UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM BAZZI, 

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREA M. GACKI, et al.,

Defendants.

 No. 19-cv-484 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mohammad Ibrahim Bazzi seeks to supplement the administrative record of the 

proceeding that led the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) to designate him as a

Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. After 

OFAC initially designated him, Plaintiff wrote to the office seeking to strike a deal—he would

take certain remedial actions if OFAC would agree to remove his name from the Specially 

Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. OFAC rejected that request. Later, after this 

litigation was underway, OFAC discovered technical errors in the original administrative record. 

To correct those errors, OFAC decided to re-designate Plaintiff through a new agency 

proceeding. Plaintiff now contends that his letter to OFAC, which included what he alleges is 

exculpatory information pertaining to his designation, should be part of the administrative record

for his re-designation because it was before the agency at the time of the re-designation.

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the administrative record, Dkt. 

28, Defendants’ opposition, Dkt. 29, and Plaintiff’s reply, Dkt. 30, the Court will DENY

Plaintiff’s motion.
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I. BACKGROUND

On May 17, 2018, OFAC designated Plaintiff as an SDGT, pursuant to Executive Order 

13224, for “assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support 

for, or financial or other services to or in support of, Hizballah.” Dkt. 29 at 7; Dkt. 1-1 at 1–2

(Ex. A) (Press Release, “Treasury Targets Key Hizballah Financing Network and Iranian 

Conduit”). The office therefore placed Plaintiff on its Specially Designated Nationals and 

Blocked Persons List. Dkt. 23 at 7 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶ 23); see also Notice of OFAC Sanctions 

Action, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,997 (May 23, 2018). Plaintiff’s property and interests in property

subject to U.S. jurisdiction were blocked, and U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing with 

either Plaintiff or his companies. Dkt. 28-1 at 6.

On November 29, 2018, Plaintiff’s counsel met with OFAC to request a “terms of 

removal agreement”—that is, “an agreement by which Bazzi would undertake certain steps to 

negate the basis of his designation in exchange for a delisting.” Dkt. 23 at 10 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶ 

38). After the meeting, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to OFAC, which reiterated his request for 

a terms of removal agreement and identified “countervailing information” challenging the 

allegations underlying OFAC’s designation. Id. at 10–11 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶ 39). The letter, for 

instance, argued that Plaintiff’s relationship with Abdallah Safi-Al Din, with whom OFAC had

accused Plaintiff of associating in a press release announcing his designation, Dkt. 1-1 at 1–2

(Ex. A), had ended in 2006 or 2007. Dkt. 28-2 at 7. Plaintiff’s counsel was “clear,” however, 

that the letter did not constitute “a request for administrative reconsideration under 31 C.F.R. §

501.807,” and that “neither this letter nor any of its representations should be included in any 

record being developed with respect to an administrative reconsideration of Bazzi’s designation.” 

Id. at 3. Rather, the letter was “simply” intended to memorialize the parties’ conversation at the 
3

meeting and to “facilitate further discussion with the agency about resolving this matter without 

litigation.” Id. On February 6, 2019, OFAC responded by letter and denied Plaintiff’s request 

for a terms of removal agreement. Dkt. 28-3 at 2.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 26, 2019, challenging his designation. Dkt. 1. On 

June 12, 2019, OFAC filed the certified index of the administrative record, with substantial 

redactions. Dkt. 8-1. As part of the administrative record, OFAC provided Plaintiff with an

“evidentiary memorandum” from case “SDGT-12644,” which set forth OFAC’s reasons for 

designating Bazzi, again with substantial redactions. Id.; Dkt. 28-4. Plaintiff then filed an 

amended complaint, alleging that OFAC had not given him sufficient notice of the basis for his 

designation. Dkt. 9 at 8–9 (Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 32–36). The parties cross-moved for summary 

judgment. Dkt. 10; Dkt. 11. 

In preparing the unredacted version of the administrative record for the Court’s ex parte, 

in camera review, OFAC discovered “an apparent administrative error in the processing of two 

exhibits prior to this litigation.” Dkt. 29 at 8. “Specifically, two exhibits to the evidentiary

memorandum contained certain discrete pieces of information that should not have been 

included.” Id. To remedy this error, OFAC re-designated Plaintiff in a new agency proceeding 

with a new administrative record. See Dkt. 18 at 2; Dkt. 19 at 1.

On November 25, 2019, OFAC re-designated Plaintiff in a new evidentiary memorandum 

pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which had been amended since Plaintiff’s first designation. 

Dkt. 19 at 1; Dkt. 23 at 8 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶ 28). On December 6, 2019, OFAC filed a certified 

index of the new administrative record from Plaintiff’s re-designation. Dkt. 20-1. The updated 

administrative record included a new evidentiary memorandum with a new case number,

“SDGT-17144.” Dkt. 28-1 at 11. The new administrative record “is very similar to the 
4

administrative record supporting [Plaintiff’s] initial designation,” again with substantial

redactions. Dkt. 23 at 8 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶ 30). On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a second 

amended complaint, challenging both his re-designation and the agency’s denial of his request 

for a terms of removal agreement. Dkt. 23.

Plaintiff now moves to complete, or, in the alternative, to supplement the administrative 

record pertaining to his re-designation with (1) his letter requesting a terms of removal 

agreement; (2) the agency’s response to that letter; and (3) the evidentiary memorandum and 

exhibit list for case SDGT-12644. Dkt. 28; Dkt. 30. OFAC opposes the motion. Dkt. 29.

II. ANALYSIS

Courts review agency action based on “the whole record or those parts of it cited by a 

party.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. This means that “review is to be based on the full administrative record 

that was before the [agency] at the time [of its] decision.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 

Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). The administrative record includes “all materials 

compiled by the agency” that were “before the agency at the time the decision was made.” 

James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted); see also Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 530 F.3d 991, 1002 

(D.C. Cir. 2008). The Court “should have before it neither more nor less information than did 

the agency when it made its decision.” Walter O. Boswell Mem’l Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 

788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Limiting judicial review to the record before the agency “reflects the recognition that 

further judicial inquiry into executive motivation represents a substantial intrusion into the 

workings of another branch of Government and should normally be avoided.” Dep’t of 

Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 
5

see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should 

be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the 

reviewing court.”). The agency’s designation of the record is therefore “entitled to a strong 

presumption of regularity.” Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Salazar, 859 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41 

(D.D.C. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).

In order to limit review to “only those documents that were before the agency,” courts 

“do not allow parties to supplement the record unless they can demonstrate unusual 

circumstances justifying a departure from this general rule.” Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. 

Burwell, 786 F.3d 46, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted). The D.C. Circuit has 

identified three such unusual circumstances in which supplementing the administrative record is 

warranted: “(1) the agency deliberately or negligently excluded documents that may have been 

adverse to its decision; (2) the district court needed to supplement the record with background 

information in order to determine whether the agency considered all of the relevant factors; or 

(3) the agency failed to explain administrative action so as to frustrate judicial review.” Id. 

(quoting Kempthorne, 530 F.3d at 1002); see also City of Dania Beach v. FAA, 628 F.3d 581, 

590 (D.C.Cir.2010). 

When deciding whether to consider materials beyond those in the administrative record

certified by the agency, courts have used the word “supplement” in two different ways, which 

has led to “some confusion.” Pac. Shores Subdivision v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 448 F. 

Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2006). The distinction between the types of supplementation can be 

important, as in this case. First, a plaintiff may file a motion to “complete” the administrative 

record. That is, the plaintiff may assert that the materials in question actually were before the 

agency at the time of its decision, but the agency failed to include them in the certified record. 
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Id. at 5–6. Courts in this district have held that to overcome the presumption of regularity a 

plaintiff seeking to complete the administrative record must “put forth concrete evidence that the 

documents it seeks to ‘add’ to the record were actually before the decisionmakers.” Marcum v. 

Salazar, 751 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D.D.C. 2010). Alternatively, a plaintiff may file a motion 

asking the Court to consider extra-record evidence. That is, the plaintiff may seek review of 

evidence separate and apart from the record that was before the agency. Because reliance on 

extra-record evidence is difficult to reconcile with “the principle that judicial review of an 

administrative action is just that—a review of the administrative action the agency took based on 

what was before it at the time it acted”—courts will grant such a motion only on “rare 

occasions.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 20-cv-103 (RDM), 

2020 WL 5642287, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2020).

Here, Plaintiff principally moves for completion of the record, arguing that the letter 

requesting a terms of removal agreement was before the agency at the time of his re-designation. 

Dkt. 28-1 at 17–19. But, in the alternative, he argues that the letter should be considered as 

extra-record evidence, because even if the agency did not consider the letter during the redesignation process, it should have. Id. at 20–21.

With respect to completion, Plaintiff argues that the certified administrative record “does 

not include all documents and materials that had been considered by OFAC before it rendered” 

its re-designation decision because the record does not include Plaintiff’s letter to OFAC 

requesting a terms of removal agreement. Id. at 17. The letter was relevant to the redesignation, Plaintiff asserts, because it provided OFAC with “exculpatory information with 

respect to each allegation from OFAC’s press release announcing Bazzi’s initial designation.” 

Id. Plaintiff argues that the letter was “uncontrovertibly before and considered by the agency, as 
7

evidenced by OFAC’s response, and OFAC cannot now ignore it with respect to the agency 

action being challenged in this instant case.” Id. at 17–18. Plaintiff also points out that a similar 

group of agency decision-makers worked on his initial designation, his terms of removal request, 

and his re-designation, meaning that the full record was before them. Id. at 18–19.

OFAC responds that it properly excluded the letter from the administrative record 

because it “did not consider [the letter in] re-designating [Plaintiff].” Dkt. 29 at 15. OFAC 

argues that Plaintiff “improperly conflates discrete agency actions”—OFAC’s rejection of the 

terms of removal offer was an entirely separate agency action from its decision to re-designate 

Plaintiff. Id. at 17. The Court must base its review, according to OFAC, on the record from the 

discrete agency action being challenged, in this case the re-designation, and may not consider 

materials generated even in related proceedings. Id. Relying on the presumption of regularity, 

OFAC asserts that Plaintiff cannot show that the agency considered a document in one agency 

action by pointing out that it considered that same document in a different agency action. Id. at 

17–18.

Plaintiff’s motion to complete the record presents a close question, which requires careful 

attention to what Congress meant when it required courts to base their review of administrative 

decisions “on the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party,” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (emphasis 

added), and what the Supreme Court meant when it declared that the “whole record” refers to

“the full administrative record that was before the [agency] at the time [of its] decision,” Citizens 

to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. Countless decisions since Citizens to Preserve 

Overton Park have reaffirmed the fundamental tenet that, “in an APA case, a reviewing court 

‘should have before it neither more nor less information than did the agency when it made its 

decision.’” Hill Dermaceuticals v. FDA, 709 F.3d 44, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Walter O. 
8

Boswell Mem’l Hosp., 749 F.2d at 792); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 

729, 744 (1985) (discussing the administrative record in terms of the “record before the 

agency”); Dist Hosp. Partners, 786 F.3d at 55 (explaining that review is based on the “record 

that was before” the agency); Kempthorne, 530 F.3d at 1002 (same); James Madison Ltd., 82 

F.3d at 1095 (same); IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez, 129 F.3d 618, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same); Puerto 

Rico Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. v. Riley, 10 F.3d 847, 850–51 (D.C.Cir.1993) (same); Envtl. 

Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). 

In applying and refining this standard, decisions from this Court have often asked

whether the agency “considered” a particular document. See, e.g., Bimini Superfast Operations 

LLC v. Winkowski, 994 F. Supp. 2d 103, 105 (D.D.C. 2014); Wilmina Shipping AS v. United 

States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 11-cv-2184, 2013 WL 12340838, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 

2013). Under this view, a plaintiff seeking to complete the administrative record must “identify 

reasonable, non-speculative grounds for its belief that the documents were considered by the 

agency and not included in the record.” Pac. Shores, 448 F.Supp. 2d at 6. Somewhat more 

expansively, several decisions posit that the administrative record must “include all information . 

. . that [the agency] directly or indirectly considered . . . at the time the relevant decisions were

made.” Alaska Excursion Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 541, 550 (D.D.C. 1984)

(emphasis added); see also In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371, 372 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting 

from grant of stay); Thompson v. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989); Bar MK 

Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739 (10th Cir. 1993); Maritel, Inc. v. Collins, 422 F. Supp. 2d 

188, 196 (D.D.C. 2006); Pac. Shores, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 4; Bimini Superfast Operations LLC, 

994 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
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For present purposes, the Court need not wrestle with the metaphysical question of what 

it means to “consider” a document “indirectly” because it is well settled that an agency “may not 

skew the record in its favor by excluding pertinent but unfavorable information” and may not 

“exclude information on the grounds that it did not ‘rely’ on the excluded information in its final 

decision.” Maritel, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 196. The APA “‘requirement of review upon ‘the 

whole record’ means that courts may not look only to the case presented by one party, since 

other evidence may weaken or even indisputably destroy that case.’” Walter O. Boswell Mem’l 

Hosp., 749 F.2d at 792 (quoting S. Rep. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945)). Permitting an 

agency to ignore “unfavorable” evidence that was before it at the time of the decision would 

frustrate judicial review and would deprive the APA of much of its force. Id.; see also In re 

United States, 138 S. Ct. at 372 (Breyer, J., dissenting from grant of stay) (“Effective review 

depends upon the administrative record containing all relevant material presented to the agency, 

including not only material supportive of the government’s decision but also materials contrary 

to the government’s decision.”). It is for this reason that the D.C. Circuit precedent permits 

supplementation of the administrative record if “the agency deliberately or negligently excluded 

documents that may have been adverse to its decision.” Dist. Hosp. Partners, 786 F.3d at 55; 

Kempthorne, 530 F.3d at 1002; James Madison, 82 F.3d at 1095.

Against this backdrop, Plaintiff “clarif[ies]” that his principal argument is not “that 

OFAC should have considered” the information set forth in his letter; rather, he maintains “that 

OFAC did consider that letter.” Dkt. 30 at 18. In the ordinary course, that argument would carry 

substantial weight. As Plaintiff notes, previous decisions from this Court have held that a 

plaintiff can make out a prima facie case for completing the record by showing that “the 

documents at issue (1) were known to the agency at the time it made its decision, (2) are directly 
10

related to the decision, and (3) are adverse to the agency’s decision. ” Fund for Animals v. 

Williams, 391 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kent 

County v. EPA, 963 F.2d 391, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding a “prima facie showing” that the 

agency “excluded from the record evidence adverse to its position” where the agency was 

“negligent” in failing to find internal reports that did not support its ultimate decision); Styrene 

Info. & Research Ctr., Inc. v. Sebelius, 851 F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2012) (observing that 

agency’s adoption of some reports but not others “lends some credibility” to suggestion that the 

rejected reports were “adverse”). Applying that standard here, Plaintiff’s letter seeking a terms 

of removal agreement and OFAC’s response denying that request were squarely before OFAC

when it re-designated Plaintiff: The decisionmakers responsible for re-designating Plaintiff were 

aware of the letter and its contents, Dkt. 29 at 12; the contents of Plaintiff’s letter spoke directly 

to the facts underlying his designation and therefore also his “substantively identical” redesignation, Dkt. 29 at 10; and the letter was adverse to OFAC’s decision to re-designate 

Plaintiff, because it at least arguably refuted point by point his alleged ties to terrorists and 

terrorist organizations, Dkt. 28-2 at 2–7.

The problem that Plaintiff faces is that he expressly requested that OFAC omit the letter 

from “any record being developed with respect to an administrative reconsideration of Bazzi’s 

designation.” See Dkt. 29 at 15. OFAC argues that if Plaintiff wanted the agency to “determine 

whether [the letter’s contentions] negated the basis for his designation, he should have submitted 

a request for administrative reconsideration.” Id. According to OFAC, Plaintiff “cannot deprive 

OFAC of the occasion to substantively respond to his letter’s allegations in the agency’s 

administrative process, and then use those allegations in this Court to attack his designation.” Id. 

at 16. Plaintiff replies that OFAC “miss[es] the point entirely,” because he “does not now claim 
11

that the letter should have been considered as part of a reconsideration of his designation.” Dkt. 

30 at 5. Rather, Plaintiff asserts, what matters is that the letter was before OFAC at the time of 

the re-designation. Id.

Because OFAC makes initial designation decisions ex parte, the administrative 

reconsideration process typically represents the only mechanism for a designated person to 

proffer exculpatory evidence, including facts that allegedly undermine the basis for the blocking 

order, to the agency. See 31 C.FR. § 501.807; Zevallos v. Obama, 793 F.3d 106, 110 (D.C. Cir. 

2015); see also Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. CV 19-2554 (JEB), 2020 WL 1911561, at *2 (D.D.C. 

Apr. 20, 2020). In seeking administrative reconsideration, the blocked person “may submit 

arguments or evidence that the person believes establishes that insufficient basis exists for the 

designation.” 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(a). After OFAC has conducted its review of the request for 

reconsideration, which may (but need not) include a hearing, “[OFAC] will provide a written 

decision to the blocked person.” Id. § 501.807(d). Significantly, as the D.C. Circuit has noted, a 

“designated person can request delisting as many times as he likes.” Zevallos, 793 F.3d at 110.

Here, however, Plaintiff expressly requested that OFAC refrain from using his 

submission in that manner, Dkt. 28-2 at 3, and, as a result, the office reasonably concluded that 

Plaintiff was not asking that it consider the letter in making any merits determination. He was 

merely asking that OFAC consider the information in the context of reaching a negotiated 

resolution, while reserving his right to submit the letter for formal consideration if that failed. Id. 

