[Cite as State v. Greenlee , 2021-Ohio-455.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. KIEL T. GREENLEE Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 28756 Trial Court Case No. 2019-CRB-1486 (Criminal Appeal from Municipal Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 19th day of February, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . JOHN D. EVERETT, Atty. Reg. No. 0069911, City of Kettering Pros ecutor’s Office, 2325 Wilmington Pike, Kettering, Ohio 45420 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee BRIAN BRENNAMAN, Atty. Reg. No . 0088988, 1616 Turner Road, Xeni a, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . . HALL, J.-2-

{¶ 1} Kiel T. Greenlee appeals from his convictions for resisting arr est and obstructing official business, arguing that the evidence was in sufficient. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm. I. Factual and Procedural Background {¶ 2} Greenlee was charged with resisting arrest under R.C. 2921.33 a nd obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31. The complaint alleged that Greenlee fled from police officers when they attempted to execute an arr est warrant and then, when he stopped, resisted their efforts to complete the arrest. The case was tried to a jury, which found Greenlee guilty on both charges. {¶ 3} At trial, Officer Brian Robinson of the Kettering Police Depart ment testified that, on August 16, 2019, he was given the task of serving an a rrest warrant on Greenlee. He drove his cruiser to Kettering’s Residenze Apartments, where Greenlee lived, and met Officer Bruce Abrams. Abrams was to accompany Robinson to serve the warrant and arrived in his own cruiser. The officers learned that Greenlee was at the pool. They drove over to the pool area, parking their cruisers nearby. As the of ficers, who were both in uniform, walked up to the pool, they saw a bare-footed man who was wearing swim trunks get up and walk toward the pool area’s exit. The man continued to walk past the leasing office. At that point, Officer Robinson identified the man as G reenlee. Then, Greenlee abruptly took off running. Robinson gave chase, ordering Greenl ee to stop. Greenlee continued to run, occasionally looking back over his shoulder. About a minute later, Greenlee came to a stop. Officer Robinson came up behind him an d ordered him to the ground, but Greenlee did not move. Robinson again ordered Green lee to get down. When-3- Greenlee did not comply, Robinson grabbed Greenlee’s arm and fo rcibly took him to the ground using an arm-bar take-down. Greenlee did not resist bein g taken down and did not resist after he was on the ground. Once Greenlee was on the ground, Officer Robinson told him that he was under arrest. {¶ 4} At the close of all evidence, Greenlee moved for acquittal unde r Crim.R. 29. The trial court overruled the motion. The jury found Greenlee g uilty of both resisting arrest and obstructing official business. The court sentenced him to 6 0 days in jail with 30 days suspended. {¶ 5} Greenlee appeals. II. Analysis {¶ 6} The sole assignment of error alleges: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANT’S RULE 29 MOTION, AS THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EITHER CHARGE. {¶ 7} Crim.R. 29(A) states that “[t]he court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall orde r the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment, in formation, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such of fense or offenses. * * *.” “A sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument challenges whether the Sta te has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Croom , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25094, 2013-Ohio-3377, ¶ 36, citing State
v. Hawn , 138 Ohio App.3d 449, 471, 741 N.E.2d 594 (2d Dist.2000). “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to supp ort a criminal conviction-4- is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine wheth er such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s gu ilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evide nce in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Resisting arrest {¶ 8} R.C. 2921.33(A) provides that “[n]o person, recklessly or by fo rce, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” Th ere is no dispute that Greenlee’s arrest was lawful. 1 The question is whether the evidence was sufficient that he resisted the arrest. {¶ 9} “ ‘An arrest occurs when the following four requisite elements are involved: (1) An intent to arrest, (2) under a real or pretended authorit y, (3) accompanied by an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, and (4) which is so understood by the person arrested.’ ” State v. Darrah , 64 Ohio St.2d 22, 26, 412 N.E.2d 1328 (1980), quoting State v. Terry , 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 128, 214 N.E.2d 114 (8th Dist.1966). {¶ 10} Officer Robinson intended to arrest Greenlee under a warrant, a nd he had the authority to do so. Both officers were in uniform and pulle d up in police cruisers, leaving no doubt that they were police officers. That Greenlee walked away when he ostensibly saw them and then ran despite hearing Officer Robins on’s command to stop suggests that he understood that they were there for him. The “ actual or constructive

1 The warrant had been issued by the Kettering Municipal Court a nd was admitted into evidence and stipulated to by the parties.-5- seizure or detention of his person” occurred when Greenlee stop ped running and Robinson ordered him to the ground. At that point, Greenlee wou ld have understood that he was being “seized.” {¶ 11} Based on Officer Robinson’s testimony, it appears that Greenlee began running almost immediately after Robinson identified him and be fore Robinson could announce that he had a warrant for Greenlee’s arrest, so Greenl ee’s behavior delayed the arrest from taking place, culminating with his failure to c omply with Officer Robinson’s orders to get on the ground. {¶ 12} It is a close question whether Greenlee’s actions were sufficie nt to constitute resisting. “Resisting” need not involve active force ; it could be a reckless act. R.C. 2921.33(A). “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his co nduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C). We have said that “an accused’s avoidance of apprehension constitutes resisting a rrest.” City of Fairborn v.
Blanton , 2d Dist. Greene No. 94-CA-103, 1995 WL 386905, *5 (Jun. 28, 1 995), citing State v. Williams , 84 Ohio App.3d 129, 133, 616 N.E.2d 540 (12th Dist.1992). Furthermore, “delaying an arrest by preventing the seizure or d etention of a person may constitute resisting arrest because it constitutes reckless res istance. By committing an act giving rise to the delay, a person may be proceeding with h eedless indifference to the consequences and disregarding a known risk that his conduct wil l prevent arrest.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Hicks , 9th Dist. Summit No. 24708, 2011-Ohio-2769, ¶ 19. {¶ 13} Officer Robinson pursued Greenlee in headlong flight while repe atedly ordering him to stop, but Greenlee continued to run. When he fi nally did stop, he refused-6- to comply with Officer Robinson’s repeated orders to get on the ground, requiring Robinson to take Greenlee down by force. We believe that the ju ry could have reasonably that Greenlee’s running away and refusal to comply with multipl e orders to stop and then to get on the ground were done with heedless indifference to th e consequences and disregarded a known risk that his conduct was delaying the offi cer’s attempt to seize or detain him. Obstructing official business {¶ 14} R.C. 2921.31(A) provides that “[n]o person, without privilege t o do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public offi cial's lawful duties.” A defendant acts purposefully if he acts with the “specific inten tion to cause a certain result.” R.C. 2901.22(A). Accordingly, the evidence must be sufficient t o find that Greenlee intended to “to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance” of his arrest and did actually hamper or impede the officers. {¶ 15} “[A] defendant’s intent in acting must be ‘determined from the manner in which it [the act] is done, the means used, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence.’ ” State v. McCoy , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22479, 2008-Ohio-5648, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Wellman , 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.). “A mere failure or refusal to respond to an office r’s request does not constitute obstructing official business.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Crawford , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25506, 2013-Ohio-4398, ¶ 17. But “[w]alking away from a pol ice investigation and failing to heed a police officer’s orders to stop can be suffic ient to find a person guilty of-7- obstructing official business.” State v. Terry, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26722, 2016-Ohio3484, ¶ 23. “[T]he total course of the defendant’s conduct must be considered” as opposed to “viewing the acts of a defendant in isolation.” (Cit ations omitted.) State v. Overholt , 9th Dist. Medina No. 2905-M, 1999 WL 635717, *2 (Aug. 18, 199 9); see also N. Ridgeville v. Reichbaum , 112 Ohio App.3d 79, 84, 677 N.E.2d 1245 (9th Dist.1996) (multiple affirmative acts taken together can be suf ficient to establish obstruction). “ ‘Where the overall pattern of behavior is one o f resistance, * * * officers may consider the totality of the events and need not point to a single act that rises to the level of obstruction.’ ” Roseborough v. Trotwood , S.D.Ohio No. 3:06-cv-129, 2007 WL 3402880, *5 (Nov. 13, 2007), quoting Lyons v. Xenia , 417 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir.2005). {¶ 16} Here, viewing the evidence in favor of the state, we think that the jury could have reasonably found that Greenlee’s acts of running, failing to comply with Officer Robinson’s command to stop, and failing to comply with the offi cer’s commands to get on the ground were intended to prevent, obstruct, or delay the off icers’ performance of their official duties and actually did hamper or impede them. 2 There was sufficient evidence to support Greenlee’s conviction for obstructing official business

. III. Conclusion {¶ 17} We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support both charges. Accordingly, the trial court properly overruled Greenlee's moti on for acquittal. The sole assignment of error is overruled . The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 Although the conduct supporting the separate charges may have overlapped, there is no assignment of error related to whether the charges should ha ve merged, and we therefore express no opinion on the subject.-8-

DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.

Copies sent to: John D. Everett Brian Brennaman Hon. Frederick W. Dressel