NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL CANALES, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0100

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-434869-001 DT

The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge

The Honorable David B. Gass, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Spencer D. Heffel

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. CANALES

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Michael Canales (“Appellant”) appeals his convictions and 

sentences for two counts of sale or transportation of dangerous drugs.

Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Smith v. Robbins, 

528 U.S. 259 (2000); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); and State v. Leon, 

104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), stating that he has searched the record on 

appeal and found no arguable question of law that is not frivolous.

Appellant’s counsel therefore requests that we review the record for 

fundamental error. See State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30, 2 P.3d 89, 96 

(App. 1999) (stating that this court reviews the entire record for reversible 

error). This court allowed Appellant to file a supplemental brief in propria 

persona, and he has done so, raising two issues that we address.

¶2 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona 

Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).1 Finding no reversible 

error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶3 On September 5, 2013, a grand jury issued an indictment, 

charging Appellant with two counts of sale or transportation of dangerous 

drugs (methamphetamine), each a class two felony. See A.R.S. § 13-3407.

The State later filed an allegation of historical priors, alleging Appellant had 

two historical prior felony convictions for enhancement purposes.

 

1 We cite the current version of the applicable statutes because no 

revisions material to this decision have occurred since the dates of the 

offenses.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State 

v. Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 64, 887 P.2d 592, 594 (App. 1994).
STATE v. CANALES

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¶4 At trial, the State presented the following evidence: In March 

2013, Phoenix police detectives Egea and Ayala were working undercover 

as narcotics officers, and they became aware of Appellant through 

Appellant’s former girlfriend and a confidential informant. At 

approximately 4:30 p.m. on March 20, the detectives drove to an apartment 

complex in Phoenix, where the confidential informant introduced them to 

Appellant. The confidential informant walked away after the introduction, 

and the detectives, left alone with Appellant, inquired about purchasing 

methamphetamine. Appellant informed the detectives that he did not have 

the methamphetamine on his person, and the detectives agreed to drive 

Appellant to a different location, where Appellant would supply the 

methamphetamine.

¶5 The detectives drove Appellant to a second apartment 

complex. Detective Egea handed Appellant $110 to purchase the 

methamphetamine. Appellant exited the vehicle and entered a nearby 

apartment. When Appellant returned, he handed Detective Egea a Ziploc 

baggie containing a substance that appeared to be methamphetamine.

Detective Egea gave Appellant an additional $20 for facilitating the deal, 

and the detectives drove Appellant back to the first apartment complex.

The substance in the Ziploc baggie that Appellant handed Detective Egea 

was subsequently tested and determined to be 3.519 grams of 

methamphetamine, a usable quantity.

¶6 On April 10, 2013, the undercover detectives again arranged 

to purchase methamphetamine from Appellant. The detectives drove to a 

convenience store, where they met the confidential informant. Soon 

afterward, at approximately 3:40 p.m., Appellant arrived. Detective Ayala 

was the purchaser, and as Appellant approached Detective Ayala in the 

parking lot, the confidential informant walked away, while Detective Egea 

“kind of hung around [and] watched” the transaction between Appellant 

and Detective Ayala. Detective Ayala handed Appellant $150, and 

Appellant walked to a vehicle and retrieved a substance, which he gave to 

Detective Ayala. The substance was subsequently tested and determined

to be 7.21 grams of methamphetamine in a usable condition.

¶7 The jury found Appellant guilty of both charged counts, and 

found the State had proved an alleged aggravating circumstance of 

pecuniary gain. Before sentencing, Appellant admitted he had two 

historical prior felony convictions for enhancement purposes. The trial 

court sentenced Appellant to concurrent, presumptive terms of 15.75 years’ 

imprisonment in the Arizona Department of Corrections for each count, 
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Decision of the Court

4

and credited him for 140 days of presentence incarceration. Appellant filed 

a timely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct/Vouching

¶8 Appellant argues his conviction must be reversed because the 

prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by vouching 

for the State’s witnesses. We disagree.

¶9 “To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a 

defendant must demonstrate that ‘(1) misconduct is indeed present; and (2) 

a reasonable likelihood exists that the misconduct could have affected the 

jury’s verdict, thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.’” State v. Moody, 

208 Ariz. 424, 459, ¶ 145, 94 P.3d 1119, 1154 (2004) (citation omitted). 

Prosecutorial misconduct is not merely “legal error, negligence, mistake, or 

insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional 

conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial.” Pool 

v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984) (footnote 

omitted). To justify reversal, the misconduct “must be ‘so pronounced and 

persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.’” State v. Lee, 

189 Ariz. 608, 616, 944 P.2d 1222, 1230 (1997) (citations omitted). Even then, 

reversal is not required unless the defendant was denied a fair trial. State 

v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 600, 858 P.2d 1152, 1203 (1993).

¶10 It is improper for a prosecutor to vouch for the credibility of 

the State’s witnesses. State v. Salcido, 140 Ariz. 342, 344, 681 P.2d 925, 927 

(App. 1984). “Prosecutorial vouching occurs ‘when the prosecutor places 

the prestige of the government behind its witness,’ or ‘where the prosecutor 

suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s 

testimony.’” State v. Garza, 216 Ariz. 56, 64, ¶ 23, 163 P.3d 1006, 1014 (2007) 

(citing State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 401, 783 P.2d 1184, 1193 (1989), 

disapproved on other grounds by State v. King, 225 Ariz. 87, 89-90, ¶¶ 9-12, 235 

P.3d 240, 242-43 (2010)).

¶11 We have reviewed the entirety of the prosecutor’s closing 

arguments, and conclude that nothing in the prosecutor’s remarks 

constitutes impermissible prosecutorial vouching. The prosecutor neither 

bolstered the detectives’ credibility by referencing matters outside the 

record nor placed the prestige of the government behind the detectives by 

providing personal assurances of their veracity. See State v. King, 180 Ariz. 

268, 277, 883 P.2d 1024, 1033 (1994) (citation omitted). Further, “during 

closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals 
STATE v. CANALES

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to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, 

and suggest ultimate conclusions.” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 602, 858 P.2d at 1205.

The prosecutor did exactly that. Moreover, viewed in context, the 

prosecutor’s arguments made clear that it was for the jury alone to 

determine the witnesses’ credibility and to “consider the evidence in light 

of reason, common sense, and experience.” Finally, the prosecutor’s

subsequent characterization of the detectives’ testimony as “reasonable”

was fair rebuttal to defense counsel’s argument challenging the detectives’ 

credibility. See State v. Duzan, 176 Ariz. 463, 468, 862 P.2d 223, 228 (App. 

1993); see also State v. Martinez, 130 Ariz. 80, 82, 634 P.2d 7, 9 (App. 1981) 

(concluding that prosecutorial comments that are a fair rebuttal to areas 

opened by the defense are proper). The prosecutor did not commit 

misconduct by her remarks, much less fundamental, reversible error.

II. The Confidential Informant

¶12 Appellant also argues the trial court abused its discretion and 

violated the Confrontation Clause in denying his pretrial motion to compel 

disclosure of the identity of the State’s confidential informant, who did not 

testify at trial. We disagree.

¶13 Appellant’s argument revolves around the following facts: 

Before trial, Appellant filed a motion to compel disclosure of the identity of 

the confidential informant who introduced the detectives to Appellant. The 

State responded that the informant was not present during the charged 

transactions and was not a material witness. At the evidentiary hearing on 

the motion, Detective Egea testified the confidential informant was not 

present during any drug-related conversations or transactions involving 

the detectives and Appellant. The prosecutor noted Appellant had not 

asserted the defense of entrapment,3 and after argument by counsel, the 

trial court denied Appellant’s motion.

¶14 “Disclosure of the existence of an informant or of the identity 

of an informant who will not be called to testify” is not required if 

“disclosure would result in substantial risk to the informant or to the 

informant’s operational effectiveness, provided the failure to disclose will 

not infringe the constitutional rights of the accused.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

15.4(b)(2). A defendant seeking to overcome the State’s policy of protecting 

an informant’s identity bears the burden of demonstrating the informant 

“would be a material witness on the issue of guilt which might result in 

 

3 The only defense Appellant asserted in his notice of defenses was 

insufficiency of the State’s evidence.
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exoneration and that nondisclosure of his identity would deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Grounds, 128 Ariz. 14, 15, 623 P.2d 803, 804 

(1981) (quoting State v. Tuell, 112 Ariz. 340, 343, 541 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1975), 

abrogated on other grounds by State v. Duran, 233 Ariz. 310, 313, ¶¶ 17-18, 312 

P.3d 109, 112 (2013)); accord State v. Robles, 182 Ariz. 268, 271, 895 P.2d 1031, 

1034 (App. 1995). To make this showing, however, the defendant must 

provide evidence, such as “sworn affidavits, stipulated facts, depositions,

and oral testimony.” Grounds, 128 Ariz. at 15, 623 P.2d at 804; accord Robles, 

182 Ariz. at 271, 895 P.2d at 1034 (affirming the denial of a motion for 

disclosure for failure to present evidence in support of the appellant’s claim 

that the confidential informant had entrapped him). “A mere possibility or 

speculative hope that an informant might have other information which 

might be helpful to the defendant is insufficient” to compel disclosure. State 

ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court (Sorum), 21 Ariz. App. 170, 172, 517 P.2d 523, 

525 (1974).

¶15 In this case, Appellant did not testify at the evidentiary 

hearing on the disclosure motion or present any affidavit, deposition 

testimony, or other evidence in support of his motion. Instead, as in 

Grounds and Robles, only defense counsel’s argument was presented in 

support of the requested disclosure. Both of those courts found argument 

alone insufficient, and so do we. See Grounds, 128 Ariz. at 15, 623 P.2d at 

804; Robles, 182 Ariz. at 271, 895 P.2d at 1034. Other than the testimony of 

Detective Egea, which supports the trial court’s decision to deny 

Appellant’s motion, the record is devoid of evidence on which this court 

can further review the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, on this record, 

disclosure of the confidential informant’s identity would have been

inappropriate, and Appellant has not sustained his burden of proving he 

was deprived of a fair trial by the denial of his motion. See Grounds, 128 

Ariz. at 15, 623 P.2d at 804.

¶16 Further, the Confrontation Clause4 prohibits the admission of 

an out-of-court statement of a witness who does not appear at trial if the 

statement is testimonial, unless the witness is unavailable and the 

defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See 

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). Because no testimony of 

the confidential informant was offered against Appellant, Appellant’s 

 

4 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 

be confronted with the witnesses against him.” See also Ariz. Const. art. 2, 

§ 24 (“In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to meet 

the witnesses against him face to face . . . .”).
STATE v. CANALES

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rights under the Confrontation Clause were not implicated. The trial court 

did not abuse its discretion, much less commit fundamental, reversible 

error in denying Appellant’s motion to compel the identity of the State’s 

confidential informant.

III. Other Issues

¶17 We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and 

find none. See Leon, 104 Ariz. at 300, 451 P.2d at 881; Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, 

¶ 30, 2 P.3d at 96. The evidence presented at trial was substantial and 

supports the verdicts, and the sentences imposed were within the statutory 

limits. Appellant was represented by counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings and allowed to speak at sentencing. The proceedings were 

conducted in compliance with his constitutional and statutory rights and 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

¶18 After filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations 

pertaining to Appellant’s representation in this appeal have ended.

Counsel need do no more than inform Appellant of the status of the appeal 

and of his future options, unless counsel’s review reveals an issue 

appropriate for petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. See State 

v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). Appellant has 

thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he desires, with a pro 

per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.

CONCLUSION

¶19 Appellant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.