IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs November 7, 2017

CHARVASEA LANCASTER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C-15-65 Donald H. Allen, Judge

No. W2017-00553-CCA-R3-PC

The Petitioner, Charvasea Lancaster, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty 

pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was 

ineffective in explaining the possible sentencing outcomes to him. Following our review, 

we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD 

WITT, JR., and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

George Morton Googe, District Public Defender; and Gregory D. Gookin, Assistant 

District Public Defender, for the appellant, Charvasea Lancaster.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Caitlin Smith, Assistant Attorney 

General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Alfred Lynn Earls, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In June 2014, the Petitioner, sixteen years old at the time, entered open guilty 

pleas to one count of aggravated burglary, one count of burglary, two counts of vehicle 

burglary, and seven counts of theft of property in various amounts. See State v.

Charvasea Rodshun Lancaster, No. W2015-00936-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 6915578, at 

*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 22, 2016). The convictions arose out of a crime spree in 

September and October 2013 during which the Petitioner stole four vehicles, three lawn 

mowers, an ATV, and a trailer. Id. 

02/02/2018
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At the plea submission hearing, the trial court explained to the Petitioner that there 

would be a separate sentencing hearing where the trial court would decide the Petitioner’s 

sentence. The Petitioner stated that he understood this. The trial court reviewed the 

range of punishments for each offense with the Petitioner, and the Petitioner stated that 

he understood them. The trial court also explained to the Petitioner that it could order 

some of his sentences to be served consecutively, and the Petitioner stated that he 

understood that.

Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that four of the Petitioner’s 

eleven sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty-two 

years. The trial court also imposed over $8,500 in restitution to the Petitioner’s victims. 

On delayed appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s total effective sentence. 

Lancaster, 2016 WL 6915578, at *4. The Petitioner did not seek permission to appeal to 

our supreme court.

The Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that 

he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel because she had informed him that 

he would receive a six-year sentence if he pled guilty. At the post-conviction hearing, the 

Petitioner testified that when he pled guilty, he had no idea he could get a sentence as 

high as twenty-two years. The Petitioner explained that trial counsel had only discussed 

with him a possible sentence of “six [years] or probation or something like that.”

However, the Petitioner admitted that trial counsel had discussed “numbers” with 

him and that she told him that the trial court could sentence him to “whatever [it] 

want[ed] to give [him].” The Petitioner also admitted that he had confessed to the 

offenses and that the trial court had reviewed with him the open nature of his plea 

agreement. The Petitioner further admitted that he thought trial counsel had “fought for 

[him],” but the Petitioner “felt like [trial counsel] could have done better” and gotten him 

“another kind of plea or something like that.” 

Trial counsel testified that the Petitioner’s case “was a very difficult case . . . 

because there were so many victims and so many items that were taken.” Trial counsel 

recalled that she met with the Petitioner “on several occasions” and “went over the case 

backwards and forwards” with him. With respect to the plea negotiations, trial counsel 

recalled that the State would only agree to an open plea and “was not willing to do any 

type of negotiated sentence.”

Trial counsel explained that the reason for the State’s unwillingness to negotiate a 

sentence was because the Petitioner had confessed to the offenses. The Petitioner had 

“[j]ust turned” sixteen at the time of his arrest. According to trial counsel, the 

Petitioner’s mother entered the room where the Petitioner was being questioned and,

while the investigator was out of the room, the Petitioner’s “mother started fussing at him 
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and asking him what happened and he just spilled the beans and everything was 

recorded.” Trial counsel further recalled that “[o]nce the investigator came [back], [the 

Petitioner’s] mom said, ‘You better tell him exactly what you told me,’ and [the 

Petitioner] spilled the beans again.”

Trial counsel testified that she explained to the Petitioner that the length and 

manner of service of his sentences would be decided by the trial court and that there were 

“a variety of ways that the sentence could play out.” Contrary to the Petitioner’s claims, 

trial counsel testified that she explained to the Petitioner that the chances of him getting a 

six-year sentence were “slim to none.” Trial counsel recalled that she “talked numbers” 

with the Petitioner and “played with them to see what he could possibly get.” Trial 

counsel also testified that she “was overly prepared for trial” had the Petitioner decided 

not to plead guilty.

Based upon the foregoing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The postconviction court accredited the testimony of trial counsel. It concluded that there was 

“no evidence that the [P]etitioner desired to go to trial” and that the Petitioner had entered 

his guilty pleas “knowingly and voluntarily and [they] were not subject to force or 

coercion.” This timely appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily and knowingly 

entered. The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective because the Petitioner 

“expected to receive a sentence of six years” and he “had no idea that he would be 

sentenced to twenty-two years.” The State responds that the post-conviction court did not 

err in denying the petition.

The burden in a post-conviction proceeding is on the petitioner to prove his 

allegations of fact supporting his grounds for relief by clear and convincing evidence. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f); see Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 293-94 (Tenn. 

2009). On appeal, we are bound by the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless we 

conclude that the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. Fields v.

State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). Additionally, “questions concerning the 

credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given their testimony, and the factual 

issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved” by the post-conviction court. Id. 

However, we review the post-conviction court’s application of the law to its factual 

findings de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457.

Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. 
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Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to effective assistance of 

counsel. Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 

446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is made 

under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the burden is on the 

petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the 

deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993).

Deficient performance requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” despite the fact that reviewing courts 

“must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. Prejudice requires 

proof of “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “Because a petitioner must 

establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides

a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim.” Goad v. State, 938 

S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). The Strickland standard has been applied to the right to 

counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 

S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).

In the context of a guilty plea, like the present case, the effective assistance of 

counsel is relevant only to the extent that it affects the voluntariness of the plea. 

Therefore, to satisfy the second prong of Strickland, the petitioner must show that “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have [pled] guilty 

and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see 

also Walton v. State, 966 S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). 

Here, the post-conviction court accredited trial counsel’s testimony that she 

explained to the Petitioner that his sentences would be up to the trial court and that his 

chances of getting a six-year sentence were “slim to none.” Trial counsel further testified 

that she “talked numbers” with the Petitioner and “played with them to see what he could 

possibly get.” Additionally, at the plea submission hearing, the trial court explained and 

the Petitioner stated that he understood that his sentences would be determined at a 

separate sentencing hearing and that some of his sentences could be served consecutively. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in denying the 

petition.
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CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of 

the post-conviction court is affirmed.

_________________________________

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE