Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-551 | August 11, 2016 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kevin Wild

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Justin F. Roebel 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bryant Dowdy,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

August 11, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1506-CR-551

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Kurt M. 

Eisgruber, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

49G01-1302-MR-13442

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Bryant Dowdy appeals his convictions and sentence for murder and attempted 

murder. Dowdy raises three issues which we consolidate and restate as: 

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

certain evidence; and 

II. Whether the court abused its discretion in sentencing him. 

We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 17, 2012, Dowdy, Eric Clanton, and Dominique Clanton 

planned to rob Nishant Patel, who had advertised an iPhone for sale on 

Craigslist. Dowdy contacted Patel and sent him a text message with a street 

address of an apartment in Indianapolis as a location to meet. Eric and 

Dominique arrived at the location in Eric’s Camaro, and Eric stayed in the 

vehicle while Dominque exited it. Dominique saw Dowdy and another man, 

who Dominique believed was Dowdy’s cousin, and the three of them entered 

the apartment building. Dowdy was wearing all black including a black hat and 

carried a black shotgun, and neither Dominique nor the other man had a 

weapon. The three men discussed their plan that Dominque and the other man 

would stall Patel until Dowdy came out pointing the shotgun. 

[3] Patel arrived and parked his vehicle in front of the apartment building. Patel 

had with him the iPhone he planned to sell and his firearm, a Bersa Thunder 

380 handgun. Dominique and the man he believed was Dowdy’s cousin 

approached Patel’s vehicle and talked about the iPhone and the selling price, 
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and Dominique saw the iPhone in a white box and a firearm on Patel’s lap. 

The men pulled out their wallets to pretend they were gathering money. At that 

point, Dowdy approached Patel’s vehicle pointing the shotgun, and Dominique 

turned and walked away. Dominique heard “a boom” and then ran to Eric’s 

Camaro. Transcript at 190. Dominque dropped several items including raffle 

tickets from his wallet, attempted to pick them up but did not pick up 

everything, entered Eric’s vehicle, and Eric drove to the house where Dowdy

was staying. At the house, Dominique soon noticed that Dowdy had the 

iPhone and firearm that belonged to Patel in his hands. Dowdy told 

Dominique that he had dropped his hat at the scene and needed to go back to 

retrieve it, and he left the house. Eric and Dominique left to go the home of 

Dominique’s mother. Patel died as a result of the robbery. 

[4] On December 18, 2012, Dominique contacted Dowdy because he and Eric had 

a buyer lined up for the iPhone, and Dominique and Eric planned to meet 

Dowdy at a certain intersection in Indianapolis. Dominique drove to the 

location in Eric’s Camaro, and Eric rode in the front passenger seat. After 

waiting at the location for about thirty minutes, Dominique and Eric saw 

Dowdy walking up the street again in all black with a black hat. Eric opened 

his door and lifted his seat up so Dowdy could climb in, and Dowdy entered 

the back of the Camaro and sat directly behind Eric. Dowdy handed Eric the 

iPhone still in the box and Dominique started the Camaro. As Dominique

began to drive, his vision went black and he could not hear anything except a 

loud ringing in his ear, and he felt the door open and himself hit the pavement. 
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[5] A driver of another vehicle heard gunshots and then observed a car come to a 

stop in front of her. The driver observed a black male exit the driver’s side door 

and begin to run northbound, saw Dominique fall out of the car and heard him

yell for help and collapse, and observed the male that had initially run 

northbound come back, retrieve something from the car, and then run 

northbound again. The driver observed that the male who ran away wore a 

black hooded jacket and a black skull cap. The driver called 911. 

[6] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police officers arrived at the scene and discovered 

Dominique on the road and Eric slumped over in the front passenger seat of the 

vehicle. Dominque made sounds loud enough to attract the attention of one of 

the officers. Eric was unresponsive, and officers discovered the iPhone in its 

box on the floorboard in front of Eric’s body. Dominique had been shot in the 

back of the head, was transported by ambulance to the hospital, and survived. 

Eric suffered three gunshot wounds to his head and died as a result. The 

stippling on Eric indicated the shot was fired from within three feet. Cartridge 

cases recovered from the Camaro revealed that they were fired from the same 

firearm as the test cartridge located in Patel’s Bersa Thunder 380 firearm case.

1

 

[7] On February 26, 2013, the State charged Dowdy with the murder of Eric and 

the attempted murder of Dominique. On May 27, 2014, the State filed a notice 

 

1

Patel’s brother gave law enforcement the test cartridge. The State presented testimony that a test fired 

cartridge is a cartridge case that a manufacturer includes with a particular firearm and that a comparison of 

spent cartridges found in the rear area of the Camaro and under one of the seats to the test case showed that 

all of the cartridges were fired from the same gun. 
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of intent to offer evidence under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) of other crimes to

show motive, intent, preparation, knowledge, absence of mistake and/or 

identity, namely that Dowdy was charged with murder in another cause, that 

Dominique was his co-defendant in that case, and that Eric was present during 

the events leading up to and after the murder. At a hearing in November 2014, 

the State argued that Dominique was part of the robbery in the first murder, 

and the court stated “I think we’d lay it out as 404B but I guess I’ve always 

viewed these – well, the second one especially, is – is so close in time and so 

inextricably intertwined . . . .” Id. at 475. The court later stated “I think they 

are so intertwined that I don’t even know if it’s 404B but if you do consider it 

404B I think it is motive and identity and any number of reasons why it would 

come in and then obviously your . . . plea agreement would come in too.” Id.

at 476. 

[8] At a final pre-trial hearing on April 23, 2015, Dowdy argued that a threshold 

requirement is to determine whether or not the evidence consisting of the prior 

case is true, and that at the least the court needed to ascertain the likelihood of 

the truthfulness of the information in the other case. The State argued that it 

would “not mention the term ‘murder’ in its case-in-chief,” that the evidence of 

the December 17, 2012 events related to Dowdy’s motive to shoot Dominique 

and kill Eric, that it would introduce evidence that the casings found at the 

scene showed the shots were fired from the gun of the victim of the robbery, 

that Dominique saw the firearm and iPhone in Patel’s vehicle and in Dowdy’s 

possession the night of the robbery, and that Dowdy gave the iPhone to Eric on 
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the night Eric was shot. Supplemental Transcript at 5. The court stated “I do

see where your motive and your identity, clearly you need that evidence from 

the first, so and that does put it within 404(b)” and “I do see it that way, . . . I 

see it through the State’s eyes as far as they’re wanting that evidence for motive 

purposes, identity, and it does corroborate their witness . . . .” Id. at 16. The 

court ruled that it would permit the State to present its requested evidence. 

[9] At the start of Dowdy’s trial on April 27, 2015, the court stated that the State’s 

reliance on evidence of the events of December 17, 2012, “as far as motive . . . 

and identity are appropriate in this circumstance,” noted that the State had 

indicated it would limit the evidence from that incident to not include the 

murder, although the door could be opened, and stated “[y]ou’ve made your

record as far as your argument on that 404B. I will allow the State to utilize it.” 

Transcript at 4. Later, when the State began to introduce evidence of what 

police observed and recovered at the scene on December 17, 2012, Dowdy 

objected and argued that the evidence “has nothing to do with this case” and 

was impermissible 404(b) evidence, and the court overruled the objection and 

noted that the arguments were made before trial. Id. at 43. Dowdy objected 

again a short time later, and the court stated “I do think you’ve preserved your 

record sufficiently so it is noted.” Id. at 49. 

[10] The State presented evidence related to the events of December 17, 2012, which 

included photographs of a shotgun shell as well as two raffle tickets and two 

business cards from Fifth Third Bank that were discovered on the ground 

around Patel’s vehicle. The State elicited testimony from Dominique that raffle 
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tickets had fallen from his wallet and that he banked with Fifth Third Bank. 

Dominique testified that he and Dowdy were friends, he had known Dowdy for 

several years, he had met him when they were staying at the same apartment 

complex, his mother and Dowdy’s mother were friends, and that he knew 

Dowdy’s nickname. He also testified that Dowdy directed Patel to a particular 

location in the apartment complex where there were no cameras and that 

Dowdy was armed with a shotgun and Eric and Dominique were not armed. 

Dominique indicated that he was involved in the planning of the robbery of 

Patel, did not think it would be necessary to use a firearm, and was planning to 

take the phone from Patel and run away. 

[11] Dominique further testified that he gave a number of statements to police, and 

that he first spoke to a detective at the hospital, and said: “I said it was just me 

and Eric and I . . . didn’t remember who else was in the car with me.” Id. at 

207. He further testified that this was not true and that he was not truthful with 

the detective because he was scared of Dowdy. He stated that, at some point 

while his mother was visiting him in the hospital, he told her that Dowdy was 

in the car and was the person who shot him and Eric. When asked how long he 

was in the hospital, Dominique answered “I’d say about two weeks.” Id. at 

209. He testified that he gave a second statement to a detective in the homicide 

office a few weeks later and that he still did not tell the detective who was in the 

back seat of the car “[b]ecause . . . Dowdy was still able to get [him] if [he] told 

what happened.” Id. at 211. Dominique indicated that, after the second 

interview, he was arrested for his participation in the robbery of Patel. 
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[12] Dominique also testified that, about a month after the second statement, he 

gave a third statement to the detective during which he told the detective that 

Dowdy was in the back seat of the Camaro on December 18, 2012. He stated 

that, at the time he gave the third statement, he had not entered into a plea 

agreement. He then indicated that, about ten months after the third statement, 

he gave a fourth statement at which detectives and his attorney were present 

and that, before that meeting, he was offered a plea agreement in exchange for 

talking to police regarding the events of December 17, 2012. The plea 

agreement provided that Dominique would plead guilty to conspiracy to 

commit robbery as a class A felony and would fully cooperate and testify 

against Dowdy and that the State would dismiss all remaining counts against 

Dominique. 

[13] Dominique’s mother testified that when Dominique arrived at her house on 

December 17, 2012, he was crying and upset and did not tell her why, and said 

that he would tell her later. Dominique’s mother also testified that she gave 

two statements to police, the first on December 19, 2012, and the second on 

January 10, 2013, and that, in the second statement, she shared new

information with the detective which was that, while Dominique was 

hospitalized, he had informed her that Dowdy was the person who had shot 

him. The court admitted the testimony of Dominique’s mother regarding 

Dominique’s statement to her on the basis that it was a statement of 

identification. 
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[14] The jury found Dowdy guilty of murder and attempted murder, and the court 

sentenced him to fifty years for the murder of Eric and twenty-five years for the 

attempted murder of Dominique, and ordered that the sentences be served 

consecutively for an aggregate sentence of seventy-five years. 

Discussion

I.

[15] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

particular evidence regarding the events of December 17, 2012, and 

Dominique’s statement to his mother. Generally, we review the trial court’s

ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. 

Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. We reverse only 

when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied.

We may affirm a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence if it 

is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 

(Ind. 1998), reh’g denied. Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of 

discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Fox 

v. State, 717 N.E.2d 957, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied. 

A. December 17, 2012 Events

[16] Dowdy contends that, contrary to the State’s assertion that the evidence 

regarding the December 17, 2012 incident showed his motive and identity, 

“[t]he only real similarity between the two incidents was the use of a firearm, 
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and different guns were used in each crime” and that “[t]hey were in part 

different crimes, different circumstances, accomplished by different methods, 

and the individuals allegedly involved had different relationships in each 

incident.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He argues that the photographs of the crime 

scene and evidence of a shotgun shell, raffle tickets, and business cards found at 

the scene on December 17th did nothing to contribute to showing motive for 

the December 18th shootings. He also contends that the evidence that he had 

Patel go to a location with no cameras, that he was the only person with a 

shotgun, that he stealthily approached Patel, and that Dominque was scared 

and crying after the incident was not related to his motive for the December 

18th crimes and was extremely prejudicial. 

[17] The State notes that the trial court found that the December 17, 2012 crimes 

were inextricably bound up with the charged crimes, and argues that evidence 

of uncharged criminal acts which are intrinsic to the charged offense are 

admissible, and that the court properly allowed evidence of the robbery and 

killing of Patel because it was part of the same criminal conduct and not merely 

propensity evidence. The State maintains that Dowdy, Dominique, and Eric

met on December 18, 2012 to finish their business related to the robbery, 

Dowdy shot Eric and Dominique with Patel’s gun, the only reasonable 

inference is that Dowdy killed Eric and attempted to kill Dominique to cover 

up his involvement in the robbery and killing of Patel, and that, under these 

circumstances, evidence of the killing of Patel was necessary to complete the 

story of the crimes on trial. 
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[18] In addition, the State asserts that for the first time on appeal Dowdy argues that 

some of the evidence of the December 17, 2012 incident was admissible but that 

other evidence should have been excluded as overly prejudicial or irrelevant, 

that these new arguments are waived, and that, waiver aside, even if evidence 

of the December 17th killing was only admissible to show motive, there is no 

merit to Dowdy’s argument that the State could not present details of the crime. 

The State also contends that any error in the admission of the December 17th 

killing was harmless because Dominique identified Dowdy as the person in the 

car who was in a position to commit the shooting on December 18, 2012, that 

forensic evidence showed Eric was shot in the back of the head from within the 

car at close range, that Dominique had observed Dowdy in possession of the 

Bersa Thunder 380 handgun the previous night, and that the witness who called 

911 observed someone fitting Dowdy’s description exit the backseat of the car 

and run away after the shooting. 

[19] Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) provides in part: 

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is 

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to 

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 

accordance with the character.

(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may 

be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. . . . 
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Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if 

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 

following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 

delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 

[20] The standard for assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is: (1) the 

court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the 

charged act; and (2) the court must balance the probative value of the evidence 

against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403. Whatley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 

276, 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Boone v. State, 728 N.E.2d 135, 137-138 

(Ind. 2000), reh’g denied; Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997)), trans. 

denied. The evidence is inadmissible when the State offers it only to produce the 

“forbidden inference” that the defendant has engaged in other, uncharged 

misconduct and the charged conduct was in conformity with the uncharged 

misconduct. Id. (citing Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1235 (Ind. 2000)). The 

trial court has wide latitude, however, in weighing the probative value of the 

evidence against the possible prejudice of its admission. Id. If evidence has 

some purpose besides behavior in conformity with a character trait and the 

balancing test is favorable, the trial court can elect to admit the evidence. Id.

(citing Boone, 728 N.E.2d at 138). For instance, evidence which is necessary for 

the jury to understand the relationships between the victim, various witnesses, 

and the defendant may be admissible. Id. (citing Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 
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1265, 1270-1271 (Ind. 2002)). In addition, evidence of motive is always 

relevant in the proof of a crime. Fry v. State, 748 N.E.2d 369, 372 (Ind. 2001). 

[21] The challenged evidence regarding Dowdy’s participation in the robbery and 

shooting of Patel on December 17, 2012, was not introduced to show his 

propensity to engage in crime or that his behavior was in conformity with a 

character trait. The testimony of Dominique regarding the events of December 

17, 2012 was necessary for the jury to understand the relationships between 

Dowdy, Dominique, and Eric and the context of the subsequent meeting and 

shooting of Dominique and Eric on December 18, 2012. The testimony further 

explained why Dominique contacted Dowdy on December 18, 2012 to say that 

he had a buyer lined up for the iPhone, why Dominique and Eric arranged a 

meeting with Dowdy, and why Dowdy handed a white box containing an 

iPhone to Eric while seated in the Camaro. Additionally, the challenged 

evidence was offered to establish Dowdy’s motive to commit the crimes against 

Dominique and Eric on December 18, 2012, and Dowdy’s identity as the 

person who committed the crimes. We cannot say the probative value of the 

challenged evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, and the admission of the evidence did not violate Rule 404(b). See 

Fry, 748 N.E.2d at 372 (holding that the State offered the evidence of a scheme 

to steal a television involving the defendant and one of the victims to show the 

defendant’s motive for killing the victims and that the admission of the evidence 

did not violate Ind. Evidence Rules 404(b) or 403); Whatley, 908 N.E.2d at 282

(noting the evidence of the defendant’s drug use and delivery was necessary for 
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the jury to understand the relationships between the defendant, the victim, and 

the other witnesses and the context of the events which culminated in the 

victim’s death and holding the evidence did not violate Ind. Evidence Rules

404(b) or 403) (citing Wilson, 765 N.E.2d at 1270-1271 (holding that evidence of 

the defendant’s drug dealing and prostitution-related activities was admissible 

in a murder prosecution and did not violate Ind. Evidence Rules 404(b) or 403 

where the evidence was “necessary for the jury to understand the relationships 

between the victim, various witnesses, and the defendant”); Ross v. State, 676 

N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996) (holding that prior misconduct was “admissible 

because it demonstrated the defendant’s motive and intent to commit the 

murder and illuminated the relationship between the defendant and victim”)). 

B. Dominique’s Statement to His Mother

[22] Dowdy also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dominique’s mother to 

testify as to the contents of Dominique’s statement to her at the hospital that 

Dowdy was the person who shot him. Ind. Evidence Rule 801 provides that 

hearsay is a statement not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 

hearing and is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. 

Evidence Rule 802 provides that hearsay is not admissible unless these rules or 

other law provides otherwise. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1) provides that a 

statement is not hearsay if: 

A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is 

subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the 

statement:
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* * * * *

(B) is consistent with the declarant’s testimony, and is 

offered to rebut an express or implied charge that 

the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a 

recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; 

or

(C) is an identification of a person shortly after 

perceiving the person. 

[23] Dowdy asserts that “the main issue is the timing of the claimed motive to

fabricate.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. He states that Dominique provided 

different information in his first two statements to the detectives than he did in 

the rest and that it is apparent that he did the same when he first talked to his 

mother while in the hospital. He argues that Dominique’s statement to his 

mother “was made after his motive to fabricate arose.” Id. He states that 

Dominique knew he could be charged in connection with the death of Patel on 

December 17th and had “a virtually instant motive to lie about Dowdy’s 

identity and involvement in the December 17 case in an attempt to implicate 

Dowdy instead of himself.” Id. at 23. 

[24] The State contends that the court properly admitted the testimony of 

Dominique’s mother regarding Dominique’s prior identification of Dowdy as 

the shooter, noting that the trial court admitted the testimony under the 

exception to the hearsay rule for statements of identification of a person under 

Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). The State argues that Dominique’s 

identification was not hearsay because he identified Dowdy as the shooter to 
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his mother a few weeks after the shooting and that, based on Dominique’s 

presence at trial and availability for cross-examination, the prior identification 

was admissible under Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). The State further 

asserts that Dowdy’s argument on appeal misstates the record by asserting that 

testimony of Dominique’s mother was permitted as a prior consistent statement 

when in fact it was admitted as identification evidence. Additionally, it 

contends that Dominique’s prior statement would have been admissible under 

Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), that Dominique would have had no motive to 

fabricate until he received a benefit for agreeing to testify against Dowdy, and 

that the testimony of Dominique’s mother would also have been admissible to 

rehabilitate Dominique from Dowdy’s suggestion during cross-examination

that Dominique implicated him in exchange for leniency in the other crime. 

Finally, it states that any error in admitting the identification testimony of 

Dominique’s mother was harmless because Dominique identified Dowdy as the 

shooter at trial, Eric was shot from behind at close range, Dowdy’s use of 

Patel’s gun tied him to the shooting, and a bystander who called 911 

corroborated Dominique’s account. 

[25] Dominique testified before the jury and was subject to cross-examination about 

his prior statement. The record shows that Dominique’s mother gave a second 

statement to police on January 10, 2013, in which she said that Dominique had 

informed her at the hospital that Dowdy was the person who had shot him. 

Dominique testified that he had been hospitalized for approximately two 

weeks, that he had perceived Dowdy enter the backseat of the Camaro, and that 
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he and Dowdy were friends. We cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in finding that Dominique’s statement to his mother constituted an 

identification of Dowdy shortly after Dominique perceived him pursuant to 

Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). See Dickens v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. 

2001) (stating that statements of identification are not hearsay if they are made 

shortly after perceiving the person and the declarant is available for crossexamination concerning the statement at trial under Ind. Evidence Rule 

801(d)(1)(C), noting that “the term ‘shortly’ is relative rather than precise,” the 

purpose of the rule is to assure reliability, and holding that the statements 

qualified as statements of identification and were not hearsay) (citing Robinson 

v. State, 682 N.E.2d 806, 810-811 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (observing that the 

declarant made his statement identifying the defendant as one of the men who 

shot the victims two months and thirteen days after the shootings, noting that 

the declarant testified that he knew the defendant and that the two were friends, 

and holding that the identification was made shortly after perceiving the 

defendant for purposes of Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C))). 

