Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1607-CR-1547 | December 29, 2016 Page 1 of 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Ryan W. Tanselle

Capper Tulley & Reimondo

Brownsburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew R. Elliott

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Carlvet Lee,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

December 29, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

32A04-1607-CR-1547

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Karen M. Love, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D03-1507-F2-16

Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1607-CR-1547 | December 29, 2016 Page 2 of 3

[1] Carlvet Lee appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he pleaded 

guilty to seven counts of felony drug and gun offenses. Lee argues that the trial

court abused its discretion in its determination of mitigating circumstances and 

that the sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Finding 

that Lee waived the right to challenge the sentence, we dismiss the appeal.

[2] Lee and the State entered into a plea agreement, which was accepted by the 

trial court on April 26, 2016. The plea agreement contains the following 

provision:

Defendant is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving his 

right to challenge the sentence imposed by the Court pursuant to 

this agreement on the basis that such sentence is erroneous for 

any reason. He is waiving his right to challenge the Court’s 

finding and balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors as 

well as his right to have the Court of Appeals review the sentence 

under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

Appellant’s App. p. 58-59. It is undisputed that the sentence imposed by the 

trial court was within the bounds of the terms of the plea agreement.

[3] It is well established that a defendant may waive his right to appeal his sentence 

as part of a plea agreement and that such waivers are valid and enforceable. 

E.g., Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 74-75 (Ind. 2008). Lee contends that the 

waiver is unenforceable because the record does not reveal that he was advised 

of his right to appeal an open plea before he agreed to the waiver provision. It 

is well established, however, that neither a separate advisement of rights form 

nor an additional discussion about the waiver provision are required for a valid 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1607-CR-1547 | December 29, 2016 Page 3 of 3

waiver. Id. at 76. If the written plea agreement contains an express waiver of 

the right and nothing else in the record indicates that the plea was not knowing 

and voluntary, then the waiver is valid. Id. at 76-77. Here, Lee and his 

attorney both stated that he understood the plea agreement and Lee stated 

under oath that he understood the potential sentence he faced under the plea 

agreement. Tr. p. 12-13, 45-47. Under these circumstances, we find that Lee 

has waived his right to challenge his sentence and hereby dismiss this appeal.

[4] The appeal is dismissed.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.