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____________________________________ * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. NON

-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.
ASHLEY MARIE BARBER Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No. 839 WDA 2018 Appeal from the PCRA Order May 7, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

-20

-CR

-0000573

-2012 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 27, 2018 Appellant, Ashley Marie Barber, appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County dismissing her first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541

- 9546. We affirm. The PCRA court aptly sets forth the pertinent facts and procedural history, as follows: Defendant/Petitioner [hereinafter “Appellant”] pled guilty, along with her co

-defendant Jade Olmstead, to the first

-degree murder of Brandy Stevens. To put the matter in context, the following is a summary of the facts Appellant admitted in her plea colloquy. Appellant admitted that Olmstead and she had a plan to lure Stevens into the woods to fight her. After the physical altercation began, the plan became to kill her. The fight started with Appellant hitting Stevens in the face and throat with her fists and hands. Stevens began fighting back and screaming for help. Appellant held Stevens while Olmstead struck her multiple times in the head with a shovel.

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- Petitioner beat Stevens’ forehead off a tree stump until she could see visible blood and brain material. Appellant used a rope that had been on the tree stump to first hold and then to strangle Stevens. When Stevens stopped fighting back, Appellant stated that her “anger wasn’t done” and it was frustrating to her that Stevens was no longer fighting so Appellant dropped a boulder from over her head onto Stevens’ face. Appellant then poured water into Stevens’ mouth to drown her. Appellant and Olmstead put Stevens in a shallow grave they dug in the ground and covered her face and body with dirt. Appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment after her guilty plea on November 14, 2013. Appellant filed a pro se Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief on November 5, 2014. Appellant was appointed PCRA counsel and counsel filed an Amended Petition for PCRA relief on February 20, 2015. The court heard argument on the Amended Petition on May 4, 2015 and an evidentiary hearing was held on October 26, 2017. The court ordered briefs to be filed within 45 days. Upon motion of the Appellant, the court extended time for filing, and both the Commonwealth’s and the Appellant’s briefs were timely submitted by January 11, 2018
. Appellant assert[ed] essentially two reasons for relief under the PCRA: 1) that her guilty plea was unlawfully induced and thus not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and 2) ineffective assistance of counsel [in inducing her to plead guilty when she was incompetent to do so]. The two issues [as presented] dovetail[ed] as Pennsylvania law sets forth that a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel during a plea process as well as during trial. [After thorough review of both issues, the PCRA court denied Appellant relief by order dated May 7, 2018]. PCRA Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 1

-2. Appellant presents the following question for our consideration: [Did] the PCRA court err[ ] in denying Appellant’s Amended Petition for Post

-Conviction Collateral Relief where the Appellant contends (1) Appellant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter her plea based upon a totality of circumstances; (2) Appellant testified regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel concerning the entry of [her] guilty plea; and (3) the PCRA court failed to permit testimony from a psychiatrist regarding her

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- past mental health history and mental status at the time of entry of Appellant’s guilty plea? Appellant’s brief, at 3. We begin with our standard of review governing PCRA appeals
. This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record and we do not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Similarly, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Finally, we may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perry, 128 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2015)). Appellant first raises a mental incompetence claim against her guilty plea. As a prefatory matter, we note that an appellant generally waives a challenge to the validity of his or her guilty plea if it is not first raised before the trial court and in a direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609

–610 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“[a] defendant wishing to challenge the [validity] of a guilty plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i)

. In the case sub judice, Appellant has not previously raised this challenge, hence, the general rule would call for waiver of this claim.

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- However, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 2005), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “the failure to raise on direct appeal a claim that the appellant was incompetent at the time of trial does not constitute a waiver of that claim for purposes of the PCRA.” Id. at 1155

-56. In so doing, the Court acknowledged it has ‘long held that ‘the mental competence of an accused must be regarded as an absolute and basic condition of a fair trial[,]’” such that “when the issue presented is whether a person was competent to stand trial, the waiver rule is not applicable.” Id. at 1155 (citations omitted). Among the PCHA cases upon which the Court relied in this regard was Commonwealth v. Giknis, 420 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1980), where the Court declined to find waiver where appellant asserted for the first time in his PCHA petition that he was incompetent to have entered a guilty plea. Brown, 872 A.2d at 1155. Observing that the relevant provisions defining waiver in both the PCHA and PCRA are nearly identical, the Brown Court declined to find waiver under the PCRA. On this authority, therefore, we determine Appellant has not waived her competence claim by failing to raise it previously before the trial court or on direct appeal. In addressing Appellant's issue related to his guilty plea, we first set forth our well

-settled standard of review. “Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered.” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa.Super. 2003). In Commonwealth v. Fluharty, [632 A.2d 312 (Pa.Super. 1993)], we set forth guidelines to determine the validity of a guilty plea:

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- In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This determination is to be made by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. [A] plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea. Id. at 314 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa.Super. 2006). “A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523 (citation omitted). “Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citing Pollard, supra). “[W]here the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is established.” Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa.Super. 2001). Relatedly, the test for determining competence to enter a plea is whether the defendant “had the opportunity at the appropriate time to consult with counsel, understand counsel's advice and information and understand the

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- nature of the pending criminal proceedings against him.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 469 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Pa.Super. 1983) (citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 414 A.2d 388 (Pa.Super. 1979), and Commonwealth v. Marshall, 318 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1974)). Since the determination of competency is a matter for the sound discretion of the lower court, we may not disturb that finding absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Frey, 904 A.2d 866, 872 (Pa. 2006). The 167

-page Notes of Testimony of Appellant’s guilty plea colloquy belie the portrayal of an incompetent defendant struggling to communicate with counsel and understand the nature of criminal proceedings against her. In fact, throughout the lengthy colloquy, Appellant responded clearly and appropriately to the many questions put to her. While most of her responses consisted of short answers either in the affirmative or in negative, she provided them in a manner reflecting discernment and understanding of the questions. For example: THE COURT: [As to the written guilty plea colloquy] So it looks like your printing and both you and Mr. Draudt [defense counsel] signed it; is that true? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: And did you sign it of your own free will? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: Did anyone force you or threaten you to sign it? APPELLANT: No.

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- THE COURT: Any questions for me about this form? APPELLANT: No, sir.

. . . THE COURT: You’ve had some mental health treatment including you’ve been institutionalized for at least one occasion for a short period of time; is that right? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you’ve been on medication for a period of time off and on; is that right? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: And are you on medication right now? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: Are you taking that in the dosage and manner that the doctors and professionals have prescribed it to you in [sic]? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: ...[Y]ou’re taking it when you’re given it? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: You’re not cheeking it or not taking it or spitting it out or anything? APPELLANT: No. THE COURT: And you have been taking that regularly throughout your stay at the jail? APPELLANT: Most of the time. THE COURT: Okay. Over the last month or so, have you been taking it regularly?

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- APPELLANT: Yes.

. . . THE COURT: Is the medication helping you? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Is the medication affecting your ability to understand me at all here today? APPELLANT: No. THE COURT: Are you currently under the influence of alcohol? APPELLANT: No. THE COURT: Drugs? APPELLANT: No. THE COURT: Controlled substances, other than the medication we’ve talked about? APPELLANT: No, sir. THE COURT: [Is] anything that you’re aware of today having an impact on your ability to understand me? APPELLANT: No.

... THE COURT: Do you believe you are competent? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: You understand all of the things we’ve talked about? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: You understand your defenses, the rights you have to proceed to trial; you understand Mr. Draudt’s role; you

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- understand Mr. Schultz’s role; you understand my role; the various court staff’s roles. Do you understand all of those things? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: And do you believe you have been able to assist Mr. Draudt in his representation of you over the months that have been leading up to today? APPELLANT: Ninety percent of the time. THE COURT: Okay. So there have been some tough days maybe where you weren’t feeling your best or you were a little down in the dumps or a lot down in the dumps, maybe or medication wise or mental health wise or, maybe, it’s medically wise, you weren’t able to give the information that you wanted. But for the majority of that time, you have been able to provide and assist in your own defense; is that true? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: And especially, let’s say, the last 30 to 60 days, have you been able to assist in your own defense? APPELLANT: Yes. THE COURT: ... [Y]our [sic] decision to enter the plea today has nothing to do with the fact that you’ve had some times where you weren’t able to help. You’re decision to enter the plea today is based upon the evidence and what you believe the evidence will show; is that true? APPELLANT: Yes.

. . . THE COURT: The printing [on the written guilty plea colloquy] is all yours. The part that’s filled in by Mr. Draudt is the punishments and we’ll talk a lot about the punishment in a little while, but you’ve signed that as well. You understood and read what he filled in? APPELLANT: Yes.

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- THE COURT: And he filled that in prior to you signing the form? APPELLANT: Yes, we talked about it, that’s why it is separate. THE COURT: I bet you did. Okay. Any questions for me about that form? APPELLANT: No, sir. THE COURT: Okay, [I have discussed with defense counsel a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of relevance] and directed or indicated he should look at the case. I assume that you’ve done that; is that true? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And have you gone over that with Ms. Barber? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. [It] is a complicated case. I’m not going to go through it now and bore everybody

– APPELLANT: I’ve read it. THE COURT:

--with it, but you understand what it means? APPELLANT: Yes.

. . . THE COURT: The defendant is alleged, you’re the defendant here, you’re alleged to have on or about May 24, 2012 with malice, premeditation with specific intent to kill, kill Brandy Stevens. Do you understand that? APPELLANT: No, it was on May 17. THE COURT: Okay. You’re right. It was on May 17. N.T. at 10, 12

-14, 16

-17, 18

-19, 113.

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- Appellant also answered the Commonwealth’s open-ended questions pertaining to the facts underlying the charges against her. Again, Appellant showed no sign of incompetence in this phase of the colloquy, as she clearly described the nature of her relationship with the co

-defendant and gave a detailed account of relevant events occurring before, during, and after their brutal murder of the victim. N.T. at 118

-161. At the conclusion of the colloquy, Appellant pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree. N.T. at 162. She denied that either coercion or undisclosed promises induced her plea. N.T. at 163. She expressed satisfaction with plea counsel’s assistance and denied he had failed to keep her informed or to carry out her requests. Id
. Appellant argues the PCRA court erroneously dismissed as incredible her PCRA testimony that she was mentally incapable at her plea colloquy of reliably claiming adherence to her medication regimen, comprehension of the proceeding and its consequences, and satisfaction with plea counsel’s assistance. Appellant’s brief, at 8

-10; 11

-14. Under governing standards set forth above, however, it was Appellant’s burden to prove at the PCRA hearing that she was not, in fact, competent during her plea colloquy despite every appearance indicating otherwise. See Pollard, supra. Appellant’s self

-conflicting PCRA testimony failed to meet this burden, as she claimed at one instance an incapacity to understand the plea proceedings only to claim later that she repeatedly found it necessary during the time leading up to her plea to apprise plea counsel on relevant decisional

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- law and procedures. N.T. 10/26/17, at 44. Viewing this contradictory PCRA testimony in light of both Appellant’s plea colloquy

—in which she presents as alert, responsive, communicative, and consistent in her narrative

—and plea counsel’s PCRA testimony describing the process by which Appellant voluntarily decided to plead guilty, the PCRA court rejected the notion that mental incompetence tainted Appellant’s guilty plea
. As we agree there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s claim of incompetence, we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s decision
. Next, Appellant alleges plea counsel ineffectively induced her to enter an unintelligent plea, as her mental incompetence caused by her refusal to take prescribed psychiatric medications was abundantly clear. In order to establish eligibility for PCRA relief, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conviction resulted from “[i]neffective assistance of counsel, which in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth

-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). “[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving to the contrary.” Commonwealth v. Brown, __ A.3d __, 2018 WL 5046812, at *12 (Pa. filed Oct. 17, 2018). The PCRA will provide relief to an appellant if ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to enter an involuntary plea of guilt. Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728 (Pa.Super. 2003). We conduct our review of such a claim in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Lynch,

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- 820 A.2d at 732. “The voluntariness of [the] plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 733 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136 (Pa.Super. 2002)). It is well

-established that counsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s error. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009). Appellant’s charge of counsel’s ineffective inducement of her plea centers on her claimed mental incompetence at the time. Because we have rejected Appellant’s underlying claim of mental incompetence as meritless, she many not prevail on her ineffectiveness claim. In Appellant’s final issue, she contends the PCRA court erred in denying her request to present the testimony of a psychiatrist regarding Appellant’s mental status at the time she entered her guilty plea. The admissibility of evidence is vested in the sound discretion of the hearing court and an appellate court may reverse only where there is an abuse of that discretion.

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- Commonwealth v. Henry, 706 A.2d 313, 319 (Pa. 1997). An abuse of discretion not found based on mere error of judgment, but rather where ruling is manifestly unreasonable or result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill

-will
. Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 476 (Pa. 2015)

. Here, the record shows Appellant mischaracterizes the PCRA court’s pre

- hearing order. The court did not preclude the possibility of considering the psychiatrist’s opinion, it only declared it premature to permit the opinion on Appellant’s competence at the time of her plea. In that vein, the court “reserve[ed] the right after hearing from other witnesses and argument to determine whether an additional hearing date is required to allow the petitioner to present a psychiatrist.” Order, 11/30/15, at 1. The court then placed the onus upon Appellant to resubmit her request for the admission of such expert opinion: Again the court does not hold that it will not permit the psychiatrist to testify, but rather the reports that have been authored and are in the file do not appear to provide an appropriate foundation in light of the new information and, therefore, the court directs that the psychiatrist may not testify at the time of the original PCRA hearing and that in the event that counsel for the petitioner believes thereafter that psychiatric testimony is appropriate, that the reports upon which he is relying to suggest that that testimony is admissible be provided to the Commonwealth and the court in advance so that appropriate determinations can be made as to whether there are issues to be addressed on these questions
. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).

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- It appears that Appellant never availed herself of the court’s invitation to petition the court after the PCRA hearing if she still believed it appropriate to admit the psychiatrist’s opinion testimony concerning her competence at the plea hearing. Accordingly, we discern no factual basis to her claim that the PCRA court precluded her from introducing the psychiatrist’s opinion
. For the foregoing reasons, as well as for the reasons expressed in the cogent and comprehensive opinion of the Honorable Mark D. Stevens, see PCRA Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 1

-11, 1 

### which we adopt as our own, we affirm the PCRA order
. Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 12/27/2018

____________________________________________ 1 

### The parties shall attach a copy of the PCRA court’s February 12, 2018, opinion to this memorandum in the event of further proceedings.Circulated 11/30/2018 03:01 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON' .L,_,`:' Poi._

... CRIi\fiN.V... DiV1Sfe,r COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

VS. ASHLEYMARIE BARBER Defendant.

Mark D. Stevens, J. Jr:I' I '1 Y't,11-i-.C1

20 I t -14't J(: No, 

### CR 573-2012 GLE.Iih Or CO CRAWFORD COUNTY,URTSPA



### MEMORANDUM AND 

### ORDER I CERTIFY THIS TO FIE A TRUE COPY OF ORIGINAL ON FILE IN THE CLERK OF COURTS OFFICE 

# /1
CLERK OF COURTS, CRAWFORD COUNTY, PA
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES FIRST MONDAY JANUARY 2022 

## ri May7, 2018 Before the Court is the 

### Defendant's Amended Petition for 

### Post Conviction Collateral Relief. 

### Defendant/Petitionerpled guilty, along 

### withher co-defendantJade Olmstead, to the first degreemurder 

### ofBrandy Stevens. To put the matter in context, the following is a summary 

### ofthe facts Petitioner admitted in her plea colloquy. Petitioner 

### admittedthat Olmstead and 

### Petitioner had a plan to lure Stevens into the woods to fight her. (N.T. 

### Plea Colloquy, p. 125.) After the physical altercation began, the plan became to kill her. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 127.) The 

### fight started withPetitioner hitting Stevens in the face and throat with her fists and hands. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 129.) Stevens began fighting back and screaming for help. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 130.) Petitioner held Stevens while Olmstead struck

### her multiple times in the head with a shovel. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 133.) Petitioner beat 

### Stevens' forehead off a tree stump until she 

### could see 

### visible blood and brain material. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 133-134.) 

### Petitioner used a rope that had 

### been on the tree stump to first hold and then to strangle Stevens. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 137.) When Stevens stopped fighting back, 

### Petitioner stated that 

### her "anger

### wasn't done" and itwas 

### frustrating to her that Stevens was no 

### longer fighting so Petitioner dropped a 

### boulder from over her head onto Stevens' face. (N,T. Plea Colloquy, p. 143-144.) Petitioner then poured water into 

### Steven's mouth to drown her. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 146; 160.) Petitioner and Olmstead put Stevens in a shallow grave they dug in the ground and covered her face and body 

### with dirt. (N.T, Plea Colloquy, p. 148.) Petitioner was 

### sentenced to a term 

### of life imprisonment after her guilty plea on 

### November 14, 2013. 

### Petitioner filed a pro se Motion for 

### Post Conviction Collateral 

### Relief on November 5, 2014. 

### Petitioner was appointed PCRA counsel and counsel filed an Amended Petition for 

### Post Conviction Collateral 

### Reliefon February 20, 2015. The Court heard argumenton the Amended 

### Petition on May 4, 2015 aro:
. - 26, 2017 The 

### Court ordered briefs to be tiled .vv:tart 43 Upon 

### nioncn ot Peutionw, the Court extended the time 

### for filing, and both the 

### Commonwealth's and the 

### Petitioner's briefs weretimely submitted oy January 11, 2018. Petitioner asserts essentially two reasons for 

### relief under the 

### Post Conviction Collateral 

### ReliefAct: 1) that her guiltyplea was unlawfully induced and thus not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent; and 2) 

### ineffective assistance

### oftrial counsel. The two issues dovetail as Pennsylvania law sets forth that a criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance 

### of counsel during a 

### plea process as well as during trial. Commonwealth v. 

### Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.Super.2002). 

### Allegations 

### ofineffectiveness in connection with the entry 

### of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for 

### relief only 

### if the ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Flood, 627 A.2d 1193 (Pa. Super. 1993). A guilty plea will be deemed 

### valid 

### ifthe totality 

### ofthe circumstances surrounding the plea shows that the defendant had a full 

### understanding 

### ofthe nature and 

### consequences ofhis plea such that he knowingly and 

### intelligently entered the plea 

### of his own accord. 

### Commonwealth v, 

### Martinez, 453 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1982); 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 

### 314-15 (Pa.Super. 1993). Pennsylvania law does not require the defendant to "be pleased with the outcome 

### of his decision to enter a 

### plea 

### of guilty; all that is required is that his 

### decision to plead guilty be knowingly, 

### voluntarily and 

### intelligently made," Commonwealth v. 

### Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

### Pennsylvania law presumes the defendant is aware 

### ofwhat he is doing when he enters a guilty plea, and 

### the defendant bears the burdento 

### prove otherwise. Connnonwealth v. 

### Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003). To evaluate the issues raised in Petitioner 

### Barber's PCRA, we undertake a totality assessment 

### of the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent character 

### of the plea. Our totality assessment examines the statements and the understanding 

### ofthe 

### Petitioner during the 

### Court's lengthy guilty plea colloquy held on 

### November 14, 2013 wherein the Court engaged in an extensivedialogue with meaningful participation by the Petitioner throughout. To 

### support her contention that her plea was not voluntary, 

### Petitioner points to her past mental health treatment and history 

### ofdrug and alcohol abuse. 

### Petitioner cites her testimony at the PCRA hearing on October 26, 2017 wherein she testified 

### that she 

### refused medications and had psychological difficulties at the Crawford County Correctional 

### Facility immediately prior to entering her guilty plea. (See 

### Brief in Support 

### of PCRA Petition, p. 4.) 

### Petitioner's Brief specifically cites 

### PCRA testimony where she testified she was not taking her prescribed medication leading up to the date 

### ofher guilty plea because she 

### thought she did not need it anymore. (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing p. 39-42.) She also cites that portion 

### ofher testimony reflecting that hermental state in the few weeks leading up to the entry 

### ofher guilty plea "had been fine for a long 

### time" but that 

### when her co-defendant, Jade Olmstead, came back to Crawford County from somewhere else, it detrimentally affected hermental state and 

### "everything fell apart again."

2(N.T PCRA t r

_ uc,. k.4-ipaLio c; goir_g Cri :it th tunc. 

# Jr plea and she 

## it' t no 

### leg,' `.o uncterstand was going on in the two years preceding the plea. 

### PCRA Hearing p. 44.) Petitioner maintain she was 

### misled by 

### Robert Draudt,her trial counsel, because he led 

### her to believe that she should "give up" and that "no matterwhat I had done, no matterwhat way we went withthe case, either way, that was it." (N. T. PCRA Hearing p. 43; 45.) Although stopping short 

### of testifying that she communicated to her attorney that she would not or did not want to enter the plea, Petitioner argues she indicated to her attorney that she wanted to "go other directions" meaning "other defenses." (N. T. PCRA Hearing p.45.) The Court was surprised by 

### Petitioner's testimony at the PCRA Hearing because she so drastically changed her testimony and directly contradicted the clear andunequivocal statements she made at her guilty plea colloquy on

### November 14, 2013. 

### Petitioner's testimony at the guilty plea 

### colloquy on 

### November 14, 2013 evidenced her clear understanding 

### ofthe plea and 

### ofthe process. Petitioner was questioned about her mental health history and her current mental state and medications. She 

### testified she was taking her medicationin the dosage and 

### manner that the doctors 

### prescribed it. (N. T. Plea Colloquy, p.I2.) The Court 

### specifically asked her 

### if she was cheeking or spitting out her medication and she testified that she was not. (N. T. Plea Colloquy, p. 12.) She testified that she was regularly taking her 

### prescribed medication and it was helping her and not affecting her ability to understand the Court. (N, T. Plea Colloquy, p.12-13.) She indicated she was not under the influence 

### of alcohol or controlled substances other than her prescribed medications and no substances were impacting her ability to understand the Court. (N. T. Plea Colloquy, p. 13.) She indicated 

### that despite having had mental health treatment and taking medication to help her with certain issues, she 

### was comfortable goingthrough the guilty 

### plea proceedingfrom a mental health perspective and she understood the 

### conversations with 

### her attorney and with the Court. (N. T. Plea Colloquy, p.14.) When asked 

### if she believed she was competent, she indicated that she believed she was competent and she

### understood what the Court was explaining.. (N. T. Plea Colloquy, p. 16.) When the Court pressed her on this and asked 

### her to 

### further specify her understanding 

### of the process, her answerswere as follows: THE COURT; You understand all the things

### we've talked about? MS. BARBER: Yes. THE COURT: You understood yourdefenses, therights you have to proceed at trial; you understand Mr. 

