IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1432

Filed January 12, 2022

PAUL YAKEL and THERESE YAKEL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

RANDALL W. WHEELER, individually,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

LIGHTWINE CONSTRUCTION, INC., and CARSON STONE & SUPPLY, LLC,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, James S. 

Heckerman, Judge.

Paul and Therese Yakel appeal the district court’s grant of a defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Sean A. Minahan of Lamson Dugan & Murray, LLP, Omaha, for appellants.

Brody D. Swanson of Peters Law Firm, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellee.

Jack Ruesch of Telpner Peterson Law Firm, Council Bluffs, for defendant 

Lightwine Construction, Inc.

Gregory G. Barntsen of Smith Peterson Law Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs, for 

defendant Carson Stone & Supply, LLC.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Schumacher, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

Paul and Therese Yakel filed an amended petition against Lightwine 

Construction, Inc. (Lightwine), Carson Stone & Supply, LLC (Carson Stone), and 

Randall W. Wheeler alleging (1) they “obtained bids from several contractors to 

tear off and install new siding on their home”; (2) they “obtained a proposal from 

Defendant Lightwine for the labor to remove the original siding and installation of 

new siding on [their] home”; (3) Wheeler “directed [] Lightwine and other 

subcontractors during the project”; and (4) they later discovered the “siding was 

warping and pulling away from the home” and “was not installed pursuant to the 

instructions provided by the siding manufacturer.” They raised breach-of-contract,

negligent-construction, and breach-of-implied-warranty claims against Lightwine 

and Wheeler and respondeat superior/vicarious liability and negligence claims 

against Carson Stone.

Wheeler moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the 

motion “as to all claims made against Wheeler by the Yakels.” The Yakels 

appealed.

The supreme court, on its own motion, raised a jurisdictional issue premised 

on the dismissal of claims against only one of the three defendants. The court

stated, “[T]he order granting [Wheeler’s] motion for partial summary judgment may 

be interlocutory” because

[i]f the claimed basis of liability of the dismissed defendants is 

connected with, or so related to, the claimed basis of liability of the 

remaining defendants that one may affect the other, a judgment as 

to the discharged defendants is not appealable until the issues as to 

the remaining defendants are settled.
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(quoting McGuire v. City of Cedar Rapids, 189 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 1971)). The 

court required this court to address the jurisdictional issue. We begin and end 

there.

“A party may appeal as of right only from a final order or judgment; a party 

seeking to appeal an interlocutory order must obtain permission of the appellate 

court.” Mason City Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Van Duzer, 376 N.W.2d 882, 884–85 

(Iowa 1985); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.103. “Whether a complete dismissal of 

one defendant in a multi-defendant action is final for purposes of appeal turns on 

the question of whether the interest of the dismissed defendant is severable from 

the claims against the [remaining] defendants.” Buechel v. Five Star Quality Care,

Inc., 745 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 2008). “Separate and distinct causes of action 

must be such as are both separable from each other and separable by some 

distinct line of demarcation.” McGuire, 189 N.W.2d at 597. 

In order to be severable, and therefore appealable, any 

determination of the issues settled by the judgment of dismissal must 

not affect the determination of the remaining issues, whether the 

judgment on appeal is reversed or affirmed, and the determination of 

the remaining issues must not affect the final determination of the 

issues between the plaintiffs and the dismissed defendants. It is not 

necessarily the identity of the defendants’ interests which controls, 

but whether the determination of the issues as to any defendant 

depends on or affects the determination of the issues as to the other 

defendants. If the claimed basis of liability of the dismissed 

defendants is connected with, or so related to, the claimed basis of 

liability of the remaining defendants that one may affect the other, a 

judgment as to the discharged defendants is not appealable until the 

issues as to the remaining defendants are settled.

Id. (quoting Att’y Gen. of Utah v. Pomeroy, 73 P.2d 1277, 1294 (Utah 1937)). 

The requirement that claims be severable along a distinct line of 

demarcation aligns with “the general policy against piecemeal appeals.” Id. at 596. 
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That is particularly true in the civil context, where “the policy favoring avoidance of 

piecemeal appeals” outweighs the need for prompt disposition of cases. 

Shoemaker v. City of Muscatine, 275 N.W.2d 206, 208–09 (Iowa 1979); see also 

Stockton Realty Co. v. Muscatine Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. Agency, No. 03–1331,

2004 WL 1902518, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2004). 

We first consider the Yakels’ “respondeat superior/vicarious liability” and 

negligence claims against Carson Stone. “Translated from Latin, respondeat 

superior means ‘let the principal answer.’” Teebo v. Johnson, No. 17-1683, 2018 

WL 2084845, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018). “[U]nder the doctrine of 

respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the negligence of an employee 

committed while the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment.” 

Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted). 

“Vicarious liability is broadly defined as liability a person bears for the actionable 

conduct of another person because of a relationship between the two parties.” 

Jones v. Glenwood Golf Corp., 956 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Iowa 2021) (citation 

omitted). “Vicarious liability is commonly used in cases involving respondeat 

superior, principals and agents, employers and employees, or other similar 

relationships.” Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 762 N.W.2d 463, 

471 (Iowa 2009). “[A] claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat 

superior rests on two elements: proof of an employer/employee relationship, and 

proof that the injury occurred within the scope of that employment.” Godar, 588 

N.W.2d at 705 (citation omitted). 

The Yakels alleged (1) Wheeler “was acting within the scope and course of 

his employment with [] Carson Stone when he contracted with” them; (2) Carson 
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Stone was “vicariously liable for the negligent acts of [] Wheeler, its employee, 

under the doctrine of respondeat superior”; (3) Wheeler, “while in the course and 

scope of his employment with [] Carson Stone, was negligent in providing 

contractor services to” them; (4) Wheeler “was instructed by [] Carson Stone to 

provide designs and to use [] Carson Stone’s materials in the designs”; and 

(5) “Carson Stone breached [its] duty of care in failing to properly train, supervise, 

and instruct [] Wheeler over the course of the project.” 

There is no question “determination of the issue[] settled by the . . . 

dismissal” would “affect the determination of” the respondeat superior/vicarious 

liability and negligence claims against Carson Stone. See McGuire, 189 N.W.2d 

at 597. 

We turn to the breach-of-contract, negligent-construction, and breach-ofimplied-warranty claims against Lightwine. The Yakels alleged (1) “Wheeler acting 

within his scope of employment with [] Carson Stone, obtained a proposal from [] 

Lightwine for the labor to remove the original siding and installation of new siding 

on [their] home”; (2) “Lightwine represented to [] Wheeler that it was qualified to 

install [] the type of siding purchased by” them; (3) “Wheeler relayed [] Lightwine’s 

representations to” them; (4) Wheeler “failed to ask [] Lightwine whether it had 

installed real wood siding before”; (5) Wheeler “failed to provide [] Lightwine with 

the manufacturer instructions from the siding manufacturer”; and (6) “Wheeler 

acting within [his] scope of employment with [] Carson Stone directed [] Lightwine 

and other subcontractors during the project.” They claimed Lightwine “breached 

the contract by failing to properly install the siding in a workmanlike manner.” 
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The contract claim against Lightwine is inextricably entwined with the claims 

against Wheeler and Carson Stone. See Lerdall Const. Co. v. City of Ossian, 318 

N.W.2d 172, 175–76 n.2 (Iowa 1982) (stating, “A determination of the contract’s 

legality in the trial against the city will plainly affect plaintiff’s case against the 

individual defendants” and, “In the case at bar, we find no claim asserted against 

the individual defendants which does not affect or will not be affected by a 

determination of the issues involved in the claims against the city. Therefore, this 

appeal . . . is not appealable as a matter of right”), holding modified on other 

grounds by Banco Mortg. Co. v. Steil, 351 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1984). Resolution of 

the terms and scope of the contract as the Yakels request requires consideration 

of Wheeler’s role relative to the other defendants. 

The negligent-construction claim against Lightwine incorporated the same 

allegations underlying the breach-of-contract claim, including the allegation that 

Wheeler, acting within the scope of his employment with Carson Stone directed 

the activities of the subcontractors. The Yakels claimed Lightwine breached a duty 

of care “in failing to properly install the siding pursuant to the manufacturer’s 

instructions and in failing to use the degree of care, skill, and knowledge ordinarily 

exercised by contractors in the installation of siding on a home.” The claim could 

not be decided without determining Wheeler’s role. 

The breach-of-implied-warranty claim against Lightwine was similarly 

intertwined with Wheeler’s claim. The Yakels incorporated the previous allegations 

by reference and claimed, “Lightwine, in its removal and installation of siding on 

the home, impliedly warranted that the work performed would be performed in a 

workmanlike manner, that the work was fit for the purpose it was intended, and 
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would be of good quality or free from defects.” They alleged, “Wheeler in the 

course of providing contractor services to [them], impliedly warranted that the work 

performed by him and his subcontractors would be performed in a workmanlike 

manner, that the work was fit for the purpose it was intended, and would be of good 

quality or free from defect.” 

Because “the issues resolved by partial summary judgment[] are 

inextricably entwined with unresolved issues,” the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of Wheeler is not final and ripe for appeal as a matter of right. 

See Van Duzer, 376 N.W.2d at 885. 

We must next decide whether to treat the appeal as an application for 

interlocutory appeal. See Buechel, 745 N.W.2d at 735; Iowa R. App. P. 6.104(2). 

The supreme court “has traditionally been parsimonious about allowing 

interlocutory appeals.” Van Duzer, 376 N.W.2d at 886. The court has 

“emphasized the disadvantages of piecemeal appeals and cautioned that we view 

with disfavor applications for permission to appeal.” Id. “The main factor in 

determining whether such an interlocutory appeal should be granted is whether 

consideration of the issues would serve the interest of sound and efficient judicial 

administration.” Buechel, 745 N.W.2d at 735–36. 

We are hard-pressed to discern how the grant of an application for 

interlocutory appeal would serve the interests of sound and efficient judicial 

administration. Each of the claims raises questions of fact or law that intersect 

with claims that are currently before the district court. The interests of efficiency 
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and avoidance of piecemeal litigation dictate consideration of issues involving all 

three defendants in a single appeal. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.