```

[Federal Register: May 4, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 85)]
[Notices]               
[Page 23710-23718]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr04my10-64]                         

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

 
Order Finding That the ICE PG&E Citygate Financial Basis Contract 
Traded on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Performs a Significant 
Price Discovery Function

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final order.

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SUMMARY: On October 9, 2009, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(``CFTC'' or ``Commission'') published for comment in the Federal 
Register \1\ a notice of its intent to undertake a determination 
whether the PG&E Citygate Financial Basis (``PGE'') contract, traded on 
the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (``ICE''), an exempt commercial 
market (``ECM'') under sections 2(h)(3)-(5) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act (``CEA'' or the ``Act''), performs a significant price discovery 
function pursuant to section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. The Commission 
undertook this review based upon an initial evaluation of information 
and data provided by ICE as well as other available information. The 
Commission has reviewed the entire record in this matter, including all 
comments received, and has determined to issue an order finding that 
the PGE contract performs a significant price discovery function. 
Authority for this action is found in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA and 
Commission rule 36.3(c) promulgated thereunder.
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    \1\ 74 FR 52210 (October 9, 2009).

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DATES: Effective date: April 28, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gregory K. Price, Industry Economist, 
Division of Market Oversight,

[[Page 23711]]

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581. Telephone: (202) 418-5515. E-mail: 
gprice@cftc.gov; or Susan Nathan, Senior Special Counsel, Division of 
Market Oversight, same address. Telephone: (202) 418-5133. E-mail: 
snathan@cftc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 (``Reauthorization Act'') \2\ 
significantly broadened the CFTC's regulatory authority with respect to 
ECMs by creating, in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, a new regulatory 
category--ECMs on which significant price discovery contracts 
(``SPDCs'') are traded--and treating ECMs in that category as 
registered entities under the CEA.\3\ The legislation authorizes the 
CFTC to designate an agreement, contract or transaction as a SPDC if 
the Commission determines, under criteria established in section 
2(h)(7), that it performs a significant price discovery function. When 
the Commission makes such a determination, the ECM on which the SPDC is 
traded must assume, with respect to that contract, all the 
responsibilities and obligations of a registered entity under the Act 
and Commission regulations, and must comply with nine core principles 
established by new section 2(h)(7)(C).
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    \2\ Incorporated as Title XIII of the Food, Conservation and 
Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18, 2008).
    \3\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(29).
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    On March 16, 2009, the CFTC promulgated final rules implementing 
the provisions of the Reauthorization Act.\4\ As relevant here, rule 
36.3 imposes increased information reporting requirements on ECMs to 
assist the Commission in making prompt assessments whether particular 
ECM contracts may be SPDCs. In addition to filing quarterly reports of 
its contracts, an ECM must notify the Commission promptly concerning 
any contract traded in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3) of 
the CEA that averaged five trades per day or more over the most recent 
calendar quarter, and for which the exchange sells its price 
information regarding the contract to market participants or industry 
publications, or whose daily closing or settlement prices on 95 percent 
or more of the days in the most recent quarter were within 2.5 percent 
of the contemporaneously determined closing, settlement or other daily 
prices of another contract.
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    \4\ 74 FR 12178 (Mar. 23, 2009); these rules became effective on 
April 22, 2009.
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    Commission rule 36.3(c)(3) established the procedures by which the 
Commission makes and announces its determination whether a particular 
ECM contract serves a significant price discovery function. Under those 
procedures, the Commission will publish notice in the Federal Register 
that it intends to undertake an evaluation whether the specified 
agreement, contract or transaction performs a significant price 
discovery function and to receive written views, data and arguments 
relevant to its determination from the ECM and other interested 
persons. Upon the close of the comment period, the Commission will 
consider, among other things, all relevant information regarding the 
subject contract and issue an order announcing and explaining its 
determination whether or not the contract is a SPDC. The issuance of an 
affirmative order signals the effectiveness of the Commission's 
regulatory authorities over an ECM with respect to a SPDC; at that time 
such an ECM becomes subject to all provisions of the CEA applicable to 
registered entities.\5\ The issuance of such an order also triggers the 
obligations, requirements and timetables prescribed in Commission rule 
36.3(c)(4).\6\
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    \5\ Public Law 110-246 at 13203; Joint Explanatory Statement of 
the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 110-627, 110 Cong., 2d 
Sess. 978, 986 (Conference Committee Report). See also 73 FR 75888, 
75894 (Dec. 12, 2008).
    \6\ For an initial SPDC, ECMs have a grace period of 90 calendar 
days from the issuance of a SPDC determination order to submit a 
written demonstration of compliance with the applicable core 
principles. For subsequent SPDCs, ECMs have a grace period of 30 
calendar days to demonstrate core principle compliance.
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II. Notice of Intent To Undertake SPDC Determination

    On October 9, 2009, the Commission published in the Federal 
Register notice of its intent to undertake a determination whether the 
PGE contract performs a significant price discovery function, and 
requested comment from interested parties.\7\ Comments were received 
from the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (``IECA''), Working 
Group of Commercial Energy Firms (``WGCEF''), ICE, Economists 
Incorporated (``EI''), Natural Gas Supply Association (``NGSA''), 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (``FERC''), and Financial 
Institutions Energy Group (``FIEG'').\8\ The comment letter from FERC 
\9\ did not directly address the issue of whether or not the PGE 
contract is a SPDC; IECA concluded that the PGE contract is a SPDC, but 
did not provide a basis for its conclusion.\10\ The other parties' 
comments raised substantive issues with respect to the applicability of 
section 2(h)(7) to the PGE contract, generally asserting that the PGE 
contract is not a SPDC as it does not meet the material liquidity, 
material price reference and price linkage criteria for SPDC 
determination. Those comments are more extensively discussed below, as 
applicable.
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    \7\ The Commission's Part 36 rules establish, among other 
things, procedures by which the Commission makes and announces its 
determination whether a specific ECM contract serves a significant 
price discovery function. Under those procedures, the Commission 
publishes a notice in the Federal Register that it intends to 
undertake a determination whether a specified agreement, contract or 
transaction performs a significant price discovery function and to 
receive written data, views and arguments relevant to its 
determination from the ECM and other interested persons.
