* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally

disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may

be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel

has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 7/26/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

KELVIN BOYICE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-3072

(D.C. No. 94-CV-2234)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.**

This is an appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) in this employment discrimination action filed pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Kelvin Boyice was employed by UPS until UPS discharged him on

December 3, 1991 for job abandonment. Boyice filed a complaint in the United States

District Court for the District of Kansas on June 10, 1994, concerning his December 3,
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1991 discharge. Boyice alleged in his complaint that his discharge was based on his race

and in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. UPS moved for summary

judgment in the district court on the basis that, inter alia, Boyice’s § 1981 claims were

barred by Kansas’ two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4), which applies to

claims for “injury to the rights of another.” The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of UPS on the ground that Boyice’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of

limitations. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same standards as the district court. Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 548 (10th Cir.

1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 92 (1995).

The parties agree that the statute of limitations on Boyice’s claims began to run on

December 3, 1991, when Boyice became aware that he had been discharged by UPS. The

only issue on appeal is whether the district court applied the correct statute of limitations

to Boyice’s claims. We conclude that it did. The federal civil rights statutes do not

provide a specific statute of limitations. We have held that civil rights actions brought

pursuant to § 1981 should be characterized as violations of personal rights and, therefore,

the district courts should apply the similar state statute of limitations. Baker v. Board of

Regents of the State of Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 630 (10th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, we

have specifically held with respect to federal civil rights claims asserted in the state of

Kansas under §§ 1983 and 1981 that “[b]ecause both section 1983 and 1981 claims are
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actions for injury to the rights of another, the appropriate state statute of limitations is

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4).” Id.; see also Edwards v. Boeing Co., No. 92-3276, 1993

WL 214566, at *2 (10th Cir. June 18, 1993) (“The appropriate limitations period for

actions brought in Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is the two-year statute of limitations of

K.S.A. § 60-513(a)(4).”). K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) provides for a two year statute of

limitations for “an injury to the rights of another.” Because Boyice did not file this

lawsuit until June 10, 1994, more than two years after his claims accrued, the district

court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of UPS.

We therefore AFFIRM the Memorandum and Order of the district court. The

mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel

Circuit Judge