/ 


ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on (!)1 /1/.p.l 10 

United States Bankruptcy Court 

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 


SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 


www.flsb.uscourts.gov 


Broward Division 


In re Case No. 09-34791-BKC-RBR 

Chapter 11 

ROTHSTEIN ROSEN FELDT ADLER, P.A., 

Debtor. 

----------------------------,/ 

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION 


GRANTING MOTION OF TRUSTEE HERBERT STETTIN 


TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT WITH MICHAEL SZAFRANSKI, ET AL. 


THIS MATTER came before the Court on Friday, August 17, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. (the 

"Hearing") upon the Trustee's Motion to Approve Settlement with Michael Szafranski 

("Szafranski"), Elana J. Sturm ("Sturm"), ABS Capital Funding, LLC ("ABS"), SKIS Ventures, 

LLC ("Skis"), Alexa Funding, LLC ("Alexa") and Onyx Options Consultants Corp. ("Onyx") 1(the 

"Settlement Motion") and Request for Entry of Bar Order (the "Bar Order Request") [DE 808] 

and the objections of (1) the United States Trustee ("U.S. Trustee") [DE 865]; (2) Gibraltar 

Private Bank and Trust ("Gibraltar") [DE 872]; (3) Purported "Banyon Noteholders" [DE 873]; (4) 

T.D. Bank, N.A. ("TD Bank") [DE 874]; and (5) Emess Capital, LLC ("Emess") fDE 877J 

(collectively, the "Objections"). 

1 ASS, Skis, Alexa and Onyx are collectively referenced, to as the "Szafranski. Entities." Szafranski, Sturm 

and the Szafranski Entities are collectively referenced to as the "Settling Parties." 

Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 1 of 13
The Court, having: (i) reviewed and considered the Settlement Motion; (ii) the Objections 

thereto; (iii) the Trustee's Omnibus Response to the Objection [DE 882]; (iv) taken notice of the 

status of these proceedings; (v) conducted the Hearing; (vi) heard representations and 

argument of counsel for the Trustee, and counsel for the Parties filing the Objections; (vii) heard 

the evidentiary proffer of the Trustee; and (viii) heard the testimony of the Trustee, and it 

appearing that the relief requested in the Settlement Motion is reasonable and in the best 

interests of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate, finds good cause to grant the relief requested in the 

Settlement Motion. Therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

A. Procedural Background 

1. This case was commenced by four petitioning creditors as an involuntary chapter 

11 proceeding on November 10, 2009 [DE 1]. The Court entered an Order for Relief on 

November 30, 2009 [DE 66]. On November 20, 2009, this Court entered an order directing the 

appointment of a trustee. [DE 30]. 

2. On November 20, 2009, the United States Trustee's office selected Herbert Stettin 

(the "Trustee") as the Trustee in this case. [DE 35]. On November 25, 2009, the Court ratified 

Mr. Stettin's appointment as Trustee. [DE 55]. 

3. On February 3, 2010, the Trustee filed a complaint, Adversary Proceeding 

No.10-02607-RBR-A [Adv. Case DE 1], against defendants, Szafranski and the Szafranski 

Entities; to recover certain alleged fraudulent and preferential transfers that the Trustee alleges 

the Defendants received in the months leading up to the collapse of Scott W. Rothstein's 

2 The findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in this Sale Order shall constitute the Court's 

findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7052, made applicable to this 

proceeding by Bankruptcy Rule 9014. To the extent any finding of fact shall later be determined to be a 

conclusion of law, it shall be so deemed and such finding made applicable in this Order, and to the extent 

any conclusion of law shall later be determined to be a finding of fact, it shall be so deemed and such 

finding made applicable in this Order. 

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("Rothstein") now well known Ponzi scheme. 

4. On February 11, 2010, the Trustee filed a First Amended Adversary, asserting, 

among other things, claims for fraudulent and preferential transfers, constructive trust, and 

equitable lien against Szafranski and the Szafranski Entities. [Adv. Case DE 12]. The Trustee 

has asserted that alleged transfers were (i) either actually or constructively fraudulent transfers, 

(ii) preferential transfers, and/or (iii) transfers made pursuant to usurious loans which, therefore, 

constitute either avoidable and recoverable transfers or, alternatively, a debt owing to the estate 

pursuant to Florida's usury laws. [Adv. Case DE 12]. 

5. On May 3, 2010, the Trustee filed a Second Amended Adversary Complaint (the 

"Complaint") in the Bankruptcy Court [Adv. Case DE 93], asserting, among other things, claims 

for fraudulent and preferential transfers, constructive trust, equitable lien, negligence, breach of 

fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty against the Settling Parties (the 

"Adversary Proceeding"). Prior to the time that the Defendants responded to the Complaint, the 

parties entered into a settlement. [DE 808]. 

B. The Settlement Motion 

6. As the result of a settlement conference conducted between the parties on May 10, 

2010 without a mediator, the Trustee and the Settling Parties agreed to settle all claims that 

were or could have been asserted in the Adversary Proceeding. Among other things, the 

Settlement Agreement contemplates the following: 

a. 	 The Settling Parties agreed to pay the Trustee $6,028,000.00 US, which sum 

represents a recovery of approximately 86.3% of Szafranski's and Sturm's 

total assets. The first part of the settlement payment, $4,728,000.00 US, is 

due within two (2) days of entry of an Order approving the Settlement 

Agreement. The remaining $1,300,000.00 US is to be paid on or before 24 

months after the entry of an Order approving the Settlement Agreement (the 

"Second Payment"). The Second Payment is to be secured by certain real 

property and improvements located at 133 Camden Drive, Bal Harbour, 

Florida which is also subject to the Order Granting Verified Emergency 

Motion and Supporting Memorandum of Law of the Plaintiff, Chapter 11 

Trustee Herbert Stettin, for Entry of Preliminary Injunction and for Other 

Relief and Request for Judicial Notice entered in the Adversary Proceeding 

[Adv. Case DE 75] on April 23, 2010. [DE 808 at Ex. A ~~2-3]. 

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b. 	 Upon election of the Trustee and otherwise, the Szafranski Entities have 

consented to each of the following (i) the entry of a separate judgment in 

favor of the Trustee and against the Szafranski Entities substantively 

consolidating, nunc pro tunc (to a date to be selected by the Trustee), for all 

purposes the assets and liabilities of the Szafranski Entities with and into the 

Debtor's estate; (ii) the entry of a separate judgment in the amount of $32.5 

million US against the Szafranski Entities pursuant to Section 548(a)(1 )(A) of 

the Bankruptcy Code; and (iii) a judgment providing that with respect to funds 

paid by RRA to the Szafranski Entities as recipients, that the Szafranski 

Entities acted as "conduits" with respect to such transfers. [DE 808 at Ex. A 

~9]. 

c, 	 The Settling Parties agree to provide the Trustee with a sworn statement of 

their existing assets and liabilities, which the Trustee is entitled to 

independently verify. If the Trustee discovers a material variation, the bar 

order described below shall be deemed null and void. In return, the Trustee 

has agreed to dismiss all claims pending in the Adversary Case with 

prejudice. Each party has agreed to bear their own costs related to the 

Adversary Case. Szafranski has also agreed to cooperate with the Trustee 

with his investigation of claims against third parties. [DE 808 at Ex. A ~16]. 

d. 	 The parties request this Court enter a bar order (the "Bar Order") precluding 

the bringing of any civil claims by creditors of RRA against Szafranski and 

Sturm, individually or collectively. [DE 808 at Ex. A 1f11].3 

7. On July 14, 2010, the Trustee filed the Settlement Motion and Bar Order Request. 

In summary, the Settlement Agreement provides for the Settling Parties to pay the estate the 

total sum of $6,028,000.00, representing approximately 86.9% of the total assets of Szafranski 

and Sturm (including assets claimed exempt). [DE 808]. 

8. As a result of revised valuations and disclosures of the assets available to 

Szafranski to settle the estate's claims, the Settling Parties later agreed to pay the estate the 

total sum of $6,578,000.00. This revised sum represents approximately 90% of the total assets, 

including exempt and non-exempt assets, held both individually and jOintly by Szafranski and 

Sturm. [DE 882]. See Hrg. Trans. at p. 50:20-23. 

9. In exchange for voluntarily turning over to the Trustee almost all of their assets, the 

Trustee has agreed to obtain an Order from the Bankruptcy Court enjoining all claims against 

3 As a result of negotiations among and between the Trustee, the Official Committee of Unsecured 

Creditors, T.D. Bank, NA, and Gibraltar Private Bank and Trust, the form of a revised proposed Bar 

Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 4 of 13
Szafranski and Sturm that are in any manner related to their involvement with RRA and Scott 

W. Rothstein. [DE 808]. 

10. Based upon its review of the Certificate of Service [DE 822, 827, 850, 866] 

concerning the Settlement Motion and the representations of the Trustee's counsel that the 

notice afforded all third parties who may have claims against Szafranski and Sturm, such 

service: (a) constituted the best practicable notice; (b) constituted notice that was reasonably 

calculated under the circumstances to apprise all such third parties of the proposed settlement 

and Bar Order and their right to attend the hearing on the Motion and object to the entry of this 

order; (c) constituted due, proper, adequate and sufficient notice to all third parties; (d) satisfies 

all requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 

Procedure; and (e) satisfies all requirements of due process. 

11. All persons and third parties who were served with the Settlement Motion and 

failed to object to the entry of this Order have waived their right to object to the Court's entry of 

this Order and the Bar Order. 

C. The Trustee's Business Judgment 

12. The Trustee has been licensed to practice law since 1962. He is admitted to the 

Florida state courts, the Supreme Court of Florida, the District Court for the Southern District of 

Florida, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. As a 

practitioner, the Trustee has tried approximately 400-500 commercial lawsuits. The Trustee 

served as a state court judge between 1976 and 1979 and has continued to hear cases as a 

senior judge for the last 11 years. As a judge, the Trustee has presided over thousands of 

cases, the majority of which were commercial cases. The Trustee has also been involved in a 

vast number of appellate cases as both a practitioner, and as an appellate judge on the 4th 

District Court of Appeals, where he served temporarily on three separate occasions. The 

Trustee has also served as a mediator in over 1,200 commercial disputes in federal and state 

court cases, and as an arbitrator in dozens of commercial cases. See Hrg. Trans. at pp. 27:1 ­

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 5 of 13
28:21; 44:22-23. 


13, The Trustee supervised and directed the extensive analysis by counsel and 

forensic experts of transfers made by RRA in the 4 year period prior to the commencement of 

this case, including to the Settling Parties, This analysis included substantial forensic 

accounting and documentary forensic work including the review of thousands of pages of emails related to the Rothstein/Szafranski relationships and transactions. The Trustee is very 

familiar with the legal and factual bases of the Estate's claims against Settling Parties, and has 

worked extensively with the Estate's counsel and forensic experts in evaluating and litigating 

such claims. The Trustee has personally participated in numerous substantive discussions and 

meetings with the Settling Parties over the past several months. The parties thoroughly 

discussed in detail the Estate's claims and the defenses the Settling Parties would have 

asserted to such claims if a consensual resolution was not reached. The parties exchanged 

comprehensive transfer analyses, relevant documents and research referenced in support of 

each parties' positions. See Hrg. Trans. at pp. 28:22 -29:17; 44:22-23. 

14. The Trustee believes, in his business judgment, informed by his nearly five 

decades as a practitioner, judge and mediator, that the Settlement Agreement is in the best 

interests of the Estate and its creditors, and that the Settlement overwhelmingly meets the 

standard for judicial approval of settlements in the 11 th Circuit as set forth in Wallis v. Justice 

Oaks II, Ltd. (In re Justice Oaks II, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990). See Hrg. Trans. at pp. 

52:4-56: 16. 

15. The Settlement Agreement is the result of arms-length negotiations between the 

Trustee and the Settling Parties, and the Court finds that the Trustee and the Settling Parties 

have acted in good faith in negotiating and entering into the Settlement Agreement. The Court 

further finds that entry into the Settlement Agreement is a proper exercise of the Trustee's 

sound business judgment. 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 6 of 13
D. The Objection Filed by the United States Trustee [DE 865] 

16. The United States Trustee filed an objection to the Settlement Motion on the basis 

that the alleged culpability of the Settling Parties in the Rothstein Ponzi Scheme precludes the 

entry of a "bar order." [DE 865). Additionally, counsel for the United States Trustee argued at 

the Hearing that the settlement motion should not be approved, to the extent it is conditioned on 

the entry of a "bar order" because the Trustee was likely to achieve a significantly similar result 

through litigation. See Hrg. Trans. at p. 142:14-18. 

E. The Objection Filed by Gibraltar Private Bank & Trust [872] 

17. The Objection filed by Gibraltar [DE 872) has been withdrawn, without prejudice to 

object on any grounds (including but not limited to lack of subject matter jurisdiction or on any 

other basis, whether or not included in the Objection) to any other settlements or bar orders 

proposed in the future course of this case. 

F. The Objection Filed by the "Banyon Noteholders" [DE 873] 

18. The Banyon Noteholders filed a Limited Objection to the Settlement Motion [DE 

873). The Banyon Noteholders (except for Richard Polidori) did not file proofs of claim in the 

Debtor's bankruptcy estate. [DE 837 at p. 2). The Banyon Noteholders do not object to the 

settlement, but only object to the entry of a bar order as it would enjoin their claims against the 

Settling Parties. Id, The Banyon Noteholders purport to be creditors of a group of entities that 

provided funding to the Rothstein Ponzi scheme known as the "Banyon Entities" and claim to 

have direct claims against the Settling Parties, all arising from their involvement in Rothstein's 

Ponzi scheme. 

G. The Limited Objection Filed by T.D. Bank, N.A. [DE 874] 

19. The Limited Objection filed by TD Bank [DE 874J has been voluntarily withdrawn, 

without prejudice to object on any grounds (including but not limited to lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction or on any other basis, whether or not included in the Limited Objection) to any other 

settlements or bar orders proposed in the future course of this case. 

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H. The Objection Filed by Emess Capital, LLC [DE 875] 

20. The Objection filed by Emess [DE 875] was withdrawn at the Hearing pursuant to 

an agreement between the Trustee and counsel for Emess. See Hrg. Trans. at pp. 85:25-86:2; 

86:19-22. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

A. Jurisdiction, Parties & Venue. 

The Court has jurisdiction over the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, and this matter 

is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2). Venue of this case in this district is 

proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. Due and proper notice of the Motion and 

Hearing was given to the parties required under the Bankruptcy Code, Federal Rules of 

Bankruptcy Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court. 

B. Approval of the Settlement Agreement. 

The Trustee seeks approval of the Settlement pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal 

Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Rule 9019(a) provides that, after notice and a hearing, a court 

may approve a proposed settlement of a claim. The decision of whether or not to approve a 

compromise is within the sound discretion of the court. In re Chira, 367 B.R. 888, 896 (S.D. Fla. 

2007) (citing In re Air Safety Intern., L.C., 336 B.R. 843, 852 (S.D. Fla. 2005)); In re Arrow Air, 

Inc., 85 B.R. 886 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988). 

The Eleventh Circuit, in Justice Oaks, provided additional guidance regarding whether 

a settlement should be approved and established a four-part test: (a) the probability of 

success in litigation; (b) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of collection; (c) 

the complexity of the litigation involved and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily 

attending it; and (d) the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their 

reasonable views in the premises. 898 F.2d at 1549. 

In passing on proposed settlements, the Court must determine whether a proposed 

settlement is fair and equitable. In re Chira, 367 B.R. at 896. The Court must evaluate whether 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 8 of 13
the compromise falls below the "lowest point in the range of reasonableness." In re S&I Invs., 

421 B.R. 569, 583 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) (citing In re Bicoastal Corp., 164 B.R. 1009, 1016 

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993)); In re Arrow Air, Inc., 85 B.R. at 886. 

The Settlement Agreement meets the standards for approval set forth by the Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals in Justice Oaks and, therefore, approval of the Settlement Agreement is 

proper pursuant to Rule 9019 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Court 

specifically finds that the Settlement Agreement (i) is fair and reasonable, (ii) falls within the 

reasonable range of possible litigation outcomes, and (iii) is in the best interests of the estate 

because full settlement (a) precludes any risks associated with litigation and collection in this 

matter, (b) increases the dividend available to creditors, and (c) allows for a distribution of sums 

and proceeds within a reasonable time. In making this determination, the Court has expressly 

considered: (i) the probability of success in the litigation; (ii) the difficulties, if any, to be 

encountered in the matter of collection; (iii) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the 

expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (iv) the paramount interest of 

the creditors and proper deference to their reasonable views in the premises. 

C. The Bar Order Request 

As part and parcel of the Settlement Agreement, the Trustee seeks the entry of a bar 

order enjoining any party from suing Szafranski or Sturm from any matter arising from or relating 

to claims against or investments with RRA and Rothstein's Ponzi scheme in accordance with 

the authority granted the Bankruptcy Court. [DE 808]. No creditor or interested party argued 

that a bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to enter some form of a bar order in appropriate 

circumstances. Arguments were raised as to the scope of the bar order by Gibraltar, the 

Banyon Noteholders, TO Bank and Emess. The rights of Gibraltar and TO Bank, as mentioned, 

to object to any future bar order on any basis, have been and are hereby expressly preserved. 

The objections of Gibraltar, TO Bank and Emess have been resolved by an agreed form of the 

bar order. The U.S. Trustee does not dispute that the Court has jurisdiction to enter a bar order, 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 9 of 13
but objects both to the scope of the proposed bar order and whether a bar order should be 

entered in this case. 

This Court has the inherent power under the Bankruptcy Code, including section 

105(a), to issue any order necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of Title 11. 

Munford v. Munford, Inc. (In re Munford), 97 F.3d 449, 454 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding 

bankruptcy court had authority under section 105(a) to enter order barring claims against 

certain defendants). The Eleventh Circuit concluded that (i) public policy favors settlements; 

(ij) the cost of litigation can be burdensome to a bankruptcy estate, and (iii) "bar orders pay an 

integral role in facilitating settlements." Munford, 97 F.3d at 455; accord In re S&llnvs., 421 

B.R. at 583-86 (approving a bar order as part of a settlement with the estate). 

In this case, the Trustee has testified that the Bar Order Request is an essential and 

critical element of the Settlement and the willingness of Szafranski and Sturm to pay 

$6,578,000.00 US, a sum representing in excess of 90% of their total assets. The Settlement 

Agreement expressly provides the Settling Parties the option of terminating the Settlement if 

the Bar Order Request is not entered. The Trustee has further testified that without a bar 

order, the Settling Parties would not have had entered into the Settlement. The Trustee has 

also identified that a significant portion of the non-exempt assets that compromise the 

payments to be made by Szafranski are funds which were fraudulently transferred by the 

Debtor to Szafranski. 

A bar order is consistent with the pronouncement of the Eleventh Circuit in Munford and 

In re U.S. Oil and Gas Litigation, 967 F.2d 489 (11th CiL 1992), and therefore, entry of a bar 

order is proper pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and the inherent powers of this Court. See In re 

Grau, 267 B.R. 896 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2001); S.E.C. v. Mut. Benefits Corp. et a/., Case No. 04­

cv-60573-FAM (J. Moreno) (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2007); In re Reliance Fin. & Inv. Grp., Inc., Case 

No. 02-33249-PGH)(J. Hyman) (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2006); In re Biscayne Lofts, LLC, 

Case No. 10-13020-BKC-AJC (J. Cristol) (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2010); see also In re 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 10 of 13
Rothstein Rosenfeldt Adler, P.A., Case No. 09-34791-BKC-RBR (J. Ray) (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 

August 25, 2010)(Order Granting Trustee's Motion to Approve Settlement With Steven and 

Marcy Lippman Pursuant to Rule 9019 and Request for Entry of Bar Order). 

The Court specifically concludes that the Settlement Agreement, generally, and the Bar 

Order, specifically: (i) is integrally related to the Trustee's claims against Szafranski and Sturm; 

(ii) is adequately interrelated to those claims; (iii) arises out of the same facts as the Szafranski 

and Sturm's underlying dispute with the Trustee; (iv) is a critical and required term of the 

Settlement Agreement; (v) is necessary to achieve the complete resolution of the issues 

contained in the Settlement Agreement, without which the Settling Parties would not proceed 

with the Settlement Agreement; and (vi) is fair and equitable under the circumstances. For the 

avoidance of doubt, and in light of the decisions of the Eleventh Circuit in Munford and US. Oil 

and Gas, as adopted by this Court in In re S & I Investments, the Court finds that it has subject 

matter jurisdiction to enjoin claims against Szafranski and Sturm, because such claims (i) are 

interrelated with claims which have been or could be asserted by the Trustee, and (ii) impact the 

administration of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate. 

The U.S. Trustee's Objection to the reasonableness of a bar order in this case has some 

facial appeal, given Szafranski's alleged culpability. However, the practical reality absent the 

entry of a bar order is that funds that would otherwise be available to creditors, even given the 

existence of an injunction, could still be dissipated or forfeited. Given the pending and 

threatened litigation in state and federal court, "nobody wins" by denying a bar order. It is the 

Trustee's obligation to maximize recovery in the most efficient manner. That has been done 

here. Szafranski and Sturm may have "bought peace", but have done so by giving up almost all 

their assets. 

D. The Banyan Noteholders are not Prejudiced by the Entry of the Bar Order. 

The Banyon Noteholders, the only party maintaining an objection limited to the scope 

of the Bar Order, argued at the Hearing that they would receive essentially no benefit in 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 11 of 13
exchange for having their claims against Szafranski barred. It was conceded that the Banyon 

Noteholders intentionally failed to file a claim in this bankruptcy estate despite having received 

notice of the claims bar date. To the extent that claims filed by the Banyon Entities are 

allowed in the Debtor's estate, by settlement or through litigation, the Banyon Noteholders will 

receive a benefit as a result of the entry of a bar order. 

Notwithstanding, any recovery that the Banyon Noteholders could receive as a result 

of their independent and direct claims against Szafranski, which are directly related to the 

claims at issue in this bankruptcy proceeding, would either be (i) property fraudulently 

transferred from the Debtor's bankruptcy estate, or (ii) property subject to the Trustee's 

fraudulent transfer claims. See In re Van Dieppen, 236 Fed.Appx. 498 (11th Cir. 

2007)(fraudulent transfer avoidance claims which arose from a judgment entered on a litigation 

claim in state court against debtor's prepetition transferees were "property of the estate"); In re 

Zwirn, 362 B.R. 536,540-41 (S.D.Fla. 2007)(actions for the recovery of the debtor's property by 

individual creditors under state fraudulent conveyance laws would interfere with the estate and 

with the equitable distribution scheme dependent upon it, and were therefore appropriately 

stayed under §362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code). 

ORDER 

Based upon the foregoing, and after due consideration and good cause appearing for 

the relief requested in the Settlement Motion, it is 

ORDERED as follows: 

1, 	 Except as otherwise modified herein, the Settlement Motion is GRANTED in all 

respects. 

2. 	 Except as otherwise provided herein, the objections of T.D. Bank, N.A., Emess 

Capital, LLC, and Gibraltar Private Bank and Trust, are deemed WITHDRAWN. 

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Case 09-34791-RAM Doc 1012 Filed 09/16/10 Page 12 of 13
• 


3. 	 Except as otherwise provided herein, the objections of the United States Trustee and 

the Banyon Noteholders are OVERRULED. 

4. 	 Each and every term and condition of the Settlement Agreement is approved, 

incorporated and adopted herein and shall be considered as part of this Order. 

5. 	 The Bar Order is approved in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A, and shall be 

entered separately as an Order of this Court .. 

6. 	 The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to enforce or interpret the terms and 

conditions of this Order, the Bar Order, the Settlement Agreement, and the 

performance of all obligations thereunder by the Parties. 

##If. 

The Clerk shall serve copies to: 

John H. Genovese, Esq. 


Charles H Lichtman, Esq. 


David C. Cimo, Esq 


David L Gay, Esq. 


Isaac M Marcushamer, Esq. 


Jesus M Suarez, Esq. 


Steven D Schneiderman, Esq. 


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