    \8\ IECA describes itself as an ``association of leading 
manufacturing companies'' whose membership ``represents a diverse 
set of industries including: plastics, cement, paper, food 
processing, brick, chemicals, fertilizer, insulation, steel, glass, 
industrial gases, pharmaceutical, aluminum and brewing.'' WGCEF 
describes itself as ``a diverse group of commercial firms in the 
domestic energy industry whose primary business activity is the 
physical delivery of one or more energy commodities to customers, 
including industrial, commercial and residential consumers'' and 
whose membership consists of ``energy producers, marketers and 
utilities.'' ICE is an ECM, as noted above. EI is an economic 
consulting firm with offices located in Washington, DC, and San 
Francisco, CA. NGSA is an industry association comprised of natural 
gas producers and marketers. FERC is an independent federal 
regulatory agency that, among other things, regulates the interstate 
transmission of natural gas, oil and electricity. FIEG describes 
itself as an association of investment and commercial banks who are 
active participants in various sectors of the natural gas markets, 
``including acting as marketers, lenders, underwriters of debt and 
equity securities, and proprietary investors.'' The comment letters 
are available on the Commission's Web site: http://www.cftc.gov/lawandregulation/federalregister/federalregistercomments/2009/09-023.html.
    \9\ FERC stated that the PGE contract is cash settled and does 
not contemplate actual physical delivery of natural gas. 
Accordingly, FERC expressed the opinion that a determination by the 
Commission that a contract performs a significant price discovery 
function ``would not appear to conflict with FERC's exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) over certain sales of 
natural gas in interstate commerce for resale or with its other 
regulatory responsibilities under the NGA'' and further that, ``the 
FERC staff will continue to monitor for any such conflict * * * 
[and] advise the CFTC'' should any such potential conflict arise. CL 
06 (references the number of the comment letter (``CL'') in the 
public record).
    \10\ IECA stated that the subject ICE contract should ``be 
required to come into compliance with core principles mandated by 
Section 2(h)(7) of the Act and with other statutory provisions 
applicable to registered entities. [This contract] should be subject 
to the Commission's position limit authority, emergency authority 
and large trader reporting requirements, among others.'' CL 01.
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III. Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA

    The Commission is directed by section 2(h)(7) of the CEA to 
consider

[[Page 23712]]

the following criteria in determining a contract's significant price 
discovery function:
     Price Linkage--the extent to which the agreement, contract 
or transaction uses or otherwise relies on a daily or final settlement 
price, or other major price parameter, of a contract or contracts 
listed for trading on or subject to the rules of a designated contract 
market (``DCM'') or derivatives transaction execution facility 
(``DTEF''), or a SPDC traded on an electronic trading facility, to 
value a position, transfer or convert a position, cash or financially 
settle a position, or close out a position.
     Arbitrage--the extent to which the price for the 
agreement, contract or transaction is sufficiently related to the price 
of a contract or contracts listed for trading on or subject to the 
rules of a DCM or DTEF, or a SPDC traded on or subject to the rules of 
an electronic trading facility, so as to permit market participants to 
effectively arbitrage between the markets by simultaneously maintaining 
positions or executing trades in the contracts on a frequent and 
recurring basis.
     Material price reference--the extent to which, on a 
frequent and recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions in a 
commodity are directly based on, or are determined by referencing or 
consulting, the prices generated by agreements, contracts or 
transactions being traded or executed on the electronic trading 
facility.
     Material liquidity--the extent to which the volume of 
agreements, contracts or transactions in a commodity being traded on 
the electronic trading facility is sufficient to have a material effect 
on other agreements, contracts or transactions listed for trading on or 
subject to the rules of a DCM, DTEF or electronic trading facility 
operating in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3).
    Not all criteria must be present to support a determination that a 
particular contract performs a significant price discovery function, 
and one or more criteria may be inapplicable to a particular 
contract.\11\ Moreover, the statutory language neither prioritizes the 
criteria nor specifies the degree to which a SPDC must conform to the 
various criteria. In Guidance issued in connection with the Part 36 
rules governing ECMs with SPDCs, the Commission observed that these 
criteria do not lend themselves to a mechanical checklist or formulaic 
analysis. Accordingly, the Commission has indicated that in making its 
determinations it will consider the circumstances under which the 
presence of a particular criterion, or combination of criteria, would 
be sufficient to support a SPDC determination.\12\ For example, for 
contracts that are linked to other contracts or that may be arbitraged 
with other contracts, the Commission will consider whether the price of 
the potential SPDC moves in such harmony with the other contract that 
the two markets essentially become interchangeable. This co-movement of 
prices would be an indication that activity in the contract had reached 
a level sufficient for the contract to perform a significant price 
discovery function. In evaluating a contract's price discovery role as 
a price reference, the Commission will consider the extent to which, on 
a frequent and recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions are 
directly based on, or are determined by referencing, the prices 
established for the contract.
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    \11\ In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register release, the 
Commission identified material price reference, price linkage and 
material liquidity as the possible criteria for SPDC determination 
of the PGE contract. Arbitrage was not identified as a possible 
criterion and will not be discussed further in this document or the 
associated Order.
    \12\ 17 CFR 36, Appendix A.
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IV. Findings and Conclusions

a. The PG&E Citygate (PGE) Financial Basis Contract and the SPDC 
Indicia

    The PGE contract is cash settled based on the difference between 
the bidweek price index for the price of natural gas at the PG&E 
Citygate for the month of delivery, as published in Intelligence Press 
Inc.'s (``IPI's'') Natural Gas Bidweek Survey, and the final settlement 
price of the New York Mercantile Exchange's (``NYMEX's'') physically-
delivered Henry Hub natural gas futures contract for the same calendar 
month. The IPI bidweek price, which is published monthly, is based on a 
survey of cash market traders who voluntarily report to IPI data on 
fixed-price transactions for physical delivery of natural gas at the 
PG&E Citygate conducted during the last five business days of the 
month; such bidweek transactions specify the delivery of natural gas on 
a uniform basis throughout the following calendar month at the agreed 
upon rate. The IPI bidweek index is published on the first business day 
of the calendar month in which the natural gas is to be delivered. The 
size of the PGE contract is 2,500 million British thermal units 
(``mmBtu''), and the unit of trading is any multiple of 2,500 mmBtu. 
