IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA 

January 2023 Term 

_____________ 

No. 21-0738 

_____________ 

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA, 

Plaintiff Below, Respondent, 

V. 

TREMAINE LAMAR JACKSON, 

Defendant Below, Petitioner. 

________________________________________________ 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County 

The Honorable Robert A. Burnside, Jr., Judge 

Criminal Action No. CC-41-2020-F-430 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

________________________________________________ 

Submitted: March 22, 2023 

Filed: June 9, 2023 

Graham B. Platz, Esq. 

Public Defender Services 

Appellate Advocacy Division 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Attorney for the Petitioner 

Patrick Morrisey, Esq. 

Attorney General 

Michael R. Williams, Esq. 

Senior Deputy Solicitor General 

William E. Longwell, Esq. 

Assistant Attorney General 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Attorneys for the Respondent

JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

JUSTICE ARMSTEAD dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion. 

FILED 

June 9, 2023 

released at 3:00 p.m.

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK 

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS 

OF WEST VIRGINIA 
i 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “When a prior conviction constitute[s] a status element of an offense, 

a defendant may offer to stipulate to such prior conviction[]. If a defendant makes an offer 

to stipulate to a prior conviction[] that is a status element of an offense, the trial court must 

permit such stipulation and preclude the state from presenting any evidence to the jury 

regarding the stipulated prior conviction[]. When such a stipulation is made, the record 

must reflect a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, defense counsel and the state 

indicating precisely the stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made voluntarily 

and knowingly by the defendant. To the extent that State v. Hopkins, 192 W. Va. 483, 453 

S.E.2d 317 (1994)[,] and its progeny are in conflict with this procedure they are expressly 

overruled.” Syllabus point 3, State v. Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999), 

overruled on other grounds by State v. McCraine, 214 W. Va. 188, 588 S.E.2d 177 (2003), 

and reinstated by State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014). 

2. “When a defendant is charged with a crime in which a prior conviction 

is an essential element of the current crime charged (e.g.[,] being a felon in possession of 

a firearm under [W. Va. Code § 61-7-7(b) (eff. 2016)]), and stipulates to having been 

previously convicted of a crime, the trial court shall inform the jury that the defendant 

stipulated to the prior conviction. The jury shall be informed that the defendant was 
ii 

convicted of a prior felony or misdemeanor, but shall otherwise not be informed of the 

name or nature of the defendant’s prior convictions. To the extent State v. Dews, 209 

W. Va. 500, 549 S.E.2d 694 (2001), is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby 

modified.” Syllabus point 5, State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014). 

3. A trial court may establish and enforce a pretrial deadline for 

producing stipulations in criminal proceedings. However, when no deadline has been set, 

a trial court must permit a defendant to stipulate to a prior conviction during trial when 

(1) that prior conviction is an essential element of a current crime charged, and (2) the 

purpose of the stipulation is to prevent the State from informing the jury of the name and 

nature of the prior conviction. 
1 

BUNN, Justice: 

The defendant, Tremaine Lamar Jackson, appeals four felony convictions 

stemming from an incident in May 2020 that resulted in Troy Williams’s death after he 

was shot in the chest. At the time of the shooting, Mr. Jackson was on parole from a 2017 

felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter, so the charges against him included the 

status offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Mr. Jackson claims the Circuit 

Court of Raleigh County committed reversible error by refusing to accept his stipulation to 

his prior felony conviction. The circuit court refused the stipulation because Mr. Jackson 

offered it during the trial, after refusing earlier attempts by the prosecutor to obtain the 

stipulation. The court’s refusal permitted the State to admit evidence of the name and nature 

of Mr. Jackson’s prior, similar offense. We find the admission of this evidence prejudiced 

Mr. Jackson. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.1

I. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Troy Williams was fatally shot in the chest during a bogus drug transaction 

with Mr. Jackson. During the incident, Mr. Jackson, accompanied by three companions, 

attempted to sell rock salt to Mr. Williams by representing that it was methamphetamine. 

