* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 13 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL C. WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SUSAN BRIMER LOVING; WELLON B. POE; KARIN KRIZ; SUE WYCOFF; LARRY A. FIELDS; DAN REYNOLDS; JAMES L. SAFFLE; MICHAEL D. PARSONS; DOLORES RAMSEY; DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS; MALIK MUHAMMAD; JEMAL AZIZ; DAWUD ALI; GAY ABSTON TUDOR; JOE MANNING; GREGORY H. HALL; CALVIN SAMUEL MUSE, JR.; HUGH REED; ROBERT A. NANCE; PHIL DESSAUER; DANIEL BINTY; WILLIAM R. EVANS,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 96-6192 (D.C. No. CIV-94-1740-W) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.1 See Washington v. Department of Corrections , No. C-93-786 (Pittsburg

County Dist. Ct. Mar. 2, 1995) (dismissing claims c oncerning disciplinary procedures as frivolous and without merit), aff’d. , No. 85,295 (Okla. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1995); Washington v. Saffle , No. C-92-759 (Pittsburg County Dist. Ct. Feb. 22, 1995) (dismissing claims of tort and breac h of contract against Muslim representatives and constitutional claims against c orrection officials for (continued...) -2- After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
BACKGROUND Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the Oklaho ma Department of Corrections (DOC). Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaint iff’s allegations can be grouped into three general categories: (1) DOC officials a nd employees adopted and implemented allegedly unconstitutional prison polic ies concerning religious services, grooming codes, and disciplinary procedur es; (2) Muslim representatives under contract with the DOC to provide inmates withreligious counseling allegedly failed to visit plaintiff; and (3) the fo rmer Oklahoma Attorney General and her staff allegedly failed to investigate plain tiff’s complaints before successfully defending DOC officials and employees against plaintiff’s civil rights claims in Oklahoma state court actions. 1 The complaint requested1 (...continued)

infringement of right to practice religion by faili ng to change practices of Muslim representatives and for adopting and enforcing groo ming code provisions), aff’d. , No. 85,296 (Okla. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1995); Washingt on v. Department of Corrections , No. C-91-24 (Atoka County Dist. Ct. Mar. 1, 1994) (granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s claim s concerning illegal, unfair, and unconstitutional disciplinary procedures and pr oceedings); Washington v. Saffle , No. C-88-717 (Pittsburg County Dist. Ct. Feb. 3, 1994) (dismissing as moot claim for injunctive relief from provisions of prison grooming code).

2 The district court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, where plaintiff is incarcerated, had already placed restrictions on pl aintiff’s filings. -3- injunctive relief, $46 million in compensatory dama ges, and $23 million in punitive damages. Initially, the district court dismissed the complai nt for improper venue and, based on plaintiff’s earlier filings, imposed futur e restrictions on plaintiff’s filing in forma pauperis complaints in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma. 2 On plaintiff’s first appeal to this court, we aff irmed the filing restrictions, but reversed and remanded on the issu e of venue. Washington v. Loving , No. 94-6466, 1995 WL 421131 (10th Cir. July 18, 1 995). On remand, the district court adopted the substance of the supplemental findings and recommendations of the magistrate judg e and entered a dispositive order. The order, dated April 16, 1996, (1) dismis sed plaintiff’s claims against several defendants for insufficiency of service of process, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5); (2) entered summary judgment in f avor of moving defendants3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was amended by the PLRA and rec odified at

subsection 1915(e).

4 Although plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on Ju ne 4, 1996, after the effective date of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), see Pub.L.No. 104-0134, § 804(a)(3), 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), we wi ll not require plaintiff to comply with the filing fee obligations of PLRA. Atthis point in the litigation, it would be inequitable to reverse the district court’ s grant of leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. -4- based on the doctrines of collateral estoppel and r es judicata, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; and (3) dismissed plaintiff’s claims as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), as effective at the time of the d ismissal. 3 In addition, the court denied plaintiff’s three motions to recuse and granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. 4 On May 14, 1996, the district court denied plaint iff’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from judgment.
DISCUSSION We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 12 91. The former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted a district court to d ismiss an in forma pauperis action as frivolous if the claim was “based on an i ndisputably meritless legal theory” or founded on “clearly baseless” factual co ntentions. Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). We review such a dismi ssal for abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). After a careful review of the record, we agree with the district court that plaintiff’s case is legally meritless and factually baseless. The conclusory5 Because we find that plaintiff’s action was legallyfrivolous and subject to

dismissal under subsection 1915(d), we need not rea ch issues concerning service of process, collateral estoppel, and res judicata. -5- allegations plaintiff makes in his court filings do not add up to a claim of constitutional dimensions. See Swoboda v. Dubach , 992 F.2d 286, 290 (10th Cir. 1993). Moreover, the majority of plaintiff’s claim s have been litigated to a conclusion in state court proceedings. After caref ully considering plaintiff’s arguments, we find no error and affirm the dismissa l under subsection 1915(d) for substantially the same reasons stated in the magistrate’s findings and recommendations and the district court’s order of April 16, 1996. 5 We also affirm the denial of plaintiff’s motion forrelief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Relief from judgment is discreti onary and is warranted only in exceptional circumstances. Van Skiver v. United St ates , 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). The motion does not demonstrate any exceptional circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b) and our reading of the record on appeal does not disclose any. Finally, we find no abuse of discretion, see United States v. Burger , 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992), in the district c ourt’s denial of plaintiff’s motions to recuse. Plaintiff’s motions alleged that the court’s adverse rulings were evidence of bias and prejudice. However, “jud icial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis” for recusal based o n bias or partiality. See Liteky-6-

v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). There must be a “displ ay [of] a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fai r judgment impossible.” Id. Nothing in the record suggests that the district co urt judge displayed such favoritism or antagonism. AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge