2020 IL App (1st) 191414-U 

No. 1-19-1414 

FIRST DIVISION

July 6, 2020 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 

JOHN A. SCATCHELL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of

) Cook County, Chancery Division. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 18 CH 0785 

) 

VILLAGE OF MELROSE PARK, and ) 

BOARD OF POLICE AND FIRE ) 

COMMISSIONERS OF MELROSE PARK, ) Honorable 

) Pamela McLean-Meyerson, 

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding. 

 

PRESIDING JUSTICE GRIFFIN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Pierce and Walker concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The dismissal of plaintiff’s second amended-complaint for declaratory judgment 

with prejudice pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 

5/2-615 (West 2018)) was warranted; plaintiff can prove no set of facts under the 

pleadings that would entitle him to relief.

¶ 2 Plaintiff John A. Scatchell filed a declaratory judgment action against defendants Village 

of Melrose Park (Village) and Board of Police and Fire Commissioners (BOFPC) in the circuit 

court of Cook County claiming the BOFPC lacked the authority to hear disciplinary charges filed 

against him. Plaintiff alleged the BOFPC was: (1) abolished by the Village in a municipal 
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ordinance adopted on July 9, 2012; and in the alternative, (2) improperly constituted in violation 

of Illinois statute. Defendants moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment action pursuant to 

section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) (Code). The trial 

court held a hearing and dismissed the action with prejudice. For the following reasons, we affirm 

the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 Plaintiff was a police officer for the Melrose Park Police Department. The police chief and 

deputy police chief of the Melrose Police Department filed disciplinary charges against plaintiff 

for allegedly violating department rule and policies. The matter was set for an administrative 

hearing. While the charges were pending, plaintiff challenged the administrative body’s authority 

to adjudicate the matter in a separate declaratory judgment action filed on July 19, 2018, in the 

circuit court of Cook County. Plaintiff amended his complaint two times on July 30, 2018 and 

October 24, 2018. 

¶ 5 In his second-amended complaint, plaintiff alleged the administrative body hearing his 

charges, the BOFPC, was abolished by the Village in municipal ordinance no. 1613 adopted on 

July 9, 2012 (Ordinance 1613) and derived it’s authority from nowhere such that any action it 

undertook would be void. Alternatively, plaintiff claimed the BOFPC lacked authority to hear the 

charges because it was improperly constituted in violation of the Fire and Police Commissioners 

Act (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1 et seq. (West 2018)) (Commissioners Act), which requires board members 

to serve three-year terms (id. §10-2.1-1) and limits the number of board members who belong to 

the same political party (id. § 10-2.1-3). 

¶ 6 Plaintiff attached the following exhibits to his second-amended complaint: (1) a copy of 

Ordinance 1613; (2) a letter entitled “Notice of Hearing”; (2) the minutes from a special meeting; 
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(3) a Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2018)) (FOIA) denial letter from 

the Village; (4) copies of the Village’s budget and schedules of expenditures; and (5) copies of 

resolutions passed by the Village. 

¶ 7 Ordinance 1613 amended chapter 2.76 of the Village municipal code. It abolished the 

BOFPC (“[t]he Village Board hereby abolishes the Board of Police and Fire Commissioners for 

the Village”) and created the Personnel Board (“[t]here is hereby created the ‘Personnel Board’ of 

the Village of Melrose Park, which shall consist of no greater than five (5) members appointed by 

the Mayor with the advice and consent of the Board of Trustees”). Members of the Personnel 

Board served three-year staggered terms “so that no more than two (2) appointments expire on 

April 30 of any year.” The then-current members of the BOFPC (Michael Caputo (Caputo), 

Pasquale Esposito (Esposito) and Mark Rauzi (Rauzi)) were “appointed to serve as members of 

the Personnel Board for the remainder of their respective terms of office.” The Personnel Board 

“assume[d] all of the powers and duties of the Board and Fire and Police Commissioners.” 

¶ 8 The letter attached to plaintiff’s second-amended complaint was written on BOFPC 

letterhead, listed plaintiff and his attorneys as addressees, and was entitled “Notice of Hearing.” 

The body of the letter read as follows: “YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that charges have been 

filed against you before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Melrose 

Park, Illinois (“Board”) *** by police Chief Sam Pitassi and Deputy Police Chief Michael 

Castellan *** and that said Board has ordered that a hearing be had on the said charges *** on the 

25th day of April, 2018.” The letter was signed by the secretary of the BOFPC, Pat Esposito, and 

dated April 3, 2018. 

¶ 9 The minutes were dated May 10, 2014, entitled “SPECIAL MEETING [,] BOARD OF 

THE POLICE AND FIRE COMMISSIONERS” and read in pertinent part as follows: 
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“EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE (Consider charges and set hearing on disciplinary charges filed on 

April 25, 2018 (Castellan))”. The FOIA denial letter informed plaintiff that his request for public 

records from the Personnel Board was denied because “the Village does not have a personnel 

board.” The Village’s 2012 budget and its schedules of expenditures from 2012 to 2018 showed 

that funds were appropriated for the BOFPC and its chairman, commissioner, and secretary. The 

Personnel Board did not appear in the budget or any of the schedules of expenditures. 

¶ 10 Finally, the text of the resolutions attached to plaintiff’s second-amended complaint 

showed the Village appointed the same three members to the BOFPC from 2012 to 2018. In 2012, 

2013 and 2014, the Village passed resolutions appointing Caputo, Esposito, and Rauzi as members 

to the BOFPC to serve one-year terms. The resolutions passed in 2015 and 2016 authorized the 

Village President to extend the terms of those appointments until such time as he deemed 

appropriate. In 2017 and 2018, the Village again appointed the same individuals to the BOFPC to 

serve one-year terms. Each resolution contained a “superseder” provision, indicating that “[a]ll 

code provisions, ordinance, resolutions, and orders, or parts thereof, in conflict herewith, are to the 

extent of such conflict hereby superseded.” 

¶ 11 On November 16, 2018, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second-amended 

complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code, which provides for the dismissal of a complaint 

that fails to state a claim for relief. In their motion, defendants acknowledged that Ordinance 1613 

abolished the BOFPC on July 9, 2012, but pointed out that the ordinance also established the 

Personnel Board, vested the Personnel Board with the powers of the BOFPC and appointed the 

then-current members of the BOFPC to the Personnel Board. Defendants contended that the 

“BOFPC” was just a label, and its former members were fully empowered to hear the charges filed 

against plaintiff pursuant to Ordinance 1613. 
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¶ 12 Defendants took the following alternative positions with respect to Villages’ resolutions:

(1) they were valid and superseded the conflicting provisions of Ordinance 1613 “with respect to 

the name of the Board and the terms of its members” such that Caputo, Esposito, and Rauzi were 

still acting with the authority granted to them by Ordinance 1613, but under a new name and with 

one-year terms; or (2) they were invalid and Caputo, Esposito, and Rauzi remained members of 

the Personnel Board as statutory holdovers pursuant to section 3.1-30-5 of the Illinois Municipal 

Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5 (West 2018)) because no one was “appointed and qualified to replace 

them.” Either way, defendants argued, the members hearing the charges against plaintiff did not 

lack authority. Defendants argued that plaintiff’s alternative challenge to the composition of the 

BOFPC (or the Personnel Board) was a non-starter because the Village was a home-rule 

municipality and could adopt an ordinance that conflicted with requirements of the Commissioners 

Act (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1 et seq. (West 2018)).

¶ 13 On June 25, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

second-amended complaint. The trial court found the BOFPC was abolished by Ordinance 1613. 

However, it concluded that the resolutions passed by the Village post-abolishment “superseded” 

the conflicting provisions of Ordinance 1613 and operated to “revive” the BOFPC. The trial court 

further found the BOFPC was not improperly constituted because the Village was a home-rule 

municipality and therefore not bound by the requirements of the Commissioners Act (65 ILCS 

5/10-2.1 et seq. (West 2018)). The trial court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed plaintiff’s 

second-amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to Section 2-615. 

