Reversed and Rendered and Opinion Filed February 17, 2017 

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In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-16-00691-CV THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, Appellant V. THE SUDER FOUNDATION, Appellee On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-08295 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Whitehill This is a special appearance interlocutory ap peal arising from a contractual arrangement between a Texas private foundation and a foreign st ate public university. Th e pivotal question is whether the university’s communications with Texas residents and attendance at various meetings in Texas due to that contractual relationship suppor t specific jurisd iction over the university in this case based on that contractual arrangement. In two issues, the University of Alabama (UA) urges that the trial court erred in denying its special appearance in this suit filed by the Suder Founda tion (the Foundation) because (i) UA did not commit any acts that constitute purposeful availment in this state and the Foundation’s claims do not arise from or rela te to any activities conducted here and, regardless, exercising personal jurisdiction over it in this case would offend traditional notions of fair play and–2– substantial justice and (ii) ther e is legally or factually insuffi cient evidence supporting the trial court’s order. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that (i) UA’s contac ts with Texas do not constitute the required minimum contacts and (ii) we thus need not consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Nor do we reach UA’s second issue. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying UA’s special appearance and render judgment dismissing the Foundation’ s claims against UA for lack of personal jurisdiction. I. Background A. The Parties UA is a public educational institution located in Alabama. The Foundation, a private Texas non-profit orga nization, runs the First Scholars Program (the Program). The Program “is administered on the campuses of select four-year major public universities,” and provides “start -up and early-stage funding,” schol arship support, and resources to affiliate universities for use on participating campuses across the United States. The Program is intended to support the success of first generation college students at participating universities. B. The Contractual Relationship Giving Rise to the Lawsuit In 2009, UA employee Kim Gentry called Dianne Schorr, the Foundation’s executive director, to learn more about the Program. The discussion included UA’s involvement with another first generation st udent program and UA’s plans for fu ture funding. Gentry said UA was “really open” about future funding opportunities. In January 2010, Gentry sent the Foundation a le tter expressing an interest in future first generation college student oppor tunities with the Foundation.–3– A month later, the Foundati on published a request for pro posals in various national educational periodicals seeking applications for participation in the Program. Schorr also mailed the RFP to about sixty universities, including UA. After Gentry called Schorr at the Foundati on’s Texas phone number to ask about the RFP, UA sent its application to the Foundation’s Texas address. The application identified a number of proposed UA actions and initiatives, all of which we re to occur on UA’s Alabama campus. The proposed budget requ ested funds for UA personnel an d UA operating costs such as office equipment and travel to the Program ’s “pilot sites” in Kentucky and Utah. The Foundation called UA in Alabama to ask a bout the application. Later, Schorr called Gentry to tell her that UA was one of two univers ities selected to participate in the Program. The goal was to establish and implement the Program “on the campus of [UA].” To facilitate that goal, the Founda tion expected that UA would: (i ) institute a “living learning community” at the UA campus in Alabama, (ii) provide individual gui dance to students in Alabama, (iii) provide social and cultural events for students in Alabama, (iv) create a planning team comprised of faculty and staff in Alabama, and (v) establish a “str ategic partners team” which was to include “key campus partners” to s upport the Program. Between June 2010 and July 2014, UA and the Foundation entered into six contracts to implement the Program (the Agreements). None of the Agreements were negotiated in Texas. 1 Throughout their five-year relationship, the parties communicated by email and telephone. In addition, UA representatives made seven trips to Texas to meet with other Program participants and the Foundation for tr aining, fundraising and de velopment, strategy

1 The Agreements include the Planning Grant Ag reement, The Affiliate Agreement, and four addenda to the Affiliate Agreement. Th e addenda, executed between June 2012 and July 2014, increased UA’s responsibilities, but none were required to occur in Texas.–4– development, and a “stewardship” visit. But nothing in the Agreements requires UA to travel to Texas, and the Foundation admits that holding events in Texas was simply its preference. In September 2015, UA notified the Foundation th at it would no longer participate in the Program. In response, the Foundation init iated this Texas st ate court lawsuit. C. Trial Court Proceedings The Foundation’s petition alleges specific pe rsonal jurisdiction ove r UA under the Texas Long-Arm statute and includes breach of contract , anticipatory breach, promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. Specifically, the F oundation asserts that UA breached the Agreements by failing to submit various required data, update tracking systems, participate in various group calls, and attend a conference in February 2015. According to the Foundation, the parties’ relationship was to continue in perpetuity. UA filed a special appearance and motion to dism iss for lack of jurisdiction. The special appearance was subsequently amended and attached: (i) the Agreements and addenda, (ii) an affidavit, (iii) deposition excerpts, (iv) several emails, and (v) calendar entries and other assorted attachments. The Foundation responded and filed three suppor ting affidavits, deposition excerpts from two UA representatives, and documen ts produced by the parties. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied UA’s sp ecial appearance. This interlocutory appeal followed. II. Analysis A. Appellant’s First Issue: Did the trial court err by determ ining that it had personal jurisdiction over UA? 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law Whether a court can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresiden t is a question of law. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc. , 301 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2010). We thus review de novo a trial–5– court’s order granting or de nying a special appearance. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg , 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex. 2007). However, the exercise of personal jurisdiction requires the trial court to resolve any factual disputes before applyi ng the jurisdictional formula. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc., v. Coleman , 83 S.W.3d 801, 805–06 (Tex. 2002). When, as here, the trial court does not file findings of fact and conclusions of law in suppo rt of its special appearance ruling, we infer all facts necessary to supp ort the judgment and s upported by the evidence. Id. Once all factual disputes are resolved, we examine de novo whet her the facts negate all bases for personal jurisdiction. Am. Type Culture , 83 S.W.3d at 806

. Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdic tion over a nonresident defendant only if (i) the Texas long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction and (ii) the jurisdiction satisfies constitutional due-process guarantees. Id . Our long-arm statute allows jurisdiction over a nonresident that does bu siness in Texas. T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C ODE § 17.042. That statute includes a list of acts that may constitute doing bu siness in this state, including contracting with a Texas resident where either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in Texas or committing a tort in whole or in part in Texas. Id . § 17.042(1), (2) (emphasis added). The “broad doing-business language allows the statute to reach as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow.” Moki Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 575. Constitutional due process permits a state to ex ercise jurisdiction only when a nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum, purposeful c ontact with the state, and the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend trad itional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Stull v. LaPlant , 411 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). Texas special appearance law dictates that th e plaintiff and the defendant bear shifting burdens of proof in a pers onal jurisdiction challenge. Id .; T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 120a. The plaintiff–6– bears the initial burden to plead sufficient a llegations to invoke juri sdiction under the Texas long-arm statute. Moki Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 574. If the plainti ff pleads sufficien t jurisdictional allegations, then a defendant who contests the tria l court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction bears the burden of negating all bases of ju risdiction alleged by the plaintiff. Id

. We focus on two prongs when considering spec ific jurisdiction: (i) purposeful availment and (ii) relatedness. See Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co ., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. 2009). Purposeful availment is the touchst one of jurisdictional due process. Michiana Easy
Livin ’ Country, Inc. v. Holten , 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005). T hus, it is “essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking th e benefits and protections of its laws.” Id . ( quoting Hanson v. Denckla , 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). The purposeful availment prong analyzes (i) the defendant’s own actions but not the unilateral activity of another part y; (ii) whether the defendant’s actions were purposeful rather than random, isolated, or fortuitous; and (iii) whether the defendant sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of th e privilege of doing business in Texas. Jani–King Franchising Inc. v. Falco Franchising, S.A. , No. 05–15–00335–CV, 2016 WL 2609314, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 5, 2016, no pet.) (citing Michiana , 168 S.W.3d at 785). The defendant’s activities must justify a conclusionthat the defendant c ould reasonably anticipate being called into a Texas court. Am. Type Culture , 83 S.W.3d at 806 ( citing World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The “quality and nature of the defendant’s contacts, rather than their number” governs the inquiry in the minimum contacts analysis. Id

.–7– The “relatedness” prong analyzes the rela tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Searcy v. Parex Res., Inc. , 496 S.W.3d 58, 67 (Tex. 2016). Courts may exercise specific jurisdiction when the defendant’s forum contacts are “isolated or sporadic” only if the plaintiff’s cause of action arises from or relates to those contacts. 2 TV Azteca v. Ruiz , 490 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. 2016); Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom , 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013). Thus, for a nonresident de fendant’s forum contacts to s upport an exercise of specific jurisdiction, there must be a “substantial c onnection between those co ntacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” Cornerstone Healthcare Grp. v. Nautic Management, VI L.P . 493 S.W.3d 65, 73–74 (Tex. 2016); Moncrief Oil , 414 S.W.3d at 156. “The operative facts are those on which the tr ial will focus to prove the liability of the defendant who is chal lenging jurisdiction.” Leonard v. Salinas Concrete, LP , 470 S.W.3d 178, 188 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). Therefore, we analyze the defendant’s contacts “on a claim by claim basis” to determine whether each claim arises out of or is related to the defendant’s minimum contacts. TV Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 37. 3 But in so doing, we must not confuse “the roles of judge a nd jury by equating the jurisdicti onal inquiry with the underlying merits.” See Michiana , 168 S.W.3d at 790. Applying the above principles, we must dete rmine whether a Texas court may properly exercise specific jurisdiction over UA in this case. In addition to the Agreements, the Foundation relies on email, phone calls, travel to Texas, and UA’s transmission of data from Alabama to Texas as sufficient minimum contacts to establish jurisdiction in this state. The Foundation also assigns weight to UA’s initia l telephone inquiry about the Program. As discussed below, we conclude that these contact s do not support specific jurisdiction over UA.

2 “Continuous and systematic” contacts are general jurisdiction concepts, see Tv Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 37, and general jurisdiction is not at issue here. 3 Here, all of the claims sound in cont ract, so the analysis is the same.–8– 2. Purposeful Availment Among other things, the Foundation relies on several emails and letters exchanged between UA and the Foundation over five years as a basis for jurisdiction. 4 Both parties initiated these communications throughout the five year relationship. UA knew the Foundation was located in Texas when UA was initiating communicat ions with it. For example, Jessica Franks, UA’s Program coordinator, and Leslie Aberna thy, UA’s Director of Corporate and Foundation Relations, would contact the Foundation to transm it data, report on students’ progress, and seek input, guidance, and expertise regarding the Progr am. Franks also regul arly participated in Program working groups by phone or teleconference. For four years, Franks met with one such group once or twice a month, and the Foundation moderated these te leconferences from Texas. During the same time period, Abernathy particip ated in teleconferen ces with a group of affiliate university development representati ves, which calls were moderated by a Foundation staff member. These calls i nvolved discussing Program highli ghts and fundraising strategies, and Abernathy believed that UA wa s contractually obligated to part icipate in them. None of the participating affiliate universities, ho wever, were located in Texas. In the beginning, the group calls between UA, the Foundation, and other Program participants were initiated from the Foundation’s Texas offi ce. This changed as more universities participated in th e Program, and by 2010, the parties us ed call-in services for group calls. The call-in numbers for these services did not use numbers associated with Texas. It is undisputed that the telephone calls, vide oconferences, letters, and emails related to the Agreements. But, as the following cases dem onstrate, these communications do not establish minimum contacts. See KC Smash 01, LLC v. Gerdes, Hendrichson, Ltd, L.L.P ., 384 S.W.3d

4 The parties disagree as to the exact number. But it is the “quality not quantity” of contacts that determines the sufficiency of a nonresident’s contacts with Texas. Televentures, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech ., 12 S.W.3d 900, 912 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied).–9– 389, 393 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (contacts via phone and email and “the sending of payments” to a party in Texas were not c ontacts demonstrating purposeful availment); Olympia Capital Assoc., L.P. v. Jackson , 247 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (“The existence of a contract between the nonresiden t defendant and a resident of the forum and engaging in communications rela ted to the execution and performance of that contract are insufficient to establish the mi nimum contacts necessary to s upport the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over th e nonresident defendant.”); Alenia Spazio, S.p.A. v. Reid , 130 S.W.3d 201, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied ) (“numerous telephone and facsimile communications with people in Texas re lating to an alleged cont ract do not establish minimum contacts”)

. Likewise, sending data to Texas does not establish sufficient contact with the forum. See 2007 E. Meadows, L.P. v. RCM Phoenix Partners, L.L.C. , 310 S.W.3d 199, 205 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2010, pet. denied) (sending monthly rent rolls and due diligence to Texas insufficient minimum contacts). UA, however, argues that ma ny of the Agreements required UA to provide the Foundation with various information, includi ng mid and year end re ports, data concerning student Program participants, budget expens e forms and expense reports, and mentor information. This argument ignores the fact that all of this data was prepared in Alabama before it was transmitted to Texas, and the data concer ned activity on the UA campus in Alabama. In other words, the data concerned UA’s perf ormance of the contract in Alabama. Moreover, some of the data was sent to the Foundation’s outside consulting firm to analyze before they sent it to the Foundation in Texas. The principals of this consulting firm were, at various times, located in Utah, Ohio, and Iowa. These data transmissions were just anothe r mode of communicating between UA and the Foundation, which happened to be located in Texas, and jurisdiction should not be determined by–10– the fortuitous location of the Texas resident when the nonres ident communicates with them. Bryan v. Gordon , 384 S.W.3d 908, 916-17 (Tex. App.—Hous ton [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The Foundation also relies on UA’s seven trips to Texas to meet with representatives from other universities participating in th e Program. These trips include: (i) a 2010 developmental meeting with the Foundation and ot her Program participants; (ii) multiple day training sessions in 2012 and 2013; (iii) a cele bratory event attended by the Foundation and other Program participants; (iv) a 2013 visit from two UA official s to meet Eric Suder, the Foundation’s president; (v) a tw o-day 2013 meeting attended by othe r Program participants; and (vi) a 2014 strategic initiatives meeting. But the Agreements do not requi re UA representatives to tr avel to Texas, nor was UA ever informed that Texas travel would be required. And, the Foundation admits that holding events in Texas was simply a matter of preference. Furthermore, the contract-relat ed travel did not always invo lve UA traveling to Texas. Foundation personnel also traveledto UA’s Alabama campus five to seven times during the parties’ relationship. One 2014 event was held at the Univ ersity of Kentucky campus in Lexington, Kentucky. Finally, the Foundation relies on the parties’ contractual rela tionship itself as a basis for jurisdiction. It argues that UA first “reached out” to the Foundation to inquire about the Program, transmitted the signed Agreements, partially performable in Texas, to Texas, and received over $1,000,000 in funding from a Texas entity. The Foundation also claims that by entering into this contractual relationship that was allegedly to continue “in perpetuity,” UA purposefully availed itself of th e privilege of conducting activi ties in Texas. We disagree. Contracting with a Texas residents does not of itself constitute purposeful availment. Ahrens v. DeAngelli, P.L.L.C. v. Flinn , 318 S.W.3d 474, 484 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet.–11– denied); Counter Intelligence, Inc. v. Calypso Water Jet Sys., Inc. , 216 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). Instead, a contract’s significance in our minimum contacts analysis turns on (i) prior negotiations; (ii) contem plated future consequences; (iii) terms of the contract; and (iv) the actual course of dealing. See Gustafson v. Provider HealthNet Servs., Inc ., 118 S.W.3d 479, 483 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) ( citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985)). Even a sustained contra ctual relationship with a Texas resident does not support the exercise of jurisdiction if th e contract is centered around the nonresident’s “operations outside Texas.” McFadin v. Gerber , 587 F.3d 753,760 (5th Cir. 2009). The Agreements at issue here were not negotiated. Rather, th ey were entered into after the Foundation solicited RFP’s on a nationwide basis and UA responded. While UA may have contacted the Foundation to genera lly inquire about the Program prior to the RFP, the parties’ contractual relationship did not resu lt from this initial contact. T hus, parties’ the pre-contractual relationship does not weigh heavily in our analysis. The Agreement’s terms and the parties’ pe rformance, however, ar e instructive here. According to the Foundation, the Agreement’s purpose was to establish and implement the Program “on the campus of the University of Alabama.” The Foundation awarded approximately $1,000,000 in scholarships for UA stude nts, who were expected to reside on campus in Alabama. Indeed, the Program’s focus pertaining to UA was first generation UA college students, and the activities identified by UA in its RFP were all to be performed on UA’s campus in Alabama. These activities included: (i) utilizing a UA-based program coordinator and graduate assistant; (ii) providing a “living l earning community” for students on campus; (iii) freshman and individual tutoring; (iv) customi zed orientation and a special class; (iv) and utilization of a UA core planning team.–12– Under the initial agreement, the Planning Grant agreement, the Foundation provided a $60,000 grant to UA, which was obligated to:

