “transfer value” is EUR [62-72] billion. Germany claims that the equity to be provided to the bad bank (i.e. EUR 3 billion) is sufficient to cover so-called expected losses. In the absence of a proper valuation it remains unclear whether this equity is sufficient to cover the write down or first loss required under the IAC as no details regarding the methodology used have been revealed. However, aggregate figures provided by Germany reveal a difference between the book value and the real economic value of EUR [2,5-5,5] billion. Thus, the equity provided appears to be insufficient to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value, which is at odds with the requirements of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

As indicated above, the “transfer value” is EUR [62-72] billion. Germany claims that the equity to be provided to the bad bank (i.e. EUR 3 billion) is sufficient to cover so-called expected losses. In the absence of a proper valuation it remains unclear whether this equity is sufficient to cover the write down or first loss required under the IAC as no details regarding the methodology used have been revealed. However, aggregate figures provided by Germany reveal a difference between the book value and the real economic value of EUR [2,5-5,5] billion. Thus, the equity provided appears to be insufficient to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value, which is at odds with the requirements of the IAC.

| (65) | Moreover, the Commission notes that the shareholders have granted a guarantee amounting to EUR 1 billion which is already required to compensate for the shortfall of equity mentioned in point 62. Furthermore, the shareholders have an obligation to bear losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank. Germany claims that both obligations will theoretically not be needed and do not have an economic value. This claim is however contradicted by the need felt by the parties concerned not only to notify the additional guarantee of EUR 1 billion but to cap the saving banks obligation to bear losses incurred by the bad bank. This is, in the view of the Commission, further evidence that the equity provided to the bad bank is not sufficient to cover all potential losses and, therefore, to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Moreover, the Commission notes that the shareholders have granted a guarantee amounting to EUR 1 billion which is already required to compensate for the shortfall of equity mentioned in point 62. Furthermore, the shareholders have an obligation to bear losses resulting from the resolution of the bad bank. Germany claims that both obligations will theoretically not be needed and do not have an economic value. This claim is however contradicted by the need felt by the parties concerned not only to notify the additional guarantee of EUR 1 billion but to cap the saving banks obligation to bear losses incurred by the bad bank. This is, in the view of the Commission, further evidence that the equity provided to the bad bank is not sufficient to cover all potential losses and, therefore, to cover the difference between the book value and the real economic value.

| (66) | The Commission consequently has doubts that the measures amount to proper burden sharing in line with the IAC and reserves a final judgement on compatibility until the real economic value has been properly established. Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges that the additional explicit guarantee of EUR 1 billion is part of the asset relief measures and must therefore take part in its approval. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission consequently has doubts that the measures amount to proper burden sharing in line with the IAC and reserves a final judgement on compatibility until the real economic value has been properly established. Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges that the additional explicit guarantee of EUR 1 billion is part of the asset relief measures and must therefore take part in its approval.

—   Remuneration

| (67) | Point 21 of the IAC notes that correct remuneration is another element of the burden-sharing requirement. The Commission shall ensure, as noted in Annex IV to that Communication, that any pricing of the asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those projected in the determination of the real economic value. In line with the Commission's recent practice (17) this is based upon the capital relief effect resulting thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 21 of the IAC notes that correct remuneration is another element of the burden-sharing requirement. The Commission shall ensure, as noted in Annex IV to that Communication, that any pricing of the asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those projected in the determination of the real economic value. In line with the Commission's recent practice (17) this is based upon the capital relief effect resulting thereof.

| (68) | The notification does not indicate how WestLB will remunerate the asset relief measure. Instead, Germany claims there is no need to provide remuneration, because the equity provided to the bad bank was sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Apart from the fact that the Commission has doubts as to the establishment of the real economic value, it has not received any figures for the calculation of the capital relief effect. Since it is not in a position to verify whether the claim of Germany is correct, the Commission must reserve doubts in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The notification does not indicate how WestLB will remunerate the asset relief measure. Instead, Germany claims there is no need to provide remuneration, because the equity provided to the bad bank was sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Apart from the fact that the Commission has doubts as to the establishment of the real economic value, it has not received any figures for the calculation of the capital relief effect. Since it is not in a position to verify whether the claim of Germany is correct, the Commission must reserve doubts in this respect.

| (69) | Furthermore, the Commission highlights again the potential benefit stemming from the shareholders obligation to bear the losses of the bad bank and that apparently it was necessary to cap this obligation as regards the saving banks. This is further evidence that the equity may not be sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Nevertheless, no remuneration is envisaged. Therefore the Commission raises doubts regarding remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Furthermore, the Commission highlights again the potential benefit stemming from the shareholders obligation to bear the losses of the bad bank and that apparently it was necessary to cap this obligation as regards the saving banks. This is further evidence that the equity may not be sufficient to cover both losses and the capital relief effect. Nevertheless, no remuneration is envisaged. Therefore the Commission raises doubts regarding remuneration.

4.4.   Revised restructuring plan

| (70) | The recapitalisation and the asset relief measures are provided with the aim of enabling the restructuring of WestLB. WestLB was already previously under the obligation to present a restructuring plan (18), which was recently submitted. Germany claims that its most recent update aims also at incorporating the current measures including the potential EUR 2 billion mentioned in recital 24. They will thus be subject to this preliminary assessment under the Commission's Restructuring Communication (19). |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The recapitalisation and the asset relief measures are provided with the aim of enabling the restructuring of WestLB. WestLB was already previously under the obligation to present a restructuring plan (18), which was recently submitted. Germany claims that its most recent update aims also at incorporating the current measures including the potential EUR 2 billion mentioned in recital 24. They will thus be subject to this preliminary assessment under the Commission's Restructuring Communication (19).

| (71) | The updated restructuring plan reveals that the original timetable for the asset relief measure has been delayed. Moreover, the currently assessed measures show that a significant amount of additional aid is required compared to the aid under assessment in the Decision of 12 May 2009. Therefore, in the context of the assessment of the revised restructuring plan, all aid measures, including those which were already examined in the Decision of 12 May 2009, will be considered when evaluating the restoration of viability of WestLB through the spin-off of assets into a bad bank and the sale of the remainder by the end of 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The updated restructuring plan reveals that the original timetable for the asset relief measure has been delayed. Moreover, the currently assessed measures show that a significant amount of additional aid is required compared to the aid under assessment in the Decision of 12 May 2009. Therefore, in the context of the assessment of the revised restructuring plan, all aid measures, including those which were already examined in the Decision of 12 May 2009, will be considered when evaluating the restoration of viability of WestLB through the spin-off of assets into a bad bank and the sale of the remainder by the end of 2011.

—   Return to viability

| (72) | The Commission first doubts whether WestLB can generate sufficient revenues that would enable the bank to pay an appropriate remuneration for the recapitalisation and the asset relief measures. Hence, the Commission doubts that the restructuring plan is suitable to restore the viability of WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The Commission first doubts whether WestLB can generate sufficient revenues that would enable the bank to pay an appropriate remuneration for the recapitalisation and the asset relief measures. Hence, the Commission doubts that the restructuring plan is suitable to restore the viability of WestLB.

| (73) | Furthermore, the restructuring plan raises doubts that it is suitable to ensure that WestLB can be sold in a public tender in whole or in parts. As regards marketability, Germany anticipates that further capital will be required to enable the sale of the bank. The Commission takes this as an indication that Germany does not assume that the restructuring plan is apt to achieve the sale of the bank. According to the business plan, even in a medium-term perspective two of the three core business areas currently break even only because a considerable amount of costs has been accounted for in the Corporate Centre unit and has not been fully allocated to the three core business areas. The Commission therefore has doubts that these core business areas are marketable. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Furthermore, the restructuring plan raises doubts that it is suitable to ensure that WestLB can be sold in a public tender in whole or in parts. As regards marketability, Germany anticipates that further capital will be required to enable the sale of the bank. The Commission takes this as an indication that Germany does not assume that the restructuring plan is apt to achieve the sale of the bank. According to the business plan, even in a medium-term perspective two of the three core business areas currently break even only because a considerable amount of costs has been accounted for in the Corporate Centre unit and has not been fully allocated to the three core business areas. The Commission therefore has doubts that these core business areas are marketable.