¶ 14 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on July 8, 2019. Jurisdiction is proper under Illinois 

supreme court rules 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). On appeal, plaintiff asks 

us to reverse the trial court’s judgment because the facts alleged in his second-amended complaint 
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taken as true establish his entitlement to declaratory relief. Defendants ask us to affirm the 

judgment on any basis in the record because the trial court’s judgment was correct.

¶ 15 ANALYSIS

¶ 16 The issue on appeal is whether plaintiff can prove no set of facts under the pleadings that 

would entitle him to relief. Our review is de novo. Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC, 

2013 IL App (4th) 120139, ¶ 25. 

¶ 17 A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on 

defects apparent on its face. Jane Doe-3 v. McLean County Unit Dist. No. 5 Board of Directors, 

2012 IL 112479, ¶ 15. Under section 2-615, the critical question is whether the allegations in the 

complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of 

action upon which relief may be granted. Id. ¶ 16. In making the determination, all well-pleaded 

facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be taken as true. O’Callaghan v. 

Satherlie, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 18. A court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to 

section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved that would entitle the 

plaintiff to recovery. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006). 

¶ 18 The essential requirements of a declaratory judgment action are: (1) a plaintiff with a legal 

tangible interest; (2) a defendant having an opposing interest; and (3) an actual controversy 

between the parties concerning such interests. Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 372 (2003). 

“The declaratory judgment procedure allows ‘ “ ‘the court to take hold of a controversy one step 

sooner than normally—that is, after the dispute has arisen, but before steps are taken which give 

rise to claims for damages or other relief. The parties to the dispute can then learn the consequences 

of their action before acting.’ ” ’ ” Id. at 372-73 (quoting Kaske v. City of Rockford, 96 Ill. 2d 298, 
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306 (1983), quoting Buege v. Lee, 56 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1978), quoting Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110, 

¶ 57.1, Historical and Practice Notes, at 132 (Smith-Hurd 1968)). 

¶ 19 Plaintiff claims the facts alleged in his second-amended complaint, taken as true and 

liberally construed, establish that the BOFPC, not the Personnel Board, was hearing the

disciplinary charges against him and lacked the authority to do so because the BOFPC was either 

abolished by Ordinance 1613, or improperly constituted in violation of the Commissioners Act (65 

ILCS 5/10-2.1 et seq. (West 2018)). Plaintiff further argues that the resolutions passed by the 

Village after July 9, 2012, were invalid and failed to “revive” the BOFPC (as the trial court found) 

because a resolution cannot supersede or amend an ordinance. According to plaintiff, the BOFPC 

is “illegal” and we should reinstate his second-amended complaint so that he may defend the 

charges before an administrative body with the authority to make a binding decision. 

¶ 20 Defendants counter, and argue that Caputo, Esposito and Rauzi derived their authority from 

Ordinance 1613 and none of the allegations or exhibits attached to plaintiff’s second-amended 

complaint, taken as true, demonstrate otherwise. Defendants take alternative positions as to the 

validity of the resolutions passed by the Village after Ordinance 1613 was adopted. Defendants 

claim the resolutions were either: (1) valid and superseded the conflicting provisions of Ordinance 

1613 by changing the name of the Personnel Board back to the BOFPC and re-appointing Caputo, 

Esposito and Rauzi as members of the BOFPC to serve one-year terms; or (2) invalid and failed to 

appoint members to the Personnel Board, in which case Caputo, Esposito and Rauzi remained in 

their positions as “statutory holdovers” pursuant to Illinois law until someone was appointed in 

their place.

¶ 21 We hold that the dismissal of plaintiff’s second-amended complaint with prejudice 

pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code was warranted. Plaintiff can prove no set of facts under the 
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pleadings that would entitle him to declaratory relief. The judgment of the circuit court of Cook 

County must be affirmed. 

¶ 22 The plain text of Ordinance 1613 makes clear, and the parties do not dispute, that on July 

9, 2012, the Village replaced the BOFPC with the Personnel Board, vested the powers of the 

BOFPC in the Personnel Board, and appointed the members of the BOFPC to the Personnel Board 

to serve out the remainder of their terms in office. The central question here is what happened 

when those terms expired, as provided in plaintiff’s second-amended complaint, on April 30, 2013. 

We find the allegations and exhibits attached to plaintiff’s second-amended complaint, taken as 

true and liberally construed, establish that the Village never appointed anyone to succeed the 

members of the Personnel Board.

¶ 23 The resolutions passed by the Village were invalid and ineffectual. First, the resolutions 

expressly appointed members to a non-existent entity: the BOFPC. Second, the resolutions could 

not, contrary to the trial court’s finding, supersede the conflicting provisions of Ordinance 1613 

because a municipal ordinance may only be repealed, modified or amended through the passage 

of an ordinance. See Naperville Police Union, Local 2233, American Federation of State, County 

& Municipal Employees AFL-CIO v. City of Naperville, 97 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (1981) (“[a]n 

ordinance may be repealed, modified or amended only by municipal action of like dignity and, 

therefore, may not be amended or modified by resolution since a resolution is an act of lesser 

dignity than an ordinance”). Accordingly, the Village never appointed any successors to the 

Personnel Board and the BOFPC was not “revived.” 

¶ 24 Because no successors were chosen, the members of the Personnel Board remained in 

office by operation of law. See 65 ILCS 5/3.1-30-5 (West 2018) (“[i]f there is a failure to appoint 

a municipal officer, or the person appointed fails to qualify, the person filling the office shall 
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continue in office until a successor has been chosen and has qualified”); see also City of Pekin v. 

Industrial Commission, 341 Ill. 312, 319 (1930) (“[w]here the tenure of an office is vested for a 

specified period of time and until a successor shall be elected or appointed and qualifies, the mere 

expiration of the specified period of time for the duration of the term of office does not operate to 

vacate the office or to impair the powers of the officer to continue to act”). By remaining in office, 

Caputo, Esposito, and Rauzi continued to exercise the powers of Personnel Board (which 

“assume[d]” the powers of the BOFPC under Ordinance 1613) and possessed the requisite 

authority to hear and act upon plaintiff’s disciplinary charges. 

¶ 25 We reject plaintiff’s contentions that the exhibits attached to his second-amended 

complaint establish his entitlement to declaratory relief. None of the exhibits, including those 

showing that the Personnel Board did not have a budget and that a Village FOIA officer indicated 

the Village did not have a Personnel Board, demonstrate that Caputo, Esposito, and Rauzi lacked 

or somehow lost their authority under Ordinance 1613. Accordingly, plaintiff’s initial claim for 

declaratory relief must fail under section 2-615 of the Code. 

¶ 26 Plaintiff’s additional claim that the BOFPC was improperly constituted fares no better. The 

Village is a home rule unit of local government under the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and pursuant 

to section 6(a) of article VII, “may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its 

government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the 

public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.” Ill. Const.1970, art. 

VII, § 6(a). Our supreme court has “consistently held that an ordinance enacted by a home rule 

unit under the grant of power found in section 6(a) supersedes a conflicting statute enacted prior 

to the effective date of the Constitution.” Stryker v. Village of Oak Park, 62 Ill. 2d 523, 527 (1976). 
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¶ 27 Pursuant to its section 6(a) authority, the Village adopted Ordinance 1613 and did not 

include in its text a provision limiting board membership based on political affiliation. As plaintiff 

points out, the absence of a provision so limiting board membership conflicted with section 10-

2.1-3 of the Commissioners Act (65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-3 (West 2018), which provides in pertinent 

part that “[n]o more than 2 members of the board shall belong to the same political party.” 

However, the conflict was of no consequence. As a home rule municipality, the Village’s adoption 

of Ordinance 1613 superseded the conflicting provisions of the Commissioners Act. Stryker, 62 

Ill. 2d at 527. Accordingly, plaintiff’s additional claim fails under section 2-615 of the Code as 

well.

¶ 28 Accordingly, the dismissal of plaintiff’s second-amended complaint with prejudice was 

warranted. Plaintiff can prove no set of facts under the pleadings that would entitle him to relief. 

The judgment must be affirmed. 

¶ 29 CONCLUSION

¶ 30 Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 31 Affirmed.