Page 1 of 10

Tagged Opinion for Print Reporter

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

In re:

 Case No. 21-13557-PDR

Suzanne L. Roach,

 Chapter 13

 Debtor. 

 / 

ORDER OVERRULING DEBTOR’S OBJECTION TO CLAIM

Debtor Suzanne L. Roach filed her Chapter 13 petition on April 15, 2021.0F

1 On 

June 23, 2021, the Debtor’s children, Russell Everett Conn and Katrina Lee Conn

(the “Children”), filed Claim 8-1, alleging a $28,875.85 debt arising from a state court 

judgment for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty against the Debtor that 

granted actual damages and attorneys’ fees, but did not determine the amount of 

either.1F

2

1 (Doc. 1).

 

2 (Doc. 1).

Peter D. Russin, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court

_____________________________________________________________________________

ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on August 16, 2022.

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 1 of 10
Page 2 of 10

Under Local Rule 2083-1(B)(1)(c), 

[n]ot later than 21 days after expiration of the claims bar date, [counsel 

for the debtor] shall examine, from records maintained by the clerk, the 

claims register and all claims filed in the case to determine whether 

additional action is necessary, including the filing and service in 

accordance with all applicable rules of . . . (c) objections to 

nonconforming claims.

The Court created a local form, the “LF-76”, for submission of these certifications.

The LF-76 allows counsel to indicate what actions, if any, the debtor intends to take, 

including objections, with respect to any of the filed claims. After the claims bar date 

passed, on July 2, 2021, Debtor’s Counsel submitted the LF-76, certifying that he 

reviewed “the claims register and all claims filed” under Local Rule 2083-1(B), and 

concluded that “[n]o further action [was] necessary.”2F

3

On July 6, 2021, the Court confirmed the Debtor’s plan.3F

4 Under the Confirmed 

Plan, the Debtor makes a monthly payment to the Chapter 13 Trustee and creditors 

receive a pro rata dividend based on the Chapter 13 Trustee’s calculations made after 

a review of the allowed claims (including the Children’s Claim) in reliance upon the 

Debtor’s LF-76. The Plan was confirmed over a year ago and the Chapter 13 Trustee 

has been making pro rata distributions to creditors.

On July 19, 2021, the day before the deadline to object to the dischargeability 

of debts, the Children filed an adversary proceeding seeking a determination that the 

debt established by the Claim is nondischargeable.4F

5 The Children filed a motion for 

3 (Doc. 25).

4 (Docs. 23 & 30).

5 Case No. 21-01233-PDR (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (the “Adversary Proceeding”).

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 2 of 10
Page 3 of 10

summary judgment on June 3, 2022, and the Debtor responded with her own crossmotion for summary judgment.5F

6 The Adversary Proceeding remains pending as the 

Court considers the motions.

On June 23, 2022, exactly one year after the Children filed the Claim, the 

Debtor filed an objection to it, arguing that the state court judgment is unliquidated, 

and the Claim provides no clear grounds for the amount asserted.6F

7 The Children 

oppose the objection.7F

8 The Court heard argument on August 1, 2022.

Analysis

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a), the provisions of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan “bind 

the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for 

by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has 

rejected the plan.” See In re Cushion, 349 B.R. 919, 921 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (“The 

binding effect of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is a basic tenet of bankruptcy 

law.”). The Debtor acknowledges that the Children timely filed the Claim but argues 

that she “tactically or strategically would have proceeded in a different manner, and 

in all likelihood would have objected” if she knew the Children would file the 

Adversary Proceeding. Although unclear, this is presumably because the Debtor had 

no interest in the amount of the Claim where under the pro rata distributions of her 

Confirmed Plan, the Debtor’s monthly plan payment is static. Only once the Children 

6 (Adversary Proceeding Docs. 55 & 62).

7 (Doc. 34).

8 (Doc. 37).

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 3 of 10
Page 4 of 10

sought a determination that the Claim is nondischargeable was the Debtor 

incentivized to object to the Claim to minimize the amount. The Children oppose the 

Objection on the grounds that it is untimely and procedurally improper; from the 

response and the arguments at the hearing, the Court recognizes the Children’s 

opposition as, generally, invoking res judicata, equitable estoppel, and waiver. 

I. Res Judicata bars the Objection.

Section 1327(a) gives res judicata effect to confirmed Chapter 13 plans. See, 

e.g., In re Starling, 251 B.R. 908, 911 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). “Under res judicata, . . 

. a final judgment on the merits bars the parties to a prior action from re-litigating a 

cause of action that was or could have been raised in that action.” Universal Am. 

Mortg. Co. v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 331 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Wallis 

v. Justice Oaks II, Ltd. (In re Justice Oaks II, Ltd.), 898 F.2d 1544, 1549 n. 3 (11th 

Cir. 1990)). Because plans provide for the treatment of allowed claims, the 

confirmation order generally precludes post-confirmation objections to such claims. 

See In re Swanson, 307 B.R. 306, 308 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2004); Starling, 251 B.R. at 

911; In re Clark, 172 B.R. 701, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994). However, because res 

judicata only applies where there is a final judgment on the merits, it does not 

prevent post-confirmation objections where the claim was filed on the eve of 

confirmation and the debtor was not provided a reasonable opportunity to object to 

it. See Palms of Destin Club, LLC v. Commc’n Processing Sys., Inc., No. 21-12202, 

2022 WL 293960, *4–5 (11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2022) (quoting In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 4 of 10
Page 5 of 10

244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001)); Cushion, 349 B.R. at 921; Swanson, 307 B.R. 

at 309.

The Claim was filed just thirteen days before the confirmation hearing. The 

Court would not usually consider this sufficient time to review and object to a claim. 

After all, even if the Debtor filed the Objection the same day the Claim was filed, the 

Court’s local rules would have prevented consideration of the Objection at the 

confirmation hearing. See Local Rule 3007-1(B)(2) (stating that “[o]bjections to claims 

filed less than 14 days before the confirmation hearing . . . shall require at least 30 

days notice . . .”). But Debtor’s Counsel filed the LF-76, which by its plain language 

clearly establishes that Debtor’s Counsel had sufficient time to review the Claim, and 

certified “no further action [was] necessary.” Because the Debtor already certified 

that she would not object, the slim timing exception that might have allowed the 

Debtor to raise a post-confirmation objection does not apply. Therefore, the Objection 

to Claim is barred by res judicata.

The Debtor’s argument asks the Court to ignore res judicata because, had she 

known the Children were going to file the Adversary Proceeding, she would have 

objected. The Court finds this argument unavailing. Res judicata exists, in part, to 

conserve judicial resources and foster “reliance on judicial action by minimizing the 

possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 

1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979)). 

The Chapter 13 Trustee and the Court rely on the LF-76 and if, at the confirmation 

hearing, there was (1) a pending objection, (2) an LF-76 certification indicating the 

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 5 of 10
Page 6 of 10

Debtor’s intent to object, or (3) no LF-76 certification at all, local practice dictates 

confirmation would have been continued.8F

9 Instead, the LF-76 stated that no further 

action was necessary, indicating to all parties, including the creditors, Chapter 13 

Trustee, and the Court, that all filed claims would be deemed allowed and the plan 

was ready to be considered for confirmation.

The Children relied on the Claim’s status as an allowed claim when they filed 

the Adversary Proceeding under the expectation that the validity and amount were

established.9F

10 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). Now, the Adversary 

Proceeding has been pending for nearly a year and, relying on the Claim’s allowance, 

the Children have not made any allegations or produced any evidence relating to the 

amount of the debt they are owed. 

To allow the Objection to proceed would ignore the careful procedural structure 

that allows debtors to confirm a chapter 13 plan early in the case on the condition 

that they certify the claims process is complete. See Local Rule 2083-1(B). The legal 

consequence though is that res judicata bars later objections to the resulting allowed 

claims. The facts compel that result, and the Objection is overruled.

9 To determine whether the Court can confirm a plan, it must know what unsecured claims 

are allowed, otherwise it cannot determine whether the plan complies with the requirements of 

confirmation including, for example, § 1325(a)(4), which requires that 

the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the 

plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would 

be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this 

title on such date.

See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) & (b)(4)(B).

10 (Adversary Proceeding Doc. 19).

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 6 of 10
Page 7 of 10

II. Equitable estoppel bars the Objection.

Even if the LF-76 does not prevent the raising of post-confirmation objections 

based on res judicata, equitable estoppel prevents the Debtor’s Objection. “The 

doctrine of equitable estoppel ‘allows a person’s act, conduct[,] or silence when it is 

[her] duty to speak, to preclude [her] from asserting a right [she] otherwise would 

have had against another who relied on that voluntary action.’” In re Hawkins, 377 

B.R. 761, 770 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007). The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies 

where: 

(1) the party estopped knew the relevant facts; (2) the party estopped 

intended for its conduct to be acted or relied upon, or the party acting 

had the right to believe the conduct was so intended; (3) the party acting 

was ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party acting relied on the 

conduct to its injury. 

Id. (cleaned up).

With respect to the first element, Debtor knew the relevant facts. Though the 

Debtor argues she would have objected if she was aware the Children would file the 

Adversary Proceeding, the Court finds that argument flawed. The “relevant facts” 

here are that the Debtor was fully aware that the creditors’ deadline to file an 

adversary proceeding objecting to dischargeability was approaching and knew of the 

existence of the state court judgment providing the basis for the Claim and finding 

breach of fiduciary duty. There were a variety of ways the Debtor could have sought 

to preserve her rights through that deadline including indicating in the LF-76 the 

possibility the Debtor may object to the Claim.10F

11 Instead, the Debtor chose not to do 

11 The Debtor could have, for example, (1) requested a continuance of the confirmation hearing 

and LF-76 deadline to allow the Debtor time to consider whether to object to claims after the passing 

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 7 of 10
Page 8 of 10

so, and certified that she was prepared to move forward with confirmation with the 

claims allowed as filed.

With respect to the second element, the Debtor intended for her conduct in 

filing the LF-76 to be acted or relied upon, and the other parties in the case had the 

right to believe the conduct was so intended. The Debtor’s clear intent in filing the 

LF-76 certification early was to push the case expeditiously to confirmation. Had the 

Debtor not filed the LF-76 before the confirmation hearing, or if the LF-76 indicated 

that the Debtor objected—or intended to object—to the Claim, the confirmation 

hearing would have been continued. In short, absent Debtor’s Counsel’s LF-76 

certification, the Court would not have confirmed the pending Chapter 13 plan. 

Further, the creditors, including the Children, had every right to rely upon—just as 

the Chapter 13 Trustee and the Court relied upon—Debtor’s LF-76 certification 

acknowledging the Debtor’s determination that all filed claims be deemed allowed. 

With respect to the third element, the Children were ignorant of the Debtor’s 

true intention to file the Objection if the Children filed an adversary proceeding

objecting to the dischargeability of the Claim. Instead, they accepted—just as the 

Court and the Chapter 13 Trustee accepted—that Debtor’s LF-76 meant exactly what 

it said. 

of the deadline to object to dischargeability of debts; (2) included language in the plan that reserved 

the Debtor’s right to object to claims for a period of time after the expiration of the dischargeability 

deadline; or (3) included language in the LF-76 stating that the Debtor was still in the process of 

determining what action, if any, to take with respect to the Claim.

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 8 of 10
Page 9 of 10

With respect to the fourth element, as previously explained, the Children 

detrimentally relied on the Claim’s status as an allowed claim when they filed the 

Adversary Proceeding under the expectation that the validity and amount were

established. 

Therefore, the four elements of equitable estoppel are satisfied and, even if res 

judicata did not apply, the Debtor would still be prevented from raising the Objection 

under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

III. The Debtor waived her right to raise the Objection.

The Debtor’s LF-76 constitutes waiver. “Waiver, generally characterized as 

‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right,’ requires (1) the existence at the 

time of waiver of a right, privilege, advantage or benefit which may be waived; (2) the 

actual or constructive knowledge thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such 

right, privilege, advantage or benefit.” In re New River Shipyard, Inc., 355 B.R. 894, 

910 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (quoting Dooley v. Weil (In re Garfinkle), 672 F.2d 1340, 

1347 (11th Cir. 1982)) (cleaned up). Here, the Debtor (1) had a right to object to 

timely-filed claims or to delay confirmation until she had a reasonable opportunity to 

review the claims;11F

12 (2) was aware of that right; and (3) by filing the LF-76, explicitly 

notified the creditors, the Chapter 13 Trustee, and the Court that no further action, 

including an objection, was needed on the Claim and the case could proceed to 

12 Local Rule 2083-1(B) merely requires Debtor’s Counsel to review the claims within twentyone days after the Claims Bar Date. Here, the deadline was not until July 15, 2021, which is after the 

confirmation hearing. The Debtor would not have even needed to request an extension to take her time 

and review the claims.

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 9 of 10
Page 10 of 10

confirmation. Therefore, even in the absence of res judicata or equitable estoppel, the 

Debtor, through the LF-76, waived her right to object to the Claim.

Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the Objection (Doc. 34) is OVERRULED.

# # #

Copies to Stephen Orchard, Esq., who is directed to serve this Order on all interested parties.

Case 21-13557-PDR Doc 42 Filed 08/17/22 Page 10 of 10