97-019

 No. 97-019

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 1997

BURNT FORK CITIZENS COALITION, an unincorporated association,

 Petitioner and Respondent,

 v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF RAVALLI COUNTY, 

a body politic and political subdivision of the State of Montana,

 Respondent and Appellant,

 and

DENNIS MORGAN, TRUSTEE OF AMPAC MANAGEMENT, INC., 

PROFIT SHARING PLAN,

 Intervenor-Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Ravalli,

 The Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellants:

 Norman H. Grosfield, Utick & Grosfield, Helena, Montana

 (for Board of County Commissioners of Ravalli County)

 Martin S. King; Worden, Thane & Haines; Missoula, Montana

 (for Dennis Morgan, Trustee of AMPAC Management, Inc.)

 For Respondent:

 William A. Rossbach and Elizabeth A. Brennan; Rossbach & Whiston,

P.C.;

 Missoula, Montana; and Karl J. Englund, Attorney at Law, Missoula,

Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: May 30, 1997

 Decided: December 30, 1997 

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Filed:

 __________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 Petitioner Burnt Fork Citizens Coalition filed a petition for writ of review in 

the

District Court for the Twenty-First Judicial District in Ravalli County after the 

respondent

Board of County Commissioners of Ravalli County conditionally approved the 

subdivision

proposal submitted by intervenor-respondent Dennis Morgan. After a hearing, the

District Court granted Burnt Fork's writ of review and held that the conditional 

approval

was "annulled and set aside." Morgan and the Board appeal. We affirm the order of 

the

District Court.

 There are two issues on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it held that the Board was obligated to 

apply

the county subdivision regulations and that the regulations had not been impliedly

repealed by the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, õ 76-3-608(3)(a), MCA (1993)?

 2. Did the District Court err when it found that the Board had exceeded its

jurisdiction when it considered the subdivision proposal without the satisfaction of 

certain

conditions precedent?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Dennis Morgan owns a 191-acre tract of land in northeast Ravalli County. In

1994, he submitted a proposal to the Ravalli County Board of County Commissioners

("Board") to develop a 32-lot subdivision on the land, known as Burnt Fork Meadows. 

The Board denied the proposal, but expressly stated that Morgan could resubmit a 

revised

proposal and offered him general direction about what aspects of the proposal to 

revise. 

 In the spring of 1995, Morgan submitted a second Burnt Fork Meadows

subdivision proposal which included twenty lots. In addition to the preliminary 

plat,

Morgan submitted a number of supplemental materials to support his proposal, pursuant

to the Ravalli County Subdivision Regulations. On July 12, 1995, the Ravalli County

Planning Board held a public hearing to accept public comment on the proposed

subdivision, in accordance with the County Subdivision Regulations. A number of

citizens spoke at the hearing, almost all of whom expressed opposition to the 

subdivision

for a variety of reasons. The Planning Board, which acts in an advisory capacity to 

the

Board, voted at the meeting to recommend to the Board that the proposed subdivision 

be

denied. A few days later, the chair of the Planning Board communicated in a memo to

the Board its findings from the hearing and "strongly recommend[ed]" that the Board

deny the subdivision.

 Despite the Planning Board's recommendation, the Board conditionally approved

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the Burnt Fork Meadows subdivision on August 11, 1995. The Subdivision Regulations

of Ravalli County provide that the basis of a decision by the Board to approve or

disapprove a subdivision shall be whether the information submitted has demonstrated 

that

the subdivision would be in the public interest. The Regulations also state that any

subdivision not in the public interest shall be disapproved and that, as part of its 

decision,

the Board shall include written findings regarding eight criteria for determining 

public

interest. The Board's conditional approval made written findings regarding only 

five of

the eight criteria. All of those indicated that the subdivision would have a 

negative effect

on the public interest. 

 On September 11, 1995, Burnt Forks Citizens Coalition, an unincorporated

association of interested citizens, filed a petition for writ of review in the 

District Court. 

The Coalition asserted in an amended petition that the Board failed to follow the 

County

Subdivision Regulations and that in doing so it acted in excess of its jurisdiction 

when it

approved the subdivision. Morgan moved to intervene, and the District Court granted

his motion on October 27, 1995. He later moved to dismiss the petition for, among 

other

things, its failure to state a claim. After the parties briefed the issue, the 

District Court

denied the motion to dismiss on July 26, 1996. 

 A hearing was held on August 29, 1996. Following the hearing, the parties

submitted briefs regarding the implied repeal of the County Subdivision Regulations 

by

the amended Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, õ 76-3-608(3)(a), MCA (1993). On

October 30, 1996, the District Court held that the County Subdivision Regulations had

not been repealed and that the Board's approval failed to comply with the Subdivision

Regulations. Therefore, it granted the petition for writ of review and ordered that 

the

conditional approval be "annulled and set aside."

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it held that the Board was obligated to apply 

the

county subdivision regulations and that the regulations had not been impliedly 

repealed

by the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, õ 76-3-608(3)(a), MCA (1993)?

 We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether its

interpretation of the law is correct. See Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co.

(1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898 P.2d 680, 686; see also Kreger v. Francis (1995), 271

Mont. 444, 447, 898 P.2d 672, 674; Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245

Mont. 470, 474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603-04.

 The Montana Subdivision and Platting Act requires that local governing bodies

adopt regulations for the development of subdivisions within their jurisdiction. 

See õ 76-

3-501, MCA. Pursuant to the Act, the Board of County Commissioners of Ravalli

County adopted regulations to review proposed subdivision plats in 1985. Until 1993,

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the County Regulations mirrored the Act; each required that the Board weigh eight

criteria to determine whether the proposed subdivision would be in the public 

interest. 

The criteria included: "(a) the basis of the need for the subdivision; (b) expressed 

public

opinion; (c) effects on agriculture; (d) effects on local services; (e) effects on 

taxation;

(f) effects on the natural environment; (g) effects on wildlife and wildlife 

habitat; and (h)

effects on the public health and safety." Section 76-3-608(2), MCA (1985); see also

Ravalli County Subdivision Regulations, Section II.A.10.

 The 1993 Montana Legislature, however, amended the Act, so that local governing

bodies were required to review only five criteria. They included: "the effect on

agriculture, local services, the natural environment, wildlife and wildlife habitat, 

and

public health and safety." Section 76-3-608(3)(a), MCA (1993). The Board, at the 

time

of its review of the Burnt Fork Meadows subdivision, had not amended its County

Regulations to conform to the amended 1993 Act, and still listed eight criteria for 

review.

 Here, in an attempt to justify the Board's consideration of only the five 

criteria in

the amended 1993 Act, the Board and Morgan assert that the County Regulations, as 

they

existed in 1995, conflicted with the Act, and therefore, that the County Regulations 

had

been impliedly repealed and replaced by the amended 1993 Act. Accordingly, they

contend that the Board, in fact, complied with the County regulations, since the 

County

regulations, like the Act, required that the Board make findings regarding only five

criteria, and not the eight criteria listed in the "outdated" County Regulations. We

disagree.

 There is no question that the Board is required to review and either approve or

disapprove a subdivision proposal pursuant to the terms of the County Regulations in

effect at the time that the proposal is submitted. See õ 76-3-501(2), MCA. It is 

also

undisputed that the County Regulations, as they existed at the time of Morgan's Burnt

Fork Meadows proposal, required the Board to review and make written findings on 

eight

criteria to determine the public interest. Based on õ 76-3-501(2), MCA, the Board 

may

not ignore its own County Regulations and apply just the terms of the Act to review 

and

conditionally approve a proposed subdivision. Rather, we hold that it is bound to 

follow

the County Regulations in effect at the time that the proposal is made.

 The Board and Morgan assert that the County Regulations "conflicted" with the

amended 1993 Act because they included criteria that the Legislature had expressly

removed from the Act and that the County Regulations were therefore impliedly 

repealed. 

They rely on State ex rel. Swart v. Casne (1977), 172 Mont. 302, 308-09, 564 P.2d 

983,

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986, in which we stated: "This grant of authority does not include the right to

promulgate regulations in direct conflict with the Act. . . . An administrative 

agency is

not a 'super legislature' empowered to change statutory law under the cloak of an

assumed delegated power." Swart held that where the Act specifically provided for an

exemption, a state agency could not develop regulations that eliminated the 

exemption. 

However, their reliance on Swart and their consequent claim that the County 

Regulations

"directly conflict" with the Act is unfounded.

 Unlike the state agency in Swart, county governments have extensive powers

pursuant to the Montana Constitution. See Art. XI, Sec. 4, Mont. Const. ("A county 

has

legislative, administrative, and other powers provided or implied by law. . . . 

[which]

shall be liberally construed."). In State ex rel. Dreher v. Fuller (1993), 257 

Mont. 445,

450-51, 849 P.2d 1045, 1048, which also involved the Act, we explained that an 

agency's

authority is limited by the specific and definite guidance from the Legislature, 

while a

county governing body, which often has separate legislative authority and is 

accountable

to its constituents, requires less guidance. Accordingly, the Act's mandate to local

governing bodies to assert local control and to develop their own subdivision 

regulations

clearly contemplates that counties are free, pursuant to their legislative 

authority, to

promulgate regulations which do not necessarily conform exactly to the Act, so long 

as

they do not conflict with it. See Dreher, 257 Mont. at 451, 849 P.2d at 1049 ("[A]

regulation which establishes procedures . . . gives substance to the Act's policy of 

local

government control."). 

 If we consider the amended 1993 Act as a whole, we further note that local

governing bodies are not necessarily required to maintain their subdivision 

regulations in

precise accordance with the language of the Act. For example, õ 76-3-608(3), MCA

(1993), states that proposals must be reviewed for the five "primary criteria," while

earlier versions of õ 76-3-608, MCA, made no attempt to designate the eight criteria 

as

primary in relation to other criteria that local governing bodies might consider. In

addition to the provision that names the five primary criteria, the amended 1993 Act

added a provision that requires local governing bodies to review a proposed 

subdivision

for its "compliance with the local subdivision regulations provided for in part 5 of 

[the

Act]." Section 76-3-608(3)(b)(ii), MCA (1993). This clearly indicates that the Act

expects local regulations to be able to supplement the five requirements in õ 76-3-

608(3)(a), MCA (1993). Finally, the Act prior to and after the 1993 amendments 

refers

to state standards as "minimum" requirements for local subdivision regulations and 

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the

need for local regulations to be "consistent with [the Act]." Section 76-3-504(2), 

MCA. 

 We find clear evidence in the Act that local regulations need not be in precise

conformity with the Act. The clear intent is that local governing bodies be able to

develop their own local subdivision regulations that are consistent with the Act, 

and that

the Act establishes minimum requirements that local governing bodies must follow. 

Mere

difference between the County Regulations and the Act is insufficient grounds on 

which

to assert that the County Regulations conflict with the Act and effectuate their 

implied

repeal by the Act.

 Nonetheless, we recognize that some local subdivision regulations may 

significantly

conflict with the Act so as to undermine the legality of the local regulations. Where

differences between statutes exist, the earlier statute may be impliedly repealed by 

the

later one if they are "plainly and irreconcilably repugnant to or in conflict with 

each

other." W.R. Grace & Co. v. Department of Revenue (1989), 238 Mont. 439, 450, 779

P.2d 470, 476.

 Here, the County Regulations merely hold subdivision proposals to a stricter set

of criteria than the Act requires. As stated above, the Act contemplates that local 

bodies

be able to establish a review process that is particular to their own jurisdiction. 

The

County Regulations expand on the Act's minimum requirements and preserve a stricter

review process for proposed Ravalli County subdivisions, which is consistent with the

policy of local government control and suggests no threat to the Act. See Dreher, 

257

Mont. at 451, 849 P.2d at 1049. Accordingly, we conclude that the County Regulations

are not plainly and irreconcilably repugnant to or in conflict with the Act. 

Therefore,

they are not impliedly repealed by the amended 1993 Act and the Board was bound to

make findings on the eight criteria in the County Regulations.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err when it found that the Board had exceeded its

jurisdiction when it considered and conditionally approved the subdivision proposal

without the satisfaction of certain conditions precedent?

 This matter came before the District Court as a petition for writ of review. 

Section 27-25-102(2), MCA, authorizes a district court to grant a writ of review 

"when

a lower tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded the

jurisdiction of the tribunal, board, or officer and there is no appeal or, in the 

judgment

of the court, any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy." 

 The parties here do not contest the writ based on the adequacy of the remedy

available to the Coalition. Rather, the Board and Morgan assert that even if the 

Board

was bound to review the proposed subdivision according to the eight criteria in the

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County Regulations, its failure to do so and its subsequent conditional approval in 

light

of the findings did not amount to an act that exceeded its jurisdiction. Therefore, 

we

must determine if the Board's conditional approval of the subdivision constitutes an

exercise of authority beyond its jurisdiction.

 In Buffalo v. Thiel (1984), 213 Mont. 280, 691 P.2d 1343, we were called upon

to analyze a tribunal's authority or jurisdiction under circumstances analogous to 

those

in this case. In that case, Myron Buffalo was sued in justice court by Jerry Thiel 

for

damage to a motel room based on a theory of implied contract. The justice court 

issued

an ex parte pre-judgment attachment of a pickup in Buffalo's possession and the truck

was impounded. Buffalo filed a petition for writ of certiorari or review in the 

district

court, which concluded that it had no authority to review the pre-judgment 

attachment. 

On appeal, we held that certiorari or review, as provided for by õ 27-25-102, MCA, is

appropriate where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction, but that it cannot be 

employed to

correct errors within a tribunal's jurisdiction. See Buffalo, 213 Mont. at 284, 691 

P.2d

at 1345. We stated that:

In this sense, the lack of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an

erroneous decision made by a court in exercising the jurisdiction it

possessed. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts Section 90. If a court is acting within its

jurisdiction, it has the power to decide erroneously as well as correctly. 

Johnston v. Marsh (3rd Cir. 1955), 227 F.2d 528. 

Buffalo, 213 Mont. at 284, 691 P.2d at 1345.

 We noted, however, that:

The area of difficulty arises, as in this case, where an inferior court has

both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and is acting under a

particular statute conferring jurisdiction to act only in certain circumstances. 

The inquiry in such a case is to whether all of the conditions precedent to

such jurisdiction are present. The presence or absence of such

"jurisdictional facts" is determinative of whether the lower court acted with

and within its jurisdiction.

Buffalo, 213 Mont. at 285, 691 P.2d at 1345.

 We noted that a justice court's authority to issue a writ of attachment was

dependent by statute on submission of an affidavit which establishes that the 

defendant

is indebted to the plaintiff based on a contract for the direct payment of money and 

that

the contract at issue in that case was clearly not one for the direct payment of 

money. 

For that reason, we held that the justice court had not satisfied a condition 

precedent to

the exercise of its jurisdiction and that the district court erred when it denied 

Buffalo's

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petition for a writ of certiorari.

 A similar situation exists in this case. By both statute and regulation, there 

were

limitations on the Board's jurisdiction or authority to approve a subdivision 

application. 

Section 76-3-501(2), MCA, provides that "[r]eview and approval or disapproval of a

subdivision under [the Act] may occur only under those regulations in effect at the 

time

an application for approval of a preliminary plat or for an extension under 76-3-610 

is

submitted to the governing body."

 In other words, the Board was limited by statute from acting on an application

absent compliance with its own regulations. The Subdivision Regulations of Ravalli

County which were in effect on the date of the intervenor's application provided as

follows:

The governing body shall disapprove any subdivision which it finds not to

be in the public interest. To determine whether the proposed subdivision

would be in the public interest the governing body shall issue written

findings of fact which weigh the following criteria for public interest:

 a. The basis of need for the subdivision;

 b. Expressed public opinion;

 c. Effects on agriculture;

 d. Effects on local services;

 e. Effects on taxation;

 f. Effects on the natural environment;

 g. Effects on wildlife and wildlife habitat and;

 h. Effects on the public health and safety.

 The Board made no findings regarding the need for the subdivision, expressed

public opinion, or its effects on taxation. Of those findings that the Board did 

make,

none of them established that the development was in the "public interest" based on 

the

criteria considered. For example, the Board found:

 1. "[T]he cumulative impacts [of this subdivision] will have a negative longterm impact on the local farming economy."

 2. "[I]t is expected that there will be negative effects of this subdivision 

on the

continued operation of existing agricultural activities."

 3. "This subdivision will negatively effect [sic] the provision of county-wide

public services as they are provided at this time."

 4. "The development of these lots will result in additional air pollution 

related

to vehicular and home heating emissions."

 5. "Until additional school facilities can be assured, a subdivision of this

magnitude would substantially and immediately jeopardize the quality of education of

those students currently enrolled and the additional students from this subdivision."

 6. "[T]his proposed subdivision in this area will have a negative impact on

wildlife populations and habitat."

 7. "Police protection is available, but would be severely limited due to

response time and available personnel." 

 We conclude that the District Court did not, as the appellants contend, simply

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review the Board's decision to determine whether it was correct. If the Board had 

made

findings that the subdivision was in the "public interest" and the District Court had

concluded, based on the evidence, that those findings were in error, the appellants'

argument would have some merit. However, in this case, the Board's own findings were

that the applicant for subdivision approval had failed to meet the statutory 

prerequisite for

approval. In the language of our decision in Buffalo, the condition precedent to the

Board's authority to approve, or even conditionally approve, the application for

subdivision approval had not, based on the Board's own findings, been satisfied. 

 We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err when it held that the

Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it considered and conditionally approved the

subdivision of Burnt Fork Meadows, and when the court, on that basis, "annulled and 

set

aside" conditional approval of that application.

 For these reasons, the order and judgment of the District Court are affirmed.

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

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