NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-887

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

LEIF L., a juvenile.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a jury trial, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent

by reason of unlawful possession of a firearm (G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10 [a]), unlawful possession of ammunition (G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10 [h] [1]); and unlawful possession of a weapon (here, a 

switchblade knife) prohibited by G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b). On 

appeal, the juvenile argues that the loaded firearm, which the 

judge held was lawfully seized in plain view, should have been 

suppressed, because the incriminating nature of the firearm was 

not immediately apparent. Because we agree that the seizure of 

the firearm was unlawful, we reverse the order denying the 

juvenile's motion to suppress the firearm, the ammunition, and 

1 A pseudonym.
2

the switchblade discovered incident to his arrest, and we set 

aside all three adjudications of delinquency. Further, we 

accept the Commonwealth's concession that there was insufficient

evidence the defendant knew the firearm was loaded, and we 

therefore order judgment for the juvenile on the ammunition

charge. Finally, in light of the recent decision in 

Commonwealth vs. Canjura, 494 Mass. 508 (2024) (holding that 

statutory ban on possession of switchblade knives violates U.S. 

Constitution's Second Amendment), we order judgment for the 

juvenile on the switchblade charge.

Background. We summarize the judge's findings of fact, 

supplemented by testimony that the judge explicitly or 

implicitly credited. See Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 

Mass. 429, 431 (2015). On September 27, 2021, an anonymous 911 

caller reported that he had seen a group of young males on the 

porch of a multi-unit Brockton residence and that he saw one of

the males, who was wearing a white hoodie, "wave a gun around."2 

Brockton police officers Shannon O'Donnell and Wilson Alves 

responded to the address immediately and observed the juvenile 

2 The caller also reported that some of the males, including 

the juvenile, were wearing black ski masks. The dispatcher did 

not, however, relay this information to the officers on the 

scene, and they were unaware of it at the time the search and 

seizures took place. For this reason, the Commonwealth agreed

at oral argument that the report of masks is not relevant to our 

analysis.
3

wearing a white hooded sweatshirt. Officer O'Donnell recognized 

one of the other individuals as someone she knew from a prior 

shooting investigation. Upon exiting the vehicle, the officers 

ordered the individuals to put their hands on their heads, and 

the officers began to pat frisk them.

At about this time, Detective Michael Bunker and another 

officer arrived on scene. Detective Bunker went onto the porch

to "cover" Officer O'Donnell. While there, he observed "what 

looked to be like a firearm, the tail end of a firearm"

protruding from a small cross-body bag located next to where the 

juvenile had been seated. He picked up the bag and noticed that 

its weight was consistent with the presence of a gun. Detective 

Bunker seized the bag, unzipped it fully, and removed a firearm, 

which turned out to contain one round of ammunition.

After discovering the firearm, the officers learned that 

the juvenile was a minor and therefore could not possess any 

firearms license, so they arrested him. Officer O'Donnell 

conducted another, more thorough search of the juvenile incident 

to his arrest and found a switchblade on his person.

The juvenile was charged with unlawful possession of a 

firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and unlawful 

possession of the switchblade. His motion to suppress the 

fruits of what he asserted were an unlawful search and seizure 
4

was denied. He was adjudicated delinquent on all three counts, 

and he now appeals.

Discussion. 1. Suppression. In reviewing a ruling on a 

motion to suppress, "we adopt the motion judge's factual 

findings absent clear error," but we "independently determine 

whether the judge correctly applied constitutional principles to 

the facts as found." Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 450 Mass. 818, 

821 (2008). Here, the Commonwealth's case depends most 

immediately on the validity of the firearm's "plain view" (or 

"plain feel") seizure. It was only after that seizure that 

(1) the juvenile was asked if he had a license, (2) Officer 

O'Donnell learned that he was a juvenile and arrested him, and 

(3) a search incident to arrest led to the discovery of the 

switchblade. For the following reasons, we conclude that the 

seizure was invalid and thus that the firearm and switchblade

should have been suppressed.3

3 We reject the Commonwealth's suggestion that the motion to 

suppress could have been denied on the basis that the juvenile's 

supporting affidavit dated May 3, 2022, was not properly signed. 

The juvenile's electronic signature could have been lawfully 

affixed pursuant to the Supreme Judicial Court's Updated Order 

Authorizing Use of Electronic Signatures by Attorneys and SelfRepresented Parties, issued June 10, 2020, ¶¶ 2-5. See 

https://www.ma-appellatecourts.org/docket/OE144. That order 

provides that if a party has a good faith basis to believe that 

an electronic signature was unauthorized, "a challenge may be 

raised promptly by way of motion," which the Commonwealth did 

not do here. See id. ¶ 9.
5

A police officer may seize objects inadvertently discovered 

in plain view if the officer: (1) is lawfully in a position to 

view the object, (2) has a lawful right of access to the object,

and (3) its incriminating character is immediately apparent. 

See Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 730-731 (1999). 

"[W]hether a thing plainly viewed or plainly felt may be 

constitutionally seized is to be measured by whether there is 

probable cause to believe in the incriminating character of the 

object." Commonwealth v. Cullen, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 390, 402 

(2004), citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)

(plain feel), and Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-327 (1987)

(plain view).

The Supreme Judicial Court has previously held that "the 

incriminating character of [a] weapon . . . [is] immediately 

apparent and remain[s] so until such time as the officers 

ascertain[] whether the defendant had a license to carry a 

firearm." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 51 (2011). 

More recently, however, the court recognized "that a general 

prohibition against carrying a firearm outside the home is 

unconstitutional" in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol 

Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Commonwealth v. Guardado, 

491 Mass. 666, 690 (2023), S.C., 493 Mass. 1 (2023). 

"Accordingly, the absence of a license is necessary to render a 
6

defendant's possession of a firearm" criminal activity. 

Guardado, supra. Therefore, the incriminating character of the

firearm in this case was immediately apparent only if there was

probable cause to believe that the juvenile was unlicensed.4

Here, at the time of the seizure, police had no such 

probable cause. First, although the juvenile was ultimately

found to be too young to possess any firearm license under 

Massachusetts law, there is nothing in the record to support a 

finding that the officers recognized or could have recognized 

that the juvenile was a minor based on his appearance. Contrast 

Commonwealth v. Karen K., 491 Mass. 165, 179 (2023) (officer 

coming face to face with juvenile "could have observed that she 

likely was too young to be licensed to carry a firearm in the 

Commonwealth"). Indeed, the testimony was that police learned 

the juvenile's age and licensure status only after seizing the 

weapon and arresting the juvenile.

Second, the information provided by dispatch and 

corroborated by the officers on scene was inadequate to infer 

that the juvenile was unlicensed. The dispatch recordings and 

testimony from the officers confirm that police were informed 

only that a man in a white hoodie was seen waving a firearm at 

4 The Commonwealth does not argue that the firearm was 

seized as evidence of another crime known to police.
7

the address. Officer Alves testified that he was not even sure 

what the caller meant when he reported a man "just waving the 

gun." Once on scene, police testified that they observed the

group "just sitting there talking," and that no one seemed angry 

or nervous or made any furtive gestures.

Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argues that police could 

reasonably believe that the suspect waving a firearm was 

unlicensed because a licensed gun owner would treat a firearm 

with more respect. The cases cited by the Commonwealth in its 

brief do not adequately support this proposition.

In both Commonwealth v. Manha, 479 Mass. 44, 45 (2018), and

Commonwealth v. Haskell, 438 Mass. 790, 794 (2003), the court 

agreed that reasonable suspicion existed to justify a stop and 

frisk of the defendants based on 911 reports that the defendants 

were handling firearms in a manner that either constituted a 

crime or suggested imminent criminal activity. See Manha, supra

(911 caller told police that suspect pointed firearm at her and 

threatened her); Haskell, supra ("the act of publicly loading a 

handgun is an event that creates a reasonable suspicion that a 

crime may be about to take place"). "Waving" a firearm, without 

more, does not rise to this level. See Haskell, supra at 793

("Because it is legal in Massachusetts to carry a handgun if 

properly licensed, a report that an individual possesses a 
8

handgun, without any additional information suggesting criminal 

activity, does not create a reasonable suspicion that a crime is 

or will be committed").

The only case cited by the Commonwealth that recognizes a 

possible nexus between a person's handling of a weapon and the

person's licensure status is Commonwealth v. Edwards, 476 Mass. 

341, 346-347 (2017). In Edwards, police received a 911 report 

that, among other suspicious behaviors, the suspect was openly 

holding a gun in his hand. Id. at 346. In assessing whether 

the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory 

stop, the court considered the officer's testimony that, in his

experience, "trained, licensed owners of a handgun typically 

carry their firearm in a holster." Id. Nevertheless, the court 

acknowledged that "a person licensed to carry a gun is not 

required to carry it holstered and concealed from view," and as 

such, this fact added only "marginally" to the reasonable 

suspicion calculus. Id. at 346 n.10. Ultimately, the court 

agreed that a combination of factors, including the suspect's 

handling of the firearm, "just barely" met the reasonable 

suspicion threshold. Id. at 347.

Here, none of the officers testified about their experience 

with specific behaviors exhibited by licensed or unlicensed 

firearm owners or about how that experience might have 
9

contributed to any belief that the juvenile was unlicensed.

Even if police had testified that licensed owners rarely "waved"

around a firearm, however, it would add only marginally to the 

analysis, where such behavior is not illegal in and of itself. 

Moreover, we are grappling here with the probable cause 

standard; if the facts in Edwards -- many of which were not 

present here -- "just barely" rose to the level of reasonable 

suspicion, then the facts known to police at the time of the 

seizure here cannot establish probable cause to believe that the 

firearm was illegally possessed.

In deciding that there was inadequate basis to seize the 

firearm in this case, we do not question whether police who spot 

a firearm in plain view under similar circumstances may make 

reasonable inquiry about the ownership of the firearm and the 

owner's licensure status. Nor do we suggest that officers, 

while making those inquiries, could not take reasonable steps, 

such as placing themselves between the persons and the firearm, 

to ensure that no one within reaching distance could quickly 

grab and use the gun. It might also be permissible to

temporarily secure the firearm if there is a reasonable 

suspicion that its presence poses a risk to officer safety. But 

these are not facts and arguments with which we have been 

presented, and we do not decide those issues. Instead, here we 
10

have a case where officers, armed with little more than the 

knowledge that the juvenile was seen in possession a firearm, 

seized a firearm without any articulable reason to suspect that 

the firearm was unlawfully possessed or used.

In sum, we conclude that the firearm was unlawfully seized

and that the knife found on the juvenile incident to his arrest

was the fruit of that unlawful seizure. Therefore, the motion 

to suppress the firearm, the ammunition contained in the 

firearm, and the switchblade should have been granted.

2. Sufficiency of evidence. The Commonwealth has 

correctly conceded that evidence of the juvenile's knowledge 

that the gun was loaded was insufficient, so that the 

adjudication for unlawful possession of ammunition cannot stand. 

See Commonwealth v. Brown, 479 Mass. 600, 601 (2018).

3. Second Amendment issue. The juvenile argues, as he did 

in the trial court, that the ban in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (b), on 

the possession of switchblade knives violates the U.S. 

Constitution's Second Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court 

recently agreed with this argument and invalidated the ban. See 

Commonwealth vs. Canjura, 494 Mass. at 509. The adjudication on 

the switchblade charge thus cannot stand.

Conclusion. The order denying the juvenile's motion to 

suppress is reversed. The adjudications of delinquency are 
11

vacated and the verdicts are set aside. On the charges of 

delinquency by reason of unlawful possession of ammunition and 

unlawful possession of a weapon prohibited by G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10 (b), judgment shall enter for the juvenile.

So ordered.

By the Court (Sacks, 

Ditkoff & Toone, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: October 4, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.