United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted April 13, 2017*

Decided May 9, 2017 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

No. 16-3325 

SAMUEL SLEDGE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY and JOHN A. WOLFE, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 16 C 3627 

Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Samuel Sledge has thrice sued State Farm and its insured, John Wolfe, seeking 

damages for the same automobile accident, but each time Sledge has struck out. His 

first lawsuit, filed in an Illinois court in 2011, was dismissed three years later for failure 

to prosecute. In 2015 he brought a similar action, also in state court, against both 

defendants. This time the court granted State Farm’s motion to dismiss on the ground 

that Illinois prohibits a direct action against an insurer without the plaintiff’s first 

obtaining a judgment against the insured, see Marchlik v. Coronet Ins. Co., 239 N.E.2d 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the appeal is 

frivolous. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 16-3325 Page 2 

799, 802–03 (Ill. 1968). Later the court dismissed Sledge’s action against Wolfe for failure 

to prosecute. Sledge now claims in this federal suit that State Farm and Wolfe conspired 

to violate his constitutional rights under color of state law, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. 

State Farm moved to dismiss for two reasons: first, that the state court’s most recent 

dismissal precludes the current suit; and second, that Sledge did not allege that the 

company acted under color of state law. The district court agreed with both of State 

Farm’s arguments, and for good measure, it also dismissed Sledge’s claim against Wolfe 

for failure to effect service, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1), (m). Wolfe has taken no part in this 

litigation. 

We affirm the dismissal because state action is an essential element of claims 

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 that rely on the Fourteenth Amendment. See 

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) 

(§ 1983); United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983) 

(§ 1985). Sledge tells us in his brief that he “doesn’t allege state farm was an actor of any 

state,” but, he contends, suits under § 1983 are not limited to state officials, persons 

acting under color of state law, or those who are acting in such close coordination with 

the state that “seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State 

itself.” Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 295 (internal quotation marks omitted). He is 

incorrect. See Xiong v. Fischer, 787 F.3d 389, 397–98 (7th Cir. 2015); Johnson v. Larabida 

Children’s Hosp., 372 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2004). Sledge’s allegations do not suggest 

that State Farm conspired with state officials or itself acted under color of state law, and 

so his complaint is frivolous. We offer no comment on the allegations against Wolfe 

because he was never served. 

The remainder of Sledge’s brief is devoted to asking us to overturn various 

decisions of the state courts, but we have no supervisory power over the Illinois court 

system and thus cannot oblige. United States ex rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 

1186 (7th Cir. 1983). 

AFFIRMED.