 engage campus departments in developing the Program on UA’s campus,

 participate in calls with representatives from the Foundation and other Program sites,

 visit the University of Kentucky and the University of Iowa for insight and information concerning the Program, and

 collaborate with other Program sites and the outside data cons ultants located in Iowa and Utah. UA also agreed to refine and develop material s for the Program and provide the Foundation with its work product, including sample documen ts, policies, procedures and strategies. Although UA agreed to indemnify the F oundation under Alabama law, there was no choice of law provision in the Planning Grant Agreement or any of the other Agreements. In addition, the Foundation does not identify, nor do we discern, any express contractual provision requiring UA to perform in Texas. The Affiliate Agreement provided add itional funding for scholarships and UA’s operation of the Program. The Affiliate Agreement further provided that the Foundation and “one or more [affiliate] universities could visit the UA campus for “training and/or collaborative work session[s].” Other than funds for travel to Colorado a nd Kentucky, the operating costs identified in the Affiliate Agreement were to be expended at UA’s campus in Alabama. An additional $82,000 was designated to help UA create an on-cam pus infrastructure to support its student participants.–13– The Affiliate Agreement also specified the re sponsibilities of UA’s Program Coordinator, Jessica Franks. Franks was required to: (i) mana ge the Program at UA, (ii) create a welcoming atmosphere for student participants; (iii) work with students, admissions, scholarships, and financial aid offices; and (iv) participate in st atus calls with the Foundation and other Program participants. Thus, the Agreements established that the f unding which forms the basis of the parties’ relationship was intended to be, and was, primarily spent in Alabama. UA’s contractual obligations to develop the Program, participate in calls and collaborat e with other Program participants and outside data co nsultants were primarily to be performed in Alabama. Other than travel funds for visiting other non-Texas based Program participants, the operating costs identified in the Agreements were to be expende d in Alabama. Thus, UA’s contract performance was substantially in Alabama, and the parties’ contractual relationship wa s centered in Alabama, not Texas. These circumstances do not establish “purposeful availment.” See Guardian Royal Exc. Assn., Ltd. v. English China Clays , P.L.C. , 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). The Foundation does not dispute that there was at least partial performance in Alabama, but it insists that UA was also obligated “to assist in the development of the Texas-based Foundation’s nationalprogram” and to provide the Foundation with data “to promote its larger nationwide mission.” (Emphasis added) . This national focus, how ever, underscores that the contractual relationship was not Texas-centered. The Foundation also argues that the emails, Te xas travel, phone calls , and other “singular connections to Texas” cannot be viewed in is olation, and collectively demonstrate “continuing and wide-reaching contacts” in an “ongoing business relationship.” See Burger King , 471 U.S. at 480; Texva , 300 S.W.3d at 887. But, as discussed below, this argument ignores that there is no–14– “substantial connection between th ese contacts and the operative facts of the litigation.” Moki
Mac , 221 S.W.3d at 585. 3. Relatedness The Foundation contends that the litigation is related to Texas because its “claim regarding breaches of the Agreements arises from [UA’s] failure to perform under those agreements in Texas.” We disagree. The analysis of whether a cause of action is related to the defendant’s activities in the forum focuses on the defendant’s activities ra ther than the plaintiff’s residence. Tv Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 42. UA’s Texas contacts must be more than the “ra ndom, fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts it made by interacting with an entity in this state. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014); Burger King , 471 U.S. at 475. Here, the litigation involves UA’s alleged breach of contract and related claims. Specifically, the Foundation argues that UA breached the Agreements by failing to (i) send the Foundation a 2014 mid-year report, (ii) send the UA coordinator to attend a Texas conference, (iii) participate in monthly calls with the F oundation, and (iv) submit posts to the Foundation for its national website. Yet none of these activities were co ntractually required to be performed in
Texas. Thus, the Foundation’s relatedness argument relies on an erroneous premise—that the above actions were “Texas focused obligations.” We have already c oncluded, however, that UA’s contractual obligations, when specified, were to be performed in Alabama. Because performance was to occur in Alabama, it follows that any alleged breach would occur there as well. See Televentures, 12 S.W.3d at 910 (breach occurs where party fails to perform); see also Ashdon, Inc. v. Gary Brown & Assocs., Inc ., 260 S.W.3d 101, 113 (Te x. App.—Houston [1st–15– Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (contract calling for nonres ident’s performance outside Texas will not subject nonresident to jurisdiction here). In an effort to demonstrate that the contract was performable in Texas, the Foundation asserts that the Texas location of the Foundati on and its employees is significant. But our analysis focuses on the defenda nt’s activities rather than the plaintiff’s residence. Tv Azteca , 490 S.W.3d at 42. UA’s Texas activities included p hone calls, emails, and transmitting to Texas and Texas visits. None of these activities, however, are related to the operative facts of the Foundation’s claims and would not be the trial’s focus. See id . at 53. Instead, the trial would focus on whether UA’s performance in Alabama failed. Therefore, we conclude that the litigation does not arise out of or relate to UA’s activities in Texas. See Asshauer v. Glimcher Realty Trust , 228 S.W.3d 922, 932–33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). 4. Fair Play and Substantial Justice Because we conclude that the Foundation does not have the required minimum contacts with Texas, we need not consider whether the assertion of jurisd iction over UA would be consistent with traditiona l notions of fair play and substa ntial justice. Crossroads Financial , LLC v. A.D.I.M Global Co. Ltd ., No. 05-16-00486-CV, 2016 WL 7220970, at *10, n.10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 13, 2016, no pet.); Olympia Cap. Assoc., L.P. v. Jackson , 247 S.W.3d 399, 422 n.8 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). B. Appellant’s Second Issue: Is the evidence le gally and factually sufficient to support the order? Because our disposition of appellant’s first i ssue disposes of the case, we need not and do not reach its second issue. III. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above , we conclude that the tria l court erred in denying UA’s special appearance because UA negated the Foundatio n’s alleged bases of sp ecific jurisdiction.–16– We thus resolve UA’s sole issue in its favor, re verse the trial court’s order denying UA’s special appearance, and render judgment dismissing the Foundation’s claims agai nst it for lack of personal jurisdiction.

160691F.P05 /Bill Whitehill/ BILL WHITEHILL JUSTICE–17– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA, Appellant No. 05-16-00691-CV V. THE SUDER FOUNDATION, Appellee On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-08295. Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill. Justices Lang and Brown participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of th is date, the order of the trial court is REVERSED and judgment is RENDERED dismissing the THE SUDER FOUNDATION’s claims against THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAM A for want of personal jurisdiction.

It is ORDERED that appellant THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA recover its costs of this appeal from appellee THE SUDER FOUNDATION.
Judgment entered February 17, 2017.