| (74) | One of WestLB's core assumptions for the business plan — and a key factor for prospects of its profitability in the future — is that the bank will receive a Single-A rating again in the future. However, in May 2009 WestLB was downgraded to BBB+. Moreover, an analysis of a recent reporting by Standard & Poor's (dated 15 October 2009) shows that this rating agency is sceptical about the business model of WestLB, highlighting the weakness of focussing on cyclical wholesale business areas and the vulnerability to financial stress from recessions and difficult capital market conditions. Hence, the scepticism that is expressed in that report does not justify assuming that the bank's rating will improve in the short-term. Thus, the projected profit and loss figures are unlikely to be achieved as the current plan seems to significantly underestimate WestLB's cost of funding. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

One of WestLB's core assumptions for the business plan — and a key factor for prospects of its profitability in the future — is that the bank will receive a Single-A rating again in the future. However, in May 2009 WestLB was downgraded to BBB+. Moreover, an analysis of a recent reporting by Standard & Poor's (dated 15 October 2009) shows that this rating agency is sceptical about the business model of WestLB, highlighting the weakness of focussing on cyclical wholesale business areas and the vulnerability to financial stress from recessions and difficult capital market conditions. Hence, the scepticism that is expressed in that report does not justify assuming that the bank's rating will improve in the short-term. Thus, the projected profit and loss figures are unlikely to be achieved as the current plan seems to significantly underestimate WestLB's cost of funding.

—   Own contribution

| (75) | Germany has provided a commitment to limit payments on capital instruments in case of losses and to achieve loss contribution. According to an ad hoc publication dated 16 December 2009, WestLB will probably post a loss for 2009 and not release reserves to enable payment and coupons or prevent loss participation. Shareholders and other creditors of capital instruments will hence contribute to the restructuring. However, the notified measures limit the potential for losses and thus enable WestLB to serve these instruments in the future. Thus, burden-sharing by shareholders and holders of capital instruments will remain limited. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Germany has provided a commitment to limit payments on capital instruments in case of losses and to achieve loss contribution. According to an ad hoc publication dated 16 December 2009, WestLB will probably post a loss for 2009 and not release reserves to enable payment and coupons or prevent loss participation. Shareholders and other creditors of capital instruments will hence contribute to the restructuring. However, the notified measures limit the potential for losses and thus enable WestLB to serve these instruments in the future. Thus, burden-sharing by shareholders and holders of capital instruments will remain limited.

| (76) | In particular, the savings banks, instead of participating adequately in the burden-sharing, benefit significantly from the asset relief measure. As a result of the recapitalisation, they only contribute to the restructuring process of WestLB to a very limited extent. Furthermore, according to the FMStFG, the shareholders of the beneficiary bank should also compensate for losses that may occur at the resolution of the bad bank, corresponding to their stake. However, this obligation of the savings banks and consequently their participation in future losses of the bad bank has been capped at EUR 4,5 billion. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In particular, the savings banks, instead of participating adequately in the burden-sharing, benefit significantly from the asset relief measure. As a result of the recapitalisation, they only contribute to the restructuring process of WestLB to a very limited extent. Furthermore, according to the FMStFG, the shareholders of the beneficiary bank should also compensate for losses that may occur at the resolution of the bad bank, corresponding to their stake. However, this obligation of the savings banks and consequently their participation in future losses of the bad bank has been capped at EUR 4,5 billion.

| (77) | On this basis the Commission has doubts that burden-sharing is sufficient. Moreover, should Germany not propose genuine measures for burden-sharing of the savings banks, the Commission would have to ask for recovery of any unlawful and incompatible aid from the savings banks. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

On this basis the Commission has doubts that burden-sharing is sufficient. Moreover, should Germany not propose genuine measures for burden-sharing of the savings banks, the Commission would have to ask for recovery of any unlawful and incompatible aid from the savings banks.