The PGE contract is listed for up to 72 calendar months commencing with 
the next calendar month.
    The Henry Hub,\13\ which is located in Erath, Louisiana, is the 
primary cash market trading and distribution center for natural gas in 
the United States. It also is the delivery point and pricing basis for 
the NYMEX's actively traded, physically-delivered natural gas futures 
contract, which is the most important pricing reference for natural gas 
in the United States. The Henry Hub, which is operated by Sabine Pipe 
Line, LLC, serves as a juncture for 13 different pipelines. These 
pipelines bring in natural gas from fields in the Gulf Coast region and 
ship it to major consumption centers along the East Coast and Midwest. 
The throughput shipping capacity of the Henry Hub is 1.8 trillion mmBtu 
per day.
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    \13\ The term ``hub'' refers to a juncture where two or more 
natural gas pipelines are connected. Hubs also serve as pricing 
points for natural gas at the particular locations.
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    In addition to the Henry Hub, there are a number of other locations 
where natural gas is traded. In 2008, there were 33 natural gas market 
centers in North America.\14\ Some of the major trading centers include 
Alberta, Northwest Rockies, Southern California border and the Houston 
Ship Channel. For locations that are directly connected to the Henry 
Hub by one or more pipelines and where there typically is adequate 
shipping capacity, the price at the other locations usually directly 
tracks the price at the Henry Hub, adjusted for transportation costs. 
However, at other locations that are not directly connected to the 
Henry Hub or where shipping capacity is limited, the prices at those 
locations often diverge from the Henry Hub price. Furthermore, one 
local price may be significantly different than the price at another 
location even though the two markets' respective distances from the 
Henry Hub are the same. The reason for such pricing disparities is that 
a given location may experience supply and demand factors that are 
specific to that region, such as differences in pipeline shipping 
capacity, unusually high or low demand for heating or cooling or supply 
disruptions caused by severe weather. As a consequence, local natural 
gas prices can differ from the Henry Hub price by more than the cost of 
shipping and such price differences can vary in an unpredictable 
manner.
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    \14\ See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf.
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    The PG&E Citygate is part of the Golden Gate Market Center, which 
is located in Northern California. The Golden Gate Market Center offers 
seven

[[Page 23713]]

different transaction points, which are Malin, Citygate, Kern River 
Station, High Desert Lateral, Daggett, Southern Trails and Topock. 
Citygate serves as interconnection between the backbone pipeline system 
and the local transmission and distribution lines.\15\ The Golden Gate 
Market Center had an estimated throughput capacity of two billion cubic 
feet per day in 2008. Moreover, the number of pipeline interconnections 
at the Golden Gate Market Center was nine in 2008, up from eight in 
2003. Lastly, the pipeline interconnection capacity of the Golden Gate 
Market Center in 2008 was 6 billion cubic feet per day, which 
constituted a 32 percent increase over the pipeline interconnection 
capacity in 2003.\16\ The PG&E Citygate is far removed from the Henry 
Hub and is not directly connected to the Henry Hub by an existing 
pipeline.
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    \15\ The cash market transactions included in the comparable 
Platts index are those fixed-price gas deliveries from Pacific Gas 
and Electric's intrastate transmission system to citygates on PG&E's 
local distribution system in Northern California.
    \16\ See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf
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    The local price at the PG&E Citygate typically differs from the 
price at the Henry Hub. Thus, the price of the Henry Hub physically-
delivered futures contract is an imperfect proxy for the PG&E Citygate 
price. Moreover, exogenous factors, such as adverse weather, can cause 
the PG&E Citygate gas price to differ from the Henry Hub price by an 
amount that is more or less than the cost of shipping, making the NYMEX 
Henry Hub futures contract even less precise as a hedging tool than 
desired by market participants. Basis contracts \17\ allow traders to 
more accurately discover prices at alternative locations and hedge 
price risk that is associated with natural gas at such locations. In 
this regard, a position at a local price for an alternative location 
can be established by adding the appropriate basis swap position to a 
position taken in the NYMEX physically-delivered Henry Hub contract (or 
in the NYMEX or ICE Henry Hub look-alike contract, which cash settle 
based on the NYMEX physically-delivered natural gas contract's final 
settlement price).
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    \17\ Basis contracts denote the difference in the price of 
natural gas at a specified location minus the price of natural gas 
at the Henry Hub. The differential can be either a positive or 
negative value.
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    In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, the Commission 
identified material price reference, price linkage and material 
liquidity as the potential SPDC criteria applicable to the PGE 
contract. Each of these criteria is discussed below.\18\
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    \18\ As noted above, the Commission did not find an indication 
of arbitrage in connection with this contract; accordingly, that 
criterion was not discussed in reference to the PGE contract.
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1. Material Price Reference Criterion
    The Commission's October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice 
identified material price reference as a potential basis for a SPDC 
determination with respect to this contract. The Commission considered 
the fact that ICE maintains exclusive rights over IPI's bidweek price 
indices. As a result, no other exchange can offer such a basis contract 
based on IPI's PG&E Citygate bidweek index. While other third-party 
price providers produce natural gas price indices for this and other 
trading centers, market participants indicate that the IPI PG&E 
Citygate bidweek index is highly regarded for this particular location 
and should market participants wish to establish a hedged position 
based on this index, they would need to do so by taking a position in 
the ICE PGE swap since ICE has the right to the IPI index for cash 
settlement purposes. In addition, ICE sells its price data to market 
participants in a number of different packages which vary in terms of 
the hubs covered, time periods, and whether the data are daily only or 
historical. For example, ICE offers ``West Gas End of Day'' and ``OTC 
Gas End of Day'' \19\ with access to all price data or just current 
prices plus a selected number of months (i.e., 12, 24, 36 or 48 months) 
of historical data. These two packages include price data for the PGE 
contract.
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    \19\ The OTC Gas End of Day dataset includes daily settlement 
prices for natural gas contracts listed for all points in North 
America.
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    The Commission will rely on one of two sources of evidence--direct 
or indirect--to determine that the price of a contract was being used 
as a material price reference and therefore, serving a significant 
price discovery function.\20\ With respect to direct evidence, the 
Commission will consider the extent to which, on a frequent and 
recurring basis, cash market bids, offers or transactions are directly 
based on or quoted at a differential to, the prices generated on the 
ECM in question. Direct evidence may be established when cash market 
participants are quoting bid or offer prices or entering into 
transactions at prices that are set either explicitly or implicitly at 
a differential to prices established for the contract in question. Cash 
market prices are set explicitly at a differential to the section 
2(h)(3) contract when, for instance, they are quoted in dollars and 
cents above or below the reference contract's price. Cash market prices 
are set implicitly at a differential to a section 2(h)(3) contract 
when, for instance, they are arrived at after adding to, or subtracting 
from the section 2(h)(3) contract, but then quoted or reported at a 
flat price. With respect to indirect evidence, the Commission will 
consider the extent to which the price of the contract in question is 
being routinely disseminated in widely distributed industry 
publications--or offered by the ECM itself for some form of 
remuneration--and consulted on a frequent and recurring basis by 
industry participants in pricing cash market transactions.
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    \20\ 17 CFR part 36, appendix A.
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    The PG&E Citygate is a major trading center for natural gas in the 
United States. Traders, including producers, keep abreast of the prices 
of the PGE contract when conducting cash deals. These traders look to a 
competitively determined price as an indication of expected values of 
natural gas at the PG&E Citygate when entering into cash market 
transaction for natural gas, especially those trades providing for 
physical delivery in the future. Traders use the ICE PGE contract, as 
well as other ICE basis swap contracts, to hedge cash market positions 
and transactions--activities which enhance the PGE contract's price 
discovery utility. The substantial volume of trading and open interest 
in the PGE contract appears to attest to its use for this purpose. 
While the PGE contract's settlement prices may not be the only factor 
influencing spot and forward transactions, natural gas traders consider 
the ICE price to be a critical factor in conducting OTC 
transactions.\21\ As a result, the PGE contract satisfies the direct 
price reference test.
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    \21\ In addition to referencing ICE prices, natural gas market 
firms participating in the PG&E Citygate market may rely on other 
cash market quotes as well as industry publications and price 
indices that are published by third-party price reporting firms when 
entering into natural gas transactions.
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    In terms of indirect price reference, ICE sells the PGE contract's 
prices as part of a broad package. The Commission notes that the PG&E 
Citygate is a major natural gas trading point, and the PGE contract's 
prices are well regarded in the industry as indicative of the value of 
natural gas at the PG&E Citygate. Accordingly, the Commission believes 
that it is reasonable to conclude that market participants are 
purchasing the data packages that include the PGE contract's prices in 
substantial part because the PGE contract prices have particular value 
to them. Moreover, such prices are

[[Page 23714]]

consulted on a frequent and reoccurring basis by industry participants 
in pricing cash market transactions. In light of the above, the PGE 
contract meets the indirect price reference test.
    NYMEX lists a futures contract that is comparable to the ICE PGE 
contract on its ClearPort platform. However, unlike the ICE contract, 
none of the trades in the NYMEX, PG&E Citygate Basis Swap (Platts 
IFERC) futures contract are executed in NYMEX's centralized 
marketplace; instead, all of the transactions originate as bilateral 
swaps that are submitted to NYMEX for clearing. The daily settlement 
prices of the NYMEX PG&E Citygate Basis Swap futures contract are 
influenced, in part, by the daily settlement prices of the ICE PGE 
contract. This is because NYMEX determines the daily settlement prices 
for its natural gas basis swap contracts through a survey of cash 
market voice brokers. Voice brokers, in turn, refer to the ICE PGE 
price, among other information, as an important indicator as to where 
the market is trading. Therefore, the ICE PGE price influences the 
settlement price for the NYMEX PG&E Citygate Basis Swap futures 
contract. This is supported by an analysis of the daily settlement 
prices for the NYMEX and ICE PG&E Citygate contracts. In this regard, 
97 percent of the daily settlement prices for the NYMEX PG&E Citygate 
Basis Swap futures contract are within one standard deviation of the 
PGE contract's price settlement prices.
    Lastly, the fact that the PGE contract does not meet the price 
linkage criterion (discussed below) bolsters the argument for material 
price reference. As noted above, the Henry Hub is the pricing reference 
for natural gas in the United States. However, regional market 
conditions may cause the price of natural gas in another area of the 
country to diverge by more than the cost of transportation, thus making 
the Henry Hub price an imperfect proxy for the local gas price. The 
more variable the local natural gas price is, the more traders need to 
accurately hedge their price risk. Basis swap contracts provide a means 
of more accurately pricing natural gas at a location other than the 
Henry Hub. An analysis of PG&E Citygate natural gas prices showed that 
55 percent of the observations were more than 2.5 percent different 
than the contemporaneous Henry Hub prices. The average PG&E Citygate 
basis value between January 2008 and September 2009 was -$0.16 per 
mmBtu with a variance of $0.10 per mmBtu.
i. Federal Register Comments
    ICE stated in its comment letter that the PGE contract does not 
meet the material price reference criterion for SPDC determination. ICE 
argued that the Commission appeared to base the case that the PGE 
contract is potentially a SPDC on two disputable assertions. First, in 
issuing its notice of intent to determine whether the PGE contract is a 
SPDC, the CFTC cited a general conclusion in its ECM study ``that 
certain market participants referred to ICE as a price discovery market 
for certain natural gas contracts.'' \22\ ICE states that CFTC's reason 
is ``hard to quantify as the ECM report does not mention'' this 
contract as a potential SPDC. ``It is unknown which market participants 
made this statement in 2007 or the contracts that were referenced.'' 
\23\ In response to the above comment, the Commission notes that it 
cited the ECM study's general finding that some ICE natural gas 
contracts appear to be regarded as price discovery markets merely as an 
indicia that an investigation of certain ICE contracts may be 
warranted, and was not intended to serve as the sole basis for 
determining whether or not a particular contract meets the material 
price reference criterion.
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    \22\ CL 03.
    \23\ CL 03.
