UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4921

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

IRFAN M. JAMEEL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief

District Judge. (2:13-cr-00098-HCM-LRL-1)

Submitted: August 28, 2015 Decided: October 7, 2015

Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Brian Donnelly, J. BRIAN DONNELLY, P.C., Virginia Beach, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States 

Attorney, Robert J. Krask, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Irfan M. Jameel of wire fraud affecting a 

financial institution, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343, 3293 (2012) (Count 

1); financial institution fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344 (2012) 

(Counts 2 and 3); and using a false social security number, 18 

U.S.C. § 2, 48 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (2012) (Count 4). Jameel 

received a 108-month sentence. Pursuant to the indictment, the 

district court also entered a forfeiture money judgment in the 

amount of $3,927,591.66. On appeal, Jameel alleges that (1) the 

offenses in the indictment were impermissibly joined and, if 

not, the district court abused its discretion in denying his

motion to sever Count 4; (2) the district court erred in denying 

his proposed jury instructions regarding state of mind; and (3) 

the district court erred in permitting the Government to obtain 

a money judgment in lieu of forfeiture of specific property and, 

if not, he was entitled to submit the monetary determination to 

a jury. Jameel has also filed a pro se supplemental brief. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm. 

Jameel first claims that the district court erred in ruling 

that Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) permitted joinder of Count 4 of the 

indictment, fraudulent use of a social security number, with the 

other three counts of the indictment. He further claims that, 

even if proper, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14, the joinder was 

prejudicial because the evidence associated with the wire fraud 
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and bank fraud charges would not have been admissible at a 

separate trial on the unrelated charge of fraudulent use of a 

social security number. 

Rule 8(a) provides that two or more offenses may be charged 

in the same indictment when the offenses “are of the same or 

similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, 

or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or 

plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). We interpret the second and 

third alternative prongs “flexibly, requiring that the joined 

offenses have a logical relationship to one another.” United 

States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 385 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 

1842 (2015). “Joined offenses have a logical relationship to 

one another for Rule 8(a) purposes, when consideration of 

discrete counts against the defendant paints an incomplete 

picture of the defendant’s criminal enterprise.” Id. (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Because of the prospect 

of duplicating witness testimony, impaneling additional jurors, 

and wasting limited judicial resources, joinder is the rule 

rather than the exception. United States v. Hawkins, 589 F.3d 

694, 700 (4th Cir. 2009). 

 "The question of '[w]hether offenses in an indictment are 

improperly joined under Rule 8(a) is a question of law reviewed 

de novo.'" United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 768 (4th Cir. 
4

2011) (quoting United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378, 384–85 

(4th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2740 (2012). If 

joinder was improper, we “review this nonconstitutional error 

for harmlessness, and reverse unless the misjoinder resulted in 

no ‘actual prejudice’ to the defendants ‘because it had [no] 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.’” United States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 412 

(4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. 

Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). If joinder was proper, the 

defendant can still challenge the joinder under Rule 14, which 

provides that “[i]f the joinder of offenses . . . appears to 

prejudice a defendant or the government, the court may order 

separate trials of counts. . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(). Under 

Rule 14, a properly joined claim can be severed only if there is 

a "serious risk" that joining the claims would "prevent the jury 

from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." 

Blair, 661 F.3d at 768. We have reviewed the district court’s 

order denying Jameel’s misjoinder motion and motion to sever and 

conclude that joinder was proper and that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Jameel’s motion to sever. 

Jameel next claims that the district court erred by 

refusing to allow a jury instruction that distinguished a mens 

rea of carelessness from knowledge. He also sought an 

instruction requiring the jury to find, in order to convict, 
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that Jameel had knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. 

Jameel’s theory of the case below was that he had a subjective 

belief that he was accurately representing his income to the 

lenders named in Counts 1, 2, and 3, and that he was authorized 

to use his father’s social security number in the manner that he 

did for purposes of Count 4. His defense was that he did not 

knowingly execute a scheme to defraud, but acted because of 

ignorance, mistake, or carelessness. 

With respect to Counts 1-4, the court instructed the jury 

that Jameel must have acted “knowingly”:

The term “knowingly” as used in these instructions in 

describing the alleged state of mind of the defendant, 

means that he was conscious and aware of his actions, 

realized what he was doing or what was happening 

around him, and did not act because of ignorance, 

mistake, or accident.