—   Measures limiting the distortion of competition

| (78) | According to point 30 of the Restructuring Communication, the nature and form of measures limiting the distortion of competition depends on the amount of the aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted, as well as on the characteristics of the market or markets on which the beneficiary bank will operate. The Commission doubts that the measures proposed to mitigate the distortive effect of the entire aid (original aid and present aid) are sufficient as no relevant additional measures have been proposed notwithstanding the substantial additional aid to be received by WestLB. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

According to point 30 of the Restructuring Communication, the nature and form of measures limiting the distortion of competition depends on the amount of the aid and the conditions and circumstances under which it was granted, as well as on the characteristics of the market or markets on which the beneficiary bank will operate. The Commission doubts that the measures proposed to mitigate the distortive effect of the entire aid (original aid and present aid) are sufficient as no relevant additional measures have been proposed notwithstanding the substantial additional aid to be received by WestLB.

| (79) | Given the potential magnitude of the aid stemming from the original measures plus asset relief measures and the capital injection, the Commission, at this stage, cannot exclude that [...] WestLB might be the only alternative to make all the aid compliant with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Given the potential magnitude of the aid stemming from the original measures plus asset relief measures and the capital injection, the Commission, at this stage, cannot exclude that [...] WestLB might be the only alternative to make all the aid compliant with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.

5.   CONCLUSION AND TEMPORARY AUTHORISATION OF THE MEASURES

| (80) | All measures in favour of WestLB constitute State aid, which can however not be authorised at this stage because the asset relief measure does not fulfil the conditions of transparency and disclosure, valuation, burden sharing, and remuneration and because of doubts regarding the chances of restoration of viability, burden sharing and the mitigation of distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

All measures in favour of WestLB constitute State aid, which can however not be authorised at this stage because the asset relief measure does not fulfil the conditions of transparency and disclosure, valuation, burden sharing, and remuneration and because of doubts regarding the chances of restoration of viability, burden sharing and the mitigation of distortion of competition.

| (81) | However, the Commission has established that it will authorise emergency measures temporarily if needed for reasons of financial stability (20), while it is not ready to take a definite decision given doubts on compatibility of the measures as restructuring aid. In the present case the supervisory authorities have confirmed that the aid is necessary in order to prevent of the initiation of bank resolution procedures of a systemically relevant bank. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the Commission has established that it will authorise emergency measures temporarily if needed for reasons of financial stability (20), while it is not ready to take a definite decision given doubts on compatibility of the measures as restructuring aid. In the present case the supervisory authorities have confirmed that the aid is necessary in order to prevent of the initiation of bank resolution procedures of a systemically relevant bank.

| (82) | It has first been established that the recapitalisation measures fulfil the requirements of the Recapitalisation Communication. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

It has first been established that the recapitalisation measures fulfil the requirements of the Recapitalisation Communication.

| (83) | Second, as regards the asset relief measures, the Commission has doubts regarding their compatibility with the IAC. These doubts relate in particular to the real economic value, which could not be assessed at this stage. However, these doubts do not hinder a temporary approval for reasons of financial stability, because Germany committed that the measure would be brought in line with the IAC if the real economic value turned out to be lower than submitted. Moreover, the Commission has verified that the other criteria of the IAC are met (in particular eligibility and the management of assets) and that the recapitalisation and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion ensure some limited burden sharing at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Second, as regards the asset relief measures, the Commission has doubts regarding their compatibility with the IAC. These doubts relate in particular to the real economic value, which could not be assessed at this stage. However, these doubts do not hinder a temporary approval for reasons of financial stability, because Germany committed that the measure would be brought in line with the IAC if the real economic value turned out to be lower than submitted. Moreover, the Commission has verified that the other criteria of the IAC are met (in particular eligibility and the management of assets) and that the recapitalisation and the guarantee of EUR 1 billion ensure some limited burden sharing at this stage.

| (84) | Given the imminent threat of the initiation of bank resolution procedures in the absence of the measures, the Commission considers the recapitalisation measure and the asset relief to be temporarily compatible for six months with the internal market as emergency support under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Therefore, the Commission has at this stage temporarily no objection to the transfer of the assets to the bad bank. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Given the imminent threat of the initiation of bank resolution procedures in the absence of the measures, the Commission considers the recapitalisation measure and the asset relief to be temporarily compatible for six months with the internal market as emergency support under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. Therefore, the Commission has at this stage temporarily no objection to the transfer of the assets to the bad bank.

| (85) | In light of the doubts regarding compatibility of the asset relief measure with the IAC and the failure of the current revised restructuring plan to demonstrate that it will ensure the sale of the beneficiary, proper burden sharing and mitigate the distortions of competition, the Commission needs to further investigate the measures and thus to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

In light of the doubts regarding compatibility of the asset relief measure with the IAC and the failure of the current revised restructuring plan to demonstrate that it will ensure the sale of the beneficiary, proper burden sharing and mitigate the distortions of competition, the Commission needs to further investigate the measures and thus to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU.

6.   DECISION

The Commission concludes that the measures notified by Germany on 10 December 2009 concerning the recapitalisation of WestLB, the guarantee and the associated asset relief measure constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU regarding the asset relief in the form of the establishment of a bad bank concerning transparency and disclosure, valuation and burden sharing (including remuneration) as well as on the restructuring aid (asset relief, recapitalisation and guarantee) to WestLB.

On the basis of the commitments provided by Germany, and in order to secure financial stability the Commission authorises the asset relief in the form of the establishment of a bad bank, the recapitalisation by SoFFin in the amount of EUR 3 billion as well as the guarantee of the shareholders of EUR 1 billion temporarily for a period of six months.

Germany is required to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular:

—   transparency and disclosure including evaluation: the final composition of the portfolios and the evaluation of the assets to be spun off,

—   burden sharing and remuneration: detailed information regarding burden sharing and remuneration for the asset relief measure, based upon evaluation,

—   suitability of the restructuring plan to enable sale: a revised restructuring plan that takes into account the full amount of State aid granted, comprising adequate remuneration, additional in-depth restructuring, and measures limiting distortion of competition.

Should the Commission come to the conclusion that unlawful State aid was granted to savings bank which are members of Westfälisch-Lippische Sparkassen- und Giroverband and Rheinische Sparkassen- und Giroverband by releasing them from their obligation to contribute to the recapitalisation and by introducing a cap to their liabilities and thus their participation in losses of bad bank, such unlawful aid if incompatible will be recovered from the savings banks.

Germany is requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

The Commission wishes to remind Germany that Article 108(3) TFEU has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Germany that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.

The Commission notes, that for the reason of urgency Germany exceptionally accepts the adoption of the decision in the English language.”

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(1)  With effect from 1 December 2009, Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty have become Articles 107 and 108, respectively, of the TFEU. The two sets of provisions are, in substance, identical. For the purposes of this Decision, references to Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU should be understood as references to Articles 87 and 88, respectively, of the EC Treaty where appropriate.

1

(2)  Cf. Commission Decision of 12 May 2009 in Case C 43/08, Restructuring of WestLB AG, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/C-43-2008-WLWL-en-12.5.2009.pdf

2

Restructuring of WestLB AG

(3)  Cf. Commission Decision of 7 October 2009 in Case N 531/09, Assumption of Risk for WestLB, not yet published.

3

Assumption of Risk for WestLB

(4)  According to information sent by Germany on 18 November 2009, the risk shield that was in the end contractually agreed upon was only EUR 5,9 billion, therefore lower than the amount initially notified.

4

(5)  Cf. point 1.1 and 3.3 of the Annex to Commission Decision of 12 May 2009 in Case C 43/08, Restructuring of WestLB AG, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/C-43-2008-WLWL-en-12.5.2009.pdf

5

Restructuring of WestLB AG

(6)  Confidential information.

6

(7)  It is contractually excluded that SoFFin can become majority shareholder.

7

(8)  The FMStFG in section 8a provides the possibility for the SoFFin to create a bad bank, a so-called “Bundesrechtliche Abwicklungsanstalt”. Its main objective is to take over — and subsequently to wind-up — risky and non-strategic assets. Usage of a bad bank requires that the requesting bank has a viable business model and is sufficiently capitalized. Upon request, the SoFFin will allow or reject the application after an assessment of the business concept for the bad bank and an evaluation of the assets to be taken over.

8

The bad bank's take-over of assets shall be accomplished in the form of an asset spin-off by the beneficiary bank which is released from any contingent liabilities (“Nachhaftung”) of the bad bank. Instead, the shareholders of the beneficiary bank remain liable for debts of the bad bank and are obliged to loss compensation (“Verlustübernahme”), if required, corresponding to their percentage of equity. The bad bank is an organisationally and economically autonomous entity within the Bundesanstalt für Finanzmarktstabilisierung (FMSA) with the legal capacity to act and take legal action on its own behalf. If a bad bank is created, the SoFFin is responsible for its monitoring, coordination and liquidation, while the bad bank is autonomously responsible to cover its operating costs. Losses or surpluses after the wind-up of the bad bank's asset are allocated to the shareholders of the beneficiary bank. Therefore, the FMStFG requires that potential losses are borne by the shareholders of the beneficiary bank.

Additionally, according to section 8 point 4.5 FMStFG, a beneficiary bank has to disclose all risks associated with the respective assets prior to the asset relief measure. However, there is no obligation to evaluate the assets.

(9)  This also applies to the additional EUR 2 billion for the benefit of WestLB mentioned in point 25.

9

(10)  Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector, OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1.

10

(11)  As regards the application ratione temporis the Commission recalls that it has to apply law and guidelines in force at the time of the adoption of the decision, irrespective of the time at which the aid measures were designed or notified (cf. Case C 334/07 P Commission v Freistaat Sachsen, judgment of 11 December 2008, not yet reported) The IAC applies to the present bad bank, since it agreed to and notified after the publication of the IAC, notwithstanding its retroactive entering into force.

11

Commission

Freistaat Sachsen

(12)  Commission Communication on the return viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial crisis under State aid rules, OJ C 195, 14.8.2009, p. 9.

12

(13)  Communication from the Commission — Recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2.

13

(14)  See point 16 in Commission Decision of 12 December 2008 in Case N 625/08, OJ C 143, 24.6.2009, p. 1.

14

(15)  Commission Decision of 22 October 2009 in Case C 29/09, HSH Nordbank, point 40, OJ C 281, 21.11.2009, p. 42.

15

(16)  Commission Decision of 22 October 2009 in Case C 29/09, HSH Nordbank, OJ C 281, 21.11.2009, p. 42, point 40. To some extent also Commission Decision of 15 December 2009 in Case C 17/09 — LBBW, not yet published.

16

(17)  Cf. Commission Decision of 15 December 2008 in Case C 17/08 LBBW, Commission Decision of 18 November 2009 in Case C 10/09 ING.

17

(18)  The Commission already noted in its Decision of 7 October 2009 that the need for additional aid in the restructuring phase required reassessment of the implementation of the existing restructuring plan.

18

(19)  Although the Decision of 12 May 2009 made reference to the 2004 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, the Commission has clarified in point 49 of the Restructuring Communication that all aid notified to the Commission before 31 December 2010 will be assessed as restructuring aid to banks pursuant to that Communication instead of the 2004 Guidelines.

19

(20)  Commission Decision of 13 November in Case C 15/08, Hypo RealEstate, not yet published, and Commission Decision of 31 March 2009 in Case C 10/09 ING, OJ C 158, 11.7.2009, p. 13.

20

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