[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11084

____________________

MICHAEL MARTINEZ,

as Owner of and for a 2019 22’ Cape Horn, 

hull identification number FAB22078E919, 

her engines, tackle and appurtenances,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ERIC REYNOLDS,

Defendant-Appellee.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-10129-JLK

____________________

Before NEWSOM and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and STORY,*DISTRICT 

JUDGE.

STORY, District Judge:

Following a boating accident between Michael Martinez and 

Eric Reynolds, Reynolds filed a Petition for Exoneration From or 

Limitation of Liability in order to limit the liability he could 

personally incur from the accident. Martinez filed a claim for his 

alleged damages within that proceeding, and the parties voluntarily 

settled his claim and executed a Settlement Agreement and Release 

of Claims (“Settlement and Release”).

After the settlement, Martinez filed his own Petition to 

similarly limit his own liability from the accident. The district 

court dismissed his Petition, finding that the Settlement and 

Release precluded its filing. Martinez appeals that dismissal, 

arguing that the Settlement and Release only released his own 

personal injury and property damage claims against Reynolds, not 

his right to bring the Petition. After careful review, we reverse the 

* Honorable Richard W. Story, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Georgia, sitting by designation. 

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 3

district court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

I

Martinez owned a 22-foot boat that he kept docked at the 

Anchorage Resort in Key Largo, Florida. On December 30, 2019, 

Martinez left the dock in his boat with several passengers on board. 

After an afternoon of fishing, around sunset, Martinez began 

driving his boat back to shore at approximately 30 miles per hour. 

A 32-foot boat operated by Eric Reynolds collided with Martinez’s 

boat. Reynolds was driving approximately 55 miles per hour at the 

time of the collision, which caused damage to Martinez’s boat and 

serious injuries to Martinez and his passengers. The Florida Fish 

and Wildlife Conservation Commission charged Reynolds 

criminally for the collision and found that Martinez was not at 

fault.

As a result of the accident, on January 24, 2019, Reynolds 

filed a Petition for Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability 

pursuant to the Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 

§ 30501, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Supplemental Rule 

F. Martinez asserted claims against Reynolds in this proceeding to 

account for his personal injuries and the damage to his boat. 

Reynolds asserted a compulsory counterclaim against Martinez in 

the Limitation proceeding for his own alleged injuries and 

damages. Martinez and Reynolds ultimately settled Martinez’s 

claim, after which they executed a Settlement and Release dated 

September 21, 2020.

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

The Settlement and Release noted that both Martinez and 

Reynolds mutually participated in its drafting, and therefore its 

language would “not be presumptively construed either in favor of 

or against either of the Parties.” The “Release of Claims” section 

stated, in pertinent part: 

Martinez does hereby release . . . 

Reynolds . . . of and from all manner of 

action and actions, cause and causes of 

action, claims the Party hereto made, 

could or should have made including,

but not limited to any and all claims for 

negligence; intentional tort; and for all 

damages allowable, . . . ; common law, 

statutory, and bad faith actions, actions 

for subrogation, contribution and/or 

indemnity . . . and any sums or expenses 

whatsoever, including any claim or 

demand for arbitration, known or 

unknown, in admiralty, law or equity, 

presently existing or which might arise 

or be discovered in the future arising 

out of or resulting from any property 

damage, or injury(s) sustained by 

Martinez, on the Vessel including the 

boating incident involving Reynolds 

and Martinez on or about December 30, 

2019 . . . and arising out of or resulting 

from the Incident and/or Limitation 

Action.

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 5

The Settlement and Release further reiterated that it was 

intended to fully settle, resolve, and release all of Martinez’s claims 

against Reynolds for damages arising out of the accident. Finally, 

it acknowledged that Reynolds had filed a still-pending claim 

against Martinez for his own alleged personal injuries and property 

damage stemming from the accident. As such, it clarified that the 

Release was “specifically intended to release Reynolds from any 

further liability to Martinez for injuries and damages sustained by 

Martinez in the afore described incident” and “preclude[d] any 

further and future claims or counterclaims by Martinez against 

Reynolds arising out of the boating accident in question.” The 

Release explicitly did not preclude Reynolds from proceeding with 

his own counterclaim for damages against Martinez arising from 

the boat collision nor did it waive any defenses that Martinez could 

raise in Reynolds’ counterclaim against him. 

Following the parties’ settlement, on November 5, 2020, 

Martinez filed his own Petition for Exoneration From or Limitation 

of Liability in the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Florida, seeking to limit his own liability stemming from 

the accident. Reynolds moved to dismiss the Petition, arguing that 

it was barred by the parties’ Settlement and Release. Martinez 

argued that the Settlement and Release governed his own personal 

injury and property damage claims against Reynolds, not the other 

way around, and therefore did not bar his Petition. 

The district court agreed with Reynolds, concluding that 

Martinez’s Petition was a cause of action and that the Settlement 

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and Release “released Reynolds from ‘all manner of action and 

actions, cause and causes of action’ that could have been brought 

by Martinez in connection with the subject boating collision.” In 

reaching this conclusion, the district court focused almost 

exclusively on isolated phrases in the parties’ Settlement and 

Release and the Limitation of Liability Act. And, as a result, the 

district court held that Martinez’s Petition was barred by the 

Settlement and Release and dismissed Martinez’s Petition. 

Martinez timely appealed to this Court. He argues that the 

district court erred in dismissing his Petition for two primary and 

related reasons: (1) when read as a whole, such that every provision 

has meaning, the Settlement and Release does not prohibit 

Martinez’s Petition; and (2) a Petition is defensive in nature and not 

the type of “cause of action” contemplated by the Settlement and 

Release.1 Reynolds disagrees and believes that the district court 

accurately construed the Settlement and Release and therefore 

properly dismissed Martinez’s Petition. 

II

A 

1 We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations 

omitted). We also review do novo the interpretation of a contract, including 

whether it is ambiguous. Reynolds v. Roberts, 202 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 

2000) (citation omitted). 

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Martinez’s primary argument is that the Settlement and 

Release must be read as a whole and put into context, so that every 

provision has meaning. And when that is done, he argues that two 

conclusions are inescapable: “the release only discharged 

Martinez’s personal injury and property damage claims against 

Reynolds,” and it “did not discharge or affect Reynolds’ injury 

claims against Martinez” or “Martinez’s right to defend those 

claims being made by Reynolds against him and to limit his 

liability.” 

“[A] settlement agreement is essentially a contract and is 

subject to the traditional rules of contract interpretation.” Norfolk 

S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 

2004) (citation omitted). 

The parties agree that Florida law applies to construe the

Settlement and Release. “The polestar guiding the court in the 

construction of a written contract is the intent of the parties.” 

Circuitronix, LLC v. Kapoor, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 

2020) (citation and quotations omitted). “To determine the intent 

of the parties, a court should consider the language in the contract, 

the subject matter of the contract, and the object and purpose of 

the contract.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “[T]he 

contract language is the best evidence of the parties’ intent at the 

time of the execution of the contract.” Taylor v. Taylor, 1 So. 3d 

348, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted). 

In addition, “courts must read provisions of a contract 

harmoniously in order to give effect to all portions thereof.” 

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8 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

S&B/BIBB Hines PB 3 Joint Venture v. Progress Energy Fla., 365 

F. App’x. 202, 204 (11th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see also

Lalow v. Codomo, 101 So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 1958) (“The intention

of the parties must be determined from an examination of the 

whole contract and not from the separate phrases or paragraphs.”)

(citation omitted). Courts “may draw reasonable inferences from 

unambiguous contract language to determine what the parties 

intended.” GE Med. Sys. S.C.S. v. SYMX Healthcare Corp., 2021 

WL 821433, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2021) (citation and quotations 

omitted). 

A contract is ambiguous if it “is susceptible to two different 

interpretations, each one of which is reasonably inferred from the 

terms of the contract.” Frulla v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 543 F.3d 1247, 

1252 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). However, 

“a party’s interpretation of the contract that is unreasonable in light 

of the contract’s plain language does not make the contract 

ambiguous.” Caracol Television S.A. v. Telemundo Television 

Studios, LLC, 2022 WL 202546, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 24, 2022) 

(citation omitted). In addition, “it is the duty of the court, as near 

as may be, to place itself in the situation of the parties, and from a 

consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the occasion, and 

apparent object of the parties, to determine the meaning and intent 

of the language employed.” Circuitronix, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d at

1359 (citation and quotations omitted). 

In construing and interpreting the Settlement and Release 

here, the district court focused on two isolated provisions. First, it 

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 9

observed that the Settlement and Release releases Reynolds “[o]f 

and from all manner of action and actions, cause and causes of 

action, claims the party hereto made, could or should have made .

. . known or unknown, in admiralty, law or equity, presently 

existing or which might arise or be discovered in the future . . . 

arising out of or resulting from the Incident and/or Limitation 

Action.” And, second, the district court noted that the Settlement 

and Release preserved Martinez’s defenses to Reynolds’ stillpending negligence claim. 

If we looked at only those two provisions, we might reach 

the same conclusion as the district court. But that is not how we 

read and interpret contracts. Indeed, long-standing Florida law 

instructs us to determine the parties’ intent through “an 

examination of the whole contract and not from the separate 

phrases or paragraphs.” Lalow, 101 So. 2d at 393 (citation omitted). 

Doing so here leads to a different conclusion than the district court 

reached. 

First, we look at the title of the document itself: “Settlement 

Agreement and Specific Release of Claims by Michael Martinez.” 

The inclusion of the phrase “by Michael Martinez” at the end of the 

title suggests that the parties intended for the Settlement and 

Release to apply solely to Martinez’s affirmative claims against 

Reynolds. Were that not the case, and the parties intended for the 

document to also apply to (and restrict) Martinez’s right to file his 

own Petition, the parties could have used a different title. For 

example, they could have titled their document “Settlement 

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10 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

Agreement and Release of Claims by Michael Martinez and Eric 

Reynolds” or left out the parties’ names altogether. 

Next, the Recitals section states that “Martinez and 

Reynolds . . . desire to resolve the claim by Michael Martinez 

arising out of the Incident and Limitation Action.” This language 

refers only to Martinez’s claim against Reynolds, and 

unambiguously conveys the intent of the Settlement and Release—

to voluntarily settle Martinez’s affirmative claim for damages 

against Reynolds. 

The “Release of Claims” section has a lot to unpack. The 

district court is correct that this section purports to release 

Reynolds “of and from all manner of action and actions, cause and 

causes of action, claims the Party hereto made, could or should 

have made . . . known or unknown, in admiralty, law or equity, 

presently existing or which might arise or be discovered in the 

future . . . arising out of or resulting from the Incident and/or 

Limitation Action.” But focusing on that line ignores other 

language and key context in the section. For example, between 

that excerpted release language, the Settlement and Release details 

a number of types of claims that Martinez releases his right to 

bring, including negligence, intentional tort, and all sorts of 

monetary damages. Importantly, these are all affirmative claims 

that Martinez could have raised against Reynolds as a result of

Reynolds’ alleged liability to him. They have nothing to do with 

Martinez’s own liability to Reynolds. Moreover, this section later 

states that it releases Reynolds from any claims “arising out of or 

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 11

resulting from any property damage, or injury(s) sustained by 

Martinez, on the Vessel including the boating accident. . . .” Again, 

this language clearly contemplates the release of Martinez’s 

affirmative claims against Reynolds for the injuries that he 

allegedly sustained and property damage he allegedly incurred in 

their accident. It says nothing about Martinez’s own liability or his 

right to seek to limit that liability. 

Several other provisions follow this same interpretive 

trajectory. The “Consideration and Payment to Martinez” section 

notes that Reynolds’ settlement payment is made in release “of any 

and all claims by Martinez against Reynolds for damages arising 

out of the Limitation Action and/or Incident.” The “Agreement 

to Hold Harmless and Indemnify” section discusses Reynolds’ 

negligence, Martinez’s injuries, and the potential of future claims 

or actions filed against Reynolds. And the “Not an Admission” 

section clarifies that the Settlement and Release “resolves disputed 

claims by Martinez against Reynolds.” 

Finally, lest there be any remaining doubt, the final 

paragraphs of the Settlement and Release “acknowledge[] that 

Reynolds has filed, and there is pending in this action, a claim by 

Reynolds against Martinez for personal injuries allegedly sustained 

by Reynolds in the afore described incident.” Moreover, it states 

as follows: 

This release is specifically intended to 

release Reynolds from any further 

liability to Martinez for injuries and 

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

damages sustained by Martinez in the 

afore described incident. This release 

precludes any further and future claims 

or counterclaims by Martinez against 

Reynolds arising out of the boating 

accident in question. Nothing in this 

release will prevent or preclude in any 

way Reynolds’ ability to proceed with 

his own claim for damages against 

Martinez arising from the subject boat 

collision. This release is not intended 

and does not waive any defenses which 

Martinez is entitled to raise in the claim 

by Reynolds against Martinez. These 

defenses include, but are not limited to, 

comparative fault by Reynolds. 

This section again repeats what the rest of the Settlement and 

Release conveys—it specifically applies only to Martinez’s 

affirmative claims against Reynolds for his own alleged injuries and 

property damages.

The parties strenuously dispute the import of the last two 

sentences of this section, which explicitly preserve Martinez’s right 

to assert defenses to any claims by Reynolds. Reynolds believes 

these sentences contemplate only his existing counterclaim against 

Martinez and Martinez’s right to raise defenses to that 

counterclaim, in part because “Martinez’[s] independent action for 

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 13

exoneration and limitation of liability is not a defense ‘in the claim 

by Reynolds against Martinez.’” We disagree. As we will next

discuss, a Limitation proceeding is an inherently defensive action. 

As such, the text of the Settlement and Release preserved 

Martinez’s right to assert defenses in one of two ways—directly in 

response to Reynolds’ counterclaim, or through a Limitation 

proceeding. It does not bar Martinez’s Petition. 

Again, the court’s role in construing a contract is to 

determine the intent of the parties by considering the contract’s

subject matter, its object and purpose, and, most importantly, its 

language. To do so, we must read all of the contract provisions 

together to give each of them meaning. Here, however inartfully 

the Settlement and Release was written and prepared, it is not 

ambiguous. To the contrary, when we review and interpret all of 

its provisions together, it is clear that the Settlement and Release 

was intended to resolve only Martinez’s affirmative claims against 

Reynolds for his own damages that he allegedly incurred, and 

nothing more. It was not intended to preclude Martinez from filing 

his own Petition to limit his own liability stemming from the 

accident. If that is what the parties, and particularly Reynolds, 

meant for the Settlement and Release to say, then they could have 

written it to apply to and bar Martinez’s Limitation proceeding. 

But they did not, and we will not read the Settlement and Release 

to apply more broadly than its terms clearly state.

Here, the district court focused on isolated phrases in the 

Settlement and Release rather than interpreting it as a whole, 

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erroneously concluding that the Settlement and Release barred 

Martinez’s Petition. 

B 

Even if we agreed with the district court’s interpretation of 

the Settlement and Release, Martinez also argues that the district 

court erred in dismissing his Petition because such a Petition is defensive in nature and not the type of “cause of action” that is contemplated—and therefore barred—by the Settlement and Release. 

We agree.

Under the Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. 

§§ 30501, et seq., “a shipowner can limit its liability for certain 

claims involving its vessel to the value of the vessel.” In re Bertsch, 

540 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1190 (S.D. Fla. 2021); see also Orion Marine 

Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918 F.3d 1323, 1325 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The 

Act establishes a procedure by which a shipowner can limit its liability for certain claims involving one of its vessels to the value of 

the vessel plus its then-pending freight.”) (citing 46 U.S.C. §

30505(a)). In other words, this Act allows a shipowner to seek to 

limit his or her liability following a maritime accident where there 

is a potential for multiple claimants against him or her. 

“A shipowner can assert its right to limitation of liability in 

one of two ways. First, the shipowner can claim limitation by 

pleading it as a defense in an answer to a claim in any court. 

Alternatively, the shipowner can file a limitation of liability 

proceeding in federal district court.” El Paso Prod. GOM, Inc. v. 

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 15

Smith, 406 F. Supp. 2d 671, 675 (E.D. La. 2005) (citations omitted). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule F, Limitation 

of Liability, sets forth the applicable procedures that shipowners 

must follow to protect their right to limit liability. In evaluating a 

shipowner’s right to limit his or her liability, the court first 

“determine[s] what acts of negligence or conditions of 

unseaworthiness caused the accident,” and then “determine[s] 

whether the shipowner had knowledge or privity of those same 

acts of negligence or conditions of unseaworthiness.” Tug Allie-B, 

Inc. v. United States, 273 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and 

quotations omitted).

