In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-3379 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

TRAVIS LEE BEECHLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:20-cr-00211-JPH-MJD-1 — James P. Hanlon, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 6, 2022 — DECIDED MAY 19, 2023 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, HAMILTON, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Travis Beechler of 

drug trafficking and firearms offenses based on evidence 

gathered pursuant to a home detention compliance check. 

Beechler alleged that the search was an unlawful warrantless 

law enforcement search disguised as a home detention compliance check, and thus violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, Beechler’s 

expectation of privacy was minimal, and the government’s 
2 No. 21-3379 

legitimate needs were significant; therefore, we agree with the 

district court that the search did not violate his Fourth 

Amendment rights. We also affirm the district court’s denial 

of Beechler’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and for a new 

trial and affirm the district court’s sentencing decision.

I.

In August 2020, Travis Beechler and his girlfriend, Kimia 

Turner, were both serving terms of home confinement 

through Marion County Community Corrections (MCCC) 

and were required to stay within their residences. Turner reported her residence as 2041 East Legrande Avenue, in Indianapolis, Indiana, and Beechler reported his elsewhere. At the 

same time that Beechler and Turner were serving their home 

confinement sentences, the FBI Safe Streets Gang Task Force 

was engaged in a wiretap investigation involving several individuals distributing controlled substances in Indianapolis. 

The agents discovered that a target of the investigation expected a shipment of marijuana to arrive at Turner’s residence 

at 2041 East Legrande Avenue. During their surveillance of 

the house, the FBI agents noticed a man with an ankle monitor 

and reported to MCCC that it suspected that one of the occupants was on home confinement and might be engaged in 

drug trafficking activity. Based on this report, MCCC employees surmised that Beechler was not staying at his reported address but was instead staying with Turner at 2041 East 

Legrande. On August 3, 2020, an employee from MCCC, accompanied by officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department (IMPD), went to Turner’s address to check 

compliance with residency requirements and other terms of 

the home detention contract. While there, MCCC officers encountered both Turner and Beechler and discovered 
No. 21-3379 3

methamphetamine in the bedroom in which they were staying. Officers then stopped the search and obtained a search 

warrant for the residence. During that search they seized five 

firearms, ammunition, and additional evidence of drug trafficking, including 388.4 grams of methamphetamine, 10.6 

grams of heroin, and $1,508 in cash. Beechler was charged 

with possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a previously 

convicted felon. 

After officers took Beechler into custody and read him his 

Miranda rights, he agreed to an interview in which he 

acknowledged that he stored the drugs at the home for another person in exchange for free rent, that he had the ability 

to sell pounds of methamphetamine at a time, that others often fronted him up to five pounds of methamphetamine, and 

that he tried to make at least a thousand dollars for each 

pound of methamphetamine sold. He also acknowledged the 

guns in the home, admitted that he knew they were loaded, 

and said that they were there to protect the drugs for which 

he was responsible. 

Before trial, Beechler filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the compliance check, claiming that although law enforcement labeled the search as a community 

corrections compliance check, the officers actually conducted 

the search for law enforcement purposes and thus the warrantless search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The 

district court denied Beechler’s motion to suppress, finding 

that Beechler waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of MCCC’s Home Detention agreement. That agreement contained the following provision: 
4 No. 21-3379 

You waive your rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, 

as well as Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana 

Constitution, regarding search and seizure of 

your person or effects. Furthermore, you shall 

permit law enforcement, MCCC staff, and/or 

their contracted vendor, as well as any law enforcement officer acting on MCCC’s behalf, to 

search your person, residence, motor vehicle, or 

any location where your personal property may 

be found, to insure [sic] compliance with the requirements of MCCC or their contracted vendor.

R. 46-3 at 1. 

After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Beechler on all 

counts. Beechler moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new 

trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

convictions. The district court denied Beechler’s post-trial 

motions, reasoning that they merely restated his suppression 

arguments rather than contesting the sufficiency of the evidence at trial.

At sentencing, the district court, over Beechler’s objections, applied four different sentencing enhancements: the 

“manager or supervisor” enhancement, the “drug premises” 

enhancement, an enhancement for having five firearms, and 

the “career offender” enhancement. The district court sentenced Beechler to a total of 360 months in prison—below the 

bottom end of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range 

of 420 months. 
No. 21-3379 5

On appeal, Beechler challenges the district court’s denial 

of his motion to suppress, the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, the denial of his motion for a new trial, and 

the district court’s application of various sentencing enhancements. 

II.

A.

Beechler contends that the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress primarily because it failed to view 

the search for what it was—a warrantless, non-consensual 

search. In considering a district court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress, we review questions of law de novo and findings of 

fact for clear error. United States v. Radford, 39 F.4th 377, 383 

(7th Cir. 2022). 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Where a search 

is found to be unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence recovered from the illegal search at trial. Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 

232, 237 (2016). A court assesses the reasonableness of a search 

by looking at the totality of the circumstances, including “by 

assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes 

upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 

which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–

19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300

(1999)); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); see also

United States v. White, 781 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2015). When 

assessing the privacy expectations of a person subject to a correctional system, salient factors include the level of 
6 No. 21-3379 

punishment or supervision to which the individual has been 

subjected, whether the individual has agreed to waive some 

or all Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for more freedom within the correctional system, and expectations of privacy formed pursuant to state law. See United States v. Woods, 

16 F.4th 529, 535–37 (7th Cir. 2021). On the other side of the 

scale, a court must consider the government’s interest in protecting the public, reducing recidivism, and promoting reintegration into society. Samson, 547 U.S. at 849–50. 

Beechler’s status as a person serving a sentence of home 

confinement informs both sides of the balance as a court assesses “the intru[sion] on individual liberty and the degree to 

which it promotes legitimate governmental interests.” 

Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. When the Supreme Court weighed 

the privacy expectations of the probationer in Knights, it considered that punishment exists on a continuum from probation to solitary confinement, with inversely proportional expectations of privacy. Id.; see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 

868, 874 (1987) (noting that expectations of privacy correspond to the “continuum of possible punishments ranging 

from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a 

few hours of mandatory community service,” with work-release programs in the middle). It then noted that probation 

significantly diminishes a person’s expectation of privacy and 

increases the governmental interest in preventing recidivism 

such that government officials need no more than a reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of a probationer’s house. Id.

at 119–21. Then, in Samson, the Court went one step further 

while considering the privacy rights of a parolee and concluded that “a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
No. 21-3379 7

that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer 

would not offend the Fourth Amendment.” 547 U.S. at 847. 

Like Samson, Beechler had severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of his status as a person on home 

confinement subject to the strict conditions for participation 

in the program. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (“The extent and 

reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that parolees 

like petitioner have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status alone.”). Beechler was part of a 

post-conviction monitoring program that allowed convicted 

individuals to serve out their sentence at home with the use 

of an electronic monitoring system in what is essentially “an 

established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals.” Id. at 850 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 

(1972) (“The essence of parole is release from prison, before 

the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner 

abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.”)). 

Beechler’s status on home confinement, like Samson’s status 

as a parolee, significantly diminished his expectations of privacy. See Id. at 852. 

People on home confinement or parole have lowered expectations of privacy, not merely because of their status but 

also because the government usually extends the benefits of 

additional freedom in exchange for an agreement to comply 

with certain requirements. Id. at 850; see also Pennsylvania Bd. 

of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998). In both 

Knights and Samson, the prisoners, like Beechler, signed waivers of virtually all of their Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for particular conditions of release. Knights, 534 U.S. 
8 No. 21-3379 

at 114; Samson, 547 U.S. at 846.1 Neither opinion, however, relied exclusively on the acceptance of the search condition in 

the agreement signed by the prisoner in its determination of 

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. See Knights, 

534 U.S. at 118 (“We need not decide whether Knights’ acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the 

Schneckloth sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights, however, because we conclude that the search of 

Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach of ‘examining the totality of the circumstances,’ with the probation search condition being a salient 

circumstance.”) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 

(1996)); Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n.3 (quoting Knights for this 

same proposition). However, as the Court in Knights pointed 

out, the fact that a parolee signed an agreement waiving 

Fourth Amendment rights is certainly a “salient circumstance” in the examination of the totality of the circumstances. 

Knights, 534 U.S. at 118. 

The agreement Beechler signed weighs heavily into the totality of the circumstances analysis, as that agreement contained clear and significant restrictions on Beechler’s liberty—

requiring him to be confined to the inside of his home at all 

times except for work, medical appointments, and a select few 

1 Samson agreed in writing, as required by California law, that he 

could be “subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace 

officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant 

and with or without cause.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (citing Cal. Penal Code 

Ann. §3067(a)). Knights signed a probation agreement that required him 

to “[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal 

effects, to search at anytime, [sic] with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 114. 
No. 21-3379 9

other approved activities; restricting where he could live and 

work; prohibiting the possession and use of alcohol and nonprescription drugs (including possession by others in the 

home); prohibiting the purchase and possession of firearms; 

and many other very restrictive limitations on his liberty. See

R. 46-3. Most importantly, it contained an absolute waiver of 

Fourth Amendment rights. It did not limit Beechler’s consent 

to searches based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

Cf. United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739, 744, 750 (2022) (upholding warrantless search of parolee even where parole agreement required “reasonable cause to believe that the parolee is 

violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition to 

remaining on parole”). 

Beechler unambiguously waived his rights under the 

Fourth Amendment. The waiver “clearly expressed the search 

condition” and “unambiguously informed” Beechler of it.

Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. And the compliance check fell 

“squarely within the terms of the conditions of” Beechler’s 

home detention contract—to check for violations of residency 

requirements, state and federal law, and other required conditions. See White, 781 F.3d at 864. In sum, Beechler’s reasonable expectations of privacy were significantly diminished 

both by his status on home confinement and the agreement 

he made to participate in the program. 

Finally, because assessing an individual’s liberty interest 

“turns in large part on the extent of [the defendant’s] legitimate expectations of privacy,” the reasonableness analysis 

also “is shaped” by whether state law governing the terms of 

the home detention contract authorized the search condition. 

White, 781 F.3d at 861. Under Indiana law, “[a] probationer or 

community corrections participant may, pursuant to a valid 
10 No. 21-3379 

search condition or advance consent, authorize a warrantless 

premises search without reasonable suspicion.” State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 780 (Ind. 2015). 

As for the government’s interest, given the fact that Beechler was serving his sentence within the confines of his home, 

the state had an interest in supervising him to ensure compliance with the terms of his agreement, to prevent recidivism, 

protect the public from further criminal activity, and to monitor his reentry into society. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120–21; 

Price, 28 F.4th at 749. The government’s interest grew significantly as soon as it learned that Beechler might be committing 

drug crimes and skirting residency requirements. Preventing 

Beechler from being involved in illegal activity and monitoring his location were, after all, the very purpose for the home 

confinement agreement. 

Beechler does not challenge the waiver as ambiguous or

not express, nor does he deny its legality under Indiana law. 

Instead, he invites the court to apply the “stalking horse” theory (although he does not name it as such), based on the 

premise that “when a parole or probationary search operates 

as ‘a subterfuge for a criminal investigation’ to evade the 

Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements, such searches ‘violate[] the Fourth Amendment.’” 

Price, 28 F.4th at 750 (quoting United States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 

964, 967 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, we have made clear that 

when the rationale for a search relies on the ordinary, totality

of the circumstances Fourth Amendment analysis, as it does 

here, there is no basis for examining the official purpose of the 

search and thus “the stalking horse theory has no application.” Price, 28 F.4th at 752; see also Whren v. United States, 517 

U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in 
No. 21-3379 11

ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). The 

MCCC and IMPD officers’ motivations for initiating the compliance check are simply “irrelevant.” Price, 28 F.4th at 752. 

Given Beechler’s exceptionally low expectation of privacy 

and the government’s strong interest in his compliance with 

the terms of his home confinement, the totality of the circumstances test dictates that the search was reasonable within the 

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s denial of Beechler’s motion to suppress. 

B.

Beechler also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for a 

new trial because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of 

law. “[W]e review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine only whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Stewart, 902 F.3d 

664, 679 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Webster, 775 F.3d 

897, 904–05 (7th Cir. 2015)). “Great deference is afforded to 

jury verdicts,” United States v. Maldonado, 893 F.3d 480, 484 

(7th Cir. 2018), and thus, we will overturn a jury verdict for 

insufficiency of the evidence only if the record is “devoid of 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Stevenson, 680 F.3d 

854, 856 (7th Cir. 2012). This is a “nearly insurmountable burden.” Maldonado, 893 F.3d at 484. 

Beechler’s sufficiency of the evidence argument depends 

on this court finding that the motion to suppress the evidence 

should have been granted. Beechler argues that if his motion 
12 No. 21-3379 

to suppress had been granted, the government would not 

have been able to prove all of the essential elements required

to support a finding of guilt. Having determined that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress, however, 

we can consider this evidence in assessing the jury’s verdict. 

The government presented more than sufficient evidence 

of Beechler’s guilt to support the jury’s verdict on all counts. 

The evidence presented at trial was overwhelming. The jury 

heard Beechler’s recorded interview in which he admitted to 

selling large quantities of drugs, aiming to make at least one 

thousand dollars for every pound of drugs he sold. Police 

seized 404.6 grams of a mixture or substance of methamphetamine from the home where Beechler was residing, and 

Beechler admitted that he was holding the drugs at the home 

for someone else in exchange for lodging. In addition to the 

drugs, police seized five firearms from the home whichBeechler acknowledged he possessed to protect the drugs in the 

home. Additionally, the jury heard evidence of drug dealing 

and gun possession in the texts found on Beechler’s phone. 

This is more than sufficient evidence to allow the jury’s verdict to stand. 

C.

Beechler next contends that the district court committed 

reversible error by applying four different enhancements during sentencing, including enhancements for being a “manager 

or supervisor,” for “maintaining a premises for the purpose 

of distributing controlled substances,” for possessing five firearms, and the “career offender” enhancement. We review for 

clear error only the district court’s findings of fact when applying a sentencing enhancement and accord “great deference” to those findings. United States v. Lundberg, 990 F.3d 
No. 21-3379 13

1087, 1097 (7th Cir. 2021). A district court’s factual findings at 

sentencing need only be supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. United States v. Galvan, 44 F.4th 1008, 1012 (7th Cir. 

2022). We reverse a district court’s application of a sentencing 

enhancement “only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Lovies, 

16 F.4th 493, 504 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. House, 

883 F.3d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 2018)). Although the Sentencing 

Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, a district court 

should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (“[T]he Guidelines should be the starting 

point and the initial benchmark. The Guidelines are not the 

only consideration, however.”). The district court must then 

consider the arguments of the parties and the factors set forth 

in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). Id. at 49–50. 

The district court did not commit reversible error in applying the “manager or supervisor” sentencing enhancement 

to Beechler. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c), “[i]f the defendant 

was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor,” the offense 

level increases by two. U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c); U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(c) 

cmt. 2. A manager or supervisor in a criminal organization 

under §3B1.1 is “straightforwardly understood as simply 

someone who helps manage or supervise a criminal scheme.” 

House, 883 F.3d at 724. To apply the enhancement, a court 

need only find that the defendant directed at least one other 

person. United States v. Hernandez, 309 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 

2002). In applying this enhancement, the district court concluded that the evidence established that Beechler “was a substantial drug operator and not merely a menial.” R. 140 at 10. 

The district court found that Beechler “was personally involved in the redistribution of substantial quantities of 
14 No. 21-3379 

drugs,” and played a “leadership role” on at least one occasion when he “directed his cousin to make a drug delivery.” 

Id. These factual findings were not clearly erroneous, so we 

uphold the district court’s application of the “manager or supervisor” enhancement to Beechler.

Likewise, ample evidence supported the district court’s 

application of the “drug premises” sentencing enhancement. 

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12), “if the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” the offense level increases by 

two. U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12). Maintaining a drug premises entails “own[ing] or rent[ing] [the] premises, or exercis[ing] control over them, and for a sustained period of time, us[ing] 

those premises to manufacture, store, or sell drugs, or direct[ing] others to those premises to obtain drugs.” United 

States v. Ford, 22 F.4th 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting United 

States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 591 (7th Cir. 2008)).To exercise 

the requisite control, “the defendant does not necessarily 

need to have owned or rented the premises,” so long as he 

was more than a “casual visitor.” Id. A defendant maintains 

the premises for purposes of this enhancement even if others 

also have control of the premises. Id. Manufacturing or distributing controlled substances “need not be the sole purpose” for maintaining the premises but must be one of the defendant’s “primary or principal uses for the premises.” 

U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 cmt. n.17. In making a primary purpose determination, the court should consider the frequency with 

which the premises were used by the defendant for manufacturing or distributing controlled substances versus for lawful 

purposes. Id. 
No. 21-3379 15

The district court found that Beechler stored large quantities of drugs meant for later sale, and that “he was given free 

lodging in exchange for safeguarding the drugs.” R. 140 at 16. 

Thus, there can be no doubt that he exercised control over the 

premises, for a sustained period of time, and that he used 

those premises to store drugs intended for later sale. See Ford, 

22 F.4th at 694. Indeed, but for his agreement to safeguard the 

drugs, he would not have been staying at the house. We see 

no error in the district court’s application of the drug premises 

enhancement. 

The district court did not commit reversible error in applying an enhancement for having five firearms to Beechler. 

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1)(A), if the offense involved 

more than two but less than eight firearms, the defendant’s 

offense level increases by two. U.S.S.G. §2K2.1(b)(1)(A). “To 

determine which guns, if any, should be considered ‘involved 

in’ the defendant’s offense, sentencing courts apply the definition of ‘relevant conduct’ in U.S.S.G. §1B1.3.” United States 

v. Burnett, 37 F.4th 1235, 1238 (7th Cir. 2022). These provisions—§2K2.1 and §1B1.3—read together, instruct a district 

court to apply the enhancement if the firearms were “involved in the same course of conduct or common scheme or 

plan as the offense of conviction.” Id. at 1238–39 (citing

U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(2)). “That total includes not only the specific gun or guns which the defendant was convicted of possessing, but any firearm the possession of which qualifies as 

relevant conduct.” United States v. Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690, 694 

(7th Cir. 2013). 

The district court found ample evidence to conclude that 

all the guns were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, as the district court pointed out at 
16 No. 21-3379 

sentencing. R. 140 at 16 (noting that a “large quantity of drugs 

... [was] being stored at the residence ... [Beechler] was given 

free lodging in exchange for safeguarding the drugs ... and 

the guns ... were located there as well”). This included even 

those guns that were stored in other parts of the house. Beechler admitted that he personally possessed the guns and

acknowledged that the guns were at the home to protect the 

drugs. R. 119-2 at 13–14. All of the guns, therefore, were part 

of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, and 

the district court properly applied an enhancement for the 

five firearms Beechler possessed. 

Beechler’s final enhancement argument alleges that the 

district court erred in applying the career offender enhancement, but Beechler waived this argument by failing to 

properly develop it on appeal. United States v. Lanzotti, 205 

F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped 

arguments ... are waived.”).2 In his appellate brief, Beechler 

merely incorporated by reference the objections that he made 

below to the application of the career offender enhancement. 

(Beechler Brief at 29). (“Beechler timely objected to the career 

criminal determination ... Beechler continued his objection in 

his supplemental briefing and hereby incorporates the same as if 

fully set forth herein.”). However, “[t]he incorporation of arguments by reference in an appellate brief is forbidden.” Norfleet 

2 The government contends that all of Beechler’s sentencing enhancement challenges suffer from underdevelopment and incorporation by reference and are thus waived on appeal. (Government Brief at 24). We have 

given Beechler the benefit of the doubt despite under-developed arguments as to the other sentencing enhancements, but because Beechler only 

incorporated by reference his argument regarding the career criminal enhancement, we must consider it to be waived. 
No. 21-3379 17

v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2012). “It is not this 

court’s responsibility to research and construct the parties’ arguments.” Lanzotti, 205 F.3d at 957 (7th Cir. 2000). 

Even if Beechler had preserved this argument, the claim 

still fails. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, a defendant is a career 

offender if “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old 

at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of 

conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that 

is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; 

and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions 

of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. §4B1.1. Beechler contends that the prior felony conviction that the district court used to apply this enhancement does not qualify because he committed this felony 

when he was seventeen years old, and the case was improperly waived into adult court. A defendant cannot attack the 

validity of the previous state conviction used to enhance his 

federal court sentence unless it was obtained in a proceeding 

where the defendant was denied his right to counsel. Harris v. 

United States, 13 F.4th 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Custis v. 

United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496–97 (1994)). 

Finally, even if Beechler were correct that the facts do not 

support the conclusion that these sentencing enhancements 

apply to him, we would still affirm his sentence because any 

error in applying these enhancements would be harmless. 

“Any error in calculating a total offense level is harmless 

when the district court makes clear that—considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)—it would have imposed the same sentence even if we were to conclude it had 

incorrectly calculated the Guidelines range.” Lovies, 16 F.4th 

at 508. The district court confirmed that it would have 
18 No. 21-3379 

imposed the same sentence even if the enhancements did not 

apply. R. 140 at 42 (“[I] have fashioned a sentence that I believe is the one that I would choose, weighing all of the 

§3553(a) factors, regardless of the application of any one of the 

particular guideline provisions that were challenged.”). 

Therefore, any remand to the district court for it to impose the 

same sentence would be “pointless.” See United States v. Jett, 

982 F.3d 1072, 1079 (7th Cir. 2020). 

In addressing Beechler’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing decision, we 

look only at whether the district court abused its discretion. 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A sentence within or below the Guidelines 

range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Beechler’s sentence of 360 months was well below the bottom 

end of the Guideline recommendation of 420 months. R. 140 

at 43–44. 

To rebut this presumption, Beechler contends that his below-Guidelines sentence failed to adequately reflect the required §3553 factors. Section 3553(a) sets forth factors that the 

court should consider in imposing a sentence that is sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary, instructing the court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. 

§3553(a)(1). Beechler argues that consideration of §3553(a)(1) 

warrants a below-Guidelines sentence in his case because he 

has positive relationships in his life, a dependent who will be 

detrimentally impacted by his prolonged incarceration, and 

has a history of extensive reliance on illegal drugs which 

causes him to be untruthful and make bad decisions. 
No. 21-3379 19

Beechler also argues that consideration of §3553(a)(6) warrants a below-Guidelines sentence in his case because his sentence was harsher than that of similarly situated offenders, 

contrary to §3553’s instruction to consider “the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[.]” 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6). Beechler, however, does not cite 

any sentencing decisions involving similarly situated persons 

to support this proposition. 

The district court thoroughly discussed the §3553(a) factors it considered in determining Beechler’s sentence. R. 140 

at 37–44. The court balanced Beechler’s criminal history of violence, drugs, and guns, and the seriousness of his offense 

against his youthfulness, drug dependence, and potential for 

rehabilitation. Id. An appeal is not an occasion to secondguess a district court’s weighing of the §3553(a) factors, particularly when a defendant receives a below-Guidelines sentence. United States v. De La Torre, 940 F.3d 938, 954 (7th Cir. 

2019). The sentence the district court imposed was reasonable 

and well within the court’s discretion. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Beechler’s convictions and sentence.