### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 15, 200 4
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MA RK DA NIEL GOD SEY

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty Nos. 239641 and 242704 Rebecca Ste rn, Judge

No. E2003-02141-CC A-R3- HC - F iled Septem ber 27, 2004

Def endant a ppeals the tria l court’s dismissal o f h i s p et i t i o n for writ of habea s corpus in Case N o. 242704 in which Def

end an t al l eg ed that the municipal or dinance supporting his c onviction for
re c kle ss dri vin g wa s u nla wf ull y e na c te d. De fe nd a nt a lso app e a ls the tr ia l c ou rt ’s or d e r de c lari ng him to be an ha

bitual motor ve hicle offe nder in Ca se No. 239641. After a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d,
we a ffirm the tria l court’s judg ments in Case Nos. 242704 and 239641. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Trial Court Affi rm ed
T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.
J erry H. Summers, Chattanoog a, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Mark D aniel Godse y
. Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th T

. Ry a n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam H. Cox , I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and K enneth O. Fritz, Assi stant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION
On Ma rc h 1 1, 20 02 , th e Sta te fi le d a pet iti on to de c lare De fe nd a nt an h abitua l mo tor ve hic le of fe nd e r p ur su a nt t o T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 5 5- 10 -6 07 . A s p re dic a te of fe ns e s, the Sta te alleg ed that De fenda nt had bee n convicted of driving while impaired on Septe mber 1, 1999; for driving under the influence on November 26, 1999; and for rec kless driving on November 19, 2001. The Nove mber 19, 2001, c onviction for re ckless driving resulted from a violation of sec tion 24-13 of the Chattanoog a City

Code.
Be fore a hea

ring was c onducted on the State’ s petition, Defendant filed a petition f or habe as corpus r elief a nd a “motion to strik e a prior conviction” on January 2, 2003. I n his petition, Def endant al l eged that section 24-13 of the Chattanoog a City Code was unlaw fully

enac ted, and-2-

Def endant’ s conviction on Novembe r 19, 2001 wa s theref ore void. De fendant conce ded that he w as not incar cer ated as a re sult of this conviction. Defendant arg ued, howe ver, that habea s corpus re lief
wa s a pp ro priat e becau se the Sta te ’s a tte mpt to u se his re c kle ss dri vin g c on vic tio n to su pp ort a fi nd in g t hat D e fe nd a nt w a s a n h abitua l mo tor ve hic le of

fe nd e r o pe rate d a s a

re str a int a g a ins t hi s lib e rt y . T he City of Chatta no og a , altho ug h not na me d as a pa rt y to the la ws uit , f

ile d a n a ns we r t o De fe nd a nt’ s pet iti on fo r ha be a s cor pu s re lie f g e ne ra lly de nying that se c tio n 2 4- 13 wa s u nla wf ull y enac ted.
The trial c ourt denied D efe ndant’s petition for ha beas c orpus re lief in Case No. 242704 on May 8, 2003. On May

23, 2003, Def

endant filed an amended petiti on for writ of habeas cor pus and a mot ion to rehea

r which the trial court de nied on J uly 31, 2003. The trial c ourt enter ed an or der nunc pro tunc to A ug ust 27, 2003 in Ca se No. 239641decla ring Def endant to be an habitual motor vehicle of fende r. De fenda nt filed a notice of appe al on Aug ust 28, 2003.
I. Notice of Ap peal
We first addre ss the State’s challeng e to the sufficie ncy of the content of D efe ndant’s notice of appe al. The State arg ues t hat Defenda nt’s notice of appea l fails t o ref er specifica lly to the trial court’s judg ment on J uly

31, 2003 in Case No. 242704 deny ing D efe ndant habe as cor pus relief . The State points out that the body of Def endant’ s notice ref

ers only to the trial court’s order enter ed nunc pro tunc fo r A ug us t 27 , 2 00 3 in Ca se No . 2 39 64 1 d e c lari ng De fe nd a nt t o b e a ha bitua l moto r v e hic le offe nder. The S tate arg ues t hat t he is sues on appea l are thus lim ited to those arising out of the trial court’s A ug ust 27, 2003 order. Rule 3(f) of

the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e requires an appellant to spec ify the judgme nt from which relief is soug ht in his or her notice of appea l. See Te nn
. R. Ap p. P. 3( f) . Ru le 3(f) , howeve r, also states that “ [a] n appea l shall not be dismis sed for informality

of form or title of the notice of

appea l.” I

d. Th e pu rpose of

the ru le is t o p ro vid e fo rm a l no tic e of a n in te nti on to appea l. Id. , A dv iso ry

