Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 21.11( a)( 1) (West 2003). 1 Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 21.11( a)( 2) (West 2003). 2 Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.021( a)( 1)(B ) (West Supp. 2004-05). 3 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00134- CR

Silv e r io M ar ti ne z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 30220 88, H ONO RAB LE WILF ORD F LOW ERS, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N A j ur y c on vic te d a

pp e lla nt S ilv e ri o M art ine z of tw o co un ts of ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d by contac t, one count of

indece ncy with a child by exposure, and one count of ag g ravated sexual 1 2 assault of a

child. The jury

assessed punishment of six y ear s’ imprisonment for ea ch of the two 3 counts of indec ency

with a child by

contac t, five y ear s’ imprisonment for indec ency with a child by
ex p o s u re , an d

s ev en y ea rs ’ i mp ri s o n m en tfo r a ggra v at ed s ex u al as s au l to f a ch i l d
. M ar t i n ez b ri n gs tw o is su e s o n a

pp e a l. F ir st, he c la ims that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y de nyinghis c ha lle ng e s f

or c a us e when two ve nirepe rsons testified that t hey could not consider the full rang e of punishment. Second, he contends that the trial cour t erre d by allowing the jury

to convict him of four of fense s, when theB e c a us e the iss ue s p re se nte d in thi s a pp e a l c on c e rn

the fo rm in whic h th e sp e c if ic 4 a lle g a tio ns we re pr e se nte d in the ind ic tme nt a

nd su bmi tte d to the jur

y , w e un fo r

t un a te ly mus t di sc us s Mart ine z’s a c ts i n s ome de ta il. 2 indictment appea

red to c harg e him with only three crimes. For the re asons stated be low, we a ffirm the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. BACK GR OUND Silv e ri o M art ine z’s ste pd a ug hte r t e sti fi e d th a t Ma rt ine z be g an e ng a g ingin inappropriate sexual conduct with her in January of 2002, whe n she wa s 12 y ear s old, and repe ated this conduct many

times over the course of seve ral months. This abuse oc curr ed g ener ally while her mother wa s at work at night, and oc curr ed in various locations, including he r bedr oom, her mother’ s be dr oo m, a

nd , a ft e r t he fa mil y mov e d to Ma

rt ine z’s ho us e , in

his liv ingro om. The c omplainant first repor ted the abuse to her mother, w ho ref used to believe her da ug hte r a nd a c c us e d h e r o f l y ing . In A ugus t 20 02 , th e c omp la ina nt m a de an out cry

to h e r a un t, Mary Sanchez, while visiting Sanc hez and her biologica l father , Sanchez’s brother. Sanc hez then took the complainant to the police station to report the abu s e, an d l at er to a doctor for

a phy sical examination. Martinez was arr ested on Oc tober 21, 2002, for ag g ravated sexual assault of a child. The indictment conta ined three sections labele d as counts that conta ined a total of eig ht para g raphs. Count I contained four parag raphs, and alleg ed that Mar tinez had committed the 4 fo llo wi nga c ts o f i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t:

• Count I , p ara g ra

phon e , all e g e d tha t Mar

tin e z tou c he d th e c omp la ina nt’ s anu s;

• Count I , para g ra

phtw o, a lle g e d th a t Ma

rt ine z tou c he d th e c omp la ina nt’ s b re a st;3

• Count I , para g raph thre e, alleg ed that Mar tinez touched the complai nant’s g e nit a ls;

• Count I , para g raph four, allege d that Martinez cause d the complainant to touch Mart ine z’s g e nit a ls.
Count I Ic on ta ine d on e pa ra g ra ph , and a lle g e d that Ma

rt ine z ha d c omm itt e d in de c e nc y wi th a c hil d by exposure by

exposi ng his ge nitals knowing the complainant was p re sent. Count I I Icontained three para g raphs, a

nd alleg ed that Mar

tinez had committed the following a cts of agg ravated sexual assault of a

child:

• Count I I I , para g raph one, alleg ed that Martinez penetr ated th e c omplainant’s anus with his sex ual org an;

• Count I I I , para g raph two, alleg ed that Martinez cause d the complainant’ s sexual org an to contac t his mout h;

• Count I I I , para g raph three, alleg ed that Martinez penetrate d the complainant’ s mouth with his sexual orga n.
Af te r the de fe ns e ha d re ste d bu t pr ior to c los ingargume nts , M art ine z mov e d to re qu ir e the State to
e le c t amon g the va

ri ou s a c ts a lle g e d in the ind ic tme nt that it wo uld re ly on fo r c on vic tio n in

c ounts one and thr ee. Se e O’

Ne al v . S tat e , 746 S.W .2d 769, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The c ourt g rante d Martinez’s motion, and the State elec ted to proce ed with C ount I , para g raph one (alleg ing that Martinez touched the complainant’s anus), Count I , para g raph two (alleg ing that Martinez touched the complainant’ s brea st), Count I , para gr a p h th r e e ( a ll e g in g

th a t M a r ti n ez touched the c omplainant’s g enitals), Count I I(alleg ing that Martinez ex p o s ed his g enitals knowing the complainant wa s pr e se nt) , Co un t I I I , p ara g ra phon e (a lle g ingthat Ma

rt ine z pen etr ated the c omp la ina nt’ s a nu s w ith4

his sex ual org an), a

nd Count I I I , para g raph two (alleg ing that Martinez touched the c omplainant’s sexual orga

n with his mout h) as separate counts—si x counts in total. Each pa rag raph e lected by

the State was submitted to the jury as a separate offe nse. The jur y returne d a ver dict of not g uilty on Count I , para g raph one (touching the complainant’s anus), and Count I I I , para g raph one (pene trating the complainant’ s anus with sexual org an), and returne d verdic ts of g uilty on the other f

our off enses that the State had e lected.

The fa cts rele vant to eac h of the e rror s claimed by Martinez are set forth be low.
DI SCU SSIO N Jur y c hal le nge s forc aus e

I n h is f ir st p oin t of er

ro r, Ma rt ine z c la ims that the tr ia l court e rr e d whe n it de nie d h is
c ha lle ng e s o f t

wo pr os pe cti ve ju ror s for c a us e . M art ine z cl a ims that, d ur ingvo ir dir e , it be c a me appar ent th at t wo venire persons, Silberkra us and Soliz , wer e unable to consider the f ull rang e of punishm en t fo r t he off

ense of ag g ravated sexual assault. Be cause the trial cour t denied the challeng es for

cause , Martinez argues that he w as for ced to use a peremptory strike t o exclude eac h of the two challeng ed venire persons, that he was denied additional pere mptory strikes, and that he identified two member s of the jury as objectionable and claimed he would have struck them with a pere mptory

challeng e. Mar

tinez appropr iately prese rved the trial court’s error , if any . De mo uc he tte
v . S tat e , 731 S.W .2d 75, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (describingproce dure f or pre servingerr or for trial court’ s failure to sustain challeng es for cause ).5 During voir dire, de fense counsel a sked the pa nelists whether the y

could consider pro b a ti o n f

o r a g g r a v a te d s e xu a l a s s a u lt o f a c h il d
. T h e f

o ll o w in g e xc h an g e to o k p lace betwee n de fe ns e c ouns e l and

Silb e rk ra us : Mr. Mang e: Can y ou consider pr obation? Silberkraus: I f the lawsay s, y eah. Mr. Mang e: The lawsay s y ou can. Silberkraus: Idon’t know that I could. M r . M an g e : I have to do s o me th in g th a t f r e qu e n tl y irritates pe ople about lawy e rs . . . . [T]he thi ng

I have to do is
. . . pin

y ou do wn . Y ou

sa id that I do n’ t kn owtha

t I c ou ld. Cou ld you , c ou ld you no t? To this question, S ilberkra us responde d “No, I

don’t think so.” L ater , the trial judg e ca lled Silberkraus to the bench, and questioned him ag ain about whether he could c onsider probation in the appropriate case . Silberkraus re plied:
Silberkraus: Iam tempted to say y es bec ause that’s what the L eg islature has de e me d th e a

pp ro pr ia te punis hme nt. Court: They

have g iven y ou a wide r ang e. Silberkraus: Ican’ t thi n k i n m y mind right now the oretica lly what that appropr iate ca se mig ht be. Court: Do y ou think that there c ould be an a ppropriate case ? Silberkraus: I t’s a theore tical possibili ty that case exis ts. Ican’ t think of one rig ht

no w w he re I pe rs on a lly wo uld thi nk if Iha d f ound the pe rs on

g uil ty bey ond a re asonable doubt where Imy self would think a re c omm e nd a tio n o f p ro bat ion w ou ld b e a pp ro pr ia te . B ut i t is possible.6 Potential juror Soliz , simil ar to S ilberkra us, initi ally

responde d that he would be unable to conside r probation for the off ense of ag g ravated s exual assault of a child. Towar d the end of voir dire , the trial cour t called Soliz t o the benc h an d ex p l ained the r ang e of punishment associate d with ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild, and asked o n ce aga i n if he c ould consider probation. Soliz responde d:
Sol iz: I wo uld c on sid e r bu t I thi nk the y sh ou ld be a lot mor e ha rs h than th a t, espec ially for a child. Court : B ut you

c ou ld c on sid e r i t? Soliz : Yea

h, Ig uess I

could consider

it . . . . Court : Yo u w ou ldn ’t

g ive it, may

be , b ut you

c ou ld c on sid e r i t. Sol iz: Iwo uld

no t e ve n c on sid e r i t. Court : No w you

jus t ans we re d it

dif fe re nt. Soliz : Well, it ’s just t h at I fee l a little bit s trong er tha n that. Idon’t think it’s harsh en o u g h to b e h o n e s t w it h y o u . Wh a t I

f e e l a n d w h a t I th ink what sh ou ld b e do ne is n ot w hat y ou are a sk ing me . Wh a t y ou are a sk ingme is what the law

is and Iwill have to g o with the law.
The trial c ourt’s dec isions to deny Martinez’s challeng es to the se two potential jurors for c ause are subject to r eview under the abuse of discre tion standard. Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 887 S.W .2d 84 6, 85 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). A tri a l c ourt ’s ru lin g on a c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e is r e vie we d w ith “‘c onsiderable defe renc e’ be cause the trial cour t is in the best position to evaluate the ve nirepe rson’s demea nor and r esponses.” Bl ue v . S tat e , 1 2 5 S.W .3d 491, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Colbu rn v . S

tat e , 966 S.W .2d 511, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). This is espec ially true whe n the7

re c or d re fl e c ts that a pote nti a l juro r w a s v a c ill a tin g or e qu ivo c atin g , b e c a

us e the tr ia l ju dg e wa s in the best position to observe the person’ s demea nor and tone of voice—important fac tors that “do not
come throug h when revie wing a cold re cord.” Ba nd a v . S tat e , 890 S.W .2d 42, 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 94 ); se e Colbu rn , 966 S.W .2d at 517 (“When the potential juror’ s answer s are vacillating , unclea r, or contradi ct o ry , we ac cord pa rticular de fer ence to the trial court’ s decision. . . . And, whe n the venire man is persistently

uncer tain about hi s ability to follow the law, w e will not second guess the t r i a l c ou rt .” ); se e als o Co rte z v . H CCI -S an An ton io , Inc ., 2005 Tex. L EXI S 206, at *12 (Mar. 11, 2005). Af

te r r e vie wi ngthe e nti re vo ir dir e te sti mony of e a c h o f t he a bo ve tw o v e nir e pe rs on s,
we c annot conc lude that the trial court a bused its discretion when it denie d Martinez’s cha lleng es fo r c a us e to S ilb e rk

ra us a nd Sol iz ba se d o n th e ir

va c ill a tin g ans we rs as to whe th er the y c ou ld
c on sid e r p ro batio n in

an a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d c a se . A lth ou g h Si lbe rk ra us wa s una

ble to describe a spec ific ca se i n which he believed probation would be appropriate, he was not re quired to i de nti fy

su c h a hy po the tic a l c a se wh e re , a s h e re , h e a g re e d th a t it is p os sibl e th at su ch a

c a se exis ts. Se e Ga rc ia , 8 87 S.W. 2d a t 85 4 ( su g g e sti ng , in

c on te xt of

ans we ri ngsp e c ia l is su e s in
a sse ssi ngpunis hme nt f

or c a pit a l murd e r, that ve nir e pe rson is no t su bje c t to c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e if sh e state s sh e wi ll f

ulf ill he r d uti e s b ased on law a

nd e vid e nc e pr e se nte d, e ve n if sh e is u na ble to
c on c e ive of

sit uatio n in wh ic h s he wo uld

ans we r s pe c ia l issu e in ne g a tiv e ). As fo r Soli z, b e c a us e his v o ir d ir e te s ti mo n y w a s e qu iv o c a l, w e mu s t a c c o r d g r e at d e f e r e n c e to th e tr ia l ju d g e , who had the better opportunity

to see a nd hear him. Se e id
. Al tho ug h Mar tin e z’s br ie f q

uit e art fu lly

a tte mpt s, albeit re ly ing s o m et i mes on matters outside the r ecor d, to portray voir dire e vents in a manne rI n particula r, we disag ree with Marti n ez that the trial cour t abused its discretion by 5 questioning the venire p er s o n s direc tly , rathe r than a llowing the State to do so. Mar tinez has not d emons trated that the trial court’ s questions were “re asonably calc ulated to bene fit the State or prejudice the def

endant’ s rig hts.” Ga rd

ne r v . S tat e , 733 S.W .2d 195, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
. I ndee d , w e b e li e v e th a t s u c hin te r v e n ti o nw a s w ar

r an te d f o r th e p u r p o s e s o f e xp e d it io n a nd c la r ification. Se e id . I n any event, e ven assuming that the trial cour t abused its discretion by questioning the prospec tive jurors direc tly , we ag ree with the State that, beca use Mar tinez did not object to the court’s direc t questioning of ve nirepe rsons, such er ror wa s not preser

ved by Martinez for r eview. T ex. R . App. P. 33.1. Eac h para g raph state s that the ac ts alleg ed occ urre d on or ar ound J uly 6, 2002. 6 8 favor able to him, we a

re bound a s an appe llate cour t to rely upon the re cord be fore us. Vuong v. Sta te , 830 S.W .2d 929, 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

We find all other arg uments made by Martinez with respe ct t o his first point of error to be without merit. We overrule Martinez’s first issue. 5
The indic tm e nt

I n h is s e c on d is su e , M art ine z ar g ue s th a t the tr ia l court e rr e d b y a llo wi ngthe jur

y to
c on vic t hi m of

fo ur of fe ns e s w hen th e in di ctmen t a pp e are d to c ha

rg e him wi th o nly

thr e e c ri me s. Mart ine z as se rt s t hat th e vag ue ne ss o f t he a lle g a tio ns in t

he ind ic tme nt m a de it i mpo ssi ble to deter mine from the f

ace of the indictment t hat all of t he acts occur red on differ ent day s, and ar g ues 6 that th e State the re fo re sh ou ld h a ve pr ov ide d mo re no tic e that it int e nd e d to pr oc e e d u po n s e pa rate counts of the same offe nse. The e ssence of Mar tinez’s arg ument is that the trial court should not have a uthorized his conviction for multiple counts of indece ncy with a child by contac t and ag g ravated sexual assault, b u t ra t h er s h o uld have r ead Count I and Count I I Ias alleg ing only one offe nse ea ch.9 Martinez alleg es that he was harme d by the trial court’s err or in the following three way s: (1) because the t rial j udg e allowed the S tate to proce ed on Count I , para g raph thre e (a lleg ing that Martinez touched the c omplainant ’s g enitals), and Count I I I , para g raph two ( alleg ing that Martinez touched the c omplainant’s sexual org an with his mouth) , t h e jury could have found that both offense s occur

red on the same oc casion, in violation of his rig ht ag ainst double jeopar dy ; (2) Martinez was for ced to c hoose betw ee n his constituti onal rig ht to a unanimous jury and his rig ht ag ainst double jeopar dy , and wa s place d in a position where he reg retted “an intellig ent exercise of his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ” ; and (3 ) M art ine z no w ha s fo ur fe lony c on vic tio ns wh e n be fo re tr ia l he on ly ha d n oti c e that th e State wa s se e kin g c on vic tio ns on thr e e of fe ns e s. Whe nm u l t i p l e o f

f e n s e s ar e c o m m i t t e d

d u r i n g a s i n g l e c r i m i n a l e p i s o d e , t he se of fe ns e s ma y be joi ne d in

a sin g le ind ic tme nt. Tex
. Co de Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 2 1. 24 (a ) ( Wes t 2003); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 3.01 (West 2003) (def ining “ criminal episode” as the c ommissi on of tw o o r m o re o ff

enses that “ are committed pursuant to the same tra nsaction or pur suant to two or more tra nsactions that ar e conne cted or constitute a common scheme or pl an”)
. Where a n indictment contains mu lt ip le c o u n ts , th e St a te is n o t r e qu ir e d to e le c t b e tw e e n c o u n ts an d e a c h c o u n t ma y be
s u b mi tt e d to th e jury
. Ow e ns v . S tat e , 96 S.W .3d 668, 672 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). Ho we ve r, up on the tim e ly mot ion by the de fe nd ant, the State is re qu ir e d to m a ke an e le c tio n o f t ho se alleg ed acts upon which it will rely to pursue a c onviction. Gu tie rre z v . S tat e , 8 S.W .3d 739, 748 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (upholding denial of motion to require State to elect be c a us e mot ion

“ c a me too la te ,” a s a

pp e lla nt d id n ot make mot ion

un til a ft e r h e ha d p re se nte d h is
case -in-chie f and thus could “ no longe r take advanta g e o f t h e b en efits of election”). O ne of theA count may contain as man y

separ ate pa

rag raphs a s nece ssary . Tex. Code Crim. P roc. 7 Ann. ar t. 21.24(b) (West 1989). 10 purposes of the elec tion rule is that the rule g ives the defendant noti ce of the particular offense the State intends to r ely on for prosec ution a nd aff ords the defe ndant an opportunity to defe nd. O’Neal , 746 S.W .2d at 772-73; Ph ill ips v . S tat e , 130 S.W .3d 343, 349 (Tex. App.—Houst o n [14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. re f’d)
. I n the present case , Martinez himself frustrated this purpose by waiting to move for a n elec tion until afte r pre senting his case- in-chief
. I n th e c on te xt of

the c ha rg e s lik e tho se in t

he pr e se nt c a se , w hic h o ft e n e nc omp a ss separ ate and differ ent assaults within the sa me transa ction or ser ies of tra nsactions, “a

n indictment
c on ta i n i n g a l t e r

n a t i v e l e g a l t h e o r i e s m ay p r e s e n ts o m e qu e s t i o na s t o w h e t h e r i tc h ar g e s se pa ra te offe nses or merely alternative leg al theorie s.” Vi c k v . S tat e , 991 S.W .2d 830, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). As a g ener al rule, a “count” is u s ed to charg e the of fense itself and a “ para g raph” is the portion of a count which alleg es the method of committing the off ense. Owens , 96 S.W .3d at 673. 7 The substanc e of the alleg ation deter mines its chara ct er as a “count” or a “ para g raph,” not the terminolog y used. Da lto n v . S tat e , 898 S.W .2d 424, 426 (Tex. A pp.—For t Worth 1995, pet. re f’d)
. I n response to Martinez’s argument that he should have been gi v en notice that the State would proce ed o n t he par ag raphs a s separ ate c ounts beca use the indictment wa s “under standably

vag ue” w ith respec t to the time the alleg ed offe nses occ urre d, we note at the outset that the State ne e d no t a lle g e a sp e c if ic date in an ind ic tme nt. Te x. Cod e Cr im. P roc. Ann . ar t. 21.02(6) ( West 1989) (“The time mentioned must be some date anter ior to the prese ntment of the ind ic tme nt, and

no t so re mot e that th e pr os e c uti on of the of fe ns e is b arr e d b y

lim itatio n. ” ). I t is11

settled law that “ the ‘on or about’ lang uag e of an indictment a llows the State to prove a date other than the one a lleg ed in the indictment as long as t h e d at e i s an terior to the pr esentment of the indictment a

nd within the statutory

limit ation period.” Sle dg e v . S tat e , 9 5 3 S. W. 2 d

2 5 3 , 2 5 6 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1997). Allowing inexact ref ere nces to dates of the a lleg ed ac ts is particularly nece ssary in child sex ual abuse case s, where “it i s n o t o ft en that a c hild knows . . . the date that she w as sexually assaulted.” Id. at 256 n.8. Thus, the State was not r equire d to alleg e diffe rent dates in eac h para g raph of

the indictment, as Martinez claims. Ba sed on this settled law, we do not believe that the indictment was improper ly vag ue, nor that the S tate fa iled to fulfill its duty to provide Mar

tinez notice of the offe nses he was being char g ed with. Cur ry v . S tat e , 3 0 S. W.3 d 3 94 , 3 98 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2000) (“ An i ndictment is ge nera lly sufficie nt to provide notice if it follows the statutory lang uag e.”)
. We next turn to the i ssue of whether the trial cour

t improperly

authorized Martinez’s
c on vic tio ns ba se d o n th e ind ivi du a l pa ra g ra ph s o f t he ind ic tme nt. I n Owens , t h i s C o u rt wa s prese nted with a similar ar g ument as that made here by Martinez. Owens’ s indictment contained three counts alleg ing various acts of sexual abuse. Owens , 96 S.W. 3d

a t 67 0– 71 . O ne c ount, a lle g inga g g ra vated se xua l a ssa

ult , c on ta ine d tw o p ara g ra ph s;
eac h para g raph alleg ed that Owens ha d committed differ ent ac ts. Id. at 671. The trial court in that
c a se su bmi tte d e a c h p ara g ra

phto t he jur y a s a se pa rate of fe ns e , a nd the jur y returned a se pa rate verdic t based on each pa

rag raph submitted. Id. at 672. Owe ns argued on appe al that the trial c ourt
err ed by submitt ing multiple par ag raphs to the jury . We held that t h e t ri al court did not err by treating the two “par ag raphs” as “counts” alleging two discrete offe nses and a uthorizi ng Owens’ s
c on vic tio n f

or bo th. We s ta te d th a t “ [t]ho se wh o c omm it mult ipl e dis c re te a ssa ult s ag a ins t the sameNotwithstanding our decision in Owens , we strongly cautioned the State ag ainst using the 8 ty pe of dr afting it used in t h e i ndictment “to obtain a tac tical adva ntag e at tria l, thereby

cre ating confusion as to whe ther the para g raph descr ibes a sepa rate offe nse or a

n alternate manner

and mea ns of c o m m i t ting the sa

me offe nse.” Ow e ns v . S tat e , 9 6 S. W.3 d 6 68 , 6 73 n. 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 2003, no pet.). Mar

tinez does not contend here that the S tate drafted the indictment in such a way to o bta in a

ta c tic a l a dv anta g e a t tr ia l. 12 victim are liable for se parate prosec ution and pun i shment for e very instance of

such cr iminal misconduct.” Id. at 672-73. 8

I n the pre sent ca se, t h e para g raphs in the indictment alleg ed that Mar tinez had committed multi ple a cts of sexual abuse a g ainst the complainant, a nd the complainant testified at trial as to the multiple instances of se x ual abuse . Specifica l l y , the complainant testified that Martinez had committed the following acts: (1) he licked her vag ina “se vera l times”; (2) he licke d and touched her brea sts; (3) he place d his pe nis on her bottom li p; (4) he put his penis in her vag ina and her “butt hole”; and (5) he put his fing ers “ throug h [her] vagina .” Given this evidenc e, the tria l court did not err

by allowing the State to proce ed with the separ ate “par ag raphs” as “c ounts” alleg ing multipl e offenses and authorizing Mar tinez’s conviction for those e lected by the State, as the r ecor d contained suf

ficient e vidence to uphold a conviction on ea ch of the counts. Se e Ve rn on v . S tat e , 841 S.W .2d 407, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (finding that defe ndant’s various acts of sex ual misconduct committed ag ainst stepdaug hter ove r per iod of six y ear s did not c onstitut e a sing le offe nse, but rathe r mul tip le a ssa

ult s a g a ins t the same v ic tim ); Hu tc hin s v . S tat e , 9 9 2 S. W. 2 d

6 2 9 , 6 3 3 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) (h old ingthat be c a us e app ella

nt t ou c he d v ic tim ’s g e nit a ls w ithhis fing ers be fore penetr ating her with his penis, t wo distinct offense s were committed despite the two acts’ c lose temporal pr ox imity ).Although the State argues that Mar tinez did not prese rve the d o u b l e jeopar dy claim for 9 re vie w, Te x. R. Ap p. P. 33 .1 , “ [b]e c a us e of the fu nd a me nta l natur e of

do ub le je op ard

y pr ote c tio ns , a do ub le jeo pa

rd y c la im m ay

be ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l . . . w he n th e un dis pu te d f a c ts show the double jeopa

rdy violation is clear l y

appar ent on the fa ce of the re cord a

nd when enfor ceme nt of usual rules of proce dural default s erve s no leg itimate state interests.” Gonzalez v. Sta te , 8 S.W .3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We will assume t h ese c onditions are satisfied he re and c on sid e r M art ine z’s do ub le je op ard y c la im. 13 Be cause the re cord c ontains sufficient e vidence of Mar tinez’s sex ual ab u s e of the complainant, Mar

tinez’s contention that these convic tions viol ate his rig ht ag ainst double jeopar dy beca use two of the c ounts submitt ed to the j ury could have allowed for two convictions base d on the same unde rly ing c onduct also fa ils. I n order to p re v ai l o n a d o uble jeopar dy claim, the evide nce 9
mus t show that the tw o off e ns e s at issu e ne c e ssa

ri ly aro se fr om “ on e a c t w hic h c ou ld b e su bje c t to two differ ent interpre tations.” Oc ho a v . S tat e , 9 8 2 S
. W.2d 904, 908 (Tex. C rim. App. 1998). Martinez has not demonstrate d that his conviction of indece ncy with a child by contac t was base d on the same c onduct under ly ing his c onviction f or ag g ravated sexual assault of a child. Hutchins , 992 S.W .2d at 633. I ndeed, as we have alre ady noted, the complainant testified t h at M artinez touched he r g enitals with his finge rs—an a ct not alleg ed in Count I I I , para g raph two ( alleg ing that Martinez touched the c omplainant’s s exual org an with his mouth), but that supports a convic tion for the offe nse alleg ed in Count I , para g raph thre e (a lleg ing that Martinez touched the ge nitals of the
c omp la ina

nt) . T hu s, Mart ine z’s do ub le je op ard y c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t. Martinez further argues t hat he was force d to elec t betwee n his constituti onal rig ht to a unanimous jury

and his rig ht ag ainst double jeopar dy
. As we h av e just stated, howeve r, Martinez’s rig ht ag ainst double jeopar dy was not violated. Nor , for that matter , was his rig ht to a
u n an i m o u s j u r

y. T h e e l e c t i o n r

u l e p e r f o r m s an i mp o rt an tf

u n c t i o ni nc a s e s t h a tt h r e a t e nt o d e n y aThe jury char g e stated that if the jury found evide nce that the defe ndant eng ag ed in “se x ual 10 c on ta c t by

tou c hin g the br e a st or g e nit a ls o f” the c omp la ina nt, the n it sh ou ld r e tur

n a g uil ty ve rd ic t. Fran c is v . S

tat e , 36 S.W .3d 121, 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 14 defe ndant’s rig ht to a unanimous jury
. Se e Fran c is v . S tat e , 36 S.W .3d 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n Fran c is , the cour

t of criminal appe als held that there was a possibili ty

of a non- unanimous jury verdic t when the tria l court g rante d a motion to elect that reque sted that the State choose betwee n tw o s e pa rate of fe ns e s a lle g e d in

a on e -c ou nt, on e -p ara g ra

phind ic tme nt, and

the State e le c te d to pursue a single conviction base d on the two sepa rate offe nses. I mportant to the Francis court’s ruling , the j udg e subm itted the s epar ate offense s to the j ury in the j ury char g e in the disjunctive, 10 and re quested that the jury return o n ly

one ver dict. Id. at 124-25. Fran c is is t hu s d ist inguis ha

ble fr om t his c a se ; he re , th e State e le c te d to purs ue six se pa rate c on vic tio ns ba se d o n s ix se pa rate of fe ns e s, and

the tr ia l ju dg e su

bmi tte d e a c h o ff

e ns e to t he jur y se pa rate ly and re qu ir e d th e jur

y to
c on sid e r e a c h o ff

e ns e a pa rt fr om t he oth e r o ff

e ns e s. Th e jud g e fu

rt he r re qu ir e d the jur

y to c ome to a unanimous dec ision f

o r ea ch o ffe nse cove red in the c harg e. And, in fa ct, the jury did return a separ ate and unanimous verdic t f or eac h of the six counts char g ed. We the ref ore ho l d t hat Martinez’s constitutional right to a una nimous jury and his r ight ag ainst double jeopar dy wer e not violated. Finally , Martinez argues that he w as h ar m ed beca use he w as convic ted of four offe nses, wher e the indictment appe are d to char g e him of o n l y three . As discussed above , the ind ic tme nt a

nd the re c or d sup po rt the jur y ’s fi nd ing s th a t Ma

rt ine z co mmi tte d f

our s e pa rate fe lon ie s. Be cause we co n cl ude that the de fenda nt was suffic iently

put on notice as to the offe nses the State would re ly o n fo r co n viction and that the trial c ourt appropr iately addre ssed15

Martinez’s m otion for an elec tion, we hold that Martinez was not harme d by any alleg ed error on the part of the trial court. We ther efor e over rule Mar tinez’s second issue.
CO NC LU SION We conclude that the trial court did not err when it de nied Martinez’s two cha lleng es for c ause dur ing the voir dire of potential jurors. We a lso conclude tha t Martinez was not harme d wh e n th e tr ia l c ourt

a llo we d th e State to pr oc e e d on se le c te d pa ra g ra ph s of the ind ic tme nt a s se pa

rate
c o u n ts , an d

th a t M arti n e z w a s a d e qu a te ly p u t o nn o ti c e a s to th e c h ar g e s b r o u g h t a g a in s t h im
. We
a ff ir m th e c on vic tio ns .

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: Mar ch 24, 2005 Pub lis h