United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 8, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 05-41042

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

RAMIRO SALAICES ESTRADA,

Defendant-Appellant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

_______________

m 05-41089

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

JORGE MANUEL ESTRADA,

Defendant-Appellant.
2

_________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

_________________________

Before SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges,

and HANEN,

* District Judge.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Ramiro Estrada (“Ramiro”) and his brother

Jorge Estrada (“Jorge”) were charged with aiding and abetting the possession of 68 kilograms

ofmarihuana with intent to distribute. They entered into conditional guilty pleas, reserving the

right to appeal the denial of their motions to

suppress. We affirm.

I.

On November 13, 2004, Ramiro and Jorge

were returning from Zacatecas, Mexico, in Ramiro’s 1989 Chevy. The vehicle was stopped

at approximately 12:08 a.m. on I-10 by trooper

Sergio Villarreal and sergeant Gary Chandler.

The video recording of the traffic stop shows

that about one minute after the stop, Villarreal

approached the vehicle and read the license

plate number for the computer check. The

driver, Jorge, was told that he was stopped for

having a defective rear license plate lamp in

violation of TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.

§ 547.322 (Vernon 1995).

Villarreal asked for identification of the

driver and passenger and for registration and

insurance papers. At the same time, he shined

his flashlight onto the front windshield for the

vehicle identification number and then quickly

flashed the back of the truck cab as he began

to review the paperwork. At 12:11, Villarreal

told Jorge that he would give him a warning

for the defective lamp, then asked him to step

outside the vehicle. Villarreal went back to

Ramiro, who was still in the passenger seat.

He questioned him about the car and histravel

plans. Ramiro told him, among other things,

that he has owned the car for about a month.

At 12:13, Villarreal walked to the back of

the truck and, on his way, shined his flashlight

to the area to the back of the truck’s cab and

bed. At this time he saw “fresh marks” and

“scratches” around the fuel tank eye piece

latches and vehicle frame. He explained that

the “eye piece latches” were devices holding

the tank to the truck frame and that he noticed

that they were topped by a hardened adhesive

material. 

At that time, he thought the marks were

“out of the ordinary”: They were short, no

more than three inchesinwidth, indicating that

the metal strap to the fuel tank had been recently “removed or tampered with.” He described the adhesive material as “hardened,”

“discolored,” and with a consistencymuch like

“J-B Weld” or “Bondo-type” material. 

Villareal further explained that the material

wasthe type ofsubstance used for filling or repairing holes during automotive repair and * District Judge of the Southern District of

Texas, sitting by designation.
3

that, based on his extensive classroom training

and on-the-job experience, including an occasion at which he had found illegal narcotics

concealed in a gas tank in similar fashion, he

suspected that a false compartment or a container had been built into the fuel tank to conceal contraband. Villarreal indicated that contraband is concealed in fuel tanks after an opening is cut into the tank. Adhesive material is

typically used to cover newly created compartments to prevent seepage of fuel and contraband.

The videotape shows that next Villarreal

pointed to the license plate and showed Jorge

that the lights did not work and told him that he

would give him a warning. At 12:14, he pulled

Jorge away from the vehicle and to the edge of

the road and asked him similar questions and

also whether any repairs had been done on the

truck. Jorge advised that Ramiro had had the

truck for about three months, Jorge did not

know of any repairs.

At 12:16, Villarreal walked back to the DPS

car and told Chandler that “the story is about

the same, they have been in Zacatecas (Mexico), they have traveled about 15 hours, they

are carpet layers, but Ramiro indicated he

bought the vehicle in October 2004 and his

brother stated he had bought it 3 months ago.”

He also noted that he saw “a strap across the

gas tank, with a slit, which turns to lock, and it

looks like it has been turned recently.” While

Villarreal was talking to Chandler, the computer check on the defendants’ criminal history

(which was requested only about eight minutes

into the stop) came back negative at 12:18. 

Villarreal walked back to Jorge, who was

standing by the side of the road, and began a

new inquiry. Villarreal asked Jorge a series of

questions, including whether he had had any

problems with the gas tank. After receiving

the answers, Villarreal went to the passenger,

Ramiro, and asked him a set of similar questions. 

At 12:22, Villarreal asked Ramiro to get

out of the truck, then proceeded to ask him

another series of questions. At 12:23, Villarreal asked Ramiro in Spanish for permission to

“inspect” the truck, and Ramiro agreed. Then

he also obtained permission, in Spanish, from

Jorge. Villarreal testified at the suppression

hearing that the demeanor of the defendants

was one of calmness. 

Villarreal began to search by going to the

driver’s side and viewing the back of the cab.

