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Filed 7/29/22 White v. City of Stockton CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

RALPH LEE WHITE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CITY OF STOCKTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

C092503

(Super. Ct. No. 

STKCVURC20170010472)

For years, Ralph Lee White held a use permit that allowed the sale of beer and 

wine in a mini-mart on his commercial property. The trial court determined that in 2016, 

the City of Stockton (the City) violated White’s constitutional due process rights when it 

misinterpreted the use permit and denied a business license that would allow White’s 

tenant to sell beer and wine. The trial court issued a writ of mandate requiring the City to 
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interpret the use permit to allow the sale of beer and wine, and the City does not 

challenge that portion of the ruling on appeal. 

The trial court also considered whether the City could be held liable for damages 

for the due process violation under Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs. (1978) 436 U.S. 

658 [56 L.Ed.2d 611] (Monell). Finding liability for constitutional damages, the trial 

court awarded $38,000 in damages against the City. 

The City now contends the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the trial 

court’s statement of decision do not support an award of damages under Monell. For his 

part, White contends the City cannot rely on the trial court’s statement of decision 

because the City did not sufficiently request one. 

We conclude (1) the City sufficiently complied with the requirements for a 

statement of decision, and (2) the evidence does not support damages for the City’s 

violation of White’s constitutional due process rights. We will reverse the award of 

damages and otherwise affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND1

A

During the relevant time period, White owned commercial property in the City 

and held a use permit. For 20 years, the City interpreted the use permit to allow sale of 

beer and wine. In 2016, White’s tenant, Mohammed Alnaggar, applied for a business 

license to sell beer and wine. Megan Meier, an Assistant Planner for the City’s 

Community Development Department, investigated the application and learned that 

gasoline was no longer being sold on the property as anticipated in the use permit. She 

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 White argues the City forfeited its arguments on appeal by omitting from its statement 

of facts some of the facts White deems significant. (Oak Valley Hospital Dist. v. State 

Dept. of Health Care Services (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 212, 217 [appellant must set forth 

facts favorable to the judgment].) We disagree. The City’s statement of facts included 

the essential facts necessary to decide this appeal.
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concluded the business license should be denied because beer and wine could be sold on 

the property only if gasoline was also sold. According to the trial court, Meier’s decision 

to deny the business license was ratified by a City policymaker. 

White filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages against the 

City. The trial court concluded the change in the interpretation of the use permit, which 

resulted in the denial of the business license, violated White’s constitutional right to due 

process. Based on this conclusion, the trial court issued a writ of mandate in this action 

in 2018, requiring the City to interpret the use permit as allowing the sale of beer and 

wine. The City concedes the writ was properly issued and does not contest on appeal the 

finding the City violated White’s constitutional due process rights. The only issue on 

appeal is whether White is entitled to damages for violation of his due process right under 

Monell. 

After the City denied the business license in 2016 and before this action was filed, 

Alnaggar applied for a new use permit to sell beer and wine on the property. The 

Planning Commission denied the new use permit, and the City Council upheld the denial 

on appeal. Concerning that application for a new use permit, the trial court noted: “As 

we now know, a new use permit was never necessary. Mr. Alnaggar had a valid use 

permit allowing the off-sale of beer and wine on the premises, even though City did not 

acknowledge it.” 

The question of damages for the violation of constitutional due process was 

considered during a court trial, after which the trial court issued a statement of decision. 

The trial court concluded White was entitled to damages for the violation of his due 

process rights under Monell because Meier’s determination to deny the business license 

was ratified by her superiors. This appeal followed.

B

A municipality may be held liable under 42 United States Code section 1983 

(section 1983) for violation of a person’s federal constitutional rights if the entity, itself, 
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caused the violation. (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 690.) “To establish Monell liability, 

‘ “a plaintiff must ‘identify the challenged policy, [practice, or custom,] attribute it to the 

[municipality] itself, and show a causal link between the execution of the policy, 

[practice, or custom,] and the injury suffered.’ ” [Citation.]’ ” (Arista v. County of 

Riverside (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1064.)

A plaintiff may establish municipal liability under section 1983 in any one of 

several ways. First, the plaintiff may prove the unconstitutional action was taken 

pursuant to an express municipal policy. (Monell, supra, 436 U.S. 658.) Second, the 

plaintiff may prove a city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation 

pursuant to “a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express 

municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as to constitute a “custom or usage” 

with the force of law.’ ” (St. Louis v. Praprotnik (1988) 485 U.S. 112, 127 [99 L.Ed.2d 

107].) Third, the plaintiff may establish the constitutional violation was committed by an 

official with “final policymaking authority” and the challenged action itself thus 

constituted an act of official government policy. (Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati (1986) 

475 U.S. 469, 480-481 [89 L.Ed.2d 452] (Pembaur).) And fourth, the plaintiff may 

prove an official with final policymaking authority ratified a subordinate’s 

unconstitutional action and the basis for it. (St. Louis, at p. 127.)

The trial court found the City liable under the fourth way of establishing liability 

under section 1983: ratification of a subordinate’s unconstitutional action and the basis 

for it. 

Additional background is provided in the Discussion.

DISCUSSION

I

Preliminarily, we consider White’s contention the City did not sufficiently request 

a statement of decision on the issue of Monell liability. He claims that because the City 
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did not sufficiently request a statement of decision, we must infer all factual findings in 

favor of the judgment without regard to the trial court’s stated reasoning. 

“A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all 

intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its correctness.” (In re Marriage 

of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) In support of the judgment, we will infer 

findings based on substantial evidence. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 

150 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) However, “[w]hen a proper request for a statement of decision 

has been made, the scope of appellate review may be affected. [Citation.] Under [Code 

of Civil Procedure] section 632, upon a party’s request after trial, the court must issue a 

statement of decision ‘explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of 

the principal controverted issues at trial.’ And under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 

634, if the statement of decision does not resolve a controverted issue or is ambiguous, 

and the omission or ambiguity was brought to the attention of the trial court, ‘it shall not 

be inferred on appeal . . . that the trial court decided in favor of the prevailing party as to 

those facts or on that issue.’ [Citations.]” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 

970, 981.)

The City initially requested a statement of decision from the trial court. 

Specifically, the City requested an explanation of whether White “carried his burden 

under California law to prove a loss of earnings caused by an act or failure to act by the 

City.” The City also requested a statement as to proof of damages. 

The trial court issued a tentative decision in which it considered Monell liability 

and concluded there was sufficient evidence of ratification to support the City’s liability 

because Meier declared that she and her “superiors” had decided the Community 

Development Department could not approve the business license. After issuing the 

tentative decision, the trial court entertained oral argument on the tentative decision. In 

its argument, the City specifically disagreed with the trial court’s finding of ratification, 

pointing out that there was no evidence that anyone with policymaking authority ratified 
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Meier’s decision to deny the business license. White also presented argument on the 

ratification issue. 

At the end of the hearing, the City reiterated its desire for a statement of decision 

and offered to file an amended request for statement of decision. The trial court said 

there was no need for an amended request because it intended to adopt the tentative 

decision as the statement of decision, with minor modifications not relevant here. White 

asked if the modified statement of decision would be a new tentative decision; the trial 

court indicated it would be the final order upon which judgment would be entered 

because the trial court had already considered all the arguments. 

On appeal, White contends we must infer all findings in support of the judgment 

because the City did not request a statement of decision or object to the trial court’s 

finding that the denial of the business license was ratified by a policymaker. In making 

this contention, White ignores the colloquy between the trial court and counsel 

concerning whether the City needed to make any further filing concerning the 

controverted issues. The trial court chose to hold a hearing and discuss the issues rather 

than requiring adherence to the procedures in Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 

634, and the trial court told the City that it desired no further filings with respect to the 

statement-of-decision process. A trial court has inherent and statutory discretion to 

control the proceedings to ensure the efficient administration of justice. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 128; People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 951.) And White did not object 

to the trial court’s exercise of discretion in controlling the proceedings.

We therefore conclude the City complied with the requirements of Code of Civil 

Procedure sections 632 and 634 to the extent allowed by the trial court. Consequently, 

we review the findings of fact for substantial evidence and consider de novo whether the 

trial court’s findings of fact support the conclusions of law. (Westfour Corp. v. 

California First Bank (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1558.)
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II

The City contends the trial court’s findings of fact were insufficient to support the 

trial court’s judgment based on Monell liability. 

The trial court’s statement of decision held that the City was liable under Monell

because Meier’s decision to deny the business license was ratified by a policymaker. The 

trial court relied on Meier’s declaration that the decision was made by Meier and “her 

superiors.” 

The City argues the evidence that Meier’s “superiors” in her office participated in 

the decision was not sufficient to establish that an official with final policymaking 

authority ratified the decision to deny the business license. We agree. The trial court 

made no findings concerning who the superiors were or that such superiors were 

policymakers, and there is no evidence to support a finding that Meier or her superiors in 

her office were officials with final policymaking authority. 

“[N]ot every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the 

municipality to [section] 1983 liability. Municipal liability attaches only where the 

decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the 

action ordered. The fact that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has 

discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to 

municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. [Citation.] The official must 

also be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity 

before the municipality can be held liable.” (Pembaur, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 482-483, 

fns. omitted.) “[M]unicipal liability under [section] 1983 attaches where—and only 

where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various 

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with 

respect to the subject matter in question. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 483.)

The fact that Meier’s superiors participated in the decision to deny the business 

license does not establish the decision was made by an official with final policymaking 
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authority. Therefore, the findings of fact in the statement of decision do not support the 

trial court’s conclusion of law in that regard. This flaw was the focus of the City’s 

argument at the hearing concerning the statement of decision. When a conclusion of 

law—here, that a policymaker ratified the decision to deny the business license—is not 

supported by the findings of fact, the conclusion of law must be disregarded. (Lee v. 

Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. (1918) 177 Cal. 656, 659; County of Santa Cruz v. McLeod 

(1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 222, 235.) If there was factually no ratification, the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion of ratification and imposition of Monell

liability.

Even if we were to disregard the statement of decision, the evidence, construed in 

favor of the judgment and implying findings in favor of the judgment, was insufficient to 

support Monell liability. A plaintiff carries the burden of proof on Monell liability. 

Therefore, if there is an absence of evidence to support Monell liability, the defendant 

must prevail. (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 

1279, 1296 (Harman).) 

White claims there was evidence a policymaker ratified the decision to deny the 

business license because Meier’s superiors participated in the decision and included a

policymaker. One of Meier’s superiors was Peter Kwong, the City’s Director of 

Community Development. In fact, Kwong confirmed that he was involved in the 

decision to deny the business license because the business no longer sold gas. And White 

claims Kwong had final policymaking authority. But the argument fails on the last 

assertion—that Kwong had final policymaking authority. There was no evidence or legal 

theory presented that Kwong had final policymaking authority. Instead, Kwong testified 

he did not have final policymaking authority. 

Nevertheless, White claims Meier and Kwong were “final policymakers on this 

particular issue” because they made the final decision to deny the business license. 

White argues: “This was a final decision limiting the available uses under the existing 
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use permit with no opportunity for White—the permit holder—to challenge it.” The

argument conflates the concepts of final policymaker and final decisionmaker. “ ‘When a 

final decision by an employee implements municipal policy, then municipal liability may 

follow. But if a final decision does not implement municipal policy, or is contrary to it, 

then it is not imputable to the municipality.’ [Citation.]” (Harman, supra, 136 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1299.) In other words, a final decision may or may not reflect final 

policy. It was incumbent on White to establish that the decision to deny the business 

license reflected municipal policy or was ratified by a final policymaker. He did not. 

White also argues Meier’s decision to deny the business license was ratified by the 

Planning Commission and the City Council because those bodies later denied Alnaggar’s 

application for a new use permit. (White did not present this theory to the trial court, and 

the trial court did not address it in the statement of decision.) This argument has no merit 

because the Planning Commission and City Council were not reviewing the decision to 

deny the business license based on the already-existing use permit—the decision which 

violated White’s constitutional rights. Approval or ratification of the business-license 

denial, which was based on the already-existing use permit, was not presented to the 

Planning Commission or City Council. Instead, whether to issue a new use permit—a 

decision much different than whether the already-existing use permit allowed sale of beer 

and wine—was before those two bodies. Accordingly, the decision to deny a new use 

permit was not effectively a ratification of Meier’s decision to deny the business license

based on the already-existing use permit.

White claims the City Council knew of, and was deliberately indifferent to, the 

violation of White’s constitutional rights caused by the denial of the business license. 

However, because the denial of the business license was not presented to the City 

Council, the claim that the City Council was deliberately indifferent lacks merit.
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DISPOSITION

The award of damages is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 

The City is awarded its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

 /S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

 /S/

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

 /S/

DUARTE, J.