Jameel unsuccessfully moved to insert “carelessness” in addition 

to “ignorance, mistake, or accident.” 

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 

decision whether to give a proffered jury instruction. United 

States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir. 2009). The court 

commits reversible error in declining to give a proffered jury 

instruction if the instruction was correct, not substantially 

covered by the remainder of the court’s jury charge, and 

addressed “some point in the trial so important, that failure to 

give the requested instruction seriously impaired the 
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defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” United States v. 

Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 206 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In 

making this inquiry, we review jury instructions holistically, 

considering whether, taken as a whole and in the context of the 

entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the 

controlling law. United States v. Hickman, 626 F.3d 756, 771 

(4th Cir. 2010). A district court errs in refusing to give a 

jury instruction regarding a defense only if the instruction is 

both an accurate statement of the law and has an evidentiary 

foundation. United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 356 (4th 

Cir. 2012). Applying this standard, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying the proposed instruction. 

To the extent Jameel sought an instruction requiring the 

jury to find, in order to convict, that Jameel had knowledge 

that his conduct was unlawful, this argument too is unavailing. 

See United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 561 (4th Cir. 

2000) (“The conventional mens rea of criminal statutes . . . 

requires not that a defendant know that his conduct was illegal, 

but only that he know the facts that make his conduct illegal.” 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore 

conclude that the district court did not err in refusing 

Jameel’s proposed jury instructions. 

Last, Jameel argues on appeal that because the proceeds of 

his offenses could be traced to real property (the Richardson 
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Road property), the district court erroneously entered a 

forfeiture of money judgment against him in the amount of 

$3,927,591.66. He further claims the entry of a money judgment 

deprived him of his right to a jury determination on the 

forfeiture of such property. 

In an appeal from criminal forfeiture proceedings, we 

review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and 

conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 

352, 363 (4th Cir. 2010). To obtain a forfeiture order, the 

Government must establish a nexus between the property and the 

crime by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 364; Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A). A court’s forfeiture determination may 

be based on record evidence or any additional evidence submitted 

by the parties and accepted by the court as relevant and 

reliable. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(B).

The indictment in this case contained a forfeiture 

allegation notifying Jameel that upon conviction of the offenses

charged in Counts 1 through 3, he would forfeit “any property, 

real or personal, from proceeds obtained directly or indirectly, 

as a result of or traceable to, such violations.” The court 

held a hearing on the Government’s motion for preliminary 

forfeiture of property and, by written order, granted the 

Government’s motion
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Jameel’s first argument that a money judgment was 

inappropriate because the specific property that constitutes the 

proceeds of the offense is still available is foreclosed by this 

court’s decision in United States v. Blackman, 746 F.3d 137, 145 

(4th Cir. 2014) (“It is well settled that nothing in the 

applicable forfeiture statutes suggests that money judgments are 

forbidden. . . . Such judgments would seem especially 

appropriate where physical assets derived from the conspiracy 

are no longer traceable or available.” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). The proceeds from the Richardson 

Road property were no longer available as Jameel pledged the 

property as collateral for his loans. A trustee held the title 

for the benefit of the secured credits. Furthermore, there was 

negative equity in the home of at least $1,163,524.42. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude that a money judgment was 

appropriate in this case. See id. at 144 (“Forfeiture is 

calculated on the basis of the total proceeds of a crime, not 

the percentage of those proceeds remaining in the defendant’s 

possession at the time of sentencing.”).

To the extent Jameel claims he was entitled to a jury trial 

to determine the amount of the money judgment, his argument is 

without merit. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the 

government seeks a personal money judgment, the court must 

determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered 
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to pay”); see also United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1277 

(11th Cir. 2013) (right to jury trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(b)(5) applies only to specific property, not to the amount 

of a monetary judgment).

Accordingly, we affirm Jameel’s convictions and sentence. 

We have reviewed Jameel’s pro se supplemental brief and discern 

from it no valid basis to overturn the criminal judgment. We 

further deny Jameel’s pro se motions to compel, to strike 

counsel’s opening brief, for de novo review of the entire case, 

for leave to file a formal brief, to exceed limitations for such 

brief, and for transcript at government expense, and all other 

pending motions. We also deny as moot his pro se motion for 

stay pending appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED