Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 83 / Friday, May 1, 2009 / Notices 20345 

definitions of the Domestic Like Product 

and Domestic Industry; if you disagree 

with either or both of these definitions, 

please explain why and provide 

alternative definitions. 

Authority: This review is being conducted 

under authority of title VII of the Tariff Act 

of 1930; this notice is published pursuant to 

section 207.61 of the Commission’s rules. 

By order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

Issued: April 24, 2009. 

William R. Bishop, 

Acting Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E9–9770 Filed 4–30–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE: P 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE 

COMMISSION 

[Investigation No. 337–TA–632] 

In the Matter of Certain Refrigerators 

and Components Thereof; Notice of 

Commission Decision To Review in Its 

Entirety; A Final Initial Determination 

Finding No Violation of Section 337 

AGENCY: U.S. International Trade 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the U.S. International Trade 

Commission has determined to review 

the presiding administrative law judge’s 

(‘‘ALJ’’) final initial determination 

(‘‘ID’’) finding no violation of Section 

337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in the 

above-captioned investigation. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jean 

Jackson Esq., Office of the General 

Counsel, U.S. International Trade 

Commission, 500 E Street, SW., 

Washington, DC 20436, telephone (202) 

205–3104. Copies of the ALJ’s IDs and 

all other non-confidential documents 

filed in connection with this 

investigation are or will be available for 

inspection during official business 

hours (8:45 a.m. to 5:15 p.m.) in the 

Office of the Secretary, U.S. 

International Trade Commission, 500 E 

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20436, 

telephone (202) 205–2000. General 

information concerning the Commission 

may also be obtained by accessing its 

Internet server at http://www.usitc.gov. 

The public record for this investigation 

may be viewed on the Commission’s 

electronic docket (EDIS) at http:// 

edis.usitc.gov. Hearing-impaired 

persons are advised that information on 

this matter can be obtained by 

contacting the Commission’s TDD 

terminal on (202) 205–1810. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

February 21, 2008, the Commission 

voted to institute this investigation, 

based on a complaint filed by Whirlpool 

Patents Company of St. Joseph, 

Michigan; Whirlpool Manufacturing 

Corporation of St. Joseph, Michigan; 

Whirlpool Corporation of Benton 

Harbor, Michigan, and Maytag 

Corporation of Benton Harbor, Michigan 

(collectively, ‘‘Whirlpool’’). The 

complaint, as supplemented, alleges 

violations of section 337 based upon the 

importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, and the sale within 

the United States after importation of 

certain refrigerators and components 

thereof that infringe certain claims of 

U.S. Patent Nos. 6,082,130 (‘‘the ‘130 

patent); 6,810,680 (‘‘the ‘680 patent’’); 

6,915,644 (‘‘the ‘644 patent’’); 6,971,730; 

and 7,240,980. Whirlpool named LG 

Electronics, Inc.; LG Electronics, USA, 

Inc.; and LG Electronics Monterrey 

Mexico, S.A., De, CV (collectively, 

‘‘LG’’) as respondents. The complaint, as 

supplemented, further alleges that an 

industry in the United States exists as 

required by subsection (a)(2) of section 

337 and requested that the Commission 

issue an exclusion order and cease and 

desist orders. 

On September 11, 2008, Whirlpool 

and LG filed a joint motion seeking 

termination of this investigation with 

respect to the ‘680 patent and the ‘644 

patent on the basis of a settlement 

agreement. On September 25, 2008, the 

ALJ issued an ID, Order No. 10, 

terminating the investigation, in part, as 

to the ‘680 and ‘644 patents. No 

petitions for review were filed. On 

October 27, 2008, the Commission 

determined not to review Order No. 10. 

On October 17, 2008, Whirlpool filed 

a motion for summary determination 

that it had satisfied the importation 

requirement. On November 20, 2008, 

the ALJ issued the subject ID, Order No. 

14, granting complainant’s motion for 

summary determination of importation. 

No petitions for review were filed. On 

December 15, 2008, the Commission 

issued notice that it had determined not 

to review Order No. 14. 

On July 24, 2008, Whirlpool filed a 

motion seeking leave to amend the 

complaint and notice of investigation to 

(1) remove references to patents that had 

been withdrawn from this investigation; 

(2) add a reference to a non-exclusive 

license that relates to two patents at 

issue; and (3) update the current state of 

the domestic industry. On November 25, 

2008, the ALJ issued Order No. 15, in 

which he granted Whirlpool’s motion as 

to (1) and (3) above and denied it with 

respect to (2). No petitions for review 

were filed. The Commission determined 

not to review the subject ID on 

December 15, 2008. 

On February 26, 2009, the ALJ issued 

a final ID, in which he found no 

violation of Section 337. On March 11, 

2009, Whirlpool filed a petition for 

review, and LG filed a contingent 

petition for review. Whirlpool, LG and 

OUII filed responses. The Commission 

has determined to review the final ID 

and requests briefing by the parties to 

the investigation on the issue of claim 

construction. In particular, the 

Commission would like the parties to 

address: 

1. Do the ordinary and customary 

meanings of the following terms differ 

from the meanings ascribed to them by 

the inventors’ testimony: ‘‘freezer 

compartment,’’ ‘‘disposed within,’’ 

‘‘mounted on,’’ ‘‘having an access 

opening and a closure member for 

closing the access opening,’’ and ‘‘ice 

storage bin having a bottom opening.’’ 

Please discuss with reference to 

dictionary definitions and expert 

testimony. 

2. Are the phrases ‘‘mounted on’’ and 

‘‘disposed within’’ mutually exclusive 

in the context of claim 1 of the ‘130 

patent? Are either or both of these terms 

synonymous with ‘‘installed’’? 

3. How does the prosecution history 

inform the claim construction, in terms 

of disclaimer and interpretation? 

4. Would one of ordinary skill in the 

art understand a space defined by a 

cabinet having an access opening but 

not having a closure member to mean a 

‘‘freezer compartment,’’ given that 

temperatures within such a 

compartment cannot be reduced to 

freezing? 

5. In construing claim 1, the parties 

dispute whether the ‘‘closure member’’ 

is part of the freezer compartment. What 

conclusions can be drawn from the term 

‘‘freezer compartment closure member’’ 

appearing in dependent claim 9? What 

conclusions, if any, can be drawn from 

a comparison of claim 1 and 

independent claim 10, the latter clearly 

identifying the closure member as part 

of the refrigerator. 

6. To what extent should the 

Commission consider inventor 

testimony when construing the claims? 

See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP 

Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1580 

(‘‘Markman requires us to give no 

deference to the testimony of the 

inventor about the meaning of the 

claims.’’). 

7. For parties proposing additional or 

different meanings on claim 

construction, do these point to a 

different result for infringement, 

validity, or domestic industry? Please 

explain with regard to each relevant 

20346 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 83 / Friday, May 1, 2009 / Notices 

refrigerator model. Responses should 

rely on evidence of record. 

8. Specifically, with respect to 

infringement, respond to the following: 

Does the closure member have to be the 

closure member to the access to the 

freezer compartment? If so, can a selfcontained ice maker within a fresh-food 

compartment qualify as a freezer for 

which there is a closure member within 

the meaning of claim 1? Does it matter 

if both the ice maker and the storage 

unit are in the closure member? 

Opening submissions must be filed no 

later than close of business on May 8, 

2009. Reply submissions must be filed 

no later than the close of business on 

May 15, 2009. No further submissions 

on any of these issues will be permitted 

unless otherwise ordered by the 

Commission. 

Persons filing written submissions 

must file the original document and 12 

true copies thereof on or before the 

deadlines stated above with the Office 

of the Secretary. Any person desiring to 

submit a document to the Commission 

in confidence must request confidential 

treatment unless the information has 

already been granted such treatment 

during the proceedings. All such 

requests should be directed to the 

Secretary of the Commission and must 

include a full statement of the reasons 

why the Commission should grant such 

treatment. See 19 CFR 210.6. Documents 

for which confidential treatment by the 

Commission is sought will be treated 

accordingly. All non-confidential 

written submissions will be available for 

public inspection at the Office of the 

Secretary. 

The authority for the Commission’s 

determination is contained in section 

337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 

amended (19 U.S.C. 1337), and in 

section 210.42–46 of the Commission’s 

Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR 

210.42–46). 

By order of the Commission. 

Marilyn R. Abbott, 

Secretary to the Commission. 

Issued: April 27, 2009. 

William R. Bishop, 

Acting Secretary to the Commission. 

[FR Doc. E9–9997 Filed 4–30–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7020–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 09–15] 

Roy Chi Lung, M.D.; Revocation of 

Registration 

On October 22, 2008, the Deputy 

Assistant Administrator, Office of 

Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement 

Administration, issued an Order to 

Show Cause to Roy C. Lung, M.D. 

(Respondent), of Fountain Valley, 

California. The Show Cause Order 

proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration, BL4971051, as a 

practitioner, and the denial of any 

pending applications to renew or 

modify his registration, on the grounds 

that Respondent is ‘‘not authorized to 

handle controlled substances in the 

state of California,’’ and that he falsified 

his most recent application for renewal 

of his DEA registration. Show Cause 

Order at 1. 

More specifically, the Show Cause 

Order alleged that effective January 30, 

2008, the Medical Board of California 

suspended Respondent’s license to 

practice medicine. Id. The Show Cause 

Order thus alleged that Respondent is 

‘‘currently without authority to handle 

controlled substances in the State of 

California, the State in which’’ 

Respondent is registered with DEA. Id. 

The Show Cause Order also alleged that 

on April 1, 2008, Respondent falsified 

his application for renewal of his DEA 

registration when he answered ‘‘no’’ to 

the question of whether he had ever had 

a state license suspended. Id. at 2. 

Respondent requested a hearing on 

the allegations, and the matter was 

assigned to an Administrative Law 

Judge (ALJ), who proceeded to conduct 

pre-hearing procedures. Thereafter, the 

Government moved for summary 

disposition on the ground that under the 

terms of an order of the Medical Board 

of California, Respondent’s state 

medical license was suspended. Gov. 

Mot. at 1. The motion noted that the 

Medical Board’s Order of Interim 

Suspension not only suspended 

Respondent’s license, it expressly 

‘‘prohibited Respondent from handling 

controlled substances and ordered 

Respondent to deliver to the Board his 

DEA registration.’’ Id. at 3. The 

Government argued that there was no 

dispute that Respondent’s license had 

been suspended in California, the State 

in which he maintains his DEA 

registration, and that under Federal 

Law, DEA ‘‘cannot register a practitioner 

to handle controlled substances who is 

without authority to handle controlled 

substances in the State in which he 

practices.’’ Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 

823(f)). Id. at 2. 

In support of its motion, the 

Government attached a copy of the 

Order of Interim Suspension. The Order 

specifically stated that Respondent 

‘‘shall not * * * [p]ractice or attempt to 

practice any aspect of medicine in the 

State of California * * * [nor] [p]ossess, 

order, purchase, receive, prescribe, 

furnish, administer, or otherwise 

distribute controlled substances or 

dangerous drugs as defined by federal or 

state law.’’ Johnston, Ex. Dir., v. Chi 

Wing Lung, M.D., OAH No. 

L2008010755, Order on Ex Parte 

Petition for Order of Interim 

Suspension, January 30, 2008, at 7. The 

Order also required that Respondent 

‘‘immediately deliver to the Division of 

Medical Quality * * * all Drug 

Enforcement Administration forms, and 

all Drug Enforcement Administration 

permits.’’ Id. 

The ALJ ordered the Respondent to 

respond to the Government’s motion by 

December 9, 2008; Respondent filed his 

response on December 5, 2008. 

Respondent requested that the ALJ 

‘‘delay ruling on the Government’s 

motion until April 1, 2009,’’ as 

Respondent anticipated that the State 

Board would issue a final decision 

regarding his medical license by then. R. 

Resp. at 1–2. 

On December 12, 2008, the ALJ issued 

her Recommended Rulings, Findings of 

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision. 

The ALJ noted that ‘‘Respondent 

himself states that his ‘Medical license 

was suspended on an interim basis 

pending the recommendation of a 

California Administrative Law Judge.’ ’’ 

ALJ at 3. The ALJ thus concluded that 

‘‘[t]hrough the Respondent’s own 

admission, * * * Respondent lacks the 

authority to practice medicine in the 

State of California,’’ and 

‘‘[c]onsequently, * * * lacks the ability 

to prescribe controlled substances in 

that State.’’ Id. 

Because no material fact was in 

dispute, the ALJ determined that there 

was no need for a ‘‘plenary, 

administrative hearing.’’ Id. at 5. 

Applying the Agency’s settled rule that 

it lacks authority under the Controlled 

Substances Act to maintain a 

registration if the registrant is without 

state authority to handle controlled 

substances in the State in which he 

practices medicine, the ALJ concluded 

that ‘‘the DEA lacks authority to 

continue the Respondent’s DEA 

registration.’’ Id. at 5; see 21 U.S.C. 

823(f), 824(a)(3). The ALJ thus granted 

the Government’s motion for summary 

disposition and recommended that the