NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1346-17T2

SCOTT ROGOW, Deceased,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE

AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT

SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent.

______________________________

Argued February 28, 2019 – Decided March 26, 2019

Before Judges Simonelli, Whipple and Firko. 

On appeal from the Board of Trustees, Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System, PFRS No. 3-10-42927.

Craig S. Gumpel argued the cause for appellant Lynne 

Rogow.

Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Danielle P. Schimmel, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SIMONELLI, P.J.A.D.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

August 22, 2019

APPELLATE DIVISION
2

A-1346-17T2

Scott Rogow (Rogow) was a firefighter with the City of Paterson (City)

who retired on an accidental disability retirement allowance under N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-7 and received his monthly retirement allowance until his death.

Rogow's children and widow, appellant Lynne Rogow, received survivor

accidental disability retirement benefits after Rogow's death pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(3). Approximately four years after Rogow's death, appellant 

requested that the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Police and Firemen's 

Retirement System (PFRS) amend Rogow's pension status so that she could 

receive the enhanced survivor accidental death benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A10. Appellant appeals from the Board's October 19, 2017 final agency decision

denying reconsideration of its May 12, 2017 denial of her request. We affirm.

I.

We begin with a review of the pertinent authority. The PFRS Act, 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 to -68, and corresponding regulations N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.1 to -

6.18, govern the PFRS. 

General Provisions

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1 contains the following pertinent definitions:

(3) "Member" shall mean any . . . fireman included in 

the membership of the retirement system pursuant to 

this amendatory and supplementary act . . . .
3

A-1346-17T2

. . . . 

(7) "Service" shall mean service as a . . . fireman paid 

for by an employer.

. . . . 

(11) "Annuity" shall mean payments for life derived 

from the aggregate contributions of a member.

(12) "Pension" shall mean payments for life derived 

from contributions by the employer.

(13) "Retirement allowance" shall mean the pension 

plus the annuity.

. . . . 

(16) "Retirement" shall mean the termination of the 

member’s active service with a retirement allowance 

granted and paid under the provisions of this act.

[(Emphasis added).]

N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.7(a)(1) provides that "[a] 'member in service' means that the 

member or the employer was making pension contributions to the retirement 

system at the time of filing the application for a disability retirement allowance." 

N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.1 governs the retirement application process. N.J.A.C.

17:4-6.1(a) provides that "[a] member's retirement application becomes 

effective on the first of the month following receipt of the application unless a 

future date is requested." N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.2 provides that a member's retirement 
4

A-1346-17T2

allowance becomes due and payable "[thirty] days after the date the Board 

approved the application for retirement or one month after the date of the 

retirement, whichever is later." N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.3(a) provides:

Except as provided by N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.7, a member 

shall have the right to withdraw, cancel or change an 

application for retirement at any time before the 

member's retirement allowance becomes due and 

payable by sending a written request signed by the 

member. Thereafter, the retirement shall stand as 

approved by the Board.

[(Emphasis added).]

Accidental Disability Retirement Allowance and

Survivor Accidental Disability Retirement Death Benefits

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7 governs retirement on an accidental disability 

retirement allowance. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(2) provides:

Upon retirement for accidental disability, a member 

shall receive an accidental disability retirement 

allowance which shall consist of:

(a) An annuity which shall be the actuarial equivalent 

of his aggregate contributions and

(b) A pension in the amount which, when added to the 

member’s annuity, will provide a total retirement 

allowance of [two-thirds] of the member’s actual 

annual compensation for which contributions were 

being made at the time of the occurrence of the accident 

or at the time of the member’s retirement, whichever 

provides the largest possible benefit to the member.
5

A-1346-17T2

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7(3) governs survivor accidental disability retirement 

death benefits:

Upon receipt of proper proofs of the death of a member 

who has retired on accidental disability retirement 

allowance, there shall be paid to such member’s 

beneficiary, an amount equal to [three and one-half] 

times the compensation upon which contributions by 

the member to the annuity savings fund were based in 

the last year of creditable service; provided, however, 

that if such death shall occur after the member shall 

have attained [fifty-five] years of age the amount 

payable shall equal [one-half] of such compensation 

instead of [three and one-half] times such 

compensation.

[(Emphasis added).]

Survivor Death Benefits

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(1) provides for payment of death benefits to the 

survivor of a PFRS member who dies from non-accidental means while in active 

service:

Upon the receipt of proper proof of the death of a 

member in active service on account of which no 

accidental death benefit is payable under [N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10] there shall be paid to such member’s 

widow or widower a pension of [fifty percent] of final 

compensation for the use of himself or herself and 

children of the deceased member, to continue during his 

or her widowhood; if there is no surviving widow or 

widower or in the case the widow or widower dies or 

remarries, [twenty percent] of final compensation will 

be payable to one surviving child, [thirty-five percent] 
6

A-1346-17T2

of final compensation to two surviving children in 

equal shares and if there be three or more children, 

[fifty percent] of final compensation will be payable to 

such children in equal shares.

In the event of death occurring in the first year of 

creditable service, the benefits, payable pursuant to this 

subsection, shall be computed at the annual rate of 

compensation.

If there is no widow or widower or child, [twenty-five 

percent] of final compensation will be payable to one 

surviving parent or [forty percent] of final 

compensation will be payable to two surviving parents 

in equal shares.

[(Emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5)(a) addresses when a member is deemed an active member

of the PFRS for eligibility purposes:

For the purposes of this section and [N.J.S.A. 43:16A10(5)], a member of the [PFRS] shall be deemed to be 

an active member for a period of no more than [ninetythree] days while on official leave of absence without 

pay when such leave is due to any reason other than 

illness, and for a period of not more than one year in 

the event of an official leave (a) due to the member’s 

maternity, or (b) to fulfill a residency requirement for 

an advanced degree, or (c) as a full-time student at an 

institution of higher education, and (1) while he is 

disabled due to sickness or injury arising out of or in 

the course of his employment as a member to whom this 

act applies, is not engaged in any gainful occupation, 

and is receiving or entitled to receive periodic benefits 

(including any commutation of, or substitute for, such 

benefits) for loss of time on account of such disability 
7

A-1346-17T2

under or by reason of workmen’s compensation law, 

occupational disease law or similar legislation and has 

not retired or terminated his membership; or (2) for a 

period of no more than two years while on official leave 

of absence without pay if satisfactory evidence is 

presented to the retirement system that such leave of 

absence without pay is due to the member’s personal 

illness other than an illness to which (1) above applies.

[(Emphasis added).]

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5)(b) addresses the timing of the member's death:

If a member dies within [thirty] days after the date of 

retirement or the date of board approval, whichever is 

later, a death benefit shall be payable only if he is 

deemed to be an active member in accordance with this 

section; provided, however, a member applying for 

disability benefits shall be deemed an active member if 

he was covered by the death benefit provisions of the 

act at the termination of employment, filed the 

application for disability retirement with the retirement 

system within [thirty] days following such termination 

of employment and dies within [thirty] days after the 

date of retirement or the date of board approval, 

whichever is later. If a member files an application for 

disability retirement while in service and otherwise 

meets the requirements for disability retirement, but 

dies before the retirement takes effect, the retirement 

shall be considered effective.

Survivor Accidental Death Benefits

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1) provides for payment of survivor accidental death 

benefits "[u]pon the death of a member in active service as a result of . . . an 
8

A-1346-17T2

accident met in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and 

place[.]" (Emphasis added). N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(2) provides, in pertinent part:

Upon the receipt of proper proofs of the death of a 

member on account of which an accidental death 

benefit is payable, there shall be paid to his widow or 

widower a pension of [seventy percent] of the 

compensation, upon which contributions by the 

member to the annuity savings fund were based in the 

last year of creditable service, for the use of herself or 

himself and the children of the deceased member; if 

there is no surviving widow or widower or in case the 

widow or widower dies, [seventy percent] of such 

compensation will be payable to the member’s 

surviving child or surviving children in equal shares.

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(5) provides:

In addition to the foregoing benefits payable under 

[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(2)], there shall also be paid in one 

sum to such beneficiary, if living, as the member shall 

have nominated by written designation duly executed 

and filed with the retirement system, otherwise to the 

executor or administrator of the member’s estate, an 

amount equal to [three and one-half] times the 

compensation upon which contributions by the member 

to the annuity savings fund were based in the last year 

of creditable service.

Further, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(6) provides:

In addition to the foregoing benefits, the State shall pay 

to the member’s employer-sponsored health insurance 

program all health insurance premiums for the coverage 

of the member’s surviving widow or widower and 

dependent children.
9

A-1346-17T2

Unlike, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5)(b), N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 contains no language 

regarding the timing of the member's death. 

II.

We now turn to the facts of this case. Rogow suffered a work-related 

injury on July 6, 2009. On October 28, 2010, Rogow submitted an application 

for an accidental disability retirement allowance. On May 2, 2011, the Board 

approved Rogow's application, effective November 1, 2010. Rogow remained 

on the City's payroll through May 2011. On June 1, 2011, Rogow began 

receiving an accidental disability retirement allowance of $5,238.88 per month. 

Rogow died on August 28, 2012. After receiving notice of Rogow's death, 

on September 20, 2012, the Division of Pensions and Benefits (Division)

notified appellant that she would receive a survivor accidental disability 

retirement benefit of $3,884.06 per month for the rest of her life or until she 

remarried, plus a group life insurance benefit in the amount of $326,261.64. In 

addition, Rogow's two minor children would each receive $971.02 per month. 

In October 2012, appellant and the children began receiving their monthly 

benefits. Appellant also received the $326,261.64 group life insurance benefit. 

The children's monthly benefits terminated on July 1, 2017. By that time, they 

had received a total of $114,580.36. 
10 A-1346-17T2

Appellant filed a dependency petition with the Division of Workers' 

Compensation for compensation for Rogow's death under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. On 

August 11, 2016, a judge of compensation found Rogow's death was causally 

related to his employment with the City and dependency benefits were payable 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-13. The judge approved a settlement providing

dependency benefits to appellant and the children totaling $347,850. 

Appellant also filed a claim with the Public Safety Officers' Benefits

(PSOB) Office.

1

 On September 9, 2016, the PSOB Office found Rogow's death 

was covered under the PSOB Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796 to 3796d-7,

2

and was a 

direct and proximate result of an injury sustained in the line of duty. The PSOB 

Office concluded appellant was entitled to $161,517.66, and each of the children 

were entitled to $53,839.29. 

On September 6, 2016, approximately six years after Rogow's effective 

retirement date and approximately four years after his death, appellant filed a 

request with the Board to amend Rogow's "pension status from 'accident[al] 

 

1

 The record does not reveal the date appellant filed the dependency petition 

with the Division of Workers' Compensation or the claim with the PSOB.

2

 The PSOB Act has been transferred to 34 U.S.C.A. §§ 10281 to 10308.
11 A-1346-17T2

disability' to 'line of duty death'" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10. Appellant 

provided no explanation for the delay in making this request. 

The request was referred to the Division for administrative review. On 

January 24, 2017, the Division denied the request administratively. Quoting the 

language in N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.3(a),

3

the Division found Rogow was approved for 

an accidental disability retirement allowance, effective November 1, 2010; 

Rogow began receiving his retirement allowance on July 1, 2011; and appellant 

had been receiving her survivor accidental disability retirement benefits since 

October 2012. 

Appellant appealed the Division's decision. On May 8, 2017, the Board 

denied the appeal. In a May 12, 2017 written decision, the Board found N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10(1) requires that the death of the PFRS member must occur while in 

active service, and Rogow was not eligible for accidental death benefits because 

he was retired and receiving an accidental disability retirement allowance at the 

time of his death. 

