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to begin on the information on January 14, 2013. Three days before trial, 

the State obtained an indictment charging petitioner with the same 

offenses contained in the information and trial was scheduled to begin on 

those charges on March 18, 2013, in a different judicial department. The 

State then moved to voluntarily dismiss the information without 

prejudice. Petitioner moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice 

contending, among other things,' that any further delay would violate his 

Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. At a hearing on petitioner's 

motion, the district court declined to rule on petitioner's speedy-trial claim 

and concluded that the claim was not properly before that judicial 

department. We conclude that this was error. 

"Any defense or objection which is capable of determination 

without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion." 

See NRS 174.095. This includes a claim of constitutional magnitude. See 

generally State v. Erenyi, 85 Nev. 285, 287, 454 P.2d 101, 102 (1969) 

(affirming district court's decision to grant defendant's motion to dismiss 

charges because defendant was denied his constitutional right to a speedy 

trial). "[T]he proper remedy for a violation of a defendant's constitutional 

speedy-trial rights is dismissal of the [charging document] with prejudice." 

failed to satisfy his burden with 

Winkle v. Warden, 127 Nev. , 

Any claim alleging conscious 

rights should be brought in a 

'We conclude that petitioner has 

respect to his other claims of error. See 

 , 269 P.3d 898, 899-900 (2011). 

indifference to petitioner's procedural 

challenge to the subsequent indictment. 

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2 
U.S. v. Young, 657 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, U.S. 

132 S.Ct. 1647 (2012); see also Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 

(1973) (considering the severity of this remedy but concluding that 

dismissal must remain "the only possible remedy" (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Had the district court considered petitioner's motion to 

dismiss and ruled in his favor, the State would be precluded from 

proceeding with the same charges in a separate charging document. See 

Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("[D]ismissal 

based on a finding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been 

denied bars all further prosecution of the accused for the same offense."). 

Therefore, we conclude that the district court disregarded its duty to rule 

on petitioner's constitutional speedy-trial claim before permitting the 

State to dismiss the information without prejudice. See NRS 34.160; State 

v. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. „ 267 P.3d 777, 779-80 (2011) 

(discussing when a writ of mandamus will issue). Although petitioner 

asks this court to order the district court to dismiss the information with 

prejudice, a constitutional speedy-trial determination is a fact intensive 

exercise and the record before us is insufficient to determine whether 

petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. We 

therefore grant the petition for extraordinary relief, in part, and direct the 

clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus instructing the district 

3 
Gibbons 

Saitta 

court to hold a hearing and determine whether petitioner was denied his 

constitutional right to a speedy tria1. 2,3 

It is so ORDERED. 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Bush & Levy, LLC 

Oronoz & Ericsson 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

2We express no opinion as to whether petitioner and the State can 

satisfy their respective burdens under the Sixth Amendment. See Doggett 

v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992); Redd v. Sowders, 809 F.2d 

1266, 1269 (6th Cir. 1987). 

3We note that the petitioner has filed a motion for leave to file a 

reply to the State's answer and the State has opposed that motion. Given 

our resolution of the petition, we deny the petitioner's motion for leave. 

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