1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SARRI A. SINGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-2639 

Judge Beryl A. Howell 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 This action brought by four plaintiffs, who are U.S. citizens, arises out of the bombing on 

June 11, 2003 of a commuter bus, Egged Bus No. 14A, as the bus drove down Jaffa Road in 

Jerusalem. Pls.’ Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 2, 8–11, ECF No. 1. The explosion killed seventeen 

people and injured many others, including the victim-plaintiff, Sarri Anne Singer, in this case. 

Id. ¶ 23. The remaining three plaintiffs are immediate family members of the injured victimplaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Plaintiffs allege that defendant, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is liable 

under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A, for its material support of Hamas terrorists that bombed the bus. Id. ¶¶ 61, 67–68. 

Although plaintiffs have complied with the FSIA’s requirements for service, Iran has failed to 

enter an appearance or otherwise defend against this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4); Return 

of Service/Affidavit of Summons and Complaint Executed, ECF No. 14; Clerk’s Entry of 

Default, ECF No. 16. Plaintiffs now seek default judgment against defendant as to liability and 

damages. See Pls.’ Mot. Default J. (“Pls.’ Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 21. For the reasons detailed 

below, plaintiffs’ motion is granted. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

Two prior decisions in federal courts have found defendant liable for the Egged Bus No. 

14A bombing: Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (Cogan, J.) and 

Baxter v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 11-2133 (RCL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 243209 (D.D.C.

Sept. 27, 2019) (Lamberth, J.). The Linde court heard evidence and witness testimony, including 

expert witnesses. See Linde, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 299–310. In Baxter, another judge of this Court

concluded that judicial notice of the findings of fact in Linde was appropriate, see Baxter, 2019 

LEXIS 243209, at *8, and plaintiffs here request that this Court take judicial notice of these two 

prior related proceedings. Pls.’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L. Supp. Mot. 

Default J. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) ¶¶ 9, ECF No. 21-1.

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to “judicially notice” 

adjudicative facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute because” they “can be accurately 

and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” FED. R.

EVID. 201(b).1 Rule 201 is used frequently to take judicial notice of factual evidence developed 

in other FSIA proceedings “involving the same conduct by the same defendants,” Akins v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2018), “even when those proceedings 

have taken place in front of a different judge,” Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 

186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 

(D.D.C. 2009)). This avoids “the formality of having that evidence reproduced.” Taylor v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Murphy v. Islamic Republic 

1 “[A]djudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case.” Nat’l Org. for Women, Wash., D.C. 

Chapter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 736 F.2d 727, 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, C.J., concurring) (quoting FED. R.

EVID. 201(a), Advisory Committee Note). The Rule does not govern judicial notice of “legislative fact[s],” FED. R.

EVID. 201(a), which are “those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the 

formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body,” Nat’l Org. 

for Women, 736 F.2d 727 at 737 n.95 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 201, Advisory Committee Note).
3

of Iran, 740 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2010)); see also Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran

(“Oveissi II”), 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding courts permitted “in subsequent 

related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation” (citation omitted)); Est. of 

Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (taking “judicial 

notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases”). 

Taking judicial notice of prior findings “does not conclusively establish the facts found in 

those cases” in the later FSIA case. Foley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 191. Rather, “based on judicial 

notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases[,] . . . courts may reach their own 

independent findings of fact.” Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 

(D.D.C. 2010); see also Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 172 (D.D.C. 

2010). In fact, “courts in FSIA litigation have adopted a middle-ground approach that permits 

courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation—

without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced—to reach their own, 

independent findings of fact in the cases before them.” Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172.2

This Court is persuaded that this approach is both “efficient and sufficiently protective of 

the absent defendant[’s] interests,” Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, and will therefore grant 

plaintiffs’ request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Linde and Baxter. The 

evidence regarding the Egged Bus No. 14A bombing is summarized below, followed by an 

overview of the procedural history of this case.

2 The D.C. Circuit has endorsed the use of judicial notice to establish facts in FSIA terrorism cases. In Han 

Kim v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the D.C. Circuit held that plaintiffs had “met their burden of 

producing evidence ‘satisfactory to the court’” to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, where the 

only evidence linking North Korea to the victim’s disappearance was a South Korean court’s conviction of a North 

Korean agent, of which the district court had taken judicial notice. 774 F.3d 1044, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also 

id. 1051.
4

A. The Bus No. 14A Bombing

Around 5:30 p.m. on June 11, 2003, a suicide bomber disguised as an “ultra-Orthodox 

Jew” boarded Egged Bus No. 14A, which was traveling along Jaffa Road towards downtown 

Jerusalem. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. C, Excerpt II of the Expert Rept. of Dr. Ronni Shaked (“Shaked 

Rept. Excerpt II”) at 209, ECF No. 21-5. When the bus neared Davidka Square, the bomber 

“detonated [an] explosive charge.” Id. The resulting explosion killed seventeen people and 

injured over 100 more. Id.

B. Defendant Iran’s Role

Ample evidence links the Iran-backed group Hamas to the Egged Bus No. 14A bombing. 

See id. at 215 (summarizing the various ways in which Hamas publicized its responsibility for 

the Egged Bus No. 14A bombing). Immediately after the attack, on its website, Hamas claimed

responsibility for the bombing and both identified and praised the bomber. Id. at 214. An 

official 2003 Hamas operations report lists information matching the bombing. See id. The

website of Hamas’ military branch, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (“Qassam Brigades”), see 

Pls.’ Mot., Ex. B, Excerpt I of the Expert Rept. of Dr. Ronni Shaked (“Shaked Rept. Excerpt I”) 

at 14 n.28, ECF No. 21-4, posted pictures depicting the bomber wearing Hamas-affiliated 

clothing, see Shaked Rep. Excerpt II at 209–11. The bomber also filmed a “will” where he 

stated that he was carrying out the bombing on behalf of the Qassam Brigades.

3 See id. at 211–

12. Finally, other convicted Hamas members confessed to helping the bomber execute the 

Egged Bus No. 14A bombing. See id. at 214–15. Thus, there is “a very high degree of 

probability” that Hamas was responsible for the Egged Bus No. 14A bombing. Id. at 215.

