See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 2

- 3

- 1 0 5 (20 0 1 ). 1 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 3, 200 5 S es sio n I N RE 

### ESTAT E OF MERLE JE FFERS McFARLAND Appeal by p erm ission from the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section

Chancery Court

for Haw kin s County No. 3554 Hon. Th om as R. F rier son, II, Ch ancellor

No. E2003-01833-SC-R9- CV - F iled Jul y 7, 2005

We gr anted r eview in this case to determine the appropriate manne r of distributing la psed re siduary g if ts i n a wi ll. Spe c if

ic a lly , we are c on fr on te d w ith a ho log ra ph ic wi ll c on ta ini ng a

re sid ua ry c laus e wh ic h d e vis e d p e rc e nta g e s o f the te statr ix’s e state to c e rt a in n a med ben efi c iari e s. Th re e of the se be ne fi c iari e s p re de c e a se d th e te statr ix, c a us ing the ir g if ts t o la ps e
. B e c a us e the se be ne fi c iari e s a lso died without issue, the Tenne ssee anti-lapse statute is not applicable

. Thus, the question prese nted 1 is whether the lapsed re siduary g ifts are to be divided among the re maining r esiduary benef iciarie s or pass throug h intestate succe ssion to the testatrix’s heir s at law. The probate court concluded tha t the lapsed g ifts cre ated a

partial intestac y , and the lapse d g ifts passed to the heir s at l aw. The Court of Appe als aff

irmed. Upon re view, we aff irm the judg ment of the Court of Appe als.
Te nn. R ule App . P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Appe als Affir m e d.
W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J ., delivered t h e o p inion of the court, in which E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , and A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J r., JJ ., joined. F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J., fi le d a dis sent in g o pin ion in which J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., joined.
Charles R. Terry , Morristown, Tenne ssee, Doug las T. J enkins, Roge rsville, Tenne ssee, a nd Wil liam L ewis Jenkins, J r., Dy ersbur g , Tenne ssee, f or the appellant, Stephen D. McFar land, Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of Mer le J eff ers Mc Fa rland.
G e n e Pau l G ab y , G r e e n e v il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll e e , Ja me s Co x.
J ames Robert Walker, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, T he Univer sityof Tenne ssee.
Patrick L edfor d, Kin g s p o r t, T e n n e s s e e , for Amicus Curia e, Elizabeth Walker, Administratrix C .T.A. of the Estate of Charle s Dow Chase.-2-

Daniel B . Minor, King sport, Tenne ssee, f or Amicus Curiae , J ackie Terry Olinge r.

OP IN ION
F acts

On No ve mbe r 1 4, 19 94 , M s. Me rl e Jef fe rs Mc F arl a nd e xec ute d a ho log ra ph ic wi ll. I n th is will, Ms. McFar land named a n administrator for her estate, gave direc tions reg arding her burial, set
a sid e tw o p e rc e nt o f h e r e state to p ro vid e funds for fun eral e xpe ns e s, a nda lso de vis e d a sp e c if ic bequest of thr ee thousa nd dollars to the Tieke -McCulloug h Cemetery bank fund. The will furthe r direc ted that the re mainder of her e state wa s to be divided among eig hteen na med individuals and entities. Specifica lly , Ms. McFa

rland provide d in her will that “[ t ] h e re s t of the e state I wish to be divided to the following .” She then listed the following benef iciarie s along with the perc entag es of her e state devised to e ac h

