In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-19-00378-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2

Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. CV-2017-00827

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS SYSTEM, Appellant

V.

LISA BARRINGER, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal,1 Appellant University of North Texas 

System appeals the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction in this agediscrimination and retaliation case brought by Appellee Lisa Barringer. In four issues, 

UNT argues that the trial court erred by denying its plea because (1) Barringer did not 

suffer an adverse employment action, (2) Barringer failed to establish she was replaced 

or treated disparately, (3) Barringer failed to establish an adverse employment action 

or a causal connection between her supervisor’s knowledge of any alleged protected 

activity by her and the reason she left UNT’s employment, and (4) Barringer did not 

present sufficient evidence of pretext by UNT. Because we conclude that the 

jurisdictional evidence proves that Barringer resigned of her own free will and that she 

was not constructively discharged, we reverse the trial court’s order denying UNT’s 

plea to the jurisdiction and render judgment that this case be dismissed for want of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. 

II. BACKGROUND

Barringer, who at the time this suit was filed was fifty-one years old, began 

working for UNT in March 2013 as its sole human resources (HR) project manager. 

1See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8); Tex. R. App. P. 28.1(a). 
3

Barringer’s duties initially included various HR compliance and technology projects, 

but later, she was also assigned projects involving HR administrative responsibilities. 

According to Barringer, she had always received “an overall rating of exceeding 

expectations” on her informal and formal performance reviews. Initially, Barringer 

reported to either Alan Clemson or Steve Sosland, but in November 2014, Luis Lewin 

became Barringer’s direct supervisor. 

By Barringer’s account, no later than early 2015, Lewin transferred his 

executive assistant, Louise Hall, who was over seventy years old at the time, to 

another position under one of his subordinates for the purpose of terminating Hall’s 

employment. Afterward, Lewin hired Addyson Green, an individual under thirty 

years of age, to replace Hall. Lewin allegedly then began to assign Green 

administrative projects and duties that had traditionally been Barringer’s 

responsibilities. He also began to remove most of Barringer’s compliance and 

technology projects from her and assign them to other employees. 

Barringer contended that she sought direction from Lewin regarding her work 

on human resources compliance and technology projects, but that Lewin was “noncommunicative with respect to her request for assistance . . . to the point of absolutely 

ignoring her.” Barringer claims that she complained to UNT’s HR representatives 

about Lewin, but she was afforded no remedy. On August 12, 2016, as she was 

seeking assistance from him regarding a project she was working on, Lewin 

confronted Barringer. According to Barringer, Lewin subjected her to a “harangue” 
4

that included Lewin’s allegations that she had been inadequately performing her duties 

for the prior six months and that she was not well liked by other employees. During 

this encounter, Lewin allegedly also “threatened” her with administrative leave and an 

investigation based on complaints by others regarding her performance as copresenter of a recent HR workshop. 

Barringer pleaded that “[i]n the face of Lewin’s unjustified threat of 

administrative leave, investigation and discipline and threat of termination only, and 

for no other reason, [she] was constructively discharged from her position.” 

Specifically, Barringer alleged that she had to quit “with good cause” because she was 

dissatisfied with Lewin’s lack of communication and feedback and because he had 

made false claims of her inadequate performance. Afterward, Lewin allegedly 

eliminated Barringer’s position, hired an assistant for Green (who is also under the age 

of thirty), and promoted Green with an increase in salary. 

Barringer filed a claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission and subsequently received a notice of right to file a civil 

action against UNT from the Texas Workforce Commission. Barringer later filed this 

suit in April 2017, claiming age discrimination and (eventually) retaliation in violation 

of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.055. More 

than two years later, UNT filed its plea to the jurisdiction claiming that it had 

sovereign immunity from this suit under the Texas Labor Code because Barringer 

could not meet all prima facie elements of her claims. Among several arguments, 
5

UNT claimed that the jurisdictional evidence proved that Barringer had not suffered 

an adverse employment action by being constructively discharged, an element to both 

her age-discrimination and retaliation claims. As part of its plea, UNT attached 

several exhibits including Barringer’s and Lewin’s depositions. 

In her deposition, Barringer testified that she had initiated the meeting with 

Lewin where he told her that it had been reported to him that at the HR workshop 

Barringer had made disparaging remarks about upper management and had made a 

pejorative comment regarding Muslims. Barringer said that she admitted to Lewin 

that she was “unprepared” to present the workshop, but she denied having made the 

pejorative comment, and she attributed her other comments to her joking. 