3 Leaving a “will” is a common way by which Hamas-affiliated operatives publicize their responsibility for 

terrorist attacks. See Shaked Rept. Excerpt I at 8, 10.
5 

Iran “has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism” by the U.S. Department of State 

“since January 19, 1984.” Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 

2006) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 77 

(D.D.C. 2018); U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/statesponsors-of-terrorism/ (last visited June 13, 2024). The Baxter court found that through its 

material support to Hamas, Iran was responsible for the Egged Bus No. 14A bombing. See 

Baxter, 2019 LEXIS 243209, at *12–13, *27. Baxter also noted that many other courts, as well 

as the State Department, have found Iran responsible for supporting Hamas. See Baxter, 2019 

LEXIS 243209, at *26.

Dr. Patrick L. Clawson, an expert on Iran, opined that Iran and Hamas have likely been 

linked since Hamas’ founding due to similarities in ideology. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. A, Decl. of 

Patrick L. Clawson (“Clawson Decl.”) ¶¶ 28–29, ECF No. 21-3. Clawson noted that the two 

grew closer due to Hamas’ “willingness to perpetrate terrorist attacks and bus bombings.” See 

id. ¶ 41. In fact, Clawson is “personally aware” that high-level Israeli and Palestinian state 

officials believed Iran to be the “principal sponsor” of Hamas terrorism, and believed that “Iran 

‘ordered’ bus bombings in Israel.” See id. ¶ 42. Furthermore, beyond just “strongly and publicly 

encourag[ing] Hamas to carry out such attacks,” see id. ¶ 41, Iran also provided Hamas with 

“funding, safehaven, training, and weapons,” see id. ¶ 38 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM), “immediately before, during, and immediately after” the 

Egged Bus No. 14A bombing, see id. ¶ 48. 

C. The Instant Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs in this action include one individual who suffered physical and psychological 

injuries from the Egged Bus No. 14A bombing and three of her immediate family members who 
6

suffered psychological injuries. See Compl. ¶¶ 8–11. The plaintiffs and their connection to the 

attack are described below.

1. Sarri Singer

At 5:30 p.m. on June 11, 2003, Sarri Anne Singer (“Sarri”) was a passenger on Egged 

Bus No. 14A. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. E, Decl. of Sarri Anne Singer (“S. Singer Decl.”) ¶ 14, ECF No. 

21-7. Soon after she sat down, Sarri felt “a huge shockwave” hit her, as if “two huge pieces of 

metal had struck each other very hard and vibrated back.” Id. ¶ 18. Later, Sarri would learn that 

the “shockwave” she felt was in fact a suicide bombing. Id. After the blast, Sarri’s left eye was 

swollen shut, and she could see very little out of her right. Id. ¶ 21. She also could not hear, see 

id. ¶ 23, as the blast also ruptured both of her eardrums, which caused her ears to bleed for “at 

least a week.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24. Sarri began screaming, id. ¶ 26, at which point someone pulled her 

off the bus and stayed with her until an ambulance arrived to take her to a hospital, see id. ¶ 27. 

At the hospital, Sarri received immediate surgery on her left shoulder, see id. ¶ 29, because 

shrapnel from the bomb had completely penetrated it and broken her clavicle, id. ¶ 20. Sarri 

remained in the hospital for “11 or 12 days,” id. ¶ 28, but she could not sleep because of the 

stress and chaos of the situation, id. ¶ 31. When discharged, Sarri continued to suffer from the 

physical, as well as emotional, toll of the bombing, which included “acute anxiety, sadness, and 

worry.” See id. ¶ 33.

Sarri required long-term medical care for her injuries. See id. ¶¶ 35–56 (detailing the 

timeline of Sarri’s rehabilitative care). She started physical therapy on her shoulder a couple 

months after the bombing and stayed in therapy for “a year and a half.” See id. ¶¶ 35–36. She 

also required additional and repeated treatment for her ears, see id. ¶ 44, and her teeth, after 

dentists discovered shrapnel lodged in her gums, see id. ¶¶ 49–51. Sarri also pursued 

psychological counseling, due to her experiencing “many symptoms of PTSD,” see id. ¶ 46, with 
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one of her therapists noting that “all of [Sarri’s] treatment related to the attack,” see id. ¶ 55. To 

this day, Sarri still has not regained full use of her shoulder, ears, and teeth, and continues to be 

affected psychologically by the attack, see id. ¶¶ 57, 63, effects which sometimes manifest as 

increased forgetfulness, difficulty focusing, and difficulty sleeping, see id. ¶ 66.

2. Robert Singer

On June 11, 2003, Robert Singer (“Robert”) received a phone call informing him that 

Sarri, his daughter, had been injured in a terrorist attack. See Pls.’ Mot., Ex. F, Decl. of Robert 

Singer (“R. Singer Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 12, ECF No. 21-8. Robert received no additional information 

from that call, which was “very stressful and emotionally draining.” See id. ¶ 13. He later spoke 

to staff at the hospital where Sarri was being treated and learned that she had to undergo surgery. 

See id. ¶ 15. Robert and his son, Sarri’s brother Eric, see id. ¶ 2, flew to Israel that day to be 

with Sarri, see id. ¶ 16. 

When Robert reached the hospital, “it was bedlam.” Id. ¶ 17. Seeing Sarri “bandaged up 

and clearly injured” was “extremely traumatic” for Robert. Id. ¶ 19. He felt “useless” being 

unable to help Sarri other than provide her with emotional support. Id. Robert also felt unhappy 

with Sarri’s decision to remain in and eventually return to Israel after the attack, as he feared she 

could be injured again. See id. ¶¶ 22, 29. 

Robert and Sarri have a close relationship, see id. ¶ 10, so Sarri’s injuries had a 

“significant impact” on Robert. See id. ¶¶ 35–36. Robert is now generally more concerned about 

the safety of his children than he was before the attack, see id. ¶ 31, and is “extremely worried” 

when he unexpectedly does not hear from them, id. Whenever Sarri visits Israel, Robert 

becomes particularly worried. See id. ¶ 32. Overall, Robert is now more tense and cautious, see 

id. ¶ 33, and sometimes wakes up at night worrying about his children, id. ¶ 34. 
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3. Eric Singer

On June 11, 2003, Eric Singer (“Eric”) received a call from his father and learned that his 

sister, Sarri, had been injured by a terrorist attack. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. H, Decl. of Eric Singer (“E. 

Singer Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 21-10. Eric and his father travelled to Israel that same day to be 

with Sarri. See id. ¶ 10. When they got to the hospital, Eric found it “extremely difficult” to see 

Sarri “helpless,” and “bandaged and [with] visible injuries on her face and legs.” See id. ¶ 11. 

Eric was also reluctant and anxious to return to the United States without Sarri, as he feared that 

she would fall victim to other terrorist attacks. See id. ¶¶ 14, 18. 

Due to the continued effects of her injuries, Eric worries about Sarri’s “wellbeing and 

general safety.” See id. ¶¶ 26–27. On top of his concerns over Sarri, the attack has also affected 

Eric’s daily life. See id. ¶ 24. It “reinforced and intensified” Eric’s fear of visiting Israel. Id. 

He also “developed a fear of being in large areas and at large gatherings.” Id. ¶ 25. He cannot 

relax in these environments, and “constantly look[s] over [his] back [to] see who is there.” See 

id. Although this fear was most severe following the attack, it persists to this day. Id. 

4. Judith Singer

On June 11, 2003, Judith Singer (“Judith”) received a phone call from her son Eric 

informing her that her daughter Sarri had been injured in a bus bombing in Israel. Pls.’ Mot., Ex. 

G, Decl. of Judith Singer (“J. Singer Decl.”) ¶¶ 5–6, ECF No. 21-9. Eric told her that he and his 

father, Judith’s former husband, were traveling to Israel to be with Sarri. Id. ¶ 8. Judith wanted 

to travel with them, but could not because her passport had expired. Id. ¶ 8. Her inability to see

and comfort Sarri at “the worst moment” in Sarri’s life greatly distressed Judith. See id. ¶ 9. 

Judith could not directly call Sarri, so she could only get updates on Sarri’s condition by calling 

her son. See id. ¶¶ 10, 12. Receiving indirect instead of first-hand impressions about the scope 

of Sarri’s injuries was also difficult for Judith. See id. ¶ 13.
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While Judith was “grateful” that Sarri survived, she was “devastated” that Sarri had been 

injured. See id. ¶ 13. When she was finally able to be together, seeing the injuries that Sarri had 

suffered was difficult for Judith. Id. ¶ 16. Witnessing the residual impacts of the attack on Sarri 

negatively affects Judith to this day. Id. Like Sarri’s father, see R. Singer Decl. ¶ 31, Judith 

cannot “put to rest” her fear that Sarri will be injured when travelling, see id. ¶¶ 21; 23, 25. 

Merely thinking about the bombing makes Judith anxious and sad, see id. ¶ 22, and she herself 

finds being “near or on a bus” upsetting and has “developed a fear of going through tunnels.” 

See id. ¶ 20.

D. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 8, 2021. See Compl. at 14. Plaintiffs’ subsequent 

motion to waive Local Civil Rule 5.1(c), which would have required plaintiffs to include 

plaintiffs’ full residential address in the caption of the pleading, see Pls.’ Ex Parte Mot. for 

Waiver of Local Civ. Rule 5.1(c), ECF No. 2, was granted on October 12, 2021, see Minute 

Order (October 12, 2021), and plaintiffs then filed their addresses under seal on October 12, 

2021, see Names and Addresses of All Plaintiffs, ECF No. 5.

Iran was properly served under the FSIA and, after failing to appear, the Clerk of the 

Court entered default against Iran on October 21, 2022. See Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 

16. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for default judgment as to liability and damages on December 

6, 2023. See Pls.’ Mot. at 1. Plaintiffs filed their declarations and exhibits with that motion. Id. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is now ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court to consider entering a default 

judgment when a party applies for that relief. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). Nevertheless, 
10

“strong policies favor resolution of disputes on their merits” and, therefore, “‘[t]he default 

judgment must normally be viewed as available only when the adversary process has been halted 

because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 

1980) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 

(D.C. Cir. 1970)). Furthermore, “entry of a default judgment is not automatic,” Mwani v. bin 

Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted), and thus the procedural posture of a 

default does not relieve a federal court of its typical obligations, including its “affirmative 

obligation” to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, James 

Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Additionally, “a court 

should satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering judgment against an absent 

defendant.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 6.

When default judgment is sought under the FSIA, a claimant must also “establish[] his 

claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This 

requirement “provides foreign sovereigns a special protection akin to that assured the federal 

government by Fed. R. Civ. P. 55([d]).” Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 

2014); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 26 (1976) (stating that § 1608(e) establishes “the same 

requirement applicable to default judgments against the U.S. Government under [R]ule 55([d])”). 

While the “FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of 

evidence the plaintiff must provide,” courts must be mindful that Congress enacted § 1605A, 

FSIA’s terrorism exception, and § 1608(e) with the “aim[] to prevent state sponsors of 

terrorism—entities particularly unlikely to submit to this country’s laws—from escaping liability 

for their sins.” Han Kim v. People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)); see also Maalouf v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
11

923 F.3d 1095, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2019). With this objective in mind, the D.C. Circuit has 

instructed that “courts have the authority—indeed, we think, the obligation—to ‘adjust 

evidentiary requirements to . . . differing situations.’” Han Kim, 774 F.3d at 1048 (quoting 

Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981)) (formatting modified).

Generally, courts in FSIA default actions must draw their “findings of fact and

conclusions of law from admissible testimony in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Evidence.” Id. at 1049 (quoting Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 n.1 

(D.D.C. 2001)). Courts take uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible 

evidence as true. Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 78 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (D.D.C. 2015) 

(“Courts may rely on uncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by affidavits.” (citing 

Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 171)); accord Worley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 F. Supp. 3d 311, 

319 (D.D.C. 2014); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (authorizing court to “consider the fact undisputed 

for purposes of the motion” when adverse party “fails to properly address another party’s 

assertion of fact”).

The D.C. Circuit’s “review of findings underlying a default judgment in a FSIA case of 

this sort is ‘lenient.’” Fraenkel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 892 F.3d 348, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017)), as “the courts are

granted broad discretion to determine what degree and kind of evidence is satisfactory.” 

