### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 390 -CR

Ro be r t S anc he z , A ppe lla nt

v . The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 299TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-05 -90 0262 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES F . BAI RD , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Following a benc h trial, appe llant Robert Sanchez was adjudg ed g uilty of theft $500
or more by

a public ser

vant, a state jail felony
. See Tex. Penal C ode Ann. § 31.03(a), ( e)( 3), (f )(1) (We st Su pp . 2 00 9) . T he c ourt

a sse sse d a

mis de me ano r p un ish me nt o f t hir ty day s in cou nty

ja il, suspended imposition of sentence , and plac ed appe llant on community supervision fo r o ne y ear . Se e id . § 12 .4 4( a ) ( Wes t Supp . 200 9)
. Ap pe lla nt co nte nd s tha t the e vid e nc e is le g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o sup po rt the fi nd ing of g uil t and that th e c ourt e rr e d b y a dmi tti ngc e rt a in d oc ume nts in e vid e nc e . We ov e rr

ule the se c on te nti on s a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt. App e ll an t w a s a

li e u te n an t i nth e A u s ti n Co mm u n it y Co ll e g e ( A CC ) p o lic e de pa rtme nt. I n 2 00 2, L ie ute na nt Wi lli a m Mc Ca

ule y and Se rg e ant Je su s Br antn e r w e re a ssi g ne d to inv e sti g a te re po rt s th a t c e rt a in m e mbe rs of the de pa rtme nt w e re “ do ub le -d ipp ing ,” that is, be ingpa id b y t h e c o l l ege fo r t i m e t h ey

we re ac tu al l y d ev o t i n g t o o ff -du t y em p l o y

m en t
. Ba s ed o nt h e f

i n d i n gsAlthough appellant was paid a sa lary , the evidenc e re g ardingthe amount of his compensation 1 wa s in te rm s o f a

n h ourl y rate
. I n 20 01 , a

pp e lla nt wa s pa id $1 8. 13 an ho ur . I n 20 02 , he wa s p a id $19.14 an hour. In J anuar y throug h Aug ust 2003, appel l an t was pa id $19.60 an hour, a nd he wa s paid $21.08 an hour

for the r est of that y ear . On the other

hand, B rantne r testified that appellant and his c o-def endants worke d the “A shift,” 2 which was 6:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. weekday s. Acc ording to Bra ntner, the thre e co- defe ndants wer e assig ned to the Riverside c ampus, wher e appe llant supervised Olguin, and Olg uin supervised Ree se. 2 of McCaule y

and B rantn er , appellant, Serg eant Albe rt Olg uin, and Off icer L ewis Reese wer e t erm i n at ed b y t h e de p ar t m en t i n 2 0 0 3
. T h e te rm i n at ed o ff i ce rs ap p ea l ed t h ei r di s m i s s al s t o a c o l l ege g rieva nce c ommitt ee w hich, followinga hea ring , reinstated the m with back pay . McCauley and Br antner then re ported their f

indings to t he district attorne y . I n 2005, indictments were filed
acc using O lguin, Ree se, and a ppellant of s t ea l i n g $1500 or more f rom the colleg e pursua

nt to a
sc he me and c on tin

uin g c ours e of c on du c t that be g an o n o r a bo ut M ay 8, 20 01 , a

nd c on tin ue d unti l on or about Septembe r 30, 2003. Se e id
. § 31.09 (West 2003). Followinga joint trial, the district court adjudg ed Olguin and Reese to be not g uilty an d co nvicted appe llant of the lesser included off

ense. As a lieutena

nt, appellant wa s a salari ed employ ee. B e c a u s e h e w a s o ns a l ar

y, 1

a pp e llan t w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to re po rt the sp e c if

ic ho ur s th a t he wo rk e d, bu t he wa s n e ve rt he le ss
e xpe c te d t o wor k for ty

ho ur s p e r w e e k. Th e c hie f o f t he AC C po lic e a t th a t ti me , Pa ul Wi lli a ms, te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt h a d th e fl e xibil ity

to c ho os e the ho ur s he wo rk e d, so lon g a s h e fu lf ill e d h is obligation to work (or report paid leave ) for forty hours ea ch we ek. I f appe llant worked more than 2 fo rt y ho ur s in a we e k, he re c e ive d c omp tim e rather than o ve rt ime pa y . App e lla

nt a c c ru e d p a id
vacation and sick leave , and he w as re quired to file a leave of abse nce f

orm ea ch month showing the hours, if any , that he had taken that month as paid lea ve.Appellant took paid lea ve for the entire months of Aug ust and September 2002. 3 3

The c ase a g ainst appellant re sted larg ely on documentar

y evidenc e. This evidenc e i n cl u d e d d u t y

l o gs , d i s t ri ct d i s p at ch er ’s l o gs , an d d ai l y ac t i v i t y l o gs fr o m M ay

2 0 0 1 t h ro u gh September 2002. A duty log is a record, kept by the department’s dispatche rs, showing when e ach of fi c e r r e po rt s ( e ith e r b y

ra dio or te le ph on e ) on an d off du ty e a c h d ay . Adis tr ic t di sp a tc he r’ s lo g is
a da ily re c or d, a lso ke pt b y

the dis patc he rs , o f c a lls re c e ive d and ma de by the dis patc he rs and

re fl e c ts p o l i ce ac t i v i t i es co l l ege -w i d e. A da i l y ac t i v i t y l o g i s k ep t fo r ea ch i n d i v i d u al ca mp u s o f t h e c o l l ege and is a re cord of police activities on the campus. The entries in a daily activity log a re ma de by

the office rs and se rg eants a ssigne d to the campus. In addition to these log s, the State also introduce d
co pies of the lea

ve of a bsence forms filed by

appellant dur ing the rele vant time period a nd copies of a pp e lla nt’ s e mpl oy

me nt r e c or ds fr om s e ve ra l other e mpl oy e rs . U sin g the se do c ume nts , Mary Khin, an investig ator in the district attorne y ’s offic e, ca lculated the number of hours a ppellant
wa s sh ow n to have wo rk e d at th e c oll e g e , the numbe r of ho ur s o f p a id l e a ve re po rt e d b y a pp e lla nt, and the number

of hours appellant was shown to have wor ked for other e mploy ers f

rom May 2001 throug h September 2002. A ca l en d ar prepar ed by Khin summarizing the re cords a nd showing appellant’ s employ

ment for e ach month wa s also introduced in evidence
. See Tex. R. Evi d. 1006. Khin testified that she wa s able to ve rify that appellant had worke d at the colleg e or t ak en p ai d l ea v e of ab s en ce fo r a to t al o f 10 1 1
. 5 h o u rs fr o m M ay 2 0 0 1 t h ro u gh J u l y 2 0 0 2 , an av er age of 67.5 hours pe r month. Khin testified that base d on the assumption that appellant wa s obligated 3 to w or k 160 ho ur s at the c oll e g e e a c h mont h (40 ho ur s per

we e k ti me s 4 we e ks ), sh e wa s una ble to
acc ount for a total of

1388.5 hours, an aver ag e of 92.5 hours per month, during those months. ToPay roll rec ords from Omni B ank, one of app el l an t ’s o ff

-duty employ ers, showe d that 4 appellant’ s hours at the bank regularly overla pped the 6:30 a .m. to 2:30 p.m. we ekday time period that, a c c or din g to B ra

ntn e r, a pp e lla nt w a s a ssi g ne d to wo rk

a t A CC’ s Ri ve rs ide c a mpu s. 4 g ive so me pe rs pe c tiv e to t he se numbers , a t a

pp e lla nt’ s 2 00 1 s a lary

of $1 8. 13 an h our, it w ou ld require pay

ment for only 28 hours of work not perf ormed to constitute the $500 misappropriation found by the trial cour

t. A ppellant’s documented work and paid leave hours at the c olleg e during any single month of the period r ang ed fr om a low of 24 hours in A pril 2002 to a hig h of 113 hours in May 2001. Duringthose same 15 months, appe llant was shown to have worke d a total of 715.5 hours of off

-duty employ

ment at t hree differ ent employ ers, an aver ag e of almost 48 hours per
m o n t h
. I nM ay

2 0 0 2 , a m o n t h i nwh i ch Kh i nco u l d ac co u n t f

o r o n l y 3 2 h o u rs o f c o l l ege
e mpl oy me nt, re c or ds sh ow e d th a t a pp e lla nt w or ke d a tot a l of 12 6. 5 h ours a t th re e of

f- du ty job s. 4 I mad Moucha

y leh is the internal a

uditor at ACC, a

nd he cha ired the c ommitt ee that hear d ap p el lant’s appe al from his dismissal. He testified that duringthe hea ring , appellant sa id, “Ye s, Idid it. I t w as a big mistake.” Mouchay leh could not r emember

the exact question to which this answer w as g iven, but he testified that “ the whole committee was for—to look at the a lleg ation of double-dipping , so it has to be related to that.” Another member of this commit tee, patrol office r Mickey Priddy , testified, “As be st I can remembe r, Mr. Sanchez was asked a question . . . along the lines of . . . did y ou do what y ou’re being ac cu s ed o f
. . . . And to the best of my memory , he admitted that he had done wrong , he wa s sorry for wha t he had done and he kne w that what he had done was wrong .” Maxi ne Kaplan, a contra ct compliance manag er for the colleg e, testified that she “happe ned to run into” a

ppellant on the day

he wa s terminated. She sa id that she could see that appellant wa s upset, and she a sked him what wa s wrong . She testified, “He told me that he had be en5

terminated. . . . That the reason .
. . had to do with working another job during work time.” K aplan
re c a lle d th a t a

pp e lla nt t old he r t hat Will iams, th e chi e f o f p oli c e , h a d g ive n h im p e rm iss ion to do that. Ap pe lla

nt d oe s n ot c on te nd that the e vid e nc e summa ri zed a bo ve do e s n ot r a tio na lly
su pp or t a fi nd ingbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t a

pp e lla nt a pp ropri ate d $ 50 0 o r m or e fr om A CC by a c c e pti ngsa lary

fo r h ours he did

no t w or k at th e c oll e g e . Ins te a d, a pp e ll ant argues that th is appropr iation was not unlawful be cause it was done with the c olleg e’s e ffe ctive conse nt.

Appellant notes that his le ave forms wer e approve d by Wil liams, his supervisor, a nd t h at without that approva l appellant would not have been pa id. Wi lliams testified that he trusted appellant, a

nd that he routinely approve d appellant’ s leave forms wit hout independently verify ing the ir a c c ur a c y . Willi a ms wa s not as ke d an d did not te sti fy wh e the r he g a ve a pp e lla nt p e rm iss ion

to work other

jobs on coll ege time, as appellant told Kapla n. Wil liams did testify , howeve r, that he did no t g ive a

pp e lla nt p e rm iss ion

to w or k f ro m h om e fo r s ix mon ths , f ro m Se pte mbe r 2 00 1 to April 2002. Wil liams also testified that he expected a ppellant and the othe r lieute n ants he super vised to work a f

ull 40 hours eac h wee k. Ap pe lla nt a lso re fe rs to t

he te sti mo ny of G e ra ldi ne Tu c ke r, AC C’ s a sso c iate vice- president f

or human re lations. Tucker testified that an e mploy ee’ s s u p e r v isor is a repr esentative of the c olleg e and the employ ee’ s pay is based on what the supervisor a uthorizes. She also testified, howeve r, that both t h e s u p ervisor and the employ ee w ere require d to comply with the colleg e’s policies. Tucke r testified that no one at the colleg e wa s authorized to a pprove pay

ment for work not perf ormed or to pe rmit an employ ee to wor k for a nother e mploy er on c olleg e time.6 Appellant relies chief

ly on the results of his a

ppeal from the termination. He a rg ues that the g rieva

nce c ommitt ee “spec ifically looked into the alleg ations that [appellant] was pa id for hours not worke d as a ba sis to uphold t he termination and they did not uphold the termination.” He
ur g e s that the c omm itt e e , “ by fa ili ng to up ho ld [ap pe lla nt’ s] te rm inatio n, and ins te a d le tti nghim ke e p th e pa

y that ha d b e e n p a id t o h im an d rei ns tatin g him to h is f or me r p os iti on , e ff

e c tiv e ly consente d to [ appellant] keepingthe monies paid to him from May 2001 throug h September 2003.” Ap pe lla nt n ote s th a t a c c or din g to T uc ke r, the c omm itt e e that he ard a pp e lla nt’ s a pp e a l w a s a

“ du ly authorized repr esentative” of the colleg e, and that, acc ording to Mouchayleh, the colleg e pre sident could have overr

uled the committee’s rec ommendation that appellant be reinstated but did not do so. Mo uc ha y le h d e nie d th a t th e c omm itt e e a pp ro ve d th e c ha lle ng e d p ay men ts t o
a pp e lla nt. He ind ic a te d, in r e sp on se to q ue sti on s b y

the State , that the c omm itt e e “ wa s n ot t he re to investigate whethe r [appellant] was g uilty or not.” I nstead, the c ommitt ee “ was ther e to . . . determin e w h e th e r

o r n o t t h e te r mi n a ti o np r o c e s s h a d

b e e nf a ir
. ” D u r in g c r o s s - e xa mi n a ti o nby appellant’ s counsel, Moucha y leh explained the dec i s ion to reinstate appe llant as follows: “The te rm inatio n w a s f

or the do ub le -d ipp ing
. Th e a dmi ssi on —h e a dmi tte d th a t he did it, bu t—b e c a

us e the termination was made on a n unfair pr ocess be cause others we re double -dipping and they wer e not terminated.” Mouchay leh added, “The committee decision was only to whether

the termination was to be uphe ld or not. I t has nothing to do with his pay or any thing e lse.” Tucke r’s testimony

was similar. She testified, “My rec ollection is that the g rieva nce committ ee s ai d—their re port to me was that the ba sis for the docume ntation of the time was not7

officia l and, there fore , we should a l l o w t he employ ees to c ome bac k to work and g ive them bac k pay .” Tuc ker a lso testified:

Th e g ri e va

nc e c omm itt e e did no t make any fi nd ing s a s to [ap pe lla

nt’ s guil t or innoce nce]. They

simply decide d—see, the decision has to be ba sed on whe ther or not the termination wa s valid itself. And so the decision wa s that the basis upon which would make th e d eter mination, which wer e these supposedly rec ords, wer e not officia l, theref

ore, w e should not have te rminated the employ ees but ther e wa s no g uilt or innocence . I t’s whether the termination should be upheld.
Tucke r ag ree d with the prosec utor t hat “the g rieva nce c ommitt ee [did not say ] t hey didn’t do any thing wr ong .”

When there is a c halleng e to the s u fficiency of the e vidence to sustain a criminal conviction, the question pre sented is whethe r a rational trier of fact could have found the e ssential elements of the offe nse beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979); Cla y ton v . S tate , 2 35 S.W. 3d

77 2, 77 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). I n a le g a l su ff ic ie nc y re vie w, a ll the e vid e nc e is r e vie we d in the lig ht m os t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e v e r d i c t ; i ti s a s s u m e d t h a tt h e t r i e r

o f f a c tr e s o l v e d

c o n f l i c t s i nt h e t e s t i m o n y,
we ig he d th e e vid e nc e , a nd dr e w r e a so na

ble inferenc e s in

a mann e r t

hat su pp or ts the ve rd ic t. Clayton , 2 3 4 S
. W
. 3 d

a t7 7 8
. In a

f a c tu a l s u f f i c i e n c y r e v i e w , a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i s c o n s i d e r e d e qu a l l y, incl u d i n g the testimony

of def ense w itnesses and the e x istence of alternative hy

potheses. Cle wis
v . S tat e , 92 2 S.W. 2d 12 6, 12 9 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Or on a v . S tate , 8 3 6 S. W. 2 d 3 1 9 , 3 2 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 199 2, no pet.). Althoug h due def ere nce still must be acc orded the fac t finder’ s det erminations, particularly those conc erningthe weig ht and cr edibility of the e vidence , the revie wing court may

disag ree with the result i n order to preve nt a manife st injust ice. Johnson ,8

23 S.W. 3d

1, 9; Cai n v . S

tate , 958 S.W .2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The e vidence will be deeme d fac tually insufficient if the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so weak as to make the finding of g uilt clearly

wrongor manife stly u n j u s t , or if the ve rdict is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the available evidenc e. W ats on v . S tate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414-15 (Te x . Crim. App. 20 06 ); Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11.

Viewingthe evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the finding of g uilt, we conclude that a rational trier of fac t could have f ound bey ond a re asonable doubt that appellant did not have ACC’s effe ctive conse nt to rece ive salar y pay ments for work not perfor med. Ther e is evidenc e that appellant’ s supervisor, Willi ams, was not authoriz ed by the colleg e to appr ove sala ry pay ments for work not per formed, and W illiams denied knowingly doing so. The court could rationally conclude that the g rieva

nce c ommitt ee’ s decision to reinstate a ppellant wit h pay

did not constitut e ACC’s retroa ctive conse nt to appellant’s appr opri at i o n of unea rned sa lary , but merely

ref lected the committee’s conc lusion that the termination proce ss had bee n flawe d or unfa ir. Point of error one is overrule d. There was testimony sug g esting that Wil liams knew that appe llant was not working full-time for the c olleg e and was acc epting pay from the c olleg e for time spent working elsewhe re. There was no e vidence , howeve r, that Will iams was author ized by the colleg e to permit appellant to do this. To the contrary , ACC’s vice-pr esident for human relations testified without contradiction that no supervisor wa s authorized to approve full-time pay for pa rt-time work. There is no evidence that the g rieva

nce c ommitt ee’ s decision to reinstate appellant was based on a findingthat appellant was not g uilty

of the ac cu s at ion ag ainst him or constituted the colleg e’s c onsent to appellant’s9

actions. Even w hen the e vidence is viewed in a ne utral lig ht, the trial court’ s findin g b ey ond a
rea sonable doubt that appe llant did not have ACC’ s ef fe ct i ve conse nt to rece ive pay for wor k not perf ormed wa s neither c lear ly wrongor manife stl y u n j u s t nor ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the available evidenc e. Point of err or two is overr uled. Appellant’s last point of er ror is that the trial c ourt err ed by admitting in evidenc e State’s ex h i b i t s 1 t h ro u gh 6 8

— t h e du t y l o gs , d i s p at ch er ’s l o gs , an d d ai l y ac t i v i t y l o gs
— b ec au s e t h ey
wer e unre liable. B y

extension, appellant also contends that State’s e x h i b i t 8 7 , the ca lendar summarizing his activities as re flec ted in these log s, should not have bee n admitted.

We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit evidenc e under an abuse of discre tion standard. W

alte rs v . S

tate , 2 47 S.W. 3d

20 4, 21 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ). A c ourt ’s de c isi on to admit evidence under a

n exception to the hear say rule will be uphe ld unless it was so clea rly wrong as to lie outside the z o n e o f rea sonable disag ree ment. Zul ian i v . S tate , 9 7 S. W. 3 d

5 8 9 , 5 9 5 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2003).

Ex hibits 1 t hroug h 68 wer e admitted under t h e h ea rs ay

exception for re cords of
re g ula rl y c on du c te d a c tiv ity . T e x. R. E vid . 8 03 (6)
. Under thi s e xce pti on , a

bu sin e ss r e c or d is
a dmi ssi ble if

: ( 1) it w a s ma de and ke pt in the c ours e of a re g ula rl y c on du c te d b us ine ss a c tiv ity ; ( 2) it was the r eg ular pra ctice of the business ac tivity

to make the r ecor d; (3) the re cord w as made at or
near the time of the e vent that it rec ords; an d (4 ) the re cord w as made by , or fr om information transmitted by , a per son with knowledg e. Id . Even if these requisites ar e met, and it is undisputed that they wer e in this case, a rec ord is ina dmissibl e under rule 803(6) if the source of information or the method or c ircumst an ce s o f p repa ration indicate a lac k of trustworthiness. Id . Appellant’s10

argume nt re sts on thi s pr ov iso
. He c on te nd s that the va ri ou s log s we re sh ow n to be an unrel iabl e
re co rdo f w h en a c am p u s p o l i ce o ff i ce r w as wo rk i n g. Appellant cites Tuc ker’ s testimony that the grieva nce committee did not consider the logs to be a valid basis for terminating h i s an d his co-def endants’ e mploy

ment beca

use they wer e
no t “ of fi c ia l.” Ap pe lla

nt a lso po int s to an e xch ang e be tw e e n Mo uc ha y le h and the tr ial co urt , in which the c ourt asked Mouc hayleh, as interna l auditor at the c olleg e, if he considere d the log s to be “re liable to deter

mine when somebody

works.” Mouc hayleh answe red that he did not consider the logs to be reliable for that pur pose. Appe llant’s co-de fenda nt Olguin testified that the duty and dispatch log s were inacc urate due to the dispatcher s’ inexperience and lack of training , and that the daily activity logs wer e not intende d to r ecor d when duty shifts be g in a nd end b u t o n l y

t o rec ord signific ant eve nts during the day . Wil liams also acknowle dg ed, in re spons e t o q u estions by defe nse counse l, that there w ere “discre pancie s” in t h e duty logs. A nother ACC police off icer , L ieutenant Micha el McCra dic, ag ree d with appel l an t ’s counse l that the logs ma intained by the dispatcher s were “not alwa y s 100 perc ent ac curat e, ” b u t added that “we ha ve the a ctivity

log on campus that we [t he off

icer s] fil led out.” Ap pe lla nt r e fe rs us to t

wo op ini on s, bo th d e a lin g wi th t he a dmi ssi bil ity

of do c ume nts fo un d in fi le s ma int a ine d b y pa

ro le of fi c e rs . I n on e , the de fe nd ant’ s pa ro le fi le c on ta ine d a

ur ina ly sis repor t show ing that he had teste d positive for amphe tamines. Ph ilp ot v . S tate , 897 S.W .2d 848, 850 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 5, pe t. re f’ d)
. Th e c ourt he ld that the re po rt wa s n ot a tr us tw or thy bu sin e ss
rec ord bec ause the re w as no evide nce r eg ardingthe qualifications of the anony mous tester or the methodology

employ ed. Id . at 851-52. The other opinion c ited by appellant de alt with the admission11

of do c ume nts and

le tte rs c on c e rn ing th e de fe nd ant’ s p sy c ho log ic a l c on dit ion and a me na bil ity to reha bilitation that wer e found in his parole file. Po rte r v . S tate , 578 S.W. 2d 74 2, 74 4- 45 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1979). Af

ter noting that the source s of the opinions contained in these documents we re f or the most part anony

mous and that none we re shown to be competent to make the state ments attributed to t he m, t he c ourt he ld t

hat th e do c ume nts did

no t ha ve an in dic ia

of re lia bil ity c omm e ns ur a te wi th the rig hts of confr ontation and cr oss-examin at i o n m ere ly beca use they wer e collec ted in a g overnme nt file. Id . at 746. Dea ling a s they do with the issue of hea

rsay within hearsa

y , neither of the se op ini on s is on

po int wi th t he c a us e be fo re us . A commentator

on the rules of

evidenc e has w ritten:
The ba ckgr ound of the “ lack of trustworthiness” proviso is desc ribed extensively