1

 Mr. Jackson also claims that the circuit court erred by prohibiting him from 

testifying that someone else shot Mr. Williams. This ruling was based on a purported lack 

of notice. Because we reverse and remand for a new trial on other grounds, we do not 

address this issue. 
2 

Following a police investigation, Mr. Jackson was indicted, and ultimately convicted, of 

four felony counts: (1) first-degree murder in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-1; 

(2) use or presentation of a firearm during the commission of first-degree murder in 

violation of West Virginia Code § 61-7-15a; (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm in 

violation of West Virginia Code § 61-7-7; and (4) use or presentation of a firearm during 

the commission of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of West Virginia 

Code § 61-7-15a. 

Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence of Mr. Jackson’s 

2017 conviction for voluntary manslaughter, pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Evidence 

404(b), to show absence of mistake or modus operandi in connection with the first-degree 

murder charge. During a pretrial hearing, Mr. Jackson opposed the use of the Rule 404(b) 

evidence, arguing that it was unfairly prejudicial.2 The circuit court preliminarily found the 

evidence was inadmissible but stated that the issue could be revisited if the evidence 

presented at trial justified reconsideration. 

During trial, the State called Detective Jonathan Weaver of the Charleston 

Police Department to testify. Detective Weaver participated in the investigation of Mr. 

Williams’s death as well as the investigation that led to Mr. Jackson’s 2017 conviction for 

2 See W. Va. R. Evid. 403 (allowing exclusion of relevant evidence that is 

unfairly prejudicial). 
3 

voluntary manslaughter. When the State began to question Detective Weaver about the 

2017 conviction, Mr. Jackson objected based on the court’s pretrial ruling that evidence of 

the prior conviction was inadmissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). The State explained that it 

offered the evidence to establish the status element necessary to prove that Mr. Jackson 

was a felon in possession of a firearm, and not for the reasons previously rejected by the 

court. It also expressed its intent to introduce the 2017 sentencing order from Mr. Jackson’s 

voluntary manslaughter conviction, which identified the offense and noted the use of a 

firearm. 

Mr. Jackson then offered to stipulate to his prior felony conviction. The State 

refused to accept Mr. Jackson’s offer to stipulate because it previously attempted, 

unsuccessfully, to elicit this stipulation from Mr. Jackson.3 The State argued that accepting 

the stipulation during trial would be unfair because, absent an earlier stipulation, it had 

prepared to prove the 2017 conviction by Detective Weaver’s testimony and the sentencing 

order, which it viewed as the best evidence of an element of the felon in possession charge. 

The circuit court overruled Mr. Jackson’s objection and allowed the State to question 

Detective Weaver about the prior conviction. While Detective Weaver did not testify about 

the factual details of the prior conviction, and the court instructed the jury on the limited 

purpose for the evidence, the State still elicited testimony that Mr. Jackson had a prior 

3

 Mr. Jackson did not refute the State’s assertion that it made pretrial attempts 

to obtain a stipulation concerning Mr. Jackson’s prior felony conviction. 
4 

felony conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Furthermore, the court admitted into 

evidence the 2017 sentencing order, which noted the use of a firearm in committing the 

offense. The jury received a copy of the 2017 sentencing order with the admitted trial 

exhibits for use during its deliberations. The jury convicted Mr. Jackson on all four counts 

of the indictment, with a recommendation of mercy for the first-degree murder charge. 

By amended sentencing order entered on August 24, 2021, the circuit court 

sentenced Mr. Jackson to life with mercy for first-degree murder; a determinate term of ten 

years for use of a firearm in the commission of first-degree murder; a determinate term of 

five years for being a felon in possession of a firearm, with a recidivist enhancement of an 

additional five years; and a determinate term of ten years for use of a firearm in committing 

the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court ordered these sentences 

to be served consecutively. This appeal followed. 

II. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Mr. Jackson challenges an evidentiary ruling by the trial court. “The West 

Virginia Rules of Evidence . . . allocate significant discretion to the trial court in making 

evidentiary . . . rulings.” State v. Swims, 212 W. Va. 263, 269, 569 S.E.2d 784, 790 (2002) 

(quoting Syl. pt. 9, Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W. Va. 111, 506 S.E.2d 

554 (1997)). For this reason, “with few exceptions, this Court reviews 
5 

‘evidentiary . . . rulings of the circuit court under an abuse of discretion standard.’” State 

v. Delorenzo, ___ W. Va. ___, ___, 885 S.E.2d 645, 663 (2022) (quoting Syl. pt. 1, in part, 

State v. Gray, 204 W. Va. 248, 511 S.E.2d 873 (1998) (per curiam) (additional quotations 

and citation omitted)). Touching on one of these exceptions, we have acknowledged that 

“[a]lthough most rulings of a trial court regarding the admission of evidence are reviewed 

under an abuse of discretion standard, . . . an appellate court reviews de novo the legal 

analysis underlying a trial court’s decision.” State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 680, 461 

S.E.2d 163, 186 (1995). Guided by these standards, we address the circuit court’s decision 

to refuse Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation, bearing in mind that “[e]ven if we find the 

circuit court abused its discretion, the error is not reversible unless the defendant was 

prejudiced.” State v. Marple, 197 W. Va. 47, 51, 475 S.E.2d 47, 51 (1996). 

III. 

DISCUSSION

Mr. Jackson asks us to determine whether the circuit court erred by refusing 

his stipulation to a prior felony conviction as a status element of the offense of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm.4 He argues that the circuit court was required to accept his 

4

 We have explained that there are two scenarios when a prior conviction is 

a status element of an offense: 

The fact that a defendant has been previously convicted 

of a crime is a status element when: (1) his/her prior conviction 

makes otherwise legal conduct illegal, meaning that the prior 
6 

felon status stipulation and to refuse to admit evidence of the name and nature of his prior 

offense. 

This Court has previously established a mandatory obligation on trial courts 

to accept a defendant’s offer to stipulate to a prior conviction that is a status element of an 

offense: 

When a prior conviction constitute[s] a status element 

of an offense, a defendant may offer to stipulate to such prior 

conviction[]. If a defendant makes an offer to stipulate to a 

prior conviction[] that is a status element of an offense, the trial 

court must permit such stipulation and preclude the state from 

presenting any evidence to the jury regarding the stipulated 

prior conviction[]. When such a stipulation is made, the record 

must reflect a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, 

defense counsel and the state indicating precisely the 

stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made 

voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant. To the extent that 

State v. Hopkins, 192 W. Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d 317 (1994)[,] 

and its progeny are in conflict with this procedure they are 

expressly overruled. 

conviction is an essential element of the current crime charged 

(e.g., a felon possessing a firearm); or (2) the prior conviction 

is merely a penalty enhancer, meaning that it enhances the 

penalty for conduct that is itself illegal even without the 

defendant’s prior convictions (e.g., third-offense driving under 

the influence). 

State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 592, 767 S.E.2d 471, 487 (2014). In this case, Mr. 

Jackson’s status of having a prior felony conviction is an essential element of the crime of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
7 

Syl. pt. 3, State v. Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999), overruled on other 

grounds by State v. McCraine, 214 W. Va. 188, 588 S.E.2d 177 (2003), and reinstated by 

State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014). 

The pertinent facts of this case differ from those addressed by the Nichols

Court. The defendant in Nichols was on trial for third-offense DUI and stipulated to the 

status element of that offense—his two prior DUI convictions—to keep the jury from 

learning of his prior convictions. Despite this stipulation, the circuit court required the State 

to present evidence to establish those prior convictions.5 Here, the circuit court refused to 

accept Mr. Jackson’s offer to stipulate to his prior felony conviction. While this refusal 

violates our holding in Nichols, the State argues that the circuit court did not err in refusing 

to accept Mr. Jackson’s stipulation because it was made during trial and was not reduced 

to writing, signed, or filed with the circuit court clerk as required by Rule 42.05 of the West 

Virginia Trial Court Rules.6

5

 The circuit court relied on State v. Hopkins, 192 W. Va. 483, 453 S.E.2d 

317 (1994), when it required the State to present evidence of Mr. Nichols’s two prior DUI 

convictions. This Court overruled Hopkins in the Nichols opinion. See Syl. pt. 3, State v. 

Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310 (1999). 

6

 Pursuant to West Virginia Trial Court Rule 42.05, “[u]nless otherwise 

ordered, stipulations must be in writing, signed by the parties making them or their counsel, 

and promptly filed with the clerk.” 
8 

To determine whether or under what circumstances a circuit court must 

accept a last-minute stipulation that does not comply with Trial Court Rule 42.05, we 

consider the rationale underlying our holding in Nichols, which followed the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S. Ct. 644, 136 

L. Ed. 2d 574 (1997).7 The decision in Nichols was centered on addressing the risk of a 

conviction tainted by a jury’s improper consideration of a prior conviction for similar 

conduct: 

“Evidence of prior convictions may lead a jury to 

convict a defendant for crimes other than the charged crime, 

convict because a bad person deserves punishment rather than 

based on the evidence presented, or convict thinking that an 

erroneous conviction is not so serious because the defendant 

already has a criminal record.” 

Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 443-44, 541 S.E.2d at 321-22 (quoting State v. Alexander, 571 

N.W.2d 662, 668 (Wis. 1997)). Similarly, the Old Chief Court observed that, while 

evidence of prior criminal conduct is relevant, “‘the risk that a jury will convict for crimes 

other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad 

person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary 

relevance.’” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181, 117 S. Ct. at 650, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (quoting 

United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)). This risk is particularly 

7

 As in this case, the defendant in Old Chief was charged with possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon. “The government wanted to introduce a copy of the 

judgment of his prior conviction, which contained the name and nature of the offense 

committed . . . . The defendant offered to stipulate to the fact that he had been previously 

convicted of a felony.” Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 442-43, 541 S.E.2d at 320-21. 
9 

significant when the prior conviction involves the use of a gun or is similar to an offense 

in the pending case: 

[T]here can be no question that evidence of the name or nature 

of the prior offense generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice 

to the defendant. . . . Where a prior conviction was for a gun 

crime or one similar to other charges in a pending case the risk 

of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious[.] 

Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S. Ct. at 652, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574. Consequently, once a 

defendant has stipulated to a prior conviction that is a status element of a charged crime, 

and that conviction is an essential element of that crime (as opposed to a penalty enhancer),8

the jury may not be informed of the name and nature of the prior conviction: 

When a defendant is charged with a crime in which a 

prior conviction is an essential element of the current crime 

charged (e.g.[,] being a felon in possession of a firearm under 

[W. Va. Code § 61-7-7(b) (eff. 2016)] and stipulates to having 

been previously convicted of a crime, the trial court shall 

inform the jury that the defendant stipulated to the prior 

conviction. The jury shall be informed that the defendant was 

convicted of a prior felony or misdemeanor, but shall otherwise 

not be informed of the name or nature of the defendant’s prior 

convictions. To the extent State v. Dews, 209 W. Va. 500, 549 

S.E.2d 694 (2001), is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby 

modified. 

Syl. pt. 5, State v. Herbert, 234 W. Va. 576, 767 S.E.2d 471 (2014). 

Importantly though, this Court has recognized with approval “the ‘familiar, 

standard rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, 

8

 See supra note 4 for an explanation of the two types of status elements. 
10 

or, more exactly, that a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the 

full evidentiary force of the case as the Government chooses to present it.’” State v. Gates, 

No. 17-0905, 2018 WL 6131292, at *2 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 2018) (memorandum decision) 

(quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-87, 117 S. Ct. at 653, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574). In Nichols, 

we acknowledged that relying on a stipulation to establish a prior conviction that is merely 

a status element of an offense does not deprive the jury of necessary information or prevent 

the prosecution from presenting the substance of its case: 

In reaching its result, the opinion in Old Chief made a 

distinction between stipulations to a status element of an 

offense, as opposed to a stipulation to other elements of an 

offense. Justice Souter wrote that “proof of the defendant’s 

status goes to an element entirely outside the natural sequence 

of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to 

commit the current offense.” Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191, 117 

S. Ct. at 655, 136 L. Ed. 2d 594. Old Chief reasoned that 

because a status element of an offense is independent of an 

offense’s mental and physical requirements, it was not 

necessary that a jury be informed of a status element. . . . 

Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 443, 541 S.E.2d at 321. See also Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190, 117 

S. Ct. at 654-55, 136 L. Ed. 2d 574 (“[R]ecognition that the prosecution with its burden of 

persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story has, however, virtually no 

application when the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some 

judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior 

charged against him.”). 
11 

The risk of unfair prejudice from evidence of the name and nature of the prior 

conviction, when that conviction is an essential element of a current charge, must inform 

our consideration of the State’s contention that Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation was 

properly rejected by the trial court because it was made during trial and did not comply 

with West Virginia Trial Court Rule 42.05. Neither Rule 42.05 nor Nichols imposes a 

specific timeframe for stipulations. Pursuant to Rule 42.05, “[u]nless otherwise ordered, 

stipulations must be in writing, signed by the parties making them or their counsel, and 

promptly filed with the clerk.” W. Va. Tr. Ct. R. 42.05. While the rule includes mandatory 

language requiring that “stipulations must be in writing, signed . . . , and promptly filed 

with the clerk,”9 this rule also allows for discretion by adding the qualification “[u]nless 

otherwise ordered.” Id. (emphasis added). Given this discretion, we easily reconcile Trial 

Court Rule 42.05 with the Nichols mandate that a court accept an offered stipulation of a 

prior conviction when that conviction is a status element of a charged offense. When an 

offered stipulation falls within Syllabus point 3 of Nichols, a circuit court must exercise its 

discretion and accept the stipulation. The absence of a contemporaneous writing simply 

does not outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice to a defendant from the court’s refusal to 

accept such a stipulation. In fact, we have previously found the lack of a written stipulation 

to be harmless in circumstances less compelling than these. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 214 

W. Va. 516, 524, 590 S.E.2d 709, 717 (2003) (finding the lack of a writing memorializing 

9

 “Typically, the word ‘must’ is afforded a mandatory connotation.” Ashby 

v. City of Fairmont, 216 W. Va. 527, 532, 607 S.E.2d 856, 861 (2004). 
12 

stipulations that occurred during a pretrial hearing to be either harmless or invited error). 

Cf. Syl. pt. 7, State v. Redden, 199 W. Va. 660, 487 S.E.2d 318 (1997) (holding that even 

though W. Va. R. Crim. P. 23(a) requires a defendant’s waiver of a jury trial to be in 

writing, when the record firmly establishes a defendant otherwise knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently waives the right, the failure to have the waiver in writing does not 

invalidate the waiver). 

That said, however, the better practice is for a defendant to timely enter into 

a stipulation that complies with the writing, signing, and filing requirements of Trial Court 

Rule 42.05. Furthermore, this issue could be prevented by the trial court establishing a 

deadline for the submission of Rule 42.05 compliant stipulations, which is certainly within 

a trial court’s inherent authority. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, in part, State v. Fields, 225 W. Va. 

753, 696 S.E.2d 269 (2010) (“[A] circuit court has inherent authority to conduct and control 

matters before it in a fair and orderly fashion.”); State v. Delorenzo, ___ W. Va. at ___, 

885 S.E.2d at 657 (same).10 Accordingly, we now hold that a trial court may establish and 

10 The State relies upon this inherent authority to argue that the circuit court 

properly rejected Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation. However, a court may not exercise its 

authority to manage proceedings in a manner that materially prejudices a defendant. See, 

e.g., State v. Kennon, 18 Wash. App. 2d 1062, 2021 WL 3619870, at *4 (2021) 

(unpublished opinion) (“[Defendant] alleges that the trial court violated his constitutional 

right to a fair trial when it allowed additional officers to ‘lurk . . . behind the prosecutor 

table’ during [a witness’s] testimony. Because the officers’ presence was not inherently 

prejudicial and the trial court has broad discretion to manage court proceedings, we 

disagree.” (emphasis added)), review denied, 501 P.3d 146 (Wash. 2022). See also Great 

Am. Ins. Co. v. Mueller, No. 21-12039, 2022 WL 2377391, at *3 (11th Cir. June 30, 2022) 
13 

enforce a pretrial deadline for producing stipulations in criminal proceedings. However, 

when no deadline has been set, a trial court must permit a defendant to stipulate to a prior 

conviction during trial when (1) that prior conviction is an essential element of a current 

crime charged, and (2) the purpose of the stipulation is to prevent the State from informing 

the jury of the name and nature of the prior conviction.11

(“While the court has ‘broad discretion’ to manage its cases, the ‘[f]ailure to consider and 

rule on significant pretrial motions before issuing dispositive orders can be an abuse of 

discretion’ if the litigant was ‘materially prejudiced’ as a result . . . .” (citations omitted)); 

United States v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 16-CV-02120-EMC, 2021 WL 4079145, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (“Trial courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets and 

can modify their case management orders upon a showing of ‘good cause,’ which considers 

the moving party’s diligence and any prejudice that will result to the non-moving party.” 

(emphasis added)); Helal v. Helal, No. 2592, Sept. term, 2019, 2021 WL 2000082, at *5 

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. May 19, 2021) (“[C]ourts have broad discretion to manage their 

resources, and we will not second guess such decisions ‘unless it clearly appear[s] that 

prejudice has resulted from the denial of a legal right.’” (citation omitted)). 

11 The State additionally contends, without explanation, that the Nichols

requirement for “a colloquy between the trial court, the defendant, defense counsel and the 

state indicating precisely the stipulation and illustrating that the stipulation was made 

voluntarily and knowingly by the defendant,” cannot be accomplished during a jury trial. 

Syl. pt. 3, in part, Nichols, 208 W. Va. 432, 541 S.E.2d 310. We disagree. The Nichols

Court clarified that it did not intend a burdensome dialog: 

We do not require that trial courts engage in the formal 

requirements under Rule 11 of the West Virginia Rules of 

Criminal Procedure for accepting plea agreements. A 

stipulation to prior convictions is an acknowledgment of a fact 

that, in nearly every case, will be a matter that is of public 

record. 

Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 445 n.22, 541 S.E.2d at 323 n.22. Furthermore, courts often pause 

to address issues outside the presence of the jury and we see no reason why this colloquy 

cannot be handled similarly. 
14 

In this case, no deadline for producing stipulations was set by the trial court. 

Furthermore, because Mr. Jackson’s offer to stipulate to his prior conviction for voluntary 

manslaughter was refused, the jury had evidence of the name and nature of that offense, 

including the fact that it was committed with a firearm. While the State produced this 

evidence to establish that Mr. Jackson was a felon in possession of a firearm, he was also 

being tried for first-degree murder and for using a firearm in the commission of that murder. 

Given these charges, providing the jury with details of Mr. Jackson’s prior conviction 

produced an unreasonable risk that his convictions were based upon improper grounds, i.e., 

that he acted in conformance with his prior illegal conduct or that he is simply a bad person 

worthy of punishment. In other words, “‘the only reasonable conclusion [is] that the risk 

of unfair prejudice . . . substantially outweigh[ed] the discounted probative value of the 

record of conviction.’” Nichols, 208 W. Va. at 443, 541 S.E.2d at 321 (quoting Old Chief, 

519 U.S. at 191, 117 S. Ct. at 655, 136 L. Ed. 2d. 574). As such, the circuit court abused 

its discretion by refusing Mr. Jackson’s offered stipulation and unfairly prejudiced him by 

that error. 
15 

IV. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we reverse the Circuit Court of Raleigh 

County’s amended sentencing order dated August 24, 2021, and remand this matter for a 

new trial consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and Remanded.