Maalouf, 923 F.3d at 1114 (citing Han Kim, 774 F.3d at 1047; Owens, 864 F.3d at 785). In 

particular, “[i]n a FSIA default proceeding, a factual finding is not deemed clearly erroneous if 

there is an adequate basis in the record for inferring that the district court . . . was satisfied with 

the evidence submitted.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 785 (second alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION

A default judgment may be entered when (1) the court has subject-matter jurisdiction 

over the claims, (2) personal jurisdiction is properly exercised over the defendant, (3) the 

plaintiffs have presented satisfactory evidence to establish their claims against the defendant, and 

(4) the plaintiffs have satisfactorily proven that they are entitled to the monetary damages they 

seek. These requirements are satisfied here and addressed in order below.

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction under the FSIA

“The district courts . . . have original jurisdiction” over “any nonjury civil action against a 

foreign state” seeking “relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to 

immunity either under sections 1605–1607 of this title.” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The FSIA defines 

a “foreign state” to include “a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 

instrumentality” thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Plaintiffs seek in personam relief, raising the key 

question whether defendant is entitled to immunity under the “state sponsor of terrorism” 

exception set forth in §1605A.

4

“[T]he FSIA establishes a general rule granting foreign sovereigns immunity from the 

jurisdiction of United States courts,” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 13 

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1604), but “that grant of immunity is subject to a number of 

exceptions,” id. at 13–14; Doe v. Taliban, No. 22-7134, 2024 WL 1814317, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 

26, 2024). Among those exceptions is the “terrorism exception,” enacted “[i]n 1996, [when] 

Congress withdrew foreign sovereign immunity for lawsuits that seek money damages for 

4 This suit falls beyond the ten-year statute of limitations for actions brought under the FSIA’s terrorism 

exception, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b), but the “limitation period in § 1605A(b) is not jurisdictional,” and defendant 

has “forfeited its affirmative defense . . . by failing to raise it in” this Court, Owens, 864 F.3d at 805; see also 

Maalouf, 923 F.3d at 1115 (holding that a district court may not sua sponte raise a forfeited statute of limitations 

defense under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b)). 
13

personal injury or death from a state sponsor of terrorism that has engaged in an ‘act of torture, 

extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or 

resources * * * for such an act[.]’” Borochov v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 94 F.4th 1053, 1058

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 

No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241); see also Mark v. Republic of Sudan, 77 F.4th 892, 

895 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Plaintiffs assert jurisdiction based on the FSIA’s terrorism exception. See 

Compl. ¶ 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. 

In addition to creating “a cause of action for U.S. citizens, members of the U.S. armed 

forces, and U.S. government employees who have been injured by foreign states’ acts or 

sponsorship of terrorism,” Borochov, 94 F.4th. at 1057 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c)), the terrorism 

exception abrogates a foreign state’s immunity when certain preconditions are met. “First, the 

foreign state was designated a ‘state sponsor of terrorism at the time [of] the act * * * or was so 

designated as a result of such act[.]’” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)). As the D.C. 

Circuit has explained, “[t]his designation provision allows the Executive Branch to regulate if and 

when a foreign sovereign may be haled into American courts to answer terrorism allegations.” 

Doe v. Taliban, 2024 WL 1814317, at *13–14; see also Owens, 531 F.3d at 889–93 (situating 

the FSIA’s delegation of authority to designate state sponsors of terrorism in the President's 

foreign-relations powers). “Second, ‘at the time [of] the act,’ either a victim of the act or the 

claimant in the suit was an American national, a member of the U.S. armed forces, or an employee 

or contractor for the U.S. government acting within the scope of their employment.” Borochov, 

94 F.4th. at 1057 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii)).

5

5 A third precondition for the terrorism exception to apply is that “if ‘the act occurred in the foreign state 

against which the claim has been brought,’ the claimant gave the foreign state a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to arbitrate 

prior to filing a lawsuit,” Borochov, 94 F.4th at 1057 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(iii)), but the attack at issue 

here did not take place in Iran, so this requirement is inapplicable.
14

Plaintiffs satisfy each of the applicable elements here. As stated supra in Part I.B, Iran 

was designated a state sponsor of terrorism in 1984, nineteen years before the 2003 Egged Bus 

No. 14A bombing. All plaintiffs averred in sworn declarations that they were U.S. citizens at the 

time of the attack.6 Finally, plaintiffs seek damages “for personal injury . . . that was caused by 

an . . . extrajudicial killing” for which defendant provided “material support or resources.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1); see also Owens, 864 F.3d at 778 (“[T]he plain meaning of § 1605A(a) 

grants . . . jurisdiction over claims against designated state sponsors of terrorism that materially 

support extrajudicial killings committed by nonstate actors”). 

More specifically, the bus bombing that plaintiffs allege caused their injuries was an 

“extrajudicial killing” resulting in deaths and also the physical and emotional injuries to 

American citizens. The term “extrajudicial killing” in the FSIA’s terrorism exception has the 

“meaning given” in “the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991,” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7), 

which defines the term as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment 

pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 

recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,” Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 

(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3(a)). The Egged Bus No. 14A bombing killed 

“numerous innocent civilians . . . and injured many more.” See Baxter, 2019 LEXIS 243209, at 

*34. “Those who perished were killed not according to the judgment of a regularly constituted 

court but instead the malicious design of the Hamas terrorists who carried out the attack[].” Id. 

Thus, the bombing qualifies as an “extrajudicial killing[] as defined by the FSIA.” Id.

Furthermore, this Court takes judicial notice of the evidence presented in Linde and 

Baxter, demonstrating that defendant provided “material support or resources” for this 

6 S. Singer Decl. ¶ 2; R. Singer Decl. ¶ 1; E. Singer Decl. ¶ 1; J. Singer Decl. ¶ 1.
15

extrajudicial killing. The evidence in those cases, described supra in Part I.A–B, shows that 

defendant encouraged Hamas to carry out these bombings, and provided substantial funding, 

training, and supplies to the organization. This establishes that defendant’s actions were “a 

‘substantial factor’ in the sequence of events that led to the plaintiff[s’] injur[ies]” and that the 

injuries were “‘reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence’ of the 

defendant’s conduct.” Owens, 864 F.3d at 794 (quoting Rothstein v. UBS, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d 

Cir. 2013)) (explaining that the jurisdictional standard for causation under the FSIA’s terrorism 

exception is proximate cause).

Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, defendant is not immune from this suit, and 

subject-matter jurisdiction may be properly exercised. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).

B. Personal Jurisdiction under the FSIA

“Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over 

which the district courts have jurisdiction . . . where service has been made under section 1608 of 

[the FSIA].” 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Section 1608 first prescribes two methods by which service 

shall ordinarily be made, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1)–(2), but these methods were “not available” 

to plaintiffs in this action, Holladay v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 406 F. Supp. 3d 55, 61 (D.D.C. 

2019); see also Frost v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 383 F. Supp. 3d 33, 49 (D.D.C. 2019), as 

“defendant[] ha[s] neither made a special arrangement for service with the plaintiffs nor entered 

into any international convention governing service,” Braun v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 228 F. 

Supp. 3d 64, 78 (D.D.C. 2017).

Plaintiffs attempted service under § 1608(a)(3) by sending two copies of the summons, 

complaint, notice of suit, and the FSIA, along with a translation of each into Iran’s official 

language by certified or registered mail to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Aff.
16

Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs then transmitted the same documents under 

the cover of diplomatic notes, following the procedure for service provided by 28 U.S.C.

§ 1608(a)(4), and Iran was thus served on July 11, 2022. See Return of Service/Aff. of 

Summons and Complaint Executed, ECF No. 14. On August 23, 2022, the U.S. Department of 

State certified in an Affidavit of Service that the requirements for diplomatic service under 28 

U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) were met by causing delivery of a Summons, Complaint, and Notice of Suit 

to Iran on July 11, 2022. See id. 

Accordingly, this Court has personal jurisdiction over Iran because plaintiffs effectively 

executed service under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). 

C. Defendant’s Liability

Plaintiffs seek relief under FSIA § 1605A(c), see Compl. ¶ 1, which creates a private 

right of action for “personal injury or death,” and provides that, “[i]n any such action, damages 

may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A(c)(4). Yet § 1605A(c) does not set out guidance on the substantive bases for liability 

that determine plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages. Consequently, courts “may rely on wellestablished statements of common law, found in state reporters, the Restatement of Torts, and 

other respected treatises, in determining damages under § 1605A(c).” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353; 

see Est. of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying 

“general principles of tort law,” such as the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to determine 

liability); see also Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 399 (citing Oveissi II, 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 54 (D.D.C. 

2012)); Worley, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 335. Defendant’s liability is discussed in detail below.

1. Sarri Singer

Sarri brings her claims under theories of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”). Compl. ¶¶ 70–83. As discussed in the damages section, Sarri may 
17

recover under only one theory, see, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002)

(“[I]t ‘goes without saying that the courts can and should preclude double recovery by an 

individual.’”) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980)), but each 

theory of liability is nevertheless evaluated.

a. Assault and Battery

Battery requires an act “intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact . . . or an 

imminent apprehension of such a contact,” and that such a contact in fact “directly or indirectly 

results.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13. “Harmful contact” causes a “physical 

impairment of the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.” Id. § 15; see also 

Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52, 76 (D.D.C. 2010) (defining these terms). 

Iran acted with the intent to cause harmful contact with the passengers of Egged Bus No. 14A 

when it materially supported the bus bombing. See, e.g., Gill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 249 F. 

Supp. 3d 88, 102 (D.D.C. 2017) (defining material support for terrorist attacks as acts intending 

to cause harm). Sarri was a passenger on Egged Bus No. 14A at the time of the bombing, see S. 

Singer Decl. ¶ 14, and suffered harmful physical contact from the explosive force of the blast, 

see id. ¶¶ 20–25 (detailing the injuries to Sarri’s shoulder, eye, face, ears, and legs). Therefore,

Iran is liable to Sarri for battery.

Assault occurs where a defendant “acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact 

with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and . . . the other 

is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1). 

“[A]cts of terrorism are, by their very nature, intended to harm and to terrify by instilling fear of 

further harm,” so where plaintiffs averred “that they did, in fact, fear such harm because of the 

attack,” defendant may be held liable for assault. Murphy v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 740 F. 
18

Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (same). Imminence is 

defined as being “so close to striking distance that [one] can reach the other almost at once.” 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 29 cmt. 2. Everyone on Egged Bus No. 14A “seated and 

standing around” Sarri had been “instantly killed” by the suicide bombing. S. Singer Decl. ¶ 19. 

Sarri therefore was within “striking distance” of the bombing. Furthermore, Sarri herself 

suffered severe physical injuries, and could not see or hear well immediately following the 

explosion. See id. ¶¶ 21, 23. Thus, Sarri was “put in . . . imminent apprehension” of further 

“harmful or offensive contact” by the defendant due to how vulnerable the blast rendered her. 

Defendant is therefore liable to Sarri for assault.

b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

“[O]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly cause[d] 

severe emotional distress to” a plaintiff is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1); see also Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 26. “Acts of 

terrorism are by their very definition extreme and outrageous and intended to cause the highest 

degree of emotional distress.” Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22 (D.D.C. 

2009); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (same). Sarri has demonstrated through her sworn 

statement that she suffered severe emotional and psychological harms as a result of the attack. 

See S. Singer Decl. 31, 33, 45–46 (describing the immediate and lasting negative psychological 

impacts of the bombing). Defendant is thus liable to Sarri for IIED. 

2. Sarri’s Family Members

The remaining three plaintiffs—Robert Singer, Eric Singer, and Judith Singer—seek to 

collect damages as immediate family members of Sarri Singer for the bombing.

The family members’ theory of liability is IIED. Compl. ¶¶ 79–83 (Third Claim for 

Relief). The Restatement permits recovery for those who were not a direct target of a 
19

defendant’s conduct if (1) “the defendants’ conduct is sufficiently outrageous and intended to 

inflict severe emotional harm upon a person [who] is not present” and (2) the claimant is a 

member of a victim’s immediate family, Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27 (quoting DAN B.

DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 307, at 834 (2000)), or the functional equivalent of an immediate 

family member, see Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 

(extending liability under the FSIA for IIED to “members of the victim’s household” who were 

also “viewed as the functional equivalents of immediate family members”); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. l (leaving “open the possibility of situations in 

which presence . . . may not be required”).

All three plaintiffs are immediate family members—parents and sibling—of the victim, 

and thus able to maintain claims for IIED. See Fritz, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 63 (observing that the 

“strict meaning” of immediate family is “one’s spouse, parents, siblings, and children” (quoting 

Heiser II, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 28)). All three plaintiffs also demonstrated through their sworn 

statements that they suffered severe emotional harms as a result of the attack. See R. Singer 

Decl. ¶¶ 13, 19, 35; E. Singer Decl. ¶¶ 11–12, 22–24; J. Singer ¶¶ 7, 9, 13. Both Robert, Sarri’s 

father, and Eric, Sarri’s brother, rushed to Israel when they heard about Sarri being injured in the 

bombing and saw first-hand the extent of her injuries. R. Singer Decl. ¶ 16, E. Singer Decl. ¶ 10. 

Robert was “very stress[ed]” and “emotionally drain[ed]” after finding out that Sarri had been 

injured in a terrorist attack. R. Singer Decl. ¶ 13. Seeing her “bandaged up and clearly injured” 

in the hospital made Robert feel helpless, distraught, and “traumati[zed].” Id. ¶ 19. Eric also 

noted that “[i]t was extremely difficult” to see Sarri in her injured state, see E. Singer Decl. ¶ 11, 

and that the attack “really reinforced and intensified” his fear of travelling to Israel, id. ¶ 24. 

Judith, Sarri’s mother, felt “very distress[ed]” and “helpless” when she was unable to see Sarri 
20

after the attack, see J. Singer Decl. ¶ 9, and feels “horrible” whenever she thinks about the attack,

id. ¶ 22. Therefore, the defendant is liable to these plaintiffs for IIED.

In summary, the victim-plaintiff and the family member plaintiffs established the

defendant’s liability under the federal private right of action against state sponsors of terrorism, 

28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), for the torts of battery, assault, and IIED.

D. Damages

Turning to the allowable damages, the victim-plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for 

pain and suffering under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Compl. ¶ 74. The family member plaintiffs 

seek damages for IIED under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). Id. ¶ 82. Plaintiffs also request punitive 

damages, id. ¶ 85, as well as prejudgment interest and costs, id. ¶¶ 86–87. The damages award 

to which each plaintiff is entitled is described below.

1. Legal Standard for Damages Under Section 1605A(c)

In actions brought under the FSIA’s terrorism exception, foreign states may be liable for 

money damages, including “economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering and punitive 

damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c). To recover, plaintiffs “must prove that the consequences of 

the foreign state’s conduct were reasonably certain (i.e., more likely than not) to occur, and must 

prove the amount of damages by a reasonable estimate.” Roth, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 353 (stating the same). Courts may 

look to expert testimony and prior awards in determining whether the amount of damages has 

been proven by a reasonable estimate. See Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 845 F. Supp. 2d 

204, 214 (D.D.C. 2012); Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 29 (D.D.C. 

2008). The D.C. Circuit “review[s] the District Court’s FSIA damages awards for abuse of 

discretion.” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 356. 
21

The evidence presented in Linde and Baxter, of which this Court has taken judicial notice 

and reviewed above supra Part I.A–B, has satisfactorily shown that plaintiffs’ injuries were 

reasonably certain and were the intended consequences of defendant’s material support of 

Hamas. Having concluded this, whether plaintiffs have shown the amount of pain and suffering

and punitive damages by a reasonable estimate will be considered next.

2. Pain and Suffering

As discussed, defendant is liable to the victim-plaintiff for battery, assault, and IIED, but 

the bar on multiple recoveries allows this plaintiff to recover only under one theory, for the 

single underlying harm. See, e.g., Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (“The Court notes that these 

plaintiffs who have claimed assault, battery, and IIED may recover under only one of any such 

theories, as multiple recovery is prohibited.”). Within this single-recovery framework, the 

“baseline assumption,” Kaplan v. Hezbollah, 213 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2016), applied in 

previous cases under the FSIA’s terrorism exception is that “persons suffering injuries in terrorist 

attacks are entitled to $5 million in damages.” Id. (quoting Davis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

882 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2012)). The baseline may be adjusted either upward or 

downward. An upward departure would be warranted “in the presence of ‘severe instances of 

physical and psychological pain, such as where victims suffered relatively more numerous and 

severe injuries, were rendered quadriplegic . . . or were mistaken for dead.’” Id. at 35–36 

(quoting Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 84). A downward departure would be warranted “in the face 

of ‘minor shrapnel injuries or minor injury from small-arms fire.’” Id. at 36 (quoting Valore, 

700 F. Supp. 2d at 84).

Pain and suffering damages are by their nature difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, a 

review of the victim-plaintiff’s sworn statement demonstrates that she suffered severe physical 
22

injuries and chronic psychological pain. See S. Singer Decl. ¶¶ 20–25, 45, 49 (describing how 

the explosion and shrapnel broke her collarbone, burned her face and hair, burst her eardrums, 

misaligned her teeth, and left her with post-traumatic stress disorder). Thus, the victim-plaintiff 

is entitled to the baseline assumption award of $5,000,000 for the significant physical injuries 

she sustained as a result of the bombing and the psychological symptoms she has suffered since. 

