IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA 

September 2023 Term 

_______________ 

No. 22-623 

_______________ 

In re C.L., A.L.-1, A.L.-2, and A.L.-3

________________________________________________________________________ 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County 

The Honorable Tera L. Salango, Judge 

Case Nos. 21-JA-539, 21-JA-540, 22-JA-160, and 22-JA-161 

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS 

________________________________________________________________________ 

Submitted: September 12, 2023 

Filed: November 7, 2023 

CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Jason Lord, Esq.

Charleston, West Virginia 

Counsel for Petitioner 

Patrick Morrisey, Esq.

Attorney General 

Spencer J. Davenport,, Esq.

Assistant Solicitor General 

Brittany Ryers-Hindbaugh, Esq. 

Assistant Attorney General 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Counsel for Respondent 

Department of Health and Human Resources 

J. Rudy Martin, Esq. 

Charleston, West Virginia 

Guardian Ad Litem 

FILED

November 8, 2023

released at 3:00 p.m.

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
JUSTICE ARMSTEAD concurs, in part, and dissents, in part, and reserves the right to file 

a separate opinion.
i 

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 

1. “‘Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject 

to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence 

and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused 

or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly 

erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the 

finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not 

overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must 

affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 

record viewed in its entirety.’ Syllabus Point 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 

223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).” Syllabus Point 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 

873 (2011). 

2. “‘A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child 

and, unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, 

abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or 

otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent 

to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.’ 
ii 

Syllabus, Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960).” Syllabus Point 

7, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011).

3. “‘To facilitate the prompt, fair and thorough resolution of abuse and 

neglect actions, if, in the course of a child abuse and/or neglect proceeding, a circuit court 

discerns from the evidence or allegations presented that reasonable cause exists to believe 

that additional abuse or neglect has occurred or is imminent which is not encompassed by 

the allegations contained in the Department of Health and Human Resource[s]’s petition, 

then pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect 

Proceedings [1997] the circuit court has the inherent authority to compel the Department 

to amend its petition to encompass the evidence or allegations.’ Syl. Pt. 5, In re Randy H., 

220 W. Va. 122, 640 S.E.2d 185 (2006).” Syllabus Point 6, In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 

170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013). 

4. “‘To exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court must make specific 

factual findings explaining how each child’s health and welfare are being harmed or 

threatened by the allegedly abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in the 

petition. Due to the jurisdictional nature of this question, generalized findings applicable 

to all children named in the petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make specific 

findings with regard to each child so named.” Syllabus Point 3, in part, In re B.V., 248 W. 

Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023). 
iii 

5. “‘Where it appears from the record that the process established by the 

Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the 

disposition of cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected has been 

substantially disregarded or frustrated, the . . . case [will be] remanded for compliance with 

that process[.]’ Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001).” 

Syllabus Point 5, In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013). 
1 

WALKER, Chief Justice:

After Petitioner Father A.L.1 was seen living out of a car with two of his 

children and their mother, the Respondent West Virginia Department of Health and Human 

Resources filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect by the parents based on their failure 

to provide adequate housing. In an amended petition adding Father’s two other children to 

the proceedings, DHHR repeated the lack-of-housing allegations even though they lived 

with a different mother and had not seen Father for years. The circuit court ultimately 

terminated Father’s parental rights to all four children—two on the basis of abandonment 

even though that was never alleged nor a reason on which the circuit court based 

adjudication, and two because of inadequate housing even though Father presented 

evidence suggesting he had obtained housing by the time of disposition. As explained 

below, we find the circuit court failed to follow the process established by the West 

Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes, 

so we vacate the dispositional orders and remand for further proceedings. 

1

 We use initials to identify the parties in cases involving sensitive facts. See In re 

L.W., 245 W. Va. 703, 706, 865 S.E.2d 105, 108 (2021) (citing W. Va. R. App. Proc. 40(e); 

State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 645 n.1, 398 S.E.2d 123, 127 n.1 (1990)). 
2 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

In September 2021, DHHR filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect of C.L. 

and A.L.-1 because their mother2 and Father lacked adequate housing. The petition alleged 

that Child Protective Services received a referral that all four were living out of a car in the 

summer months and that a CPS worker observed Father and both children asleep in the car 

with a battery-operated fan on the car dashboard. Father apparently explained that they 

were staying in the car because the paternal grandparents’ home would not be appropriate 

for the children, so the CPS worker placed the children with their paternal aunt under a 

temporary parenting plan. DHHR also alleged general and unsubstantiated abuse and 

abandonment of C.L. and A.L.-1.3 

In April 2022, DHHR amended the petition to include Father’s two other 

children, A.L.-2 and A.L.-3, who, at the time of the filing of the amended petition, lived 

with their non-abusing mother and did not have relationships with Father. The amended 

petition did not contain any new allegations of abuse and neglect as to these two children, 

but only repeated the improper housing allegations contained in the original petition. 

2

 The circuit court terminated the parental rights of the children’s mother, N.P., 

below. She did not appeal the termination. 

3

 The allegations lacked specificity, evidenced by DHHR’s use of the word “child” 

instead of “children” and references to sexual abuse or sexual exploitation though DHHR 

offered no specific facts to support such allegations. 
3 

The circuit court, at a preliminary hearing in September 2021, ordered 

DHHR to provide Father with parenting and adult life skills services, supervised visits, and 

random drug screens. Father stopped participating in those services in February 2022, so 

the court terminated them due to his noncompliance. Father claimed he stopped 

participating in services because he wished instead to focus on his relationship with his 

new girlfriend. 

At a May 2022 hearing, after multiple continuances, the circuit court 

adjudicated Father as neglectful of C.L. and A.L.-1 because of his inability to provide the 

children with shelter and other necessary items. It also concluded that Father abused the 

children, though it made no factual findings to support that conclusion. 

In June 2022, the circuit court adjudicated Father of neglecting A.L.-2 and 

A.L-3 because he had not seen them for at least two years and made no effort to do so, he 

did not know the children’s birthdays, and he provided no financial or emotional support 

aside from wage garnishment. It also concluded that Father abused A.L.-2 and A.L-3, 

though, again, it made no factual findings to support that conclusion, and the amended 

petition included no specific allegations of abuse. The same day, the circuit court 

addressed disposition for Father as to C.L. and A.L.-1. Father testified that he had obtained 

an apartment in Covington, Virginia, three months before the hearing, had established fulltime employment at McDonalds, had purchased two cars, and was recently married. 

DHHR presented no evidence to contradict Father’s testimony. Instead, it introduced 
4 

evidence that Father failed to comply with the services designed to help him obtain housing 

and remedy the conditions alleged in the petition. Instead of directing DHHR to conduct 

further inquiry into Father’s contention that he had obtained housing and employment, the 

circuit court terminated Father’s parental rights to C.L. and A.L.-1 because it found no 

reasonable likelihood that Father could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. 

The circuit court held a dispositional hearing regarding Father’s parental 

rights to A.L.-2 and A.L.-3 in July 2022. The circuit court again heard testimony from 

Father about his living situation and employment. Father offered into evidence a lease for 

his apartment and a SNAP benefits receipt to prove his employment. Like in the prior 

hearing, DHHR offered no evidence to rebut Father’s testimony, and DHHR conducted no 

further inquiry into Father’s living and employment situation. The circuit court terminated 

Father’s parental rights to A.L.-2 and A.L.-3 on abandonment grounds. 

Father appeals to this Court the circuit court’s orders terminating his parental 

rights to all four children. 
5 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

For appeals from abuse and neglect proceedings, we review questions of law 

de novo, defer to a circuit court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and affirm a 

circuit court’s findings if plausible in light of the evidence: 

Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court 

are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse 

and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the 

circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of 

law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These 

findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless 

clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, 

although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing 

court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a 

reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it 

would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a 

finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible 

in light of the record viewed in its entirety.[4] 

With these principles in mind, we turn to Father’s single assignment of error 

and address the circuit court’s procedural errors. 

4

 Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011) (quoting Syllabus 

Point 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).).
6 

III. ANALYSIS

Father argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by terminating his parental 

rights to the four children contending he was entitled to an improvement period or more 

time to improve the conditions of abuse and neglect. We find no merit to Father’s 

contention. Still, as explained below, we vacate and remand because the circuit court 

clearly erred when it failed to follow the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse 

and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes. 

We address Father’s single assignment of error to emphasize that it has no 

merit or bearing on this Court’s decision in this matter. Circuit courts may grant 

improvement periods when, among other things, the parent demonstrates by clear and 

convincing evidence that he is likely to fully participate in services.5 Father demonstrated 

his tendency to forgo court-ordered services when he failed to comply with postadjudication services. Given Father’s unwillingness to participate in court-ordered 

services, he failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he would fully 

5

 See W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2) (2015) (“After finding that a child is an abused 

or neglected child . . . a court may grant a respondent an improvement period of a period 

not to exceed six months when . . . [t]he respondent demonstrates, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the respondent is likely to fully participate in the improvement period and 

the court further makes a finding, on the record, of the terms of the improvement period.”).
7 

participate in an improvement period. So, the circuit court acted within its discretion when 

it denied him an improvement period. 

We vacate and remand, however, due to the circuit court’s procedural errors 

throughout the proceedings below. First, it erred when applying the Rules of Procedure 

for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes when it terminated Father’s 

parental rights to C.L. and A.L.-1 rather than directing DHHR to conduct further inquiry 

into Father’s living situation after he presented evidence that he may have corrected the 

conditions of abuse and neglect for which the court adjudicated him. And it did not comply 

with the same Rules and statutes as to A.L.-2 and A.L.-3 when it adjudicated Father as 

abusive and neglectful because the amended petition contained no specific allegations of 

abuse, neglect, or abandonment of those children. The circuit court further erred when it 

terminated Father’s parental rights to A.L.-2 and A.L.-3 for abandonment, a condition not 

sufficiently alleged in the petition or specified at adjudication. 

We begin with a review of the process for abuse and neglect proceedings to 

emphasize the purpose of each vital stage. The West Virginia and United States 

Constitutions establish a parent’s fundamental right to parent his children, and the 
8 

procedure for abuse and neglect proceedings aims to balance that right with the best 

interests of the children.6

A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her 

infant child and, unless the parent is an unfit person because of 

misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other 

dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement 

or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such 

custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her 

infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.”[7]

 

This Court insists that applicable rules and statutes must be carefully 

followed if it is to protect this balance.[8]

6

 See Syl. Pt. 3, In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013) (quoting 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973)); see also In re C.M.-1, 247 

W. Va. 755, ___, 885 S.E.2d 875, 886 (2023) (Wooton, J., dissenting) (“In the law 

concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right 

of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to that of any other 

person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due Process 

Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions.”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, In re 

Willis, 157 W. Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973)). 

7

 Syl. Pt. 7, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W. Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011) (quoting 

Syl., Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960)). 

8

 See W. Va. R. of P. for Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 2 (2015) (“The[] rules are 

designed to . . . provide fair, timely and efficient disposition of cases involving suspected 

child abuse or neglect.”); see also In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 632, 558 S.E.2d 620, 

631 (2001) (“As this most important area of the law has expanded, this Court has insisted 

that the directives of applicable rules and legislative enactments must be carefully 

identified, respected, and incorporated within our court system. The Rules of Procedure for 

Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and the related statutes detailing fair, prompt, and 

thorough procedures for child abuse and neglect cases are not mere general guidance; 

rather, they are stated in mandatory terms and vest carefully described and circumscribed 
9 

A petition alleging abuse or neglect of a child by a parent initiates an abuse 

and neglect proceeding.9 An abuse and neglect petition must “allege specific conduct 

including time and place [and] how the conduct comes within the statutory definition of 

neglect or abuse with references to the statute[.]”10 And the petition must contain “[a] 

statement of facts justifying court intervention which is definite and particular and 

describes . . . [t]he specific misconduct, including time and place, if known, or incapacity 

of the parent(s) and other person(s) responsible for the child[ren]’s care . . . .”11

After a petition is filed, the case proceeds to an adjudicatory hearing and then 

to a dispositional hearing. The adjudicatory hearing and the dispositional hearing create a 

two-phase process.12 At the adjudicatory hearing, to have jurisdiction over an abuse and

discretion in our courts, intended to protect the due process rights of the parents as well as 

the rights of the innocent children.”). 

9

 See W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(a) (2019) (“If the department or a reputable person 

believes that a child is neglected or abused, the department or the person may present a 

petition setting forth the facts to the circuit court . . . .”). 

10 Id. § 49-4-601(b). 

11 W. Va. R. of P. for Child Abuse & Neglect Pro. 18. 

12 Syl. Pt. 1, State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983) (“In a child abuse 

and neglect hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives 

under [W. Va. Code § 49-4-604], it must hold a hearing under [W. Va. Code § 49-4-601], 

and determine ‘whether such child is abused or neglected.’ Such a finding is a prerequisite 

to further continuation of the case.”); see also In re A.P.-1, 241 W. Va. 688, 693, 827 

S.E.2d 830, 835 (2019) (“The first phase culminates in an adjudication of abuse and/or 

neglect. The second phase is a dispositional one, undertaken to achieve the appropriate 
10 

neglect case, the circuit court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the children 

named in the petition are abused or neglected based upon conditions that existed at the time 

of filing.

13 After adjudication, if, during the course of the proceeding, the circuit court has 

reason to believe that additional abuse or neglect has occurred which was not alleged in 

the original petition, then it has the inherent authority to compel DHHR to amend its 

petition to encompass the additional evidence or allegations: 

To facilitate the prompt, fair and thorough resolution of 

abuse and neglect actions, if, in the course of a child abuse 

and/or neglect proceeding, a circuit court discerns from the 

evidence or allegations presented that reasonable cause exists 

to believe that additional abuse or neglect has occurred or is 

imminent which is not encompassed by the allegations 

contained in the Department of Health and Human

Resource[s]’s petition, then pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of

Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings [1997] 

the circuit court has the inherent authority to compel the 

permanent placement of a child adjudged to be abused and/or neglected.”) (quoting In Re 

Beth Ann B., 204 W. Va. 424, 427, 513 S.E.2d 472, 475 (1998)). 

13 See W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 (2018) (defining “abused child” and “neglected 

child”); W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(i) (“At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the 

court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and shall make findings of fact 

and conclusions of law as to whether the child is abused or neglected and whether the 

respondent is abusing, neglecting, or, if applicable, a battered parent, all of which shall be 

incorporated into the order of the court. The findings must be based upon conditions 

existing at the time of the filing of the petition and proven by clear and convincing 

evidence.”); see also Syl. Pt. 8, In re C.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022) (“For a 

circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an abuse and neglect case, the child must 

be an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected child’ as those terms are defined in West Virginia Code 

§ 49-1-201 (2018). Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) (2019), a circuit court's 

finding that a child is an ‘abused child’ or a ‘neglected child’ must be based upon the 

conditions existing at the time of the filing of the abuse and neglect petition.”). 
11 

Department to amend its petition to encompass the evidence or 

allegations.[14]

If it does so, then after DHHR amends the petition to include additional 

allegations, the circuit court must reopen adjudication to address them.15 Defects in 

adjudication implicate the due process protections provided to parents subject to these 

sensitive proceedings.16 A circuit court may not merely declare that no reasonable 

likelihood exists for a parent to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect without 

explicitly stating factual findings in the record to support such a conclusion.17 Indeed, this 

Court has emphasized the jurisdictional nature of the adjudicatory hearing: 

14 Syl. Pt. 6, In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. 170, 744 S.E.2d 280 (2013) (quoting Syl. 

Pt. 5, In re Randy H., 220 W. Va. 122, 640 S.E.2d 185 (2006)); see also W. Va. R. of P. 

for Child Abuse & Neglect Pro. 19(b) (“If new allegations arise after the final adjudicatory 

hearing, the allegations should be included in an amended petition rather than in a separate 

petition in a new civil action, and the final adjudicatory hearing shall be re-opened for the 

purpose of hearing evidence on the new allegations in the amended petition.”). 

15 Id.

16 See In re K.L., __ W. Va. __, __, 885 S.E.2d 595, 604 (2022) (“The Court’s 

insistence upon proper adjudication of the issues underlying abuse and neglect is not a 

‘hollow formality.’ Rather, this Court has made clear that defects in adjudication implicate 

the due process protections afforded to parents and that proper adjudication is a 

jurisdictional prerequisite to continuation of the proceedings.”) (quoting In re A.P.-1, 241 

W. Va. 688, 695, 827 S.E.2d 830, 837 (2019)). 

17 See Syl. Pt. 2, In re E.H., 247 W. Va. 456, 880 S.E.2d 922 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, in 

part, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620). 
12 

To exercise subject matter jurisdiction, the court must 

make specific factual findings explaining how each child’s 

health and welfare are being harmed or threatened by the 

allegedly abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in 

the petition. Due to the jurisdictional nature of this question, 

generalized findings applicable to all children named in the 

petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make specific 

findings with regard to each child so named.[18]

After the circuit court has adjudged a child abused or neglected, the case 

proceeds to a dispositional hearing.19 At that hearing, it may consider several alternatives, 

with precedence given to the least restrictive alternative appropriate to the circumstances 

of the case.20 Here, the circuit court entered disposition under § 49-4-604(c)(6).21 When 

18 Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023). 

19 W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c) (enumerating the disposition determinations available 

to the circuit court). 

20 Id.; see also In re S.C., 245 W. Va. 677, 688, 865 S.E.2d 79, 90 (2021) 

(referencing W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)). 

21 W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (2020) (“Upon a finding that there is no reasonable 

likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near 

future and, when necessary for the welfare of the child, terminate the parental, custodial 

and guardianship rights and responsibilities of the abusing parent and commit the child to 

the permanent sole custody of the nonabusing parent, if there be one, or, if not, to either 

the permanent guardianship of the department or a licensed child welfare agency. The court 

may award sole custody of the child to a nonabusing battered parent . . . .”). See also In re 

A. P., 245 W. Va. 248, 261, 858 S.E.2d 873, 886 (2021) (Walker, J., concurring) (citations 

omitted) (“This dispositional alternative, six, must be supported by both a finding that there 

is ‘[n]o reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially 

corrected’ as well as a finding that termination is ‘necessary for the welfare of the child.’”). 
13 

proceeding under this disposition, the circuit court must make two separate findings: first 

that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected in the near future[,]” and second, that termination “is necessary for 

the welfare of the child[ren].”22 While it is true that “[t]he controlling standard that governs 

any dispositional decision remains the best interests of the child[ren,]” 23 when considering 

termination under § 49-4-604(c)(6), the circuit court must properly make the first finding 

before it progresses to a best-interest analysis.24

Adherence to this process matters. This Court has found plain error where 

the circuit court terminated parental rights based on allegations and issues which were 

never properly made subject of the adjudication.25 As we have recognized, 

the failure to adjudicate [a] parent[] on matters upon 

which termination was based allow[s] “troubling allegations 

[to] wholly elude[ ] . . . commensurate attention” during the 

proceedings—a fundamental prerequisite to the goal of 

reunification of families. Recognizing the dynamic nature of 

issues underlying abuse and neglect proceedings, the Lilith H.

Court reminded circuit courts of “their authority, if not 

obligation, to compel newly-discovered or developed abuse 

22 W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6). 

23 In re S.C., 245 W. Va. 677, 865 S.E.2d 79 (2021) (quoting In re B.H., 233 W. 

Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014)). 

24 W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6); see also In re A.P., 245 W. Va. at 260, 858 S.E.2d 

at 886 (Walker, J., concurring).

25 See In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. at 180, 744 S.E.2d at 290. 
14 

and neglect allegations to be made part of a petition” through 

amendment of the petition lest those issues remain 

“unaddressed.”[26]

And “[w]here it appears from the record that the process established by the 

Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the 

disposition of cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected has been 

substantially disregarded or frustrated, the . . . case [will be] remanded for compliance with 

that process[.]”27

With this background to guide us, we turn to the specific facts related to the 

children in this case. 

A. Children C.L. and A.L.-1 

As detailed above, the circuit court adjudicated Father as neglectful of C.L. 

and A.L.-1 in May 2022 due to his failure to provide housing for them. Father testified the 

following month at the June 2022 dispositional hearing for C.L. and A.L.-1 that he had 

obtained housing—a two-bedroom apartment in Covington, Virginia, that he shared with 

his wife and her two children. He also testified that he obtained full-time employment at 

26 In re K. L., __ W. Va. at __, 885 S.E.2d at 603 (emphasis removed) (quoting In 

re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. at 181, 744 S.E.2d at 283). 

27 Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Lilith H., 231 W. Va. at 744, 744 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting 

Syl. Pt. 5, in part, In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620). 
15 

McDonalds in Virginia, where he worked for one month prior to the hearing. Father 

presented evidence tending to show a “reasonable likelihood that the condition[] of 

neglect” for which he had been adjudicated—the failure to provide C.L. and A.L.-1 with 

adequate housing—could be substantially corrected in the near future,” and the 

circumstances of his supposed living situation and its adequacy for the children warranted 

further investigation by DHHR. 

Rather than rebut Father’s testimony regarding his improved housing and 

employment, a DHHR employee testified that she was unaware of Father’s housing 

situation. And rather than pursuing further investigation by a home study to determine 

whether Father had remedied the conditions alleged in the petition and whether his new 

home would be suitable for the children to visit, DHHR introduced evidence of Father’s 

earlier failure to participate in court-ordered services intended to address Father’s 

inadequate housing for the children. But DHHR never explained why Father’s failure to 

participate in services demonstrated an inability to correct his housing condition. Indeed, 

a DHHR employee testified that, if Father had a place to live and the Petition was filed on 

the date of the dispositional hearing, then Father “technically” corrected the condition 

which led to the filing of the petition. DHHR broadly asserted that Father failed to follow 

through with a reasonable family case plan when he stopped participating in court-ordered 

services, but the DHHR witness testified that the department never inquired into Father’s 

out-of-state living situation.
16 

We note that the circuit court’s order was so conclusory that we cannot 

determine whether it terminated Father’s parental rights for failure to follow the family 

case plan or failure to correct the housing condition for which he was adjudicated. The 

circuit court also suggested that Father abandoned C.L. and A.L.-1 when it found at 

disposition that Father had not seen or made any effort to see the children since January 

2018. Confusingly, the events leading to the filing of the petition—when the children lived 

with Father—occurred in September 2021. And the petition never alleged Father’s 

abandonment of C.L. and A.L.-1., and his adjudication related only to conditions of 

inadequate housing for them. 

“‘No reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected’ means that, based upon the evidence before the court, the abusing 

adult or adults have demonstrated an inadequate capacity to solve the problems of abuse or 

neglect on their own or with help.”28 At the time of disposition, the evidence before the 

circuit court suggested that Father corrected the condition for which he was adjudicated. 

So, the circuit court erred when it terminated Father’s parental rights to C.L. and A.L.-1 

under § 49-4-604(c)(6) despite evidence that Father may have corrected the conditions of 

abuse and neglect, and without further inquiry into his living situation. Further scrutiny 

28 W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d) (emphasis added). 
17 

about the best interests of the children is not necessary here because the circuit court failed 

to satisfy the first prong of the analysis. 

B. Children A.L.-2 and A.L.-3 

As explained above, DHHR failed to allege any facts applicable to A.L.-2 

and A.L.-3 when it filed the amended petition adding them to the proceeding below. It 

simply included a cut-and-paste copy of the inadequate housing allegations relating to 

Father’s other children. But A.L.-2 and A.L.-3 lived with their mother at all relevant times. 

DHHR failed to enumerate any specific or relevant allegation against Father regarding his 

parenting of A.L.-2 and A.L.-3. The general allegations suggesting abandonment fail to 

satisfy the “definite and particular” requirement of Rule 18. And, since the circuit court 

made “generalized findings” rather than “specific findings with regard to each child so 

named,” the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition.29 As 

explained above, the circuit court could have compelled DHHR to amend the petition to 

allege abandonment of the children when it heard evidence that Father had not seen the 

children for at least two years, made no effort to see the children, did not know the 

children’s birthdays, and provided no emotional or financial support to the children absent 

29 See Syl. Pt. 2, in part, In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d at 366. 
18 

wage garnishment.30 Instead, it adjudicated Father as abusive and neglectful without 

reference to the allegations in the petition relating to Father living out of a car with his 

other children. Importantly, the adjudicatory order lacked a finding of abandonment. The 

circuit court later terminated Father’s parental rights based on abandonment and a 

declaration that Father demonstrated no reasonable likelihood of correcting the conditions 

of abuse and neglect, despite the deficient adjudicatory order and without reference to 

allegations set forth in the petition. 

We recognize the circuit court’s efforts to protect these children from an 

absent parent. But it failed to follow the statutory requirements designed to ensure that the 

circumstances leading to termination adequately justify this most serious remedy. The 

circuit court’s substantial disregard of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect 

Proceedings frustrated the process below, and we must vacate its dispositional orders and 

remand the case.

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the above reasons, we vacate and remand the circuit court’s July 1, 2022 

order terminating Father’s parental rights to C.L. and A.L.-1, and we instruct the circuit 

30 See W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 (defining “Abandonment” as “any conduct that 

demonstrates the settled purpose to forgo the duties and parental responsibilities to the 

child [.]”). 
19 

court to hold a new dispositional hearing. As to the allegations of abandonment which 

arose post-adjudication, the circuit court, consistent with Rule 19(b), may instruct DHHR 

to file an amended petition on that basis, and upon filing, it shall reopen adjudication. We 

vacate and remand the circuit court’s July 2, 2022 order terminating Father’s parental rights 

to A.L.-2 and A.L-3. The circuit court, consistent with Rule 19(b) may instruct DHHR to 

file an amended petition on the basis of abandonment, and upon filing, it shall reopen 

adjudication. 

 

 

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.