According to Barringer, Lewin told her that because of her performance in the 

workshop, including the statements she allegedly made, he was going to place her on 

administrative leave while he was away on vacation and that there would be an 

investigation into her conduct at the workshop when he returned. Barringer said that 

she asked Lewin whether he was going to fire her, and he told her that he had not 

decided: 

Q: Okay. Did he tell you he was contemplating terminating you? 

A: He said he hadn’t decided. 

Q: He did not say that he was contemplating it, based on all the complaints 

about [your] behavior?

A: No. 
6

By Barringer’s account, the insinuation that Lewin did not know whether he 

was going to fire her and that he would not decide until he returned from his twoweek vacation left a cloud of uncertainty over her “that was just torture for no 

reason.” Barringer admitted that she told Lewin that she did not want to go through 

an investigation. And Barringer said that shortly after the meeting, she gave Lewin a 

two-week notice2that she would be resigning, but “he refused” to let her serve out 

the two weeks, and her resignation became effective immediately. 

Lewin testified in his deposition that he had told Barringer that he was placing 

her on administrative leave with pay while he was on vacation because of the alleged 

comments she had made at the HR workshop. Consistent with Barringer’s deposition 

2While Barringer said that she gave a two-week notice, her August 12, 2016 

resignation letter states: 

It is with a great deal of sadness that I tender my resignation as Project 

Manager for the HR Department at the University of North Texas 

System effective today, August 12th.

My tenure in this role has been at times frustrating and discouraging but 

also fun and challenging.

I continue to be a proud UNT Alumni and I wish the HR team all the 

best as they strive to improve and succeed. 

Barringer testified that she was “trying to resign with as much dignity and 

professionalism as I could.”
7

testimony,3 Lewin said that Barringer is the one who asked whether he was 

contemplating firing her, and he responded, “I’m contemplating it, but I’m going to 

place you on administrative leave pending an investigation.”

By Lewin’s account, less than an hour after this conversation, Barringer 

informed him that she was resigning. Because of that, Lewin said that a formal

investigation never took place, but if it had, someone outside of HR would have 

conducted it:

Q: But you never did the investigation because she refused?

. . . .

A: I couldn’t do the investigation without her—giving her, you know, a fair 

chance to tell her story.

Q: So is that a formal, like, interview? Would you be doing the interview, or 

would it be a third party?

A: We had—we had a practice in HR that if there was a complaint about an 

HR—with an HR person, we would never make the investigation. We 

would call the General Counsel and ask them to recommend a third 

party from the outside to do an investigation not to show any bias, you 

know, or unfairness in the investigation, per se. 

Q: So you couldn’t threaten [Barringer] with an investigation by you, 

correct?

. . . .

A: Correct. 

3Barringer testified in her deposition that Lewin had told her that the reason he 

was placing her on administrative leave was because he was “going on vacation, and I 

don’t want to deal with this now.”
8

Lewin stated that had an investigation revealed that Barringer had not made the 

offensive statements in the HR workshop, she “[a]bsolutely” would have retained her 

job. But Lewin said that he did not believe Barringer when she said she had not made 

inappropriate or pejorative comments in the HR workshop.4 

UNT also provided the trial court with Hall’s affidavit. Hall stated that she 

never heard Lewin describe her as “old school” and that she did not believe that 

Lewin or any other UNT employee ever treated her differently or unfairly “because of 

[her] age.” She also swore that Barringer had never complained to her “about any age 

discrimination by [Lewin].” 

After having a hearing on UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court denied 

the plea. This appeal followed. 

III. DISCUSSION

In its first issue, UNT argues that Barringer failed to establish an adverse 

employment action and that because an adverse employment action is necessary to 

establish a prima facie case of either age discrimination or retaliation, Barringer failed 

to produce sufficient evidence of a critical element to both of her claims. Specifically, 

4Also attached to UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction are what appear to be two 

completed feedback forms from attendees of the HR workshop. One form indicated 

that Barringer did “not seem prepared” for the workshop and that she “sometimes 

seemed a bit insulting to the group.” Another form had the comment that Barringer 

was “a little unprepared” for the workshop. Barringer’s co-presenter of the 

workshop—the employee who allegedly brought Barringer’s conduct in the workshop 

to Lewin’s attention—on the other hand received reviews of being “excellent” and 

“Wonderful! A++!” 
9

UNT argues that Barringer failed to rebut UNT’s evidence that she was not 

constructively discharged. Thus, UNT argues, the trial court erred by denying its plea. 

We agree. 

A. Standard of Review

A trial court’s ability to hear a case lies in its subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland 

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). “A plea to the jurisdiction is a 

dilatory plea that seeks dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 

Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) (citing Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 

554). A plea to the jurisdiction may be used to assert governmental immunity and 

defeat a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. A trial court’s ruling on a plea to the 

jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Tex. 

2015).

If a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we 

consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the 

jurisdictional issues raised, just as the trial court must do. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife 

v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004); Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555. If the evidence 

creates a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the 

plea to the jurisdiction, and the factfinder will resolve the question. Miranda, 

133 S.W.3d at 227–28. But if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a 

fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea as a matter of 

law. Id. at 228. The standard mirrors our review of summary judgments, where we 
10

take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant, indulging every reasonable 

inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant’s favor. City of El Paso v. 

Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. 2009).

B. Waiver of Governmental Immunity and the McDonald Douglas Framework

Both of Barringer’s claims fall under the Texas Commission on Human Rights 

Act (TCHRA). See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.051 (age discrimination), 21.055 

(retaliation). The TCHRA waives governmental immunity but only in those instances 

in which “the plaintiff actually alleges a violation of the TCHRA by pleading facts that 

state a claim thereunder.” Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 

636 (Tex. 2012). Absent a pleading stating a claim under the TCHRA, the 

governmental entity’s immunity from suit has not been waived. Id. at 637.

There are two alternative methods by which a plaintiff can establish 

discrimination or retaliation under the TCHRA. See Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 

47 S.W.3d 473, 476–77 (Tex. 2001). An employee can offer direct evidence of the 

employer’s discriminatory actions or words. Id. at 476. Direct evidence of 

discrimination is evidence that, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus 

without inference or presumption. Coll. of the Mainland v. Glover, 436 S.W.3d 384, 392 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

Alternatively, because direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation is a 

“rarity” in employment cases, courts allow claims to proceed with indirect or 

circumstantial evidence of discrimination or retaliation. See Russo v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 
11

93 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Under this 

second method, which applies in this case, Texas courts follow the burden-shifting 

mechanism set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas.

5 See 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824–26 (1973); 

Glover, 436 S.W.3d at 392.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as applied to the TCHRA, the plaintiff 

is entitled to a presumption of discrimination if the plaintiff meets the “minimal” 

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Mission Consol., 

372 S.W.3d at 634. The prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination because 

courts presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on 

the consideration of impermissible factors. See id. Once a plaintiff has established a 

prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce 

evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 

See M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 24 (Tex. 2000) (per 

curiam). A plaintiff “will only be required to submit evidence if the defendant

presents evidence negating one of” the basic facts that make up the prima facie case. 

Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 637. 

5Analogous federal statutes and the cases interpreting them guide our reading 

of the TCHRA. Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 634.
12

C. Adverse Employment Action and Constructive Discharge

An age discrimination prima facie case requires that the plaintiff show that she 

suffered an adverse employment action. See Mission Consol., 372 S.W.3d at 634; Bowen 

v. El Paso Elec. Co., 49 S.W.3d 902, 908 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, pet. denied). 

Likewise, a retaliation prima facie case requires the plaintiff to produce evidence that 

she suffered an adverse employment action.

6

 See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 

Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 789 (Tex. 2018); Bartosh v. Sam Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 

317, 329 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. denied); Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 

214 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). One way 

of demonstrating an adverse employment action is with proof that an employee was 

constructively discharged. Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. 

2010).

A constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes conditions so 

intolerable that an employee reasonably feels compelled to resign. See Baylor Univ. v. 

Coley, 221 S.W.3d 599, 604–05 (Tex. 2007) (citing Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 

129, 141, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004)); Hammond v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 821 S.W.2d 

174, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). Many factors are relevant 

6Citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, Barringer claims that 

an “adverse employment action . . . is actually not required to establish an actionable 

claim of retaliation . . . .” 548 U.S. 53, 69–70, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415–16 (2006). But 

the Supreme Court of Texas explained in Alamo Heights that an employee must 

experience a “material adverse employment action” to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under the TCHRA. 544 S.W.3d at 782.
13

to the consideration of whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged, including 

evidence of badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to 

encourage the employee’s resignation. Davis v. City of Grapevine, 188 S.W.3d 748, 766 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied), abrogated on other grounds by Lujan v. 

Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. 2018). In deciding if the work conditions meet 

that standard, courts consider a number of employer actions, such as demotion or a 

reduction in salary or job responsibilities. Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 

473, 481 (5th Cir. 2008). But potential disciplinary action, investigations into alleged 

work-place violations, or work-place criticisms are insufficient alone to cause a 

reasonable person to resign. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 

App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied). And courts “have repeatedly held that complaints of 

ostracism and personality conflicts, unfair criticism, and heated exchanges are petty 

annoyances, not conduct likely to deter an employee from making a discrimination 

complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 789; see also Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S. 

Ct. at 2415 (reasoning that “‘personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy’ and 

‘snubbing by supervisors and co-workers’ are not actionable” under Title VII)

(quoting 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 669 

(3d ed. 1996)).

Evidence that an employee was forced to choose between resigning or being 

fired may also be sufficient to raise a fact issue regarding constructive discharge. 

Gardner v. Abbott, 414 S.W.3d 369, 383 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); Perret v. 
14

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 770 F.3d 336, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2014). In these so-called 

“ultimatum” cases, courts require something beyond the employee’s subjective belief 

that termination was inevitable. See Perret, 770 F.3d at 338–39 (holding that employees 

were not given ultimatum when employer placed employees on a performance 

improvement plan, which was the last step in employer’s process for terminating 

employees); Faruki v. Parsons S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1997) (reasoning 

ultimatum standard met when supervisor told employee he should find another job, 

and he had one week before he would be placed on indefinite unpaid leave); Davis, 

188 S.W.3d at 766 (holding ultimatum standard met when manager informed 

employee that “it would be in his best interest if he decided to resign rather than be 

terminated because future employers may ask the City whether Davis resigned or was 

terminated”). 

D. No Evidence of Constructive Discharge

Barringer argues, as she did in the trial court, that the cumulation of Lewin’s 

recent unsatisfactory performance reviews of her, his telling her that she was unliked 

by her coworkers, his assuming the truthfulness of the allegation that she had made

inappropriate comments at the HR workshop, his alleged position that an 

investigation would not change his mind about terminating her employment, and his 

actual threat of termination all led her to reasonably believe she needed to resign. We 

disagree. 
15

Regarding Lewin’s recent unsatisfactory performance reviews, it is wellestablished that work-place criticisms are insufficient to cause a reasonable person to 

resign for purposes of establishing constructive discharge. Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d at 9. 

As to Lewin’s telling Barringer that she was disliked by fellow employees, this 

comment amounts to nothing more than potentially unfair criticism about personality 

conflicts and is “not conduct likely to deter an employee from making a 

discrimination complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 789.

The evidence also does not support Barringer’s contention that Lewin had 

already assumed the truthfulness of the allegations against her and thus an alleged 

investigation would have been a sham. Indeed, Lewin testified at his deposition that 

he intended to have these claims investigated once he returned from his two-week 

vacation and that had the results of an investigation exonerated Barringer, she would 

have “[a]bsolutely” retained her position at UNT. Further, investigations into alleged 

work-place violations are insufficient alone to cause a reasonable person to resign. 

Bertrand, 37 S.W.3d at 9. Additionally, believing one employee’s version of events 

over another’s is not evidence of constructive discharge. Tex. State Office of Admin. 

Hearings v. Birch, No. 04-12-00681-CV, 2013 WL 3874473, at *8 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio July 24, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reasoning that belief in “one 

employee’s statements over another’s is not supportive of a claim for constructive 

discharge. If so, employers would be subject to a constructive discharge claim each 

time there was a dispute between two or more employees . . . .”). 
16

Barringer points to no evidence in the record that Lewin did not intend to do 

exactly what she testified he told her, which was that he was placing her on paid leave 

pending an investigation. And to the extent that Barringer contends that Lewin’s 

testimony that he did not believe her explanations for what occurred at the HR 

workshop demonstrates that he had already predetermined to terminate her 

employment, Barringer has pointed to no evidence in the record contradicting Lewin’s 

testimony that he told her that an investigation into these allegations would occur

prior to making a decision as to her employment. Moreover, the evidence 

demonstrates that Lewin would not have been the one conducting the investigation

into Barringer’s behavior at the HR workshop, and Lewin said he did not have the 

authority to threaten Barringer with an investigation by him. 

