IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles Talbert, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 125 M.D. 2022

:

Department of Corrections; :

George Little, :

Respondents : Submitted: October 21, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE CEISLER FILED: March 21, 2023

Before this Court are an Application for Summary Relief filed by Charles 

Talbert and a Cross-Application for Summary Relief filed by the Department of 

Corrections and George Little (together, DOC)1in this Court’s original jurisdiction. 

Because we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and 

DOC’s right to relief is clear, we deny Mr. Talbert’s Application for Summary Relief 

and grant DOC’s Cross-Application for Summary Relief.

Background

On December 18, 2019, the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas

(Trial Court) sentenced Mr. Talbert to 29 months to 60 months’ incarceration for 

possessing an instrument of crime, followed by a consecutive sentence of 1 to 2 

years’ incarceration for recklessly endangering another person. The sentencing 

order states in relevant part:

1 Mr. Little is the former Secretary of DOC.
2

Credit for time served if applicable on this case. Sentence is 

consecutive to any other sentence being served. Court recommends 

[State Correctional Institution (SCI)-]Waymart for mental health and 

drug treatment. While incarcerated[,] defendant to have anger 

management, drug and mental health treatment, job training. Upon 

release[,] defendant to continue mental health and drug treatment, 

random urinalysis, seek and maintain employment, stay away from 

both victims. . . .

Mandamus Pet., Ex. 1 (emphasis added).

On March 23, 2022, Mr. Talbert filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus 

(Mandamus Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction, seeking to compel DOC to 

credit his sentence for time served and to either transfer him to SCI-Waymart for 

mental health treatment or release him on parole.2

On April 4, 2022, Mr. Talbert filed an Application for Summary Relief, 

asserting that he has a clear right to have DOC fully implement the sentence imposed 

by the Trial Court. Specifically, Mr. Talbert seeks pre-sentence time credit “from 

the date of arrest, up until being released on bail (59 days), [a]nd from the date of 

his bail being revoked, up until his sentence (344 days).” Mandamus Pet. ¶ 11. Mr. 

Talbert asks this Court “to fix his minimum sentence date to February 23, 2022, 

and[] . . . put him on the parole list.” Talbert Appl. for Summ. Relief at 1. Mr. 

Talbert also asks this Court to direct DOC to provide him with “the anger 

2 A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Taglienti v. Dep’t of Corr., 806 A.2d 

988, 991 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). “This Court may only issue a writ of mandamus where the petitioner 

possesses a clear legal right to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty, the 

[respondent] possesses a corresponding duty to perform the act, and the petitioner possesses no 

other adequate or appropriate remedy.” Detar v. Beard, 898 A.2d 26, 29 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
3

management, drug, and mental health treatment” that the Trial Court “ordered [him] 

to receive while in DOC custody.” Id.; see Mandamus Pet. ¶ 16(B).

3

 

On August 3, 2022, DOC filed a Cross-Application for Summary Relief, 

asserting that Mr. Talbert has failed to establish a clear right to mandamus relief. 

DOC asserts that the Trial Court did not direct DOC to apply the specific credit Mr. 

Talbert seeks. DOC also asserts that although the Trial Court recommended that Mr. 

Talbert be housed at SCI-Waymart, it is within DOC’s discretion to determine 

where, and under what conditions, to house Mr. Talbert. According to DOC, the 

Pennsylvania Parole Board and DOC have exclusive “authority over the treatment 

conditions, programming, and employment aspects of [Mr. Talbert’s] sentence.” 

DOC Appl. for Summ. Relief ¶ 39.

Analysis

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b) provides that “[a]t any 

time after the filing of a petition for review in an . . . original jurisdiction matter the 

court may on application enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). “An application for summary relief is properly evaluated 

according to the standards for summary judgment.” Myers v. Com., 128 A.3d 846, 

849 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). In ruling on a motion for summary relief, we must view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and may enter 

judgment only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact; and (2) the right 

to relief is clear as a matter of law. Nw. Youth Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 

1 A.3d 988, 990 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “The record, for purposes of [a] motion 

for summary relief, is the same as [the] record for purposes of a motion for summary 

3 Mr. Talbert also previously filed an Application for Peremptory Relief and an Application 

for Preliminary Injunction, both of which this Court denied.
4

judgment.” Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192, 195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2015).

