Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and Opinion filed 

December 21, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-22-00372-CV

DEBRA BOOTHE, Appellant

V.

ZEDDIE BOOTHE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 505th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 19-DCV-261361

O P I N I O N

Debra Boothe appeals from the final decree of divorce terminating her 

marriage to Zeddie Boothe. The trial court found that Debra committed fraud on 

the community and wasting of community assets and that she owed reimbursement 

to the community. Taking those factors into account, as well as Zeddie’s attorney’s 

fees, the trial court awarded the entirety of the known community estate to Zeddie. 

The trial court also denied Debra’s request for spousal maintenance. In two issues 
2

on appeal, Debra contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial 

court’s awarding of the entire community estate to Zeddie and that the court 

abused its discretion in denying her request for spousal maintenance. Concluding 

that the trial court erred in its division of the community estate, we reverse and 

remand that portion of the decree for a new division of property and affirm the 

remainder of the judgment, including the denial of spousal maintenance.

Background1

Although there was some disagreement between the parties regarding an 

earlier ceremony, the trial court found that Zeddie and Debra were married in 

March 1989, and such finding is not challenged on appeal. The trial court also

found that the couple stopped living together as spouses around June 1995. The 

couple had three children together. The youngest child, Jasmine, emancipated on 

June 26, 2010. However, the record contains a Default Order in Suit for 

Modification of Child Support Obligation, dated November 10, 2015, which 

ordered Zeddie to pay $840 a month in child support for Jasmine indefinitely due 

to a purported disability. In the proceedings currently before us, the trial court 

found that there was no credible evidence to substantiate that Jasmine was or ever 

had been disabled and that credible evidence disproved any such disability. 

At trial, Debra testified that other than the clothes on her back and in her 

closet, she did not own anything. She did not present any other evidence regarding 

community or separate property and did not testify as to any debts.

2 Zeddie 

1 We have reviewed the record, but we also accept as true the facts stated in appellant’s 

brief to the extent supported by record citation because appellee failed to file a brief. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 38.1(g); Jackson v. Cain-Stegemoller, No. 14-18-00207-CV, 2019 WL 3724988, at *1 

n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 8, 2019, no pet.). The State, which was also a party 

due to an alleged child support arrearage, has expressly waived its right to file a brief.

2 Debra’s attorney represented that he had documentation of some nature at the trial, but 

he was unable to get it admitted into evidence. No issues regarding the excluded evidence are
3

testified and presented a proposed property division showing that he possessed 

community property valued at $446,232.32 and owed community debts of 

$12,100, for a positive total of $434,132.32. Zeddie’s proposed property division 

showed Debra as possessing no community property and owing no community 

debts. The community property listed for Zeddie included vehicles, bank accounts, 

and retirement accounts.

The trial court concluded that Zeddie “should be awarded a disproportionate 

share of the parties’ estate due to the following reasons: actual or constructive 

fraud committed by Debra Boothe, wasting of community assets, reimbursement, 

and attorneys’ fees to be paid.” The only specific finding the trial court made

regarding any of these allegations was that Debra “continued to collect $840.00 per 

month in child support from Petitioner until September 2021 based on false claims 

that Jasmine Boothe was disabled.” Among other things in its final decree, the trial 

court dissolved the parties’ marriage, terminated Zeddie’s child support obligation, 

awarded each side the community property that was in their possession or under 

their control (effectively awarding Zeddie the entirety of the proven community 

estate except for Debra’s clothes) as well as the liabilities they had incurred, and 

ordered each side to pay their own attorney’s fees. The trial court also denied 

Debra’s request for spousal maintenance.

Among other things, Zeddie testified at trial that the couple separated in 

1995 because Debra was squandering money and had stolen a couple of his 

checkbooks and was writing checks without his knowledge. He said that she was 

using the money to throw parties for the neighborhood. He further alleged that he 

and Debra had operated a daycare for a time, but Debra used the business to steal

clients’ social security numbers for her own benefit. Zeddie asked that the 

raised in this appeal.
4

community estate be reimbursed for what he called Debra’s fraudulent conduct. He 

did not, however, suggest any specific amount by which the community estate had 

allegedly been diminished by such conduct. Alternatively, he asked to be awarded

a disproportionate share of the community estate. Zeddie asserted that the couple 

had lived apart since the agreed separation, but he had not filed for divorce in the 

intervening 27 years because he wanted his children to know that he was not 

abandoning them.

Zeddie stated that Jasmine was 29 years old at the time of trial, and although 

he initially stopped paying child support when she turned 18, he was told to start 

paying again when she allegedly went to college. He subsequently received an 

order stating that he did not have to keep paying child support, and, in fact, he 

received a reimbursement. However, new child support proceedings resulted in a 

default order against him in late 2015 when Debra alleged that Jasmine was 

disabled and mentally unstable. Zeddie said, however, that Jasmine is not disabled 

and Debra defrauded the court and him. He explained that Jasmine has worked 

since she turned 18, got her GED in 2010, is married, and can and does support 

herself. He said that he had paid $840 a month since 2015 in child support for 

Jasmine. He alleged the money was not, in fact, used for Jasmine. He said that he 

and Jasmine had tried to rectify the situation, but the attorney they contacted 

wanted too much money. Although the default child support order states that 

Zeddie was duly notified, he contended at trial that he was not served with notice 

for those proceedings and that notice was sent to the wrong address. He only found 

out about the order later from the human resources department of his employer. He 

asked that the funds be reconstituted back into the community estate and counted 

against Debra in the division of the estate.

The trial court made no finding and Zeddie offered no testimony regarding 
5

the total amount of child support that he erroneously paid based on the disability 

claim. However, the default order provided that he was to pay $840 a month in 

child support starting September 18, 2014, and the court below found that the 

payments ended in September 2021. Assuming Zeddie made 85 months of 

payments, this equates to $71,400. But there was also evidence that Zeddie was in 

arrears on the payments by $5,208.21, apparently because the default order had 

been retroactive and he never made the retroactive payments. The amount Zeddie 

actually paid was therefore less than $71,400.3 Although Zeddie also testified at 

one point that he had made a total of $115,000 in child support payments for 

Jasmine since her emancipation, as stated, he acknowledged that he had already 

received a reimbursement for the amounts he allegedly paid because she was in 

college.

When specifically asked about his fraud claims against Debra, Zeddie 

identified her taking money without his knowledge (presumably the allegedly 

stolen checks) and the alleged receipt of child support under false pretenses. He 

told the court that he was asking for the division shown in exhibit P-2, which 

showed everything being awarded to Zeddie. He asserted that Debra has made zero 

contribution to the community estate, but he suggested without specifics that her 

father may have left her some property. Regarding Debra’s spousal maintenance 

claim, Zeddie testified that Debra had not been a spouse to him in 27 years. He did 

not believe she was entitled to spousal maintenance because they had each been 

supporting themselves. He asserted that his attorney’s fees in the case totaled 

$48,000.

Zeddie said he thought Debra was in pretty good shape and her vision was 

3 We say less than $71,400 rather than simply deducting the amount of the arrears that 

Zeddie never paid because the amount given for the arrears likely included interest that should 

not be subtracted from the amount of the payments he actually made.
6

fine, but she just chose not to work. He explained that she worked when they 

operated a daycare from 1989 to 1991, and she worked at another daycare during

the same period. He stated that the couple was filing separate tax returns but she 

once filed his tax return and then kept the refund. He reported the matter, but he 

says he was told she could do it because she was his wife. He did not state how 

much money was involved. He said that although he wants Debra to receive none 

of his retirement funds, she might be entitled to 20 percent of the funds that he 

earned between 1989 and 1995, the period when they were actually living together.

The trial court found that Debra’s “testimony throughout the trial was 

inconsistent and void of credibility.” In her testimony, Debra asserted that she was 

legally blind and had been blind since birth. She receives monthly social security 

disability checks of $742. She stated that she married Zeddie in 1986 and they 

became separated in 2013. According to Debra, Jasmine still requires care and 

supervision and Debra provides it; she also provides Jasmine a place to live and 

helps with her children. She explained that Jasmine has sickle cell anemia and 

learning disabilities and is unable to provide for herself. Debra admitted that she 

had no proof that Jasmine had limited mental capacity.

Debra was previously arrested for writing a bad check. She said that she has 

not applied for jobs because she cannot work due to her poor vision and numerous 

health issues that include high blood pressure, a blockage near her heart, a tumor in 

her head, depression, and anxiety. She also said that she has a learning disability

and lacks any education or training that could help her get a job. She insisted she 

could not provide for herself without spousal maintenance. She lives with Jasmine 

and another daughter and helps with the other daughter’s mortgage. She denied 

living off the child support payments and said her mother and uncle were paying 

for her attorney. 
7

Debra explained that during the marriage, Zeddie was “in and out” and was 

not helping pay bills, so sometimes their power would get cut off. According to 

Debra, Zeddie never voluntarily helped with their three children, and she had to 

depend on her parents for help. She said that when he would leave, they would 

have to move because they could not pay the rent. Zeddie did not appear for child 

support hearings in 1998, 2003, 2008, or 2015, even though she told him the dates. 

She said he spent money on the sons he fathered with other women. She denied 

improperly taking money from Zeddie, stealing his checks, or filing his tax return. 

She asserted that Zeddie told her she should stay home and take care of the 

children. She also said that she contributed to the marital estate by cooking,

cleaning, washing clothes, and taking care of the children. Debra insisted she did 

not own any property or furniture or really anything of value except clothing, and 

she denied receiving any inheritance from her father.

Zeddie’s niece, Taurus Lee, testified that Jasmine was independent and 

supporting herself financially, and Lee had not known Jasmine to live with Debra 

since Jasmine got married. She said that Jasmine has neither displayed any signs of 

mental instability nor received any money from Debra as support. Lee described 

Debra as untrustworthy and said that Debra probably could not stay with a relative 

because she could not be trusted. Lee had not known Debra to work except for the 

brief period where she ran a daycare. 

In closing argument, Zeddie’s attorney alleged that Debra had committed 

actual and constructive fraud by seeking child support for a nondisabled adult 

child, and the attorney asked the court to reconstitute the estate by adding the

amount of those payments back into the estate and awarding Zeddie a 

disproportionate share. She also requested the court award Zeddie attorney’s fees. 

She concluded by asking that the court order the proposed division in exhibit P-2, 
8

which showed the entirety of the community estate going to Zeddie. In his closing 

argument, Debra’s attorney asserted she had not committed fraud but merely 

provided documents to the attorney general’s office, which sought the continuing 

child support. He also alleged Zeddie had wasted community funds through his 

numerous affairs and fathering children outside the marriage. And he cited Debra’s 

alleged disability and other health issues. As stated above, the trial court awarded 

Zeddie the entirety of the known community estate, citing “actual or constructive 

fraud . . . , wasting . . . , reimbursement, and attorneys’ fees.”

Property Division

In her first issue, Debra challenges the trial court’s award of the entire 

community estate to Zeddie. We will begin our analysis by setting out the law 

governing division of the community estate in a divorce decree before turning to 

the trial court’s findings, Debra’s arguments, and the evidence. We conclude that 

the trial court erred in its division of the community estate.

Governing law. In a divorce decree, the trial court shall order a division of 

the parties’ community estate “in a manner that the court deems just and right, 

having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.” 

Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001; Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2001). Trial 

courts have wide discretion in determining a just and right division. Schlueter v. 

Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex. 1998). When circumstances justify, this

standard may result in a disproportionate division of assets and liabilities. Id. at 

589–90. Indeed, the property division need not be equal; however, it must be 

equitable, and there must be some reasonable basis for an unequal division of the 

property. E.g., Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–99 (Tex. 1981); Gordon v. 

Gordon, No. 14-10-01031-CV, 2011 WL 5926723, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Among the factors a trial court 
9

may consider in making an unequal division are the spouses’ earning capacities,

disparity of income and abilities, education, business opportunities, relative 

physical condition, relative financial condition, disparity of ages, size of separate 

estates, nature of the property, and the benefits that the spouse who did not cause 

the breakup of the marriage would have enjoyed had the marriage continued.

Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698–99; In re Marriage of Rangel & Tovias-Rangel, 580 

S.W.3d 675, 682 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Although 

fault in the breakup of the marriage may be considered, the division of property 

should not serve to punish the party at fault. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 

539, 543–45 (Tex. 2018).

Claims for waste, fraudulent transfer of community property, or other 

damage to community property belong to the community itself and also may be

considered in the trial court’s division. See Chu v. Hong, 249 S.W.3d 441, 444–45 

(Tex. 2008); see also Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589; K.T. v. M.T., No. 02-14-

00044-CV, 2015 WL 4910097, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2015, no 

pet.) (mem. op.) (“In addition, a court may consider one spouse’s wrongful 

dissipation of community assets.”); Smith v. Smith, 143 S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (listing 14 factors Texas courts have considered in 

ordering a disproportionate division).

Reimbursement is an equitable right that arises when the funds or assets of 

one estate are used to benefit and enhance another estate without the first estate 

receiving some benefit. Marriage of O’Brien, 436 S.W.3d 78, 82 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Waste, or constructive fraud, is one form of 

fraud on the community that occurs when a spouse wrongfully depletes the 

community estate of assets without the other spouse’s knowledge or consent. See 

In re Marriage of Walzel, No. 14-16-00637-CV, 2018 WL 614767, at *3–4 (Tex. 
10

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Schlueter, 

975 S.W.2d at 589); see also Cantu v. Cantu, 556 S.W.3d 420, 427 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“Fraud is presumed whenever one spouse 

disposes of the other spouse’s one-half interest in community property without that 

other spouse’s knowledge or consent.”). Waste requires disposal of community 

assets for non-community purposes. Giesler v. Giesler, No. 03-08-00734-CV, 2010 

WL 2330362, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). A 

spouse commits actual fraud against the other spouse’s interest in the community 

estate when the spouse transfers community property or expends community funds

for the primary purpose of depriving the other spouse of the use and enjoyment of 

the assets involved in the transaction. Strong v. Strong, 350 S.W.3d 759, 771 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). A trial court also has equitable power to award 

either spouse attorney’s fees as part of its just and right division of the marital 

estate. Maxwell v. Maxwell, No. 14-20-00298-CV, 2021 WL 4956881, at *25 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Findings and evidence. As mentioned above, the trial court generally

justified the disproportionate division based on Debra’s fraud, her wasting of

community assets, reimbursement, and Zeddie’s attorney’s fees. The only specific 

finding that the trial court made in support of the disproportionate division was that 

Debra “continued to collect . . . child support from Petitioner until September 2021 

based on false claims that Jasmine Boothe was disabled.” Although the trial court 

did not make an explicit finding as to the total amount lost from the community

due to this conduct, the record indicates that the amount was less than $71,400.

4

4 As set forth above, this calculation is based on 85 months at $840 per month minus the 

unpaid arrearage. No contention is made in this appeal, or was made below, that the funds used 

to pay the child support in question were not community property. Zeddie indicated in his 

testimony that the money came from his earnings during the marriage, which would have been 
11

Zeddie also testified that early in the marriage, Debra had stolen some 

checks and cashed them in order to throw parties for the neighborhood. Zeddie did 

not, however, offer any clue as to the total amount of the funds Debra expended in 

this fashion. And Zeddie testified that at one point, when they were filing separate 

tax returns, Debra filed a tax return in his name and then kept the tax refund. He 

said that when he reported this, he was told she could do it because she was his 

wife. Zeddie again did not offer any hint regarding the amount of the tax refund or 

what Debra may have done with it. Zeddie also testified that his attorney’s fees in 

the case totaled $48,000, and the trial court indicated it was taking that into 

account in making a disproportionate division as well.

Debra’s arguments. Debra argues that the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s disproportionate division. She argues more 

specifically that (1) there was insufficient evidence of the amount of any alleged 

damage to the community; (2) there was no evidence her separate estate benefitted 

from any community funds; (3) a trial court cannot recognize a claim for 

reimbursement for the payment of child support, citing Tex. Fam. Code § 3.409; 

(4) the attorney general’s office sought the disability child support; and (5) Zeddie 

failed to provide expert testimony regarding the reasonableness and necessity of 

his attorney’s fees.

The evidence, however, was sufficient to support a determination that Debra 

committed fraud by obtaining continuing child support on false pretenses. It was 

established that Debra sought and received child support based on her allegations 

that Jasmine was disabled, and there was substantial evidence that Jasmine, in fact, 

was not disabled and had never been disabled. See, e.g., Strong, 350 S.W.3d at 771

community property. See Tex. Fam. Code § 3.002; Marriage of O’Brien, 436 S.W.3d at 84 

(“[E]arnings during marriage, even during the pendency of divorce proceedings, are community 

property.”).
12

(discussing fraud against the community). Additionally, there was evidence on 

which the court could have concluded that Debra committed constructive fraud or 

wasting against the community by cashing Zeddie’s checks without his consent 

and using that money to throw neighborhood parties and filing his tax return and 

taking the tax refund without his consent, although there was no evidence of how 

much this conduct may have cost the community. See Cantu, 556 S.W.3d at 427

(discussing constructive fraud and wasting); Walzel, 2018 WL 614767, at *3–4

(same). But see Kaftousian v. Rezaeipanah, 511 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. App.—El 

Paso 2015, no pet.) (holding disproportionate division of marital estate could not 

be supported by allegations where trial court did not make findings based on those 

allegations).

5 And, although Zeddie’s attorney did not provide live testimony 

regarding the reasonableness and necessity of her fees, she did provide an affidavit 

on that issue and Zeddie did not object to the form of the evidence. See, e.g., 

Spencer v. Vaughn, No. 03-05-00077-CV, 2008 WL 615443, at *13–14 (Tex. 

App.—Austin Mar. 6, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Just and right division. The bigger issue that Debra raises is not whether 

there was evidence she committed fraud, constructive fraud, or wasting, but 

whether the trial court’s division of the community estate based on this conduct—

awarding Zeddie the entirety of the existing community estate—was just and 

right.6 A trial court is certainly permitted to take such wrongful conduct into 

consideration when dividing a community estate. See, e.g., Chu, 249 S.W.3d at 

444–45; Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589; Debrock v. Debrock, No. 03-21-00308-CV, 

2022 WL 17970214, at *17 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. 

5 We need not and do not make a ruling as to whether the trial court considered or 

properly considered the evidence concerning the checks and the tax refund in resolving the issues 

in this appeal.

6 There does not appear to be any evidence in the record supporting a reimbursement 

claim. See O’Brien, 436 S.W.3d at 82.
13

op.); K.T., 2015 WL 4910097, at *12.

Although the trial court here did not expressly provide its calculations for 

reconstituting the marital estate (i.e., adding the amounts wrongfully taken from 

the community back into the estate before making a just and right division), such 

calculations are not difficult. See generally Tex. Fam. Code § 7.009 (requiring 

court reconstitute estate in light of actual or constructive fraud on the community). 

The total positive value of the estate after subtracting liabilities also assigned to 

Zeddie was $434,132.32. The proven amount of losses caused by Debra’s 

wrongful conduct was less than $71,400. Assuming the trial court reconstituted the 

community estate and considered $71,400 as Debra’s share, the division was

approximately 86% to Zeddie and 14% to Debra. Even considering that the trial 

court was within its discretion in factoring in Zeddie’s attorney’s fees in making 

the division and there was some evidence of additional unquantified damages

related to the alleged theft of checks and a tax return, this is still a very 

disproportionate split. See generally Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 700 (“Mathematical 

precision in dividing property in a divorce is usually not possible.”). But is it 

inequitable?

There is no exact threshold as to what percentage split between spouses 

constitutes an unfair or unjust division and thus reversible error. See Bradshaw, 

555 S.W.3d at 547 (Devine, J., concurring). That said, a division this 

disproportionate is somewhat rare but not unheard of in Texas jurisprudence. See

id.; id. at 551 (Lehrmann, J., dissenting). Typically, cases resulting in such a 

disproportionate division involve either evidence demonstrating conduct impacting 

a much greater percentage of the community estate than was shown here, evidence 

relating to one or several of the Murff factors, or evidence of abuse. See, e.g., 

Lynch v. Lynch, 540 S.W.3d 107, 130 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. 
14

denied) (collecting and describing cases with very disproportionate property

divisions); see also Simons v. Simons, No. 11-21-00066-CV, 2023 WL 2415209, at 

*8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming award of 

entire marital estate to wife where husband had treated her cruelly, was at fault in 

the break-up of the marriage, and had sexually assaulted his step-daughter);

Christensen v. Christensen, No. 01-16-00735-CV, 2018 WL 1747260, at *8 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 12, 2018, no pet.) (affirming disproportionate 

division based on waste, fault in the break-up of the marriage, and multiple Murff

factors); Ohendalski v. Ohendalski, 203 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2006, no pet.) (affirming 81/19 division based on findings of adultery, cruelty, 

waste, and Murff factors).

Here, as indicated, Debra’s wrongful conduct was shown to impact only a 

relatively small percentage of the community estate and there was no evidence of 

any Murff factors that would support a disproportionate division in Zeddie’s favor

or that Debra was abusive. To the contrary, Zeddie was shown to be in a 

significantly better financial position with significantly greater earnings potential 

than Debra. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s division 

of the community estate was neither supported by a reasonable basis nor equitable

and therefore constituted reversible error. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 

224, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (holding division was so 

disproportionate as to be unfair and unjust); K.T., 2015 WL 4910097, at *12

(holding although evidence supported unequal division of community estate, it did 

not support such a disproportionate division); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509, 

512 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (holding 75/25 split was not 

supported by the evidence); Blair v. Blair, No. 14-97-00832-CV, 1999 WL 

649082, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 1999, no pet.) (not 
15

designated for publication) (holding, even assuming right of reimbursement,

property division was “grossly inequitable”). Accordingly, we must reverse the 

portion of the decree dividing the community estate and remand for a new division. 

See Graves v. Tomlinson, 329 S.W.3d 128, 153 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2010, pet. denied) (“[O]nly the trial court may make a just division of community 

property.”).

Spousal Maintenance

In her second issue, Debra asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying her request for spousal maintenance. Chapter 8 of the Family Code

governs the awarding of spousal maintenance in a divorce decree. Tex. Fam. Code 

§§ 8.001-.359; see also Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. 2018) (“In 

1995, the Texas Legislature first authorized courts to award a form of involuntary 

post-divorce alimony referred to as ‘spousal maintenance.’”). The Code defines 

“maintenance” as “an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of periodic 

payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other 

spouse.” Tex. Fam. Code § 8.001(1). 

The Code authorizes trial courts to award spousal maintenance in “very 

limited circumstances” if the parties meet certain eligibility requirements. Dalton, 

551 S.W.3d at 130. Among the possibilities stated in the statute, a spouse may be 

eligible if they lack sufficient property, including separate property, on dissolution 

of the marriage to provide for their minimum reasonable needs, and either (1) has 

been married to the other spouse for at least 10 years and lacks the ability to earn 

sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs, or (2) is unable to 

earn sufficient income to provide for their minimum reasonable needs because of 

an incapacitating physical or mental disability. Tex. Fam. Code § 8.051. If the 

spouse is determined to be eligible for maintenance, the court must then determine 
16

the nature, amount, duration, and manner of the payments by considering certain 

listed factors. Id. § 8.052.

The party seeking spousal maintenance bears the burden to establish the 

requirements of the statute. See, e.g., Marin v. Marin, No. 03-22-00013-CV, 2023 

WL 2776296, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Cooper 

v. Cooper, 176 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dis.] 2004, no pet.). We 

review a trial court’s denial of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion. See, 

e.g., W.D. v. R.D., No. 02-18-00328-CV, 2019 WL 2635563, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.); Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 555 S.W.3d 

141, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). We will reverse the trial 

court’s order only if we determine, from reviewing the record as a whole, that the 

decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. Coble v. Adams, No. 01-13-00562-CV, 

2014 WL 6602480, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.)

(mem. op.). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

decision and indulge every legal presumption in favor of its judgment. Id.

It is uncontested that Zeddie and Debra were married for well over 10 years. 

Debra further asserts that she is legally blind and unable to work due to that 

disability and that she also suffers from several health issues and a learning 

disability. She maintains that her only source of income is a $742 monthly social 

security disability payment and that she owns nothing except her own clothes. The 

only support in the record that Debra references for these assertions is her own 

testimony, which the trial court found to be thoroughly “inconsistent and void of 

credibility.” In a trial to the bench, such as this, the trial court is the sole judge of 

witness credibility and the weight to be assigned to testimony. See Saba Zi Expl., 

L.P. v. Vaughn, 448 S.W.3d 123, 131 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no 

pet.). Debra’s attorney was unable to get any documentary evidence into the record 
17

to support her claims regarding her disabilities, health issues, inability to earn a 

living, and lack of property. Although, as discussed above, there is some evidence 

from Zeddie indicating Debra did not possess any community property, Debra does 

not cite any evidence beyond her own testimony in support of her claims.

Zeddie testified that he thought Debra could see pretty well, and he was not 

aware of any other health issues she might have. He also noted that she had either 

worked for or operated a daycare for a couple of years. He believed that she was 

“in good shape” but just chose not to work. Additionally, under cross-examination, 

Debra acknowledged that she would only need about $303 a month in addition to 

her disability payments to meet her minimum reasonable needs. See Tex. Fam. 

Code § 8.051; see also Trueheart v. Trueheart, No. 14-02-01256-CV, 2003 WL 

22176626, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 23, 2003, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (explaining that the Code does not define the term “minimum reasonable 

needs” and deciding what a particular person’s needs are is a fact-specific 

determination that should be made by the trial court on a case-by-case basis).

Although the trial court did not state an express finding as to why it denied 

the spousal maintenance request, it may have reasonably concluded that Debra 

failed to meet her burden to establish either that she lacked sufficient property to 

provide for her minimum reasonable needs or that she lacked the ability to earn 

sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. See Tex. Fam. 

Code § 8.051; see also J.F. v. J.F., No. 02-19-00029-CV, 2020 WL 4248681, at *4 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 23, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (collecting cases 

where spouse asserting disability or health issues failed to meet burden for spousal 

maintenance). We therefore overrule Debra’s second issue.

Conclusion

We reverse the portion of the final decree of divorce that divides the marital 
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estate and remand that issue to the trial court for further proceedings. We affirm

the remainder of the divorce decree.

/s/ Frances Bourliot

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Bourliot, Hassan, and Poissant.