Of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation. *

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 09-1943

DELIA ESQUILÍN-MENDOZA; DAYMAR VEGA-ROSA; 

MICHAEL TORRES-ROSARIO; ROBERTO PACHECO-ROSARIO,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

DON KING PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Leval, and Lipez, Circuit Judges. *

Louis A. De Mier Le-Blanc for appellants.

Ricardo L. Díaz Soto for appellee.

February 18, 2011
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LEVAL, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Delia Esquilín-Mendoza

("Esquilín") appeals from the judgment of the United States

District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, dismissing her tort

claim against Don King Productions, Inc. ("DKP"). The suit,

brought in federal court by virtue of diversity of citizenship, 28

U.S.C. § 1332, alleged that DKP acted negligently in seizing

Plaintiff’s automobile in execution of a court judgment

notwithstanding a defect in the execution warrant, and in failing

to return the vehicle promptly when the court vacated the warrant.

Plaintiff claimed damages of approximately $1 million for emotional

distress and deprivation of the use of the automobile. The

district court dismissed the action and entered judgment for the

Defendant, based on its finding that Plaintiff had failed to

establish a causal connection between the Defendant’s actions and

her injury. We hereby direct that the judgment be vacated and the

suit dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction under § 1332

because it is a legal certainty that the "matter in controversy

[does not] exceed[] the sum or value of $75,000." 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

BACKGROUND

The pertinent facts of this case consist primarily of the

facts of the prior lawsuit brought by DKP. DKP was the producer of

a closed-circuit telecast transmission of a championship boxing

match on March 1, 2003, between Roy Jones, Jr. and John Ruiz. DKP

distributed this televised transmission to subscribing
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establishments in Puerto Rico. On or about August 13, 2004, DKP

brought suit in the United States District Court for the District

of Puerto Rico against numerous restaurants, bars, and other like

establishments in Puerto Rico, and their owners, alleging that they

had violated Section 705 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47

U.S.C. § 605, by intercepting its closed-circuit transmission and

exhibiting it to their patrons. DKP sought damages against each

defendant under the statute’s provision for a private cause of

action by "any person with proprietary rights in the intercepted

communication." 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6); § 605(e)(3)(A). Among the

numerous defendants named in DKP’s suit were: 

30. Defendants Alberto López, his wife Delia López,

and the conjugal partnership which they constitute

. . . doing business as DELIA’S TACOS.

Upon the failure of those defendants to answer the complaint,

the court noted the default and granted summary judgment to DKP,

awarding damages of $12,000. The order of judgment named the

defendants as "Alberto López, individually and in representation of

the conjugal partnership between him and his wife Delia López,

a.k.a. Delía Esquilín d/b/a Delia’s Tacos." Upon the defendants’

failure to pay the judgment, the court issued a writ of execution,

pursuant to which the United States Marshal seized the Plaintiff’s

1995 Toyota 4 Runner sport utility vehicle. The writ, consistent

with DKP’s complaint, named "Alberto López, his wife Delia López,
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and the conjugal partnership which they constitute . . . doing

business as DELIA’S TACOS" as the defendants against whom judgment

had been entered.

Esquilín then moved to set aside the judgment and the writ of

execution. The basis of the motions was essentially that Delia,

the owner of Delia’s Tacos, is not married to Alberto López, so

that her surname is not López, as specified in DKP’s complaint, but

Esquilín, and that Alberto López is not an owner but an employee of

Delia’s Tacos. DKP did not contest these motions. The judgment

and writ of execution were therefore vacated, and on September 11,

2006, the court directed DKP to return the vehicle by September 25,

2006. For reasons which are disputed by the parties (each side

accusing the other of failure to cooperate), the vehicle was not

restored to Delia Esquilín’s possession until October 2007.

Esquilín then brought this action against DKP asserting gross

negligence and illegal embargo. She claimed damages of

approximately one million dollars for deprivation of the vehicle,

extreme mental anguish and depression resulting from public

humiliation, injury to her public dignity, and stress, which

exacerbated her heart problems.

The District Court granted DKP’s motion to dismiss Esquilín’s

suit, ruling that she failed to establish a causal connection

between DKP’s actions and her alleged injuries, and that her own

acts and omissions contributed to her loss.
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DISCUSSION

For cases brought in the federal courts on the basis of

diversity of jurisdiction, § 1332 of the Judicial Code of the

United States provides that jurisdiction lies only "where the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,

exclusive of interests and costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Although no

party has questioned whether the district court had jurisdiction to

rule in this case, it is well established that the courts have a

duty to ensure that they are not called upon to adjudicate cases

which in fact fall outside the jurisdiction conferred by Congress.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

In St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.

283, 288-89 (1938), the Supreme Court reviewed a case in which the

Court of Appeals had directed the remand to the state court of a

suit, which had been brought by the plaintiff in state court and

had been then removed by the defendant to federal court on the

basis of diversity of citizenship. The complaint asserted damages

of $4,000, which exceeded the then-current threshold requirement of

$3,000. The district court had found in the plaintiff’s favor on

the merits and awarded damages in the amount of $1,162.98. The

Court of Appeals directed that the judgment be vacated and the case

remanded to the state court on the ground that the plaintiff’s

claim did not equal the amount necessary to give the District Court

jurisdiction. Id. at 285. The Supreme Court reversed the remand
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to state court and reinstated the judgment. The Supreme Court

explained that the court’s eventual determination that the damages

were less than the jurisdictional amount did not negate the

propriety of the plaintiff’s original claim for an amount that

exceeded the jurisdictional minimum. The Supreme Court described

the test for determining satisfaction of the jurisdictional amount

as follows:

The intent of Congress drastically to restrict

federal jurisdiction in controversies between

citizens of different states has always been

rigorously enforced by the courts. The rule

governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in

cases brought in the federal court is that, unless

the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by

the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently

made in good faith. It must appear to a legal

certainty that the claim is really for less than

the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.

The inability of plaintiff to recover an amount

adequate to give the court jurisdiction does not

show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction. Nor

does the fact that the complaint discloses the

existence of a valid defense to the claim. But if,

from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to

a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot

recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs,

the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the

plaintiff never was entitled to recover that

amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable

for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, the

suit will be dismissed.

Id. at 288-89.

This discussion in St. Paul is confusing. On the one hand, it

states, "[T]he sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim

is apparently made in good faith. . . . The inability of plaintiff

to recover an amount adequate to give the court jurisdiction does
 Some further confusion arises from the Supreme Court’s use 1

of the term "colorable" where the term "not colorable" seems more

appropriate. In the legal context, the word is most commonly used

to mean having apparent validity, see Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary

of Modern Legal Usage 124 (1st ed. 1987) ("used in the law in the

sense ‘having at least a prima facie aspect of justice or

validity’"), which does not seem compatible with the Court’s

explanation. It appears, however, that "colorable" also has a

secondary meaning which is very nearly the contrary of the first.

The Merriam-Webster Third New International Dictionary, for

example, gives as the first and second meanings, "1. Seemingly

valid and genuine, having an appearance of truth, right, or

justice, plausible" and "2. FEIGNED, FICTITIOUS, COUNTERFEIT."

Merriam-Webster Third New International Dictionary 449. The

Supreme Court apparently had in mind the latter sense.

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not show his bad faith or oust the jurisdiction." Id. at 289. On

the other hand, another part of the Court’s explanation states

that, where it appears "to a legal certainty that the claim is

really for less than the jurisdictional amount," dismissal is

required. Id. (emphasis added). "[I]f . . . from the proofs, the

court is satisfied to a [legal] certainty that the plaintiff never

was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was

therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction, 1

the suit will be dismissed." Id. The latter passage appears to

render irrelevant whether the plaintiff exercised good faith in

pleading entitlement to recover the jurisdictional amount when it

is clear "to a legal certainty" that he cannot recover a sufficient

amount. Id.

Our decisions have construed the Supreme Court’s summary to

mean that "legal certainty that the claim is really for less than

the jurisdictional amount," id., trumps the plaintiff’s good faith
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in claiming for a larger amount. See Barrett v. Lombardi, 239 F.3d

23, 30 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[T]he amount specified by the plaintiff

controls, as long as that amount is asserted in good faith. Hence,

a court can dismiss an action for insufficiency of the amount in

controversy only when, ‘from the face of the pleadings, it is

apparent, to a legal certainty, . . . that the plaintiff never was

entitled to recover’ a sum equal to, or in excess of, the

jurisdictional minimum." (citations omitted) (quoting St. Paul, 303

U.S. at 289)); see also Spielman v. Genzyme Corp., 251 F.3d 1, 5

(1st Cir. 2001); Dep't of Recreation & Sports v. World Boxing

Ass'n, 942 F.2d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1991).

Saying approximately the same thing in slightly different

terms in other cases, we construed the Supreme Court’s language in

St. Paul to mean that the plaintiff’s "good faith" in pleading the

jurisdictional amount includes an element of "objective good

faith": jurisdiction is defeated notwithstanding the plaintiff’s

good faith in claiming for the jurisdictional amount if one

familiar with the applicable law could not reasonably have

concluded that the claim was worth the jurisdictional amount.

Coventry Sewage Assoc. v. Dworkin Realty Co., 71 F.3d 1, 4-8 (1st

Cir. 1995); Jimenez Puig v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, 574 F.2d 37, 40

(1st Cir. 1978).

The present case seems to us to fall squarely within the

contested territory between the divergent prongs of the Supreme
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Court’s explanation. Esquilín pleaded that, as the result of DKP’s

improper seizure of her car and its failure to return it promptly

when the judgment against her and the execution warrant were

vacated, she suffered not only deprivation of use of the vehicle

but also serious emotional injury resulting from her humiliation

and anxiety. We have no reason to believe that Esquilín possesses

any sophisticated understanding of legal entitlements and thus have

no reason to question her good faith in asserting entitlement to

damages for these injuries. If her good faith in making the claim

were controlling, federal jurisdiction would lie because her

complaint pleaded injury far beyond the requisite jurisdictional

amount.

On the other hand, examination of her claims and concessions

makes clear that she has no legal entitlement to recover damages

for any emotional or other injury caused by DKP’s execution of its

judgment against the vehicle. The only defect identified by

Esquilín in the proceedings that led to the seizure of the vehicle

was that, because of DKP’s mistaken belief that she was married to

her employee, López, her surname was written incorrectly in the

operative documents. DKP’s complaint was directed against "Alberto

López, his wife Delia López, and the conjugal partnership which

they constitute . . . doing business as DELIA’S TACOS." The

subject of the complaint was the unauthorized interception and

exhibition of DKP’s transmission at Delia’s Tacos. The plaintiff
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Delia Esquilín acknowledges that she is the owner of Delia’s Tacos,

and has never denied that DKP’s closed-circuit transmission was

exhibited at Delia’s Tacos without DKP’s authorization. Her

allegations therefore show no impropriety in DKP’s having brought

suit and obtained judgment against her, or its subsequent seizure

of her car pursuant to a warrant of execution when she failed to

pay the judgment. The fact that DKP erroneously believed that the

Delia who owned Delia’s Tacos was married to López and shared his

surname, and that DKP made out the court documents naming her in

that manner, in no way shows any impropriety in the seizure of her

car, given her admissions that she was the owner of Delia’s Tacos,

which illegally intercepted DKP’s transmission. DKP’s suit was

thus properly brought against her; judgment and execution therefore

were properly entered notwithstanding the mistake as to her

surname.

While Esquilín claims she was not served with process in DKP’s

suit, which resulted in the seizure of the car, it is clear on

careful reading of her allegations that she is not denying that the

summons and complaint were served on her. She is rather contending

that the service of the complaint should be deemed ineffective and

void because it named her by the wrong name. Whatever merit there

may be to such a contention where a defendant reasonably believes

that the complaint served on her was not properly directed against

her because it named a different person, that is not the
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circumstance here. It was unmistakably clear from the face of

DKP’s complaint that it was directed against Delia, the owner of

Delia’s Tacos, and that it related to the unauthorized interception

and exhibition of the fight telecast at Delia’s Tacos. As Delia

Esquilín admits that she is Delia, the owner of Delia’s Tacos, and

did not deny that DKP’s telecast was exhibited at Delia’s Tacos,

she could not have had any reasonable doubt that the complaint

served on her was intended for her and sufficiently identified her.

Therefore, notwithstanding her presumable good faith in making

the claim, we find it clear to a legal certainty that the plaintiff

Delia Esquilín has no legal entitlement to damages for emotional

injury resulting from the judgment against her and the consequent

seizure of her car. These damage claims are all predicated on the

theory that DKP had no cause for the judgment that resulted in the

seizure of her car. But, notwithstanding its insignificant mistake

as to her marital status, DKP was entitled to judgment against

Delia, the owner of Delia’s Restaurant, and to seize her car in its

execution.

Esquilín’s only plausible claim for damages relates to the

delay in returning the vehicle, which DKP and Esquilín each claim

was due to the fault of the other. Assuming the validity of

Esquilín’s claim that DKP was at fault in failing to return the car

to her promptly following the court’s order, the only harm she

suffered from that wrong was the deprivation of the use of a
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vehicle for approximately thirteen months. The rental value of an

equivalent car for the period of allegedly wrongful deprivation

constitutes the only damages to which she might have a plausible

entitlement.

The cost of renting a vehicle equivalent to hers for this 13-

month period could not have approached $75,000. By Esquilín’s own

admission, the rental of an equivalent vehicle would not have

exceeded $22,500. One "familiar with the applicable law . . .

could [not] objectively have . . . viewed [the claim] as worth [the

jurisdictional minimum]." Coventry, 71 F.3d at 6. Because it is

clear to a legal certainty that Esquilín has no claim for damages

remotely approaching $75,000, we dismiss the case for want of

jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

The District Court’s judgment is hereby vacated and the suit

is dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.