. He r two brother s, Wi llie L ee Jeffe rs and Minnis Rankin J eff ers, we re e a c h to re c e ive a te n pe rc e nt sha re of the re sid ua

ry e state

. Cla

re nc e L e e Mc F arl a nd , M ary L ou ise McF arla nd, and Eve ly n B. Mc Fa rland McCulley

wer e ea ch also devised a

ten per cent sha

re. A nother te n p e rc e nt s ha

re wa s to be div ide d e qu a lly be tw e e n th e thr e e so ns of Cly de E. Mc F arl a nd . T he F ir st United Methodist Church of Bulls Gap rec eived a five pe rce nt share. L arry and Virg inia Carpente r wer e to divide a f

i v e p er cent share. A two pe rce nt share w as devised to the c ity of B ulls Gap. Another two pe rce nt share w ent to the Tieke -McCulloug h Cemetery for “ mowing and u p k ee p of the ce metery .” The Thompson Cancer Center in Knoxvill e wa s d ev ised a ten pe rce nt share to be used for rese arc h, and the University of Tennessee was also to rec eive ten pe rce nt “for sc holarships
or wh a t th e y

ne e d mo st.” Ms

. McFa rl a ndg ra nte d o ne pe rc e nt s ha re s to the B ull s G ap M a so nic L o d g e a n d E a s te r n St ar L o d g e
. F in a ll y , th e U n it e d Wa y F u n d o r a n y o th e r “ w o r th y c h ar ity fund” was de vised a two pe rce nt share. On October 12, 2001, seven y ear s after making the will, Ms. McFa rland pa ssed away

at the
a g e of e ig hty -f ou r. An a dmi nis tr a tor

wa s a pp oin te d b y

the tr ia l c ou rt , a ndthe wi ll w a s a dmi tte d to probate . Howeve r, the a dminist rator subsequently filed a decla ratory judgme nt a ction seeking the court’s g uidance as to how the proc eeds of t h e es t at e we re to be distributed. This action was
ne c e ssi ta te d du e to the fa c t that thr e e of the re sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s na me d in the wi ll, Min nis Ra nk in Jef fe rs , Wil lie L e e Jef

fe rs , a ndMa

ry L ou ise Mc F arl a nd , h a d p re de c e a se d th e te statr ix, Ms

. M c F ar l a n d

. A l s o , n o n e o f t h e s e p r e d e c e a s e d b e n e f

i c i ar i e s h a d l e f

t a s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e o r

i s s u e
. It was ther efor e unce rtain as to how these individuals’ shares w ere to be distributed.
The c hance ry court, ex erc ising probate jurisdi ction, determined that the g ifts to each of the three prede cea sing be nefic iaries ha d lapsed. B eca use ea ch had die d without lea ving sur viving issue, T e n n e s s e e ’ s a n t i

- l ap s e s t a t u t e , T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 3 2

- 3

- 1 0 5 ( 2 0 0 1 ) , d i d n o tap p l y.-3-

The probate court concluded tha t these circ umstances resulted in a partial intestacy in Ms. F arla nd’s estate. The chanc ellor also acknow ledg ed that the l ong -standing common law rule, as announc ed in Ford v. F ord, 31 Tenn. 431 ( 1852), wa s that lapsed re sidua ry gi ft s do not remain a s part of the
re sid ue of

the wi ll t o b e dis tr ibuted to re ma ini ng be ne fi c iari e s, bu t in ste a d p a ss b y int e state succe ssion to the testator’s next of kin. There fore , the chancellor directed that those share s of the estate de vised to the p re d ec ea s ed beneficia ries we re to be distributed to Ms. McFar land’s heir s at la w, rathe r tha n b e ing div ide d a mon g the re ma ini ng re sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s.
The e state admi n i strator filed a n interlocutory appea l in the Court of Appea ls, where the decision of the pr obate c ourt was subseque ntly aff irmed. W e then g rante d revie w. The issue prese nted is whether

the lapsed r esiduary g ifts pass t o the testatrix’s heirs at law or to the rema ining
re sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s. Th e e state a dmi nis tr a tor , a lon g wi th the re ma ini ng re sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s, arg ue that th e laps e d g if ts s ho uldbe div ided a mon g the re ma ini ng re sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s in p ro p o rt i o n to their interests g rante d in the will. I n opposition, t he surviving heirs ar g ue that the lapsed g ifts pass by

intestate succ ession.

Stand ard of Review
When this C ourt is called upon to construe a will, a nd there is no dispute in the evidenc e as to any materia l fac t, then the question on appe al is one of law . I n re Estate of Vince nt, 98 S.W .3d 14 6, 14 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) . A c c or din g ly , o ur re vie w i s d e no vo wi th no p re su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss acc ompany ing the lower c ourts’ conc lusions of law. I d. (citation omitted).

Ana lys is
I. P rinciples of

Will Cons truct ion
I n construing a will, the ca rdinal rule is that the Court must attempt to a scertain the intent of the testator a nd to give eff ect to that intent unless prohibited by a rule of law or public policy . I d. at 150; see Winningha m v. Wi nningha m, 966 S.W .2d 48, 50 (Tenn. 1998) . Holog raphic wills drawn by unskilled drafte rs ar e g iven a liberal construction. See Garner v. Be cton, 212 S.W .2d 890, 891 (Tenn. 1948) . Neve rtheless, the intention of the te stator must be asce rtained, if at all possible, from the particular wor ds used in the will and from the c ontext , g ener al scope , and purpose of the ins tr u me n t. D a u g h e r ty

v
. D a u g h e r ty , 7 8 4 S. W. 2 d 6 5 0 , 6 5 3 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 0 )

. T h e Co u r t “ c annot determine the devolution of estate s based upon the me re surmise as to t h e t es tator’s intention.” Pinkerton v. Turman, 268 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tenn. 1954).
The a dminist rator of

the estate arg ues that Ms. McF arla nd’s will manifested a clea r pr e fe re nc e fo r tho se sp e c if ie d b e ne ficiari e s r a the r tha n f or the he ir s a t la w. He arg ue s th a t Ms

. Mc F arl a nd c le arl y int e nd e d the re sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s to re c e ive the re ma ind e r of he r e state , in its
e nti re ty , a ndto the e xclu sio n o f a ll o the r p e rs on s, inc lud ing he r h e ir s. Th e a dmi nis tr a tor a lsoT h e wor d “ i s s u e” h as be en i n t er pr et ed as me an i n g on l y di r ec t de s ce n dan t s of t h e ben ef

i ci ar y
. W h i t e, 159 2 S. W

. 2d a t 95. -4- corr ectly notes that when a

person makes a will there is a presumption that the person did not intend to die intestate as to any part of his or her property

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-101 (2001); I n re Walker, 849 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1993).

On the oth e r h a nd , the la w re qu ir e s us to re a d a will a s if it h a d b e e n e xec ute d im me diate ly prior to the testator’ s death. Te nn. Code Ann. § 32-3- 101 (2001); see also Be ll v. S h annon, 367 S.W. 2d76 1, 76 6 (T e nn . 196 3) . Fu rthe rm or e , a pe rs on is p re su me d to be a c qu a int e d w ith app lic able
ru le s o f la w w h e n e xe c u ti n g a

w il l. M c Ca

r le y v
. M c Ca

r le y , 3 6 0 S. W. 2 d 2 7 , 2 9 ( T e n n
. 1 9 6 2 )

. We must presume, there fore , that Ms. McFa rland, prior

to her de ath, knew tha t severa l of the be ne fi c iari e s h a d p re de c e a se d her, andwe c a n f urthe r p re su me that sh e kn e w the se laps e d g if ts would pass by

intes t at e succ ession to her he irs. Also, there is no e vidence in the rec ord that she
a tte mpt e d to re dr a ft

or re vis e her w ill to p ro vid e fo r a n a lte rn a tiv e dis tr ibu tio n o f the laps e d g if ts.

Fa ced w ith a lack of

any clea r evide nce c oncerning the testatrix’s int ent on this point, we are le ft to a pp ly the g e ne ra l rule s g ov e rn ing re sid ua ry c laus e s a ndlaps e d g if

ts.
II. Ge neral Rules of Pr operty D esce nt and Distribution A g if t or de vis e in a wil l w hic h f a ils be c a us e the be ne fi c iary pr e de c e a se s th e te stator

is s a id to lapse. White v. Kane, 159 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tenn. 1942). T o avoid this problem, Tenne ssee, like many o th e r s tate s , h a s e n a c te d a n “ a n ti

- la p s e ” s tatu te w h ic h w o rk s to s a v e la p s e d g if ts f o r the
re pr e se ntativ e s o f the pr e de c e a se d b e ne fi c iary . I d. Th e Te nn e sse e a nti -l aps e statut e pr ov ide s, in pa rt : (a ) Wh e ne ve r the de vis e e or le g a te e or

a ny me mbe r o f a

c la ss t o w hic h a n im me diate dev is e o r b e q u e s t is ma d e , d ie s b e f o r e th e te s tato r , o r is d e a d a t th e ma k in g of the wi l l , leaving issue which survive s the testator , the issue shall take the estate or interest devise d or beque athed whic h the devisee or leg ate e o r t he member of the class, as the case may

be, would have taken, ha d that person survive d th e testator, un le ss a dif fe re nt d isp os iti on the re of is m a de or

re qu ir e d b y

the wi ll. Tenn. Code Ann. § 32- 3-105 (2001) (empha sis added). This statute attempts to further the pre sumed intent of the testator in the a bsence of any
co n tr ar y in te n t e xp r e s s e d th r o u g h th e w il l. We is s v
. B r o a d w a y N a t’ l B a n k , 3 2 2 S. W. 2 d 4 2 7 , 432 (Tenn. 1959). Howeve r, t he anti-lapse statute save s the g ift only if the pre dece ased be nefic iary has left issue surviving the testator; ot herw ise, the s tatute has no application, and the gift lapses. See

2 Cox v. Sulli ns, 183 S.W .2d 865, 866 (Tenn. 1944)

.Se e Cor bet t , 207 P. a t 821- 22; I n r e Fr ol i ch Es t at e, 295 A. 2d a t 451; I n re G ray ’ s E st at e, 23 A. 205, 206 3 ( P enn
. 18 92 ) ; I n r e Sl ack T r us t , 22 0 A. 2d 47 2, 47 3 ( V t

. 19 66 ) ; s ee al s o Ed war d C. H al bach, Jr

. , St ar e D eci s i s an d R ul es o f C o nst ruct i o n i n W i l l s and T rus t s, 52 C al

. L. R ev. 92 1 , 94 0 (19 6 4 ); P a tric ia J. R o b ert s, Lap se St at ut es: R ecurri ng C o n stru c tio n P ro b le m s,3 7 E m o ry L . J. 3 2 3 , 3 6 8 -7 1 (1 9 8 8 ).

T hi s i s al so t he rul e espo used i n t he m o st current vers i o ns o f A m eri can Juri sprud ence and t he R est at em ent 4

o f P rop ert y
. See 8 0 A m
. Jur. 2 d W i l l s § 1 4 5 2 (20 0 2 ); R est at em ent (T hi rd) of P rop
. : W i l l s & O t her D o nat i ve T rans fers § 5 .5 c m t. o (1 9 9 9 ).

As of t h e dat e of t h i s opi n i on t h i r t y
- s ev en s t at es h ad adopt ed t h e U PC r u l e by s t at u t e. Se e, e
. g
. , Al a. Code 5 § 43- 8- 225( b) ( 1982) ; Ar i z. Rev

. St at

. § 14- 2604 ( 2005) ; C ol o. R ev
. St at

. § 15- 11- 604 (2004) ; Fl a. St at

. c h

. 732. 604( 2) ( 2004) ; H aw
. Rev

. St at

. § 560: 2- 604 ( 1996) ; M i ch

. Comp. La ws § 700. 2604( 2) ( 1998) ; M on t

. Code An n
. § 72- 2- 614 (20 0 3 ); 20 P a. C o ns. Stat

. § 2 5 1 4 (11 ) ( 1 9 9 9 ); W ash. R ev. C o d e § 1 1

. 1 2

. 1 2 0 (2) (19 9 9 ). Fo ur s t at es have ado p t ed t he U P C ru le thr o u g h c a se law . S e e , e.g ., In r e F ro lich E sta te , 2 9 5 A .2 d a t 4 5 2 ; In re S la c k T ru st, 2 2 0 A .2 d a t 4 7 4

.

I n a dd i t i on t o T enn es s ee, s eve n ot her s t at es an d t he D i s t r i ct of Co l umbi a c ont i nu e t o adher e t o t he t r adi t i onal 6

com mo n- l aw or “ E ng l i s h” r ul e. See B r ons on v. P i nn ey , 33 A

. 2d 32 2, 32 6 ( C onn. 19 43 ) ; St ar key v. D i s t

. of Co l umbi a, 3 7 7 A .2d 3 8 2 , 3 8 3 (D .C . 1 9 7 7 ); M att er o f E st ate o f K i rke nd all , 6 4 2 N .E .2d 5 4 8 , 5 5 2 (Ind

. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 4 ); B an ke rs T rust C o
. v. A l l en, 13 5 N

. W

. 2 d 60 7 , 61 2 (I o wa 1 9 6 5 ); H o p son v. R at l i f f , 42 6 So

. 2 d 1 3 7 7 , 1 3 8 0

- 8 1 (La. C t

. A p p
. 19 8 3 ); B y rd
v. W al l i s , 181 So. 727 , 731 ( M i s s
. 193 8); I n r e Est at e of Lewi s E s t at e, 15 9 P. 96 1, 962 ( N ev. 191 6); D ean v. M oo r e, (c o n tinu e d ...) -5- An oth e r m a nn e r o f d isp os ing of laps e d g if

ts is thr ou g h a will ’s re sid ua ry c laus e
. I f the wi ll contains spec ific g ifts or devises of property which lapse, these are deeme d to fall into the residue and are disposed of throug h the provisions of the re siduary clause , unless the testator ha s manifested a contr ary intention. Milli g an v. Gre eneville Col l., 2 S.W .2d 90, 93 (Tenn. 1928). Yet a particular problem arises when, a s in the prese nt c ase, the anti-lapse sta tute is inapplicable, a nd the g ift which has lapsed is a lrea dy a part of the residue. Under such circ umstances, the tr aditional rule, de rived from the Eng lish c ommon law , is tha t the lapsed g ift falls out of the terms of the will a nd passes by intestate succ ession to the testator’s he irs at law. See , e.g ., Corbett v. Skag g s, 207 P. 819, 820 (Ka n. 19 22 ); I n r e F ro lic h E state , 2 95 A. 2d 44 8, 45 0 (N .H . 197 2)

. Th is ru le ha s, in fa c t, be e n the la w i n Te nn e sse e fo r the pa st 1 53 y e ars , ha vin g be e n ad op te d in Fo rd v. F or d, 31 Te nn . 431 (1 85 2) . T his Court held in Ford that when “a bequest to sever al be of t he residue, and it fail as to part by rea son of l ap s e , p ar ti a l r e v o c a ti o n , o r o th e r c a u s e b e f

o r e s tate d , s u c h p ar t c a n n o t f a ll in to th e r emaining residue, but will be undisposed of and g o to the next of kin.” I d. at 435. Despite its stabilityin our state, this rule has been much criticized in other jurisdictions and by leg al commentators, with the main ar g ument being that the rule de feats the most probable intent of the testator in this situation. Due in part to this criticism, the Uniform Probate Code adopts an 3 alternative rule, ofte n called the “modern” rule , which dire cts that “if the r esidue is devised to two or more pe rsons and the sha re of one of the residuary

devisee s fails for a ny

rea son, his share pa sses to the other re siduary

devisee , or to other r esiduary devisee s in pro p o rt ion to their interests in the
re sid ue .” Un if . Pr ob a te Cod e § 2 -6 06 (1 97 4)

. Th e UPC ru le ha s g ain ed wid e -s pr e a d s up po rt , 4 hav in g been ad op ted , ei th er byst atu te o r t hro ugh cas e la w, i n the vas t maj ori ty of ot her st ate s. By 5 contr a s t, th e c o mm o n
- la w o r F o r d ru le r e ma in s in e f

f e c t i n o n ly

a mi n o r it y o f s tate s , in c luding Tenne ssee. 6(

. . . con t i n u ed) 6 3 8 0 P .2 d 9 3 4 , 9 3 7 (O k la . 1 9 6 2 ).
-6- Ne ve rthe le ss, a lth ou g h w ide ly aba nd on e d in oth e r j ur isd ic tio ns , th e F or d r ule c a nn ot f

a ir ly be te rm e d e ith e r inc or

re c t or ill og ic a l. Th e re a so ns su pp ortin g the mod e rn UPC ru le are g e ne ra lly that it more closely

comports with the proba ble intent of the testator

and th at i t avoids partial intestacy . See I n re Slac k Trust, 220 A.2d at 473-74; Corbett, 207 P. at 822. Howeve r, in our view, it is j ust a s likely that a person would consider the implications of the traditional or F ord rule w hen executing his or he r will and thus implicitl y intend that lapsed g ifts should pass to the heirs, rather than to the re maining r esiduary benef iciarie s. There fore , neither of the rules is more log ically corr ect tha n th e ot her. Th e two d ive rg e nt r ule s si mpl y

re pr e se nt t wo c omp e tin g sc ho ols of tho ug ht a s to wh a t a te stator wo uldmos t pr ob ably

de sir e to h app e n w he n a

re sid ua ry g if t la ps e s.
Th e F or d r

ule do e s not r e su lt i n a ny ob vio us inj us tic e or

un fa ir ne ss, a ndc a nn ot b e sa id t o fr us tr a te the int e nt of the te stator

. F or ins ta nc e , in the pr e se nt c a se , the te str a tr ix d e vis e d ce rt a in pe rc e nta g e s o f h e r r e sid ua ry e state to e ig hte e n s pe c if

ie d p art ie s, a nd thr e e of the se g if ts s ub se qu e ntl y lapsed. The will gives no indication of how the testatrix prefe rre d these lapse d g ifts to be distributed. Howeve r, application of the For d rule re sults i n the testatrix’s stated intentions being c arried out pr e c ise ly a s sh e dir e c te d w ith re sp e c t to fi ft e e n of the e ig hte e n b e ne fi c iari e s. F urthe r, the laps e d g if ts pass to the m ost natura l objects of her bounty – her heirs, which is a disposition favored unde r the law. See F urchtg ott v. Young, 487 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tenn. 1972) (holdin g that in the absenc e of
a n e xpre sse d in te nti on to the c on tr ary , “ ‘a c on str uc tio n wi ll be fa vo re d wh ic h c on fo rm s mo st n e arl y to the g ener al laws of inhe ritance and which w ill pre fer those of the blood of the testator to strang ers or to persons not so closely rela ted t o the t estator’ ”) (quoting Davis v. Mitchell 178 S.W .2d 889, 913 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 94 4) ). Con ve rs e ly , ap pli c a tio n of the mod e rn UPC ru le wo uldwo rk to c omp le te ly redr aft the terms of the w ill, with none of the eig hteen be quests being fulfilled exactly as direc ted by the testatrix. Although w e do not know how the te statrix would have pr efe rre d the lapsed g ifts t o be distributed, she clea

rly g ave considera

ble t houg ht to the s pecif

ic per centa g es of he r estate which she allotted to eac h benef

iciary . To enlar g e those pe rce ntag es now, wi t h o u t an y evidenc e that the testatrix i ntended suc h an outcome, w ould, in our opinion, totally frustra te her

intentions as stated in the will. Fa ced with the choice betwee n these two options, we conc lude that the F ord rule se cure s the re su lt w hic h mo st c los e ly c omp orts w ith the te statr ix’s state d in te nti on s a ndis th e mo st j us t, natura l, and re asonable dispositi on of the prope rty . See Da vis, 178 S.W .2d at 913 (stating that “such construction will be adopte d if possible that will dispos e of the property in a j u s t , n at u ral or
rea sonable manne r”)

. III . P r inc iple of St ar e De c isi s
Further supporting rete ntion of the common-law F ord rule is the principle that whene ver a judicia l d e c is io n , s u c h a s F o r d , “ h a s b e e n s u b mi tt e d to a n d f o r s o me ti me , a c te d u n d e r , a n d is not manifestly

repug nant to some rule of law of vital importance in the s y stem, it should not li g htly be-7-

departed from, nor

for pur poses which a

re not of the highe st value to the community .” Ha ll v. Skidmore, 171 S.W .2d 274, 276 (Tenn. 1943) (internal quotations omi tted) over ruled on other g rounds by Gra ves v. Sawy er, 588 S.W .2d 542 (Tenn. 1979). I n urg ing us to abandon the F ord rule, the appe llants cite a g ener al trend towa rd adoption of the more m odern UPC rule, and also arg ue that the te statr ix pr ob ably int e nd e d fo r he r e state to be div ide d a mon g the na me d r e sid ua ry be ne fi c iari e s, to the exclusion of her heirs. N either arg ument is sufficiently persua sive or compe lling to support overriding a

rule of la w that has be en in e ffe ct in this state for far more than a century
. The doc trine of sta re dec isi s is “ on e of

c omm a nd ing imp orta nc e , g ivi ng , a s it do e s, fi rm ne ss a ndsta

bil ity to principles of la w.” J.T. Far g ason C o. v. Ba ll, 159 S.W

. 221, 222 (Tenn. 1913). Stabilit y in the law
a llo ws ind ivi du a ls to pla n the ir a ff a ir s and to “s a fe ly jud g e of the ir le g a l rig hts .” I d. Ge ne ra lly , w e llsettled rules of la w will be overturned only when there is obvi ous err or or unr easona bleness in the prec edent, chang es in conditions which re nder the prec edent obsolete , the likelihood that adher ence to prec edenc e would ca

use g reater harm to the communi ty than would disreg arding stare de cisis, or an inconsistency

betwee n prec edent a nd a co nstitut ional provision. None of the se re asons ar e evident in the pre sent ca se.
Th e po we r o f thi s Court to ov e rr ule fo rm e r d e c isi on s “ is v e ry sp ari ng ly e xer c ise d a ndon ly when the r eason is compe lling.” Eding bourg h v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 337 S.W .2d 13, 14 (Tenn. 1960). Radica l chang es in the l aw are best made by the l eg islature. J .T. Fa rg ason C o., 159 S.W . at 222. I n our view, if our

Gene ral Asse mbly

determines that the UPC or “modern” rule would be tter se rv e the pu bli c int e re st, the n it is within its po we r to ad op t it int o la w, a s h a ve ma ny oth e r s ta te s. Fo r t h e t i m e b ei n g, we s ee n o co m p el l i n g re as o n i n t h e c as e n o w b ef o r e u s t o o v e r ru l e t h e l o n gstanding pre ce d ent established in F ord. Ther efor e, we ag ree with the probate court a nd the Court of Appe als that the F ord rule g overns this c ase, a nd the lapsed r esiduary g ifts in Ms. McFar land’s will pass to her heirs unde r the law s of intestate succ ession.

Conclusion
I n summary , we hold that the lapsed re siduary g ifts at issue in this case ar e not to be divided among the re maining r esiduary benef iciarie s. Rather, the lapsed g ifts r esult in a partial intestac y and there fore pass under

the laws of intesta te succ ession to the testatrix’s heirs at law.
Costs of this appea l are taxed to the appellant, Stephen D. Mc Fa rland, a dminist rator C.T.A.
o f t h e e s t a t e o f

M e r l e J e f f e r s M c F ar l a n d , o r

h i s s u r e t i e s , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

______________________________ WI LL I AM M. B AR KE R, JUS TI CE