IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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m 00-31057

Summary Calendar

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BRENDA MEEKINS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

ROBERT P. THOMPSON,

DIRECTOR, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE WORK PROGRAM;

LAURA PEASE,

DIRECTOR, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE WORK PROGRAM;

LAURA BECK,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, FAMILY INDEPENDENCE WORK PROGRAM,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(98-CV-2047-J)

_________________________

April 4, 2001

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, 

and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

Brenda Meekins sued, among others,

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has

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*

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determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.
2

Robert P. Thompson, Laura Pease, and Laura

Beck in their individual and official capacities

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 for

alleged civil rights violations. Asserting qualified immunity as a defense, those three

defendants appeal the denial oftheir motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Because

the district court correctly found Meekins’s

allegations sufficient to survive the motion to

dismiss, we dismiss the appeal for want of

jurisdiction.

I.

Meekinswas employed as aFamilySecurity

Program Specialist II in the Family

Independence Work Program(“FIND”) ofthe

Louisiana Department of Social Services. Her

employment was terminated, so she sued,

complaining that her termination was

retaliatory, in violation of the First Amendment.

Meekins’s original complaint sought injunctive andmonetaryrelief, naming appellants

and other officials in their official capacities

only. The defendants, claiming qualified

immunity, filed a motion seeking either

dismissal or judgment on the pleadings, or

alternatively, a more definite statement of the

claims. In response, and pursuant to Schultea

v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en

banc), the district court ordered Meekins to

submit a reply under FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a)

addressing qualified immunity.1 The court

found Meekins’s complaint, augmented by her

rule 7(a) reply, sufficient to assert a cause of

action under §§ 1981 and 1983 and denied the

motion to dismiss. 

Meekins then filed a motion to amend her

complaint to assert claims against defendants

in their individual capacities, which a

magistrate denied, whereupon Meekins filed a

separate action in the district court, asserting

the individual capacity claims. The court

consolidated the actions and dismissed the

second action without prejudice.

Before consolidation, the defendants

perfected an interlocutory appeal to this court;

we dismissed the monetary claims on the

ground of sovereign immunity, leaving intact

the claims for injunctive relief. Meekins v.

Foster, No. 99-30583, at 6-7 (5th Cir. April 3,

2000) (unpublished). We declined, however,

to rule on the individual capacity claims, because they had not been consolidated with the

original action until after the defendants had

filed their notice of appeal. Id. at 6.

On remand and after consolidation,

defendants moved for dismissal of the

individual capacity claims, and the court

dismissed the claims against all defendants

except appellants, with respect to whom the

1

Schultea established the use of a rule 7(a)

reply to resolve the inherent conflict between the

Federal Rules’ notice pleading procedures and the

substantive right of qualified immunity, which

requires that a plaintiff allege with particularity

those facts necessary to overcome a qualified immunity defense:

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1

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When a public official pleads the affirmative defense of qualified immunity in

his answer, the district court may, on the

official’s motion or on its own, require the

plaintiff to reply to that defense in detail.

By definition, the reply must be tailored to

the assertion of qualified immunity and

fairly engage its allegations.

Shultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
3

court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning

that 

after a fair reading of the Complaint as a

whole and plaintiff’s Schultea reply,

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to

state a claim for violation of her civil

rights. She alleges that she was fired because she spoke out about welfare and

welfare reform, and was critical of the

way the state handled welfare reform.

II.

Although the denial of a motion to dismiss

is normally not appealable, we review de novo

the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds; such a denial is considered

an appealable collateral order when rendered

on an issue of law. Shipp v. McMahon, 234

F.3d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 2000), petition for

cert. filed (U.S. Mar 5, 2001) (No. 00-1392).

We do not have jurisdiction in this posture to

review the evidentiary sufficiency of the allegations, however. Steadman v. Tex. Rangers,

179 F.3d 360, 365 (5thCir. 1999) (stating that

we have jurisdiction to review only “legal” issues under the collateral order doctrine and

noting that “[a]n order is not ‘legal’ where it

resolves a fact-related dispute of ‘evidence

sufficiency.’”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115

(2000). 

A motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) “is

viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.”

Shipp, 234 F.3d at 910 (quoting Kaiser

Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Avondale

Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.

1986)). Surviving a motion to dismiss is

generally not a high hurdle for a plaintiff: We

liberally construe the complaint in favor of the

plaintiff, and we take as true all facts in the

complaint; a motion to dismiss should not be

granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of his claimwhichwould entitle himto

relief.” Anderson v. Pasadena Indep. Sch.

Dist., 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42

F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995)).

With respect to claims against which

qualified immunity can be a defense, however,

we require a heightened standard of pleading,

whereby the plaintiff must allege specific

conduct giving rise to a constitutional

violation. Id. Such allegation “must be

pleaded with factual detail and particularity,

not mere conclusionary allegations.” Jackson

v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 715-16 (5th Cir.

1996)(quotationmarks omitted). Specifically,

“the plaintiff must identify defendants who

were either personally involved in the

constitutional violation or whose acts are

causally connected to the constitutional

violation alleged.” Woods v. Edwards, 51

F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995). In addition, the

plaintiff must allege a violation of a “clearly

established constitutional right.” Shipp, 234

F.3d at 911.2

A plaintiff who states a First Amendment

claim sufficiently alleges the violation of a

clearly established right. Kennedy, 224 F.3d at

377. The plaintiff must establish that the

asserted protected speech addressed a matter

of public concern; if he does so, “the court

2

If a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to show

that the defendants violated a clearly established

right, the court must inquire “whether the

defendants’ conduct was objectively reasonable in

light of ‘clearly established’ law at the time of the

alleged violation.” Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish

Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 377 (5th

Cir. 2000). Appellants, however, contend only that

Meekins has failed to show that they violated a

clearly established right, so the second stage of the

inquiry is not before us.
4

must strike ‘a balance between the interests of

the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting

upon matters of public concern [against] the

interest of the State, as an employer, in

promoting the efficiency of the public services

it performs through its employees.’” Click v.

Copeland, 970 F.2d 106, 111 (5th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.

563, 568 (1968)).

Appellants contend that they fired Meekins

for insubordination and inappropriate contact

with Southern University of New Orleans

(“SUNO”) and other potential contractors under the FIND program. Meekins disagrees

with the characterization of her contact with

SUNO, contending that her relationship with

it constituted protected activity under the First

Amendment, because she participated “in public speech on issues of welfare reform and

welfare related matters at [SUNO] . . . .”

Moreover, Meekins contendsinher complaint,

the true reason for her dismissal was her

refusal to participate inSSand, more

importantly, disclosure ofSSthe misconduct of

Appellants, the managers of the FIND

program: “Thompson, Pease, and Beck have

conspired to unlawfully terminated [sic] plaintifffromher position because she exercise [sic]

rights protected bythe First Amendment to the

United States Constitution and because she

has been a whistleblower and has complained

of illegal practices of the Department’s Office

of Family Support Orleans Region.”

Appellants argue that Meekins’s claims allege facts insufficient to overcome the

qualified immunity defense. Specifically, they

argue, Meekins has shown neither that she engaged in a protected activity nor that her interest in pursuing that activity outweighs the

government’s interest, as required by Pickering. Meekins, however, has alleged, inter

alia, that she was fired in retaliation for

revealing the misconduct of the officialsin the

FIND program.3 In her rule 7(a) reply, she

sets forth many specific allegations of

misconduct and alleged attemptsto report that

misconduct to higher officials, to buttress her

claim of whistleblower retaliation. 

A public employee has “a clearly

established right to speak on matters of public

concern, on matters of public safety, and on

matters of officialmisconduct.” Kennedy, 224

F.3d at 376 (citations omitted) (compiling

cases). Likewise, allegations of corruption, if

true, “are matters of public concern and

outweigh the government’sinterest in efficiency.” Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150,

157 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 52

(2000). 

Although Breaux focused on the objective

truth of the plaintiff’s allegations in finding

that they were matters of public concern, that

case was decided after a jury trial. In the

context of a motion to dismiss, we must accept

as true Meekins’s allegations of misconduct.

Thus, her claims not only allege speech on a

matter of public concern; they also, at least for

purposes of the motion to dismiss, establish by

their nature that Meekins’s interest outweighs

the government’s. Meekins also has alleged

that all three appellants were intimately

involved both in the purported misconduct and

in her allegedly improper termination, meeting

the requirement that the named defendants be

somehow causally connected to the alleged

constitutional violation. 

3 We need not address whether Meekins’s other

alleged protected speechSSher discussions of

welfare reform at SUNOSSrelated to a matter of

public concern, becausewe find that her allegations

of whistleblower retaliation are sufficient. 
5

Meekinstherefore allegessufficient factsto

survive the motion to dismiss. On remand, the

district court may find that Meekins’s allegations ofmisconduct and retaliationhave no

evidentiary support; we have no jurisdiction,

however, to address that issue now. We may

reverse the order only if Meekins did not

allege facts that, if true, would defeat a

qualified immunity defense. She has done so,

and we therefore are without jurisdiction to

entertain this appeal. 

DISMISSED.