*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
JOHN LENTI v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 41647)

DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who previously had pleaded guilty to burglary in the first

degree and had admitted to five violations of probation as part of a

plea agreement, filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

claiming, inter alia, that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently

and voluntarily given because the petitioner was under the influence

of several heavy narcotics administered by Department of Correction

personnel, rendering him unable to understand the plea agreement, and

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine that the

petitioner was so heavily medicated that he was unable to understand

and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. The habeas court rendered judgment

denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held:

1. This court declined to review the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court

erred in determining that his guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because the petitioner failed to address the threshold issue of whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying

his petition for certification to appeal on this issue and addressed only

the habeas court’s purported error in concluding that his due process

rights had not been violated; generally, a petitioner is not afforded

appellate review of the habeas court’s decision if he has failed to establish that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition

for certification.

2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for

certification to appeal regarding the petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim: although the habeas court did not make an explicit

finding regarding the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in light of the findings supported by the record, including findings

that the petitioner was not impaired by the prescribed medications to

the extent that he could not understand the proceedings or the terms

of the plea agreement, that his decision to accept that offer was made

cogently and voluntarily, that the petitioner responded appropriately to

the trial court’s questions during the plea canvass, and its determination

that the petitioner’s testimony was not credible, the habeas court did not

err in concluding that the petitioner was not impaired by his prescribed

medications to the extent that he could not understand the plea agreement and the plea proceedings; accordingly, the petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim must fail.

Argued October 24, 2019—officially released February 4, 2020

Procedural History

Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Tolland and tried to the court, Sferrazza, J.; judgment

denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the

petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner

appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Douglas H. Butler, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s

attorney, and Tamara Grosso, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The petitioner, John Lenti, appeals

following the denial of his petition for certification to

appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) improperly

concluded that he had failed to establish that his plea

was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily,

and (2) abused its discretion in denying his petition for

certification to appeal from the court’s determination

that he had received the effective assistance of counsel.

Both of these claims rest on the petitioner’s assertion

that he was impaired at the time of his plea by the

ingestion of medications prescribed by Department of

Correction personnel. We disagree with this assertion

and the petitioner’s claims and, accordingly, dismiss

the appeal.

The habeas court’s memorandum of decision sets

forth the following relevant facts and procedural history: ‘‘On August 12, 2013, the petitioner was on probation for five burglary offenses for which he had received

a total, effective sentence of twenty years imprisonment, execution suspended after the service of two

years, and five years of probation. On that day, the

police arrested the petitioner for having unlawfully

entered an elderly woman’s home by damaging a garage

door; displayed a handgun upon encountering the

woman; and demanded that she give him money and

her car keys or he would shoot her. The woman refused

to comply, and the petitioner stole her cordless phone,

as he fled the scene on foot.

‘‘When the police apprehended him a short while

later, the police retrieved a pellet gun nearby. The petitioner confessed to breaking into the victim’s home

while armed with the pellet gun. The petitioner faced

charges of home invasion, attempted robbery first

degree, and numerous misdemeanors.’’ As a result of

this arrest, the petitioner also was charged with five

counts of violation of probation in relation to the five

prior burglary convictions for which he was then on

probation. The petitioner owed a total of eighteen years

for those convictions.

In exchange for pleading guilty to burglary in the first

degree and admitting to five violations of probation,

the state offered to recommend to the court a sentence

of between ten and eighteen years of imprisonment.

On March 27, 2014, the petitioner pleaded guilty in

accordance with the state’s offer. The petitioner

responded appropriately to the court’s canvass. Prior

to sentencing, trial counsel asked Kenneth Selig, a board

certified forensic psychologist, to analyze and assess

the petitioner’s mental status. On June 19, 2014, the

court sentenced the petitioner to sixteen years of

imprisonment followed by two years of special parole.
The petitioner did not file a direct appeal.

On December 24, 2014, the petitioner commenced

the present habeas action. On May 30, 2017, the petitioner filed an amended petition seeking to have his

guilty pleas vacated. In his amended petition, the petitioner alleged that: (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly,

intelligently, or voluntarily given because the petitioner

was under the influence of heavy narcotics administered by Department of Correction personnel, rendering

him unable to understand the plea agreement, and (2)

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine

that the petitioner was so heavily medicated that he

was unable to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea.

The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed

a return, alleging that the petitioner’s due process claim

was procedurally defaulted.1 The habeas court conducted a trial on November 21, 2017, during which the

petitioner, trial counsel and Robert H. Powers, a forensic toxicologist, testified. No witnesses were called by

the respondent.

On April 13, 2018, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. The habeas court found that the petitioner

failed to prove that his prescribed medications diminished his ability to understand the plea agreement or

the proceedings. Further, the court found that, at the

time he pleaded guilty, the petitioner understood the

terms of the agreement and that his decision to plead

was knowing and voluntary.

Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied. The

petitioner subsequently appealed, claiming that the

habeas court had abused its discretion in denying his

request for certification to appeal, solely with respect

to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review. ‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition

for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas

corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 229

Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms

v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994).

First, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that the denial

of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of

discretion. . . . Second, if the petitioner can show an

abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on the

merits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanders v.

Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 813, 821,

153 A.3d 8 (2016), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 904, 156 A.3d

536 (2017). As to the first prong, the ‘‘standard requires

the petitioner to demonstrate that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve

the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. . . . In determining whether the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request

for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine

whether the habeas court reasonably determined that

the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grover v. Commissioner of Correction, 183 Conn. App. 804, 812, 194

A.3d 316, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 933, 194 A.3d 1196

(2018).

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court

erred in determining that his guilty plea was made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.2 The petitioner

fails to address the threshold issue of whether the

habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal on this issue but only

addresses the habeas court’s purported error in concluding that his due process rights had not been violated. See Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 169 Conn. App. 821. Generally, a petitioner is

not afforded appellate review of the habeas court’s decision if he has failed to establish that the habeas court

abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification. See Reddick v. Commissioner of Correction, 51

Conn. App. 474, 477, 722 A.2d 286 (1999).

‘‘In Petaway v. Commissioner of Correction, 49

Conn. App. 75, 77–78, 712 A.2d 992 (1998), and, subsequently, in Reddick v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 51 Conn. App. 477, this court refused to review

the petitioners’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

In each of those cases, the petitioner raised the claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel but failed to brief

the threshold issue . . . of how the court had abused

its discretion in failing to grant certification to appeal

as to that underlying claim.’’ Mitchell v. Commissioner

of Correction, 68 Conn. App. 1, 7–8, 790 A.2d 463, cert.

denied, 260 Conn. 903, 793 A.2d 1089 (2002). Accordingly, we do not review the petitioner’s first claim.

In addressing the petitioner’s claim of ineffective

assistance, we first note that it is well established that

‘‘[t]he habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be

disturbed [on appeal] unless they are clearly erroneous.

. . . Thus, [t]his court does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, we

must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment of the

credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude. . . .

The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter

of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be

given to their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Orcutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 284

Conn. 724, 741, 937 A.2d 656 (2007).

The habeas court found that ‘‘the petitioner has failed
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

prescribed drugs used by the petitioner in the days

preceding his decision to plea[d] guilty, during the taking of his pleas, and between plea and sentencing

impaired his ability to comprehend the information and

advice given to him by defense counsel, the plea canvass

conducted by the trial judge, or the interviews conducted between plea and sentencing.’’ The court further

found that ‘‘the petitioner understood the legal situation

in which he was enmeshed, the terms of the plea agreement, and that his decision to accept that offer was

made cogently and voluntarily.’’

During his habeas trial, the petitioner testified that

he did not remember being sentenced and would never

have pleaded guilty had it not been for his overmedicated state. The habeas court found the petitioner’s

testimony not to be credible, specifically stating that

his testimony was ‘‘inaccurate, self-serving, and contradicted by other, more credible evidence.’’ As stated

previously, we do not disturb the court’s credibility

determination on appeal. See Orcutt v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 284 Conn. 741.

The habeas court noted that, although trial counsel

testified that the petitioner complained that the medication he was taking had ‘‘unpleasant side effects’’ and

that he wanted to discontinue that course of treatment,

trial counsel also stated that the medication seemed

to have no ‘‘detrimental influence on the petitioner’s

comprehension or judgment.’’ Further, between plea

and sentencing, Selig examined the petitioner over multiple sessions and produced a report3

for the sentencing

court that did not contain any complaints from the

petitioner about his ability to make a knowing decision

to plead guilty due to the medications. In his report,

as the habeas court notes, Selig determined that the

‘‘combination of [medications] has been very helpful

for [the petitioner] as has abstaining from addictive

drugs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The habeas

court also found that the petitioner responded appropriately to all of the court’s questions during the plea

canvass, including direct questions about whether the

petitioner had taken any medications that affected his

ability to understand the court.4 Thus, the habeas court’s

finding that the petitioner was not negatively affected

by his medications is not clearly erroneous.

Although the habeas court did not make an explicit

finding regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, it did find that the petitioner was not impaired

by the prescribed medications to the extent that he

could not understand the proceedings or that ‘‘his ability

to comprehend the information and advice given to

him by defense counsel’’ was impaired at the time he

pleaded guilty. In light of the findings supported by the

record, and the habeas court’s credibility determinations, we do not disturb its implicit finding that trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to determine that

the petitioner was impaired. Because the habeas court

did not err in concluding that the petitioner was not

impaired by his prescribed medications to the extent

that he could not understand the plea agreement and the

plea proceedings, the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim must fail. Therefore, we conclude that the habeas

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition

for certification to appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The habeas court did not rule on the respondent’s defense of procedural default.

2 On appeal, the petitioner also claims that the habeas court erred in

finding that he had failed to establish that his due process rights were

violated when he involuntarily pleaded guilty because he was incompetent

at the time he pleaded due to his ‘‘pervasive, persistent and debilitating’’

mental health issues. We do not consider this claim as it was not raised in

the petitioner’s operative petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Greene

v. Commissioner of Correction, 131 Conn. App. 820, 822, 29 A.3d 171 (2011)

(‘‘[h]aving not raised this issue before the habeas court, the petitioner is

barred from raising it on appeal’’), cert. denied, 303 Conn. 936, 36 A.3d

695 (2012).

3 The petitioner’s presentence investigation report and Selig’s report were

admitted into evidence under seal at the habeas trial.

4 During the sentencing, the petitioner spoke on his own behalf and stated

to the court, ‘‘I’m on the right medication now; I’ve been doing great.’’