J. S18042/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

DEONTAE ALLEN McDOWELL, : No. 1823 WDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order, September 6, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-04-CR-0000870-2015,

CP-04-CR-0000874-2015

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MUSMANNO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 23, 2018

Deontae Allen McDowell appeals pro se from the September 6, 2017 

order denying his application for leave to defer fines and costs on the basis it 

lacked jurisdiction to grant appellant the relief he requested. After careful 

review, we affirm.1

The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

On June 24, 2016, pursuant to a plea agreement, 

[appellant] entered a guilty plea in Case No. 870 of 

2015 to one count of Persons Not to Possess a 

Firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1), and a 

guilty plea in Case No. 874 of 2015 to another count 

of Persons Not to Possess a Firearm under 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). The [c]ourt accepted 

[appellant’s] plea and imposed in each case a 

 

1 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief in this matter.
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sentence of five years to ten years in a state 

correctional facility. The sentences were within the 

standard range and were run concurrently. 

[Appellant was also ordered to pay fines and costs in 

the amount of $1,563.50. (See notes of testimony,

6/24/16 at 38-40; application for leave to defer fines 

and costs, 9/5/17 at 1.2] On September 5, 2017, 

[appellant] filed an Application for Leave to Defer 

Fines and Costs. In his Application, [appellant]

asked the [c]ourt to “issue an order stating that the 

twenty percent (20%) deductions cease and the 

remainder of the debt owed be deferred until 

[appellant’s] pending minimum sentence . . . [.]” On

September 6, 2017, [t]he [c]ourt entered an Order 

denying [appellant’s] Application on the basis that it 

did not have jurisdiction to grant the relief 

requested.

On October 13, 2017, [appellant] filed with the 

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania an Application 

for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and a 

Petition for Review. According to the stamp on the 

envelope, these documents were mailed on 

October 3, 2017. On November 8, 2017, the 

Commonwealth Court mailed [appellant’s] 

documents to the Beaver County Clerk of Courts, 

stating that it appears to be an attempt by 

[appellant] to file a notice of appeal, and directing 

the [c]ourt to process the document in accordance 

with Pa. R.A.P. 905 (regarding filing of a notice of

appeal). These documents were received and 

time-stamped by the Beaver County Clerk of Courts 

on November 13, 2017. The [c]ourt entered an 

Order on December 4, 2017, directing that

[appellant’s] Petition for Review be treated as a 

Notice of Appeal, and that it be treated as having

been filed on October 13, 2017 in accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(4).

 

2 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9782(b)(5) (“Act 84”), the Department of 

Corrections (“DOC”) is “authorized to make monetary deduction from inmate 

personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any other 

court-ordered obligation.”
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Trial court opinion, 12/5/17 at 1-2.

Preliminarily, we note that appellant’s pro se appeal was stamped as 

filed by the Commonwealth Court on October 13, 2017, in excess of the 

30-day appeal period from the trial court’s September 6, 2017 order, and 

thus appears untimely on its face. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating, a “notice 

of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from 

which the appeal is taken.”). However, where a pro se appellant is 

incarcerated, as is the case here, the prisoner mailbox rule applies and an 

appeal is deemed filed on the date the prisoner deposits the appeal with 

prison authorities or places it in a prison mailbox. Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 46 A.3d 715 

(Pa. 2012). Instantly, the post-mark on the envelope that accompanied

appellant’s notice of appeal indicates that it was deposited with prison 

authorities on October 3, 2017, before the 30-day appeal period expired. 

Accordingly, we deem the instant appeal to be timely.3 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver 

County violate [appellant’s] constitutional right 

to Due Process when it failed to take subject 

matter jurisdiction over the Motion for 

Deferment?

 

3 We note that the trial court did not order appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On December 5, 2017, the trial court filed its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion.
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[2.] Is [appellant] eligible for a Deferment of Fines 

and Costs incurred by Act 84, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9728 et seq. (Act 1998-84 (S.B. 640),

P.L. 640 § 4, approved June 18 1998, eff. in 

120 days) by the Court of Common Pleas when 

it states it lacks subject matter jurisdiction?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (emphasis omitted).

Here, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to order the DOC to 

cease its 20% deduction from appellant’s inmate account because appellant

failed to challenge his underlying sentence. The trial court reasoned as 

follows:

A review of [appellant’s] Application for Leave to 

Defer Fines and Costs clearly shows that [appellant]

made no claims whatsoever regarding modification 

of his Sentence Order, or the validity of his sentence. 

Rather, he merely claimed that he was unable to 

afford the [DOC] twenty percent deductions from his 

inmate account, claimed a right to deferment, and 

requested the Court to order the [DOC] to cease its 

deductions until the completion of his minimum 

sentence. . . . Because the claim [appellant]

addressed to this Court was, in truth, a civil action 

against the [DOC], an agency of the Commonwealth, 

this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the 

claim, and [appellant’s] Application was properly 

denied.

Trial court opinion, 12/5/17 at 4-5 (footnote omitted).

Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusions. This court 

addressed a similar matter in Commonwealth v. Danysh, 833 A.2d 151 

(Pa.Super. 2003). Danysh involved a situation where the Court of Common 

Pleas of Susquehanna County denied an inmate’s petition to cease Act 84 

deductions from his inmate account, after concluding that the 
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20% deduction constituted a “reasonable amount.” Danysh, 833 A.2d at 

152. On appeal, the Danysh court raised the issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction sua sponte, recognizing that the Commonwealth Court has 

original jurisdiction over various classes of cases, including civil suits against

government actors. Id. The Danysh court concluded that the inmate’s 

action was a civil action “against the Commonwealth government, as [the] 

DOC falls within the jurisdictional statute’s definition of that term[,]” and the 

inmate “should have brought his petition as a petition for review of a 

governmental determination under the Commonwealth Court’s original 

jurisdiction.” Id. at 153-154, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 761(a)(1) (providing, in 

relevant part, that “the Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction 

of all civil actions or proceedings . . . [a]gainst the Commonwealth 

government . . . .”). Therefore, the court of common pleas lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction. Id. at 154.4

Based on the foregoing, we discern no error on the part of the trial 

court in denying appellant’s application for leave to defer fines and costs for 

lack of jurisdiction.

5

 See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 858 A.2d 627, 

 

4 This court did note, however, that the trial court would have had 

jurisdiction if the defendant were incarcerated in the county jail as opposed 

to a state correctional institution. Danysh, 833 A.2d at 154. Here, 

appellant is incarcerated at S.C.I. Rockview.

5

In Danysh, we explained that “[a]lthough the court of common pleas 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we have appellate jurisdiction since this is 

an appeal from a final order.” Danysh, 833 A.2d at 152 n.1. The same is 

true in the instant matter.
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629-630 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc) (concluding that the trial court 

properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over an inmate’s pro se

petition to stop the DOC from deducting 20% of his earnings from his inmate 

account to pay for court-ordered costs and restitution). Accordingly, we 

affirm the September 6, 2017 order of the trial court denying appellant’s 

application because it lacked jurisdiction to address it, without prejudice to 

seek relief from the Commonwealth Court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/23/2018