Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Talerico v. Village of Clarendon Hills, 2021 IL App (2d) 200318

Appellate Court 

Caption

RICHARD TALERICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE VILLAGE OF 

CLARENDON HILLS, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Second District 

No. 2-20-0318

Filed June 22, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 18-MR-1718; 

the Hon. Bonnie M. Wheaton, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded with directions.

Counsel on

Appeal

Jerome F. Marconi, of Chicago, for appellant.

Jason A. Guisinger, Anthony G. Becknek, and Caitlyn R. Culbertson, 

of Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice Birkett concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Richard Talerico, was a law enforcement officer employed by defendant, the 

Village of Clarendon Hills (defendant or Village). Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory 

judgment against defendant in the circuit court of Du Page County, seeking a ruling that he 

was entitled to the payment of health insurance benefits pursuant to section 10 of the Public 

Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014)). Following cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant and against 

plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the payment of health insurance 

benefits under the Act because he suffered a “catastrophic injury” and the injury occurred 

“during the investigation of a criminal act.” 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014). For the reasons 

explained herein, we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting 

summary judgment for defendant and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter 

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Plaintiff was hired by defendant as a full-time, probationary police officer on November 1, 

1986, and received his regular appointment on May 1, 1988. On January 11, 2015, plaintiff 

was dispatched to a home in the Village in response to a report of a home invasion. While 

carrying evidence-technician equipment, plaintiff slipped on snow and ice located at the rear 

of his squad car. Plaintiff injured his left shoulder when he stuck out his left arm to brace 

himself from falling. In September 2016, plaintiff filed an application for line-of-duty 

disability benefits with the Board of Trustees of the Clarendon Hills Police Pension Fund 

(Pension Board). A hearing was held before the Pension Board over two dates in March and 

May 2017. In a written decision issued in August 2017, the Pension Board determined that the 

incident of January 11, 2015, constituted an “act of duty” under the Illinois Pension Code (see 

40 ILCS 5/5-113 (West 2014); Harroun v. Addison Police Pension Board, 372 Ill. App. 3d 

260, 262 (2007)) inasmuch as plaintiff “was acting in his capacity as [an] evidence technician 

when injured and was responding to an active crime scene to perform [an] investigation.” 

Accordingly, the Pension Board awarded plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension for his 

injury. See 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 2014).

¶ 4 After being awarded the line-of-duty disability pension, plaintiff contacted defendant by 

letter to request the payment of health insurance benefits pursuant to the Act (820 ILCS 320/1 

et seq. (West 2014)). To qualify for health insurance benefits under the Act, a full-time law 

enforcement officer must “suffer[ ] a catastrophic injury or [be] killed in the line of duty” (820 

ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2014)) and the injury or death “must have occurred as the result of the 

officer’s response to fresh pursuit, the officer[’s] *** response to what is reasonably believed 

to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a 

criminal act” (820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2014)). In his letter to defendant, plaintiff asserted 

that he was entitled to benefits under the Act because he suffered a catastrophic injury “while 

in the course of investigating a crime.” Defendant denied the request on the basis that plaintiff 

was not injured under any of the four factors listed in section 10(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 

305/10(b) (West 2014)).

¶ 5 Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant. The 

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary 
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judgment were copies of the transcripts of the proceedings before the Pension Board and a 

copy of the Pension Board’s decision. Attached to defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

were, inter alia, transcripts of deposition testimony from plaintiff and James Shaw, another 

patrol officer who responded to the home invasion. The documents attached to the parties’ 

cross-motions for summary judgment disclose the following with respect to the circumstances 

leading to plaintiff’s injury.

¶ 6 On January 11, 2015, plaintiff was assigned to the day shift as patrol supervisor and onduty evidence technician. Sometime between 1 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. that day, plaintiff responded 

to a call of a home invasion in progress at 358 Reserve Circle in the Village. Shaw also 

responded to the dispatch, as was the protocol for a felony. Plaintiff and Shaw parked in 

different locations away from the home, met somewhere “outside the residence,” and 

approached the scene together. Upon their arrival, plaintiff noticed that the front door of the 

residence appeared to have been forced open. The homeowner related that she was upstairs 

when she heard a loud noise and a chime that sounds when her door is opened. The homeowner 

walked to the top of the staircase and saw an unidentified male standing at the foot of the stairs. 

The subject fled after being seen by the homeowner. The officers moved the homeowner to 

Shaw’s squad car for safety reasons. The officers then conducted a “quick search” of the 

residence to make sure there were no other offenders in the building.

¶ 7 Plaintiff testified that it took only “a few minutes” to secure the homeowner and search the 

residence. After the scene was secured, plaintiff directed Shaw to canvass the neighborhood to 

obtain information about the offender or ascertain his whereabouts. Plaintiff would gather 

evidence at the scene. Shaw escorted the homeowner back into the home and took her upstairs. 

Plaintiff testified that, although the scene was secure in that there was no immediate physical 

threat to anyone, “there was still evidence that needed to be located, evidence that needed to 

be documented, [and] evidence that needed to be collected.” Plaintiff noted, for instance, that 

there was snow on the ground, so he would need to search for “footprints in the snow.” He 

would also dust for fingerprints and look for “tools that may have been used to pry open the 

door” or any other evidence “to establish who the perpetrator may be.” Plaintiff stated that, if 

he did not respond “quickly,” the evidence would “deteriorate or be destroyed.” Plaintiff 

explained that “snow footprints” could be lost due to melting snow or “snow kicked over the 

top.” Likewise, he stated that any fingerprints that may have been left on any surfaces could 

be lost if not handled “expeditiously” and that, if a tool is buried in the snow, its evidentiary 

value could be “ruined.”

¶ 8 Plaintiff did not have in his squad car the equipment to process the evidence because the 

police department has only one set of such equipment and it is for the use of all the police 

department’s evidence technicians. Accordingly, plaintiff went to the police station to retrieve 

the equipment needed to process the crime scene. Shaw remained at the scene to wait with the 

homeowner. At some point, however, Shaw left the homeowner to canvass the neighborhood 

as plaintiff had directed.

¶ 9 Plaintiff estimated that he was at the crime scene for about 10 minutes before getting into 

his squad car to return to the police station. Plaintiff drove “normally” to the police station and 

did not use the lights or sirens on his squad car. At the police station, plaintiff retrieved a 

camera, a fingerprint-dusting kit, and a kit for packaging and marking evidence. Each of these 

items was kept in a separate bag. Plaintiff placed all three bags in his squad car. The camera 

bag was placed either on the passenger seat beside him or on the rear driver’s side seat. The 
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other two bags were placed on the back seat. Plaintiff testified that it did not take him more 

than 15 minutes to drive to the police station, retrieve the equipment, and return to the scene.

¶ 10 When plaintiff arrived back at the scene, he parked on the street in front of the residence. 

Plaintiff parked in this location because, unlike when he first arrived, the scene was secure 

from any offender. Nevertheless, plaintiff still had his “eyes open” because the subject was 

still at large. After parking, plaintiff picked up the camera bag and exited the squad car. 

Plaintiff then walked to the rear of the vehicle to get the rest of his equipment from the back 

seat. While carrying the camera bag, plaintiff slipped on snow and ice. As plaintiff was falling, 

he “stuck [his] left arm out, caught the back of the vehicle with it to break [his] fall and it 

shoved [his] arm and everything back up into [his] shoulder.” Plaintiff immediately felt a sharp 

pain in his left arm, and the arm went numb. Plaintiff took some time to regain his composure 

and allow the pain to subside. Despite the pain, plaintiff retrieved the rest of the equipment 

from the squad car and spent the next 30 to 45 minutes processing the crime scene. At some 

point, a third officer, Zach Finfrock, showed up to assist plaintiff and Shaw. Once plaintiff 

finished processing the crime scene, he returned to the police station and notified his supervisor 

of the injury.

¶ 11 Plaintiff acknowledged that the crime scene had been left unattended for a time while he 

went to retrieve the evidence-technician equipment and Shaw canvassed the area. He stated, 

however, that canvassing the area was a priority because there was a description of the offender 

and the situation had to be handled “expeditiously.” He explained that tracking the suspect was 

possible if the officers could obtain information from other potential witnesses. Plaintiff also 

noted that there were two tasks that needed to be done “immediately” and, at the time, there 

were only two officers to do them. Moreover, plaintiff opined that permitting the homeowner 

back in the house did not interfere with his ability to gather evidence at the scene because the 

homeowner was secured away from the items the police knew they had to process in the 

building.

¶ 12 Plaintiff also acknowledged that, after he and Shaw secured the area, all that was left to do 

at the scene was to collect evidence, which, while a “top priority,” was not an emergency 

“[b]ecause we’re not trying to preserve a life.” Plaintiff further admitted that he was not injured 

as a result of “an unlawful act perpetrated by another” and that, after the scene was secured, he 

and Shaw were “no longer in any sort of hot-pursuit situation.” According to plaintiff, however, 

he was “processing a crime scene” or “continuing the investigation of a criminal act” at the 

time of his injury. While plaintiff had not taken any photographs prior to his fall, he was 

“setting up all [his] equipment,” which is “part of the investigation process” because he “can’t 

do anything without having everything set up properly to do it.” Plaintiff explained:

“I was investigating a criminal act—something that someone had done and I was 

investigating that, establishing the facts of what happened, looking for evidence as to 

what happened.

And that was my job, at that point in time, as the crime scene investigator—to 

locate, find, document and collect all possible evidence documenting what happened 

then.”

Plaintiff agreed that, at some point, the initial investigation of a criminal act ceases. In 

plaintiff’s opinion, this would have occurred once he had “finished documenting everything, 

collecting everything, packaging everything, secured it in [his] vehicle so [he] could transport 

it out of there, at that point that would have ended the investigation.” Plaintiff stated that until 
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that point “it was an active investigation of items that had to be secured and documented.” 

Plaintiff stated that, absent a timely investigation, evidence such as footprints, fingerprints, or 

tools used in the commission of the offense could have been lost or deteriorated to the point 

that they would have been rendered useless.

¶ 13 Shaw agreed that, at the time that plaintiff left the scene to obtain his evidence-technician 

equipment, there was no longer an emergency. However, he also stated that it remained a 

“police matter” because the crime scene “needed to be processed.” Shaw further testified that 

a third officer, Finfrock, responded to the scene and helped him canvass the neighborhood. 

Although he could not recall with certainty, Shaw did not believe that he would have left the 

scene or the homeowner alone until another officer was there to guard the scene or sit with the 

homeowner. As a result, he and Finfrock would have canvassed the neighborhood after 

plaintiff returned to begin collecting evidence.

¶ 14 On May 15, 2020, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of 

defendant and against plaintiff. In so ruling, the court reasoned as follows:

“The Illinois Supreme Court, in Gaffney v. Bd. of Trustees of Orland Fire Prot.

Dist., 2012 IL 110012, construed [the Act] in a case that was factually relevant. The 

Court found in essence that recovery under [section 10(b) of the Act] was limited to 

injuries sustained in an emergency situation, declaring that an ‘emergency’ under the 

Act occurs when the incident ‘is urgent and calls for immediate action’.

In the case before the Court, the injury was sustained by Plaintiff after he 

determined that the crime scene was secure and after he had left the scene and returned 

with his investigative equipment. At the time of the injury, the Plaintiff was not 

involved in a situation that was urgent or called for immediate action. As a matter of 

law, Plaintiff is not entitled to medical insurance coverage for himself and his family 

under [the Act].”

On June 8, 2020, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s ruling.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in 

favor of defendant and against him. According to plaintiff, he is entitled to health insurance 

benefits under section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014)) because (1) he suffered a 

“catastrophic injury” and (2) the injury occurred “during the investigation of a criminal act.” 

Plaintiff further asserts that, in granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor, the trial court 

mistakenly applied the wrong factor from section 10(b) and never addressed plaintiff’s claim 

that his injury occurred during the investigation of a crime. In its response, defendant does not 

contest that plaintiff suffered a “catastrophic injury” for purposes of section 10 of the Act.

Defendant insists, however, that the trial court properly granted its motion for summary 

judgment because plaintiff did not satisfy the second precondition for an award of benefits 

under the statute. In defendant’s view, plaintiff’s injury did not occur “during the investigation 

of a criminal act” because plaintiff was not actively conducting any investigative tasks or duties 

when he was injured. Defendant further posits that the trial court correctly decided the case 

because of the “judicial gloss” on section 10 of the Act supplied by the supreme court in 

Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012.
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¶ 17 A. Standard of Review

¶ 18 “The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is not to try an issue of fact, but rather 

to determine whether one exists.” Mydlach v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 226 Ill. 2d 307, 311 

(2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 

file, along with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2014); 

Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 73; O’Laughlin v. Village of River Forest, 338 Ill. App. 3d 189, 

191 (2003). By filing cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties agree that no factual 

issues exist and the case turns solely on legal issues. Bremer v. City of Rockford, 2016 IL 

119889, ¶ 20; Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 73. We note, however, that “the mere filing of crossmotions for summary judgment does not establish that there is no issue of material fact, nor 

does it obligate a court to render summary judgment.” Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 28. 

Because of its drastic nature, summary judgment should be granted only when the movant’s 

right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 42. In 

appeals from orders granting summary judgment, our review is de novo. O’Laughlin, 338 Ill. 

App. 3d at 191.

¶ 19 B. Statute

¶ 20 The issue in this case involves section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014)). The 

purpose of section 10 is to continue the provision of employer-sponsored health insurance 

coverage for a public safety employee and his or her family when the employee is 

catastrophically injured or killed in the line of duty. Village of Vernon Hills v. Heelan, 2015 

IL 118170, ¶ 20; Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills, 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 16; Richter v. Village 

of Oak Brook, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, ¶ 16; Phalin v. McHenry County Sheriff’s 

Department, 381 Ill. App. 3d 185, 189 (2008). Section 10 of the Act provides in relevant part 

as follows:

“(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or 

correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this 

Act suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire 

premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured 

employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child 

reaches the age of majority or until the end of the calendar year in which the child 

reaches the age of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child is 

a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support. ***

* * *

(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, 

firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under 

this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response 

to fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to 

be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of 

a criminal act. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit health insurance 

coverage or pension benefits for which the officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent 

children may otherwise be eligible.” 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014).

Thus, section 10 of the Act imposes two preconditions for the award of health insurance 

benefits to a public safety employee. First, section 10(a) of the Act provides that health 
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insurance benefits are available if the employee “suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the 

line of duty.” 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2014); Springborn v. Village of Sugar Grove, 2013 

IL App (2d) 120861, ¶ 25; Richter, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, ¶ 16. Second, section 10(b) of 

the Act provides that the injury or death must have occurred under one of the four factors 

specified in that subsection. 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2014); Springborn, 2013 IL App (2d) 

120861, ¶ 25; Richter, 2011 IL App (2d) 100114, ¶ 16.

¶ 21 As set forth above, plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to health insurance benefits because 

(1) under section 10(a) of the Act, he suffered a “catastrophic injury” and (2) under section 

10(b) of the Act, the injury occurred “during the investigation of a criminal act.” Observing 

that plaintiff was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension for his injury, defendant does not 

contest that plaintiff suffered a “catastrophic injury” within the meaning of section 10(a). See 

Village of Vernon Hills, 2015 IL 118170, ¶ 25 (holding that, where a line-of-duty disability 

pension has been awarded, a public safety employee has suffered a “catastrophic injury” within 

the meaning of section 10(a) as a matter of law and there is no need to engage in discovery or 

present evidence regarding the employee’s injury); Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 

392, 400 (2003) (holding that under section 10(a) of the Act, the phrase “catastrophic injury” 

is synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability pension); Senese v. Village 

of Buffalo Grove, 383 Ill. App. 3d 276, 278 (2008) (“The term ‘catastrophic injury’ has been 

construed to mean an injury entitling a police officer or firefighter to receive a line-of-duty 

disability pension.”). However, defendant does dispute whether plaintiff’s injury occurred 

“during the investigation of a criminal act” within the meaning of section 10(b). We turn to 

that issue now, first addressing plaintiff’s claim that, in granting summary judgment in 

defendant’s favor, the trial court mistakenly applied the wrong factor from section 10(b).

¶ 22 C. Trial Court’s Rationale

¶ 23 Plaintiff argues that the trial court mistakenly applied the wrong factor from section 10(b) 

in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against him. According to plaintiff, 

he never proceeded on the theory that his injury occurred as a result of his response to what he 

reasonably believed was an emergency. See 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2014) (listing the four 

factors under which injury or death must result for a public safety employee to qualify for 

benefits under the Act). Yet, the trial court appeared to rely exclusively on this factor in 

granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, at the time of his injury, 

plaintiff “was not involved in a situation that was urgent or called for immediate action.” 

Plaintiff further asserts that the trial court never referenced his argument that he was entitled 

to benefits under section 10(b) of the Act because his injury occurred during the investigation 

of a crime. Defendant responds that plaintiff’s position “ignores the judicial gloss” that our 

supreme court gave to section 10 of the Act in Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012.

¶ 24 Throughout this litigation, plaintiff has consistently asserted that the sole basis on which 

he was entitled to benefits under section 10(b) of the Act was that his injury occurred “during 

the investigation of a criminal act.” Plaintiff advanced this theory in his letter to defendant 

requesting benefits under the Act, in his complaint for declaratory judgment, and in his crossmotion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, nowhere in its ruling does the trial court 

reference plaintiff’s argument that he was entitled to benefits under section 10(b) because he 

was injured “during the investigation of a criminal act.” Instead, the trial court, invoking 

Gaffney, determined that recovery under section 10(b) is “limited to injuries sustained in an 
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emergency situation” and that, at the time of his injury, plaintiff was not involved in a situation 

that was “urgent and called for immediate action.” The trial court’s reliance on Gaffney is 

grossly misplaced. Significantly, Gaffney did not construe the during-the-investigation-of-acriminal-act factor at issue here. Rather, Gaffney addressed whether the public safety 

employees at issue were injured in “response to what is reasonably believed to be an 

emergency,” a wholly separate factor. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 55 (“[T]he issue is whether 

the facts alleged by Gaffney show his injury occurred in ‘response to what is reasonably 

believed to be an emergency,’ within the meaning of [section 10(b)].”). Moreover, contrary to 

the finding of the trial court, our review of Gaffney does not reveal any language in that case 

that can reasonably be construed as suggesting that recovery under every factor in section 10(b) 

is “limited to injuries sustained in an emergency situation.”

¶ 25 Defendant’s claim that the trial court correctly decided the case given “the judicial gloss” 

on section 10 of the Act supplied by the supreme court in Gaffney is simply inaccurate. 

Defendant observes that the supreme court stated that the four factors in section 10(b) “involve 

potentially dangerous situations occurring in the course of employment” (Gaffney, 2012 IL 

110012, ¶ 63) and that “[a] firefighter’s employment includes responding to situations 

involving imminent danger to a person or property” (Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 63). 

According to defendant, therefore, plaintiff “must necessarily have been in a potentially 

dangerous situation or in a situation involving imminent danger to a person or property at the 

time of his injury.” We reiterate, however, that neither these statements nor any other language 

from Gaffney convey the notion that recovery under every factor in section 10(b) is “limited to 

injuries sustained in an emergency situation.” Moreover, the potential for danger arguably 

existed at the time of plaintiff’s injury, given that he was responding to an active crime scene 

and the suspect remained at large.

¶ 26 In short, we agree with plaintiff that the trial court’s analysis misses the mark. Despite the 

trial court’s failure to address the section 10(b) factor advanced by plaintiff, we note that it is

our obligation to review the result reached by the trial court, not its reasoning. In re Marriage 

of Romano, 2012 IL App (2d) 091339, ¶ 48. Accordingly, we turn to plaintiff’s claim that he 

is entitled to health insurance benefits under the Act because he was injured “during the 

investigation of a criminal act,” thereby satisfying one of the factors for such an award under 

section 10(b).

¶ 27 D. Section 10(b) of the Act

¶ 28 The Act does not define the term “during the investigation of a criminal act.” Plaintiff 

notes, however, that the phrase was recently construed by the court in City of Charleston v. 

System of Administrative Hearing of the City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634. In that 

case, a 911 dispatcher radioed Officer Steven Englum and told him that the chief of police 

wanted an officer to report to a local convenience store “ ‘immediately.’ ” City of Charleston, 

2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 5. The nature of the call was otherwise unknown because the 

individual who called 911 had been abruptly cut off. Upon arriving at the convenience store, 

Englum performed a visual inspection of the premises and spoke to the store’s employees. 

Englum determined that there was nothing amiss at the store. Englum then radioed his 

commanding officer, but no one answered the transmission. Englum testified that it would not 

have been reasonable to end his investigation at that point. He explained that he had “ ‘a 

heightened concern’ ” because he was dispatched “ ‘immediately’ ” to the area by his “ ‘most 
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superior officer,’ ” but nothing was “ ‘going on.’ ” City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 

180634, ¶ 8. Englum was trying to determine if the chief of police requested assistance at the 

convenience store or if someone was impersonating the chief. Accordingly, Englum drove 

“ ‘very expeditiously’ ” from the convenience store to the police station to speak with his 

commanding officer about “ ‘the nature of this call and this investigation.’ ” City of Charleston, 

2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶¶ 8-9. Englum did not turn on his emergency lights or siren on the 

way to the police station. Upon arriving at the police station, Englum pulled into his assigned 

parking spot and exited the vehicle. As he was walking around the back of the squad car to 

enter the police station, Englum slipped on ice, injuring his right shoulder and left hand. 

Englum picked himself up from the pavement, went into the police station, and told his 

commanding officer about the dispatch to the convenience store. The commanding officer 

knew nothing about it. Because of Englum’s injury, he was removed from the case and another 

officer was assigned to the investigation in his stead. City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th 

180634, ¶ 9. 

¶ 29 As a result of his injuries, Englum was awarded a line-of-duty disability pension. 

Thereafter, he petitioned for health insurance benefits under section 10 of the Act. Pursuant to 

a city ordinance, an administrative hearing was held on Englum’s request for section 10 

benefits. After considering the evidence presented, the hearing officer issued a written decision 

awarding Englum benefits. The City of Charleston filed a complaint in the circuit court, 

contesting the administrative decision. On judicial review, the circuit court affirmed the 

hearing officer’s decision, and the City of Charleston appealed.

¶ 30 On appeal, the reviewing court addressed whether Englum was injured “during the 

investigation of a criminal act” within the meaning of subsection 10(b). City of Charleston, 

2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶¶ 22-31. In particular, the court phrased the issue as “whether a 

police officer, applying for health insurance benefits on the theory that ‘the injury *** occurred 

*** during the investigation of a criminal act,’ has to prove the actual commission of a criminal 

act.” City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 25 (quoting 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 

2008)). In answering this inquiry, the court recognized that much of what a law enforcement 

officer does in the line of duty involves the investigation of possible criminal activity. City of 

Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 28. The court stated that requiring an officer seeking 

benefits under section 10 of the Act to prove that a crime that he or she was investigating 

actually was committed would remove from the statute’s coverage a lot of what police officers 

do in the line of duty. City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 28. In addition, the 

court observed that the word “investigate” is commonly defined as to “ ‘carry out a systematic 

or formal inquiry to discover and examine the facts of (an incident, allegation, etc.) so as to 

establish the truth.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, 

¶ 29 (quoting New Oxford American Dictionary 886 (2005)). Given this definition, the court 

concluded that the legislature “must have contemplated that one aspect of the truth the police 

officer would try to establish, or at least confirm, was whether the suspected crime really had 

been committed.” City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 29. Accordingly, the court 

held that “a criminal act” in section 10(b) includes “a possible criminal act, a possibility that 

calls for ‘investigation.’ ” City of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 31. The court 

therefore affirmed the award of section 10 benefits to Englum. City of Charleston, 2019 IL 

App (4th) 180634, ¶ 31.
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¶ 31 We find City of Charleston to be of limited guidance here, as the court’s analysis in that 

case centered on a different aspect of the phrase “during the investigation of a criminal act.” 

As noted, the issue addressed by the court in City of Charleston was “whether a police officer, 

applying for health insurance benefits on the theory that ‘the injury *** occurred *** during 

the investigation of a criminal act,’ has to prove the actual commission of a criminal act.” City 

of Charleston, 2019 IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 25. Here, the parties’ dispute does not center on 

the “criminal act” aspect of the phrase. Indeed, the parties do not disagree that plaintiff was 

dispatched in response to a report of a criminal act in progress. Rather, the parties focus on the 

first three words of the phrase, that is, whether plaintiff was inured “during the investigation

of a criminal act” within the meaning of section 10(b).

¶ 32 Plaintiff asserts that he was injured “during the investigation of a criminal act” because the 

sole reason he returned to the residence “was to investigate the circumstances of the alleged 

crime using his skills and the tools of an evidence technician.” Thus, plaintiff reasons, his 

injury occurred while he “was performing the ‘systematic or formal inquiry to discover and 

examine the facts’ of an incident by the collection of fingerprints and photographing the 

incriminating evidence within a home.” Defendant disagrees, arguing that plaintiff’s injury did 

not occur “during the investigation of a criminal act” because plaintiff was not actively 

conducting any investigative tasks or duties when he was injured.

¶ 33 Since the legislature did not define the phrase at issue in the statute, we turn to the rules of 

statutory construction to ascertain its meaning. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Nowak, 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 11; Krohe, 

204 Ill. 2d at 394-95. The best indicator of legislative intent is the statutory language given its 

plain and ordinary meaning. Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 395. Where the language of the statute is 

clear and unambiguous, a court must apply the statute without resort to any aids of statutory 

construction. Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 395. If the statutory language is ambiguous, however, a court 

may look to extrinsic sources, including legislative history, to ascertain the legislature’s intent. 

Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 395. A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by 

reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways. Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 395-96. 

The construction of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo review. Nowak, 2011 IL 

111838, ¶ 11. 

¶ 34 As noted previously, although the legislature made the application of section 10(b) 

contingent upon the injury occurring under one of the four enumerated factors, including 

“during the investigation of a criminal act,” the Act nowhere defines what any of the terms in 

that phrase mean. However, we may consult the dictionary for guidance in determining the 

meaning of a term. Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 60; Senese, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 279. The primary 

definition of the word “during” from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is 

“throughout the continuance or course of.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 703 

(2002). “Investigation” has been defined as 

“[t]he activity of trying to find out the truth about something, such as a crime, accident, 

or historical issue; esp., either an authoritative inquiry into certain facts, as by a 

legislative committee, or a systematic examination of some intellectual problem or 

empirical question, as by mathematical treatment or use of the scientific method.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 

The term “criminal act” has been defined as “[an] unlawful act that subjects the actor to 

prosecution under criminal law.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Given these 
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definitions, we have no difficulty concluding that plaintiff was injured “during the 

investigation of a criminal act,” within the plain meaning of section 10(b) of the Act.

¶ 35 On the day of his injury, plaintiff received a report of a home invasion—a criminal act. See 

720 ILCS 5/19-6 (West 2014) (setting forth the elements of “home invasion” and defining the 

offense as a Class X felony). In response, plaintiff and Shaw, the other responding officer, 

began the process of trying to find out the truth about the alleged criminal act. To this end, 

plaintiff and Shaw traveled to the scene and met outside the residence. As plaintiff approached 

the front door, he noticed that the door appeared to have been forced open. The officers then 

spoke to the homeowner and conducted a “quick search” of the residence to make sure there 

were no offenders in the home. Shaw remained on the scene to wait with the homeowner. At 

some point, Shaw performed a canvass of the area. Plaintiff, as the on-duty evidence 

technician, went to the police station to retrieve the equipment he would need to process the 

crime scene and collect evidence in furtherance of the investigation of the criminal act. At the 

police station, plaintiff retrieved a camera bag, a fingerprint-dusting kit, and a kit for packaging 

and marking evidence and placed the three items in his squad car. Plaintiff then returned to the 

scene, parked his vehicle in front of the residence, picked up the camera bag, and exited his 

vehicle. As plaintiff walked to the back of the vehicle to get the rest of his equipment from the 

back seat, he slipped on snow and ice and fell. After taking time to regain his composure and 

allow his pain to subside, plaintiff retrieved the rest of the equipment from the squad car and 

spent 30 to 45 minutes processing the crime scene. When he completed these tasks, plaintiff 

returned to the police station. From the moment of his initial dispatch to the crime scene until 

he left to return to the police station after his injury, plaintiff was clearly involved in a 

continuous course of conduct intended to gather evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the 

truth about the crime for which he was dispatched. As such, we conclude that plaintiff was 

injured “during the investigation of a criminal act” within the plain meaning of section 10(b) 

of the Act. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

¶ 36 Defendant advances various reasons why, in its view, the trial court reached the proper 

result. We address these claims seriatim. Initially, defendant, citing Nowak, 2011 IL 111838, 

¶ 19, asserts that, because the Act is in derogation of the common law, it is to be strictly 

construed in defendant’s favor, not broadly in plaintiff’s favor. In Nowak, however, the 

supreme court invoked this tenet of statutory construction because it found that the Act was 

ambiguous as to when a municipality’s obligation under section 10 attaches—the date on 

which the public safety employee actually suffers an injury or the date on which the public 

safety officer is declared permanently disabled and therefore eligible for a line-of-duty 

disability pension. Nowak, 2011 IL 111838, ¶¶ 12-13. As noted above, we find no such 

ambiguity with respect to the meaning of the phrase “during the investigation of a criminal 

act.” Thus, we decline defendant’s invitation to narrow the scope of the phrase using this canon 

of statutory construction. 

¶ 37 Next, defendant asserts that, although plaintiff invokes only the fourth section 10(b) factor 

in support of his request for health insurance benefits, this specific factor must be read in 

context with the other three factors. See Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 29 (2009) (“In 

determining the plain meaning of statutory terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, the 

subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.”). Defendant posits 

that reading all four section 10(b) factors “together, thematically, is the only proper way to 

read and analyze [the Act].” According to defendant, when one examines the four factors that 
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entitle a public safety employee to benefits under the Act, “a theme emerges: they all pertain 

to scenarios where there is an enhanced risk of danger and involve an elevated pretext of 

unknowns.” In support of this position, defendant cites the dissent in Marquardt v. City of Des 

Plaines, 2018 IL App (1st) 163186, ¶ 37 (Mason, J., dissenting). However, a dissent has no 

precedential value. People v. Love, 2013 IL App (2d) 120600, ¶ 42; People v. Smythe, 352 Ill. 

App. 3d 1056, 1061 (2004). More significantly, contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is 

nothing in the plain language of the statute that engrafts an enhanced-risk-of-danger or 

elevated-pretext-of-unknowns element onto the fourth factor. Indeed, such an interpretation 

ignores the plain language of the statute. In this regard, the first three factors in section 10(b)—

a response to fresh pursuit, a response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, and 

an unlawful act perpetrated by another—are all prefaced with the phrase “as a result of.” The 

fourth factor—the investigation of a criminal act—does not naturally follow the words “as a 

result of.” That is, the legislature did not specify that the injury must occur “as a result of the 

investigation of a criminal act.” Rather, the legislature provided that the injury must occur 

“during the investigation of a criminal act.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 

2014). Thus, as it is written, the only requirement imposed by the factor of section 10(b) at 

issue in this case is that the injury occur “during” the investigation of a criminal act. And as 

we determined previously, from the moment of his initial dispatch to the crime scene until he 

left to return to the police station after his injury, plaintiff was clearly involved in a continuous 

course of conduct intended to gather evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the truth about 

the crime for which he was dispatched. As such, plaintiff was injured “during the investigation 

of a criminal act” within the plain meaning of section 10(b) of the Act.

¶ 38 Defendant also posits that, to be entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act, the public 

safety employee “had to have been performing his or her duties according to a requirement of 

immediate necessity which led to the injury.” In response to this assertion, we point out there 

was some immediacy to the actions plaintiff was taking at the time of his injury. To this end, 

plaintiff was investigating a home invasion that occurred while the homeowner was present. 

The suspect remained at large. At his deposition, plaintiff testified that there was still evidence 

that needed to be collected and that if he did not act “expeditiously” the evidence could be lost 

or destroyed. Plaintiff noted, for instance, that there was snow on the ground, so he would need 

to search for “footprints in the snow.” Plaintiff also had to dust for fingerprints and search for 

tools used in the commission of the offense. Plaintiff stated that, if he did not act “quickly,” 

the footprints in the snow could melt or be otherwise disturbed. Likewise, plaintiff stated that 

any fingerprints that may have been left on surfaces could be lost if not handled in a prompt 

manner and that the evidentiary value of other evidence could be “ruined.” Thus, we conclude 

that there was also an element of immediacy attached to plaintiff’s investigative duties at the 

time of his injury.

¶ 39 Next, defendant maintains that plaintiff is not entitled to section 10 benefits because, at the 

time of his injury, he “was not conducting any investigation or any investigatory acts.” In this 

regard, defendant points out that, at the time of plaintiff’s injury, he had not removed the 

camera from its bag, he had not removed the rest of the evidence-technician equipment from 

the back seat of the squad car, and he had not taken any photos. According to defendant, 

plaintiff “had not even stepped back into the role of an evidence technician that may have given 

rise to a different set of circumstances.” Thus, defendant reasons, plaintiff’s injury occurred 

“during an interlude to an investigation and not during the investigation proper.” We disagree. 
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The plain language of section 10(b) does not require a public safety employee to be injured 

while performing investigatory acts. It requires only that the injury occur “during the 

investigation of a criminal act.” And as we determined previously, from the moment of his 

initial dispatch to the crime scene until he left to return to the police station after his injury, 

plaintiff was clearly involved in a continuous course of conduct intended to gather evidence 

for the purpose of ascertaining the truth about the crime for which he was dispatched. 

Defendant’s position therefore lacks merit.

¶ 40 In a related argument, defendant cites People v. Tsombanidis, 235 Ill. App. 3d 823, 836 

(1992), to suggest that plaintiff was not injured “during the investigation of a criminal act” 

because he was performing only administrative tasks at the time of his injury. At issue in 

Tsombanidis was whether the business record exception to the hearsay rule applied to an 

internal Drug Enforcement Agency form (Form 48) authorizing the destruction of evidence. 

The court held that Form 48 was admissible under the business record exception because it 

was completed pursuant to regular office practice and not “during an investigation of an alleged 

offense or during an investigation relating to pending or anticipated litigation.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Tsombanidis, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 836. We find defendant’s reliance 

on Tsombanidis misplaced for the simple reason that that case did not involve an analysis of 

section 10(b) of the Act.

¶ 41 Citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), defendant next asserts that the 

investigation had ended prior to plaintiff’s fall. Sharpe is a criminal case that analyzed a traffic 

stop under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV). 

Defendant attempts to analogize the “investigatory stop” in Sharpe to plaintiff’s investigation. 

Plaintiff argues that the two situations are not remotely similar. We agree with plaintiff. At 

issue in Sharpe was whether a 20-minute detention of a person suspected of transporting 

marijuana met the fourth amendment’s standard of reasonableness. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 683. It 

was in this context that the United States Supreme Court made the statement that, when an 

investigatory stop continues indefinitely, it can no longer be justified as an investigatory stop. 

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 683. Sharpe is simply not relevant in determining when plaintiff’s criminal 

investigation formally ended under section 10(b) of the Act.

¶ 42 Defendant nevertheless insists that there must be an end point to the phrase “during the 

investigation of a criminal act,” as investigations can last months, even years. Defendant 

maintains that such an interpretation of the phrase would be overly expansive. Defendant 

posits, for instance, that an officer who falls backward in his or her chair within the comfort of 

the police station and is injured while reading an e-mail pertaining to an ongoing criminal case 

would be entitled to benefits under the Act. Defendant further posits that the same would be 

true for an officer who picks up a cold case file in a police station basement and then falls on 

the stairs. Of course, this presupposes that each of these injuries arose to the level of a 

“catastrophic injury” under section 10(a) of the Act. This point aside, while we do not disagree 

with the premise that the initial investigation of a criminal act must cease at some point, we 

decline to comment any further on the situations described by defendant, as they are not 

illustrative of the factual scenario before us in this case and defendant was clearly injured 

“during” the investigation of a criminal act.

¶ 43 Defendant also insists that plaintiff is foreclosed from receiving benefits under section 10 

of the Act, based on the definition of “investigate” set forth by the court in City of Charleston. 

As noted above, the City of Charleston court stated that the word “investigate” means to 
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“ ‘carry out a systematic or formal inquiry to discover and examine the facts of (an incident, 

allegation, etc.) so as to establish the truth.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) City of Charleston, 2019 

IL App (4th) 180634, ¶ 29 (quoting New Oxford American Dictionary 886 (2005)). According 

to defendant, plaintiff’s investigation would not fall into this definition because it was neither 

systematic nor formal in that plaintiff (1) left the scene of the crime to obtain his equipment, 

(2) ordered Shaw, the only other officer on duty on the scene, to also leave the scene to canvass 

the neighborhood, (3) pulled up to the front of the scene “with seemingly no regard for 

footprints that may be in the street from when the perpetrator fled,” and (4) permitted the 

homeowner to pass through the scene to reenter her house. 

¶ 44 At the outset, we note that the court in City of Charleston used a slightly different definition 

of “investigate” than the definition of “investigation” we employ here. However, even 

assessing plaintiff’s conduct under the definition used by the court in City of Charleston, 

plaintiff would still be entitled to benefits under section 10 of the Act. Contrary to defendant’s 

position, plaintiff’s investigation was systematic and formal. To this end, plaintiff explained 

that he and Shaw followed the protocol for responding to felonies. Plaintiff stated that the 

officers parked in different locations away from the home, met somewhere “outside the 

residence,” and approached the scene together. The officers spoke with the homeowner and 

moved her to safety, after which they conducted a “quick search” of the residence to make sure 

there were no other offenders in the building. After the scene was secured, Shaw escorted the 

homeowner back into the home and took her upstairs. Plaintiff went to the police station to 

retrieve the equipment needed to process the scene. Shaw remained on the scene to wait with 

the homeowner. Plaintiff returned within 15 minutes, parking in front of the residence. While 

in the process of retrieving the equipment he needed to process the scene, plaintiff was injured. 

Once plaintiff’s pain subsided, he completed his evidence-technician duties at the scene and 

returned to the police station. Based on this record, we conclude that the facts contain sufficient 

indicia to establish that plaintiff’s actions constituted a systematic and formal inquiry to 

discover and examine the facts of the offense so as to fall within the definition of “investigate” 

as set forth by the court in City of Charleston.

¶ 45 In so holding, we are cognizant that plaintiff (1) left the crime scene to obtain his 

equipment, (2) ordered Shaw to canvass the neighborhood, (3) parked in front of the crime 

scene, and (4) allowed the homeowner to reenter her home. However, these facts do not render 

the investigation unsystematic and informal. Indeed, reasonable explanations were offered for 

each of these acts. Plaintiff had to leave the crime scene to obtain the equipment because the 

only set the police department had was housed at the police station. Plaintiff testified that 

canvassing the area was a priority because there was a description of the offender and the 

situation had to be handled expeditiously. Moreover, Shaw testified that it would have been 

unlikely that he would have left the scene or the homeowner until another officer was there to 

guard the scene or sit with the homeowner. Additionally, there was no evidence that plaintiff, 

by parking in front of the crime scene, disturbed any evidence. Finally, plaintiff testified that 

permitting the homeowner back in the house did not interfere with his ability to gather evidence 

at the scene because the homeowner was secured away from the items the police knew they 

had to process in the home.
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¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 In short, plaintiff was entitled to the payment of health insurance benefits by defendant 

pursuant to the plain language of section 10 of the Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014)) because 

he suffered a “catastrophic injury” and the injury occurred “during the investigation of a 

criminal act.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand the case to the trial court with 

directions to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.

¶ 48 Reversed and remanded with directions.