* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 96-30765

(Summary Calendar)

_________________

ALBERTO QUERAL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GULF COAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Louisiana

(95-CV-2230-C)

May 12, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Alberto Queral, a naturalized American citizen who was born

in Cuba, worked as a commercial loan officer for Gulf Coast Bank

& Trust Company (“Gulf”). After Gulf fired Queral, he sued

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and §§ 23:1006 and 51:2242

of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, alleging that Gulf had
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terminated him because of his race and national origin. After a

bench trial, the district court ordered that judgment be entered

in favor of Gulf. We affirm.

I

Gulf hired Queral in 1991, and installed him as manager of

its West Esplanade branch. A couple of years later, Gulf

transferred Queral to its main office in New Orleans. Queral’s

salary remained the same but his duties changed. Subsequently,

Gulf hired Queral as a commercial loan officer at the main

office.

Starting in January 1994, Queral began to devote most of his

time to being a commercial loan officer. He worked under the

supervision of Rodney Jordy, and was given a loan quota of

$250,000 per quarter, a typical target for new officers. Also in

January, Jordy filled out an evaluation of Queral, rating his

employment performance as “satisfactory” or better in all areas

except for job productivity, where he termed Queral’s performance

“fair.”

The bank commissioned a study to determine why its costs

seemed higher than comparable banks. This study concluded that,

among other things, the loan department was overstaffed by two or

three people. Gulf’s president, Guy Williams, then met with

Jordy and Walter Alvarez, the bank’s vice president. Williams

declared that Gulf would dismiss the least productive loan

officers. Jordy asked Williams to reconsider his decision, and
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Williams decided to defer any terminations.

Queral exceeded his loan quotas for the first two quarters

of 1994. His third quarter loan total fell short of the quota,

however by the end of the year, he had surpassed his yearly quota

of $1,000,000. Sometime in 1994, Jordy told Williams that Queral

was the least productive loan officer, and the decision was made

to fire Queral.

At trial, Queral presented some evidence of intentional

discrimination. He testified (1) that Williams told him that

maybe Queral could help Gulf be the first “Hispanic” bank; (2)

that after Jordy learned that Queral had been named to the

Jefferson Parish Economic Development Council, Jordy stated that

he was surprised that a Cuban had been appointed; (3) that Jordy

had averred that he believed that ninety-nine percent of crime in

New Orleans was committed by minorities and that Queral’s accent

could be a problem in generating business for the bank; and (4)

that another loan officer made an offensive ethnic joke about

Cubans at a meeting presided over by Jordy. The district court

found all this proof credible.

The district court also determined that a “sizable portion”

of Queral’s loan totals were generated by Williams and other bank

employees and that, if this portion was disregarded, Queral was

the least productive loan officer at Gulf. In addition, the

district court found that Queral showed “some deficiency” with

regard to a loan officer’s duties, which include producing new
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loans, maintaining the portfolio of existing loans, and crossselling other bank services.

II

On appeal, Queral makes a number of arguments based on the

elaborate burden-shifting apparatus set forth in McDonnell

Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668

(1973). However, after a case has been fully tried on the

merits, this apparatus ceases to have any importance to the

appellate court. Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d

927, 933 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct.

767, __ L. Ed. 2d __ (1997); see also Weaver v. Amoco Prod. Co.,

66 F.3d 85, 87 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[o]n appeal of a

jury’s verdict of age discrimination, we need not address the

sufficiency of [the plaintiff’s] prima facie case”). Rather, our

inquiry becomes whether the record contains sufficient evidence

to support the conclusions reached by the trier of fact. 

Patterson, 90 F.3d at 933.

In conducting this inquiry, we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); EEOC v.

Clear Lake Dodge, 60 F.3d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1995). We will

reverse a district court’s judgment based on erroneous factual

findings only if, after weighing the evidence, we are definitely
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and firmly convinced that the district court made a mistake. 

Clear Lake Dodge, 60 F.3d at 1151. Where the district court’s

finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one

witness over that of another, that finding))if not internally

inconsistent))can virtually never be clear error. Schlesinger v.

Herzog, 2 F.3d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1993).

III

At trial, Queral did not present any direct evidence that

Gulf fired him because he was Cuban. However, he could still

satisfy his burden of persuasion through circumstantial proof. 

Burns v. Texas City Refining, Inc., 890 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir.

1989). To show discriminatory firing, Queral needed to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Gulf used his

race as a determinative factor in firing him. Rhodes v.

Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

The district court found that Queral had not proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that he was fired because of his

race or that his race played any part in Gulf’s decision to

terminate him. Queral disputes this finding by adverting to the

evidence of intentional discrimination summarized above and to

proof that he was a “competent, respected and productive

employee.”

While Queral did present evidence that Jordy made

discriminatory remarks to him and that Queral generated some new
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business for Gulf, ample proof existed that Gulf reasonably

believed it had to fire unproductive loan officers and that

Queral was the least productive one. On this record, we believe

that the district court did not clearly err in determining that

Queral failed to show that race played a determinative role in

his firing. Accordingly, we determine that sufficient evidence

exists to support the district court’s judgment in favor of Gulf. 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the

district court.