UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JAMES F. OUTLAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 96-1960

STANDARD PRODUCTS COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.

Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-95-1787)

Submitted: August 5, 1997

Decided: September 17, 1997

Before HALL, WILKINS, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

J. Andrew Williams, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Louis

A. Colombo, Michael K. Farrell, BAKER & HOSTETLER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

James Outlaw appeals from the district court's order and order on

reconsideration granting summary judgment to Standard Products

Company ("Standard"), Outlaw's former employer, in this action

alleging that Standard defamed Outlaw by allegedly making false

statements to two industry trade journals and a Cleveland, Ohio, daily

newspaper, about the circumstances surrounding Outlaw's termination. Outlaw was one of seventeen managers terminated by Standard

after Corporate executives determined that the plant was being managed poorly. The two trade journals published very similar articles,

and reported that a Standard "spokesman" said that "cost control, pricing and management issues were at the core of the problems at the

Spartanburg plant." The daily paper reported the same problems at the

plant but did not attribute any statements to a company spokesperson.

All three articles reported that Ted Zampetis, the president of Standard, stated that the managers at the plant did not appreciate the gravity of the problems at the plant. The two trade journals quoted

Zampetis as saying that "management there didn't seem to realize

how serious the problem was," while the daily paper quoted him as

saying that "[s]ome people just had their heads in the clouds."

Outlaw alleges that these statements are the "heart" of his defamation claim. The district court granted Standard summary judgment,

and subsequently denied reconsideration, on the grounds that no publication occurred, that the allegedly defamatory statements were not

"of and concerning the plaintiff," and that the statements were either

substantially true or nonprovable opinions. The district court's opinion relies in part on state law, and in part on First Amendment law,

to support its holdings. The extent, however, to which First Amendment protections usurp state standards in defamation cases depends

on factors such as whether the plaintiff is a private individual or a

public official, whether the defendant is a media entity, and whether

the statements at issue are of public or private concern. See Chapin

v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1091-92 (4th Cir. 1993);

Faltas, MD, MPH v. State Newspaper, 928 F. Supp. 637, 644 (D.S.C.

1996). The district court did not discuss these factors. We, however,

will generally decline to consider constitutional issues in a defamation

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case where it can be disposed of under state defamation law. See

Lapkoff v. Wilks, 969 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1992). Because we find

that this case can be decided under state defamation law, we decline

to determine the extent, if any, to which First Amendment protections

insulate Standard from liability in this case.

While the parties disagree over whether Ohio or South Carolina

law applies to this case, the dispute is inconsequential because both

states require, among other things, publication, falsity, and that the

defamation be about the plaintiff. See Parker v. Evening Post Publishing Co., 452 S.E.2d 640, 644 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994); National Media

Serv. Corp. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 573 N.E.2d 1148, 1149 (Ohio App.

1989). To survive Standard's summary judgment motion, Outlaw had

to produce evidence of specific facts establishing each of these essential elements. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Summary judgment is appropriate unless the evidence favoring the

non-moving party is sufficient for a jury to return a verdict for that

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

In this case, we find that there is no genuine issue for trial concerning the falsity of the statements asserted in the articles. Outlaw does

not deny that the problems mentioned in the articles existed at the

plant. Instead, he asserts that these problems could not have been his

fault because they existed before he arrived at the plant. He therefore

reasons that the articles are false because they inaccurately imply that

he, as a member of "management," was at least partly responsible for

these problems. We disagree.

The information contained in the articles does not logically support

the inference that Outlaw was guilty of mismanagement at the plant,

or personally responsible for any of the problems there. The articles

merely state that there were problems at the plant attributable to mismanagement, an assertion which Outlaw does not dispute is true. A

reasonable person could only conclude that Outlaw bore personal

responsibility for problems at the plant based on information extrinsic

to the articles, such as the fact that Outlaw was a manager at the plant,

and that he was terminated from his position. The articles therefore

neither state nor imply any falsity.

We also agree with the district court that the articles do not refer

to Outlaw specifically. Construing the reference requirement in the

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context of Maryland law, we have held that the publication at issue

"must contain some `special application of the defamatory matter' to

the individual." Aids Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Arcand v.

Evening Call Pub. Co., 567 F.2d 1163, 1164 (1st Cir. 1977)). We

concluded that reference to a group does not implicate the individual

members of the group. Id. As the district court noted, in this case none

of the articles mentions Outlaw or any other employee by name or

title. The reference to "management" refers to a group, and therefore

does not implicate Outlaw.

Accordingly, we conclude that under either Ohio or South Carolina

law, there is insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue for trial

as to whether the statements at issue were false or concerned the

Plaintiff. Because Outlaw's inability to establish these essential elements of his action is dispositive, we need not address the parties'

remaining contentions. We therefore affirm the decision of the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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