NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0263n.06

No. 22-1587

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RODDRICK MONTEZ WILSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Roddrick Wilson was 

charged with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and with 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He conditionally pleaded guilty, 

reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence based on 

alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Because his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, 

we affirm.

I.

Around midnight on June 6, 2021, Grand Rapids Police Officer Ryan Manser was 

patrolling a residential area in a marked police vehicle. When he approached an intersection, 

Manser heard a car door slam to his right and turned to observe a man (later revealed to be Wilson)

in blue jeans and a t-shirt walking away from a black sedan. Wilson repeatedly looked over his 

shoulder at Manser’s vehicle and walked with his left hand swinging freely and right hand pinned 
No. 22-1587, United States v. Wilson

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to his side. Manser then turned right at the intersection and activated the spotlight on his vehicle 

to better observe Wilson. As soon as he did so, Wilson bolted, running down the block and through 

residential foliage to evade Manser, who then noticed a dark object in Willson’s right hand and 

suspected it was a firearm.

Manser pursued and, with the assistance of other officers, located Wilson hiding on the 

front porch of a house in the neighborhood. The officers took Wilson into custody, searched him,

and found an iPhone and a car key fob in his pockets. Manser then proceeded, with the assistance 

of a canine tracking Wilson’s scent, to search the area where Wilson ran through the foliage. 

Manser found a semiautomatic handgun, another cell phone, and a container of pills—then 

believed to be Adderall but later revealed to be methamphetamine. The officers placed Wilson 

under arrest.

Returning to the area where Manser had first heard a car door slam, the officers used the 

key fob seized from Wilson and found that it matched a black Mercedes Benz in that exact location. 

The officers ran a license plate check on the Mercedes and discovered the plate was registered to 

a different vehicle, one belonging to a woman named Kayla Shannon. They then checked the VIN 

number which was registered to a man named Victor Castillo. Because Wilson was under arrest 

and because the vehicle was not registered to him and had illegitimate license plates, police

impounded the vehicle. The officers therefore searched the vehicle prior to having it towed and 

found a large amount of cash, sets of other vehicle keys, and numerous peach-colored pills, similar 

to the pills found in the foliage.

Wilson was later charged in a seven-count indictment. He moved to suppress the evidence 

found in the vehicle, claiming the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied 

the motion. He pleaded guilty to two of the counts, one for possession with intent to distribute 500 
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3

grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and 

one for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). He reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and 

to withdraw his plea should he prevail on appeal. He now asks this court to reverse the district 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

II.

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 

536 (6th Cir. 2011). The movant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged search 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. 

III.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the “right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

CONST. amend IV. Generally, this right is secured by requiring law enforcement officers to obtain 

a warrant prior to conducting a search. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985). However, 

the Supreme Court has long recognized that some circumstances, including the search of an 

automobile and the inventorying of seized assets, obviate the need for a warrant provided the 

search is otherwise reasonable. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (automobile 

exception); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (inventory exception).

In one such circumstance, under what is known as the inventory exception, police may 

search and examine items seized as part of an inventory policy. See United States v. Smith, 510 

F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 2007). “It is settled law that the police may conduct an inventory search 

of an automobile that is being impounded without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” 
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United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith, 510 F.3d at 650). This

exception exists to allow police to protect items in their custody from theft or loss and to avoid 

danger arising from the seizure of potentially hazardous articles. Smith, 510 F.3d at 651. To pass 

the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, an inventory search must be conducted 

“according to standard police procedures.” Id. (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 5 (1990)). 

Law enforcement may not undertake an inventory search as a pretext for a criminal investigation. 

United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 2020). 

Another warrant exception, the so called “automobile exception,” allows law enforcement 

to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have “probable cause to believe that the vehicle 

contains evidence of a crime.” Smith, 510 F.3d at 647 (internal quotation omitted). Probable cause 

exists if, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a “fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 

(1983). Probable cause requires only “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima 

facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir. 

1998) (internal quotation omitted). Importantly, the automobile exception is not limited to cases 

where the car is immediately mobile, Carney, 471 U.S. at 391, or to items in plain view, United 

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 817-22 (1982). Rather, law enforcement may search a vehicle and 

the containers therein provided the officers have probable cause to believe that the object of the 

search may reasonably be found in the vehicle or containers. Id. at 824.

These officers had two legitimate reasons to search Wilson’s vehicle without a warrant. 

Start with the inventory exception. Grand Rapid’s impoundment policy provides that officers 

“shall impound” a vehicle when “the driver was arrested and is not the owner.” The officers validly 

arrested Wilson for possession of contraband. After they located his vehicle with the key fob 
No. 22-1587, United States v. Wilson

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found in his pocket, they discovered that the vehicle was registered to someone else. Because they 

had arrested Wilson and he did not own the vehicle, they impounded the car and, per department 

policy, searched it prior to having it towed.

Wilson claims the officers did not follow department policy because they never saw him 

drive the vehicle. Because the policy authorizes impoundments when “the driver” is arrested, 

Wilson argues, the search was not pursuant to standardized criteria and therefore invalid under the 

Fourth Amendment. The district court rejected this argument, finding that Manser’s observation 

of Wilson walking away from the nigh-closed vehicle, combined with the key fob found on his 

person, sufficiently “attached” Wilson to the vehicle for the purposes of the impoundment policy. 

We agree. The officers could reasonably conclude that Wilson was the driver of the vehicle.

Wilson secondly argues that the real reason for the search was investigatory. He cites the 

cross-examination of an officer at the scene, who, when asked whether his “real reason for 

searching the car” was to look for evidence of a crime, simply responded, “Yes, sir.” While the 

Fourth Amendment certainly prohibits inventory searches that operate as a ruse for a criminal 

investigation, Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, we have previously rejected challenges to such searches based 

solely on the subjective motives of the officers—particularly when the inventory search was 

inevitable and objectively justifiable. See Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 636; United States v. Kimes, 246 

F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2001). The inventory search in this case was objectively justified by 

standardized police procedures and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Even if we were to conclude that the officers’ inventory search fell on the impermissible 

investigatory purpose side of the line, their search was valid under the automobile exception. The 

officers undoubtedly had probable cause to search Wilson’s vehicle. Manser first noticed Wilson 

when he heard a car door slam and saw him walking away from the black sedan. That initial 
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sighting, combined with the discovery of the key fob in Wilson’s pocket, supported a fair 

probability that Wilson had just exited the vehicle. Once the officers recovered both the firearm 

and drugs which Wilson had attempted to discard while fleeing, they accurately deduced that if 

Wilson had just exited the vehicle carrying contraband, it was likely that more could be found in 

the vehicle. The officer’s logic and conclusion were self-evidently reasonable.

Wilson makes much of the fact that Manser did not actually see him driving or exiting the 

vehicle. He argues that because the officers did not actually see him exit the vehicle and because 

he was not arrested in or near his vehicle, that the police did not have probable cause to search his 

vehicle. This argument is without merit. The probable cause inquiry looks to the totality of the 

circumstances, including what the officer heard. Considering what Manser heard and saw, we 

agree with the district court that sufficient evidence “attached” Wilson to the vehicle to support 

probable cause.

The officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and they did not violate Wilson’s 

Fourth Amendment rights. The district court therefore did not err in refusing to suppress the fruits 

of the search.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.