# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 8 , 2017 *

Decided March 8 2017

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER , Circuit Judge

FRANK H

. EASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER , Circuit Judge

No. 1 6

- 3 792

MATTHEW TYLER , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.

STEPHANIE WICK , et al., Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

No. 14

- cv

- 68

- jdp

James D. Peterson , Judge

.



### O R D E R
Matthew Tyler , a Wisconsin civil detainee , appeal s the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on his claim that they disposed of his property in violation of his right to due process and access to the courts. T he district court reason ed that adequate post

- deprivation remedies defeated his due proces s claim and he identified no legal claim that he lost because of the discarded property. We agree with the district court’s reasoning and thus affirm the judgment

.

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C)

. NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 1 6

- 3 792 Page 2

Because this appeal arises from a ruling at summary judgment, we review the evidence in th e light most favorable to Tyler , the opposing party . See Dunderdale v. United Airlines, Inc. , 807 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015). Tyler describes two events . The first is the revocation of his extended supervision. Tyler served seven year s in prison for sexually assaulting a child . Before his term of extended supervision began , the state civil ly commit ted him as a sexually violent person and transfer red him to the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center

. While there, Center officials determined that Tyler violated facility rules by having sex with another resident

. In response, a state court revoked his extended supervision . Tyler was then incarcerated in the Dodge Correctional Institution for four m onth s a fter which he returned to Sand Ridge.

The seco nd event is T yler ’s lack of access to his property as he shuttled between these two facilities. When he left Sand Ridge , officers sent his belongings to a relative

. Tyle r ’s relative sent that property back to Sand Ridge when Tyler returned there, but officials allowed Tyler to keep only some items (clothing, footwear, and legal papers)

. Sand Ridge deemed the rest (electronics, other paperwork, and photographs) prohibited . After Tyler and Sand Ridge employees disagreed about what to do with the remainin g items , the employees dis carded them.
As relevant to this appeal, Tyler sued officials in state court for dis carding his property. Defendants removed the suit to federal court and moved for summary judgment

. After discovery limited to “ immunity ” issues, t he district court granted the motion s. T he court explained that the claim about the discarded property failed, both under due

- process and access

- to

- courts theor ies . Tyler suffered no violation of due process because , although he alleged that the defendants discarded his property in breach of the Center’s rules, he had an a dequate post

- deprivation remed y under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(v)

. (The court ruled, though, that Tyler could no longer bring an action under that law because he did not timely comp ly with its notice

- of

- claim requirement

. ) T he defendants also d id not deny him access to the courts , the court ruled, because Tyler did not identify any meritorious legal claim that he lost from no t ha ving those materials. Finally sovereign immunity barred any official

- capacity claims.

In this court Tyler challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims regarding his discarded prop erty. H e repeats that the defendants denied him due process by disposing of his property . But because, as Tyler a sserts , the defendants breached the Center’s rules for handling his property, the availab i l ity of a post

- deprivation remed y under Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(v) for the ir unauthorized disposal of his property provide s adequate process. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 53 3 (1984); Tenny v. Blagojevich ,No. 1 6

- 3 792 Page 3

659 F.3d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 2011). And th at remedy was available to him , even if, as the district court decided, he failed to pursue that remedy properly. See Stachowski v. Town of Cicero, 425 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 2005)

. T yler replies that the district court should have remanded to state court the question whether he complied with the notice

- of

- claim requirement of Wis. Stat. § 51.61

. But t he district court had supplemental jurisdiction to address whether he complied with the state law’s notice requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a ).
Tyler also argues , irrelevantly, that he sued defendants in their official capacities

. He believes that they lack sovereign immunity because Lapides v. Board of Regents of U niversity System of Georgia ruled that “a State’s voluntary appearance in federal court amount[s] to a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity.” 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002)

. But Tyler loses on the merits of his due

- process claim, so his argument goes nowher e. And Lapides applies only to state

- law claims for which the State has waived its immunit y in state court

. 535 U.S. at 617. But Wisconsin has not w aived sovereign immunity for tort suits in state court

. Wis. Stat. § 775.01

. Tyler next contends that by withholding his property the defendants denied him access to the courts

. He argues that he could have better defended himself in his revocation hearing (w here he had counsel) if he had his property

. But any claim for damages that necessarily questions the validity of his revoked extended supervision is barred by Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477, 486

– 87 (1994) ; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson , 544 U.S. 74, 81

– 82 (2005)

. Moreover Tyler does not explain what legal material he lacked but needed for his defense to th e revocation proceeding

. In re Maxy , 674 F.3d 658, 66 0

- 6 1 (7th Cir. 2012)

. Tyler replies that discarding his property prevented him from complying with the time limits of Wisconsin’s notice

- of

- claim requirement for his
state

- law claim. But he has not submitted any evidence th at his filing delay resulted from not having his belongings.
Tyler’s last argument is that the district court erred by limiting discovery to

“ immunity ” issues. This limitation was proper because the adequacy of hi s suit did not turn on any facts that broader discovery from the defendants might facilitate. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“Until th[e] threshold immunity question is resolved, dis covery should not be allowed.”); Delgado v. Jones , 28 2 F.3d 511, 515

– 16 (7th Cir. 2002)

. We have considered Tyler’s remaining arguments , but none ha s any merit.

AFFIRMED.