NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

ELLERY CHACKSFIELD,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 13-55854

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02871-AJB-JMA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 5, 2015

Pasadena, California

Before: FISHER, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Allstate Insurance Company brought this action seeking a declaration that 

Gordon Hammers’s umbrella insurance policy did not cover damages arising out of 

a car accident with Ellery Chacksfield for which Gordon’s brother Robert had been 

found responsible because Robert was not a “resident of [Gordon’s] household.” 

In response to cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 

 

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

FILED

MAY 20 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

concluded that Robert was a resident of Gordon’s household and granted summary

judgment to Chacksfield. We reverse and remand for entry of summary judgment 

in favor of Allstate.

Residents of the same household must live “under one roof or within a 

common curtilage.” Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch., 278 Cal. Rptr. 52, 58 (Ct. App. 

1991). Robert and Gordon did not live “under one roof” because Robert lived in a 

separate trailer and had been prohibited to enter Gordon’s house, and we disagree 

with the district court’s conclusion that Robert and Gordon lived within a common 

curtilage.

California courts seem to apply the same definition of “curtilage” in both the 

insurance coverage and Fourth Amendment contexts. See People v. DiMatteo, No. 

A105694, 2005 WL 20005, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2005) (unpublished) (citing 

Jacobs, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 57 n.4); see also Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Granite State 

Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “we may consider 

unpublished state decisions, even though such opinions have no precedential 

value”). Under that definition, to determine the extent of a home’s curtilage, courts

consider “(1) ‘the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home’; (2) 

‘whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home’; (3) ‘the 
3

nature of the uses to which the area is put’; and (4) ‘the steps taken by the resident to 

protect the area from observation by people passing by.’” People v. Lieng, 119 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 200, 207 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 

(1987)).

Applying these factors, we conclude that Robert and Gordon did not live 

within a common curtilage. First, Robert’s trailer was more than 100 feet from 

Gordon’s home, and “even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than 

100 feet beyond the home.” Id. at 208. Second, Robert’s trailer was enclosed 

within its own fence. Third, Robert’s trailer and Gordon’s home did not share uses 

in common. Thus, three factors weigh decisively in favor of the conclusion that 

Robert and Gordon did not share a common curtilage. The fourth factor is not 

obviously to the contrary, and would not outweigh the other three factors even if it 

were.

We reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 

Chacksfield, and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of 

Allstate.

REVERSED and REMANDED.