J-S57012-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAEL J. ALLEYNE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 236 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 8, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001098-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 27, 2017

Appellant, Lael J. Alleyne, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

conviction for first-degree murder and related offenses. After careful review, 

we reverse one of Appellant’s convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery 

and its sentence, but affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellant was 

sixteen on the day he committed these crimes. Along with Charles David 

Martin III, he devised a plan to purchase marijuana from Nichelson Raymond 

and Richard Piscoya. In fact, Appellant and Martin planned to rob Raymond 

and Piscoya. Appellant used Monserrat Rosas, a mutual friend of his and 

Piscoya’s, to arrange the drug buy.
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On the day of the sale, Rosas approached the vehicle in which Raymond 

and Piscoya sat, and got into the backseat in order to conduct the drug sale. 

Appellant and Martin then approached the vehicle. Appellant opened the front 

passenger side door of the car, pointed a gun at the vehicle’s occupants, and 

demanded that they give him the marijuana. In an effort to escape, Raymond 

threw the car into reverse and the vehicle rolled backward. Appellant fired 

several shots into the car, which struck and killed Raymond. Appellant and 

Martin fled the scene. 

Appellant was arrested and proceeded to a jury trial with Martin. 

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery, two 

counts of conspiracy, and one count each of possession of an instrument of 

crime and possession of a firearm by a minor.1 The court sentenced Appellant 

to an aggregate term of forty-eight years to life imprisonment. Appellant 

timely appealed.

On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented against him, the jury instructions used at trial, and the admission 

of two autopsy photographs into evidence. We begin by evaluating Appellant’s 

sufficiency argument.

To preserve a sufficiency issue on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

statement “must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence 

was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3701(a)(1)(i), (ii), 903, 907(a), and 6110.1(a), 

respectively. 
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2009) (citations omitted). “Such specificity is of particular importance in cases 

where ... the [a]ppellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which 

contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Appellant raised the issue of sufficiency in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement. But he failed to specify with any particularity which elements of 

each of the seven crimes he desired to challenge. Instead, Appellant merely 

named all seven of his crimes and baldly stated the evidence was insufficient 

to support his convictions.

Despite this, our Supreme Court has previously held that this Court may

afford sufficiency review in certain cases even where an appellant fails to 

preserve his specific sufficiency contention, provided the issue is “relatively 

straightforward.” Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. 

2007).

In this specific instance, we find it appropriate to overlook Appellant’s 

lack of specificity. The Commonwealth concedes Appellant’s sufficiency 

challenge to his second conspiracy conviction (the focus of Appellant’s 

appellate brief) is meritorious and deserving of relief. See Commonwealth’s 

Brief, at 12. Thus, we will review the merits of this conviction. 

A challenge to whether an appellant engaged in one conspiracy or 

multiple conspiracies depends on a factual finding, and is thus a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 768 A.2d 

309, 313-314 (Pa. 2001) (holding that a challenge to whether an appellant’s 
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criminal conduct amounted to one conspiracy or more is a fact-driven inquiry

and constitutes a sufficiency claim, rather than a non-waivable illegality of the 

sentence issue). 

To prove criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must show that an 

appellant “1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act 

with another person or persons; 2) with a shared criminal intent; and 3) an 

overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. 

Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “If a 

person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one 

conspiracy so long as multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement 

or continuous conspiratorial relationship.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c). 

The jury found Appellant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery of 

Nichelson Raymond and conspiracy to commit robbery of Richard Piscoya. At 

trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Monserrat Rosas, the 

woman Appellant used to arrange the drug purchase. Rosas explained

Appellant asked her to set up a fake drug sale with Raymond and Piscoya, 

with the stated intention of robbing the men. Rosas stated that she told 

Appellant she did not wish to rob Piscoya or participate in the scheme. 

Appellant then told her he would instead supply her with cash, which she 

would use to purchase the marijuana. Rosas testified that, on the day of the 

sale, she proceeded to Piscoya’s car to make the drug transaction. She said 

she was shocked when Appellant and Martin followed her to the car. Rosas 

stated that Appellant then pointed a gun into the car and told Raymond and 
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Piscoya that he and Martin wanted the drugs. At this point, Rosas jumped out 

of the car and ran away.

Based on that, the Commonwealth presented evidence Appellant and 

Martin formulated a plan to rob Raymond and Piscoya of their drugs. However, 

as noted above, multiple crimes may be the result of a single conspiracy, so 

long as those crimes are the object of the same agreement. The evidence 

offered indicates the existence of a single agreement, to rob the victims and 

steal their drugs. The fact this crime victimized two persons rather than one 

does not create an additional conspiracy, in the absence of a second, separate 

criminal agreement. The Commonwealth concedes this very point, agreeing 

the judgment of sentence for the conspiracy to commit robbery of Piscoya 

should be reversed. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 12 (“The Commonwealth 

concedes that, based on the facts of this case, Appellant is correct.”) Appellant 

is entitled to relief on this claim.

However, his sentence for that conviction is concurrent with his 

sentences for his other crimes, and our disposition does not affect Appellant’s 

aggregate sentence. In cases where our decision does not alter the overall 

sentencing scheme, remand is unnecessary. See Commonwealth v. Thur,

906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006). Thus, we reverse Appellant’s second 

conspiracy conviction, but decline to remand.

In his second claim, Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. In Appellant’s view, Raymond 

made a swift motion to shift the car into reverse and try to escape from 
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Appellant. Appellant asserts he may have reasonably believed Raymond was 

reaching for a gun. He supports this argument by indicating that Raymond 

had a gun on his person at the time of his death.

“Our standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions 

is one of deference – an appellate court will reverse a court’s decision only 

when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth 

v. Yale, 150 A.3d 979, 983 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

[A] voluntary manslaughter instruction is warranted only where 

the offense is at issue and the evidence would support such a 

verdict. To support a verdict for voluntary manslaughter, the 

evidence would have had to demonstrate that, at the time of the 

killing, [a]ppellant acted under a sudden and intense passion 

resulting from serious provocation by the victim.

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d 943, 979 (Pa. 2013) (brackets in 

original; citation omitted). And no jury charge is required on voluntary 

manslaughter where the defendant denies committing the killing. See id., at 

980. 

That is the situation here. Appellant denied culpability at trial. Far from 

establishing the applicability of voluntary manslaughter to the evidence, 

Appellant continues to maintain in his appellate brief that he is not guilty of 

killing Raymond. Appellant’s argument the trial court erred in not supplying 

the voluntary manslaughter instruction instead appears to concede that if

Appellant did commit the murder, it was justified by Raymond’s swift 

movement toward the car’s gear shift. Appellant’s denial that he shot 

Raymond precludes such an instruction. See id. 
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Appellant admits “the shooter” only began firing the gun into Raymond’s 

car as Raymond drove it in reverse in order to escape. Appellant’s Brief, at 

17. As Appellant concedes, Raymond was attempting to escape at the time he 

was shot. Appellant has thus wholly failed to demonstrate any circumstances 

which would justify a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction. Based on the 

foregoing, we find that Appellant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter

jury instruction.

In his final issue for our review, Appellant contends the trial court erred 

in admitting autopsy photographs of Raymond at trial. We find this claim 

waived. 

“The viewing of photographic evidence in a murder case is, by its nature, 

a gruesome task. But photographs of a corpse are not inadmissible per se.” 

Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 822 A.2d 747, 765 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted).

In determining whether photographs [of a decedent] are 

admissible, we employ a two-step analysis. First, we consider 

whether the photograph is inflammatory. If it is, we then consider 

whether the evidentiary value of the photograph outweighs the 

likelihood that the photograph will inflame the minds and passions 

of the jury. Even gruesome or potentially inflammatory 

photographs are admissible when the photographs are of such 

essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the 

likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.

Commonwealth v. Solano, 906 A.2d 1180, 1191-1192 (Pa. 2006) (citations

omitted).

The autopsy photographs are not in the certified record. It is an 
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appellant’s responsibility to ensure that the certified record contains all the 

items necessary to review his claims. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tucker, 

143 A.3d 955, 963 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 

362, 372 (Pa. Super. 2008). “When a claim is dependent on materials not 

provided in the certified record, that claim is considered waived.” 

Commonwealth v. Petroll, 696 A.2d 817, 836 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation 

omitted). 

Without the photographs, we cannot conduct a review of Appellant’s

issue presented on appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Powell, 956 A.2d 

406, 423 (Pa. 2008) (finding claim that an autopsy photograph was unduly 

prejudicial waived “[b]ecause the record does not contain the photograph 

appellant refers to, we cannot assess his description and claim”); Petroll, 696 

A.2d at 836 (finding claim of improperly admitted photographs waived where 

they were not in the certified record). Accordingly, we find Appellant’s final 

claim waived for our review. 

Thus, we reverse Appellant’s second conspiracy to commit robbery 

conviction, but decline to remand for resentencing as it does not alter the 

overall sentencing scheme. We affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence in all 

other respects.

Judgment of sentence reversed in part and affirmed in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/27/2017