First, Mr. Talbert asserts that he was entitled to credit for time served and it 

was DOC’s responsibility to figure out exactly how much time should be credited to 

his sentence. In response, DOC asserts that it cannot sua sponte apply credit to Mr. 

Talbert’s sentence without clear direction from the sentencing court. We agree with 

DOC.

Here, the Trial Court’s sentencing order did not identify specific dates of 

credit to be applied to Mr. Talbert’s sentence, nor did it unambiguously award him

credit. Rather, the sentencing order merely stated: “Credit for time served if 

applicable on this case.” Mandamus Pet., Ex. 1 (emphasis added). Our courts have

consistently denied relief to a petitioner seeking a modification or recalculation of 

his sentence where the sentencing order was either silent as to credit or ambiguous 

in stating that the petitioner should receive “credit for time served.” See, e.g.,

McCray v. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. 2002) (holding that DOC had 

no duty to credit the petitioner’s sentence for time served because the sentencing 

order did not indicate that he was to receive credit for time served); Hoyt v. Dep’t of 

Corr., 79 A.3d 741, 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (sustaining DOC’s preliminary 

objections to a mandamus petition where the sentencing order was silent as to credit); 

Canfield v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 585 M.D. 2016, filed Aug. 11, 2017), 

slip op. at 2, 4 (sustaining DOC’s preliminary objections to a mandamus petition

where the sentencing order did not indicate a specific number of days for which 

credit should be given, merely stating that the petitioner was to receive “credit for 

time served as allowed by law”); Mullen v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 328 

M.D. 2013, filed Jan. 30, 2014), slip op. at 4-6 (sustaining DOC’s preliminary 
5

objections to a mandamus petition where the sentencing order did “not clearly 

require credit for the . . . period at issue”).

4

 In Canfield, this Court explained:

Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct an error in DOC’s 

computation of maximum and minimum dates of confinement where 

the sentencing order clearly gives the inmate credit for the time period 

in question and DOC’s computation does not comply with that credit. 

It cannot be used to challenge DOC’s failure to give credit where the 

sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not provide the credit at 

issue. The requirements for mandamus cannot be satisfied in those 

circumstances because there is no clear right to relief and because the 

inmate has an adequate and more appropriate alternative remedy of 

seeking modification or clarification of the sentence in the trial court.

Canfield, slip op. at 3-4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see Terrell v. 

Facility Mgr. at SCI-Mahoney State Prison (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 95 M.D. 2020, filed 

Nov. 19, 2020), slip op. at 6 (“[M]andamus cannot be used to challenge the failure 

to award credit when the sentencing order is either ambiguous or does not provide 

the specific credit at issue.”) (emphasis added).

We agree with DOC that the sentencing order in this case was ambiguous with 

regard to credit. The sentencing order did not specify an amount of credit to be 

applied, stating only that “credit for time served” would be given “if applicable.” As 

explained above, mandamus cannot be used to challenge DOC’s failure to apply

credit where the sentencing order is ambiguous. Therefore, we conclude that DOC 

has a clear right to relief on this issue.5

4 Pursuant to this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, unreported decisions of this Court, 

issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

5 Our courts have held that when a sentencing court does not give an inmate full credit for 

time served, the appropriate remedy is to seek modification or clarification from the sentencing 

court or through the direct appeal process, not through a mandamus action in this Court. See 

McCray, 872 A.2d at 1133; Hoyt, 79 A.3d at 743; see also Mullen, slip op. at 5 (holding that where 
6

Second, Mr. Talbert asserts that DOC is obligated to provide him with mental 

health and drug treatment while he is in custody, rather than commit him to “the 

restrictive housing unit where his mental health has, and continues to, contrarily 

deteriorate without the treatment.” Talbert Reply Br. at 4. Mr. Talbert avers that

instead of providing him with the treatment recommended by the Trial Court, DOC 

“sent him to [a] maximum security prison[], in long[-]term restrictive housing, for 

behavior that resulted from his ‘untreated’ anger, drug, and mental health issues.” 

Mandamus Pet. ¶ 19. Mr. Talbert further avers:

[Mr. Talbert] has the following serious mental disorders: anxiety, [posttraumatic stress disorder], [attention deficit hyperactivity disorder], 

bipolar, paranoia schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, and 

borderline personality disorder. Instead of being treated for these 

conditions, . . . DOC has established and maintained a campaign of 

punishing [Mr. Talbert] with more and more isolated confinement for 

behavior directly related to the symptoms of his mental illness.

Talbert Br. in Support of Appl. for Prelim. Inj. at 1-2 (emphasis added). Mr. Talbert

contends that by keeping him in “long[-]term isolated confinement alone,” DOC has 

“cause[d] him to suffer permanent psychological harm.” Id. at 4; see also Talbert 

Answer to DOC New Matter ¶¶ 16, 19-20 (averring that “keeping [Mr. Talbert] in 

long-term isolated confinement” continues to aggravate “his pre[]existing physical 

and mental health issues”).

However, as this Court previously recognized, since the filing of his 

Mandamus Petition and Application for Summary Relief, Mr. Talbert has been 

transferred out of the restrictive housing unit at SCI-Camp Hill; he is now 

permanently housed at SCI-Coal Township. Talbert v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., 

a sentencing order did not unambiguously require the credit the petitioner sought, his remedy was 

to seek modification or clarification of the sentence from the trial court).
7

No. 125 M.D. 2022, filed Oct. 18, 2022), slip op. at 2 (unpaginated). Therefore, the 

adverse conditions Mr. Talbert allegedly suffered while in restrictive housing at SCICamp Hill, which formed the basis of both his Mandamus Petition and Application 

for Summary Relief, no longer exist. Id.

Furthermore, while the sentencing court may make recommendationsto DOC, 

DOC has the ultimate authority to determine where and under what conditions an 

inmate will be housed. See 37 Pa. Code § 93.11(a) (“An inmate does not have a 

right to be housed in a particular facility or in a particular area within a facility.”);

Lopez v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 119 A.3d 1081, 1085 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (“‘It is entirely 

a matter of [DOC’s] discretion where to house an inmate.’”) (citation omitted), aff’d, 

144 A.3d 92 (Pa. 2016); Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) 

(“[J]udges may not indiscriminately denominate the place a prisoner is housed[.]”). 

Moreover, “[m]andamus does not lie to compel [DOC] employees to exercise their 

discretion in a particular way, even if th[is] Court believes it has been exercised 

incorrectly.” Clark, 918 A.2d at 160-61. Thus, even though the Trial Court 

recommended that Mr. Talbert be housed at SCI-Waymart for mental health 

treatment, DOC was not bound by that recommendation. Rather, DOC avers that, 

since Mr. Talbert has been in DOC’s custody, it “has provided [him] with reasonable 

and appropriate mental health care” and “has recommended reasonable and 

appropriate programming for [him].” DOC Appl. for Summ. Relief ¶¶ 41-42.6 

There is nothing in the record to suggest that SCI-Coal Township, where Mr. Talbert 

is now confined, is incapable of providing the treatment he needs. Therefore, we 

conclude that DOC has a clear right to relief on this issue.

6 According to DOC, “[Mr. Talbert] has an extensive misconduct history of refusing to 

obey orders and threatening [DOC] employees, sometimes with threats of physical harm, making 

it difficult for [DOC] employees to communicate with him.” DOC Appl. for Summ. Relief ¶ 43.
8

Conclusion

We conclude, based on our review of the record, that (1) Mr. Talbert has not

established a clear right to relief, and (2) DOC has established a clear right to relief. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Accordingly, this Court denies Mr. Talbert’s Application 

for Summary Relief and grants DOC’s Cross-Application for Summary Relief.

____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles Talbert, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 125 M.D. 2022

:

Department of Corrections; :

George Little, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 21st day of March, 2023, this Court hereby DENIES the 

Application for Summary Relief filed by Charles Talbert and GRANTS the CrossApplication for Summary Relief filed by the Department of Corrections and George

Little.

____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge