IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 13–0010

Filed June 27, 2014

JOHN GOODPASTER,

Appellant,

vs.

SCHWAN’S HOME SERVICE, INC. 

and TODD SWANSON, Individually and in His Corporate Capacity,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. 

Staskal, Judge. 

Plaintiff appeals from the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment in favor of defendant. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR 

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 

Jill M. Zwagerman and Alyssa I. Snyder of Newkirk Zwagerman

Law Firm P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant. 

Alan L. Rupe of Kutak Rock LLP, Wichita, Kansas, and Kathryn E. 

Jones of Kutak Rock LLP, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellees. 

Mark D. Sherinian and Melissa C. Hasso of Sherinian & Hasso Law 

Firm, West Des Moines, and Thomas J. Duff of Duff Law Firm, P.L.C., 

Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa Association for Justice. 
2

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this appeal involving a lawsuit for wrongful termination of 

employment, we must determine whether multiple sclerosis is a disability 

contemplated by the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code 

chapter 216 (2011). If so, we must also determine whether the employee

was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his 

employment as a product delivery driver who must hold a commercial 

driver’s license. The district court granted summary judgment for the 

employer. On our review, we conclude multiple sclerosis is a disability 

under the ICRA and that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding 

whether the employee was qualified to perform the essential functions of 

the position. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand for 

further proceedings. 

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

John Goodpaster was employed by Schwan’s Home Service, Inc. as 

a customer service manager. Schwan’s is the largest home delivery 

frozen foods company in the nation and operates sales companies from 

various locations around the country, including Des Moines. The 

Des Moines location was managed by Todd Swanson. Goodpaster began 

working for Schwan’s as a manager trainee and was promoted to 

customer service manager in August 2007. His main duty was to sell 

and deliver company products to customers at their homes or place of 

business. A basic requirement of the job was to operate a commercial 

vehicle and meet all requirements of the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), including maintaining a driver’s license and 

medical certification to drive. 

Goodpaster sought medical attention in late 2008 after suffering 

chest pains and loss of eyesight. He was seen by several doctors and 
3

underwent multiple medical examinations and tests, including an 

examination at the Mayo Clinic. A neurologist at the Mayo Clinic 

suspected Goodpaster had “quiescent subclinical” multiple sclerosis. A 

neurologist in Des Moines diagnosed Goodpaster with multiple sclerosis, 

although another doctor was unable to identify any symptoms of multiple 

sclerosis in Goodpaster. Goodpaster had other medical ailments, 

including fibromyalgia and hypertension. 

Goodpaster continued to work despite his medical problems. Over 

the next one and one-half years, he would occasionally experience what 

he called “flare-ups” while working. During these flare-ups, which 

occurred between five and ten times, he would experience vision 

impairment and loss of control and strength in his arms and legs. 

Medical providers advised him to stop working and to relax until the 

symptoms subsided. Goodpaster had no form of medical restrictions on 

his work. 

At times, Goodpaster asked Schwan’s to rearrange his route due to 

his health condition. He was accommodated on each occasion. 

However, on another occasion, Goodpaster asked Swanson if someone 

could transport him from a location on his delivery route to the company 

office because he felt it was unsafe for him to drive. In response, he was 

asked to “gut it out.” On another occasion, Goodpaster requested that 

Swanson make arrangements for another employee to ride with him on 

his route as a backup driver in the event he suffered a flare-up. This 

request was also denied. Goodpaster also sought a transfer to a 

warehouse position. He was never interviewed for an opening in the 

warehouse because he did not meet the requirement of having prior 

warehouse experience. 
4

Goodpaster’s sales began to decrease. Over time, he became the 

lowest performing customer service manager at the Des Moines location. 

Swanson, however, had removed Goodpaster from some of his most 

profitable routes and assigned him to less profitable routes. Sales 

expectations and quotas were part of the job, and Goodpaster was failing 

to meet the company’s expectations. 

Goodpaster was given several written warnings about his failure to 

meet company sales expectations. After no improvement was made, 

Goodpaster was terminated. 

Goodpaster subsequently filed a lawsuit in district court under the 

ICRA for disability discrimination and retaliation. He claimed he was 

terminated from his employment because he had multiple sclerosis. He 

also claimed Schwan’s failed to provide him with reasonable 

accommodations. Goodpaster sued both Schwan’s and Swanson. 

Schwan’s and Swanson moved for summary judgment. They claim 

Goodpaster could not establish a case for discrimination or retaliation as 

a matter of law. Among other specific grounds, Schwan’s claimed 

Goodpaster did not have a qualifying disability, was not qualified to 

perform the essential functions of the job with or without a reasonable 

accommodation, and had no direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. 

Schwan’s and Swanson also argued there was no causal connection

between Goodpaster’s request for accommodations and termination of 

his employment to support the retaliation claim. Finally, Schwan’s and 

Swanson claimed Schwan’s had a legitimate, common nondiscriminatory 

reason to terminate Goodpaster. 

Goodpaster moved to compel discovery prior to submission of the 

summary judgment motion so he could fully resist the proceeding. The 

district court denied the request. 
5

The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. 

Goodpaster appealed. On appeal, he claims multiple sclerosis is a 

disability protected under the ICRA, and his claim was sufficient to 

withstand summary adjudication. 

II. Scope of Review. 

We review a decision by the district court to grant summary 

judgment for correction of errors at law. See Phillips v. Covenant Clinic, 

625 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Iowa 2001); see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. 

Summary judgment is proper when the movant establishes there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); Swartzendruber v. Schimmel, 613 

N.W.2d 646, 649 (Iowa 2000). “The burden is on the moving party to 

demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sallee v. 

Stewart, 827 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2013). As we determine whether the 

moving party has met this burden, we view the record in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. See Wright v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 599 

N.W.2d 668, 670 (Iowa 1999). “Even if facts are undisputed, summary 

judgment is not proper if reasonable minds could draw from them 

different inferences and reach different conclusions.” Walker Shoe Store, 

Inc. v. Howard’s Hobby Shop, 327 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa 1982). 

III. Discussion. 

The ICRA makes it “an unfair or discriminatory practice” to 

discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an employee 

“because of the . . . disability of such . . . employee.” Iowa Code 

§ 216.6(1)(a). To prevail on a disability discrimination claim under the 

ICRA, Goodpaster must initially prove a prima facie case by showing: (1) 

he has a disability, (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of 

the customer service manager position, and (3) the circumstances of his 
6

termination raise an inference of illegal discrimination. See Schlitzer v. 

Univ. of Iowa Hosp. & Clinics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2002). We 

begin by considering the first element of the claim. 

A. Whether Goodpaster’s Multiple Sclerosis Constitutes a 

Disability Under the ICRA. The Act defines a “disability” as “the 

physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial 

disability.” Id. § 216.2(5). The definition also includes the condition of a 

person with a positive diagnosis of human immunodeficiency virus, 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome, and related diagnoses, but no 

further legislative explanation is provided. See id. 

Regulations promulgated by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 

however, do elaborate on the meaning of a disability. See Iowa Admin. 

Code r. 161—8.26 (providing definitions for various terms related to 

disability discrimination in employment). They provide that “[t]he term 

‘substantially handicapped person’ shall mean any person who has a 

physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more 

major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded 

as having such an impairment.” Id. r. 161—8.26(1).1 Goodpaster seizes 

on this definition to argue that he is a disabled person under all three 

prongs of the definition. Because we conclude a genuine issue of 

 1Neither our Code nor regulations explicitly refer to a “substantially handicapped 

person” in any other place. Instead, it appears the legislature and the Iowa Civil Rights 

Commission have updated the phrasing in other areas. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 216.2(5) 

(“ ‘Disability’ means the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a 

substantial disability, and the condition of a person with a positive human 

immunodeficiency virus test result, a diagnosis of acquired immune deficiency 

syndrome, a diagnosis of acquired immune deficiency syndrome-related complex, or any 

other condition related to acquired immune deficiency syndrome.” (Second emphasis 

added.)). Nonetheless, we believe this regulation is intended to provide the relevant 

definition of those persons covered by the ICRA and accordingly take notice of this 

provision. 
7

material fact exists regarding the issue of actual disability, we can

confine our analysis to the first prong of the definition involving the 

presence of an actual disability that impairs a major life activity. 

The term “physical or mental impairment” means: 

a. Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic 

disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one more of the 

following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; 

special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; 

cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic 

and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or

b. Any mental or psychological disorder, such as 

mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or 

mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 

Id. r. 161—8.26(2). Additionally, “[t]he term ‘major life activities’ means 

functions such as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, 

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 

Id. r. 161—8.26(3). 

We have never determined whether multiple sclerosis is a disability 

under the ICRA, although we have assumed without comment in a past 

case that multiple sclerosis is a disability. See Boelman v. Manson State 

Bank, 522 N.W.2d 73, 77–78 (Iowa 1994). In this case, we confront the 

question head-on. 

To begin with, multiple sclerosis fits within the broad category of a 

“physiological disorder or condition” that generally affects the 

neurological system. See id. r. 161—8.26(2)(a). Further, there was 

sufficient record evidence that Goodpaster’s multiple sclerosis limits

some major life activities, like walking, during episodic flare-ups. See id. 

r. 161—8.26(3). The fighting question is whether the occasional flareups experienced by Goodpaster constitute a substantial limitation of a 

major life activity. 
8

The phrase “substantially limits” is not defined by statute or the 

Iowa Administrative Code. The underlying controversy—whether 

Goodpaster’s multiple sclerosis is a disability under the ICRA—

essentially centers on these words. Both parties rely to some extent on 

federal law. 

Schwan’s argues multiple sclerosis is not a disability, and

primarily relies on a federal court case that held multiple sclerosis does 

not substantially limit any major life activity. Nyrop v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 

No. 11, 616 F.3d 728, 733–35 (8th Cir. 2010). The holding in Nyrop is 

grounded in a pair of United States Supreme Court cases that increased 

the threshold inquiry in order to decide if an impairment substantially 

limits a major life activity under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990, as amended (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213.2 First, in Sutton v. 

United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court held that whether an 

impairment substantially limits a major life activity “is to be determined 

with reference to corrective measures” such as medication or eyeglasses. 

527 U.S. 471, 488, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450, 466

(1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 

110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, as recognized in Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free 

Sch. Dist., 582 F. Supp. 2d 326, 342 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 

vacated in part on other grounds, 381 Fed. Appx. 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2010). 

Second, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the 

Court held the phrase “substantially limits a major life activity” must be 

interpreted strictly, reasoning that the language “substantially” and 

“major” precludes minor impairments. 534 U.S. 184, 196–98, 122 S. Ct. 

 2The court in Nyrop acknowledged a series of 2008 amendments substantially 

modifying the ADA, which we discuss further below, but found the amendments were 

not retroactive and did not apply them to decide the case. 616 F.3d at 734 n.4. 
9

681, 691, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615, 630–31 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA 

Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, as 

recognized in Ragusa, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 341 n.4. The Toyota Court also 

held: 

[T]o be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an 

individual must have an impairment that prevents or 

severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are 

of central importance to most people’s daily lives. The 

impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term. 

Id. at 198, 122 S. Ct. at 691, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 631. It opined that the 

terms “major life activities” and “substantial limitation” “need to be 

interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as 

disabled.” Id. at 196, 197, 122 S. Ct. at 691, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 631. 

Congress amended the ADA in 2008. See ADA Amendments Act of 

2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The Federal Act now 

provides, “The definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in 

favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the 

maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12102(4)(A). Notably, it specifies that “[a]n impairment that is episodic 

or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life 

activity when active.” Id. § 12102(4)(D). Additionally, “[t]he 

determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life 

activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 

mitigating measures such as . . . medication.” Id. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I). 

A review of the legislative history reveals Congress disfavored the 

Toyota and Sutton cases. Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, the bill’s lead 

sponsor, chief advocate, and floor manager in the Senate, declared the

bill was “rejecting several opinions of the Supreme Court that have had 

the effect of restricting the meaning and application of the definition of 
10

disability.” See 154 Cong. Rec. S8342–01 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) 

(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin). Similarly, Representative George Miller 

of California stated the bill “revers[ed] flawed court decisions to restore 

the original congressional intent of the [ADA].” 154 Cong. Rec. H8286–

03 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. George Miller). Of 

course, the original intent of the ADA is best captured by the passionate 

words of Senator Harkin, whose brother Frank is deaf, when he delivered 

the Senate's first sign language floor speech upon the ADA’s passage, 

“that today Congress opens the doors to all Americans with disabilities; 

that today we say no to fear, that we say no to ignorance, and that we 

say no to prejudice.” 136 Cong. Rec. S9684–03 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) 

(statement of Sen. Tom Harkin). 

Importantly, federal regulations and agency rules promulgated to 

implement the 2008 amendments declare multiple sclerosis to be a 

disability. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (2013) (“[A]pplying the 

principles set forth in . . . this section, it should be easily concluded that 

the following types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit

the major life activities indicated: . . . multiple sclerosis substantially 

limits neurological function . . . .”); see also Regulations to Implement the 

Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as 

amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978–01, 16,987, 16,989, 17,004 (Mar. 25, 

2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). Similarly, the introduction to 

a final agency rule explains:

The Amendments Act states that its purpose is “to 

reinstate a broad scope of protection” by expanding the 

definition of the term “disability.” Congress found that 

persons with many types of impairments—including 

epilepsy, diabetes, HIV infection, cancer, multiple sclerosis, 

intellectual disabilities (formerly called mental retardation), 

major depression, and bipolar disorder—had been unable to 

bring ADA claims because they were found not to meet the 
11

ADA’s definition of “disability.” Yet, Congress thought that 

individuals with these and other impairments should be 

covered and revised the ADA accordingly. Congress

explicitly rejected certain Supreme Court interpretations of 

the term “disability” and a portion of the EEOC regulations 

that it found had inappropriately narrowed the definition of 

disability. 

Id. at 16,987. Thus, it is now clear that federal law considers multiple 

sclerosis to be a disability. 

Goodpaster contends the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 requires

us to interpret of the ICRA to include multiple sclerosis. We disagree, at 

least with his initial phrasing of the point. Federal law does not 

necessarily control our interpretation of a state statute. Iowa employers 

must follow federal law, but it is axiomatic that an amendment to a 

federal statute does not simultaneously and automatically amend a 

parallel or even identical Iowa statute. Just as “we are not bound by 

federal cases construing a federal statute when we are called upon to 

construe our own Civil Rights Act,” Loras Coll. v. Iowa Civil Rights 

Comm’n, 285 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Iowa 1979), we are not bound by the 

language of federal statutes when interpreting language of the ICRA, cf. 

DeBoom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]e must be 

mindful not to substitute ‘the language of the federal statutes for the 

clear words of the [ICRA].’ ” (quoting Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 

631 (Iowa 1989))).

Notwithstanding, we recognize the Iowa Act “only pronounces a 

general proscription against discrimination and we have looked to the 

corresponding federal statutes to help establish the framework to analyze 

claims and otherwise apply our statute.” Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc. v. 

Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2003). Initially, we note that the 

ICRA declares that it “shall be construed broadly to effectuate its 

purposes.” Iowa Code § 216.18(1) (emphasis added). Of course, Toyota
12

and Sutton did not construe the terms of the federal statute broadly. See 

Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196–98, 122 S. Ct. at 691, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 630–31; 

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488, 119 S. Ct. at 2149, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 466; see

also Alex B. Long, “If the Train Should Jump the Track . . .”: Divergent 

Interpretations of State and Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 

40 Ga. L. Rev. 469, 495 (2006) (“The Supreme Court’s restrictive reading 

of the ADA’s terms has provoked a large outcry from academics and the 

original sponsors of the measure in Congress.”); Sandra F. Sperino, 

Diminishing Deference: Learning Lessons from Recent Congressional 

Rejection of the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Discrimination Statutes, 

33 Rutgers L. Rec. 40, 42 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has often chosen 

narrow statutory interpretations that do not comport with the liberal 

reading to be given to employment discrimination statutes.”). As noted 

by Representative Tony Coehlo, the lead sponsor of the ADA in the House 

of Representatives who suffer from epilepsy, “The Supreme Court wrote 

me out of my own bill.” Tony Coelho, Our Right to Work, Our Demand to 

Be Heard: People with Disabilities, the 2004 Election, and Beyond, 48 

N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 729, 734 (2003). Indeed, the construction of the ADA 

was so narrow that Congress intervened. 

In the past, section 216.18(1) has had a substantive impact on the 

outcome of a case. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. Secondary Rds. v. Iowa Civil 

Rights Comm’n, 468 N.W.2d 811, 815–16 (Iowa 1991) (distinguishing a 

narrow rule in Brown v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Bd., 345 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 

1984), because “Brown was not a civil rights case” and construing the 

ICRA “broadly to effectuate its purposes”). Indeed, this section has led 

us before to adopt broad definitions to eliminate employment 

discrimination. See Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 

238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 394 N.W.2d 375, 382–83 (Iowa 1986) 
13

(adopting a broad definition of “actual damages” in part because of 

precursor to section 216.18). Other state courts have relied upon similar 

broad language to depart from narrow federal civil rights precedent. See

Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 573 (Minn. 2008) 

(indicating broader view of civil rights statute required because state law 

explicitly “requires liberal construction of its terms”); Genaro v. Cent. 

Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 785 (Ohio 1999) (same); Marquis v. City of 

Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 49–50 (Wash. 1996) (rejecting federal caselaw 

holding independent contractors are not protected under employment 

discrimination law and relying in part on explicit requirement to construe 

state statute liberally). 

Further, unlike federal law, where civil rights protections against 

employment discrimination are scattered into three statutes—the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 623(a), and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112—Iowa has one unified statute, 

Iowa Code chapter 216. While numerous fractures in the federal law 

have developed depending upon the statute involved, no such fractures 

arise under Iowa law. See Sandra F. Sperino, Revitalizing State 

Employment Discrimination Law, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 545, 546–64

(2013). 

These initial observations reveal Toyota and Sutton, which were 

explicitly built upon a core premise that the ADA must be “interpreted 

strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” 

Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197, 122 S. Ct. at 691, 151 L. Ed. 2d at 631; accord 

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488, 119 S. Ct. at 2149, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 466, are 

inapposite to any discussion of the meaning of the ICRA. Thus, we find 
14

these federal cases do not aid in the interpretation of our Iowa statute

today. 

We acknowledge we relied on Toyota and Sutton in a 2004 case to 

resolve a claim under the ADA. See Hansen v. Seabee Corp., 688 N.W.2d 

234, 239–40 (Iowa 2004). A close reading of Hansen, however, reveals it 

was solely an ADA case. See id. at 235–37. In Hansen, a worker noticed 

he had a sore back and was subsequently diagnosed with a sacroiliac 

lesion. Id. at 236. Eventually, he was laid off and filed a disability 

discrimination lawsuit under the ICRA and then subsequently amended 

his petition to include a claim under the ADA. Id. Following a bench 

trial, the district court directed a verdict for the defendant on plaintiff’s 

state-law claim, reasoning plaintiff was not disabled under the ICRA. Id.

at 237. However, the court found plaintiff was disabled under the ADA 

and entered judgment for the plaintiff. Id. In summarizing the posture 

of the case on appeal, we explained that Seabee appealed, alleging 

“Hansen failed to establish he was disabled under the ADA. Hansen did 

not cross-appeal or otherwise rely upon his state claims to support the 

district court judgment. Consequently, our review is limited to the 

federal ADA claim.” Id. Relying on Toyota and Sutton, we determined the 

plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA and reversed the district court. 

Id. at 239–44. Accordingly, Hansen similarly has no bearing on our 

determination of whether multiple sclerosis is a disability under the 

ICRA.

On the other hand, we are guided by the broad reach early 

interpretations gave the Act. An early—and influential—law review 

article regarding Iowa’s law against disability discrimination in 

employment opined that, broadly speaking, three categories of 

disabilities exist under Iowa law:
15

The category [into which a purported disability fits] will 

depend on the nature of the particular disability and the 

specific allegations of discrimination. The first category 

consists of disabilities which, on their face, are 

acknowledged to be substantial handicaps. Blindness, 

deafness, epilepsy, paralysis—these and other permanent 

impairments are clearly protected. The second category 

consists of handicaps which the Commission regards as 

insubstantial per se. Migraine headaches, common colds, 

the flu, a simple fracture and other temporary conditions of 

a relatively trivial nature exemplify this category. The third 

category is the most difficult to describe. It consists of 

impairments which are neither permanent nor evanescent, 

but which fall somewhere in the middle. Addiction to drugs 

or alcohol, various kinds of mental illnesses, and periods of 

recovery from major surgery illustrate the types of 

intermediate-term impairments which, depending on the 

totality of the circumstances, may or may not be protected. 

Scott H. Nichols, Iowa’s Law Prohibiting Disability Discrimination in 

Employment: An Overview, 32 Drake L. Rev. 273, 328–29 (1983) 

[hereinafter Nichols]. Multiple sclerosis is not part of the second category 

consisting of insubstantial impairments. Rather, multiple sclerosis is 

very likely among the group in which certain impairments, “on their face, 

are acknowledged to be substantial handicaps.” Id. at 239. 