He flashed his light again and stated, “See

where the black strap comes out, it has rust

but I see a lighter mark, like the strap has been

moved.” Then, he looked under the vehicle at

the gas tank. He knocked on the tank, which

produced a hollow sound. When Villarreal

went to the passenger side of the tank, he stated, “There’s a bump on top and it looks like a

J-B weld on the tank but its hard to tell how

fresh it is. It has scratch marks and I see a

light blue color but it could be from wear and

tear, I don’t know.” 

Villarreal testified that he saw “fresh

scratch marks” and more adhesive material

along a ridge of the gas tank. He also observed that the bolts used to hold the straps to

the frame of the truck were not the same size

and were loose. It appeared that the bolts had

been removed and replaced without being

tightened, so they were flush with the bed of

the truck.

The tape next shows (22 minutes and 57

seconds after the stop) that Villarreal stated

that he was going to call “Schulenberg P.D. to
4

see if they have a scope and density meter.”

Sergeant Koehne with the Schulenberg police

department arrived on the scene approximately

one hour after the initialstop. After assembling

the scope and inserting it into the gas tank,

Koehne and Villarreal identified that the tank

had a green wall, inconsistent with the rest of

the tank. 

By 1:30., Koehne identified several walls

that could serve as compartments, and Koehne

and Villarreal decided to bring down the tank.

At 1:45, Villarreal began to call garages for the

dropping of the tank. He located a garage at

1:54. 

At about 2:00, Villarreal told both defendants that they were not under arrest but were

merelydetained, and handcuffed themand seated them in the DPS vehicle. The defendants

and the Chevy truck were driven to the garage,

where they arrived at 2:27, whereupon the

work began to drop the tank. The marihuana

was found, and at that point, about three hours

after the initial stop, Villarreal told the defendants they were under arrest and read them

their Miranda rights. 

II.

Following a hearing, Ramiro and Jorge entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the

right to appeal the rulings on the motions to

suppress. On appeal, they do not challenge the

validity of the stop, but only its duration and

scope and the voluntariness of the consent to

search.

III.

In assessing whether there was reasonable

suspicion, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its determination

of reasonable suspicion de novo. See Ornelas

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

We view the evidence introduced at a suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party. United States v. Orozco, 191

F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999).

A routine traffic stop is a limited seizure

that closely resembles an investigative detention as was addressed in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Shabazz,

993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir.1993). Accordingly, the Terry framework is used to analyze

cases in which motorists are stopped for violating traffic laws. Id. The Estradas concede

that the initial stop was a valid traffic stop for

driving with a defective light. They aver, however, that Villarreal exceeded the scope ofthat

stop when he continued to question them after

he received the results of the criminal background check at 12:18. See United States v.

Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198-99 (5thCir. 1999).

Once the purpose of a valid traffic stop has

been completed and an officer’s initial suspicions have been verified or dispelled, the detention must end unlessthere is additionalreasonable suspicion supported by articulable

facts. United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261

F.3d 425, 434 (5th Cir. 2001); Shabazz, 993

F.2d at 436. This is because a detention must

be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effect the purpose of the stop, unless

further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges. Dortch, 199 F.3d at

200. Mere “uneasy feelings” and inconsistent

stories between a driver and a passenger do

not constitute articulable facts that support a

reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. See

United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336,

338-39 (5th Cir. 2002).

To the extent that the Estradas argue that

the length of the stop was unreasonable before

12:18, that argument is foreclosed by United
5

States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir.

2004) (en banc). In a valid traffic stop, an officer may request a driver’s license and vehicle

registration and run a computer check thereon.

Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508.

As the district court correctly determined,

Villarreal’s questioning of Ramiro and Jorge

beforeVillarreal’srequest for a computer check

about eight minutes into the stop does not

implicate Fourth Amendment concerns. As

Brigham explained, “neither our prior cases nor

any other caselaw . . . institutes a per se rule

requiring an officer immediately to obtain the

driver’slicense and registrationinformationand

initiate the relevant background checks before

asking questions.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 511.1

Even questions unrelated to the reason for the

stop do not, in themselves, constitute a Fourth

Amendment violation.2

Therefore, the registration and license check,

as well asthe questionsthat Villarreal asked the

brothers within the first ten minutes of the stop

before, and while waiting for, the computer

results did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Under Brigham, the purpose of the initial stop

ended at 12:18, when the results of the criminal

background check came back negative, unless

the officersformed additionalreasonable suspicion before that time.

Reasonable suspicion exists when the detaining officer can point to specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably

warrant the search and seizure. Santiago, 310

F.3d at 340. The determination of whether

Villarreal had developed a reasonable suspicion must be made based on the totality of the

circumstances and the collective knowledge

and experience of the officer or officers. See

Jones, 234 F.3d at 241. 

Reasonable suspicion does not arise solely

from the inconsistent answers regarding the

length of Ramiro’s ownership of the truck.

This case, however, is distinguishable from

Dortch, Santiago and Jones, because in those

cases there were no physical facts suggesting

the presence of a hidden compartment. In

contrast, in this case there was significant

physical evidence that, taken together with the

officer’s training and experience, gave rise to

reasonable suspicion. 

As we have recounted, the videotape shows

that at 12:13, Villarreal directed his flashlight

to the area from the passenger’s side to the

back of the truck’s cab and bed. He testified

at the suppression hearing that at that time, he

saw “fresh marks” and “scratches” around the

fuel tank eye piece latches and vehicle frame;

which were “out of the ordinary” and showed

the presence of an adhesive material and suggested that the gas tank had been tampered

with. Based on his extensive classroom training and on-the-jobexperience, including an occasion at which he found illegal narcotics

concealed in a gas tank in similar fashion, he

suspected that a false compartment or container was built into the fuel tank to conceal

contraband. Adhesive material is typically

used to cover newly created compartments to

prevent seepage of fuel and contraband.

1

See also Brigham, 382 F.3d at 509 (“Finally,

this process, from the time Trooper Conklin started

questioning Brigham until he returned to his patrol

car to check the registration and I.D.’s provided by

Brigham and the others, lasted only seven minutes.

Conklin’s questioning exemplified a graduated response to emerging facts.”).

2

Id. at 508 & nn.5-6 (“‘[D]etention, not questioning, is the evil at which Terry’s second prong is

aimed.’”) (citation omitted).
6

Defendants assert that Villareal could not

have seen the scratch marks and the adhesive at

12:13, because he admitted at the suppression

hearing that this happened later, after he asked

for consent to search the car, at 12:23. We

disagree. 

In the testimony to which defendants point,

Villareal testified only that he looked below the

car later, not that he did not see the scratch

marks until later. He indicated that at the point

when he flashed his flashlight to the area to the

back ofthe truck cab and the truck bed (12:13),

he saw scratches and a discolored substance

that he thought was adhesive that is used for

creating hidden compartments in the gas tanks

to conceal contraband. Furthermore, Villarreal’s testimony that he saw adhesive and scratch

marks (indicating that the gas tank has been

tampered with) is not merelyconvenient ex post

testimony by Villarreal; the videotape’s audio

shows that he told Chandler before 12:18, at

about 12:16, that there was a strap across the

gas tank, with a slit, that turns to lock, and it

looked like it has been turned recently. 

These facts, taken together with the officers’

experience, and seen fromthe totality ofthe circumstances, including the fact that the vehicle

had recently crossed from Mexico, “a common

origin of illicit drugs,”3suggest that there was

a reasonable likelihood that the vehicle’s gas

tank had a hidden compartment that was meant

to transport drugs. 

The facts here do not reflect a mere customization of the vehicle that could also support a

conclusion of innocent travel. Rather, Villarreal’s expert experience conforms with common sense: It is hard to conceive of a legitimate use for a large hidden storage compartment in any part of a vehicle, let alone in the

gas tank. 

Courts must allow law enforcement “officersto draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and

deductions about the cumulative information

available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). The adhesive

marks and other scratches, together with the

other evidence, do not fully exclude the possibility of innocent travel given the age of the

vehicle,4but the likelihood of criminal activity

need not rise to the levelrequired for probable

cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7

(1989). Because under the law of this circuit,

evidence of a hidden compartment supports

“probable cause” for a search/arrest, evidence

indicating the existence of a hidden compartment also supportsthe lesser standard of “reasonable suspicion.”5

3 United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d

1235, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2004).

4

See also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10 (holding

that factors which by themselves were “quite

consistent with innocent travel” collectively

amounted to reasonable suspicion).

5

See United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716,

724 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of hidden compartment contributed to probable cause to

search); United States v. Price, 869 F.2d 801, 804

(5th Cir. 1989) (“Once the agents had discovered

the secret compartment they had probable cause to

search the compartment itself.”); see also United

States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10thCir.

1994) (considering, among other factors providing

probable cause, a “four or five-inch difference in

the truck bottom and the floor which indicated a

(continued...)
7

As we explained in Innocencio, 40 F.3d at

724, the “discovery of fresh paint (on a brand

new truck) around the fender wells and the

fresh undercoating beneath the bed of the

truck” all contributed in creating “a reasonable

belief that the vehicle contained a false

compartment” and this “belief would create

sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle.”

Similarly here, the discovery of the scratch

marks and the adhesive created a reasonable

belief that the vehicle contained a false compartment that has recently been used, and this

belief created at least reasonable suspicion. 

IV.

Because Villarreal’s continued detention of

Ramiro and Jorge after Villarreal obtained negative resultsfrom the computer check wassupported by reasonable suspicion developed before 12:18, Ramiro’s and Jorge’s consent to the

search the car at 12:23 was not unconstitutionally tainted.

6 Thus, the government’s burden to

prove consent bythe preponderance ofthe evidence is not as heavy as it would have been

had a Fourth Amendment violation preceded

the consent. Dortch, 199 F.3d at 201. We

agree with the district court that the consent

was free and voluntary. 

The voluntariness of consent is a question

of fact to be determined on the totality of the

circumstances. Id. We look to (1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status;

(2)the presence of coercive police procedures;

(3) the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant’s

awareness of his right to refuse consent;

(5) his education and intelligence; and (6) his

belief that no incriminating evidence will be

found. Id. Although all six factors are relevant, no single one is dispositive. Id.

Here, multiple factors favor a finding of

voluntariness: The records shows that Ramiro

and Jorge were calmand cooperative and does

not indicate that Villarreal engaged in coercive

tactics. Defendants’ educational levels, however, and their testimony that they were not

aware that they could refuse consent, favor a

finding that the consent was not voluntary.

But, we will not reverse the district court’s

finding that consent was voluntary unless it is

clearly erroneous. Id. If the district court

“bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly

erroneousstandard is particularly strong since

the judge had the opportunity to observe the

demeanor of the witnesses.” Id.

Based on a review of the videotape, the

district court found that the consent given was

5

(...continued)

hidden compartment designed to carry contraband”);

United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855,

858-59 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v.

Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence of hidden compartment, along with

inadequate amount of luggage for claimed duration

of trip, furnished probable cause); United States v.

Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997)

(holding discovery of “what appeared to be a hidden

compartment in the gas tank,” along with evidence

of air freshener and conflicting stories from the

passengers, sufficient to furnish probable cause);

United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 825

(10thCir. 1997) (“Recent Fourth Amendment cases

in this circuit and others have determined that

evidence of a concealed compartment can give rise

to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”).

6

See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 512 (reasoning that

(continued...)

6

(...continued)

absent a Fourth Amendment violation, consent to

search a vehicle is not unconstitutionally tainted).
8

voluntary and was an independent act of free

will. Therefore, because no single factor is dispositive, and because there were sufficient

factors supporting consent (and the district

court could have disbelieved defendants’ testimony that they were unaware of their rights),

there is no clear error. 

After Villarreal searched the truck with defendants’ permission, he obtained additionalevidence that supported the prolonged detention,

as the district court determined. The Estradas

do not challenge the constitutionality of their

detention following Villarreal’s search of the

truck. Even if they challenged it, Keane’s

discoveryof a hidden compartment with the use

of the scope constitutes probable cause, which

would permit a warrantless search and the

transfer of the car to the police station.7 Therefore, we do not need to reach the issue of

whether the removal of the car exceeded the

scope of the consent. 

The Estradas also complain about the use

of the handcuffs after the discovery of the

hidden compartment and before the move to

the garage, but the handcuffs were not

unconstitutional under a Terry stop analysis.8

Finally, although the brothers also complain

that they were not Mirandized until the marihuana was found, this complaint does not help

their case, because they are not claiming that

any information obtained from them in violation of Miranda was introduced in court. 

AFFIRMED.

7

“[P]olice officers who have probable cause to

believe there is contraband inside an automobile that

has been stopped on the road may search it without

obtaining a warrant.” Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S.

380, 381 (1984) (per curiam). The officers do not

need to obtain a warrant to move the vehicle from

the roadside to a garage if there is probable cause to

search a vehicle. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399

U.S. 42, 48, 52 n.10 (1970) (observing that it “was

not unreasonable . . . to take the car to the station

house”); United States v. Gastiaburo, 16 F.3d 582,

586 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he justification to conduct

a warrantlesssearch under the automobile exception

does not disappear merely because the car has been

immobilized and impounded.”); United States v.

Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th Cir. 1985) (“Under

the ‘automobile exception’ then, the police conduct

in moving Lopez from Interstate 40 to the Santa

Rosa State Police office is proper if it was supported by probable cause.”).

8 United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709

(9thCir. 1983) (“[T]he use of handcuffs, if reasonably necessary, while substantially aggravating the

intrusiveness of an investigatory stop, does not necessarily convert a Terry stop into an arrest necessitating probable cause.”); United States v. Ricardo

D., 912 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding

that officers “may move a suspect from the location of the initial stop without converting the stop

to an arrest when it is necessary for safety or

security reasons”); United States v. Bradshaw, 102

F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the officer

“could lawfully detain [defendant in the back of the

squad car] until he had finished performing radio

checks and issuing the citation,” because it was

“well within the bounds of the initial stop.”).