UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4728

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEWAYNE LAMONT RICHMOND,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-4729

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEWAYNE LAMONT RICHMOND,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:22-cr-00336-LCB-1; 1:13-cr-00055-

LCB-1)

Submitted: August 22, 2024 Decided: August 26, 2024

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Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

No. 23-4728, affirmed in part and dismissed in part; No. 23-4729, affirmed by unpublished 

per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Sandra Payne Hagood, LAW OFFICE OF SANDRA PAYNE HAGOOD, 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jacob Darriel Pryor, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In 2013, Dewayne Lamont Richmond pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by 

a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced Richmond to 115 

months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release. In 2023, while on 

supervised release, Richmond pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced 

Richmond to a total of 160 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised 

release.

Based on his new convictions and other conduct, Richmond admitted to violating 

the terms of his supervised release. The district court therefore revoked his supervised 

release and sentenced him to a term of 24 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to 

the sentence for the new criminal offenses. Richmond appealed both judgments and 

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting 

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning in No. 23-4729 whether 

the court abused its discretion in finding Richmond violated the terms of supervised release

and whether the sentence for the supervised release violations was reasonable, and in No. 

23-4728 whether Richmond’s appeal waiver was valid and whether there are any 

meritorious issues falling outside the cope of the waiver. The Government has moved to 

dismiss Richmond’s appeal of the new criminal convictions in No. 23-4728 as barred by 

Richmond’s waiver of his appellate rights contained in the plea agreement. For the 

following reasons we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

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With respect to Richmond’s appeal of the supervised release revocation judgment 

in No. 23-4729, a district court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised 

release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review a district court’s decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion and its factual findings underlying the revocation 

for clear error. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). We conclude 

that the district court did not err in revoking Richmond’s supervised release based on his 

admission to the violations and guilty plea to the new criminal conduct.

With respect to Richmond’s revocation sentence “[a] district court has broad 

discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). Thus, we will “affirm a revocation sentence 

so long as it is within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.” 

United States v. Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 296 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first 

determine “whether the sentence is unreasonable at all.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” id. at 297 

(internal quotation marks omitted), and the explanation indicates “that the court considered 

any potentially meritorious arguments raised by the parties,” United States v. Patterson, 

957 F.3d 426, 436-37 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court need 

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not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when 

imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the 

sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light 

of the totality of the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that 

the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Richmond’s revocation sentence is both procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. When imposing its sentence, the district court correctly 

calculated the policy statement range, considered the relevant statutory factors, imposed a 

sentence within the statutory maximum, gave sufficiently detailed reasons for its decision, 

and addressed Richmond’s arguments for a lesser sentence. Specifically, in imposing a 

sentence within the policy statement range, the court explained that Richmond had 

committed several violations starting only a year after he had been released onto 

supervision. 

Next, we conclude that Richmond has waived his right to his sentence for the new 

criminal conduct in No. 23-4728. As we have explained, a defendant may, in a valid plea 

agreement, waive the right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins, 

905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de 

novo and will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the scope 

thereof. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). 

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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the 

waiver. Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed 

to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the 

defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea 

agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023). 

“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate 

rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant 

understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Based on the totality of circumstances, we conclude that Richmond knowingly and 

voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the appeal waiver. Moreover, 

Richmond’s appeal waiver included his right to appeal his convictions and sentence on any 

grounds except for a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum or based on an 

impermissible factor. We therefore grant the Government’s motion in part and dismiss

Richmond’s appeal in No. 23-4728 as to all issues within the scope of the appellate waiver.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in these appeals and 

have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

revocation judgment in No. 23-4729, affirm Richmond’s convictions in No. 23-4728, and 

dismiss the remainder of the appeal in No. 23-4728. This court requires that counsel inform 

Richmond, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Richmond requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such 

a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw 

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from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on 

Richmond.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

No. 23-4728, AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART;

No. 23-4729, AFFIRMED

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