Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed January 28, 2021.

In the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-19-00181-CR

JOHN KEVIN DUFOUR, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 208th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1522339

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant John Kevin Dufour appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting 

him of the first-degree felony of continuous sexual abuse of a young child, for 

which the jury assessed punishment at imprisonment for 50 years. See Jessica 

Lunsford Act, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 593, § 1.17, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1120, 1127–

28 (adding Penal Code section 21.02),

1 amended by Act of Apr. 7, 2011, 82d Leg., 

1

In 2007 the legislature created the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child

or children in response to an expressed need to address sexual assaults against young children 
2

R.S., ch. 1, § 6.04, sec. 21.02(c), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 15–16 (since amended; 

hereinafter “2011 Penal Code § 21.02”).

.2

In a single issue, appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State did not prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the two acts of sexual abuse alleged to have occurred were 

committed at least 30-days apart. 2011 Penal Code § 21.02(d). We conclude that 

the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2011, C.B. was nine. She lived in Houston with her parents and three 

siblings. Because her parents worked long hours and her mother often worked 

nights, she stayed with her maternal grandparents—appellant and his wife—after 

school several times per week and occasionally on weekends. Appellant and his

wife lived in apartments across the street from C.B.’s family until March 2014, 

when C.B.’s family moved to a different apartment nearby. Sometimes she would 

stay with her grandparents along with all her siblings, and on occasion she would 

stay with her grandparents alone. C.B.’s grandmother also worked evening and 

overnights shifts which left appellant as the only adult in the apartment on those 

occasions.

In 2014, when C.B. was eleven, C.B. told her mother that appellant had been

touching her on “her chest and on her behind.” C.B.’s mother immediately severed 

who are typically unable to give precise dates when there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse. See

Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring) (“Perhaps 

the Texas Legislature can address this conundrum and consider enacting a new penal statute that 

focuses upon a continuing course of conduct crime—a sexually abusive relationship that is 

marked by a pattern or course of conduct of various sexual acts.”).

2 This statute was amended in 2017. Though the 2017 amendments do not apply to this 

case, the amendments are immaterial to the issue raised by appellant. See Act of May 28, 2017,

85th Leg., R.S., ch. 685, § 31, sec. 21.02(b) (adding “regardless of whether the actor knows the

age of the victim at the time of the offense”), 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 3038, 3056; Act of May 26, 

2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 1038, § 2, sec. 21.02(b) (adding “regardless of whether the actor 

knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense”), 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4072, 4072.
3

contact between appellant and all her children, though she did not make a police 

report. In 2015, C.B. told her aunt about the abuse and C.B.’s aunt urged her 

mother to make a police report. C.B.’s mother reported the abuse to the police

shortly thereafter. As part of the police investigation, C.B. participated in a 

forensic interview in 2016 during which she revealed that her grandfather would 

touch her breasts and vagina under her clothes with his hand too many times to 

count. C.B. told Clara Rivers, the forensic interviewer, that the sexual abuse 

occurred for approximately five years and her grandfather gave her money for 

letting him touch her. C.B. told Rivers that she did not remember exactly when it 

started, but she recalls being very young. C.B. told Rivers the abuse stopped when 

she was 12.

Defendant was charged by indictment alleging continuous sexual abuse of a 

young child, which identified the constituent offenses of aggravated sexual assault 

of a child occurring on or about October 1, 2011, as well as an act constituting the

offense of indecency with a child by contact on or about October 1, 2014. At trial,

C.B. was 16. She testified that she did not remember the “exact first time”

appellant sexually abused her, but testified about four specific incidents between 

2011 and 2014.

The first incident occurred when C.B. and her siblings were watching

television with appellant. She recalls sitting on the couch with her grandfather and 

he was touching her vagina under her clothes while her siblings were in the room. 

The second incident occurred in appellant’s room while C.B. was laying on the 

bed. Appellant removed C.B.’s clothes and licked her vagina. C.B. could not 

remember when the second incident occurred in relation to the first incident. C.B. 

also described a third incident in which she accompanied appellant to the grocery 

store in his truck. In this circumstance, C.B. recalled asking appellant to touch her 
4

and he complied by touching her vagina under clothes. She did not recall when the

third incident occurred. C.B. also testified to a fourth incident in which appellant 

“licked her boobs” while she was in appellant’s room. C.B. testified the abuse did 

not happen every time she went to appellant’s home. Though C.B. was unable to 

specify any time period for the four incidents that occurred, she did testify that the 

incidents happened “less” after her family moved to a new apartment complex in 

2014, because she did not see appellant as often.

II. ARGUMENT

In his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient

to sustain his conviction for continuous sexual assault of a child. Specifically, 

appellant argues that the State did not prove that at least two acts of sexual abuse 

specified in the indictment occurred over a period of at least thirty days.

A. Standard of review

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a 

reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences 

therefrom, a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979);

Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Jourdan v.

State, 428 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (jury must find every constituent 

element of charged offense). We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Isassi v. State, 330

S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the jury’s resolution of any

conflicting inferences from the evidence and presume that it resolved such 

conflicts in favor of the judgment. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Whatley v. State, 445

S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Although juries may not speculate about
5

the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable 

inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence 

presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16).

We measure sufficiency to support a conviction by comparing the evidence 

presented at trial to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically 

correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge reflects the governing law, the 

charging instrument, the State’s burden of proof and theories of liability, and an 

adequate description of the offense for the particular case. Id. In conducting a 

sufficiency review, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.

Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).

B. Applicable law

To establish continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State must prove the

following elements:

(1) the defendant “commit[ted] two or more acts of sexual abuse”

(2) “during a period that is 30 or more days in duration,” and

(3) “at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, 

the [defendant was] 17 years of age or older and the victim [was] a 

child younger than 14 years of age.”

2011 Penal Code § 21.02(b). “Acts of sexual abuse” are listed in the statute and, as 

relevant here, include indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault. See

2011 Penal Code § 21.02(c).

A person commits aggravated sexual assault if he intentionally or knowingly 

causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual 

organ of another person, including the actor. Act of Apr. 7, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., 
6

ch. 1, § 6.05, sec. 22.021, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 16 (former Tex. Penal Code 

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B), since amended). A person commits indecency 

with a child if he engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to 

engage in sexual contact. Act of May 18, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 260, § 1, sec. 

21.11(a)(1), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 710, 710 (former Tex. Penal Code § 21.11(a)(1), 

since amended). Sexual contact is defined to include, as relevant here, any 

touching by a person, including touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or 

any part of the genitals of a child with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 

desire of any person. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(c)(1).

3

C. Analysis

Appellant argues that the State presented no evidence that the two acts 

alleged in the indictment took place during a period that is thirty or more days in 

duration. The indictment alleges:

JOHN KEVIN DUFOUR, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore 

on or about OCTOBER 1, 2011, did then and there unlawfully, during 

a period of time of thirty or more days in duration, commit at least 

two acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than fourteen years of 

age, including an act constituting the offense of AGGRAVATED

SEXUAL ASSAULT OF A CHILD, committed against C.B. on or 

about OCTOBER 1, 2011, and an act constituting the offense of 

INDECENCY WITH A CHILD BY CONTACT, committed against 

C.B. on or about OCTOBER 1, 2014, and the Defendant was at least 

seventeen years of age at the time of the commission of each of those 

acts.

C.B. testified to four specific incidents of sexual abuse, one of which 

satisfies the elements of an aggravated sexual assault. At least one of the other 

three incidents recounted by C.B. satisfies the requirements for indecency with a 

3 For purposes of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of young child or children, an 

“act of sexual abuse” does not include touching, including touching through clothing, the breast 

of a child. 2011 Penal Code § 21.02(c)(2).
7

child by contact. Though C.B. was unable to provide any time frame for any of the 

incidents in her trial testimony, C.B.’s testimony established that the sexual abuse 

occurred before and after the family’s move in March 2014 to a new apartment 

complex.

4 C.B. testified that after the move “there was less, like—because I

wouldn’t see him as often as I would at Shadow Ridge.”

5

The jury also heard testimony from Clara Rivers, the forensic clinician 

interviewer, as an outcry witness. Through Rivers, the jury learned C.B. described

appellant’s touching of her vagina as occurring over approximately a five-year

period and ending when she was twelve. C.B. was not able to recall when exactly 

the abuse began. She described herself to Rivers as “just really young,” but said it 

may have started when she was in the third or fourth grade. C.B. told Rivers that 

appellant touched her too many times to count. C.B. also told Rivers that appellant 

paid C.B. different amounts of money, which she believed was related to the length

of time she allowed appellant to touch her. Rivers’s testimony established a pattern 

of continuous sexual abuse.

While C.B. did not tell Rivers of the incident in which appellant licked her 

vagina, Rivers also testified that children, like C.B., may give partial disclosures

because they do not feel comfortable or are not ready. Rivers described that during 

the interview process the interviewer would attempt to develop a rapport with the 

child and make the child feel comfortable. Rivers interviewed C.B. once in 2016. 

The jury could have concluded that both C.B.’s disclosures at trial and her 

disclosures to Rivers were partial disclosures of the sexual abuse experienced by 

4 C.B.’s mother testified that the family moved in March 2014.

5 C.B. was never asked at trial about the time period over which the sexual abuse 

occurred. She was asked only when the incidents occurred, what grade she was in and how far 

apart in time two of the incidents occurred. She responded that she did not know to all questions 

about timing.
8

C.B. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07 (providing conviction for sexual 

assault of child is “supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim”).

Taking the cumulative force of C.B.’s testimony together with Rivers’s 

testimony, the jury knew that incidents of sexual abuse occurred over a multi-year 

period beginning around the time that C.B. was in the third or fourth grade. 

Rivers’s testimony established that appellant’s touching of C.B.’s vagina was part

of a continuous pattern of sexual abuse, and not an isolated incident that occurred

at a singular point in time. Given the multi-year pattern of conduct on the part of 

appellant, the jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant licked C.B.’s 

vagina during the time period of sexual abuse she identified for Rivers. 

See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15–17 (explaining that “an inference is a conclusion 

reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”

and that appellate courts must consider whether inferences are reasonable in light 

of the “combined and cumulative force of all the evidence”). Given that C.B. told 

Rivers the touching of her vagina occurred over multiple years, too many times to 

count, the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the licking of 

C.B.’s vagina occurred at least thirty days before or after one of the incidents in

which appellant touched C.B.’s vagina with his hand.

Appellant urges us to find that the evidence is not sufficient to support the 

verdict because even if some “activity” or touching may have taken place in the 

three-year time frame identified by Rivers, nothing established that the two acts 

specified in the indictment occurred at least thirty days apart. The essence of 

appellant’s argument is that because C.B. did not tell Rivers about the licking 

incident, Rivers’s testimony cannot prove up timing for the aggravated assault.

Appellant also correctly references that C.B. was never able to provide a specific 

time frame—or even an approximate one—to show that the two acts specified in 
9

the indictment occurred at least thirty days apart. However, appellant’s argument 

requires us to disregard Rivers’s testimony and look at the testimony of each 

witness in isolation, which conflicts with the governing standard of review 

requiring us to view the “cumulative force” of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (citing Johnson v. State, 871 

S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (“Each fact need not point directly and

independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all 

the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.”)).

Though the evidence establishing the timing of the two predicate acts

adduced by the State was not directly established by any witness, it satisfies the 

standard that governs our review. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19. Here, the jury 

heard Rivers’s testimony about appellant’s pattern of abuse and reached the 

conclusion that the two predicate acts occurred at least thirty days apart. Viewing

the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a rational jury could 

have evaluated the cumulative force of the evidence and determined that the two 

predicate acts occurred at least thirty days apart beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Therefore, we hold the evidence is sufficient to establish the offense of continuous

sexual abuse of a young child and overrule appellant’s sole issue.
10

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Charles A. Spain

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.

Do Not Publish —Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).