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    Second, ICE argued that the Commission should not base a 
determination that the PGE contract is a SPDC on the fact that this 
contract has the exclusive right to base its settlement on the IPI PG&E 
Citygate Index price. While the Commission acknowledges that there are 
other firms that produce price indices for the PG&E Citygate, as it 
notes above, market participants indicate that the IPI Index is very 
highly regarded and should they wish to establish a hedged position 
based on this index, they would need to do so by taking a position in 
the ICE PGE swap since ICE has the exclusive right to use the IPI 
index.\24\
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    \24\ Futures and swaps based on other PG&E Citygate indices have 
not met with the same market acceptance as the PGE contract. For 
example, NYMEX lists a basis swap contract that is comparable to the 
PGE contract with the exception that it uses a different price index 
for cash settlement. Open interest as of September 30, 2009, was 
approximately 19,000 contracts in the NYMEX PG&E Citygate Basis Swap 
contract versus about 167,000 contracts in ICE's PGE contract. 
Moreover, there has been no centralized-market trading in the NYMEX 
PG&E Citygate Basis Swap contract, so that contract does not serve 
as a source of price discovery for cash market traders with natural 
gas at that location.
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    WGCEF, NGSA, EI and FIEG all stated that the PGE contract does not 
satisfy the material price reference criterion. The commenters argued 
that other contracts (physical or financial) are not indexed based on 
the ICE PGE contract price, but rather are indexed based on the 
underlying cash price series against which the ICE PGE contract is 
settled. Thus, they contend that the underlying cash price series is 
the authentic reference price and not the ICE contract itself. The 
Commission believes that this interpretation of price reference is too 
limiting in that it only considers the final index value on which the 
contract is cash settled after trading ceases. Instead, the Commission 
believes that a cash-settled derivatives contract could meet the price 
reference criteria if market participants ``consult on a frequent and 
recurring basis'' the derivatives contract when pricing forward, fixed-
price commitments or other cash-settled derivatives that seek to ``lock 
in'' a fixed price for some future point in time to hedge against 
adverse price movements.
    As noted above, the PG&E Citygate is a major trading center for 
natural gas in North America. Traders, including producers, keep 
abreast of the prices of the PGE contract when conducting cash deals. 
These traders look to a competitively determined price as an indication 
of expected values of natural gas at the PG&E Citygate when entering 
into cash market transaction for natural gas, especially those trades 
that provide for physical delivery in the future. Traders use the ICE 
PGE contract to hedge cash market positions and transactions, which 
enhances the PGE contract's price discovery utility. While the PGE 
contract's settlement prices may not be the only factor influencing 
spot and forward transactions, natural gas traders consider the ICE 
price to be a crucial factor in conducting OTC transactions.
    Both EI and WGCEF stated that publication of price data in a 
package format is a weak justification for material price reference. 
These commenters argue that market participants generally do not 
purchase ICE data sets for one contract's prices, such as those for the 
PGE contract. Instead, traders are interested in the settlement prices, 
so the fact that ICE sells the PGE prices as part of a broad package is 
not conclusive evidence that market participants are buying the ICE 
data sets because they find the PGE prices have substantial value to 
them. The Commission notes that the PG&E Citygate is a major natural 
gas trading point, and the PGE contract's prices are well regarded in 
the industry as indicative of the value of natural gas at the PG&E 
Citygate. Accordingly, the Commission believes that it is

[[Page 23715]]

reasonable to conclude that market participants are purchasing the data 
packages that include the PGE contract's prices in substantial part 
because the PGE contract prices have particular value to them.
ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Price Reference
    Based on the above, the Commission finds that the PGE contract 
meets the material price reference criterion because cash market 
transactions are being priced on a frequent and recurring basis at a 
differential to the PGE contract's price (direct evidence). Moreover, 
the ECM sells the PGE contract's price data to market participants and 
it is reasonable to conclude that market participants are purchasing 
the data packages that include the PGE contract's prices in substantial 
part because the PGE contract prices have particular value to them. 
Furthermore, such prices are consulted on a frequent and reoccurring 
basis by industry participants in pricing cash market transactions 
(indirect evidence).
2. Price Linkage Criterion
    In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, the Commission 
identified price linkage as a potential basis for a SPDC determination 
with respect to the PGE contract. In this regard, the final settlement 
of the PGE contract is based, in part, on the final settlement price of 
the NYMEX's physically-delivered natural gas futures contract, where 
the NYMEX is registered with the Commission as a DCM.
    The Commission's Guidance on Significant Price Discovery Contracts 
\25\ notes that a ``price-linked contract is a contract that relies on 
a contract traded on another trading facility to settle, value or 
otherwise offset the price-linked contract.'' Furthermore, the Guidance 
notes that, ``[f]or a linked contract, the mere fact that a contract is 
linked to another contract will not be sufficient to support a 
determination that a contract performs a significant price discovery 
function. To assess whether such a determination is warranted, the 
Commission will examine the relationship between transaction prices of 
the linked contract and the prices of the referenced contract. The 
Commission believes that where material liquidity exists, prices for 
the linked contract would be observed to be substantially the same as 
or move substantially in conjunction with the prices of the referenced 
contract.'' Furthermore, the Guidance proposes a threshold price 
relationship such that prices of the ECM linked contract will fall 
within a 2.5 percent price range for 95 percent of contemporaneously 
determined closing, settlement or other daily prices over the most 
recent quarter. Finally, the Commission also stated in the Guidance 
that it would consider a linked contract that has a trading volume 
equivalent to 5 percent of the volume of trading in the contract to 
which it is linked to have sufficient volume potentially to be deemed a 
SPDC (``minimum threshold'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Appendix A to the Part 36 rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To assess whether the PGE contract meets the price linkage 
criterion, Commission staff obtained price data from ICE and performed 
the statistical tests cited above. Staff found that while the PG&E 
Citygate price is determined, in part, by the final settlement price of 
the NYMEX physically-delivered natural gas futures contract (a DCM 
contract), the PG&E Citygate price is not within 2.5 percent of the 
settlement price of the corresponding NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas 
futures contract on 95 percent of the days. Specifically, during the 
third quarter of 2009, 45 percent of the PG&E Citygate natural gas 
prices derived from the ICE basis values were within 2.5 percent of the 
daily settlement price of the NYMEX Henry Hub futures contract. In 
addition, staff finds that the PGE contract fails to meet the volume 
threshold requirement. In particular, the total trading volume in the 
NYMEX Natural Gas contract during the third quarter of 2009 was 
14,022,963 contracts, with 5 percent of that number being 701,148 
contracts. The number of trades on the ICE centralized market in the 
PGE contract during the same period was 108,468 contracts (equivalent 
to 27,117 NYMEX contracts, given the size difference).\26\ Thus, 
centralized-market trades in the PGE contract amounted to less than the 
minimum threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The PGE contract is one-quarter the size of the NYMEX Henry 
Hub physically-delivered futures contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Due to the specific criteria that a given ECM contract must meet to 
fulfill the price linkage criterion, the requirements, for all intents 
and purposes, exclude ECM contracts that are not near facsimiles of DCM 
contracts. That is, even though an ECM contract may specifically use a 
DCM contract's settlement price to value a position, which is the case 
of the PGE contract, a substantive difference between the two price 
series would rule out the presence of price linkage. In this regard, an 
ECM contract that is priced and traded as if it is a functional 
equivalent of a DCM contract likely will have a price series that 
mirrors that of the corresponding DCM contract. In contrast, for 
contracts that are not look-alikes of DCM contracts, it is reasonable 
to expect that the two price series would be divergent. The PG&E 
Citygate and the Henry Hub are located in two different areas of the 
United States. The Henry Hub primarily is a supply center while the 
PG&E Citygate primarily is a demand center. These differences 
contribute to the divergence between the two price series and, as 
discussed below, increase the likelihood that the ``basis'' contract is 
used for material price reference.
i. Federal Register Comments
    NGSA \27\ stated that the PGE contract does not meet the price 
linkage criterion because basis contracts, including the PGE contract, 
are not equivalent to the NYMEX physically-delivered Henry Hub 
contract. EI \28\ also noted that the PGE and NYMEX natural gas 
contracts are not economically equivalent and that the PGE contract's 
volume is too low to affect the NYMEX natural gas futures contract. 
WGCEF \29\ stated that the PG&E Citygate price is determined, in part, 
by the final settlement price of the NYMEX Henry Hub futures contract. 
However, WGCEF goes on to state that the PGE contract ``(a) is not 
substantially the same as the NYMEX [natural gas futures contract] * * 
* nor (b) does it move substantially in conjunction'' with the NYMEX 
natural gas futures contract. ICE \30\ opined that the PGE contract's 
trading volume is too low to affect the price discovery process for the 
NYMEX natural gas futures contract. In addition, ICE states that the 
PGE contract simply reflects a price differential between PG&E Citygate 
and the Henry Hub; ``there is no price linkage as contemplated by 
Congress or the CFTC in its rulemaking.'' FIEG \31\ acknowledged that 
the PGE contract is a locational spread that is based in part on the 
NYMEX natural gas futures price, but also questioned the significance 
of this fact relative to the price linkage criterion since the key 
component of the spread is the price at the PG&E Citygate location and 
not the NYMEX physically-delivered natural gas futures price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ CL 05.
    \28\ CL 04.
    \29\ CL 02.
    \30\ CL 03.
    \31\ CL 07.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Conclusion Regarding the Price Linkage Criterion
    Based on the above, the Commission finds that the PGE contract does 
not meet the price linkage criterion because

[[Page 23716]]

it fails the price relationship and volume tests provided for in the 
Commission's Guidance.
3. Material Liquidity Criterion
    To assess whether the PGE contract meets the material liquidity 
criterion, the Commission first examined volume and open interest data 
provided to it by ICE as a general measurement of the PGE market's size 
and potential importance, and second performed a statistical analysis 
to measure the effect that changes to PGE prices potentially may have 
on prices for the NYMEX Henry Hub Natural Gas (a DCM contract), the ICE 
NWP Financial Basis contract (an ECM contract) and the ICE Malin 
Financial Basis contract (an ECM contract).\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ As noted above, the material liquidity criterion speaks to 
the effect that transactions in the potential SPDC may have on 
trading in ``agreements, contracts and transactions listed for 
trading on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market, 
a derivatives transaction execution facility, or an electronic 
trading facility operating in reliance on the exemption in section 
2(h)(3) of the Act.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's Guidance (Appendix A to Part 36) notes that 
``[t]raditionally, objective measures of trading such as volume or open 
interest have been used as measures of liquidity.'' In this regard, the 
Commission in its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice referred to 
second quarter 2009 trading statistics that ICE had submitted for its 
PGE contract. Based upon on a required quarterly filing made by ICE on 
July 27, 2009, the total number of PGE trades executed on ICE's 
electronic trading platform was 1,142 in the second quarter of 2009, 
resulting in a daily average of 17.8 trades. During the same period, 
the PGE contract had a total trading volume on ICE's electronic trading 
platform of 99,418 contracts and an average daily trading volume of 
1,553.4 contracts. Moreover, the open interest as of June 30, 2009, was 
150,299 contracts, which includes trades executed on ICE's electronic 
trading platform, as well as trades executed off of ICE's electronic 
trading platform and then brought to ICE for clearing.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ ICE does not differentiate between open interest created by 
a transaction executed on its trading platform versus that created 
by a transaction executed off its trading platform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequent to the October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, ICE 
submitted another quarterly notification filed on November 13, 
2009,\34\ with updated trading statistics. Specifically, with respect 
to its PGE contract, 1,514 separate trades occurred on its electronic 
platform in the third quarter of 2009, resulting in a daily average of 
22.9 trades. During the same period, the PGE contract had a total 
trading volume on its electronic platform of 108,468 contracts (which 
was an average of 1,643 contracts per day).\35\ As of September 30, 
2009, open interest in the PGE contract was 166,981 \36\ contracts. 
Reported open interest included positions resulting from trades that 
were executed on ICE's electronic platform, as well as trades that were 
executed off of ICE's electronic platform and brought to ICE for 
clearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See Commission Rule 36.3(c)(2), 17 CFR 36.3(c)(2).
    \35\ By way of comparison, the number of contracts traded in the 
PGE contract is similar to that exhibited on a liquid futures market 
and is roughly equivalent to the volume of trading for the NYMEX 
Palladium futures contract during this period.
    \36\ By way of comparison, open interest in the PGE contract is 
similar to that exhibited on a liquid futures market and is roughly 
equivalent to that in the Chicago Board of Trade's soybean meal 
futures contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the Guidance, the Commission stated that material liquidity can 
be identified by the impact liquidity exhibits through observed prices. 
Thus, to make a determination whether the PGE contract has such 
material impact, the Commission reviewed the relevant trading 
statistics (noted above). In this regard, the average number trades per 
day in the second and third quarters of 2009 were above the minimum 
reporting level (5 trades per day). Moreover, trading activity in the 
PGE contract, as characterized by total quarterly volume, indicates 
that the PGE contract experiences trading activity that generally 
exceeds that found in thinly-traded markets.\37\ Thus, it is reasonable 
to infer that the PGE contract could have a material effect on other 
ECM contracts or on DCM contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Staff has advised the Commission that in its experience, a 
thinly-traded contract is, generally, one that has a quarterly 
trading volume of 100,000 contracts or less. In this regard, in the 
third quarter of 2009, physical commodity futures contracts with 
trading volume of 100,000 contracts or fewer constituted less than 
one percent of total trading volume of all physical commodity 
futures contracts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To measure the effect that the PGE contract potentially could have 
on a DCM contract, or on another ECM contract, Commission staff 
performed a statistical analysis \38\ using daily settlement prices 
(between January 2, 2008, and September 30, 2009) for the PGE contract, 
as well as for the NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas contract (a DCM 
contract) and the ICE NWP Rockies Financial Basis and ICE Malin 
Financial Basis contracts (ECM contracts). The simulation results 
suggest that, on average over the sample period, a one percent rise in 
the PGE contract's price elicited a 1.1 percent increase in each of the 
NYMEX Henry Hub and ICE Malin prices, as well as a 1 percent increase 
in the Rockies price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ Specifically, Commission staff econometrically estimated a 
vector autoregression (VAR) model using daily settlement prices. A 
vector autoregression model is an econometric model used to capture 
the evolution and the interdependencies between multiple time 
series, generalizing the univariate autoregression models. The 
estimated model displays strong diagnostic evidence of statistical 
adequacy. In particular, the model's impulse response function was 
shocked with a one-time rise in PGE contract's price. The simulation 
results suggest that, on average over the sample period, a one-
percent rise in the PGE contract's price elicited a 1.1 percent 
increase in the NYMEX Henry Hub and Malin prices, as well as a one 
percent increase in the Rockies contract's price. These multipliers 
of response emerge with noticeable statistical strength or 
significance. Based on such long run sample patterns, if the PGE 
contract's price rises by 10 percent, then the price of NYMEX Henry 
Hub natural gas futures contract, as well as those for the ICE basis 
swap contracts based on the Rockies and Malin hubs, each would rise 
by about 10 percent to 11 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Federal Register Comments
    As noted above, comments were received from seven individuals and 
organizations, with five comments being directly applicable to the SPDC 
determination of the ICE PGE contract. WGCEF, EI, FIEG, ICE and NGSA 
generally agreed that the PGE contract does not meet the material 
liquidity criterion.
    WGCEF \39\ and NGSA \40\ both stated that the PGE contract does not 
materially affect other contracts that are listed for trading on DCMs 
or ECMs, as well as other over-the-counter contracts. Instead, the PGE 
contract is influenced by the underlying PG&E Citygate cash price index 
and the final settlement price of the NYMEX Henry Hub natural gas 
futures contract, not vice versa. FIEG \41\ stated that the PGE 
contract cannot have a material effect on NYMEX contract because the 
PGE contract trades on a differential and represents ``one leg (and not 
the relevant leg) of the locational spread.'' The Commission's 
statistical analysis shows that changes in the ICE PGE contract's price 
significantly influences the prices of other contracts that are traded 
on DCMs and ECMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ CL 02.
    \40\ CL 05.
    \41\ CL 07.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, ICE opined that the Commission ``seems to have adopted a 
five trade-per-day test to determine whether a contract is materially 
liquid. It is worth noting that ICE originally suggested that the CFTC 
use a five trades-per-day threshold as the basis for an ECM to report 
trade data to the CFTC.'' In this regard, the Commission adopted a five 
trades-per-day threshold as a reporting requirement to enable it to 
``independently be aware of ECM contracts that may develop into SPDCs''

[[Page 23717]]

rather than solely relying upon an ECM on its own to identify any such 
potential SPDCs to the Commission. Thus, any contract that meets this 
threshold may be subject to scrutiny as a potential SPDC. As noted 
above, the Commission is basing a finding of material liquidity for the 
ICE PGE contract, in part, on the fact that there have been more than 
20 trades per day on average in the PGE contract during the third 
quarter of 2009, which is quadruple the five trades-per-day that is 
cited in the ICE comment. In addition, the Commission notes that the 
number of contracts per transaction in the PGE contract is high 
(approximately 72 contracts per transaction) and thus, as noted, 
trading volume (measured in contract units) is substantial. The PGE 
contract also has significant open interest.
    ICE implied that the statistics provided by ICE were misinterpreted 
and misapplied by the Commission. In particular, ICE stated that the 
volume figures used in the Commission's analysis (cited above) 
``include trades made in all [72] months of * * * [the] contract'' as 
well as in strips of contract months, and a ``more appropriate method 
of determining liquidity is to examine the activity in a single traded 
month or strip of a given contract.'' ICE stated that only about 25 to 
40 percent of the trades occurred in the single most liquid, usually 
prompt, month of the contract.
    It is the Commission's opinion that liquidity, as it pertains to 
the PGE contract, is typically a function of trading activity in 
particular lead months and, given sufficient liquidity in such months, 
the PGE contract itself would be considered liquid. ICE's analysis of 
its own trade data confirms this to be the case for the PGE contract, 
and thus, the Commission believes that it applied the statistical data 
cited above in an appropriate manner for gauging material liquidity.