 

3

 The Division incorrectly cited N.J.A.C. 17:2-6.3(a), which governs the Public 

Employees' Retirement System; however, it is clear the Division was referring 

to N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.3(a).
12 A-1346-17T2

Appellant requested reconsideration of the Board's decision. In an

October 19, 2017 final agency decision, the Board denied reconsideration, 

reiterating as follows:

As an active member [] Rogow applied for and was 

granted an [a]ccidental disability retirement. At that 

point his status was no longer an active participant, but 

[] Rogow was a retiree of PFRS. As a matter of law, 

the Board denied [appellant's] request in accordance 

with [N.J.S.A.] 43:16A-10 which requires that the 

death of the PFRS member must occur while the 

member is in active service. Because [] Rogow was 

retired and receiving [a]ccidental disability benefits he 

is not eligible for [a]ccidental death benefits.

The Board acknowledged that the term "active service" is not specifically 

defined in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10, but cited the definition of "service" in N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-1 that "'[s]ervice' shall mean service as a . . . fireman paid for by an 

employer." The Board also noted that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5)(a) provides that a 

PFRS member is in active service if he has not retired or terminated his 

membership. 

The Board determined that the history of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 revealed a 

legislative intent to narrow the eligibility for accidental death benefits and 

require that such benefits be awarded only upon the death of a member who was 

in active service. The Board explained: 
13 A-1346-17T2

A review of the history of [N.J.S.A.] 43:16A-10 

indicates that prior to 1967, an [a]ccidental death 

benefit was awarded "[u]pon the accidental death of a 

member before retirement." L. 1964, c. 241, §7 

(emphasis added). Thus, a death benefit was payable 

so long as no retirement application was filed, even if 

the member had left service and was not contributing to 

the system. In 1967, the language of [N.J.S.A.]

43:16A-10 was amended to provide the benefit "[u]pon 

the death of a member in active service." L. 1967, c.

250 (Chapter 250), § 10 (emphasis added). Chapter 

250's definition of the term "retirement" further 

indicates . . . the Legislature's intent to narrow the 

eligibility for an accidental death benefit. It defined 

"[r]etirement" as "withdrawal from active service with 

a retirement allowance granted under [the PFRS 

statutes]."

The Board also determined that "[b]y the plain language of [N.J.S.A.]

43:16A-10(1), the Legislature intended that an accidental death benefit only be 

available to those members who are in 'active service' at the time of death and 

had not yet retired." 

III.

On appeal, appellant contends the Board's decision was arbitrary, 

capricious and unreasonable because it incorrectly found N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1) 

requires that the death of the PFRS member must occur while in active service. 

Appellant also contends the history of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 does not support the 

Board's decision.
14 A-1346-17T2

Our review of the Board's decision is limited. Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police 

& Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011). We will not disturb the Board's 

decision absent "a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, 

or that it lacks fair support in the record." Ibid. (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 

N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)). "However, because 'questions of law are the province 

of the judicial branch,' we are 'in no way bound by [the Board's] interpretation 

of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue . . . .'" Ibid. (citation 

omitted) (quoting 37 Steven L. Lefelt et al., New Jersey Practice, § 7.19 (2d ed. 

2000); Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). We review 

an issue of statutory interpretation de novo. McGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 

108 (2012). Because this appeal involves the Board's interpretation of N.J.S.A.

43:16A-10(1), our review is de novo.

"When interpreting a statute, our main objective is to further the 

Legislature's intent." In re Pontoriero, 439 N.J. Super. 24, 35 (App. Div. 2015) 

(quoting TAC Assocs. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 202 N.J. 533, 540 (2010)). 

Toward that end, the plain language of the statute provides the starting point for 

the analysis. In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012). The language of the 

statute must be construed in accordance with its ordinary and common sense 

meaning. State ex rel. K.O., 217 N.J. 83, 91 (2014). "If the language is clear 
15 A-1346-17T2

on its face, courts should enforce [the statute] according to its terms." Bermudez 

v. Kessler Inst. for Rehab., 439 N.J. Super. 45, 51 (App. Div. 2015) (alteration 

in original) (quoting Perrelli v. Pastorelle, 206 N.J. 193, 199-201 (2011)). 

The language of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1) is clear on its face. The statute

expressly provides that accidental death benefits are payable "[u]pon the death 

of a member in active service." (Emphasis added). First, Rogow was not a 

"member in service" at the time of his death, as he and the City were not making 

pension contributions to the PFRS at that time. See N.J.A.C. 17:4-6.7(a)(1) ("A

'member in service' means that the member or the employer was making pension 

contributions to the retirement system at the time of filing the application for a 

disability retirement allowance"). 

Second, although N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 does not specifically define "active 

service," it is clear that Rogow also was not in "active service" at the time of his 

death. The term "active" is defined, in part, as "engaged in full-time service 

esp[ecially] in the armed forces." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 13 

(11th ed. 2014). N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(7) defines "service" as "service as a . . . 

fireman paid for by an employer." At the time of his death, Rogow was not 

engaged in full-time service as a fireman and was no longer on the City's payroll.
16 A-1346-17T2

Moreover, Rogow's active service terminated upon his retirement. See

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-1(16) ("Retirement" means "the termination of the member's 

active service with a retirement allowance granted and paid under the provisions 

of this act."). Further, a PFRS member is not deemed to be an active member if 

he has retired. See N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5)(a) ("[A] member of the [PFRS] shall 

be deemed to be an active member . . . [if he] has not retired or terminated his 

membership"). Rogow's retirement terminated his active service as of June 1, 

2011, when he began receiving an accidental disability retirement allowance.

Accordingly, we conclude that a member who is retired and receiving a 

retirement allowance from the PFRS at the time of his death is not "a member 

in active service" and thus is not entitled to accidental death benefits under 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10. 

Appellant attempts to overcome this conclusion by arguing that if the 

Legislature intended for N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 to be based on the timing of a 

member's death and to require that the death occur while in active service, it 

would have included timing of death language in the statute similar to the 

language in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9. Appellant posits that because of this omission, 

the only relevant issue in determining eligibility for an accidental death benefit 
17 A-1346-17T2

is whether the death was the result of the member's injury that occurred in the 

line of duty. We disagree.

"Ordinarily, we are enjoined from presuming that the Legislature intended 

a result different from the wording of the statute or from adding a qualification 

that has been omitted from the statute." DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 493 

(2005). Thus, "[a] court should not 'resort to extrinsic interpretive aids' when 

'the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one 

interpretation . . . .'" Id. at 492 (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 

N.J. 513, 522 (2004)).

"When the plain meaning is unclear or ambiguous, we next consider 

extrinsic evidence of the Legislature's intent, including legislative history and 

statutory context." Pontoriero, 439 N.J. Super. at 36; see also Bermudez, 439 

N.J. Super. at 50. "Likewise, interpretations of the statute and cognate 

enactments by agencies empowered to enforce them are given substantial 

deference in the context of statutory interpretation." Klumb v. Bd. of Educ., 199 

N.J. 14, 24 (2009). "Above all, we 'seek to effectuate the "fundamental purpose 

for which the legislation was enacted."'" Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

162 N.J. 318, 323 (2000) (quoting Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 

170 (1999)). 
18 A-1346-17T2

Appellant’s attempt to infer the legislative intent through her comparison 

of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9 and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 is based on her erroneous 

application of statutory context, and thereby leads to an incorrect interpretation 

of legislative intent. We reiterate that N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(1) provides, in 

pertinent part: 

Upon the receipt of proper proof of the death of a 

member in active service on account of which no 

accidental death benefit is payable under [N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10] there shall be paid to such member's widow 

or widower a pension of [fifty percent] of final 

compensation for the use of himself or herself and 

children of the deceased member . . . . 

[(Emphasis added).]

Although appellant is correct that the statute provides death benefits upon 

the death of a member in active service, that requirement is not dependent on 

the language in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5), as she claims. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5) sets 

forth the circumstances under which a member shall be deemed to be an active 

member under certain sections of the PFRS Act; however, it does not set forth 

the requirement that a member's death occur while in active service. Rather, as

in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1), that requirement appears in the first line of N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-9(1). Cf. N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1) (accidental death benefits are payable 

"[u]pon the death of a member in active service"). The statutory language 
19 A-1346-17T2

clearly and unambiguously provides that death benefits under both N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-9 and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 are payable only if the member is "in active 

service" at the time of death. 

In her analysis of the statutory context, appellant fails to recognize the 

similar language in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(1) and N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1), and 

instead focuses on the timing of death requirements in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9(5)(b). 

Although those requirements may vary in scope and detail from the requirements 

of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1), they do not create any ambiguity in the language of 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1), nor do they contradict the first line of the statute, which 

explicitly provides that accidental death benefits are payable "[u]pon the death 

of a member in active service." Thus, appellant's examination of N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-9(5)(b) does not create an ambiguity in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 and does 

not contradict the Board's determination. 

Appellant also argues the Board misapplied the legislative history of 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 because the statute's 1967 amendment did not narrow the 

eligibility for accidental death benefits, but rather expanded eligibility by 

eliminating the requirement that the accidental death occur before retirement 

and choosing language which no longer had a temporal limitation. However, 

the legislative history shows otherwise.
20 A-1346-17T2

A statute's legislative history is often "rich with clues as to the 

interpretation of statutory language." TAC Assocs., 202 N.J. at 544. 

"Furthermore, amendments carry 'great weight' in determining the intention of 

the original statute." Ibid. (quoting Edwards v. Mayor & Council of Moonachie, 

3 N.J. 17, 24-25 (1949)). An examination of the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10, however, does not reveal an intent to reject the ordinary meaning of 

the present statute's plain language. See ibid. ("We find nothing in th[e] history 

that would warrant us to reject the ordinary meaning . . . in favor of the farfetched interpretations forged by [plaintiff]."). 

In 1964, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1) provided as follows:

Upon the accidental death of a member before 

retirement; provided, that evidence shall be submitted 

to the board of trustees justifying the determination that 

the natural and proximate cause of such death was an 

accident met in the actual performance of duty, within 

[five] years preceding the date of such death, and that 

such death was not the result of the member's willful 

negligence, an accidental death benefit shall be 

payable.

[L. 1964, c. 241, § 7 (emphasis added).]

A 1967 amendment provided as follows: 

Upon the death of a member in active service as a result 

of an accident met in the actual performance of duty at 

some definite time and place, and such death was not 
21 A-1346-17T2

the result of the member's willful negligence, an 

accidental death benefit shall be payable . . . . 

[L. 1967, c. 250, § 10 (emphasis added).] 

Although "amendments carry 'great weight' in determining the intention 

of the original statute[,]" TAC Assocs., 202 N.J. at 542, the Legislature’s intent 

is not clear from the 1967 amendment alone. See Klumb, 199 N.J. at 28 ("We 

are no more enlightened regarding the intent of the Legislature by the language 

changes in the statute . . . than by the words of the statute itself."). Thus, 

"discerning the meaning of the statute requires further inquiry into other 

extrinsic evidence." Ibid. 

While the Legislature has not amended the language at issue since 1967, 

the subsequent legislative history of the statute is instructive in determining the 

Legislature’s intent. Notably, the Legislature has often reinforced the 

requirement that accidental death benefits are payable only when a PFRS 

member’s death occurs while in active service. 