Schwan’s points out that we have held a condition must be 

“ ‘permanent or long term’ ” to qualify as disabling. See Vincent v. Four M 

Paper Corp., 589 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Iowa 1999) (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). In Vincent, we noted that one factor in determining whether a 

condition substantially limits a major life activity is “[t]he permanent or 

long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or 

resulting from the impairment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The other factors are “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment” and 

“[t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Iowa law has for years contemplated some disabilities might be 

permanent but, unlike federal law, has never contemplated that a 
16

disability could not be intermittent or episodic. See Foods, Inc. v. Iowa 

Civil Rights Comm’n, 318 N.W.2d 162, 164–69 (Iowa 1982) (concluding 

plaintiff who suffered from intermittent grand mal seizures due to 

epilepsy could maintain ICRA claim in spite of an administrative 

regulation that required the disability be “unrelated” to the plaintiffs’ 

ability to perform available jobs). Clearly, the plaintiff’s condition in 

Foods—epilepsy—did not substantially impair her ability to complete 

major life activities for large portions of time. Rather, she was only 

impaired—and then quite substantially—during grand mal seizures. 

Similarly, we held alcoholism was capable of being a disability 

under the ICRA in Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil 

Rights Commission, 366 N.W.2d 522, 526–28 (Iowa 1985).3 Additionally,

we specifically contemplated that it was a protected disability “when the 

condition is arrested.” Id. at 528. We noted that alcoholism “is a 

substantial handicap, but if the alcoholic remains sober the disability 

should not prevent the individual from performing his or her job in a 

reasonably competent and satisfactory manner.” Id.

We also observe that the regulations promulgated by the 

commission to define disability were based heavily on the definition of 

disability contained in the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 

amended, 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). Nichols, 32 Drake L. Rev. at 334. A 

number of federal cases applying the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 consider

 3We note that, in Consolidated Freightways, we considered whether the 

employee was disabled under a Cedar Rapids city ordinance. See 366 N.W.2d at 524. 

Iowa Code section 216.19 requires cities to secure the rights protected by the ICRA and 

permits cities to provide greater protections against unfair or discriminatory practices. 

See Iowa Code § 216.19. The city ordinance at issue in Consolidated Freightways, 

however, contained a definition that was “almost identical” to the definition of 

“disability” in the ICRA. See 366 N.W.2d at 526. Therefore, we find Consolidated 

Freightways persuasive. 
17

multiple sclerosis as a disability, often without any significant inquiry 

into the issue. See Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2009)

(holding plaintiff with multiple sclerosis had standing to pursue claim 

under Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1056, 1059–61 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding summary 

judgment against plaintiff with multiple sclerosis was inappropriate); 

Carter v. Casa Cent., 849 F.2d 1048, 1050, 1053–54 (7th Cir. 1988)

(upholding district court ruling that plaintiff with multiple sclerosis was 

denied job as a result of disability); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 

658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding plaintiff with multiple 

sclerosis established he is a disabled person who was rejected from a 

residency program based on his disability); see also Flight v. Gloeckler, 68 

F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1995) (referring to multiple sclerosis as a disability 

and distinguishing it from the plaintiff’s proffered basis of discrimination, 

his inability to drive). 

Federal cases prior to Toyota considered whether multiple sclerosis 

is a disability and either considered it to be a disability, see Mortiz v. 

Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir. 1998), or contemplated 

it could constitute a disability based on testimony of how it impacts an 

individual’s life and work, see Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 

876, 884 (6th Cir. 1996) (“To show she had a ‘disability,’ [plaintiff] must 

establish that she had an impairment that substantially limited her 

major live activities . . . .”); see also Flight, 68 F.3d at 64 (rejecting 

plaintiff’s ADA claim because the ADA “is inapplicable because the 

distinction in the present case is not based upon Flight’s disability, 

multiple sclerosis, but rather upon his inability to drive” (emphasis 

added)). Moreover, multiple sclerosis was considered a disability under 

other federal statutes (with statutory language similar to the ICRA) prior 
18

to the United States Supreme Court’s now-superseded decisions. See 

Jankowski Lee & Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 1996) 

(“It is clear that Rusinov’s MS is a handicap within the meaning of the 

[Fair Housing Act].”); see also Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 

328, 330, 336 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding plaintiff who suffered from multiple 

sclerosis had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of Fair 

Housing Amendments Act claim and was entitled to a preliminary 

injunction). 

Accordingly, we hold multiple sclerosis can constitute a disability

under the Iowa Act if the plaintiff produces evidence that the condition 

substantially impaired one or more major life activities during episodes 

or flare-ups, even if it did not impair life activities at all when in 

remission. 

Turning to the evidence in this case, Goodpaster has generated a 

genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his multiple sclerosis 

substantially limits his major life activities. He testified that during 

flare-ups, he experiences vision impairment, memory loss, fatigue, and

loss of control and strength in his arms and legs. 

Schwan’s draws on caselaw that casts doubt on whether a 

substantial limitation can exist when the plaintiff experiences memory 

loss, see Crock v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1117–18 

(S.D. Iowa 2003), vision problems, see Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 

619 F.3d 898, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2010), fatigue, see Croy v. Cobe Labs., 

Inc., 345 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003), or difficulty walking, see 

Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2003). 

However, these cases are ADA cases hailing from an era of federal law in 

which the ADA turned a blind eye to victims of episodic ailments. Crock, 

for instance, pointed out that the plaintiff there stated “some of [her] 
19

symptoms are constant while the severe symptoms are episodic,” and 

concluded “even severe symptoms which are episodic do not constitute a 

substantial limitation on a major life activity.” 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. 

Crock then cites EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 353 (4th Cir. 

2001), in which the Fourth Circuit held profound symptoms associated 

with epileptic seizures did not amount to a disability under the ADA. 

Crock, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1117–18.

Crock correctly followed federal law as it existed in 2003. Yet, that 

state of the law is no longer extant. Sara Lee is inconsistent with Iowa 

law. Croy is similarly inapposite to the ICRA. A person may be disabled 

under the ICRA, even during the intermissions of their symptoms, so 

long as their symptoms constitute a substantial limitation when active. 

See, e.g., Consol. Freightways, 366 N.W.2d at 528; Foods, 318 N.W.2d at 

168–69. 

We hold Goodpaster generated a genuine issue of material fact 

regarding whether his multiple sclerosis substantially limits one or more 

of his major life activities.4 He has at least generated a jury question. 

 4In addition to the major life activity of walking, for example, a genuine issue of 

material fact exists regarding whether Goodpaster’s multiple sclerosis substantially 

limits his ability to work. This is unsurprising, as the ability to work is something of a 

disability discrimination catchall, and “impairments that substantially limit a person's 

ability to work usually substantially limit one or more other major life activities.” See 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) app. (2013). To be clear, in the past, we required the proffered 

disability to be “generally debilitating” and to “affect [the employee] regardless of the job 

he might hold.” Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 471 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 

1991). We said, “An impairment that interferes with an individual’s ability to do a 

particular job but does not significantly decrease that individual’s ability to obtain 

satisfactory employment otherwise is not substantially limiting within our statute.” 

Probasco v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 420 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988); accord Jasany 

v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1985); Salt Lake City Corp. 

v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636–37 (Utah 1983). Schwan’s asserts Goodpaster’s multiple 

sclerosis was not generally debilitating because Goodpaster is qualified for other jobs 

and currently works as a laborer. However, Henkel, which itself involved a disability 

discrimination claim based on depression and anxiety, suggests multiple sclerosis is in 

fact generally debilitating. See Henkel, 471 N.W.2d at 810. 
20

B. Whether Goodpaster is Qualified to Perform the Essential 

Functions of the Job With or Without Accommodation. Goodpaster 

must also be able to show he is qualified for the customer service 

manager position. See Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530. To do so, he must 

show he, “with or without reasonable accommodation, ‘can perform the 

essential functions of the position . . . without endangering the health 

and safety of [himself] or others.’ ” Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 80 

(alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1993)). We then 

consider whether Schwan’s failed to offer Goodpaster a reasonable 

accommodation. We use a two-step inquiry to determine whether an 

employee is qualified for a position. Id. at 80. First, the fact finder must 

determine if the employee can perform the essential functions of the 

position without an accommodation. Id. If an employee can perform the 

essential functions of a position without an accommodation, the

employee is qualified and can make a prima facie case of disability 

discrimination, and the inquiry at this stage of the case ends. See id. If 

the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the position, the 

fact finder must determine whether a reasonable accommodation exists 

that would permit the employee to do so. See id. If so, the employee is 

qualified; if not, the employee is not qualified for the position and cannot 

make a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See id. We address 

these inquiries in turn. 

1. Qualified employee. The first step of our inquiry is whether 

Goodpaster “could perform the essential functions of the job.” Id. “The 

‘essential functions’ of the job are those that ‘bear more than a marginal 

relationship to the job at issue.’ ” Id. (quoting Chandler v. City of Dallas, 

2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993)). We have said in the past that a 

person is qualified when the person “can perform the essential functions 
21

of the job ‘in spite of’ his or her disability.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Sioux 

Gateway Fire Dep’t, 497 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Iowa 1993)). “This inquiry 

must consider ‘[t]he nature and extent of a disability, the needs of a 

particular job, and the impact of disability on a person’s ability to 

perform that job.’ ” Courtney v. Am. Nat’l Can Co., 537 N.W.2d 681, 685 

(Iowa 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Frank v. Am. Freight Sys., 

Inc., 398 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Iowa 1987)). “ ‘[T]he court must consider 

whether the person has “the requisite skill, experience, education and 

other job-related requirements of the employment position that such 

individual holds or desires.” ’ ” Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 531 (quoting 

Treanor v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir. 2000)). 

“Whether an individual is qualified for a particular job, despite his or her 

disability, requires an individualized inquiry.” Courtney, 537 N.W.2d 

685. 

In this case, the primary qualification at issue is whether 

Goodpaster could obtain the necessary DOT certification. The United 

States Supreme Court has held that an employer may defend a 

discriminatory termination action under the ADA when the employer 

terminated the employee pursuant to the DOT regulations requiring a 

certain level of visual acuity for commercial drivers. Albertson’s, Inc. v. 

Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567–78, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169–74, 144 

L. Ed. 2d 518, 531–38 (1999). The reasoning behind this holding is that 

“[w]hen Congress enacted the ADA, it recognized that federal safety rules 

would limit application of the ADA as a matter of law.” Id. at 573, 119 

S. Ct. at 2172, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 535. The Court stated: 

The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report 

on the ADA stated that “a person with a disability applying 

for or currently holding a job subject to [DOT standards for 

drivers] must be able to satisfy these physical qualification 
22

standards in order to be considered a qualified individual 

with a disability under title I of [the ADA].” 

Id. at 573, 119 S. Ct. at 2172–73, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 535 (quoting S. Rep. 

No. 101–116, at 25 (1989)) (first alteration in original). 

Schwan’s argues Goodpaster was not qualified by essentially 

asserting the “direct threat” defense under the ADA, which provides that 

“[a]n employer may impose as a qualification standard ‘a requirement 

that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of 

other individuals in the workplace.’ ” Id. at 569, 119 S. Ct. at 2170, 144 

L. Ed. 2d at 532 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994 & Supp. III)). A 

“ ‘direct threat’ [is] defined by the [ADA] as ‘a significant risk to the health 

or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable 

accommodation.’ ” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12111(3)). While conceptual 

daylight would ordinarily exist between the “essential function” aspect of 

a prima facie case of disability discrimination and the “direct threat” 

defense under the ADA, the inquiries appear to collapse together in this 

context. See Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 304 F.3d 493, 494, 500 (5th 

Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (considering whether a police officer could safely 

perform an essential function of the position—driving and holding an 

individualized assessment of the officer’s claim using the direct-threat 

defense model is required). 

The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a 

major life activity and accordingly constitutes a disability under the Act 

should ordinarily be reviewed on a “case-by-case basis” even though 

“[s]ome impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a 

major life activity.” Albertson’s, Inc., 527 U.S. at 566, 119 S. Ct. at 2169, 

144 L. Ed. 2d at 530–31. So too should the determination of whether a 

plaintiff is qualified to perform the essential functions of a position with 
23

or without accommodation generally be determined by a case-by-case 

analysis as opposed to resorting to a blanket exclusion of a class of 

workers from a given job. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2013) (“The 

determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ shall be based on 

an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to 

perform the essential functions of the job.” (Emphasis added.)); Kapche, 

304 F.3d at 494, 500 (vacating grant of summary judgment and holding 

plaintiff with insulin-treated diabetes mellitus required individualized 

assessment of his “ability to safely perform the essential functions” of a 

police officer position, which included driving). There is no reason to 

take a contrary approach. 

This conclusion is bolstered by federal regulations that provide 

guidance to medical examiners evaluating whether a driver who has a 

neurological condition may nevertheless obtain a commercial license. 

The mere diagnosis of a disease that could impact driving is insufficient 

to disqualify a driver. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.43 (“Instructions for 

Performing and Recording Physical Examinations”). The regulations

provide: “Any neurological condition should be evaluated for the nature 

and severity of the condition, the degree of limitation present, the 

likelihood of progressive limitation, and the potential for sudden 

incapacitation.” Id. Furthermore, authority relevant to the criteria

indicated that multiple sclerosis can result in disqualification, but it 

recognizes not all cases of multiple sclerosis are the same and that some 

people with multiple sclerosis may be able to obtain certification. U.S. 

Dep’t of Transp., Conference on Neurological Disorders and Commercial 

Drivers 28–29 (1988), www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/medical/

conference-neurological-disorders-and-commercial-drivers-part-i. 
24

In this case, the record supported a conclusion that Goodpaster 

was recertified to drive a commercial vehicle in 2008 and 2009. At the 

same time, the evidence revealed he did not tell the doctor who made the 

certification that he had multiple sclerosis in 2008, and the record was 

unclear about the result of the certification in 2009. Yet, Goodpaster at 

least generated a fact issue on the question whether he was qualified to 

perform the essential functions of the customer service manager position. 

Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether 

Goodpaster was qualified to perform the essential functions of the 

customer service manager position without accommodation. 

2. Reasonable accommodation. Even with evidence in the record 

to support a conclusion that Goodpaster continued to be licensed to 

operate a commercial vehicle, Schwan’s asserts Goodpaster still could 

not safely and adequately perform the essential functions of his job with 

accommodations because no reasonable accommodations existed. In 

other words, even with a license to drive, Schwan’s argues Goodpaster 

was disqualified because he could not drive at times and his requested 

accommodations needed to overcome his inability to drive were 

unreasonable as a matter of law. 

