COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

LAQUAY DERAY ARNOLD,

 Appellant, 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee. 

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No. 08-23-00038-CR

Appeal from the 

26th Judicial District Court

of Williamson County, Texas 

(TC# 18-2437-K26) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

Following a bench trial, Appellant Laquay Deray Arnold was convicted of aggravated 

assault causing serious bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to ten years’ confinement; but 

suspended that sentence and placed him on community supervision for a term of five years. In his 

sole point of error, Arnold claims the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the court’s 

rejection of his self-defense claim. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Arnold was charged by indictment with one count of aggravated assault causing serious 

bodily injury. Specifically, the charging instrument alleged that Arnold intentionally, knowingly, 

1 This case was transferred from the Austin Court of Appeals pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket 

equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We follow the precedent of that court to the extent it might 

conflict with our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 
2

and recklessly caused serious bodily injury to D.J.2 by striking D.J. with his hand. Following 

Arnold’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, the State presented its case to the bench. 

On September 1, 2018, D.J., who was 16 years old at the time, described that he and a 

group of friends were hanging out near a park, around 8 p.m. at night. The group splintered as 

some of them went to play “ding-dong ditch,” which meant, “[t]o ring someone’s doorbell and run 

away.” Separated from the group, D.J. remained near the park. Soon, he walked towards a pavilion

where the group usually rendezvoused. As he walked in that direction, a car pulled up next to him

and a man, later identified as Arnold, exited the vehicle. Arnold confronted D.J. asking whether 

he had “ding-dong ditched his house,” and kicked in his door. D.J. responded, “No,” explaining

he had the wrong guy. Without warning, Arnold hit D.J. on the left side of his face with his fist.

D.J. described that he immediately saw a light flash, he felt his face had broken, and he lost a tooth. 

As his mouth filled with blood, he felt shocked. 

D.J. described that he never acted aggressively towards Arnold, never attempted to hit him, 

and used no confrontational words towards him. Nevertheless, Arnold continued to threaten him 

while asking him if he felt ready to die. Arnold next grabbed him by his shirt demanding to know 

who had kicked in his door. To diffuse the situation, D.J. gave him names of his friends, and guided 

him to the pavilion in the park. 

On arrival, Arnold threatened D.J.’s friends, telling the group he was a convicted felon who 

could “beat them up pretty bad.” Particularly, Arnold directed his attention to C.A. Another friend, 

J.W., soon arrived. After briefly observing, J.W. inserted herself between C.A. and Arnold. When 

J.W.’s mother soon arrived, Arnold continued to argue with her, and a larger fight ensued. D.J.

called the police. As the crowd dispersed, Arnold also left the scene. 

2 We use initials to protect the anonymity of the complaining witness and other witnesses who were all minors at the 

time the offense was committed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3).
3

When police arrived and examined D.J.’s condition, they suspected he had sustained a 

broken jaw. He was soon taken to Dell Children’s hospital where physicians confirmed his injury. 

As treatment, the medical team inserted a metal plate and wire into his mouth, which he wore for 

several weeks. By the time of his testimony at trial, he described that part of his face remained

numb, and he continued to struggle with persistent drooling. 

Along with D.J., J.W., M.L., and C.A. also testified at trial. J.W. described she had been 

talking with friends while outside the front of her house. Suddenly, she saw a “guy in a hoodie” 

run towards their front door. After he kick the door in, her dog ran out of the house. She chased 

after two males she saw running from the area. Eventually, she spotted D.J. running on the street 

closest to the trail leading to the pavilion. As she watched him, she saw Arnold—who she knew 

from his friendship with her mother—approach D.J. and exit his vehicle. While calling out to D.J.,

Arnold asked him whether he had kicked in her family’s front door. When D.J. denied doing it, 

Arnold “struck him in the face right then and there.” D.J. then held his jaw. She said she never saw 

D.J. move aggressively towards Arnold or act as if he were going to hit Arnold. Instead, D.J.

“backed up,” and he was “respectful” when answering Arnold’s questions. Eventually, she, D.J., 

and Arnold, all made it over to the pavilion, where she next saw Arnold ball up his fist and 

aggressively confront C.A. At that point, she stood in front of C.A. while warning Arnold not to 

hit any of her friends. When J.W.’s mother soon arrived, they argued over something totally off 

topic. Arnold then got in his car and completely left the area without saying where he was going. 

On cross-examination, when Arnold’s counsel asked J.W. whether she told police she did 

not see Arnold punch D.J., she answered she did not remember making those statements. J.W. also 

testified that she had spoken to Child Protective Services (CPS) as part of the investigation. She 

admitted she had been dishonest when she denied she had seen who had punched D.J. She revealed 

at trial that Arnold had been pressuring her to keep quiet to ensure they were “all on the same 
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page” about the events that took place. J.W. identified Arnold in a photo line-up presented by 

police after the incident. 

As a third witness, M.L. testified she saw D.J. walking on the street before Arnold stopped 

him. She also described that D.J. had not acted aggressively towards Arnold before Arnold became 

angry and punched him in the face. She described that D.J. looked “more scared” than hostile. 

After the punch, D.J. tried to get away from Arnold but he followed him to the pavilion. 

As a fourth witness, C.A. testified he was a part of the group that ding-dong-ditched 

Arnolds’s home. He testified that D.J. did not take part in playing the game. He described that 

another friend was the one who had kicked the door open. C.A. testified he merely stood by the 

driveway. He wanted to get a head start to run towards the pavilion. After he arrived at the pavilion, 

he saw Arnold and D.J. approaching the group. D.J. had a bloody face while Arnold held his shirt. 

Arnold was angry and questioned him aggressively. Once they learned that police were called, 

Arnold left the area. C.A. denied that Arnold seemed timid or afraid of any of the other males who 

were present. 

Finally, the State also presented testimony from other witnesses including an ER physician, 

a responding officer, a detective who handled the investigation, and from D.J.’s father. Others 

identified Arnold as the man who hit D.J. Based on a comparison of height and weight, Arnold 

was described as “quite larger” than D.J., being that he was 50-pounds heavier and 6 inches taller.

In his case-in-chief, Arnold testified in his own defense. Providing background, Arnold 

testified that a year and half before the incident, in 2017, he had a heart transplant. He also had 

other serious health issues. He described himself as being in poor health, weighing about 180 

pounds, or significantly less than what was documented on his driver’s license. During his 

transplant recovery, he reconnected on Facebook with Hollye Peel, a friend with a background “in 

the heart field.” After they dated, their romantic relationship evolved such that he spent increasing 
5

time with her at her home. Arnold described two prior incidents that caused him concerns about 

the safety of the neighborhood where she lived. On one occasion, Peel’s daughters came into her

room talking about someone shining a light into the window of their room. He reacted by going 

outside but he didn’t see anyone there. Another time a police helicopter circled the neighborhood 

looking for a suspicious white van. 

On the night of the incident, he described he was home with Peel when he heard a loud 

“boom,” causing him to look in the direction of the front door. He then saw that the door had been 

kicked wide open, and two individuals, who he believed were grown men wearing white T-shirts, 

were standing on the other side. As he ran outside, he saw J.W. was crying hysterically. 

Due to his diminished physical condition, he was too physically weak to walk or chase 

anyone. He decided he would drive around the neighborhood looking for the men who had kicked

in the door. While driving, he soon saw J.W. and Peel chasing D.J. He assumed D.J. was part of 

the group that had kicked in the door. Arnold testified he approached D.J. intending to learn where 

he lived so he could call the police. He viewed D.J. as a “cocky” man. He claimed he felt “sick” 

and “weak” during their confrontation. 

Arnold testified he merely asked D.J. questions about the identities of the other guys who 

had kicked their door. Their conversation went back and forth three times before he noticed D.J. 

looking around, seemingly searching for his friends. Unsure of D.J.’s next move, Arnold took a 

step back. At that point, he saw D.J. swing his hand as if he were going to hit him. Because of his 

medical condition and poor health, he described that he was afraid. He threw a straight punch at 

D.J. to protect himself. When asked why he would put himself in a contentious situation knowing 

he was physically frail, he said he wanted answers from the individualsresponsible for the incident.

Arnold next described that he followed D.J. to the pavilion, where he next questioned D.J.’s 

friends. Afterwards, he returned home on foot before police arrived on the scene. When asked why 
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he fled instead of waiting for police, he answered he had feared for his safety in the neighborhood,

and he was not feeling well. 

At the close of evidence, during closing argument, Arnold’s counsel urged the trial court 

to find that Arnold protected his family and protected himself. The State urged the court to reject 

this claim and find Arnold guilty of the charged offense. After a short recess, the trial court found 

the evidence had established beyond a reasonable doubt that Arnold was in fact guilty of 

aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. The trial court later sentenced Arnold to 

confinement for a term of ten years, but it then suspended the sentence and placed him on 

community supervision for five years. Arnold filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. This 

appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

A defendant raising self-defense has the burden of producing evidence to support the 

defense. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The State then has the 

burden of persuasion to disprove the raised defense; this burden only requires the State to prove 

its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but it has no burden of production of evidence. Id. When a

fact-finder finds the defendant guilty, there is an implicit finding against the defensive theory. Id.

Because the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove self-defense by establishing 

its case beyond a reasonable doubt, we review sufficiency challenges to the fact-finder’s rejection 

of self-defense under the Jackson standard. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979); 

Gonzalez v. State, No. 08-19-00062-CR, 2020 WL 7585890, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Dec. 22, 

2020, no pet.) (applying Jackson v. Virginia standard to a jury’s rejection of self-defense claim).

In resolving the sufficiency of the evidence issue, we look not to whether the State presented 

evidence which refuted appellant's self-defense; but rather, we determine whether, after viewing 

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have 
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found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found 

against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Braughton v. State, 569 

S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

It is solely the job of the fact-finder to assess witness credibility and attach weight to the 

witnesses’ testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). As a 

reviewing court, we may not “sit as a thirteenth juror reweighing the evidence or deciding whether 

we believe the evidence established the element in contention beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” 

Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc). Thus, the fact-finder, 

as the sole arbiter of witness credibility, can choose to believe or disbelieve witness testimony. 

Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855. Further, only the fact-finder acts “to resolve conflicts in the testimony, 

to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” 

Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). 

When the record supports conflicting inferences, we defer to the fact-finder to resolve those 

conflicts and assume the conflicts were resolved in favor of the judgment. Dobbs v. State, 434 

S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Furthermore, the issue 

of self-defense is a fact issue for the fact-finder to resolve. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 913

(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc). 

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if the person intentionally, knowingly, 

or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); 

22.02(a)(1)., “[A] person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the 

actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s 

use or attempted use of unlawful force.” Id. § 9.31(a). A “reasonable belief” is one held by “an 

ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 1.07(a)(42). There is a subjective and objective component to a self-defense claim: not only must 
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an actor subjectively believe the use of force is immediately necessary to protect oneself, but that 

belief must be objectively reasonable. Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). 

SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM

Arnold challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s rejection of 

his self-defense claim. In support of his argument, Arnold points to the suspicious events in the 

neighborhood and his poor health. With these circumstances in mind, Arnold claims the evidence 

established he was frightened when he perceived that D.J. had moved his arm in a manner as if he 

would hit him. Arnold further argues there is uncontroverted evidence that he had undergone a 

heart transplant several months prior to the incident. He asserts he was physically fragile, actively 

taking blood-thinners, and worried about the implications to his health if he were involved in a 

physical altercation with D.J. Arnold urges he punched D.J. once, but only enough to neutralize 

the threat of violence he perceived. Thus, Arnold avers that any ordinary and prudent individual 

in Arnold’s shoes would have acted similarly to defend himself, and no rational trier of fact would 

have found against his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. 

At trial, the testimony from three eyewitnesses differed significantly from Arnold’s telling 

of the facts. The witnesses all testified to Arnold’s aggressive demeanor. They described that D.J. 

had not acted aggressively towards Arnold; rather, it was D.J. who appeared scared of Arnold. 

First, D.J. testified that Arnold punched him in the face without warning or provocation. D.J. 

further stated that Arnold continued to threaten him afterwards, even threatening his life at one 

point, grabbed him by his shirt, and demanded that he give him names of his friends. Next, J.W. 

also testified to witnessing Arnold hit D.J. in the face, describing that she never saw D.J. make any 

aggressive movements towards Arnold. J.W. further testified that Arnold continued to be 

aggressive at the pavilion. She herself intervened to prevent Arnold from hitting another one of 

her friends. Additionally, C.A. testified Arnold had pulled D.J. by his shirt as they walked to the 
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pavilion. He described Arnold as being aggressive with his questioning and he looked angry. 

Lastly, M.L. described that he saw Arnold punch D.J. out of anger when he failed to give him the 

answers he wanted. 

Viewing the record in its entirety, the claim of self-defense fell squarely on a question of 

credibility. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 610 (providing that given two conflicting versions of 

events, it was the job of the jury to decide whether to believe Appellant’s self-defense claim). If 

believed, the victim’s testimony alone could support a guilty verdict. Padilla v. State, 254 S.W.3d 

585, 590 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). Here, considering the conflicting testimony

between Arnold, D.J, and several other witnesses, the trial court was free to reject Arnold’s 

testimony as not being credible. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611. Further, the trial court was 

free to disbelieve Arnold’s testimony about his fearful state of mind given he admitted on crossexamination that, despite his fear and frail physical condition, he intended to confront the 

individuals that he believed had been responsible for kicking in the family’s door. And moreover, 

even after he admitted to punching D.J., Arnold proceeded to grab him by his shirt as they walked 

to the pavilion where he confronted other members of the group.

The trial court could have rationally concluded that Arnold had not been fearful of D.J. but 

instead sought confrontation out of vengeance. See Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 33 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2021) (“[A] person’s belief, absent direct evidence, generally must be inferred from the 

circumstances of the case.”). Arnold testified he himself never called police, even after he had 

identified the individuals he believed had been responsible for the disturbing incident at his door. 

When police finally arrived, Arnold in fact fled the scene. Because our review requires that we 

resolve all inferences in favor of the judgment, we may assume the court rejected Arnold’s claim 

that he fled out of fear, and instead, we may infer from this record that he fled to avoid 
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apprehension. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“Evidence of 

flight . . . shows a consciousness of guilt of the crime for which the defendant is on trial.”).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment, we conclude that 

a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a 

reasonable doubt and against Arnold’s claim of self-defense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03; 

see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609. Accordingly, we overrule Arnold’s sole issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

January 4, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)