UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

MARKESHA MONIQUE CHASE, Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 13-5081 v. (N.D. Oklahoma) CHRIS L. DIVINE; JERRY D. HILLBURN, Defendants-Appellees, and JERRY MCGREGER; TERI KING; GREG PALMER; ALBERTSONS; C T CORPORATION, Defendants. (D.C. No. 4:13-CV -00219-JED-TLW)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TYMKOVICH , ANDERSON , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

Ms. Markesha Chase su ed, seeking documentati on and review of her payroll compensation into an invest ment fund during her employment at a grocery in the mid- to la te-1990s. The district cour t granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a valid claim, hol ding that the claims were

* This order and judgment does not constitute precedent. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 22, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 time-barred and that any amendment woul d be futile. Ms. Chase appeals these rulings, and we affirm. Ms. Chase’s Pleadings and the District Court Proceedings The Plaintiff names th ree store manage rs and the cor porate owner as defendants and makes the foll owing factual allegations: There was a transfer of hours worked by me into an account that currently needs to be re view, based on hour s achieved and work I should be full compensated. I wo rked during the years of 1995 of the month of Nove mber and all of 1997 through December and again in of 1998 and 1999.

. . . . Jerry Hillburn was helping me to make a legit transfer along with Chris L. Divine into my legal social security account on the grounds of working under a school honor mention under employee identification number [] and [] these services were honor under penalty c ode and service I co nduct myself in a well manor. Based on these allegations, she requests the following relief: To receive full compensation as time service on eligibility to retain work history and hedge fund The complaint does not identify a ny legal basis for this relief. After the Defendants filed their moti on to dismiss, Ms. Chase filed a socalled motion “to proceed,” which the district court c onstrued as a motion for a hearing. There Ms. Chase st ates that while she worked at the grocery, it allowed employees to invest in a fund through payroll deductions. She notes that she has3 not received requested docum entation related to those investment s and argues that she is protected under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206. The district court held a hearing on th e Defendants’ motion to dismiss. At that hearing, Ms. Chase cl arified that she had worked at a grocery in Tulsa between 1995 and 1999 and that her compla int is based on a transfer of hours while she was employed ther e. Ms. Chase advised th e court that the underlying misconduct ended in 1999. The claims were dismissed with prejudice for failure to stat e a valid claim.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In orderi ng dismissal with prejudice, the court concluded that Ms. Ch ase’s complaint did not state a cognizable clai m for relief and that amendment would be futile because the limita tions period ha d expired on the claims under the Fair Labor Standard s Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255. Ms. Chase’s Arguments on Appeal On appeal, Ms. Chase argues that th e district court er red by failing to correctly apply “worker conser vatoral law” or to conduct a trial. We reject these arguments. We engage in de novo re view over the dismissal; and, in considering whether the dismissal should have been with prejudice, we review the ruling only for an abuse of discretion. See Sutton v. Ut ah State Sch. fo r Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (reviewing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de4 novo); Grossman v. Novell, Inc. , 120 F.3d 1112, 1126 (10th Cir. 1997) (reviewing a dismissal with prejudice fo r an abuse of discretion). When considering a moti on to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), th e district court must “accept as true all well-pleaded factual alle gations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Smith v. United States , 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, the comp laint “must contain sufficie nt factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a clai m to relief that is pl ausible on it s face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard require s a plaintiff to plead “fac tual content that allows the court to draw the reas onable inference that the de fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Because Ms. Chase proceeds pro se, we liberally construe her pleadings, as the district court did. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But this relaxe d pleading standard does no t excuse a pl aintiff from complying with the pleading requirements of Iqbal , 1 and the distri ct court cannot become an advocate by c onstructing argume nts on behalf of the plaintiff. 2

1 See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Ci r. 1991) (noting that “a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury”).

2 Garrett v. Selby Con nor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).5 When we confine ourselves to the allegations in the complaint, we conclude that they do not state a plausible claim. T hough the Plaint iff points to “worker conservatoral law,” she does not say what that is and we ca nnot ascertain any legal error. We conc lude that the district c ourt correctly dismissed Ms. Chase’s complaint for failur e to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We also agree with the district cour t’s conclusion that Ms. Chase’s claims under the Fair Labor Standa rds Act are time-barred. Under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), claims accruing under the Act have a two- or three-year period of limitations. Ms. Chase told the district court that her claims e nded in 1999, and she did not sue until April 2013, over a decade after the three-year limitations period would have run. Because the claims are time-barred, we conclude that am endment would be futile. If a complaint fa ils to state a claim and am endment would be futile, dismissal with prejud ice is appropriate. Grossman v. Novell , 120 F.3d 1112, 1126 (10th Cir. 1997). Therefore, we af firm the dismissal with prejudice.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge