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56

7 ROCHDI MAGHFOUR v. CITY OF WATERBURY

89 (SC 20502)

10 Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,

11 Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js. 12

134 Syllabus

15 The plaintiff, an employee of the defendant city, sought to resolve a dispute

16 concerning a lien the city placed on certain settlement proceeds that

17 he had received as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred

18 in 2016. At all relevant times, the city was self-insured and paid for the

19 medical care that the plaintiff received in connection with the accident.

20 In July, 2017, the legislature passed an amendment (P.A. 17-165, § 1) to

21 a statute (§ 7-464) concerning group insurance benefits for municipal

22 employees that allowed a self-insured city that provides health benefits

23 for its employees to file a lien on the portion of any settlement proceeds

24 that represents payment for medical expenses incurred by a city

25 employee when such expenses result from the negligence or reckless26 ness of a third party. Later in July, 2017, the plaintiff filed an action

27 against the third-party tortfeasor who had caused the plaintiff to sustain

28 injuries in the accident. Thereafter, on October 1, 2017, P.A. 17-165, § 1,

29 became effective. In October, 2018, the city filed a notice of lien, claiming

30 a right to reimbursement for amounts that it had paid for the plaintiff’s

31 medical expenses from any judgment or settlement the plaintiff might

32 receive arising from the accident. Approximately one week later, the

33 plaintiff settled his civil action against the third-party tortfeasor. The

34 plaintiff then brought the present action, claiming that P.A. 17-165, § 1,

35 did not authorize the lien filed by the city because the plaintiff’s injuries

36 occurred and his action against the third-party tortfeasor was com37 menced before the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1. The trial court

38 granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judg39 ment thereon, concluding, inter alia, that the legislature did not expressly

40 indicate that it intended for P.A. 17-165, § 1, to apply retroactively to

41 pending actions and, therefore, that the statute (§ 55-3) precluding a

42 new law that imposes any new obligation from being construed to have

43 retroactive effect barred the city’s lien. On the city’s appeal from the

44 trial court’s judgment, held that the trial court properly granted the

45 plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, as that court correctly deter46 mined that the city’s lien stemmed from an improper, retroactive applica47 tion of P.A. 17-165, § 1: the legislature did not explicitly provide that

48 P.A. 17-165, § 1, should apply retroactively, and, because that public act

49 created a new right for a self-insured municipality to assert a lien to

50 recover medical expenses that it has paid and eliminated the right of a

51 municipal employee to retain sums that he or she recovers from a third52 party tortfeasor if those sums represent medical expenses paid by the

53 municipality, P.A. 17-165, § 1, was substantive, and, pursuant to § 55-3,

54 could operate prospectively only; moreover, there was no merit to the

55 city’s claim that allowing it to place a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement

56 proceeds would not effect a retroactive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1,

57 in view of the fact that the plaintiff settled his action against the third58 party tortfeasor after the effective date of that public act, as the settle59 ment was not independent of the motor vehicle accident that ultimately

60 led to the settlement and that occurred prior to the public act’s effec61 tive date. 62

63 Argued December 8, 2020—officially released August 3, 2021* 64

6567 Procedural History

68 Action for interpleader to resolve a dispute concern69 ing a lien claimed by the defendant on certain settlement

70 proceeds, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

71 district of Waterbury, where the court, Roraback, J.,

72 granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,

73 denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
74 and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the

756 defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Daniel J. Foster, corporation counsel, for the appel78 lant (defendant).

79801 Jonathan H. Dodd, for the appellee (plaintiff).
823 Opinion

84 MULLINS, J. The defendant, the city of Waterbury

85 (city), appeals from the judgment of the trial court ren86 dered in favor of the plaintiff, Rochdi Maghfour. On

87 appeal, the city contends that the trial court improperly

88 granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

89 because it erroneously concluded that General Statutes

90 § 7-464, as amended by § 1 of No. 17-165 of the 2017

91 Public Acts (P.A. 17-165), did not authorize the city’s

92 lien in this case. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm

93 the judgment of the trial court.

94 The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial

95 court and contained in the record, and procedural his96 tory are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. On

97 June 20, 2016, the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle

98 accident. He was an employee of the city, which is a

99 self-insured municipality. Therefore, the city paid for

100 medical care resulting from his injuries.

101 On July 14, 2017, the plaintiff initiated an action

102 against the third-party tortfeasor who had caused his

103 injuries in the motor vehicle accident. Earlier that

104 month, the legislature had enacted P.A. 17-165, § 1,

105 which amended § 7-464 by adding subsections (c) and

106 (d).1 See P.A. 17-165, § 1; 60 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 2017 Sess.,

107 pp. 3076–77, 3101–3102; 60 H.R. Proc., Pt. 13, 2017 Sess.,

108 pp. 5329–35. The new subsections allow a self-insured

109 city, town, or borough to file a lien on the portions of

110 judgments or settlements that represent payment for

111 medical expenses incurred by its employees when such

112 expenses result from the negligence or recklessness of

113 a third party. See P.A. 17-165, § 1. Public Act 17-165,

114 § 1, had an effective date of October 1, 2017.

115 After the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1, the city

116 filed a notice of lien dated October 15, 2018, with the

117 plaintiff’s attorney. In that notice, the city claimed a

118 right to reimbursement of medical expenses for which

119 it had paid from any judgment or settlement the plaintiff

120 might receive arising from his June 20, 2016 motor vehi121 cle accident. Thereafter, on October 23, 2018, the plain122 tiff settled his civil action against the third-party tortfea123 sor.

124 Following the settlement, the plaintiff and the city

125 could not reach an agreement to resolve the issue of

126 whether the city was entitled to a lien on the settlement

127 for the amount of the medical expenses it had paid.

128 Consequently, the plaintiff initiated the present action

129 in the trial court contesting the validity of the city’s lien

130 on the proceeds of his settlement.2In his petition, the

131 plaintiff claimed that § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-

132 165, § 1, did not authorize the lien filed by the city

133 because the plaintiff’s injury occurred and his action

134 against the third-party tortfeasor was commenced

135 before the effective date of the act.

136 Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. The
137 trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary

138 judgment and denied the city’s motion for summary

139 judgment. In doing so, the trial court concluded that

140 the legislature did not expressly indicate that it intended

141 for P.A. 17-165, § 1, to apply retroactively to pending

142 actions and, therefore, that General Statutes §§ 1-1 (u)3

143 and 55-34 barred the lien from affecting pending litiga144 tion and from applying retroactively. This appeal fol145 lowed.5

146 On appeal, the city asserts that the trial court improp147 erly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg148 ment because the plain language and legislative intent

149 of § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, indicate that

150 the city’s lien would apply to the proceeds of the plain151 tiff’s settlement reached after the act’s effective date.

152 The city contends that, because the plaintiff reached

153 his settlement after the effective date of P.A. 17-165,

154 § 1, and the plain language of the statute applies to

155 settlements, its lien under the act would not operate

156 retroactively in the present case. According to the city’s

157 reasoning, P.A. 17-165, § 1, simply applies to any settle158 ments reached after the effective date of the act. The

159 plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly deter160 mined that the city was not authorized to file a lien on

161 the proceeds of his settlement in this matter because

162 § 55-3 bars P.A. 17-165, § 1, from applying retroactively

163 and § 1-1 (u) prevents it from applying to existing litiga164 tion.

165 We begin by setting forth the standard of review

166 governing this appeal. ‘‘The scope of our review of the

167 trial court’s decision to grant the [plaintiff’s] motion

168 for summary judgment is plenary.’’ Shoreline Shellfish,

169 LLC v. Branford, 336 Conn. 403, 410, 246 A.3d 470

170 (2020). ‘‘To the extent that the trial court’s decision

171 . . . requires us to construe a [statute], our review is

172 also plenary and is guided by our well established legal

173 principles regarding statutory construction. . . . In

174 construing statutes, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us

175 first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

176 relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

177 text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

178 such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

179 absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

180 the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’

181 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

182 Id., 410–11.

183 Both the plaintiff and the city agree that their compet184 ing motions for summary judgment gave rise to no genu185 ine issue as to any material fact. Thus, the issue of

186 whether the trial court properly granted the plaintiff’s

187 motion for summary judgment turns solely on a point

188 of statutory interpretation, namely, whether, as a matter

189 of law, § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, autho190 rizes the city to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement

191 from his civil action against the third-party tortfeasor.
192 As instructed by § 1-2z, we begin our analysis with

193 the text of § 7-464 (c), which provides in relevant part

194 that ‘‘[a] self-insured town, city or borough that provides

195 group health benefits for its employees has a lien on

196 that part of a judgment or settlement that represents

197 payment for economic loss for medical, hospital and

198 prescription expenses incurred by its employees and

199 their covered dependents and family members when

200 such expenses result from the negligence or reckless201 ness of a third party. . . .’’ As we noted previously,

202 P.A. 17-165, § 1, provided that the amendment to § 7-464

203 became effective on October 1, 2017. The legislature,

204 however, did not expressly indicate whether it intended

205 the amendment to apply retroactively to events that

206 occurred before its effective date, such as the plaintiff’s

207 motor vehicle accident. Therefore, the plain language

208 of the statute does not answer the question on appeal,

209 and we must examine the relationship of § 7-464 (c)

210 with our law governing the retroactivity of statutes.

211 ‘‘In considering the question of whether a statute may

212 be applied retroactively, we are governed by certain

213 well settled principles, [pursuant to] which our ultimate

214 focus is the intent of the legislature in enacting the

215 statute. . . . [O]ur point of departure is . . . § 55-3

216 . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v.

217 Volvo Excavators AB, 333 Conn. 283, 292, 215 A.3d

218 149 (2019). Section 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the

219 general statutes, not previously contained in the stat220 utes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on

221 any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a

222 retrospective effect.’’ ‘‘[W]e have uniformly interpreted

223 § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that stat224 utes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospec225 tively only. . . . In civil cases, however, unless consid226 erations of good sense and justice dictate otherwise, it

227 is presumed that procedural statutes will be applied

228 retrospectively. . . . [Although] there is no precise def229 inition of either [substantive or procedural law], it is

230 generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines

231 and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes

232 the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining

233 redress. . . . Procedural statutes . . . therefore leave

234 the preexisting scheme intact.’’6(Internal quotation

235 marks omitted.) King v. Volvo Excavators AB, supra,

236 292.

237 Because the legislature did not expressly provide that

238 P.A. 17-165, § 1, should apply retroactively, the pre239 sumption stands that, if § 7-464, as amended by the act,

240 affects substantive rights, then it shall apply prospec241 tively only. See id. Here, then, we must determine whether

242 § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1, affects a sub243 stantive or procedural right in order to answer the ques244 tion of whether the city is entitled to the lien in this case.

245 Prior to the passage of P.A. 17-165, § 1, a self-insured

246 municipality did not have the express right to assert a
247 lien to recover medical expenses paid as benefits from

248 the proceeds of an employee’s litigation against third249 party tortfeasors.7 See, e.g., P.A. 17-165, § 1; see also,

250 e.g., Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Plan251 ning and Development, Pt. 1, 2017 Sess., p. 247, remarks

252 of Representative Stephanie E. Cummings (state repre253 sentative who previously spoke with city’s leadership

254 acknowledged during her testimony in support for pas255 sage of house bill that became P.A. 17-165, § 1, that, as

256 self-insured municipality, city lacked right under Con257 necticut law to recover collateral source benefits). After

258 P.A. 17-165, § 1, went into effect, however, a self-insured

259 municipality had the right to assert a lien to recover

260 medical expenses it had paid. See General Statutes § 7-

261 464 (c) and (d).

262 The statutory change thus confers a new right on a

263 self-insured municipality, such as the city. Correspond264 ingly, the statute, as amended, simultaneously elimi265 nates the right of plaintiffs, held prior to the enactment

266 of P.A. 17-165, § 1, to retain sums they recover from

267 negligent or reckless third-party tortfeasors who have

268 harmed them if those sums represent medical expenses

269 paid by the municipality. Thus, because P.A. 17-165, § 1,

270 created a new right for self-insured municipalities and

271 limited the rights of their employees, we conclude that

272 § 7-464, as amended by the act, is substantive. See, e.g.,

273 Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 Conn.

274 451, 455–57, 446 A.2d 818 (1982) (holding that amend275 ment affecting insurance company’s lien recovery

276 amount was substantive rather than procedural); see

277 also, e.g., Little v. Ives, 158 Conn. 452, 457, 262 A.2d 174

278 (1969) (‘‘[l]egislation which limits or increases statutory

279 liability has generally been held to be substantive in

280 nature’’).8 The statute therefore must operate prospec281 tively only.

282 The city asserts that allowing it to file a lien on the

283 plaintiff’s settlement proceeds in the present case

284 would not present a retroactive application of the stat285 ute. Specifically, the city asserts that, because the plain286 tiff settled his action against the third-party tortfeasor

287 on October 23, 2018, after the effective date of P.A. 17-

288 165, § 1—which was October 1, 2017—upholding its

289 lien does not require a retroactive application of the

290 act. We disagree.

291 As this court has previously concluded, ‘‘a statute

292 does not operate retrospectively merely because it is

293 applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the

294 statute’s enactment . . . or upsets expectations based

295 in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new

296 provision attaches new legal consequences to events

297 completed before its enactment.’’ (Emphasis in original;

298 internal quotation marks omitted.) Shannon v. Com299 missioner of Housing, 322 Conn. 191, 204, 140 A.3d

300 903 (2016). In other words, ‘‘a law has retroactive effect

301 when it would impair rights a party possessed when he
302 acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or

303 impose new duties with respect to transactions already

304 completed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

305 205–206. This court further cautioned that ‘‘[t]he conclu306 sion that a particular rule operates retroactively comes

307 at the end of a process of judgment concerning the

308 nature and extent of the change in the law and the

309 degree of connection between the operation of the new

310 rule and a relevant past event.’’ (Internal quotation

311 marks omitted.) Id., 204. Moreover, this court noted

312 that ‘‘[a]ny test of retroactivity will leave room for dis313 agreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the

314 enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philo315 sophical clarity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

316 Id.

317 We conclude that allowing the city to pursue statutory

318 lien rights in the present case would result in an

319 improper, retroactive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1,

320 because it would attach new legal consequences to

321 events completed before the act’s effective date. Those

322 events are the legal rights to which the plaintiff became

323 entitled as a result of personal injuries sustained by

324 him on June 20, 2016, the date of the motor vehicle

325 accident. The act impaired the right of the plaintiff to

326 obtain compensation for personal injuries caused by

327 the tortfeasor’s negligence on certain conditions, one

328 of those being that any such recovery would be free

329 and clear of any claims by the city requiring repayment

330 of sums expended for medical care relating to those

331 injuries. Public Act 17-165, § 1, created a new liability

332 or obligation on the part of the plaintiff to pay proceeds

333 of his settlement to the city to reimburse the city for

334 past payments made by it. It also created a correlative,

335 new right entitling the city to obtain reimbursement for

336 medical expenses from the proceeds of the plaintiff’s

337 settlement.

338 Indeed, neither the plaintiff’s obligation nor the city’s

339 corresponding right existed at the time of the plaintiff’s

340 motor vehicle accident or at the time the city paid most

341 of the medical expenses, and, in this particular case,

342 even the commencement of the plaintiff’s underlying

343 civil action predated the effective date of P.A. 17-165,

344 § 1. Thus, applying P.A. 17-165, § 1, to a settlement

345 related to a motor vehicle accident that occurred prior

346 to the effective date of the act is a retroactive applica347 tion of the act. Contrary to the city’s position, the settle348 ment does not stand on its own. Rather, the settlement

349 stems from the motor vehicle accident that occurred

350 prior to the effective date of P.A. 17-165, § 1, and the

351 respective substantive rights and obligations of the par352 ties relating to that accident cannot be altered retroac353 tively. Accordingly, we conclude that allowing the city

354 to file a lien on the plaintiff’s settlement proceeds in the

355 present case would constitute an improper, retroactive

356 application of the act.
357 In summary, because the legislature did not explicitly

358 provide that § 7-464, as amended by P.A. 17-165, § 1,

359 should apply retroactively, and, because it is substan360 tive in nature, § 55-3 requires that the statute operate

361 prospectively. The postevent amendments to § 7-464

362 cannot attach new legal consequences to the plaintiff’s

363 motor vehicle accident, from which his settlement

364 arose. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined

365 that the city’s lien stemmed from an improper, retroac366 tive application of P.A. 17-165, § 1, and properly granted

367 the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

368 The judgment is affirmed.

36970 In this opinion the other justices concurred.

371 * August 3, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

372 is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

373 1 General Statutes § 7-464 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(c) A self-insured

374 town, city or borough that provides group health benefits for its employees

375 has a lien on that part of a judgment or settlement that represents payment

376 for economic loss for medical, hospital and prescription expenses incurred

377 by its employees and their covered dependents and family members when

378 such expenses result from the negligence or recklessness of a third

379 party. . . .

380 * * *

381 ‘‘(d) As used in subsection (c) of this section: (1) ‘Self-insured town, city

382 or borough’ means a town, city or borough that provides group health

383 benefits to its employees by paying submitted medical, hospital and prescrip384 tion expense claims from its revenues . . . .’’

385 2 The plaintiff initiated this action under § 7-464 (c) (4) (C), which provides

386 in relevant part: ‘‘If agreement cannot be reached on the application of

387 equitable defenses to the claimed lien amount, then either the employee,

388 covered dependent, family member or the self-insured town, city or borough

389 may petition the Superior Court for resolution on the application of equitable

390 defenses. . . .’’

391 The parties do not dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the

392 plaintiff’s claim, so we do not address the issue of whether the plaintiff’s

393 action was appropriately brought under § 7-464 (c) (4) (C).

394 3 General Statutes § 1-1 (u) provides: ‘‘The passage or repeal of an act

395 shall not affect any action then pending.’’

396 4 General Statutes § 55-3 provides: ‘‘No provision of the general statutes,

397 not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any

398 new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have a

399 retrospective effect.’’

400 5 The city appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate

401 Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General

402 Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

403 6 The city asserts on appeal that the trial court incorrectly determined

404 that § 1-1 (u) applied to its lien because the lien was not at issue in the

405 plaintiff’s civil action against the third-party tortfeasor and, therefore, would

406 not affect that action. The plaintiff responds that the trial court correctly

407 determined that § 1-1 (u) bars P.A. 17-165, § 1, from affecting his litigation,

408 as it was pending at the time of the act’s effective date. We need not decide

409 whether § 1-1 (u) is applicable to this case because we conclude that § 55-

410 3 is dispositive of the matter.

411 7 Any right to subrogation or a lien under the workers’ compensation

412 scheme did not apply in the present case because there was no allegation

413 that the plaintiff’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment

414 with the city. Prior to the passage of P.A. 17-165, § 1, General Statutes § 52-

415 225c prohibited the city from recovering the amount of benefits provided

416 to the plaintiff as a collateral source.

417 8 Public Act 17-165, § 1, also imposes a new obligation on the plaintiff

418 that did not previously exist, namely, that he was being forced to pay money

419 in the form of a lien from a sum he recovered as a result of his applicable

420 settlement under § 7-464 (c). See, e.g., Little v. Ives, supra, 158 Conn. 453–57

421 (holding that statute could not apply retroactively under § 55-3 when it

422 imposed new obligation and liability on defendant highway commissioner,

423 i.e., filing certificate of taking within reasonable amount of time after filing
424 highway layout map and being subject to paying additional damages for not

425 doing so, respectively).

4267