IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON JUDE I. DOTY, Appellant,

v. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON and JUDY SCHURKE, inhercapacity as Deputy Director, Respondent. No. 72021-0- DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FILED: February 17,2015
Leach, J. — Jude Doty appeals the superiorcourt order affirming an order of the director of the Department of Labor and Industries (Department). The director's order upheld citations the Department issued to Doty for violating child labor laws by employing his sons, ages 11 and 13, in Doty's construction business. Because the Department did not exceed its rule-making authority when it defined the word "employ," substantial evidence supports the director's findings, and those findings supportthe conclusions that Doty employed his sons and committed serious violations ofchild labor laws, we affirm. FACTS Jude Doty owned and operated a construction and house-moving business in which he employed workers. Doty and his wife homeschool theirNO. 72021-0-1/2


### children, and as part of "vocationaltraining," Dotyinvolved his sons Zachary, 13, and Stephen, 11, in the business. For one project, he moved several houses 

### from a hospital property to differentsites in the city of Yakima. Zachary worked on the project from April 2002 through January 2003, and Stephen from November2002 through January2003. 

### Both Zachary and Stephen worked at the construction sites, working near and operating heavy equipment such as backhoes, bulldozers, and tractors. At 

### times, Dotywas not nearby supervising their use of the heavy equipment. The boys performed many construction-related tasks, includingjobs also performed by adult subcontractors. This work benefited the business. More than once, Zachary rode on the rooftop of one of the relocated 

### houses as a truck towed it down a public arterial at "approximately walking speed." Avideotape shows Zachary moving around on the roof, lifting overhead wires and cables as a "spotter" to ensure the safe passage of the house down 

### the street. The roof of the house was approximately 22 feet above the ground. Zachary did not wear a harness or other safety equipment. According to Doty, he profited from using a spotteron top of the house because he has to pay if he 

### damages wires in transit. Zachary did notfall from the roof or suffer anyinjury. Atother times, both Zachary and Stephen acted as spotters by walking alongside or in front of a moving house, making sure it did not hit signs, cars, or
-2-NO. 72021-0-1/3



### otherobstacles. On one occasion, a Department investigatorobserved Zachary 

### jumping on and off the moving truck as he directed his father. The investigator also sawZacharywalking only a few feet from a reversing backhoe. On January 28, 2003, the Department cited Doty for 11 violations of child 

### labor laws underWAC296-125. The citations assessed penalties of$6,5001 and classified 5 ofthe violations as "serious." The Department also issued an order 

### of immediate restraint, prohibiting Doty from allowing his sons to work at construction sites or inthe proximity ofheavy equipment. 

### Over the next two days, Doty continued to have both boys perform construction work. On January 30, 2003, whileZachary operated a backhoe on 

### softdirt, it tipped onto its side. According to an adult worker at the site, Zachary operated the backhoetoo fast for the conditions. He was not wearing a seatbelt
or harness. Dotywas not nearby supervising him. Zachary crawled out from 

### under this machine, uninjured. Later, Doty had Zachary use a bulldozer to pull the backhoe upright. 

### On January 31, 2003, the Department cited Doty for 20 additional violations, imposing $20,000 in penalties. The Department classified all 20 violations as "serious-imminent danger-repeat" and issued another order of immediate restraint. 

### 1 After the Department amended the citation to eliminate 6 of the violations, Doty's penalties totaled $5,000. -3-NO. 72021-0-1/4
Doty appealed, and the administrative lawjudge affirmed. Doty appealed to the director, who affirmed the citations on August 31, 2004. The directorfound that Doty had employed his sons in his house-moving business in violation of child labor laws and that by permitting them to perform construction-related 

### activities, he exposed them to the risk ofserious physical harm or death. Doty appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the director, holding that the Department may define "employ" for purposes of child labor laws and that these laws are constitutional as applied to Doty. Doty appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

### When reviewing an agency's decision under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), chapter 34.05 RCW, this court sits inthe
same position as the superior court2 and applies the review standards of the 

### WAPA directly to the administrative record.3 Anappellate court reviews the final 

### decision of the director.4 The party asserting the invalidity of an agency action has the burden to demonstrate that invalidity.5 This court will grant relief from an agency order only if it determines that the agency erroneously interpreted or 

### 2D.W. Close Co. v. Dep'tof Labor & Indus.. 143 Wn. App. 118, 125, 177 P.3d 143 (2008). 

### 3RCW49.12.400; Tapper v. Emp't Sec. Dep't. 122 Wn.2d 397, 402, 858 P.2d 494 (1993). 4 RCW 49.12.400. 

### 5RCW34.05.570(1)(a). -4-NO. 72021-0-1/5
applied the law, substantial evidence does not support the order, or the order is 

### arbitrary or capricious.6 Substantial evidence isevidence sufficient topersuade a fair-minded person ofthe truth ofthe matter asserted.7 If this court determines that substantial evidence supports the director's findings, itthen decides ifthose findings supportthe director's conclusions of law.8 This court reviews an agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation de 

### novo, under an error of law standard.9 In interpreting agency regulations, regulatory definitions apply, and courts give undefined words their ordinary 

### dictionary definitions.10 This court gives "substantial weight" to the agency's interpretation of regulations within its area of expertise and will uphold that interpretation if"'itreflects a plausible construction ofthe language ofthe statute 

### and is notcontraryto the legislative intent.'"11

6 RCW 34.05.570(2)(d), (e), (i); Xenith Grp.. Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 167Wn. App. 389, 393, 269 P.3d 414 (2012). 

### 7Mowat Constr. Co. v. Dep't of Labor &Indus., 148 Wn. App. 920, 925, 201 P.3d 407 (2009). 

### 8J.E. Dunn Nw., Inc. v. Dep't of Labor &Indus.. 139 Wn. App. 35, 42, 156 P.3d 250 (2007). 

### 9Roller v. Dep't of Labor &Indus., 128 Wn. App. 922, 926, 117 P.3d 385 (2005).10Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Dep't of Labor &Indus., 145 Wn. App. 52, 57, 185 P.3d 646 (2008). 11 Cobra Roofing Serv., Inc. v. Dep'tof Labor &Indus.. 122 Wn. App. 402, 409, 97 P.3d 17 (2004) (quoting Seatoma Convalescent Ctr. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 82Wn. App. 495, 518, 919 P.2d 602 (1996)). -5-NO. 72021-0-1/6

ANALYSIS Child Labor in the Industrial Welfare Act In the industrial welfare act, chapter 49.12 RCW, the Washington legislature declared, "The welfare of the state ofWashington demands that all employees be protected from conditions oflabor which have a pernicious effect 

### on their health."12 The act contains provisions governing child labor. Itstates that the Department "may adopt special rules for the protection of the safety, 

### health, and welfare of minor employees."13 Courts construe remedial statutes 

### likethis one liberallyand itsexceptions narrowly.14 The industrial welfare act defines "employee" as one "who is employed in the business of the employee's employer whether by way of manual labor or otherwise."15 The statute defines "employer" as "any person, firm, corporation, partnership, business trust, legal representative, or other business entity which engages in any business, industry, profession, or activity in this state and

12RCW 49.12.010. 13 RCW49.12.121(1). 14 Pellino v. Brink's Inc., 164 Wn. App. 668, 684-85, 267 P.3d 383 (2011) (quoting Int'lAss'n of Fire Fighters, Local 46 v. City ofEverett, 146Wn.2d 29, 34, 42 P.3d 1265 (2002) (quoting Peninsula Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Pub. Sch. Emps. of Peninsula, 130Wn.2d 401, 407, 924 P.2d 13 (1996))). 15 RCW 49.12.005(4). -6-NO. 72021-0-1/7 

### employs one or more employees."16 Statutory provisions and WACs about the 

### employmentofminors define"employ" as "toengage, suffer, orpermittowork."17 Chapter 296-125 WAC prohibits all minors from engaging in many occupations and activities. These activities include working as an outside helper 

### or flagger on any public road or highway;18 operating orworking inproximity to heavy equipment such as earth-moving machines, backhoes, bulldozers, or 

### tractors;19 and working more than 10 feet above ground or floor level.20 Additionally, minors under 16 years old may not work inthe construction industry
at all unless theirwork is limited to office duties.21 Washington statutes and regulations provide limited exemptions from the child labor laws. The general definition of "employ" inthe WAC excludes certain limited types of work: The term "employ" does not include newspapervendors or carriers, the use of domestic or casual labor in or about private residences, agricultural labor as defined by RCW 50.04.150, or the use of voluntary or donated services performed for an educational, charitable, religious, or nonprofit organization and without expectation or contemplation of compensation for the services 

### performed.1221
16RCW49.12.005(3)(a). 17 RCW49.12.320(1); WAC296-125-015(2). 18WAC 296-125-030(2). 19WAC 296-125-030(17). 20WAC 296-125-030(28). 21 WAC 296-125-033(4). 22WAC 296-125-015(2). -7-NO. 72021-0-1/8

The house-to-house sales provision contains the statute's only express 

### exemption forparentemployers.23 WAC296-125-043 provides an exemptionfrom state minimum wage laws when a minor student is in a work place to carry out an occupational training experience assignment directly supervised on the premises by a school official oran employerundercontractwith a school and when no appreciable benefit is rendered to the 

### employer by the presenceof the minorstudent.[24] To beexemptas occupational training, a minor's work mustmeetsix criteria: 4.1. The training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities ofthe employer, is similarto thatwhich would be given in a vocational school; and 4.2. The training is for the benefitofthe trainee; and 4.3. The trainees do not displace regular employees, but work undertheir close observation; and 4.4. The business that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees, and may in fact be impeded; and 4.5. The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion ofthe training period; and 4.6. The trainees understand they are not entitled to wages forthe 

### time spentin the training.[25]

23 RCW 49.12.320(1). 24WAC 296-125-043(4). 25Wash. Dep'tof Labor &Indus., Admin. Policy ES.C2 §§ 4.1-.6, at 6 (rev. Sept. 2, 2008). -8-NO. 72021-0-1/9
Department's Authority To Define "Employ" 

### Doty contends that the Department exceeded its authority when it "redefine[d] the meaning of employment." Heasserts that the legislature granted the Department only a narrow authority to adopt "special" rules, not broad general authority. 

### We disagree. The legislature intended that the industrial welfare act 

### protect"all employees" from unhealthyworkenvironments.26 The "special rules" of RCW 49.12.121(1) are rules for the protection of minor employees in 

### particular. As early as 1914, our Supreme Court recognized that preventing "persons of immature judgment from engaging in hazardous occupations" and preventing "employment and overwork of children during the period of their mental and physical development" were part of the "objects, purposes, and 

### humane spirit of the law."27 The Department does not exceed its authority by adopting regulations that fall squarely within the legislature's mandate to protect 

### minor workers, and "'properly promulgated, substantive agency regulations have

26RCW 49.12.010. 27 Hillestad v. Indus. Ins. Comm'n, 80 Wash. 426, 431, 141 P. 913(1914). -9-NO. 72021-0-1/10

the force and effect of law.'"28 The Department did not exceed its statutory 

### authority by adopting itsdefinition of"employ."29 "Employ" as Applied to the Dotys Because the statute and regulations do not expressly define the word "employ," the director looked to ordinary dictionary definitions of "work" to interpret it. The directorconcluded that one definition—"a labor, task, orduty that is one's accustomed means of livelihood"30—did not apply to Zachary and Stephen's activities. However, the director concluded that under a second definition—"an activity in which one exerts strength or faculties to do or perform 

### something"31—"[Doty] permitted his boys towork." Doty argues that the Department should have used one of a number of
common law tests, any ofwhich would show he did not employ his sons. But the tests he cites do not apply here. First, he cites Cotton v. WeyerhaeuserTimber 

### Co.32 to argue that because he did not "'expressly'" hire Zachary or Stephen or "'suffer[ ] or permit[ ]'"them to work "'undercircumstances where an obligation to pay [them] will be implied,'" he cannot be their employer. Cotton, however, 28 Wingert v. Yellow Freight Svs., Inc., 146 Wn.2d 841, 848, 50 P.3d 256 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Manorv. Nestle Food Co., 131 Wn.2d 439, 445, 932 P.2d 628 (1997)). 29An almost identical definition is found in federal labor statutes such as the FairLabor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 30 CitingWebster's UniversalEncyclopedic Dictionary2130-31 (2002). 31 Webster's, at2130-31. 

### 32 20 Wn.2d 300, 312, 147 P.2d 299 (1944). -10-NO. 72021-0-1/11


### involved an adultbringing a claim under the FairLabor Standards Actof1938.33 The child labor laws do not require proofof an obligation to pay wages to prove 

### employment. Adopting this requirement would thwart the laws' purpose by facilitating the economicexploitation ofchildren. 

### CitingAmerican Products Co. v.Villwock,34 Doty also arguesthat because the record contains no evidence of a contract between him and the boys for a "'fixedcompensation which [they] may use as [they] seefit'" and the boys are not 

### emancipated, the Departmentcannotprove parental employment. But American Products involves a differentfactual and legal context—workers' compensation— 

### and uses a "clearand convincing" testfor a contractual relationship that is not in
the statute at issue here. 

### DotycitesAnfinsonv. FedExGround Package System, Inc.35to argue that the boys are economicallydependent on him as children and that he directs and controls the boys' activities as a father, not an employer. Anfinson, however, does not involve child labor laws but the test to distinguish employees from 

### independent contractors.36 The statutes and regulations governing child labor include neither an economicdependence test nor a direction and control test. As 

### the directornoted, the legislature acted to regulatethe health, safety, and welfare 33 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938). 34 7 Wn.2d 246, 266-67, 109 P.2d 570 (1941). 35 174Wn.2d 851, 281 P.3d 289 (2012). 36Anfinson, 174 Wn.2d at 866-71. -11-NO. 72021-0-1 /12


### of minorworkers, "thus expressly acting to change the common lawrelationship 

### ofemployer-employee in RCW 49.12.121 and the regulations underit."37 We conclude that the director did not err in using RCW 49.12 and WAC 296-125, ratherthan any ofthetests Dotycites, to interpret "employ." 

### Doty maintains that the boys worked as part of the vocational and occupational training component ofthe family's homeschooling. But the boys' activities do not meet the six-part test for a training exemption from the child labor laws. Because the law prohibited the work the boys did, Doty cannot 

### characterize itas training similar to that provided in a vocational school. Doty does not dispute that the boys' work benefited his business. Zachary and Stephen at times displaced regular employees and did not always work under 

### Doty's observation. Because Doty did not use paid subcontractors for the tasks the boys performed, his business derived an immediate economic benefit from their activities. None ofthe other exemptions—house-to-house sales, casual or 

### domestic labor at a private residence, or agriculturalwork—applyto Zachary and Stephen's work. 

### Doty does not dispute that he allowed the boys to help move houses, operate heavy machinery, and do a variety ofotherconstruction-related tasks as

37 See Clausen v. Dep't ofLabor & Indus., 15 Wn.2d 62, 69, 129 P.2d 777 

### (1942) (courts apply common law rules unless rules modified bystatute). -12-NO. 72021-0-1/13 

### part of Doty's business. We affirm the director's conclusion that Doty employed his sons in work not exemptfrom the child labor laws. Doty's Constitutional and Statutory Rights as a Parent Doty also contends that the Department's citations violate both his constitutional rights and his statutory right to direct their home-based 

### occupational education.38 He cites In re Custody of Smith39 to support his assertion that the Department violated his freedom under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to "'establish a home and bring up children.'" But Smith does not support Doty's position. While ourSupreme Court in Smith recognized a parent's "constitutionally protected right to rear his or her children without state interference,"40 the court also noted that "the state may step in and override a decision of a parent where the decision would harm the child."41 The Smith court singled out child labor as an area in which the State 

### may exercise its authority, notingthatthe UnitedStates Supreme Court "found a

38 Doty cites RCW 28A.200.020 and RCW 28A.225.010(4), which pertain to parents' rights and duties inconducting home-based education. 39 137 Wn.2d 1, 13-14, 969 P.2d 21 (1998) (quoting Mever v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923)). affd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). 40Smith, 137Wn.2dat15. 41 Smith, 137 Wn.2d at 15-16. -13-NO. 72021-0-1/14

narrow exception necessary in light ofthe 'crippling effects of child employment,' 

### 'more especially in publicplaces.'"42 Beyond his bare contentions, Doty does not explain how his constitutional and statutory rights to raise his children and direct their occupational education include a right to violate other statutes and regulations enacted to protect the 

### safety, health, and welfare of minors. This claimfails.43 Designation ofViolations as "Serious" Doty challenges the director's findings that the alleged violations were "serious" and thereforejustified higher penalties. The child labor laws define a violation as serious ifdeath or serious physical harm has resulted or is imminentfrom a condition that exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes that have been adopted or are in use by the employer, unless the employerdid not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know ofthe presence of the violation.'441 Aserious or repeated violation subjects an employerto a penalty of up to $1,000 

### foreach daythe violation continues.45

42 Smith, 137 Wn.2d at 16 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)). 43 See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Boslev, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (declining to review inadequately briefed assignmentof error). 44 RCW 49.12.390(2). 45 RCW49.12.390(2). -14-NO. 72021-0-1/15 

### Doty argues thatbecausethe regulations listing prohibited minoractivities do not use the terms "'serious,' 'harm,' 'injury,' or 'death' in a pertinent way," the director's conclusion of law "finds no anchor in the regulations or statute and 

### floats unconnected to any authority." Doty also disputes that any danger to the boys was "imminent." 

### We disagree. As the director points out, the activities prohibited to minors
are properlyclassifiedas "serious" as a matter of lawbecausethey are inherently
hazardous: 

### The list ofoccupations in WAC296-125-030 and -033 identify work 

### activity which by their very nature are dangerous and pose a substantial risk ofharm which could result in serious physical injury or death..
. . Further, the practices by [Doty] of having his 11 year

### old and 13year-old childrenengage in activities known by law to be inherentlydangerous for childrenshows that serious physical harm or death was imminent. Children 11 and 13 years of age are 

### generally inexperienced at exercising sound and independent judgment necessary for workin inherently dangerous activities, as Zachary demonstrated when he rolled over the backhoe he was 

### operating. The risk of harm is heightened when the children are especiallyyoung as inthe case here. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "imminent" as "ready 

### to take place: near at hand: .
.. hanging threateningly over one's head: 

### menacingly near."46 Contrary to Doty's assertion, the Department's use of the word "imminent" is not "strikingly vague" or a "redefinition" of the word. Rather, it

46Webster'sThird New InternationalDictionary 1130 (2002). -15-NO. 72021-0-1/16 

### aptly describes the risks involved when minors engage in inherently dangerous
work. 

### Inchallenging the Department's "serious" designations, Dotyassigns error to several findings of fact. First, he alleges that the Department did not prove 

### that Zachary's lifting of communication wires while on top of the moving house created a danger of electrical shock from induced voltage, calling the director's 

### finding of fact "pure speculation." The director weighed testimony and declarations from both parties' experts on this issue and found, "The opinions of 

### the Department experts, Miller, Ervin and Mcmurdie in this regard are more credible than those of [Doty's expert] Carl Plumb." Substantialevidence supports 

### the director's findings, and "itis notthefunction of an appellate court to substitute 

### itsjudgmentfor that of the trial court or to weigh the evidence or the credibilityof witnesses."47 

### Dotyalso challenges the director's rejection ofPlumb's opinion, based on
an unrelated regulation, that because Zachary was only "observing rather than 

### being engaged in activities," use of a safety monitor system in lieu of fall restraints or warning lines would have complied with the law. But videotaped evidence shows Zachary moving around on the roof and lifting traffic signals— much more than simply inspecting or observing. And Plumb's opinion ignores 47 Davis v. Dep't of Labor & Indus.. 94 Wn.2d 119, 124, 615 P.2d 1279 (1980). -16-NO. 72021-0-1/17 

### the fact that the law prohibited 13-year-old Zachary from working on the roof at all. Substantial evidence supports the director's finding that Plumb's opinion was
not credible. 

### Doty also disputes the director's finding that Plumb had an "erroneous 

### belief that lack of aWISHA [Washington IndustrialSafety and Health Act of1973, chapter 49.17 RCW] violation precludes a serious violation of the child labor standards." But in his declaration, Plumb fails to acknowledge the stricter 

### standards for minors, only observing that the boys' more dangerous activities, if 

### performed by an adult, would "not violate specific WISHA safety standards." Substantial evidence supports this finding. 

### Next, Doty faults the director for not specifically listing the alleged missing safety equipment. Butsubstantial evidence shows that the boys did hazardous work without safety harnesses, reflective vests, hard hats, or boots. And Doty cites no authority supporting a contention thatthe Department's failure to exactly itemize required safety equipment renders its finding erroneous or its action arbitrary orcapricious. This claim fails. 

### Doty also challenges the director's findings that Zachary drove the backhoe on "uneven terrain," that drivers who tip over a backhoe "are thrown fromthe seat," and thatZachary "hit a temporary electrical wire while operating a 

### backhoe." Dotydoes notdisputethat Zachary, wearing no safety harness, tipped
-17-NO. 72021-0-1/18


### over the backhoe while driving over ground that was "soft" in places. The 

### director weighed testimony that Zachary drove too fast and in an unsafe manner. Substantialevidence supports the director'sfindings here. 

### Dotydoes not dispute the director'sfindings that on the days namedinthe Department's citations, he permitted (1) both Zachary and Stephen to drive 

### heavymachinery, (2) both boys toperformvarioustasks at theconstruction sites, (3) Zachary toperformvariousactivities more than 10feet above groundlevel on the rooftop of a house moving along citystreets, and (4) Zachary to workas an outside helper on citystreets as part of Doty'shouse-moving business. 

### Substantial evidence supports the director's challenged findings of fact, 

### and unchallengedfindings are verities on appeal.48 These findings support the director's conclusions of law that Doty employed his sons in work prohibited to 

### minors. The findings likewise support the conclusion that these violations of state child labor laws were repeated and serious, warranting the penalties the 

### Departmentassessed. Weaffirmthedirector's orderupholdingtheDepartment's citations and penalties. Dotv's Status as Judgment Debtor 

### For the first time on appeal, Dotyargues that any judgment should have 

### been entered against him as a married man in his separate capacity. This 48 Kitsap County v. Kitsap Rifle &Revolver Club. Wn. App. , 337 P.3d 328, 334 (2014). -18-NO. 72021-0-1/19


### argumentfails. This court has declined to review a requestto clarifythe identity of the judgment debtor where a party did not raise the issue before the trial court.49 Moreover, "[a] debt incurred by either spouse during marriage is 

### presumed to be a communitydebt,"50 and "[i]tis wellsettled that this presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence" that the parties have 

### renounced the marital community.51 Doty does not attempt to overcome this presumption, and our Supreme Court has overruled the case he cites for the proposition that his interest in community property should be shielded from 

### executionto satisfy his separate obligations.52 Attorney Fees Doty argues thathe is entitledto attorneyfees and costs. Because he has not prevailed on any issue, he is not entitled to this relief under any authority cited by him.
CONCLUSION Because the Department did not exceed its rule-making authority when it defined "employ," substantial evidence supports the director's findings, and those
49 Am. Disc. Corp. v. Shepherd. 129 Wn. App. 345, 347 n.1, 120 P.3d 96 (2005); RAP 2.5(a). 50 Oil Heat Co. of Port Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 26 Wn. App. 351, 353, 613P.2d 169(1980). 51 OilHeat Co.. 26 Wn. App. at 353-54. 52 Stockand v. Bartlett. 4 Wash. 730, 730-31, 31 P. 24 (1892), overruling recognized by Halev v. Highland. 142Wn.2d135, 142, 12 P.3d 119 (2000). -19-NO. 72021-0-1/20 

### findings support the conclusion that Doty employed his sons and committed serious violations of child labor laws, we affirm. We decline to review Doty's 

### claim that anyjudgment should be entered against himas a married man in his separate capacity and decline his requestforattorneyfees.

WE CONCUR: 

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