Affirmed; Opinion Filed January 15, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-01262-CR

ANTHONY PAZ TORRES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-76860-P

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Evans

Opinion by Justice Evans

Appellant Anthony Paz Torres appeals from the judgment adjudicating him guilty of 

murder. In three issues, appellant asserts: (1) the evidence was insufficient to disprove that 

appellant acted in self-defense; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that appellant acted 

with the requisite mental state for murder; and (3) the trial court erred in speculating that the mental 

health provider would inform parole officials that appellant was compliant in taking antipsychotic 

medication. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

A. December 17, 2015

Mahar Yousaf, an employee at Omar’s Wheels and Tires, was working on December 17, 

2015 when appellant came into the shop wearing a yarmulke. Appellant stated that he needed air 

and the employees told him to help himself. Appellant began cursing and saying things like “what 
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are you doing here, you Muslims.” Someone at the tire shop called the police. Evan Amine, an 

employee at the shop, told appellant to leave and “C-Bo,” another employee, exchanged words 

with and kicked appellant as he was backing up. Appellant continued to curse and back up. Yousaf 

did not see anyone with a weapon. C-Bo and appellant almost got into a fight and Amine took a 

photo of appellant’s license plate.

Sabrina Vanegas, a Dallas police officer, was dispatched to the tire shop on December 17, 

2015 because a man had caused a disturbance. Officer Vanegas spoke with a witness at the tire 

shop, identified appellant’s address from his license plate, and drove to appellant’s house. When 

asked if he said anything about Muslims, appellant replied:

I just told them that I’m Jewish, I’m Christian. They started talking shit to me, man. 

I told them I’m Jewish, I’m Christian; Christians and Jews we’re united. And I 

simply told them that Muslims are here in this country prospering off of Christians 

but Christians and Jews can’t live in their country. 

Appellant said he did not provoke the employees but they got mad at him because he was Jewish. 

Appellant said the employees attacked him and kicked him in the head. The officers advised 

appellant not to go back to the tire shop and appellant said he would not.

B. December 24, 2015

Bryan Vazquez, an employee, was at the tire shop on December 24, 2015 and interacted 

with appellant. Appellant asked Vazquez if the air was free and Vazquez said it was. Vazquez 

then went to put air in his tire but appellant ignored him and walked into the main building. 

Vazquez saw appellant pacing back and forth before he pulled his gun and started shooting. 

Vasquez was shot on the side of his back. He testified that Amine did not pull a gun on appellant. 

He also noted that the shop has many cameras but not all of them were working due to remodeling 

at the shop. Benigo Cuevas was also at Omar’s shop on December 24, 2015 and identified 

appellant as the shooter. Cuevas testified that he heard Amine tell appellant to leave and appellant 
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“started shooting crazy.” Cuevas did not see Amine with a gun or see anyone else shooting towards 

appellant. 

Rene Rangel, Enrique Garcia Mendoza, and Luis Alberto Morales Lopez went to Omar’s 

Wheels and Tires to get tires on December 24, 2015. Rangel parked next to the shop’s office. 

Mendoza sat in the passenger front seat of the car and Lopez sat in the back. They were waiting 

outside when a man began shooting toward the shop’s employees. Appellant shot through 

Rangel’s rear windshield hitting Mendoza in the back of the neck. Rangel identified appellant as 

the shooter. Rangel testified that Omar shot back at appellant after appellant tried to take off from 

the tire shop. In addition, Yousaf was shot several times and sustained serious injuries.

Amine recognized appellant from his prior visit and told Omar to be careful. Omar went 

up to appellant and offered to help him. Appellant asked about getting air and told Omar he was 

looking for the “bald headed guy.” Omar testified that it clicked in his head that this was the guy 

from the prior week and he understood that appellant was asking about C-Bo. Omar did not have 

his gun on him because he had left it in his truck. Omar testified that he was the only one who 

carried a gun at the shop and that there were no other weapons there. Appellant wandered into the 

back of the shop where the employees worked and Omar and Amine escorted him out. After Omar 

asked appellant to leave, Omar saw him touch the gun at his waistband. Omar called 911, picked 

up a sledgehammer because he was “scared for his life,” and walked away from appellant. Omar 

walked toward his truck to get his gun. Appellant was in the parking lot walking back and forth 

when he started shooting toward the shop. When appellant began shooting, Omar testified that no 

one had acted aggressively toward him or aimed a gun at him. In addition, Omar stated that no 

one threatened to shoot, stab or hit appellant prior to the shooting nor did Omar threaten appellant 

with the sledgehammer. Omar started shooting back at appellant when appellant jumped into his 

car. Omar testified that appellant tried to reload his gun but once Omar began shooting, appellant 
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drove off and almost hit him with his car. Omar fired at appellant but did not fire toward Rangel’s 

car. Although the shop has many security cameras, the surveillance system did not record the 

shooting of the victim. Omar does not know how the security footage lost minutes of a recording 

but he did not delete the footage nor did anyone touch the surveillance system until the detectives 

came to the shop and asked about it. 