[26] Additionally, we observe that Dominique’s statement to his mother while he 

was hospitalized was consistent with his testimony at trial that Dowdy was the 

person who shot him. The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that whether a 

motive to fabricate has arisen is a fact sensitive issue and we do not 

automatically find that a participant in a crime has a motive to fabricate, even 

where the police are inquiring into the declarant’s involvement in the crime. 

Holsinger v. State, 750 N.E.2d 354, 360 (Ind. 2001). At the time Dominique told 
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his mother that Dowdy was the person who shot him, Dominique had not been 

arrested for his participation in the robbery of Patel and had not obtained any 

promise of leniency with respect to possible charges for his involvement in the 

robbery. In eliciting testimony from Dominique that he faced a shorter

sentence because he entered a plea agreement, Dowdy suggested that 

Dominique recently fabricated his testimony against him to obtain leniency. To 

rebut that charge the State was allowed to offer evidence of Dominique’s prior 

statement to his mother pursuant to Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B). See id. at 

359-360 (holding that, at the time an accomplice to a robbery gave a statement 

to police implicating the defendant in the murder of a robbery victim, the 

accomplice did not have a motive to fabricate and that the statement was 

admissible under Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut an implied charge of 

fabrication). We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

admitting Dominique’s statement to his mother under Ind. Evidence Rule 

801(d)(1). 

II.

[27] Next, Dowdy argues that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 

consecutive sentences because it did not articulate a reason for imposing 

consecutive sentences. He also contends that the court provided almost nothing 

to review. The State posits that the trial court’s statement, while brief, was 

adequate because it explained that Dowdy’s consecutive sentences were 

justified by the multiple victims. 
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[28] We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An 

abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and 

actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its 

discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a 

sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including 

a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not 

support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that 

are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) 

considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-491. If the 

trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we 

cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same 

sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” 

Id. at 491. The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or 

those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of 

discretion. Id. 

[29] The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “before a trial court can impose a 

consecutive sentence, it must articulate, explain, and evaluate the aggravating 

circumstances that support the sentence.” Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578, 580 

(Ind. 2008). In reviewing the court’s sentencing decision, we may consider both 

the written and oral sentencing statements. See Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622, 

631 (Ind. 2002). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-551 | August 11, 2016 Page 20 of 21

[30] At sentencing, the court stated: 

I do believe though based on the circumstances of this crime, I

think each victim should be sentenced individually. When I 

think back to it, the shots were taken,I believe, first at Eric

Clanton, although I’m not certain, and then the weapon had to be 

turned . . . towards the second victim, and that victim was 

Dominique, if it did occur that way. But regardless, it wasn’t two 

victims in one line of fire, it was two lines of fire at two different 

victims, so they will be sentenced consecutively.

As to Eric, who is the subject of Count One, I believe the Court 

will sentence a 50-yearsentence to the Department of Corrections.

Asto Dominique, the sentence will be a 25-year sentence 

consecutive to a 50-year sentence. Overall, a 75-year sentence 

will be imposed. That is 75 years at the Department of 

Corrections. 

Transcript at 464-465. 

[31] The presence of multiple victims is an aggravating circumstance that justifies 

the imposition of consecutive sentences. See Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 

1225 (Ind. 2008) (stating that “[w]hether the counts involve one or multiple 

victims is highly relevant to the decision to impose consecutive sentences”); 

McCann v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (Ind. 2001) (noting that “[i]njury to 

multiple victims has been cited several times by this Court as supporting 

enhanced and consecutive sentences”); Gilliam v. State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2009) (stating “a single aggravating circumstance may justify the 

imposition of consecutive sentences” and “[t]he presence of multiple victims is 

one such aggravating circumstance”). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1506-CR-551 | August 11, 2016 Page 21 of 21

[32] Based on the trial court’s comments that multiple victims justified consecutive 

sentences, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in sentencing Dowdy to 

consecutive terms. See Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering consecutive 

sentences and noting the court’s support for its decision to impose consecutive 

sentences included that there had been two murder victims), trans. denied. 

Conclusion

[33] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Dowdy’s convictions and sentence for 

murder and attempted murder. 

[34] Affirmed. 

Baker, J., and May, J., concur.