NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________ No. 15

- 3468

____________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. ROBERT G. WRAY, a/k/a Robert Mac Wray, a/k/a Robert

- George Wray, a/k/a Robert

- George Wray of the Christ Clan a/k/a Robert

- George of the Wray Clan, a/k/a Robert Wray, a/k/a Robert George Robert G. Wray,

Appellant

____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ( E .D. Pa . No. 2

- 14

- cr - 00504

- 001 ) District Judge: Honorable Jeffr e y L. Schmehl

____________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a)

November 4 , 2016 Before: CHAGARES , HARDIMAN , and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

.

(Filed: November 4, 2016 )

____________ OPINION *

_ ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge

. Robert Wray appeals his judgm ent of conviction for wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, failure to appear, and conspiracy to defraud the United States following a jury trial. Wray claims the District Court erred in admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. W e will affirm.
I Wray’ s conviction was brought about by his association with Dennis Fluck, a medical doctor who defaulted on loans he received from the U.S. Department of Health and Hum an Services in the 1980s. After obtaining a judgment against Fluck, HHS was unable to collect its debt for many years because it could not locate Fluck, who had changed his name to Dennis Erik Von Kiel

. In 2007, HHS finally located Fluck and attempted to g arnish his wages. Soon after HHS filed a writ of garnishment in federal court indi cating that “Von Kiel” owed $182, 365.96, outside counsel to Fluck’s employer received a letter from “Rob ert m ac Wray, Attorney

- at

- lawe” claiming tha t Fluck’s wages were bein g illegally garnished by the “United States Federal Corporation’s Justice Department ” and that those wages actually belong “ to the Church. ” App

. 199

– 202. Wray also filed dozens of documents in HHS’ s federal civil suit against Fluck

— all of which were signed by “Robert mac Wray ” and many of which designated Wray as “attorney at lawe.” Though3

HHS prevailed in that case in April 2010, Fluck quickly filed for bankruptcy to stay all debt collection efforts. Wray’s efforts on behalf of Fluck continued as he f ile d numerous documents with the bankruptcy court and even listed himself as a co

- plaintiff on one of Fluck’s claims.
After the bankruptcy judge dismissed Wray from the proceedings , Wray changed his nom de plume from Robert mac Wray to “ Robert: Wray ” and cont inued filing fraudulent documents . One such document

— the “Bill of Exchange”

— stated: “ Standing in Honor, I Robert, Trustee of the charged defendant remit to the Internal Revenue Service a Bill of Exchange in settlement of this Public debt, extinguishing it from the Public Record.” App. 503

. During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings, Wray also helped Fluck avoid federal taxes. When Fluck was first hired by his employer in 2005, he indicated on IRS forms that he was a “trus t” exempt from federal tax es instead of an individual

. As a result of this ruse, Fluck neither paid income taxes nor filed tax returns despite the fact that his annual wages often exceeded $200,00 0 between 2005 and 2013 . Wray entered this scheme in 2011. The basic arrangement was t his: Fluck told his employer to send his
wages to a Utah bank account belonging to a sham religious entity for which Wray was the signatory, then Wray would tra nsfer those same funds, minus a fee of some $240 , back to an account in Pennsylvania belonging t o a second sham religious entity for which4

Fluck was the sole trustee. Wray participated in this scheme from February 2011 until October 4, 2013. Wray was charged with wire fraud and bankruptcy fraud in 2014

. P rior to trial, the G overnment filed a motion in limine expressing its intent to offer the testimony of Victor Balletta and Michael Reis pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence

. The crux of the Government’s proffer was that Balletta would testify that Wray knew that Fluck was not pay ing taxes and Reis would testify that Wray had authored documents similar to those he had created for Fluck. Wray opposed their testimony as impermissible character evidence

. The G overnment countered that the testimony would establish Wray’s knowledge, int ent, modus operandi, and identity. After a hearing, the District Court granted the G overnment’s motion. Wray now appeals this decision.
II 1 We review the District Court’ s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Caldwell , 760 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2014). Rule 404(b) (1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. ” But such evi dence can be admitted “ for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because Wray was charged with federal crimes. W e have jurisdiction 

### over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. ” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
And the evidence must be: “ (1) offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b)(2); (2) relevant to that purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under the Rule 403 balancing requirement; and (4) accompanied by a limiting instruction, if requested. ” United States v.
Steiner , 815 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2016). We shall appl y these legal precepts to determine the admissibility of the trial testimony of Balletta and Reis.
A Balletta testified that Fluck introdu ced him to Wray so that Wray could assist Balletta’s struggling business

. Over the course of several phone conversat ions, Wray advised Balletta about becoming a sovereign citizen , i.e. , one who was allowed “ legally
not to pay income tax

. ” App. 616. Wray also told Balletta that Fluck was a sovereign citizen and “wasn’t paying any taxes.” Id

. Wray argues that this testi mony was not relevant to a material fact at issue. Specifically, he contends that “knowledge that [Fluck] was not paying taxes is not relevant to demonstrate that [Wray] participated and assisted [Fluck] .” Wray Br. 1 4

. Wray mistakenly conflates relevance w ith guilt. Although Balletta’s testimony does not prove Wray’s guilt, as the Advisory Committee has explained , “a brick is not a wall.” Fed. R. Evid. 401 (advisory committee notes); see also id. (explaining that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable). Ba l letta’s testimony made it more likely that Wray knew of Fluck’s sc heme to avoid taxes and6

assist ed him. And it tended to weaken Wray’s claim that “he had no knowledge of the purpose of why [Fluck] ha d set up this two

- step plan.” App. 48

. Accordingly, Balletta’s testimony was relevant

. B Reis testified that Wray helped him perform a “name restoration.” App. 630. According to Wray, if Reis changed his name from capital to lower

- case letters and inserte d a colon between his surname and given name , Reis would be “protecting [his] name from any lawsuits.” App. 631. In addition to Reis’s testimony, the G overnment introduced several documents Wray created to perform this “name restoration.” Those documents b ore many of the same hallmarks as the “ Bill of Exchange ” and the other fraudulent documents submitted during Fluck’ s bankruptcy proceeding. For example, b oth sets o f documents included names separated by a colon (“Robert: Wray” and

“ Michael John: Reis”) an d the peculiar misspelling of “lawe.” App. 633

– 34; Supp. App. 240

– 41. Wray argues that because he did not perform these same “name restoration” services for Fluck, Reis’ s testimony “did not make it more probable that [Wray] engaged in unlawful activiti es to assist [ Fluck ] in avoiding paying income taxes or filing false documents with the bankruptcy court.” Wray Br . 15. We disagree. Wray’s argument ignores a key function of Reis’ s testimony : proving Wray’s identity as the aut hor of the “Bill of Exchange .” App. 49. Given the similarities between7

the documents, Reis ’ s testimony regarding Wray’s handiwork on t he “name restoration” documents makes it more likely that Wray authored the “ Bill of Exchange .” For that reason, Reis’s testimony was relevant.
C
H aving explained the relevance of Ballett a ’s and Reis’s testimony, we turn to Wray’s argument that it should have been excluded in any event. According to Wray, “any potential probative value of [the challenged testimony] was outweighed by its prejudicial e ffect under Rule 403.” Wray Br . 15 . In support of this argument, Wray merely rehashes his claim that the testimony was not relevant. We have already explained why that argument is incorrect. See
supra Part (II)(A )

– ( B ). Moreover, the District Court instruct ed the jurors as to the limited purposes for which they were to consider the evidence. See United States v. Gaev , 24 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir. 1994) ( explaining that we have in many cases found that “p roper limiting instructions from the court cured the possi ble prejudice to the defendant ” (citations omitted)). Without more, Wray falls far short of showing that the District Court abused its discretion when it granted the Government’s motion in limine

. * * * For the reasons stated, we will affirm the Distri ct Court’s judgment

.