Filed 7/16/24 P. v. Greer CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONNIE JOE GREER,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329995

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA187860)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with instructions.

William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Ronnie Greer appeals the trial court’s order resentencing 

him under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 

Greer was convicted of escaping from custody in 2000. He 

was sentenced to six years, imposed consecutively to a separate

sentence of 35 years to life on burglary charges.

In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified Greer’s escape conviction as 

eligible for section 1172.75 resentencing. At the resentencing 

hearing, the trial court agreed Greer was eligible for resentencing 

and reduced Greer’s sentence from six to four years. Greer was 

not present at the hearing and was not represented by counsel. 

Believing Greer had already served his sentence for escape 

concurrently to his indeterminate sentence for burglary, the court 

stated it would not appoint counsel for Greer and had not 

obtained Greer’s waiver of the right to be present at his 

resentencing proceedings.

Greer argues the trial court erroneously denied him the 

statutory right to appointed counsel and his statutory and 

constitutional right to be present at resentencing. The People 

concede the errors. We agree and remand for a full resentencing 

in accordance with section 1172.75.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Greer’s Convictions and Sentences

In 1999, Greer was charged with escape from a reentry 

facility (§ 4530, subd. (b)). The information also alleged Greer 

had two prior strike convictions (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); 667, 

subds. (b)-(i)), and had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, 

subd. (b)). After a bench trial, the trial court found Greer guilty 

of this count and found the special allegations true.

Before trial and sentencing on his escape conviction, Greer 

was separately convicted in January 2000 of two counts of first 

degree burglary and sentenced to 35 years to life. Greer was 

sentenced on the escape charge in May 2000. He received a 

six-year prison term: a middle term of two years, doubled by a 

prior strike enhancement (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); § 667, 

subds. (b)-(i)), plus one year for each of two prior prison term 

allegations under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Greer’s sentence 

for escape was imposed consecutive to his life term for burglary.

B. Section 1172.75 Proceedings

On February 8, 2023, CDCR identified Greer’s case for 

resentencing review pursuant to former section 1171.1, now 

section 1172.75. The trial court considered Greer’s eligibility for 

section 1172.75 resentencing on February 16. The court issued a 

tentative ruling as follows:

[P]ursuant to [section 1172.75] the court intends to 

strike the one year priors and resentence the 

defendant to 4 years. Pursuant to statute the court 

must set this matter for hearing, have defendant 
4

transported from wherever he is housed in the state 

of California, have all counsel and defendant present 

for OSC.

However, defendant on this matter concluded this 

sentence on or about 5-12-2006. The defendant is not 

in custody on this matter and defendant is in 

prop[r]ia persona, therefore, the court grants the 

petition for resentence and modifies the abstract and 

minute order to reflect that the defendant is 

resentenced to 4 years which expired on or about 

2004.

[. . .] The court shall not set this matter for hearing 

as this court finds that the defendant will not be 

harmed nor prejudiced by not having a hearing 

scheduled and because this case has concluded on or 

about 5-12-2006 and defendant is not in custody on 

this matter.

On March 17, 2023, the court recalled Greer’s previous 

sentence and re-imposed a middle term sentence of four years. 

Greer was not present at the hearing, nor was he represented by 

counsel. The court noted, “The court issued an order on 2/16/23, 

and sent that out to Mr. Greer in state prison. The problem, 

however, is that I don’t have anything from Mr. Greer that says, 

‘Okay,’ Okay with us simply going forward without him.” 

Nevertheless, the court stated, “this is harmless error to not have 

Mr. Greer present.”

Greer timely appealed.
5

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background and Standard of Review

“Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) 

required trial courts to impose a one-year sentence enhancement 

for each true finding on an allegation the defendant had served a 

separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody 

for at least five years.” (People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 

375, 379-380.) “Senate Bill No. 483 added section 1171.1 to the 

Penal Code, which was subsequently renumbered without 

substantive change as section 1172.75. [Citation.] 

Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that ‘[a]ny sentence 

enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,

pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any 

enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent 

offense . . . is legally invalid.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Once the 

[California] Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

identifies those persons ‘currently serving a term for a judgment 

that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a)’ to the 

sentencing court, ‘the court shall recall the sentence and 

resentence the defendant.’ (§ 1172.75, subds. (b) & (c).)” 

(People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 399.)

“Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), states that the 

resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser sentence than the one 

originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed 

enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public 

safety,’ and further, resentencing ‘shall not result in a longer 

sentence than the one originally imposed.’” (People v. Garcia

(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855.) The resentencing court must 
6

apply “any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide 

for judicial discretion” and “may consider postconviction factors, 

including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of 

rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that 

reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical 

condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future 

violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have 

changed since the original sentencing so that continued 

incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, 

subds. (d)(2) & (d)(3).)

By its own terms, section 1172.75 ensures the defendant’s 

“right to be present, represented by counsel, and present evidence 

at the hearing.” (People v. Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 

768, 773 (Montgomery), review granted May 29, 2024, S284662; 

see § 1172.75, subds. (d)(3), (d)(5), & (e).) Additionally, the 

California and federal constitutions guarantee the defendant’s 

right to be personally present at all critical stages of criminal 

proceedings, including sentencing and resentencing. (See 

People v. Velasco (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 663, 673-674 (Velasco)

[§ 1172.75 proceeding]; People v. Santos (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 

666, 677, review granted May 29, 2024, S284341 (Santos) 

[same].) 

A defendant’s statutory and constitutional right to be 

present at resentencing “may be waived.” (Velasco, supra, 

97 Cal.App.5th at p. 673; accord, Santos, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 677.) Such a waiver must be voluntary, knowing and 

intelligent. (See Santos, at p. 677; see also § 977, subd. (b)

[providing for waiver of defendant’s right to be present at 

sentencing].) “[D]efense counsel may waive the defendant’s 

presence, ‘but only if there is evidence that the defendant 
7

consented to the waiver. [Citations.] At a minimum, there must 

be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was 

waiving and the consequences of doing so.’” (Santos, at pp. 677-

678; see § 977, subd. (b)(2), (b)(2)(A)-(B).) 

“‘Under the federal Constitution, error pertaining to a 

defendant’s presence is evaluated under the harmless-beyond-areasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23 . . . .’ [Citations.] ‘Under that standard, 

the error “may be deemed harmless only if we can conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not affect the 

outcome of the proceeding.”’” (Santos, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 678; accord, Velasco, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 674.) We 

assess denial of a statutory right to counsel in resentencing

proceedings under the Watson standard for state-law error: 

whether there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of 

the error, the defendant would have obtained a more favorable 

result. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957-958

(Lewis), citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

(Watson).)

B. The Trial Court Denied Greer’s Right to Be Present and His 

Right to Appointed Counsel at the Resentencing Hearing,

and the Error Was Not Harmless

Greer asserts, the People concede, and we agree the court 

prejudicially erred by resentencing Greer without appointing 

counsel and without Greer’s presence in court or a valid waiver of 

his presence. The court noted Greer was absent from the 

proceeding and had not waived his right to be present. Although

the court stated there was “a public defender here,” the court did 

not appoint counsel for Greer or hear argument from Greer. 
8

Proceeding with resentencing under these circumstances was 

contrary to Greer’s constitutional and statutory rights. (See 

Montgomery, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 773; Velasco, supra,

97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 673-674; see also § 1172.75, subds. (d)(5), 

(e).) 

These errors were not harmless. (See Santos, supra, 

100 Cal.App.5th at p. 678, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 

386 U.S. 18, 23 (Chapman); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 974, citing Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Although the 

court believed Greer had already served his sentence on the 

escape conviction, Greer’s sentence for escape was imposed 

consecutive to his indeterminate life sentence, such that 

resentencing on the escape conviction would affect Greer’s total 

time in custody. Further, at his resentencing hearing Greer was 

not present, and he did not have counsel or the opportunity to 

present any argument or evidence. Greer avers that he could 

have “offered evidence about his rehabilitation efforts in prison 

over the past 24 years,” “argued that the strike allegation should 

be dismissed because it is more than 30 years old,” or “asked the 

court to impose the low term.” (See Velasco, supra, 

97 Cal.App.5th at p. 674 [defendant’s absence from resentencing 

not harmless error because he “was not able to present evidence 

of any of [section 1172.75’s postconviction] factors”].) We 

conclude Greer’s inability to be present at his hearing and to 

have counsel present such evidence and arguments was not 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman, at p. 23.) It 

is also reasonably probable that appointed counsel would have

obtained a more favorable result by assisting Greer in presenting

postconviction evidence and clarifying the details of Greer’s 

sentence for the court. (See Watson, at p. 836.) Therefore, as the 
9

People concede, Greer is entitled to a full resentencing hearing, 

including the appointment of counsel, the opportunity to be 

present at the hearing, and to offer postconviction evidence. (See 

Velasco, at p. 674.)

DISPOSITION

The resentencing order is reversed and the matter is 

remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a full 

resentencing hearing consistent with section 1172.75.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.