* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-41285

Summary Calendar

STEVEN RANDOLL BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNKNOWN CARDIOLOGIST; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH;

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH, GALVESTON; REGINALD

STANLEY, M.D.; HELEN PEEK, Staff Nurse; ANNETTE THOMPSON,

Food Service Manager; MYRON FARRAR, Food Service Manager,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:00-CV-24

July 24, 2002

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Steven Brown, Texas prisoner no. 731528, appeals the district

court’s dismissal on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of

his claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that various

medical and non-medical defendants violated his Eighth Amendment

rights by showing deliberate i ndifference to his medical needs.

Brown complains of medical treatment, work requirements, and his1 H oltzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp.

, 255 F.3d 254, 257 (5th Cir.

2001).

2 See Moore v. McDonald , 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).

3 See Morris v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc.

, 277 F.3d 743, 753 (5th Cir.

2001).

4 S ee Varnado v. Lynaugh

, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

2 diet, prior to and after he suffered a heart attack in 1998. The

district court dismissed the claims on grounds that the claims were

time-barred and lacked merit and that the defendants were entitled

to immunity.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo

, applying the

same standard as the district court. 1 Brown filed suit on January

2 4, 2000. His claims arising before January 24, 1998, are timebarred under the two-year Texas statute of limitations applicable

to th is action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 W e also pretermit any

analysis of Eleventh Amendment or qualified immunity because the

record contains no evidence sho wing deliberate indifference to

Brown’s medical needs, which is required to create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Brown has alleged a violation of a

clearly established constitutional right under the Eighth

Amendment. 3

The summary judgment record establishes that Brown r eceived

competent medical care prior to and following his heart attack.

Brown’s disagreements regarding his medical treatment are

insufficient to establish a constitutional claim. 4 E ven a triable5 See id.

6 See Mendoza v. Lynaugh , 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993).

7 See Harris v. Hegmann , 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999).

3 issue of negligence would not preclude summary judgment dismissing

his Eighth Amendment claims. 5 I n additio n, Brown fails to shows

that any delay in medical treatment he may have received caused his

heart attack or resulted in any other substantial harm. 6

Brown’s deliberate indifference claims against the non-medical

defendants alleging that they refused his reques ts for work

restrictions, denied him a therapeutic diet, and allegedly

disregarded his injured wrist and bur ned fingers likewise cannot

survive summary judgment. Brown has provided no summary judgment

evidence that, inter alia

, the non-medical defendants were aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm to Johnson existed or, even if they were, that

they drew such an inference. 7

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, Barron’s motions for discovery of the

identity of the “unknown cardiologist” and appointment of counsel

are DENIED.