[Cite as State v. Reeder, 2021-Ohio-4558.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ALLEN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-21-08 

 v. 

CHADWICK T. REEDER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-21-09 

 v. 

CHADWICK T. REEDER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 1-21-10 

 v. 

CHADWICK T. REEDER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-2- 

 

Appeals from Allen County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court Nos. CR 2019 0247, CR 2019 0346 and CR 2019 0474 

Judgments Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 27, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Karin L. Coble for Appellant 

 Jana E. Emerick for Appellee 

ZIMMERMAN, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Chadwick T. Reeder, (“Reeder”) appeals his

three convictions and sentences of the Allen County Common Pleas Court in case 

numbers CR 2019 0247, CR 2019 0346, and CR 2019 0474. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} In case number CR 2019 0247 (“0247” hereafter), the Allen County 

Grand Jury indicted Reeder as to events that occurred on September 14, 2017 

through March 29, 2018 on the following criminal counts: Count One of 

Trafficking in Hashish in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(7)(c), a third-degree 

felony; Count Two of Trafficking in Marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), 

(C)(3)(a) and (b), a fourth-degree felony; Counts Three, Four, and Five of 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-3- 

Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(a), 

fourth-degree felonies; Count Six of Trafficking in Marijuana in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(1), (C)(3)(a), a fifth-degree felony; Count Seven for Possession of 

Hashish in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(7)(c), a fifth-degree felony; and Count 

Eight for Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), 

(C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 1). The 

indictment included firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.141(A) and 

specifications for forfeiture of guns, money, and property in a drug case under R.C. 

2941.1417(A) as to Counts Seven and Eight.1

 (Id.). 

{¶3} In case number CR 2019 0346 (“0346” hereafter), the Allen County 

Grand Jury indicted Reeder as to events that occurred on March 10, 2019 on the 

following five criminal counts: Count One for Possession of Hashish in violation 

of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(7)(g), a second-degree felony; Count Two for Possession 

of Marijuana in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(3)(d), a third-degree felony; 

Count Three for Possession of Hashish in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(7)(c), 

a fifth-degree felony; Count Four for Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation 

of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony; and Count Five for Possession 

of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(a), also a fifth-degree felony. 

1

 The State was seeking the forfeiture of four different firearms, $23,408.00 in U.S. currency, and a security 

system. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 1). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-4- 

(Case No. CR 2019 0346, Doc. No. 1). All the Counts in this indictment included 

a specification for money in a drug case under R.C. 2941.1417(A).2

 (Id.). 

{¶4} In case number CR 2019 0474 (hereinafter “0474”), the Allen County 

Grand Jury indicted Reeder as to events that occurred on August 7, 2019 on a single 

count of Possession of Hashish in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(7)(e), a thirddegree felony, which included a specification of money in a drug case under R.C. 

2941.1417(A).3

 (Case No. CR 2019 0474, Doc. No. 1). 

{¶5} On November 21, 2019, Reeder entered pleas of guilty, under a 

negotiated plea agreement, in all three cases. Specifically, in case number 0247, 

Reeder pleaded guilty to all eight counts in the indictment, to the firearm 

specifications in Counts Seven and Eight, and to the forfeiture specifications in 

Count Seven in exchange for the dismissal of seven specifications for the forfeitures 

of a gun, money, and property (in Count Eight). In case number 0346, Reeder 

pleaded guilty to an amended Count One for Possession of Hashish in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(7)(e), a third-degree felony, as well as the forfeiture 

specification in amended Count One, and all four remaining counts (as indicted) in 

exchange the dismissal of the specifications for the forfeitures of money in Counts 

Two, Three, Four, and Five. And, in case number 0474, Reeder pleaded guilty to 

2

 The State sought forfeiture of $3,060.00 in U.S. currency. (Case No. CR 2019 0346, Doc. No. 1). 

3

 The State was seeking to forfeit $2,044.00 in U.S. currency. (Case No. CR 2019 0474, Doc. No. 1). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-5- 

the charge of Possession of Hashish in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(7)(e), a 

third-degree felony as well as the specification for the forfeiture of money. 

{¶6} During the colloquy between the trial court and Reeder in the course 

of the change-of-plea hearing, the State advised the trial court that a part of the plea 

agreement, as to a nonmerger stipulation between the parties, was inadvertently not 

included on the paperwork. After notifying the trial court of such omission, the trial 

court instructed the State to add the nonmerger stipulation to the “other” section of 

the plea form or wherever space was available on the plea forms for each case. The 

additions were made and the subject of merger was explained to Reeder in open 

court by the trial court. No objection was lodged by Reeder as to the issue of merger 

thereafter. 

{¶7} Reeder’s judgment entries of conviction were filed in the trial court 

on November 21, 2019 and a sentencing hearing was scheduled in all cases for 

January 23, 2020. 

{¶8} At sentencing, the trial court determined in case 0247 that none of the 

counts merged for the purposes of sentencing (under the nonmerger stipulation) and 

that mandatory prison terms were required for the firearm specifications in Counts 

Seven and Eight. Thereafter, in case 0247, the trial court sentenced Reeder to 24 

months in prison as to Count One; 12 months as to Count Two; 15 months each as 

to Counts Three, Four, and Five; nine months as to Count Six; and six months each 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-6- 

on Counts Seven and Eight. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 68). Reeder was 

sentenced to two mandatory (one year) terms in prison as to the firearm 

specifications in Counts Seven and Eight. (Id.). The trial court further ordered that 

Count One be served consecutive to Count Two; that Counts Three, Four, and Five 

(although served concurrently to one another) be served consecutive to all other 

counts; that Count Six be served consecutive to the other counts; and that Counts 

Seven and Eight (be served concurrently to one another), but consecutive to the 

other counts for a total of 66 months in prison. (Id.). The trial court further ordered 

Reeder to serve two mandatory one-year prison terms (for the firearm specifications 

in Counts Seven and Eight) to be served consecutive to each other and consecutive 

to the other counts. (Id.). Thus, the total sentence in case 0247 was seven years and 

six months in prison. (Id.). 

{¶9} In case 0346, the trial court determined that none of the counts merged 

for the purposes of sentencing (under the nonmerger stipulation) and that mandatory 

prison terms were not required, but a term of prison was presumed for Count One. 

Thereafter, in case 0346, the trial court sentenced Reeder to 24 months (each) in 

prison as to Counts One and Two; to 9 months in prison (each) as to Counts Three 

and Four; and to 12 months in prison as to Count Five. The trial court further 

ordered that Count One be served concurrently to Count Two; that the terms in 

Counts Three and Four be served concurrently to one another, but consecutive to 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-7- 

Counts One, Two, and that Count Five be served consecutive to the other counts. 

Thus, in case 0346, the trial court imposed a total of three years and nine months in 

prison. Further, the trial court ordered the terms to be served consecutive to the 

terms imposed in case 0247. 

{¶10} In case 0474, the trial court determined that a mandatory prison term 

is not required, but a prison term is presumed. (Case No. CR 2019 0474, Doc. No. 

15). Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Reeder to 36 months in prison as to 

Count One to be served consecutive to the terms imposed in cases 0247 and 0346. 

(Case No. CR 2019 0474, Doc. No. 15). 

{¶11} Thus, the trial court’s aggregate sentence of Reeder in the three cases 

is 14 years and three months. (Id.). 

{¶12} The trial court filed its judgment entries of sentencing on January 24, 

2020 in each case. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 68); (Case No. CR 2019 

0346, Doc. No. 38); (Case No. CR 2019 0474, Doc. No. 15). 

{¶13} We granted appellant’s request for a delayed appeal in each case on 

April 7, 2021. We have consolidated all three cases for the purpose of appeal. 

Reeder assigns four assignments of error, which we will address in the order 

presented. 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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Assignment of Error I 

The trial court committed plain error by sentencing Mr. Reeder 

to two mandatory, consecutive one-year terms in violation of 

statute. 

{¶14} In his first assignment of error, Reeder argues that the trial court erred 

by imposing two mandatory, consecutive one-year prison terms for the firearm 

specifications (in case 0247 in Counts Seven and Eight) under R.C. 2941.141(A). 

Specifically, Reeder asserts that his felonies were “committed as part of the same 

act or transaction”, and thus are excepted under R.C. 2929.14. 