In 2002, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10 to allow a member's 

surviving spouse to remarry without losing accidental death benefits. In its 

statement to the bill, which proposed this amendment, the Senate State 

Government Committee noted that prior to the amendment, "the surviving 

spouse of a member of the [PFRS] . . . who died in active service as a result of 
22 A-1346-17T2

accident met in the actual performance of duty lo[st] the accidental death benefit 

pension if he or she remarrie[d]." S. Comm. Statement to S.B. 1434 (June 6, 

2002) (emphasis added). Similarly, in support of a 2008 amendment, which 

extended accidental death benefits to members of other public retirement 

systems, the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee noted: 

[a]s amended, the bill provides the same benefits to the 

survivors of an active member the [PFRS], the State 

Police Retirement System (SPRS), the Public 

Employees' Retirement System (PERS), or the 

Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF), who dies 

as a result of service in either the reserve component of 

the Armed Forces of the United State or the National 

Guard while on federal active duty as are currently 

provided to an active member of the respective 

retirement system, who dies as a result of an accident 

sustained in the actual performance of duty. 

[Assemb. Comm. Statement to Assemb. B. 770 (Oct. 6, 

2008) (emphasis added).] 

The Committee Statement further noted that "[c]urrent law provides death 

benefits and other increased benefits to survivors of PFRS . . . members who die 

while active members as a result of an accident met in the actual performance 

of duty." Ibid. (emphasis added). 

In 2016, after Rogow's death, the Legislature further amended N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10 by increasing the accidental death benefit to seventy percent of final 

compensation for a member's surviving child or children. S. 2061 (2016). In 
23 A-1346-17T2

doing so, the Legislature explicitly noted that the bill "enhances benefits 

provided in . . . the PFRS upon the accidental death of a member in active 

service." Legis. Fiscal Estimate to S.B. 2061 (June 22, 2016) (emphasis added).

In 1967, the Legislature changed the introductory language of N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10(1) from "[u]pon the accidental death of a member before retirement" 

to "[u]pon the death of a member in active service." Although it is initially 

unclear whether the Legislature intended this amendment to narrow or broaden 

the requirements for accidental death benefits, the subsequent legislative history 

clearly indicates the Legislature's intent to limit the statute's reach to members 

who were in active service at the time of their death. 

Furthermore, the legislative history contains nothing from which we can 

conclude that the Legislature sought to permit payment of accidental death

benefits to a PFRS member who had retired and was receiving an accidental 

disability retirement allowance at the time of his death. Had the Legislature 

intended to do so, it would have omitted the language providing that such 

benefits be payable "[u]pon the death of a member in active service[.]" N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10(1) (emphasis added); see Bermudez, 439 N.J. Super. at 56 (noting if 

the Legislature intended to apply the requirements of the Nursing Home Act to 
24 A-1346-17T2

other institutions, it would have used a more inclusive term in the title and text 

of the legislation). 

Accordingly, we conclude the Board properly determined that Rogow was 

ineligible for accidental death benefits because he was not a member in active 

service at the time of his death, as required by N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10, but was 

retired and receiving an accidental disability retirement allowance. The 

legislative history supports the Board's decision. 

IV.

Appellant contends the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious and 

unreasonable because the Board failed to follow its own precedent in Lake v. 

Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 961 (Dec. 30, 

2005) and Estock v. Board of Trsustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, 

2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 237 (May 12, 2005), which did not require that the 

death of a PFRS member occur in active service.

4

 Appellant misinterprets these 

cases, and they are not binding on us. 

 

4

 We decline to address appellant's argument that, for good cause shown, the 

Board has the authority to alter or change a retirement classification from 

accidental disability to accidental death after the disability determination has 

been made. The Board's final agency decision was not based on appellant's 

failure to show good cause. 
25 A-1346-17T2

Unlike here, in Lake, the Board denied a request to change a police 

officer’s retirement application from an ordinary disability retirement allowance 

to accidental death benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10, finding that the officer’s 

widow did not timely file her request and her husband’s death was not caused 

by a traumatic event "such that accidental benefits are available under N.J.S.A. 

43:16A-10." Lake, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS at *7-8, 13. Similarly, in Estock, 

the Board denied a widow’s request to change her husband’s special retirement 

allowance to accidental death benefits, finding that the widow's request was 

untimely. Estock, 2005 N.J. AGEN LEXIS 237 at *4. 

Appellant argues that Lake and Estock support her interpretation of 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1) because, in those cases, the Board did not address 

whether the members were in active service at the time of their death. However, 

the Board’s failure to address this issue is not determinative of whether or not 

the statute requires the same. 

Appellant's argument implies that if the Board does not address every 

possible ground for denying a request, any grounds for denial that are not 

addressed simply do not exist. However, the Board's decision not to address 

every possible reason for denying a request to change a member's retirement 

application does not imply that additional issues do not exist or that there are no 
26 A-1346-17T2

additional grounds on which to deny the request. In fact, in Estock, the Board 

explicitly noted that it was unnecessary to fully explore or address all of the 

issues raised in the matter because "a decision on the merits is plain" and it was 

therefore unnecessary to explore additional grounds for dismissal. Estock, 2005 

N.J. AGEN LEXIS 237 at *5. The Board in Estock and Lake therefore did not 

suggest that accidental death benefits are not dependent on a member's death 

occurring while in active service. Rather, the Board merely denied the requests 

on other grounds. 

Moreover, despite appellant's claim to the contrary, the Board's precedent 

actually supports its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1). In Goode v. Board 

of Trustees, Police & Firemen's Retirement System, No A-4454-08 (App. Div. 

June 7, 2010) (slip op. at. at 6), we upheld the Board's determination that the 

petitioner was not entitled to death benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9 because 

her husband was not in active service at the time of his death and "consequently 

the only pension benefits payable from his PFRS account are his aggregate 

contributions owed to his beneficiary record."5 Although the Board made this 

determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-9, the Board and the court relied on 

 

5 Although the case is unpublished, and therefore not binding, it is instructive 

in reviewing the Board's prior determinations of similar issues. See Trinity 

Cemetery Ass'n v. Twp. of Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 48 (2001); R. 1:36-3.
27 A-1346-17T2

the language of the statute which provides that death benefits are payable 

"[u]pon the receipt of proper proof of the death of a member in active service 

. . . ." Id. at 4. 

In Schott v. Board of Trustees, Police & Firemen’s Retirement System, 94 

N.J.A.R.2d (TYP) 227, the Board denied a former police officer’s application 

for an ordinary disability retirement allowance, finding he was no longer "in 

service" when he filed his application, as required by N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1). The 

statute provides that "[u]pon the written application by a member in service . . . 

any member, under [fifty-five] years of age, who has had [five] or more years 

of creditable service may be retired on an ordinary disability retirement . . . ." 

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-6(1) (emphasis added.) The Board rejected the officer's 

application because he filed it five months after his employment had been

terminated. Schott, 94 N.J.A.R.2d at 4-5.

Although the Board did not make its determination in Schott pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10, its decision supports the Board's statutory interpretation in 

this matter because it relates to language that is almost identical to the language 

in N.J.S.A. 43:16A-10(1). "Indeed, when cognate laws are passed, they should 

be viewed as part of a consistent plan unless they are 'expressly or impliedly 

incompatible.'" Klumb, 199 N.J. at 32 (quoting Jacobs v. N.J. State Highway 
28 A-1346-17T2

Auth., 54 N.J. 393, 401 (1969)). "The statute should be considered in light of 

other statutory provisions and the nature of the subject matter." G.S. v. Dep't of 

Human Servs., Div. of Youth & Family Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172 (1999). 

Furthermore, "the pension statutes are to be construed as part of a harmonious 

whole[.]" Klumb, 199 N.J. at 33. 

The Board's precedent supports its interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:16A10(1). Accordingly, the Board's decision was not arbitrary, capricious and 

unreasonable and must be upheld. 

To the extent we have not specifically addressed appellant's remaining 

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.