NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHAWN B., 

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.B., 

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0387

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS 17772

 JD 28201

The Honorable Alison Bachus, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix

By Thomas A. Vierling

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Daniel R. Huff

Counsel for Appellee, Department of Child Safety
SHAWN B. v. DCS, S.B.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Shawn B. (Father) appeals from the order terminating his 

parental rights to S.B. (Child). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Father and Charmaine L. (Mother) are the biological parents 

of Child, born July 16, 2005.2 In April 2014, Child’s guardian ad litem filed 

a dependency petition. At that time, Child’s guardianship with paternal 

aunt terminated, paternal aunt wished to be Child’s placement, and Child

needed mental health services and stabilization. In February 2015, the 

juvenile court found Child dependent as to Father. Father is currently

serving a life sentence with parole in California. 

¶3 At the severance hearing, the case manager, Ms. Gevers, 

testified that Child has been doing well in the care of paternal aunt for the 

last five years, and that she is willing to adopt Child. Paternal aunt can 

meet all of Child’s needs and Child has been receiving weekly trauma

counseling. Ms. Gevers also testified that paternal aunt provides

permanency and Child wants to remain with her. Child is adoptable and 

has bonded to paternal aunt. 

¶4 Ms. Gevers further testified that she mailed at least four letters 

to Father advising him how to participate in services, and providing 

instructions on how to communicate with Child by sending cards, gifts or 

 

1 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

juvenile court’s decision.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 

445, 449, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

2 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child, but 

Mother is not a party to this appeal. 
SHAWN B. v. DCS, S.B.

Decision of the Court

3

letters to her.3 Ms. Gevers never received any contact from Father 

regarding Child’s well-being, and Father did nothing to maintain or 

establish the parent-child bond. Moreover, Ms. Gevers testified that as a 

result of Father’s incarceration, Child lacks permanency and wonders 

“what’s going to happen to her from one day to the next.”

¶5 Father appeared telephonically at the severance hearing. He

testified that his last in-person contact with Child was a visit at the jail two 

years ago. He claimed he had not sent any cards, gifts or letters to Child 

because he did not know where to send them. However, Father testified

that he attempted to contact Child through her paternal grandmother, and 

he attempted to obtain Child’s contact information from the Department of 

Child Safety. Father stated that before his incarceration, Child was very 

close to him and loved him and he worried that if paternal aunt kept Child, 

he will never be able to speak to Child again. However, Father could not 

recall Child’s full birthday, whether Child was taking any medications, or 

the Child’s favorite color or food.

¶6 Following the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s 

parental rights to Child due to length of incarceration. As to Child’s best 

interests, the juvenile court found: 

the child will benefit from termination of the parent-child 

relationship with . . . Father. The child is in a loving, stable 

home that is a relative placement. The child is bonded to 

placement. The placement, a paternal aunt, can meet all of the 

child’s needs. Indeed, the child is undergoing trauma therapy 

and has some special needs; placement is currently meeting 

all of those needs. . . . [T]he placement provides a safe, stable, 

and permanent home for the child that can, and does, meet 

the child’s special needs. 

¶7 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised 

Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, and -2101.A (West 2016).4

 

3 Ms. Gevers also mailed a copy of her last two letters to Father’s 

attorney. 

4 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
SHAWN B. v. DCS, S.B.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶8 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must (1) find 

one of the grounds for termination in A.R.S. § 8-533.B by clear and 

convincing evidence, and (2) find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky 

J., 234 Ariz. 437, 440, ¶ 13 (App. 2014). We do not reweigh the evidence on 

appeal because the juvenile court is in the best position to “weigh the 

evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make 

appropriate findings.” Frank R. v. Mother Goose Adoptions, 239 Ariz. 184, 

202, ¶ 58 (App. 2016) (quoting Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 

278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002)).

¶9 Father first argues that termination is not in Child’s best 

interests because “ending the relationship would hurt [Child,] who wants 

to have contact with the Father.” The juvenile court’s best interests finding 

requires proof that the child would either benefit from termination or be 

harmed if the parental relationship continued. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action 

No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). We will not disturb the juvenile court’s 

order unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous. Frank R., 239 Ariz. at 

202, ¶ 59. 

¶10 Here, the juvenile court found that Child would benefit from 

the termination of Father’s parental rights because Child is currently in a 

loving, stable, permanent home that is a relative placement. The record 

supports these findings. Ms. Gevers testified that Child has bonded to the 

placement and the placement is meeting all of Child’s needs, including 

special needs such as trauma therapy. Ms. Gevers also testified that the 

placement provides permanency for Child. Moreover, the juvenile court

doubted Father’s ability to assess Child’s best interests, noting, for example, 

that Father did not know basic information about Child’s therapy, her 

favorite color or food, or her birthday. On this record, termination is in 

Child’s best interests. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 

174, 179, ¶¶ 20-21 (App. 2014) (determining that the benefits of permanency 

and stability supported best interests finding); see also Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 337, ¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2004) (recognizing that 

permanency and stability are in children’s best interests).

¶11 Father also argues that procedures followed in this case were

fundamentally unfair because he “has been wanting to have ongoing 

contact with his child[,] but he has been shut down at all turns.” Father 

raises this argument for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, we do not 

address this argument because it was not made in the juvenile court. See
SHAWN B. v. DCS, S.B.

Decision of the Court

5

Kimu P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 39, 44 n.3, ¶ 19 (App. 2008)

(refusing to address parent’s due process claims raised for the first time on 

appeal from severance) (citing Paloma Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Jenkins, 194 Ariz. 

133, 137, ¶ 17 (App. 1998)).

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child.