NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HOLLY JOHNSTON, Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. KIMBERLY-CLARK GLOBAL SALES, LLC, a Delaware foreign lim ited liability com pany, Defendant - Appellee. No. 12-35030 D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00540-PK
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Michael W. Mosm an, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Subm itted July 11, 2013 Portland, Oregon Before: PREGERSON, MURGUIA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. Holly Johnston appeals the district court’s order granting sum m ary judgm ent in favor of Kim berly-Clark Global Sales, LLC in her diversity action alleging intentional interference with econom ic relations under Oregon law. We review a 

# FILED
OCT 17 2013 M OLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.grant of sum m ary judgm ent de novo, viewing the evidence in the light m ost

favorable to the non-m oving party to determ ine whether any genuine issues of
m aterial fact rem ain. Coszalter v. City of Salem , 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and rem and. Oregon law governs this dispute. To establish a claim for intentional interference with econom ic relations in Oregon, a plaintiff m ust prove: (1) the existence of a professional or business relationship; (2) intentional interference with that relationship; (3) by a third party; (4) accom plished through im proper
m eans or for an im proper purpose; (5) a causal effect between the interference and dam age to the econom ic relationship; and (6) dam ages. McGanty v. Staudenraus , 901 P.2d 841, 844 (Or. 1995). On appeal, the parties dispute whether Johnston was required to produce adm issible evidence that Kim berly-Clark was solely m otivated by an “im proper purpose.” In Oregon: a plaintiff does not have to present evidence[,] other than its evidence of an im proper m otive[,] in order to prove that a defendant was not m otivated in part by proper objectives. The fact finder m ay infer from the existence of an im

proper m otive that it was the defendant’s only m otive. Once there is evidence of both proper and im proper m otives, the trier of fact m ay find that the m otives were all proper, all improper or a m ixture of both. Harm v. Cent. Life Assurance Co. , 813 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).

2Kim

berly-Clark presented evidence that it was m otivated by legitim ate purposes, but Johnston offered som e evidence that Kim berly-Clark acted with a retaliatory purpose. See Boers v. Payline Sys., Inc. , 918 P.2d 432, 436–37 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (retaliatory m otive is improper). Thus, a genuine issue of m aterial fact
rem ains regarding whether Kim berly-Clark acted with an improper purpose. See Harm , 813 P.2d at 1106. Kim berly-Clark argues that Welch v. Bancorp Management Advisors , 675 P.2d 172, 178 (Or. 1983), supports its position. Welch recognized that where an “agent acts within the scope of his authority and with the intent to benefit the principal,” the “agent is not liable to a third party for intentional interference with contract even if the agent acts with ‘m ixed m otives’ to benefit him self or another principal as well.” Welch , 675 P.2d at 217–18. Welch is not dispositive because it addresses when an agent who induces a corporation to breach a contract is liable to the other party to the contract for intentional interference with econom ic relations. Here, Johnston does not allege that Kappes induced Kim berly-Clark to breach a contract with her. Rather, Johnston alleges that Kappes interfered with the
econom ic relationship that existed between Johnston and her em ployer, Banner & Witcoff. We also reject Kim

berly-Clark’s argum ent that Johnston failed to raise an

3issue of m aterial fact regarding the intentional interference and causation elem ents.

The record is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to decide that Kim berly-Clark “intentionally interfered” with Johnston’s econom ic relationship and that a “causal effect” existed between the “interference and dam age to the econom ic relationship.” M

cGanty , 901 P.2d at 844. Construing the facts in the light m ost favorable to Johnston, circum stantial evidence is sufficient for Johnston’s
com plaint to survive sum m ary judgm ent. Accordingly, we reverse and rem and for further proceedings. REVERSED and REMANDED.

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