Standard of Review 

{¶15} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse a sentence 

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not 

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is 

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 

¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the 

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.

at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. 

Analysis 

{¶16} Here, the trial court sentenced Reeder to 66 months on the eight 

indicted counts in case 0247 pursuant to his negotiated plea agreement. (Case No. 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-9- 

CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 68). Then, the trial court ordered two (2) additional oneyear prison terms as to the firearm specifications (in Counts Seven and Eight) to be 

served consecutive to each other and consecutive to the other counts for a total 

sentence of seven years and six months in prison in case 0247. (Id.). 

{¶17} Important to this discussion, R.C. 2929.14 governs sentencing for 

firearm specifications. R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) provides in its pertinent parts: 

(C)(1)(a) Subject to division (C)(1)(b) of this section, if a mandatory 

prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to division (B)(1)(a) 

of this section for having a firearm on or about the offender’s person 

or under the offender’s control while committing a felony, if a

mandatory prison term is imposed upon an offender pursuant to 

division (B)(1)(c) of this section for committing a felony specified in 

that division by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, or if both 

types of mandatory prison terms are imposed, the offender shall serve 

any mandatory prison term imposed under either division 

consecutively to any other mandatory prison term imposed under 

either division or under division (B)(1)(d) of this section, 

consecutively to and prior to any prison term imposed for the 

underlying felony pursuant to division (A), (B)(2), or (B)(3) of this 

section or any other section of the Revised Code, and consecutively 

to any other prison term or mandatory prison term previously or

subsequently imposed upon the offender. 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) (Oct. 17, 2017) (current version R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) Apr. 

12, 2021). Reeder relies on R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) in his assertion that the trial court 

erred by imposing the firearm specification terms to run consecutively to one 

another, rather than, concurrent. 

{¶18} R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) sets forth an exception to the general rule 

espoused in R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a) and states as follows: 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-10- 

If a court imposes a prison term on an offender under division 

(B)(1)(a) of this section, * * * a court shall not impose more than one 

prison term on an offender under division (B)(1)(a) of this section for 

felonies committed as part of the same act or transaction. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) (Oct. 17, 2017) (current version R.C. 

2929.14(B)(1)(b) Apr. 12, 2021). 

{¶19} Significant to this appeal and because it is dispositive of the issue 

before us, Reeder acknowledged and stipulated (at his change-of-plea hearing) that 

each of the counts in the indictment (in case 0247) were separate acts and merger 

would not apply. (Nov. 21, 2019 Tr. at 19-22). Put more plainly, Reeder entered 

into a plea agreement with the State to plead guilty to the firearm specifications and 

to waive the protections afforded him under R.C. 2941.25 (by virtue of his 

nonmerger stipulation) when he stipulated that his acts were separate and merger 

did not apply. See State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 20, 

quoting State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 29 (“It is possible 

for an accused to expressly waive the protection afforded by R.C. 2941.25, such as 

by ‘stipulating in the plea agreement that the offenses were committed with separate 

animus.’”). Thus, the trial court did not err (at sentencing) by imposing consecutive 

prison terms for his firearm specifications under Counts Seven and Eight 

considering Reeder’s “intentional relinquishment [] of a known right”. Id. quoting 

State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 15 quoting United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993), quoting Johnson 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-11- 

v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938). Consequently, Reeder’s 

sentence is not contrary to law. 

{¶20} Accordingly, Reeder’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Assignment of Error II 

The conviction for offenses which do not exist in Ohio law are 

void, or, alternatively, voidable. 

{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Reeder argues that the THC 

identified in Counts Three, Four, Five, and Eight in case 0247 and Count Four in 

case 0346 is not a Schedule I controlled substance, and thus is not defined as an 

offense under the Ohio Revised Code.4

 Specifically, in this assignment of error, 

Reeder attacks the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court. 

Standard of Review 

{¶22} A conviction based on an indictment which does not charge an offense 

is void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. See State v. Harper, 160 Ohio 

St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 21-22, quoting State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 178 

(1967). Jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review under a de novo standard 

of review. See State v. Stewart, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-21-05, 2021-Ohio-2294, ¶ 

6. “De novo review is independent, without deference to the lower court’s 

4

 Indeed, Reeder raised this issue in pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment filed on August 14 and October 

1, 2019, and the State filed its memorandum in opposition on October 30, 2019. (See Case No. CR 2019 

0247, Doc. Nos. 19, 20, 36). However, the trial court never ruled on those issues because Reeder ultimately 

entered a guilty plea on November 21, 2019. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. Nos. 57, 58). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-12- 

decision.” State v. Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-38, 2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27, 

citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.3d 145, 147 

(1992). 

Analysis 

{¶23} “‘Ohio’s Criminal Rules and statutes provide for the direct review of 

criminal judgments through appeal, and collateral attacks through postconviction 

petitions, habeas corpus, and motions to vacate.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Love, 

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0039, 2018-Ohio-1140, ¶ 17, quoting Lingo v. State, 

138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, ¶ 44. Thus, “[t]he authority to vacate a void 

judgment is ‘an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.’” Id. at ¶ 18, quoting 

Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), paragraph four of syllabus, and citing 

Lingo at ¶ 48. 

{¶24} A judgment rendered by a trial court lacking subject-matter 

jurisdiction is void and issues of voidness can be raised at any time. Id. at ¶ 19, 

citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 17. 

“Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata can be surmounted where a judgment is 

void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., citing id., State Wilson, 73 Ohio 

St.3d 40, 44-45 (1995), fn. 6, and Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d at 178-179. 

{¶25} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently “realign[ed]” its void-versusvoidable jurisprudence with “the traditional understanding of what constitutes a 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-13- 

void judgment,” to hold that “[w]hen a case is within a court’s subject-matter 

jurisdiction and the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of 

that jurisdiction in imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment 

voidable,” not void. Harper at ¶ 4-5 and at ¶ 41-43. The Supreme Court of Ohio 

traced the roots of that “understanding” back 150 years to its 1857 decision in Ex 

parte Shaw, 7 Ohio St. 81 (1857), and through its decision, more than a century 

later, in Perry. Under the “traditional” rule, 

‘a judgment of conviction is void if rendered by a court having either 

no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or no jurisdiction of 

the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction to try the defendant for the crime 

for which he was convicted. * * * Conversely, where a judgment of 

conviction is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the person 

of the defendant and jurisdiction of the subject matter, such judgment 

is not void, and the cause of action merged therein becomes res

judicata as between the state and the defendant.’ 

(Emphasis added.) Harper at ¶ 21-22, quoting Perry at 178-179. 

{¶26} “Subject-matter jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court of Ohio noted,

“refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular 

class or type of case.” Harper at ¶ 23. Article IV, Section 4(B), of the Ohio 

Constitution and R.C. 2931.03 confers upon a common pleas court subject-matter 

jurisdiction over felony cases. See Harper at ¶ 24-25. And, a trial court has 

jurisdiction over any person appearing before it under a valid indictment. See Stacy 

v. Van Coren, 18 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1969); Page v. Green, 174 Ohio St. 178, 

178-179 (1963). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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{¶27} Even though Reeder entered his guilty pleas before the trial court 

rendered its decision on his motions to dismiss (i.e., “invalid indictments”) he has 

not waived this objection by pleading guilty because he is attacking the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the trial court to render convictions as opposed to defects in 

his pleas under Crim.R. 11. A defect in subject-matter jurisdiction requires 

correction whether or not it was raised in the trial court and cannot be waived 

because it goes to the heart of the trial court’s power to adjudicate a case on the 

merits. See Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241, 2008-Ohio-853, ¶ 45, quoting 

Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. Consequently, we must 

address Reeder’s second assignment of error on the merits. 

{¶28} Here, Reeder was convicted in case 0247 in Counts Three, Four, and 

Five of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), 

(C)(1)(a), all fourth degree felonies. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 58). R.C. 

2925.03 provides in its pertinent parts: 

(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: 

(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled 

substance analog; 

* * * 

(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of 

the following: 

(1) If the drug involved in the violation is any compound, mixture, 

preparation, or substance included in schedule I or schedule II, with 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-15- 

the exception of marihuana, cocaine, L.S.D., heroin, hashish, and any 

controlled substance analog, whoever violates division (A) of this 

section is guilty of aggravated trafficking in drugs. The penalty for the 

offense shall be determined as follows: 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), 

or (f) of this section, aggravated trafficking in drugs is a felony of the 

fourth degree, and division (C) of section 2929.13 of the Revised 

Code applies in determining whether to impose a prison term on the 

offender. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(a) (Sept. 14, 2016) (current version 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(1)(a) June 29, 2019). Moreover, Reeder was convicted of 

Aggravated Possession of Drugs in case 0247 in Count Eight of Aggravated 

Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), a fifth degree 

felony. (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 58). R.C. 2925.11 states in its pertinent 

parts: 

(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled 

substance or a controlled substance analog. 

 

* * * 

(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of 

the following: 

(1) If the drug involved in the violation is a compound, mixture, 

preparation, or substance included in schedule I or II, with the 

exception of marihuana, cocaine, L.S.D., heroin, hashish, and any 

controlled substance analog, whoever violates division (A) of this 

section is guilty of aggravated possession of drugs. The penalty for 

the offense shall be determined as follows: 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1)(b), (c), (d), or (e) 

of this section, aggravated possession of drugs is a felony of the fifth 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-16- 

degree, and division (B) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code

applies in determining whether to impose a prison term on the 

offender. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a) (Sept. 14, 2016) (current version 

R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a) Mar. 22, 2019). Important to this appeal, all four counts 

enumerated the Schedule I substance as “THC, a Schedule I drug”.

5

 (Case No. CR 

2019 0247, Doc. No. 1). 

{¶29} Additionally, Reeder was convicted in case 0346 of Count Four for 

Aggravated Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), a fifthdegree felony. (Case No. CR 2019 0346, Doc. No. 29). R.C. 2925.11 states in its 

relevant parts: 

(A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled 

substance or a controlled substance analog. 

* * * 

(C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of one of 

the following: 

(1) If the drug involved in the violation is a compound, mixture, 

preparation, or substance included in schedule I or II, with the

exception of marihuana, cocaine, L.S.D., heroin, any fentanyl-related 

compound, hashish, and any controlled substance analog, whoever 

violates division (A) of this section is guilty of aggravated possession 

of drugs. The penalty for the offense shall be determined as follows: 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (C)(1)(b), (c), (d), or 

(e) of this section, aggravated possession of drugs is a felony of the 

fifth degree, and division (B) of section 2929.13 of the Revised Code 

5

 The indictment contained language under Counts Three, Four, and Five that the drug (i.e., THC) was “in 

an amount less than the bulk amount.” (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 1). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-17- 

applies in determining whether to impose a prison term on the 

offender. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a) (Oct. 31, 2018) (current version R.C. 

2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a) Mar. 22, 2019). Significantly, Count Four also sets forth that 

the drug involved in this violation “is a compound, mixture, preparation, or 

substance included in Schedule I or II, to wit: THC, a Schedule I drug.” (Case No. 

CR 2019 0346, Doc. No. 1). 

{¶30} Reeder argues that THC is not a Schedule I controlled substance. 

Because the answer to this assignment of error involves a question of statutory 

interpretation, which is a question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. 

Hudson, 2013-Ohio-647, at ¶ 27, citing State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St. 3d 295, 2007-

Ohio-4163, ¶ 8. 

{¶31} R.C. 3719.01(C) defines a “‘[c]ontroled [s]ubstance’” to mean “a 

drug, compound, mixture, preparation, or substance included in schedule I, II, III, 

IV, or V.” (Emphasis added.) (Mar. 19, 2015) (current version R.C. 3719.01(C) 

Mar. 22, 2020). See State v. Naples, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011169, 2018-Ohio2562, ¶ 18, citing R.C. 3719.01(C). Moreover, R.C. 3719.01(BB) defined 

“[s]chedule I” to mean a “controlled substance schedule[] * * * established pursuant 

to section 3719.41”. (Mar. 19, 2015) (current version R.C. 3719.01(V) Mar. 22, 

2020). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

-18- 

{¶32} Since the focus of Reeder’s assignment of error is whether THC 

constitutes a Schedule I controlled substance, we direct our attention to Schedules 

of controlled substances that were in effect at the time Reeder committed his 

offenses set forth under R.C. 3719.41.6

 Under R.C. 3719.41(C), “[h]allucinogens” 

were defined as 

[a]ny material, compound, mixture, or preparation that contains any 

quantity of the following hallucinogenic substances, including their 

salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, unless specifically excepted under 

federal drug abuse control laws, whenever the existence of these salts, 

isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within the specific chemical

designation. For the purposes of this division only, “isomer” includes 

the optical isomers, position isomers, and geometric isomers. 

(Emphasis added.)7

 Indeed, “[t]etrahydrocannabinols” was listed as a 

“[h]allucinogen[]” under R.C. 3719.41(C)(27).8

 Significantly, “THC is [an 

acronym for] tetrahydrocannabinol, the principal psychoactive constituent [i.e., 

compound] of the cannabis plant.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 

603 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (6th Cir.2015), fn. 2. See also State v. Naples at ¶ 2, citing 

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. at 375, fn. 2. Moreover, THC is an active isomer

6

 Notably, R.C. 3719.41 was amended by Am.Sub. S.B. 57, 2019 Ohio Laws 13, effective March 22 2020, 

enabling the State Board of Pharmacy to adopt rules in accordance with Chapter 119 of the Ohio Revised in 

establishing five different controlled-substance schedules. R.C. 3719.41(A). Those five controlledsubstance schedules are now situated exclusively under Ohio Administrative Code Chapter 4729:9-1 titled 

Controlled Substance Schedules. See Ohio Adm.Code 4729:9-1-01-4729:9-1-05. 7

 Importantly, the language in the 2014 and 2018 versions of R.C. 3719.41(C) were analogous. Compare 

R.C. 3719.41(C) (July 10, 2014), with (Oct. 31, 2018), and (current version Ohio Adm.Code 4729:9-1-01(D) 

Oct. 19, 2020). 

8

 The 2014 and 2018 versions of R.C. 3719.41(C)(27) were also analogous. Compare R.C. 3719.41(C)(27) 

(July 10, 2014), with (Oct. 31, 2018), and (current version Ohio Adm.Code 4729:9-1-01(D)(31) Oct. 19, 

2020). 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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present in cannabis. See Bacon v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 2012 WL 3112374, 

*5 (N.D.Ohio, May 30, 2012); U.S. v. Caseer, 399 F.3d 828, 848 (6th Cir.2005) 

(noting Marijuana is the common name for “all parts of the genus Cannabis sativa 

L.” (cannabis plant); identifying THC as tetrahydrocannabinols “the main 

psychoactive substance produced naturally by the marijuana plant”; and observing 

that the compounds of these structures contain optical isomers). See also R.C. 

3719.01(L) (Mar. 19, 2015) (defining an “[i]somer” as an “optical isomer” “except 

as otherwise expressly stated”) compare with R.C. 3719.41(C) (July 10, 2014) 

(expressly including “optical isomers” as well as “position isomers” and “geometric 

isomers”) with (current version R.C. 3719.01 Mar. 22, 2020) (containing no 

definition for an isomer). 

{¶33} Because THC is a chemical compound that contains isomers and is an 

acronym for “[t]etrahydrocannabinols”, which was listed as a Schedule I controlled 

substance at the time Reeder committed his offenses, we conclude that Reeder’s 

argument that THC is not a Schedule I controlled substance is without merit. 

Moreover, because his jurisdictional argument is predicated on what we have 

concluded to be a meritless assertion, we conclude that the trial court acted with 

subject-matter jurisdiction herein. 

{¶34} Accordingly, Reeder’s second assignment of error is overruled. 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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Assignment of Error III 

Defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, causing Mr. 

Reeder’s guilty plea to be unknowing and involuntary because 

Mr. Reeder pled guilty to offenses which do not exist in Ohio law. 

Assignment of Error IV 

Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 

stipulating in a plea agreement that no counts would merge. 

{¶35} In his third and fourth assignments of error, Reeder asserts that his 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by allowing Reeder to plead 

guilty to offenses that “do not exist in Ohio law” and by stipulating at Reeder’s 

indicted acts were separate acts that do not merge for the purposes of sentencing. 

Standard of Review 

{¶36} “In criminal proceedings, a defendant has the right to effective 

assistance of counsel under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions.” State 

v. Evick, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2019-05-010, 2020-Ohio-3072, ¶ 45, citing Sixth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), and 

State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71 (1976), holding modified, State v. Cole, 2 Ohio 

St.3d 112 (1982). A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

must establish: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the 

circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. 

Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland at 687. In order to show 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must show that 

counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional 

judgment. Strickland at 689. Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all 

decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. 

Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998). Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if 

unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Frazier, 61 

Ohio St.3d 247, 255 (1991). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a 

substantial violation of counsel’s essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 

42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142 (1989). 

Analysis 

{¶37} “When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, he is making a ‘complete 

admission of [his or her] guilt.’” State v. Welly, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-37, 2016-

Ohio-863, ¶ 22, quoting Crim.R. 11(B)(1). “A criminal defendant who pleads guilty 

is limited on appeal; he [or she] may only attack the voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent nature of the plea and ‘“may not thereafter raise independent claims 

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of 

the guilty plea.”’” State v. Mata, 3d Dist. Allen 1-04-54, 2004-Ohio-6669, ¶ 12, 

quoting State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 271-272 (1992), quoting Tollett v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973). Consequently, “[a] 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless 

counsel’s conduct affected the voluntary nature of the plea.” Id. at ¶ 13. 

{¶38} Because we previously concluded in Reeder’s second assignment of 

error that Counts Three, Four, Five, and Eight (in case 0247) and Count Four (in 

case 0346) are valid criminal offenses, we will not conclude that Reeder’s trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to plead guilty 

to those offenses. As such, Reeder’s argument that his pleas were not made 

knowingly and voluntarily is overruled. 

{¶39} Next, Reeder asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel by pleading him guilty under (a negotiated plea agreement) to 

counts that should have merged, and thus were made unknowing and involuntary. 

Specifically, Reeder argues that he did not know the practical ramifications of 

merger, and hence, his plea was involuntary. (See Appellant’s Brief at 9). In our 

review of the record, Reeder received the benefit of his bargain, which included the 

dismissal of numerous specifications (in case 0247) and an amendment of Count 

One (in case 0346) that was reduced from a second-degree felony (carrying a 

mandatory prison term up to eight years) to a third-degree felony (carrying a nonmandatory prison term of up to 36 months). (Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. Nos. 

57, 58); (Case No. CR 2019 0346, Doc. No. 29); (Nov. 21, 2019 Tr. at 3-6, 11, 76-

82, 84-88, Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 91). The record is clear that the trial 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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court engaged in an extensive discussion in open court as to Reeder’s understanding 

of his nonmerger stipulation. (Nov. 21, 2019 Tr. at 19-24, Case No. CR 2019 0247, 

Doc. No. 91). Moreover, Reeder was free to reject the negotiated plea agreement at 

any point during his change-of-plea hearing. See State v. Booker, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 101886, 2015-Ohio-2515, ¶ 15. Nevertheless, after the nonmerger 

explanation by defense counsel and the trial court, Reeder acknowledged he 

understood his nonmerger stipulation, and thereafter entered his guilty pleas. (Nov. 

21, 2019 Tr. at 25, 79, Case No. CR 2019 0247, Doc. No. 91). Trial counsel noted 

at the change-of-plea hearing that the decision to enter a nonmerger stipulation 

resulted from the “global resolution” of all three cases. (Id. at 22). See State v. 

Knight, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109302, 2021-Ohio-3674, ¶ 49, 51. 

{¶40} In the instant appeal, Reeder has failed to fulfill his burden of 

demonstrating that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in light of the 

foregoing or that he has suffered prejudice in light of his plea deal. Id. at ¶ 49, citing 

State v. Wright, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103823, 2016-Ohio-5248, ¶ 11, citing State 

v. Yonkings, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98632, 2013-Ohio-1890, ¶ 8-11. 

{¶41} Accordingly, Reeder’s third and fourth assignments of error are

overruled. 
Case Nos. 1-21-08, 1-21-09 and 1-21-10 

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{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

MILLER and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jlr