in the Adviso ry C o m m i t t ee’ s Note to Fe dera l Rule 803(6). Courts are lik e ly to i nv ok e the “ la c k o f t ru stwort hi ne ss” pr ov iso wi th r e g ard to d oc ume nts p re p ar ed i n an t i ci p at i o n o f l i t i gat i o n , o r u n d er ci rc u m s t an ce s s i m i l ar l y

s u gges t i n g a motive to mis repr esent. Amongthe Texas case s that have applied t he proviso, one c o urt found that income tax returns posse ss sufficient trustworthiness. In another , the court e x cluded a post-mortem blood te st of fer ed to support an af

firmative de fense of i n t o x i c a t i o n i n a w o r

k e r s ’ c o mp e n s a t i o n c a s e , f i n d i n g g a p s i nt h e c h a i no f

c u s t o dy, and that cert ain re citations in the Rule 902(10) af fidavit ac company

ing the rec ord wer e “impossible.” A par ty need not pr ove that business r ec o rd s are acc urate befor e they are admitted . Gene rally , objections that rec ords contain inac cura cies, ambiguities, or o m i s s i o n s g o t o w e i g h tr a t h e r t h ana dm i s s i b i l i t y.
2 Steven Goode e t al., Texas Practice : Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidenc e § 803.11 (3d ed. 2002) (footnotes c ollecting fede ral a nd state ca ses omitted). When ex h ibits 1 t hroug h 68 wer e first off ere d by the State, appe llant objected on
c on fr on ta tio n g ro un ds , b ut not on the la c k of tr us tw or thi ne ss g ro un d h e no w u

rg e s. L a te r i n th e tr ia l,T h e S t a t e d o e s n o t c o n t e n d t h a t a p p e l l an t ’ s o b

j e c t i o nt o t h e c h a l l e n g e d

e v i d e n c e w a s u n t i m e l y. 5 I t a pp e ars that th e tr ial cou rt did sig nif ic antl y dis c ount t

he we ig ht o f t

his e vid e nc e , g ive n it s 6 decision to convict a

ppellant of the unla

wful appropr iation of $500, rathe r than the $1500 a lleg ed in t he ind ic tme nt, and

to a c qu it a

pp e lla nt’ s c o- de fe nd ants
. 12 appellant moved to strike the exhibi ts “ based on the evidenc e that this [trial] Court has hea rd fr om people who actua lly know these documents, including an interna l auditor from the c olleg e, they are unreliable .” The court ove rruled the motion to s trike, ruling that “the arg uments that y ou have ma de and the testimony

that I ’ve heard goe s to the weig ht and not the admissibilit y of those docume nts.” 5 There is no evidence that the dut y logs, dispatc her’ s logs, a

nd daily activity logs w ere pr e pa red un de r c ir c ums tanc e s su g g e sti nga mot ive to m isr e pr e se nt. Th is i s p art ic ula rl y tr ue wi th reg ard to the da ily

activity logs, which wer e prepa red by the offic ers themse lves. On the other hand, it is reasonably

clea r that these va

rious logs w ere not mai n t ai n ed for pay roll purposes, and the re appea rs to be no serious dispute that they contained omissions and inacc urac ies with r espec t to the actua l numbe r of hours a particula r campus police office r might have been on duty on any particula r da y . N e ve rt he le ss, it wa s not unr e a so na ble fo r t he tr ia l c ourt

to c on c lud e that th e log s w e re a br oa dly
acc urate ref

lection of appellant’ s activities as a campus poli ce of fice r duringthe months in question. We f ind no c le ar a

bu se of dis c re tio n in

the c ourt ’s de c isi on

to ad mit e xhibi ts 1 thr ou g h 6 8 a

nd to consider the testimony

reg ardingthe omissions and inaccur acie s in the logs as g oing to the w eig ht of the e vidence
. Be cause appellant’ s challeng e to the admission of exhibi t 87 is pre mised on the 6 inadmissibil ity

of exhibit s 1 throug h 68, we a lso find no abuse of disc retion in the admission of that exhibi t. Point of er

ror thre e is overr

uled.13 The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: De cembe r 29, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh