### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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NO. 03-0 6 -00 039 -CR
M ar c us W ill iam s , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-05 -90 4127 , HO NORAB LE B RENDA KENNEDY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
We withdraw our

opinion and judgme nt issued on J une 1, 2007, and substitute the following in its pl ace . We overrule the State’s motion for re hear ing.

A ju r y c o n v ic te d a

p p e ll an t M ar c u s Wi ll ia

ms o f th e o f

f e n s e s o f r o b b e ry

and ag g ravated robbe ry . See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § § 2 9
. 0 2 , 2 9
. 03 (West 2003). The jury assessed punishment at 60 y ear s’ confinement for each offense , with the s entenc es t o run conc urre ntly . I n a sin gl e i s s ue on appe al, Will iams asserts that ther e wa s insufficient evide nce to support the jur y ’s finding that Wil liams ex hibited a dea dly wea pon. Additionally , althoug h Wil liams did not raise the issue, the State, in a supplementa l brief, concede s that Wil liams’s convictions for both robbe ry and ag g ravated robbe ry

violated double jeopa

rdy
. T h e S t at e as ks us to affirm the district c ourt’s j u d g m e n t c o n v i c t i n g W i l l i a m s o f a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y an d v a c a t e W i l l i a m s ’ s c o n v i c t i o nf o r r o b b e r y.2

We overrule Wil liams’s sufficienc y issue and ag ree with the State that a double jeopa rdy violation
occur red. W e also ag ree that, under the circ umstances pr esent he re, w e must aff irm Wi lliams’s conviction for a g g ravated robbe ry and vac ate his convic tion for robbe ry . BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that in the ea rly morning hours of Aug ust 4, 2004, Alejandro Catemaxa and his son Claudio were robbed at gunpoint in th e p ar k i n g lot of their apa rtment
co mp le x. T h e St a te ’ s e v id e n c e in c lu d e d th e te s ti mo n y o f A le ja n dr o an d Cl a

u d io , p o lic e off

icer Manuel Jim enez, and r obbery detec tive Richard Gua

jardo. Alejandr o testified that he and his son lived in the same apa rtment and would ofte n dr ive to w or

k to g e the r. On

the mor nin g in q ue sti on , A le

jand ro wa s wa iti ngin t

he pa rk inglot fo r h is son when he was a

pproac hed by

two men in a truc k. Alejandr o testified that the men we re a sking for dire ctions to places that they s ai d wer e on “L amar

or Gua dalupe or

something like that.” Alejandr o’s suspicions were arouse d beca use he knew t hat t he places t o which the men were a sking dir e c tio ns we re no t c los e to e ith e r s tr e e t.

Alejandr o further

testified that when Claudio c ame outside and the pair trie d to ge t in their ca

r to leave , one of the men p u lled out a g un and pointed it at Alejandr o. The man w as speakingto him in English, which Alejandr o could not understand. Howeve r, Aleja ndro testified that he under stood from the man’s g estures that “he wanted some thing.” Alejandr o g ave the man his wallet and Claudio did the s ame. The men then drove awa y . Alejandr o identified Will iams as the man w ho ha d p oin te d th e g un a t hi m.3 During Alejandr o’s testimony , the State showed Ale jandro a g un rec overe d during the robber y investigation a

nd asked Alejandr o whether he could identify

it as the ty

pe of w eapon that had bee n pointed at him during the robbe ry . Alejandr o answe red that the g un appea red simil ar but not identical. Alejandr o explained that he could only see the upper pa rt of the we apon whe n he wa s robbed be cause of the a

ng le at which the g un had bee n pointed at him. Cla ud io, wh o und e rs too d Eng lis h be tte r tha n his f a the r, te sti fi e d th a t Will iams t old them to “g ive him ever

y thing be cause he wa s g oing to kill us with a g un.” Claudio testified that he
saw the g un and

that Will iams p oin te d it

a t bo th o f t

he m. C la ud io e xpla ine d th a t he g a ve Willi a ms his wa lle t be c a

us e he wa s a fr a id t

hat e ith e r he or his fa

the r wo uld be inj ur e d or

e ve n k ill e d. Cla

ud io identified Will iams as the man with the gun. Claudio w as also shown the g un that was re cover ed duri ng the i nv e sti g a tio n a nd wa s a sk e d if

it l oo ke d li ke the g un

that w a s u se d o n h im. Cla ud io testified, “I t’s simil ar to the one Isaw, but I can’ t say that’s the one.” Be cause Alejandr o and Claudio spoke little Eng lish, Office r Manuel J i m enez was called to the crime sc ene to tra nslate for and intervie w the victims. J imenez testified that Alejandr o descr ibed how Wil liams g ot out of his vehicle, appr oache d Alejandr o, asked f or direc tions, pull ed out a wea pon, and plac ed it on Alejandr o’s chest. J imenez further testified that Alejandr o descr ibed the wea pon as “a n automatic with a blac k on top and white on bottom.” De te c tiv e Ric ha

rd Gu a jard o inve sti g a te d th e rob bery and te sti fi e d th a t, i n a ph oto lineup, Alejandr o identified Esteba n Be nitez and Wi lliams as the men who robbed him. Guajardo also testified that a CO2- power ed B B gun was found in B enitez’s h o t el ro o m d uring the inv e sti g a tio n. Gu a

jard o e xpla ine d th a t th e re wa s a lso a se c on d, un re c ov e re d gun that Will iamsWil liams does not specify in his brief whe ther he is challeng ing the leg al or fa ctual 1 sufficie ncy

of the e vidence . We will address both. 4 c la ime d to ow n at aro un d the tim e the ro bb e ry oc c ur re d. Gu a jard o c ou ld n ot t e sti fy

wi th c e rt a int

y wh i c h o f t h e t w o w e a

p o n s W i l l i a m s u s e d d

u r i n g t h e r o b b e r

y . H o w e v e r , G u a

j ar d o d id n ote in h is inv e sti g a tio n r e po rt

tha t th e g un de sc ri be d by Al e

jand ro ma tc he d th e g un

se ize d f ro m th e ho te l r oo m. Guajar do testified that a CO2-pow ere d BB pistol was capa ble of c ausing death or serious bodily

injury
. Specifica lly , Guajar do explained that it could put out an ey e, bre ak a tooth,
o r ev en cause death if shot at someone ’s abdomen or head. G uajar do also rea d to the jury the
war ning on the g un, which stated t h at “mis use or c are less use may cause serious injury

or death.” T h e S t a t e i n d i c t e d

W i l l i a m s f

o r t h e o f f e n s e s o f r o b b e r y an d a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r

y. Count one of the indictment alleg ed that, on or a bou t Aug ust 4, 2004, W illiams i ntentionally and kn ow ing ly

pla c e d A le

jand ro Ca te ma xa in

fe ar of imm ine nt bo dil y inj ur y or de a th wh ile in t

he c ours e
o f c o m m i t t i n g t h e f

to f p r o p e rt y an d

w i t h i n t e n tt o o b t a i nan d m a i n t a i nc o n t r o l o f

s a i d p r o p e rt y. Count two of the indictment alleg ed the same offe nse, the same date, a nd the same vic tim as count one but adde d an allega

tion that a deadly wea

pon was used during the commission of the offe nse,
name ly a CO 2- po we re d B B pis tol . The jur y c on vic te d Wil liams o f b oth c ounts in t

he ind ic tme nt. Wil liams pleaded true to the enhanc ement par ag raphs in the indictment alleg ing thr ee pr ior felony
c on vic tio ns , a

nd the jur y a sse sse d p un ish me nt at 60 y e ars ’ c on fi ne me nt f or e a ch off e ns e . T his appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N De adl y- wea pon fin ding

