F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

W I L L I A M N A T H A

N I E L W A S H I N G T O N , Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v.

L O S A N G E L E S C O U

N T Y S H E R I F F ’ S D E P A R

T M E N T ; L E E B A C A ; T W

I N T O W E R S C O R R E C T I ON A L F A C I L I T Y , D efendants-Appellees. No. 13-56647

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-04402-UA-PJ W

OPI N I ON

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Georg e H. King , Chief District J u d g e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 4, 2016 Pasadena, California

F iled August 12, 2016

B efore: J EROME F ARRI S, CARL OS T. B EA, and MI L AN D. SMI TH, J R., Circuit J udg es.

O pinion by

J udg e Milan D. Smith, J r.W A S H I N G T ON V

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SUMMARY *

P risoner Civil Rights

The p anel reve r s ed the district c ourt’s denial of a prisoner’s motion to proceed in f orm pauperi s after the district court f

ound that the prisoners h ad accru e d a t least three p rior “strikes” under the Prison L itig ation Reform Act’s “three strikes rule.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g ).

The p anel h eld that the district court improperly assessed the ex istence of f

ive p rior strikes ag a inst plaintiff a nd therefore the panel remanded for th e d i s trict court to assess whether plaint i f

f was entitled to proceed with his action in forma pauperis.

Assessing the prior federal filing s, the panel h e l d that a dismissal pursuant to Heck v

. Humphrey
, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), may constitute a strike for failure to st a te a claim when Heck ’s bar to relief is obvious f r om the f a c e of the complaint, and the e n tirety of the complaint is dismissed for

a qualifying reason under the Prison L itig ation Reform Act. The p anel held that when multiple claims are presented in a sing le action, a strike may o nly be assessed when the case a s

a whole is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Prison L itig ation Reform Act. Apply ing this leg al framework to the facts of plaintiff’s prior filing
, which intertwine d the H eck

barred damag es claims w i t h a h abeas challeng e to the underlying sentence, the panel concluded that the d ismissal

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b eenp rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.W A S H I N G T ON V

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of plaintiff’s a ction pursuant to Hec k d id not constitute a strike.

The panel held that a dismissal due to abstention under Y o unger v. Harris
, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), similar to a d ismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, is not a strike.

The panel held that plaintiff’s two mandamus p etitions,

w h i c h d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n ge d t h e u n d e r l y ing crimin al proceeding s, were more properly construed as appeals o f criminal cases, and therefore operated like habeas claims that lie outside the scope o f the Prison L itig ation Reform A ct, a nd do not incur strikes.

COUNSEL

J oanna S. McCallum ( argued), Manatt, Phelps & Phi l lips, L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mackenz ie C. Smith (arg ued) and Paul B

. B each, L awrence B each Allen & Choi, PC, Glenda le, California, for D e f e n d a n t

- A p p e l l e e Lo s A n g e l e s C o u n t y S h e r i f f ’s Department.

No appearance for Defendants-Appellees L ee B aca a nd Twin Towers Correctional F a cility

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OP INION

M. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e :

This appeal addresses the application of the P r i son L itig ation Reform Act of 1995’s (PL RA) “three-strikes” rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1 915(g ), to Plaintiff W illiam W ashing ton’s action a g ainst the L os Ang eles County Sheriff’s D epartment, L ee B aca, and the Twin Towers Correctional F ac i l i t y (collectively
, D efendants). The PL RA’s “three-strikes” rule prohibits a prisoner from f i l i n g a n action in forma pauperis (I F P) if he h as accumulated three “strikes” for prior federalcourt actions while incarcerated or in detention, unles s he is “under imminent d ang er of serious p h y s ical injury .” Id

. A prisoner can incur a “strike” for bring ing an action “that was dismissed on the g rounds that it is frivolous, malicious, o r fails to state a claim upon which relief may be g ranted.” Id

.

W a shing ton, a California state prisoner
, r equested leave
to file suit I F P ag ainst Defendants. The district cour t denied W a shing ton’s I F P request on the basis that he h ad accrued at least three prior “strikes” under § 1915(g ). The district court also found that W ashing ton’s c omplaint failed to adequately plead “imminent dang er o f serious phy sical injury ” within the meaning of § 1915(g )

. B e cause we hold that the district court improperly assessed the ex istenc e o f prior strikes ag ainst W a shing ton, we REVERSE and REMAND.

F ACTS AND P RIOR P ROCEEDING S

W h ile in detention p ending the outcome o f a criminal trial, W ashing ton submitted a complaint, alleg ing violations of his Eig hth A mendment rig ht to adequate medical care a nd safe prison co n d itions, and requesting monetary a ndW A S H I N G T ON V

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injunctive relief pursuant to 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983. A long with the submissio n o f his complaint, W ashing ton requested permission to pro c e ed I FP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which would permit him to pay the $350 filing fee in g radual installments rather than a s an initial lump sum. See Andrews

v. Cervantes
, 4 93 F .3d 10 4 7
, 1 0 5 1–52 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court found that W ashing ton had accrued at least three strikes under the PL RA, and that his complaint did not a lleg e “imminent dang er of serious p h y sical injury ,” which would permit him to by

pass the PL RA’s three-strikes rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g ). I t denied the I F P request and dismissed the action without prejudice.

B e low we c onsider the history of W ashing ton’s five prior federal filing s, w hich Defe n d ants claim resulted in PL RA strikes ag a inst W ashing ton. 1

1. Washington v. Haviland , No. 2:09-CV-3052

I n November 2009, W ashing ton filed a § 1983 complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern D istrict of California
aga i n s t prison wardens and various state officials. See W ashington v. Haviland
, No. 2 :09-CV-3052 (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 3
, 2009). I n the c omplaint, W ashing ton claimed that the defendants, in a separate state p r oceeding
, had applied an improper sentencing e n hancement, causing h im to remain in prison for an additional y ear, in violation of his F ourteen t h Amendment rig hts. He requested compens a tion f o r his injuries, including monetary damag es for neg lig ent infliction

1 B ecau se w e u ltim ately co n clu d e th at W ash in g to n h as n ot accru ed th ree strik es, w e d eclin e to d elv e i n to th e su b s tan ce o f h is m o st recen t co m p lain t to d ecid e w

h eth er i t a d e q u ately alleg es an “ im m in en t d an g er o f serio u s p h y sical in

j ury .” 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 91 5 (g ).W A S H I N G T ON V

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of emotional distres s , actual loss of wag es, and punitive damag es, a s well as injunctive relief in the form o f a “recall” of his sentence. W ashing ton simultaneously submitted an I F P request.

A mag istrate judg e screened W a shing ton’s c o m p laint pursuant to 2 8 U. S

. C

. § 1915A(a). The mag istrate judg e concluded that Heck v

. Humphrey
, 512 U .S. 477 (1994), required dismissal of W ashin gton’s § 1983 claim b ecause a favorable ruling would cast into doubt the valid i t y of his underlying sentence. The mag istrate judg e the n a d vised W a shing ton that a habeas petitio n w as the “proper mechanism” for c h alleng ing his sentence. On March 15, 2010, the distric t c ourt adopted the mag istrate judg e’s recommendations, d enied W ashing ton’s I F P application, a nd dismissed the action “withou t prejudice for failure to state a cog niz able claim.”

2. Washington v

. California Suprem e Court , No. 2:10- CV-54

I n J a nuary 2010, after the California Supreme Court denied W ashing ton’s emerg ency e x parte mot i on for relief, W a shing ton broug ht an action challeng ing the validity of the

s e n t e ncing enhancement throug h a mandamus petition, this time in the U.S. Dist r ict Court for the Central District o f California. See W

ashington v. Cal. Supreme Court
, No. 2:10- CV-54 (C.D. Cal. filed J an. 5, 2010). He also submitted an I F P request with the complaint.

The U.S. District Court fo r the Central District o f California uses a standard template order for screening I F P requests. Such a template w as used in this case a s well as in subsequ e nt cases W ashing ton filed in that court. On theW A S H I N G T ON V

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template order, the mag istrate judg e recommended a denial of the I F P request. Under the section listing “reas o n ( s )” for the denial, the mag istrate judg e did not indicate that t he pleading was “[ f] rivolo u s , m alicious, or fails to state a claim,” or that the “denial may constitute a strike” under the PL RA. Rather, the mag istrate judg e offered a separate

ex p lanation in th e c omments section. Specifically
, she concluded that a mandamus petition was inappropriate when other f orms of relief, such as a habeas petition, w ere available
to challeng e the sentencing decision. A c cording ly
, the
mag istrate judg e directed the clerk to “ a ttach the appropriate [ habeas] form for petitioner to use.” The district court denied the I F P request without further comment or qualification.

3. Washington v

. California Suprem e Court , No. 2:10- CV-964

I n F e bruary 2010, W ashing ton submitted a near facsimile of the earlier mandamus petition, accompan i e d b y an I F P request. See W

ashington v. Cal. Supreme Co u r t , No. 2:10- CV-964 (C.D. Cal. filed F eb. 19, 2010). A differe nt mag istrate judg e concluded that the compl a i n t “remains an inappropriate mandamus action,” and that W ashing ton could instead submit a habeas peti tion. The mag istrate judg e checked off the box es on t h e t emplate order indicating that
t h e c o m plaint was “ [f] rivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim” a n d that “ [ t] his denial may constitute a strike.” The district court denied W ashing ton’s I F P request.

4. Washington v. Los Angeles Police Departm e nt , No. 2:12-CV-5873

Over two y ears later, in J u ly 2012, W a s h i n gt on f iled a § 1983 complaint in relation to ong o ing stat e c r i m inalW A S H I N G T ON V

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proceeding s. See W

ashington v. L.A. Police Dep’t
, No. 2:12- C V

- 5873 (C.D. Cal. filed J uly 6, 2 012). He ag ain request e d I FP status. W ashing ton a lleg ed that the L os Ang eles Pol i c e Department as w ell as its officers and ag ents “com m itted felony misconduct to f

alsely imprison [ W ashing ton] and to potentially manipulate the v er d i c t of a trial,” in violation o f the F if th and F ourteenth Amendments. Specifically
, W a shing ton claimed that the defendants had forg ed evidence and falsified re ports in a criminal investig ation involving W a shing ton. He requested d a m a ges and various forms o f injunctive relief.

A mag istrate judg e recommended that the I F P request be denied. T he mag istrate judg e note d that it was “not clear whether the underlying criminal case ag a inst [ W ashing ton] is
ong oing or whether he has a lready been con v i c t e d ,” b ut, in either case, W ashing ton’s § 1983 c l a i m “[ could] not g o forward.” The mag istrate judg e r easoned t h a t the claim was either barred by Heck

, because it c hallenge d a criminal conviction, or barred by Y ounger v. Harris
, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because the state c r iminal proceeding s were o n g o ing

. 2 The mag istrate judg e also noted that a habeas petition w a s the appropriate remedy fo r c halleng ing the leg ality of his confinement. According ly
, the mag istrate judg e ticked off the f o l l owing box es on the template o rder as reasons for the denia l of I F P status: (1) “District Court lacks jurisdiction; (2) “F rivolous, malicious, or fails to state a c l a i m ”; (3) “L eave to amend would be f utile”; and (4) “ Other.” Under the “Other” section, the mag istrate judg e wrote: “ Heck barred

2 T h e reco rd rev eals th at th e state crim in al p ro ceed in g s w e r e t he n

o n g o in g , th eref

o re trig g erin g ab sten tio n un der Yo u n g er

. See in fra Sectio n II.B

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and/or Y ounger abstention.” The district court deni ed W a shing ton’s I F P request, without leave to amend.

5. Washington v

. C ity of Los Angeles , No. 2:12-CV7429

I n Aug ust 2 012, W ashing ton f iled a nother § 1983 lawsuit, repeating similar facts fro m h i s J uly 2012 complaint, a nd requested I F P status. See W a shington v

. City of Los Angeles
, No. 2:12-CV-7429 (C.D. Cal. f iled Aug

. 29, 2012). T h is time, W ashing ton modified the named defendants and the relief
soug h t, notably removing his previous request for immediate release f rom c ustody and “thoroug h investig ation of the criminal case,” but requ e sting that a “forensic document

ex aminer be appointed to prove [ the] authen t i c i t y of [ the] document in question.” W a shingt o n a lso removed his claim of false imprisonment, but retained his alleg ati o n s of dueprocess violations arising from police misconduct.

The same mag istrate ju d ge that reviewed W ashing ton’s previous J uly

2012 I F P request reviewed this complaint. On the template order, the mag istrate judg e r ec o m m ended denying the I F P request for the same reasons as the J u ly 2012 I F P request, b ut addit i o n ally checked a box stating that the denial “may constitute a s trike.” The district court denied W a shing ton’s I F P request, without leave to amend.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND JURISDICTION

“W e r eview the district court’s interpretation a nd application of § 1915(g )” de novo. Cervantes
, 493 F. 3 d at 1052. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Andrews v. King , 398 F .3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005).W A S H I N G T ON V

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ANALYSIS

I. P rison Litigation Ref orm Act

The Prison L itig ation Reform Act of 1995 (PL RA), Pub. L

. No. 104-134, tit. VI I I
, 1 1 0 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 1915) r estricted the a bility of prisoners to avail themselves of I F P status when filing certain federal lawsuits. Specifically
, § 1915(g ) contains the PL RA’s “threestrikes” r ule. This provision ba r s p risoners from proceeding I F P if they

have accrued “three strikes” under the statute:

I n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action

or appeal a judg men t in a civil action o r proceeding under this section if the prisoner ha s , on 3 or more p r ior occasions, while incarcerated or d e tained in any faci l i t y , broug ht a n a ction or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on th e g rounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to s t a t e a claim upon which relief may be
g ranted, unless the p risoner is under imminent dang er of serious phy sical injury

. Althoug h the leg i s l a t i v e history of the PL RA is meag er, the Act’s su p p o r t e r s indicated that it w as meant to curb the volume of n on-meritorious, a n d often frivolous, civil-rig hts lawsuits broug h t challeng ing prison co n d itions. See Cervantes
, 493 F

. 3 d at 1 051–52. The PL RA also contains other provisions desig ned to limit the number of such suits in federa l c o u rts. F or ex ample, it contains an administrativeex h austion requirement to ensure that prisoners make use of prison g rievance proc e dures. 42 U .S.C. § 1 997e(a). I n additio n , the PL RA requires that courts screen prisonerW A S H I N G T ON V

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complaints and d ismiss them sua sponte if t h e y determine then, or later in the p roceeding s, that the complaints a re “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ ] to state a claim.” 28 U .S.C. § 1915A.

II. P LRA “Strikes”

A. Heck Dism issals

Central to W ashi n gt o n’s argument is that a d ismissal under Heck does not constitute a strike within the meaning o f § 1915(g ). I n Heck v. Humphrey
, the Supreme Court held that

a court must d ismiss a § 1 983 claim if (1) it seeks to r ecover damag es for “ harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction o r sentence inval i d ” a nd ( 2) the plaintiff cannot show that “the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, ex p ung ed by ex ecutive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authoriz ed to m a k e s u c h

a determination, or called into question by a federal c o u rt’s issuance of a writ of h abeas c o r pus.” 512 U.S. at 486–87. According ly
, a civil damag es claim that undermines a valid, underlying conviction o r sentence is “not cog niz able under § 1983.” Id. at 487. The Court ex plained that, in such cases, it was “ deny [ ing ] the ex istence of a cause of action,” and that

“ a § 1983 cause of action for damag e s attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id

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W a shing ton a dvances several arguments concerning why Heck dism i ssals do n ot qualify as strikes. 3 F irst, we address the leg al f ramework fo r d e termining when a Heck d ismissal constitutes a strike, including whether such d ismissals may be “frivolous, malicious, or f ail[ ] to state a claim” under the PL RA. 2 8 U.S.C. § 1915(g ). Ultimately
, we hold that a dismissal may co n s t i t u t e a PL RA strike for failure to state a claim w hen Heck ’ s b ar to relief is obvious from the face o f the complaint, and the entirety of the complaint is dismissed for a qualif

y i ng reason under the PL RA. Second, we a pply this le ga l f

r amework to the facts of W ashing ton’s case, a nd conclude that the Heck dismissal in question, N o

. 2 :09-CV3052, does not constitute a PL RA strike.

1. Dism issals of F rivo l o u s or Malicious Com plaints

F irst, W a shing ton contends that a complaint d i s m i ssed under Heck

, standing a lone, is not a p er s e “frivolous” o r “malicious” complaint. W e ag ree. A Heck di s m i ssal is not categ orically frivolous—that is, hav i ng “no basis in law o r fact,” King
, 398 F

. 3d at 1121 ( in t e r n al q uotation marks a

nd

3 Co n trary to Def

en d an t s’ co n t en tio n , w e h av e n ev er sq u arely b ro ach ed th e q u estio n

o f w h eth er Heck

d i sm issals co un t as strik es. S ee Cerva n tes , 4 9 3 F.3 d at 1 0 5 2 n .2

. R a t h e r , o u r p rio r cases are i n co n clu siv e b ecau s e th ey af f irm ed d istrict- co u

rt d ism issals w ith o u t en g ag in g in an an aly sis of th e p ro p riety o f im

p o sin g PL RA strik es f

o r th o se d ism issals. S e e Bu tterfield v. Ba il
, 12 0 F.3 d 1 0 2 3 , 1 0 2 5 (9 t h Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) (af

f irm in g Heck d ism issal f

o r f ailure to state a claim un d er F ed eral Ru le o f Civ il P ro ced ure 1 2 (b )(6 )). Neith er d o es Bela n us v. Cla rk
, 7 9 6 F.3 d 1 0 2 1 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ), b in d u s on th is i ssu e. Bela n us assessed a P L RA strik e f o r a Ru le 1 2 (b )(6 ) d ism issal o n th e g ro un d t h at th e “ t h ru s t” o f th e co m

p lain t w as b arred b y th e statu te o f

lim itatio n s, su chth at a d ism issal f o r f ailure to state a claim

co u ldb e su s tain ed o n

th at b asis. Id . at 1 02 4

– 2 5 , 1 0 2 7

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citation omitted)—be c ause plaintiffs may h ave meritorious claims that d o not accrue until the underly ing criminal proceeding s have been successfully challeng ed. See Heck
, 512 U.S. at 4 89–90. F or this reason, a H eck dismissal is made wit h o u t p rejudice, such that a prisoner may refile the complaint once his conviction has b een o verturned. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa
, 49 F .3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) ( per curiam). Similarly
, a Heck dismissal c annot be characteriz ed a s malicious, unless the court specifically finds that the complaint was “filed with the intention or d esi re to harm another.” King
, 3 98 F .3d at 1121 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Dism issals f

or F ailure To State a Claim

Neither do all Heck dismiss a l s c ateg orically count a s dismiss a l s f

o r failure to state a c laim under F e deral Rule o f C i v i l Procedure 12(b)(6). W e have previously d e termi n e d t h a t the lang uag e “fails to state a claim u p on which relief may be
g ranted” in § 1 915(g )
, tracks the langu ag e of Rule 12(b)(6), and that d ismissals under Rule 1 2(b)(6) may constitute strikes within the meaning of the PL RA. See Knapp v. Hogan
, 738 F .3d 1 106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). W e now hold that Heck dismissals may constitute Rule 12(b)(6) d ismissals for failure
to state a claim when th e pleading s present an “obvious bar
to securing relief” under Heck

. ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. , 765 F .3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014).