Alex Brinkley, an officer with the police department at Baylor Hospital, was working in

the emergency room waiting room on December 24, 2015. Someone informed Brinkley that a 

man outside had been shot. Brinkley went outside and saw a Chevrolet sedan with bullet holes on 

the front driver’s side, but appellant had already gone inside. He recalled seeing a Glock handgun 

magazine laying in the car. Brinkley also saw a leather handgun holster on appellant’s body. 

Detective Abe Santiago, a retired crime scene investigator with the Dallas police department, was 

dispatched to Baylor Hospital on December 24, 2015. Santiago photographed appellant as well as 

appellant’s car, a 2011 Chevrolet, and the Glock on the passenger seat floorboard. 

C. Trial

At trial, Dr. Candace Shoppe, a forensic pathologist at the Dallas County Medical 

Examiner’s Office, testified that she performed Mendoza’s autopsy and concluded that he died 

from a gunshot wound. Dr. Shoppe recovered the bullet core from Mendoza’s neck. April 

Kendrick, the firearm supervisor at the Southwest Institute of Forensic Sciences, testified at trial 

that she analyzed evidence for this case including two firearms, magazines, fired cartridge cases 

and fired bullets. Kendrick reviewed the fired cartridge casings and concluded that many of the 

casings were fired by appellant’s Glock semiautomatic pistol. Kendrick also reviewed other 

casings fired by another Glock pistol. Kendrick did not match the bullets to the guns.

Derick Chaney, a detective with the Dallas police department, was assigned to the murder 

investigation at the tire shop. Detective Leonard retrieved the surveillance video from the shop 
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and Detective Chaney did not see Detective Leonard delete any footage. Detective Chaney

testified that he was aware that some of the videos skipped and were missing time but that the 

missing time did not change his conclusions in the case. 

Following the trial, the jury found appellant guilty of murder as charged in the indictment. 

The trial court sentenced appellant to thirty-five years’ confinement in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. 

ANALYSIS

D. Sufficiency of Self-Defense and Requisite Mental State

In his first two issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to (1) disprove 

that he acted in self-defense and (2) establish that he acted with the requisite mental state for 

murder.

1. Standard of review

When reviewing whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support a criminal 

conviction, the standard of review we apply is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard tasks the factfinder 

with resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable 

inferences from basic facts. Id. On appeal, reviewing courts determine whether the necessary 

inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. 

In evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence in the context of a self-defense issue, we 

apply the general sufficiency review principles along with sufficiency principles specific to selfdefense. Gilbert v. State, 575 S.W.3d 848, 862 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d). When 
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there is a claim of self-defense or defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce evidence 

supporting the defense while the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the raised issues. 

Id. The defendant must produce some evidence that would support a rational finding in his favor 

on the defensive issue. Id. As with the general sufficiency principles, the trier of fact is the sole 

judge of the credibility of defensive evidence, and is free to accept it or reject it. Id. 

2. Murder

A person commits murder if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an 

individual; or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to 

human life that causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1) and (2). 

3. Self-defense

Appellant argues that he acted reasonably in determining that it was necessary to defend 

himself based on the events at the tire shop on December 17 and 24, 2015, and the evidence was 

insufficient to disprove that he acted in self-defense. Pursuant to the penal code, a person is 

justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the 

force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of 

unlawful force. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). A person is justified in using deadly force against 

another if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31 and when 

and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary. See 

TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.32(a).1 

 

1 Section 9.31 of the Texas Penal Code provides as follows: 

The actor’s belief that the force was immediately necessary as described by this subsection is 

presumed to be reasonable if the actor:

(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used:
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The evidence demonstrates that appellant provoked the altercation on December 17, 2015. 

Appellant entered the tire shop and began cursing and saying things like “what are you doing here, 

you Muslims.” After appellant was told to leave and failed to do so, C-Bo exchanged words with 

appellant and kicked him. The police advised appellant to stay away from the shop but appellant 

returned on December 24, 2015. Appellant asked for C-Bo and wandered into the employee work 

area. Omar asked appellant to leave but appellant continued to pace in the parking lot before 

pulling out a gun and firing toward the shop employees hitting Mendoza, Vasquez, and Mahar. 

Several witnesses testified that no one acted aggressively toward appellant or aimed a gun at him 

prior to the shooting by appellant. Witnesses also testified that Omar only shot at appellant after 

he had begun shooting toward the employees. Thus, the evidence does not suggest that anyone

threatened appellant with the use of deadly force at the time appellant began shooting. 

In addition, there is no evidence that Mendoza was appellant’s intended target. Mendoza 

was an unarmed customer with his back toward appellant seated in his friend’s car next to the tire 

shop’s office. Appellant does not argue Mendoza presented any threat of force against appellant, 

nor would the record support such an argument because all the evidence is that Mendoza sat in the 

car with his back toward appellant. Under the principle known as transferred intent, appellant is 

criminally responsible for causing Mendoza’s death because the only difference between what 

 

(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with 

force, the actor’s occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;

(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with 

force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual 

assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery;

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and

(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a 

violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.
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actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked, is that a different person was 

injured, harmed, or otherwise affected. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(b)(2); Manrique v. State, 

994 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Texas law also provides that even if appellant was 

justified in using deadly force against one of the tire shop employees, justification is unavailable 

in a prosecution for the reckless injury or killing of an innocent third person. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE § 9.05 (“Even though an actor is justified under this chapter in threatening or using force or 

deadly force against another, if in doing so he also recklessly injures or kills an innocent third 

person, the justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in a prosecution for the reckless 

injury or killing of the innocent third person.”). Thus, even if the evidence were to demonstrate 

that appellant was justified in using deadly force against one of the tire shop employees, which it 

does not, appellant would not be entitled to the use of self-defense as justification for killing 

Mendoza. See Banks v. State, 955 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.). For 

all these reasons, we overrule appellant’s first issue.

3. Requisite mental state

Appellant argues that (1) the jury charge should have included an “accident” justification

instruction because Mendoza was not appellant’s intended target; and (2) appellant’s mental 

condition prevented him from acting intentionally or recklessly. As for appellant’s accident 

argument, the defense of accident no longer exists in the penal code. See Williams v. State, 630 

S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“There is no law and defense of accident in the present 

penal code, and the bench and bar would be well advised to avoid the term ‘accident’ in connection 

with offenses defined by the present penal code.”). Instead, the penal code provides that a “person 

commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or 

possession.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.02(a). “Voluntariness” within the meaning of section 

6.01(a) refers only to one’s physical bodily movements and means the absence of an accidental 
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act, omission or possession. See Alford v. State, 866 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In 

this case, the evidence demonstrates that appellant voluntarily pulled out a weapon and began 

firing toward the tire shop employees. In his second argument, appellant argues that his mental 

condition prevented him from acting intentionally or recklessly. Appellant, however, rested after 

the conclusion of the State’s case and did not call any witnesses or experts in support of his defense. 

Appellant failed to provide the jury with any evidence that he suffered from schizophrenia because 

this evidence was introduced only during the punishment phase of the trial. Accordingly, the jury 

could not have considered whether appellant’s diagnosis had any impact on his mental state when 

reaching its verdict. For all the reasons discussed above, we overrule appellant’s second issue. 

4. Sentencing Hearing

In his third issue, appellant argues that the “trial court erred in speculating that the mental 

health provider in the Institutional Division would inform parole officials that Appellant was 

compliant in taking antipsychotic medication.” Appellant asserts that his due process and statutory 

rights were violated because “the trial court used incorrect information that Appellant would parole 

eight to 11 years before completing his 35-year sentence on the successful management of his 

schizophrenia.” Generally, to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must present to the 

trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Appellant failed to raise this objection during the sentencing hearing. 

Accordingly, appellant has failed to preserve this argument for appellate review.
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CONCLUSION

We resolve appellant’s issues against him and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/David Evans/

DAVID EVANS

JUSTICE

Do Not Publish

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

181262F.U05
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ANTHONY PAZ TORRES, Appellant

No. 05-18-01262-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 203rd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F15-76860-P.

Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. 

Justices Molberg and Reichek participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 15th day of January, 2020.