    In addition, EI and ICE stated that the trades-per-day statistics 
that it provided to the Commission in its quarterly filing and which 
are cited above includes 2(h)(1) transactions, which were not completed 
on the electronic trading platform and should not be considered in the 
SPDC determination process. Commission staff asked ICE to review the 
data it sent in its quarterly filings. In response, ICE confirmed that 
the volume data it provided and which the Commission cited in its 
October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, as well as the additional 
volume information it cites above, includes only transaction data 
executed on ICE's electronic trading platform. The Commission 
acknowledges that the open interest information it cites above includes 
transactions made off the ICE platform.\42\ However, once open interest 
is created, there is no way for ICE to differentiate between ``on-
exchange'' versus ``off-exchange'' created positions, and all such 
positions are fungible with one another and may be offset in any way 
agreeable to the position holder regardless of how the position was 
initially created.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Supplemental data supplied by the ICE confirmed that block 
trades in the third quarter of 2009 were in addition to the trades 
that were conducted on the electronic platform; block trades 
comprised 63.4 percent of all transactions in the PGE contract.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Liquidity
    Based on the above, the Commission concludes that the PGE contract 
meets the material liquidity criterion in that there is sufficient 
trading activity in the PGE contract to have a material effect on 
``other agreements, contracts or transactions listed for trading on or 
subject to the rules of a designated contract market * * * or an 
electronic trading facility operating in reliance on the exemption in 
section 2(h)(3) of the Act'' (that is, an ECM).
4. Overall Conclusion
    After considering the entire record in this matter, including the 
comments received, the Commission has determined that the PGE contract 
performs a significant price discovery function under two of the four 
criteria established in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. Although the 
Commission has determined that the PGE contract does not meet the price 
linkage criterion at this time, the Commission has concluded that the 
PGE contract does meet both the material liquidity and material price 
reference criteria. Accordingly, the Commission is issuing the attached 
Order declaring that the PGE contract is a SPDC.
    Issuance of this Order signals the immediate effectiveness of the 
Commission's authorities with respect to ICE as a registered entity in 
connection with its PGE contract,\43\ and triggers the obligations, 
requirements--both procedural and substantive--and timetables 
prescribed in Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) for ECMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See 73 FR 75888, 75893 (Dec. 12, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Related Matters

a. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \44\ imposes certain 
requirements on Federal agencies, including the Commission, in 
connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of 
information as defined by the PRA. Certain provisions of Commission 
rule 36.3 impose new regulatory and reporting requirements on ECMs, 
resulting in information collection requirements within the meaning of 
the PRA. OMB previously has approved and assigned OMB control number 
3038-0060 to this collection of information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Cost-Benefit Analysis

    Section 15(a) of the CEA \45\ requires the Commission to consider 
the costs and benefits of its actions before issuing an order under the 
Act. By its terms, section 15(a) does not require the Commission to 
quantify the costs and benefits of an order or to determine whether the 
benefits of the order outweigh its costs; rather, it requires that the 
Commission ``consider'' the costs and benefits of its actions. Section 
15(a) further specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated 
in light of five broad areas of market and public concern: (1) 
Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price 
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public 
interest considerations. The Commission may in its discretion give 
greater weight to any one of the five enumerated areas and could in its 
discretion determine that, notwithstanding its costs, a particular 
order is necessary or appropriate to protect the public interest or to 
effectuate any of the provisions or accomplish any of the purposes of 
the Act. The Commission has considered the costs and benefits in light 
of the specific provisions of section 15(a) of the Act and has 
concluded that the Order, required by Congress to strengthen federal 
oversight of exempt commercial markets and to prevent market 
manipulation, is necessary and appropriate to accomplish the purposes 
of section 2(h)(7) of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When a futures contract begins to serve a significant price 
discovery function, that contract, and the ECM on which it is traded, 
warrants increased oversight to deter and prevent price manipulation or 
other disruptions to market integrity, both on the ECM itself and in 
any related futures contracts trading on DCMs. An Order finding that a 
particular contract is a SPDC triggers this increased oversight and 
imposes obligations on the ECM calculated to accomplish this goal. The 
increased oversight engendered by the issue of a SPDC Order increases 
transparency and

[[Page 23718]]

helps to ensure fair competition among ECMs and DCMs trading similar 
products and competing for the same business. Moreover, the ECM on 
which the SPDC is traded must assume, with respect to that contract, 
all the responsibilities and obligations of a registered entity under 
the CEA and Commission regulations. Additionally, the ECM must comply 
with nine core principles established by section 2(h)(7) of the Act--
including the obligation to establish position limits and/or 
accountability standards for the SPDC. Section 4(i) of the CEA 
authorizes the Commission to require reports for SPDCs listed on ECMs. 
These increased responsibilities, along with the CFTC's increased 
regulatory authority, subject the ECM's risk management practices to 
the Commission's supervision and oversight and generally enhance the 
financial integrity of the markets.

c. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \46\ requires that 
agencies consider the impact of their rules on small businesses. The 
requirements of CEA section 2(h)(7) and the Part 36 rules affect ECMs. 
The Commission previously has determined that ECMs are not small 
entities for purposes of the RFA.\47\ Accordingly, the Chairman, on 
behalf of the Commission, hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) 
that this Order, taken in connection with section 2(h)(7) of the Act 
and the Part 36 rules, will not have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \47\ 66 FR 42256, 42268 (Aug. 10, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Order

a. Order Relating to the ICE PG&E Citygate Financial Basis Contract

    After considering the complete record in this matter, including the 
comment letters received in response to its request for comments, the 
Commission has determined to issue the following Order:
    The Commission, pursuant to its authority under section 2(h)(7) of 
the Act, hereby determines that the PG&E Citygate Financial Basis 
contract, traded on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., satisfies the 
statutory material liquidity and material price reference criteria for 
significant price discovery contracts. Consistent with this 
determination, and effective immediately, the IntercontinentalExchange, 
Inc., must comply with, with respect to the PG&E Citygate Financial 
Basis contract, the nine core principles established by new section 
2(h)(7)(C). Additionally, the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., shall be 
and is considered a registered entity \48\ with respect to the PG&E 
Citygate Financial Basis contract and is subject to all the provisions 
of the Commodity Exchange Act applicable to registered entities. 
Further, the obligations, requirements and timetables prescribed in 
Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) governing core principle compliance by the 
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., commence with the issuance of this 
Order.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(29).
    \49\ Because ICE already lists for trading a contract (i.e., the 
Henry Financial LD1 Fixed Price contract) that was previously 
declared by the Commission to be a SPDC, ICE must submit a written 
demonstration of compliance with the Core Principles within 30 
calendar days of the date of this Order. 17 CFR 36.3(c)(4).

    Issued in Washington, DC on April 28, 2010, by the Commission.
David A. Stawick,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2010-10305 Filed 5-3-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
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