I n his sole issue on appea l, Wi lliams asserts that the evide nce w as insufficie nt to 1 support the jury ’s finding that he exhibi ted a deadly wea pon during the commission of the offe nse.5 When there is a c halleng e to the lega l sufficie ncy of t he evidence to sustain a c riminal conviction, we consider whether a rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of th e o f f e n s e b e y o n d a r e a s o n a

b le d o u b t. Vo do c ho ds k

yv . S tat e , 1 58 S.W. 3d

50 2, 50 9 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2005). We re view all the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t and assume that the tr ie r o f f

a c t r e so lve d c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mony , w e ig he d th e evi den ce, and dr e w r e a so na ble infere nces in a

manner that s u p ports the ver dict. Se e Gr iff in v . S tat e , 614 S.W .2d 155, 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). I t is not necessar y that ever y fac t point direc tly and independently to the defe ndant’s g uilt; i t is enoug h if the conclusion is war rante d by the combined and cumulative f orce of all the incr iminating cir cumstance s. J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 871 S.W .2d 183, 186 (Tex. C rim. App. 1993). We consider

even e rrone ously

admitted evidenc e. Id
. I n a fa c tua l su ffi c ie nc y

re vie w, we vie w the e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l li g ht a

nd a sk whether a jury was rationally

justified in finding guilt bey ond a re asonable doubt. See W ats on v . S tat e , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We then d et er m i n e wh ether the evidenc e supporting the ver dict is so weak that the ve rdict is clea rly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the verdict is ag ainst the gre at weight and preponde ranc e of the conf licting e vidence
. Id
. a t 41 5. We w ill no t r e ve rs e a c a se on a fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y c ha lle ng e un le ss we c an sa y , wi th s ome objective ba sis in the recor d, that the g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e contr adicts the jury ’s ver dict. Id . at 417.

Un d e r b o th th e le g a l an d f a c tu a l s u f f ic ie n c y s ta

n d ar d s o f r e v ie w , th e jur y is the exclusive jud g e o f th e f

a c ts , th e c r e d ib il it

y o f th e w it

n e s s e s , an d th e w e ig h t to b e g iv e n to the witnesses’ testimony
. J

ag ge rs v . S tat e , 125 S.W .3d 661, 670 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, p et
. re f’ d ) ( ci t i n g Pe nagrap h v . S tat e , 6 23 S.W. 2d 34 1, 34 3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ))
. Un de r b othSe e als o R iv e ra v . S tat e , N o . 0 3

- 0 4

- 0 0 2 3 5
- CR , 2 0 0 5 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 3 9 9 7 , a t *19 2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 26, 2005, no pet.) (not de signated for publication).

6 le g a l and fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie ws , an a

pp e llate c ourt

mus t be a pp ro pr ia te ly

de fe re nti a l to the fa c tfi nd e r’ s r ole a t tr ia l. Ha rv e yv . S tat e , 135 S.W .3d 712, 717 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pe t.) (citing J on es v. S tat e , 944 S.W .2d 642, 647-48 (Te x . Crim. App. 1996)). The jury may believe all, some, 2 or none of

any witness’s testimony
. Sh ar p v . S tat e , 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); J ag ge rs , 125 S.W .3d at 6 70. This standard of revie w applies to both direc t and circ umstantial evidenc e ca ses. Kin g v . S tat e , 29 S.W .3d 556, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Proof of the use or exhibit i o n o f a d ea d l y wea pon is an essential e lement of the offe nse of a g g ravated robbe ry as cha rg ed in t he indictment. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 29.03(a) (2). A dea dly wea pon is “any

thing that in the manne r of it s u s e o r i n t en ded use is ca pable of causing death or serious bodily

injury .” Id . § 1.07(a) (17)( B) (West Supp. 2006). During the robbe ry

investigation, a CO2-power ed BB pistol was r ecove red f rom the hotel room of Esteba

n Be nitez, W illiams’s alleg ed ac complice in the c rime. Al though D etec tive Gu a jard o te sti fi e d th a t he c ou ld no t be c e rt a in if thi s wa s the we a po n us e d in the ro bb e ry , he did no te in his investigation re port that the g un descr ibed by Alejandr o matched the g un seized from the hotel
room. Fur

thermore , both A lejandro and Claudio te stified that the g un rec overe d by the police wa s “similar” to the gun used in the robbe ry . Although neither individual c ould state with cer tainty that this was the wea

pon used, a r ational jury

could infer

that this uncertainty

could have been due to the traumatic nature of be ing r obbed at gunpoint.7 Alejandr o also explained that his view of the wea pon was obscur ed by

the ang le at which Willi ams held it. Howeve r, Alejandro further t estified that, despite m inor differ ence s, the g un
s h o w nt o h i m i nc o u rtw a s “ t h e s a m e , j u s ta l i t t l e b i tb i g g e r ” t h ant h e g u nu s e d d u r i n g t h e r o b b e r

y. Claudio’s testimony

about the g un corr oborate d Alejandr o’s t estimony
. We find nothing irr ational about the jury ’s decision to infer from t he testimony of the two victims that the gun used during the commission of the rob b er y was the same g un rec overe d by the police. Se e Ab bo tt v . S tat e , 726 S.W .2d 644, 647 (Tex. A pp.—Amarillo 1987, pet. ref ’d) ( testimony

that g un “looks like” a

nd “could ha ve bee n” we apon used w as suffic ient). There is also the issue of De tective Gua jardo’s te stimony

that Wil liams told hi m that he ow ne d a se c on d g un a t aro un d the tim e of the ro bb e ry . Th e po lic e we re un a ble to r e c ov e r t

his g un. Howeve r, De tective Gua jardo a lso testified that Wi lliams tol d him that he had tra ded one gun for the othe r. A ra

tional jury

could infer that this other g un had been trade d awa y prior to the robber

y in e xch ang e fo r t

he CO 2- po we re d B B pis tol , e sp e c ia lly c on sid e ri ngthat th e po lic e we re un a ble to
re c ov e r t he oth e r gun

bu t w e re a

ble to r e c ov e r t

he B B pis tol
. We also find nothing irr ational about the jury ’s decision to infer that the B B pistol
a lle g e dly us e d d ur ingthe c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e wa s a de a dly

we a po n. “ [A]n o bje c t is a

de a dly
wea pon if the ac tor i n t en d s a use of the obje ct in which it would be ca pable of causingdeath or serious bodily injury .” Mc Cai n v . S tat e , 22 S.W .3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Here , the uncontrove rted testimony of Al ej an d ro and Claudio establishes that Willi ams pointed the g un dir e c tly a t the m dur ing the ro bb e ry . Of fi c e r Jimen e z te sti fi e d tha t A le jand ro tol d h im that Will iams place d the g un on Alejandr o’s che st. Detec tive Guajar do provided un controve rted testimony that8

a CO2-powe red B B pistol is c apable of causing serious bodily injury or eve n death if pointed towa rd a per son’s head or abdomen. The jury also hea rd Gua jardo re ad the wa

rning label on the gun, which st ate d t hat “mi su se o r carel ess us e ma y caus e ser io us in

ju ry or d eat h. ” “W it h t est im on y th at a BB g un is capa

ble of causing serious bodily injury , it is reasonable for a jury to make a de adly

wea pon fi nding.” Ad

am e v . S tat e , 6 9 S. W.3 d 5 81 , 5 82 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); se e De lga do v . S tat e , 986 S.W .2d 306, 308-09 (Te x . App.—Austin 1999, no pet.).

Viewingthe evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t, w e find that there was leg ally s ufficie nt evidence to support the jury ’s dea dly wea pon finding . Considering all of the evidenc e in a ne utral light, we find that there was fa ctually sufficie nt evidence to support the jury ’s de a dly we a po n f ind ing . We ov e rr

ule Willi a ms’ s so le iss ue on a pp e a l.
Do uble je opa r dy

I n a supplemental brief, the State conce des that a double jeopar dy violation occurr ed in this case bec ause Williams rece ived multiple punishm ents for the same off ense. The F ifth Amendment g uara ntee a g ainst double jeopar d y p rot ects a g ainst: (1) a
se c on d p ro se c uti on fo r the same of fe ns e fo llo wi ng c on vic tio n; (2 ) a se c on d pro se c uti on fo r t he same offe nse following acquittal; and ( 3) multiple punishments for the same of fense
. Il lin ios v. V

ita le , 44 7 U .S. 41 0, 41 5 ( 19 80 ); Ce rv an te s v . S tat e , 815 S.W. 2d

56 9, 57 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Berger

v . S tat e , 104 S.W .3d 199, 204-05 (Te x . App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). When the same act or transac tion violates two differe nt pe nal statutes, the two off enses a re the same for

double-jeopa

rdy purposes if one of the off

enses c ontains all the eleme nts of the other. Blockburge r v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). C umulative punishment may be imposed whe re se parate offe nses occ ur9

in the same transaction, as longas ea ch convic tion requires pr oof of a n additional element whic h the
o th er does not. Id .; Ph ill ips v . S tat e , 787 S.W .2d 391, 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Absent in d ic a ti o no f

c o n tr ar y le g is lati v e in te n t, it

is p r e s u me d

th a t t h e le g is latu

r e d id n o t i n te n d

to a u th o r iz e multipl e punishments for two of fense s that are the same unde r the Blockburge r te st. W halen v. United States , 4 4 5 U
. S
. 6 8 4 , 6 9 1

- 9 2 ( 1 9 8 0) ; Duv all v . S tat e , 59 S.W .3d 773, 780 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref ’d). I n T e xas, an o ff

e ns e is inc lud e d w ith in a no the r i f, a mon g oth e r t hin g s, “ it i s established by

proof of the same or

less than all the facts require d to establish the commission of the of fe ns e c ha rg e d. ” Te x. Cod e Cr im. P roc. Ann . a rt . 3 7. 09 (1 ) ( Wes t 20 06 ); Hu tc hin s v . S tat e , 992 S.W .2d 629, 631 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref ’d). Unde r Texas law, t h e o ff en s e of ag g ravated robbery

is defined a s robber

y , committed with the use or exhibiti on of a de adly wea pon. See Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 29.03(a) (2). Thus, r obbery is a l esser -included of fense of
a g g r a v a t e d

r o b b e r y. The leg islature also de term i nes whe ther off enses a re the same for

double-jeopa

rdy purposes by

defining the “a llo wable unit of pr osecution.” Ex parte Hawk ins , 6 S.W .3d 554, 556 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Sanab r i a v. Un i t ed States , 437 U.S. 54 (1978)). In Texas, the allowable unit of pr osecution for an assa ultive offense such as ro b b er y is per victim. Id . at 560. Thus , mul tip le c on vic tio ns fo r t he same of

fe ns e c omm itt e d a g a ins t di ff e re nt v ic tim s d o n ot v iol a te double jeopar dy
. Id . at 561.

Ho we ve r, in thi s ca se , Williams w a s in dic te d f or a sin g le of fe ns e inv olv inga

sin g le victim, Alejandro Catema x a. The State did not name Claudio Cate maxa a s a victim in either count of the indictment. Ther efor e, althoug h it was p er m i s s i b l e to s ubmit both robbery and ag g ravated10

robber y to the jury , Wil liams c ould not be convicted of both. See B erger , 1 0 4 S. W. 3 d a t 2 0 5
. We ag ree with the State that Wil liams “was subjec ted to multipl e pun i shment for the same cr iminal transac tion in viol ation of double jeopa rdy .” Id
. “When a de fenda

nt is convicted in a sing le cr iminal action of t wo offe nses that ar e the ‘same ’ for

double jeopar dy

purposes, the r emedy i s t o v ac ate one of the c onvictions.” Lan de rs v . S

tat e , 9 5 7 S
. W
. 2 d 5 5 8 , 5 5 9 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 9 7 ) ( c i t i n g Ball v. United States , 47 0 U .S. 85 6, 86 4- 86 5 ( 19 85 )) . H ow e ve r, the law g ov e rn ing wh ic h of t he c on vic tio ns to v a c a te is
curr ently somewhat unsettled. In Lan de rs , the c ourt of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls a do pte d “ wh a t w e wi ll c a ll the ‘most serious punishment’ test” f or dete rmining w hich of the “ same” offe nses in t he doublejeopar dy context shoul d be re tained. Id. at 560. The L a n d e rs cou rt ex pl aine d th a t “ [t]he ‘m os t
se ri ou s p un ish me nt’ is the lon g e st s e nte nc e imp os e d, wi th r ule s o f p aro le e lig ibi lity