The district court concluded that a Petition for Exoneration 

From or Limitation of Liability was a “cause of action” as 

contemplated by the parties’ Settlement and Release. As such, it 

held that Martinez’s Petition must be barred because “Martinez 

cannot circumvent the purpose and effect of the settlement 

agreement and release, which was to ensure that Reynolds would 

have no further legal action instigated against him in any way in 

connection with the accident.” In reaching this conclusion, the 

district court focused on isolated phrases in the Limitation of 

Liability Act. In particular, it noted that the statute permits a vessel 

owner to “bring a civil action” and “file a complaint” in federal 

district court. True enough. And it is also true that federal courts 

routinely refer to such Petitions as “causes of actions.” See, e.g., In 

re Brown, 766 F. App’x. 30, 32-33 (5th Cir. 2019) (discussing the 

shipowner’s cause of action under the Limitation of Liability Act); 

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

In re Wellborn, 2013 WL 2243088, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2013) 

(“The Limitation of Liability Act [] provides a cause of action 

whereby a vessel owner facing liability for a maritime accident may 

file a petition in federal court seeking protection . . . .”) (citation 

omitted). 

However, those facts ignore the nature of a Limitation 

proceeding and overlook how other federal courts have treated 

them. Most obviously, a Limitation proceeding is not a typical 

adversarial proceeding, because a ship owner filing a Petition does 

not name defendants or assert affirmative claims against any 

defendants. Accordingly, the petitioner need not effectuate formal 

service of process on any potential claimants. To the contrary, 

after the ship owner files his or her Petition and clears the required 

procedural hurdles, the district court itself issues a notice to all 

potential claimants about the Limitation proceeding, instructing 

them to promptly file any claims that they may have against the 

petitioner. Any claimants are then responsible for entering the 

Limitation proceeding themselves by filing claims against the 

petitioner within the Limitation proceeding. That decision is 

wholly voluntary, though—a ship owner’s filing of a Petition 

imposes no obligations on any potential claimants. Here, then, 

Martinez did not “instigate[]” any legal action “against” Reynolds, 

as the district court suggested, and Reynolds now argues. 

In addition, Limitation proceedings are inherently 

defensive. See, e.g., Corso v. DeWitt, 180 B.R. 589, 592 (C.D. Cal. 

1994) (“Appellant’s limitation action is defensive rather than 

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21-11084 Opinion of the Court 17

offensive in nature.”) (citation omitted); Application of Sand Bar I, 

Inc., 1992 WL 84277, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 1992) (“A limitation 

of liability action is so thoroughly defensive in nature . . . .”); In re 

Indep. Towing Co., 242 F. Supp. 950, 953-54 (E.D. La. 1965) (“A 

petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability has always 

been construed as a defensive action and the proceeding apparently 

one in personam. . . . Therefore, as a defensive action, in personam, 

a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability is the 

assertion of a personal defense.”) (citations omitted). 

Courts have long referred to them as such, and that makes 

sense—a party instituting a Limitation proceeding is not seeking to

(and, indeed, cannot) recover any monetary damages from any 

potential claimants. See Application of Sand Bar I, Inc., 1992 WL 

84277, at *3 (“the vessel owner . . . never can recover money 

pursuant to that statute”) (citation omitted). Just the opposite. 

Such a proceeding simply allows boat owners to protect 

themselves and limit their own liability. Id. (“A petition for 

limitation of liability is nothing more than a statutory procedure to 

secure a vessel owner’s rights in defending a prospective suit for 

damages. It is not a suit itself, as contemplated by the Eleventh 

Amendment . . . .”); see also In re Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. All 

Potential Claimants, 2021 WL 2779115, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 

2021) (“And it is well-established that the Limitation of Liability Act 

is designed only to protect owners and to determine claims made 

against them.”) (citations omitted). 

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18 Opinion of the Court 21-11084

Simply put, Martinez’s Petition for Exoneration From or 

Limitation of Liability is not the type of “cause of action” that is 

contemplated by the parties’ Settlement and Release here. Martinez did not file it against Reynolds or seek damages from him. 

Rather, he sought to limit his own liability for all potential claims 

stemming from the accident, including those by Reynolds, against 

him. Accordingly, even if we agreed with the district court’s construction of the parties’ Settlement and Release, which we do not,

we nevertheless find that Martinez’s Limitation proceeding is not 

barred by the Settlement and Release. The district court erred by 

holding otherwise. 

III 

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

judgment granting Reynolds’ motion to dismiss Martinez’s Petition for Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability, and remand 

to allow Martinez to proceed with his Petition. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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