# ***********************************************The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it wasreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certificationis the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject tomodification and technical correction prior to officialpublication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the advance release version of an opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ***********************************************1

4 56

7 

## ROCHDI MAGHFOUR v. CITY OF WATERBURY 8 

## (SC 20502) 9 10 Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, 11 Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js. 12 13 Syllabus 4 15 The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant city, sought to resolve a dispute 16 concerning a lien the city placed on certain settlement proceeds that 17 he had received as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred 18 in 2016. At all relevant times, the city was self-insured and paid for the 19 medical care that the plaintiff received in connection with the accident. 20 In July, 2017, the legislature passed an amendment (P.A. 17-165, § 1) to 21 a statute (§ 7-464) concerning group insurance benefits for municipal 22 employees that allowed a self-insured city that provides health benefits 23 for its employees to file a lien on the portion of any settlement proceeds 24 that represents payment for medical expenses incurred by a city25 employee when such expenses result from the negligence or reckless26 ness of a third party. Later in July, 2017, the plaintiff filed an action 27 against the third-party tortfeasor who had caused the plaintiff to sustain 28 injuries in the accident. Thereafter, on October 1, 2017, P.A. 17-165, § 1, 29 became effective. In October, 2018, the city filed a notice of lien, claiming 30 a right to reimbursement for amounts that it had paid for the plaintiff’s 31 medical expenses from any judgment or settlement the plaintiff might 32 receive arising from the accident. Approximately one week later, the 33 plaintiff settled his civil action against the third-party tortfeasor. The 34 plaintiff then brought the present action, claiming that P.A. 17-165, § 1, 35 did not authorize the lien filed by the city because the plaintiff’s injuries36 occurred and his action against the third-party tortfeasor was com37 menced before the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1. The trial court38 granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judg39 ment thereon, concluding, inter alia, that the legislature did not expressly 40 indicate that it intended for P.A. 17-165, § 1, to apply retroactively to 41 pending actions and, therefore, that the statute (§ 55-3) precluding a 42 new law that imposes any new obligation from being construed to have 43 retroactive effect barred the city’s lien. On the city’s appeal from the 44 trial court’s judgment, held that the trial court properly granted the45 plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, as that court correctly deter46 mined that the city’s lien stemmed from an improper, retroactive applica47 tion of P.A. 17-165, § 1: the legislature did not explicitly provide that 48 P.A. 17-165, § 1, should apply retroactively, and, because that public act 49 created a new right for a self-insured municipality to assert a lien to 50 recover medical expenses that it has paid and eliminated the right of a51 municipal employee to retain sums that he or she recovers from a third52 party tortfeasor if those sums represent medical expenses paid by the 53 municipality, P.A. 17-165, § 1, was substantive, and, pursuant to § 55-3, 54 could operate prospectively only; moreover, there was no merit to the 55 city’s claim that allowing it to place a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement 56 proceeds would not effect a retroactive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1,57 in view of the fact that the plaintiff settled his action against the third58 party tortfeasor after the effective date of that public act, as the settle59 ment was not independent of the motor vehicle accident that ultimately60 led to the settlement and that occurred prior to the public act’s effec61 tive date. 62 63 Argued December 8, 2020—officially released August 3, 2021* 64

65 Procedural History 67

68 

## Action for interpleader to resolve a dispute concern69 

## ing a lien claimed by the defendant on certain settlement 70 

## proceeds, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial 71 

## district of Waterbury, where the court, Roraback, J ., 72 

## granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, 73 

## denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,74 

## and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the 75 

## defendant appealed. Affirmed. 6 

## Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appel78 

## lant (defendant).

79 

## Jonathan H. Dodd, for the appellee (plaintiff). 80182 Opinion 3

84 

## MULLINS, J. The defendant, the city of Waterbury 85 

## (city), appeals from the judgment of the trial court ren86 

## dered in favor of the plaintiff, Rochdi Maghfour. On 87 

## appeal, the city contends that the trial court improperly 88 

## granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 89 

## because it erroneously concluded that General Statutes 90 

## § 7-464, as amended by § 1 of No. 17-165 of the 2017 91 

## Public Acts (P.A. 17-165), did not authorize the city’s 92 

## lien in this case. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm 93 

## the judgment of the trial court.

94 

## The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial 95 

## court and contained in the record, and procedural his96 

## tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On 97 

## June 20, 2016, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle 98 

## accident. He was an employee of the city, which is a 99 

## self-insured municipality. Therefore, the city paid for 100 

## medical care resulting from his injuries.

101 

## On July 14, 2017, the plaintiff initiated an action 102 

## against the third-party tortfeasor who had caused his 103 

## injuries in the motor vehicle accident. Earlier that 104 

## month, the legislature had enacted P.A. 17-165, § 1, 105 

## which amended § 7-464 by adding subsections (c) and 106 

## (d).1 

## See P.A. 17-165, § 1; 60 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 2017 Sess., 107 

## pp. 3076–77, 3101–3102; 60 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2017 Sess., 108 

## pp. 5329–35. The new subsections allow a self-insured 109 

## city, town, or borough to file a lien on the portions of 110 

## judgments or settlements that represent payment for 111 

## medical expenses incurred by its employees when such 112 

## expenses result from the negligence or recklessness of 113 

## a third party. See P.A. 17-165, § 1. Public Act 17-165, 114 

## § 1, had an effective date of October 1, 2017.

115 

## After the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1, the city 116 

## filed a notice of lien dated October 15, 2018, with the 117 

## plaintiff’s attorney. In that notice, the city claimed a 118 

## right to reimbursement of medical expenses for which 119 

## it had paid from any judgment or settlement the plaintiff 120 

## might receive arising from his June 20, 2016 motor vehi121 

## cle accident. Thereafter, on October 23, 2018, the plain122 

## tiff settled his civil action against the third-party tortfea123 

## sor.

124 

## Following the settlement, the plaintiff and the city 125 

## could not reach an agreement to resolve the issue of 126 

## whether the city was entitled to a lien on the settlement 127 

## for the amount of the medical expenses it had paid. 128 

## Consequently, the plaintiff initiated the present action 129 

## in the trial court contesting the validity of the city’s lien 130 

## on the proceeds of his settlement.2 

## In his petition, the 131 

## plaintiff claimed that § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17- 132 

## 165, § 1, did not authorize the lien filed by the city 133 

## because the plaintiff’s injury occurred and his action 134 

## against the third-party tortfeasor was commenced 135 

## before the effective date of the act.

136 

## Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The137 

## trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary 138 

## judgment and denied the city’s motion for summary 139 

## judgment. In doing so, the trial court concluded that 140 

## the legislature did not expressly indicate that it intended 141 

## for P.A. 17-165, § 1, to apply retroactively to pending 142 

## actions and, therefore, that General Statutes §§ 1-1 (u)3 143 

## and 55-34 

## barred the lien from affecting pending litiga144 

## tion and from applying retroactively. This appeal fol145 

## lowed.5

146 

## On appeal, the city asserts that the trial court improp147 

## erly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg148 

## ment because the plain language and legislative intent 149 

## of § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, indicate that 150 

## the city’s lien would apply to the proceeds of the plain151 

## tiff’s settlement reached after the act’s effective date. 152 

## The city contends that, because the plaintiff reached 153 

## his settlement after the effective date of P.A. 17-165, 154 

## § 1, and the plain language of the statute applies to 155 

## settlements, its lien under the act would not operate 156 

## retroactively in the present case. According to the city’s 157 

## reasoning, P.A. 17-165, § 1, simply applies to any settle158 

## ments reached after the effective date of the act. The 159 

## plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly deter160 

## mined that the city was not authorized to file a lien on 161 

## the proceeds of his settlement in this matter because 162 

## § 55-3 bars P.A. 17-165, § 1, from applying retroactively 163 

## and § 1-1 (u) prevents it from applying to existing litiga164 

## tion.

165 

## We begin by setting forth the standard of review 166 

## governing this appeal. ‘‘The scope of our review of the 167 

## trial court’s decision to grant the [plaintiff’s] motion 168 

## for summary judgment is plenary.’’ Shoreline Shellfish, 169 

## LLC v. Branford, 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d 470 170 

## (2020). ‘‘To the extent that the trial court’s decision 171 

## . . . requires us to construe a [statute], our review is 172 

## also plenary and is guided by our well established legal 173 

## principles regarding statutory construction. . . . In 174 

## construing statutes, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us 175 

## first to consider the text of the statute itself and its 176 

## relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such 177 

## text and considering such relationship, the meaning of 178 

## such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield 179 

## absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of 180 

## the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ 181 

## (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 182 

## Id., 410–11.

183 

## Both the plaintiff and the city agree that their compet184 

## ing motions for summary judgment gave rise to no genu185 

## ine issue as to any material fact. Thus, the issue of 186 

## whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s 187 

## motion for summary judgment turns solely on a point 188 

## of statutory interpretation, namely, whether, as a matter 189 

## of law, § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, autho190 

## rizes the city to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement 191 

## from his civil action against the third-party tortfeasor.192 

## As instructed by § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with 193 

## the text of § 7-464 (c), which provides in relevant part 194 

## that ‘‘[a] self-insured town, city or borough that provides 195 

## group health benefits for its employees has a lien on 196 

## that part of a judgment or settlement that represents 197 

## payment for economic loss for medical, hospital and 198 

## prescription expenses incurred by its employees and 199 

## their covered dependents and family members when 200 

## such expenses result from the negligence or reckless201 

## ness of a third party. . . .’’ As we noted previously, 202 

## P.A. 17-165, § 1, provided that the amendment to § 7-464 203 

## became effective on October 1, 2017. The legislature, 204 

## however, did not expressly indicate whether it intended 205 

## the amendment to apply retroactively to events that 206 

## occurred before its effective date, such as the plaintiff’s 207 

## motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the plain language 208 

## of the statute does not answer the question on appeal, 209 

## and we must examine the relationship of § 7-464 (c) 210 

## with our law governing the retroactivity of statutes.

211 

## ‘‘In considering the question of whether a statute may 212 

## be applied retroactively, we are governed by certain 213 

## well settled principles, [pursuant to] which our ultimate 214 

## focus is the intent of the legislature in enacting the 215 

## statute. . . . [O]ur point of departure is . . . § 55-3 216 

## . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. 217 

## Volvo Excavators AB, 333 Conn. 283, 292, 215 A.3d 218 

## 149 (2019). Section 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the 219 

## general statutes, not previously contained in the stat220 

## utes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on 221 

## any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a 222 

## retrospective effect.’’ ‘‘[W]e have uniformly interpreted 223 

## § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that stat224 

## utes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospec225 

## tively only. . . . In civil cases, however, unless consid226 

## erations of good sense and justice dictate otherwise, it 227 

## is presumed that procedural statutes will be applied 228 

## retrospectively. . . . [Although] there is no precise def229 

## inition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is 230 

## generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines 231 

## and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes 232 

## the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining 233 

## redress. . . . Procedural statutes . . . therefore leave 234 

## the preexisting scheme intact.’’6 

## (Internal quotation 235 

## marks omitted.) King v. Volvo Excavators AB, supra, 236 

## 292.

237 

## Because the legislature did not expressly provide that 238 

## P.A. 17-165, § 1, should apply retroactively, the pre239 

## sumption stands that, if § 7-464, as amended by the act, 240 

## affects substantive rights, then it shall apply prospec241 

## tively only. See id. Here, then, we must determine whether 242 

## § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, affects a sub243 

## stantive or procedural right in order to answer the ques244 

## tion of whether the city is entitled to the lien in this case.

245 

## Prior to the passage of P.A. 17-165, § 1, a self-insured 246 

## municipality did not have the express right to assert a247 

## lien to recover medical expenses paid as benefits from 248 

## the proceeds of an employee’s litigation against third249 

## party tortfeasors.7 

## See, e.g., P.A. 17-165, § 1; see also, 250 

## e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Plan251 

## ning and Development, Pt. 1, 2017 Sess., p. 247, remarks 252 

## of Representative Stephanie E. Cummings (state repre253 

## sentative who previously spoke with city’s leadership 254 

## acknowledged during her testimony in support for pas255 

## sage of house bill that became P.A. 17-165, § 1, that, as 256 

## self-insured municipality, city lacked right under Con257 

## necticut law to recover collateral source benefits). After 258 

## P.A. 17-165, § 1, went into effect, however, a self-insured 259 

## municipality had the right to assert a lien to recover 260 

## medical expenses it had paid. See General Statutes § 7- 261 

## 464 (c) and (d).

262 

## The statutory change thus confers a new right on a 263 

## self-insured municipality, such as the city. Correspond264 

## ingly, the statute, as amended, simultaneously elimi265 

## nates the right of plaintiffs, held prior to the enactment 266 

## of P.A. 17-165, § 1, to retain sums they recover from 267 

## negligent or reckless third-party tortfeasors who have 268 

## harmed them if those sums represent medical expenses 269 

## paid by the municipality. Thus, because P.A. 17-165, § 1, 270 

## created a new right for self-insured municipalities and 271 

## limited the rights of their employees, we conclude that 272 

## § 7-464, as amended by the act, is substantive. See, e.g., 273 

## Koskoff, Koskoff & Biederv.Allstate Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 274 

## 451, 455–57, 446 A.2d 818 (1982) (holding that amend275 

## ment affecting insurance company’s lien recovery 276 

## amount was substantive rather than procedural); see 277 

## also, e.g.,Littlev. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 457, 262 A.2d 174 278 

## (1969) (‘‘[l]egislation which limits or increases statutory 279 

## liability has generally been held to be substantive in 280 

## nature’’).8 

## The statute therefore must operate prospec281 

## tively only.

282 

## The city asserts that allowing it to file a lien on the 283 

## plaintiff’s settlement proceeds in the present case 284 

## would not present a retroactive application of the stat285 

## ute. Specifically, the city asserts that, because the plain286 

## tiff settled his action against the third-party tortfeasor 287 

## on October 23, 2018, after the effective date of P.A. 17- 288 

## 165, § 1—which was October 1, 2017—upholding its 289 

## lien does not require a retroactive application of the 290 

## act. We disagree.

291 

## As this court has previously concluded, ‘‘a statute 292 

## does not operate retrospectively merely because it is 293 

## applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the 294 

## statute’s enactment . . . or upsets expectations based 295 

## in prior law.Rather, the court must ask whether the new 296 

## provision attaches new legal consequences to events 297 

## completed before its enactment.’’ (Emphasis in original; 298 

## internal quotation marks omitted.) Shannon v. Com299 

## missioner of Housing, 322 Conn. 191, 204, 140 A.3d 300 

## 903 (2016). In other words, ‘‘a law has retroactive effect 301 

## when it would impair rights a party possessed when he302 

## acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or 303 

## impose new duties with respect to transactions already 304 

## completed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 305 

## 205–206. This court further cautioned that ‘‘[t]he conclu306 

## sion that a particular rule operates retroactively comes 307 

## at the end of a process of judgment concerning the 308 

## nature and extent of the change in the law and the 309 

## degree of connection between the operation of the new 310 

## rule and a relevant past event.’’ (Internal quotation 311 

## marks omitted.) Id., 204. Moreover, this court noted 312 

## that ‘‘[a]ny test of retroactivity will leave room for dis313 

## agreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the 314 

## enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philo315 

## sophical clarity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 316 

## Id.

317 

## We conclude that allowing the city to pursue statutory 318 

## lien rights in the present case would result in an 319 

## improper, retroactive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1, 320 

## because it would attach new legal consequences to 321 

## events completed before the act’s effective date. Those 322 

## events are the legal rights to which the plaintiff became 323 

## entitled as a result of personal injuries sustained by 324 

## him on June 20, 2016, the date of the motor vehicle 325 

## accident. The act impaired the right of the plaintiff to 326 

## obtain compensation for personal injuries caused by 327 

## the tortfeasor’s negligence on certain conditions, one 328 

## of those being that any such recovery would be free 329 

## and clear of any claims by the city requiring repayment 330 

## of sums expended for medical care relating to those 331 

## injuries. Public Act 17-165, § 1, created a new liability 332 

## or obligation on the part of the plaintiff to pay proceeds 333 

## of his settlement to the city to reimburse the city for 334 

## past payments made by it. It also created a correlative, 335 

## new right entitling the city to obtain reimbursement for 336 

## medical expenses from the proceeds of the plaintiff’s 337 

## settlement.

338 

## Indeed, neither the plaintiff’s obligation nor the city’s 339 

## corresponding right existed at the time of the plaintiff’s 340 

## motor vehicle accident or at the time the city paid most 341 

## of the medical expenses, and, in this particular case, 342 

## even the commencement of the plaintiff’s underlying 343 

## civil action predated the effective date of P.A. 17-165, 344 

## § 1. Thus, applying P.A. 17-165, § 1, to a settlement 345 

## related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred prior 346 

## to the effective date of the act is a retroactive applica347 

## tion of the act. Contrary to the city’s position, the settle348 

## ment does not stand on its own. Rather, the settlement 349 

## stems from the motor vehicle accident that occurred 350 

## prior to the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1, and the 351 

## respective substantive rights and obligations of the par352 

## ties relating to that accident cannot be altered retroac353 

## tively. Accordingly, we conclude that allowing the city 354 

## to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement proceeds in the 355 

## present case would constitute an improper, retroactive 356 

## application of the act.357 

## In summary, because the legislature did not explicitly 358 

## provide that § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, 359 

## should apply retroactively, and, because it is substan360 

## tive in nature, § 55-3 requires that the statute operate 361 

## prospectively. The postevent amendments to § 7-464 362 

## cannot attach new legal consequences to the plaintiff’s 363 

## motor vehicle accident, from which his settlement 364 

## arose. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined 365 

## that the city’s lien stemmed from an improper, retroac366 

## tive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1, and properly granted 367 

## the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

368 

## The judgment is affirmed.

369 

## In this opinion the other justices concurred. 70 371 * August 3, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, 372 is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 373 1 General Statutes § 7-464 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) A self-insured 374 town, city or borough that provides group health benefits for its employees 375 has a lien on that part of a judgment or settlement that represents payment 376 for economic loss for medical, hospital and prescription expenses incurred 377 by its employees and their covered dependents and family members when 378 such expenses result from the negligence or recklessness of a third 379 party. . . . 380 * * * 381 ‘‘(d) As used in subsection (c) of this section: (1) ‘Self-insured town, city 382 or borough’ means a town, city or borough that provides group health383 benefits to its employees by paying submitted medical, hospital and prescrip384 tion expense claims from its revenues . . . .’’ 385 2 The plaintiff initiated this action under § 7-464 (c) (4) (C), which provides 386 in relevant part: ‘‘If agreement cannot be reached on the application of 387 equitable defenses to the claimed lien amount, then either the employee, 388 covered dependent, family member or the self-insured town, city or borough 389 may petition the Superior Court for resolution on the application of equitable 390 defenses. . . .’’ 391 The parties do not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the 392 plaintiff’s claim, so we do not address the issue of whether the plaintiff’s 393 action was appropriately brought under § 7-464 (c) (4) (C). 394 3 General Statutes § 1-1 (u) provides: ‘‘The passage or repeal of an act 395 shall not affect any action then pending.’’ 396 4 General Statutes § 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the general statutes, 397 not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any 398 new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a 399 retrospective effect.’’ 400 5 The city appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate 401 Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General 402 Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. 403 6 The city asserts on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined 404 that § 1-1 (u) applied to its lien because the lien was not at issue in the 405 plaintiff’s civil action against the third-party tortfeasor and, therefore, would 406 not affect that action. The plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly 407 determined that § 1-1 (u) bars P.A. 17-165, § 1, from affecting his litigation, 408 as it was pending at the time of the act’s effective date. We need not decide 409 whether § 1-1 (u) is applicable to this case because we conclude that § 55- 410 3 is dispositive of the matter. 411 7Any right to subrogation or a lien under the workers’ compensation 412 scheme did not apply in the present case because there was no allegation 413 that the plaintiff’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment 414 with the city. Prior to the passage of P.A. 17-165, § 1, General Statutes § 52- 415 225c prohibited the city from recovering the amount of benefits provided 416 to the plaintiff as a collateral source. 417 8 Public Act 17-165, § 1, also imposes a new obligation on the plaintiff 418 that did not previously exist, namely, that he was being forced to pay money 419 in the form of a lien from a sum he recovered as a result of his applicable 420 settlement under § 7-464 (c). See, e.g.,Littlev. Ives, supra, 158 Conn. 453–57 421 (holding that statute could not apply retroactively under § 55-3 when it 422 imposed new obligation and liability on defendant highway commissioner, 423 i.e., filing certificate of taking within reasonable amount of time after filing424 highway layout map and being subject to paying additional damages for not 425 doing so, respectively). 426 7