*Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-50268

(Summary Calendar)

ROBERT AARON WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TIMOTHY EARY, An Officer-Co. III, 

ET AL., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(W-94-CA-380)

( August 9, 1995)

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:* 

 

In this appeal from a judgment of the district court

dismissing his civil rights lawsuit, Plaintiff-Appellant Robert
2

Aaron Williams, an inmate of the Hughes Unit of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (TDCJ),

claims that the district court abused its discretion. As

defendants in the action, Williams named Correctional Officers

Timothy W. Eary and Tommy A. Gober and Captain Raul J. Mata of

Hughes Unit. In his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, Williams sought

both money damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, including

restoration of "good time" taken from him as a result of the

complained-of disciplinary conviction. Finding no reversible

error, we affirm. 

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Williams alleged in his complaint that Officer Gober ordered

him to get a haircut, and that after Williams did so, Officer Eary

charged him in a disciplinary report "for refusing to cut the top

of his hair." Williams asserts first that he did not control the

haircut he received and second that he could not correct it because

he had to report for work. He also alleged that two other TDCJ

officials were of the opinion that the haircut met TDCJ grooming

guidelines. 

At Williams' disciplinary hearing, Captain Mata found him

guilty of a major rule infraction and as punishment took some

accumulated "good time" from him. Williams took appeals through

the grievance procedure but they were denied. 

The magistrate judge ordered Williams to amend his complaint,

"to state specific facts demonstrating a constitutional violation."
3

Williams subsequently filed a lengthy document, Part I of which is

entitled "Judgment Consideration." In it he alleged relevant facts

in greater detail and he stated various propositions of law.

Williams alleged that he got a haircut as ordered by Gober, but

that after he left the barber shop, he was told by Gober that he

was "going to drop a dime" on Williams, terminology that Williams

purportedly did not understand. Officer Eary then took over,

telling Williams, "I don't like your cut." Williams replied that

it was in accordance with the guideline book.

Eary allegedly told Williams to stand by a wall, but after

standing there for about 12 minutes, Williams heard the call to

return to work. Eary told Williams either to go get another

haircut or to give Eary his (Williams') ID card; however, Williams

decided that going to work was more important, so he did.

A few days later, Eary charged Williams with refusal to obey

a direct order. At the disciplinary hearing, Captain Mata found

Williams guilty. On appeal, the warden upheld the verdict. The

warden found, based on the disciplinary report, that Williams had

refused to cut the top of his hair, i.e., to comply with the

grooming guidelines. The warden noted further that Williams "made

no request for witnesses at the time of service or during the

hearing," and that his evidence was sufficient. 

 After affirmance by the Regional Director at Step 2,

Williams appealed to the Deputy Director. Williams alleged that he

did not disobey the order to get a haircut, but that "[t]he entire

ordeal was staged," planned by Gober and Eary. The Deputy Director
4

denied Williams' appeal for reasons similar to those of the Warden,

adding that Williams had the opportunity to present his defense at

his hearing.

The district court noted that Williams had "filed a `Judgment

Consideration' that appears to be an Amended Complaint," but

concluded that it "adds nothing to Plaintiff's previous claims."

The court treated this document as Williams' objections to the

magistrate judge's report. The court dismissed the action on

grounds that Williams' "allegations raise, at best, a defense to

the underlying disciplinary charge, i.e.[,] that his violation of

the TDCJ rules was unintentional because he had gotten a haircut."

II

ANALYSIS

In Williams' lengthy appellate brief, only a small part of

which is relevant, the closest he comes to stating an issue is that

he should not have been convicted of the disciplinary violation

because he had the right to refuse the second haircut, i.e., his

first haircut that day was in accordance with the TDCJ rules. In

effect, Williams is contending that the evidence was insufficient

to support his disciplinary board conviction. Both in the district

court and in his appellate brief, however, he concedes that he

violated Officer Eary's order to get a second haircut. Williams'

contention lacks merit because his conviction is supported by "some

facts," by considerably more evidence than "any evidence at all."

See Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 992 (1982).
5

The only case cited by Williams that is even remotely relevant

is Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1993). In that case, the

court held that the district court's finding that Iowa prison

officials did not have a legitimate penological interest in

prohibiting shag haircuts was not clearly erroneous. We, however,

have upheld TDCJ's grooming code, including the prohibition of

inmates' allowing their hair to grow long. Powell v. Estelle, 959

F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 668 (1992).

Williams states that, at the beginning of his disciplinary

hearing, his request for a witness was denied. He does not,

however, reveal the name of the proposed witness or the content of

the testimony that the witness may have given. Moreover, this

allegation is in conflict with the Warden's finding that Williams

"made no request for witnesses at the time of service [of the

disciplinary report on him] or during the hearing." We will not

consider this issue, because Williams has not argued it as an issue

in his brief. See Weaver v. Puckett, 896 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 966 (1990).

In an apparent reference to Eary and Gober, Williams asserts

that "the two officer[s]" deliberately caused the violation by

giving him the Hobson's Choice of either refusing the order to get

a haircut or missing work. This is contradicted to some extent by

allegations of Williams' amended complaint to the effect that

Officer Eary "took over" after Officer Gober told Williams he was

"going to drop a dime" on him. Assuming that Williams is now

alleging a conspiracy, we shall not address it because Williams did
 

1 In his "Judgment Consideration" Williams mentions the terms

"plots" and "conspiracy," but they are in a paragraph of gibberish

devoid of any factual allegation tending to show a conspiracy. 

6

not present such a theory to the district court.1 "[I]ssues raised

for the first time on appeal are not reviewable by this court

unless they involve purely legal questions and failure to consider

them would result in manifest injustice." Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920

F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

"An in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed as frivolous

[pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] if it lacks an arguable basis in

law or fact." Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).

"Dismissal with prejudice [is] appropriate if the plaintiff has

been given an opportunity to expound on [his] factual allegations

. . . but does not assert any facts which would support an arguable

claim." Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993).

We review § 1915(d) dismissals "utilizing the abuse of

discretion standard." Id. at 317. When we do so here we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

dismissed Williams' action with prejudice, because his amended

complaint shows that he failed to allege "any facts which would

support an arguable claim." Id. at 319.

AFFIRMED.