and g oo d ti me servingas a tie- brea

ker.” The c ourt’s adoption of this rule was informed by its previous adoption of a similar rule in the misjoi nder context: “whe n a defe ndant is c onvicted of two or more off enses that wer e misjoined, the reme dy is to retain the most serious offe nse and vaca t e the remaining offe nses.” Id. at 5 5 9 (c i t i n g Ex parte Pe na , 820 S.W. 2d 80 6, 80 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ) ( plu ra lity opinion)). “The most serious offense ,” under the rule that the court had applied in the misj oinder context, had been “ deter

mined by the deg ree of the fe lony , the ra ng e of punishment and the sentenc e imposed, with rules of parole elig ibilit y and g ood conduct time as a tie-bre aker .” Id. When adopting that r ule , th e c ourt of c ri min a l a pp e a ls r e je c te d o the r “ pr e do min ant m e tho ds ” it h a d p re vio us ly ap p l i ed , i n cl u d i n g “[ ch o o s i n g] t h e o ff en s e t h at t h e d ef

en d an t wa s co n v i ct ed o f fi rs t , ” “ af fi rm [ i n g] the c on vic tio n that ha d the low e st n umb e r o n th e c ha

rg ingins tr

ume nt, ” and

“ [ch oo sin g ] the of

fe ns e11

that was a lleg ed first in the indictment.” Pena , 820 S.W .2d at 808. I t cited seve ral policy justifications for the ne w rule, inc luding that “ it doe s not attempt to make ar bitrary distinctions based
on wh ic h a lle g a tio ns or c on vic tio n pr e c e de d the oth e rs ,” e ns ur ing that “ the ou tc ome of a c a se wi ll not depend on the coincidence of the orde r of of fense s in an indictment or jury char g e.” Id. at 808. Rece ntly , the court of criminal appea ls c larified the application of what it termed the “most serious off

ense” test of Lan de rs . Ex parte Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 06 ); cf
. id . at 339-40 (K eller, P.J., concurring ). I t expressed conc ern that a standar d based on “ the de g re e of the fe lony , th e ra

ng e of punis hme nt a

nd the se nte nc e imp os e d, wi th r ule s o f p a ro le elig ibilit y and g ood conduct time as a tie-bre aker ” could be difficult to apply and su b j ec tive. Cavazos , 203 S.W .3d at 337-38. The court instead adopted a test based primarily on the fa ct-finde r’s discretion: “the ‘most se rious’ offe nse is the offe nse of c onviction for which the g reatest sentence
was a ssessed.” Id. a t 33 8. Th e c ourt a dd e d, “ To the e xten t th a t Lan de rs ho lds that ot he r f a c tor s, such as the de g ree of the fe lony , rang e of punishment, and r ules g overningparole elig ibil ity and
awa rding of g ood-conduc t time, shall be used in that deter mination, it i s overr

uled.” Id
. Having clar ified t he nature of the “most serious” of fense test, Cavazos a

pp lie d it to two convictions arising from the same incident, burg lary of a ha bitation with intent to commit theft and burg lary

of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault, for eac h of which the def endant had bee n sentenc ed to a 25- y ear term. In that situation, the court found a tie-b re ak er i n the imp os iti on

of re sti tut ion fo r onl y on e of the of fe ns e s (burg lary wi th int e nt to co mmi t the ft ), be c a us e “re stitut ion is pu

n is hment.” Id . Havingconclude d that the “punishment asse ssed makes the burg lary with intent to commit theft conviction the ‘most se rious’ offe nse,” the cour t did not need to proce ed further , but noted the following in a footnote:12

Some of our ca se law sug g ests that, all other factors be ing e qual, the convic tion that should be aff

irmed is the offe nse named in the first verdic t form. See , e.g. , Ex pa rte Cravens , 8 05 S.W. 2d

79 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Mc In tir e v . S tat e , 698 S.W 2d 652 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ); Ex parte Siller , 686 S.W .2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Gene rally , this will be the offe nse descr ibed in Count Iof the indictment. We do not a d dr e s s t h a tqu e s t i o nt o d ay. Id . at 339 n.8. Cravens , Mc In tir e , and Siller

wer e ea ch misjoinder ca ses that pre dated Pena
. Th e pr e se nt c a se pr e se nts the qu e sti on that Cavazos left unaddre ssed. Her e, we are
c on fr on te d w ithtw o id e nti c a l 60 -y e ar s e nte nc e s in tw o w ri tte n ju dg me nts of c on vic tio n. Th e on ly differ ence betwee n the two judg ments is that r obbery is list ed as a

“sec ond deg ree felony

enhanc ed to [ a] f ir s t d e g r e e f

e lo n y , ” w h il e a g g r a v a te d r o b b e r y is li s te d a s a “ f

ir s t d e g r e e f

e lo n y .” Unlike Cavazos , no restitution was order ed for either c onviction. Rece nt l y , i n Vi lla nu e v a v . S tat e , N os . PD -0 71 8- 06 & 07 19 -0 6, 20 07 Te x. Cr im. App. L EXI S 866, at *13-14 (Te x . Crim. App. J une 27, 2007), a ca s e i n volving a double jeopar dy vio la tio n w he re the se nte nc e s imp os e d we re ide nti c a l and no re sti tut ion

wa s o rd e re d, the c ourt

he ld that “[u] nder the se circ umstances” it wa s appropr iate to use a n aff irmative dea dly

wea pon finding in the judgme nt of one of the convictions as a tie-bre aker
. Id
. I n her dissent, Presiding J udg e Ke ller sug g ested that the ma

j o ri t y had adopte d the position of her c oncurr ence in Cavazos that pa ro le
c on se qu e nc e s shou ld re ma in av a ila ble a s a tie- br e a ke r wh e n the punis hme nt i s o the rw ise ide nti c a l. Id . at *2 5- 26 n. 1 ( Ke lle r, P.J., dis se nti ng ); see Cavazos , 2 03 S.W. 3d 333, 34 0 (Tex . Cr im. App. 2006) (Keller, P.J ., concur ring ) (“ Perhaps pa

role a nd g ood time conseque nces should not be the fir st tie -b re a ke r, bu t it

sh ould be an ava ila

ble tie -b re a ke r w he n th e punis hme nt i s o the rw ise identical.”) . More g ener ally , Villanueva a pp e a rs to c lari fy that the Court of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls d id not intend Cav az os to p ro hib it all c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f “ o t h e r f a c t o r s , s u c h a s t h e d e g r e e o f t h e f e l o n y,13

ra ng e of punis hme nt, and

ru le s g ov e rn ing pa

ro le e lig ibi lity

and awa rd ingof g oo d- c on du c t ti me ” to deter mine the “most serious” of fense after

application of the leng th-o f- s en tence and re stitut ion criter ia prove s to be indeterminate
.

F oll ow ingthi s mo st r e c ent gu ida nc e fr om t

he Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls, we wi ll reta in the ag g ravated robbe ry convi ct i o n and vac ate the r obbery conviction. See Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.145(d); Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 42.12, § 3g (a) (1)( F) (ag g ravated robbe ry , but
no t r ob be ry , a

re a mon g of

fe ns e s f or wh ic h inma te s are no t e lig ibl e fo r paro le un ti l c a le nd ar t ime
serve d equals one -half of sentenc e).

CO NC LU SION The district cour

t rende red two w ritten judg ments of conviction, one for each of the two offe nses for w hich appellant was convicted. The judgme nt of conviction for a g g ravated robbe ry is affirme d. The judg ment of convic tion for robbe ry is vacated.

____________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med in part, Va cate d in part on Motion for Rehe aring Filed: Jul y

27, 2007 Pub lis h