(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE ET AL. v. 

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION 

ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 18–1584. Argued February 24, 2020—Decided June 15, 2020* 

Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (Atlantic), sought to construct an

approximately 604-mile natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to 

North Carolina along a route that traversed 16 miles of land within 

the George Washington National Forest. As relevant here, Atlantic 

secured a special use permit from the United States Forest Service, 

obtaining a right-of-way for a 0.1-mile segment of pipe some 600 feet 

below a portion of the Appalachian National Scenic Trail (Appalachian

Trail or Trail), which also crosses the National Forest. Respondents

filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit, contending, inter alia, 

that the issuance of the special use permit for the right-of-way under

the Trail violated the Mineral Leasing Act (Leasing Act). Atlantic intervened. The Fourth Circuit vacated the permit, holding that the 

Leasing Act did not empower the Forest Service to grant the right-ofway because the Trail became part of the National Park System when 

the Secretary of the Interior delegated its authority over the Trail’s 

administration to the National Park Service, and that the Leasing Act

prohibits pipeline rights-of-way through lands in the National Park 

System. 

Held: Because the Department of the Interior’s decision to assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did 

not transform the land over which the Trail passes into land within 

—————— 

*Together with No. 18–1587, Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association et al., also on certiorari to the same 

court. 
 

 

 

 

2 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Syllabus 

the National Park System, the Forest Service had the authority to issue the special use permit. Pp. 3–18.

(a) These cases involve the interaction of multiple federal laws. The 

Weeks Act provided for the acquisition of lands for inclusion in the National Forest System, stating that such lands “shall be permanently

reserved, held, and administered as national forest lands.” 16 U. S. C. 

§521. The Forest Service, with authority granted by the Secretary of 

Agriculture, has jurisdiction over the National Forest System, including the George Washington National Forest. The National Trails System Act (Trails Act) establishes national scenic and national historic 

trails, 16 U. S. C. §1244(a), including the Appalachian Trail, 

§1244(a)(1). It also empowers the Secretary of the Interior to establish 

the Trail’s location and width by entering into “rights-of-way” agreements with other federal agencies, States, local governments, and private landowners. §§1246(a)(2), (d), (e). The Leasing Act enables any 

“appropriate agency head” to grant “[r]ights-of-way through any Federal lands . . . for pipeline purposes,” 30 U. S. C. §185(a), defining “Federal lands” as “all lands owned by the United States,” except (as relevant) lands in the National Park System, §185(b). The National Park 

System is, in turn, defined as “any area of land and water now and 

hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior, through the 

National Park Service for park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.” 54 U. S. C. §100501. Pp. 3–5.

(b) An examination of the interests and authority granted under the 

Trails Act shows that the Forest Service “right-of-way” agreements 

with the National Park Service for the Appalachian Trail did not convert “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act into “lands” within the “National Park System.” Pp. 5–13.

(1) A right-of-way is a type of easement. And easements grant

only nonpossessory rights of use limited to the purposes specified in 

the easement agreement: They are not land; they merely burden land

that continues to be owned by another. The same principles that apply

to right-of-way agreements between private parties apply here, even 

though the Federal Government owns all lands involved. A right-ofway between two agencies grants only an easement across the land, 

not jurisdiction over the land itself. Read in light of basic property law

principles, then, the plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between the two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands crossed by the Trail. Pp. 7–10.

(2) The various duties described in the Trails Act—that the Secretary of the Interior (through the National Park Service) administers 

the Trail “primarily as a footpath,” 16 U. S. C. §1244(a)(1); can designate Trail uses, provide Trail markers, and establish interpretative 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Syllabus 

and informational sites, §1246(c); and can regulate the Trail’s “protection, management, development, and administration,” §1246(i)—reinforce the conclusion that the agency responsible for the Trail has the

limited role of administering a trail easement, but that the underlying

land remains within the Forest Service’s jurisdiction. Pp. 10–11. 

(3) This conclusion is also reinforced by the fact that Congress

spoke in terms of rights-of-way in the Trails Act rather than in terms

of land transfers, as it has unequivocally and directly done in multiple

other statutes when it has intended to transfer land from one agency

to another. See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U. S. C. §1281(c). 

Pp. 12–13. 

(c) Respondents’ theory—that the National Park Service administers the Trail, and therefore the lands that the Trail crosses—depends 

on presuming, with no clear congressional command, a vast expansion

of the Park Service’s jurisdiction and a significant curtailment of the 

Forest Service’s express authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way on 

“lands owned by the United States.” 30 U. S. C. §185(b). It also has 

striking implications for federalism and private property rights, especially given that Congress has used express language in other statutes 

when it has intended to transfer lands between agencies. Pp. 13–17. 

911 F. 3d 150, reversed and remanded.

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and BREYER, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and in which 

GINSBURG, J., joined except as to Part III–B–2. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a 

dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 18–1584 and 18–1587 

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

18–1584 v. 

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION 

ASSOCIATION ET AL. 

ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE, LLC, 

PETITIONER 

18–1587 v. 

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION 

ASSOCIATION, ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 15, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to decide whether the United States Forest Service has authority under the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U. S. C. §181 et seq., 

to grant rights-of-way through lands within national forests

traversed by the Appalachian Trail. 588 U. S. ___ (2019). 

We hold that the Mineral Leasing Act does grant the Forest 

Service that authority and therefore reverse the judgment 

of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 

—————— 

* JUSTICE GINSBURG joins all but Part III–B–2 of this opinion. 
2 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

I 

A 

In 2015, petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (Atlantic) filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission to construct and operate an approximately 

604-mile natural gas pipeline extending from West Virginia

to North Carolina. The pipeline’s proposed route traverses 

16 miles of land within the George Washington National 

Forest. The Appalachian National Scenic Trail (Appalachian Trail or Trail) also crosses parts of the George Washington National Forest. 

To construct the pipeline, Atlantic needed to obtain special use permits from the United States Forest Service for 

the portions of the pipeline that would pass through lands

under the Forest Service’s jurisdiction. In 2018, the Forest 

Service issued these permits and granted a right-of-way 

that would allow Atlantic to place a 0.1-mile segment of 

pipe approximately 600 feet below the Appalachian Trail in

the George Washington National Forest. 

B 

Respondents Cowpasture River Preservation Association, Highlanders for Responsible Development, Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley

Network, Sierra Club, Virginia Wilderness Committee, and

Wild Virginia filed a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. They contended that the issuance of the special use

permit for the right-of-way under the Trail, as well as numerous other aspects of the Forest Service’s regulatory process, violated the Mineral Leasing Act (Leasing Act), 41

Stat. 437, 30 U. S. C. §181 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et 

seq., the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 

2952, 16 U. S. C. §1604, and the Administrative Procedure

Act, 5 U. S. C. §500 et seq. Atlantic intervened in the suit. 

The Fourth Circuit vacated the Forest Service’s special 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

use permit after holding that the Leasing Act did not empower the Forest Service to grant the pipeline right-of-way

beneath the Trail. As relevant here, the court concluded 

that the Appalachian Trail had become part of the National

Park System because, though originally charged with the 

Trail’s administration, 16 U. S. C. §1244(a)(1), the Secretary of the Interior delegated that duty to the National Park

Service, 34 Fed. Reg. 14337 (1969). In the Fourth Circuit’s 

view, this delegation made the Trail part of the National

Park System because the Trail was now an “area of land . . . 

administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] acting

through the Director [of the National Park Service].” 54 

U. S. C. §100501. Because it concluded the Trail was now 

within the National Park System, the court held that the 

Trail was beyond the authority of “the Secretary of the Interior or appropriate agency head” to grant pipeline rightsof-way under the Leasing Act. 30 U. S. C. §185(a). See 911 

F. 3d 150, 179–181 (CA4 2018).1 

II 

These cases involve the interaction of multiple federal

laws. We therefore begin by summarizing the relevant statutory and regulatory background. 

A 

Congress enacted the Weeks Act in 1911, Pub. L. 61–435,

36 Stat. 961, which provided for the acquisition of lands for 

inclusion in the National Forest System, see 16 U. S. C. 

§§516–517. The Weeks Act also directed that lands acquired for the National Forest System “shall be permanently reserved, held, and administered as national forest 

lands.” §521. Though Congress initially granted the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to administer national forest lands, §472, the Secretary has delegated that authority 

—————— 1The Fourth Circuit also ruled for respondents on their other statutory 

claims. 
4 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

to the Forest Service, 36 CFR §200.3(b)(2)(i) (2019). 

What is now known as the George Washington National 

Forest was established as a national forest in 1918, see 

Proclamation No. 1448, 40 Stat. 1779, and renamed the 

George Washington National Forest in 1932, Exec. Order 

No. 5867. No party here disputes that the George Washington National Forest was acquired for inclusion in the

National Forest System and that it is under the jurisdiction

of the Forest Service. See 16 U. S. C. §1609. 

B 

Enacted in 1968, the National Trails System Act (Trails

Act), among other things, establishes national scenic and 

national historic trails. 16 U. S. C. §1244(a). See 82 Stat. 

919, codified at 16 U. S. C. §1241 et seq. The Appalachian 

Trail was one of the first two trails created under the Act. 

§1244(a)(1).

Under the statute, the Appalachian Trail “shall be administered primarily as a footpath by the Secretary of the

Interior, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture.” 

Ibid. The statute empowers the Secretary of the Interior to 

establish the location and width of the Appalachian Trail

by entering into “rights-of-way” agreements with other federal agencies as well as States, local governments, and private landowners. §§1246(a)(2), (d), (e). However, the Trails 

Act also contains a proviso stating that “[n]othing contained 

in this chapter shall be deemed to transfer among Federal

agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for federally administered lands which 

are components of the National Trails System.”

§1246(a)(1)(A).

The Trails Act currently establishes 30 national historic 

and national scenic trails. See §§1244(a)(1)–(30). It assigns

responsibility for most of those trails to the Secretary of the 

Interior. Ibid. Though the Act is silent on the issue of delegation, the Department of the Interior has delegated the 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

administrative responsibility over each of those trails to either the National Park Service or the Bureau of Land Management, both of which are housed within the Department 

of the Interior. Congressional Research Service, M. De Santis & S. Johnson, The National Trails System: A Brief Overview 2–3 (Table 1), 4 (Fig. 1) (2020). Currently, the National Park Service administers 21 trails, the Bureau of 

Land Management administers 1 trail, and the two agencies co-administer 2 trails. Ibid. The Secretary of Interior

delegated his authority over the Appalachian Trail to the 

National Park Service in 1969. 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. 

C 

In 1920, Congress passed the Leasing Act, which enabled 

the Secretary of the Interior to grant pipeline rights-of-way 

through “public lands, including the forest reserves,” §28, 

41 Stat. 449. Congress amended the Leasing Act in 1973 to 

provide that not only the Secretary of the Interior but also 

any “appropriate agency head” may grant “[r]ights-of-way

through any Federal lands . . . for pipeline purposes.” Pub. 

L. 93–153, 87 Stat. 576, codified at 30 U. S. C. §185(a). Notably, the 1973 amendment also defined “Federal lands” to

include “all lands owned by the United States, except lands 

in the National Park System, lands held in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe, and lands on the Outer Continental 

Shelf.” 87 Stat. 577, codified at 30 U. S. C. §185(b). In 1970, 

Congress defined the National Park System as “any area of

land and water now and hereafter administered by the Secretary of the Interior, through the National Park Service for

park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other 

purposes.” §2(b), 84 Stat. 826, codified at 54 U. S. C. 

§100501. 

III 

We are tasked with determining whether the Leasing Act

enables the Forest Service to grant a subterranean pipeline 
6 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

right-of-way some 600 feet under the Appalachian Trail. To 

do this, we first focus on the distinction between the lands 

that the Trail traverses and the Trail itself, because the 

lands (not the Trail) are the object of the relevant statutes. 

Under the Leasing Act, the “Secretary of the Interior or

appropriate agency head” may grant pipeline rights-of-way

across “Federal lands.” 30 U. S. C. §185(a) (emphasis 

added). The Forest Service is an “appropriate agency head”

for “Federal lands” over “which [it] has jurisdiction.”

§185(b)(3). As stated above, it is undisputed that the Forest

Service has jurisdiction over the “Federal lands” within the

George Washington National Forest. The question before 

us, then, becomes whether these lands within the forest 

have been removed from the Forest Service’s jurisdiction 

and placed under the Park Service’s control because the 

Trail crosses them. If no transfer of jurisdiction has occurred, then the lands remain National Forest lands, i.e., 

“Federal lands” subject to the grant of a pipeline right-ofway. If, on the other hand, jurisdiction over the lands has 

been transferred to the Park Service, then the lands fall under the Leasing Act’s carve-out for “lands in the National 

Park System,” thus precluding the grant of the right-ofway. §185(b)(1) (emphasis added).

We conclude that the lands that the Trail crosses remain 

under the Forest Service’s jurisdiction and, thus, continue 

to be “Federal lands” under the Leasing Act. 

A 

We begin our analysis by examining the interests and authority granted under the Trails Act. Pursuant to the Trails 

Act, the Forest Service entered into “right-of-way” agreements with the National Park Service “for [the] approximately 780 miles of Appalachian Trail route within national forests,” including the George Washington National 

Forest. 36 Fed. Reg. 2676 (1971); see also 16 U. S. C. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

§1246(a)(2); 36 Fed. Reg. 19805.2 These “right-of-way” 

agreements did not convert “Federal lands” into “lands” 

within the “National Park System.” 

1 

A right-of-way is a type of easement. In 1968, as now, 

principles of property law defined a right-of-way easement 

as granting a nonowner a limited privilege to “use the lands

of another.” Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W. Va. 594, 604, 

64 S. E. 2d 606, 613 (1951); Builders Supplies Co. of 

Goldsboro, N. C., Inc. v. Gainey, 282 N. C. 261, 266, 192 

S. E. 2d 449, 453 (1972); see also R. Powell & P. Rohan, Real 

Property §405 (1968); Restatement (First) of Property §450

(1944). Specifically, a right-of-way grants the limited “right 

to pass . . . through the estate of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1489 (4th ed. 1968). Courts at the time of the Trails 

Act’s enactment acknowledged that easements grant only 

nonpossessory rights of use limited to the purposes specified in the easement agreement. See, e.g., Bunn v. Offutt, 216 Va. 681, 684, 222 S. E. 2d 522, 525 (1976). And 

because an easement does not dispossess the original 

owner, Barnard v. Gaumer, 146 Colo. 409, 412, 361 P. 2d 

778, 780 (1961), “a possessor and an easement holder can

simultaneously utilize the same parcel of land,” J. Bruce & 

J. Ely, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land §1:1, p. 1–5

(2015). Thus, it was, and is, elementary that the grantor of 

the easement retains ownership over “the land itself.” Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 257, 177 

N. W. 2d 786, 789 (1970) (emphasis added). Stated more 

plainly, easements are not land, they merely burden land

that continues to be owned by another. See Bruce, Law of 

Easements and Licenses in Land §1:1, at 1–2.

If analyzed as a right-of-way between two private land-

—————— 2The specifics of the agreement between the two agencies is not in the 

record before us. 
 

8 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

owners, determining whether any land had been transferred would be simple. If a rancher granted a neighbor an 

easement across his land for a horse trail, no one would 

think that the rancher had conveyed ownership over that

land. Nor would anyone think that the rancher had ceded 

his own right to use his land in other ways, including by

running a water line underneath the trail that connects to 

his house. He could, however, make the easement grantee 

responsible for administering the easement apart from the 

land. Likewise, when a company obtains a right-of-way to

lay a segment of pipeline through a private owner’s land, no 

one would think that the company had obtained ownership

over the land through which the pipeline passes.

Although the Federal Government owns all lands involved here, the same general principles apply. We must 

ascertain whether one federal agency has transferred jurisdiction over lands—meaning “jurisdiction to exercise the incidents of ownership”—to another federal agency. Brief for 

Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 22–23, n. 2. The 

Trails Act refers to the granted interests as “rights-of-way,”

both when describing agreements with the Federal Government and with private and state property owners. 16 

U. S. C. §§1246(a)(2), (e). When applied to a private or state

property owner, “right-of-way” would carry its ordinary

meaning of a limited right to enjoy another’s land. Nothing

in the statute suggests that the term adopts a more expansive meaning when the right is granted to a federal agency,

and we do “not lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different meanings to the same term in the same . . . 

statute,” Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. ___, ___– 

___ (2019) (slip op., at 7–8). Accordingly, as would be the

case with private or state property owners, a right-of-way

between two agencies grants only an easement across the 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

land, not jurisdiction over the land itself.3 

The dissent notes that the Federal Government has referred to the Trail as an “area” and a “unit” and has described the Trail in terms of “acres.” See post, at 7–10, 13 

(opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). In the dissent’s view, this indicates that the Trail and the land are the same. This is 

not so. Like other right-of-way easements, the Trail burdens “a particular parcel of land.” Bruce, Law of Easements 

and Licenses in Land §1:1, at 1–6. It is thus not surprising

that the Government might refer to the Trail as an “area,”

much as one might mark out on his property the “area” of 

land burdened by a sewage easement. The fact remains 

that the land and the easement are still separate. 

The dissent also cites provisions of the Trails Act that discuss “lands” to be included in the Trail. See post, at 12. But 

this, too, is consistent with our conclusion that the Trail is 

an easement. Like all easements, the parcel of land burdened by the easement has particular metes and bounds.

See, e.g., Carnemella v. Sadowy, 147 App. Div. 2d 874, 876, 

538 N. Y. S. 2d 96, 98 (1989) (“[T]he subject easement . . . 

reasonably described the portion of the property where the 

easement existed”); Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission 

Co., 314 S. W. 2d 193, 195–196 (Ky. 1958). In fact, without 

such descriptions, parties to an easement agreement would 

be unable to understand their rights or enforce another 

party’s obligations under the easement agreement. Thus, 

there is nothing noteworthy about the fact that the Trails 

Act discusses whether particular lands should be included 

—————— 3 It is of no moment that the Trails Act also permits the agency responsible for the Trail to grant “rights-of-way upon, over, under, across, or 

along any component of the national trails system.” 16 U. S. C. §1248(a). 

See post, at 13 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). This provision merely extends a positive grant of authority to the agency responsible for the Trail; 

it does not divest the original agency of that same authority. See J. Bruce 

& J. Ely, The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land §1:1, p. 1–5 (2015)

(noting that “a possessor and an easement holder can simultaneously 

utilize the same parcel of land”). 
 

 

 

10 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

within the metes and bounds of the tracts of land burdened 

by the easement. In short, none of the characterizations 

identified by the dissent changes the fact that the burden 

on the land and the land itself remain separate.4 

In sum, read in light of basic property law principles, the

plain language of the Trails Act and the agreement between 

the two agencies did not divest the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses. It gave the

Department of the Interior (and by delegation the National 

Park Service) an easement for the specified and limited purpose of establishing and administering a Trail, but the land

itself remained under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.

To restate this conclusion in the parlance of the Leasing

Act, the lands that the Trail crosses are still “Federal 

lands,” 30 U. S. C. §185(a), and the Forest Service may 

grant a pipeline right-of-way through them—just as it 

granted a right-of-way for the Trail. Sometimes a complicated regulatory scheme may cause us to miss the forest for

the trees, but at bottom, these cases boil down to a simple 

proposition: A trail is a trail, and land is land. 

2 

The various duties described in the Trails Act reinforce 

—————— 4The dissent suggests that we are not engaging in statutory interpretation and that, relatedly, we should not look to state law for our analysis. See post, at 8, n. 8, 12, n. 9. Neither criticism is warranted. We are 

principally concerned with the meaning of the term “right-of-way,” 

which, as the dissent’s own authority acknowledges, carries the same

meaning whether it appears in federal or state law. In New Mexico v. 

United States Trust Co., 172 U. S. 171 (1898), for instance, the Court interpreted the term in a federal statute. There, the Court acknowledged 

that there is a difference between “ ‘an easement in land [and] the land 

itself ’ ” and that a “right of way . . . constitute[s] no . . . right of possession 

of the land itself.” Id., at 182, 184. We have more recently confirmed 

that it is appropriate to look to “basic common law principles” when interpreting the terms right-of-way and easement. See Marvin M. Brandt 

Revocable Trust v. United States, 572 U. S. 93, 106 (2014); id., at 105, 

n. 4. 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

that the agency responsible for the Trail has a limited role 

of administering a trail easement, but that the underlying 

land remains within the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. 

The Trails Act states that the Secretary of the Interior (and

by delegation the National Park Service) shall “administe[r]” the Trail “primarily as a footpath.” 16 U. S. C. 

§1244(a)(1). The Secretary is charged with designating 

Trail uses, providing Trail markers, and establishing interpretative and informational sites “to present information to

the public about the [T]rail.” §1246(c). He also has the authority to pass regulations governing Trail protection and

good conduct and can regulate the “protection, management, development, and administration” of the Trail. 

§1246(i). Though the Trails Act states that the responsible 

agency shall “provide for” the maintenance of the Trail, 

§1246(h)(1) (emphasis added), it is the Forest Service that 

performs the necessary physical work. As the Government 

explained at oral argument (and as respondents did not dispute), “[i]f a tree falls on forest lands over the trail, it’s the

Forest Service that’s responsible for it. You don’t call the 

nine [National] Park Service employees at Harpers Ferry 

[in West Virginia] and ask them to come out and fix the 

tree.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. These statutory duties refer to the 

Trail easement, not the lands over which the easement 

passes.

The dissent resists this conclusion by asserting that the

National Park Service “administers” the Trail, and that so 

long as that is true, the Trail is land within the National

Park System. See post, at 15–16. But the National Park 

Service does not administer the “land” crossed by the Trail. 

It administers the Trail as an easement—an easement that 

is separate from the underlying land.5 

—————— 5The dissent argues that its position is supported by the fact that the 

terms “administer” and “manage” are “terms of art.” Post, at 15. The 

dissent, however, does not demonstrate that either term carries a “widely 
 

12 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

3 

Finally, Congress has used unequivocal and direct language in multiple statutes when it wished to transfer land

from one agency to another, just as one would expect if a 

property owner conveyed land in fee simple to another private property owner. In the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, for 

instance, which was enacted the same day as the Trails Act, 

Congress specified that “[a]ny component of the national 

wild and scenic rivers system that is administered by the 

Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service 

shall become a part of the [N]ational [P]ark [S]ystem.” 

§10(c), 82 Stat. 916, codified at 16 U. S. C. §1281(c) (emphasis added). That statute also explicitly permits the head of 

an agency “to transfer to the appropriate secretary jurisdiction over such lands.” §6(e), 82 Stat. 912–913, codified at

16 U. S. C. §1277(e) (emphasis added). Congress has also

authorized the Department of the Interior “to transfer to

the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture for national

forest purposes lands or interests in lands acquired for or in

connection with the Blue Ridge Parkway” and specifies that

“[l]ands transferred under this Act shall become national 

forest lands.” Pub. L. 82–336, 66 Stat. 69 (emphasis added).

Similar language appears in a host of other statutes. See 

§§5(a)(2), 8(c)(2), 114 Stat. 2529, 2533; Pub. L. 89–446, 80

Stat. 199; §7(c), 79 Stat. 217; Pub. L. 88–415, 78 Stat. 388. 

The fact that Congress chose to speak in terms of rights-ofway in the Trails Act, rather than in terms of land transfers, reinforces the conclusion that the Park Service has a 

limited role over only the Trail, not the lands that the Trail 

crosses. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170, 178– 

179 (1993). 

—————— 

accepted meaning,” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 405 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), let alone that Congress “borrow[ed] terms

of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice,” Carter v. United States, 530 U. S. 255, 264 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted). 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

For these reasons, we hold that the Trails Act did not 

transfer jurisdiction of the lands crossed by the Trail from

the Forest Service to the Department of the Interior. It created a trail easement and gave the Department of the Interior the administrative responsibilities concomitant with 

administering the Trail as a trail. Accordingly, because the 

Department of the Interior had no jurisdiction over any

lands, its delegation to the National Park Service did not 

convert the Trail into “lands in the National Park System,”

30 U. S. C. §185(b)(1) (emphasis added)—i.e., an “area of 

land . . . administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] acting through the Director [of the National Park Service].” 54 

U. S. C. §100501 (emphasis added). The Forest Service 

therefore retained the authority to grant Atlantic a pipeline 

right-of-way. 

B 

1 

Respondents take a markedly different view, which is 

shared by the dissent. According to respondents, the Trail

cannot be separated from the underlying land. In their 

view, if the National Park Service administers the Trail, 

then it also administers the lands that the Trail crosses, 

and no pipeline rights-of-way may be granted.

Respondents’ argument that the National Park Service

administers the Trail (and therefore the lands that the

Trail crosses) proceeds in four steps. First, the Trails Act 

granted the Department of the Interior the authority to administer the Trail. 16 U. S. C. §1244(a)(1). Second, the Department of the Interior delegated those responsibilities to 

the National Park Service in 1969. 34 Fed. Reg. 14337.

Third, in 1970, Congress defined the National Park System

to include “any area of land and water administered by the 

Secretary [of the Interior] acting through the Director [of 

the National Park Service].” 54 U. S. C. §100501. Under 
 

14 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

respondents’ view, the 1970 National Park System definition made the Trail part of the National Park System. But 

one more step was still required to place the Trail outside

the Forest Service’s Leasing Act pipeline authority. That 

final step occurred in 1973, when the amendment to the 

Leasing Act carved out lands in the National Park System

from the definition of the “Federal lands” through which 

pipeline rights-of-way could be granted. 30 U. S. C. 

§185(b)(1). Because the Trail had become part of the National Park Service in 1970, respondents conclude that the

1973 carve-out applied to the Trail. Therefore, in their 

view, the Forest Service cannot grant pipeline rights-of-way

under the parcels on which there is a right-of-way for the 

Appalachian Trail.

This circuitous path misses the mark. As described 

above, under the plain language of the Trails Act and basic 

property principles, responsibility for the Trail and jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses can and must be 

separated for purposes of determining whether the Forest

Service can grant a right-of-way. See supra, at 6–10. 

2 

Even accepting respondents’ argument on its own terms,

however, we remain unpersuaded. Respondents’ entire theory depends on an administrative action about which the 

statutes at issue are completely silent: the Department of 

the Interior’s voluntary decision to assign responsibility 

over a given trail to the National Park Service rather than 

to the Bureau of Land Management. To reiterate, respondents contend that the Department of the Interior’s decision 

to delegate responsibility over a trail to the National Park

Service renders that trail an “area of land . . . administered 

by the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through the [Park 

Service.]” 54 U. S. C. §100501. Respondents’ theory requires us to accept that, without a word from Congress, the 

Department of the Interior has the power to vastly expand 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

the scope of the National Park Service’s jurisdiction 

through its delegation choices. See Addendum to Reply

Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 1a–2a.

After all, respondents’ view would not just apply to the approximately 2,000-mile-long Appalachian Trail. It would 

apply equally to all 21 national historic and national scenic 

trails currently administered by the National Park Service. 

See Congressional Research Service, National Trails System. Under our precedents, when Congress wishes to “‘alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme,’” as respondents contend it did here through delegation, we would 

expect it to speak with the requisite clarity to place that

intent beyond dispute. See Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 

584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 15) (quoting Whitman 

v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 

(2001)). We will not presume that the act of delegation, rather than clear congressional command, worked this vast 

expansion of the Park Service’s jurisdiction and significant

curtailment of the Forest Service’s express authority to 

grant pipeline rights-of-way on “lands owned by the United

States.” 30 U. S. C. §185(b). 

Respondents’ theory also has striking implications for 

federalism and private property rights. Respondents do not

contest that, in addition to federal lands, these 21 trails 

cross lands owned by States, local governments, and private 

landowners. See also post, at 21 (acknowledging that the

Trail alone “comprises 58,110.94 acres of Non-Federal land,

including 8,815.98 acres of Private land” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under respondents’ view, these privately owned and state-owned lands would also become

lands in the National Park System.6 Our precedents require Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if it 

—————— 6The dissent contends that this concern is misplaced because, under

its view, though the National Park Service will be administering the

thousands of miles of land that the 21 trails cross, the Federal Government will not have ownership over it. See post, at 19–20. As explained 
 

16 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal

and state power and the power of the Government over private property. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 

(1991).

Finally, reliance on the Department of the Interior’s delegation of its Trails Act authority is especially questionable 

here, given that Congress has used express language in

other statutes when it wished to transfer lands between 

—————— 

supra, at 6–10, this argument suffers from the same flaw—namely, that

the Trail easement and the land that the Trail crosses are one and the 

same. Moreover, under the dissent’s view, the National Park Service 

would still gain power over numerous tracts of privately owned and 

state-owned land. The dissent cites no authority to explain why this assertion of “administrative” jurisdiction would not pose many of the same 

difficulties as outright ownership. For instance, the National Park Service provides for the maintenance of the Trail where it crosses federal

lands. 16 U. S. C. §1246(h)(1). Over half of the States through which the 

Trail passes have analogous laws for state-owned lands. See, e.g., N. C. 

Gen. Stat. Ann. §143B–135.76 (2019); Tenn. Code Ann. §§11–11–106, 

11–11–117 (2012); Va. Code Ann. §10.1–203 (2018); Md. Nat. Res. Code 

Ann. §5–1001 (2018); 64 Pa. Cons. Stat. §803(b) (2010); N. J. Stat. Ann.

§13:8–39 (West 2003); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 132A, §12 (2018); Conn. Gen. 

Stat. §§23–69, 23–70 (2017); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §216–D:2 (2019); Me. 

Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 12, §1892 (2020 Cum. Supp.). The dissent’s view 

would allow the Federal Government to displace all such laws. Attempting to downplay the implications of its position, the dissent asserts that

the National Park Service already has such jurisdiction under the Trails

Act and its implementing regulations. See post, at 19, n. 13. This, too, 

is incorrect. Recognizing the fact that “[National Park Service] lands are 

intermingled with private, local, [and] state” lands, 67 Fed. Reg. 8479 

(2002), the National Park Service has concluded that the regulations governing the Trail pointed to by the dissent “do not apply on non-federally 

owned lands,” 36 CFR 1.2(b) (2019); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 30253 (1983);

Dept. of Interior, W. Janssen, Appalachian National Scenic Trail, Superintendent’s Compendium of Designations, Closures, Permit Requirements and Other Restrictions Imposed Under Discretionary Authority 

§5, p. 3 (2019) (“The rules contained in this Compendium apply to all

persons entering, using, visiting or otherwise present on federally owned 

lands”). Thus, the dissent points to nothing indicating that the National

Park Service has ever adopted its novel theory, with its attendant federalism concerns. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

agencies. See supra, at 12. Congress not only failed to enact similar language in the Trails Act, but it clearly expressed the opposite view. The entire Trails Act must be 

read against the backdrop of the Weeks Act, which states 

that lands acquired for the National Forest System—including the George Washington National Forest—“shall be

permanently reserved, held, and administered as national

forest lands.” 16 U. S. C. §521. The Trails Act further provides that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall be

deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established under any other law for 

federally administered lands which are components of the 

National Trails System.” §1246(a)(1)(A). These two provisions, when combined with the Trails Act’s use of the term 

“rights-of-way” and the administrative duties set out in the 

Trails Act, provide much clearer—and more textual— 

guides to Congress’ intent than an agency’s silent decision

to delegate responsibilities to the National Park Service.

In sum, we conclude that the Department of the Interior’s

unexplained decision to assign responsibility over certain

trails to the National Parks System and the Leasing Act’s 

definition of federal lands simply cannot bear the weight of 

respondents’ interpretation. 

IV 

We hold that the Department of the Interior’s decision to 

assign responsibility over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service did not transform the land over which 

the Trail passes into land within the National Park System. 

Accordingly, the Forest Service had the authority to issue 

the permit here.7 

—————— 7Objections that a pipeline segment interferes with rights of use enjoyed by the National Park Service would present a different issue. See 

Bruce, Law of Easements and Licenses in Land §1:1. These cases do not 

present anything resembling such a scenario. Under the current proposal, the workstations for laying the challenged segment of the pipeline 
18 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

will be located on private land, approximately 1,400 feet and 3,400 feet

respectively from the Trail. Atlantic plans to use a method of drilling 

that will not require the company to clear any land or dig on the Trail’s

surface. The entry and exit sites will not be visible from the Trail, nor 

will any detour be required. And, the final pipeline will lie approximately 600 feet below the Trail. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Nos. 18–1584 and 18–1587 

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, ET AL., 

PETITIONERS 

18–1584 v. 

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION 

ASSOCIATION ET AL. 

ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE, LLC, 

PETITIONER 

18–1587 v. 

COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION 

ASSOCIATION, ET AL. 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 15, 2020]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, 

dissenting. 

The majority’s complicated discussion of private-law 

easements, footpath maintenance, differently worded statutes, and policy masks the simple (and only) dispute here. 

Is the Appalachian National Scenic Trail “lan[d] in the National Park System”? 30 U. S. C. §185(b)(1). If it is, then 

the Forest Service may not grant a natural-gas pipeline

right-of-way that crosses the Trail on federally owned land. 

So says the Mineral Leasing Act, and the parties do not disagree. See Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline,

LLC, 10; Brief for Federal Petitioners 3; Brief for Respondents 1. 

By definition, lands in the National Park System include

“any area of land” “administered” by the Park Service for 
2 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

“park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other 

purposes.” 54 U. S. C. §100501. So says the National Park 

Service Organic Act, and the parties agree. See Brief for 

Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 38; Brief for Federal Petitioners 45–46; Brief for Respondents 5–6. 

The Appalachian Trail, in turn, is “administered” by the

Park Service to ensure “outdoor recreation” and to conserve 

“nationally significant scenic, historic, natural, or cultural

qualities.” §§3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 919–920; see also 34 Fed. 

Reg. 14337 (1969). So say the National Trails System Act 

and relevant regulations, and again the parties agree. See 

Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 6, 8–9; 

Brief for Federal Petitioners 9, 26; Brief for Respondents 5.

Thus, as the Government puts it, the only question here

is whether parts of the Appalachian Trail are “‘lands’” 

within the meaning of those statutes. Brief for Federal Petitioners 3. Those laws, a half century of agency understanding, and common sense confirm that the Trail is land,

land on which generations of people have walked. Indeed, 

for 50 years the “Federal Government has referred to the 

Trail” as a “‘unit’” of the National Park System. Ante, at 9; 

see Part I–C, infra. A “unit” of the Park System is by definition either “land” or “water” in the Park System. 54 

U. S. C. §§100102(6), 100501. Federal law does not distinguish “land” from the Trail any more than it distinguishes 

“land” from the many monuments, historic buildings, parkways, and recreational areas that are also units of the Park 

System. Because the Trail is land in the Park System, “no

federal agency” has “authority under the Mineral Leasing

Act to grant a pipeline right-of-way across such lands.” 

Brief for Federal Petitioners 3. 

By contrast, today’s Court suggests that the Trail is not

“land” in the Park System at all. The Court strives to separate “the lands that the Trail traverses” from “the Trail 

itself,” reasoning that the Trail is simply an “easement,” 

“not land.” Ante, at 6, 7. In doing so, however, the Court 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

relies on anything except the provisions that actually answer the question presented. Because today’s Court condones the placement of a pipeline that subverts the plain 

text of the statutes governing the Appalachian Trail, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, seeks to construct a natural-gas pipeline across the George Washington

National Forest. The proposed route traverses 21 miles of

national forests and requires crossing 57 rivers, streams, 

and lakes within those forests. See 911 F. 3d 150, 155 (CA4 

2018) (case below in No. 18–1584); App. in No. 18–1144

(CA4), p. 1659. The plan calls for “clearing trees and other 

vegetation from a 125–foot right of way (reduced to 75 feet 

in wetlands) through the national forests, digging a trench 

to bury the pipeline, and blasting and flattening ridgelines 

in mountainous terrains.” 911 F. 3d, at 155. Construction 

noise will affect Appalachian Trail use 24 hours a day. See 

App. 79–80. Atlantic’s machinery (including the artificial 

lights required to work all night) will dim the stars visible 

from the Trail. See id., at 80. As relevant here, at one 

stretch the pipeline would cross the Trail.1 

A 

Three interlocking statutes foreclose this proposal. The 

Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “or appropriate agency head” to grant rights-of-way for

natural-gas pipelines “through any Federal lands.” 30 

U. S. C. §185(a); see also §185(q) (governing renewals of 

—————— 1The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also found that Atlantic’s 

proposal may conflict with several environmental laws, including the National Forest Management Act and the National Environmental Policy

Act. See 911 F. 3d, at 154–155, 160–179 (remanding for further agency 

review). Those aspects of the Fourth Circuit’s decision are not before this 

Court. 
 

 

 

4 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

pre-existing pipeline rights-of-way “across Federal lands”).2 

“For the purposes of” §185, however, “‘Federal lands’” exclude “lands in the National Park System.” §185(b). Thus, 

as all acknowledge, if a proposed pipeline would cross any

land in the Park System, then no federal agency would have

“authority under the Mineral Leasing Act to grant” a “rightof-way across” that land. Brief for Federal Petitioners 3; 

see also Brief for Petitioner Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC, 

10; Brief for Respondents 1.3 

Although the Mineral Leasing Act does not define “lands 

in the National Park System,” the Park Service Organic Act

does. Under the Organic Act, the Park System and any

“unit” of the Park System “include any area of land and water administered by the Secretary” of the Interior, “acting

through the Director” of the Park Service, for “park, monument, historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.”

54 U. S. C. §§100102, 100501. That definition is sweeping; 

whether land or water, “any area” so “administered” by the

Park Service is in the Park System. §100501.4 

—————— 2 If the “surface” of “all of the Federal lands involved” is “under the 

jurisdiction of one Federal agency,” then the head of that agency (rather 

than the Secretary of the Interior) has authority to grant the right-ofway across federal land. 30 U. S. C. §185(c)(1). If, by contrast, the surface of that land “is administered by the Secretary [of the Interior] or by

two or more Federal agencies,” then only the Secretary may grant the 

right-of-way. §185(c)(2). 3Although the Mineral Leasing Act’s right-of-way authority excludes

lands in the Park System, Congress may enact separate legislation permitting natural-gas pipelines across such lands. See, e.g., §1(a), 126 Stat.

2441 (providing that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior may issue right-ofway permits” for certain natural-gas pipelines across Glacier National 

Park). Here, however, Atlantic and the Government have identified no 

other permitting authority besides the Mineral Leasing Act. 4The legal meaning of “land” when Congress enacted the relevant statutes was “any ground, soil, or earth whatsoever.” Black’s Law Dictionary 

1019 (4th ed. 1968). The ordinary meaning of land was much the same. 

Webster’s New International Dictionary 1388 (2d ed. 1949) (“The solid 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

In turn, the National Trails System Act of 1968 (Trails

Act), 82 Stat. 919, provides that the Appalachian Trail 

“shall be administered” “by the Secretary of the Interior” to

“provide for maximum outdoor recreation potential and for 

the conservation and enjoyment” of “nationally significant

scenic, historic, natural, or cultural qualities.” §§3(b), 

5(a)(1), id., at 919–920; see also 16 U. S. C. §§1242(a)(2),

1244(a)(1). The Trails Act provides that the Secretary of 

the Interior has authority to “grant easements and rightsof-way,” among other things, “under” the Appalachian 

Trail’s surface. §9(a), 82 Stat. 925; see also 16 U. S. C. 

§1248(a).5 In 1969, the Secretary of the Interior assigned 

all these powers to the Park Service, naming it the Trail’s

“land administering bureau.” 34 Fed. Reg. 14337. Since 

then, the Federal Government has consistently identified 

the Trail as a “‘unit’” of, and thus land in, the National 

Park System. 54 U. S. C. §§100102(6), 100501; see also, 

e.g., ante, at 9; Part I–C, infra. 

By statutory definition, the Appalachian Trail is land in 

the National Park System, and the Mineral Leasing Act

does not permit pipeline rights-of-way across it. 

B 

Statutory history reinforces that the Appalachian Trail is

land in the National Park System. When the Trails Act 

designated the Appalachian Trail in 1968, then-existing 

law provided that “all federally owned or controlled lands”

administered by the Park Service for certain purposes were

within the Park System. §2(a), 67 Stat. 496. At the time, 

though, many “lands” owned by the Federal Government 

—————— 

part of the surface of the earth, as distinguished from water”; “Any

ground, soil, or earth whatsoever . . . and everything annexed to it, 

whether by nature . . . or by man”). 5 It is undisputed that 16 U. S. C. §1248 does not authorize rights-ofway for natural-gas pipelines. Atlantic therefore does not rely on this 

provision. 
 

6 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

were “supervis[ed]” by the Park Service “pursuant to cooperative agreement[s]” but technically “under the administrative jurisdiction” of other federal agencies. §2(b), ibid. 

The law defined these as “‘miscellaneous areas’” outside of 

the Park System. Ibid. 

In 1970, after the Park Service had begun its role as the

Trail’s land-administering bureau, Congress enacted the 

General Authorities Act. This Act declared that the Park 

System had “grown to include superlative natural, historic, 

and recreation areas in every major region” and Territory

of the United States, and that the Act’s “purpose” was “to 

include all such areas in the [Park] System and to clarify 

the authorities applicable to the system.” Pub. L. 91–383, 

§1, 84 Stat. 825. To that end, Congress eliminated the 

“‘miscellaneous areas’” classification, see §2(a), id., at 826, 

and amended the Park Service Organic Statute to define

the National Park System as “‘any area of land and water 

now or hereafter administered by the Secretary of the 

Interior through the National Park Service.’” §2(b), ibid.; 

see also 54 U. S. C. §§100102(2), (5), (6), 100501. Of course, 

the Appalachian Trail was then (and “ ‘[t]hereafter’ ”)

“‘administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the

National Park Service.’” §2(b), 84 Stat. 826.

In 1973, having broadly defined lands in the Park System, Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act by eliminating authority to grant rights-of-way across those lands. 

Before then, the Mineral Leasing Act had provided limited 

permission to grant rights-of-way through “public lands,” 

§28, 41 Stat. 449, a term of art referring to certain federally 

owned land that had never been owned by a State or private

individual, see Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 

384 U. S. 63, 65, and n. 2 (1966). The 1973 amendments 

replaced the Mineral Leasing Act’s reference to “public 

lands” with “‘all lands owned by the United States’” and

carved out “‘lands in the National Park System.’” §101, 87

Stat. 577; see also 30 U. S. C. §185(b). This carve-out meant 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that parties seeking to build natural-gas pipelines across 

federally owned land in the Park System could not rely on 

the Mineral Leasing Act. §101, 87 Stat. 577; 30 U. S. C. 

§185(b).6 

Put simply, “any area of land and water administered by” 

the Park Service is a unit of the Park System and must be

“regulate[d]” through “means and measures” that “conserve” and “provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” in ways “as will leave 

them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” 

54 U. S. C. §§100101, 100501. By 1970, the Appalachian

Trail was no doubt such an area, as Congress knew when it 

excluded all federally owned land “in the National Park

System” from the Mineral Leasing Act in 1973.7 Because 

the proposed pipeline here would cross that park land, Atlantic cannot rely on the Mineral Leasing Act to authorize

its proposal. 

C 

Agency practice confirms this conclusion. For a half century the Park Service has acknowledged that the Appala-

—————— 6Congress reiterated that the Trail is land in the Park System in 1983. 

It amended the Trails Act to provide that that the Secretary of Interior’s 

“ ‘administrative responsibilities’ ” over the Appalachian Trail would be

“ ‘carr[ied] out’ ” by “ ‘utiliz[ing] authorities related to units of the national 

park system.’ ” §207(h), 97 Stat. 47; see also 16 U. S. C. §1246(i). 7See §2(b), 84 Stat. 826 (General Authorities Act); H. R. Rep. No. 91– 

1265, p. 2 (1970) (“The national park system which we know and cherish

today has grown and matured over the years [and] has broadened to include . . . areas primarily significant for their outdoor recreation potential”); ibid. (explaining that amendments to the Park Service Organic Act 

“reference . . . more recent concepts like national recreation areas” as 

“units of the national park system”); see also §101, 87 Stat. 576–577

(Mineral Leasing Act); S. Rep. No. 93–207, p. 29 (1973) (explaining that 

the Mineral Leasing Act “is not intended to grant rights-of-way through 

the National Park System” and citing the recently revised Park Service 

Organic Act). 
 

8 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

chian Trail is a unit of (and land in) the Park System. Recall that a year after the Trails Act’s enactment, the Secretary of Interior named the Park Service the “land administering bureau” for the Appalachian Trail. 34 Fed. Reg.

14337. In 1972, the Park Service identified the Trail as a 

“recreational are[a]” that it “administered.” National Park 

Service (NPS), National Parks & Landmarks 88 (capitalization deleted). Similarly, as the administrator of that

land, the Park Service issued regulations for the Trail under the umbrella, “Areas of the National Park System.” 36 

CFR pt. 7 (1983) (capitalization deleted); see also id., 

§7.100; 48 Fed. Reg. 30252 (1983). When it did so, the Park 

Service explained that “[t]hese regulations will be utilized 

to fulfill the statutory purposes of units of the National

Park System.” 36 CFR §1.1; 48 Fed. Reg. 30275. All those 

terms—land, area, administer, recreation, unit of the National Park System—trace the Organic Act’s definition of 

land in the Park System. See, e.g., 54 U. S. C. §§100102(6), 

100501.8 

More recently, a 2005 Park Service history stated that 

the Appalachian Trail was “brought into the National Park

System” by the Trails Act and that, with the Trail’s “inclusion in the System, the [Park Service] became responsible 

for its protection and maintenance within federally administered areas.” NPS, The National Parks: Shaping the System 77. A 2006 Park Service handbook stated that 

“[s]everal components of the National Trails System which 

are administered by the [Park] Service,” including the Ap-

—————— 8The Court acknowledges that “the Government might refer to the 

Trail” as “ ‘area’ of land,’ ” but concludes that those references must pertain only to easements as defined by state law. Ante, at 9 (analogizing to 

sewage easements and citing state law). That view strays far from the 

federal statutes at issue. The simpler conclusion is that when the Government uses terms that define land in the Park System, the Government refers to land in the Park System. 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

palachian Trail, “have been designated as units of the national park system” and “are therefore managed as national 

park areas.” NPS, Management Policies 2006, §9.2.2.7, 

p. 134. A 2016 Park Service index similarly listed the Trail 

as “a unit of the National Park System.” NPS, The National 

Parks: Index 2012–2016, p. 142 (NPS Index).

Still taking cues from statutory text, the Park Service

continues to refer to the Appalachian Trail as land in the

Park System. Just last year, the Park Service issued a reference manual describing the Appalachian Trail as a “land

protection project” that has “been formally declared [a]

uni[t] of the National Park System.” NPS, National Trails 

System: Reference Manual 45, pp. 28, 221 (2019) (NPS, Reference Manual). The Park Service’s compendium of regulations similarly explains that the General Authorities Act

“brought all areas administered by the [Park Service] into

one National Park System.” NPS, Appalachian Trail Superintendent’s Compendium 2 (2019). Even the Park Service’s recent budget justification to Congress identified 

the Appalachian Trail as a “Park Base Uni[t],” a “Park 

Uni[t],” and a national “par[k].” Dept. of Interior, Budget

Justifications and Performance Information—Fiscal Year 

2020: National Park Service, at Overview–16, ONPS–89, 

–105 (Budget Justifications) (capitalization deleted).

The Government has even brought this understanding to

bear against private citizens. For example, the Government (including the Park Service and the Forest Service)

filed a damages lawsuit against an individual, invoking the

Organic Act and asserting that a segment of the Appalachian Trail passing through Forest Service lands was a unit 

of the National Park System. See Record in United States 

v. Reed, No. 1:05–cv–00010 (WD Va.), Doc. 1, p. 2 (“The 

United States . . . has established the Appalachian National Scenic Trail . . . as [a] uni[t] of the National Park Service”). In that case, the Government obtained a jury verdict

against someone who had caused a fire on a Trail segment 
 

10 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that was, as the Government alleged, land in the Park System. See ibid., see also id., Doc. 31 (judgment).

Here, at least before they reached this Court, both the

Park Service and Forest Service explained in proceedings 

below that the Trail is land in the Park System. The Park 

Service noted that the Appalachian Trail is a “protected corridor (a swath of land averaging about 1,000 feet in 

width . . . )” that the Park Service “administers.” App. 97. 

Thus, the Park Service detailed, “the entire Trail corridor” 

is a “park unit.” Ibid. For its part, the Forest Service 

acknowledged that the Park Service “is the lead federal administrator agency for the entire [Appalachian Trail], regardless of land ownership.” Id., at 126. Again, this statement echoes the Organic Act’s definition of land in the Park 

System, see 54 U. S. C. §100501, further reflecting that the

Trail is land in the Park System. 

The agencies’ common ground does not stop there. The 

Park Service’s Land Resources Division estimates that the 

Appalachian Trail corridor constitutes nearly 240,000 

acres. NPS, Land Resources Div., Acreage Reports, Listing 

of Acreage, p. 1 (Dec. 31, 2019) (NPS, 2019 Acreage Report).

The Forest Service concurs. See Dept. of Agriculture, Revised Land and Resource Mgmt. Plan–George Washington

Nat. Forest 4–42 (2014) (Forest Service Land Plan). In its 

own management plan, the Forest Service explained that 

the Secretary of the Interior “administer[s]” in the George

Washington National Forest “about 9,000 acres.” Ibid. 

Acres of land, that is. 

As federally owned land administered by the Park Service, the Trail segment that Atlantic aims to cross is exempt

from the Mineral Leasing Act’s grant of right-of-way authority. 

II 

The Court resists this conclusion for three principal reasons. Each tries to detach the Appalachian Trail from land, 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

but none adheres to the plain text and history described 

above. 

A 

First, the Court posits that the Forest Service granted the

Park Service only an “easement” for the Trail’s route 

through the George Washington National Forest. See ante, 

at 7–10. Because private-law “easements are not land,” the 

Court reasons, nothing “divest[ed] the Forest Service of jurisdiction over the lands that the Trail crosses.” Ante, at 7, 10. 

That reasoning is self-defeating. Despite recognizing

that the Park Service “administers the Trail,” the Court insists that this administration excludes “the underlying 

land” constituting the Trail. Ante, at 11. But the Court 

does not disclose how the Park Service could administer the 

Trail without administering the land that forms it.

Neither does the Court explain how the Trail could be a 

unit of the Park System if it is not land. The Court declares 

that the Trail’s status as a System “‘unit’” does not “indicat[e] that the Trail and the land are the same.” Ante, at 

9. But the Court cites no statutory authority for this view.

Nor could it. The Organic Act says the opposite: A “‘System

unit’” is by definition “land” or “water.” 54 U. S. C. 

§§100102(6), 100501. Unless the Court means to imply that

the Appalachian Trail is water, the Trail must be land in 

the Park System. Indeed, the Court’s atextual reading unsettles much of the Park System as we know it. Other System units include the Booker T. Washington National Monument, George Washington’s birthplace, the Harriet 

Tubman Underground Railroad National Historical Park,

the Blue Ridge Parkway, and the Golden Gate National 

Recreation Area. See, e.g., Budget Justifications, ONPS– 

89, –92, –109; accord, NPS Index, at 32, 61, 85, 104, 105. 

These monuments, houses, roads, and recreational areas 

are just as much “land” in the Park System as is a foot trail

worn into the earth. 
 

12 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

The Court’s analysis of private-law easements is also unconvincing. In the Court’s words, a private-law easement

is “a limited privilege” granted to “a nonowner” of land. 

Ante, at 7; see also ibid. (adding that “the grantor of [an] 

easement retains ownership” over the land and that “easements are not land, they merely burden land that continues

to be owned by another”). But as the Court recognizes, “the

Federal Government owns all lands involved here,” ante, at 

8, so private law is inapposite. Precisely because the Government owns all the lands at issue, it makes little sense to 

ask whether the Government granted itself an easement 

over its own land under state-law principles. Between 

agencies of the Federal Government, federal statutory commands, not private-law analogies, govern. 

In any event, the Trails Act provides that the “rights-ofway” for the Appalachian Trail “shall include lands protected for it” where “practicable.” 16 U. S. C. §1244(a)(1); 

cf. §1246(d) (listing the “areas . . . included” in a rightof-way); §1246(e) (providing that the Government may 

“acquire such lands or interests therein to be utilized as 

segments of ” a trail and that “lands involved in such rightsof-way should be acquired in fee”).9 Thus, even with a socalled “easement” through a federal forest, the Park Service 

still administers land “acquire[d]” and “protected” for the

Trail.10 That is why the Park Service refers to the Trail as 

—————— 9The Court maintains that these provisions are also “consistent with”

its private-law paradigm, ante, at 9, but private law does not override

the plain text of the relevant statutes. See Part I–A, supra. The Court 

simply works backwards from state law, even though statutory interpretation is supposed to start with statutory text. See, e.g., Rotkiske v. 

Klemm, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 4). Indeed, the Court offers 

almost no analysis on the language of the General Authorities Act or the

Park Service Organic Act. 10A right-of-way may include not just a right of passage, but also the 

land itself. See, e.g., 16 U. S. C. §521e(3) (providing that certain “rightsof-way” are “lands”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1587 (11th ed. 2019) (“right- 
Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

a “swath of land,” App. 97; why the Forest Service admits

that the Park Service administers those “acres,” Forest Service Land Plan 4–42; and why the Secretary of the Interior 

has authority to grant rights-of-way “under” the Trail’s surface, §1248(a). 

Tellingly, the Court recognizes that §1248(a) “extends a 

positive grant of authority to the agency responsible for the 

Trail.” Ante, at 9, n. 3. Indeed. That only scratches the 

surface. The Park Service may control what happens under 

the Trail consistent with “units of the national park system.” §1246(i). The Park Service also determines which 

“uses along the trail” to permit, §1246(c), and provides for 

the Trail’s “protection, management, development, and administration,” §1246(i). But under the Court’s atextual 

reading of the relevant statutes, the agency tasked with

protecting the Trail (and empowered to grant rights-of-way

under it) could be excluded from determining whether a 

pipeline bores across the Trail. The Court’s interpretation

means that the Mineral Leasing Act would not even stop 

Atlantic from building a pipeline on top of an undisputed 

unit of the Park System. Cf. ante, at 17, n. 7. That cannot 

be right.

The Court also appears to assume that the Park Service’s

administrative jurisdiction over lands making up the Appalachian Trail must be mutually exclusive with the Forest 

Service’s jurisdiction. See ante, at 6–10 (focusing on

whether “jurisdiction over the lands” making up the Trail 

was “transferred,” “convert[ed],” or “divest[ed]”). But this 

—————— 

of-way” can refer to “[t]he strip of land”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1489

(4th ed. 1968) (similar); see also New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 

172 U. S. 171, 181–182 (1898) (discussing these two definitions and explaining that the “intention of the legislature” controls). Although the

Court quotes New Mexico for the proposition that a “ ‘right of way’ ” cannot constitute “ ‘possession of the land itself,’ ” ante, at 10, n. 4, that passage had to do with a “naked right of way,” i.e., a simple right of passage. 

172 U. S., at 184 (emphasis added). 
 

 

14 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

is not a zero-sum inquiry. The question is “not whether 

those portions of the [Appalachian Trail] were removed 

from the George Washington National Forest; the question 

is whether they were added to the National Park System.”

Brief for National Resources Defense Council et al. as Amici 

Curiae 2. As explained above, the lands making up the Appalachian Trail were indeed added to the National Park 

System.

That the Trail may fall within both the Forest System

and the Park System is not surprising. The Trails Act recognizes that two agencies may have overlapping authority 

over the Appalachian Trail. See 16 U. S. C. §1244(a)(1) 

(giving the Secretary of the Interior administrative authority “in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture”);

§1246(a)(2) (“Development and management of each segment of the National Trails System shall be designed to 

harmonize with and complement any established multipleuse plans for that specific area”). So too the Mineral Leasing Act contemplates that multiple agencies may share authority over federally owned land implicated in proposed 

rights-of-way. See 30 U. S. C. §185(c); see also n. 2, supra. 

The Court appears to recognize this point, see ante, at 9, 

n. 3, but does not follow it to its logical conclusion: that land 

may be in both the Park Service and the Forest Service and

thus excluded from the Mineral Leasing Act’s right-of-way

authority. The Mineral Leasing Act’s carve-out simply asks

whether the federally owned land is in the Park System at 

all. See §185(b). If it is, then (as the parties recognize) the

Mineral Leasing Act does not permit pipelines to cross that

park land.

The Court also cites a 1983 amendment to the Trails Act 

for the proposition that the lands making up the Appalachian Trail are not administered by the Park Service. See 

ante, at 17 (citing 16 U. S. C. §1246(a)(1)(A)). This provision states that “nothing” in the Trails Act “shall be deemed 
 

 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 15 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

to transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities . . . for federally administered lands which are 

components of the National Trails System.” §1246(a)(1)(A);

see also §207, 97 Stat. 45–46. It does not aid the Court’s 

analysis.

For one thing, §1246(a)(1)(A) undercuts the Court’s distinction between a trail and land: The statute equates “components of the National Trails System” like the Appalachian Trail with “lands.” Ibid.; see also §1241(b) 

(Appalachian Trail is a “componen[t]” of the National Trails 

System). For another, in relying on this provision, the

Court elides two terms of art: “administering” land and

“managing” it. See ante, at 10–11, 17. “Trail administration is distinguished from on-the-ground trail management.” NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 21.11 Section 

1246(a)(1)(A) itself differentiates the terms because it uses

both, but disclaims only the transfer of “management,” not 

“administration.” When, as here, “‘“Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in 

another,”’” this Court “generally presumes” that “Congress 

‘“intended a difference in meaning.”’” Maine Community 

Health Options v. United States, ante, at 16. 

This distinction between administration and management tracks the Park Service Organic Act. The Organic Act

defines the Park System as land “administered” by the Park

Service. 54 U. S. C. §100501; see also §100502 (reflecting 

—————— 11The Park Service Reference Manual defines “Administration” as a 

term referencing the agency broadly “responsible for Federal funding

and staffing necessary to operate the trail and exercising trailwide authorities from the [Trails Act] and [the administering agency’s] own organic legislation.” NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 8; see also ibid. (“Trail 

administration provides trailwide coordination and consistency”). “Management,” by contrast, refers to localized matters like “local visitor services,” “law enforcement,” “site-specific compliance,” “site interpretation,” “trail maintenance” and “marking,” “resource preservation and 

protection,” and “viewshed protection.” Id., at 10. 
 

16 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

difference between administration and management). Similarly, the rest of the Trails Act differentiates the two terms

by giving the Secretary of the Interior (and by extension the 

Park Service) power to “administe[r]” the lands making up

the Appalachian Trail, §5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 920, in consultation with other parties about proper Trail “management,”

§7(i), id., at 925. Even the Mineral Leasing Act echoes this 

difference by equating land “under the jurisdiction of [a]

Federal agency” with land “administered” by that agency.

30 U. S. C. §§185(c)(1), (2). The Court may be right that the

Park Service “‘provide[s] for’ the maintenance of the Trail” 

while the Forest Service “performs the necessary physical 

work,” ante, at 11, but that only punctuates the contrast between administration and management. See, e.g., NPS, 

Reference Manual 45, at 8, 10, 21. There is no disputing 

that the Park Service administers the Appalachian Trail,

even if the Forest Service manages it.12 

At bottom, 16 U. S. C. §1246(a)(1)(A) does not change the 

fact that the Park Service administers the Appalachian

Trail as a unit of the Park System. Nor does it supersede 

the Park Service Organic Act’s definition of Park System

lands or the Mineral Leasing Act’s exclusion of those lands. 

B 

Second, the Court maintains that Congress should have

used “unequivocal and direct language” had it intended for 

the Trail to be land in the Park System. Ante, at 12. The 

Court cites the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (Rivers Act) and

the Blue Ridge Parkway statutes, noting that Congress

“failed to enact similar language in the Trails Act.” Ante, 

—————— 12Mere months after Congress had enacted §1246(a)(1)(A) to clarify

that it had not transferred “management responsibilities,” the Park Service issued a final rule for “General Regulations for Areas Administered 

by the National Park Service,” reaffirming that the Appalachian Trail 

was land in the Park System. See 48 Fed. Reg. 30252. That agency action makes little sense under the Court’s view. 
 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

at 17. But as the Government explained, “[m]agic words

such as ‘transfer jurisdiction’ are unnecessary.” Reply Brief 

for Federal Petitioners 9 (citation omitted).

Indeed, neither example lends the Court much support.

Certainly the Rivers Act, 82 Stat. 906, stated that any component of the Rivers System would “become a part of ” the 

National Park System. §10(c), id., at 916. But this shows 

that Congress has many means to make land a unit of the 

Park System. Congress charted another path for the Appalachian Trail by enacting the General Authorities Act, a

statute just as explicit as the Rivers Act. Again, it was after

the Park Service had become the Trail’s “land administering bureau,” 34 Fed. Reg. 14337, that Congress provided 

that “‘any area of land . . . now or hereafter administered 

by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park 

Service’” is land in the Park System, §2(b), 84 Stat. 826; see 

also 54 U. S. C. §§100102(2), (6), 100501. Resembling the 

Rivers Act, the General Authorities Act unambiguously

provided that a component of the Trails System would become land in the National Park System. 

The Blue Ridge Parkway statutes also undermine the

Court’s conclusion. The Court cites a 1952 statute and 

some more recent laws, see ante, at 12, but the enactments 

that originally created the Blue Ridge Parkway did not include language about “transferring” land from one agency 

to another. Rather, they stated that the parkway “shall be

administered and maintained by the Secretary of the Interior through the National Park Service” and be “subject to” 

the Park Service Organic Act, even though the relevant 

lands included national forests. See 49 Stat. 2041; ch. 277, 

54 Stat. 249–250; NPS, Blue Ridge Parkway: Virginia and 

North Carolina Final General Management Plan 12 (2013).

The only salient difference between the original Blue Ridge

Parkway statutes and the Trails Act is that, for the latter,

Congress took an additional step by enacting the General 

Authorities Act. 
 

18 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

For similar reasons, it is not significant that the National

Trails Act allowed the Secretary of the Interior to decide

which agency in the Interior Department would administer

the Appalachian Trail. Cf. ante, at 14–17. That was a 

choice for Congress and the Executive Branch, not the Judiciary. See §5(a), 82 Stat. 920. More important, this designation had occurred before Congress enacted the General 

Authorities Act and amended the Mineral Leasing Act, and

Congress was aware that the Park Service had already been

selected to administer the land. The Court is therefore incorrect to suggest that Congress altered a regulatory 

scheme “through delegation.” Ante, at 15. Congress did so 

instead explicitly through legislation and ratification. 

C 

Last, the Court objects on policy grounds that hewing to

the statutes’ plain meaning would have “striking implications for federalism and private property rights.” Ibid. 

Not so. For starters, the pertinent provisions under the

Mineral Leasing Act apply only to “lands owned by the

United States.” 30 U. S. C. §185(b)(1). That statute does 

not address a State or private landowner’s ability to grant 

rights-of-way for pipelines. Congress, moreover, already 

addressed the Court’s concerns. The Trails Act prescribed

the means by which nonfederal “land necessary for [the

Trail] may be acquired”: by voluntary arrangements or, if 

“all voluntary means for acquiring the property fail,” 

through “condemnation proceedings.” Preseault v. ICC, 494 

U. S. 1, 5, n. 1 (1990) (citing 16 U. S. C. §§1246(e), (g)). 

“Where practicable,” the Trails Act incorporated preexisting cooperative agreements. §1244(a)(1). And as the 

Park Service has explained, it took the cooperative path to

acquire private and state land for the Trail. See, e.g., NPS, 

Reference Manual 45, at 41 (extolling the Trail’s cooperative agreements that became “a laboratory for developing 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 19 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

sustainable partnerships that can care for and protect interstate trails”). 

True, that the Appalachian Trail is land in the Park System means the Park Service has some power to regulate

nonfederal property. But that authority is not new. For 

decades the Park Service has regulated waste disposal on 

“all lands and waters within the boundaries of all units of 

the National Park System, whether federally or nonfederally owned.” 36 CFR §6.2 (1995). It also has power to regulate the entire Appalachian Trail, including lands that the 

Government does not own. 16 U. S. C. §1246(c) (requiring 

private landowners to act “in accordance with regulations”

governing “the use of motorized vehicles” on the Trail).13 

—————— 13The Court predicts that “difficulties” would arise if the Trail were

land in the Park System, asserting that the Park Service’s “ ‘administrative’ ” authority could allow the Government to “displace” state laws

providing for Trail maintenance. Ante, at 16, n. 6. The Court’s concerns 

do not follow. Even with the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, 

cl. 2, federal and state laws can (and do) coexist in this context and myriad others. See, e.g., NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 8 (Park Service’s

“Trail administration provides trailwide coordination and consistency” 

among “government agencies, landowners, interest groups, and individuals”). The Court’s core objection seems to be that the Park Service could 

“gain power over numerous tracts of privately owned and state-owned 

land.” Ante, at 16, n. 6. But it already did. See 16 U. S. C. §1246(c); 54

U. S. C. §100751(a); Pub. L. 91–383, §§1, 2(b), 84 Stat. 825–826; 36 CFR 

§7.100; 67 Fed. Reg. 8479 (2002); 48 Fed. Reg. 30252; see also Sturgeon 

v. Frost, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 8). Despite that fact, none 

of the Court’s supposed “difficulties” has arisen. Compare ante, at 16, 

n. 6, with, e.g., NPS, Reference Manual 45, at 41 (explaining complementary “Federal, State, and nonprofit roles” in the Trail’s successful “management”). Rather, as the Court points out, the Park Service has not

fully exercised its authority, applying fewer regulations on private lands 

than on federal lands out of respect for private interests. 67 Fed. Reg. 

8480. That the Park Service chooses not to regulate, however, does not 

mean it is powerless to do so. 

In any case, the Court’s policy objections do not bear on the statutory 

question here. And the Court’s citations only confirm that the Trail is 

among the Park Service’s “administered lands.” Id., at 8479. As those 
20 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE v. COWPASTURE 

RIVER PRESERVATION ASSN. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Nor is the Park Service’s authority over Trail lands remarkable. Uniform regulatory power is a feature of a unified National Park System. After all, Congress designed

the Park System to “expres[s] a single national heritage” 

and to “conserve” the country’s “scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life” for “the common benefit of all

the people of the United States.” 54 U. S. C. §§100101(a), 

(b). Thus, “the Secretary [of the Interior], acting through

the Director of the Park Service, has broad authority under

the National Park Service Organic Act . . . to administer 

both lands and waters within all system units in the country.” Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op.,

at 8); see also §100751(a) (Secretary of the Interior “shall

prescribe such regulations as [he or she] considers necessary or proper for the use and management of System

units”). Because “[t]hose statutory grants of power make

no distinctions based on the ownership of either lands or 

waters,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 8), “park boundaries can encompass both federally and nonfederally owned lands and

waters,” all “subject to [Park] Service regulations,” id., at 

___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3).14 

Despite all this, the Court insists that Congress use “exceedingly clear language” when it wishes “to significantly

alter the balance between federal and state power and the 

—————— 

sources show, the Park Service’s “general” regulations for lands “administered by the National Park Service” apply to Trail segments under the 

agency’s “primary land management responsibility.” 48 Fed. Reg.

30252–30253; see also id., at 30253 (noting that because the Park Service

“cannot abrogate [its] responsibility by excluding areas of the National

Park System from coverage,” it may also impose “special” regulations applicable to private lands). Those authorities thus reveal that administration differs from management, and that either way the Trail segment at

issue is land in the Park System. 14 If any Park Service regulations impair state or private-property 

rights, the Takings Clause and the Trails Act provide for compensation 

in appropriate cases. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 5; 16 U. S. C. §§1246(e), 

(g). 
 

Cite as: 590 U. S. ____ (2020) 21 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

power of the Government over private property.” Ante, at 

15–16. But Congress did. It used language so clear, in fact,

that every year the Park Service provides an acreage report 

listing state and private land as part of the Appalachian

Trail system unit. Last year, the Park Service’s report

listed that the Trail system unit comprises 58,110.94 acres 

of “Non-Federal” land, including 8,815.98 acres of “Private” 

land. See NPS, 2019 Acreage Report. 

* * * 

Today’s outcome is inconsistent with the language of three 

statutes, longstanding agency practice, and common sense. 

The Park Service administers acres of land constituting the 

Appalachian Trail for scenic, historic, cultural, and recreational purposes. §§3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 919–920; 34 Fed. Reg. 

14337. “[A]ny area of land” so “administered” by the Park Service is a unit of and thus land in the National Park System. 

54 U. S. C. §§100102(6), 100501. The Mineral Leasing Act 

does not permit natural-gas pipelines across such federally

owned lands. 30 U. S. C. §185(b). Only Congress, not this 

Court, should change that mandate.

I respectfully dissent.