W e do not hold, h owever, that a succe s s f u l challeng e to the underlying c riminal proceeding s, i.e. , “fav o r able termination,” is a necessary e lement of a civil damag es claimW A S H I N G T ON V

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u n d e r § 1983. 4 Section 1983 merely r equires that a litiga n t alleg e a “deprivation of a

ny rig hts, privileg es, or immunities secured by the Cons titution and laws,” and that the challeng ed conduct transpire “under color of [ state la w]

. ” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The fa ct t h a t a conviction has been set aside is not an element of the c laim at issue. I ndeed, a particular plaintiff’s need to demonstrate that his conviction has b e en s e t a s ide is conting ent on a threshold leg al determination
, made by the court, that the requested relief would undermine the underlyin g c onviction. Cf. Lockett v

. Ericson , 656 F .3d 892, 896–97 (9th Cir. 2011).

I nstead, c ompliance w i t

h H eck most c losely resembles the mandatory a dministrative ex haustion of PL RA claims, which constitutes a

n aff i r mative defense a

nd not a pleading requirement. 5 See Jones v

. Bock
, 549 U.S. 199, 215–17 (2007). L ike dismissals for lack o f administrative ex haustion, Heck dismissals do not r eflect a final determ ination on the underlying merits of the case. See Lopez v

. Smith
, 2 03 F .3d

4 T h e tw o circu it co urts to co n sid er th is i ssu e directly h av e bo th h eld th at Heck d ism issals m ay co n stitu te a strik e f

o r “ f ailure to s tate a claim ,” alth o u g h th eir reaso n in g on th i s sco re is ov erb ro ad

. S ee S mith v. Vetera n s Ad min

. , 6 3 6 F .3 d 1 3 0 6
, 1 3 1 2 (1 0 th Cir. 2 01 1 ) (h old in g th at “ th e f av orab le
term in atio n o f a h ab eas case i s an essen tia l elemen t o f a p riso n er’ s civ i l claim f o r d am ag es b ro u g h t un d e r 4 2 U .S.C. § 1 9 8 3 th at n ecessarily im p lies th e in v alid ity o f th e p riso n er’ s co n v ictio n ”); In re Jo n es , 6 5 2 F.3 d 3 6
, 3 7 (D.C. C ir. 2 0 1 1 ) (p er curiam ) (ad o p tin g th e reaso n in g in S mith ); see

a l s o H a m i lto n v. Lyo n s , 7 4 F.3 d 9 9
, 1 0 3 (5 th C ir. 1 9 9 6 ) (h o ld in g , w ith

scan t an aly sis, th at Heck

d i sm issals are categ o rically “ f riv o lo u s”).

5 Co n sistent w ith th e b urd en of p ro o f f or an af f i rm ativ e def

en s e, w e h av e h eld th at th e d ef

en d an t in a § 1 9 83 actio n m u st sh o w t

h at th e plain tif

f ’ s

su ccess in th e actio n w o u ld n ecessarily im p ly th e in v alid ity of a crim in al

co n v ictio n

. S

ee S m i t h v

. C ity o

f Hemet
, 3 9 4 F .3 d 6 8 9, 6 9 9 n .5 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ) (en b an c); S

a n fo rd v. Mo tts , 2 5 8 F.3 d 1 1 1 7 , 1 1 1 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ).W A S H I N G T ON V

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1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) ( en b anc). Rather, Heck dismissals reflect a matter of “judicial traffic control” and prevent civil actions from col l aterally a ttacking ex isting criminal judg ments. Albino v. Baca
, 747 F .3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 201 4 ) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Heck

, 512 U.S. a t 483–87. Therefore, as w ith affirmative defenses, a court may properly dismiss a H e c k

barred claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if there ex ists an “obvious bar to securing relief o n the face of the c o mplaint.” A S ARCO, L LC
, 765 F .3d a t 1004; see J ones , 549 U.S. at 215. W i t h respect to No. 2:09-CV-3052, the Heck deficiency was plain f r o m t he face of the complaint, as Washing ton soug ht a “recall” of his alleg edly unlawful sentence, thereby r evealing that it was still ex tant.

3. F ull and P artial Dism issals under Heck

I n l i gh t of the above analy sis of Heck
, w e must nex t decide whether the dismissal in No. 2:09-CV-3052 trig g ered

a PL RA strike. B efore proceeding
, howe v e r, we clarify that so-called Heck dismissals come in various g uises. This is an important distinction because only a complete dismissal of an action under Heck

—rather than the dismissal of a particular claim within that action—constitutes a strike. See Cervantes
, 493 F .3d at 1054.

B r oadly speaking
, there are t w o k i nds of cases in which Heck is implicated. The first ty pe was presented in Heck itself, where a prisoner f

iled a civil suit seeking purely money damag es related to an alleg e dly unlawful conviction. 512 U.S. at 479. Heck barred the suit b ecause an a w ard o f damag es would undermine the v a lidity of the underly ing

c o nviction, and the entire action therefore faced dismissal under Heck

. Id. at 486–87.W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 16

A n o t h e r ty

pe is the o ne we have before us, in which a prisoner see k s injunctive relief challeng ing his sentence o r conviction—and further seeks monetary relief fo r damag e s

a t t ributable to the same sentence o r conviction. The f i r s t request, for injunctive relief, sounds in habeas, and is n o t

s u b j ect to the PL RA’s reg ime. King
, 398 F .3d at 1122–23. The s e c o nd request, seeking damag es, is intertwined with W a shing ton’s plea for injun ctive relief, and is therefore subject to dismissal under Heck

.

W h en we are presented w i t h multiple claims within a sing le action, w e assess a PL RA strike o nly wh e n t he “case

as a w hole” is dismissed for a qualifying rea s o n u n der the Act. Cervantes
, 493 F .3d a t 1054. A lthoug h one portion o f W a shing ton’s action mig h t have been dismissed for failure to comply with Heck

, the remainde r sounds only in habeas. A habeas action, as we have held, is not a “civil action” within the purview of the PL RA because it operates to challeng e the validity of a criminal proceeding
, a n d its dismissal d o e s not trig g er a strike. King
, 398 F .3d at 112 2

– 2 3 ; s e e also ElShaddai v. Zamora
, No. 13-56104, slip o p. at 17–18 (9th Cir. Aug

. 1 2, 2016) ( holding that would-be hab eas petitions do
not count as strikes). As a result, Washing ton has not accrued

a strike for the dismissal of his first suit, No. 2:09-CV-3052, because the entire action w as not d i s m i s s ed for one of the qualifying reasons enumerated by the Act. 6

6 W e em p h asize th at o ur h o ld in g is lim ited t o th e q u estio n n o w b ef ore

u s, i.e ., w h eth er s u c h d ism i ssals co n stitu te strik es w i th i n th e m ean i n g of th e P L RA
, an d d o es n o t a l t e r o ur ex istin g law g o v ern in g a co urt’ s d eterm in atio n of w

h en to “ co n v ert a d efe c t i v e sectio n 19 8 3 claim in to a h ab eas p etitio n .” Trimb le
, 49 F .3 d at 5 8 6 ; see T u cker v. Ca rlso n , 9 2 5 F.2 d 3 3 0
, 3 3 2 (9 th Cir. 1 99 1 ); see a lso Ca stro v. Un ited S ta tes , 5 4 0 U.S. 3 7 5
, 3 8 2

– 8 3 (2 0 0 3 ).W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 17

Considered from another ang le, the Heck -d i s missed claims were part and parcel of W ashing ton’s leg al challeng e to his c riminal sentence. W ashi n gt o n soug ht relief from the fact or dura tion o f h is confinement, specifically a “recall o f his sentence,” and related monetary damag es. This p rompted the district court to advise h im that h abeas proceeding s were “the p roper mechanism” f or challeng es to his sentence. Until W a shing ton has proven the invalidity of th a t s e n t e nce, he is barre d f rom obtaining damag es a r ising f rom it. Heck

, 512 U.S. at 486– 8 7

. B ecause W ashing ton’s Heck -barred damag es claims are th u s i n tertwined with his h abeas challeng e to the underlying sentence, we decline to impose a strike with r espect to his entire action. This approach squares with the underlying purp o ses o f the PL RA, where Cong ress

was pre o ccupied with the proliferation of c ivil-rig hts suits challeng ing prison conditions—not c riminal convictions. See King
, 398 F .3d at 1122–23.

B. Y ounger Abstention

F ederal district courts twice dis m i s sed W ashing ton’s complaints under Heck “and/o r” Y ounger , Nos. 2 :12-CV5873 and 2:12-CV-7429, finding that they “ lack[ ed] jurisdiction.” W ashing ton argu es that a Y ou n g er d ismissal should b e treated l i k e a Rule 12(b)(1) d ismissal for lack o f subject-matter jurisdiction, which does not trig g er a PL RA strike. See Moore v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff’s Office
, 657 F .3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 2011). W e ag ree with W ashing ton. 7

7 Sim i l a r l y , W ash in g to n co n ten d s t h at a Heck d ism issal is p ro p erly

co n sid ered j urisd ictio n al in n ature, an d s h o u ld th eref o re n o t trig g er a strik e. B ecau s e w e co n clu de th at W ash in g to n ’ s p artial d ism issa l u n d e r Heck d id n o t w arran t a P L RA strik e, w e declin e to reach th is altern ativ e arg u m en t.W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 18

Under Y

ounger v

. Harris
, a federal court must apply a multi-part test to de t e r m i ne whether it should decline to

ex e r cise its juri s diction. See 401 U.S. at 41. “ Y ounger principles a

pply in an ac t i o n f

or damag es p ursuant to 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the federal plaintiff brings a

c o n stitutional challeng e to a state p roceeding when that proceeding is ong oing ; the state proceeding is o f a j u dicial nature, implicating important state interests; and the federal plaintiff is not barred from litig ating his federal constitutional issues in that proceeding .” Gilb e r t son v. Albright
, 3 81 F .3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004). Alth o u gh t h e courts below never resolved w hether dismissal was a ppropriate under H

eck o r Y o u n g e r , the r ecord reveals that the dismissals should have occurred und e r Y

o u nger , as both dismissed suits were broug ht prior to W ashing ton’s Aug ust 2 013 state-court conviction. See W allace v. Kato
, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007).

W e hold that a dismissal d ue to Y ounger abstention, similar to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, is not a strike under t h e PL RA. The doctrine of abstention involves a d ecisi o n b y a federal court to d ecline to ex ercise jurisdiction over the underly ing c laims for reasons of comity

. Gilbertson
, 3 8 1 F .3d at 970–71; see Albino
, 747 F .3d at 1170. Dismissal on jurisdictional g rounds

o c c u r s n ot only before an ex amination of the merits, but curtails such an ex amination. See Moore
, 6 5 7 F. 3 d at 895. “Unlike those situations where a federal c ourt merely a bstains from decision on federal quest i ons until the resolution o f underlying or related state law iss u e s

. . . Y ounger v. Harris contemplates the outrig ht dismissal o f the federal suit, and the presentation of all claims, both state and federal, to the state courts.” G ibson v. Berryhill
, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 19

As a result, W ashing t o n ’s two prior dismissals under Y o unge r , Nos. 2:12-CV-5873 and 2:12-CV-7429, do not constitute strikes. Moreover, to the ex tent W ashing ton

re quested relief in those a ctions that sounded distinctly in habeas, w hile his remaining claims w ere barred by Y o unger , such mix ed dismissals do not c onstitute strikes unless the entire action is d ismissed for a qualifying rea s o n under the PL RA. See supra Section I I .A.3. Here, n either the d ismissal of W ashin gt on’s claims under Y ounger , nor those sounding in habeas, p re s ent qualifying reasons for imposing a strike within the meaning of § 1915(g ).

C. P etitions f

or a Writ of

Mandam us

I n enacting the PL RA, Cong r es s intended to limit a pr i s o n e r’s a

bility to proceed I F P in “a civil action” or the “appeal [ of] a judg ment in a civil a ct i o n o r proceeding

. ” 28 U.S.C. § 1 915(g ). W e have already h e l d that the PL RA does not ex tend to a p r isoner’s use of habeas corpus p etitions. Ki ng , 398 F .3d a t 1122. L ike habeas, mandamus is a common-law writ that cannot b e square ly characteriz ed as a “civil action” or appeal thereof wit h i n t he meaning of the PL RA.

Most of the circu i t s t o have considered this issue have adopted an approach similar to that o f the Seventh Circuit in Martin v

. United States
, 9 6 F

. 3d 853, 854–55 (7th Cir. 1996). I n M artin , the Seventh Circuit c oncluded that, in many cases,

a mandamus petition “ag ainst the judge presiding in the petitioner’s case,” effectively operates as a form of appeal. Id

. at 854. W hether the “appeal” is civil in nature will depend on whether the underlying l i t ig ation is civil, and seeks “relief
soug h t in civil actions that a re cove r e d by the PL RA.” In re Nagy
, 89 F .3d 115, 117 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996); s e e M a r tin ,W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 20

96 F .3d at 854–55 (“ A p e t i t i on for mandamus in a criminal proceeding is not a form of pr i s oner litig ation.

. . . I t is a procedural step in the criminal litig ation, like an interlocutory

or final appeal or a civil contempt proceeding ag a i n s t a witness.”); I

n re Grant
, 635 F .3d 1227, 1 2 30 (D.C. Cir. 2 011) (applying PL RA to mandamus petitions when the underly ing action is civil); In re S

tone , 118 F .3d 1032, 1033–34 (5th Cir. 1997) ( same); In re Tyler
, 110 F

. 3d 528, 529 ( 8th Cir. 1 997) (same); c f

. Madden v

. Myers
, 102 F .3d 74, 76–77 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that mandamus actions are categ orically not “civil ac t ions”). But see Green v. Nottingham
, 90 F .3d 415, 417–18 (10th Cir. 1996).

I n W ashing ton’s c a se, his two mandamus petitions, N os. 2 : 1 0

- C V

- 54 and 2:10-CV-964, directly challe n g e d u n d e r l y i n g criminal p roceeding s, and are m o r e properly construed a s appeals of criminal cases. W e a re persuaded b y the r easoning of the Seventh Circuit in Martin
, and we ther efore conclude that Washing ton’s two mandamus petitions operat e d like habeas claims c halleng ing a criminal conviction a n d lie outside the scope of the PL RA.

III. Application to Washington’s P rior F ilings

F inally
, W ashing ton raise s several g lobal procedural challeng es concerning the district court’s reliance on

s c r e ening orders in a ssessing PL RA strikes. I n lig ht of p ri o r courts’ use of the screening form template, see infra n.8, we acknowledg e that o v erreliance on prior classifications can be particularly problematic. See King
, 398 F .3d at 1121; S nider

v. M elindez
, 199 F

. 3d 1 08, 115 n.4 (2d Cir. 1 999). However,

w e s et his procedural c halleng e s aside for a future d a y because, under our a

naly sis, W ashing ton has not sust a ined
any strikes under the PL RA.W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 21

W a shing ton’s preliminary dismissal, No. 2:09-CV-3052,

was a m i x e d Heck

/habeas dismissal, w hich we concluded does not qualify as a strike. S ee supra Section I I

. A. The nex t two d ismissals, Nos. 2 :10-CV-54 and 2 :10-CV-964, relate to mandamus p etitions challeng ing criminal proceeding s, which

are not “civil actions ” w i t h i n the purview of the PL RA and, like habeas petitions, do not incur strikes. See supra Section I I .C.

Nonetheless, D efendants contend that Washing ton ’s second m a

n damus petition w as dismissed for frivolousness o r maliciousness because it was nearly identical to his first. 8 W e decline to assess a strike, howe v er, because W ashing ton’s action took the f

orm of a mandamu s p e t i tion “appealing ” a criminal case. See id. The most lo gi ca l manner of r eading § 1915(g ) is to impose a sy mmetry in the statutory languag e , w h ere Cong ress was c oncerned with regu lating “ci v i l actions,” so that qualifying strikes accrue only from the same. Cf. Martin
, 9 6 F .3d at 8 5 4 (reasoning that “in c ontex t it is apparent that the word ‘appeal’ [ in 2 8 U

. S .C. § 1915(b)(1)]

means the appeal in a civil action.”); King
, 398 F

. 3 d at 1122 (holding that “dismissed habeas p etitions d o not c ount a s strikes”). B ecause W ashing ton’s second mandamus petition

was not a “civil action,” i t f a lls outside the scope o f the PL RA, a nd we do n o t co n sider its d ismissal a q ualifying strike.

8 T h e screen in g o rd er u sed in th ese d ism issals is o f lim ited assist an ce b ecau se it d oes n o t req u i re t h at a co urt enu m erat e t h e s p ecif ic P L RA g ro un d u p o n w h ich th e d ism issal is b ased

. Neith er did th e d istrict co urt b elo w iso late t

h e g ro un d s f

o r d ism i s s al, o r m ak e ex p licit f in d in g s of f riv o lity o r m alicio u sn ess. S ee Kn a p p , 7 38 F.3 d at 1 1 09

– 1 0 (“ It i s b e st p ractice f o r a d i strict co urt to ex pressly in dicate w h en a d ism issal f

alls in to

o n e o f th e th ree categ ories.”).W A S H I N G T ON V

. L .A. C T Y

. S H E R I F F ’ S D E P ’ T 22

The f inal pair of di s m i s s a ls, Nos. 2:12-CV-5873 a nd 2:12- CV-7429, were made pursuant to Y ounger , which o perates a s

a jurisdictional bar to § 1983 r elief, and does not result in a st r i k e for failure to state a claim. See supra Section I I .B

. Moreover, because a c ourt declines to ex e rcise its jurisdiction under Y ounger abstention
, it ty pically cannot make a substantive f

inding of frivolousness or maliciousne s s

. See Moore
, 657 F .3d at 8 93 (“[ T ] here is nothing necessarily frivolous or malicious in bring ing a n action for w h i c h t he
court lacks jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted)). Even so, W a s h i ng ton’s second Y ounger

barred complaint, No. 2:12-CV-7429, w as not frivolous o r malic i o u s by virtue of being repetitive, as Defendants contend. Rather, it reflects a pro se litig ant’s inartful attempt to amend the first pleading
, N o. 2:12-CV-5873, by revising his requested relief and causes of action to avoid the Y ounger bar. Neither the initial reviewing court, nor the subsequ e nt

c o u r t , made specific finding s of fri v o l o u s n e s s o r maliciousness, and we decline to do so now. As a result, we conclude that W ashing ton has n ot accrued any PL RA strikes for his prior dismissals.

CONCLUSION

W e hold that the d i s t rict court improperly a ssessed the

ex istence of prior strikes ag ainst W ashing ton. A c cording ly
, we REVERSE and REMAND for the district court to assess whether W ashing ton is otherwise entitled to proceed with his action in forma pauperis

.