### Draudt's role; you 

### understand Mr. 

### Schultz's role; you 

### understandmy role;the various 

### staff's roles. Do you 

### understand all 

### ofthosethings?

3MS. BARBER: Yes.
THE COURT: And do you believe you have been ableto assist Mr. Draudt in his representation 

### ofyouoverthe ninemonths that have been leading up to today? MS. BARBER: Ninety percent 

### ofthe time, yes. (N. T. Plea Colloquy, p. 17.) 

### Petitioner's answer shows her ability to quantify and describe her level 

### ofunderstanding when she entered her plea. The stated 

### "ninety percentrate" 

### ofunderstanding and assistance is not only evidence 

### ofthe 

### Petitioner's beliefthat she comprehended the legal process to a high degree, but her language is also evidence 

### ofher abilityto

### precisely and easily communicate her state 

### ofmind to the Court on the day she entered 

### her plea. At another point in 

### the colloquy, after the Court explained the different elements necessary for the different types 

### of murder and the defenses thereto, the Petitioner again showed her close

### attention to the procedure and her detailedunderstanding as follows: THE COURT: The defendant is alleged, 

### you're the 

### defendant here, 

### you're alleged to have on or about May 24, 2012 with malice, premeditation 

### with specificintent to kill, kill Brandy Stevens. Do youunderstand that? MS. BARBER: No, it was onMay 17. THE COURT: Okay. 

### You're right. It was onMay 17. MR. SCHULTZ: Theinformation says May

# - THE COURT: Theinformation says May

# - well, you know what, I havetwo informations. It got corrected. It did. There was an amended information. So 

### I've gottwo 

### ofthem. I grabbedthe wrong one. 

### It'sMay 17. Thank you for that clarification. And 

### that's the rule 

### ofthumb. 

### Ifthat happens, I say

### something 

### that's not true,

### just likethat, tell me 

### it's wrong. 

### We'll deal will (sic) it. 

### We'll fix it, Okay? MS. BARBER: Yes. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 113.)

4Then, even later 

### inthe colloquy, 

### afterbeing advised that !: loi44_, be able to raise ine issues she raiseo in net Omnibus Pretlia( A/1mm or 

### sii;tt blame 1:: other directions, Petitionerresponded that, 

### "it was nobody 

### else's fault," N.T. 

### Plea Colloquy, p. 160.) These arethree specific examples 

### ofthe conversational, detail-oriented statements

### made by Petitioner that demonstrated she was paying close attention and participatory. She exhibited both the ability and the desire to communicate her understanding to the Court. She was able to correct the Court when necessary and demonstrated she was thinking critically during the process. While Petitioner may have also given many "yes or 

### no" answers duringthe colloquy, reading the transcript 

### of the colloquy in its entirety, it is 

### evident that the Petitioner was appropriately engaged, actively conversational, and sufficiently demonstrated she understood what she wasdoing. 

### Petitioner's PCRA testimony also contradicts her trial 

### counsel's testimony, who testified at the PCRA hearing. 

### Petitioner's trial counsel, 

### Robert Draudt, testified that he believed his client was competent to stand trial, believed she was capable 

### of asking him questions about 

### her case, believed she was capable 

### of giving him 

### intelligent answers, and believed she was capable 

### of communicating with him during the process. (N.T. 

### PRCA Hearing, p. 22-23.) Regarding her mental health, Draudt observed that his 

### client's mental health was stabilized, but at the time 

### ofthe plea he believed she was competent to enter the guilty plea. (N.T.

### PCRAHearing, p. 29; 31.) Draudt further testified he 

### never told Petitioner to "give 

### up" but rather that he believed co-defendant Jade 

### Olmstead's plea actually helped 

### Petitioner's case because Ms. 

### Olmstead's pleading guilty made it more 

### difficult for Olmstead to blame everything on the Petitioner. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, p. 14; 24-25; 28.) Rather than talking her into the plea, Draudt testified that it was the 

### Petitioner who first mentioned wanting to take a plea. (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing, p. 27.) Further, Draudt testified it was the 

### Petitioner's position that she did not want to put her family through a trial, and this sentiment did not come from him but 

### ratherfrom the Petitioner herself. (N.T. 

### PCRAHearing, p. 27.) Regarding whether Petitioner was taking her prescribed medication at the time she entered her plea, 

### Petitioner's PCRA testimony also contradicted the testimony 

### of Dawn Salsberry, the Health Service Administrator at 

### the Crawford County Correctional Facility where Petitioner was receiving her medications, Ms. Salsberry testified that she administered medications to inmates and kept the records relating to inmate medication. Ms. Salsberry testified that, except for two 

### morning doses and one absence, she had record 

### of Petitioner consistently taking her medication during the time frame leading up to entry 

### of Petitioner's guiltyplea. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, p. 72-74; 76-78.) Part 

### of the 

### totality assessment is the observation 

### of Petitioner's conversational courtroom demeanor during the guilty 

### plea colloquy, the non-pressured nature 

### ofthe dialoguebetween Petitioner andthe Court, tar. ory,irtcv..itos Vet:ilJnr. r ilL;..tiv. .ir take breaks throughout the proce.t,, and the siosv purpubefully care Li.t 

### explanations i.psen to i-etitiotr.:: (both by the Court and by coutisettprior to entry Dt tier 

### gurit; oica is4/tlimg about Pztitionei demeanor at

### the colloquyindicatedPetitionerwas 

### underundue stress or was having ahard time coping with the proceeding. The Court has no recollection 

### ofPetitioner banging her head on counsel table and notes this is an action that the Court would have noted and 

### placed 

### ofrecord. To the contrary, 

### throughout the colloquy, the Petitioner appeared calm and the Court would periodically check with the Petitioner to evaluate her understanding and level 

### ofcomfort with theprocess. (See e.g. N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 113.) The Court notes Petitioner watched a video 

### explaining the plea process and her plea rights in 

### preparationfor her plea while she was atthe correctional facility. She then filled out a written 

### pleacolloquyin

### her own handwriting and they went over

### that writtenpleacolloquy and the PSI with 

### her attorney. (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing 'p. 8-10.) Thus, Petitioner received three very detailed explanations about the plea process in three 

### different ways through the video, the written

### pleacolloquy, and the

### extensive oral colloquy with the Court. 

### Petitioner's observable understanding 

### of the process interrelates with the 

### Court's finding that 

### Petitioner was taking 

### her medication and not suffering from a mental health issue at the time she entered her plea. Factually, based upon the 

### testimony 

### ofAttorney Draudt, the testimony 

### of jail representative Dawn Salsberry, and observations 

### ofthe 

### Petitioner's demeanor and 

### participation, we 

### find Petitioner was taking her medication and 

### was stable and competent. There is 

### nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner suddenly mentally decompensated when her co-defendant returned to Crawford County. In fact, 

### Attorney Draudt indicated to the contrary when he credibly testified 

### thatPetitioner's mental

### health was "stabilized." Thus, there
was simplyno 

### valid mental health issue atthe time Petitioner entered her

### plea. Considering the totality 

### of Petitioner's presumptively truthful answers at the plea colloquy, her involvement in the process, the 

### Court's explanations to her, and the 

### testimony 

### of her trial counsel and the

### jail representative, and the complete lack 

### of any valid mental health issue, 

### Petitioner's argument that her guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is undermined and the Court finds the 

### Petitioner's plea was voluntary. 

### Petitioner's less-than- credible testimony 

### at the 

### PCRA hearing is insufficient to merit 

### reliefand the Court therefore denies

### reliefbased upon

### Petitioner's first PCRA claim. Although not part 

### ofour totality analysis, we note that a 

### defendant whopleads guilty is bound by the statements he makes while under oath, and 

### he may 

### not later assert 

### grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he 

### made at his plea colloquy. Commonwealth v. 

### Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003). It is a 

### longstanding rule in Pennsylvania that a 

### defendant maynot challengehis guilty plea by asserting that he lied 

### while under oath, even 

### ifhe avers that counsel induced the lies. 

### Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523 (citing Commonwealth v. 

### Cappelli, 489 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. 1985)). A 

### person who elects to 

### plead
6-./y to rat e 

### statements he makes in

# ei.C' el 0-11;j ;:j:d '.eta m11 WA ;1.
- MSC:: grouncis 

### ior withdrawing tr.e plea cc:nuad-xi the sta,..ement3 Ile mace at his colloquy. 

### Id. (citing 

### Commonwealth v.. 

### Stork, 7 7 A.2d 789, 

### 790-9i (7a Super 1999; Given this rule, the 

### Court clarifies its position that further testimony from defense expert Dr. Christine 

### Marton was not necessary. In advance 

### ofthe PCRA evidentiary hearing the Court made a 

### determination that before it would permit an 

### expert to be retained for evaluation purposes or be called as a witness on the question 

### ofPetitioner's competency at the time she entered 

### her plea, itwould be appropriate to hear testimony from the 

### Petitioner 

### herself
as well as counsel and other witnesses. Foundationally, the Court considered what was necessary to 

### determine whether there was a colorable issueregarding her mental health status at therelevant time 

### surroundingher plea. After hearing from the Defendant/Petitioner and counsel and 

### after weighing the credibility 

### ofthe various witnesses and reviewing in detail the 

### Petitioner's answers under oath at the colloquy and her interaction with the Court, the Court is satisfied that, based upon the entire record, there is no colorable issue as to competency. 

### Petitioner's answers to the various questions about 

### her competency, mental health medications, mental 

### health treatment, and, frankly, mental health defenses coupled with her answers on the written plea 

### colloquy all lead to the clear and 

### inescapable conclusionthat she was competent at the time she entered her plea. 

### Even

### ifthe analysis were based exclusively upon the 

### Defendant's testimony at the time 

### ofthe PCRA Hearing 

### where she was clearly competent and 

### understood what was going on, she nonetheless still failed to 

### provide 

### a credible foundation to 

### contradict 

### the testimony at the colloquy and the 

### Court's own observations 

### ofher interactions at the time 

### ofthe plea, The factual inconsistency between 

### her own testimony at the colloquy and the 

### PCRA Hearingmake is such that the Court is satisfied that the record supports unequivocally 

### the conclusionthat she
was competent and 

### understood the nature

### ofthe

### plea she was entering. Next we 

### consider 

### Petitioner's argumentthat her trial counsel was ineffective. 

### Petitioner argues that her trial counsel, Robert Draudt, did not have the appropriate experience and qualificationsto counselher in connection with herguilty plea. When 

### considering an allegation 

### ofineffective assistance 

### ofcounsel, counsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner 

### pleads and proves that: (1) the underlying claim is 

### ofarguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

### reasonable basis for his conduct; and (3) petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's action or omission. 

### Commonwealth v, Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014), "In orderto meetthe prejudiceprong 

### ofthe ineffectiveness standard, 

### a defendantmust show 

### that there is a 

### 'reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 

### result 

### ofthe proceeding would have been 

### different.' "Commonwealth v. Reed, 42 A.3d 314, 319 (Pa. Super. 2012). The burden 

### ofproving ineffectiveness rests with the appellant. Commonwealth v. 

### Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1018 (Pa. 2007), Additionally, we note that counsel cannot be held ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. 

### Commonwealth v. 

### Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005), 

### appealdenied, 895 A.2d 549 (Pa. 2006),

7s gen,..--a1 he 16 31- tia 3 

# te appropriate experience ai:tt cjaiiticauc.r-L- necessa7

### I IC 

### adequatCy 

### counst,,.thr Petitioner in connection with ner gu:!ty plea. narticulariy given the 

### evidence ofthe 

### Petitioner's mental status:" 

### (Amended PCRA Petition, p. 3. Paragraph 10(d).) 

### Petitioner also argues her attorney failed to fully explainthe nature and consequences

## of the Motion for Change 

### ofVenue or Venire (Amended PCRA Petition, p. 3. Paragraph 10(b)). 

### The 

### Petitioner's 

### brief cites to 

### portions of her PCRA testimony wherein the Petitioner describedher knowledge 

### ofthe law and her

### beliefthat she understood her own case better than her trial counsel. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, p. 45-50.) She references looking 

### through cases and exploring defenses in the lawbooks provided by Crawford County. She 

### mentions consultations with a friend 

### ofhers who is an attorney and complains that her attorney was not aware 

### of or qualified for 

### her defense. (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing, p. 47.) Petitioner points to various other perceived failures 

### ofher trial counsel, ranging from allegations

### ofhis 

### alleged failure to provide her with discoveryto his showing her

### apaper that somehow led her to 

### believethe death penalty was stillapossibility. (N.T. PCRA Hearing,p. 47-50.) Once again, 

### Petitioner'stestimony is contradicted by both her own 

### testimonyat her plea colloquy and 

### thetestimony ofher trial counsel atthe PCRA Hearing. We also note, before we describe the contradictory parts 

### ofher testimony regarding 

### her relationship with Mr. Draudt, that 

### Petitioner's two PCRA arguments are logically inconsistent. In her first PCRA argument, Petitioner contends she was 

### not 

### of sound mind, did not understand the process, and was suffering from a mental health condition that precluded her from 

### understanding and entering a knowing and 

### voluntary plea. In her second argument, Petitioner portrays 

### herself as a legal strategist who 

### knew more than her own attorney. She recounts 

### that she 

### researched the law and consulted with an attorney friend to arrive at the 

### best approach for her case. We note that she
even participated in legal discussion regarding case law when the Court cited a case 

### that Petitioner stated she hadread and understood. (See N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 19.) 

### Petitioner's inconsistent arguments further undermine her credibility at the PCRA Hearing and 

### bolster our confidence in 

### Petitioner's competency. 

### Petitioner entered not

### just a knowing and voluntary plea, but also an intelligent one. Our 

### observation 

### ofher understanding 

### ofthe legal process, her communications regarding the case law, and 

### her active and involved participation in her defense made it clear that this Petitioner understood the process and her situation. She acted involved and capable in her communications to the Court and to her attorney at the time she entered the plea. Looking at a 

### totality 

### of the circumstances, her 

### attorney's effectiveness is not an issue. At the guilty

### plea colloquy, 

### Petitioner not only stated she was satisfied with her attorney and his representation (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 163), she also 

### visibly demonstrated her working relationship with Attorney Draudt through 

### her communications and breaks to consult with her attorney regarding parts 

### of the colloquy. (See e.g. N.T. Plea Colloquy, p, 28.) Further, she

8answered in the affirmative when asked s /..riorne;- 

### Draudt did everything she wanted him to do, provided her with discovery, and was. availalia- to speak 

### with her whenever she wanted. (N.`ls, 

### ilea Colloquy, p. 163.) Evaluating the record in 

### our assessment

### ofAttorney 

### Draudt's performance, we note that Attorney Draudt evidenced his ability to represent the Petitioner in the 

### following particulars: a) he appeared on

### behalfofPetitioner at pretrial proceedings and filed and effectively argued
an Omnibus Pretrial 

### Motion in an attempt to suppress her 

### confession and the initial stop 

### of Petitioner and also 

### filed motions relating to discovery and extensions 

### oftime (N,T. 

### PCRA Hearingp. 6; 21-23); b) he filed a Motion for Change 

### ofVenue/Venire in an 

### attempt to move theproceedings to a 

### differentcounty to avoid pretrial publicity (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearingp. 13; 18); c) he filed a 

### competency motion andhad his client evaluated by a 

### psychiatrist and reviewed the 

### doctor's report with Petitioner before effectively representing Petitioner at her competency hearing (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing p. 7-9); d) he provided his client 

### with discovery and spoke 

### with her regularly, even frequently, about the evidence against her (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing p. 20-21); e) he met with 

### Petitioner numerous times at 

### the Crawford County Correctional Facility [approximately 40 times] to discuss 

### Petitioner's case (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing p. 19); 

### 0 he conferred with other attorneys regarding 

### Petitioner's case (including an attorney friend 

### of Petitioner's at Petitioner's request) (N,T. PCRA Hearing p. 6); g) 

### he met with 

### Petitioner's family to discuss the case (N.T. PCRA Hearing p. 21; 15); and f) 

### he explained the available defenses and/or trial 

### strategies and their possible outcomes to Petitioner. (N.T, 

### PCRA Hearing p. 12-13.) Petitioner confirmed many 

### of the above details. 

### During the 

### plea colloquy, 

### Petitioner confirmed she was able to communicate with 

### Attorney Draudt to 

### assist him in his representation and that he had been to the

### jail numerous times to discuss her case with her (N,T, Plea Colloquy, p. 16; 20). She confirmed that they spent a lot 

### oftime talking about her
case. (N.T. 

### Plea Colloquy, p. 32.) She said she had a 

### sufficient amount 

### of time to 

### talk to Draudt about her case. (N.T. 

### Plea Colloquy, p. 114; 163). She spoke with 

### Draudt about giving up herright to appeal thepretrial rulings, (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 163.) She confirmed 

### that he explained all 

### ofher post sentence rights and 

### thoroughly went over the written plea colloquy with her. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 72-72; 9.) She explained how shediscussed the relevant case law with Attorney Draudt. (N.T. Plea Colloquy, p. 20.) She said she was satisfied with his representation and

### that he had done everything she had asked him to do. (N.T. 

### Plea Colloquy, p. 163.) She 

### acknowledged that Draudtwas available to speak with her 

### whenever she wanted, thathe answered 

### herquestions and 

### provided herwithdiscovery. (N.T. 

### PleaColloquy, p. 163.) Also, at the 

### PCRA Hearing, Petitioner confirmed 

### that she 

### had discussed all 

### of her mental health issues and 

### their implications with 

### Attorney Draudt (N.T. PCRA Hearing, p. 36.) and she 

### confirmed that they also discussed details 

### ofher case like 

### the timing 

### of sentencing (N.T. PCRA Hearing, p. 44), the Omnibus Pretrial 

### Motion (N.T. 

### PCRAHearing, p. 61), and 

### the implications 

### ofbeing examined by Dr. 

### Marton (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing, p. 61). Further, she
9speciricatly fIcitnEtkvi that she never 

### complained about Attorney 

### Draudt's representation. (N.T ?CRA

### heann2: p

. 6 1. .) Considering 

### the above listing 

### of Attorney 

### Draudt's actions in his 

### representation 

### of Petitioner and the confirmation 

### of those actions by Petitioner, we find 

### Attorney Draudt acted 

### with sufficient 

### effort and experience throughout the pretrial stages and up through 

### thetime 

### of the plea colloquy to satisfy the Court that he effectively represented the Petitioner and had a reasonablebasis for the above-listed conduct in his representation 

### ofPetitioner. The Court also notes, in light 

### ofPetitioner's testimony at the 

### PCRA Hearing, that the deathpenalty was 

### neverpart 

### ofthis case. We find Attorney 

### Draudt's testimony credible (N.T. PCRA Hearing p. 28) and 

### further note that Attorney Draudt is 

### not death qualified and 

### would not have been 

### appointed by the Court to represent this Petitioner 

### if the death penalty were in any way at issue. Any implication by Petitioner that the issue 

### ofthe death penalty somehow impacted her representation or her ability to understand her plea is 

### without merit and inconsistent with all credible evidence 

### ofrecord. The same can be said about 

### Petitioner's complaint that she did not understand the impact 

### of being sentenced directly after entering her guilty plea, which we also find not credible. Theissue was 

### clearly raised and carefully explained by the 

### Court atthe plea colloquy, and Petitioner testified she 

### understood the impact 

### ofthetiming 

### ofsentencing (N.T. Guilty 

### Plea Colloquy, p. 164- 165.) With regard to 

### Petitioner's statement at the PCRA Hearing that she wanted to pursue "other defenses,"to complete our

### PCRA analysis and 

### meetthe test for 

### effectiveness set forth in the case law, we next evaluate whether the legal decision to take the 

### plea rather than moving forward to trial on any available defense resulted in prejudice to 

### Petitioner and whether a different approach would have changedthe result

### oftheproceeding. In 

### Petitioner's Brief in Support 

### of her PCRA Petition, she excerpts 

### portions 

### of her PCRA testimony describing 

### Petitioner's research in law books and 

### how she would bring defenses to her 

### attorney's attention after talking with her attorney friend. According to Petitioner, Attorney 

### Draudt would not have known about these defenses 

### ifit were 

### not for her. Although we do not find this statement credible in light 

### ofthe 

### testimony 

### ofAttorney Draudt, even assuming 

### arguendo that Attorney Draudt only became aware 

### of the need to find a competency expert to 

### examine the 

### Defendant after 

### communicating with his client, 

### this would not have changed the outcome. Competency was questioned. An expert was retained. Two psychiatric reports were prepared and submitted to the Court. The 

### Court held a 

### hearing on competency andfound Petitioner to be competent. Then

### Petitioner made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to enter a guilty plea afterfull consultation withher counsel. The Court finds 

### Attorney Draudt credible and finds that he did not encourage or compel his client to enter aplea but 

### rather felt that the case had improved. He was prepared or at least 10nott;:-. prepare:: It incticatet-4 a uesire to enter a plea and 

### convoed same to counsel. Thosc issues were explored detail throughout the colloquy. Attorney 

### Draudt had developed and was prepared to present any available applicable defense at trial. From a trial, perspective, Attorney Draudt was glad that 

### Petitioner's codefendant entered a guilty 

### plea "because that removed any impetus for her to, you know, cast blame on my client." (N.T. PCRA Hearing, p.. 11.) He also believed that 

### Petitioner's co

### defendant's plea removed the possibility 

### of the Commonwealth using Olmstead as a witness and this was good for 

### Petitioner's case. (N.T. 

### PCRA Hearing, p. 24-25.) Then, despite Attorney 

### Draudt's efforts to move the case forward to trial, it was the 

### Petitioner who brought up her desire to enter a guiltyplea and it was the 

### Petitioner who decided that she did not want to go trial because she did not 

### want to put her family through a trial. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, p. 27.) Therefore, to the extent that Petitioner believed that any defenses had merit, for Petitioner to suggest somehow that it was 

### her counsel who encouraged her to abandon those defenses is contrary to the facts. To summarize, the suggestion that somehow her decision to enter the plea was based upon 

### counsel's unpreparedness or lack 

### ofunderstanding 

### ofthe law is simply inconsistent with the factual 

### testimony at the time 

### of the entry 

### of the plea and sentencing and the credible testimony from 

### the PCRA Hearing. There are no credible facts 

### of record that lead to the conclusion that the 

### Defendant was compelled to enter a plea. Rather, her decision was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made after consulting with counsel and her family after thoroughly going over the case in detail and considering available defenses. The Court combines this 

### observation with the equally compelling fact thatthe details 

### ofthe actual 

### incident conveyed by Petitioner meet the elements 

### of first degree murder without presenting a viable defense. To the extent that there would be other defenses that did not involve 

### the actual conduct but focus on the 

### Petitioner's state 

### ofmind, once again, her answers at the time 

### ofthe colloquy and her exchanges with the Court under oath eliminate those issues from further reasonable consideration. The fact 

### that now in retrospect Petitionerbelieves her choice to enter a plea was wrong or not a good 

### conclusion on her part does not lead to the conclusion that it was a 

### result 

### of counsel's error, lack 

### of explanation, or lack 

### ofpreparedness or effectiveness. In contrast, the credible testimony 

### ofAttorney Draudtpoints to the conclusion that counsel was 

### notthe 

### moving force behind the plea, 

### nor was it his desire that the Defendant enter a plea, and a factual foundationfor first degree murder was well established at the time 

### oftheplea. Because we find a totality 

### ofthe circumstances shows Petitioner entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea that was not compelled, forced, or even minimally caused by any action or 

### inaction 

### ofAttorney Draudt whose representation was sufficiently effective, 

### Petitioner'sPCRA is withoutmerit.
11ACCORDINGLY, we 

### enter the following ORDER:

12

### ORDER MarkD. Stevens, J. Niev 2018 AND NOW, this day

### ofMay 2018, it ishereby ORDERED 

### thatPetitioner's Amended Petition for Post.Conviction Collateral

### Reliefis herebyDENIED.

BY

### THECOURT: 

# /(Y J.

13