IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2017-CA-01060-COA

MICHELLE POPE APPELLANT

v.

DANIEL FOUNTAIN APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/15/2017

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. D. NEIL HARRIS SR.

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: GEORGE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MARK V. KNIGHTEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER BRICE WIGGINS

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 12/17/2019

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ.

C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. This is a paternity matter. Although there are only two parties to this action, the case 

really involves three adults: Daniel Fountain, Michelle Pope, and Brian Martin; and one

minor child: J.M. 

¶2. On June 15, 2017, the George County Chancery Court entered an order establishing

Fountain as the biological father of J.M. The court also entered a temporary order granting

Fountain visitation with J.M. and requiring Fountain to pay child support. Pope, J.M.’s

mother, now appeals fromthe judgment establishing paternity and the temporaryorder. Pope

contends that the chancery court erred in entering the paternity and temporary orders because

Martin (Pope’s ex-husband and the man who had been previously named as J.M.’s legal
father) should have been added as a necessary party to this action under Mississippi Rule of

Civil Procedure 19. 

¶3. We agree with Pope that Martin should have been added as a party to this action. 

Therefore, we reverse the chancellor’s judgment establishing paternity and remand for

further proceedings once Martin has been properly joined. We further find that we lack

jurisdiction to address the temporary order on appeal.

BACKGROUND

¶4. Pope and Martin married on December 23, 1994. Around 2006, Martin had a

vasectomy.

1

In 2007, Pope (while still legally married to, but separated from, Martin)

engaged in a sexual relationship with Fountain. As a result of her relationship with Fountain,

Pope became pregnant. And in October 2007, Pope gave birth to J.M. 

¶5. According to sworn testimony, Martin has known since J.M.’s conception that he was

not J.M.’s biological father.2In fact, upon review of the record, it appears that Martin, Pope,

and Fountain each knew, from the time that J.M. was born, that Fountain was J.M.’s

biological father. Nonetheless, Pope listed Martin as the father on J.M.’s birth certificate. 

1 Prior to Martin’s vasectomy, Pope and Martin had conceived four children together.

2 Martin testified before the George CountyChanceryCourt that he “knew that [J.M.]

wasn’t [his] because [he] couldn’t have children at that particular time.” Pope’s testimony

was consistent:

Q: All right. So . . . when [you] and Mr. Martin got back together and y’all

reconciled and you were pregnant, did [Martin]recognize that child not

to be his child?

A: He did, yes.

2
It is unclear whether Martin and Fountain agreed to this before Pope listed Martin as J.M.’s

father, but both Martin and Fountain were, at the least, aware soon after and did not dispute

Pope’s action.3

¶6. Notwithstanding Martin being named the father on J.M.’s birth certificate and

providing financial support for J.M., Pope also allowed Fountain to have significant

visitation with J.M. from the time that he was six months old.4 Pope and Fountain agreed to

this visitation; it was not court ordered. According to Pope, she worked a second job on the

weekends, and it was helpful for Fountain to keep J.M. while she was working. Regardless,

it is not disputed that Fountain has maintained a relationship with J.M. throughout his life,

despite Martin being named J.M.’s legal father.

¶7. On October 3, 2012, when J.M. was five years old, Pope and Martin divorced. J.M.

is listed as a child of Pope and Martin’s marriage in the divorce decree entered by the George

CountyChancery Court. The decree, which is still operative, provides that Pope and Martin

will enjoy joint legal custody of J.M., that Martin will pay child support and continue

providing J.M. with medical and dental insurance, and that Martin will have visitation with

J.M.5 

3 The record suggests that the parties agreed to Martin being named as J.M.’s legal

father on his birth certificate because J.M. was born with a congenital heart defect that

would require surgery, and Martin, who was on active duty in the United States Navy,

agreed to place J.M. on his health insurance as his dependent.

4

 During this time period, Martin was deployed. 

5 Martin was serving active duty with the United States Navy at the time the decree

was entered, so visitation was conditioned upon Martin being transferred or otherwise

residing within 500 miles of Pope and J.M.

3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶8. Approximately three and a half years after Pope and Martin’s divorce, on March 21,

2016, Fountain filed an emergency motion for ex parte relief in the Harrison County

Chancery Court, Second Judicial District. Fountain alleged that Pope had abused J.M. (by

spanking him with a wooden paddle) and requested temporary sole legal and physical

custody of J.M. Fountain named Pope as the sole defendant and did not include Martin as

a party to the action. That same day, the court held an ex parte hearing. The court then

entered an emergencyex parte order giving Fountain temporary sole physical custody ofJ.M.

and prohibiting Pope from being within 1,000 feet of J.M., until further ordered by the court.

¶9. Following the entry of the emergency ex parte order, Pope hired counsel. On March

24, 2016, Pope filed a motion to dismiss or to transfer for improper jurisdiction. A few

weeks later, the Harrison County Chancery Court, Second Judicial District, granted the

motion and transferred the case to the George County Chancery Court. 

¶10. On April 11, 2016, Pope filed a separate petition to establish paternity in the George

County Chancery Court. In her petition, Pope alleged that “she and [Fountain] engaged in

a sexual relationship that resulted in the conception of their child, namely, [J.M.], born [in

October 2007].” Pope named Fountain as the sole defendant to the petition and did not

include Martin as a party to the action. 

¶11. On April 29, 2016, the George CountyChanceryCourt entered an order consolidating

the two cases between Pope and Fountain. On the same date, Fountain filed a response and

counter-petition to Pope’s petition to establish paternity. In his response, Fountain admitted

4
that he is the biological father of J.M. and that an order establishing paternity should be

entered. In his counter-petition, Fountain requested immediate physical custody of J.M.;

temporary child support; a full hearing on the merits to determine permanent custody,

visitation, and support rights and obligations of the parties; and an appointment of a guardian

ad litem (GAL) for J.M. Following a hearing, the George County Chancery Court entered

a temporary order awarding Pope and Fountain joint legal custody, with Pope having

visitation, and appointing a GAL for J.M. 

¶12. On August 2, 2016, the GAL filed her initial investigative report with the court, 

recommending that J.M. be placed in Pope’s custody and have liberal visitation with

Fountain. On August 3, 2016, the court held another hearing. Prior to this hearing, the

parties conferenced with the chancellor off the record. Apparently, during the off-record

conference, the parties raised the question of whether Martin (J.M.’s legal father pursuant

to J.M.’s birth certificate and Pope and Martin’s divorce decree) was a necessary party to the

action. Once back on the record, the chancellor appeared to agree, stating, “Y’all, I don’t

know how we got to this point. . . . [W]e should have addressed this before now, but Mr.

Martin has got to be a party to this proceeding.”6 

6

 The chancellor further explained, 

Here’s the problem, Mr. Fountain, is that in order for me to go forward on the

paternity, even though you and [Pope] agree, there is a court order out there

that says Mr. Martin is the father of [J.M.]. And I’m not–and all three of these

lawyers have given me a lot of detail that I’m not going to [go] into–I mean,

everybody knows what’s going on. 

But from a legal standpoint the law required that Mr. Martin either

waive process, enter an appearance or be a part of this action. Because right

5
¶13. Despite this recognition, however, the chancellor proceeded with the August 3

hearing. At the end of the hearing, the chancellor found the court lacked the necessary and

proper parties to make a determination on paternity: “Although the proof is very strong, we

still need Mr. Martin to weigh [in] on this one way or the other.” On September 13, 2016,

the court entered another temporary order. The pertinent parts of the temporary order stated

as follows:

2.

That Daniel Fountain is the biological father of the minor child, [J.M.], date

of birth, October . . . 2007. Mr. Brian Martin, [Pope]’s prior husband, must be

served and/or allowed to disestablish his paternity to the minor child prior to

the establishment of Daniel Fountain’s paternity.

3.

That both [Pope and Fountain] are awarded joint legal custody of [J.M.] with

[Pope] being awarded physical custody of [J.M.].

4.

[Fountain] shall be allowed visitation . . . .

On September 26, 2016, the court amended the September 13, 2016 temporary order. In this

amendment, the court ordered the GAL to file a petition to disestablish Martin’s paternity and

to contact Martin to determine whether he would agree to disestablish paternity. Martin was

not—and has yet to be—added as a party to this action. 

¶14. On November 30, 2016, Pope filed a motion to dismiss her paternity action. Fountain

filed a response in objection, and on December 28, 2016, the court entered an order denying

now he’s–from a legal standpoint–is the father of [J.M.].

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Pope’s motion to dismiss. The order also directed the GAL to file a petition to establish

Fountain as J.M.’s father based on the parties’ testimony that there is DNA evidence of

Fountain’s paternity. Although Pope objected to the court’s order, on February 17, 2017, the

GAL filed a complaint, on behalf of J.M., to establish paternity, child custody, and other

relief.

7 This complaint was filed in the ongoing civil action between Fountain and Pope and

listed Pope and Fountain as the sole defendants. The complaint did not name Martin as a

party.

8

 

¶15. On May 22, 2017, the court held another hearing on the outstanding motions. 

Although Martin had not been named as a party to the action or served with any pleadings,

he attended the May 22 hearing and provided testimony as a witness. Pope and Fountain also

testified. While no one testifying at the May 22 hearing disputed that Fountain is the

biological father of J.M., Martin testified that he wanted to remain J.M.’s legal father and

that he had no intention to disestablish paternity. 

¶16. Nonetheless, on June 15, 2017, the court entered a judgment establishing paternity and

adjudicating Fountain as J.M.’s biological father.9 On the same date, the court also entered

7 The GAL also filed a complaint to disestablish paternity and for other relief on

February 2, 2017. However, the GAL never served the disestablishment complaint on any

parties or pursued the disestablishment complaint in any other manner. 

8 The GAL likewise issued summonses to Pope and Fountain but did not issue a

summons to Martin. 

9

In the judgment, the court noted: “DNA test(s) received into evidence establish

Daniel Fountain as the biological father of [J.M.]; . . . Brian Martin had a vasectomy and

therefore could not have conceived [J.M.]; . . . [and] Michelle Pope testified that Daniel

Fountain is the biological father of [J.M.].”

7
a temporary order granting Fountain unsupervised visitation with J.M. every other weekend

and requiring Fountain to pay child support for J.M., until further order of the court. On July

14, 2017, Pope filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

¶17. On appeal, Pope contends that the chancery court erred in entering the judgment

establishing paternity and in entering the temporary order. We will address the judgment

establishing paternity, but we lack jurisdiction to address the temporary order. See

McDonald v. McDonald, 876 So. 2d 296, 298 (¶8) (Miss. 2004) (“[A]ppellate review of

temporary orders is improper.”) (quoting McDonald v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182, 1193

(¶46) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). 

¶18. Pope’s primary assertion regarding the judgment establishing paternity is that Martin

should have been joined as a party under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 19 before an

adjudication of paternity was made, and failure to join Martin was error.10 The application

of Rule 19 is a matter of law, so we apply a de novo review. Williams v. Williams, 264 So.

3d 722, 725 (¶5) (Miss. 2019). 

10 Pope also generally asserts that “since [Martin] has not, nor does he intend to,

disestablish paternity as the legal father, the Court’s entry of a paternity [j]udgment was in

error.” Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-9-10 (Rev. 2018) sets forth “circumstances

under which a legal father may disestablish paternity and terminate a child support

obligation when the legal father is not the biological father of the child.” Even assuming

section 93-9-10 has any applicability given the record before us, see Miss. Code Ann. § 93-

9-10(1)(a) & (3), Pope provides no supporting authority for her assertion that paternity of

the legal father must be disestablished before biological paternity can be established. 

Accordingly, it is waived. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 805 So. 2d 452, 487 (¶90) (Miss.

2001) (“Failure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review

such issues.”).

8
¶19. A person is a necessary party when he “has such a substantial interest in the suit that

no complete, practical, and final judgment can be made without directly affecting his interest

or else leaving the controversy in such condition that its final determination may be wholly

inconsistent with equity and good conscience.” Mahaffey v. Alexander, 800 So. 2d 1284,

1285 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Rule 19 addresses joinder of necessary parties. Pursuant

to Rule 19(a), assuming joinder is feasible, 

A person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court shall be joined as a

party in the action if:

(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already

parties, or

(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated

that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter

impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the

persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,

multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed

interest.

If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he

should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or,

in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

(Emphasis added). When joinder is not feasible, Rule 19(b) applies.11 

11 Rule 19(b) states:

If a person as described in subdivision (a) hereof cannot be made a party, the

court shall determine whether in equityand good conscience the action should

proceed among the parties before it or should be dismissed, the absent person

being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the

court include: First, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s

absence might be prejudicial to himor those already parties; second, the extent

to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief,

or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a

judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether

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¶20. Here, although the court expressly noted at various times in the proceedings that

Martin needed to be joined in this action, it did not determine if it was feasible to join Martin. 

It is unclear why, despite the court’s multiple acknowledgments, the proceedings continued

without Martin. But given that the same court entered Martin and Pope’s divorce decree,

awarding Martin joint legal custody of and visitation with J.M. and requiring Martin to pay

child support, we presume that the court has continued jurisdiction regarding J.M.’s custody. 

Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-202 (Rev. 2018). Additionally, although Martin mayno longer live

in George County, Martin appeared as a witness at the May 22, 2017 paternity hearing,

suggesting his ability to attend and participate in this action’s proceedings. We thus continue

with a Rule 19(a) analysis.

I. Rule 19(a)(1)

¶21. As noted supra, for the entirety of J.M.’s life (arguably until now), Martin has been 

considered J.M.’s legal father. And pursuant to a George County divorce decree, Martin has

joint legal custody of J.M., visitation rights, and child support responsibilities. Given these

rights and responsibilities, it is apparent that “in [Martin’s] absence complete relief cannot

be accorded among [Pope and Fountain]” in this action. M.R.C.P. 19(a)(1). 

¶22. Pope has asked the court to “award [her] the sole paramount care, custody and control

of [J.M.], as well as [establish] permanent child support payments to be made to [her] . . . .” 

And in his counter-petition, Fountain has requested a full hearing on the merits to determine

permanent custody, visitation, and support rights and obligations of the parties. If Martin is

the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for

nonjoinder.

10
not added as a party to this action, the chancery court risks conflicting orders regarding J.M.

and his custody, his child support, and his accessibility for visitation. 

II. Rule 19(a)(2)

¶23. Along this same vein, Martin “claims an interest relating to the subject of th[is]

action,” namely, J.M.12 And the complete “disposition of th[is] action in his absence may (i)

as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of

the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or

otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.” M.R.C.P. 19(a)(2). 

Pope notes that disposition ofthis action has the potential to diminish Martin’s “custodial and

visitation rights” as well as dilute Martin’s “rights of inheritance.” We agree, though we do

not know whyPope—who as plaintiffsought the very relief the chancery court granted—did

not include Martin as a party at the outset or after any of the multiple times the chancery

court instructed the parties to join him. Moreover, complete disposition may leave Pope at

risk of being subject to inconsistent or contradictory obligations in regard to J.M.’s visitation

with Martin and Fountain. For these reasons, we find that Martin is a “necessary party” to

this action. See Mahaffey, 800 So. 3d at 1285 (¶5). 

¶24. “In discussing the joinder of parties under Rule 19, our supreme court has stated that

the ‘failure to join interested parties . . . under M.R.C.P. 19(a) justifies reversal and remand

as a violation of fundamental due process.’” Am. Pub. Fin. Inc. v. Smith, 45 So. 3d 307, 311

(¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Calhoun Cty. v. Warner, 853 So. 2d

12 Martin testified at the May 22 hearing that he considered J.M. to be his child and

that he has no intention to voluntarily disestablish paternity. 

11
1159, 1170 (¶38) (Miss. 2003)). This is true even if, “on remand, the same result might be

reached.” Powell v. Evans, 113 So. 3d 1270, 1275 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013); see also

Davis v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co., 58 So. 3d 1233, 1238 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). 

Accordingly, we reverse the chancellor’s judgment establishing paternity and remand for

further proceedings once Martin has been properly joined.

¶25. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE,

WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.,

CONCUR.

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