An upward departure is not warranted because the victim-plaintiff has regained most of her 

physical and mental faculties, see id. ¶¶ 63–64, and because the victim-plaintiff’s injuries 

resemble those of other victims of terrorism who received baseline awards, see Thole v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, No. 23-793, 2024 WL 2208208, at *14 (D.D.C. 2024).7

 

3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The family member plaintiffs seek damages under an IIED theory to compensate for the 

emotional distress they experienced as family members of the victim-plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 82 

(Third Claim for Relief). “Under the FSIA, a claim for solatium is nearly indistinguishable from 

a claim for IIED.” Flanagan v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 87 F. Supp. 3d 93, 115 (D.D.C. 2015) 

(Contreras, J.); see also Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 357. “[S]olatium is traditionally a compensatory 

damage which belongs to the individual heir personally for injury to the feelings and loss of 

decedent’s comfort and society,” Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 356 (quoting Flatow v. Islamic Republic 

of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 29 (D.D.C. 1998)), but solatium damages have also been awarded to 

compensate for the emotional distress of the family members of surviving victims, Wultz v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 864 F. Supp. 2d 24, 39 (D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that “in the context 

7 Plaintiff Sarri Singer also seeks economic damages for her assault and battery claims in the complaint, see 

Compl. ¶¶ 74, 78, as permitted by the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c), but as she does not provide any support for 

an amount of economic damages in either the plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment or her accompanying 

declaration, economic damages will not be granted in this case. See Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 

3d 57, 71 (D.D.C. 2015).
23

of distress resulting from injury to loved ones—rather than death—courts have applied a 

framework where awards are valued at half of the awards to family members of the deceased” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (“Relatives of 

surviving servicemen received awards valued at half of the awards to family members of the 

deceased.”). Damages recoverable on immediate-family member plaintiffs’ claims of IIED thus 

will be discussed as a claim for solatium damages.

“Mental anguish, bereavement and grief resulting from” an immediate family member’s 

death or injury “constitutes the preponderant element of a claim for solatium.” Fraenkel, 892 

F.3d at 356–57 (alteration adopted) (quoting Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 30). In determining the 

appropriate amount to compensate victims’ family members for emotional distress, “the Court 

may look to prior decisions awarding damages . . . for solatium.” Acosta, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 29. 

Commonly accepted is the standardized framework for solatium damages in Est. of Heiser v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran (“Heiser I”), 466 F. Supp. 2d. 229, 269 (D.D.C. 2006). See Roth, 78 F. 

Supp. 3d at 403 (noting the “framework has been adopted by other courts as an appropriate 

measure of solatium damages for the family members of victims of state-sponsored terror” 

(citing Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85)). Although not mandatory, see Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 361 

(“There is no statutory basis for concluding that district courts must award solatium damages in 

the amounts that Heiser found commonly granted.” (emphasis in original)), the Heiser

framework is adopted here for consistency, see also Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (adopting the 

Heiser framework for awarding solatium damages); Schooley, 2019 WL 2717888, at *77 (same).

The Heiser framework, as a baseline, awards spouses of deceased victims $8,000,0000, 

parents and children of deceased victims $5,000,000, and siblings of deceased victims 

$2,500,000. Valencia, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 15. “[F]amilies of victims who have died are typically 
24

awarded greater damages than families of victims who remain alive,” Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d 

at 269 (quoting Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 425 F. Supp. 2d 56, 75 (D.D.C. 2006)), and so 

the courts have awarded family members of surviving victims approximately half the baseline 

awards for family members of the deceased, see Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 39; Valore, 700 F. 

Supp. 2d at 85. Here, then, the applicable baseline solatium awards are $4,000,000 to spouses of 

surviving victims and $2,500,000 to parents of surviving victims, see Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 

39; “[c]hildren of a surviving victim receive $1.5 million on average,” Spencer v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 71 F. Supp. 3d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2014), and siblings of surviving victims receive 

$1,250,000, see Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 85.

These numbers serve only as an anchor from which the Court should deviate to 

compensate for specific circumstances. See Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 362 (“While past solatium 

awards from comparable cases are appropriate sources of guidance for district courts, different 

plaintiffs (even under [the] FSIA) will prove different facts that may well (and should) result in 

different damage awards.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Decisions to deviate from the 

starting points provided by the Heiser framework are committed to the discretion of the 

particular court in each case.” Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran (“Oveissi I”), 768 F. Supp. 2d 

16, 26 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Fraenkel, 892 F.3d at 351 (“District Court judges have discretion 

. . . to grant solatium awards based on the particular facts of each case, subject to abuse-ofdiscretion review for errors of law, clearly erroneous factual findings, and faulty reasoning.”).

Damages for Sarri Singer’s parents are addressed first, followed by her sibling.

a. Parents

Two of the family member plaintiffs will receive an award as the parent of a victim of the 

Egged Bus No. 14A bombing: Robert Singer and Judith Singer. Sarri, their daughter, was a 
25

passenger on Egged Bus No. 14A when the explosion occurred. See S. Singer Decl. ¶¶ 14, 18. 

She suffered serious physical and emotional injuries. See id. ¶¶ 20–25. Witnessing Sarri’s 

injured state and helping her along her long road to recovery was difficult and distressing for 

both Robert and Judith. See R. Singer Decl. ¶ 19; J. Singer Decl. ¶ 16. Parents of victims are 

each entitled to a baseline award of $2,500,000 under the Heiser framework. See Akins, 332 F. 

Supp. 3d at 44 (awarding $2,500,000 to the parents of injured service-members). Here, both

Robert and Judith Singer, whose child was awarded $5,000,000, will receive an award of 

$2,500,000. No departure from the baseline is warranted because their harms are consistent with 

those suffered by many parents of victims of terrorism, see Valencia, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 16, and 

their damages are proportional to the damages awarded to their daughter, Sarri.

b. Siblings

The remaining plaintiff is a sibling of the victim-plaintiff: Eric Singer. He has described 

distress upon learning about the bombing and ongoing negative emotional effects of the bombing

on his sister Sarri. See E. Singer Decl. ¶¶ 11, 19–20. These harms are consistent with those 

suffered by many siblings of victims of terrorism. See Valencia, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 15. Within 

the Heiser framework, siblings of victims awarded between $5,000,000 and $7,000,000 are each 

entitled to an award of $1,250,000, with no downward departure for proportionality required. 

See Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 45 (awarding a baseline amount of $1,250,000 to siblings of 

injured service-members). Eric is thus entitled to an award of $1,250,000.

E. Punitive Damages

In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs seek punitive damages under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1605A(c). Compl. ¶ 85 (Fourth Claim for Relief). The Supreme Court has laid out three 

“guideposts” for “reviewing punitive damages” awards: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the 
26

defendants’ misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the 

plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages 

awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 

Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). Weighing this precedent, this Court has awarded “[p]unitive 

damages equal to compensatory damages” in light of the “identified flaws in the [other] 

methods” for determining punitive damages. See Christie v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil 

Action No. 19-1289 (BAH), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116378, at *87 (D.D.C. July 2, 2020). 

Specifically, Christie determined that this method avoided “a singular focus on deterrence,” id. at 

*88–89, as well as “elevat[ing] superficial similarities over meaningful ones” and “skim[ing] 

over analysis of the plaintiffs’ precise harms,” and does not “yield an excessive award,” id. 

Awarding punitive damages equal to compensatory damages, Christie concluded, was most 

appropriate because “plaintiffs [were] already receiving substantial compensatory awards,” id. at 

*91, “‘the compensatory damages for the injury suffered’ . . . [were] ‘based on a component 

which’ would be ‘duplicated in the punitive award,’” id. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426), 

and “[a]dding hundreds of millions of dollars to [the] amount [of outstanding court judgments 

already owed by Iran] . . . [was] not likely to have a meaningful deterrent effect,” id. at *93. 

The Christie punitive damages approach analysis, which has likewise been applied in 

several other cases in this district, see, e.g., Blank v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-CV-3645, 

2021 WL 3021450, at *10 (D.D.C. July 17, 2021); Ackley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 20-

CV-621, 2022 WL 3354720, at *60 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022), will also be applied here. Although 

plaintiffs urge this Court to adopt the framework employed in Gill v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 

249 F. Supp. 3d 88, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2017) and multiply each plaintiff’s compensatory award by 
27

three to arrive at a punitive damages amount, see Pls.’ Mem. ¶¶ 159–60, a punitive damages 

award equal to compensatory damages is most appropriate here. Plaintiffs are already receiving 

substantial compensatory awards, supra Part III.D.2–3, and punitive damages above a one-to-one 

ratio to compensatory damages are unlikely to have an additional deterrent effect on Iran and 

would be excessive given the scope of plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to a total 

punitive damages award of $11,250,000 to be apportioned according to their compensatory 

damages. See also Valore, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (apportioning in the same fashion).

F. Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiffs next seek prejudgment interest. Compl. ¶ 87. “Whether to award such interest 

is a question that rests within this Court’s discretion, subject to equitable considerations.” 

Oveissi II, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 58. At the same time, the majority of Judges on this Court

confronted with this issue have concluded—as this Court did in Akins—that “pain and suffering 

and solatium damages are both designed to be fully compensatory” and prejudgment interest is 

therefore unwarranted. See Barry v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 437 F. Supp. 3d 15, 60 (D.D.C. 

2020) (Contreras, J.) (quoting Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 232 (D.D.C. 

2012)); see Doe A-1 v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, No. 18-cv-252 (DLF), 2021 WL 

723257, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2021) (Friedrich, J.) (denying prejudgment interest because the 

award “in today’s dollars fully compensates the crew members and their estates for their time 

spent in captivity” (emphasis in original)); Bathiard v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 16-cv1549 (CRC), 2020 WL 1975672, at *8 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2020) (Cooper, J.) (holding 

“prejudgment interest is not appropriate for nonpecuniary damages already designed to provide 

complete compensation”); Schertzman Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1214 (JEB), 

2019 WL 3037868, at *10 (D.D.C. Jul. 11, 2019) (Boasberg, J.) (denying prejudgment interest 
28

because “direct-injury and solatium awards [are] to be fully compensatory” already); Maupin v. 

Syrian Arab Republic, 405 F. Supp. 3d 79, 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2019) (Spec. Master Report), adopted 

by Maupin v. Syrian Arab Republic, 405 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D.D.C. 2019) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); 

Thuneibat v. Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F. Supp. 3d 22, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2016) (Howell, J.). 

Thus, the overarching tide of persuasive precedent in this District weighs against awarding 

prejudgment interest, and is even less warranted considering punitive damages are permissible in 

§ 1605A cases, as prejudgment interest “does not apply to punitive damages because 

‘prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation’ and punitive damages are noncompensatory.” Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (quoting Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 42).

Consistent with this persuasive precedent, this Court concludes plaintiffs are not entitled 

to prejudgment interest on their compensatory or punitive damages. When denying prejudgment 

interest on compensatory damages in Oveissi I, Judge Lamberth explained that “[i]n adopting the 

Heiser framework, this Court determined that the values set by that scale represent the 

appropriate level of compensation, regardless of the timing of the attack.” Oveissi I, 768 F.

Supp. 2d at 30 n.12; see also Maupin, 405 F. Supp. 3d at 94; Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 54. 

Indeed, nonpecuniary damages for pain and suffering and solatium “do not typically require 

prejudgment interest because they are ‘designed to be fully compensatory.’” Id. (quoting Wyatt, 

908 F. Supp. 2d at 232). As in Oveissi I, where “the Court s[aw] no reason to deviate from its 

standard practice” of relying on “the values set by th[at] [Heiser] scale[, which] represent the 

appropriate level of compensation” and award prejudgment interest, Oveissi I, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 

30 n.12, the instant plaintiffs “have not provided any reason why awards under [the Heiser] 

framework are insufficient to provide ‘complete compensation,’” Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 46 

(quoting West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 (1987)). Plaintiffs are likewise not 
29

entitled to prejudgment interest on their punitive damages. “[P]rejudgment interest does not 

apply to punitive damages because ‘prejudgment interest is an element of complete 

compensation’ and punitive damages are non-compensatory.” Thuneibat, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 55 

(quoting Wultz, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 42). Accordingly, plaintiffs are awarded monetary damages 

in the amounts established above without prejudgment interest.

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment and damages is 

granted. Defendant is liable for the pain and suffering inflicted on Sarri Singer, IIED inflicted on 

her immediate family members, and for punitive damages equal to compensatory damages. 

Plaintiffs are awarded compensatory and punitive damages in the total amount of 

$22,500,000, which is apportioned as follows:

1. Victim-plaintiff Sarri Singer is entitled to $5,000,000 in pain and suffering damages and 

$5,000,000 in punitive damages;

2. Plaintiff parents Robert Singer and Judith Singer are each entitled to $2,500,000 in 

damages for IIED and $2,500,000 in punitive damages;

3. Plaintiff sibling Eric Singer is entitled to $1,250,000 in damages for IIED and $1,250,000 

in punitive damages.

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

DATE: June 17, 2024.

__________________________

BERYL A. HOWELL 

United States District Judge