If Plaintiff had then sought reconsideration without submitting the letter, OFAC could have 

decided that request without referencing the letter, as requested. The fact that in this case OFAC

re-designated him, rather than reconsidering his existing designation, does not require a different 

result. Either way, it was up to Plaintiff to decide whether to proffer his additional information 
12

to OFAC for consideration on the merits (as opposed to consideration as part of a negotiated 

resolution), and the office reasonably relied on his request not to add the information to the 

administrative record. Having made this choice, Plaintiff needs to accept the consequences. 

Moreover, if he wants OFAC to consider the letter for reasons other than a negotiated 

compromise, he still has the means to do so—he just needs to file a request for reconsideration, 

along with the letter.

The D.C. Circuit has explained that limiting supplementation of the administrative record 

serves both to incentivize parties to “structure their participation [in the administrative process] 

so that it . . . alerts the agency to the [parties’] position and contentions,” Theodore Roosevelt 

Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 514–15 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and to prevent parties 

from making “an end run around the agency’s substantive . . . judgments,” CTS Corp. v. EPA, 

759 F.3d 52, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2014). It is a foundational tenet of administrative law that the agency 

should be given the opportunity to address a party’s submission in the first instance, a principle 

that provides part of the basis for limiting judicial review to the administrative record. By 

requiring that Plaintiff request administrative reconsideration before seeking to expand the 

record on judicial review of OFAC’s decision, the Court can protect the integrity of the 

administrative process and can ensure that the office has the opportunity to consider the 

information (and to issue a written decision) in the usual course.

Plaintiff’s alternative argument that the Court should consider the letter as extra-record 

evidence, Dkt. 30 at 12, fails for much the same reason. If anything, his request that the agency 

not consider the letter for purposes of administrative reconsideration is even more preclusive 

under the standards established for the admission of extra-record evidence. A court should 

consult extra-record evidence only when “gross procedural deficiencies” compromise the 
13

administrative process or frustrate judicial review. Hill Dermaceuticals, 709 F.3d at 47. 

Admitting extra-record evidence may be necessary “(1) when the agency failed to examine all 

relevant factors; (2) when the agency failed to explain adequately its grounds for decision; (3) 

when the agency acted in bad faith; or (4) when the agency engaged in improper behavior.” 

Styrene Info. & Research Ctr., Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (citing IMS, P.C., 129 F.3d at 624). 

Plaintiff cannot make a colorable argument that OFAC committed a “gross procedural” error, 

“acted in bad faith,” or “engaged in improper behavior” when it was merely following his own

instructions not to consider the letter other than for purposes of a negotiated resolution. And, to 

the extent that Plaintiff argues in his complaint that OFAC failed adequately to explain its 

decision, including by providing Plaintiff with insufficient notice of the reasons for his redesignation, Dkt. 23 at 15–17 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 60–70), he does not need the letter to make 

out those claims, which rise and fall on the sufficiency of the existing record.

The Court thus concludes that Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the administrative record 

with his letter and OFAC’s response, regardless whether the motion is construed as seeking to 

complete the administrative record or to present extra-record evidence, must be denied.

* * *

That leaves two other loose ends. In addition to his letter to OFAC and the office’s letter 

in response, Plaintiff also seeks to supplement the administrative record for his re-designation 

with the evidentiary memorandum and exhibit list from the certified administrative record for his 

first designation. Dkt. 28-1 at 21. Although he lists those materials in his request for relief, 

Plaintiff provides no argument for why they were or should be part of the administrative record 

for the re-designation. The Court will therefore deny the motion with respect to those materials.
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Finally, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the agency’s rejection of 

his request for a terms of removal agreement as arbitrary and capricious, in addition to

challenging his re-designation. Dkt. 23 at 14 (2d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 54–55). OFAC has not filed a

separate administrative record for that agency action and, instead, merely asserts in a footnote 

that Plaintiff “is not entitled to a separate administrative record underlying that decision because 

in challenging an action committed to the agency’s [un]reviewable discretion, he fails to . . . state 

a claim under the APA upon which relief could be granted.” Dkt. 29 at 17 n.5; see also Dkt. 24-

1 at 30–32 (seeking summary judgment because the decision whether to enter a terms of removal 

agreement is committed to agency discretion). Plaintiff, for his part, has not requested a separate 

administrative record for his challenge to OFAC’s denial of a terms of removal agreement. 

Because Plaintiff has not raised the issue, and because OFAC merely mentions the question in 

passing, the Court will reserve judgment on whether a separate administrative record is necessary

with respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to OFAC’s refusal to enter into a terms of removal 

agreement.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to supplement the 

administrative record, Dkt. 28. It is further ORDERED that the parties shall confer and file a 

proposed briefing schedule for summary judgment motions on or before September 30, 2020.

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge 

Date: September 23, 2020