“If the plaintiff cannot perform the essential functions of the job, 

then the fact finder goes on to the second inquiry—‘whether any 

reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [the plaintiff] 

to perform those functions.’ ” Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 80 (alteration in 

original) (quoting Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1394). This second phase of the 

inquiry stems from the unique nature of disability discrimination:

Discrimination against the disabled differs from other types 

of discrimination in that other types, such as racial, 

religious, or sex discrimination, usually bear no relationship 

to the individual’s ability to perform a job. Consequently, it 
25

is necessary to provide a requirement of reasonable 

accommodation in order to eliminate discrimination against 

the disabled. 

Cerro Gordo Cnty. Care Facility v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 401 N.W.2d 

192, 196–97 (Iowa 1987). Therefore, 

[a]n employer shall make reasonable accommodation to the 

known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 

qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the 

employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would 

impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. 

Iowa Admin. Code r. 161—8.27(6). 

“If an employee’s ability to do her job depends on reasonable 

accommodation, the employee must make a facial showing that 

reasonable accommodation was possible.” Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 530. 

This showing is not an onerous one and requires no more of the 

employee than to propose an accommodation and present testimony of 

its feasibility. See, e.g., Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 439

(8th Cir. 1993) (“[P]laintiffs must initially meet the burden of providing 

evidence sufficient to make at least a facial showing that reasonable 

accommodation is possible. [Plaintiffs] have met their burden by 

proposing that defendants allow them to conduct self-blood-tests and to 

carry snacks.” (Citation omitted.)). 

A regulation promulgated by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission 

specifies that a reasonable accommodation may include:

(1) Making facilities used by employees readily 

accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and

(2) Job restructuring, part-time or modified work 

schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or 

devices, the provision of readers or interpreters, and other 

similar actions. 

Iowa Admin. Code r. 161–8.27(6)(a). Another regulation provides:

When an individual becomes disabled, from whatever cause, 

during a term of employment, the employer shall make every 
26

reasonable effort to continue the individual in the same 

position or to retain and reassign the employee and to assist 

that individual’s rehabilitation. No terms in this rule shall 

be construed to mean that the employer must erect a 

training and skills center. 

Id. r. 161—8.28. 

If the plaintiff shows a reasonable accommodation is possible, “the 

burden shifts to the employer to prove that it is not able to accommodate 

the plaintiff’s disability or that the proposed accommodation is 

unreasonable.” Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 80. To do so, the employer 

must “demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 

hardship on the operation of its program.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 161—

8.27(6). Another regulation promulgated by the Iowa Civil Rights 

Commission provides:

In determining pursuant to the first paragraph of this 

subrule whether an accommodation would impose an undue 

hardship on the operation of an employer’s program, factors 

to be considered include:

(1) The overall size of the employer’s program with 

respect to number of employees, number and type of 

facilities, and size of budget;

(2) The type of the employer’s operation, including the 

composition and structure of the employer’s workforce; and

(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 

Id. r. 161–8.27(6)(b). In other words, “[i]n considering the reasonableness 

of an employer’s accommodation of an employee’s disability, we must 

consider not only the disabled employee’s needs but also the economic 

realities faced by the employer.” Halsey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of MidAm., Inc., 410 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa 1987). 

We have said “[a]n accommodation is unreasonable if it requires 

the employer to change the essential nature of the job or if it places 

undue burdens on the employer.” Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 80. For 

example, removing the duty of operating a forklift from the position of 
27

forklift operator—ninety-eight percent of the working hours of the 

position—was an unreasonable accommodation. Courtney, 537 N.W.2d 

at 687. We have also said in the past that a “reasonable accommodation 

must be made by an employer only if it does not substantially impinge on 

the rights of other employees or incur more than a de minimus cost to 

the employer.” Frank, 398 N.W.2d at 803. 

The accommodations requested by Goodpaster to overcome his 

inability to drive and perform his duties included having another 

employee pick him up when he needed to stop driving, rearranging his 

route, having a driver accompany him on his route, and reassigning him 

to a warehouse position. Schwan’s claims these accommodations were 

unreasonable as a matter of law. 

The economic realities faced by an employer to provide an 

accommodation surface in this case. While a jury might reasonably 

conclude from the economic considerations in this case that a second 

driver would be an unreasonable accommodation, we recognize the 

record was generally underdeveloped on the issue of the reasonableness 

of accommodations. Moreover, the record was sparse because the 

district court cut the discovery short by granting summary judgment for 

Schwan’s based predominantly on its conclusion that the medical 

condition suffered by Goodpaster was not a disability as a matter of law. 

As a result, the district court rejected the request by Goodpaster to seek 

further discovery on the reasonableness of possible accommodations, 

and this action should not now be used by Schwan’s to support its claim 

that there is no evidence in the record to support a triable issue on the 

reasonableness of the accommodations. On balance, the issue of the 

reasonableness of some of the requested accommodations presented a 

jury issue. 
28

C. Whether the Circumstances of This Case Raise an Inference 

of Unlawful Discrimination. Schwan’s claims the evidence in the case 

could not, as a matter of law, establish an inference of discrimination 

because the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the 

record is Goodpaster was fired for poor job performance and poor sales. 

It claims there was no evidence presented that the termination was 

motivated by disability discrimination. 

Consistent with our resolution of the previous issues, the record 

supports the conclusion that Goodpaster presented a jury issue on 

whether the termination was motivated by his disability. There was 

some evidence that Schwan’s relied on Goodpaster’s “health issues” in 

terminating him. Additionally, the record was not fully developed 

because the district court denied additional discovery.

IV. Conclusion. 

Having considered all issues raised, we reverse the summary 

judgment granted by the district court. We remand the case for further 

proceedings. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 

All justices concur except Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., who 

dissent. 
29

#13–0010, Goodpaster v. Schwan’s Home Serv.

WATERMAN, Justice (dissenting). 

I respectfully dissent. The district court correctly granted 

Schwan’s motion for summary judgment based on the undisputed facts. 

I would affirm. Goodpaster had the burden to prove (1) he has a 

disability, (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of his 

delivery job with or without accommodation, and (3) the circumstances of 

his termination raise an inference of illegal discrimination under the Iowa 

Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), Iowa Code ch. 216 (2011). See Schlitzer 

v. Univ. of Iowa Hosp. & Clinics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 530 (Iowa 2002). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Goodpaster, Schwan’s 

established the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on each of 

those elements. The majority fails to explain how Goodpaster could be 

found disabled when he obtained other employment. Nor does the 

majority explain why Goodpaster’s requested accommodation—a second 

driver to retrieve or accompany him on his job driving a delivery truck—

is not unreasonable as a matter of law. Employers are not obligated 

under the ICRA to pay two persons to do the job of one as an 

accommodation. 

I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Goodpaster’s 

multiple sclerosis raised a jury question whether he is disabled within 

the meaning of the ICRA. Although his multiple sclerosis at times 

interfered with his ability to drive, it is undisputed he was physically 

capable of other satisfactory work. To the extent his condition does 

impair his driving, he is unable to perform an essential function of the 

job. Goodpaster tries to have it both ways: he claims he is disabled 

because his condition impairs his driving, yet he also claims he can 

perform the essential functions of the job—most importantly, driving. 
30

His requested accommodation—to have “another driver ride along with 

him when he was ill”—is unreasonable as a matter of law. Finally, 

Schwan’s had a valid, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate him 

because he failed to meet his sales quotas. I would not postpone the day 

of reckoning on a case doomed to dismissal. 

The majority neglects to mention that after Schwan’s terminated 

Goodpaster, he found full-time employment as a laborer and also 

operated his own painting business on the side. His ability to perform 

those physically demanding jobs is undisputed. Yet, the majority 

declares “Goodpaster generated a genuine issue of material fact exists 

regarding whether his multiple sclerosis substantially limited one of his 

major life activities.” I disagree because it is undisputed Goodpaster is 

able to maintain full-time employment consistent with his skills and 

experience. Multiple sclerosis may render a person substantially 

disabled in some cases, but this is not such a case. To his credit, 

Goodpaster has learned to manage his condition and earn an income. 

He is not disabled. 

Iowa Code section 216.2(5) defines “disability” as “the physical or 

mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial disability.” 

A substantial disability is one that “substantially limits one or more 

major life activities.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 161—8.26(1). We have 

explained that the phrase “ ‘substantially limits’ must be interpreted to 

mean the degree to which the impairment affects an individual’s 

employability,” despite the broad definition of “major life activities” in 

Iowa Administrative Code rule 161—8.26(3). Probasco v. Iowa Civil 

Rights Comm’n, 420 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Iowa 1988). This interpretation is 

necessary “[i]n order that the statute’s construction be consistent with 

[its] purpose”; namely, “the protection of employment opportunities.” Id.; 
31

accord Halsey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Mid-Am., Inc., 410 N.W.2d 250, 

252 (Iowa 1987) (noting the ICRA protects those with “substantial 

physical impairment[s] affecting [their] ability to perform on the job”). 

Accordingly, “[t]he degree to which an impairment substantially 

limits an individual’s employment potential must be determined with 

reference to a number of factors:” (1) “the number and type of jobs from 

which the impaired individual is disqualified,” (2) “the geographical area 

to which the individual has reasonable access,” and (3) “the individual’s 

job training, experience and expectations.” Probasco, 420 N.W.2d at 436. 

Applying these factors, we have long held that “[a]n impairment that 

interferes with an individual’s ability to do a particular job but does not 

significantly decrease that individual’s ability to obtain satisfactory 

employment otherwise is not substantially limiting within our statute.” 

Id.; accord Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Iowa 

1997) (considering the ICRA claim and noting “ ‘[t]he inability to perform 

a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the 

major life activity of working’ ” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1997))). 

Only when a condition is “generally debilitating” and affects an individual 

“regardless of the job he [or she] might hold” will we find that person 

disabled under Iowa Code section 216.2(5). Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil 

Rights Comm’n, 471 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 1991). 

In several cases, we have applied the rule that a person is not 

substantially disabled if the person is able to obtain satisfactory 

employment. In Probasco, the plaintiff claimed her condition, chronic 

susceptibility to bronchitis, precluded her from certain positions—

“receptionist at a beauty shop, secretary in a grain elevator, clerical work 

in hospital laboratories.” 420 N.W.2d at 437. We concluded the “record 

shows that, as a matter of law, Probasco’s employability is not curtailed 
32

to the extent which would qualify her as a ‘disabled person’ within the 

protection of the [ICRA].” Id. (emphasis added) (reversing district court’s 

affirmance of Iowa Civil Rights Commission’s disability finding). We 

explained, “the fact Probasco’s condition renders it inadvisable that she 

work around a particular set of environmental conditions is insufficient 

to qualify her as a disabled person under our statute.” Id. (citing Forrisi 

v. Bower, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986), as an example of when “an 

individual’s inability to work around particular employment conditions—

there, those conditions involving heights—did not so limit the individual’s 

employability so as to bring the individual within the protection of similar 

legislation”). 

In Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, we noted the 

plaintiff was not substantially disabled because, “while [the plaintiff] is 

limited in this particular job because of his vision, he is not limited in 

any significant way from obtaining other satisfactory employment.” 452 

N.W.2d 598, 604–05 (Iowa 1990) (affirming district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiff’s petition for judicial review). Likewise, in Vincent v. Four M

Paper Corp., tried to the bench, we affirmed the district court’s 

conclusion that the plaintiff “was not substantially limited in the major 

life activity of working because his ‘physical condition was not so 

debilitating that he would have been prevented from obtaining other 

satisfactory employment.’ ” 589 N.W.2d 55, 59, 61–62 (Iowa 1999). We 

stated, “[t]he number and type of jobs from which [the plaintiff] was 

disqualified because of his impairment was fairly limited” and explained 

that the plaintiff’s condition “preclud[ed him] from working at his former 

position of machine tender, [but] this rather narrow limitation did not 

significantly curtail [his] ability to obtain other employment not involving 
33

heavy equipment or dangerous machinery.” Id. at 62. We concluded the 

plaintiff 

failed to present substantial evidence that his impairment 

precluded him from performing a class of jobs or a broad 

range of jobs in various classes as required to establish the 

existence of a substantial limitation on his ability to work. 

Id. 

This case is even more clear-cut than Probasco, Hollinrake, or 

Vincent. It is undisputed that Goodpaster’s condition only occasionally 

impairs his driving and that he has been able to obtain satisfactory 

employment elsewhere. He obtained employment full-time as a laborer 

boring underground power lines, frequently working overtime, and 

reopened his own painting company. Goodpaster testified at his 

deposition that he has never been told by any healthcare professional 

that he has any physical limitation. He admitted, “The only comments 

that have been made to me by some doctors is when I have [flare-ups], 

take a little time, go, you know, and relax a second, . . . but they never 

told me I couldn’t do my job.” In 2009, a doctor noted that Goodpaster 

“has had no exacerbations with regards to his multiple sclerosis in the 

last year” and concluded Goodpaster “has no significant impairment that 

would restrict his ability to operate a DOT vehicle.” 

The facts of this case are much like those of Brunker v. Schwan’s 

Home Service, 583 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2009). In that case, 

another Schwan’s delivery man with multiple sclerosis alleged Schwan’s 

terminated him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000). Brunker, 583 F.3d

at 1005–06. The federal district court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Schwan’s, concluding the plaintiff “was not substantially limited 
34

in a major life activity.” Id. at 1007. The Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit agreed: 

Even when viewed in the light most favorable to 

Brunker, his impairments are not sufficient to show that he 

is disabled. In May 2003 his physician allowed him to 

return to work without any restriction at all. Once he 

returned, he drove the same route by himself and completed 

it just as quickly as he had in the past. In addition, during 

Brunker's stay at the Mayo Clinic, the doctor noted that his 

dizziness episodes, previously a daily occurrence, were 

occurring less frequently. Brunker also told the doctor that 

his writing difficulty was “variable” and his speech slurred 

“at times when he is tired.” Accordingly, we agree with the 

district court’s conclusion that the evidence in this record 

shows only “intermittent” difficulties rather than a 

substantial limitation on a major life activity. 

Id. at 1008.5 Similarly, Goodpaster’s physicians did not place any 

restrictions on him. He was able to complete his route upon returning to 

work, so long as he followed his doctor’s advice to take breaks as needed. 

And, most importantly, he obtained other employment after his 

termination. 

Undisputed facts establish that Goodpaster’s ability to obtain 

satisfactory employment is not substantially limited. Goodpaster’s 

employment prospects are not geographically limited. Cf. Bearshield, 

570 N.W.2d at 921–22 (reversing summary judgment for employer 

because “[a] reasonable person could also find Bearshield is for all 

practical purposes unable to relocate to find work”). Nor is he 

disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs or from many jobs 

for which he has training and experience. See Hollinrake, 452 N.W.2d at 

604. Goodpaster is not “generally debilitat[ed].” See Henkel, 471 N.W.2d 

 5The Brunker court remanded the case, however, because it concluded a genuine 

issue existed as to whether Schwan’s regarded Brunker as disabled. 583 F.3d at 1009. 
35

at 810. Accordingly, he does not meet the definition of “disabled” as a 

matter of law. 

Nor did Schwan’s regard Goodpaster as disabled. To prevail on a 

“regarded as” claim, Goodpaster needed to prove that Schwan’s viewed 

him as unable to work in a broad class of jobs. See Knutson v. Ag 

Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1052 (8th Cir. 2005). I agree with the 

district court’s conclusion: “the evidence does not create a genuine fact 

issue that Schwan’s perceived Goodpaster as disabled based on some 

stereotype or myth but, rather, merely reacted to Goodpaster's 

complaints and requests when he was ill.” It is also undisputed 

Schwan’s employed Goodpaster for a year after learning he had multiple 

sclerosis, demonstrating it regarded Goodpaster as able to perform his 

job satisfactorily despite his diagnosis. The district court properly 

rejected Goodpaster’s “regarded as” claim. 

If Goodpaster is disabled because his multiple sclerosis sometimes 

impairs his driving, then he cannot show he is qualified to perform the 

essential functions of his delivery driver position. His position at 

Schwan’s required him to drive to his customers’ homes. It is 

undisputed that driving is an essential function of that position. See 

Knutson v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 711 F.3d 911, 915 (8th Cir. 2013) 

(“No genuine issue of material fact exists that being DOT qualified to 

drive a delivery truck is an essential function of Knutson’s position [with 

Schwan’s].”). As the district court summarized: 

There is no dispute that driving a commercial motor 

vehicle was one of the essential functions of Goodpaster’s 

job. Goodpaster’s claimed disability is vision impairment 

and loss of strength in, and or control of, his limbs. . . . For 

obvious reasons, the disability of unpredictable onset of 

vision impairment and limb control prevents Goodpaster 

from being qualified to perform one of the essential functions 

of his job: operating a motor vehicle. Such a condition . . . 
36

renders him incapable as a matter of law and fact from 

having “[t]he ability to effectively operate a commercial 

vehicle,” one of the specific requirements of his position. 

“[A]n employer is not required to change the essential nature of the job in 

order to accommodate an employee . . . .” Henkel, 471 N.W.2d at 811. If 

Goodpaster cannot reliably drive—the basis of his disability claim—then 

he is not qualified for a customer service manager position at Schwan’s. 

Goodpaster’s suggested accommodation—that Schwan’s should 

have hired another driver to ride along with him in the event he suffered 

a flare-up of his multiple sclerosis—is unreasonable and would not have 

enabled him to perform the essential functions of his job. The district 

court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, Goodpaster’s requested 

accommodations would not render him “qualified”: 

None of the accommodations he requested would have 

enabled him to operate a motor vehicle. Rather, the 

proposed accommodations (sending someone to drive him 

back to the shop when he had a problem or sending a 

second driver along with him) would simply have eliminated 

an essential function of his job. 

(Footnote omitted.) Goodpaster was essentially requesting that Schwan’s

pay two employees to do the work of one. Such an accommodation is 

unreasonable as a matter of law. See Knutson, 711 F.3d at 915–16 

(affirming summary judgment in favor of Schwan’s, holding Schwan’s 

was not required to waive DOT license certification in order to 

accommodate home delivery driver who became vision impaired). 

Moreover, it would not solve Goodpaster’s problem—he would still be 

unable to drive his routes to customers’ homes. 

Finally, I disagree that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

whether Schwan’s discharged Goodpaster because of his condition. 

Rather, it is undisputed that Schwan’s never penalized Goodpaster 

because of his multiple sclerosis. Again, the district court got it right: 
37

[T]he evidence actually shows that Goodpaster never suffered 

any adverse job action because of blurred vision or loss of 

use of his limbs and his concomitant inability to drive. On 

the first occasion he had the problem, his supervisor told 

him to “gut it out” which, apparently, he did. On the less 

than ten other times it happened, he followed his physician’s 

instructions for dealing with such episodes, recovered and 

carried on with the work. There is no evidence that 

Schwan’s ever disciplined him or took any other action 

against him because he took these “time outs,” so to speak, 

to recover from episodes of blurred vision or loss of limb 

function. This means either that the blurred vision and loss 

of limb function was not a disability or, if it was, that 

Schwan's accommodated it. 

Schwan’s continued to work with Goodpaster for over a year before 

terminating him, apparently in hopes that his sales abilities would 

improve. Cf. Howell v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Iowa 1998) 

(noting that close proximity in time between employer’s discovery of 

employee’s condition and the employee’s discharge presented factual 

issue precluding summary judgment). No evidence raises an inference of 

discrimination because of his multiple sclerosis. 

Uncontroverted evidence in the record established that Schwan’s 

terminated Goodpaster because he did not make his sales quotas. See 

id. at 280 (noting the ICRA prohibits only “ ‘the discharge of any 

employee because of the employee’s disability’ ” and does not bar 

employers from discharging employees due to “ ‘the nature of the 

occupation’ ” (quoting Henkel, 471 N.W.2d at 809)). Goodpaster’s 

manager communicated the sales expectations to him; it was no surprise 

to Goodpaster that he was underperforming. When asked at his 

deposition if he knew he was not making his sales quota, Goodpaster 

responded, “yes.” Goodpaster knew he was costing Schwan’s money. He 

recounted: 

[C]ustomers are used to having a driver at a certain time, 

and because I ha[d] to keep rearranging my [schedule] . . . it 

got to the point where [my manager] was, like, don’t you 
38

understand we’re losing money, our customers are used to 

having you there at a certain time. 

He also recognized that his name was at the bottom of the sale rankings 

“day in and day out.” There is no evidence generating a jury question 

whether Schwan’s discharged Goodpaster because of his multiple 

sclerosis. See Beatty v. Hudco Indus. Prods., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 

1355 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (considering employee’s claim based on multiple 

sclerosis and commenting “mere knowledge of [a] disability does not 

equate with discrimination”). Goodpaster was terminated because of “his 

inability to perform the necessary tasks of his job,” which were “essential 

based on the economic realities faced by the employer.” Henkel, 471 

N.W.2d at 811. His multiple sclerosis did not give him lifetime tenure or 

immunity from termination for poor sales. 

Iowa’s disability legislation

“assures that truly disabled, but genuinely capable, 

individuals will not face discrimination in employment 

because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their 

handicaps. It would debase this high purpose if the 

statutory protections available to those truly handicapped 

could be claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and 

whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared. 

Indeed, the very concept of an impairment implies a 

characteristic that is not commonplace and that poses for 

the particular individual a more general disadvantage in his 

or her search for satisfactory employment.” 

Probasco, 420 N.W.2d at 436 (quoting Forrisi v. Bower, 794 F.2d 931, 

934 (4th Cir. 1986)). By allowing Goodpaster to proceed with his claim, 

the majority does a disservice to those who truly are substantially limited 

in their ability to work. 

Mansfield, J., joins this dissent.