And to the extent that Barringer contends that her allegations that Lewin took 

away a project that Barringer wanted and gave it to a younger employee constitutes a 

factor demonstrating constructive discharge, even if a change in job assignments is 

based on discriminatory action, that alone, without the presence of aggravating 

factors,7is not sufficient to show constructive discharge. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 

798 F.2d 748, 755 (5th Cir. 1986), remanded in part on other grounds, 491 U.S. 701, 

7

“Aggravating factors” include hostile working conditions and any other 

evidence suggesting any invidious intent on the part of the employer in creating or 

perpetuating the intolerable conditions compelling retirement or resignation. Pittman 

v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981). Barringer 

has not pointed to any evidence showing that she experienced perpetually intolerable 

conditions compelling her resignation. 
17

109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989). Furthermore, constructive discharge cannot be based upon 

the employee’s subjective preference for one position over another. Id.

Barringer also contends that Hall was fired8and replaced by a younger worker 

and that Hall had been subjected to age discrimination and that this is a factor 

demonstrating she was constructively discharged. In her affidavit, however, Hall

stated that she had never been subjected to age discrimination by Lewin or any UNT 

employee, that she had never heard Lewin describe her as “old school,” and that 

Barringer had never complained to her (Hall) “about any age discrimination by 

[Lewin].” We conclude that not only is there no evidence that Hall was subjected to 

age discrimination, the contrary is true: UNT presented undisputed evidence that 

Hall never experienced age discrimination at UNT. If the relevant undisputed 

evidence negates jurisdiction, then the plea to the jurisdiction must be granted. State v. 

Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 643 (Tex. 2007).

Additionally, there is no evidence that Lewin threatened Barringer with 

terminating her employment. First, Barringer is the one who initiated the meeting 

with Lewin. Second, Barringer’s own testimony establishes that Lewin had not 

8Hall disputes that she was fired. Rather, Hall stated in her September 18, 2019 

affidavit, 

After I retired in April 2016, I was rehired a few weeks later with 

[Lewin’s] approval to work in the System Human Resources Department

on a part-time basis. This allowed me to collect my full retirement 

benefits and also continue to work for the System. I am still currently 

employed in this position. 
18

mentioned firing Barringer until she asked him whether he was considering firing her. 

Indeed, Barringer admitted in her deposition that when she did ask Lewin whether he 

would fire her, he said that he had not yet decided. Third, Barringer’s belief that it 

was “torture” to be placed on paid administrative leave while Lewin was away for two 

weeks is nothing more than Barringer’s subjective belief that termination was 

inevitable. Faruki, 123 F.3d at 319. Fourth, the resignation letter that Barringer sent 

on the day of the meeting with Lewin makes no mention of any termination. 

In coming to a different conclusion, Barringer argues that Faruki supports her 

position that she had effectively been given an ultimatum, but in Faruki the plaintiff’s 

deposition testimony was that the employer had specifically told him that he “should 

find another job, as [the employer] would be unable to retain him, and that he had 

one week before he would be placed on indefinite unpaid leave.” Id. There is simply 

no evidence in this record that Lewin told Barringer that she should find another job 

or that she would be placed on unpaid leave. In fact, both Lewin’s and Barringer’s 

deposition testimony established that Lewin intended to place Barringer on paid leave 

pending his return from vacation and an investigation into Barringer’s alleged 

statements made at the HR workshop. In short, Faruki and this case have very little 

in common. Accordingly, Barringer has failed to present any evidence that Lewin 

made conditions at work so intolerable that she reasonably felt compelled to resign. 

See Coley, 221 S.W.3d at 604–05. 
19

Because the undisputed evidence negated one of the prima facie elements to 

both her age-discrimination and retaliation claims (an adverse employment action in 

the form of constructive discharge) and Barringer’s evidence failed to raise a fact issue 

on that element, the trial court erred by denying UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction. We 

sustain UNT’s first issue. Because our resolution of UNT’s first issue is dispositive of 

this case, we need not address UNT’s remaining three issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 

47.1.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having held that the trial court erred by denying UNT’s plea to the jurisdiction, 

we reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment that Barringer’s suit be 

dismissed for lack of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: September 10, 2020