### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O n- Br ie f Fe bruary23, 200 4 ANNA (RUTHERFORD) PEYCHEK v. DONALD LE WI S RUTHERFO RD

A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Juvenile Court for Shelb y County No. B1532 The Hon orable K enneth Turner, Judge

No. W2003-01805-C OA-R3-JV - F iled Jun e 8, 2004
Appellant filed petition seeking cre dit ag ainst child support arr ear ag e for nece ssaries pr ov ide d to min or

c hil dr e n. Th e tr ia l c ou rt g rante d A pp e llant $ 10 ,2 36 .5 0 in cred it tow ardhis suppo r t arr e ar a g e . A p p e ll a n t ap p e a ls a s s e r ti n g th a t th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in g iv in g a p e r c e n ta g e of nece ssaries pr ovided. Finding that the Appellant did not meet his burde n of proof i n his claim for nece ssaries a nd that the evidenc e in re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst the trial court’s finding s, we reve rse in part, affirm in part and re mand.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Re verse d in P art, Aff irm ed in Par t and Rem anded
W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
J eff erson D. G ilder of Southaven, Mississippi for Appellant, Dona ld L ewis Rutherfor d
Wil liam Neal Small of Memphis for A ppellee, A nna (Ruther ford) Pey chek
OP IN ION
An na Ruthe rf or d Pe y c he k ( “ Pe y c he k, ” “ Pla int if f, ” or “ Ap pe llee”) a ndDo na ld L e wi s Rutherford ( “Rutherf

ord,” “ Def

endant,” or “Appe llant”) wer e divorce d on September 17, 1990 by decr ee of the circ uit court of Shelby County

. The Final Dec ree incorporated, by ref ere nce, a marital dissoluti on ag ree ment (“MDA ”) g ranting P ey chek primary residential c ustody

of the pa rties’ two minor children, B .D.R. (d.o.b. 5/30/81) and M.J .R. (d.o.b. 11/ 12/83). Rutherford w as orde red to pay Pey chek $620 pe r m onth in child support, and to continue to carry the childre n on his hospitaliz ation policy throug h his employ er, Northwest Airlines. On Octobe r 19, 1990, the F inal Dec ree of Divorc e was amende d to inc lude a provision r equiring Rutherford to pay his child support arre ara g e, which totaled $4,975.00 at that time, in monthlypay roll deductions of $155.T h e C o n se n t O rd e r is n o t p a rt o f t h e re c o rd o n a p p e a l. 1
-2- On J anuary

18, 1991, Rutherford’ s employ ment with Northwest Airli n e s w a s termi n ate d , and he re mained unemploy ed fr om J anuary 18, 1991 until March 18, 1991. On Ma rch 18, 1991, he secur ed a job with Memphis Parc el Delivery as a c ourier.
On or a bout Febr uary 13, 1991, notice wa s sent to the cler k of the c ircuit court that the juvenile court ha d a ssu me d c hil d s up po rt jurisd ic tio n. On F e br

ua ry 27 , 199 1, Pe y c he k f

ile d a “ Pe tit ionfo r C hil d Support” in the juvenile court. On April 24, 1991, Rutherfor d fi led a “ Counterpetition to Modify Child S upport.” The se petition s we re h ea rd by the juvenile court refe ree , and his Finding s and Recommendations were signe d on May 23, 1991. On May

28, 1991, Pey chek r equeste d a hea ring befor e the juvenile judg e. The reque st was g rante d an d , af t er an evidentiary

hearing, the court enter ed an O rder

on September 19, 1991 w hich assesse d the arrear ag e at $5,223.36 a nd require d R u t h e r f o r d t o p a y s u p p o r ti n t h e a m o u n to f $ 2 1 0

. 0 0 m o n t h l y. Subsequently , Pey chek f

iled a “Petition for Citation for Contempt of C o u rt ” and, af ter a n evi d enti ary

hearing on Septe mber 3, 1992, the r efe ree sustained the alleg ations of contempt and order ed that all future p ay m en t s , i ncluding the ar rea rag e of $4,874.78 at that time, be made by income assig nment. An “Income Assig nment Orde r” w as sig ned on September 23, 1992.
On M ay 13, 1 9 9 6 , Pe y c h e k f il e d a “ M o ti o n to M o d if

y O r d e r , ” s e e k in g a n u p w ard modification of child support based upon Rutherford’ s income at that time. After an ev i dentiary he ari ng on July 1, 19 96 , Ruthe rf or d’ s c hil d su pp ort ob lig a tio n w a s in c re a se d f ro m $2 10 .0 0 mo nth ly to $603.75 monthly

. On October 29, 2002, Rutherford filed a “Petition f or Credit Ag ainst Chil d S u p port Ar re ara g e s, ” wh ic h r e a ds , inre le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: 5. That on the 4 of F ebrua ry , 1998 this court enter ed a Consent th Orde r Modify ing Custody . [P ey chek] reta in ed custody of [M.J .R.] a n d [R u th e r f

o r d ] w a s g r a n te d c u s to d y o f [B

. D

. R. ]. 1
6

. [ R u t h e r f

o r d ] w o u l d s h o w t h e p ar t i e s ’ m i n o r c h i l d r e n , n a m e l y: [M.J.R.] , date o f b irth N ov e mbe r 1 2, 19 83 , h a s r e sid e d w ith [R utherfor d] si nce O ctober 2001 while continuing to complete her senior y ear

in hig h school which wa s not completed until May 2002. 7. [R utherfor d] has paid for all school c lothes, supplies, medical expenses and all other

expenses for the a fore s aid m inor child since she has r esided with him without being r eimbursed. 8. That [Rut herf

ord] should rec eive credit ag ainst any child support arr e ara g e he ld a g a ins t hi m f or thefo llo wi ng re a so ns :-3- a) [Rutherford] has purc hased and paid for a v eh i cle f or the minor chil d a t th e r e q u e s t o f

a n d w ith th e c o n s e n t o f [P e y c h e k ] s o tha t [P e y c h e k ] w o u ldn o t h a v e to tr a n s p o r t [ M

. J. R. ]; b) [Ruth e rf

ord ] sh ou ld b e c re dit e d f or c hil d s up po rt

wh ic h s ho uld have been paid to him and for pr oviding sole support while the minor c h i l d , [ B

. D

. R

. ] , r e s i d e d i n h i s h o u s e h o l d f r o mM a y, 1 9 9 7 u n t i l M a y, 1999 when [B.D.R.] turned eig hteen y ear s old and g raduated from hig h s c ho ol;

c ) [Ruthe rf

or d] sh ou ld b e c re dit e d f or c hil d s up po rt

wh ic h s ho uld have be en p aid to him since the minor child, [M.J .R] , has re sided with him si nce O ctober , 2001; d) [Rut herf

ord] should receive cre dit for his income tax returns fr om tax y ear s 1998 and 1999; e) [R utherfor d] should rec eive cre dit f or payments for cre dit c ards f or g as, maintena nce and repairs for [M.J .R.’s] car, for clothing, e tc. f) [R utherfor d] should rec eive cre dit f or payment of seve ral medic al b il ls f o r [M

. J. R. ].
T h e m at t erwa s h ea rd o n M ay 7 , 2 0 0 3 an d R u t h er fo rd wa s gi v en cr ed i taga i n s th i s arre ar age in the amount of $10,236.50. The matter wa s continued until J une 11, 2003 to compute inter est on the arr e ara g e . O n Jun e 11 , 2 00 3 th e tria l c ou rt fo un d th e arr e ara g e a mou nt, a s o f M a y 1, 20 03 , to be $26,319.71.
Rutherford a

ppeals a nd raises thre e issues for revie w as stated in his brief : I . D id th e tr ial cou rt

e rr in g ivi ng a

c re dit of on ly 50 % o f the c hil d support arr ear ag e for

the period of time while [B.D.R.] was living with hi m , despite the a mount of nece ssaries pr ovided by Mr. Rutherford e x cee ding the $575.00 per month in support ordere d for tho se mon ths , be c aus e on e c hil d, [M.J.R. ], c on tin ue d to re sid e wi th Anna Rutherf

ord Pey chek?
I I . Was it error f

or the Judge to f

ind that $2,558.00 for school c lothes we re no t ne c e ssa

ri e s wh e n the re wa s no arg ume nt raise d byMr s. Rutherford Pey chek that she was pr oviding sc hool clothes for [M

. J. R. ]?-4- I I I

. Wa s it

e rr o r f o r th e tria l Ju d g e to f

in d th a t th e p a y me n ts f

o r the auto and maintenance the reon by Mr. Rutherfor d for the ve hicle used by his daug hter, [M.J .R.] , which wa s titl ed in the name of Anna Rutherfo rd Pey chek, w ere not cre dited ag ainst arr ear ag es as ne c e ssi tie s a nd

/or pay me nts of

c hil d s up po rt ? Pey chek r aises the f

ollowing a dditional issues for revie w as stated in he r brief : I

. D id th e u n c o n s c io n ti o u s [s ic ] a n d d is r e s p e c tf u l c o n d u c t of the Appellant rise to the le vel to justify an estoppel to preve nt him from ob ta ini ng re lie f i n p os t- tr ia l pr oc e e din g s?
I I . Can Appellant see k reli ef wh er e he did not object to the proce eding s and how the c ourt conduc ted them and wher e he did not make e fforts to preserve an ade quate r ecor d?
I I I . Did the co u rt er r i n allowing the Appellant to proc eed a fter emanc ipation of both children?
I V. Di d the trial court err in a llowing Appe llant to procee d in the hearing on May

7, 2003 in view of his fa ilure to abide by prior orde rs of the c ou rt ?
V. Did the trial court err

in giving cre dit for alleg ed payments made direc tly to Appellee?
VI . Did the t rial court err in g ranting any cre dits to Appellant on the prese ntation of the cause?
We first addre ss Appellee’ s conce rn t hat R utherfor d’s action/inaction in this case pre cludes him from seeking relief . Pey chek fi rs t as s er t s that Rutherford’ s absenc e fr om the J une 11, 2003 hearing should e stop him from obtaining re lief in this matter. Pey chek c ites to this C ourt’s opinion in Coui lla rd

v . Co uill ar d , 2002 W L 1 4 4 6 6 6 9 (T enn. Ct. App. J uly 3, 2002) in support of her contention. I n Coui lla rd , th e plaint if f/fathe r, a ft e r faili ng to ap pe ar at a he ari ng c on c e rn ing his c hil d support o b l igation, filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 Moti on to Set Aside. I n the instant case , Rutherford is not see king to se t aside the e ntire Judgment of the tria l court; rathe r, he is see king revie w of the tria l court’s finding s contain ed there in. Rutherford’ s prese nce at the hearing is not g erma ne to a r eview of

the trial court’s decision in this matter. Pey chek a lso asserts that the trial c ourt err ed in allowing Rutherford to pr ocee d afte r the e ma nc ipatio n o f b othc hil dr e n. Ruthe rf or d s e e ks re c ov e ry

fo r pa y me nt of ne c e ssa

ri e s pro vid e d to the minor children. Such lawsuits sound in c ontrac t and must be commence d within six y ear s after the nec essaries wer e provide d. Foster v . Adcock , 161 Tenn. 217, 220, 30 S .W.2d 239, 240 (Tenn.T .C .A

. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (a)(5 ) (S up p . 2 0 0 1 ) rea d s, i n re l ev an t p art, as fo l l o w s: 2

A ny order for chi l d s uppo r t s hal l be a j udgment ent i t l ed t o be enf orce d as an y ot her ju d g m e n t o f a c o u rt o f t h is sta te a n d sh a ll b e e n tit le d to full fa ith a n d c re d it in th is sta te a n d in a n y o the r state . S u c h ju d g m e n t s hal l not be s ubj ec t t o m odi f i cat i on as t o any t i m e per i od or any am ounts due pr i or t o t he dat e t hat an a ct i on f or m od i f i c at i on i s f

i l e d a nd no t i c e of t he ac t i on h as be e n m ai l e d t o the l as t kn own ad dre s s of t he opp osi ng p art i es . I f t h e f u l l a mou n t of

c h i l d s u ppor t i s n ot pa i d by t he d at e up o n whi ch t he o rdered supp o rt i s d ue, t he unp ai d am o unt i s i n arr ears and shal l b eco m e a judgm ent fo r t he unp ai d am o unt s and s hal l accrue i nt erest f rom t he d at e of t he ar r ear age at t he r at e of t wel ve perc ent ( 12 % ) per an nu m. Al l i ntere st w h ic h a c c u m u la te s o n a rr e a ra g e s sh a ll b e c o n sid e re d c h ild su p p o rt....
Id

. (emp hasi s ad d ed ).

-5- 19 30 ); T. C.A . § 28 -3 -1 09 (a )( 3) (2 00 1) . B .D .R. liv e d w ithRuthe rf or d f ro m M ay of 19 97 un til his emanc ipation in May

1999; M.J .R. lived with Rut herf ord from Oc tober 2001 until her g raduation in Ma y 20 02

. Ruthe rf

or d se e ks c re dit

fo r n e c e ssa

ri e s p ur c ha se d d uring the se tim e pe ri od s a ndhis fi lin g fo r s uc h c re dit

on Oc tob e r 2 9, 20 02 is w ith in the re le va nt s ta tut e of lim itatio ns . Pey chek a lso cites Rutherford’ s failure to abide by prior order s of the court as g rounds for denial of r elief. A g ain, Rut h er fo rd i s seeking cre dit ag ainst his child support arre ara g e for nece ssaries a nd not a modification of the support obligation per se. The nece ssaries r ule does not violate T.C.A. § 36-5-101( a)( 5) –the statute that for bids the retroa ctive mo d if

ic ation of child support 2 awa rds. I n Benson v. Benson , 1996 WL 284731, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. M ay 31, 1996), this Court a dd re sse d th e iss ue of

the ne c e ssa

ri e s rule in r e la tio n to T. C.A . § 36 -5 -1 01 (a )( 5) a s f oll ow s: On e ob je c tio n to thi s [ne c e ssa

ri e s] ru le is that a llo wi ng cred it s to pare nts who have defaulted on their child support obligations viol ates Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-5-101(a )(5)

. De sp ite thi s o b j e c t i o n , th e c o u r ts h a v e h e l d th a t g i v i n g p a r e n t s a c r e d i t ag ain st their child support a r r earages does not violate this code sec tion. Hartley , 1 99 5 WL

29 62 02 , at *3 ; Netherton v. Netherton , No. 01-A01-9208-PB 00323, 1993 WL 4955 6 , at *2 (Tenn. A pp. 26 Fe b. 19 93 ); Sut

ton v. Su tton , No. 180, 1991 WL 16234, at *1 (Tenn. A pp. 12 Fe b. 1991). Specific ally , t h i s co u rt has ac knowledg ed that the statut e pr oh ibi ts r e tr oa c tiv e mod if ic a tio ns of

c hil d s up po rt

pay me nts

. As for credits, however, this court has held that they are not modifications. Instead, the cre dit recognizes that the obligor parent provided the support the c ourt ordered in the first place. Netherton , 1993 WL 49556, at *2. Id . (empha sis added).-6-

Be cause he seeks cre dit on and not m odification of his support oblig ation, Rutherford is not ba rr e d f ro m r e c ov ery be c aus e he fe ll i nto arr e ars on his su pp ort si nc e thenatur e of a c re dit “re cog nizes t h at t h e o b ligor pare nt provided the support the c ourt order ed in the first plac e.” Netherton v. Netherton , 1 99 3 WL 49 55 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . F e b. 26 , 1 99 3) . We no w turn to thos e iss ue s c on c e rn ing wh e the r, a ndto w hat e xten t, R uth e rf or d is e nti tle d to c re dit

fo r n e c e ssa

ri e s. With re sp e c t to the “ fo rg ive nes s o f a rr e ara g e s, ” it i s w e ll s e ttl e d th a t no n- c us tod ia l pa re nts ma y be g ive n c re dit

a g a ins t th eir c hil d s up po rt ob lig a tio n f

or pay me nts ma de on be ha lf of the ir children if suc h payments are for ne cessa ries that the c ustod i al pare nt either failed to provide or ref used to provide. Bro wny ar d v . Br owny ar d , 1 9 9 9 WL 4 1 8 3 5 2 ( T e n n . Ct

. A p p . Ju n e 22, 1999); Hartley v. Thom

pson , 1995 WL 296202 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 17, 1995); Oliver v . Oczkowicz , 1990 WL 64534 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 18, 1990). Howe ver, the cr ed i t for ne cessa ries cannot exceed the amount of support due f

or the pe riod during w h i ch the nec essaries wer e furnished. W. W alton Gar rett, Divorce, Alim ony and C hild Custody §14-8(8) (2001). The obligation to provide nece ssaries require s the provision of appr opriate f ood, shelter, tuition, medical car e, leg al service s, and fune ral e xpe ns e s a s a

re ne e de d. What it e ms a

reapp ro pria te a ndneeded dep end s on th e pa re nt’ s a bil ity to provide and this issue is to be determined by the trier of

fac t. Id

. at §2-3(3) . Since this case w as tried by the court sitti ng without a jury , we r eview the case de novo upon the re cord w ith a presumption of cor rec tness of the finding s of fa ct by the trial court. Unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the finding s, we must aff

irm, absent er

ror of law. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
I n order to maintain a succ essful cla im for nece ssaries, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the child neede d the particula r g oods or service s that wer e provided, (2) that the defe ndant had a l egal obligati o n to p r o v id e th e g o o d s o r s e r v ic e s , ( 3 ) th a t th e d e f e n d a n t f a il e d to p r o v id e th e g oods or service s, and (4) the actua l c ost of these g oods or service s. Hooper v. Moser , 2003 WL 22401283, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2003).
We have r eviewe d the entire rec ord in this case and, apply ing the rules outlined su pr a , we f ind that Rutherford ha s not met his burden of proof i n order to maintain a succ essful cla im for nece ssaries. The re is not suffic ient evidenc e in t he re cord be fore us from which w e can conclude that the payments claimed by

Rutherford wer e for nece ssaries that the custodial pare nt f ailed or r efuse d to f urnis h. Th e e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e tria l c ou rt s a wa rdof c re dit fo r n e c e ssa

ri e s. We reve rse the O rder

of the trial c ourt allowing Rutherford c redits on ar rea rag es i n the amount of $1 0, 23 6. 50 fo r n e c e ssa

ri e s. Th e or de r o f the tria l c ou rt is ot her wi se a ff ir me d, a ndthe c a se is rema nded to the trial court for such further proce eding s as may

be nec essary . Costs of the appea l are a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l a n t , D o n a l d L e w i s R u t h e r f o r d , a n d h i s s u r e t y.

__________________________________________ W. FRA NK

CRA W F O RD , P RE S I

D I NG JUDGE, W.S.