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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION

In re: 

 Case No. 20-22967-EPK 

Plato Chris Foufas, Chapter 7 

 

Debtor.

_______________________________________/ 

Plato Chris Foufas,

Plaintiff, 

v. Adv. Proc. No. 22-01013-EPK

Theodora Foufas,

Carlton R. Marcyan, and

Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, LLP, 

Defendants. 

_______________________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court upon the Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support [ECF No. 52] (the “Motion”) 

filed by defendants Theodora Foufas, Carlton R. Marcyan, and Schiller, Ducanto & Fleck, 

LLP; the response [ECF No. 79] filed by Plato Chris Foufas; and the reply [ECF No. 90] 

Erik P. Kimball, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court

_____________________________________________________________________________

ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on May 3, 2023.

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filed by the defendants. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the Motion and 

enter judgment in favor of defendants.

Facts

Plato Chris Foufas is the debtor in the above-captioned chapter 7 case and the plaintiff 

in this adversary proceeding. Mr. Foufas was previously married to Theodora Foufas. For 

ease of reference, the Court will refer to Mr. Foufas as Plato, and the Court will refer to 

Theodora Foufas as Teddy. Plato and Teddy were divorced in Colorado in 1995. However, 

proceedings for equitable distribution of marital assets and related matters took place in the 

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. 

The Illinois court entered an opinion making certain findings and addressing support 

obligations in 1996. Plato retained all of his then existing business assets. He soon thereafter 

transferred those assets to an offshore trust known as the KM Trust. The Illinois court found 

that Teddy suffers from several serious medical conditions which prevented her from working

and that she required multiple invasive surgeries. The Illinois court initially awarded Teddy 

monthly maintenance payments of $20,000.

In 1999, the Illinois court entered a supplemental judgment increasing monthly 

maintenance payable to Teddy to $22,000 and ordering a lump sum payment of $252,086.50. 

In that supplemental judgment, the Illinois court found that Plato’s transfer of assets into 

the KM Trust was fraudulent and was done to avoid paying sums due to Teddy. The Illinois 

court also held Plato in contempt for failing to pay amounts due under the 1996 order.

For about 5 years, Plato paid the $22,000 monthly maintenance to Teddy. Beginning 

with the payment due on January 1, 2006, Plato stopped making monthly maintenance 

payments to Teddy. Between 2006 and 2009, Teddy filed several motions with the Illinois 

court seeking to hold Plato in contempt of court for failing to make monthly maintenance 

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payments. Apparently, settlement negotiations resulted in none of those motions being heard 

by the Illinois court. In 2009, Plato transferred all of his personal property to the KM Trust.

In 2016 Teddy filed another motion seeking entry of an order to show cause why Plato

should not be held in contempt of court for failing to pay the monthly maintenance of $22,000. 

In June 2018, the Illinois court entered an order directing Plato to show cause why he should 

not be held in contempt. Plato claimed he was insolvent and could not pay the overdue 

maintenance. He also reported over $16 million in income on his 2016 tax return.

The Illinois court held an evidentiary hearing in July 2019. On August 1, 2019, the 

Illinois court entered an order finding Plato in contempt for failure to pay the monthly 

maintenance to Teddy. The Illinois court found that Plato “will do anything in his power to 

not pay maintenance. That has been his goal ... Nothing about that has changed.” The court 

noted that Plato created the KM Trust to avoid making maintenance payments. The court 

directed that Plato be committed to the Cook County Jail until he purged himself of the 

contempt by paying to Teddy the sum of $5,183,621.78. The Illinois court initially stayed the 

order of incarceration until November 1, 2019 to permit Plato to post a bond. 

Plato sought rehearing of the Illinois court’s contempt order, which was denied. When 

denying the motion for rehearing, the Illinois court again noted Plato’s steadfast refusal to 

comply with court-ordered obligations. The court stated, “He has really chosen to do what he 

wants to do, support his own luxurious lifestyle and avoid his obligations and his 

responsibilities that have been ordered for years and years and years and years.” 

Plato then appealed the contempt order, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court 

of Illinois. The Appellate Court also noted that Plato created the KM Trust “with the obvious 

purpose of avoiding the payment of his maintenance obligations.” Eventually, in September 

2020, the Illinois court issued a Body Attachment Order directing that Plato be incarcerated 

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until he posted a bond. A copy of the Body Attachment Order is attached to Plato’s complaint

in this adversary proceeding. 

On November 27, 2020, Plato filed a chapter 7 petition with this Court. ECF No. 1, 

Case No. 20-22967-EPK. As of that date, Plato had not been arrested as a result of the Body 

Attachment Order.

On August 2, 2021, during this bankruptcy case, Plato was arrested in Illinois 

pursuant to the Body Attachment Order and taken to the Cook County Jail. The defendants 

knew Plato would travel to Illinois at that time because of his testimony at an examination

under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004 in his bankruptcy case. 

Plato immediately sought relief from the Illinois court, arguing among other things 

that the automatic stay that arose as a result of his bankruptcy case prohibited the 

enforcement of the Body Attachment Order. In response, citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B), the

defendants made it clear that they were seeking to recover from the KM Trust and argued 

that the automatic stay did not apply because such assets are not property of the bankruptcy 

estate and the debt they sought to collect is a domestic support obligation. 

The Illinois court denied Plato’s motion for release from incarceration in a brief order. 

While that order does not explicitly address the application of the automatic stay, the issue 

was at the core of Plato’s request for relief, was briefed by the parties, and was obviously 

implicit in the Illinois court’s ruling. The Illinois court could not have denied Plato’s motion 

unless it had determined that enforcement of the Body Attachment Order did not violate the 

automatic stay. 

Plato appealed the decision of the Illinois court and the decision was affirmed. 

Eventually, Plato’s current spouse posted bond and he was released from Cook County Jail. 

Plato spent seven weeks in jail. Plato did not seek relief from this Court, by filing this 

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adversary proceeding, until January 19, 2022, over five-and-a-half months after his 

incarceration and nearly four months after his release. 

In Plato’s initial schedules of assets and liabilities in his bankruptcy case, filed under 

oath, he listed Teddy’s claim of $5,183,681.98 as a domestic support obligation. He listed his 

interest as beneficiary of the KM Trust as being subject to the “full discretion” of the trustee 

of the KM Trust and having a value of “$0.00.” ECF No. 8, Case No. 20-22967-EPK. In other 

words, Plato claimed only a value-less beneficial interest in the KM Trust, from which he has 

no absolute right to distributions. Plato did not claim any ownership interest in the assets 

held by the KM Trust. 

In Plato’s initial schedules, he stated under oath that he owns only his home in 

Wellington, Florida as tenants by the entirety with his current spouse, a pistol, his personal 

clothing, a watch, hearing aids, cash on hand of $100, two empty checking accounts, and the 

right to receive monthly social security benefits. ECF No. 8, Case No. 20-22967-EPK. Plato

claimed all of this property as exempt. Plato stated that all other property in his possession 

is owned by the KM Trust. That includes, for example, the furniture and household goods in 

his homes. 

Plato has thrice amended his schedules. ECF Nos. 13, 67, and 74, Case No. 20-22967-

EPK. None of the amendments changed Plato’s statements under oath about his assets or 

his debt to Teddy. 

Early in the bankruptcy case, the chapter 7 trustee filed a motion asking the Court to 

order Plato and his business entities to turn over to the chapter 7 trustee all assets of the 

KM Trust, among other relief. ECF No. 37, Case No. 20-22967-EPK. In a memorandum in 

response to that motion, Plato stated: “Neither KM nor its assets are property of the 

Bankruptcy Estate.” ECF No. 62 (at 7), Case No. 20-22967-EPK. This statement is 

consistent with Plato’s schedules filed under oath. 

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In the complaint in this adversary proceeding, Plato alleges: “None of the exceptions 

found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) apply to the Defendants (sic) actions.” This necessarily includes 

the section 362(b)(2)(B) exception for “collection of a domestic support obligation from 

property that is not property of the estate.” It is undisputed that Teddy’s claim is a domestic 

support obligation. Thus, the exception applies so long as Teddy was not attempting to collect 

from bankruptcy estate assets. Put another way, Plato’s allegation that no exception to the 

automatic stay applies is the same as alleging that the defendants sought to collect Teddy’s 

domestic support claim from assets of the bankruptcy estate. The defendants sought 

collection only against the assets of the KM Trust. So, for Plato's allegation in this adversary 

proceeding to be true, the assets of the KM Trust must be property of this bankruptcy estate. 

By alleging that none of the automatic stay exceptions apply, Plato is saying that the KM 

Trust assets are his. This is directly at odds with Plato’s position under oath in his own 

schedules that assets of the KM Trust are not property of the estate. 

Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, made applicable to this matter by Federal Rule of 

Bankruptcy Procedure 7056, provides that summary judgment is appropriate if the Court 

determines that the “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant supports its 

assertion that a fact cannot be disputed by citing to the record, “including depositions, 

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, 

or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears 

the burden of meeting this standard. Imaging Bus. Machs., LLC v. BancTec, Inc., 459 F.3d 

1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2006). “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it is a legal element of the claim 

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under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. 

Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). In considering a motion for summary 

judgment, the Court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. In re Pony Express Delivery Services, Inc., 440 F.3d 

1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2006). 

Discussion

In this adversary proceeding, Plato seeks damages and punitive damages for violation 

of the automatic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Plato alleges the defendants violated 

the automatic stay when they facilitated his incarceration in their effort to collect a domestic 

support obligation from the assets of the KM Trust or other assets that are not property of 

the bankruptcy estate. 

Section 362(b)(2)(B) provides an exception to the automatic stay for collection of a 

domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the estate. In the Illinois

court, Teddy argued the automatic stay did not prevent her from pursuing assets of the KM 

Trust because Plato asserted the trust assets are not property of the estate in his bankruptcy

case.0F

1 

Before proceeding to the primary issues presented in the Motion, the Court must 

address an initial theory argued by Plato. He says that to the extent the defendants sought

to collect from non-estate property other than assets of the KM Trust, there is no such 

property and this constitutes a violation of the automatic stay. In the Illinois contempt 

action, defendants explicitly sought to collect only from assets of the KM Trust. But even if 

they did seek to collect from other non-estate assets, logic does not support Plato’s argument. 

1 Under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), restrictions on transfer of beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts are 

enforceable in bankruptcy cases to prevent those interests from becoming property of the bankruptcy 

estate. Plato's position with regard to property of the KM Trust is at least a colorable application of 

this provision. 

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Section 362(b)(2)(B) provides an exception for collection of domestic support obligations from 

property outside the bankruptcy estate. So long as the defendants sought to collect only from 

non-estate property, they are protected by the exception. For example, although it appears 

that Plato does not have current income from employment, if he were to obtain any such 

income it would not be property of the estate in his chapter 7 case and the defendants could 

pursue it by garnishment or other remedies. 

The defendants request summary judgment under two theories. First, the defendants 

argue that the Court should abstain from hearing this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 

1573 (11th Cir. 1992). Second, the defendants argue that the Court should apply judicial 

estoppel to prevent Plato from asserting an automatic stay violation because Plato disclaimed 

under oath any interest in the assets of the KM Trust and this is directly at odds with his 

allegations in this adversary proceeding.

Plato responds that the Court should not abstain from this adversary proceeding, 

arguing that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Carver was overruled by the Supreme Court 

in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). Plato argues against application of judicial 

estoppel, stressing that the defendants had notice that the chapter 7 trustee claimed the KM 

Trust assets are property of the bankruptcy estate. 

Abstention

11 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) provides that bankruptcy courts may abstain from hearing a 

proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related to a bankruptcy case 

“in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State 

law.”

In the Motion, the defendants argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Carver

militates in favor of the Court abstaining from this adversary proceeding. The facts in Carver

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are similar to the facts of this case. Like Plato, Mr. Carver had been ordered to pay monthly 

support and related sums following divorce. Carver, 954 F.2d at 1575. Mr. Carver defaulted 

on his obligations. Apparently not for the first time, his former spouse was forced to pursue 

a motion for contempt to obtain payment of the arrears. The state court held Mr. Carver in 

contempt, ordered him jailed for six months unless he paid all arrears, and issued a bench 

warrant for his arrest. After Mr. Carver was incarcerated for a short time, his new spouse 

paid to obtain his release. The facts of Carver differ from this case in two regards. Mr. Carver

hid from his ex-spouse that he had filed a bankruptcy petition; her counsel found out about 

the filing by accident. But Mr. Carver’s ex-spouse did learn of his petition prior to prosecuting 

the contempt motion, and so had actual knowledge of Mr. Carver's pending bankruptcy. Also, 

Mr. Carver filed a chapter 13 petition, so his post-petition income was included in property 

of the estate. When his ex-spouse sought to collect the arrears, she sought collection from his 

wages, which were estate assets, and so did not have the protection of section 362(b)(2)(B). 

In this case, Plato filed a chapter 7 petition, so any post-petition income is not included in his 

bankruptcy estate. 

After his release from jail, Mr. Carver sought sanctions against his ex-spouse for 

willful violation of the automatic stay. Id. at 1576. The bankruptcy court heard the matter 

and awarded substantial damages. Although the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Mr. Carver's

ex-spouse had violated the automatic stay, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that the 

bankruptcy court should have abstained. Citing the longstanding domestic relations 

exception developed in diversity and federal question matters, the Eleventh Circuit opined 

that “bankruptcy and district courts should tread very carefully when asked to impose 

sanctions for violation of the automatic stay where the actions underlying the violation 

involve alimony, maintenance, or support.” Id. at 1579. The court instructed that 

bankruptcy courts should consider “the purposes of the automatic stay provision as well as 

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concerns of justice, comity, and judicial economy that support abstention in domestic 

relations cases.” Id. at 1579-80 (citation omitted). 

In support of its ruling in Carver, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the ex-spouse’s 

actions had no negative impact on other creditors as Mr. Carver’s chapter 13 plan provided 

for payment of the arrears and the funds used to obtain his release were not estate assets but 

came from his father-in-law via his new spouse. Also, the Eleventh Circuit said that Mr. 

Carver himself was to blame for the situation as he had repeatedly failed to make required 

payments. The court suggested that the state court's contempt order was “as much for his 

repeated disregard for the orders of the Family Court as for the purpose of obtaining the 

arrearages.” Id. at 1580. It appears the ruling in Carver was partly due to the court's view 

that the ex-spouse was not particularly in the wrong and the bankruptcy court's sanction 

unfairly favored Mr. Carver. 

Plato argues that Carver is no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling

in Ankenbrandt. In that decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the development and 

expansion of the domestic relations exception, addressing its genesis, its source in the law, 

and the purposes of the exception. In the end, the Supreme Court determined to substantially 

limit the scope of the exception, declaring that it “encompasses only cases involving the 

issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704. Plato

and the defendants dispute the effect of Ankenbrandt on Carver. Plato argues that 

Ankenbrandt limited Carver’s application to proceedings which require a determination of 

divorce, alimony, or child custody, rather than the enforcement of a determined monetary 

obligation, and cites to bankruptcy court decisions within the Eleventh Circuit in support of 

this proposition. The defendants argue that bankruptcy jurisdiction was not at play in 

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Ankenbrandt and that later decisions in this circuit recognize Carver’s continuing vitality, 

specifically in the automatic stay context. 

Even if Carver remains good law, the circumstances of this case do not warrant 

abstention. The Eleventh Circuit’s concern was that the bankruptcy court should not step 

into the family court arena. But the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “[w]here the purposes 

of the automatic stay provision would clearly be served by affording a remedy for its violation 

and the court would not be required to delve too deeply into family law, the court need not 

abstain from hearing the claim.” Carver, 954 F.2d at 1580. In the present case, this Court 

need not step into the family court arena at all. Plato conceded under oath in his schedules 

that his obligation to Teddy is a domestic support obligation. There is no dispute on that 

issue. To determine whether the exception to the automatic stay under section 362(b)(2)(B) 

applies, the only question is whether the assets of the KM Trust -- the only assets defendants

sought to collect from -- are property of this bankruptcy estate.

Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a) and (e)(1), and the District Court’s standing order of 

reference, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over Plato's bankruptcy case, his property, 

and property of the bankruptcy estate. 

The equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over property of the estate 

is the single most central component of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The entirety 

of bankruptcy jurisprudence in the United States, including the Bankruptcy 

Act, the present Bankruptcy Code, and more than 200 years of case law 

including numerous Supreme Court decisions, hammers home the idea that 

bankruptcy is at its core an equitable proceeding dealing with a specific res, 

the bankruptcy estate. There is nothing more core to the bankruptcy process 

than the determination of what is, and what is not, included in the bankruptcy 

estate. 

Fannie Mae v. CCH John Eagan II Homes, L.P. (In re CCH John Egan II Homes, L.P.), No. 

16-01183-EPK, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 3758, *11-17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) (outlining 

the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction) (citation omitted). No other court has the power 

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to determine whether the assets of the KM Trust are property of the bankruptcy estate. This 

question does not in any way impede on the family law jurisdiction of the state court. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court will not abstain from this adversary proceeding. 

Judicial Estoppel

“The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel is intended to protect courts against 

parties who seek to manipulate the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit 

the exigencies of the moment.” Slater v. United States Steel Corp., 871 F.3d 1174, 1176 (11th

Cir. 2017). Courts in this circuit consider “whether (1) the party took an inconsistent position 

under oath in a separate proceeding, and (2) these inconsistent positions were calculated to 

make a mockery of the judicial system.” Id. at 1181. When considering whether a debtor 

intended to make a mockery of the judicial system, “a court should look to all the facts and 

circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 1185. 

In New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), the Supreme Court stated that 

“[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are 

probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle.” Id. at 750, quoting Allen v. 

Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (7th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 

referenced three considerations often considered in the application of judicial estoppel. First, 

whether a party took clearly inconsistent positions. Id. at 750. Second, whether “judicial 

acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that 

either the first or the second court was misled.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Third, 

whether the party asserting the “inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or 

impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751. 

Plato and the defendants agree the Court should apply the standard from Slater, 

which parallels the first two considerations suggested by the Supreme Court in New 

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Hampshire. The defendants urge the Court to also consider the unfair advantage concept

from New Hampshire. Plato argues that the Eleventh Circuit rejected it and that its 

consideration would inappropriately introduce a good faith inquiry into whether the 

defendants violated the automatic stay. There are two problems with this argument. First, 

the question at this point is whether Plato should be bound by his earlier (and ongoing) 

position under oath, not whether the defendants violated the stay, so application of the unfair 

advantage concept would not impact the standard used by this Court to determine whether 

a violation of the stay occurred. Second, the Eleventh Circuit did not reject the unfair 

advantage concept in Slater; it simply determined the concept did not apply in the 

circumstances of the case before it. Slater, 871 F.3d at 1182. 

In the end, it is important to stress that there are no “inflexible prerequisites or an 

exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel. Additional 

considerations may inform the doctrine's application in specific factual contexts.” New 

Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751. 

Plato's inconsistent positions were both taken before this Court rather than before

two separate courts, but they were nevertheless in separate proceedings. In his main 

bankruptcy case, Plato attempts to prevent his bankruptcy trustee and creditors from 

accessing the KM Trust assets by taking the position under oath that he has no property 

interest in the assets of the KM Trust. In this separate adversary proceeding, he seeks 

damages against the defendants for trying to collect from those same assets on a theory that 

can only be successful if those assets are in fact property of the estate subject to 

administration. There is no more blatant inconsistent position. 

Plato argues that he did not obtain an unfair advantage by his inconsistent positions 

as no court has yet to rule in his favor. This argument is misleading. Because Plato 

disclaimed any ownership in the assets of the KM Trust, his bankruptcy trustee sought 

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rulings that those assets are property of the bankruptcy estate by motion as well as through 

an adversary proceeding against Plato, the KM Trust and others. ECF No. 37, Case No. 20-

22967; Adv. Proc. No. 21-01362. The chapter 7 trustee recently settled the adversary 

proceeding against Plato and the KM Trust parties, so there will be no ruling on the merits 

whether the KM Trust assets are property of the bankruptcy estate. Nevertheless, Plato 

undoubtedly obtained a benefit from his position under oath that he does not own any of the 

KM Trust assets as that position aided in fending off the trustee’s claims. If Plato were 

successful in this suit, he would thereby obtain an unfair advantage over the defendants. He 

would have benefitted from both of his inconsistent positions. Plato’s two-faced approach 

here makes a mockery of the judicial system. 

That Plato disclosed the existence of the KM Trust in his schedules is of no moment. 

This is not a case involving a complete failure to disclose assets. The issue is that Plato 

disclaims under oath any ownership in the assets held by the KM Trust.

That Plato's bankruptcy trustee disagreed with his position that the KM Trust assets 

are not property of the estate has no impact at all on the Court’s analysis here. Obviously, 

when a party takes a position under oath in litigation, the party’s adversary may take a 

contrary position. That does not mean that the party is later able to take a diametrically 

opposed position to its earlier one and get away with it. 

In this context, the Eleventh Circuit instructs the Court to consider all the relevant 

facts and circumstances. Plato is a sophisticated businessman consistently represented by 

competent counsel. He has spent more than twenty years doing everything in his power to 

prevent Teddy from collecting court-ordered maintenance payments. The Illinois courts 

repeatedly found that the settlement of the KM Trust was a fraudulent transfer aimed solely

at avoiding Plato’s obligations to Teddy. In pursing contempt proceedings post-petition, the 

defendants relied on Plato’s position under oath that he has no ownership interest in the 

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assets of the KM Trust. Now Plato asks this Court to hold the defendants liable on a theory 

directly contrary to his un-modified oath in his bankruptcy case. This adversary proceeding 

is just Plato’s most recent move in his unending refusal to comply with orders of the Illinois 

state court and make good on his obligations to Teddy. 

Judicial estoppel prohibits Plato from asserting that assets of the KM Trust are

property of the bankruptcy estate. This is fatal to Plato’s claims in this adversary proceeding. 

For this reason, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Motion [ECF No. 

52] is GRANTED. The Court will enter separate final judgment in favor of all defendants 

and against Plato Chris Foufas.

###

Copy to:

Mark A. Levy, Esq.

Mark A. Levy, Esq. is directed to serve a copy of this order on all parties in interest and to file 

a certificate of service with the Court.

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