United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 11, 2015

Decided June 3, 2015

Before

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 13‐3182

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY L. SIMMONS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10 CR 820

Amy J. St. Eve,

Judge.

O R D E R

Anthony Simmons was convicted after a jury trial of wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343, and bankruptcy crimes, see id. §§ 157, 1519. The district court sentenced him

within the guidelines range to a total of 78 months’ imprisonment. Simmons filed a

notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and

seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Simmons opposes

counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the

nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be

expected to involve. We limit our discussion to those issues plus the additional points

that Simmons, disagreeing with counsel, believes have merit. See United States v. Bey,

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 13‐3182    Page 2

748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir.

1996). For the reasons that follow, we dismiss Simmons’s appeal.

Simmons used wholly owned Unity Management & Development Corporation

to target unsophisticated homeowners in financial straits. In one scheme, which ran for

two years beginning in 2004, Simmons represented that homeowners with equity but

falling behind on their mortgage could sell to a Unity “investor” and stay in the house

as a renter until better fortune allowed a repurchase. The “investors,” though, actually

were straw purchasers paid $10,000 by Simmons to lend their names to loan

applications full of falsehoods. Simmons never discussed selling price with a distressed

owner, so when a house sold he simply kept as his “fee” the difference between the

straw purchaser’s loan and the retired mortgage. In one instance, that was nearly 25% of

the new loan. The straw purchasers predictably defaulted, and so the homes still ended

up in foreclosure. For this scheme Simmons was convicted of three counts of wire fraud.

Then in 2007, Simmons, again through Unity, began preparing and filing skeletal

bankruptcy petitions on behalf of distressed homeowners willing to pay his exorbitant

fees. The homeowners typically had no intention of pursuing the bankruptcy case but

hoped that the automatic stay, see 11 U.S.C. § 362, would stall a foreclosure suit. On the

bankruptcy petitions Simmons failed to disclose his status as a non‐attorney preparer,

see id. § 110(b)(2)(B)(i), and with those petitions he submitted false certifications that the

debtor had engaged in credit counseling, see id. § 109(h)(1). This scheme led to three

convictions for bankruptcy fraud and another three for falsifying records in a

bankruptcy proceeding.

   

Appellate counsel begins by questioning whether Simmons could argue that the

wire‐fraud charges were barred by the statute of limitations, which is 5 years. See 18

U.S.C. § 3282(a); United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 446, 456 (7th Cir. 2009). A § 1343

violation occurs each time an interstate wire is used to execute a scheme to defraud,

see United States v. Sheneman, 682 F.3d 623, 629–30 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Turner,

551 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2008), and for each use a new 5‐year limitations period begins

to run, see United States v. Baldwin, 414 F.3d 791, 795 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2005), overruled in

unrelated part by United States v. Parker, 508 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.

Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1988). Thus, an appellate claim would be frivolous

because Simmons was indicted in September 2010, less than 5 years after each wire

transfer underlying a § 1343 count. See McGowan, 590 F.3d 456–57; Eckhardt, 843 F.2d at

993–94.
No. 13‐3182    Page 3

Regardless, Simmons never asked the district court to dismiss the § 1343 counts

as untimely. Instead, trial counsel filed a “notice” of his intention to object, based on the

statute of limitations, to any evidence concerning events that occurred more than 5 years

before he was indicted. Counsel asserted that, even if the scheme to defraud had started

in 2004 as alleged, anything Simmons did before September 2005 (5 years before the

grand jury indicted) was too old to prosecute and thus, according to counsel,

constituted “other crimes” evidence excluded by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This

premise is frivolous. As Simmons’s new lawyer recognizes, the statute of limitations

and Rule 404(b) do not place temporal constraints on the government’s proof of a single

scheme to defraud, no matter how long before indictment that scheme was commenced.

See United States v. Tadros, 310 F.3d 999, 1007 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Barnes,

230 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453, 1464 (7th Cir.

1987). Moreover, an appellate claim resting on trial counsel’s “notice” would be

especially meritless since he never followed through by objecting to particular evidence

as stale.

In his Rule 51(b) response, Simmons offers two contentions related to the points

discussed by counsel. First, Simmons posits that we lack appellate jurisdiction because,

he believes, the proceedings in the district court will not be final until the district court

discusses trial counsel’s “notice.” That belief is mistaken; the judge’s handling of the

“notice” does not affect our jurisdiction. Second, Simmons contends that the district

court should have instructed the jury that it could not find him guilty of wire fraud

without agreeing unanimously that all of his conduct comprising that offense was

committed within five years of indictment. This proposed argument rests on the

mistaken belief that, because of the statute of limitations, the indictment necessarily

charges two schemes to defraud by means of wire, one reaching back 5 years before

indictment and the other ending before then. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 479 F.3d 485,

491 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that jury unanimity might be a concern if indictment

alleges two crimes in single count). In fact, the indictment alleges a single scheme

running from 2004 into 2006, and, as we’ve already noted, it is the date that a scheme to

defraud is executed by use of an interstate wire, not the date that the scheme began, that

matters for purposes of the statute of limitations. Thus, we would conclude that the

district court’s admonishment that the jury needed to find the existence of a scheme

beyond a reasonable doubt, coupled with the general unanimity instruction, adequately

instructed the jury. See United States v. Schiro, 679 F.3d 521, 533 (7th Cir. 2012); United

States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2006).
No. 13‐3182    Page 4

Counsel next considers whether Simmons could challenge the denial of his

pretrial motion to sever the wire‐fraud counts from the counts charging bankruptcy

crimes. In his Anders brief counsel confuses severance with misjoinder. Misjoinder

occurs when the government charges in the same indictment crimes not satisfying the

criteria of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a). See United States v. Davis, 724 F.3d

949, 955 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2008). By

contrast, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a), a district court may sever

properly joined charges if separate trials are necessary to avert prejudice to a party.

See United States v. States, 652 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Ervin, 540 F.3d

623, 628–29 (7th Cir. 2008). But neither theory could have benefitted Simmons, and

pressing either on appeal would be fruitless.

We review claims of misjoinder de novo, looking only to the face of the

indictment. See Davis, 724 F.3d at 955; United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 552 (7th Cir.

2012). The district court concluded that the charges of wire fraud and bankruptcy

crimes share “similar character,” see FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a), and thus were properly joined.

That broad basis for joinder concerns categorical similarity, not temporal or evidentiary

overlap. See United States v. Berg, 714 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v.

Alexander, 135 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 1998). And the charged crimes, each of them

involving a form of fraud, are of like character. See Alexander, 135 F.3d at 476

(concluding that mail fraud and bankruptcy fraud are of similar character); United States

v. Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1111–12 (7th Cir. 1992) (same for mail fraud and embezzlement).

And as the district court noted, the accusation that Simmons used Unity to target

victims in similar financial straits underlies and directly links all nine counts in the

indictment.

As for severance, Simmons did not renew his motion after the close of evidence,

so an appellate claim challenging the adverse ruling would, most likely, be deemed

waived. See United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 538 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Rollins, 301 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir. 2002). And waiver aside, Simmons would be unable

to convince us that he was actually prejudiced by having a single trial on all nine

counts. See United States v. Quilling, 261 F.3d 707, 715 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.

Dixon, 184 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1999). The government produced overwhelming

documentary and testimonial evidence to support each charge. See United States v.

Carter, 695 F.3d 690, 701 (7th Cir. 2012); Dixon, 184 F.3d at 645–46; United States v.

Todisijevic, 161 F.3d 479, 484–85 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, Simmons was adequately

protected against prejudice because the jury was instructed to separately evaluate each

charge. See Carter, 695 F.3d at 701–02; Quilling, 261 F.3d at 715.
No. 13‐3182    Page 5

Finally, counsel notes that he evaluated the sentencing proceedings but did not

find even colorable support for a procedural or substantive challenge. The district court

calculated a guidelines imprisonment range of 70 to 87 months and decided that 78 was

the appropriate term. Counsel did not identify any possible error in the court’s

application of the guidelines, and we would presume the resulting term of

imprisonment to be reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United

States v. Pape, 601 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2010). Counsel sees nothing in the record that

would warrant setting aside that the presumption, nor do we.

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and this appeal is DISMISSED.