Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

CHRISTOPHER KIMBRELL GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

LYUBOV GORE

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CHRISTOPHER KIMBRELL, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A02-1311-CR-1002

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable Amy Barbar, Magistrate

Cause No. 49G02-0406-PC-105656

October 14, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Chief Judge
2

Case Summary

Christopher Kimbrell, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. Because Kimbrell’s argument requires consideration of matters 

beyond the face of the sentencing judgment, a motion to correct erroneous sentence was 

not the appropriate means for Kimbrell to use. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied 

Kimbrell’s motion. 

Facts and Procedural History

In 2006 Kimbrell was convicted of two counts of Class A felony child molesting 

and one count of Class C felony child molesting for molesting his biological daughter. The 

trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years for each of the Class A felonies and four 

years for the Class C felony. Finding that Kimbrell’s criminal history outweighed any 

mitigators, the court ordered the sentences for the two Class A felonies to be served 

consecutively; the sentence for the Class C felony was to be served concurrently. 

On direct appeal, Kimbrell argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

imposed consecutive sentences for the Class A felonies because the court failed to 

articulate its reasons for doing so. Kimbrell v. State, No. 49A02-0608-CR-711 (Ind. Ct. 

App. June 20, 2007). We concluded that the trial court had articulated its reasons for 

imposing consecutive sentences and affirmed Kimbrell’s fifty-year sentence. Id. 

Kimbrell later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction 

court denied. Kimbrell appealed, and we affirmed the post-conviction court. Kimbrell v. 

State, No. 49A02-1008-PC-1012 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011), trans. denied.
3

In November 2013 Kimbrell, pro se, filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence 

arguing that the trial court “erroneously sentenced [him] to consecutive 25 years [sic] 

sentences.” Appellant’s App. p. 47. He asserted that the court “did not explain why the 

aggravating circumstances warranted consecutive sentences as opposed to enhanced 

concurrent sentences.” Id. at 51. The trial court denied Kimbrell’s motion to correct 

erroneous sentence because his claim did 

not involve sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment. 

He is questioning the validity of the consecutive sentence imposed herein 

based upon the Court’s allocution of the reasons for the sentence. These 

claims may be raised only on direct appeal (as indeed this claim was raised 

by appellate counsel and rejected by the Court of Appeals) or, where 

appropriate, in post-conviction relief proceedings.

Id. at 46. 

Kimbrell now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Kimbrell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. An inmate who believes that he has been erroneously sentenced may 

file a motion to correct the sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15:

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render 

the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is 

given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must 

be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct 

sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

See also Neff v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. 2008). The purpose of Section 35-38-

1-15 “is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting 

the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind.
4

2004). Accordingly, a motion to correct sentence may only be filed to address a sentence 

that is “erroneous on its face.” Neff, 888 N.E.2d at 1251. Claims that require consideration 

of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion 

to correct sentence. Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787. Sentencing errors that are not facially 

apparent must be addressed promptly via direct appeal and thereafter via post-conviction 

relief proceedings where applicable. Id. 

Kimbrell does not allege that his sentence is facially erroneous. In fact, he did not 

include the sentencing judgment in his appendix. Instead, he argues that his sentence is 

erroneous because the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to consecutive 

terms. See Appellant’s Br. p. 7 (“The trial court found that the aggravating factors 

outweighed the mitigating factors and sentenced Kimbrell to 25 years for each count and 

ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total of 50 years. But the trial court did

not explain why the aggravating circumstances warranted consecutive sentences as 

opposed to enhanced concurrent sentences.”). This argument, however, clearly falls 

outside the parameters of Section 35-38-1-15. Resolution of this issue requires us to look 

beyond the face of the judgment and the applicable statutory authority. See, e.g., Robinson,

805 N.E.2d at 786 (motion to correct erroneous sentence is not available for claims 

concerning how the trial court weighed factors in imposing sentence). Because the motion 

to correct erroneous sentence was not the appropriate means to challenge his sentence, the 

trial court properly denied Kimbrell’s motion.1

 

1

In addition, we note that this claim is barred by res judicata. Kimbrell raised this same issue on 

direct appeal, and we decided it against him. See Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013) (res 

judicata aims to prevent repetitious litigation of disputes that are essentially the same by holding a prior 

final judgment binding against both the original parties and their privies). 
5

Affirmed. 

FRIEDLANDER, J., and MAY, J., concur.