Filed 7/3/24 In re I.G. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re I .G

. , a P erson Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B3 31605

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00691A )

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E .G

.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Step hen C. Marpet , Ju venile Court Referee . Affirmed.
Katie Curtis

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant

.2 Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell , Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent

.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳

Appellant E.G. (father) appeals from juvenile court jurisdictional and d ispositional order s asserting dependency jurisdiction over minor I.G. and ordering father to test for drugs

. We affirm the ord er s

. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In January 2023

, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral indicating S.G. (mother) tested positive for marijuana and PCP
when she gave birth to I.G. Mother also admitted she had used methamphetamine two weeks earlier

. I.G. spent several days in
the neonatal intensive care unit because he had “no active cry” at birth. On January 3, a DCFS social worker interviewed m other at the hospital. Mother reported she was enrolled in a drug
rehab ilitation program and had arranged for I.G. to live with her

at the rehab ilitation facility

. The social worker discussed a safety plan with mother , which required her to engage in rehab ilitation
services and check in with the social worker weekly

. The social
worker told mother I.G. could remain in her care as long as she
remained in treatment

. Mother and I.G. were discharged from the hospital in mid

- January 2023 and began living at the
rehab ilitation facility.
Mother said she had a nine

- year “ ‘ on

- again, off

- again ’ ”

re lationship with I.G.’s father

. She denied having any plans to3

return to a romantic relationship with him

. A hospital social
worker later reported father had visited mother and I.G. in the hospital “almost daily.” Mother had told the h ospital social worker that she and father had “an extensive domestic violence relationship.” During his initial interview, father told the social worker he smoked marijuana every two days, and he later tested positive for marijuana. Father stated he would stop sm oking marijuana if

necessary. Both parents admitted past involvement with DCFS and
the three other children they had together

. Mother indicated past domestic violence with father had led to the children being removed from her custody. She said the last v iolent incident with father happened three years earlier. She admitted smoking marijuana and methamphetamine during her pregnancy with
I.G. She had not obtain ed prenatal care because she did not want
DCFS to remove the baby from her custody and her older children had already been removed.
Father indicated the DCFS case s concerning his older
children with mother resulted from the parents’ domestic violence and mother’s drug use. Father admitted he had been in “multiple domestic violence relationships ” and that he and mother had an extensive history of domestic violence. He reported the last
violen t incident was a year and a half earlier, in 2021. Father
attributed the domestic violence to mother’s continued use of methamphetamine. Although during prior dependency cases
father had reunified with the other children he shared with
mother , the children were removed again because of mother’s continued drug use. Father reported that he was “tired of trying to fight for his children” and did not reunify. He did not feel4

DCFS gave him a fair opportunity to raise the children, who were
later adopted by a maternal family member. He indicated he did
not intend to con tinue a romantic relationship with mother. In early February 2023 , mother told the social worker she was willing to participate in voluntary family maintenance
services if she could move to an outpatient program. Mother reported there was “drama” between her and other residents at
the rehab ilitation facility, and she did not want I.G. to be exposed

to any “negativity .” The social worker reminded mother that the

current safety plan allowed I.G. to remain in mother’s care only so long as she remained at the rehab ilitation facility.
The next day, mother was expelled from the drug rehabilitation program because she refused to engage in services
and had “issue[s] with other residents .” Father picked up I.G. from the facility and returned to his home, wh ere he lived with a paternal cousin

. The social worker observed the home was furnished and had appropriate food and clothing for I.G. , and
father had a plan to care for I.G. Around this time, father
enrolled in a 12

- step program to address his marijuana use.
M other told the social worker she was entering a women’s center to complete drug rehab ilitation services

. Around a week and a half later, a counselor from the center inf ormed the social
worker that mother had left the program almost immediately

. In late February, t he social worker attempted to contact mother several times, but the calls went straight to voicemail and
mother did not respond to the social worker’s messages

. Father reported that mother called him around this time and asked him

to pick her up to visit I.G. W hen he refused, mother threatened
him. M other told father she was living “under a bridge off of
Whittier Blvd .” According to m aternal aunt

, mother wen t to stay5

at maternal grandfather’s home

, but soon left, and was “most likely living in the riverbed in Pico Rivera.” On February 24, 2023, DCFS filed a petition alleg ing I.G. was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision s (a) , (b), and (j), due to the parents’ history of engaging in domestic violence which resulted in I.G.’s siblings receiving permanent placement services; subdivision s (b) and (j) , due to mother ’s substance abuse and father ’s fail ure to protect I.G. and his siblings from mother’s substance abuse; and
subdivision (b)

, due to father’s substance abuse and mother’s history of mental and emotional problems

. 1 At the initial hearing on March 10, 2023 , the court ordered
I.G. detain e d from mo ther and released to father

. F ather was to submit to weekly random drug testing as a condition of the
release to him

. In April 2023, mother agreed to participate in random drug and alcohol testing. Mother missed all eight tests reflected in the
record

. At the June 7, 2023 adjudication hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivision s (b) and (j)

. The court found true the allegations related to mother’s substance abuse, father’s failure to protec t I.G. and his past failure to protect I.G.’s siblings from mother’s substance abuse,
and mother’s mental and emotional problems . Under section 300, subdivision (j), the court also found true allegations based on the parents’ domestic violence

, w hich led to I.G.’s siblings receiving permanent placement services and create d a continuing risk of
harm to I.G.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.6 At the August 22, 2023 disposition hearin g, the court declared I.G. a dependent of the court. Father did not object to this decision or ask the court to consider an alternative disposition . The court ordered I.G. removed from mother and
released to father under DCFS supervision

. Father request ed
that the drug test ing order be changed from weekly to “random or on suspicion. ” Father also asked that he be permitted to complete a 26

- week domestic violence program or to address domestic violence in his individual counseling.
T he court ordered father to submit to random drug testing for 90 days . I f all test results were negative

, the testing requirement would end , except for any on demand testing based on a suspicion that he was under the influence

. As father had requested, t he court a lso ordered him to complete a 26

- week domestic violence program

. Father’s case plan a dditionally
included individual counseling and parenting counseling. Father
had started individual counseling in July and was scheduled to begin a Fundamentals of Fatherhood Program shortly after the disposition hearing. Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
I. Father’s Challenge to the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings is Nonjusticiable
Father contends substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s findings that I.G. was placed at risk of harm due to father’s failure to protect I.G. and his siblings from mother’s
substance abuse

. Father does not otherwise challenge the court’s jurisdictional order. We conclude father has not raised a justiciable issue.7 “ It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable
issue .” ( In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 14 89 ( I.A. ). ) “ An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of

‘ effective ’ relief

— that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties ’ conduct or legal status. ” ( Id . at p. 1 4 90.)
It is further well established that “ ‘ [w] hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court ’ s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court ’ s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one o f the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial
evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence. ’ [Citation.] ” ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773

. )
Here , in addition to the failure to protect findings father challenges on appeal, the juvenile court also found father’s history of domestic violence against mother placed I.G. at

s ubstantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. The court additionally concluded mother’s drug use and her mental and emotional problems p ut I.G. at risk of suffering serious physical
harm. Father does not challenge these findings. Thus, even if he were to prevail on his arguments on appeal, we would not disturb
the court’s jurisdictional order . ( In re D

. P

. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,
283

– 284 ( D.P. ); I.A.

, supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1491

– 1492 .)
While father asserts this court may grant him effective
relief in ongoing proceedings , he fails to identify any tangible impact his success ful appeal could achieve

. Father identifies no8

specific dispositional order that would be undermined by a reversal of the failure to protect allegations. He asserts he is currently seeking to terminate dependency jurisdiction under section 364, but

, as he recognizes, the result of that e ffort will depend on the court’s assessment of current conditions

. (§ 364, subd. (c).) Striking jurisdictional allegations sustained as to father in June 2023 “would have neither legal nor practical consequence” in the ongoing proceedings

, and therefore would not provide father any effective relief. ( I.A.

, supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493.)
Father alternatively asks us to exercise our discretion to
reach the merits of his arguments. Although “ no single factor is necessarily dispositive o f whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal ,” appellate courts often
reach the merits when a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction ( D

. P

., supra , 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286, 285 ) , or when a challenged finding “is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing
conduct .” ( Id

. at p p

. 285

– 286 .)
Father contends the challenged allegations are likely to impact him in future proceedings because jurisdictional findings are “consistently examined by social workers and judges to determine current risk based on past events

, ” citing In re
Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134. However, a reversal of the order sustaining the challenged allegations in this
case would not erase the prior sustained findings that father
fail ed to protect I.G.’s siblings from mother’s drug use

. And

, as father acknowledges, the ultimate inquiry in any dependency
matter focuses on current circumstances. ( I.A.

, supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495 [ findings in dependency matters “require9

evidence of present detriment, based on the then prevailing
circumsta nces of parent and child” ]. ) Even if a court in a future proceeding considered the challenged findings as true, the court would still be obligated to independently assess then existing
circumstances to evaluate the risk of harm to the minor. We
further c annot conclude that the failure to protect allegations

were particularly pernicious or stigmatizing, particularly in view of the domestic violence allegations father does not challenge, which indicate he repeatedly perpetrated violence on mother.
Father ha s not suggested a specific practical, tangible impact the challenged language in the petition could have on him or his legal status. W e therefore decline to exercise our discretion
to reach the merits of h is arguments regarding the court’s jurisdictional findings . ( I.A.

, supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493;

see D

. P

., supra , 14 Cal.5th at p. 278 [speculative harm insufficient].)
II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse I ts Discretion in Declaring I.G. a Dependent of T he Court and Ordering Father to Drug Test
Father also c ontends the juvenile court abused its discretion by declaring I.G. a dependent of the court and requiring father to test for drugs

. We disagree. As an initial matter, “a parent’s failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court.” ( In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338.) Father did not ob ject to the juvenile court order declaring I.G. a dependent of the court. He also did not object to the March 10, 2023 order requiring him to submit to weekly random drug testing , or the August 22 order requiring 90 days of random drug testing. Indeed, f ather10

affirmatively requested the random drug testing required by the
latter order, and therefore forfeited his argument by inviting any error. ( In re G.P. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1196.) Father

notes forfeiture is not automatic but fails to articula te any reason why the doctrine should not apply here.
Even if these contentions were not forfeited, we would reject father’s arguments

. “After a juvenile court exercises jurisdiction over a child pursuant to section 300, it must determine the appropriate disposition for that child. [Citations.] The court has broad discretion in selecting a disposition that serves the child’s best interes ts.” ( In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 856.) The court may declare the child a dependent of the court. (§§ 300, 360 , subd. (d).) Alternatively, the court may order services to keep the family together under informal DCFS supervision. (§ 360, subd . (b).) After ordering informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b), “ ‘the
court “ has no authority to take any further role in overseeing the services or the family unless the matter is brought back before
the court ” pursuant to [section 360, subdivision (c)].’ ” ( In re
Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s dispositional
decision unless the court “ ‘ “ has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious , or patently absur d determination [citations].” ’ [Citations.] ” ( In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 31 8 ( Stephanie M. ).)
Father contends the court should have exercised its discretion to order informal supervision under section 360,
subdivision (b), instead of declaring I.G. a dependent of the court.
He argues informal supervision was appropriate because the
social worker observed father was motivated and had the11

capacity to protect I.G. and meet his needs . The social worker did not identify any significant sa fety concerns with I.G. remaining in father’s care

. Yet, other factors indicate continued court oversight was appropriate. F ather and mother had a n extensive history of
domestic violence that endangered I.G. and his siblings

. Mother used drugs , and there was no evidence her drug use had ceased

. Prior to the disposition hearing, mother left two drug
rehab ilitation programs and failed to complete a single drug test

. Father indicated the past domestic violence between the parents
was related to mother ’s drug use. F ather and mother share three
other children and a nine

- year off

- and

- on romantic history . After the prior dependency case, which ended with the termination of parental rights, father and mother apparently maintained enough of a relationship that they conceived another child together , I.G. Given the not unlikely possibility of a future
reconciliation , or, at a minimum, interaction between the parents, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that a period of formal court supervision was n ecessary to protect I.G.
from any recurring parental violence or further exposure to mother’s drug use

. In addition

, father was only beginning to

engage in three categories of services to comply with his court

ordered case plan

. D eclaring the child a dependent of the court
allowed the court to ensure father completed those services

. Considering all of these circumstances , the court was well within its discretion to declare I.G. a dependent of the court

. ( Stephanie
M.

, supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
T he court also did not abuse its discretion by requiring
father to test for drugs

. Father contends this aspect of the disposition order was not tailored to the family’s needs . He12

observes that the court dismissed the jurisdictional allegation
b as ed on his drug use . Yet, t he juvenile court may “formulate disposition orders to address parental deficiencies when necessary to protect and promote the child’s welfare, even when that parental con duct did not give rise to the dependency proceedings.” ( In re K.T. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 20, 25.) F ather admitted to using marijuana every two day s before I.G.’s birth

. He tested positi ve for marijuana shortly after I.G.’s birth

. I.G., an infant, was p laced in father’s care alone

. Although father
committed to stop using marijuana, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the court to ensure father adhered to that commitment by requiring him to periodically test for drugs

. ( In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008 [juvenile court may reasonably conclude substance abuse is an obstacle that must be addressed in reunification plan through drug and
alcohol testing].) Further, t he order was time limited, requiring a
three

- month period o f testing, followed by testing only on

sus picion of drug use. The court’s order was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.13 DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS , J.

We concur:

EDMON

, P. J.

LAVIN

, J

.