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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, as 

subrogee of DRG CLEARVIEW, L.L.C., d/b/a 

CLEARVIEW APARTMENT HOMES, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 24, 2016 

v No. 325934 

Ottawa Circuit Court 

BARBARA PELLOW, LC No. 13-003524-CK 

 Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant. 

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this breach-of-contract action, plaintiff, Travelers Indemnity Company, a subrogee of 

DRG Clearview, L.L.C., d/b/a Clearview Apartment Homes, appeals, and defendant, Barbara 

Pellow, cross-appeals, the trial court’s January 23, 2015 order granting summary disposition in 

plaintiff’s favor pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and awarding plaintiff $15,421.08 in damages. 

On appeal, plaintiff also challenges the trial court’s September 26, 2014 order granting summary 

disposition in defendant’s favor pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part, vacate in 

part, and remand for further proceedings. 

 Defendant and her boyfriend signed a lease agreement with Clearview Apartment Homes 

in 2009. During the lease, defendant’s boyfriend used a torch on the apartment’s wooden deck to 

burn the fur off of a squirrel. After doing so, defendant’s boyfriend left the torch on the deck and 

entered the apartment. Approximately 15 minutes later, he realized that a fire had started near 

where he had left the torch, and his attempts to extinguish that fire proved unsuccessful. It 

appears undisputed that defendant’s boyfriend’s actions were the cause of the fire. The fire 

resulted in substantial damage to the entire apartment complex. Travelers Indemnity Company, 

as Clearview’s insurance provider, paid in excess of $2,000,000 to repair damage that occurred 

to the apartment complex as a result of the fire. While it is undisputed that defendant was 

sleeping during the fur-burning escapade, plaintiff sued defendant for the cost of the repairs at 

issue. Plaintiff argued that defendant was contractually liable under the lease agreement, which 

provided, in pertinent part, that defendant and her boyfriend were “liable . . . for any fire, water, 

or other damage . . . negligently or intentionally caused by” defendant, her boyfriend, “or any 

guests thereof[.]” The lease also provided that, if the apartment was “rendered un-tenantable by 
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the negligent or intentional acts of [these individuals, then they] shall continue to be liable for 

Rent in the amount provided in the Agreement.”1

 Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Relying on 

MCL 600.2956’s purported abolishment of joint and several liability,2

 she argued that the 

provisions quoted above were void under MCL 554.633(1)(m)3

 of the Michigan Truth in Renting 

Act (MTRA), MCL 554.6531 et seq., because any provision purporting to render a party jointly 

and severally liable violated MCL 445.903(1)(n) and (t)4

 under the Michigan Consumer 

Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq. The trial court agreed. It concluded that, because 

the lease agreement imposed liability for fire and water damage only according to fault, which 

implicated tort standards, MCL 600.2956 applied. It therefore granted defendant’s motion. It 

did, however, provide plaintiff with an opportunity to amend its complaint to include allegations 

involving lost rent and repairs to the air conditioning equipment, heating equipment, and 

appliances, explaining that the analysis described above did not apply to these specific damages 

because there was not a specific level of fault required under the parties’ lease agreement. 

Plaintiff did so, the parties stipulated that defendant suffered $15,421.08 in those specific 

damages, and summary disposition in that amount was awarded to plaintiff pursuant to MCR 

2.116(C)(10). 

 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition because it erroneously concluded its lawsuit impermissibly implicated tort 

theories. We agree. “[A] ‘tort’ is an act that has long been understood as a civil wrong that 

arises from the breach of a legal duty other than the breach of a contractual duty.” In re Bradley 

Estate, 494 Mich 367, 381; 835 NW2d 545 (2013). “Michigan case law expressly provides that 

an action in tort may not be maintained where a contractual agreement exists, unless a duty, 

separate and distinct from the contractual obligation, is established.” Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, 

Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 52; 649 NW2d 783 (2002). When a lawsuit arises from a breach of 

 

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 The lease agreement provided that the “Resident” was liable for the damages described above, 

and, according to ¶ 26 of the agreement, “[i]f there shall be more than one Resident, they shall be 

jointly and severally liable hereunder.” 

2

 MCL 600.2956 provides that, “in an action based on tort or another legal theory seeking 

damages for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant 

for damages is several only and is not joint.” 

3

 MCL 554.633(1)(m) provides that “[a] rental agreement shall not include a provision that” 

“[v]iolates the Michigan consumer protection act[.]” 

4

 MCL 445.901(1)(n) and (t) define “[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or 

practices in the conduct of trade or commerce [that] are unlawful” as those that “[c]aus[e] a 

probability of confusion or of misunderstanding with respect to the authority of a salesperson, 

representative, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a transaction” or those where a consumer 

“[e]nter[s] into a consumer transaction in which the consumer waives or purports to waive a 

right, benefit, or immunity provided by law, unless the waiver is clearly stated and the consumer 

has specifically consented to it.” 
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promise, the lawsuit is a breach-of-contract lawsuit. Hart v Ludwig, 347 Mich 559, 563; 79 

NW2d 895 (1956). 

 In Laurel Woods Apartments v Roumayah, 274 Mich App 631, 642; 734 NW2d 217 

(2007), this Court expressly held that a lease agreement providing for joint and several liability 

was “not precluded by MCL 600.2956.”5 The same is true here. Stated simply, plaintiff’s 

lawsuit is a breach-of-contract lawsuit. Plaintiff’s claim, i.e., that defendant breached her 

contractual duty to be held liable for fire and water damage resulting from her, her boyfriend’s, 

or any of their guests’ conduct, is clearly a breach-of-contract claim. Plaintiff has not alleged 

any breach of a duty that is “separate and distinct” from those duties that are contractually 

imposed under the parties’ lease agreement. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the fact that 

the parties’ lease agreement mentioned negligence and intentional misconduct does not 

automatically transform this breach-of-contract action into a tort action, nor does it create a 

hybrid tort-contract lawsuit where MCL 600.2956 rewrites the agreement that the parties 

voluntarily entered into as defendant suggests. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]o adopt 

the position that MCL 600.2956 renders express contractual indemnification clauses 

unenforceable would require that we negate the parties’ contract. We find no language in the 

statute, nor any compelling public policy, that would require us to do so.” Zahn v Kroger Co of 

Mich, 483 Mich 34, 39; 764 NW2d 207 (2009). 

 Defendant’s position before the trial court and before this Court is without merit. She 

claims that, because she is immune from joint and several liability under MCL 600.2956, her 

agreement to be jointly and severally liable in the parties’ lease agreement violated the MCPA 

and is void under the MRTA. However, contrary to her argument and the trial court’s 

conclusion, MCL 600.2956 is inapplicable because plaintiff’s breach-of-contract lawsuit is 

precisely that—a breach-of-contract lawsuit for contract damages. Nothing in MCL 600.2956 

precludes defendant from contractually agreeing to be jointly and severally liable for the damage 

at issue. While defendant now takes issue with the fact that the provisions of the lease agreement 

at issue were never “explained to her, nor was she ever told that there were provisions in the 

lease which would attempt to impose liability on her for something else someone else did,” she 

does not provide, and we are unable to find, any legal authority requiring someone else, 

presumably plaintiff on its own initiative, to read and explain the lease agreement that she signed 

to her in a manner that she later deems satisfactory. Indeed, because defendant signed the 

 

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 We reject defendant’s claim that “Laurel Woods has no applicability to the present appeal.” In 

short, the holding in Laurel Woods Apartments—that MCL 600.2956 does not preclude the 

imposition of contract-based joint and several liability—directly addresses the issue raised in this 

case. While she, like the trial court, claims that the use of tort concepts, i.e., negligence and 

intentional misconduct, transform this breach-of-contract action into a tort or hybrid tort-contract 

action, we disagree for the reasons set forth in this opinion. Additionally, she claims that the fact 

that she raised issues relating to the MTRA and the MCPA renders Laurel Woods Apartments 

inapplicable. However, that argument relies on the trial court’s conclusions that this lawsuit 

sounded, at least somewhat, in tort and that the lease agreement was apparently too confusing to 

be understood, both of which are conclusions that we reject. 
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parties’ lease agreement, she is presumed to have read and understood its contents. Watts v 

Polaczyk, 242 Mich App 600, 604; 619 NW2d 714 (2000). 

 Defendant also argues that joint and several liability does not apply in this situation 

because only one person, her boyfriend, was at fault. Instead, she argues, plaintiff’s lawsuit 

actually implicates vicarious liability. This position is without merit as well. Where a party 

agrees to be jointly and severally liable for damage caused by another person, that party may be 

held liable for that damage regardless of his or her fault. Laurel Woods Apartments, 274 Mich 

App at 642. Thus, joint and several liability is precisely the form of liability that is at issue in 

this case. Vicarious liability, on the other hand, is entirely inapplicable as it is premised on the 

policy-based determination that one person should be liable for the actions of another due to their 

relationship. Al-Shimmari v Detroit Med Ctr, 477 Mich 280, 294; 731 NW2d 29 (2007). In 

short, we are unaware of, and defendant does not indicate, any relationship between the parties, 

other than the joint-and-several one, that imposes policy-based liability on defendant for her 

boyfriend’s actions. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition 

in defendant’s favor. 

 On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she was 

liable for lost rent and repairs to the air conditioning equipment, heating equipment, and 

appliances. We disagree. “The goal of contract interpretation is to first determine, and then 

enforce, the intent of the parties based on the plain language of the agreement.” Harbor Park 

Market, Inc v Gronda, 277 Mich App 126, 130; 743 NW2d 585 (2007). “If the language of the 

contract is unambiguous, we construe and enforce the contract as written.” Quality Prod & 

Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 375; 666 NW2d 251 (2003). And, as stated 

above, where a party contractually agrees to be held jointly and severally liable for another’s 

actions, he or she can, indeed, be held liable for the same. Laurel Woods Apartments, 274 Mich 

App at 642. 

 In this case, the plain language of the parties’ lease agreement unequivocally provides 

that defendant and her boyfriend were liable for lost rent if the apartment were to become untenantable due to their actions. It also unequivocally provides that defendant and her boyfriend 

were liable for the repair cost to the heating equipment, air conditioning equipment, and 

appliances where such repairs are necessary due to the same. While defendant claims that she 

cannot be held liable because she was not at fault, the parties’ lease agreement, i.e., the 

provisions imposing joint and several liability, expressly and unequivocally provide otherwise, 

and, as stated above, we reject her argument that she is immune from the contractual liability that 

she voluntarily agreed to. 

 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s September 26, 2014 order granting defendant’s 

motion for summary disposition. While we affirm the trial court’s January 23, 2015 order to the 

extent that it holds defendant liable for lost rent and the repair costs to the air conditioning 

equipment, heating equipment, and appliances, we vacate its January 23, 2015 order as to the 

amount of damages awarded. On remand, the trial court is to enter an order granting summary 

disposition in plaintiff’s favor in full and determine the appropriate amount of damages in light 

of the entry of that order. 
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 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, may tax costs 

pursuant to MCR 7.219. 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien 

/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood