NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 

1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to 

the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the

panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to 

the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that 

decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued 

after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of 

the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 

Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-631

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ADAM T. LICCARDI.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of two counts 

of aggravated rape and one count of rape. A panel of this court 

affirmed the convictions but vacated a portion of the order 

denying a new trial and, as to certain information the 

Commonwealth erroneously withheld during discovery, remanded for 

the same judge who had presided over the trial and new trial 

motion to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, the 

effect that omitted evidence would have had on the collective or 

individual judgments of twelve lay people. On remand, the judge 

denied the defendant's motion for a new trial after a 

nonevidentiary hearing, concluding that the undisclosed evidence 

"did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."

See Commonwealth v. Kostka, 489 Mass. 399, 411 (2022). The 

defendant requested reconsideration and the judge held an 
2

evidentiary hearing at which the trial prosecutor, her second 

chair, the defendant's trial counsel, and a codefendant's trial 

counsel testified. Thirty-six exhibits were entered in evidence 

and considered by the judge. Applying the proper standard, the 

judge again denied the motion. The defendant appeals from the 

order denying his motion for a new trial. He also claims error 

in the prosecutor's closing argument, asserting that the issue 

was not addressed in his first appeal. Finally, the defendant

appeals from the judge's order denying his motions for 

postconviction discovery. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts presented to the jury, 

reserving additional facts for later discussion. In the fall of 

2012, the victim began her freshman year at the University of 

Massachusetts (UMass). Sometime between 11 P.M. and midnight on 

a Friday in October, the defendant and his three codefendants 

arrived uninvited at the victim's dormitory. Although none of 

the men attended UMass, security permitted them to enter the 

building. The victim knew the four men but had not invited 

them, and her friends had told them not to visit that evening.

The four men entered the victim's room and spent several hours 

there consuming alcohol and marijuana that they had brought with 

them. The victim became so intoxicated that she could not sit 

up or walk without assistance. Eventually, the victim's friends 

carried her to bed. When they left to sleep in their own room, 
3

the victim was unconscious or asleep. Two of the men, including 

the defendant, remained in the victim's room and the other two 

returned a short time later. 

The four men took turns sexually assaulting the victim in 

her room while she passed in and out of consciousness.1 After 

three of the men left, the victim again passed out. She woke up

to the defendant penetrating her vagina with his penis.

In the morning, the victim woke up in severe pain and with 

internal bleeding. She told a friend that she was sexually 

assaulted by all four men. Later that day, the victim exchanged 

text messages with one of the codefendants, Emmanuel Bile. In 

one text message, the victim demanded $500 from the four men, 

"[o]r else I'm taking you to court."2 She also wrote, "Thank you 

all for raping me while I was passed out and couldn't move." 

The following day, the victim reported the rapes to police and

underwent a physical examination by a sexual assault nurse 

examiner at a nearby hospital.

During the police investigation, the defendant initially

denied sexual contact with the victim. He told a detective that 

1 Separate juries convicted each codefendant of aggravated 

rape.

2 The victim testified that she demanded the money because 

she did not want anyone, particularly her parents, to know about 

the rapes, but she wanted to be able to pay for her resulting 

medical expenses.
4

he kissed the victim at the same time his codefendant Justin 

King had consensual vaginal sex with her. After the defendant

was informed that the victim had undergone a sexual assault 

examination, he admitted to the detective that all four men 

penetrated the victim's body with their penises, sometimes 

simultaneously. The defendant acknowledged that his penis 

penetrated the victim's mouth and vagina and stated that "it 

[w]as a group thing." He admitted that the victim cried while 

he was penetrating her vagina.

The defense at trial was that the victim was raped by Bile, 

but any sex acts with the defendant were consensual and the 

victim lied about being raped by all four men because she wanted

money.

Discussion. 1. Motion for a new trial. We review a 

judge's decision on a motion for new trial for error of law or 

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 491 Mass. 

362, 365 (2023). Where, as here, the motion judge was also the 

trial judge, "we give special deference to the judge's findings 

of fact and the ultimate decision on the motion" (quotation and 

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Corey, 493 Mass. 674, 684 

(2024).

a. Egregiousness of the prosecutor's failure to disclose 

the presentment letter. "Due process of law requires that the 

government disclose to a criminal defendant favorable evidence 
5

in its possession that could materially aid the defense against 

the pending charges." Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 

404-405 (1992). A panel of this court concluded that the 

Commonwealth erroneously failed to disclose that, nearly two 

years after the rapes, the victim's attorney sent a presentment 

letter to the Attorney General's office as notice of the 

victim's intent to file a lawsuit against UMass and other 

government entities for damages resulting from the rapes.3

The defendant first contends that the discovery violation 

was so egregious that he should not have been required to 

demonstrate prejudice.4 "[P]rosecutorial misconduct that is 

egregious, deliberate, and intentional, or that results in a 

violation of constitutional rights may give rise to presumptive 

prejudice" (citation omitted). Committee for Pub. Counsel 

Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 480 Mass. 700, 724 (2018). This 

"theory should be narrowly applied, and confined to situations 

3 Under G. L. c. 258, § 4, a potential plaintiff in a civil 

lawsuit against a public employer must make presentment of their 

claim to the Attorney General's office within two years after 

the date on which the cause of action arose, or else they are 

precluded from recovering any damages awarded in a trial

4 The defendant raised this argument for the first time in 

support of his motion for reconsideration of the order denying

his motion for a new trial. Although the Commonwealth does not 

assert that the argument is waived, we note that a motion for 

reconsideration is not an "appropriate place to raise new 

arguments inspired by a loss before the motion judge in the 

first instance" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. TeixeiraFurtado, 474 Mass. 1009, 1012 n.3 (2016).
6

where the misconduct has cast such doubt . . . as to poison the 

entire investigation, and a stronger deterrent is warranted to 

prevent repetition of such misconduct" (quotations and citation 

omitted). Id. 

The prosecutor's failure to disclose her knowledge of the 

presentment letter was error. However, the judge credited the 

prosecutor's motion hearing testimony that she did not connect 

the defendant's discovery request to her conversation with the 

victim's attorney about presentment. He found that the trial 

prosecutor "showed through her conduct that she is a competent 

and ethical prosecutor." Further, the judge determined that the 

Commonwealth's failure to provide the presentment letter was 

unintentional. Given the ample evidence supporting the judge's 

findings, and the defendant's failure to present evidence that 

the prosecutor's actions were deliberate or intentional, we 

decline to disturb those findings. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 

78 Mass. App. Ct. 450, 454 (2010) (judge's subsidiary findings 

of facts not to be disturbed unless shown to be result of clear 

abuse of discretion or clear error). Thus, we discern no abuse 

of discretion in the judge's conclusion that the discovery 

violation was not egregious, deliberate, or intentional. See 

Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 480 Mass. at 724. The 

defendant was not relieved from his burden of demonstrating 

prejudice resulting from the nondisclosure.
7

b. Prejudice to the defendant from nondisclosure of the 

presentment letter. The defendant next argues that he 

demonstrated prejudice from the nondisclosure of the presentment 

letter. Absent prosecutorial misconduct, to prevail on his 

motion for a new trial, the defendant must have shown that a 

"substantial basis exists for claiming prejudice from the 

nondisclosure" of the specifically requested evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Bateman, 492 Mass. 404, 419 (2023), quoting 

Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008). "The verdict 

and judgment must be set aside unless the reviewing court's 

'conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, 

or had but very slight effect.'" Bateman, supra, quoting 

Commonwealth v. Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 24-25 (1978). 

The defendant asserts that trial counsel could have used 

the presentment letter to demonstrate that the victim had a 

financial motive to lie. In fact, trial counsel vigorously 

pursued financial motive impeachment, to no avail. Among other 

attempts to undermine the victim's credibility, trial counsel 

cross-examined the victim about her demand for money from the 

defendants. The defendant also introduced the text message from 

the victim demanding $500. Defense counsel closed, in part, by 

arguing that the victim's allegations were "about money. She 

wanted $500. She made a demand for $500." As the judge stated, 

"[a]t trial, zealous and experienced trial counsel for the 
8

defendant, extensively and vigorously, cross-examined the victim 

. . . on her demand for money." There is no prejudice where

undisclosed evidence "would have served only as weak and 

cumulative impeachment evidence." Commonwealth v. Watkins, 473 

Mass. 222, 232 (2015).

The judge fully considered the separate impact the 

presentment letter might have had on the jury and concluded it 

would not have materially aided the defense. As the person who 

saw the evidence and the jury, the judge was in the best 

position to make this assessment and we defer to his view. 

Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 409. We agree with the judge that the 

letter was of limited usefulness, because the defendant would 

have had to argue to the jury that the victim falsely accused

all four men of rape to reap rewards from a civil lawsuit 

against UMass that she still had not filed two years after the 

fact -- even though such a suit would have required her to meet 

only a civil standard of proof and would not be dependent on any 

of her assailants having been criminally convicted. Moreover, 

the defendant did not dispute that the victim was raped, only 

that his own acts were consensual.5 As the judge put it, "[o]n 

this record, evidence that a college student who was raped in 

5 The defendant testified that he stood and watched as Bile, 

who was ultimately convicted of two counts of aggravated rape, 

raped the victim.
9

her dorm room intends to file a tort lawsuit against her school 

does not undercut the strong evidence that she was raped." See 

Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 490 (2018) ("evidence 

that tends merely to impeach the credibility of a witness will 

not ordinarily be the basis of a new trial" [citation omitted]).

In addition, the judge considered the value of the 

presentment letter in the overall context of the trial evidence. 

He found that "the jury heard . . . overwhelming evidence of the 

[victim's] inability to have consented to sex." This amply 

supports his decision not to grant the defendant a new trial. 

See Drayton, 479 Mass. at 490 (order denying motion for new 

trial on basis of newly discovered evidence affirmed where case 

against defendant overwhelming); Lykus, 451 Mass. at 330 

(nondisclosure does not warrant new trial where case against 

defendant overwhelming). Indeed, in addition to the victim's 

testimony, two witnesses whom the judge concluded "ha[d] not 

been shown to have had any financial or other incentive to lie" 

testified that when they left the victim with the defendant, she 

was so intoxicated that she could not walk without assistance 

and appeared to be unconscious.6 The judge also considered the 

defendant's contention that the presentment letter might have 

6 The judge properly rejected the defendant's speculation 

that the witnesses might also have had financial motives rooted 

in the UMass lawsuit.
10

led to information that would have bolstered trial counsel's 

impeachment of the victim by showing that her financial motive 

"snowballed" from the $500 demand to a request for victim 

compensation and assistance division (VCAD) funds to, 

ultimately, a lawsuit against UMass. According to the 

defendant, the victim may have maintained her ruse for years in 

order to receive VCAD funds "for services that were unrelated to 

the alleged rapes." Correctly applying the prejudice standard 

applicable when evidence not specifically requested has been 

erroneously withheld, the judge concluded that there was not a 

substantial risk that evidence relating to the VCAD fund request

would have impacted the jury's decisions. He reasoned that such 

evidence likely would have exposed the jury to "the financial 

burdens [the victim] incurred as a result of the rapes, 

including the cost of therapy," and that in any event if the 

victim did receive VCAD funds, it could only be because VCAD had 

concluded she "was, in fact, the victim of a crime and that she 

suffered personal physical or psychological injury as a direct

result." Moreover, as discussed above, the jury did hear other

evidence that, according to the defendant, showed that the 

victim fabricated the rapes to get money. 

The defendant further contends that if trial counsel had 

possessed the presentment letter, he might have changed his 

trial strategy. Trial counsel's 2020 affidavit stated that with 
11

that letter he "may have shifted" the defense more toward 

undermining the victim's credibility, "may have advised" the 

defendant not to testify,7 and "would have considered" not 

introducing the victim's text message demanding $500 in 

evidence.8 The defendant now argues that the judge abused his 

discretion by failing to consider the impact these hypothetical 

changes in trial counsel's strategy might have had on the jury

when taken together with supposed improprieties in the 

prosecutor's closing argument. We are aware of no legal 

authority to support this proposition, nor did the defendant 

cite any in the six lines he dedicated to it in his brief. 

Instead, the defendant relies on three cases he provided in a 

post oral argument letter: Commonwealth v. Pope, 489 Mass. 790 

(2022); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 475 Mass. 459 (2016); and 

7 It is noteworthy that by the time the defendant testified, 

the jury already had heard evidence of the self-incriminating

and inconsistent statements he made to police about his sexual 

acts. 

8 We note the contrast between this noncommittal language

and counsel's statement in the same affidavit that, if he had 

the presentment letter at the time of trial, he "would have" 

used the letter itself in specific ways. At the 2022 hearing on 

the motion for reconsideration, counsel testified that he "most 

likely" would have modified his trial theory, but he explained 

this by stating that the presentment letter itself would have 

provided "more meat on the bone."
12

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392 (2005).9 These cases are 

readily distinguishable from the present case. 

In Pope, 489 Mass. at 805, withheld documents contained 

inconsistent statements from a witness who was the "linchpin of 

the Commonwealth's entire case." The documents would have 

supported the defendant's strategic focus on the witness's 

credibility and cast doubt on the police investigation. Id. at 

801, 804-805. The court concluded it was "likely" counsel would 

have used the documents to impeach the key witness, id. at 803,

and "quite likely" counsel would have used them to present a 

"Bowden defense." Id. at 804, citing Commonwealth v. Bowden, 

379 Mass. 472, 486 (1980).

In Ellis, 475 Mass. at 465-466, evidence discovered after 

the defendant's murder conviction showed that the victim

participated in crimes of police corruption with several Boston 

police detectives who investigated the victim's homicide. The 

court concluded that, with this evidence, "a reasonable jury 

likely would have had diminished confidence in the integrity and 

thoroughness of the police investigation in general." Id. at 

479. Although the court made a passing reference to what else 

counsel could have done differently at trial had he known of the 

relationship between the victim and the detectives, its analysis 

9 See Mass. R. A. P. 16, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 

(2019).
13

was fundamentally an evaluation of the impact the newly 

discovered evidence would have had on the jury. Id. at 478-479.

Finally, in Daniels, 445 Mass. at 407, an eyewitness 

identification of the defendant "was the peg on which the 

defendant's conviction hung or fell." The defendant appealed 

from a judge's order denying a request for posttrial discovery

based on newly discovered information that concerned the 

credibility of the identification. Id. at 392, 400 & n.21. The 

court explained that the prejudice standard applicable to a new 

trial motion based on the erroneous withholding of specifically 

requested evidence is due in part to the impact of such 

withholding on defense counsel's strategic decisions. Id. at 

404-405. However, the court had no difficulty agreeing that on 

the record before it, the defendant's new trial motion had been 

properly denied, i.e., the standard had not been met. Id. The 

court's principal focus was instead on the standard for 

posttrial discovery based on newly discovered evidence, which 

requires in pertinent part that a defendant "make specific, not 

speculative or conclusory, allegations that the newly discovered 

evidence would have materially aid[ed] the defense" (quotation 

and citation omitted; emphasis added). Id. at 407.

In each of these cases, the undisclosed evidence related to 

a material aspect of a critical witness's testimony in an 

otherwise weak case. Here, in contrast, the undisclosed 
14

evidence was only "weak and cumulative impeachment evidence." 

Watkins, 473 Mass. at 232. As the judge found, "[t]he 

presentment letter did not corroborate the defendant's story, 

did not cast doubt on any material element of the prosecution's 

version of events, and did not diminish the credibility of key 

prosecution witnesses." In addition, to the extent Pope, Ellis, 

and Daniels touch on trial tactics, they do not suggest that a 

defendant's speculative claim in hindsight regarding the impact 

of undisclosed evidence on a potentially different trial

strategy is enough to establish "a substantial basis . . . for 

claiming prejudice from the nondisclosure" (citation omitted). 

Bateman, 492 Mass. at 419.

While we acknowledge the possibility that in appropriate 

circumstances a defendant may be able to establish prejudice 

based on a properly supported claim of impact on trial strategy, 

this is not that case. Here, the defendant relied on the 2020 

affidavit of trial counsel filed in support of his motion for 

reconsideration, which stated only that counsel "would have 

considered" strategic changes, "may have advised" the defendant 

not to testify, "may have shifted" the defense, and "may have 

relied more heavily" on a different theme if he had the 

presentment letter. This speculative language falls well short 

of what is required for the defendant to establish a substantial 
15

basis that undisclosed evidence caused prejudice.10 Cf. 

Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47 (2011) (where defendant 

sought to vacate plea on basis that he "would not" have pleaded 

guilty but for counsel's errors, "[a]t a minimum . . . the 

defendant must aver that to be the case"). A new trial is not 

warranted based on assertions that it may, possibly, be 

conducted differently than the initial trial.

We thus discern no error or abuse of discretion in the 

judge's fully considered conclusion that the presentment letter 

"did not influence the jury or had but very slight effect." See 

Bateman, 492 Mass. at 419.

2. Closing argument. The defendant challenges the 

prosecutor's closing argument on five grounds. Because the 

defendant objected to the first two challenged remarks, "we 

evaluate whether the defendant was prejudiced [by any improper 

remarks], considering the remarks in the context of the entire 

argument, the trial testimony, and the judge's instructions to 

the jury." Commonwealth v. Beaudry, 445 Mass. 577, 584 (2005).

First, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly 

vouched for the victim's credibility when she stated that the 

10 Although the judge did not specifically address the 

credibility of these assertions, it is notable that trial 

counsel did not make them in his 2017 affidavit, which was the 

basis for the initial new trial motion as well as the motion on 

remand.
16

victim "ha[d] no reason to lie."11 Although a prosecutor may not 

argue that a victim is credible simply because she appeared to 

testify in court, Beaudry, 445 Mass. at 587, "a prosecutor may 

marshal the evidence in closing argument to urge the jury to 

believe the government witnesses and disbelieve those testifying 

for the defendant" (quotation and citation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 39 (2012). Here, the 

prosecutor properly argued from the evidence that the victim had 

no motive and little time to formulate a lie to her friend, the 

morning after, that all four men had raped her. The prosecutor 

did not exceed the bounds of permissible advocacy by asserting 

that the victim's version of events was more plausible than the 

defendant's version.

The defendant's second claim of error is that the 

prosecutor misstated the evidence by arguing that the defendant 

had testified that the victim was sober at the time of the 

rapes. "In closing argument, [p]rosecutors are entitled to 

marshal the evidence and suggest inferences that the jury can 

draw from it" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. 

11 The Supreme Judicial Court has found nothing improper in 

a prosecutor's argument that witnesses had no motive to lie, 

where the defendant's closing had attacked those witnesses' 

credibility. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 450 Mass. 395, 408, 

cert. denied, 555 U.S. 893 (2008); Commonwealth v. Helberg, 73 

Mass. App. Ct. 175, 179 & n.5 (2008); Mass. G. Evid. 

§ 1113(b)(2) & note (2024).
17

Parker, 481 Mass. 69, 74 (2018). Here, although the defendant 

did not testify in so many words that the victim was sober, he 

stated that the victim was awake, had no difficulty walking, did 

not slur her speech, and did not appear unusual in any way. 

Where ample evidence supported the prosecution's theory that the 

victim was too intoxicated to consent to sexual intercourse, the 

prosecutor was entitled to marshal that evidence to rebut the 

defendant's testimony. See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 477 Mass. 

658, 670-671 (2017) ("[T]he prosecutor's remarks were 

characteristic of enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, and 

excusable hyperbole" [quotation and citation omitted]).

Because the defendant did not object to the remaining three 

challenged remarks, we review any error for a substantial risk 

of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Shruhan, 89 

Mass. App. Ct. 320, 326 (2016). "The defendant has a 

considerable burden to demonstrate that an alleged error, or 

combination of errors, by the prosecutor in the closing 

argument, caused a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 

justice." Id.

The defendant asserts that the prosecutor misstated 

evidence when she argued that the defendant's testimony -- that 

his codefendant, Caleb Womack, did not have sexual contact with 

the victim -- was contradicted by the fact that Womack's 

deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was found on the comforter of the 
18

bed. The defendant testified that Womack sat on the bed at one 

point. The Commonwealth's expert testified that the DNA found 

on the comforter was not necessarily from sperm cells. Still, 

the prosecutor's statement that the DNA was deposited during 

Womack's rapes of the victim was a reasonable inference from the 

evidence and thus fair argument. See Commonwealth v. Roy, 464 

Mass. 818, 824 (2013) (inferences need only be reasonable and 

possible, not necessary or inescapable).

The defendant further contends that the prosecutor 

misstated evidence by saying that the defendant did not want to 

pay any portion of the $500 because he "took care of the 

problem" and "chilled her . . . out." The prosecutor 

extrapolated from one of Bile's text messages to King, where he 

stated that the defendant did not want to pay the victim. The 

defendant does not dispute that the text message "represented 

[that the defendant] was not willing to pay." Additionally, 

based on the defendant's testimony, the defendant argued in 

closing that he comforted the victim after the rapes. The 

prosecutor merely inferred that the defendant was unwilling to 

pay because he believed that he comforted the victim after the 

rapes. Again, this statement essentially asked the jury to draw 

a fair inference from the evidence. See Roy, 464 Mass. at 824.

Finally, the defendant contends that the prosecutor 

overstepped by arguing that the defendant did not want his 
19

statement to police recorded so that there would be no evidence 

that he altered his version of events. The defendant refused to 

be recorded, his testimony contradicted the interviewing 

detective's version of the statement, and the accuracy of the 

detective's version was challenged on cross-examination and in 

closing because he did not have a recording to corroborate his 

version of the statement. The defendant also directly 

challenged the detective's version of the unrecorded interview. 

Once again, the prosecutor's remarks were a fair argument, 

asking the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the 

evidence. There was no error, and no substantial risk of a 

miscarriage of justice.

3. Denial of discovery and rule 17 requests. The 

defendant further appeals from the order denying his motions for 

postconviction discovery pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 

30 (c) (4), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). We uphold 

discovery rulings, "unless the appellant can demonstrate an 

abuse of discretion that resulted in prejudicial error" 

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Torres, 479 Mass. 641, 647 

(2018). "Discovery in the context of a new trial motion under 

[rule 30 (c) (4)] is not a matter of right." Commonwealth v. 

Arriaga, 438 Mass. 556, 569 (2003). "A defendant cannot use a 

motion for postconviction discovery to engage in a fishing 

expedition" (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Ware, 471 
20

Mass. 85, 94 (2015). Rather, the defendant "must make a 

sufficient showing that the discovery is reasonably likely to 

uncover evidence that might warrant granting a new trial" 

(citation omitted). Id.

Here, the defendant's postconviction discovery motions 

sought the prosecutor's notes from two meetings with the victim,

the victim's counseling and medical records, the victim's health 

insurance records, and records from the law firm representing 

the victim in her civil suit against UMass. The defendant 

asserts that these records could reveal impeachment evidence and 

evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. Because he offers only 

speculation regarding what he hopes to find in such records, the 

defendant "has not demonstrated sufficiently that [the soughtafter] evidence actually existed." Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 

Mass. 587, 600 (2015). Further, the defendant made no showing 

that additional impeachment evidence would have "materially 

benefited the defense and would have factored into the jury's 
21

deliberations." Id. at 598. Thus, the judge properly denied 

the defendant's motions for postconviction discovery.

Orders denying motions for a 

new trial and for 

postconviction discovery

affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Sacks & 

Brennan, JJ.12),

Clerk

Entered: September 30, 2024.

12 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.