Com mis sio n Co mme nts

. Th e bo dy of De fe nd a nt’ s n oti c e of

app e a l r e a ds a s f

oll ow s:
Comes now the Def

endant MARK DA NIEL

GODSEY, by and through counsel, and pursuant to Tenne ssee rule of Appellate Procedur e 3, to [ sic] hereby g ive notice that he int e nd s to app e a l to the Cou rt of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls the fi na l ju dg me nt e nte re d in this action on the 27 day of Aug ust, 2003. (Emphasis in origina l.) th Notwithstanding the contents of the body of the notice , howeve r, the c aption of De fenda nt’s notice of ap p e a l s p e c if

ic a ll y d ir e c ts h is ap p e a l f r o m th e tria l c o u r t’ s ju d g me n ts in b o th Ca s e No. 239641 and Case N o. 242704. A failure to c omply with Rule 3(f) doe s not lim it the issues which may be ra ised on appe al. Dunlap v. Dunlap , 996 S.W .2d 803, 811 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). T he scope of r e v ie w o n ap p e a l i s a d d r e s s e d in Ru le 1 3 ( a ) o f th e T e n n e s s e e Ru le s o f

A p p e ll a te Pr o c edure

. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3, Ad vis ory Com mis sio n Comme nts

. “ [Rule 3( f) ] re a d inc on jun c tio n w ithru le-3-

13 (a ) p e rm its a ny qu e sti on of la w to be br ou g ht up fo r re vie w [exc e pt a s oth e rw ise pr ov ide d in R ule 3(e) ] as long as any

party formally decla

res an intention to appea l in a timely fashion.” Id. ; se e als o State v. W

ood , 91 S.W .3d 769, 774 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002)

. T h e St ate r elies on Hall v. Ha ll , 7 72 S.W. 2d43 2 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 9) in s up po rt of its arg ument that Def

endant has failed to pe rfe ct his appea l of Case No. 242704. In Ha ll , the appe llant attempted to see k revie w of an order of contempt despite the fac t that ne ither of his two notices of appea l refe renc ed that matter

. T h e C o u rt of Appe als conc luded that the def endant wa s prec luded from ra ising a ny

issues conce rning the orde r of contempt because of non-complianc e with R ule 3(f)

. More importantly , howeve r, the judgme nt of contempt was not a f inal, appea lable orde r. Ha ll , 772 S.W .2d at 437.
This is not t he situation in the instant case. D efe ndant filed a notice of a

ppeal r efe renc ing both case s on Aug ust 28, 2003. The noti ce w as timely filed as to the tria l court’s July31, 2003 order dismiss ing D efe ndant’s petition for habea s corpus re lief in Case No. 242704. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 4(a) . The notice of appea l was also timely filed as to the tria l court’s orde r ente red nunc pro tunc for Aug ust 27, 2003 order in Case No. 239641. Based on the f acts pre sented in this case , we c annot conclude that Def

endant’ s failure to spe cifica lly ref er to the tria l court’s July31, 2003 order in the body of his notice of a

ppeal pr eclude s this C ourt from re viewing the issues raise d in Defe ndant’s brief. Dunlap , 996 S.W .2 at 810.
II. Validi ty of Defend ant’s Rec kless Driving Convi ction
Def endant’ s basis for both his challeng e to the trial court’s orde r dec laring him to be an habitual m otor vehicle offe nder a nd his petition for habea s corpus re lief hing es upon the va lidityof section 24-13 of

the Chattanoog a City

Code. D e f

e n d an t c ontends that his rec kless driving conviction under section 24-13 of the Chattanoog a City Code is void beca use the penalties impose d b yt he municipal ordinan ce d o not mirror those assoc iated with a violation of the statutory offe nse of
rec kless driving found in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-205.
Se c tio n 2 4- 13 of

the Chatta no og a

City Cod e pr ov ide s th a t: (a) Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disreg ard f or the
s af et y o f p er s o n s o r p ro p er t y

i s gu i l t y o f r ec k l es s d ri v i n g. (b ) E ve ry pe rs on c on vic te d o f r e c kle ss dri vin g sh a ll b ep u nis he d u po n th e fi rs t conviction by a fine of not less than five dollar s ($5.00), on a second c onviction by
a fi ne of no t le ss tha n te n d oll ars ($ 10 .0 0) , o n a thi rdc on vic tio n b y

a fi ne of no t le ss than twenty -five dollar s ($25.00) a nd on all subsequent convic tions bya fine of not less than fifty

dollars ($50.00).
C HATTANOOGA , T N , C ODE § 24-13 (1986)

.-4-

Section 24-13 wa s enac ted pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 55-10-307 which pr ov ide s th a t: (a) Any

incorporated municipality may by ordinanc e adopt, by

ref ere nce, any of t he appropriate pr ovisions of §§ 55-8-101 – 55-8- 180, 55-10-101 – 55- 10-310, 55- 50-301, 55-50- 302, 55-50-304, 55- 50-305, 55-50- 311, and 55-50-312, a nd may by ordinanc e provide additional reg ulat i o n s for the ope ration of ve hicles within the
mun ic ipa lit y , w hic h s ha ll n ot b e in c on fl ic t w ith the pr ov isi on s o f s uc h s e c tio ns
. Th e statut ory

of fe ns e of re c kle ss dri vin g is c omm itt e d b y “ a ny pe rs on wh o d ri ve s a ny

ve hic le in willful or wanton disreg ard for t he safety of persons or property .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 55-10- 205. Se c tio n 2 4- 13 thu s in c or

po rate s th e sa me e le me nts of the of fe ns e of re c kle ss drivi ng a s d oe s st a te law. Com

pa re C HATTANOOGA , T N , C ODE § 24-13(a ) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-205(a ). A violation of the offe nse of r eckle ss driving unde r state law , howeve r, is a C l as s B misdemeanor wh ic h c arrie s a

pu nis hme nt o f a

pe ri odof c on fi ne me nt n ot g re a te r tha n six mon ths a nda fi ne no t to ex cee d five hundre d dollars. Id. § § 5 5

- 1 0

- 2 0 5 ( b ) a n d 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 1 ( e ) ( 3 )

. D e f e n d a n t ar g u e s that the city ’s fa ilure to adopt the pe nalty provisions of Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 55-10-205(b) w as outside its st atutory

authority thus rendering the ordinanc e void.

I n construing statutes, we must “ g ive eff ect to the leg islative intent without undulyrestric ting
or expanding a statute’s cover ag e bey ond its int ended sc ope.” State v. Flem ming , 19 S.W .3d 195, 1 9 7 (T en n
. 2 0 0 0 ), ci t i n g State v. Butler , 9 80 S.W. 2d 35 9, 36 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) . L e g isl a tiv e int e nt i s determined “fr om the natura l and ordinary meaning of the statutory lang uag e withi n the context of the entire statute without any forc ed or subtle construction that would extend or limi t the statute’s meaning .” Flemming , 19 S.W .3d at 197. A municipality “may exercise only

tho se express or nece ssarily

implied powers dele g ated to it by the L eg islature in its charter or under statutes.” City of Le ba no n v . B air

d , 756 S.W. 2d 23 6, 24 1 (T e nn . 198 8) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . A n a c tio n w hic h f a lls
ou tsi de of a mun ic ipa lit y ’s statut ory a uth ority is ultra vires , or bey ond the scope of its powers, a nd thus void or voidable. Id. , ci t i n g Crocker v. Town of Manchester , 178 Tenn. 67, 156 S.W .2d 383, 384 (1941). As our supre me court has p re v i o u s ly rec og nized, “the leg islature may confe r jurisdiction up on mun ic ipa l c ou rt s ‘ to t ry a nddis po se of

c a se s b a se d u po n v iol a tio n o f S ta te [tr a ff ic ] statut e s’ for the purposes of ‘ec onomy , eff iciency and expeditious handling of traffi c c as es
. ’” City of Cha tta no og a v . D av is , 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 2 4 8 , 2 7 7 (T en n
. 2 0 0 1 ), ci t i n g Hill v. S t a t e ex re l. Philli ps , 216 T e n n
. 5 0 3 , 3 9 2 S

. W

. 2 d 9 5 0 , 9 5 2 ( 1 9 6 5 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, C h a t t a n o o g a , a s a h o m e ru l e m u n i c i p a l i t y, is statutorilyauthorized to establish city courts to try violations of city ordinanc es. Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-17-101( a). See Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authorit y v. City of Chat tanooga , 580 S.W. 2d32 2 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) (N oti ng that th e City of Chatta no og a be c a me a “ ho me ru le ” mun ic ipa lit y in November , 1972). The c ity judge has the “ power and authority to try and dispose of violations of mu ni cip al or din a nc e s a ndha ve a ll o the r p ow e rs tou c hin g up on the arr e st andpr e lim ina ry tr ia l, dis c ha rg ing , b ind ing ov e r, of

a ll p e rs on s c ha

rg e d w ith of

fe ns e s ag a ins t the state c omm itt e d in the c ity or municipality .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 16-17- 103. The max imum penalty , howeve r, which ma y be-5-

set by a home r ule municipality

for violation of an ordinance is thirty day s imprisonment and/or forf eitures up to five hundred dollar s to co v er administrative expenses. Id. § 6-54-306( a) ( Supp. 2003).
Eac h state statutory misdem ea n o r o ff

ense c arries the possibilit y of a f ine, up to a set maxi mum amount depending on the offe nse’s c lassification, unless otherwise provided by statute. Id. § 40-35-111( e) ( emphasis adde d). The Ten n essee constitution requires that a jury fix the fine wh e re the fi ne is as se sse d as pun ish me nt fo r an of fe ns e a nd is i n e xce ss o f f

if ty do lla rs . T e nn . Co ns t. art. VI , § 14; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-301. Article VI , section 14 “a pplies to procee dings involving the violation of a municipal ordinanc e when the monetary sanction serve s punitive goa ls.” Da v is , 54 S.W .3d at 262. I n Cityof C ha tta no og a v . D av is , our su p re m e co u rt observe d that Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 6-54-306, at least fac ially , is not a pe r se violation of Article VI , section 14 beca use the express lang uag e of the statute limit s the imposit ion of a monetary penalty “to co v er administrative expenses.” Id. a t 27 4. As su c h, se c tio n 6-5 4- 30 6 “c on fe rs no a uth ority on the City of Chattanoog a to impose punitive pe nalties in e x cess of fifty dollars, either with or without a jury .” Id . at 267, n.19. The purpose of the pe nalt y p ro v i sions of section 24-13 of the Chattanoog a City Code, howeve r, “is [clear ly ] t o punish th e o ffe nder, and the lang uag e does not other wise sug g est any reme dial purposes to be se rved by the fine.” Id. a t 26 6. Th e su pr e me c ou rt state d th a t: only courts of g ener al jurisdiction have the pow er t o empane l a jury to determine fac ts or impose punishment. Theref ore, irr espec tive of any ci t y ordinanc e to the contra ry , the discre tion of the Chattanoog a City Court to impos e punitive monetary sa nc tio ns is ne c e ssa

ri ly lim ite d by Artic le VI , s e c tio n 1 4 to fi ne s n ot e xce e din g fi ft y do lla rs
. Id . at 267.
A re viewing court must “not apply a particular int erpr etation t o a st atute if that int erpr etation would lead to an a

bsurd re sult.” Flemming , 19 S.W .3d at 197. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55 -1 0- 30 7 auth orize s in c or po rate d mu nic ipa lit ie s to a do pt b y re ference “ a ny

of the app ro pria te pr ov isi on s o f §

. . . [55 -1 0- 20 5].” Th e City of Chatta no og a ’s a do pti on of the e le me nts of

the of fe ns e of reckless driving was a valid exerc ise of its authority under this sec tion. The implementation of a penalty structure for violators of

the municipal ordin an c ed e f ining the of

fense of re ckless driving was in keeping with the Cityof Chattanoog a’s authorized powers to puni s h o ff en d ers. To interpret Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-307 otherw ise would lead to the f utile require ment that a municipality

adopt pena lties it i s without authority to enforc e if it wis h ed t o adopt any of the
enumer ated statutory

offe nses listed in this s ection.
Def endant r elies on Cityof C ha tta no og a v . D av is in support of his a rg ument and conte nds in h is b ri e f that th e su pr e me c ou rt ha s pr e vio us ly state d that “ se c tio n 24 -1 3 o f the Chatta no og a City-6-

Code is arg uably

not a lawf

ully enac ted municipal ordinanc e beca use its provisions do not ‘mirror’ state law.” I n this case, howe ver, the supreme c ourt observe d:

I n its role as Am i cu s Curiae, the D istrict Attorney s Gene ral Confe renc e arg ue s st ro ng ly that se c tio n 2 4- 13 of

the Chat ta no og a

City Cod e is n ot a

la wf ull y enac ted municipal ordinanc e bec ause its provisions d o n o t “m i rror ” state la w as arg uably require d by

section 55-10- 307. Howeve r, bec ause the i s s u e p re s ented by the appellant reg arding the differ ent penalties c oncerned only the constitutionalityof the s tate s tatu te u n d e r

A r ti c le X I , s e c ti o n , 8 , w e d e c li n e to a d d r e s s th e ar g u ment raised by the Amicus. To be clear , though, our holding that se ction 55-10-307 doe s not f acia lly violate Article XI , section 8 in no way resolves the iss u e o f w h ether Chattanoog a City

Code section 24-13 must mirror the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated s ec t ion 55-10-205 to be statutorily valid. We reserve this issue for decision in future case s.
Da v is , 54 S.W .3d at 278.

B e c a us e the su pr e me c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly de c lin e d to add re ss the iss ue raise d by De fe nd a nt i n this appeal, ther e i s n o au t h ority in Cityof C

ha tta no og a v . D av is to control the disposition of the issue.
III . Ha bitual M ot orVe hic le Offen de rSt at us
The trial c ourt found that ther e we re no material disp u t ed issues of f act with re g ard to the
a lle g a tio ns c on ta ine d in theSta te ’s pe tit iona ndde c lare d D e fe nd a nt t o b e a n ha bitua l mot or

ve hic le offe nder a s defi n ed byTenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-603(2)( A). As r eleva nt here , an ha bitual moto r v e hic le of

fe nd e r i s a ny on e wh o is c on vic te d, wi thi n a thr e e -y e ar p e ri od , o f at le a st three of seve ral spec ifically enumer ated of

fense s. Id. The predic ate offe nses include the violation of a municipa l ordinance “if the e lements of the of fense cover ed by

the ordinanc e ar e the sa me as the eleme nts of the offe nse cove red by the compar able statute.” Id . -603(2) (B ).
The State offere d evidenc e that Def endant had been convicted of driving while i mpaired on September 1, 1 9 9 9 , driving under the influence on November 26, 2000, and re ckless driving on November

19, 2001, all within a three -y ear period. The judgme nt of the Chat t anooga City Court finding Def

endant g uiltyof sec tion 24-13 was duly enter ed, and D efe ndant did not se ek any appea l from the judgme nt. Defe ndant paid the f ine, and the judg ment became final. Nothing on the fa ce of t he record of the conviction invalidates this final judg ment. Se e Ev e rh ar d v . S tat e , 563 S.W .2d 79 5 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 78 ). On c e th e tr ial cou rt de te rm ine s th a t th e de fe nd a nt h a s th e re qu isi te nu mbe r o f c on vic tio ns wi thi n the re qu isi te tim e pe ri od , the re are no ma te ri a l dis pu te d iss ue s of fa c t, and the tria l court is require d to declar e the de fendant an habitual of fende r and r evoke his or he r driving privileg es. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-613( a). Ba sed on the facts prese nted in this case, we find that the trial court did not err in dec laring Def endant a n habitual motor vehicle offe nder.-7-

VI. Habeas Corpus Relief
Defendant’s ha

beas c orpus petition was base d upon his claim that his conviction under section 24-13 of

the Chattanoog a City

Code was void. We nee d not add ress this arg ument based upon the fore g oing co n cl u s ion that the ordinanc e is not void. Furthermore, the r estraint on De fe nd a nt’ s li be rt y

c a us e d b y

a n o rd e r d e c lari ng him

to b e a n hab itu a l mo tor

ve hic le of

fe nd e r i s mere ly a collate ral c onsequenc e of his convic tion of rec kless driving . Under the re cently

decide d decision of the T ennesse e S upreme Court in Hi c k ma n v . S tat e , ___ S.W .3d. ___, No. E2002-01916- SC-R11-PC (Tenn. Sept. 22, 2004), habea s corpus “is not an appropriate ave nue for relief .” Id. , s lip op. at 6-7.
CO NC LU SION
Af te r a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f this re c or d, we af fi rm the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nts in C a se No s. 242704 and 239641.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE